

Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research

Jan E. Stets  
Jonathan H. Turner *Editors*

# Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions: Volume II

 Springer

---

# Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research

*Series Editor*  
John DeLamater  
University of Wisconsin-Madison  
MADISON  
Wisconsin  
USA

Each of these Handbooks survey the field in a critical manner, evaluating theoretical models in light of the best available empirical evidence. Distinctively sociological approaches are highlighted by means of explicit comparison to perspectives characterizing related disciplines such as psychology, psychiatry, and anthropology. These seminal works seek to record where the field has been, to identify its current location and to plot its course for the future.

If you are interested in submitting a proposal for this series, please first contact the publishing editor, Esther Otten: [esther.otten@springer.com](mailto:esther.otten@springer.com)

More information about this series at <http://www.springer.com/series/6055>

---

Jan E. Stets · Jonathan H. Turner  
Editors

# Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions: Volume II

 Springer

*Editors*

Jan E. Stets  
Department of Sociology  
University of California  
Riverside  
California  
USA

Jonathan H. Turner  
Department of Sociology  
University of California  
Riverside  
California  
USA

ISSN 1389-6903

ISBN 978-94-017-9129-8

ISBN 978-94-017-9130-4 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-9130-4

Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg New York London

Library of Congress Control Number: 2005936762

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. Exempted from this legal reservation are brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis or material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the Copyright Law of the Publisher's location, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Permissions for use may be obtained through RightsLink at the Copyright Clearance Center. Violations are liable to prosecution under the respective Copyright Law.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

While the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication, neither the authors nor the editors nor the publisher can accept any legal responsibility for any errors or omissions that may be made. The publisher makes no warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein.

Printed on acid-free paper

Springer is part of Springer Science + Business Media ([www.springer.com](http://www.springer.com))

---

# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b> .....	1
	Jan E. Stets and Jonathan H. Turner	
<b>Part I Theoretical Perspectives on Emotions</b>		
<b>2</b>	<b>The Evolution of Human Emotions</b> .....	11
	Jonathan H. Turner	
<b>3</b>	<b>Emotions in Identity Theory</b> .....	33
	Jan E. Stets and Ryan Trettevik	
<b>4</b>	<b>Emotions in Affect Control Theory</b> .....	51
	Kathryn J. Lively and David R. Heise	
<b>5</b>	<b>Emotions and Group Ties in Social Exchange</b> .....	77
	Edward J. Lawler, Shane R. Thye and Jeongkoo Yoon	
<b>6</b>	<b>Emotions in Justice Processes</b> .....	103
	Karen A. Hegtvedt and Christie L. Parris	
<b>7</b>	<b>Emotions in Expectation States Theory</b> .....	127
	Murray Webster, Jr. and Lisa Slattery Walker	
<b>8</b>	<b>Status, Power and Felicity</b> .....	155
	Theodore D. Kemper	
<b>9</b>	<b>Emotions and Societal Stratification</b> .....	179
	Jonathan H. Turner	
<b>10</b>	<b>Emotions in Ritual Theories</b> .....	199
	Meredith Rossner and Mythily Meher	
<b>11</b>	<b>Emotions and Cultural Theory</b> .....	221
	Eva Illouz, Daniel Gilon and Mattan Shachak	
<b>12</b>	<b>A Retrospective Look at Emotions</b> .....	245
	Thomas J. Scheff	

<b>13 Emotions and Neurosociology</b> .....	267
David D. Franks	
<b>14 Measuring Affect and Emotions</b> .....	283
Kimberly B. Rogers and Dawn T. Robinson	
<b>Part II Social Arenas of Emotions</b>	
<b>15 The Economy and Emotions</b> .....	307
Jocelyn Pixley, Peter McCarthy and Shaun Wilson	
<b>16 Work and Emotions</b> .....	335
Amy S. Wharton	
<b>17 Families and Emotions</b> .....	359
Rebecca J Erickson and Marci D. Cottingham	
<b>18 Class, Race, and Emotions</b> .....	385
Amy C. Wilkins and Jennifer A. Pace	
<b>19 Gender and Emotions</b> .....	411
Douglas Schrock and Brian Knop	
<b>20 Mental Health and Emotions</b> .....	429
Robin W. Simon	
<b>21 Morality and Emotions</b> .....	451
Sarah K. Harkness and Steven Hitlin	
<b>22 Crime and Emotions</b> .....	473
Jody Clay-Warner	
<b>23 Sports and Emotions</b> .....	495
Gretchen Peterson	
<b>24 Technology and Emotions</b> .....	511
Daniel B. Shank	
<b>25 Social Movements and Emotions</b> .....	529
James M. Jasper and Lynn Owens	
<b>26 The Sociology of Science and Emotions</b> .....	549
John N. Parker and Edward J. Hackett	
<b>Index</b> .....	573

---

## Contributors

- Jody Clay-Warner** University of Georgia, Athens, USA
- Marci D. Cottingham** University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, USA
- Rebecca J Erickson** University of Akron, Akron, USA
- David D. Franks** Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, USA
- Daniel Gilon** Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
- Edward J. Hackett** Arizona State University, Phoenix, USA
- Sarah K. Harkness** University of Iowa, Iowa City, USA
- Karen A. Hegtvedt** Emory University, Atlanta, USA
- David R. Heise** Indiana University, Bloomington, USA
- Steven Hitlin** University of Iowa, Iowa City, USA
- Eva Illouz** Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
- James M. Jasper** Graduate Center, CUNY, New York, USA
- Theodore D. Kemper** St. John's University, Queens, USA
- Brian Knop** Florida State University, Tallahassee, USA
- Edward J. Lawler** Cornell University, Ithaca, USA
- Kathryn J. Lively** Dartmouth College, Hanover, USA
- Peter McCarthy** Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
- Mythily Meher** University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia
- Lynn Owens** Middlebury College, Middlebury, USA



- 
- Jennifer A. Pace** University of Colorado, Boulder, USA
- John N. Parker** Arizona State University, Phoenix, USA
- Christie L. Parris** Emory University, Atlanta, USA
- Gretchen Peterson** California State University, Los Angeles, USA
- Jocelyn Pixley** Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
- Dawn T. Robinson** University of Georgia, Athens, USA
- Kimberly B. Rogers** Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, USA
- Meredith Rossner** London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
- Thomas J. Scheff** University of California, Santa Barbara, USA
- Douglas Schrock** Florida State University, Tallahassee, USA
- Mattan Shachak** Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
- Daniel B. Shank** University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia
- Robin W. Simon** Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, USA
- Jan E. Stets** Department of Sociology, University of California, Riverside, USA
- Shane R. Thye** University of South Carolina, Columbia, USA
- Ryan Trettevik** University of California, Riverside, USA
- Jonathan H. Turner** Department of Sociology, University of California, Riverside, USA
- Lisa Slattery Walker** University of North Carolina, Charlotte, USA
- Murray Webster, Jr.** University of North Carolina, Charlotte, USA
- Amy S. Wharton** Washington State University, Vancouver, USA
- Amy C. Wilkins** University of Colorado, Boulder, USA
- Shaun Wilson** Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
- Jeongkoo Yoon** Ewha Womans University, Seoul, Korea

Jan E. Stets and Jonathan H. Turner

### 1.1 Background

For most of sociology's first 150 years, emotions were not systematically incorporated into sociological analysis. There were some notable exceptions such as Cooley's ([1902] 1964) discussion of pride and shame or Durkheim's ([1912] 1965) descriptions of the emotional contagion that emerged in religious rituals. Despite these exceptions, sociology was rather silent on the dynamics of emotions, perhaps because the founding figure of microsociology, Mead (1934, 1938), did not incorporate emotions into his theorizing. Only in the last three decades of the twentieth century have sociologists begun to correct Mead's oversight by theorizing and empirically studying human emotions. Today, few would question the assertion that emotions are one of the driving forces of human behavior, interaction, and social organization.

The first volume of *The Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions* (Stets and Turner 2006) was assembled to celebrate how far the discipline had come by the end of the 20th century in its understanding of emotional processes. In that volume, many of the key figures who had made the sociology of emotions one of the leading edges of

microsociology gave a first-hand account of their work. Though that volume was large, we still could not include the full range of thinking by sociologists on emotions. Coupled with the fact that so much new knowledge has been generated in less than a decade since the publication of *The Handbook*, it became increasingly clear that a second volume was needed. Thus, in the pages that follow, we allow some new voices to be heard, but we have also provided a forum for the key figures to demonstrate how their theory and research has progressed since the first volume.

While sociology was late in recognizing how important emotions are in understanding the social world, the discipline has made up for lost time and at an accelerating rate. Even with this new volume, many important topics on emotions are not included, but at the very least, we have incorporated some of the new work that was not part of the first volume. Rather than divide the volume into many sections, we have chosen to divide it into just two parts: *Theoretical Perspectives on Emotions* (Part I) and *Social Arenas of Emotions* (Part II).

In Part I, chapters from scholars working in a wide variety of theoretical traditions can be found including evolutionary theory, identity theory, affect control theory, social exchange theory, expectation states theory, status-power theory, ritual theory, cultural theory, and even neuro-sociology theory. Some of these theoretical approaches were not discussed in the last volume. Others were presented, but work has advanced to the point that updates were necessary. Our last

---

J. E. Stets (✉) · J. H. Turner  
Department of Sociology, University of California,  
Riverside, USA  
e-mail: jan.stets@ucr.edu

J. H. Turner  
e-mail: jonathan.turner@ucr.edu

chapter in this section is a fairly comprehensive coverage of measurement issues in emotions research. This is a growing area in the sociology of emotions. We thought the best place to position it would be following our theoretical papers.

In Part II, we review a broad and diverse set of social arenas where emotions are experienced and expressed. This section did not appear in the first volume so it is unique to this volume. One area of inquiry that receives attention is the analysis of emotions within institutional domains or systems—the economy and the workplace, the family, mental health, crime, sports, science, and even technology as it affects the dynamics in all institutional spheres. Still another focal point is work on emotions in stratification systems including the emotional stratification system itself, and more traditional points of inquiry such as social class, race/ethnicity, and gender, as well as chapters on justice calculations and social movements that often arise from inequalities in societies. There is also a chapter on emotions as it relates to morality, which is a rapidly growing area of theorizing and research. For each chapter in Volume II, our goal has remained much the same as the first volume, that is, to present leading theories on emotions, to review the empirical research to date, and to discuss directions for future research.

In the first *Handbook*, we had a separate section on specific emotions that included chapters on love, jealousy and envy, empathy, sympathy, anger, grief, and moral emotions. What we think better reflects the sociology of emotions today is discussing emotions as an outcome of social factors and conditions that influence the experience and expression of some emotions over others. This provides a context in which to understand emotions. The reader will find in Part II that rather than confining the analysis of a specific emotion to a single chapter, an analysis of the emotion may appear across a variety of chapters that discuss different institutional domains or places within the stratification system. For example, anger emerges in the workplace (Chap. 16), in understanding crime (Chap. 22) and in social movement activity (Chap. 25), and it may be associated with members of particular

racial categories (Chap. 18). Specific emotions not discussed in the earlier volume appear in this volume such as happiness (Chap. 8), depression (Chap. 20), pride (Chaps. 12, 25, and 26) and shame (Chaps. 12, 22, and 26). In general, we think this volume still facilitates an analysis of specific emotions, but it does so by placing these emotions within a broader context.

One thing that is missing from the sociology of emotions is an integration of emotions research with other academic disciplines. Indeed, that is noticeably absent from this volume. Sociology can learn from such diverse disciplines as evolutionary biology, neurology, psychology, philosophy, and communications to identify just a few disciplines. Equally important, other disciplines can learn a great deal from the sociology of emotions because emotions are always generated within a sociocultural context, and they always have effects not only on individuals, but also on the structures and cultures that organize human life. Thus, in the future, there will be a need for more interdisciplinary research, identifying what sociology can learn from and offer other sciences.

Even with the breadth of coverage that we think we have captured in Volume II, it is far from a full review of how far the sociology of emotions has come in just the last decade. To do this field justice, it is likely that additional volumes will be needed. But, what is clear is that the sociology of emotions is advancing rapidly, and moreover, the analysis of emotions is emerging within virtually all of the specialties of sociology.

---

## 1.2 Overview of Chapters

In Part I on the *Theoretical Perspectives of Emotions*, Chap. 2 by Jonathan H. Turner opens with an evolutionary review of why and how natural selection worked on the brain of humans' hominid ancestors. Natural selection increased the size of key subcortical areas of the brain where emotions are ultimately generated and, later, expanded the connectivity within and between the neocortex and the older subcortex. This chapter can be read with David Frank's overview

in Chap. 13 on emotions and neurosociology, where the promise of this new field is outlined. In Chap. 13, Franks emphasizes that emotions existed before cognition developmentally, and it also worked to structure cognitions and decision-making. Indeed, emotions are the driving force behind human cognition, action, and interaction.

Chapters 3 and 4 extend the coverage from *The Handbook* on identity theory and affect control theory within the symbolic interactionist tradition. In Chap. 3, Jan E. Stets and Ryan Trettevik emphasize that emotions are central to the identity verification process, with identity verification influencing positive emotions and identity non-verification influencing negative emotions. Stets and Trettevik also outline the conditions likely to produce identity non-verification, and in turn, negative emotions. Further, they review efforts by identity theorists to extend the analysis of emotions to specific emotions such as moral emotions. Moral emotions are discussed in more detail in Chap. 21.

In Chap. 4, Kathryn J. Lively and David R. Heise update and expand the affect control model of emotion by exploring how the emotions of stigmatized identities are different from the emotions of non-stigmatized identities. They also incorporate emotion management into the affect control model. Further, they introduce the idea of “emotional stations” (the location of identities in affective space) and “ineffable emotions” (feelings in our culture that have no name). Their ideas are ripe for further investigation in the sociology of emotions.

Chapter 5 by Edward J. Lawler, Shane R. Thye, and Jeongkoo Yoon outline a theory by which individuals make external attributions for their positive emotional experiences to groups and potentially macro-level structures. This emerges especially under conditions of frequent exchanges among equals who are engaged in joint tasks that generate a sense of efficacy and shared responsibility. This theory is one of the first to demonstrate the significance of emotions aroused at the micro-level for explaining commitments to macro-level structures in societies.

In Chap. 6, Karen A. Hegtvedt and Christie L. Parris focus on the role of emotions in the justice

process. They discuss the theoretical tenets of justice perspectives that address the role of emotion, and they point out that emotions are not simply an outcome of the justice process, but they also may precede the experience of (in) justice. They review the research on justice at the micro-level (in impersonal and personal relationships) and the mediated role of emotions, as well as justice research at the macro-level and the role of emotions in social movements, and in groups, more generally. Since justice calculations are central to so many emotional reactions that individuals experience, justice research has implications for almost all theories of emotions, particularly in sociology where the emphasis is always on the distribution of resources among individuals in social structures.

Chapters 7 and 8 both present theories of status processes and emotions from somewhat different, though overlapping, traditions. In Chap. 7, Murray Webster and Lisa Slattery Walker discuss the effects of status processes on emotions and vice versa in task groups. Expectations associated with status locations create the basic conditions under which emotions are generated, with confirmation of status expectations generating positive emotions and the disconfirmation of status expectations activating negative emotions. By extension, we learn that positive emotional expressions outnumber negative ones in task groups. Webster and Walker importantly draw a distinction between experienced emotions and expressed emotions. The emotions people experience are not always expressed given their status position in the group. Later in the chapter, Webster and Walker discuss how justice and legitimation processes influence emotions, although this is again conditioned upon one’s status position.

In Chap. 8, Theodore D. Kemper extends his earlier analysis of status-power theory by focusing on one class of emotions—the experience of felicity or happiness. In earlier statements on status-power theory, happiness emerged when one’s status improved in a group, for example, earning a promotion, or alternatively, when one provided status to another such as giving love. In this chapter, he examines happiness as a function not only of obtaining status and giving status to

another, but also as the result of gaining power and avoiding other's power. Later in the chapter, he discusses meaningfulness, an experience which leads to happiness, and which he maintains has status-power significance.

In Chap. 9, Jonathan H. Turner takes a broader perspective on one's position in the social structure and its relationship to emotions. He sees positive and negative emotions as resources that are unequally distributed in society and, hence, stratified. He argues that traditional stratification analyses focus too much on money, power, and prestige when there are many other types of resources distributed in societies that are highly valued by individuals and families and, moreover, are more equally distributed across social classes such as love/loyalty or sacredness/piety. These more equally distributed resources generate diffuse positive emotions among large segments of the population in post-industrial societies, reduce the degree of stratification, and, as a result, decrease the conflict potential in these societies. If conflict emerges in the future, it will come from the middle class whose emotions turn negative as their shares of highly valued resources such as education, health, aesthetics, love/loyalty in families, and justice from the law decline.

Chapters 10 and 11 discuss how emotions are embedded in our habits and traditions—our rituals—and more generally—in our culture. In Chap. 10, Meredith Rossner and Mythily Meher trace the origins of ritual theorizing and emotions in the works of Durkheim, Goffman, and Collins. They discuss how ritual theory can help us understand a wide range of social phenomena such as punishment and justice, tobacco rituals and sex rituals, violence, economic markets, and social movements. They identify two areas where ritual and solidarity dynamics are under-theorized: in the technologically mediated world in which we now live, and in macro-level, social structural processes such as power dynamics.

In Chap. 11, Eva Illouz, Daniel Gilon, and Mattan Shachak examine emotions using cultural theory. They discuss four paths through which culture and emotions are linked: through social norms and control of one's emotions; emotional discourse and performance; rituals; and virtual

emotions in technologically mediated interaction. Their latter two themes echo ideas presented in the previous chapter. Like Rossner and Meher, they highlight the importance of rituals in generating emotional arousal, and they discuss the emotional responses that can be virtually produced and disseminated through social media.

Chapter 12 is somewhat different than the other chapters in Part I. Thomas J. Scheff, one of the early founders of the sociology of emotions field, offers a retrospective look on his contributions. His work blends the symbolic interaction framework of theorists such as Cooley and Goffman with psychoanalytic theory, such as the work of Helen Block Lewis. Psychological dynamics such as catharsis and repression are discussed, but perhaps his most important contribution to the sociology of emotions is his work on shame. We are reminded how repressed shame and anger can break social bonds and, equally important, potentially fuel larger-scale collective violence in human societies.

Chapter 14, the last chapter in this section, discusses the measurement of affect and emotions. For the sociology of emotions to theoretically develop, good emotion measures are needed. Kimberly B. Rogers and Dawn T. Robinson remind us that, like any field of scientific study, we need precisely measured concepts, in which our measurement should not unduly intrude into the ongoing social interaction being studied. They argue for methods that measure emotions that are: experienced and expressed; discrete and dimensional; and direct and diffuse. Rogers and Robinson review a variety of methods in the study of emotions including: self-reports on emotional states, physiological measures, and observational and computational techniques for recording emotional arousal.

The chapters in Part I present only some of the theoretical ideas to be found in this volume. As we turn to Part II on the *Social Arenas of Emotions*, we see that emotions are aroused in virtually every social situation and arena, and there are forces driving this arousal, but these forces require theories to explain the emotional dynamics at work. The contributors bring relevant theory to bear in explaining emotions in these arenas.

Still, there is a shift in emphasis in Part II because rather than strictly having a theoretical focus as in Part I, the focus is on the central place of emotions in different substantive fields of empirical inquiry.

Chapter 15 by Jocelyn Pixley, Shaun Wilson, and Peter McCarthy opens Part II with a three-part examination of the economy and emotions. First, the authors discuss how the sociology of emotions can provide insight into understanding economies. Then, they turn to early figures such as Smith, Spencer, Durkheim, and Weber, calling attention to their treatment of “emotional factors” which are often overlooked in their economic analyses. Finally, they discuss the place of emotion in the financial economy including: the rules about emotion in the face of uncertainty in the financial market; money and the emotions it generates; the emotions associated with inflation and deflation; and the emotional states of trust and confidence in the economy.

In Chap. 16, we shift from the economy as a whole to emotions and work. Amy S. Wharton examines both the sociological and organizational literatures on work and emotions. She reviews two broad areas: emotional expression and emotional regulation. The former seeks to understand the dynamics of, for example, spontaneous emotionality that inevitably emerges at work. The latter concerns emotional labor and the regulation and management of emotions in the workplace. What Wharton reveals is that emotions are an important and pervasive dynamic at work.

In Chap. 17, we move from emotions in the institutional domain of the economy to emotions in the institutional domain of the family. Rebecca J. Erickson and Marci D. Cottingham discuss two areas where emotions emerge in the family: during the socialization process and during the enactment of emotion work at home that is gendered. They then argue that the concept of emotional capital connects the emotions that people experience in families with people’s experiences in other institutional arenas.

In Chaps. 18, 19, and 20, the scholars review emotions along major stratification lines: class, race, gender, and marital status. In Chapter 18 on class, race, and emotions, Amy C. Wilkins and

Jennifer A. Pace review a variety of aspects that influence emotions by class and race including people’s position in the social structure, their different socialization experiences that encourage different emotional habits, and the identities that they claim with people placing themselves into certain categories and behaving according to the emotional expectations associated with their class and race. Later in the chapter, the authors turn to other issues along class and racial lines such as emotional labor which works to sustain class and racial workplace inequalities, and emotional hierarchies in which some emotions are considered more desirable than others, and correspondingly, disadvantaging those along class and racial lines.

In Chap. 19 on gender and emotions, Doug Schrock and Brian Knop integrate research from both the sociology of gender area and sociology of emotions area to specify how gender and emotions are linked. Given that sociologists of gender and emotions have focused much of their research in the areas of socialization, intimate relationships, and organizations, they use these three areas to organize their chapter. In the area of socialization, the authors remind us how children are raised to associate their gender with particular emotions and feelings rules, and that this happens not only at home but also at school and in athletics. In intimate relationships and in organizations, we see how gendered socialization gets translated into different experiences for men and women at home and at work.

In Chap. 20, Robin W. Simon reviews gender, marital status, and socioeconomic status variations in emotion (discrete feelings such as sadness and happiness) and emotional well-being/distress (a set of emotions or feelings states such as depression). Like Schrock and Knop, she integrates research from two different areas. Here, she blends research from the sociology of mental health and sociology of emotions areas. After reviewing the social distribution of mental health and emotions by gender, marital status, and socioeconomic status, she discusses two main hypotheses put forth by mental health scholars as to why the socially disadvantaged (women, unmarried, and low socioeconomic status) report



more negative and less positive emotions. These include the exposure hypothesis and the vulnerability hypothesis. While both hypotheses address the role of stress, they differ with respect to how stress affects emotion. She then identifies theories in the sociology of emotions, specifically cultural and structural theories, which also explain these variations.

Sarah L. Harkness and Steven Hitlin discuss the role of emotions and morality in Chap. 21. They review two orientations as to the origins of moral thought and action: a rationalist (cognitive) perspective and social intuitionist (more emotional) perspective. They argue that neuroscience offers more support for the latter, but that a better way to approach this issue is to adopt a dual-process model in which emotion and cognition both play a role in moral thought and action with emotion being the initial “driver” and cognition occurring only “after the fact.” This model has been used in the sociological study of culture to explain how culture shapes moral codes and reactions. Later in the chapter, the authors discuss moral codes and moral emotions within and across cultures.

In Chap. 22, Jody Clay-Warner reviews the role of emotions in the sociological literature on crime. She raises three questions: What is the role of emotions in contemporary theories of criminal behavior? How can emotions shape desistance? And, what are the antecedents of fear of crime? She reviews conceptualizations of emotions in rational choice theory, control theory, learning theory, and strain theory. Then, emotions are highlighted in desistance theories including the theory of reintegrative shaming and the age-graded theory of social control. Finally, she identifies what fear of crime entails, and who is more likely to report it.

In Chap. 23, Gretchen Peterson reminds us just how much emotion is involved in sports. Sports have been part of human societies since their beginnings and, today, they are clearly a distinct institutional domain that has a large impact on society. Peterson traces the early work on emotion in sports to Elias and Dunning who addressed, for example, the ability of sports to arouse excitement, and to Scheff who addressed its cathartic

feature. She discusses more recent work on emotions in sports including research that has studied emotional management by athletes, and emotional labor in sport industries such as personal training and professional wrestling. Peterson also highlights the rituals associated with sports that not only arouse and sustain emotions, but which also create a sense of identity and community. Thus, we see how rituals influence emotions—a theme echoed in earlier chapters.

In Chap. 24, Daniel B. Shank focuses on technology and emotions. This is a topic that is briefly explored in some of the earlier chapters. However, Shank examines the relationship in more depth, beginning with how the two are intimately linked. Then, he discusses how emotions emerge and change when interacting with others through mediated technology, particularly the Internet. This is followed by an analysis of how emotions are aroused in direct interaction with machines such as computers and robots. Finally, Shank explores technological innovations that may be able to enhance emotion measurement and theory development such as Twitter data, Mechanical Turk, Time-sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences (TESS), and experiential sampling.

In Chap. 25 on social movements and emotion, James M. Jasper and Lynn Owens detail the many ways in which emotions enter social movements beginning with recruitment of new participants to a movement. Jasper and Owens isolate the various points throughout social movement activity where emotions become important such as in early movement activity when a tie to the group is important. Later, emotions may be important to protestors to create solidarity among themselves. This may be accomplished by engaging in ritual activity. Emotions also may emerge and be expressed outwardly to create an effect on outsiders who oppose them. Protestors may show feelings of pride, a show of strength, compared to shame. Jasper and Owens also examine the role that “place” plays in protests from a specific physical location to “free space” which then becomes occupied. Finally, Jasper and Owens discuss at some length how protests impact emotions.

In the last chapter, John Parker and Edward J. Hackett assess eight decades of research on

the emotional aspects of the science field. They show how emotions permeate science as a practice, profession, and institution. Within the practice of science, they note how emotions drive the activities of scientists to make observations and knowledge claims. Within the scientific profession, they discuss how emotions are important in forming relationships so essential to collaboration, organizing large scale science projects, and developing scientific social movements. Finally, within the institution of science, they discuss how emotions are what drives scientific action as an autonomous institutional domain. Emotions operate as powerful social control mechanisms in the scientific community, including shaping the functioning and outcomes of the peer review process. In general, the reader sees how science as an institutional activity is pervaded by emotions, even as science itself is supposed to be value-neutral and objective.

---

### 1.3 Conclusion

While our summary of this volume has attempted to describe the core ideas in each chapter, it does not do justice to the depth and sophistication of the topics in each of the chapters. Thus, we encourage readers to spend some time reading through each chapter for a fuller understanding of the theoretical ideas, substantive issues, empirical research, and future directions that characterize the rich areas that are reviewed.

Like *The Handbook for the Sociology of Emotions*, this second volume is incomplete as a representation of the field as it currently stands. Even together, the two volumes do not do justice to the field at this moment, much less a few years down the road. The study of emotions is not only a burgeoning field of inquiry within sociology, it is also a well-developed field in other social sciences and in neurology. It was not until the mid-1970s that the sociology of emotions took off under the leadership of several authors in this volume, such as David R. Heise, Thomas J. Scheff, and Theodore D. Kemper. Now, the

sociology of emotions can stand tall within the social sciences because of the accomplishments of theorists and researchers over the last four decades. The result is that the sociological analysis of emotions will increasingly influence other sciences like psychology and neurology. Thus, these volumes of *The Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions* are only a harbinger of more to come at an accelerating pace.

As the sociology of emotions has just begun to accelerate, it has dramatically increased the power of sociological theorizing and research. In particular, theories of emotions, supported by carefully collected data, have resolved many problems that were once considered impossible, problems such as linking theoretically the dynamics of the micro and macro realms of the social universe. Indeed, sociology is probably further along in closing this micro-macro gap than other sciences. Equally important, as emotional dynamics are studied in all of the many specialties in sociology, the discipline will develop better explanations for interpersonal behavior as well as group, community, organizational, stratification, institutional, and even societal dynamics. Developing explanations about emotions are much like discovering gravity and electromagnetism in studying the physical universe, or natural selection in the biotic universe. These are forces that allow the natural sciences to explain large domains of their respective universes. Similarly, emotions are one of the forces of the social universe, and their study dramatically expands our understanding of how this social universe operates.

---

### References

- Cooley, C. H. ([1902] 1964). *Human nature and the social order*. New York: Schocken Books.
- Durkheim, E. ([1912] 1965). *The elementary forms of the religious life*. New York: Free Press.
- Mead, G. H. (1934). *Mind, self, and society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mead, G. H. (1938). *The philosophy of the act*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Stets, J. E., & Turner, J. H. (2006). *Handbook of the sociology of emotions*. New York: Springer.



---

**Part I**

**Theoretical Perspectives on Emotions**

Jonathan H. Turner

---

## 2.1 Introduction

One question that is, surprisingly, hardly ever asked is this: Why do humans have the capacity to experience, express, and read in others such a wide variety of emotional valences? It is just assumed that humans are emotional, but the question of “why” is left unanswered. One can find somewhat vague pronouncements that emotions are socially constructed, and with big brains came language and culture that allow for an expanded palate of emotions. But is this really the answer? I think not, because emotions are generated in the subcortical regions of the brain, not in the neocortex. True, culture gives us the capacity to label emotions, and this comes from the neocortex, but the emotions themselves are of deeper origins, not only in the actual structure of brain but also in its evolution over the last 8 million years. If we are to understand emotions, then, we need an explanation of why and how the capacity for emotionality on a human scale first evolved; and an answer to this question, I believe, enables us to understand how they operate today. In this chapter, I will use a methodology developed by Alexandra Maryanski and me to offer a long-term evolutionary explanation for why and how humans became so emotional.

---

J. H. Turner (✉)  
University of California, Riverside, USA  
e-mail: jonathan.turner@ucr.edu

---

## 2.2 Humans are Primates

Humans are a species of primates, whose closest living relatives are the great apes: chimpanzees (two subspecies), gorillas (two subspecies), and orangutans. Humans share 98.5% of their genetic material with the common chimpanzee, which means that chimps should probably be grouped with humans in the family *Hominidae* and genus *Homo* rather than in *Ponidae* where they are now placed along with the genus *Pongo* (orangutans) and genus *Gorilla*. Because chimpanzees are genetically closer to humans than the other two great apes, only the vanity of humans keeps them out of *Homo*. I emphasize this point because, in chimpanzees and in the other great apes, we have an unusual vantage point: we can see what our distant ancestors are like because the habitats in which the great apes evolved have not changed dramatically for millions of year, whereas our last common ancestor with these great apes and humans had to adapt to an entirely new habitat, the African savanna. Apes evolved in the arboreal habitat, and all of the great apes still live in the forests, whereas our ancestors, called *hominins*, had to adapt to the dangerous, predator-ridden savanna. To view matter simplistically, but nonetheless usefully, hominin evolution involved taking a body plan much like that of the common chimpanzee and reworking it so that hominins could live on the savanna, which except for hominins, became the graveyard of all other species of apes. Apes are, in reality, a great evolutionary failure because most species are now extinct, ex-

cept for humans (and the verdict is still out on us) and the handful of apes that are on life-support in their shrinking forest niches. Even humans, with their capacities for culture and language, have almost gone extinct twice over the last 200,000 years. Indeed, humans are much less genetically diverse than any other primate for a simple reason: you and I are all descendants of a very small population—perhaps only a few hundred and at most only a few thousand members—that was on the verge of extinction.

The explanation for why humans became so emotional resides in this forced occupation of open-country savanna over the last 10 million years. Emotions became the key to hominin survival, not culture as is so often hypothesized. For language and culture are very late arrivals in the hominin line and were not the fundamental change that allowed hominins to do what no other ape can now do: live on the savanna.

To be sure, a bigger neocortex that could allow for culture increased fitness among late hominins over the last 2-million years, but this larger neocortex was not what allowed hominins to survive in the first place. It is the other part of the brain—the subcortical areas of the brain inherited from reptiles and early mammals—that first changed in some rather fundamental ways—long before the neocortex began to grow significantly about 2 million years ago. The subcortical areas of the brain were rewired by natural selection to make humans dramatically more emotional than other primates and, in all likelihood, all other animals on earth, and it is in this subcortex that we can see the footprint of natural selection as it enhanced hominins' and eventually humans' emotionality.

But, this conclusion only begs the question that I articulated earlier: Why was it necessary for hominins to become so emotional? What were the selection pressures on savanna-dwelling apes that, through random and blind natural selection, allowed our ancestors to survive and avoid the mass extinction of every other savanna-dwelling ape? To answer this question, we need to adopt a methodology for doing cross-species comparisons, which Alexandra Maryanski and I call *evolutionary sociology*, which we view as a more viable alternative to evolutionary psychology.

## 2.3 Evolutionary Sociology

Evolutionary sociology consists of a series of methodologies: (1) *cross-species comparisons* among primates on their respective patterns of social relations as these produce network structures among conspecifics; (2) *cladistic analysis* by which these patterns of relations among extant apes are used to reconstruct the social structures of the last common ancestor of humans and the great apes; (3) *ecological analysis* of the changes in habitat and niches in these habitats that led natural selection to push for particular behavioral and structural patterns among primates; (4) *comparative neuroanatomy* whereby the brains of extant apes are compared to those of humans to give us a sense of what natural selection did to the brain of hominins and humans over the last 8 million years; and (5) *analysis of hard-wired behavioral propensities* of all great apes, primates, and more generally, mammals to see what existing behaviors could be selected upon during hominin evolution in various habitats and niches in these habitats.

These five methods allow us to look back millions of years into humans' evolutionary history, much like the Hubble telescope can do for the universe. We cannot see with perfect clarity but we can see enough back in time to understand where our ancestors started in terms of their physical phenotype (i.e., neuroanatomy and anatomy), their behavioral phenotype (i.e., dominant behaviors), and their social phenotype (i.e., social structures). Then, we can follow their evolution and see how these various phenotypes were all transformed during the course of hominin evolution under the power of natural selection to alter anatomy, neuroanatomy, behavioral propensities, and patterns of social structure.

### 2.3.1 Structures of Relations Among Primates

The great apes reveal a very unusual pattern of relations among conspecifics: they evidence very few strong social ties and no firm basis for intergenerational continuity of social relations (Maryanski 1986, 1987, 1992, 1993, 1995). Moreover,

their basic unit of social organization is not the local group but, instead, the much larger regional community of 10 square miles in which individuals move about freely, forming temporary gatherings that then break up, only to form again but never for long periods of time (Maryanski and Turner 1992). The group, then, is *not* the natural unit of social organization for a great ape, which in all likelihood means that it was not the unit of organization for our common ancestor with great apes, as we will see shortly in cladistic analysis. Alexandra Maryanski (1986) employed a network model of tie strength among all species of apes to see what kinds of social structures had been observed by researchers (who have a behavioral bias and, in fact, have a hard time understanding what social structures is). She compared these findings with a similar analysis of representative species of monkeys which, as I will note shortly, is important in cladistic analysis. The finding on great apes are rather startling: the only consistently strong tie among all species of great apes is between a mother and her pre-adolescent offspring, and this tie is broken when *all* females leave their natal community at puberty, never to return, and in so doing break the possibility of intergenerational ties and groups. For gorillas and orangutans, males also leave their natal community at puberty, never to return. Only chimpanzee males remain in their natal community and form moderate-to-strong ties with their mothers as well as male friends and relatives. None of these ties, however, leads to permanent groups; rather, individuals hook up for a short period, and then disband. Since females of a community have all left at puberty, they must be replaced by immigrating females from other communities, which assures a resupply of females (and genetic diversity), but these females will be strangers to each other and, hence, do not form strong ties even as they sit in proximity and let their offspring play. Thus, what emerges in a network analysis of the great apes is a predominance of weak ties and a rather startling absence of strong ties that could lead to group formation. This network system is also supported by the fact that apes are promiscuous, with paternity of offspring never to be known. For chimpanzees, enthusiastic sexual promiscu-

ity makes it impossible to know who the father of an infant is; and for orangutans, who are virtually solitary, males hook up with females for a short time and then wander off to be alone, with the female raising her offspring alone as well. Only gorillas form somewhat more stable groups built around a lead silverback male and females with children, and various hangers on; this unit works in favor of the female who uses the lead silverback as a babysitter for her sexual liaisons with males lurking out of the sight of the lead male. Yet, even this somewhat structured group breaks part when the female's children enter adolescence, if not before.

This weak tie pattern is rather unusual among mammals because there is no system of kinship beyond the females caring for their offspring before the latter leave the community forever. In contrast, monkeys reveal the opposite pattern of apes: females *never* leave their natal group and, instead, form matrilineal lines of generational and collateral female kin. All males leave their natal group at puberty for other groups, being replaced by males from other troops. These males then enter into a competition for dominance, forming a hierarchy of dominance, which will change every few years, if not sooner. Thus, monkeys are entirely oriented to the local group rather than the larger community population, as is the case for apes; these groups are highly structured by female matrilineal lines and male dominance hierarchies (some monkey troops also reveal female dominance hierarchies as well). Dominant males seek to monopolize sexual access to females in a kind of harem pattern, with varying degrees of success in keeping all females in line.

I will not go into details here (see Maryanski and Turner 1992; Turner and Maryanski 2005; Turner and Maryanski 2008). The importance of these data can be seen when performing cladistic analysis.

### 2.3.2 Cladistic Analysis of the Last Common Ancestor

Cladistic analysis is the term used in biology to denote the reconstruction of the traits and charac-

teristics of a set extant species that are presumed to be biologically related. The logic of cladistic analysis is similar to historical reconstruction of languages where the common features of a set of related languages are used to discover the features of the root language from which they all evolved. In cladistic analysis, the common behavioral and structural traits of a set of extant species are used to determine the likely traits of their common ancestor. Maryanski (1986) performed this analysis—the details of the methodology are less important for my purposes here—and came to the conclusion that the last common ancestor of humans and the great apes was virtually solitary, probably much like contemporary orangutans where individuals live alone, except for females and their pre-adolescent offspring. There are no strong ties among adults, and the only strong ties are those evident in all mammals between mothers and their young offspring. But, even these ties are broken when male and females emigrate from their natal community, never to return. Thus, the last common ancestor of humans and great apes was not very social, did not form strong ties among adults, was promiscuous, and was not prone to form groups of any sort, beyond mother-offspring groups that disbanded with offspring reached puberty.

In cladistic analysis, a comparison out-group of more distantly related species is often used to assess the plausibility of the reconstruction for what are presumed to be more closely related species. Monkeys were used by Maryanski to make this comparison. Monkeys are primates, and at one time, there were few differences between monkeys and apes physically, but over a 10 to 15 million year period of time, they diverged because they began to live in different niches in the arboreal habitat (see ecological analysis below). The reason for the comparison group is to make sure that the set of species under investigation is really distinctive, as a set, in terms of key characteristics and that these characteristics did not evolve independently but, in fact, have been features of all members of this set for a long time and, in fact, distinguish them from other sets of species revealing a different pattern of characteristics. The fact that monkeys evidence almost

*the exact opposite pattern* of organization to apes suggests that, although they are both primates and share a very distant common ancestors, they are separated by several key features in their behavior and social organization, including: group organization for monkeys compared to community organization for apes; permanent matrilineal lines of related females who never leave their natal group compared to universal transfer of females away from the natal community or regional population; harem patterns of male-female among monkeys compared to sexual promiscuity between male and female apes that do not lead to strong bonds or groupings; and strong ties among related females for monkeys versus weak ties among females in ape communities.

Thus, contrary to many assumptions in philosophy and sociology, humans are not as social as their ape core as is often assumed. Family and kinship were not natural to the last common ancestor; groups in general were not permanent among all great apes; promiscuity was rampant with pair-bonding between adult males and females never occurring; and there was no inter-generational continuity for either males or females (except for species of gibbon and siamangs, which are not great apes and very far off the great apes line). The last common ancestor was virtually solitary, moving about alone within a regional community and only forming groups long enough to reproduce or, at times, to defend the community from encroachment by males from other communities. There were no strong and enduring ties among adults, and only temporary ones between sexual partners and even between females and their offspring. Obviously, humans today are more social than this profile would suggest, but the important point is that, for reasons to be outlined below, our ape nature is the exact opposite to what is often posited as “natural” to humans; and the evolution of hominins began with no bioprogrammers in the neurology of the last common ancestor for strong social ties (beyond those of all mammals in female-offspring nurturing) or for group formation. And, these facts are critical to understanding virtually everything about humans. The story of hominin evolution, then, is one where natural selection worked to increase sociality and

the capacity for group formation, but how? My answer (Turner 2000) is through the dramatic rewiring of the hominin brain toward enhanced emotionality.

### 2.3.3 The Ecology of Ape and Hominin Behavioral and Social Structural Patterns

Why did we great apes become so asocial? The answer resides in what transpired in the arboreal habitat. Many of the features of all primates—visual dominance, generalized bodies with four limbs, five fingers, and strong arms, wrists, and fingers, and greater intelligence—are all an outcome of building a body that can move about efficiently and safely in a three dimensional environment off the ground. The differences between the bodies of apes and monkeys, and more importantly, between their behavioral and organizational patterns, are a consequence of the *different* niches in the arboreal habitat where apes and monkeys lived. Without offering any details (see for details: Maryanski and Turner 1992; Turner and Maryanski 2005, 2008), monkeys gained the advantage over apes in the arboreal habitat, perhaps because they acquired the capacity to eat unripe fruit, which, to this day, the few remaining great apes cannot do. The result is that monkeys could occupy the verdant portions of the trees where there is more food and room and, hence, where larger groupings of conspecifics could survive. In contrast, despite the fact that they are larger than monkeys, apes had to migrate to the terminal feeding areas of trees where branches are thinner, where space is limited, and most critically, where food is in much shorter supply. In these niches, whatever grouping patterns apes may have once had were selected out because, to survive in these sparse niches, larger groups could not be supported; and moreover, in this habitat, individuals had to be free of strong ties of any sort so that they would be willing to move to new feeding areas. The behavioral and structural properties of apes and their societies thus reflect intense selection pressures to limit the number of individuals in any one place and

to assure that they would leave kin and move to wherever food is available. And, it appears, apes were able to prosper, even though they are larger than monkeys (requiring more food) and had to live where branches are weaker and food is in short supply. And so, the weak-tie social relations and structures of apes represent a successful adaptation to a difficult set of niches in the arboreal habitat. Moreover, some of the physical differences between apes and monkeys can be seen as an outcome of selection on the phenotypes (and underlying genotypes) of apes adapting to these niches: great apes are much more intelligent than monkeys; great apes have stronger finger, hands, wrists, arms and shoulder joints than monkeys; and the great apes can brachiote (rotate their arm 360 degrees) whereas monkeys cannot. All of these body changes represent adaptations to the “high-wire act” of the tree-tops and undersides of branches high in the air.

About 10 million years ago, African began to cool down and the dense tropical forests began to recede, and the vast savannas of African began to grow. Many species of primates were forced to the ground as the amount of space in the arboreal habitat kept declining, and here is where the mass extinction of apes began. Without the bioprogrammers for social bonding and for groups that would lead to cooperative food foraging and for collective defense in the predator-ridden, open country savanna, most species of apes went extinct. In contrast, monkeys forced to the terrestrial habitat could survive because they are well organized by male dominance hierarchies and by female matrilineal. Indeed, monkeys march across the savanna in almost military precision, with lead male at the front and his lieutenants on flanks and bringing up the rear of a phalanx of larger males encircling smaller females and children. Few predators, whether big cats or packs of hyenas and related species, would dare attack such a well-defended group. Here, the grouping propensities of monkeys allowed them to survive where the lack of such bioprogrammers in apes doomed them to extinction. Today, monkeys are by far the more fit set of species compared to apes. Indeed, apes including humans as an evolved ape represent less than 5% of all species



Table 2.1 Relative size of brain components of apes and humans, compared to *Tenrecinae*. (Source: Data from Stephan 1983; Stephan and Andy 1969, 1977; Stephan et al. 1981, 1986; Eccles 1989)

Brain component	Apes ( <i>Pongids</i> )	Humans ( <i>Homo</i> )
Neocortex	61.88	196.41
Diencephalon	8.57	14.76
Thalamus		
Hypothalamus		
Amygdala	1.85	4.48
Centromedial	1.06	2.52
Basolateral	2.45	6.02
Septum	2.16	5.48
Hippocampus	2.99	4.87
Transition cortices	2.38	4.43

Numbers represent how many times larger than *Tenrecinae* each area of the brain is, with *Tenrecinae* representing a base of 1

of primates. Apes are thus one of the great evolutionary failures in evolutionary history, a fact that is obscured by the large number of humans on earth. So, in a very real sense, we can ask: how did our hominin ancestors beat the odds and do what no other apes can do today: survive in the open, country African savanna. The answer can be seen in human neurology where natural selection rewired the hominin and, eventually, human brain to make us the most emotional animal on earth.

### 2.3.4 Comparative Neuroanatomy and Human Emotionality

Some time ago, precise measurements were taken on the brains of primates and compared to humans. In Table 2.1, I have arrayed the data for the great apes and humans on the size of various components of the brain, controlling for body size which is roughly correlated with brain size. As part of the control for body size, the numbers in the table represent how many times greater than “1” a brain system is. The “1” is designed to represent the size of a small rodent-like insectivore, *Tenrecinae* that is probably very much like the original insectivore that climbed into the arboreal habitat of Africa some 63 million years ago to initiate the primate order. This norming of measure-

ments to a common base allows for comparisons. For example, the neocortex of humans is 196.41 times larger than *Tenrecinae*, while the neocortex of apes is 61.88 larger—thus making the human neocortex a bit over three times the size of great ape brains. The numbers below this first row (comparing the size of the ape and human neocortex) are for subcortical areas of the brain, which evolved much earlier and which, in basic structure, were inherited from reptiles. These structures do not all correspond to emotional centers which are subcortical, below the neocortex which is wrapped over them, but they are all implicated in the production of emotions. Since these data were not collected to assess emotion centers, we will have to use them as a proxy for some of these centers. The diencephalon containing the thalamus and hypothalamus are relevant to emotions because all sensory inputs are routed through the thalamus and then sent to the relevant cortices in the neocortex and also to key subcortical emotion modules, such as the amygdala, which is the ancient reptilian center for *fear* and *anger*. The septum is the structure that gives pleasure to sex and hence is responsible for sexual drives. The hippocampus is involved in memory formation stores memories and, I would hypothesize, is the place where repressed emotions are stored outside the purview of the prefrontal cortex in the neocortex; and the transition cortices are responsible for working memory and inputs into the hippocampus where memories and the emotions associated with them are stored and later shipped up to the neocortex for longer term memory (if the memories and the emotions attached to them are activated in the hippocampus in their first two years of storage). What is evident is that these subcortical areas, and I suspect other emotion centers, are about twice as big as those among the great apes, controlling for body size. Interestingly, the big increase in the size of the amygdala in humans is in the baso-lateral component and, surprisingly, is mostly devoted to pleasure (Eccles 1989)—interesting because why would pleasure in humans be attached to the ancient centers for fear and anger? The septum is over twice as large in humans than apes, and why should this be so since apes take great pleasure in sex and

are highly promiscuous? In addition to being larger, the wiring connecting subcortical centers to each other and to the neocortex, particularly the prefrontal cortex where decision making occurs, is much denser in humans than in apes.

Thus, it is very clear that natural selection was grabbing onto subcortical areas of the brain to enhance emotionality during hominin evolution. And, it was doing so long *before* the neocortex began to grow significantly with *Homo erectus* some 2 million years ago. Indeed, developmental sequences in animals sometimes reflect evolutionary sequences in the history of a species; and in the case of human newborn, the infant can imitate all of the facial gestures of a caretaker signaling primary emotions within weeks of birth, whereas it takes years of babbling for an infant to begin to reproduce human speech phonemes and syntax. And so, I think it very likely that this developmental sequence mirrors the evolutionary sequence in the growth of the hominin brain. Long before the neocortex expanded to produce the capacity for symbolic culture and speech, the brain was wired for dramatically enhanced emotionality. Why would this be so?

An animal having no bioprogrammers for group formation but under intense selection pressure to organize into higher-solidarity and more-permanent groups in a predator-ridden savanna environment had to get better organized, or die. Most apes trying to adapt to the savanna died off, but natural selection stumbled upon a solution by selecting on emotion centers to increase the variety and valences of emotions that could be used to forge strong bonds and, eventually, group solidarities. Indeed, this is how people form and sustain bonds today; they generate positive emotional flows that increase commitments to others and groups through interaction rituals (Collins 2004) and other interpersonal processes of attunement (Turner 2002). Natural selection hit upon a solution to the problem faced by all apes over the last 10 millions years: get organized into more stable and cohesive groups, or go extinct. What is more, apes on the savanna have some major liabilities, beyond the lack of bioprogrammers for strong social ties and group formation.

One problem of apes adapting to the savanna is that they could not easily smell prey or predators, as most mammals do; in the transition to becoming visually dominant as an adaptation to the three-dimensional arboreal environment, the olfactory bulb, which is subcortical, was reduced in size and function because a big snout in front of eyes sockets that have been moved forward for 3-D vision would be maladaptive. But something else was created with this rewiring of the brain around the inferior parietal lobe and related modules: the brain became prewired for language. Thus, all of the great apes have the capacity for language-use and comprehension to about the level of a three year old human child. They do not use this area for human-like language, unless trained to do so, but this linguistic capacity existed very early on in ape evolution. The greater intelligence apes compared to monkeys makes this capacity accessible to selection, and hence, it was there in the common ancestor to apes and humans some 8 million years ago. The capacity for language, therefore, is not a recent invention; it existed for a long time in the ape line. This capacity had nothing to do with vision; it was a simple byproduct for rewiring the neocortex to make primates visually dominant, but it represented a pre-adaptation that could be selected upon if language was fitness enhancing. The language would not be auditory because apes lack the physical equipment for precise articulated speech, but language can be visual and be constructed from emotional phonemes strung together in a syntax carrying emotional meanings, *if* such an emotional language would be fitness enhancing.

Another liability of apes on the savanna is that they are slow; they must knuckle walk and, unlike fully quadrupedal animals under predation, they can easily be picked off and eaten by much faster predators. Still another liability is that apes are emotional and start making noise and running about randomly when aroused by, say, fear of a predator. And, a loud primate on the savanna is soon a dead one. Thus, unlike monkeys with powerful bioprogrammers for group organization, apes were very vulnerable on the savanna because they had so many other liabilities in addition to the lack of programmers to form groups.



**Table 2.2** Variants of primary emotions. (Source: Data from Turner 1996a, 1996b, 1996c)

Primary emotions:	Low intensity	Moderate intensity	High intensity
Satisfaction-happiness	Content	Cheerful	Joy
	Sanguine	Buoyant	Bliss
	Serenity	Friendly	Rapture
	Gratified	Amiable	Jubilant
		Enjoyment	Gaiety
			Elation
			Delight
			Thrilled
			Exhilarated
	Aversion-fear	Concern	Misgivings
Hesitant		Trepidation	Horror
Reluctance		Anxiety	High anxiety
Shyness		Scared	
		Alarmed	
		Unnerved	
Assertion-anger	Annoyed	Displeased	Dislike
	Agitated	Frustrated	Loathing
	Irritated	Belligerent	Disgust
	Vexed	Contentious	Hate
	Perturbed	Hostility	Despise
	Nettled	Ire	Detest
	Rankled	Animosity	Hatred
	Piqued	Offended	Seething
		Consternation	Wrath
			Furious
Disappointment-sadness	Discouraged	Dismayed	Sorrow
	Downcast	Disheartened	Heartsick
	Dispirited	Glum	Despondent
		Resigned	Anguished
		Gloomy	Crestfallen
		Woeful	
		Pained	
		Dejected	

If emotions were to be used to increase sociability, bonding, and group formation, there was yet another obstacle. Apes do not have neocortical control of their emotions, thereby making emotions a liability. Moreover, and perhaps even more fundamentally, three of the four primary emotions that all scholars would agree are hard wired in the brain—*anger*, *fear*, *sadness*, and *happiness*—are negative; and negative emotions do not promote bonding or solidarity. And so, if natural selection were to take the route to enhancing emotionality, how would it get around the problem of the high proportion of negative

valences in the basic palate of emotions among mammals. Add to this the problem of controlling emotional outbursts, and it would seem that this route to making hominins more social and group oriented would be an evolutionary dead end. How did natural selection, then, get around the liabilities inherent in emotions, per se?

The increased connectivity in the human brain gives part of the answer. I think that selection first worked on controlling noisy emotional outbursts by expanding and thickening neuro-nets between the prefrontal cortex and subcortical emotion centers. This is one of the big differences between ape and human brains, and it probably began to evolve early among hominins on the savanna. With this increased control, the neurology to expand the variations in negative emotions would be in place; and as a result, variants of different levels of intensity of primary emotions could be produced. Table 2.2 illustrates some of the variants of primary emotions that humans possess, and what becomes evident is that by simply damping the intensity and increasing variants, the intensity of negative valences declines as a proportion of all primary emotions, while more nuanced and subtle emotions can be produced. Then, I think that natural selection continued on this path by combining primary emotions, as is illustrated in Table 2.3. In Table 2.3, a greater amount of one primary emotion is combined (in some unknown way) with a lesser amount of another primary emotions, generating not only a much larger palate of emotions but also dampening further much of the negativity inhering in primary emotions. Even some of the negative emotions could be used to promote solidarity if used in a nuanced way as subtle sanctions. And when emotions are combined, some new emotions appear that can be considered more likely to promote solidarity and bonding. For example, *satisfaction-happiness* combined with a lesser amount of *aversion-fear* produces such emotions as *wonder*, *hope*, *gratitude*, *pride*, and *relief*; or *satisfaction-happiness* combined with *assertion-anger* produces emotions like *calm*, *relish*, *triumph*, and *bemusement*. All of these emotions are potentially available for bonding, and they are less negative. However, some deadly combinations can be produced

**Table 2.3** First-order elaborations of primary emotions

Primary emotions		First-order elaborations
<i>Satisfaction-happiness</i>		
Satisfaction-happiness + <i>aversion-fear</i>	<i>generate</i>	Wonder, hopeful, relief, gratitude, pride, reverence
Satisfaction-happiness + <i>assertion-anger</i>	<i>generate</i>	Vengeance, appeased, calmed, soothed, relish, triumphant, bemused
Satisfaction-happiness + <i>disappointment-sadness</i>	<i>generate</i>	Nostalgia, yearning, hope
<i>Aversion-fear</i>		
Aversion-fear + <i>satisfaction-happiness</i>	<i>generate</i>	Awe, reverence, veneration
Aversion-fear + <i>assertion-anger</i>	<i>generate</i>	Revulsed, repulsed, antagonism, dislike, envy
Aversion-fear + <i>disappointment-sadness</i>	<i>generate</i>	Dread, wariness
<i>Assertion-anger</i>		
Assertion-anger + <i>satisfaction-happiness</i>	<i>generate</i>	Condescension, mollified, rudeness, placated, righteousness
Assertion-anger + <i>aversion-fear</i>	<i>generate</i>	Abhorrence, jealousy, suspiciousness
Assertion-anger + <i>disappointment-sadness</i>	<i>generate</i>	Bitterness, depression, betrayed
<i>Disappointment-sadness</i>		
Disappointment-sadness + <i>satisfaction-happiness</i>	<i>generate</i>	Acceptance, moroseness, solace, melancholy
Disappointment-sadness + <i>aversion-fear</i>	<i>generate</i>	Regret, forlornness, remorseful, misery
Disappointment-sadness + <i>assertion-anger</i>	<i>generate</i>	Aggrieved, discontent, dissatisfied, unfulfilled, boredom, grief, envy, sullenness

**Table 2.4** The structure of second-order emotions: Shame, guilt, and alienation

Emotion	Rank-ordering of constituent primary emotions		
	1	2	3
<i>Shame</i>	Disappointment-sadness (At self)	Assertion-anger (At self)	Aversion-fear (At consequences for self)
<i>Guilt</i>	Disappointment-sadness (At self)	Aversion-fear (At consequences for self)	Assertion-anger (At self)

as is the case for *vengeance*, which is *happiness* combined with *anger*. Still, in looking over the complete palate of the emotions in Table 2.3, this combining or what I term *first-order combinations* of emotions produces many more potentially useful emotions for nuanced forms of social bonding, mild sanctioning, and social control (Turner 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2008, 2010a). The overall amount of negativity in the palate is reduced from three-fourths, as is the case with primary emotions alone, to something much less.

If these first-order elaborations of emotions enhanced fitness by increasing the emotion hooks for bonding, then *second-order elaborations* would be even more fitness enhancing because these would be combinations of the three negative emotions that produce entirely new kinds of negative emotions that could increase social

control. I believe that the origins of the uniquely human emotions of *shame* and *guilt* are an outcome of natural selection pushing combination strategies for negative emotions. *Shame* and *guilt*, I believe, are combinations of *anger*, *fear*, and *sadness* in somewhat different proportions. Table 2.4 outlines my view of how these emotion evolved; and they probably evolved rather late in hominin evolution, at best with *Homo erectus*, because they involve having a neocortex that can conceptualized normative expectations and moral rules. *Shame* is the emotion of having not met the expectations of others. At its low-intensity end, shame is *embarrassment*, whereas at its high-intensity end, emotions like *humiliation* are felt, and emotions at this intense end are devastating to self. *Guilt* is the feeling that one has violated moral codes and, like shame, it is highly painful to self. Notice that I am using the worlds self in

these definitions; so, more than just an awareness of expectations and moral codes is necessary; to feel shame and guilt, there must be a sense of *self as an object of evaluation*—yet another cognitive capacity only possible with higher intelligence (see discussion below on self).

Shame and guilt are mostly *disappointment-sadness* at self, but it is the order of magnitude of the fear and anger components that makes all of the difference in which of these two emotions is felt. If *anger at self* is the second more powerful emotion behind sadness, and *fear about the consequences to self* is the third-ranked emotion, then *shame* is experienced. If, however, the relative magnitude of *anger* and *fear* is reversed, then *guilt* is experienced. Thus, it is the *relative rank-ordering* of sadness, anger, and fear that determines which of these two emotions a person will feel, as is outlined in Table 2.4. These conclusions are, of course, highly speculative but the neurology of the brain suggests that this is the way that natural selection would have gone. Separate modules for each first- or second-order emotions would be difficult because mutations would be required, and mutations are almost always harmful, and especially so in such a complex area as the brain. Instead, directional selection on tail ends of Bell curves describing the distribution of traits for existing brain systems and the neurons connecting them would be the easier route, and comparing the human and ape brains reveals not only larger size in subcortical components, but also significantly increased connectivity. And somewhere in this enhanced connectivity, the capacity for shame and guilt was generated; and with it came increased capacity for social control in groups as self-control, thereby making hominins or humans that much more fit.

Great apes do not experience *shame* and *guilt*, and so it is possible that these are uniquely human emotion (Boehm 2012). Shame and guilt are emotions of social control because they cause individuals to monitor and sanction themselves over their success or failure in meeting normative expectations and abiding by the dictates of moral codes. They reduce the need of others to negatively sanction a person, and thereby, the negative emotional flow that can arise when individuals

imposed negative sanctions on each other. People are motivated to avoid shame and guilt, and if they feel that they have violated moral codes or not met expectations of others, they become motivated to change their behaviors and make apologies to others, which can only work to increase solidarity and the power of groups regulated by expectations and moral codes. Thus, with *shame* and *guilt*, social bonding and group formation become that much more viable because they are driven by powerful emotions of social control, and so, these emotions would dramatically enhance fitness on the African savanna. Moreover, they would eventually make viable even larger and more complex sociocultural formations organizing humans.

Because shame and guilt are so painful, another dynamic often comes into play: repression of either or both emotions. The very connectivity that makes these emotions possible also enables humans to push them out of conscious awareness, probably into the hippocampus which has memory-formation functions and, in this case, memory-hiding functions. Once repressed, however, negative emotions in general and certainly *shame* and *guilt* often transmutes into one of their constituent emotions. I have hypothesized that in the case of shame and guilt, it is the second emotion in the hierarchy outlined in Table 2.4 that is most likely to emerge in a person's behaviors. That is, *shame* transmutes into *diffuse anger*, while *guilt* transmutes into *diffuse anxiety*. These emerging emotions can be painful, particularly on social relations and group solidarity, but they do protect self from some of the intense pain of shame or guilt. Shame in particular is a dangerous emotion because once repressed, it increases in intensity and then escapes the cortical censors as *diffuse anger* that disrupts social bonds and, if experienced collectively, can lead people to attack groups and larger social structures. Thus, these emotions of social control can become out of control in their transmuted form and pose dangers to individuals and sociocultural formations.

In Table 2.5, I visualize repression as the master emotion of repression, with other defense mechanism channeling the emotional valences in various directions. Thus, the emotions listed

**Table 2.5** Repression, defense, transmutation, and targeting of emotions. (Source: Turner 2007)

Repressed emotions	Defense mechanism	Transmutation to:	Target of:
Anger, sadness, fear, shame, guilt, and alienation	Displacement	Anger	Others, corporate units <sup>a</sup> and categoric units <sup>b</sup>
Anger, sadness, fear, shame, guilt, and alienation	Projection	Little, but some anger	Imputation of anger, sadness, fear, shame or guilt to dispositional states of others
Anger, sadness, fear, shame, guilt, and alienation	Reaction formation	Positive emotions	Others, corporate units, categoric units
Anger, sadness, fear, shame, guilt, and alienation	Sublimation	Positive emotions	Tasks in corporate units
Anger, sadness, fear, shame, guilt, and alienation	<i>Attribution</i>	<i>Anger</i>	Others, corporate units, or categoric units

<sup>a</sup> Corporate units are structures revealing a division of labor geared toward achieving goals

<sup>b</sup> Categoric units are social categories which are differentially evaluated and to which differential responses are given. Members of categoric units often hold a social identity

on the left column are repressed, transmuted by specific defense mechanisms listed in the middle of the table, and then target and lock onto certain basic social objects—self, others, categories of person, or social structures—arrayed in the right column of the table. At the bottom of Table 2.5, I have listed *attribution* as a defense mechanisms, which is a bit out of the ordinary because this is usually a cognitive process but it is also the most important defense mechanisms from a sociological point of view. People make causal attributions for their experiences and, thereby, see self, others, situation, categories of others, or social structures as responsible for their emotions—whether positive or negative. When people experience a negative emotion like *diffuse anger*, they make a causal attribution; and people generally make *external attributions* for negative emotions, particularly negative emotions fueled by such powerful emotions as *shame*. Thus, negative emotions evidence a *distal bias* (Lawler 2001; Lawler et al. 2009). In contrast, positive emotions reveal a *proximal bias* and circulate locally between self and others, thereby ratcheting up the positive emotional energy in interaction rituals (Collins 2004; Lawler 2001; Lawler et al. 2009). Thus, to the extent that positive emotions are generated, attribution dynamics charge up solidarity, group symbols, and commitments to these symbols; and so, attribution dynamics may have evolved early during the time that emotions were increasingly used by hominins to forge social bonds and groups. But, once in place, attribution dynamics could convert negative emotions into acts that

break social relations and social structures down. So, attribution can be a double-edge sword.

In sum, then, analysis of the brain, especially comparative analysis of the human and ape brain, gives a real sense for what transpired in the 8 million years of evolution once hominins split off from the ancestors of present-day apes. The ecology of apes changed much less than the ecology to which hominins were forced to adapt; and so, while the evolution of apes was not static over the last 8 million years, apes still represent our best picture of what the neuroanatomy of our last common ancestor was like. And so, differences in the wiring of the ape and human brain represent the handiwork of natural selection as it worked to make hominins more social and group oriented because, without the capacity to form stable groups, the ancestors of humans would have gone to the graveyard like virtually all species of apes. What kept our ancestors alive was not culture but emotions, probably organized into a quasi language that used an ever-larger palate of emotions to forge social bonds and build up loyalties to groups. Only very late in hominin evolution did culture and spoken language evolve, but culture and language would have no teeth or power to control without the *prior* wiring of our brains for emotions. And, little has really changed, because social solidarity, groups bonds, attachments, legitimation of social structures, and social control depend far more on emotions than culture or language, although second-order elaborations of emotions like *shame* and *guilt* required some elements of proto-culture, such as

expectations for particular actions, to increase the control capacity of emotions.

As I explore below as the last element of Maryanski and my methodology for evolutionary sociology, there were many other hard-wired behavioral propensities in all apes that could have been used to forge social bonds among hominins. Yet, apparently they were not enough to make savanna-dwelling apes sufficiently fit to survive open-country savanna conditions. If they had been adequate, none of the re-wiring of the brain for enhanced emotions would have been necessary. Still, with increased emotionality, these other behavioral propensities would *all be enhanced* and, together with the super-charging effects of emotions, they explain not only human emotionality but also the basic mechanisms by which humans interact and develop more enduring social bonds.

### 2.3.5 Additional Behavioral Capacities and Propensities

In addressing the issue of “human nature” we are, essence, asking what behavioral propensities are hard wired into human neuroanatomy. All mammals have these propensities, and they vary depending upon the selection pressures generated in the ecology in which a species has evolved. Evolution is a conservative process and does not generally eliminate older behavioral propensities, but instead, adds new ones that may come to dominate over older ones. Given enough time, however, a behavioral propensity, if it is harming fitness, will be eliminated as all those members of a species who possessed this trait would simply die out, while those without it would survive and multiply. As I have emphasized thus far, natural selection worked on apes to eliminate behavioral propensity to form groups or even strong social ties, even in kin groups, because of ecological constraints imposed by the terminal feeding niches in the arboreal habitat. But, once the forests receded and pushed apes to the African savanna floor, they had to survive in an entirely new habitat where the grouping propensities lost to natural selection would now be highly adaptive. Yet, even after wiping out propensities

to form local groups and strong ties, a number of behavioral propensities that could be selected upon for more sociality remained, as I explore below. Moreover, there also existed pre-adaptations that evolved as a byproduct of changes in ape anatomy that could later be selected upon when apes were forced to the savanna floor. Probably the most important and distinctive trait of primates in general and all apes is their visual dominance, as I mentioned earlier, but let me start here and elaborate this and other traits in apes as they descended from the trees to the dangerous life in open-country savanna (Turner and Maryanski 2012).

1. *Visual dominance over haptic and auditory sense modalities, thereby subordinating other sense modalities to vision* (Maryanski and Turner 1992; Jarvis and Ettlinger 1977; and Passingham 1973, 1975, 1982, pp. 51–55). As mentioned earlier, some 63 million years ago, a small insectivore crawled or clawed its way into the arboreal habitat to initiate the primate line. This animal was, like most mammals, olfactory dominant; that is, smell was its dominant sense modality and the principle means by which it acquired information from its environment. All other sense modalities—vision, haptic (touch), and auditory (hearing)—were subordinated to smell so as to avoid sensory conflict. Smelling one’s way around a three dimensional environment is very limiting, whereas seeing one’s way would be fitness enhancing, and so over time, natural selection moved the eye sockets forward to produce overlapping and, hence, three-D vision for depth and distance, and eventually color vision as well. All primates are visually dominant, and as a result, humans are visually dominant. As soon as we smell, hear, or touch something of interests, we look at what we are sensing, with visual cues subordinating other sense modalities.

This shift to visual makes primate rather unique among mammals; a few other mammals like bats are auditory dominant and bounce sound waves off objects to maneuver in their environments. What made the movement to vision so important is that it would



be the dominant way in which all primates and eventually humans interact. We are highly attuned to visual cues from face and body language; and this visual language evolved before spoken language. We tend to see non-verbal languages as subordinate to auditory or spoken language, but in reality the opposite is the case. Body language evolved before spoken language, and more significantly, it is still dominant, especially when reading emotions. In fact, language capacities in general, including speech, are only possible because of the pre-adaptation that rewiring the primate brain for visual dominance created. A preadaptation is a trait installed by natural selection that is an outcome of selection for other traits; it is simply a byproduct of selection for these other traits, but it potentially can be selected upon if its enhancement would increase fitness. And, eventually such was the case for humans and perhaps late hominins like *Homo erectus* because, as is evident in humans, the temporal lobe leading to the association cortices around the inferior parietal lobe is devoted to spoken language production and comprehension, especially around Broca's area for speech production and Werneicke's area for speech comprehension and uploading into the meta-language by which the brain organizes through and thinking.

2. *The ability among the great apes to learn and use language at the level of a three-year-old human child* (Geschwind 1965a, 1965b, 1965c, 1985; Geschwind and Damasio 1984; Rumbaugh and Savage-Rumbaugh 1990; Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin 1994; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1988, 1993; Bickerton 2003). Again, as noted above, the *rewiring* of the brain to convert primates to visual dominance also created the potential for language production and comprehension. This neurological capacity for language is not evident in primates without, it seems, a corresponding increase in overall intelligence. Among primates, only the great apes have the requisite threshold level of intelligence to learn language. Apes became smarter than monkeys because they lived in the more dangerous niches of the arboreal

habitat—high in the trees where branches are thinner and a mistake in calculating their strength leads to death by gravity.

I have argued (Turner 2000) that this capacity for language did not just “sit there” for millions of years but instead it was selected upon early in hominin evolution to create a visually based language that could communicate emotions among our hominin ancestors. This language is thus more primal and, in important ways, *more* primary than speech. Emotions are read by looking a face and bodies more than by listening to what people actually say or their voice inflections; and so, social bonding and attachment is as much, if not more, of a visual more than auditory process. For example, when someone says that “I love you,” we look to their face and body to really be sure that this is being said sincerely.

Older data on infants supports this view that a body language built around emotions preceded spoken language ((Emde 1962); Ekman 1984; Sherwood et al. 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008). As I noted earlier, newborn babies can read all of the primary emotions in their caretakers within weeks and birth, and they can imitate these emotions in their *facial* expression whereas it takes two years of babbling before an infant can even begin to form sentences; and since evolutionary sequences often mirror evolutionary sequences, I have more confidence that the body language of emotions evolved long before spoken language (because the changes that would have to occur to primate vocal tracks, lips, and facial muscles are extensive, and these could not occur rapidly). More recent support to this conclusions comes from chance discoveries of the genes regulating the muscles and tissues necessary for fine-grained speech production; the data indicate that these have been under intense selection for only about 200,000 years, which is just about when humans first emerged (Enard et al. 2002a, 2002b). Thus, complex and highly refined enunciation may be unique to humans, with hominins having cruder vocal responses and relying primarily on the language of emotions signaled through face and body.

3. *The behavioral propensity to follow the gaze and eye movements of others* (Hare, et al. 2001, 2006; Povinelli 1999; Povinelli and Eddy 1997; Itakura 1996; Baizer et al. 2007; Tomasello et al. 2001; Tomasello and Call 1997; Okomoto et al. 2002). This propensity argues that apes and, hence, all hominins and humans are wired to look at eyes, to follow gazes, and to interpret their meanings—thus making interaction in groups a process of watching face and, particularly, eye movements. This conclusion is supported by the propensity for face-monitoring for signs of action of conspecifics particularly for emotional content (Leslie et al. 2004, Gazzaniga and Symlie 1990). Apes can communicate in very subtle ways with their face—so subtle that researchers have yet to figure out how this facial communication occurs (Menzel 1971; Stanford 1999; Mitani and Watts 2001; Turner and Maryanski 2008). By visual cues that humans often cannot decipher, chimpanzees can coordinate instrumental actions. For example, several chimpanzees intending to eat a baboon wandering through their patch of forest will communicate visually instrumental actions without emitting any auditory sounds. They, in essence, say with their eyes “you go there flush the prey out, and I will catch the prey as it runs, and then we will eat it together.” So, already built into the ape line is the capacity to communicate, even instrumental actions where coordination of roles occurs, through eyes and face alone; it should not be surprising that humans have this capacity, and moreover, that it would be selected upon during hominin evolution.
  4. *The propensity to use imitation to learn appropriate facial and body signals and behaviors* (Tomonaga 1999; Subiaul 2007; Horowitz 2003; Gergely and Csibra 2006). Apes appear to be programmed to imitate gestures of conspecifics, and especially those that carry meanings and communicate intentions and dispositions. This capacity could be dramatically expanded upon by natural selection if such signals had fitness-enhancing value among hominins; and since emotions are best read through body language, selection could “kill two birds with one stone” because by enhancing the range and subtlety of gestural communication, it would also be increasing the capacity for more nuanced emotional communication, if more nuanced emotions would also have fitness-enhancing consequences.
  5. *The larger decision-making prefrontal cortex among humans compared to apes* (Semendeferi et al. 2002). The enlarged prefrontal cortex of humans compared to that of apes indicates that selection favored not only control of emotions but also use of emotions to provide the markers of utility or reward-value in making decisions (Damasio 1994); and if this capacity enhanced fitness, it could also be used for additional control of emotions and for their use for more instrumental purposes in an emotion-based language system.
- It is evident, then, that natural selection had a great many neurological capacities on which to select for language, but a visually-based language probably built from emotions that reveal phonemes, morphemes, and syntax strung out in a series of gestural displays that “speak” to people (Turner 2000).
- Yet, social bonding and solidarity did not have to depend solely on neurological capacities for a visually based language. Primates today and, hence, our common ancestor with primates, reveal other hard-wired behavioral propensities that increase sociality. Just like emotion-generating systems and the pre-adaptation for language facility, these too could be selected upon to increase sociality of hominins. Let me list the most important of these (Turner and Maryanski 2012):
1. *The capacity among great apes to experience empathy with conspecifics* (deWaal 2009). It is clear that the great apes, particularly chimpanzees—humans’ closest primate relative—can empathize with conspecifics. They do so by reading gestures, especially those revealing emotional states but also instrumental states as well. Remarkably complex emotional states such as sympathy are apparently experienced, calling on a chimp to engage in

efforts to help those fellow chimpanzees experiencing distress and other negative emotions. Thus, apes clearly have the capacity to engage in what George Herbert Mead (1934) termed role-taking and, indeed, in-depth role-taking of emotional states, or what I have come to term emotion-taking (Turner 2010a, b). This is a hard-wired capacity that was part of the hominin neuroanatomy and, thus, could be selected upon and enhanced, if empathy had fitness-enhancing consequences. And so, in contrast to Mead's skepticism about non-human animals having the capacity to role take, it is clear that interaction with gestures carrying common meanings and understandings of emotional states takes place among apes and, no doubt, among our distant common ancestors with apes. No new mutations would be necessary for this capacity to evolve; it was already in place and could be enhanced by selection on tail ends of the Bell curve describing its distribution in the hominin genome.

2. *The rhythmic synchronization of bodies, especially of emotions, via mirror neurons* (Rizzolatti et al. 2002). Although mirror neurons were first discovered in monkeys, they are also part of ape and human neurology. The same neurons of persons who are role taking with others will tend to be activated when observing the responses of others. Mirror neurons are thus one of the mechanisms of empathy and role taking, and this mechanism is ancient and hard-wired into higher-primates. Thus, if role-taking and empathy would have fitness-enhancing value by creating bonds of solidarity, mirror neurons were available for further selection—although perhaps such selection was not needed. The capacity to fall into rhythmic synchronization, as emphasized by Collins (2004), is a neurological as much as a cultural process. It has been part of the higher-primate genome for millions of years and, thus, was part of the hominin and human genome.
3. *The capacity of chimpanzees to engage in a practice described by researchers as “carnival” in references to collective emotional dis-*

*plays by human in various carnival-like festivals seen around the world* (e.g., New Orleans, Rio). Emile Durkheim (1912) described emotional “effervescence” among periodic gatherings of Arunta aboriginals around Alice Springs, Australia. Similarly, chimpanzees and, perhaps, humans' last common ancestor who was probably even more weakly tied than chimpanzees, probably possessed this capacity for solidarity-generating emotions to be aroused in periodic gatherings of conspecifics. Chimpanzees are known to engage in carnival when gathered together, and the descriptions of carnival are very much like those of Baldwin Spencer's and Francis Gillen's description of aboriginals and Durkheim's secondary description from Spencer and Gillen's (1899) famous work on the tribes of central Australia. Carnival among apes and later hominins was probably only periodic because most apes move about their home ranges, but as hominins began to form more permanent groupings, the neurology behind carnival may have become a critical mechanisms in creating and sustaining group solidarity, just as Goffman (1967) and Collins (2004) have emphasized in their respective extensions of Durkheim's basic insight. Humans create a more mild form of effervescence during virtually all interpersonal encounters and interaction rituals. Thus, the propensity for carnival, if selected on, could be extended to almost all interaction rituals on a dramatically less intense scale to generate the same solidarity-generating consequences as interaction rituals do today among humans, if building up solidarities was critical to survival of hominin on the savanna. Moreover, carnival and effervescence make happiness a more powerful emotion, and indeed an emotion that can mitigate against the power of the three negative emotions. And so, anything that would increase the salience of positive emotions would be fitness enhancing for hominins desperate for more group organization and solidarity. Episodes of carnival gave natural selection something to work on to produce lower-key interaction rituals generating positive emotions and eventually commitments



to group symbols as late hominins began to acquire the capacity to use symbols.

At first, solidarity was purely emotional and did not invoke culture, beliefs, or norms. For, solidarity can exist and, indeed does occur in more intense forms among chimpanzees, *without* cultural props. Indeed, like language more generally, the cultural embellishment and perhaps normative regulation of carnival and its lower-key variants in interaction rituals are simply add-ons to an already extant neurological capacity that humans share with common chimpanzees and, of course, their hominin ancestors

4. *The propensity for reciprocity in the give and take of resources.* Reciprocity is evident in apes and, indeed, in many higher mammals. It is particularly developed in apes and humans and is the central dynamic of exchange theoretic descriptions of *interaction* and group processes (Cosmides 1989; deWaal 1989, 1991, 1996; deWaal and Bronson, 2006). With expanded emotional repertoires, coupled with the capacities listed above, it is not difficult to see how natural selection enhanced this sense of reciprocity, creating a need for reciprocity and arousing negative emotions and negative sanctions when reciprocity is not honored. Thus, a hard-wire propensity for reciprocity was already wired into the higher mammals, and all higher primates, and was therefore available for selection to work on.
5. *The behavioral propensity to compare shares of resources with others in making judgments of fairness in their respective distributions.* Monkeys and apes both reveal the behavioral propensity to calculate fairness in the exchange of resources. A capuchin monkey, for example, will stop exchanging with a trainer if another monkey is getting more food (Bronson et al. 2003, 2005). Chimpanzees will do the same thing, and in fact, they can often get violent if they feel left out of the distribution of resources. Moreover, a recent study reports that one chimpanzee exchanging with a trainer stopped when it saw that another chimp was not getting his fair share of resources, indicating a complex process of role taking, empathy, reciprocity, and justice calculations leading to altruistic behavior, which, it seems, all great apes possess, as did our common ancestor. Rather complicated calculations of justice and fairness involving shares of resources, behaviors produced to receive these resources, and comparisons of one's resources with those received by others can, again, occur without culture or even rules of fair exchange; and this hard-wired ability could be selected upon to promote group solidarity. What is necessary is the capacity to arouse emotions over these calculations, with fairness and unfairness generating automatic emotional arousal without invoking a moral yardstick calibrated by cultural symbols. While the notion of non-cultural morality may seem an oxymoron, such a conclusion only highlights the sociological bias toward social constructivist arguments. Morality is not just cultural; it is deeply sedimented in human neuroanatomy and evident early in primate evolution. Indeed, morality would have no power to control people if such was not the case. Morality is driven by emotions and only later in hominin evolution, perhaps with late *Homo erectus*, did cultural codes become a part of the hard-wired emotional capacity to sense justice and fairness in exchanges. Morality in this biological sense enhances solidarity and binds individuals to groups, and so it was likely grabbed by natural selection and enhanced in hominins long before the neurological capacity for symbolization with arbitrary signs and the consequent development of beliefs and ideologies in late hominins evolved.
6. *The ability to recognize an image in a mirror as a reflection of self as an object in the environment* (Gallup 1970, 1979, 1982). This capacity exists among all of the great apes, and a few other higher mammals (elephants, dolphins, and probably whales, but how would one find a mirror large enough to measure this in a whale?). All of the behavioral capacities listed above are dramatically enhanced with self-recognition and self-awareness. When animals can see themselves as objects vis-à-vis others, they are more likely to evaluate

themselves in reference to what they perceive to be the expectations of others, the expectations for reciprocity, the expectations for fairness and justice in distributions of resources, and the expectations that come with empathy and role-taking. By simply enhancing sense of self as “an object in the environment” (as G. H. Mead 1934, phrased the matter), self-directed and controlled behavior involving expectations, emotions, and non-cultural morality can evolve. Selection could have hit upon enhancing the capacity to see oneself as an object, and in conjunction with increasing the complexity and nuance of emotions so that hominins could experience such emotions as pride and shame (as emphasized by Charles Horton Cooley 1902), thereby increasing the capacity for self-control through the language of emotions. And, this kind of self-control could be achieved millions of years before cultural forms of morality evolved. And so, while chimpanzees cannot experience pride and shame (Boehm 2012), proto-shame and guilt could conceivably have evolved early in hominin evolution after the split with the ancestors of chimpanzees and other great apes.

---

## 2.4 New Kinds of Selection Pressures and Co-evolution

Natural selection was working under intense pressures to make hominins more social and group oriented. Emotions were the key to this transformation of hominin neuroanatomy, in several senses. First, emotions, per se, create social bonds if they are positive; and so natural selection worked to expand the palate of emotions in ways that increased the proportion of positive emotions and dampened the effects of negative emotions. Second, the expansion of emotions as outlined in Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 would increase the power of all of the additional characteristics of apes and hominids that increase sociality. A more nuanced palate of emotions intensifies empathizing, role taking, a reciprocating, calculating justice, viewing self and others, social control, or just about any other capacity that facilitates bonding.

In addition to these interaction effects, these additional behavioral traits can be seen as exerting selection pressures on the enhancement of emotionality. If emotions enhance sociality, bonding and group formation, per se, it has even more power when attached to these additional behavioral capacities possessed by all great apes and the common ancestor to apes and humans. And so, the existence of abilities that could potentially increase group formation were already wired into apes and, little doubt, hominin neuroanatomy; and these hard-wired propensities exerted selection pressures to enhance emotions. Indeed, since these capacities are already so developed in apes, it may be that they were enhanced by simply expanding the emotional palate and integrating it with the wiring for empathy, role taking, reciprocity, justice calculations, and self-conceptions.

If this argument is plausible, it helps explain why the emotional capabilities of hominins and humans developed so far beyond the ape measure. I have often thought that there were enough extant capacities for social bonding and group formation that could be enhanced so as to make the expansion of emotions less necessary for group formation. Surely, if empathy, role taking, self-awareness, senses of justice, reciprocity, and the like could be further developed by natural selection, the dramatic expansions of emotions would have been unnecessary, especially since emotions can turn so negative and disrupt social relations. I have never had an answer to this issue, but perhaps it has been starting me in the face all along. If emotions are the best way to enhance and give more power to all other interpersonal behaviors that are also wired into ape and hominin neuroanatomy, then these behavioral capacities put selection pressures on emotions to expand, because only with emotions do these interpersonal processes begin to have real power and teeth in controlling individualistic apes and making them more social and group oriented.

---

## 2.5 Conclusion

There is a great deal of speculation in this chapter, but it is speculation that uses empirical facts, such as the dramatic rewiring of the subcortical

areas of the brain for emotions. The methodology that I have proposed and employed with Alexandra Maryanski provides, I believe, a strategy that allows us to get a handle of what happened in the distant past; and while speculation will always be involved because social behaviors do not fossilize, it is speculation that fits the current data that can be assembled. For some, a chapter like this is not only speculative but irrelevant since many believe that humans construct their reality with their capacities for language and culture. This standard social science model is no longer adequate, however. Humans are animals that evolved like any other animal; and our traits are the consequence of adaptation to various habitats and niches in these habitats by our distant and near primate relatives. To assume that culture explains everything is, in essence, an approach that explains very little. Hominins had had to get organized, or die, long before the neocortex grew much beyond that of a contemporary chimpanzee; and thus, it is inconceivable that the only force regulating social conduct and social organization is cultural. Hominins had to get organized without the benefit of culture; and the only hard evidence about how they did so is in the wiring of human brain when compared to the brain of a chimpanzee or any great ape. The differences in subcortical areas of the brain and in the level of connectivity between the subcortex and neocortex are the “smoking gun” of what natural selection did, long before culture evolved as a consequence of natural selection late in hominin development. If we know how the brain became rewired, what the selection pressures were that drove this rewiring, and how emotionality interacts with other hard-wired behavioral propensities of our closest relatives, we have a pretty good idea of how emotions evolved but, equally important, we have much more understanding of how they operate among humans in the present, and what the neurological mechanisms driving this operation are. In essence, we know more than we did before adopting an evolutionary perspective that calls into question many of the false presumptions about culture advanced by social constructionists. With time, and in the not too distant future, the methodologies for measur-

ing and understanding specific brain assemblages will increase, and dramatically so since it is almost impossible today to keep up with advances in neuroscience. Sociologists need to be more than bystanders as this band marches by us; we need to be in the band, using this knowledge to help us understand our domain of the universe. Moreover, neurology can benefit from a sociological perspective because we have a better understanding, if we will only open our eyes to evolutionary thinking, about the selection pressures that led to the rewiring of the brain; and this knowledge can help neurologists in their search to understand brain systems. This is why I advocate for a neurosociology as a central, rather than marginal or fringe activity, in the discipline (Franks and Turner 2012).

---

## References

- Baizer, J. S., Baker, J. F., Haas, K., & Lima, R. (2007). Neurochemical organization of the nucleus *paramediana dorsalis* in the human. *Brain Research*, *1176*, 45–52.
- Bickerton, D. (2003). Symbol and structure: A comprehensive framework for language evolution. In M. S. Christiansen & S. Kirby (Eds.), *Language evolution: The states of the art* (pp. 77–93). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Boehm, C. (2012). *Moral origins: The evolution of virtue, altruism, and shame*. New York: Basic Books.
- Bronson, S. F., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2003). Animal behaviour: Fair refusal by capuchin monkeys. *Nature*, *428*, 128–140.
- Brosnan, S. F., Schiff, H. C., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2005). Tolerance for inequity may increase with social closeness in chimpanzees. *Proceedings of the Royal Society of London*, *272*, 253–258.
- Cooley, C. H. (1902/1964). *Human Nature and the Social Order*. New York: Schocken Books.
- Collins, R. (2004). *Interaction ritual chains*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Cosmides, L. (1989). The logic of social exchange: Has natural selection shaped how humans reason? *Cognition*, *31*, 187–276.
- Damasio, A. (1994). *Descartes' error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain*. New York: Putman.
- Durkheim, E. (1912/1947). *The elementary forms of the religious Life*. New York: The Free Press.
- Durkheim, E. (1912/1965). *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. New York: Free Press.
- deWaal, F. B. M. (1989). Food sharing and reciprocal obligations among chimpanzees. *Journal of Human Evolution*, *18*, 433–459.

- deWaal, F. B. M. (1991). The chimpanzee's sense of social regularity and its relation to the human sense of justice. *American Behavioral Scientist*, *34*, 335–349.
- deWaal, F. B. M. (1996). *Good natured: the origins of right and wrong in humans and other animals*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- deWaal, F. B. M. (2009). *The age of empathy: nature's lessons for a kinder society*. New York: Three Rivers Press.
- deWaal, F. B. M., & Brosnan, S. F. (2006). Simple and complex reciprocity in primates. In P. Kappeler & C. P. van Schaik (Eds.), *Cooperation in primates and humans: mechanisms and evolution* (pp. 85–106). Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
- Eccles, J. C. (1989). *Evolution of the brain: Creation of self*. London: Routledge.
- Ekman, P. (1984). Expression and the nature of emotion. In K. Scherer & P. Ekman (Eds.), *Approaches to emotion* (pp. 319–343). Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Emde, R. N. (1962). Level of meaning for infant emotions: A biosocial view. In W. A. Collins (Ed.), *Development of cognition, affect and social relations* (pp. 1–37). Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Enard, W., Przeworski, M., Fisher, S. E., Lai, C. S. L., Wiebe, V., Kitano, T., Monaco, A. P., & Paabo, S. (2002a). Molecular evolution of FOXP2, a gene involved in speech and language. *Nature*, *418*, 869–872.
- Enard, W., Khaitovich, P., Klose, J., Zollner, S., Heissig, F., Giavalisco, P., Nieselt-Struwe, K., Muchmore, E., Varki, A., Ravid, R., Doxiadis, G. M., Bontrop, R. E., & Paabo, S. (2002b). Intra- and interspecific variation in primate gene expression patterns. *Science*, *296*, 340–342.
- Franks, D. D., & Turner, J. H. (2012). *Handbook of neurosociology*. New York: Springer.
- Gallup, G. G. Jr. (1970). Chimpanzees: Self-recognition. *Science*, *167*, 88–87.
- Gallup, G. G. Jr. (1979). *Self-recognition in chimpanzees and man: A developmental and comparative perspective*. New York: Plenum.
- Gallup, G. G. Jr. (1982). Self-awareness and the emergence of mind in primates. *American Journal of Primatology*, *2*, 237–248.
- Gazzaniga, M. S., & Smylie, C. S. (1990). Hemisphere mechanisms controlling voluntary and spontaneous mechanisms. *Annual Review of Neurology*, *13*, 536–540.
- Gergely G., & Csibra, G. (2006). Sylvia's recipe: The role of imitation and pedagogy. In N. J. Enfield & S. C. Levinson (Eds.), *The transmission of cultural knowledge* (pp. 229–255). Oxford: Berg.
- Geschwind, N. (1965a). Disconnection syndromes in animals and man, part I. *Brain*, *88*, 237–294.
- Geschwind, N. (1965b). Disconnection syndromes in animals and man, part II. *Brain*, *88*, 585–644.
- Geschwind, N. (1965c). Disconnection syndromes in animals and man. *Brain*, *88*, 237–285.
- Geschwind, N. (1985). Implications for evolution, genetics, and clinical syndromes. In S. D. Glick (Eds.), *Cerebral lateralization in non-human species* (pp. 247–278). Orlando: Academic.
- Geschwind, N., & Damasio, A. (1984). The neural basis of language. *Annual Review of Neuroscience*, *7*, 127–147.
- Goffman, E. (1967). *Interaction ritual*. Garden City: Anchor Books.
- Hare, B., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2001). Do chimpanzees know what conspecifics know? *Animal Behavior*, *61*, 139–151.
- Hare, B., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Chimpanzees deceive a human competitor by hiding. *Cognition*, *101*: 495–514.
- Horowitz, A. C. (2003). Do chimps ape? Or apes human? Imitation and intension in humans (*Homo sapiens*) and other animals. *Journal of Comparative Psychology*, *117*, 325–336.
- Itakura, S. (1996). An exploratory study of gaze-monitoring in non-human primates. *Japanese Psychological Research*, *38*, 174–180.
- Jarvis, M. J., & Ettliger, G. (1977). Cross-modal recognition in chimpanzees and monkeys. *Neuropsychologia*, *15*, 499–506.
- Lawler, E. J. (2001). An affect theory of social exchange. *American Journal of Sociology*, *107*, 321–352.
- Lawler, E. J., Thye, S., & Yoon, J. (2009). *Social commitments in a depersonalized world*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Leslie, R. A., Johnson-Frey, S. H., & Grafton, S. T. (2004). Functional imaging of the face and hand imitation: Towards a motor theory of empathy. *NeuroImage*, *21*, 601–607.
- Maryanski, A. (1986). *African ape social structure: A comparative analysis*. Ph. D. Dissertation, University of California, Irvine.
- Maryanski, A. (1987). African ape social structure: Is there strength in weak ties? *Social Networks*, *9*, 191–215.
- Maryanski, A. (1992). The last ancestor: An ecological-network model on the origins of human sociality. *Advances in Human Ecology*, *2*, 1–32.
- Maryanski, A. (1993). The elementary forms of the first proto-human society: An ecological/social network approach. *Advances in Human Evolution*, *2*, 215–241.
- Maryanski, A. (1995). African ape social networks: A blueprint for reconstructing early hominid social structure. In J. Steele & S. Shennan (Eds.), *Archaeology of human ancestry* (pp. 67–90). London: Routledge.
- Maryanski, A., & Turner, J. H. (1992). *The social cage: Human nature and the evolution of society*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Mead, G. H. (1934). *Mind, self, and society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Menzel, E. W. (1971). Communication about the environment in a group of young chimpanzees. *Folia Primatologica*, *15*, 220–232.
- Mitani, J., & Watts, D. (2001). Why do chimpanzees hunt and share meat? *Animal Behavior*, *915–924*.
- Mitani, J., & Watts, D. (2001). Why do chimpanzees hunt and share meat? *Animal Behavior*, *915–924*.



- Okamoto, S., Tomonaga, M., Ishii, K., Kawai, N., Tanaka, M., & Matsuzawa, T. (2002). An infant chimpanzee (*Pan troglodytes*) follows human gaze. *Animal Cognition*, *5*, 107–114.
- Passingham, R. E. (1973). Anatomical differences between the neocortex of man and the other primates. *Brain Behavioral Evolution*, *7*, 337–359.
- Passingham, R. E. (1975). Changes in the size and organization of the brain in man and his ancestors. *Brain and Behavior Evolution*, *11*, 73–90.
- Passingham, R. E. (1982). *The human primate*. Oxford: Freeman.
- Povinelli, D. J. (2000). *Folk physics for apes: The chimpanzee's theory of how the world works*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Povinelli, D. J., & Eddy, T. J. (1997). Specificity of gaze-following in young chimpanzees. *British Journal of Developmental Psychology*, *15*, 213–222.
- Rizzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (2002). From mirror neurons to imitation: Facts and speculations. In W. Prinz & A. N. Meltzoff (Eds.), *The imitative mind: Development, evolution and brain bases* (pp. 247–266). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rumbaugh, D., & Savage-Rumbaugh, E. S. (1990). Chimpanzees: Competencies for language and numbers. In W. Stebbins & M. Berkley (Eds.), *Comparative perception: Complex signals* (Vol. 2, pp. 409–441). New York: Wiley.
- Savage-Rumbaugh, S., & Lewin, R. (1994). *Kanzi: The ape at the brink of the human mind*. New York: Wiley.
- Savage-Rumbaugh, S., Seveik, R. A., & Hopkins, W. D. (1988). Symbolic cross-model transfer in two species. *Child Development*, *59*, 617–625.
- Savage-Rumbaugh, S. E., Murphy, J., Seveik, R. A., Brakke, K. E., Williams, S. L., & Rumbaugh, D. M. (1993). Language comprehension in the ape and child. *Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development*, *58*, 1–222.
- Semendeferi, K., Lu, A., Schenker, N., & Damasio, H. (2002). Humans and great apes share a large frontal cortex. *Nature Neuroscience*, *5*, 272–276.
- Sherwood, C. C. (2007). The evolution of neuron types and cortical histology in apes and humans. In T. M. Preuss & J. H. Kaas (Eds.), *Evolution of nervous systems 4: The evolution of primate nervous systems* (pp. 355–378). Oxford: Academic.
- Sherwood, C. C., Holloway, R. L., Erwin, J. M., & Hoff, P. R. (2004). Cortical orofacial motor representation in old world monkeys, great apes and humans. *Brain Behavior and Evolution*, *63*, 82–106.
- Sherwood, C. C., Holloway, R. L., Semendeferi K., & Hof, P. R. (2005). Is prefrontal white matter enlargement a human evolutionary specialization? *Nature Neuroscience*, *8*, 537–538.
- Sherwood, C. C., Subiaul, F., & Zawidzki, T. W. (2008). A natural history of the human mind: Tracing evolutionary changes in brain and cognition. *Journal of Anatomy*, *212*, 426–454.
- Spencer, B., & Gillen, F. (1899). *The nature tribes of central Australia*. New York: Macmillan and Co.
- Stanford, C. (1999). Great apes and early hominids: Reconstructing ancestral behavior. In P. Dolhinow, & A. Fuentes (Eds.), *The nonhuman primates*. (pp. 1–37), London: Mayfield Publishing Co.
- Stephan, H. (1983). Evolutionary trends in limbic structures. *Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews*, *7*, 367–374.
- Stephan, H., & Andy, O. J. (1969). Quantitative comparative neuroanatomy of primates: An attempt at phylogenetic interpretation. *Annals of the New York Academy of Science*, *167*, 370–387.
- Stephan, H., & Andy, O. J. (1977). Quantitative comparison of the amygdala in insectivores and primates. *Acta Antomica*, *98*, 130–153.
- Stephan, H., Baron, G., & Frahm, H. (1986). Comparative size of brains and brain components. In H. Steklis & J. Erwin (Eds.), *Comparative primate biology*, (Vol. 4, pp. 1–37). New York: Alan Liss.
- Stephen, H., Frahm, H., & Baron, G. (1981). New and revised data on volumes of brain structures in insectivores and primates. *Folia Primatologica*, *35*, 1–29.
- Subiaul, F. (2007). The imitation faculty in monkeys: Evaluating its features, distribution, and evolution. *Journal of Anthropological Science*, *85*, 35–62.
- Tomasello, M., & Call, J. (1997). *Primate cognition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tomasello, M., Hare, B., & Fogleman, T. (2001). The ontogeny of gaze following in chimpanzees, *Pan troglodytes*, and rhesus macaques, *Macaca mulatta*. *Animal Behavior*, *61*, 335–343.
- Tomonaga, M. (1999). Attending to the others' attention in macaques' joint attention or not? *Primate Research*, *15*, 425.
- Turner, J. H. (1996a). The evolution of emotions in humans: A Darwinian-Durkheimian analysis. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, *26*, 1–34.
- Turner, J. H. (1996b). Cognition, emotion, and interaction in the big-brained primate. *Contemporary Studies in Sociology*, *13*, 297–318.
- Turner, J. H. (1996c). Toward a general sociological theory of emotions. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior*, *29*, 132–162.
- Turner, J. H. (1997). The evolution of emotions: The nonverbal basis of human social organization. In U. Segerstrale & P. Molnar (Eds.), *Nonverbal communication: Where nature meets culture* (pp. 211–228). Hillsdale: Erlbaum.
- Turner, J. H. (1998). The evolution of moral systems. *Critical Review*, *11*, 211–232.
- Turner, J. H. (1999). The neurology of emotions: Implications for sociological theories of interpersonal behavior. *Social Perspectives on Emotion*, *5*, 81–108.
- Turner, J. H. (2000). *On the origins of human emotions: A sociological inquiry into the evolution of human affect*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Turner, J. H. (2002). *Face to face: Toward a theory of interpersonal behavior*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.

- Turner, J. H. (2007). *Human emotions: A sociological theory*. Oxford: Routledge.
- Turner, J. H. (2010a). *Theoretical principles of sociology, volume 2 on microdynamics*. New York: Springer.
- Turner, J. H. (2010b). *Theoretical principles of sociology, volume 1 on macrodynamics*. New York: Springer.
- Turner, J. H., & Maryanski A. (2005). *Incest: Origins of the taboo*. Boulder: Paradigm.
- Turner, J. H., & Maryanski A. (2008). *On the origins of societies by natural selection*. Boulder: Paradigm.
- Turner, J. H., & Maryanski, A. (2012). The biology and neurology of group processes. *Advances in Group Processes*, 26, 1–38.

Jan E. Stets and Ryan Trettevik

---

## 3.1 Introduction

Only recently in the history of identity theory have emotions been examined. This is because identity theory, which has its roots in symbolic interaction, largely maintained a cognitive orientation of the actor given the early influential work of George Herbert Mead (1934). Mead did not theorize much about the self and emotions other than to make us aware that one's emotional expressions signaled particular meanings that called forth particular responses by others in the situation (Turner and Stets 2005). For example, the weeping of an individual in response to the loss of a loved one during a funeral would evoke in another responses that signaled sympathy such as an embrace or providing comforting words of solace. Clearly, there is more to emotions than their expression serving as a stimulus for others' responses. Nonetheless, Mead's ideas serve as a starting point for identity researchers in understanding the emotional dimension of the self.

Cooley ([1902]/1964), another important figure in the symbolic interaction tradition, implicitly incorporated emotions into his conceptualization of the *looking-glass self* given his emphasis on pride and shame that might be evoked

when individuals reflected upon how they would feel when they thought about how others evaluated them. For example, if a person claimed to be a bright mathematician, but then was unable to solve a math problem in front of the class, he might feel shame upon reflecting on how he thought others saw him. Cooley's insight that we have an emotional response to how we think others sees us, and whether we think they see us as living up to or failing to live up to who we claim to be, has become important in understanding emotions in identity theory. However, at the time, researchers did not use Cooley's insight in developing a theory about the self and emotions.

While the earliest identity theorists recognized that emotions emerged out of the identity process, the emotions generally were seen as a response to whether behavior that was indicative of an identity was supported by others in an interaction (McCall and Simmons 1978). Here we see an affinity with Cooley's thesis because individuals' emotional responses are based on whether they think others accept that their behavior reflects the identities that they are claiming. If individuals see that others are supporting their behavior, they will feel good, but if they see that others are not supporting their behavior, they will feel bad. In the latter case, McCall and Simmons maintained that individuals would engage in any number of strategies to cope with the negative feeling in order to change their negative feelings to positive feelings. For example, if the bright mathematician was not able to solve the math problem in front of the class, he might ask others to think of his blunder as a one-time occurrence.

---

We would like to thank members of the UCR Social Psychology Research Seminar for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

---

J. E. Stets (✉) · R. Trettevik  
University of California, Riverside, USA  
e-mail: jan.stets@ucr.edu

Since 1990, more serious attention has been given to the role of emotion in identity theory beginning with the work of Burke (1991). In this work, he discussed the negative arousal (distress) that was experienced when individuals' identities were not confirmed by others in a situation. Notice that this continued Cooley's argument of the role of others in influencing our emotions. It was also consistent with McCall and Simmons thesis that others reactions to us importantly influenced our emotions. What was novel in Burke's work is that he outlined the details of the identity verification process that provided important insight into how emotions emerge within the self. Further, he formulated hypotheses regarding the conditions under which more intense negative arousal would occur. The details of the identity verification process together with his hypotheses jumpstarted research on emotions in identity theory that is now almost 25 years old.

The goal of this chapter is to provide a summary of the theoretical and empirical work to date on emotions in identity theory. To situate the reader, we begin with a brief overview of identity theory. We then discuss how emotions have been incorporated into the theory, focusing on the negative and positive emotions resulting from the verification process as well as the factors leading to various specific emotions. Following this theoretical discussion, we summarize the research on emotions in identity theory.

We discuss the empirical evidence regarding the relationship between identity non-verification and negative emotions. We also discuss research that has examined whether: (1) frequent vs. infrequent identity non-verification influences negative emotions, (2) non-verifying support from family and friends effects negative emotions, and (3) those higher in the social structure experience less identity non-verification or are better able to tolerate non-verification such that they experience more positive than negative emotions. Finally, we review research in identity theory that has investigated moral emotions, how individuals cope with negative emotion, and how positive emotions can be a resource in interaction.

We conclude with some future directions for research that would help advance our under-

standing of emotions. We highlight the need for research that examines emotions that: (1) are produced by negative/stigmatized identities, (2) are experienced when multiple identities are activated, (3) emerge across encounters, and (4) are more specific and precise, thereby going beyond an analysis of simply positive and negative emotions.

---

## 3.2 Overview of Identity Theory

There are three emphases within identity theory: the *structural* emphasis (Stryker [1980]/2002), the *interactional* emphasis (McCall and Simmons 1978), and the *perceptual control* emphasis (Burke and Stets 2009). The structural addresses how the social structure influences one's identities and behaviors, the interactional focuses on how identities are maintained in interaction through negotiation with others, and the perceptual control highlights the internal dynamics within the individual including the identity verification process that influences behavior. While past reviews have addressed each of these emphases separately (Burke and Stets 2009; Stets 2006), we integrate these different emphases because we see one theory with slightly different orientations that complement one another. Importantly, across all three emphases, there is a common place where emotions emerge. Emotions appear from meeting (or failing to meet) the behavioral expectations tied to an identity. This will be an important starting point in our discussion on emotions. First, we begin with an overview of the key concepts in identity theory.

An *identity* is a set of *meanings* attached to the self while in a role (role identities) (McCall and Simmons 1978; Stryker [1980]/2002), in a group (group identities), or when differentiating oneself from others (person identities) (Burke and Stets 2009). Meaning is a mediation response to a stimulus; meaning mediates between perceiving a stimulus and responding to it (Osgood et al. 1957). When the stimulus is seeing oneself as a role player, group member, or unique person, the meanings would be individuals' reflections as to who they are when they think of themselves



in that role, group, or as a distinct person. The self-meanings attached to each stimulus make up one's identity for that stimulus, and behavior should be consistent with the self-meanings or identity associated with each stimulus. For example, a man might have the meanings of being "reliable" and "friendly" when he thinks about himself in the worker role identity. The meaning of his behavior should correspond to the meaning of the identity to which it is related. Thus, we would expect him to always complete his work assignments on time, and get along well with his co-workers.

Identity theory addresses the internal dynamics that operate within individuals when an identity is activated in a situation (Burke and Stets 2009). When activated, the meanings that define an identity serve as the standard for individuals, and the identity standard guides behavior in the situation. Further, individuals seek to have their activated identity verified in the situation. *Identity verification* occurs when the meanings that individuals attribute to themselves in the situation (on the basis of how they *think* others see them) matches the meanings in their identity standard. The "others" who individuals rely on to determine how they are being perceived in the situation involve those to whom they are close such as family members (parents, siblings, spouses/partners, and children) and friends.

The identity standard meanings are always the "ruler" for measuring how people think that others see them in the situation. These meanings are measured using a semantic differential in which respondents are asked to rank themselves on a scale of 0–10 between two bi-polar adjectives. For example, if individuals identify themselves as "8" on a 0–10 scale for being "fair," their fairness identity is set at "8." If they think that others see them as acting "8" in terms of being fair in situations (these are the reflected appraisals or their perceptions of how others view them), there is a perfect match between perceived meanings of themselves in situations and their identity standard meanings. This is identity verification, and individuals will feel good. Alternatively, if the reflected appraisals indicate that they are acting a "2" in terms of being fair in situations,

this does not correspond to the identity standard of "8"; there is, then, a non-correspondence between how the person thinks they are being perceived and the person's identity standard meanings. This is identity non-verification, and people will feel bad (Burke and Harrod 2005; Burke and Stets 1999).

The verification process is outlined above in terms of one identity that may be activated in a situation. However, people have multiple identities given the various roles they may take on, groups they belong to, and different ways in which they differentiate themselves from others. Consequently, multiple identities may be activated in a situation. To understand which multiple identities may be activated, we need to discuss the hierarchical arrangement of identities within the person based on their salience and prominence. Identities located higher in an individual's identity salience hierarchy and prominence hierarchy have a higher likelihood of being activated in a situation than those lower in the hierarchy. We briefly discuss each of these hierarchies.

*Identity salience* is the probability that an identity will be invoked across situations (Stryker 1968, [1980]/2002). Identities that are more salient have a greater likelihood of being played out in a situation. It is assumed that people have some choice in the identities that they will enact across situations, thus identity salience highlights the agentic aspect of the self in social interaction (Serpe and Stryker 1987, 1993).

Identities are arranged into a *salience hierarchy* based on how likely each identity is to be activated relative to other identities that a person may claim (Serpe 1987; Stryker [1980]/2002). The higher an identity is in the salience hierarchy, the greater the likelihood that an individual will actively seek out opportunities to perform the identity, even in situations where it may not apply (Serpe 1987; Stryker and Serpe 1982). For example, a person who has a very salient father identity may enact it at work by showing his co-workers a recent photo that he took of his children or disclosing a recent argument that he had with one of his children. He creates an occasion to express his salient identity. Thus, two identi-

ties may frequently co-occur for him in the workplace: his worker identity and his father identity.

A person who has a more salient identity is more committed to that identity. *Commitment* refers to the extent to which people: (1) are tied to social networks based on a particular identity, and (2) feel discomfort if they were no longer engaged in interaction with others associated with that identity. When a person's ties to a specific set of others depend upon playing out a particular identity, then that identity will be salient to the individual (Serpe 1987; Stryker [1980]/2002; Stryker and Serpe 1994).

*Prominence* represents the importance of an identity to an individual (McCall and Simmons 1978). The meanings underlying the identity are desired and valued. People want others to see them this way. Like the salience hierarchy, the prominence hierarchy is based on how important an identity is relative to the other identities that a person claims. While salience and prominence are similar concepts, the two are different. Salience is based on probable behavior (an external referent) while prominence is based on personal values (an internal referent). While some identities can be salient and important, other identities can be salient but not important (Stryker and Serpe 1994). While more research is needed to examine the relationship between prominent and salient identities, their relevance for emotions has to do with the identity verification process. We expect that the non-verification of a salient or prominent identity in a situation should cause individuals to feel bad.

### 3.3 Theorizing about Emotions in Identity Theory

In identity theory, emotions appear based on identity performances and the extent to which individuals think that others see them as meeting the expectations tied to a particular identity in a situation. When individuals get support for the identity they claim in a situation (McCall and Simmons 1978; Stryker 2004), or when others in a situation see them in the same way that they see themselves given their identity claim (Burke and Stets 2009), they will feel positive emotions. In

turn, the identity may increase in salience and/or prominence. Alternatively, the lack of support or shared view as to who one is in the situation generates negative emotions. Correspondingly, the identity may decrease in salience and/or prominence. As mentioned earlier, the central idea regarding the relationship between identity support (or the lack thereof) and emotion (positive or negative) is rooted in Cooley's looking glass self in which individuals feel pride or shame depending upon whether they think others evaluate them in a positive or negative way.

Emotions are not only internally experienced by individuals but they also are outwardly related to the social structure. For example, Stryker (2004) argued that emotions influence the formation of social networks because individuals who share common affective meanings are more likely to enter into and maintain social relationships with each other. When positive feelings are linked to an identity because individuals are meeting the expectations tied to the identity, it should encourage individuals to spend more time in this identity, develop more relationships based on the identity, thus expanding their social network. Negative feelings should have the opposite effect. They should discourage the formation and expansion of social networks because others are not supporting one's identity performance. Once again, we see how emotions are both a cause and consequence of identity salience and prominence.

Because positive emotions result from individuals meeting the identity expectations or being verified in a situation, individuals will continue to do what they are doing, leaving their behavior relatively unchanged. This is because they expect that future interactions will generate similar verifying outcomes and positive feelings. It is negative emotions that are stressful for individuals to tolerate. Therefore, people try to find ways to reduce and/or eliminate their bad feelings.

One thing people may do is change how they are acting in a situation with the goal of obtaining feedback from others that better aligns with the meanings in their identity. For example, if we return to our earlier discussion of the fairness identity in which the identity standard is set at "8" (on a scale of 0-10) and a person thinks that others see him as acting as a "2" in terms of being

fair in the situation, the “2” does not correspond to the identity standard meaning of “8,” and the individual will feel bad. In response, the individual might show greater equality in the situation, and with increased intensity, so that others come to see the person as an “8.”

If the person were to behave as a “10” in terms of fairness, there is still a mismatch from the identity standard meaning of “8.” How others see the individual exceeds the individual’s identity standard meaning rather than falling short of it. In identity theory, this still produces negative emotion because the goal has not been met (of an “8”). Consequently, the person might work hard at appearing less fair since current perceptions reveal excessive fairness.

While individuals can change their behavior in response to their negative feelings, they also can change how they think about the situation in order to make themselves feel better. For example, they can ignore the non-verifying feedback they receive from others thereby bypassing the negative feelings that otherwise might ensue. An important contribution that McCall and Simmons (1978) made to the study of emotions in identity theory is identifying the various ways in which individuals cognitively respond when they experience negative emotions. These strategies help people lessen or relieve their negative feelings. One strategy is to rely on “short-term credit.” Here, though individuals are currently not getting support for their identity, they “shrug off” the nonsupport as a one-time occurrence because they have received support for this identity in the past. Thus, they “ride-out” the non-support because they see it as an anomaly; it is fleeting. This helps them tolerate their negative feelings.

Another strategy is “selective perception.” This strategy involves focusing on feedback from others that supports one’s identity and ignoring feedback that indicates that others do not support one’s identity. Similar to this strategy is the strategy of “selective interpretation.” Instead of choosing what feedback to focus on, individuals choose how to interpret the feedback they are given. For example, they may interpret feedback as being supportive of their identity when it may not be supportive. Additional strategies include “criticizing,” “negatively sanctioning,”

or “blaming” others for not verifying one’s identity; “disavowing an unsuccessful identity performance” by claiming that the performance was an accident or unintentional; “switching to another identity” and thus getting some support in the situation; or “withdrawing” from a non-verifying interaction.

Sometimes, neither behavioral nor cognitive strategies diminish or eliminate the negative feelings. If the negative feelings persist, individuals can reduce the salience and level of commitment to the identity (Stryker 2004). They can also reduce the prominence of the identity. Alternatively, they can change the meanings in their identity over time (Burke and Stets 2009). This is identity change. In identity theory, it is assumed that identity change is a very gradual process. Indeed, individuals may not find that their identity is any different from yesterday, last week, or last month. It is only when considering a longer period of time from months to years that they may see a difference. If individuals repeatedly encounter situations in which the meanings regarding how they think others see them departs from the meanings held in their identity standard, and neither behavioral nor cognitive strategies reduce or remove the negative emotions that result from the discrepancy, they may change their identity meanings in the direction of the feedback they perceive they are getting from others.

In identity theory, less salient and/or prominent identities will be more likely to change than more committed and/or prominent identities. If more individuals in a person’s social network expect the person to enact behavior consistent with a set of identity meanings, then it will be costly to change the meanings of the identity than an identity based on fewer ties to others. Additionally, since salient identities are more likely to be invoked in a situation, there will be more occasions to enact behaviors based on more salient identities than less salient identities. Thus, it will be easier to change less salient identities because the likelihood of enactment is not as high. It is also easier to change less important identities, because people are not as attached to the meanings held in their standards.

### 3.3.1 Specific Emotions

Identity theorists have largely focused on positive and negative emotions to the exclusion of a wide array of specific emotions that individuals' experience. There has been some theorizing about the *intensity* of the emotion that may emerge as well as the specific emotions that may surface when non-verification occurs. Three factors appear to be particularly relevant in producing more intense emotions: the level of salience and commitment, frequency of verification, and verification or non-verification by significant others.

More salient and committed identities should generate more intense positive emotion if they are supported or verified in a situation, and they should generate more intense negative emotion if they are not supported or not verified (Burke 1991; Stryker 2004). In turn, strong positive emotions should further strengthen salient and committed identities, while strong negative emotions should weaken them.

The frequency of non-supportive or non-verifying feedback should influence more intense negative emotions (Burke 1991). The more that individuals receive feedback that others are not seeing them in the same way that they see themselves, the more that they will be unable to initiate or sustain whatever they are doing, and the more distressful their emotional reaction will be. Their normal activity is being disrupted by the non-verifying feedback, and the more this happens, the more intense the negative feelings.

The source of the non-verifying feedback is still another factor that should influence the experience of intense emotions. Non-verifying feedback from significant others such as family member, friends, and other close associates should result in more negative feelings than non-verifying feedback from strangers or acquaintances (Burke 1991). Individuals are more likely to have experienced interactions with close others in which each verifies the identity of the other, thus developing and maintaining mutually verifying relationships over time (Burke and Stets 1999). When a mutually verifying relationship gets disrupted when a close other does not verify one's identity, the non-verifying feedback is experienced in a particularly distressful and intense manner.

More recently, an analysis on the source of non-verifying feedback has been expanded to consider specific emotions that may emerge when either the person or the other in the situation is responsible for not seeing the person in a way that is consistent with the person's identity standard (Stets and Burke 2005). The person may accidentally or unintentionally engage in some behavior in which the meanings are inconsistent with the meanings in an identity. For example, a person may act ineptly on the dance floor and thereby challenge the dancer identity meaning of a "good" dancer. Thus, the person is the source of the verification problem. Alternatively, others in the situation may be the source of the verification disruption perhaps by changing the expectations in a situation. For example, male workers at an assembly plant may be threatened by the independent and dominant leadership style that their female foreman shows. Consequently, they may expect her to be more feminine in her leadership identity than how she defines herself.

When individuals attribute the identity non-verification to themselves, they may experience feelings of humiliation varying in intensity from embarrassment to shame (Stets and Burke 2005). Alternatively, when non-verification is attributed to others, individuals may experience feelings such as annoyance or hostility. While embarrassment and shame are negative feelings directed at oneself, annoyance and hostility are negative feelings directed at others.

Another expansion on the source of non-verifying feedback in situations involves considering the status (esteem and respect) and power (control of resources) of the non-verifying others relative to the individual seeking identity support or verification (Stets and Burke 2005). Here, we see how one's position in the social structure is brought into the situation and may influence the specific emotions that individuals experience. For example, when the individual rather than another is responsible for not being verified in a situation, the person may feel shame when others in the situation have higher status than the individual, the individual may feel embarrassment when others are of equal status to the person, and discomfort (a very mild form of humiliation) when others have lower status (Stets and Burke 2005). When others rather than the individual are

responsible for the individual not being verified in a situation, the person may feel fear when others in the situation have higher power than the individual, anger when others are of equal power to the person, and rage when others have lower power than the individual.

Further, identity salience prominence, and commitment might influence the intensity of the emotions that are experienced when status and power are considered. For example, when another with higher power is responsible for the individual not being verified in the situation and the individual feels fear, this fear may transmute into terror if the identity that is not being verified is of high salience and/or prominence to the person. Alternatively, if the identity that is not being verified is of low salience and/or prominence, the person may simply feel uneasy.

Overall, the more recent expansion of emotions in identity theory offers several advances over earlier theorizing. First, particular kinds of non-supportive or non-verifying feedback are associated with particular emotional states. Sometimes, others are responsible for the non-verifying feedback (an external attribution) and sometimes the individual is responsible (an internal attribution). Different emotions will emerge on the basis of the attribution of responsibility. When another is responsible for non-verifying feedback, one may feel anger (negative emotions directed outward), and when the individual is responsible, feelings such as shame may emerge (negative emotions turned inward). The different emotions that emerge from the attribution process may be conducive to reducing non-verifying feedback in the future. For example, the feeling of shame may encourage individuals to modify their behavior in the future so that it signals greater consistency with their identity. Alternatively, expressing anger may encourage others to temper future non-verifying feedback.

Second, rather than discussing the intensity of positive or negative emotions, less intense and more intense emotions are given different names, and they are tied to different attribution processes of non-verification. Thus, embarrassment is a less intense state of humiliation than shame; indeed each feels very different to the person. Third, social structural factors are brought into the analysis of

emotions by considering the dimensions of status and power. And, we can see how identity salience and prominence can influence the intensity of the emotions that are experienced when status and power are considered.

---

### 3.4 Research on Emotions in Identity Theory

Empirical work has tested many of the predictions in identity theory on emotions. Overall, the findings have supported many but not all of the theoretical expectations. Thus, there is still much that we need to learn about emotions and identities. In what follows, we summarize the main areas of empirical research on emotions in the theory.

#### 3.4.1 Identity Non-Verification and Negative Emotion

The core identity theory prediction regarding emotions is that individuals will feel good when their identities are verified, and they will feel bad when their identities are not verified. These emotional outcomes of the identity verification process have been examined in a longitudinal survey study that followed newly married couples during the first two years of marriage (Burke and Harrod 2005; Burke and Stets 1999), in a series of studies simulating the worker identity in the laboratory (Stets 2003, 2004, 2005; Stets and Asencio 2008; Stets and Osborn 2008), and a series of seven studies using both survey and laboratory data to examine the moral identity (Stets and Burke 2014).<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> In the laboratory studies, a work situation was created and the worker identity was invoked. After completing each of three simple yet different tasks, participants as “workers” received feedback that was either: (1) expected given their work (identity verification of their worker identity); (2) more positive than what they would expect (identity non-verification that exceeds their worker identity standard); and (3) more negative than what they would expect (identity non-verification that falls short of their worker identity standard). Feedback was in the form of points earned for their work. Thus, they would receive either the expected number of points for their work, more points than they would have expected, or less points than they would have expected.



In these studies, researchers consistently found that when individuals thought that others saw them as failing to meet their identity standard, they experienced negative emotions. However, when they thought that others saw them as exceeding their identity standard, the longitudinal survey found that individuals reported negative feelings (even though others' evaluation were more positive than their own evaluations), while the laboratory studies found individuals reporting positive feelings. Thus, the findings are in agreement with the prediction that non-verification in a negative direction (people do not meet their identity standard) influence negative emotions, but they are not in agreement that non-verification in a positive direction (people exceeding their identity standard) influences negative emotions.

Identity theory predicts a cognitive consistency process to individuals' emotional reactions and the longitudinal survey supports this: people seek evaluations that match their self-views and avoid evaluations that do not match their self-views; however, the laboratory findings are suggestive of a self-enhancement process: people seek positive evaluations and avoid negative evaluations (Stets and Asencio 2008).

A recent study has revealed these conflicting findings may be due to measurement issues. Researchers used a large data set derived from seven studies that included both a survey and laboratory component to address the emotional responses that occur when identities are not verified (Stets and Burke 2014).<sup>2</sup> They examined whether individuals showed an enhancement response (they feel good) or consistency response (they feel bad) to identity non-verification in a positive direction (the meanings in the reflected appraisals are more positive than the meanings of the identity standard). The results showed that when reflected appraisals and situational mean-

ings were taken into account (measures which were not fully obtained in the prior laboratory studies demonstrating an enhancement effect), there was more evidence for a consistency effect than an enhancement effect. Individuals felt bad rather than good for being over-rated.

When people were given the opportunity to think about how others viewed them, it encouraged them to think about their identity standard as a basis of comparison. Essentially, the meanings in people's identity standards come to awareness so that they can evaluate whether their identity is being verified in the situation. When individuals have the opportunity to retrieve from memory their identity meanings in light of their perceptions of others' meanings of them, any discrepancy between the two is distressing. When people have no reason to access their identity meanings in a situation, non-verifying information may simply be categorized as good or bad, and they may respond positively to the positive information and negatively to the negative information. This is the enhancement effect, and it does not involve a comparison of self-and other-meanings. It only involves the reward or punishment value of the feedback itself. This may be why the laboratory findings were more suggestive of a self-enhancement process: the opportunity to self-reflect was not provided when individuals were given feedback on each task they carried out in the lab when the worker identity was activated.

Further, because the moral dilemmas in the survey and moral task in the lab were highly relevant to the moral identity, they facilitated activation of the moral identity and the motivation to verify it. The more relevant the meanings in the situation are to one's identity, the greater should be the activation of that identity in the situation and the motivation to have that identity verified in the situation. When the situation has strong meanings for an identity and identity non-verification emerges, individuals should feel bad. Lacking these potent relevant meanings, when a person experiences positive feedback, for example, they may feel good, but the feedback may not be relevant to the activated identity in the situation. This may be a factor as to why the initial laboratory findings were more suggestive

---

<sup>2</sup> The seven studies measured the moral identity, moral behavior, and emotions. The surveys measured people's moral identity and provided eight different moral dilemmas in which participants were to indicate what action they took in the situation, and how they felt. In the laboratory, participants were placed in a testing situation in which they had an opportunity to cheat without clear detection to obtain a higher score.



of a self-enhancement process: internal identity meanings (of the worker identity) may not have been activated because external situational meanings did not cue the meanings of being a worker to the participants. Thus, there may have been no motivation to self-verify the worker identity. Overall, this recent study (Stets and Burke 2014) helps put prior research into perspective and identifies some of the possible measurement issues that can make it difficult to distinguish between consistency and enhancement effects.

### 3.4.2 Frequency and Source of Identity Non-Verification and Negative Emotion

As mentioned earlier, it has been hypothesized that more frequent non-support or non-verifying feedback should bring about more intense negative emotions (Burke 1991). Additionally, non-verifying feedback from significant others such as family members, friends, and other close associates should influence more intense negative feelings than non-verifying feedback from strangers or acquaintances. These two hypotheses have been tested (Stets 2003, 2004, 2005).

Contrary to the expectation that the intensity of negative emotions will increase with repeated identity non-verification in situations, findings from the worker identity studies discussed earlier reveals that negative emotions become less intense (Stets 2003, 2005). It is possible that this effect is showing that people's identity standards are changing (Stets 2003). While a stronger negative response to repeated identity non-verification would indicate that people think that others see them in a way that does not correspond to how they see themselves, a weaker negative response to repeated non-verification suggests that the non-correspondence is being reduced. A closer match in "self-other" views may be due to individuals changing their self-views in the direction of others' views. This is identity change.

There may be several reasons why individuals may change their identity standard, at least in the worker identity studies (Stets 2005). First, short-term laboratory studies may create a low level of commitment to identities, and less committed

identities may result in a more fluid identity standard. Second, participants in the worker identity studies were unable to take any action to change the feedback they received such as challenging the feedback by claiming it was erroneous. If individuals are unable to ward off disconfirming information, they may come to see it as reflective of themselves. Finally, the worker in the worker identity laboratory studies was always in a weaker position of power compared to the person who was giving the participant feedback. The person giving the feedback was always the "manager" in the study. Thus, if the source of the feedback is a more powerful person, they may have more influence in changing one's self-view (Cast et al. 1999).

Does the significance of the source of the non-verifying feedback intensify negative feelings? This has been empirically investigated in two ways. Using data from the General Social Survey, researchers examined whether interaction in the family, which consists of significant others, brought about more negative emotions than interaction at work, which is comprised of non-significant others (Stets and Tsushima 2001). Though the researchers did not directly test identity non-verification at home or at work, their analysis of anger revealed that more intense anger was reported in the family than at work.

In an extension on the worker identity studies discussed earlier, in one study, some participants had an opportunity to get to know their co-worker for about 10 minutes before the study began (familiar condition) compared to not being given this opportunity (unfamiliar condition) (Stets 2005).<sup>3</sup> Though getting to know another in the lab for 10 minutes is only a proxy of a significant relationship, the results showed that familiarity did result in more negative emotions in response to identity non-verification. However, this effect appeared only when the non-verification occurred once compared to more than once during the study, and only when the non-verification was in a positive direction (the other saw the person

<sup>3</sup> Those in the familiar condition reported more liking for their co-worker and saw the other as a potential friend compared to the unfamiliar condition. Thus, a short interaction with another is enough to anticipate that the other will support and perhaps verify one's identity.

more positively than did the person) compared to a negative direction (the other saw the person less positively than did the person). Because of the limitations in the above two studies (either there was no direct test of the verification process or there was no direct measure of significant others), more empirical work is needed.

### 3.4.3 Status, Identity Non-Verification and Negative Emotion

People's position in the social structure may influence their emotional response to identity non-verification. Those with higher status should be more likely than those with lower status to experience identity verification because they are more influential (given their greater power) in getting others to confirm their self-views (Cast et al. 1999). Because identity verification produces positive feelings, higher status people will be more likely to enjoy positive feelings and less likely to experience negative feelings than lower status people. Two studies support this idea.

Again, using data from the General Social Survey (Stets and Tsushima 2001), the researchers examined the relative status of identities in the home and at work. In the home, the parent identity has the highest status, the child identity has the lowest status, and spouses, interacting with each other in the spouse identity, represent equal status. At work, the employer identity has the highest status, the employee identity has the lowest status, and co-workers, interacting with each other in the worker identity, represent equal status. Consistent with the above, their analysis of anger revealed that those with lower status identities either at home or in the workplace were more likely to report more intense anger. Because of the greater intensity of their anger, those with lower status identities were also more likely to report their anger lasting a long time.

More recently, it has been argued that higher status compared to lower status is tied to greater access and control of resources in the social structure that facilitate the verification of one's identity, and in turn, positive emotions (Burke 2008). Further, when identity non-verification emerges,

higher status persons will be able to tolerate the disturbance, seeing it as minor or temporary, because they have many resources at their disposal to withstand or quickly respond to the non-verification. In turn, this prevents a strong negative emotional reaction to the non-verification. For example, a husband who is not able to repair a home electrical problem (a disturbance in verifying the husband identity) may be more upset when he has no knowledge on how to solve the electrical problem and cannot afford to hire someone to repair it compared to those who may have these resources available. Examining longitudinal data on newly married couples during the first few years of marriage, Burke (2008) found that compared to lower status individuals in the marriage, higher status persons (a higher education, occupation, and race) were more likely to have their spousal identity verified and were less likely to report strong negative emotions such as anger, depression, and distress when their spousal identity was not verified.

### 3.4.4 Beyond Positive and Negative Emotion

While most theory and research in identity theory has focused on positive and negative emotions, only one study within this research program has focused on moods (Burke 2004). Moods generally are lower in intensity and longer lasting than emotions. Additionally, while emotions have a specific target, for example, a person may be angry with another or happy about an accomplishment, the reason for one's mood isn't as clear or precise. The longer the mood lasts, the greater the ambiguity in the source of one's mood.

Two dimensions of mood have been examined: unease/distress and activity/arousal (Burke 2004). While the former is the positive-negative or calm-tense dimension of feeling, the latter is the energetic-tired dimension of feeling. Following from identity theory, if identity non-verification occurs, individuals should experience unease/distress. Because this negative feeling is taxing and draining, it should reduce people's activity/arousal level. These ideas were tested on a sample of newly married couples over the first three years of

marriage (Burke 2004). It was found that individuals struggling to verify identities such as spouse, worker, or friend experienced higher levels of unease and distress and lower levels of activity and arousal. The negative mood typically did not last beyond a couple of days. However, if the identity non-verification persisted, so did the mood.

Researchers in identity theory have begun to study specific emotions. Early research studied jealousy and anger in the home and at work (Ellestad and Stets 1998; Stets and Tsushima 2001). For example, when women who have a mother identity that is important to them read a vignette in which the father takes on a nurturant activity (specifically, the father rather than the mother assumes the caretaker role in the vignette), the women respond with feelings of jealousy (Ellestad and Stets 1998). Since the meaning of nurturance is tied to mothering, when events are manipulated so that the meaning is tied to fathering, the negative feeling of jealousy is in response to the women's threat to their mother identity.

More recently, moral emotions have been examined such as anger, empathy, guilt, and shame (Stets 2011; Stets and Carter 2011, 2012; Stets et al. 2008). Like other emotions, moral emotions emerge from the identity process. In a series of surveys and laboratory studies, Stets and her colleagues examined how the moral identity influences moral behavior and moral emotions. The moral identity should guide moral behavior. Having higher levels of moral meanings in the moral identity standard such as being more "caring," "kind," "just" and "fair," should influence individuals to behave in ways that reflect these meanings. Results from the studies show the moral identity does guide moral behavior (Stets and Carter 2011, 2012). Since identity non-verification leads to negative feelings, Stets and her associates examined the specific moral emotions that individuals experience when they think that others see them as more moral or less moral than how they see themselves given their moral identity standard.

As expected, identity non-verification increased moral emotions such as guilt and shame. Further, *framing rules* and *feeling rules* (Hochschild 1979) influenced moral emotions (Stets

and Carter 2012). Specifically, the researchers found that when individuals framed a situation as high in moral content and then engaged in moral behavior, they were less likely to report feelings of guilt and shame. Situations framed as high in moral content are those that carry strong moral meanings of good/bad behavior. When such situations emerge, they will influence moral behavior, and when moral behavior is not forthcoming, individuals will feel negative emotions such as shame and guilt.

Situation meanings also carry an affective aspect in the form of feeling rules that specify emotions individuals ought to feel. Stets and Carter found that when people were attentive to the feeling rules in moral situations that involved the cultural expectation that individuals feel guilt or shame when moral codes are violated, this influenced their own feelings of guilt and shame when they committed wrongful acts. Thus, when individuals reported that people *should* feel guilt and shame for immoral behavior, they were more likely to report experiencing these moral emotions when they engaged in immoral actions. In this way, it was not simply the framing of morally charged situations combined with moral behaviors that reduced reports of moral emotions, but also the feeling rules that indicated what one should feel in the situation, that when combined with moral behavior, also influenced a decline in reports of moral emotions.

Moral emotions have also been examined with regard to acts of commission and omission. In identity theory, researchers have primarily studied meanings related to individuals taking some action, and they have neglected to study meanings related to failing to take some action. Acts of omission are different from acts of commission in several ways (Stets 2011). Acts of omission involve a form of decision avoidance. This avoidance either postpones or bypasses the decision to act. In choosing not to act, individuals are seen as less responsible for the outcomes that emerge because their behavior is seen as less intentional. If individuals are doing nothing, then it is easier to assign the cause of an outcome to an alternative source rather than to the individuals. In contrast, in acts of commission, inferences can be drawn

about individuals' from their actions. While acts of commission may not always tell us everything about individuals because situational factors may be influencing how they behave, when they act, observers have a tendency to attribute actors' behavior to dispositional factors (characteristics of individuals) rather than situational factors (Heider 1944).

Research has examined a moral act of commission, specifically, giving people an opportunity to cheat on a test, and the results have been compared with a moral act of omission, that is, over-scoring people on a test and then giving them the opportunity to report it (Stets 2011; Stets and Carter 2012). The results revealed that not only did one's moral identity guide committed behavior but not omitted behavior, but also non-verification of the moral identity influenced moral emotions for committed behavior but not omitted behavior. In failing to report being over-scored, though individuals may have seen that others did not view them in the same way that they viewed themselves, this discrepancy in self vs. others' views did not produce negative feelings such as guilt and shame.

The absence of acting upon the environment as in failing to report being over-scored is a situation of ambiguity because the source of one's beneficial outcomes is unclear. The higher score may be due to someone's error in making appropriate calculations or a deliberate strategy by someone to help. The fact that the act of omission (failing to report being over-scored) may not be the obvious cause for the outcome may be one reason people evaluate an act of omission as less immoral than an act of commission (Spranca et al. 1991). In fact, the diminished condemnation associated with omission may lead people to choose it as a strategic response over commission because they think that the punishment from others will be less harsh (DeScioli et al. 2011).

This difference between acts of omission and commission has consequences for the identity verification process, and the emotions resulting from this process. When an identity is activated in situations, they remind us of our standards for the identity, and these standards guide behavior within and across situations. When this process is not initiated in a situation, as in the case of fail-

ing to perform a good act, people become emotionally unaffected by feedback from others that does not match how they see themselves. Since negative emotion serves as a signal that actors need to better regulate how they are perceived in a situation, and they may work to change these perceptions, for example, by changing what they are doing in the situation, any such change is not likely to be forthcoming. Thus, individuals can fail to perform (omit) good acts and either fail to experience negative feelings for their non-action or choose to ignore or suppress their negative feelings (if their behavior was intentional). This is disheartening because either the absence or denial of negative feelings serves to perpetuate using the omission strategy in situations.

### 3.4.5 Negative Emotion and Coping

People cannot remain in a continual state of negative emotion; it is too disruptive. Some research has examined how individuals manage their negative feelings when their identity is challenged. These strategies can be cognitive, where people simply change the way they think about the situation, or behavioral, where people change the way they act in a situation. Coping strategies were examined in a study using vignettes to manipulate the meaning of fathering to signal more nurturant activity (Ellestad and Stets 1998). A response of jealousy emerged for women reading these vignettes. Women with a more salient mother identity were more likely than women with a less salient mother identity to endorse the response that women in the vignette devise strategies to reassert their role as nurturer. This coping strategy may have emerged in response to threat that they felt as mothers given the jealousy that they reported. The endorsement may have helped reassert the mother identity in a situation where it had been challenged.

The coping responses to negative feelings were more extensively examined in another study that used data from the General Social Survey (Stets and Tsushima 2001). When a person's identity is not verified at home or at work and they report feelings of anger, individuals cope in slightly different ways. When managing anger stemming

from the non-verification of one's identity at home, individuals typically used cognitive strategies particularly praying to god. Such a strategy may be a way in which family members manage their anger towards one another without disrupting important and ongoing relationships. When coping with anger given the non-verification of one's identity at work, individuals tended to use behavioral strategies such as seeking support from another person. Others' might provide useful advice that tempers the negative feelings. These findings suggested that coping strategies might vary depending on the base of the identity for which the non-verification occurred. Cognitive strategies might be more common for group identities (such as the family) where acceptance is important, while behavioral strategies may be more common for role identities (such as the worker) where effective performance is important (Burke and Stets 2009).

### 3.4.6 Positive Emotion as a Resource

Emotions not only have been examined as an outcome of the identity process, but also as a resource to be used in situations. In identity theory, resources are anything that sustains individuals such as food to nourish them, education to teach them, and emotional or material support from others to help them (Freese and Burke 1994). Early research revealed that when people are in a positive mood, they are more likely to expose themselves to threatening and negative feedback (Trope et al. 2001; Trope and Pomerantz 1998). Trope and his colleagues maintained that positive emotions are a resource, buffering the affective costs associated with receiving negative information.

Applied to the identity process, positive emotions can be a resource, regulating the negative feelings that emerge when people experience identity non-verification. Conceptualizing positive emotions in this way is similar to the idea that high self-esteem is a resource for people, serving as a buffer during stressful times (Cast and Burke 2002). In the same way that high self-esteem can build a "reservoir" of good feelings that individuals can rely on when they have trouble verifying their identities, posi-

tive emotions also can build up over time and create an "energy reservoir" for individuals, acting as a buffer in non-verifying situations.

Research examined the role of positive emotions as a resource across encounters (Stets and Osborn 2008). The research examined the worker identity in the laboratory in which participants completed three tasks, and after their performance on each task, they received feedback that exceeded what they expected to receive or fell short of what they expected to receive. Across the three tasks, the feedback oscillated from exceeding their expectations to falling short of their expectations (or vice versa). What Stets and Osborn found was that positive emotions associated with initial feedback that exceeded their expectations (on the first task) persisted beyond the point of their initial arousal. The positive feelings continued to be experienced following feedback on the second and third task, even when the participants received feedback that fell short of their expectations on those tasks. Apparently, the positive emotions associated with feedback that exceeded their expectations tempered the negative feelings associated with subsequent feedback that fell short of their expectations. Negative emotions did not show the same persistence effects as positive emotions. The negative emotions did not continue beyond the point of their initial arousal unless individuals continued to receive feedback that fell short of their expectations on subsequent tasks.

In general, the findings showed the carryover effects of feelings. Emotions are not created anew in each situation. Part of one's current feelings are due to the situation, but they are also due to the feelings from yesterday, last week, or even last month (in the case of a mood) (Burke 2004). Even within an interaction, current feelings can influence later feelings in the same interaction. Stets and Osborn found that people generally were able to maintain their positive feelings from one task to another, and the maintenance of positive feelings acted as a buffer, serving to soften the blow of later unfair outcomes. Thus, emotions do more than signal verifying or non-verifying outcomes. Emotions influence interactions beyond their initial encounter to influence feelings in subsequent encounters.



### 3.5 Future Research on Emotions in Identity Theory

While we are beginning to understand how emotions emerge from the identity process, there is still much work that needs to be done. We highlight some of this work below. The landscape of future research surely is broader than what we mention.

#### 3.5.1 Negative/Stigmatized Identities and Emotion

Future research should move beyond the study of positive, normative identities such as parent, spouse, worker, student, and friend and explore the emotions produced when a negative/stigmatized identity is activated such as being childless, non-religious, unemployed, or an alcoholic. In identity theory, it is assumed that individuals will verify the meanings held in their standard regardless of whether those meanings are positive or negative (Burke and Stets 2009). When these identities are verified, they will feel positive feelings, and when they are not verified, they will feel negative feelings.

It is possible that negative/stigmatized identities may produce a mix of positive and negative feelings. On the one hand, when people's negative/stigmatized identity is verified, they should feel good that others see them as they see themselves. On the other hand, when the negative/stigmatized identity is verified, those holding that identity may feel negative emotions because they activate the third-order belief that society devalues this identity. In this way, the negative feelings may not be the intended result of the identity verification process, but rather the unintended result of taking on society's evaluation of those identity meanings.

#### 3.5.2 Multiple Identities and Emotion

Identity theory acknowledges the complex nature of the self and the multiple identities that individuals possess, but much of the theoretical and empirical work on identities and emotion focuses on one identity at a time instead of multiple

identities. People possess multiple identities, and these identities are organized hierarchically within the person based on their salience and prominence.

While the meanings that make up one identity may be exclusive to that identity, they do not have to be. The same meanings can apply to multiple identities. Further, across identities, meanings can operate in a cooperative or conflicting manner. For example, a woman might see herself as "caring" in her wife identity and mother identity. Here, her identities have the same meanings. However, in her identity as lawyer, she may see herself as "aggressive" and "unsympathetic." Typically, her lawyer identity may not be activated at the same time as, for example, her mother identity is activated, so the different meanings ("caring," "aggressive," and "unsympathetic") would not conflict. However, there may be situations where they are both activated such as when she finds herself defending her son in court on a drunk driving charge. If she were to act aggressively in the courtroom in defense of her son, she might think that the judge and jury would see her as aggressive, thereby verifying her lawyer identity. She would feel good. If she thought her son interpreted her aggressiveness as protecting and caring for him, then her mother identity also would be verified, and she would also feel good. However, if she thought her son interpreted her aggressiveness as "mean" and "unkind," then she might experience negative feelings because her mother identity is not being verified.

The above example illustrates how mixed emotions can emerge in a situation not only in instances of negative/stigmatized identities, but also when considering the activation of multiple identities. It might also be the case that with the activation of multiple identities in a situation, the verification of two identities would generate more positive emotion than if only one identity was being verified. Correspondingly, if two identities were not being verified, more negative emotions might be felt than if only one identity was not being verified.

Multiple identities also might be understood as a resource in regulating negative emotions. Recall that when people have trouble verifying



an identity, they can switch to another identity. Having other identities that are easily accessible to individuals and that are appropriate in their application to the current situation may help temper the negative feelings associated with the existing identity non-verification.

### 3.5.3 Emotion Within and Across Encounters

Research in identity theory not only has focused on one identity at a time, but it also has generally focused on emotions at one point in time. The discussion of research on positive emotions as a resource is an exception to this and highlights the importance of examining how emotions “carry over” from one situation to the next. The emotions that a person brings into a situation and the influence of emotions earlier in a situation on emotions later in a situation need to be incorporated into the identity verification process. If individuals enter an encounter feeling good, they may be more likely to interpret feedback from others in a manner that confirms their identity. Alternatively, entering an encounter feeling bad might predispose individuals to interpret feedback from others in a way that disconfirms their identity. Indeed, there is evidence that when people are in a particular affective state, they are more likely to attend to details that are congruent with their affective state (Forgas 1995). In this way, prior feelings may influence current feelings by biasing the verification process. Further, earlier identity verification (or the lack thereof) in an encounter might influence later identity verification (or the lack thereof) in the encounter.

Emotions from past experiences not only influence existing encounters and the trajectory that those encounters take, but they can also influence future encounters and the feelings that individuals anticipate experiencing (Kemper 2006). Anticipated emotions stem from two factors: the expectation of good or bad outcomes based on similar past interactions, and one’s assessment of resources available in future interactions (Kemper 2006). If people have had good outcomes in the past, they will be optimistic about good outcomes

in future interactions. Conversely, bad outcomes in the past will produce low optimism for the future. Similarly, if individuals assess resources as being readily available in the future, they will have high levels of confidence surrounding future interactions. If they do not think the adequate resources will be available, they will have low confidence regarding the future interaction.

Anticipated feelings are relevant for identity theory because people can look ahead to future interactions and make predictions regarding identity verification. They may have experienced verification in similar interactions in the past and feel good about the future. Alternatively, they may assess their resources and expect that they will be unable to verify an identity in a future interaction and feel bad about the future. This demonstrates how feelings in an interaction may be rooted in multiple sources, including those prior to the initial identity process.

### 3.5.4 Precise Emotions

Finally, we need to move beyond studying positive and negative emotions and examine specific emotions. Earlier research hypothesized that different emotions might be felt based on such factors as whether an internal or external attribution were made on the source of the identity non-verifying feedback (the individual compared to another), and the relative power and status of the individual and other in the situation (higher compared to lower power and status) (Stets and Burke 2005). For example, when individuals feel that they are responsible for the lack of identity verification in a situation (an internal attribution) perhaps because they did not behave in a way that reflected their identity meanings, they might experience a mild feeling (disappointment) to a strong feeling (depression). Alternatively, if someone else is to be blamed for their lack of identity non-verification (an external attribution), they might feel a mild feeling (annoyance) to a strong feeling (anger).

If persons see that they are responsible for the identity non-verification and they have higher status in the interaction, they might feel discomfort. If they have lower status than others in the

situation, they might feel shame. However, if they see that others are responsible for their identity non-verification, and they have higher status than those others in the interaction, they might experience rage. However, if those others have higher status, they might experience fear. Finally, the strength of the emotion may be a function of how salient or prominent is the non-verified identity to the individual. The above illustrates that there is a rich set of predictions currently in identity theory that need to be tested (Stets and Burke 2005). The extent to which these are supported can help advance identity theory and emotions beyond its current boundaries.

## References

- Burke, P. J. (1991). Identity processes and social stress. *American Sociological Review*, 56, 836–849.
- Burke, P. J. (2004). Identities, events, and moods. *Advances in Group Processes*, 21, 25–49.
- Burke, P. J. (2008). Identity, social status, and emotion. In D. T. Robinson & J. Clay-Warner (Eds.), *Social structure and emotion* (pp. 75–93). Burlington: Elsevier.
- Burke, P. J., & Harrod, M. M. (2005). Too much of a good thing?. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 68, 359–374.
- Burke, P. J., & Stets, J. E. (1999). Trust and commitment through self-verification. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 62, 347–366.
- Burke, P. J., & Stets, J. E. (2009). *Identity theory*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cast, A. D., & Burke, P. J. (2002). A theory of self-esteem. *Social Forces*, 80, 1041–1068.
- Cast, A. D., Stets, J. E., & Burke, P. J. (1999). Does the self conform to the views of others? *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 62, 68–82.
- Cooley, C. H. ([1902]/1964). *Human nature and the social order*. New York: Schocken Books.
- DeScioli, P., Christner, J., & Kurzban, R. (2011). The omission strategy. *Psychological Science*, 22, 442–446.
- Ellestad, J., & Stets, J. E. (1998). Jealousy and parenting: Predicting emotions from identity theory. *Sociological Perspectives*, 41, 639–668.
- Forgas, J. P. (1995). Mood and judgment: The affect infusion model (Aim). *Psychological Bulletin*, 117, 39–66.
- Freese, L., & Burke, P. J. (1994). Persons, identities, and social interaction. *Advances in Group Processes*, 11, 1–24.
- Heider, F. (1944). Social perception and phenomenal causality. *Psychological Review*, 51, 358–374.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1979). Emotion work, feeling rules, and social structure. *American Journal of Sociology*, 85, 551–575.
- Kemper, T. D. (2006). Power and status and the power-status theory of emotions. In J. E. Stets & J. H. Turner (Eds.), *Handbook of the sociology of emotions* (pp. 87–113). New York: Springer.
- McCall, G. J., & Simmons, J. L. (1978). *Identities and interactions*. New York: Free Press.
- Mead, G. H. (1934). *Mind, self, and society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Osgood, C. E., Suci, G. J., & Tannenbaum, P. H. (1957). *The measurement of meaning*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Serpe, R. T. (1987). Stability and change in self: A structural symbolic interactionist explanation. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 50, 44–55.
- Serpe, R. T., & Stryker, S. (1987). The construction of self and reconstruction of social relationships. In E. Lawler & B. Markovsky (Eds.), *Advances in group processes* (Vol. 4, pp. 41–66). Greenwich: JAI.
- Serpe, R. T., & Stryker, S. (1993). Prior social ties and movement into new social relationships. *Advances in Group Processes*, 10, 283–304.
- Spranca, M., Minsk, E., & Baron, J. (1991). Omission and commission in judgment and choice. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 27, 76–105.
- Stets, J. E. (2003). Justice, emotion, and identity theory. In P. J. Burke, T. J. Owens, P. A. Thoits, & R. Serpe (Eds.), *Advances in identity theory and research* (pp. 105–122). New York: Kluwer/Plenum.
- Stets, J. E. (2004). Emotions in identity theory: The effects of status. *Advances in Group Processes*, 21, 51–76.
- Stets, J. E. (2005). Examining emotions in identity theory. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 68, 39–56.
- Stets, J. E. (2006). Identity theory and emotions. In J. E. Stets & J. H. Turner (Eds.), *Handbook of the sociology of emotions* (pp. 203–223). New York: Springer.
- Stets, J. E. (2011). Applying identity theory to moral acts of commission and omission. *Advances in Group Processes*, 28, 97–124.
- Stets, J. E., & Asencio, E. K. (2008). Consistency and enhancement processes in understanding emotions. *Social Forces*, 86, 1055–1058.
- Stets, J. E., & Burke, P. J. (2005). New directions in identity control theory. *Advances in Group Processes*, 22, 43–64.
- Stets, J. E., & Burke, P. J. (2014). Emotions and identity non-verification. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 77.
- Stets, J. E., & Carter, M. J. (2011). The moral self: Applying identity theory. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 74, 192–215.
- Stets, J. E., & Carter, M. J. (2012). A theory of the self for the sociology of morality. *American Sociological Review*, 77, 120–140.
- Stets, J. E., & Osborn, S. N. (2008). Injustice and emotions using identity theory. *Advances in Group Processes*, 25, 151–179.
- Stets, J. E., & Tsushima, T. (2001). Negative emotion and coping responses within identity control theory. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 64, 283–295.
- Stets, J. E., Carter, M. J., Harrod, M. M., Cerven, C., & Abrutyn, S. (2008). The moral identity, status, moral emotions, and the normative order. In D. T. Robinson

- & J. Clay-Warner (Eds.), *Social structure and emotion* (pp. 227–251). San Diego: Elsevier.
- Stryker, S. (1968). Identity salience and role performance. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 4, 558–564.
- Stryker, S. ([1980]/2002). *Symbolic interactionism: A social structural version*. Caldwell: Blackburn.
- Stryker, S. (2004). Integrating emotion into identity theory. *Advances in Group Processes*, 21, 1–23.
- Stryker, S., & Serpe, R. T. (1982). Commitment, identity salience, and role behavior: A theory and research example. In W. Ickes & E. S. Knowles (Eds.), *Personality, roles, and social behavior* (pp. 199–218). New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Stryker, S., & Serpe, R. T. (1994). Identity salience and psychological centrality: Equivalent, overlapping, or complementary concepts? *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 57, 16–35.
- Trope, Y., & Pomerantz, E. M. (1998). Resolving conflicts among self-evaluative motives: Positive experiences as a resource for overcoming defensiveness. *Motivation and Emotion*, 22, 53–72.
- Trope, Y., Ferguson, M., & Raghunathan, R. (2001). Mood as a resource in processing self-relevant information. In J. P. Forgas (Eds.), *The handbook of affect and social cognition* (pp. 256–274). Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Turner, J. H., & Stets, J. E. (2005). *The sociology of emotions*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

---

# Emotions in Affect Control Theory

# 4

Kathryn J. Lively and David R. Heise

---

## 4.1 Introduction

According to affect control theory, individuals define situations on the basis of their community's "theory of people" (MacKinnon and Heise 2010), and social organization emerges as the individuals actualize their notions of the situation through interpersonal actions. Emotions enable sensing, communicating about, and control of the resulting social relationships.

This chapter presents affect control theory's framework on emotions in the tradition of prior expositions (Heise 2007, Chap. 8; MacKinnon 1994, Chap. 7; Smith-Lovin 1990, 1994; Smith-Lovin et al. 2006). Our purpose, here, is to bring the earlier accounts up to date and to expand coverage of the affect control theory (ACT) emotion model by giving special attention to issues that have received relatively little attention in the past<sup>1</sup>.

The chapter has three parts. We begin by introducing ACT's core emotion model, which includes such basic ACT principles as fundamental and transient impressions, and emotional dynamics associated with the three fundamental dimensions of affective meaning: Evaluation, Potency, and Activity. We also explore the emotions of in-

dividuals enacting negatively evaluated identities (such as outlaws, bill collectors, or mourners) and how the emotions of stigmatized individuals differ from the emotions of individuals in conventional roles.

The second part attends to relations between ACT's emotion model and existing scholarship on emotion. To begin, we focus on ACT's treatment of social categories, which parallels work on status expectations states, and leads into consideration of how emotions might vary by gender, racial, and ethnic categorizations. We then discuss ACT and emotion management, suggesting that the notion of emotion norm can be identified with ACT's unique construct of a characteristic emotion for an identity. The section includes an examination of how ACT scholarship aligns with Thoits' four factor model of emotion (1990) and emotion management.

Finally, we discuss two relatively new areas in ACT and emotions scholarship: emotional stations and ineffable emotions. Emotion stations represent the locations in the three dimensional affective space where individuals are positioned as a function of their institutional obligations and self-processes, giving rise to recurrent emotional patterns. Ineffable emotions are feelings for which we, as a culture, have no labels, even

---

K. J. Lively (✉)  
Dartmouth College, Hanover, USA  
e-mail: Kathryn.J.Lively@dartmouth.edu

D. R. Heise  
Indiana University, Bloomington, USA

---

<sup>1</sup> We are grateful to Neil MacKinnon, Tobias Schröder, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and Jan Stets for helping us expand our coverage of affect control theory's approach to emotions.

though such feelings occur in everyday life and are observable in some of the world's most powerful people.

This exposition on the emotion model of affect control theory foregoes a detailed presentation of the parent theory because that would be a chapter in itself. Many expositions of affect control theory are available to the interested reader (Heise 1979, 1999, 2002, 2007; MacKinnon 1994; MacKinnon and Heise 1993, 2010; Robinson and Smith-Lovin 2006; Smith-Lovin 1994; Smith-Lovin and Robinson 2006). Additional publications document studies that have validated affect control theory in experiments (Heise 2013; Heise and Lerner 2006; Heise and Weir, 1999; Schröder et al. 2013; Schröder and Scholl 2009; Smith-Lovin and Douglass 1992; Wiggins and Heise 1987), survey research (Lively 2008; Lively and Heise 2004; Lively and Powell 2006; Lively et al. 2010), and ethnographies (Francis 1997; Hunt 2008, 2013; Britt and Heise 2000).

## 4.2 Overview

According to affect control theory, emotions emerge from automatic and unconscious comparisons of the impression of self that has been created by recent events with the kind of person that one is supposed to be in the situation. Facial and bodily expression of emotion allows others to identify one's emotion, and the link between physical expressions and particular emotions is dependable enough that individuals can recognize emotions of others even across cultures (Ekman 1971).

The relations between identity, impression, and emotion allow any one of these to be inferred, given the other two. To illustrate:

- Given a reading of someone's emotion and knowing the emoter's situational identity, observers can surmise how the individual must have interpreted recent events in order to arrive at the impression of self that generates the observed emotion. (The surgeon is aghast. He must've blundered while operating.)
- Given a reading of someone's emotion and knowing what impression has been formed of

the emoter in recent events, observers can surmise what identity the emoter must be taking in the situation. (He's smiling while his crimes are recounted in court. He must be a devil.)


- Knowing a person's identity and the impression of the person generated by recent events, observers might surmise what emotion the individual is feeling even if they cannot see the individual's expressions, or if an individual is attempting to suppress or falsify emotional expressions. (The athlete feigns nonchalance as his accomplishments are recounted. But he's got to be feeling proud.)

Similarly, individuals can make such inferences reflexively in order to deepen self-understandings.

- Recognizing a felt emotion and knowing one's situational identity, an emoter can uncover a suppressed interpretation of what recent events have meant for the self. (Why am I embarrassed? They're ridiculing me!)
- Recognizing a felt emotion and knowing the impression of self created by recent events, an emoter might arrive at a new understanding of the self. (I'm so pleased with this drawing I made. Maybe I'm an artist.)
- If one is confident about one's identity and the current impression of self in a situation, one might use that knowledge in order to distinguish what emotion one really is feeling. (She left me for another. But this is not anger I feel. I'm lonely!)

While the relation between identity, impression, and emotion is deterministic internally, others' readings of emotional expressions are non-deterministic because emoters can suppress physical expressions of felt emotions, or affect different expressions, in order to mislead observers about internal processes. Additionally, surmising an impression or an identity or an emotion from the other two is accomplished by processing available information, and individuals in different genders and cultures may apply somewhat different rules of inference. Thus emotion-related conjectures about others, or about one's self, vary across individuals.

**Fig. 4.1** Relations among identity, impression, and emotion evaluations. (Pooled male and female data from Heise and Thomas 1989)



### 4.3 ACT Emotion Model

Like everything in affect control theory, the emotion model is grounded in three affective dimensions that have been cross-culturally validated in more than 20 societies (Heise 2010; Osgood et al. 1975). *Evaluation* contrasts goodness with badness. *Potency* contrasts powerfulness with powerlessness. *Activity* contrasts liveliness with lifelessness. Identities, behaviors, emotions, and other elements of social interaction are measured on the three dimensions using semantic differential scales that range from  $-4$  for badness, powerlessness, and lifelessness, to  $+4$  for goodness, powerfulness, and liveliness. Thus, for example, a grandparent has an EPA (Evaluation-Potency-Activity) profile<sup>2</sup> of  $2.96\ 1.76\ -0.71$ , meaning that the identity is viewed as extremely good, quite potent, and slightly inactive. The behavior of mugging someone has an EPA profile of  $-3.61\ 0.03\ 1.48$ , meaning that mugging is an extremely bad behavior that is neither powerful nor powerless, though slightly

active. Feeling enraged has an EPA profile of  $-1.89\ 0.76\ 1.98$ , meaning that this emotion feels quite bad, slightly potent, and quite active.

When plotted according to their evaluation and activity values, emotion labels more or less array in two bands, a positive one above the midpoint of the graph and a negative one below (MacKinnon and Keating 1989). (“Bands” is a more accurate description than the emotion “circle” reported repeatedly in the psychological literature—e.g., Fisher et al. 1985; Posner et al. 2005.) Positive emotions fall on a plane cutting through the EPA space (MacKinnon and Keating 1989). However, negative emotion labels vary in potency as well as in activity—e.g., rage versus terror—and thereby are positioned in all three dimensions (Fontaine et al. 2007; MacKinnon and Keating 1989; Morgan and Heise 1988).

#### 4.3.1 Fundamental and Transient Impressions

A key notion in affect control theory is that each individual involved in social interaction carries two affective meanings, one that is stable, based on the individual’s identity in the situation combined with the individual’s salient traits and mood, and another affective meaning that varies with events. Behavior is directed at keeping everyone’s variable meaning—their transient impressions of self—aligned with their stable meanings—their fundamental sentiments about

<sup>2</sup> Throughout this chapter, we report female EPA sentiments based on a survey conducted at Indiana University, 2002–2004 (Francis and Heise 2006), and affective processes based on female impression-formation equations derived in 2011 from data collected at the University of North Carolina, 1978. We often refer to results obtained with Interact, the computer program based on affect control theory that can be used to simulate many aspects of social interaction, including emotional responses (Heise 1995). A manual (Heise 2014) explicates Interact and provides many example analyses.



self. Individuals achieve this control by enacting new events that move transients closer to sentiments, or by reappraising recent events so that the past events seem more supportive of fundamental meanings in the situation.

In affect control theory, transient affective meaning and fundamental affective meaning together determine the emotion that one is feeling (Averett and Heise 1988; Heise and Thomas 1989; Heise 2007), and the character of emotion varies directly with one's transient affective meaning when one's fundamental affective meaning is evaluated as positive or neutral. A different dynamic applies when the fundamental meaning of self is negatively evaluated. We discuss the emotional dynamics of those with positive identities first, and then consider the other side in a separate section on Emotions Among the Stigmatized.

Affect control theory's emotion model is defined in terms of a set of empirically based equations predicting transient impressions of people from their identities and displayed emotions (Figure 4.1 shows some of the data on which the equations are based). We do not present the equations here, but the equations may be obtained from the program, *Interact*, using the instructions in the *Interact* guide (Heise 2014). Descriptions of emotion dynamics in ACT's emotion model, as reported in the following sections, were derived by algebraically manipulating the equations so that emotions are expressed in terms of identity sentiments and transient impressions.

### 4.3.2 Evaluation Dynamics

The positivity of one's emotion varies directly with the valence of one's transient impression in a situation. For example, you have positive emotions if events make you look very good, and negative emotions if events make you look very bad. Intensity of emotional pleasure or displeasure varies directly with the extremity of the positive or negative impression of self. On the other hand, one's fundamental meaning in the situation adjusts emotions by setting expectations regarding appearances. For example, looking good pro-

vides a more positive emotion for someone with a modestly positive identity like a novice, than for someone with an esteemed identity like a doctor. Similarly, appearing deficient feels more shameful for someone with an esteemed role like a teacher than for someone with a modest role like a student.

The positivity of emotions also depends on the fundamental Activity of one's identity, along with the transient impression of one's activity as a result of recent events. Emotional pleasantness is somewhat greater when occupying quiet identities like librarian or retiree than when occupying lively identities like sports-fan or protester. Appearing more active than is warranted by one's identity increases emotional positivity somewhat, and appearing less active than expected decreases emotional positivity somewhat.

### 4.3.3 Potency Dynamics

Emotion potency corresponds to emotions of dominance (e.g., pride and anger) versus emotions of vulnerability (e.g., awe-struck and fear). This aspect of emotion corresponds largely to the transient impression of the emoter's powerfulness versus powerlessness. The emoter's fundamental powerfulness sets expectations regarding how potent she or he is supposed to be, and thereby adjusts the impression effect.

For individuals with a favored but powerless identity, like an office boy, being confirmed in that identity leads to pleasant but vulnerable emotions, such as feeling awestruck or sentimental. Such individuals rarely appear even less powerless than they are, but events can make them seem pluckier than expected, in which case they feel relatively potent emotions such as contentment or happiness. An individual with a favored and powerful identity, like an authority, feels positive emotions like pride or elation when confirmed in that identity. Such powerful individuals rarely seem more powerful than they are, but when they appear less potent than expected they may feel less dominant emotions like exasperation or no emotion at all.

Besides the direct effects from potency fundamentals and transient impressions, emotion potency is affected by Evaluation and Activity processes, too. Someone whose fundamental goodness and activity is greater tends to have somewhat lower potency emotions, particularly if the individual looks less good than expected. Someone whose identity is fundamentally good and inactive but who seems more active than expected also feels a relatively impotent emotion. Individuals who are fundamentally good but quieter than expected experience more potent emotions. Summarizing roughly, favored and non-passive characters experience emotions of greater vulnerability when they seem undervalued or overly frenetic, and they experience more dominant emotions when events make them seem unexpectedly quiet.

#### 4.3.4 Activity Dynamics

Emotional dynamics on the activity dimension involve simple comparisons of one's transient and fundamental activation. Confirmation of one's fundamental activity level generates a somewhat activated emotion. A high arousal emotion results when one's impression of self is overly active, relative to one's fundamental activity level. A quiet emotion results from the impression of self being excessively inactive, relative to one's fundamental activity level.

Evaluation processes enter into emotion dynamics on the Activity dimension, but the impact is consequential only when individuals occupy deviant identities.

#### 4.3.5 Emotions Among the Stigmatized

Figure 4.1 provides a graphic rendition of how identity and emotion combine to create an impression of an emoting individual, focusing just on the Evaluation dimension and displaying actual empirical results from the Heise and Thomas (1989) study that is the basis of the emotion model discussed in this chapter. The graph shows how transient evaluations of emoters ("Impres-

sion evaluation") vary as a function of fundamental evaluations of emoters ("Identity evaluation"), and how emotional positivity varies as a function of both.

The right side of the graph shows that impressions of an individual's goodness or badness vary widely when the individual's identity evaluation is positive, and in this case pleasant emotions are associated with positive transient impressions while unpleasant emotions are associated with negative impressions.

However, the left side of the graph shows different processes when the fundamental evaluation of an individual is negative. In this case, the evaluative range of impressions narrows and follows a downward path as impressions are partially generated by more and more negative identities. The graph indicates that evil characters never create a positive impression, no matter what emotions they display. The positivity of transient impressions still correlates with emotional positivity on the left side of the graph, but pleasant emotions arise from less negative impressions rather than from positive impressions, while unpleasant emotions arise from especially negative impressions. Thus, for example, a happy robber is one that seems quite bad instead of extremely bad. Were a robber to be confirmed as extremely bad, her emotion would be depression or misery.

Negative identities also impact emotional dynamics on the potency and activity dimensions. In the case of potency dynamics, scorned identities undo and slightly reverse the impact of activity disconfirmations. That is, seeming more active than expected produces emotion potency for a scorned individual, and seeming less active than expected increases emotional vulnerability. Thus, for example, a racist is essentially neutral on potency, but a busy racist may experience dominant emotions like ecstasy, happiness, and pride. In the opposite direction, a quieted racist inclines toward vulnerable emotions like depression, misery, and unhappiness.

In the case of activity dynamics, individuals with scorned but active identities experience less arousal in their emotions when their identity activity is confirmed or when they seem too quiet

for their identity. For example, a bully whose activation level is confirmed by events might feel merely displeased or aggravated (as opposed to a more active emotion of rage), whereas seeming less active than a bully is supposed to be disposes the bully to feel depression, unhappiness, and disheartenment. On the other hand, individuals with scorned and quiet identities experience relatively high levels of arousal when their activity level is confirmed or when they seem too activated for their identity. For example, events confirming one in an invalid identity might yield embarrassment or regret (as opposed to less active emotions like depression and misery). On the other hand, events making an invalid seem overly active could make the invalid feel alarmed, mad, or lustful.

Scorned identities generate chaotic emotion dynamics, wherein small changes in impressions produce large differences in emotions, so an individual with a deviant self-identification might rapidly flip between cheeriness and fury. Theoretically, this process gets more and more extreme as evaluation becomes more negative. In fact, the predicted emotion of a deviant with an identity evaluation of  $-3.5$  is indeterminate mathematically because a denominator in the prediction equation goes to zero at that point. The emotions of such a deviant theoretically are unpredictable, and incomprehensible to an observer.

The most evaluatively negative identity in the Heise and Thomas (1989) study was pimp, evaluated  $-2.88$  by females. Thus, we have no empirical instances to examine in order to see what kinds of impressions actually emerge when emotions are attributed to extraordinarily evil characters. Identities scorned to the point of theoretical indeterminacy do exist, though, and other studies have recorded them. For example, females in a study by Francis and Heise (2006) evaluated eight identities at  $-3.5$  or less: child molester, terrorist, rapist, wife abuser, serial murderer, murderer, racist, and murderess; and males evaluated four identities at such low levels: rapist, wife abuser, murderer, and child molester. Research is required to determine if such characters really are viewed as emotionally incomprehensible.

Affect control theory's predictions about deviants' emotions have some empirical support. First, the prediction of chaotic emotionality among those maintaining a stigmatized self is remarkably similar to descriptions of emotional lability and over-responsiveness among individuals diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder (Sansone and Sansone 2010). Second, inmates in prisons are notoriously labile, attacking others at the mildest provocation or without any provocation at all (Gambetta 2009). Indeed, Gambetta argues that inmates purposely display senseless emotional behavior in order to establish their credentials as evil characters who are best left alone. For example, displaying deliberate self harm "signals 'madness' or dangerousness and thereby induces *fear* in the receiver: *If I am crazy enough to do this to myself, imagine what I can do to you*" (Gambetta 2009, p. 119).

---

#### 4.4 Social Categories

Individuals' emotional experiences are shaped not only by the social identities they occupy, but also by their social categorizations.

One reason for this is that privileged individuals often occupy unmarked identities (Stanley 1977), while individuals in disadvantaged categories occupy marked identities that lead to different actions and different emotions. For instance, women and racial and ethnic minorities often are seen not simply in terms of their operative identities (e.g., a physician), but as an amalgamation of their status characteristics and their identities (e.g., a female physician, or a Black physician), and these amalgamations produce different behaviors and emotions than do the unmodified identities because the status characteristics have unique affective meanings (Rogers et al. 2013; Schröder et al. 2013).

Affect control theory deals with marking as a form of attribution, and a separate model provides predictions of the fundamental sentiments that result when an identity is amalgamated with a status characteristic. Heise (2013) demonstrated that marking the juror identity with "female" in mid-Twentieth Century juries caused the women

in the juries to participate less than men and to produce relatively expressive actions compared to the men's more instrumental actions.

Marking often reduces the fundamental potency of a targeted individual. Reduction of an individual's fundamental potency tends to reduce impressions of the individual's potency during social interaction, and thereby the individual tends to experience less dominant, more vulnerable emotions. So, for instance, for contemporary U.S. females, the emotion EPA of a "physician" that perfectly confirms the physician identity is 2.54 3.40 1.41, whereas the emotion EPA of a perfectly confirmed "female physician" is 2.70 2.31 1.43, and emotion EPA of a perfectly confirmed "Black physician" is 2.25 2.27 1.19. The emotions of the "female physician" and "Black physician" have lower potency than the emotion of the "physician," and consequently individuals with a marked physician identity do not enjoy the feelings of invincibility of individuals with the unmarked identity.

A second reason social classifications shape emotional experiences is that individuals in a category may share distinctive sentiments. For example, among contemporary U.S. females the EPA profile for physician is 2.48 2.74 1.49, whereas the profile among males is 2.01 1.67 -0.10. Even without marking this would lead a woman who is a physician to enact the role in a friendlier fashion than a man, for example, by chatting up a fellow physician, as opposed to a man who would be inclined to counsel a fellow physician. The woman chatting up a fellow physician would have an emotion with EPA profile 2.45 0.08 1.74, whereas the man counseling a fellow physician would have an emotion with profile 2.26 0.65 0.51. So in this professional situation, the woman's emotion would be slightly less dominant and more activated than the man's.

Heise (2010) tested for gender differences in sentiments among the 1500 concepts in the Francis and Heise (2006) study of contemporary Americans, and found some differences significant at the 0.001 level. "More than males do, females condemn violence (gunfight, hurting, clubbing, slaughterhouse, slugging) and unrestrained sexuality (whorehouse, following, peeping at),

while approving more of femaleness (female, feminist, feminine), female concerns (boyfriend, beauty salon), and concepts related to affiliation (roommate, relative, restaurant)... Females see a sexual predator (rapist) as more potent than males do, as well as femaleness (female, feminine), and some standard institutional activities (sermon, grading)" (Heise 2010, pp. 177-178).

Sentiments differ across racial groups, too. Sewell and Heise (2010) used legacy data to examine the matter. "Our study of data from atlases of affective meanings compiled in the 1960s and 1970s showed that Black youths in Chicago maintained a distinct subjective culture—as different from White subjective culture as White culture was different from the subjective culture of another nation. ... Blacks rated females as more potent than males whereas Whites rated males as more potent. Additionally, Blacks rated grandmother as more potent than mother whereas Whites rated mother as more potent. ... We found that Blacks evaluated conjugal aspects of family less positively and attributed more activity (or effort) to them than aspects related to lineage. ... The atlas also revealed Black-White differences for a great variety of concepts beyond those associated with the family" (Sewell and Heise 2010, p. 409).

Distinctive sentiments are also maintained by individuals who mature in different cultures, though the differences are more subtle than one might expect. Heise (2001) examined EPA data from the U.S.A., Canada, Ireland, Germany, Japan, and China, and he found evaluations of identities and behaviors in these six cultures always correlate 0.67 or more. Potency correlations were 0.65 or more for identities, and 0.18 or more for behaviors. Activity correlations were 0.37 or above for identities, and -0.14 or above for behaviors (with a median value of 0.44 for behaviors). Heise concluded: "There is considerable cross-cultural agreement in assessments of identities' goodness and power. Of course, the high correlations do not mean that the six cultures necessarily are the same in this regard. [For example, in the family] ... Japanese evaluate family members less positively than people in the other cultures, and a child actually is felt to

be neither good nor bad in Japan. Chinese evaluate family members most positively; and the Chinese are different from people in the other five cultures in feeling that mothers are more powerful than fathers. Generally, parents are evaluated more positively than children, but not in Germany where fathers are felt to be less good than either children or mothers. Mothers generally are felt to be nicer than fathers, but this difference is negligible in the U.S.A. The power difference between fathers and mothers also is negligible in the U.S.A. These differences among societies are sufficient to create substantial variations in the affective tone of family life. For example, computer simulations based on these data suggest that fathers are supportive to children in both Japan and China, but when situations get tense Japanese fathers turn into disciplinarians while Chinese fathers turn into coaches."

A third basis for distinctive emotions among people in different social categories relates to the processing of information about people and actions. Several studies in different nations (Smith-Lovin 1987; Smith et al. 1994; Schröder 2011) suggest that there are few gender differences in affective processing of events. So far, no studies have examined racial differences in affective processing. On the other hand, studies (Cai 2001; Mackinnon 1985; Schröder 2011; Smith et al. 1994) have documented cultural differences in the processes by which cognizance of social events leads to transient impressions of the interactants. Thus, what ostensibly is the same event could lead to different emotions in different cultures as individuals in each culture process the event in their own indigenous ways.

Affect control theory's emotion model extracts emotions from transient impressions and identity sentiments. We tested for gender differences in the extraction process using the Heise and Thomas (1989) data. No significant differences were found for the Evaluation and Activity dimensions, but we did find significant gender differences on the Potency dimension. Mainly males compose emotional potency by giving a bit more weight to identity potency than females do, and the net effect is that males feel slightly less emotional dominance when they are in powerful

identities, and less emotional vulnerability when they are in powerless identities. Thus females might be prone to somewhat more vulnerable negative emotions when altercast into a weak and scorned identity like victim.

Smith et al. (2001) found substantial gender differences in emotion equations among Japanese respondents. "Among the Japanese, in contrast [to Americans], we find consistent statistical support for male-female differences in the principles underlying cognitive judgments of the evaluation, potency, and activity of attributions of trait, emotional, and status characteristics. Japanese men and women appear to give different answers to ...: What kind of person would display that emotion?" (Smith et al. 2001, p. 191).

No study has examined racial differences in the processes relating identity sentiments, transient impressions, and emotions.

So far, cultural differences in emotion equations have been examined only by Smith et al. (2001). They found substantial differences between Japanese and Americans, which they summarized in terms of three generalizations (Smith et al. 2001, p. 193). First, "Japanese men and women occupy different social worlds to a greater extent than American men and women"; second, "Japanese view emotional expression, trait dispositions, and status characteristics differently, whereas Americans do not make such distinctions." Third, the appearance of many more interaction terms in Japanese equations suggests that "Japanese are particularly attuned to the psychological consistency or congruency of particularizing modifiers and role-identities."

---

## 4.5 Emotion Norms

A foundational idea in the sociology of emotions is that emotion norms govern the display and experience of emotion (Clark 1997). Affect control theory proposes that emotion norms emerge from culturally shared sentiments regarding identities, behaviors, person modifiers, and settings. People have similar emotional reactions to events because they share affective meanings of the concepts that are deployed to comprehend events.



Adopting a similar perspective, Ridgeway (2006) argued that the cultural norms driving status expectations states originate in culturally shared sentiments.

Empirical research has demonstrated that affect control theory's predictions about emotional responses in various circumstances are accurate, for individuals in either the actor or object position of a social action, and for both females and males (Heise and Calhan 1995; Heise and Weir 1999). Moreover, the studies show that individuals mostly share the same emotion when involved in the same social circumstance, as expected from affect control theory. Taking the two points together, affect control theory defines statistical norms of emotions. Additionally, the Heise and Calhan (1995) study showed that affect control theory also accounts for prescriptive norms regarding what emotions one *should* feel in particular circumstances, because prescriptive norms parallel statistical norms of emotional reactions in most circumstances.

Circumstantial emotion norms—what Kemper (1978) called structural emotions—dynamically shift as actions change impressions, thereby changing interactants' emotions. For example, analyses in affect control theory suggest that two mourners in the U.S. feel glum as they begin interacting, but work upward through melancholy, then sentimentality, and may reach mutual compassion, even relief if they interact long enough. The transition to pleasant feelings predicted by affect control theory seems validated by the smiles and even laughter that commonly surface at a wake. Yet only the starting emotions correspond to emotions typically attributed to mourners.

The static notion of emotion norms, such as sadness for a mourner or happiness for members of a wedding party (Hochschild 1983), does not describe ongoing feelings but rather defines an idealized emotional state for individuals in a particular position<sup>3</sup>. Social position may refer to

identities—for example, attorney versus paralegal (Pierce 1995), mother versus father (Seery and Crowley 2000) or bill collector versus debtor (Sutton 1991). Social position also may be conceptualized in terms of status characteristics, such as men versus women (Lois 2003; Martin 1999) or whites versus African Americans (Harlow 2003; Wingfield 2010). As elaborated by Heise (2013), status characteristics combine with identities, thereby creating different emotions for people enacting the same role.

### 4.5.1 Characteristic Emotions

Each identity (or modified identity) can be viewed as having a characteristic emotion that theoretically would emerge when impressions of an individual enacting that identity exactly confirmed the identity's fundamental affective meaning (Heise 2002). Characteristic emotions might be viewed as goal states that individuals try to attain during interactions involving specific identities. Characteristic emotions also are useful theoretically in that they correspond to the notion of static emotion norms so often mentioned by emotion scholars, such as sadness for mourners, or happiness for brides.

Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show how characteristic emotions vary with identities' fundamental EPA profiles. Each emotion is described verbally if a named emotion is no more than one unit distant from the computed characteristic emotion<sup>4</sup>. A computer-drawn facial expression is provided as well because not all states can be described with an emotion label, and because drawings communicate more nuances than words can, even though these drawings of emotional expressions are cre-


<sup>3</sup> Some scholars have discussed emotion norms associated with particular settings such as work (Wharton 2009), home (DeVault 1991), or school (Jackson 2013). Affect control theory can incorporate settings into the composi-

tion of social actions, and it may be possible thereby to predict emotion norms for settings, especially if combined with interactant identities that institutionally match the setting—e.g., worshippers in a church.

<sup>4</sup> The Euclidean distance between two profiles is “the square root of the sum of squared differences on each of the EPA dimensions” (Heise 2007, p. 146).



**Fig. 4.2** Characteristic emotions of some valued identities with differing potency and activity




ated with simple rules<sup>5</sup>. The same visage is used in all cases to facilitate comparisons, without distracting differences in physiognomy.

An identity's characteristic emotion can be viewed as the target emotion being sought by individuals enacting that identity. For example, if you are with a friend and you yourself are enacting the friend identity, then you behave with the other in such a way as to try to feel the euphoric,

glad emotions indicated for friend in Fig. 4.2. You are trying to feel like a friend, and you are trying to show your friend the corresponding emotional expression on your face. Moreover, according to affect control theory, you try to confirm the other's identity along with your own—an idea that resonates with Goffman's (1959) notion of teamwork in social interaction. So you are trying to produce the same euphoric, glad emotions for your friend, and you are working to see the corresponding emotional expression on your friend's face. According to affect control theory analyses of friend-friend interaction, these mutual goals actually are unattainable as each individual tries to keep the other empowered, so the individuals feel less dominant emotions than indicated by the characteristic emotion. Nevertheless, feeling euphoria and gladness seem like the proper target emotions for friends.

<sup>5</sup> "Facial expressions are formed from the EPA profile computed for an individual's emotion, according to the following rules: (a) open eyes with positive activity; (b) arch up brow with positive evaluation; (c) raise brow with negative potency, lower brow with positive potency; (d) move mouth higher with positive potency, and move upper lip higher with positive potency; (e) drop lower lip and narrow mouth with positive activity; (f) curve lips up with positive evaluation, down with negative evaluation." (Heise, 2007, p. 140).

**Fig. 4.3** Characteristic emotions of some stigmatized identities with differing potency and activity



As mentioned previously, when mourners interact with other mourners, affect control theory predicts their emotions will drift away from the characteristic emotion for mourner, moving toward fairly positive and active feelings. But melancholy is the paradigmatic emotion for mourners, their idealized emotional state, and the static emotion norm for the mourner identity.

In sum, a characteristic emotion is a theoretical construct corresponding to the emotion that would be experienced if an individual perfectly confirmed the sentiment associated with his or her situational identity. The actual emotions experienced in a social relationship often do not match the characteristic emotion because individuals try to maintain the affective meanings of others' identities as well as their own. However,

characteristic emotions usefully define with precision the idealized emotion norms typically invoked in studies of emotion management.

#### 4.6 Emotion Management

Sociological accounts of emotion management suggest that individuals change their emotions by changing the emotional label, the emotional expression, the somatic experience, or the meaning of the situation (or the situation itself (Thoits 1990)). Since most sociologists view these factors of the emotional experience as interconnected, it follows that a change in one may automatically trigger a change in the others (Thoits 1995).

According to many sociologists, emotion management refers to the attempts that an individual makes to align his or her feelings with feeling norms. From an ACT perspective, feeling norms relate to the idealized characteristic emotions associated with identities, rather than to statistical norms describing shared emotion dynamics. For example, the feeling norm for a (1970s<sup>6</sup>) flight attendant is feeling delighted and elated (Fig. 4.2), and the emotion norm for a mourner is melancholy (Fig. 4.3). Emotion management occurs when an individual's emotion deviates from the norm, and someone (perhaps the individual herself) exerts pressure to correct the deviance, prompting the individual to employ strategies that move feelings toward the norm, or to appear to have done so. Emotion management, from this perspective, refers to attempts individuals make in order to bring their feelings closer to the characteristic emotions associated with their social identities.

Characteristic emotions are idealizations, and the teamwork involved in trying to confirm others' identities as well as one's own may interfere with experiencing characteristic emotions. For example, very few brides are happy every moment of their wedding day, although many feel the internal desire and external pressure to be glowing with happiness from dawn to dusk. Indeed, as soon as the bride interacts with a groom, her expected emotions (that is, those that arise out of her structural relationship with her intended) are typically much different than the feeling norm for a bride.

Numerous studies have focused on how individuals alter different aspects of the emotional experience (Lively 2000; Pollack and Thoits 1989; Ritchie and Barker 2006; Simon and Nath 2004; Thoits 1995), with the vast majority focusing on the cognitive component—that is, how individuals frame or, in some cases, reframe situ-

ations so that their desired feelings follow naturally (Hochschild and Machung 1989; Lois 2013; Mullaney and Shope 2012; also see Heise 2007). We organize this material by examining each of Thoits' (1990) four factors of emotion management and situating related studies in terms of the existing ACT literature.

#### 4.6.1 Label

According to the four-factor model of emotion management (Thoits 1990), the label that individuals apply to their physiological arousal shapes their emotional experience. In a recent study of a polyamorous community, for example, Ritchie and Barker (2006) revealed that members routinely avoided using the word "jealousy," because the emotion itself threatened fundamental aspects of their lifestyle. Instead, they substituted the word "wibbly," an emotion that sounds, at least, less negative and socially disruptive.

One way that ACT has contributed to the study of emotional labels, as they pertain to emotion management, is through the introduction of emotional segueing (Lively and Heise 2004). In an attempt to quantify the process of emotion management, particularly emotion management that requires transitioning through multiple named emotions, Lively and Heise (2004) created a map of emotional experience consisting of emotion labels distributed throughout the emotional space. The labels identify socially-constructed emotions that are readily available for mentation and interpersonal communication.

Based on the assumption that small shifts between similar emotions are more easily made than large leaps between dissimilar emotions, Lively and Heise (2004) used structural equation modeling and shortest path analyses to determine the remoteness between nine different emotion labels (distress, fear, anger, rage, shame, pride, hope, joy, and tranquility) and the shortest paths between them. Consistent with many qualitative studies of interpersonal emotion management (Britt and Heise 2000; Francis 1997; Thoits 1995), they found that the shortest path between

<sup>6</sup> The 2004 sentiment associated with flight attendant is a bit nicer and notably less active than the sentiment for flight attendant in 1978 (1.79 0.53 0.62 versus 1.40 0.48 1.33, female sentiments). Thereby the feeling norm (characteristic emotion) for a contemporary flight attendant is feeling contented or charmed, rather than delight and elation.

distress and tranquility involved transitioning first through fear and then through anger.

Lively and Heise (2004) referred to those emotions comprising the shortest paths as segueing emotions, because they facilitate movement between positive and negative feeling states. The very act of segueing is dependent upon one's ability to name an emotional destination, such as anger (as was the case of those grieving the loss of their spouse (Francis 1995)) or pride (as was the case of gay and lesbian activists (Britt and Heise 2000)). Thus the culturally available labels for emotions matter to individuals' ability to segue from one emotion to another. The map of segueing emotions that Lively and Heise offered was constrained by the nineteen named emotions used in the survey data that they analyzed. However, maps of all emotion labels (MacKinnon and Keating 1989) reveal the same kinds of constraints in moving between positive and negative emotions via named emotional states.

In a subsequent analysis of sex differences in emotional segueing, Lively (2008) reported women's shortest paths between positive and negative emotions were less efficacious and more complex than comparable shortest paths for men. In an attempt to address this finding, we reconsidered the Francis and Heise (2006) data. We found that females evaluated pleasant emotions more positively than males, and females evaluated unpleasant emotions more negatively. This gender difference in variability of evaluations of all emotions is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tail variance ratio test), even though gender differences in evaluating any particular emotion are not significant. Mean ratings of emotion Activity also are significantly more variable for females than for males ( $p < 0.05$ , two-tail variance ratio test). Females' mean ratings of emotion potency are more variable than males, but not significantly so. The significant gender differences mean that the plot of emotion labels on Evaluation and Activity axes is larger for females than for males, and therefore females have further to go than males in transitioning from negative to positive emotional states. Thus distances between emotions in the three dimensional affective space also

matter to individuals' ability to segue from one emotion to another.

Moreover, women's emotional segues tended to involve emotions that have been classed by those who study emotional culture as stereotypically feminine emotions (Cancian 1987; Simon and Nath 2004) or what affect control theorists would classify as more pleasant, less powerful, and slightly more active feelings that are consistent with fundamental sentiments about women, females, and most social identities typically held by women (i.e., waitress, nurse, teacher, mother, daughter, grandmother, etc).

In an attempt to address how emotional segueing worked, Lively (2008) suggested that individuals are able to move between experientially distant positive and negative feeling states by transitioning first through emotions that are experientially near and have similar levels of either potency or activation. If this assumption is correct, it would suggest that emotional segueing occurs along the fundamental dimensions of affective meaning upon which ACT is based (also see Francis 1997 and Lively and Heise 2004). As noted above, ACT views emotions as inextricable from actions in situated identities, which explains the use of female emotions by women who spend much of their lives either in gendered identities (such as mother or waitress) or in social identities in which they are routinely marked as female (such as a female professor or female police officer).

In short, emotion labels are socially constructed locations in the three dimensional emotion space that the culture recognizes and names as emotions. The named emotions facilitate mentation and communication about feelings, and accordingly movement from one emotional state to another requires transitioning through the named emotions.

Although Lively and Heise's original analyses were constrained by the named emotions captured in the GSS (1996) emotions module, we assume that therapists (Francis 1997), teachers (Pollack and Thoits 1989), ministers (Wasielowski 1985), social movement organizers (Britt and Heise 2000), salespeople (Leidner 1993) and the like use emotional segueing in nuanced and so-

phisticated ways, drawing on the full range of named emotions. Yet, even these interpersonal emotion management specialists are limited in what they can do because whole regions of the emotion space are devoid of named emotions, as we discuss below in our section on ineffable emotions. Theoretically it is impossible to lead someone, even oneself, into these emotion regions via interpersonal or internal conversations.

#### 4.6.1.1 Expression

In her seminal work on emotion management, Hochschild distinguished between two forms of emotion management: surface acting and deep acting. Surface acting is the cheapest form of emotion management in that it simply feigns emotion: the individual changes emotional expression without attempting to change actual feelings. Deep acting is a more psychologically expensive endeavor that requires the actor to change overt expression of emotion by actually changing one's felt emotion, usually by changing impressions of a situation or event.

Altering one's emotional expression or demeanor can serve as surface acting or, to use Goffman's terms, putting on a mask. Ironically, Ekman's work (1971) reveals that the very act of smiling has the capacity to directly affect one's physiology, as does simply leaning forward as opposed to shirking back (also see Thoits 1990), so surface acting sometimes might feedback and produce the emotion being simulated.

One way that affect control theory addresses the role of emotional expressions is by considering the effects of demeanor in conjunction with interpersonal actions. Rashotte (2001a, 2001b) examined the effects of demeanor on transient impressions generated by actions. For example, how are the effects of agreeing with someone affected by simultaneously grinning, or speaking softly, or speaking quickly, or rolling one's eyes? Her exploratory analyses revealed that such expressive behaviors do contribute to impressions of actions and of actors. For instance, performing interpersonal actions with a smile makes the actions seem significantly nicer, and adding low potency expressive behaviors like blinking and leaning back makes the actions seem even nicer.

Similarly, potent mannerisms like making a fist and sticking out one's chin make an action seem more powerful. However, Rashotte found that an amalgamation model, in which demeanor changes the meaning of the behavior being enacted and then the amalgamated act produces impressions in the usual way, does not work as a way of incorporating demeanor into ACT analyses. Expressive acts impact on impressions independently of instrumental behavior.

Schröder et al (2013) tested whether the ACT model for predicting interpersonal behaviors also predicts expressive behaviors. They coded the expressive behaviors of multiple dyads engaged in a simple task and found a substantial negative correlation between the frequency of different kinds of expressive behaviors and the extent to which the behaviors deflected impressions away from sentiments. The authors concluded, "This result corroborates the validity of affect control theory to account for the display of nonverbal behavior" (p. 53). Moreover, they found that ACT also predicted the interpersonal sequencing of expressive acts,—“the contingencies between the expressions of two interacting persons at consecutive points in time” (p. 55). Schröder et al (2013, p. 55) concluded that the “overall principle of affective consistency is as valid for nonverbal action as it is for the verbal interpretation of action.”

Finally, we note that Interact's predictions disclose authentic emotional expressions, that is, the expressions that occur as a result of confirming (or disconfirming) an identity, apart from surface acting. Indeed, Interact's visual displays of emotion states might help guide individuals who want to change their own expressions in recurrent relationships so as to overcome, say, affective consequences of non-standard socialization. Rashotte (2002b, p. 272) observed that expressive behaviors might be used for management of interpersonal relations and emotions. “Doing powerful acts in nice, non-dominant ways makes those acts seem nicer. Therefore, it might be possible to plan a demeanor for a power struggle that, while still using powerful acts, maintains one's reputation as a nice person. Perhaps when negotiating a

new contract with an employer, one should speak softly, lean back and tilt one's head."

#### 4.6.1.2 Physiology

At the core of emotional reactions lies a physiological response (Schacter and Singer 1962), and probably no individual thinks that he or she is feeling an emotion without some degree of physiological arousal. Fontaine et al. (2007) had 531 respondents in three nations rate the likelihood that each of 144 emotion features can be inferred from 24 terms describing emotional experiences. The features included 18 bodily experiences—such things as muscle tension, feelings of weakness, going pale, rapid breathing, and shivers—and nine facial features like frowning, smiling, and weeping. The physiological features were found to be integral components of emotion, on all three of the EPA dimensions of emotion.

The close linkage between physiology and emotion opens the possibility of changing emotion by changing one's physiological state, and individuals managing the emotions of others or of self do develop strategies for effecting desired changes in physiology. For example, in their study of emotionally disturbed children, Pollak and Thoits (1989) report that teachers routinely had angry and unruly children run around the playground as a way of changing their emotions; and many of Hochschild's flight attendants learned to take a deep breath before responding to an unruly passenger. Simon and Nath (2004) found some people take a drink or a pill in order to manage angry feelings, men more often than women.

Affect control theory contains no conceptual apparatus for treating physiology as an independent variable in emotion management. However, the theory does specify how individuals can work backward from a recognized emotion in order to understand impressions they have created, or the identity they are enacting, and that allows some theoretical understanding of why individuals sometimes manipulate their own or others' physiologies. For example, tiring the body through physical activity, or increasing oxygen to the brain by deep breathing, or slowing heart rate with medication allow individuals to recog-

nize different emotions in themselves, which in turn allow them to arrive at different impressions of troubling events, or to understand their social participation in terms of desired identities. The same causal pathway—physiology to emotion to impression or identity—might be used to analyze use of psychedelic or other powerful entheogenic drugs: the drugs stimulate emotional experiences that the individual interprets as uncovering hidden identities, thereby changing the individual's self in fundamental ways that alter future actions (Grof 1980).

#### 4.6.1.3 Meaning

The component of emotion management receiving the most attention from sociologists is meaning or, to use Goffman's term, framing (1974). Sociological studies have documented how individuals make meaning of their emotions (Charmaz 1997; Karp 1996), and how individuals make meaning of their situations in order to change their emotional reactions (Hochschild 1983, Hochschild and Machung 1989).

This component of emotion management aligns with Hochschild's (1983) notion of deep acting (1983). According to Hochschild, deep acting refers to drawing on one's own emotional memories in order to experience the emotion in the present that was felt in the past (Stanislawski (1965)). In her study of the airlines industry, Hochschild found that flight attendants were trained to look for characteristics that a rude or aggressive passenger had in common with an old friend or family member and to focus on those commonalities, rather than on the rudeness or the aggression. Flight attendants also were encouraged to think of unruly passengers as children or to see them not as obnoxious, but as frightened or scared. Flight attendants additionally were asked to change their own identity. Instead of seeing themselves as harried, overworked flight attendants, they were encouraged to think of themselves as gracious hostesses. Moreover, they were encouraged to think of the airplane not as a vessel hurtling through the sky at high speeds, but rather as a living room. Flight attendants who successfully sustained such reframing were better equipped to maintain corporately desired emotions. For



instance, while it is difficult for a harried, overworked flight attendant to be patient with a rude, obnoxious passenger, it is easy for a gracious hostess to be patient with a frightened child, especially when the interaction occurs in a living room as opposed to an airplane cabin.

In a more recent study of emotion management, Lois (2013) documented the strategies that homeschooling mothers use in order to manage the stress, frustration, and sense of being overwhelmed often associated with homeschooling. She found that homeschooling mothers who were struggling in their alternating roles of mother and teacher learned to reframe themselves as a “good mother,” and instead of seeing their behavior as teaching, they reframed their efforts as an educating extension of mothering. This reframe allowed them to go from “a struggling teacher teaching a reluctant student” to “a good mother mothering a child.” The first framing involving deviant situational identities often results in negative emotions, whereas the second framing with its positive identities typically results in positive emotions for both parties (also see Mullaney and Shope’s (2012) study of Direct Home Marketing).

The meaning component of social interaction is essentially what ACT is about. Affect control theory focuses on how impressions emerge from events defined in terms of identities, behaviors, settings, and attributes, with emotions emerging from identities and impressions produced by behaviors. Additionally, ACT posits that individuals reidentify elements of the situation—behaviors first, then perhaps identities Nelson (2006)—if salient sentiments cannot be confirmed through social interaction. Thus ACT provides valuable technology for explaining what is happening when individuals work with meanings in order to manage emotions.

Studies of emotion management and affect control theory converge with respect to meaning because of a shared reliance on symbolic interactionism (see Hochschild 1983; MacKinnon 1994), which posits that individuals make meaning in the course of their daily interactions with others and that these meanings determine the identities, behaviors, settings, and human at-

tributes that in turn shape emotions. From both perspectives, emotional and behavioral responses follow from defining a situation in a certain way. The major difference between the approaches is that qualitative studies of emotion management often view situational understandings as emergent, whereas ACT presumes that definitions of the situation are primarily in terms of culturally-given categories. The distinction was described by Heise (2010, p. X) as follows: “Two standpoints characterize studies of culture and meaning. One standpoint presents culture as continuously produced and reproduced by fluctuating and yet recurrent processes of meaning-making, conducted by concrete individuals in particular contexts. Another standpoint highlights the persistence of culture over time, focusing on an enduring system of meanings that organizes people’s shared experiences.” (See also Kashima 2002.)


---

## 4.7 Emotional Station

Lively and Heise (2004) introduced the notion of emotional station as follows: “Recurrent emotions reflect an individual’s station in life in terms of prevailing roles (like being a spouse) and ongoing processes (like getting a divorce).” Theoretical bases for emotional station have been elaborated since then, and we review that material next.

MacKinnon and Heise (2010) added self-sentiments as a level of affective control above identity and role processes. An individual maintains a self-sentiment, typically somewhat different at different stages of life, by embodying identities whose affective meanings match the self’s meaning. Non-confirming identities may be imposed during institutional experiences, but the individual compensates for any resulting inauthenticity by choosing other identities that pull the average embodied meaning of self back into alignment with the self meaning, so self-actualization is achieved over a period of time, such as a day or two. Thus one basis of emotional station is the selection of identities and roles to correspond with one’s current self-sentiment. These identities and

**Fig. 4.4** Ineffable (*unlabeled*) emotions with various EPA profiles. The center position corresponding to an EPA of 0 0 0 is absence of emotion



roles yield structural emotions that reflect one's self-sentiment, and simultaneously signal that one's self-meaning is being confirmed.

According to Heise (2007), institutional commitments take up significant amounts of normal life, in large part because individuals participate in a variety of institutions on a regular and ongoing basis. Consider, for instance a hypothetical adult living in a city suburb. Every weekday the individual gets up early and shares some time with family members, then commutes to work in the city, stays a full workday, and commutes home for a few more hours with family. Weekends are spent with family, with some time devoted to entertainments like socializing with friends, sports, TV, and, often, religion. This weekly pattern repeats for most of the year, but for a few weeks—typically during the summer or the holidays—when weekday time is reallocated to family, travel, and entertainment. Time committed to specific institutions varies at different stages in the individual's lifetime. For example, a youth is engaged with education instead of work, whereas an elder frequently is engaged with the institution of medicine. Such scheduled allocation of time to institutions is the norm for nearly

everyone, though time committed to specific institutions varies from one individual to another (Heise 2007).

As suggested above, certain institutional commitments take up especially large amounts of an individual's time, and those commitments change during the life course. Thereby daylong structural emotions experienced by an individual can change as the individual's primary role varies—e.g., from student to worker to patient. Moreover, people pursuing different life patterns will be involved in different institutions and roles, giving them different emotional experiences. Such dominant institutional experiences are another basis of emotional station.

Unique but prolonged life transitions such as divorce, death of a loved one, or a serious medical exigency also can keep one in unique identities that generate particular emotionalities for a period of time. These too provide bases for emotional station.

## 4.8 Ineffable Emotions

Early surveys (MacKinnon and Keating 1989; Morgan and Heise 1988) of sentiments for the hundred or so “pure” emotions (Ortony et al. 1988) discovered that no emotion labels in English refer to states of pleasant vulnerability (positive Evaluation and negative Potency), that very few emotion labels are available for evaluatively neutral feelings, and labels for unpleasant emotions are limited to feelings with only moderate levels of dominance. Indeed, MacKinnon and Keating (1989) described the domain of emotions as “a potency surface in three-dimensional EPA space” with three-dimensional expansion only for very unpleasant feelings. Absences of labels for emotions of pleasant vulnerability also were discerned in surveys in Germany (Schneider 2006; Schröder 2007), Japan (Smith et al. 2006), and China (Smith and Cai 2006).

Morgan and Heise (1988) postulated that only unpleasant feelings and feelings of potent pleasure are interpreted as emotions, and other kinds of feelings go unlabeled because they are not understood to be emotions. However, the face-drawing function added to affect control theory’s simulation program in the 1990s undermined the Morgan-Heise interpretation by showing that facial expressions of feelings expand seamlessly into all regions of the EPA space. Some examples of facial expressions representing unlabeled feeling are presented in Fig. 4.4. The top row of Fig. 4.4 shows feelings of pleasant impotence with varied levels of activation. The middle row shows feelings that are neutral on Evaluation and Potency, with varied levels of activation. The bottom row shows feelings of unpleasant potency at various activations. The center position is empty because it corresponds to an emotion EPA of 0.0 0.0 0.0 which constitutes no emotional feeling at all.

Here we take the position that feelings anywhere in the EPA space can be emotions if they are responses to events and linked with corporeal manifestations. Thus the facial expressions in Fig. 4.4 do signal emotions albeit unnamable or ineffable emotions.

Facial expressions of ineffable emotions appear in real life. For example, the expression in Fig. 4.4 corresponding to EPA values of 2.5 – 2.5 – 2.5 sometimes is seen in paintings of saints or Buddha, and such an expression is evident in the photograph of Associate Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito, Jr., applauding President Barack Obama’s arrival to deliver the 2010 State of the Union address<sup>7</sup>. The expression corresponding to EPA values of 2.5 – 2.5 2.5 is seen on young children, and a similar expression is evident in a photo of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin confronted by a topless female protestor<sup>8</sup>. We have less confidence in the ineffability of the negative emotions in Fig. 4.4—the bottom row—because ACT analyses suggest that social interactions rarely produce such emotions, and because the drawings themselves suggest that these emotions may be absorbed into named emotions like contemptuous and outraged even though their EPA profiles are much more extreme.

Why are ineffable emotions, which do appear in social life, unnamed in multiple language-culture communities? Some of the ineffable emotions are associated with children, and it is possible that they are unacknowledged verbally by adults as a form of adult-centered social control. Indeed, the few studies that we have of childhood emotional socialization suggest that adults (usually parents or teachers) not only model appropriate behaviors but also link emotion labels to expressions, situations, and feelings. For instance, Pollak and Thoits (1989) found that teachers would often name students’ emotional displays, tying them specifically to particular feeling (i.e., sadness or anger) and attributing it to a reasonable situational cue (i.e., saying to a child who commented that her mother was late to pick her up, Does that make you *mad*? Sometimes kids get *mad* when their *moms are late to pick them up*. (p. 26; emphasis in the original)).

<sup>7</sup> Alito is second from left in the photo published at [www.flickr.com/photos/whitehouse/4311877812/](http://www.flickr.com/photos/whitehouse/4311877812/).

<sup>8</sup> See the photo published in *The Economist* April 13, 2013, at [www.economist.com/news/europe/21576155-vladimir-putin-comes-under-fire-abroad-repressive-laws-home-put-his-place](http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21576155-vladimir-putin-comes-under-fire-abroad-repressive-laws-home-put-his-place).

Other ineffable emotions seem similar to the feelings experienced by religious figures. Unwillingness to name these emotions may stem from a desire to draw boundaries between those with authentic spiritual experiences and those without. Individuals with authentic experiences perhaps prevent others from talking about such experiences under the assumption that such feelings are impossible to understand without first-hand experience. (Such a strategy of exclusion is practiced by mothers, who seem unwilling to name their emotions regarding motherhood to non-mothers, who in their words, “couldn’t possibly understand” (Lois 2013)).

However, such explanations are merely speculations, and admittedly it would be amazing if ineffability of some emotions resulted from successful social control over periods of decades in multiple countries. Research is needed regarding the nature of ineffable emotions, and we return to this matter in the next section.

---

## 4.9 Prospects

Rogers et al. (2014) proposed that affect control theory is an especially useful medium for cross-disciplinary collaborative studies of emotion, because ACT rests on an empirical base, links individual and social aspects of emotion, and describes how emotion is affected by social mechanisms operating at the interaction, relationship, and cultural levels. In support of their argument, they illustrated how the ACT emotion model corresponds with major theories of emotion construction at four different levels of analysis: cultural, interactional, individual, and neural<sup>9</sup>.

Affect control theory links to emotion theories at the cultural level in three ways. First, ACT posits that emotional experiences depend on the positions of self and other within the larger social structure, and this can be connected to individualist-collectivist (or sociocentric-egocentric) forms of culture which correlate with distinct patterns

of emotion causation and perception. Second, ACT proposes that institutional and relational structures constrain individuals’ interpretations of a situation and thereby constrain experienced emotions, which is compatible with some views in cultural psychology that a culture’s association with mental organization of information regulates individual and collective behaviors and emotions. Third, ACT allows that diverse acts are acceptable in a situation while, on the other hand, all acts that disrupt fundamental meanings instigate corrective action, which addresses the concern in cultural approaches to emotion of reconciling spontaneous individual meaning-making with macro-level consensus.

At the interactional level of analysis Rogers, Schröder, and von Scheve related ACT to social exchange theory, which focuses on patterns of interaction and the status and power endowments of interaction partners. The outcomes of interactions and how those outcomes compare to expectations determine emotions, and in turn, emotional experiences can shape the structures influencing interaction. Rogers, Schröder, and von Scheve noted that ACT might make a useful contribution to the approach with its insight that disruptive behaviors producing negative emotions may or may not be controllable by others, depending on whether the disrupter is embodying a cooperative or conflictual (negative) identity. Another convergence might relate the exchange-theory finding that positive emotions during sequential exchange are associated with increasing behavioral commitment and group cohesion to Heise’s (1998) argument that shared emotion is a key element in solidarity. Heise’s (2006) ACT analysis of assimilation-accommodation processes might help understand transitions toward sustained conflict or cooperation. Additionally, according to Scholl (2013), the three affective dimensions underlying ACT relate to basic characteristics of the payoff matrices used in exchange theory studies.

At the individual level, Rogers, Schröder, and von Scheve related ACT to appraisal theory in psychology. Appraisal theory comprises a family of frameworks, with one of the prominent versions postulating that emotions develop from

---

<sup>9</sup> Readers should consult the Rogers, Schröder, & von Scheve (2014) article for references to the various theories of emotion construction.

processing several types of information about an event: relevance (How relevant is this event for me?), implications (What are this event's implications or consequences), coping potential (How well can I cope with the consequences?), and normative significance (What is the significance of this event for my self-concept and for social norms and values?) According to some renditions of appraisal theory, universal psychological mechanisms link appraisals to affective feelings on dimensions of valence, power, and activation. Thus, in appraisal theory as in ACT, emotions result from subjective interpretations of events rather than from the events themselves. Also, some versions of appraisal theory position relevant affective meanings in a space defined by essentially the same three dimensions as are used in ACT. A main contrast between the theories is that appraisal theorists relate interpretations of events to individual goals, needs, and beliefs, whereas affect control theory relates conceptualizations of an event to culturally-normative affective meanings. Exploring relations between individual appraisals and culturally shared affective meanings could inform both theories by showing how norms of affective meaning enter into individuals' emotion generating appraisals, and by tracing how personalized information processing unfolds into the emotions predicted by ACT. This lode of potential research is rich since "there have been virtually no attempts in the sociology of emotion to account for the multitude of empirical findings and concepts inspired by appraisal theory" (von Scheve 2013, p. 36).

Rogers, Schröder, and von Scheve connected affect control theory's emotion model to neuroscience via psychological constructionism. Emotions are constructed through the interaction of functional neural networks as individuals conceptualize core affect—inner representations of bodily states and sensorimotor experience—in terms of culturally derived categories. The associations of emotion categories with physiological reactions, facial and gestural muscle movements, and appraisal patterns constitute the deep meanings of emotions. As elaborated by Thagard and Schröder (*in press*), conceptualizations of core affect correspond to "semantic pointers,"

which are patterns of neural spiking that provide compressed representations of bodily states. Compression involves loss of information as lower level embodied representations are bound into higher level, more symbolic representations, though the compressed neural representations can expand recursively to represent bodily states in a more realistic fashion. Semantic relations among compressed representations can be described as their proximity on dimensions of evaluation, potency, and activity (see Schröder and Thagard 2013 for an example). Together, affect control theory and the semantic pointer framework explain the role of culture in shaping the interpretation and categorization of core affect. Affect control theory contributes a formal operationalization of the cultural construction of identity, behavior, and emotion labels in terms of their evaluation-potency-activity structure, and the semantic pointer hypothesis explains how these structural relations are represented by inter-related patterns of spiking activity in populations of neurons.

Materials discussed in this chapter relate to numerous other areas for future research. Some possibilities are elaborated below.

The description of emotion dynamics (i.e., relations between fundamental sentiments, transient impressions, and emotions) presented here is based on American data. Emotion dynamics differ in other cultures, such as Japan, and studies need to be conducted in still other cultures in order to assess the human variability in emotion dynamics. Gender differences reported here indicate that emotion dynamics also vary sub-culturally, and studies of additional sub-cultures, such as racial, class, and age groupings, are needed to examine the importance of such differences between groups in emotion formation. According to ACT, emotions also vary in sub-cultures because of unique sentiments attached to identities, behaviors, and other concepts, and future ethnographies might examine how these differences contribute to different emotional responses across groups, as was accomplished by Hunt (2008, 2013) in researching a music community.

Our discussion of Fig. 4.1 indicated that individuals enacting stigmatized identities experience



anomalous emotion processes. Several kinds of work would be valuable in future research on this topic. First, studies need to determine if ACT's predictions of emotional lability among deviants are correct. Such studies must differentiate individuals who truly adopt a stigmatized identity from those who reject being altercast into evil identities by others, such as jihadists who view their own acts of violence as heroism rather than terrorism. Second, studies should examine how ACT's insights into the emotions of the stigmatized can benefit treatment regimens in psychotherapy, social work, and prison management. Third, studies might examine incomprehensible emotionality as a side function of labeling deviants. That is, evil identities may be assigned partly in order to make targets emotionally incomprehensible thereby making it easier to process these targets of justice and vengeance without emotional empathy (Heise 1998). Fourth, the mathematical form of the emotion model needs further examination in light of Fig. 4.1. One of the terms in the emotion model multiplies identity evaluation with emotion evaluation in order to predict impression evaluation, and this term is the basis for hypothesizing a point of indeterminacy in the emotions of deviants. The model with a multiplicative interaction reproduces the shape of the empirical data in Fig. 4.1 well ( $R^2=0.83$ ), but the distribution of point in Fig. 4.1 permits a possible alternative framing, with one model applying for positive identities and a different model applying for negative identities. In the alternative approach, neither model would have an interaction term, and therefore there would be no point of indeterminacy, though emotional lability still would apply to deviants. Empirical studies are needed to determine which formulation is correct.

We argued that characteristic emotions in affect control theory correspond to ideal emotional states for individuals in particular identities or relationships (such as sadness for a mourner), and thereby the theory specifies the prescriptive emotion norms associated with different identities. The identification of emotion norms with characteristic emotions needs to be confirmed for a variety of identities. Studies showing that the

emotion norms specified by characteristic emotions change when identity sentiments change also would be valuable. The identity of flight attendant is a good prospect for examining such change in emotion norms, given Hochschild's (1983) rich description of early norms associated with this identity, and the substantial change in sentiment that occurred from 1978 to 2004 (see note 6).

In this chapter we proposed that emotional segueing depends on the emotion labels that are available in a culture and on their positioning in EPA space. This idea needs to be confirmed by additional studies showing that segueing varies culturally and sub-culturally as a function of available emotion labels and their affective meanings. Studies might also examine the impact on segueing of reformulated emotions, like the emotion of jealousy in a polyamorous community (Ritchie and Barker 2006),

Our review of ACT-related research on emotional expression suggested that demeanor affects impressions of an actor in parallel with instrumental action, with essentially the same model applying to expressive activity as to regular behaviors. Studies are needed to specify exactly how expressive actions bind with the identities of actors and objects, and how the impressions created by simultaneous expressive actions and instrumental actions meld into a unified impression of each interactant.

ACT research reveals whole domains of emotions that can be recognized in facial expressions but that have gone unlabeled in multiple languages. These ineffable emotions cannot be referenced easily in interpersonal communication relying on the spoken word, so they are difficult to control via some methods of emotion management. Moreover, their ineffability also makes them difficult to deal with scientifically. Yet these are among the positive emotions of religion and of childhood, so studies of this domain of emotions would contribute to important areas in sociology. Ineffable emotions also are among the agreeable emotions of objectification—e.g., of an employer who is forewarned by an employee (Heise 2014)—so research could clarify the emotional experiences that occur when one is the object of



others' helpful agency. As mentioned in our section on ineffable emotions, we are not positive that unpleasant domineering emotions are among the ineffable emotions, so studies addressing this issue would be valuable. Research also is needed to understand why verbal labeling of emotions is constricted cross-culturally to little more than a single plane through the three-dimensional affective space. Methodologically, research on ineffable emotions seems to be an opportunity to employ visual sociology effectively, using photographic data to track emotions, as pioneered by Schneider (2009), or software that allows respondents to draw emotional expressions easily (de Rooij et al. 2013).

Working on such topics would help scholars who already frame their work in terms of ACT to think more clearly about the implications of their scholarship for the sociology of emotion. Other sociologists of emotion might pursue some of these topics to appreciate the usefulness of a general, precise, and well-validated social psychological theory in their own work.

## References

- Averett, C. P., & Heise, D. R. (1988). Modified social identities: amalgamations, attributions, and emotions. In AL. Smith-Lovin & D. R. Heise (Eds.), *Analyzing social interaction: Advances in affect control theory* (pp. 103–132). New York: Gordon and Breach.
- Britt, L., & Heise, D. R. (2000). From shame to pride in identity politics. In S. Stryker, T. J. Owens, & R. W. White (Eds.), *Self, identity, and social movements* (pp. 252–268). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Cahill, S. E. (1999). Emotional capital and professional socialization: The case of mortuary science students (and Me). *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 62(2), 101–116.
- Cai, Y. (2001). Cultural differences in the meaning and educational utility of authoritarian parenting: Using affect control theory to explain the Asian parenting paradox. Department of Urban Education. Ph.D. Dissertation. Milwaukee, WI, University of Wisconsin.
- Cancian, F. (1987). *Love in America: Gender and self development*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- Clark, C. (1997). *Misery and company: Sympathy in everyday life*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Charmaz, K. (1997). Good days, bad days: *The self in chronic illness and time*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.
- de Rooij, A., Broekens, J., & Lamers, M. H. (2013). Abstract expressions of affect. *International Journal of Synthetic Emotions*, 4(1), 1–31.
- DeVault, M. (1991). *Feeding the family: The social organization of caring as gendered work*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Ekman, P. (1971). Universals and cultural differences in facial expressions of emotion. In J. K. Cole (Ed.), *Nebraska symposium on motivation*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Fisher, G., Heise, D. R., Bohrnstedt, G., & Lucke, J. F. (1985). Evidence for extending the circumplex model of personality trait language to self-reported moods. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 49(1), 233–242.
- Flaherty, M. G. (2003). Customizing temporal experience. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 66(1), 17–33.
- Fontaine, J. R. J., Scherer, K. R., Roesch, E. B., & Ellsworth, P. C. (2007). The world of emotions is not two-dimensional. *Psychological Science*, 18(2), 1050–1057.
- Francis, L. E. (1997). Ideology and interpersonal emotion management: Redefining identity in two support groups. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 60(2), 153–171.
- Francis, C. A., & Heise, D. R. (2003). U.S.A. dictionary (Indiana University). Vol. 2004: Copyright 2004, David R. Heise, Indiana University, Bloomington IN.
- Francis, C. A., & Heise, D. R. (2006). Mean affective ratings of 1,500 concepts by Indiana university undergraduates in 2002–2004 [Computer file]. Affect control theory website: Program interact. <http://www.indiana.edu/~socpsy/ACT/interact/JavaInteract.html>. Accessed 6 June 2014.
- Gambetta, D. (2009). *Codes of the underworld: How criminals communicate*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Goffman, E. (1959). *Presentation of self in everyday life*. Garden City: Anchor.
- Grof, S. (1980). *LSD psychotherapy (The healing potential of psychedelic medicine)*. Auburn Hills: Data Reproduction Purposes.
- Harlow, R. (2003). Race doesn't matter, but...: The effect of race on professors' experiences and emotion management in the undergraduate college classroom. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 66(4), 348–363.
- Heise, D. R. (1979). *Understanding events: Affect and the construction of social action*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Heise, D. R. (1995). Interact: A computer program for studying cultural meanings and social interaction. [http://www.indiana.edu/~socpsy/public\\_files/Interact.jar](http://www.indiana.edu/~socpsy/public_files/Interact.jar). Accessed 6 June 2014.
- Heise, D. R. (1998). Conditions for empathic solidarity. In P. Doreian & T. J. Fararo (Eds.), *The problem of solidarity: Theories and models* (pp. 197–211). Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach.
- Heise, D. R. (1999). Controlling affective experience interpersonally. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 62(1), 4–16.

- Heise, D. R. (2001). Project Magellan: Collecting cross-cultural affective meanings via the internet. *Electronic Journal of Sociology*, 5(3). (<http://www.sociology.org/content/vol005.003/mag.html>). Accessed 6 June 2014.
- Heise, D. R. (2002). Understanding social interaction with affect control theory. In J. Berger & M. Zelditch (Eds.), *New directions in contemporary sociological theory* (pp. 17–40). Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Heise, D. R. (2006). Sentiment formation in social interaction. In K. A. McClelland & T. J. Fararo (Eds.), *Purpose, meaning, and action: control systems theories in sociology* (pp. 189–211). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Heise, D. R. (2007). *Expressive order: Confirming Sentiments in Social Actions*. New York: Springer.
- Heise, D. R. (2010). *Surveying cultures: Discovering shared conceptions and sentiments*. Hoboken: Wiley Interscience.
- Heise, D. R. (2011). *Methodological issues in impression-formation research*. Bloomington: Indiana University (Department of Sociology).
- Heise, D. R. (2013). Modeling interactions in small groups. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 76(1), 52–72.
- Heise, D. R. (2014). Interact guide. Texas: SocioThought. [http://www.indiana.edu/~socpsy/public\\_files/Interact-Guide.pdf](http://www.indiana.edu/~socpsy/public_files/Interact-Guide.pdf). Accessed 6 June 2014.
- Heise, D. R., & Calhan, C. (1995). Emotion norms in interpersonal events. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 58(4), 223–240.
- Heise, D. R., & Lerner, S. J. (2006). Affect control in international interactions. *Social Forces*, 85(2), 993–1010.
- Heise, D. R., & Thomassen, L. (1989). Predicting impressions created by combinations of emotion and social identity. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 52(2), 141–148.
- Heise, D. R., & Weir, B. (1999). A test of symbolic interactionist predictions about emotions in imagined situations. *Symbolic Interaction*, 22(2), 129–161.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1979). Emotion work, feeling rules, and social structure. *American Journal of Sociology*, 85(3), 551–575.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1983). *The managed heart: Commercialization of human feeling*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hochschild, A. R., & Machung, A. (1989). *The second shift: Working parents and the revolution at home*. New York: Viking.
- Hunt, P. M. (2008). From festies to tourrats: Examining the relationship between jamband subculture involvement and role meanings. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 71, 356–378.
- Hunt, P. M. (2013). *Where the music takes you: The social psychology of music subcultures*. San Diego: Cognella.
- Jackson, B. (2013). The bonds of brotherhood: Emotional and social support among college black men. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 642(1), 61–71.
- Kang, M. (2010). *The managed hand: Race, gender, and the body in beauty service work*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Karp, D. (1996). *Speaking of sadness: Depression, disconnection, and the meanings of illness*. New York, Oxford University Press.
- Kashima, Y. (2002). Culture and self: A cultural dynamical analysis. In Y. Kashima, M. Foddy, & M. J. Platow (Eds.), *Self and identity: Personal, social, and symbolic* (pp. 207–226). Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Kemper, T. D. (1978). *A social interactional theory of emotions*. New York: Wiley.
- Leidner, R. (1993). *Fast food, fast talk. Service work and the routinization of everyday life*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Lively, K. J. (2000). Reciprocal emotion management: Working together to maintain stratification in private law firms. *Work and Occupations*, 27(1), 32–63.
- Lively, K. J. (2008). Emotional segueing and the management of emotion, by women and men. *Social Forces*, 87(2), 911–936.
- Lively, K. J. (2013). Social and cultural influences: Gender effects on emotional labor at work and at home. In A. Grandey, J. A. Diefendorff, & D. Rupp (Eds.), *Emotional labor in the 21st century: Diverse perspectives on emotion regulation at work* (pp. 223–249). New York: Psychology Press/Routledge.
- Lively, K. J., & Heise, D. R. (2004). Sociological realms of emotional experience. *American Journal of Sociology*, 109(5), 1109–1136.
- Lively, K. J. & Powell, B. (2006). Emotional expression at work and at home: Domain, status, or individual characteristics? *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 69(1), 17–38.
- Lively, K. J., Steelman, L. C., & Powell, B. (2010). Equity, emotion, and household division of labor. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 73(4), 358–379.
- Lois, J. (2003). *Heroic efforts: The emotional culture of search and rescue volunteers*. New York: New York University Press.
- Lois, J. (2013). *Home is where the school is: The logic of homeschooling and the emotional labor of mothering*. New York: New York University Press.
- MacKinnon, N. J. (1985). Affective dynamics and role analysis (Report for SSHRC Project 410-81-0089). Guelph, Ontario: Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Guelph.
- MacKinnon, N. J. (1988). The attribution of traits, status characteristics, and emotions in social interaction (Report for SSHRC Project 410-81-0089). Guelph, Ontario: Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Guelph.
- MacKinnon, N. J. (1994). *Symbolic interactionism as affect control*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- MacKinnon, N. J., & Heise, D. R. (1993). Affect control theory: Delineation and development. (pp. 64–103). In J. Berger & M. Zelditch Jr. (Eds.), *Theoretical research programs: Studies in the growth of theory*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- MacKinnon, N. J., & Heise, D. R. (2010). *Self, identity, and social institutions*. New York: Palgrave.

- MacKinnon, N. J., & Keating, L. J. (1989). The structure of emotions: Canada-United States comparisons. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 52(1), 70–83.
- Martin, S. E. (1999). Police force or police service? Gender and emotional labor. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 561(1), 111–126.
- Millman, M. (1991). *Warm hearts and cold cash: The intimate dynamics of families and money*. New York: Free Press.
- Morgan, R., & Heise, D. R. (1988). Structure of emotions. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 51(1), 19–31.
- Mullaney, J. L., & Shope, J. H. (2012). *Paid to party: Working time and emotion in direct home sales*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Nelson, S. M. (2006). Redefining a bizarre situation: Relative concept stability in affect control theory. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 69, 215–234.
- Ortony, A., Clore, G. L., & Collins, A. (1988). *The cognitive structure of emotions*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Osgood, C. E., May, W. H., & Miron, M. S. (1975). *Cross-cultural universals of affective meaning*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Pierce, J. L. (1995). *Gender trials: Emotional lives in contemporary law firms*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Pollack, L., & Thoits, P. (1989). Processes in emotional socialization. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 52(1), 22–34.
- Posner, J., Russell, J. A., & Peterson, B. S. (2005). The circumplex model of affect: An integrative approach to affective neuroscience, cognitive development, and psychopathology. *Development and Psychopathology*, 17, 715–734.
- Rashotte, L. (2002a). Incorporating nonverbal behaviors into affect control theory. *Electronic Journal of Sociology*. <http://www.sociology.org/content/vol006.003/rashotte.html>. Accessed 18 Aug 2013.
- Rashotte, L. (2002b). What does that smile mean? The meaning of nonverbal behaviors in social interaction. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 65(1), 92–102.
- Ridgeway, C. (2006). Linking social structure and interpersonal behavior: A theoretical perspective on cultural schemas and social relations. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 69(1), 5–16.
- Ritchie, A., & Barker, M. (2006). There aren't words for what we do or how we feel so we have to make them up: Constructing polyamorous languages in a culture of compulsory monogamy. *Sexualities*, 9(5), 584–601.
- Robinson, D. T., & Smith-Lovin, L. (1992). Selective interaction as a strategy for identity maintenance: An affect control model. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 55(1), 12–28.
- Robinson, D. T., & Smith-Lovin, L. (2006). Affect control theory. In P. J. Burke (Ed.), *Contemporary social psychological theories* (pp. 137–164). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Rogers, K. B., Schröder, T., & Scholl, W. (2013). The affective structure of stereotype content: Behavior and emotion in intergroup context. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 76(2), 125–150.
- Rogers, K. B., Schroder, T., & von Scheve. (2014). *Dissecting the sociality of emotion: A multilevel approach*. *Emotion Review*, 6 (2), 124-133.
- Rogers, K. B., Schröder, T., & von Scheve, C. (In Press). Dissecting the sociality of emotion: A multi-level approach. *Emotion Review*.
- Sansone, R. A., & Sansone, L. A. (2010). Emotional hyper-reactivity in borderline personality disorder. *Psychiatry*, 7(9), 16–20.
- Schachter, S., & Singer, J. (1962). Cognitive, social, and physiological determinants of emotional state. *Psychological Review*, 69(5), 379–399.
- Schneider, A. (2006). Mean affective ratings of 804 concepts by West German students in 1989. Affect control theory website. <http://www.indiana.edu/~socpsy/ACT/interact/JavaInteract.html>. Accessed 6 June 2014.
- Schneider, A. (2009). The rhythm of the whip. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 72(4), 285–289.
- Scholl, W. 2013. The socio-emotional basis of human interaction and communication: *How we construct our social world*. *Social Science Information*, 52; 3-33.
- Schröder, T. (2007). An affective ratings of 1100 concepts by German adults in 2007. Affect control theory website. [http://faculty.uncfsu.edu/tvancantfort/Syllabi/Gresearch/Readings/A\\_Schachter1.pdf](http://faculty.uncfsu.edu/tvancantfort/Syllabi/Gresearch/Readings/A_Schachter1.pdf) accessed June 6, 2014.
- Schröder, T. (2011). A model of language-based impression formation and attribution among Germans. *Journal of Language and Social Psychology*, 30(1), 82–102.
- Schröder, T., & Scholl, W. (2009). Affective dynamics of leadership: An experimental test of affect control theory. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 72(2), 180–197.
- Schröder, T., & Thagard, P. (2013). The affective meanings of automatic social behaviors: Three mechanisms that explain priming. *Psychological Review*, 120(1), 255–280.
- Schröder, T., Netzel, J., Schermuly, C., & Scholl, W. (2013a). Culture-constrained affective consistency of interpersonal behavior a test of affect control theory with nonverbal expressions. *Social Psychology*, 44(1), 47–58.
- Schröder, T., Rogers, K. B., Ike, S., Mell, J. N., & Scholl, W. (2013b). Affective meanings of stereotyped social groups in cross-cultural comparison. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 20(10), 1–17.
- Seery, B. L., & Crowley, M. S. (2000). Women's emotion work in the family: Relationship management and the process of building father-child relationships. *Journal of Family Issues*, 21(1), 100–127.
- Sewell, A. A., & Heise, D. R. (2010). Racial differences in sentiments: Exploring variant cultures. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 34(4), 400–412.
- Smith, H. W., & Cai, Y. (2006). Mean affective ratings of 1,146 concepts by Shanghai undergraduates, 1991. Affect control theory website. <http://www.indiana.edu/~socpsy/ACT/interact/JavaInteract.html>. Accessed 6 June 2014.

- Simon, R. W., & Nath, L. E. (2004). Gender and emotion in the U.S.: Do men and women differ in self-reports of feelings and expressive behavior? *American Journal of Sociology*, 109(5), 1137–1176.
- Smith, A. C., III, & Kleinman, S. (1989). Managing emotions in medical school: Students' contacts with the living and the dead. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 52(1), 56–59.
- Smith, H. W., Matsuno, T., & Umino, M. (1994). How similar are impression-formation processes among Japanese and Americans? *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 57(2), 124–139.
- Smith, H. W., Umino, M., & Matsuno, T. (1998). The formation of gender-differentiated sentiments in Japan. *Journal of Mathematical Sociology*, 22(4), 373–395.
- Smith, H. W., Matsuno, T., & Shuuichirou, I. (2001). The affective basis of attributional processes among Japanese and Americans. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 64(2), 180–194.
- Smith, H. W., Matsuno, T., Shuuichirou, I., & Umino, M. (2006). Mean affective ratings of 1,894 concepts by Japanese undergraduates, 1989–2002." Affect control theory website. <http://www.indiana.edu/~socpsy/ACT/interact/JavaInteract.html>. Accessed 6 June 2014.
- Smith-Lovin, L. (1987). Impressions from events. *Journal of Mathematical Sociology*, 13(1–2), 35–70.
- Smith-Lovin, L. (1990). Emotion as the confirmation and disconfirmation of identity: An affect control model. In T. D. Kemper (Ed.), *Research agendas in the sociology of emotions* (pp. 238–270). Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Smith-Lovin, L. (1994). The sociology of affect and emotion. In K. Cook, G. Fine, & J. House (Eds.), *Sociological perspectives on social psychology* (pp. 118–148). New York: Allyn and Bacon.
- Smith-Lovin, L. & Douglass, W. (1992). An affect control analysis of two religious subcultures. In V. Gecas and D. Franks (Eds.), *Social Perspective in Emotions*, Vol. 1, JAI Press, pp. 217–248.
- Smith-Lovin, L., & Robinson, D. T. (2006). Control theories of identity, action, and emotion: In search of testable differences between affect control theory and identity control theory. In K. A. McClelland & T. J. Fararo (Eds.), *Purpose, meaning, and action: Control systems theories in sociology* (pp. 163–188). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Smith-Lovin, L., Robinson, D. T., & Wisecup, A. (2006). Affect control theory and emotions. In J. E. Stets & J. H. Turner (Eds.), *Handbook of sociology of emotions* (pp. 179–202). New York: Springer.
- Stanislawski, C. (1965). *An actor prepares*. New York: Theatre Arts Books.
- Stanley, J. P. (1977). Gender-marking in American English: Usage and reference. In A. P. Nilsen, H. Bosmajian, H. L. Gershuny, & J. P. Stanley (Eds.), *Sexism and language* (pp. 43–74). Urbana: National Council of Teachers of English.
- Stearns, C. Z., & Stearns, P. N. (1989). *Anger: The struggle for emotional control in America's history*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Sutton, R. I. (1991). Maintaining norms about expressed emotions: The case of bill collectors. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 36(2), 245–268.
- Thagard, P., & Schröder, T. (In press). Emotions as semantic pointers: Constructive neural mechanisms. In L. F. Barrett & J. A. Russell (Eds.), *The psychological construction of emotion*. New York: Guilford.
- Thoits, P. A. (1990). Emotional deviance: Research agendas. In T. D. Kemper (Ed.), *Research agendas in the sociology of emotions* (pp. 180–203). Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Thoits, P. A. (1995). Managing the emotions of others. *Symbolic Interaction*, 19(2), 85–109.
- von Scheve, C. (2013). *Emotion and social structures: The affective foundations of social order*. New York: Routledge.
- Wasielewski, P. L. (1985). The emotional basis of charisma. *Symbolic Interaction*, 8(2), 207–222.
- Wharton, A. S. (2009). The sociology of emotional labor. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 35, 147–165.
- Wiggins, B. B., & Heise, D. R. (1987). Expectations, intentions, and behavior: Some tests of affect control theory. *Journal of Mathematical Sociology*, 13, 153–169.
- Wingfield, A. H. (2010). Are some emotions marked 'whites only'? Racialized feeling rules in professional workplaces. *Social Problems*, 57(2), 251–268.



Edward J. Lawler, Shane R. Thye and Jeongkoo Yoon

---

## 5.1 Introduction

This chapter broadens the implications of a longstanding program of theory and research on the role of emotion in social exchange (for reviews, see Lawler and Thye 2006; Thye et al. 2002). That work poses the following question: Under what conditions can purely instrumental exchange generate relations and groups that become objects of value in their own right, i.e., ends that people value in and of themselves? Social exchange theory assumes self-interested actors (individuals or groups) who form and sustain social ties only insofar as they provide valued individual rewards not readily available elsewhere. In this sense, repeated ongoing social exchanges entail purely transactional ties among two or more actors. Transactional ties are inherently conditional and unstable as individual incentives shift or evolve.

Our program of research shows how these instrumental, transactional ties can become expres-

sive, relational ones and, thus, more stable. In brief, this occurs if repeated exchanges generate everyday positive emotions (pleasure, satisfaction, interest, excitement, pride), and if people attribute those feelings to a social unit (Lawler and Yoon 1996; Lawler 2001; Lawler et al. 2008). Attributing individual feelings to a collective or group entity is crucial to the formation of such expressive, relational ties. The relevant social unit can be a local, immediate relation or small group or larger more encompassing and distant social entity (organization, community, and nation). The underlying theoretical logic is that everyday emotions and feelings mediate the effects of micro or macro social structures on the nature and strength of ties to social units (see Lawler and Yoon 1996; Lawler et al. 2000; Thye et al. 2011). We explain how micro-level processes generate social commitments to groups or larger organizations due to the emotional byproducts of purely instrumental social exchanges.

A recent book (Lawler et al. 2009) generalizes and broadens our theorizing in several ways. The book argues that the interactional foundations of everyday emotions and feelings deepen understanding of macro phenomena including, for example, the forms of commitment likely to emerge in hierarchy and network structures; how local group commitments fragment decentralized organizations; how relational ties enact and sustain social inequalities based on cultural status beliefs; and the strength of national identities in an era of weakened nation states. The book elaborates how and why the emotional dynamics of

---

Authorship is alphabetical. This chapter is based on a program of research that was supported by five grants from the National Science Foundation.

---

E. J. Lawler (✉)  
Cornell University, Ithaca, USA  
e-mail: ejl3@cornell.edu

S. R. Thye  
University of South Carolina, Columbia, USA

J. Yoon  
Ewha Womans University, Seoul, Korea

micro processes are involved in or connected to macro-sociological structures and processes and, indirectly to the Hobbesian problem of social order. The purpose of this chapter is to distill this theoretical argument in article form, elaborate its empirical foundations, and further develop the broader implications.

### 5.1.1 Micro Processes and the Hobbesian Problem

Periods of major social transformations tend to upset and unsettle the ties people form to groups or communities as well as to each other. In the current era, changes unleashed by new technologies of communication (e.g., facebook or twitter), the globalization of economic markets, and the demise of traditional employment contracts all reflect and reinforce fundamental changes in the nature and form of human social ties. To illustrate, employment and work ties are ever-changing and transitory (Cappelli 1999); a greater proportion of social connections approximate the properties of an economic “spot market;” interpersonal communications are increasing digital, cryptic, and tantamount to sequences of “sound bites.” Global, macro changes such as these have disconnected people from and loosened their emotional ties to long standing units (e.g., political entities, work organizations, local communities). Social lives are more individualized and ties more transactional (Putnam 2007). These macro level trends help account for evidence revealing a decline of social capital (Putnam 2000, 2001), an increase in the proportion of people living alone (Klinenberg 2012), and a reduction in the number of close confidants people report having (McPherson et al. 2006). These trends also have reawakened the “loss of community” theme (Riesman 1950) that sociologists often return to at times like these; such a theme is manifest in recent work on changing social ties (See also Cacioppo and Patrick 2008; Fischer 2011).

We contend, however, that the community loss theme is an illusory and misleading framing for periods of major social transformation such as currently underway (Lawler et al. 2009). It is

as much a myth as it is a reality. As critiques of Putnam’s decline of social capital thesis (Stolle and Hooghe 2004) suggest, the apparent decline of ties to traditional institutional realms is misleading because people are connecting in new ways and in different institutional realms. Fischer (2011) amasses substantial evidence indicating, for example, that ties to family and friends have remained largely stable despite major technological, economic, and work-related changes. As people are disconnected from standard social entities, such as fraternal organizations and clubs, they also are “freed” from the social constraints of these entities, giving them opportunities for social connection that previously did not exist, e.g., the extensive YouTube communities that have emerged in the past decade see (Wesch 2009). While social transformations may upset or unsettle extant social ties, people have an immense capacity to adapt and to do so quickly. Face to face time with friends and family may decline, due to job pressures, time spent commuting, and the like (Putnam 2000), but frequency of contact through virtual technologies may grow and substitute. It may not take much contact to maintain or even create a sense of social connection. Direct person to person ties may become more transitory and transactional but larger, more indirect, person to group ties may endure as objects of commitment and make those social ties more relational and less transactional. This is especially likely if ties to groups have a significant emotional or affective component.

Unsettled social ties, whatever the underlying causes, raise the Hobbesian problem of social order, which can be updated and recast as follows: How do individualized, privatized actors create and sustain affectively meaningful social ties to social units—relations, groups, organizations, communities, and nations? That people form and respond to ties with other people (person-to-person ties) is not so problematic because even the most individualized and self-interested actors, if enlightened about the longer term consequences of their actions, will perceive value in collaborations that generate joint goods or products they cannot generate alone (see Hechter 1987; Axelrod 1984; Kollock 1998). Networks or



network-based organizations serve individual interests quite well in this respect. But what about the ties people have to larger units (person-to-group ties), be they local work groups, larger organizations, neighborhoods, communities or ultimately nation states? In an individualized world, how can these social units be perceived as valued sources of reward, pleasure, belonging, and identity? How can they become affective objects of commitment in their own right?

We suggest that in an individualized world, group ties are self-generated from the “bottom up” (See Lawler et al. 2009). That is, they develop and are sustained through repeated social interactions that take place around joint tasks or activities, promoted and framed by the group unit. These foundational social interactions may be purely transactional, whereas the person to group ties may involve affective sentiments about the group itself. In this sense, person to group ties entail a *micro-to-macro* process. It is in local interactional settings that larger entities become salient, real objects toward which people orient their interactions.

This chapter explicates and amplifies that micro-to-macro process. Person-to-person and person-to-group ties can be construed as two fundamental solutions to the Hobbesian problem of order (see Mead 1936; Parsons 1951). Any social order entails intertwined P-P and P-G ties; however, in contemporary sociological theorizing these tend to be conflated and P-G ties are reduced to or recast in terms of P-P ties. In contrast we argue that it is important to treat these dimensions as distinct analytically and empirically. This is an important message of both George Herbert Mead’s contrast of specific others with generalized others and Tajfel’s social identity theory and related empirical work (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Hogg 2001).<sup>1</sup> Our theorizing indicates that person-to-person ties are the foundation for

person-to-group ties, but that once the latter form they take on a life of their own and transcend the particular P-P interactions that generate or sustain them. The micro-to-macro process through which interactions generate affective sentiments about social units make the group level social objects a source of collective orientation and group-oriented behavior.

### 5.1.2 Emotions and Commitment

An *emotion* is defined as a relatively short-lived positive or negative evaluative state that involves neurophysiological, neuromuscular, and sometimes cognitive elements (Kemper 1978; Izard 1977). The emotions of concern here are involuntary internal events that simply “happen to people” (Hochschild 1983); they emerge in sequences of social interaction at the micro level and have consequences for the nature and resilience of relational ties to other persons but also to groups.

In theorizing the role of emotions in social exchange (Lawler and Thye 1999), we distinguish the emotional consequences of the (a) interaction context, (b) interaction process, and (c) interaction outcomes. Emotions that are an integral part of the interaction context may result from cultural norms about expressions of emotion (Hochschild 1979) or reflect structural positions or hierarchies (Collins 1975; Kemper 1978). Those generated in the interaction process may represent signals to or information for actors about the course or trajectory of the interaction (Heise 1979; Frank 1988). Finally, emotions produced by interaction outcomes (rewards, success/failure) play an important role in the development of relational ties, cohesion, and solidarity (Collins 1981; Lawler et al. 2009). The upshot is that the context, process, and outcomes of interaction all have important affective elements. Our theorizing falls squarely within the interaction outcome theme, because of its social-exchange based assumption that emotions constitute internal rewards (see Lawler et al. 2009). However, attention to the interaction context and process is essential to explaining when and how emotions can generate

<sup>1</sup> In one experimental study Hogg and Turner (1985) found that groups are independent of interpersonal relations. That is, groups can be formed without interpersonal relations. They further document that interpersonal relations generate group formation only if those relations are subsumed into the common category of membership through a cognitive process of identification.

expressive or affective commitments to a group entity. We aim to explain how select features of the context and process make it more or less likely that the outcome-generated emotions will strengthen commitment to the group.

*Commitment* is defined historically in a number of ways. Kanter (1968) contrasts three forms of commitment: continuance, affective, and normative. Continuance commitment refers to the tendency of actors to remain in a group or organization because of the benefits received or the costs of leaving the group or organization. Continuance is an instrumental form of commitment that entails a rational choice. Affective commitment involves an emotional tie to the group organization. Such a tie indicates the degree to which the affiliation or membership is valued in its own right, as an end in itself. This intrinsic value of membership is based on the positive feelings generated by participation in group or organizational activities. Normative commitment is defined in terms of the moral or normative obligation one has to a group or organization. This form of commitment involves a belief that it is right and proper to conform to the rules and to serve a group or organization's collective interests. People with a normative commitment are motivated not by their own interest, but by their sense of duty and obligation to the collective goals. Scholars generally agree that people often initially engage in group relations because of instrumental incentives (i.e., continuance commitment). We assert that under certain conditions continuance commitment develops into affective- and normative-forms of commitment, creating a more solid foundation for social commitment more generally.

*Social commitments*, therefore, are defined as person to group ties that have significant affective and normative components. We assert that continuance commitment, alone, is not sufficient to sustain social order at the macro level in the long term. Whereas instrumental incentives may be sufficient to foster continuance commitment, the foundation is inherently fragile and only as strong as the stability of the incentives. In the long term, voluntary social order is possible only when people value the ties as ends in themselves and thus actively engage in the production of

social order at deeper levels—levels driven by affective and normative concerns. The question then becomes: how do people move from continuance forms of commitment to these deeper affective and normative forms? We address this process in the following sections.

---

## 5.2 Theoretical Backdrop

Our theoretical research program starts from theoretical principles found, respectively, in Durkheim (1915), Homans (1950), and Emerson (1972a, b). Durkheim's analysis of preliterate societies indicated that joint activities were a central basis for social order primarily because of the emotions and feelings generated by such activities. The distinct subunits (e.g., bands, clans, tribes) of a larger society were nomadic and separated during much of the year, but in the summer, they gathered in a single location and during this time there were many collective (religious) rituals that aroused considerable positive affect (collective effervescence). They shared emotions and feelings during these rituals that reaffirmed and strengthened the larger group (societal) affiliation and sustained it when subunits scattered. For Durkheim this process links micro and macro phenomena. Moreover, the idea that collective-level emotional experiences emanate from social interaction in joint activities can be generalized and extended to many group contexts in which people do things together, plan collaborative efforts, or accomplish joint tasks (e.g., see Collins 2004; Lawler et al. 2009).

Homans (1950) further emphasizes the importance of interaction frequency at the micro level (see also Wrong 1995). His analysis distinguishes the "external system" of a group, which represents a fixed stable structure within which people interact, from the "internal system," which is the emergent or endogenously generated set of relations within the group. The external system entails mandated activities (e.g., fixed job tasks) and a system of constraints and opportunities, determining who is likely to interact with whom. Interaction frequencies are "realized" opportunities that connect this external system to the actual

relations that form in the group. The internal system is shaped by *sentiments*, conceived as affective feelings about interaction partners. Sentiments are the proximal cause of relational bonds; more frequent interactions tend to generate positive sentiments which in turn foster stronger and more enduring relations. We build on the notion that repeated interaction is a powerful force for order and stability in part because of the emotions it generates (see Collins 1981; Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996; Wrong 1995). In comparison, Durkheim's macro approach emphasizes the effects of institutional activities and symbolic behaviors (rituals) that generate collective emotions; whereas Homans' micro approach emphasizes the impact of people engaging each other (social interaction and exchange) to accomplish tasks. Together, they suggest the micro-to-macro links at the heart of our theorizing.

Emerson (1972a, b) elaborates the structural foundations of social exchange relations and eschews the affective component of Homans, while adopting the operant foundation in Homans' (1961) later work. Exchange relations, by definition, entail ongoing and repeated exchange among the same people in which each receives valued rewards. Repetition of exchange among the same actors distinguishes social from economic exchange. Structural dependencies and interdependencies specify or define the incentives (rewards) of actors to interact and exchange with particular others, and determine the distribution of rewards or profits in an exchange relation (Cook et al. 1983; Markovsky et al. 1988). Emerson's intent was to theorize how network structures, involving three or more actors, shape the differentiation of rewards and outcomes within and across ongoing relations in that network. For Emerson, exchange relations are essentially network-embedded ties.

Affect, cohesion and order was not a central agenda for Emerson or other exchange theorists (see Willer 1999), but he noted that cohesion occurs in dyadic relations to the degree that each party is highly dependent on the other. Dependence is determined by the extent that each actor values the goods available from the other and has limited alternatives for receiving those goods

elsewhere. We build on this idea from Emerson that mutual dependencies are the structural basis for cohesive exchange relations, and theorize how mediating emotions and feelings account for the cohesion effects of mutual dependence at the relational level, but also how such emotions transform networks into group entities, and generate affective ties to local or larger groups.

### 5.2.1 Theoretical Scope

The scope conditions of our theorizing are based on those commonly found in social exchange theory and research, but with two modifications. The standard exchange conditions are as follows: (1) A social context in which at least three persons in a network seek individual gain or profit. (2) The social structure gives them incentives to consider interacting with one or more others in pursuit of that gain. (3) Individuals, at least initially, choose partners from whom they expect the greatest individual gain or benefit. We add two other scope conditions that are not standard in social exchange theorizing: (4) Interactions occur in the context of an ongoing social unit, such as a group, organization, or community. (5) There are proximal, local units as well as larger distal (more removed or distant) social units within which the proximal units are nested. One or more of these units is salient in the sense that actors are aware they are interacting within it. These generic scope conditions suggest that the theory of social commitments should apply to a wide range of social contexts.

The following discussion is organized around the themes above from Durkheim, Homans, and Emerson. The first section on "interaction and emotion" reviews our theory and research on how transactional exchange ties can become expressive through the effects of interaction on positive emotions or feelings. Emotions are the key mediator in this transformation. The second section on "joint tasks and shared responsibility" identifies the structural (objective) and cognitive (subjective) dimensions of joint activities; these conditions lead actors to attribute their individual feelings to relevant social units. The sense

of shared responsibility is the moderator for this spread of emotions upward from relational to group levels and beyond. In other words, “social unit attributions of emotion” is the mechanism by which individually-felt emotions are attributed to relations, groups, or organizations. These also determine when commitments to the local group are stronger than commitments to the larger organization in which the local group is nested. Our theorizing specifies conditions under which individual feelings at the local, immediate group level spread to larger more removed or subtle social units, such as a network or organization (see also Turner 2007).

### 5.3 Interaction and Emotion

A centerpiece of our theorizing is the simple idea that social interactions generate mild, everyday emotions, such as feeling up, down, pleasure, displeasure, satisfaction, dissatisfaction, excitement, boredom, or enthusiasm. A special property of such affective states is that when people feel them, they tend to “feel them all over,” physiologically (Damasio 1999), and moreover they are felt involuntarily. The emotions of primary concern to us are involuntary or simply “happen to people” as Hochschild (1979) suggests. Such affective states are likely to have both motivational and cognitive effects. The motivational effects are due to the fact that positive and negative emotions from interaction or exchange are internal rewards that people want to experience again or internal punishments they wish avoid. The cognitive effects include broader, more global processing of information in the case of positive rather than negative affect, i.e., attending to the “big picture” with respect to causes (see Gasper and Clore 2002).

Of particular note, positive affect generates more inclusive or integrative categorizations of self and other in negotiation settings involving social exchange (Isen 1987; Carnevale and Isen 1986). We assume that the motivational (rewarding) effects stimulate “cognitive work” through which actors ascribe meaning to and interpret the causes of emotions felt. These cognitive effects lead people to perceive the relation or group as a

social unit or object (Lawler 2001). Thus, people are motivated to figure out where their emotions are coming from and the relational unit is a plausible causal agent. At issue is how these feelings might make the exchange relation a more salient and cohesive unit and, thus, become a possible object of affective commitment. Relational cohesion theory developed by Lawler and Yoon (1996) explains how exchange relations can become objects of commitment.

#### 5.3.1 Relational Cohesion Theory

The main tasks for relational cohesion theory (Lawler and Yoon 1996; Lawler et al. 2000) were to (i) ground the “interaction-to-emotion” process in structures of dependence or power, and (ii) demonstrate how and why the interaction-to-emotion effects can make the relational unit an object of commitment (Lawler and Yoon 1996).<sup>2</sup> The structural dependence or interdependence conditions provide incentives for people to exchange with particular others and thus shape the frequencies of exchange. These constitute the instrumental ties among actors. Relational cohesion theory assumes standard conditions of social exchange (i.e., actors seeking individual gain in networks where at least some have alternative partners) but goes a step further. The theory proposes that repeated exchanges among the same actors result in the initial instrumental ties taking on expressive elements. Expressive elements emerge in exchange relations to the degree that the emotion from repeated exchanges has motivational and cognitive effects as suggested above. The instrumental foundations of the exchange relations may remain, even as expressive elements develop and strengthen.

The theory can be portrayed as a causal chain with exogenous structural conditions of

<sup>2</sup> The research adopts Emerson’s (1972b) concept of power and dependence in which (a) power is a structural potential based on dependencies or interdependencies. A’s dependence on B (the potential rewards from B) is the foundation for B’s power over A and vice versa; mutual dependencies refer to the degree that each is dependent on the other, i.e., interdependence.

interdependence producing commitment behaviors (outcomes) through an endogenous affective process. The theory is diagrammed in Fig. 1. The tripartite forms of commitment behavior were designed to reflect both instrumental and expressive behaviors: (i) staying in the relation despite equal or better payoffs elsewhere, which is the standard instrumental measure of commitment; (ii) unilateral gift giving, which entails token gifts symbolic of an expressive tie; and (iii) investing in a joint venture involving a risk of malfeasance (a prisoner's dilemma). The endogenous process consists of a simple causal chain, indicating that more frequent exchange produces more positive feelings which, in turn, generate the perception of a unifying or cohesive relation.

Two points about the general message of the theory are worth noting. The first is that the structural effects on commitment are indirect and operate only through the endogenous process. If the endogenous process does not operate or breaks down at some point (e.g., if more frequent exchange does not generate more positive emotions), the effects of structural dependencies and interdependencies on commitment will not occur. Thus, the theory makes a strong statement about the importance and centrality of the endogenous process. The second point is that the theory is a response in part to uncertainty-reduction explanations about how commitments are generated by repeated social exchange. Such explanations indicate that with repeated exchange, actors come to know more about each other and thus can anticipate each other's preferences and behaviors. Staying with a known partner avoids the uncertainty and risk of forming a new relation elsewhere. The theory of relational cohesion offers an affective explanation that complements an uncertainty reduction explanation for relational commitments. Research on the theory is detailed next.

### 5.3.2 Testing the Theory

The theory was tested across a significant number of experiments. Here we use six studies (published in three papers) to highlight important


implications of the theory and research. The first test of relational cohesion theory was conducted by Lawler and Yoon (1996) and included three experiments, one experiment for each of the three forms of commitment behavior (stay behavior, gift-giving, and investing in a joint venture). All three experiments were conducted under highly controlled conditions in which pairs of subjects (college students) represented companies negotiating the price of a product; one was a buyer and one a seller.

The information conditions of the experiments are important to note. Subjects never saw each other and expected no future contact beyond the experiment. The negotiations took place via computers and there were 12 episodes of negotiation (portrayed as "years"). Each episode was independent of the others, meaning that negotiations started anew in each "year." Within each episode (year) there were up to 3 or 5 rounds of offers and counteroffers or until agreement was reached. The only communication between subjects was through the offers (numbers inserted on the computer keyboard) they made to each other on a round. In today's terms, this is theoretically comparable to virtual interaction via internet technologies and software.

The initial 1996 test manipulated equal vs. unequal dependence and low versus high mutual dependence by providing each subject a hypothetical alternative partner. If they did not reach agreement with each other, they could opt for the alternative, which took the form of a drawing that selected an exchange agreement. The drawing was presented in the form of a probability distribution of agreements at different levels of profit for the subject. The expected value of the alternative was always lower than the midpoint value of exchange, but it varied in accord with the structural dependence condition. The expected values were equal versus unequal across the actors and very poor (low mutual dependence) or moderately poor (high mutual dependence) for both. Because of the availability of the alternative, the experimental setting made reaching agreement problematic (grand mean = 0.62) which was im-



**Fig. 5.1** The theory of relational cohesion



portant to testing the distinct impact of exchange frequency.<sup>3</sup>

The experiment included measures of all variables in the theoretical model (see Fig. 5.1). Elements of the endogenous process were measured after episode 8. Exchange frequency was the proportion of rounds on which subjects reached agreement. Questionnaires measured positive emotions as self-reports along bipolar adjectives of pleasure/satisfaction (e.g., pleased-displeased, contented-discontented etc.) and interest/excitement (e.g., excited-bored, enthusiastic-unenthusiastic, etc.). Questionnaire items also measured the perceived cohesion of the relation with the other (e.g., divisive-cohesive, converging-diverging, etc.).

The commitment behaviors were measured across episodes 8–12. Stay behavior was measured by changing the payoffs from the alternative to nearly equal those subjects could receive from exchange with each other; unilateral gifts were vouchers for pieces of candy to be distributed at the end of the experimental session; and investment behavior took the form of cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma. In the case of gift giving and investment behavior, subjects did not have information on the partner's choices (to give or not, invest or not) until after the conclusion of the 12th (and last) negotiation episode; so, these behaviors could not be exchanged and reciprocated along the way.

The results of the three experiments together provide extensive support for the theory of relational cohesion. First, more frequent exchange generated more positive emotions; and, the effects of the power-dependence structure on these positive emotions were indirect through the frequency of exchange. Second, the effects of ex-

change frequency on perceived cohesion were indirect and through positive emotions, confirming the endogenous process: exchange-to-emotion-to-cohesion. Third, as expected, equal dependence generated more frequent exchange than unequal dependence and relations higher in mutual dependence generated more frequent exchange than those with lower mutual dependence. Of special importance, there is strong and consistent support for the endogenous process of the theory (see Fig. 5.1).

Finally, when each of the three commitment behaviors were regressed on all other variables of the theory (see Fig. 5.1), relational cohesion (perceived) has the primary significant effects; in fact, only one other effect occurs, a positive impact of exchange frequency on stay behavior. The upshot is that the results of these three experiments provide virtually complete support for the role of emotion posited by the theory. All predicted effects occurred and, importantly, there were no problematic direct effects along the pathways specified in Fig. 5.1. The direct effect of exchange frequency on relational cohesion probably reflects an uncertainty-reduction process complementary to the emotional/affective process. Overall, the most important implication of the research is that mild, everyday emotions and feelings mediate the effects of structural dependencies and interdependencies on the emergence of cohesive social ties.

### 5.3.3 Extension to Productive Exchange

The first comprehensive test of relational cohesion theory (above) took a focal dyad within a hypothetical network as the relational unit. Subsequent studies adapted and extended the theory to three person groups where individuals could contribute to a joint venture (Lawler et al. 2000). This research had two primary purposes: (i) to

<sup>3</sup> In exchange theory, the structural dependence conditions may be micro level or macro level. Asking how macro structures and cultures foster or create dependencies and interdependencies in local exchanges or groupings is an avenue for linking macro and micro levels.



develop Emerson's concept of "productive exchange" and use it to test relational cohesion theory in a group context, and (ii) to test directly whether the emotional/affective and uncertainty reduction processes represent distinctive pathways to commitment. The prototype of productive exchange is three or more actors who coordinate their behaviors to produce a joint good that none can produce alone or in pairs. In essence the exchange is between the individual and the group. The actors are highly interdependent and there is a single joint good that provides actors their best outcomes, i.e., productive exchange involves an assurance game rather than a social dilemma.<sup>4</sup> Coordination and trust are the key problems faced by actors in productive exchange.

In two experiments, subjects represented companies deciding whether to contribute to a collaborative research and development project. The experimental procedures were similar to those in Lawler and Yoon (1996) with a few exceptions. First, decisions to contribute were made simultaneously over 16 episodes (years), which created the requisite problems of coordination and trust. Second, structural dependencies were manipulated in the same way but referred to how dependent each actor was on the group (collaboration). Finally, the experiments added a questionnaire measure of perceived predictability (uncertainty) of others' behavior, in order to compare uncertainty reduction and emotional/affective mechanisms. Two experiments addressed one of two dependent variables—unilateral, token gifts (to both others), and investing in a social dilemma—both of which were introduced after 12 episodes.

The results of the study provide strong support for the extension of relational cohesion theory to the phenomenon of productive exchange. First, productive exchange was more frequent when actors were more highly dependent on the group and also when they were equally rather than unequally dependent on that group. Second, these structural effects are mediated by the relational cohesion






process. As expected the frequency of productive exchange increased both positive emotion and the perceived predictability of others' behavior, suggesting distinct paths for each. Third, in accord with Lawler and Yoon (1996), positive emotion does promote stronger perceptions of group cohesion, but there are no effects of predictability (uncertainty) on group cohesion. Fourth, distinct processes lead to instrumental and expressive forms of commitment behavior. An emotional pathway, consistent with relational cohesion theory (i.e., exchange-emotion-cohesion) generates more expressive behavior (giving gifts), while an uncertainty-reduction pathway (exchange-predictability) generates more instrumental behaviors (cooperating in a social dilemma). These are dual, parallel processes through which productive exchange strengthens commitments to a group. It is noteworthy, however, that cohesion operates as a proximal condition for commitment only when exchanges foster positive emotions and feelings.

Productive exchange has a more cooperative incentive structure (i.e., an assurance game) than other forms of exchange (see Emerson 1981; Molm 1994; Lawler 2001). In contrast, negotiated exchange (e.g., see Cook et al. 1983; Markovsky et al. 1988; Willer 1999) assumes a network context in which actors compete for exchange partners and necessarily exclude some actors when they exchange with another. Such exchange networks are arenas of competition in which actors vie to be included in exchanges. The network is not a group in any clear sense. In fact, given the underlying competitive conditions, such networks are unfavorable even to psychological group formation, i.e. perceptions of the network as a group. Thus, there are no theoretical reasons to predict network-wide levels of group formation from network exchange or relational cohesion theory.<sup>5</sup> A recent study by Thye et al. (2011) takes up this issue and asks: Why and how

<sup>4</sup> In an assurance game, actors' highest payoffs are from cooperation but in other respects, the incentive structure is identical to a prisoner's dilemma, i.e., the sucker's payoff remains the worst (Kollock 1998).

<sup>5</sup> Relational cohesion theory predicts and research has shown that "pockets of cohesion" emerge in networks around exchange relations that entail the highest exchange frequencies (see Lawler and Yoon 1998); however, the theory does not analyze whether or how cohesion in relations might affect the cohesion or perceptions of the larger network.

**Fig. 5.2** Structural cohesion for several common networks. (Reprinted from Thye et al. 2011)

<i>Structural Cohesion &amp; Predicted Group Formation</i>	<i>Name and Network</i>		<i>Type of Network Power</i>	<i>Likelihood of Inclusion L(i)</i>
Highest	4-Full		Equal Power	1.00
	Triangle		Equal Power	.67
Moderate	4-Line		Weak Power	.87
	3-Branch		Strong Power	.67
Lowest	4-Branch		Strong Power	.50

might actors in competitive exchange networks come to view the overarching network as a group entity? Again, we theorize that emotions play a central, mediating role.

### 5.3.4 How Networks Become Groups

This theoretical branch of our work asserts that relational cohesion in dyads can lead to network-wide cohesion, contingent on the structural properties of the network. The theory links structural network properties to relational processes in dyads, and these relational processes in turn lead to emergent perceptions of a network-wide group affiliation (Thye et al. 2011). The key network property is structural cohesion. *Structural cohesion* is a function of the kind of power found in the network (the proportion of equal versus unequal power relations within the network) and also the network-level probability that actors are included in exchange. Network structures that entail more equal power relations (see Markovsky et al. 1988; Willer 1999 for operational measures of power) and greater likelihoods of inclusion are more cohesive in purely structural terms. Structural cohesion, as such, is an unrealized potential; whereas exchange processes are the locus of realization, if it occurs. Simply stated, with high structural cohesion more actors should be able to exchange with more others and on more equal terms. The predicted result is that, in the context of repeated exchanges, actors come to perceive the *network itself* as a social unit and orient their behavior partly toward that implied group affiliation or entity. Perceptions of a group and greater

resource sharing capture the predicted cognitive and behavioral effects of emotions that emerge from dyadic exchanges.

To test these predictions, Thye et al. (2011) studied five exchange networks (see Fig. 5.2), composed of three or four actors, who negotiated the division of a fixed pie of resources. The configuration (network) of exchange opportunities manipulated the degree of structural cohesion. Some networks contained more equal power relations and some contained more unequal power relations. There were 20 episodes of exchange, and in each episode they could exchange with only one of their prospective partners and divide 32 units of profit. The questionnaire measures of positive emotion, uncertainty, and dyadic cohesion were collected after episode 16, and perceptions of a group were measured after the 20th (and last) episode. The group-perception items asked subjects to what degree they were mutually dependent, in a similar situation, and felt a common bond with others in the network. In addition to group perceptions, the experiment measured “resource sharing” in a dictator game. From episodes 17 to 20, each actor was given 100 profit points to allocate across network members at the end of each episode. They did not receive information on the others’ resource allocations until after episode 20, so subjects could not use the resources in a strategic manner.

The results affirm the impact of structural cohesion on the emergence of a perceived group affiliation and resource sharing at the network level. These effects are indirect and mediated by positive emotions, uncertainty reduction, and relational (dyadic) cohesion. Structural cohesion

increases both positive feelings and predictability by generating greater frequencies of exchange; these two mediating processes in turn produce greater cohesion in dyadic exchange relations. Of particular importance, this dyadic-level relational cohesion in the network is the primary cause of both (i) perceptions of a group and (ii) resource sharing among its members.

These findings constitute the first empirical evidence for a micro to macro process, from dyadic relations within to the overall network as a whole. The interpretation is that relational cohesion in dyads leads people to infer that others in the network, including those they do not interact with, are collectively oriented and trustworthy. This is a rudimentary manifestation of a group entity. The research indicates that group formation emerges in networks that are structurally cohesive, and this tends to occur through emotion-based relational cohesion in dyads within those networks (see Thye et al. 2011).

One broad implication of this research is that repeated interactions in local immediate units may create a sense of social connectedness even beyond the particular local relations. If three or more people jointly pursue individual gains and do so repeatedly, a social connection forms among those with whom they interact. But importantly, a connection may also form with those experiencing the same situation but with whom the focal actors *do not* interact. The strength of the connections may vary, the target of the connection might vary, and the social unit may vary, but the fact of a social connection does not. This is a fundamental reason that the “loss of community” theme is a misleading or even mythical notion. Observations of community loss often ignore or fail to see new or subtle forms of community that stem from processes unleashed by repeated interactions, common goals or objects, or webs of indirect ties formed by patterns of direct ones. Social connections may be difficult, if not impossible, to prevent in part because people are wired to be social and their capacities and inclinations toward collaboration with other humans are a product of group-level natural selection (see Turner 2007; Haidt 2010; Haidt and Kesebir 2010).

To conclude, relational cohesion theory (Lawler and Yoon 1996; Thye et al. 2002) focuses on the relational or dyadic level. It makes no prediction about the aggregate effects of cohesion across relations in a network. However, as Thye et al. (2011) show, structurally-cohesive networks promote a collective sense of shared experience across actors in a network, even though each actor may be able to interact and exchange with only select others. The network may come to constitute a common focus for actors (Collins 1975), they may infer similar emotions by similar others in a similar context (Lawler et al. 2013), and positive emotions may spread across the relations each actor is involved in (Barsade 2002). Once a group is perceived as an entity, it can be a distinct object of affective commitment.

Relational cohesion theory presumes but does not precisely theorize the conditions under which people develop affective ties to groups. Again, the focus is primarily dyadic. A subsequent formulation, the affect theory of social exchange (Lawler 2001; Lawler et al. 2008, 2009) unpacks how and when individual emotions are attached to *relational or group entities*. The theory identifies the structural and cognitive conditions under which people attribute their own individual emotions and feelings to social units shared with others. Whereas the work of Thye et al. 2011 focused on the network-to-group problem when individuals negotiate exchange, the affect theory applies to social interactions abstractly, whether or not these involve social exchange, and explicates further the underlying micro-to-macro process. *Joint tasks, shared responsibility, and social unit attributions* are the central concepts of the theory. We elaborate these in the following pages.

---

#### 5.4 Joint Tasks and Shared Responsibility

The theory of social commitments, which draws upon the preceding theoretical ideas and is put forward in a recent book by the authors, specifies that joint tasks are a fundamental basis for forming and sustaining of relational and group ties (see Lawler et al. 2009). Three broad

notions define the contours of the theory. First, if people work on a task together with others, they are likely to feel good if they accomplish the task and bad if they don't. Any episode of social interaction has the potential to generate such emotions or feelings. The second point is that if these joint experiences recur, for example, actors repeatedly accomplish tasks with the same people across time, they may come to interpret their individual feelings as due to the context they share with others involved in the task interactions. Third, given the joint or collective dimension of the task, it is plausible that, under some conditions, they attribute their individual feelings to an enduring social entity in the context—a group, organization, community, etc. In this way, repeated interactions around joint tasks can lead to affective sentiments and ties to relational or group affiliations. By focusing on joint tasks and effects on individual feelings, the theory of social commitments explicates how and when people develop stronger or weaker affective sentiments about group-level units or entities, while also incorporating the relational-cohesion process.

The most central theoretical question posed by the theory is: *Under what conditions are people likely to attribute their individual feelings from task activity to a social unit?* Recognizing that the target unit could be a small local social unit, or a larger more removed and distant organization, an important secondary question is: *Under what conditions do individuals form stronger affective ties to local, immediate social units versus larger, more distant ones?* Here we integrate principles from the “affect theory of social exchange” (Lawler 2001) with the “nested-group theory of affective attachment” (Lawler 1992). The broader, integrative “theory of social commitments” posits that joint tasks are important because they generate a sense of shared responsibility, but more local, immediate groups are typically given greater responsibility and credit for positive events and feelings than larger, more removed social units (see Lawler 1992; Lawler et al. 2009).

### 5.4.1 Task Activity

The emphasis on “tasks” is a noteworthy feature of the theory. Most social-structural theories stress the incentives or identities that promote social interaction or exchange, but neglect the nature of the tasks to be accomplished. Yet, tasks of one sort or other are implicated in many social structures. Tasks frame and guide instrumental behaviors; they include a set of available methods or procedures (means) for completing the task and an objective or goal toward which these are directed; these means and goals of a task tend to be explicit and situational. Tasks have structural (objective) dimensions and cognitive (subjective) dimensions that shape and constrain how actors define and approach the task and how they interpret success or failure. Tasks are the key to understanding the effects of individual emotions on group ties.

The task may involve a purely individual activity (accomplished alone) or a collective activity (accomplished with others). Work environments are probably the most common place where people explicitly and self-consciously work on tasks that are sometimes individual and sometimes collective. Personal workouts and cutting the grass may represent individual tasks, whereas homeowners associations and business partnerships exemplify joint tasks. The theory of social commitments focuses on joint tasks. Joint tasks may be as simple and short term as friends enjoying a free evening together, or as complex and long-term as parents or partners raising a child.<sup>6</sup> Both kinds have important objective (structural) and subjective (cognitive) components (see Lawler et al. 2009 for a more complex categorization of task activities).

A joint task, by definition, involves two or more actors who cannot accomplish the task

<sup>6</sup> In psychology, the standard view of tasks is heavily influenced by Steiner's (Emerson 1972b) classification. Steiner distinguishes four tasks based on how individual inputs are combined: adding them (additive task); averaging (compensatory task); selecting best input (disjunctive); blended input (conjunctive). In these terms, productive exchange is a conjunctive task.

alone. Interdependence, it follows, is fundamentally at the base of any joint task. Yet, historically the notion of interdependence primarily refers to the outcome dimension of a task, that is, the rewards generated by success. In contrast, the theory of social commitments focuses on the varying degrees of joint-ness in the *behaviors or activities* that compose the task. The question is: To what degree are individual task behaviors and contributions so blended and intertwined that individual contributions to task success are indistinguishable? The answer has implications for the development of affective group ties.

#### 5.4.2 Structural and Cognitive Task Dimensions

Joint tasks take on joint qualities in a couple of different ways. For instance, I may be assigned by my manager to a work team to jointly solve a financial problem (high structural joint-ness) but I may feel primarily responsible for the outcome (low cognitive joint-ness). The “dual” nature of joint-ness leads the theory to posit two fundamental conditions for social unit attributions, one structural and one cognitive. The structural condition refers to whether individual inputs or contributions are *non-separable*—meaning indistinguishable. This refers to the nature of the task activity itself. When it is hard to tell who did what, then it is difficult to determine what impact each individual had on the collective result because the inputs of individuals are blended or interwoven in the task interaction. Tasks that render individual inputs or contributions inseparable are higher in joint-ness. The origin of this idea is Oliver Williamson’s analysis of “governance structures” in which he argues that relational teams are most likely to organize work when the contributions of individual workers to a task are non-separable and, therefore, workers have more sense of a common endeavor (Williamson 1975).

In the context of structural joint-ness, individuals are likely to make subjective inferences about their individualized and blended contributions to task success (or failure). The cognitive condition for social unit attributions of emotions is that

individuals in the group have a sense of *shared responsibility* for the results of the task activity. In the theory, a sense of shared responsibility is the proximate, moderating condition or push for social unit attributions of emotions. When actors have a sense of shared responsibility, they tend to attribute individual feelings from their task activity to social units and their task success to collective effort associated with that unit. While this subjective dimension of joint-ness may be tied closely to the objective properties of the task (non-separability), also important are the framing of the task by leaders or authorities and group members own definitions of the task as they interact to accomplish it. If leaders define the task activity in joint, collective terms, it increases the likelihood that those who accomplish it will have a stronger sense of shared responsibility and attribute individual feelings to the social unit.<sup>7</sup> The result is stronger affective ties to the group and more willingness to orient behavior toward or sacrifice for the group’s interests

A sense of shared responsibility counters or mitigates the well-known propensity of people to make self-serving attributions, taking credit for success and blaming others for failure (e.g., Kelley 1967; Weiner 1985; Graham 1991). It may not remove individualized attribution tendencies but a sense of shared responsibility makes the social unit salient as a causal force in the situation. In a work setting, the relevant social unit defining the locus of shared responsibility may be a small face-to-face workgroup, a department or division, or the larger organization (corporation, public agency, university). In most social contexts, people interact in local group settings that are nested within larger, more removed social units. The social-unit locus of shared responsibility determines which social unit actors commit to more strongly. This raises the problem of nested

<sup>7</sup> We are assuming here that the nature of the task activity and accountability are congruent, i.e., a task with joint activity and joint accountability or with individual activity and individual accountability. A joint task with individual accountability will generate lower sense of shared responsibility, as will an individual task with joint accountability. Each mixed off-quadrant case reduces the overall sense of shared responsibility.



commitments, specifically, whether joint tasks at the local level promote stronger commitments to the more immediate (proximal) or more removed (distal) unit within which the local one is nested.

### 5.4.3 Nested Group Commitments

The theory of nested-group commitments (Lawler 1992) distinguishes proximal (local, immediate) from distal (removed, overarching) groups. The theory predicts that people tend to attribute positive events and feelings to the proximal group and negative events and feelings to more distal groups. Thus, if a work group faces joint tasks, functions well as a group, and generates positive feelings on the part to members, these feelings are most likely to build commitments to the local group rather than the larger organization. This is a fundamental problem facing decentralized organizations.

Nested commitments theory aims to specify when this is most likely to occur. The argument is that the proximal group advantage is most likely where the tasks are designed and controlled locally. If tasks are designed and controlled distally then positive feelings from task activity should generate commitments to the larger unit as well as to the local unit. Commitments to local and larger unit need not be inversely related for this effect to occur. The broader implication is that group-level mechanisms of responsibility send important signals to people about the degree that their tasks are joint with others, that their responsibilities are shared, and that responsibility is at the local level. The theory of social commitments indicates how the effects of control, responsibility, and accountability bear on the strength of affective ties people develop to local groups and larger ones in which they are nested (Lawler et al. 2009).<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Jon Turner (2007) argues that social orders are based on emotions generated at the micro level. Emotions generate greater or lesser degrees of order and stability depending on the degree that they spread from micro to meso to macro levels. Turner (2007) theorizes that one of the conditions promoting the spread of positive emotions is the

### 5.4.4 Core Theoretical Argument

The crux of the theoretical argument can be expressed as five main propositions: (1) The more indistinguishable are individual efforts and contributions, the greater the sense of shared responsibility for results. (2) Greater sense of shared responsibility the more likely people are to attribute their individual emotions or feelings to a social unit, that is, make social unit attributions. (3) Social unit attributions of positive emotion produce stronger affective commitments to the group, making the group an expressive object; social unit attributions of negative emotions weaken affective commitments to the group. (4) Stronger affective commitments lead to more group-oriented behavior, including more effort on behalf of and contributions to the group activities, more willingness to collaborate with others in the group, and more inclination to compromise individual interests when they conflict with group interests. (5) Affective commitments to local groups are stronger than to larger groups in which the local ones are nested to the degree that responsibility and related perceptions of control are localized.

The theory has been tested in numerous contexts across the last two decades. The most complete test was an experiment (Lawler et al. 2008) that compared the four structural forms of social exchange conceived by Emerson (1972b, 1981): negotiated, reciprocal, generalized, and productive (see also Molm 1994). At the time this was the most comprehensive comparison of these forms of exchange. The rationale for applying the theory to these forms of exchange is that they vary in the extent to which the exchange is a highly joint task and likely to promote a sense of shared responsibility and, by implication, the strength of affective group ties. The theoretical implication is that these forms of exchange have different potentials to generate group cohesion and person to group affective ties.

social-embeddedness of each level within a higher level. He offers a complementary analysis of what we term the “nested commitment” phenomenon.



### 5.4.5 Predictions for Forms of Exchange

The general theory above predicts different levels of cohesion and commitment across the four forms of exchange. The experimental test was in three-actor exchange networks; these represented what have been termed “null” networks rather than negatively or positively connected ones (Willer 1999). In essence, there is no element of exclusion or requirement of including both partners.<sup>9</sup> With negotiated exchange subjects negotiated the division of a resource with one or both of their prospective exchange partners; with reciprocal exchange they gave resources unilaterally to one or both of the others (and could receive from one or both); in generalized exchange, there was a chain of prospective giving: A could give to B who could give to C who could give to A; finally, in productive exchange the individuals gave resources to a common effort or endeavor from which they could derive individual benefit. Negotiated and reciprocal forms entail “direct” exchange, meaning two or more actors give and receive directly from each other. Productive and generalized are two types of indirect exchange, where another person or the network (group) itself mediates each individual’s receipt of benefits.

There are three main predictions of the theory. First, among the four structural forms of exchange, productive exchange generates the greatest group cohesion and strongest affective group ties. The reason is that productive exchange entails the greatest degree of joint-ness (non-separability) and should produce the greatest sense of shared responsibility; these conditions in turn lead to social unit attributions of individual emotions and feelings from repeated exchange. Second, generalized exchange generates the weakest group cohesion and person to

group ties, because structurally the task involves the lowest level of joint-ness and should lead to the least sense of shared responsibility among the four forms of exchange. Third, in these terms, the direct forms of social exchange—negotiated and reciprocal—fall between productive and generalized exchange, yet negotiated exchange tasks involve greater joint-ness than reciprocal ones. Thus, the degree of network cohesion and affectivity of person-to-group ties should correspond to the following order:

*Productive > [negotiated > reciprocal] > generalized*

To elaborate the rationale for these predictions, let us consider in more detail the nature of each form of social exchange. In productive exchange three or more actors engage in behaviors that jointly produce a single event or good, and each actor benefits from that jointly-produced good. The joint-ness of the task is quite clear here as no single (or pair) of actors can produce the joint good; all three are required to produce a reward. In generalized exchange, actors give to some actors but they receive benefit from others. This creates a chain of possible giving, and the joint-ness of the task lacks the salience of that found in productive exchange. Applying the theoretical principles of the theory (above), the contrast between these two forms of indirect exchange is sharp. Productive exchange should generate stronger social commitments than generalized exchange because productive exchanges are more likely to produce positive emotion and social unit attributions of that emotion.

The prediction of the theory for generalized exchange is a bit controversial. There are plausible theoretical reasons and some research indicating that generalized exchange is a key foundation for cohesion and solidarity (Ekeh 1974; Bearman et al. 2004; Molm 1994; Molm et al. 2007). Solidarity effects of generalized exchange are often illustrated with Malinowski’s (1920, 1922) analysis of the Kula rings among the Trobriand islanders (the exchange system of bracelets and necklaces). It is noteworthy, however, that such examples entail settings where a group affiliation already exists, i.e., the group is salient and

<sup>9</sup> Null relations are defined as those in which each dyadic pair (or possible exchange) is not tied in any way to other dyads in the network. Thus, if you have 2 potential exchange partners, you can exchange with both of them independently. In contrast, exclusive networks allow only one exchange; whereas inclusive networks require both exchanges before any one of them pays off. See Willer (1999) for a good discussion.

exogenous to the social exchange. Our theory disputes whether solidarity effects are inherently produced from generalized exchange or whether they are contingent on and require other exogenous conditions to be met, e.g., an implicit or explicit group identity that already exists or a clear and strong incentive to give. Our predictions for forms of exchange assume a sparse social setting in which no other exogenous conditions (i.e., extant group affiliation) exert a significant pressure or a push toward giving. The point of the theory is not that generalized exchange lacks solidarity effects, but that such effects are not endogenous to this form of exchange, as they are to productive forms.<sup>10</sup>

Turning to the two forms of direct exchange, negotiated exchanges involve explicit agreements about what each actor gives and receives from the exchange, typically in the context of an offer/demand, counter-offer/counter-demand sequences. Exemplars include employment contracts or business partnerships. In contrast, reciprocal exchanges involve unilateral acts of giving at one time followed later by reciprocal acts of giving, without the form or timing of reciprocity being specified. Who gives what and when is not altogether clear and, in fact, the joint-ness of the exchange task is subtle, implicit and low is salience. Exemplars include favors among friends or coworkers over time. Our theory predicts more sense of shared responsibility under negotiated than reciprocal exchange because the joint-ness is more structurally explicit and salient to actors (see Lawler 2001; Lawler et al. 2008). The implication is that negotiated exchange will promote stronger group or relational ties than reciprocal exchange.

A contrasting argument by Molm and colleagues is that negotiated exchange also makes salient underlying conflicting interests and, therefore, weaker cohesion and solidarity should

be evident in negotiated compared reciprocal exchange. Molm's prediction has received empirical support especially when the actors have unequal power (Molm et al. 1999, 2000); under equal power they found that the effects do not operate through exchange frequency (Molm et al. 2007). Overall, at this point, it is not completely clear when, under equal power regimes, negotiated and reciprocal exchange have different effects on relational cohesion and solidarity.

#### 5.4.6 The Experimental Test

The experiment involved a series of "interaction" episodes within each of the four structures of exchange. In each episode subjects decided whether to give resources to one or both of the others (depending on the form of exchange). They represented small computer companies, each of which would benefit from resources held by the others. Subjects worked to maximize the profits of their own companies and their own pay was based on their success at this task. They did not have to exchange to generate profits. Across all four forms of exchange, they would receive a default payoff if they chose not to exchange or give to the others; this symbolized the fact that the company had a flow of profit in the absence of any exchanges with the other companies. This experimental feature is also important, theoretically, because it reduces the strength of incentives to exchange. They still have an incentive to exchange with other companies but their profits are not based completely on those exchanges.<sup>11</sup>

The primary dependent variables were included on a mid-questionnaire (administered half way through the session) and a post-questionnaire. In accord with the theory, perceptions of shared responsibility, rates of exchange behavior (giving), positive emotions or feelings, and perceived co-

<sup>10</sup> Ekeh's (1974) conception of generalized exchange subsumes several mediated, indirect forms exchange and thus interweaves what we term productive (person-group) and generalized (chain). Our theory and research shows that distinct forms within Ekeh's overarching category have very different implications for cohesion and solidarity.

<sup>11</sup> This is an important difference between our experiment and Molm's et al. (2007) where subjects received nothing in the absence of exchange. The default payoff in our experiment created an opportunity cost for giving in generalized as well as the other forms of exchange, whereas in Molm et al., it appears that subjects had little or no reason not to give in generalized exchange.

hesion of the network were measured on the mid questionnaire. The post questionnaire included the measure of affective commitments to the social unit (network) as well as a second measure of network cohesion. Our focus here is to assess two predictions—namely that among the four structural forms of exchange, (a) productive exchange generates the strongest group ties, and (b) generalized exchange produces the weakest group ties.

The results provide strong support for these predictions of the theory. First and most important, productive exchange produced the strongest effects on all the theoretically relevant dependent variables: highest rates of exchange (giving) behavior, strongest positive feelings (pleasure), greatest network cohesion (perception), and the strongest affective sentiments about the network as a group. Second, productive exchange was the only form in which perceptions of network cohesion grew in strength from the midpoint to the end. Third, consistent with the logic underlying the prediction, productive exchange also produce the greatest sense of shared responsibility (measured on the mid questionnaire). The overall implication is that productive exchange is a distinctive form of indirect exchange that has the capacity to *endogenously* generate micro social orders with affective person-to-unit ties. This occurs in part because of the emotional effects of repeated exchange.

Also consistent with our predictions, generalized exchange produces the lowest rate of exchange behavior (giving), the weakest positive emotions, the lowest perceived network cohesion, and the weakest ties to the network as a group unit. Moreover, generalized exchange was the only form of exchange in which perceptions of network cohesion declined from the midpoint to the end. This decline of network cohesion suggests the limited potential or capacity of generalized exchange structures to promote or sustain emergent micro orders or group ties (Lawler et al. 2008). These findings for generalized exchange run counter to the standard view of generalized exchange as well to research revealing its effects on group solidarity, pro-social behavior, and the like (Ekeh 1974; Molm et al. 2007; Bearman 1997; Gillmore 1987; Uehara 1990).

The results of our research contrasts with those of Molm et al. (2007), which compared three forms of exchange: generalized, reciprocal, and negotiated. Importantly, they observed stronger cohesion or solidarity effects for generalized exchange than for negotiated or reciprocal exchange. There are several differences between the studies that could account for these results, but one stands out for us. In our study, actors gave up something when they gave under generalized exchange (i.e., there was an opportunity cost), whereas there was no cost to giving in Molm et al' standard generalized-exchange condition. When a cost was included (see Molm et al. 2007, p. 236), the rates of giving in generalized exchange dropped to a level comparable to those in our study. It appears that the incentive to initiate giving was lower in our study than in the Molm et al main experiment.<sup>12</sup>

We hypothesize that generalized exchange has solidarity effects especially if one of two conditions are present. First, solidarity should increase if there is a significant structural incentive for the actors to initiate giving or exchange behavior, as implied by the contrast between our findings and Molm et al. (2007). Second, solidarity should increase if the actors develop or already have a shared group affiliation or identity (see related discussion in Lawler et al. 2008). Generalized exchange is known to be a powerful force for social order when it reflects or symbolizes a shared group affiliation or identity, and this is essentially what Ekeh (1974) argued in his “collectivist” approach to social exchange. By creating a spare network setting, we are able to assess the potential of all four forms of social exchange to *endogenously generate* micro orders. Our inference is that generalized exchange boosts solidarity when exchange behaviors (giving) reflect or

<sup>12</sup> Another interpretation for the differences is that the network conditions for negotiated and reciprocal exchange differed across the two studies. In Molm et al., these were negatively-connected networks in which actors could exchange with only one other in an exchange episode, whereas the networks in Lawler et al. (2008) allowed actors to exchange with all (two) others in the network, with just one, or with neither. This means that the comparison point for generalized exchange was different.

are symbolic of an overarching group affiliation or when the structural incentives to initiate exchange behaviors are sufficiently strong. Absent these conditions, generalized exchange does not have the solidarity effects often attributed to it. Recent empirical evidence supports the notion that a shared group identity is important to the solidarity effects of generalized exchange (see Triplett and Thye 2007; Willer et al. (2012).

The comparison of negotiated and reciprocal exchange is another point of contrast between Molm et al. (2007) and Lawler et al. (2008). These research programs emphasize different theoretical mechanisms: perceptions of shared responsibility (Lawler et al. 2008) versus perceptions of underlying conflict (Molm et al. 2007). One possibility is that the effects for negotiated versus reciprocal exchange are contingent on the degree that each mechanism is operating or dominant in a particular context. If the exchange structure and processes highlight and make salient an underlying conflict of interest, this may undermine the effects of shared responsibility and social unit attributions of emotion in our theory. If the structure and processes make salient the potential benefits of cooperation or collaboration, the resulting sense of shared responsibility may undermine the salience of any underlying conflict of interest.

Kuwabara (2011) recently made progress in ferreting out when these distinct mechanisms operate. He conducted two experiments. Study 1 compared two types of negotiated exchange: distributive and integrative. Distributive exchange involves dividing a fixed pie which is the standard setting used in exchange research, whereas integrative negotiated entails a more joint task with the potential to expand the pie through joint problem solving. Integrative negotiation entails more task jointness and therefore should elicit stronger perceptions of shared responsibility and lower conflict salience compared to distributive exchange. Study 2 used a trust game and compared one-way and two-way trust interactions, arguing that the latter involved a more explicit joint task. In study 1, integrative negotiation generated the strongest cohesion, and in study 2 a repeated, two-way trust game also produced more

cohesion than a one-way trust game. Thus, the results support the importance of joint tasks with shared responsibility, as predicted by our theory (Lawler et al. 2008). Moreover, there is no necessary conflict between the Molm et al. and Lawler et al. analyses of negotiated versus reciprocal exchange if one attends to the mechanisms specified by each theory.

---

## 5.5 Research Evidence From Outside the Lab

Recent research, conducted in the field, focuses on the role of shared responsibility and emotion attributions in group commitments. Taylor and Pillemer (2009) test the effects of joint tasks and shared responsibility on turnover among staff in nursing homes. They argue that “caregiving” in nursing homes involves highly coordinated actions and joint tasks in which actors contributions have the property of “non-separability.” The general hypothesis is that because of this task non-separability, success at caregiving will shape affective sentiments about the organization; and, in turn, these will affect turnover rates. The data were based on a longitudinal survey (two waves, 6 months apart) of staff in 20 randomly selected nursing homes in New York State. The dependent variable was whether the respondent was still working at the nursing home 6 months after the time 1 survey. The main results indicate that the perceived success of the caregiving (joint task) had an indirect effect on actual turnover through positive feelings about the nursing home (person-to-group affective sentiments). There was no direct effect, which affirms the critical mediating role of affective feelings about the organization. Broadly, this study suggests that work tasks, involving non-separable activities, generate commitment behavior (staying) so long as such tasks produce positive feelings toward the organization.

In another field study Price and Collett (2012) use the affect theory of social exchange to examine cohesion and commitment (turnover) among elementary teachers, using a nationally-representative sample. Survey questions measured task

interdependence (as shared control over school policy in several domains), frequency of cooperative action, enthusiasm and satisfaction, perceptions of cohesion, and commitment to the school (intent to stay). The results generally support the emotional pathways to commitment predicted by our theory. First, perceptions of “shared control and responsibility” as well as more “cooperative interaction” fostered positive emotions (enthusiasm about teaching, satisfaction with the school). Second, these positive feelings promoted stronger perceptions of school cohesion, and cohesion in turn increases the propensity (intent) to stay in the school. Both of the above studies offer encouraging evidence for the general applicability of the theory’s principles beyond social exchange contexts and beyond the experimental laboratory.

Nested commitment theory (Lawler 1992; Lawler et al. 2009, Chap. 6) addresses how actors credit or blame local and larger units for positive or negative feelings from task activity. The main proposition is that people are likely to attribute positive emotions to the local, immediate social units (e.g., work group, team, department, division) within which joint tasks are enacted, and negative emotions to the larger, more removed or encompassing social units (e.g., corporation, public agency). The implication is that, all other things being equal, joint tasks and the sense of shared responsibility will foster stronger affective ties to proximal (local) units than to distal (removed) units; and this tendency should be especially strong in decentralized organizations. Mueller and Lawler (1999) test this idea in work organizations by comparing a centralized organization (an air force medical center) to a decentralized organization (a public school district). The social units are a school nested in a school system, and a medical center nested in the Air Force.

The hypothesis is that work conditions will affect commitment to these units contingent on whether they are controlled at the local or central organizational level. An affective measure of job satisfaction taps positive emotions from work conditions, and commitment to local or larger units are the primary dependent variables. The results generally correspond with the theory. Work

conditions associated with and controlled by the proximal unit tend to affect commitment to that local unit (school or medical center), while those associated with and controlled by the larger unit primarily affect commitment to that distal unit (school system or air force). Job satisfaction partially mediates most of these effects. There also is more evidence of nested commitments in the decentralized than the centralized organization. While more research on nested commitments is needed, this study offers initial support for the general idea that the locus of control over task conditions has an impact on the propensity to form affective ties to the local and larger, encompassing unit.

---

## 5.6 New Directions

Recent theory and research in progress extends the research program in a number of new ways. First, research underway extends the theory beyond social exchange by testing its applicability to cooperative open-interaction task groups that lack the mixed-motive character of social exchange contexts (Thye and Lawler 2010). Second, two streams of work penetrate more deeply into the micro processes of the theory. Specifically, a recent paper theorizes how collectively-shared emotions reinforce affective group ties (Lawler et al. 2013); and a research project under development investigates whether relational cohesion in social exchange relations has a neurological foundation, manifest in brain wave activity during social exchange. Each of these extensions is elaborated below.

### 5.6.1 Moving Beyond Social Exchange

Our theorizing has focused on how and when group ties emerge from social exchange processes. Social exchange contexts are important because (i) they capture or encompass the self-interested, instrumental bases for actors’ decisions to exchange with the same others over time, and (ii) they entail by definition a joint task that people cannot accomplish alone. While the



inherent joint-ness of social exchange makes it a good context for investigating emergent group ties, this can be said of much social interaction, whether or not it entails social exchange, *per se*. Many if not most episodes of social interaction entail some degree of jointness (from very low or very high).

Social commitments theory generalizes and adapts exchange-based theoretical principles to social interactions in general and uses these to understand commitments to large scale social units, such as corporations and nations. An important implication is that the theory should apply to cooperative task groups, where there is no necessary tension between individual and collective interests. We hypothesize that task groups with joint tasks should generate stronger and more affective group ties than task groups with individualized tasks (see Lawler et al. 2009). Research in progress tests this hypothesis (Thye and Lawler 2010).

By emphasizing social interactions in joint tasks, our social commitments theory offers a qualification to prevailing sociological theories of group formation. Theory and research tends to identify two fundamental bases for group formation: *shared interests* and *shared identities* (see Anthony 2005). Behavioral manifestations of social order, such as coordination and cooperation (Hechter and Horne 2009), typically are traced to one or both of these foundations. From theories of rational choice and social exchange, cooperation develops and is sustained because of shared interests; from theories of homophily and identity, cooperation occurs and is sustained by shared identities. In combination, the broad message is that the alignment of (i) collective and individual interests and/or (ii) group and self-definitions (identities) underlie cooperation and social order in groups, large and small. These effects may be contingent on or stronger when actors repeatedly interact to accomplish joint tasks.

Even if group members' interests and identities are aligned perfectly, cooperation and collaboration can remain problematic contingent on the task structures and interactions within which the group's work is accomplished. The

real world reveals many examples of people and groups with common interests or identities having difficulty working together to achieve collective goals, e.g., faculty members of a university department, politicians of the same party affiliation, and corporate employees in the same unit. Social commitments theory contends that affective ties to groups can overcome such problems, especially in the context of joint tasks that generate positive feelings and a sense of shared responsibility (Lawler et al. 2009; Thye and Lawler 2010).

We hypothesize a qualification of the prevailing theories above based on the role that social interaction around joint tasks plays in the emergence and maintenance of group ties. The theory of social commitments implies that the effects of shared interests and shared identities on stable orders or patterns of cooperation in groups are tenuous and unsustainable, without repeated social interactions around joint tasks. Thus, whereas shared interests and shared identities have the capacity to generate enduring group ties, social interactions around joint tasks and a sense of shared responsibility may be necessary to actualize that capacity and transform instrumental ties into affective and non-instrumental ones. This is the idea being tested in ongoing research.

## 5.6.2 Theorizing Collective Emotions

Based on social commitments theory, the predicted effects of joint tasks and shared responsibility occur even when actors are separated physically and cannot read each other's emotional cues.<sup>13</sup> Virtual interactions around joint tasks should have the same basic effects on group ties as those in which there is bodily co-presence and potential for emotional contagion; these effects may be weaker, but the social-commitment process should operate nonetheless. A recent paper

<sup>13</sup> This has been a standard condition of our experiments from the start of the research program (see Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996). It is one reason for considering the tests of the theory as quite conservative.



aims to specify the conditions under which “collective emotions” are likely to emerge, despite the absence of bodily co-presence (Lawler et al. 2013).

“Collective emotions” are defined as common feelings by members of a social unit as a result of shared experiences (Bar-Tal et al. 2007). These emotions imply mutual inferences or awareness of each other’s emotions, whether or not actors have direct evidence (expressions, communications) of others’ feelings. In our theory, social unit attributions of emotion do not require or necessarily imply mutual awareness or inferences of others’ emotional states; yet, such inferences presumably would strengthen social unit attributions by affirming or validating one’s own feelings and attribution judgments. The question then is: When will actors in virtual interaction infer that others have similar feelings? Inferring similar emotions “collectivizes” the individual feelings of actors but also their social unit attributions of those individual emotions, transforming individual feelings into collective feelings perceived to be shared by others in the group.

The theoretical argument boils down to two main points. First, as relational cohesion emerges in an exchange relation (due to the emotional effects of repeated exchange), actors are likely to infer that their partners are feeling the same emotions. These inferences follow a “burden of proof” principle—that is, people infer others involved in the same joint task are experiencing the same feelings absent more detailed information or communication about others’ feelings. Such emotional inferences should strengthen the propensity toward commitment behavior even if interacting actors are physically separated or isolated from each other. Second, social unit attributions are a plausible way that emotion inferences “collectivize” individual feelings, while collective emotions enhance the salience and awareness of the shared affiliation and its force in the social context. Inferences of shared emotion reinforce social unit attributions, and social unit attributions in turn strengthen inferences of shared emotions.

### 5.6.3 Understanding Neurological Bases of Relational Cohesion

Another area of new research seeks to understand how neurological processes interface with and support the development of relational cohesion in exchange relations. Specifically, Kalkhoff et al. (2011) are spearheading a line of inquiry that examines a phenomenon known as inter-brain synchronization. *Inter-brain synchronization* occurs when brain wave activity across multiple individuals becomes “phase locked;” this is sometimes visually detectable when raw electroencephalogram (EEG) signals for electrode pairs across two individuals begin to “dance” in harmony as if being driven by a single person (Condon and Ogston 1966). Synchronization, as a more general phenomenon, is a fundamental property of human interaction (Collins 1981), occurs in a variety of rich domains (Kalkhoff et al. 2011), and is detectable from the very earliest moments of life.

A number of recent studies show that certain kinds of interaction can produce inter-brain synchronization across regions of the brain associated with joint attention (e.g., medial prefrontal cortex) and cooperation (orbito-frontal cortex). More specifically, synchronization occurs among brain waves of theoretical interest, including Beta waves (related to attention focus) and Gamma waves (related to emotions). Synchronization of this sort has been documented by neuroscientists when two individuals engage in activities such as playing guitars, playing cards, imitating movements, and so on. The interesting question for us is not that synchronization occurs, given the emerging body of supporting neurological evidence. Instead, we ask: What are the social and structural conditions that give rise to inter-brain synchronization? On this issue modern neuroscience has little to say; yet, importantly, most of the tasks investigated to date by neuroscientists involve some degree of jointness. Social exchange is good context in which to explore this question.

We suspect that the structures of exchange that have been central to our research may entail the kinds of interactions that produce syn-

chronization. For example, conditions of power dependence (i.e., high mutual dependence, equal relative dependence), network properties (i.e., structural cohesion), and those suggested by the affect theory (i.e., high task jointness) may in fact be the structural and theoretical properties of the interaction that promote synchronization. As a first step, a new project by Kalkhoff, Thye, and Lawler seeks to replicate the basic conditions of the 1996 relational cohesion study conducted by Lawler and Yoon. This time, however, we have equipment to measure and analyze EEG activity across pairs of actors who negotiate exchange. If the data reveal that conditions of structural power unleash positive emotions, relational cohesion, commitment, and *inter-brain synchronization* in social exchange, we gain insight into the neurological substrates of relational cohesion and commitment. This may be a first step in understanding how already-theorized structures give rise to social, biological, and neurological processes that undergird cohesion, commitment, and micro social order.

---

## 5.7 Conclusions

The crux of social commitments theory is this: *In social interaction people tend develop affective ties to overarching social units, as well as to other individuals; and person-to-unit ties have important effects on micro and macro orders, independent of relational or networks ties with particular others.* Person-to-unit affective ties are portrayed as an important source of stability and order in large, diverse, geographically dispersed populations. There are two primary reasons for this. First, while affective ties to large social units (nations, societies) require social interactions as a foundation, those interactions need only occur among a very small subset of actors in the population. Second, social unit attributions make it possible for local, individualized, immediate emotions and feelings to have macro level effects. Positive feelings at the micro level have the capacity to strengthen macro orders while negative feelings have the capacity to weaken it (See also Turner 2007). Social unit attributions to

larger, removed social units essentially create or strengthen ties to all members of the larger entity in the absence of direct interaction with them. An important manifestation of these micro-to-macro effects should be found in the capacity of those larger social units to mobilize and sustain widespread actions on behalf of collective goals, values, and interests.

The theory of social commitments (Lawler et al. 2009) abstracts from, generalizes, and extends three prior theories about commitments in exchange relations and organizations: *nested-commitment theory* (Lawler 1992); *relational cohesion theory* (Lawler and Yoon 1996); and the *affect theory of social exchange* (Lawler 2001; Lawler et al. 2008). Social commitments theory posits joint tasks as a structural basis for repeated interactions and positive emotions, and perceptions of shared responsibility as a key contingency (moderator) determining when those feelings are attributed to social units. The nested-commitment principle posits further that people are inclined to attribute positive events and feelings to local, immediate groups in which they interact with others and negative events and feelings to larger more distant units; in other words, they credit local units for good experiences and blame more removed units for bad experiences. This creates a fundamental problem of social order for larger social units. This problem may be reduced if local units are tightly embedded in larger ones or if the larger units or their agents successfully claim responsibility for joints tasks and positive feelings at the local group level

In closing, the problem of social order has a “top down” and “bottom up” dimension. The theory of social commitments explicitly theorizes a “bottom up” process that can generate and sustain non-instrumental ties to large scale social units. Yet, the micro processes also have implications for top-down processes. For example, the joint-ness of tasks may be a part of a larger organizational strategy or culture, and the tendency to perceive shared responsibility in tasks may be different in different cultures. The broader message of the theory of social commitments is that social order at the macro level depends not only on the top-down effects of macro level structure

and culture, but also on whether micro-level interactions generate emotional ties to larger units (see Turner 2007 for a similar point of view). The processes of order operate in both directions, micro-to-macro and macro-to-micro, but our theory argues that tasks and shared responsibility represent important linkages starting from either level, and emotions drive the process.

The theory of social commitments has implications across the spectrum of social units. Tracing the development of our work across the past 3 decades, the bottom-up evolution is evident. In the beginning the concern was with dyads negotiating in relative isolation (Lawler and Yoon 1996) or those embedded in small networks (Lawler and Yoon 1998). As theoretical sophistication grew, the number of mechanisms expanded as did the scope of applications. The program of theory and research tackled problems of cohesion and solidarity in more complex productive exchange structures where emotions and uncertainty reduction both play some role (Lawler et al. 2000; see also Yoon and Thye 2002 for an organizational application). The development of the affect theory (Lawler 2001) opened the door to new theoretical puzzles, such as which forms of exchange are inherently most likely to endogenously generate affective group ties (Lawler et al. 2008). As our work unfolded it continued to expand—eventually addressing the network conditions that produce network-to-group transformations (Thye et al. 2011) and the mechanisms through which emotions are contagious and become collective (Lawler et al. 2013). The nested-commitments principle helped to understand how these processes extend from local to even more distal units. Ironically, the most recent theoretical turn takes us back to the *very* micro level, by investigating the brain and biological processes that correspond to feelings of joint-ness and common emotion (Kalkhoff et al. 2011).

The theory of social commitments is a cumulative result of 20 years of theory and research. It ties together the theoretical mechanisms of past work and extends the scope of our theorizing from dyads and exchange to open interaction groups, to nested group structures and ultimately more macro units such as nation states. The fact

that the theory has been so uniformly supported across such a diverse array of empirical tests is a testament to the enduring role of emotions in the production and maintenance of cohesion, person-to-group ties, and social order more generally.

---

## References

- Anthony, D. (2005). Cooperation in microcredit borrowing groups. *American Sociological Review*, 70(3), 496–515.
- Axelrod, R. (1984). *The evolution of cooperation*. New York: Free Press.
- Bar-Tal, D., Halperin, E., & de Rivera, J. (2007). Collective emotions in conflict situations: Societal implications. *Journal of Social Issues*, 63(2):441–460.
- Barsade, S. G. (2002). The ripple effect: Emotional contagion and its influence on group behavior. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 47(4):644–675.
- Bearman, P. S. (1997). Generalized exchange. *American Journal of Sociology*, 102(5):1383–1415.
- Bearman, P. S., Moody, J., & Stovel, K. (2004). Chains of affection: The structure of adolescent romantic and sexual networks. *American Journal of Sociology*, 110(1), 44–91.
- Cacioppo, J. T., & Patrick, W. (2008). *Loneliness: Human nature and the need for social connection*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Cappelli, P. (1999). *The new deal at work: Managing the market-driven workforce*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
- Carnevale, P. J., & Isen, A. M. (1986). The influence of positive affect and visual access on the discovery of integrative solutions in bilateral negotiation. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 37, 1–13.
- Collins, R. (1975). *Conflict sociology: Toward an explanatory science*. New York: Academic.
- Collins, R. (1981). On the microfoundations of macrosociology. *American Journal of Sociology*, 86(5), 984–1014.
- Collins, R. (2004). *Interaction ritual chains*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Condon, W. S., & Ogston, W. D. (1966). Sound film analysis of normal and pathological behavior patterns. *Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases*, 143(4), 338–457.
- Cook, K. S., Emerson, R., Gillmore, M. R., & Yamagishi, T. (1983). The distribution of power in exchange networks: Theory and experimental evidence. *American Journal of Sociology*, 89(2), 275–305.
- Damasio, A. R. (1999). *The feeling of what happens: Body and emotion in the making of consciousness*. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Durkheim, E. (1915). *The elementary forms of religious life*. New York: Free Press.

- Ekeh, P. (1974). *Social exchange theory*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Emerson, R. M. (1972a). Exchange theory. Part I: A psychological basis for social exchange. In J. Berger, M. Zelditch Jr., & B. Anderson (Eds.), *Sociological theories in progress* (pp. 38–57). Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
- Emerson, R. M. (1972b). Exchange theory. Part II: Exchange rules and networks. In J. Berger, M. Zelditch Jr., & B. Anderson (Eds.), *Sociological theories in progress* (pp. 58–87). Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
- Emerson, R. M. (1981). Social exchange theory. In M. Rosenberg & R. H. Turner (Eds.), *Social psychology: Sociological perspectives* (pp. 30–65). New York: Basic Books, Inc.
- Fischer, C. S. (2011). *Still connected: Family and friends in America since 1970*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Frank, R. H. (1988). *Passions within reason: The strategic role of emotions*. New York: Norton.
- Gilmore, D. D. (1987). Honor, honesty, shame: Male status in contemporary andalusia. In D. D. Gilmore (Ed.), *Honor and shame and the unity of the mediterranean* (pp. 90–103). Washington, DC: American Anthropological Association.
- Gasper, K., & Clore, G. L. (2002). Attending to the big picture: Mood and global versus local processing of visual information. *Psychological Science*, 13(1), 34–40.
- Graham, S. (1991). A review of attribution theory in achievement contexts. *Educational Psychology Review*, 3(1), 5–39.
- Haidt, J. (2010). Moral psychology must not be based on faith and hope. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 5(2):182–184.
- Haidt, J., & Kesebir, S. (2010). Morality. In S. Fiske, D. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *Handbook of social psychology* (5th ed., pp. 797–832). Hoboken: Wiley.
- Hechter, M. (1987). *Principles of group solidarity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hechter, M., & Horne, C. (2009). *Theories of social order: A reader*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Heise, D. R. (1979). *Understanding events: Affect and the construction of social action*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1979). Emotion work, feeling rules, and social structure. *American Journal of Sociology*, 85(3):551–575.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1983). *The managed heart: The commercialization of human feeling*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hogg, M. A. (2001). Social categorization, depersonalization, and group behavior. In M. A. Hogg & R. S. Tindale (Eds.), *Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Group processes* (pp. 56–85). Oxford: Elsevier.
- Hogg, M. A., & Turner, J. C. (1985). When liking begets solidarity: An experiment on the role of interpersonal attraction in psychological group formation. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 24(4):267–281.
- Homans, G. C. (1950). *The human group*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Homans, G. C. (1961). *Social behavior: Its elementary forms*. New York: Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich.
- Isen, A. M. (1987). Positive affect, cognitive processes and social behavior. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (pp. 203–253). New York: Academic.
- Izard, C. E. (1977). *Human emotions*. New York: Plenum.
- Kanter, R. M. (1968). Commitment and social organization: A study of commitment mechanism in utopian communities. *American Sociological Review*, 33(4), 499–517.
- Kalkhoff, W., Thye, S. R., & Lawler, E. J. (2011). Relational Cohesion and Commitment in Exchange Relations: The Role of Inter-Brain Synchronization. The Conference for Theory and Research on Group Processes, Las Vegas, NV.
- Kelley, H. H. (1967). Attribution theory in social psychology. In D. Levine & D. E. Berlyne (Eds.), *Nebraska symposium on motivation* (pp. 220–266). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Kemper, T. D. (1978). *A sociological interactional theory of emotions*. New York: Wiley.
- Klinenberg, E. (2012). *Going solo: The extraordinary rise and surprising appeal of living alone*. London: Penguin Books, Ltd.
- Kollock, P. (1998). The emergence of exchange structures: An experimental study of uncertainty, commitment, and trust. *American Journal of Sociology*, 100(2), 183–214.
- Kuwabara, K. (2011). Cohesion, cooperation, and the value of doing things together: How economic exchange creates relational bonds. *American Sociological Review*, 76(4), 560–580.
- Lawler, E. J. (1992). Power processes in bargaining. *Sociological Quarterly*, 33(1), 17–34.
- Lawler, E. J. (2001). An affect theory of social exchange. *American Journal of Sociology*, 107(2):321–352.
- Lawler, E. J., & Thye, S. R. (2006). *Social exchange theory of emotions*. In J. E. Stets & J. H. Turner (Eds.), *Handbook of the sociology of emotions* (pp. 295–320). New York: Springer.
- Lawler, E. J., & Yoon, J. (1993). Power and the emergence of commitment behavior in negotiated exchange. *American Sociological Review*, 58(4):465–481.
- Lawler, E. J., & Yoon, J. (1996). Commitment in exchange relations: Test of a theory of relational cohesion. *American Sociological Review*, 61(1), 89–108.
- Lawler, E. J., & Yoon, J. (1998). Network structure and emotion in exchange relations. *American Sociological Review*, 63(6), 871–894.
- Lawler, E. J. & Thye, S. R. (1999). Bringing emotions into social exchange theory. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 25, 217–244.
- Lawler, E. J., Thye, S. R., & Yoon, J. (2000). Emotion and group cohesion in productive exchange. *American Journal of Sociology*, 106(3):616–657.



- Lawler, E. J., Thye, S. R., & Yoon, J. (2008). Social exchange and micro social order. *American Sociological Review*, 73(4), 519–542.
- Lawler, E. J., Thye, S. R., & Yoon, J. (2009). *Social commitments in a depersonalized world*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Lawler, E. J., Thye, S. R., & Yoon, J. (2013). The emergence of collective emotions in social exchange. In C. Scheve & M. Salmela (Eds.), *Collective emotions*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Malinowski, B. (1920). Kula: The circulating exchange of valuables in the archipelagoes of Eastern New Guinea. *Man*, 20(51), 97–105.
- Malinowski, B. (1922). *Argonauts of the Western Pacific: An account of native enterprise and adventure in the archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea*. London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd.
- Markovsky, B., Willer, D., & Patton, T. (1988). Power relations in exchange networks. *American Sociological Review*, 53(2):220–236.
- McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L., & Brashears, M. E. (2006). Social isolation in America: Changes in core discussion networks over two decades. *American Sociological Review*, 71(3):353–375.
- Mead, G. H. (1936). *Movements of thought in the nineteenth century*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Molm, L. D. (1994). Dependence and risk: Transforming the structure of social exchange. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 57(3):163–176.
- Molm, L. D., Peterson, G., & Takahashi, N. (1999). Power in negotiated and reciprocal exchange. *American Sociological Review*, 64(6):876–890.
- Molm, L. D., Takahashi, N., & Peterson, G. (2000). Risk and trust in social exchange: An experimental test of a classical proposition. *American Journal of Sociology*, 105(5):1396–1427.
- Molm, L. D., Collett, J. L., & Schaefer, D. R. (2007). Building solidarity through generalized exchange: A theory of reciprocity. *American Journal of Sociology*, 113(1), 205–242.
- Mueller, C. W., & Lawler, E. J. (1999). Commitment to nested organizational units: Some basic principles and preliminary findings. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 62(4), 325–346.
- Parsons, T. (1951). *The social system*. New York: Free Press.
- Price, H. E., & Collett, J. L. (2012). The role of exchange and emotion on commitment: A study of teachers. *Social Science Research*, 41, 1469–479.
- Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of american community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Putnam, R. D. (2001). Social capital: Measurement and consequences. *Isuma: Canadian Journal of Policy Research*, 2, 41–51.
- Putnam, R. D. (2007). E pluribus Unum: Civic engagement in a diverse and changing society. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 30(2), 137–174.
- Riesman, D. (1950). *The lonely crowd*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Steiner, I. D. (1972). *Group process and productivity*. New York: Academic.
- Stolle, D. & Hooghe, M. (2004). Inaccurate, exceptional, one-sided, or irrelevant: The debate about the alleged decline of social capital and civic engagement in western societies. *British Journal of Political Science*, 35(1), 149–167.
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. H. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup relations. In S. Worchel & W. G. Austin (Eds.), *Psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 7–24). Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
- Taylor, C., & Pillemer, K. (2009). Using affect to understand employee turnover: A context specific application of a theory of social exchange. *Sociological Perspectives*, 52(4), 481–504.
- Thye, S. R., & Lawler, E. J. (2010). *Collaborative Research: The Emergence of Social Order in Groups*. National Science Foundation Grant; SES-0956796 to USC & SES-0957982 to Cornell; 5/15/2010-5/14/2012.
- Thye, S. R., Lawler, E. J., & Yoon, J. (2011). The emergence of embedded relations and group formation in networks of competition. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 74(6), 387–413.
- Thye, S. R., Yoon, J., & Lawler, E. J. (2002). The theory of relational cohesion: Review of a research program. In S. R. Thye & E. J. Lawler (Eds.), *Advances in group process* (pp. 89–102). Oxford: Elsevier.
- Triplet, J., & Thye, S. R. (2007). Eliciting cooperation in generalized exchange: The impact of social identity and non-anonymity. The Annual Meetings of the American Sociological Association, New York, NY.
- Turner, J. H. (2007). *Human emotions: A sociological theory*. New York: Routledge.
- Uehara, E. (1990). Dual exchange: Theory, social networks, and informational social support. *American Journal of Sociology*, 96(3), 521–557.
- Weiner, B. (1985). ‘Spontaneous’ casual thinking. *Psychological Bulletin*, 97(1), 74–84.
- Wesch, M. (2009). YouTube and you: Experiences of self-awareness in the context collapse of the recording webcam. *Exploration in Media Ecology*, 8(2), 19–34.
- Williamson, O. (1975). *Markets and hierarchies*. New York: Free Press.
- Willer, D. (1999). *Network exchange theory*. Westport: Praeger.
- Willer, R., Flynn, F., & Zak, S. (2012). Structure, identity, and solidarity: A comparative field study of generalized and direct exchange. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 57(1), 119–155.
- Wrong, D. H. (1995). *Power: Its forms, bases, and uses*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Yoon, J., & Thye, S. R. (2002). A dual process model of organizational commitment: Job satisfaction and organizational support. *Work and Occupations*, 29(1), 97–124.

Karen A. Hegtvedt and Christie L. Parris

### 6.1 Introduction

A child screaming at his sister for consuming both his dessert and her own. A wife growing depressed over her burden of household chores. A worker remaining silent about her pay raise when she realizes her colleagues did not get equivalent salary bumps. White students at a private university listening with growing indignation and empathy as their African American peers tell of their own experiences of discrimination. Protesters taking to the streets, shouting angry slogans in response to a military coup that toppled the incumbent leader. Although these scenarios represent distinct contexts, all illustrate the pervasiveness of emotional responses to the experience of injustice. Whether an incident occurs within the family, school, workplace, or the political arena, individuals who perceive themselves—or, in some cases, others—to suffer an injustice are likely to feel an array of emotions. What they feel depends upon the circumstances, coupled with their own individual characteristics and relationships. Situational factors also affect whether people express openly or act upon emotional responses to their evaluations of injustice.

In this chapter, we examine the complex role of emotions in justice processes. Scholars (Cropanzano et al. 2011; De Cremer 2007; De Cremer and van den Bos 2007; Hillebrandt and Barclay 2013) have repeatedly called for more attention

to affect to understand justice issues. Jasso (2007, p. 321) notes “Justice and emotions overlap, for at every step of a justice process, the sense of justice triggers emotion.” Additionally, she specifies how framing shapes how the injustice experience “matches” to the valence and intensity of an emotion. Consideration of these dimensions begins to address what Turner (2007, p. 291) casts as the “under-theorizing” of the dynamics of emotions in justice processes as well as the “limited palate” of emotions examined in such processes.

While classic justice perspectives (Adams 1965; Homans 1974; Walster et al. 1978) conceptualize emotional responses to distributive injustice, more recent theorizing and research consider emotional responses to procedural and interactional injustice (e.g., Barclay et al. 2005; Stecher and Rosse 2005) and the possibility that emotion or general affect might shape the justice evaluations (e.g., Barsky et al. 2011; Mullen 2007). Whether emotions mediate between assessments and action, as classic theories suggest, is also currently subject to more empirical scrutiny. And, while researchers now consider responses by third parties (Mayer 2012), no longer are emotional reactions limited only to interpersonal situations. With growing attention to the role of emotions in protests and social movements (Goodwin et al. 2001; Jasper and Owen, this volume; van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2007, 2013), scholars have moved beyond the micro level of analysis. Such work, importantly, provides the impetus to examine the potential of individual-level emotional responses to injustice to affect macro dynamics between groups within society.

---

K. A. Hegtvedt (✉) · C. L. Parris  
Emory University, Atlanta, USA  
e-mail: khegtve@emory.edu



We begin by examining the core definitions and theoretical tenets of justice perspectives that address the role of emotions. In doing so, we raise issues about the meaning of the emotions proposed in these theories. Then we review empirical patterns, focusing on individual-level emotional responses before turning to those that involve group-level emotional reactions. We conclude by specifying both theoretical directions and empirical pathways, highlighting the complexity of emotions in justice processes.

## 6.2 Theoretical Framing of Emotions in Justice Processes

Fundamentally, justice processes involve a comparison between expectations regarding a distribution, decision-making procedure, or interaction dynamic and an actual state of affairs (see Hegtvedt 2006; Jasso 1980). Expectations stem from beliefs about normative principles regarded as fair within particular contexts. To the extent that an actual distribution, procedure, or interactional treatment corresponds to or is congruent with the normative rule, people tend to perceive the situation as just; lack of correspondence or congruence, in contrast, produces injustice perceptions. Thus, understanding of justice processes generally and the role of emotion more specifically requires consideration of what constitutes a normative rule.

### 6.2.1 Defining Justice Principles

Social psychological justice researchers have largely focused on three types of justice: distributive, procedural, and interactional. Two meta-analyses (Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001; Colquitt et al. 2001) generally confirm the validity of these distinct types, even though, as noted below, there is some overlap in the conceptualization of procedural and interactional justice. In addition, more recently, researchers have turned attention to retributive justice (Carlsmith and Darley 2008; Vidmar 2002) and restorative justice (Braithwaite 1989), and in so doing raise different questions about the nature of emotions in justice processes.

Distributive justice (Adams 1965; Homans 1974) refers to the dispersion of benefits and burdens (i.e., outcomes, generically) in a social group. Deutsch (1975) identified key distributive justice rules as: equality, dictating equal shares to all recipients; needs, indicating that outcomes should be commensurate to recipients' level of need; and equity, which requires outcomes to be proportional to contributions (positive things like productivity, effort, ability, merit, and status or negative things such as harms and losses). The fairness of each rule depends on the situation, with equality most relevant in situations stressing group harmony, needs when individual welfare is at issue, and equity in productivity contexts (Leventhal et al. 1980).

Procedural justice (Lind and Tyler 1988) focuses generally on principles governing decision-making. Leventhal et al. (1980) spell out normative procedural rules: (1) consistency of procedures across persons and across time; (2) bias suppression; (3) information accuracy; (4) correctability (the ability to change bad decisions); (5) representativeness of the participants to a decision or "voice;" and (6) ethicality of standards. Tyler and Lind (1992) augment procedural justice analysis by specifying principles focused on what they refer to as more informal relational processes among individuals: neutrality, echoing decision-making principles of bias suppression and honesty inherent in ethicality; standing, pertaining to status communicated through polite behavior, dignified treatment, and respect for a person's rights and opinions; and trust, capturing decision-maker intentions to be fair and ethical in immediate and future situations.

These relational or interpersonal aspects of procedural justice also exemplify what other scholars deem as interactional justice (see Jost and Kay 2010 about the procedural/interactional justice conceptual overlap). Bies (2001) defines the interactional justice in terms of treating people truthfully, and with respect and dignity. In addition, interactional justice involves providing rationale or justification for the treatment received. The fairness of procedural and interactional rules, unlike distributive justice principles, is less likely to depend upon the situational context, although

some rules (e.g., consistency and “voice”) may carry greater weight in particular situations (Lind and Tyler 1988). And, even though assessments of some procedural principles require social comparisons, procedural and interactional rules like neutrality, honesty, respect and provision of rationale may rely on more objective standards.

Retributive justice and restorative justice deal with issues of punishment for wrongdoing, often in response to other acts of injustice. Thus, when an individual harms another person, arguably a violation of distributive or interactional justice, people believe that the offender should be punished. Retributive justice, then, focuses on the reasonableness and legitimacy of the punishments for “committed crimes” (Carlsmith and Darley 2008). Restorative justice (Braithwaite 1989; van Ness and Strong 2010) refers to an alternative to punishment to redress the actions of an offender. Issues of restorative justice arise in criminal sentencing as a way to “promote healing and justice through open discussion, consensus, and forgiveness” (Jost and Kay 2010, p. 1146). To achieve restorative justice requires bringing together offenders, their victims, and affected community members in a forum to allow displays of feelings and facilitate discussion about the harm that occurred and joint decision-making about restitution and reintegration of the offender into the community. In effect, retributive and restorative justice tap into the fairness of actual responses to injustice.

While typically studied at the interpersonal level, these types of injustice and the emotions that they evoke may apply at more macro levels as well. Below we detail the basic tenets of the role of emotion in injustices arising between individuals or within small groups. Empirical sections cover both the micro-level and extrapolations to the group level as well.

### 6.2.2 Theoretical Tenets: Emotional Responses to Injustice

Theoretical pieces by Homans (1974) and Adams (1965) provide the cornerstone of social psychological research on emotional responses to

injustice. At the heart of both approaches is a comparison. The basic equity formula,  $\text{Outcomes}_A / \text{Inputs}_A = \text{Outcomes}_B / \text{Inputs}_B$  (Adams 1965) suggests a comparison of ratios between two people. Homans (1974) likewise emphasizes the importance of comparing the reward one individual gets with what another gets. Though these classic works focus on distributive injustice or inequity, the basic framework extends to analysis of procedural and interactional injustice as well.

Adams’ (1965) formulation specifies that people who perceive injustice are likely to experience unpleasant sensations of distress and tension, which they are motivated to relieve. A key means to do so is to restore justice, either by actually altering outcomes or inputs or by psychologically changing perceived assessments of elements relevant in the situation (see Walster et al. 1978). This central premise epitomizes consistency approaches of the 1950s and 1960s (see Fiske and Taylor 2013) that pivot around a drive to reduce the generally negative state of discomfort resulting from what a cognitive discrepancy between expectations derived from the equity principle and concrete amounts received through exchange or allocation. Reducing the aversive state typically produces pleasant relief. While focused on assessments of own injustice, observation of others’ injustice may create similar, though perhaps less intense, feelings of distress that spur subsequent actions and feelings.

Homans (1974) disassembles distress into specific emotions experienced by those who perceive themselves as justly rewarded, under-rewarded, or over-rewarded, both in comparison with others as well as to one’s own expectations. Reflecting on workers’ wage assessments, he notes that when individuals see themselves as justly compensated, they experience satisfaction, even if they earn less than another worker who has greater skills. Dissatisfaction emerges when a person does not get what he/she desires or when the amount received is less than another worker whose contributions are equal or perhaps even inferior. When the comparison to another worker constitutes under-reward, individuals are likely to feel angry and frustrated, and maybe resentful “toward whoever brought the condition about or benefitted from it”

(Homans 1974, p. 241). Plus, anger is especially likely when “the apparent injustice [is seen] to be the result of someone else’s actions and not [one’s] own” (Homans 1974, p. 257), which may lead to aggressive behaviors. In contrast, over-reward characterizes individuals securing more than an equally contributing other. The over-rewarded essentially benefit from injustice and thus may not experience satisfaction in the same way as the justly rewarded. Indeed, Homans (1974, p. 256, 265) notes that they may feel “super-satisfied,” particularly if they find good reason to claim that they are getting what they deserve, or guilty, especially if their outcomes come at an explicit cost to another person. Guilt may spur behaviors to increase what the other gets if it does not cost the individual too much.

Homans’s classic analysis raises three issues critical to consider in examining the role of emotions in justice processes. First, he distinguishes between victims (i.e., the under-rewarded) and beneficiaries (i.e., the over-rewarded) of injustice and their concomitant emotions and potential behavioral responses. Later theorists (e.g., Jasso 1980, 2007; Turner 2007) stress that individuals are likely to be more sensitive to and experience more intensely under-reward than over-reward. Second, Homans and these later theorists stress that observing what happens to others affects evaluations of one’s own situation. Essentially, justice evaluations are necessarily comparative, distinct from assessments of an individual’s preferences or desires. Not getting what one hopes may produce disappointment but not constitute a violation of injustice. And, third, while Homans’s arguments suggest that emotions may play a mediating role between injustice evaluations and behavioral responses, he also notes that in some situations determining whether dissatisfaction created the injustice evaluation or resulted from it is not always possible. An existing affective state may influence the choice of relevant comparison or the assessment of contributions and outcomes. Such a claim foreshadows work on the interplay between cognition and affect in the process of justice assessments and responses. As detailed below, Homans’s key issues surface in discussions of additional theoretical developments and empirical studies.

The core notion that the experience of injustice stimulates feelings of distress implicitly emerges in work on violations of procedural and interactional justice principles, especially those conveying something about individuals and their relationships to others. When organizational procedures are inconsequential and detached from associated outcomes, their violation may hardly evoke emotional arousal (Cropanzano and Folger 1991). The coupling of appraisals of outcome favorability or distributive justice with assessments of procedures, however, may jointly stimulate emotions. And, to the extent that procedural and interactional justice rules emphasize individuals’ desire to glean identity relevant information from the groups to which they belong (Tyler et al. 1997), they may be more likely to arouse emotions.

Lind and Tyler’s (1988) group value model and their later relational model (Tyler and Lind 1992) suggest that people want to be well-regarded within the groups to which they belong and that procedurally just rules and treatment communicate this sentiment. Being a valued member of a valued group, moreover, enhances an individual’s self-esteem. The distress ensuing from violations of procedurally and interactionally just principles may tap into emotions other than those identified by the distributive justice theorists because such violations signal harm to the quality of individuals’ relationships to others in the group (including authorities) and potential challenges to their own identities and feelings of self-worth and esteem.

Although the nature of emotional responses may depend upon the violation of a particular type of justice, Hillebrandt and Barclay (2013) argue that the *overall* injustice experience (i.e., the combination of the separate types of injustice) may ultimately shape emotional reactions. They suggest that while different types of injustice rouse particular emotions (e.g., distributive injustice evokes anger, interactional injustice produces indignation), those emotions create a cluster with a central or thematic emotion (e.g., resentment) that guides behaviors. This strategy for analyzing emotions in complex injustice situations awaits empirical investigation.

Beyond the core tenets of distributive justice approaches, scholars have linked affective responses to cognitive elements underlying justice assessments. Folger's (1986, 1993) referent cognition model combines outcome fairness with procedural justice. Referents refer to imagined states; a high referent pertains to easily imagining a more favorable outcome than that received and a low referent indicates difficulty in imagining such a state. Folger argues that individuals with high referents tend to grow more upset than those with low referents. Procedural justice, however, moderates that relationship such that when the process determining outcomes involves voice or justification, the disadvantaged with a high referent are likely to accept the outcome and feel less anger and resentment (Folger et al. 1983; Cropanzano and Folger 1989). Of course, the combination of distributive and procedural injustice produces the greatest level of discontent. Folger and Cropanzano (2001) extend this model to take into account moral feelings as well. And, Goldman (2003) includes analysis of three types of justice, demonstrating when distributive, procedural, and interactional justice are absent, individuals are most likely to experience anger; although the presence of any one type of justice mitigates the degree of anger.

In a similar vein, Montada (1994) and Cropanzano et al. (2000) extend the two stage process inherent in cognitive appraisal theory (e.g., Frijda 1987; Lazarus 1991) to model justice relevant emotions. The primary appraisal involves assessing the overall favorability of outcomes in view of specific goals. And, the secondary appraisal includes assessments of other contextual elements, including degree of controllability, likelihood of change, causal sources, the nature of procedures, and the like. Like any cognitive processing, appraisals may be relatively automatic and instantaneous or thoughtful and constructed, depending upon situational circumstances (see Fiske and Taylor 2013). The combined appraisals allow perceivers to make sense and create meaning out of the situation. The first stage may result in general positive or negative emotions whereas the second stage refines the

valence of affect to produce discrete emotions such as anger, guilt, pride, and shame. Extending this analysis, Hillebrandt and Barclay (2013, p. 519) note that positive emotions "broaden people's momentary thought-action repertoires" while negative emotions generally narrow them. In addition, they argue that because discrete emotions "are directed at a target and associated with specific action tendencies," distinguishing among the array of positive or negative emotions ensures understanding of specific behavioral responses.

Instances of retributive justice evoke a dominant impulse to punish the offender (Darley and Pittman 2003), especially if the inflicted harm is intentional. Such a visceral reaction may be automatic as well as accompanied by the emotion of moral outrage, constituted by a combination of feelings of anger, disgust, and contempt. Retributive responses largely focus on the perpetrator and contrast sharply with those involving restorative justice, which focuses on repairing harm to the victim and the community. Darley and Gromet (2010) note the time and cognitive resources necessary to achieving restorative justice. The restorative justice process involves evoking particular emotions, such as shame or guilt, intended to stimulate the offender's empathy with the victim and, ultimately, a desire to be reintegrated into the community (see e.g., Harris et al. 2004). While the role of moral outrage in retributive justice is similar to emotional responses to violations of other types of justice, the role of shame or guilt in restorative justice suggests another pattern. In such cases, emotion may motivate seeing a situation through the eyes of the victim and community members, and thus stimulate an evaluation of injustice, which the offender has under his or her control to remedy.

Overall, the above approaches cast emotions as a form of reaction to injustice. As such, interpretations of situational factors, via cognitive processes, along with physiological underpinnings, shape which emotion emerges. Some scholars, however, argue that people first experience the emotion and then interpret the situation, leading to perceived justice or injustice.

### 6.2.3 Theoretical Tenets: Emotions Shaping Justice Perceptions

Proponents of the idea that emotions shape justice perceptions offer perspectives that begin with either discrete emotional experiences or with more general affective states such as moods. They propose that an unexpected, typically negative feeling state triggers more careful analysis of the situation, giving rise to a fairness assessment. Sociologists Scher and Heise (1993) draw on Affect Control Theory (see Lively and Heise, this volume) to examine emotion as a precursor. Psychologists (see Cropanzano et al. 2011) have largely focused on moods, which are distinct from emotions in terms of unspecified origins, trans-situational nature, lesser intensity, and longer duration, as an antecedent. Mullen (2007) and Barsky et al. (2011) have attempted to examine how both emotions and moods shape justice evaluations.

Scher and Heise (1993) argue that the classic approaches to injustice view the creation of fairness evaluations as resulting largely from cognitive processes. In contrast, they contend that justice assessments stem from affective sources. Their central premise is “that the evaluation of a rewarding act depends crucially on the affective responses arising within the interaction, and that these affective responses emerge from the way the actors perceive the role-identities held by various interactants, the definitions of the various actions, and the ways that these meanings combine in ongoing social interaction” (1993, pp. 226–227). When transactional situations disconfirm identities (i.e., incongruence between fundamental and transient impressions based on evaluation, potency, and activity ratings) and produce experiences of unresolved anger or guilt, people cope by carefully appraising the situation and potentially characterizing the transaction as unjust. In effect, the emotion initiates a comparison of expected and received rewards, which, if it results in an unfairness judgment, stimulates a search for actions within and outside of the relationship that carry meanings in line with rectifying injustice. The primary and fundamental role of emotion in jumpstarting constructed situational appraisals awaits empirical scrutiny.

In mood-focused approaches, affective feelings meld with cognitive assessments by molding the type of processing strategy (Sinclair and Mark 1992) or by filling a void in the information available to construct the justice evaluation (van den Bos 2003). In the former, affect essentially affects the depth of processing of other information in the situation. Sinclair and Mark (1992) argue that individuals in a negative mood are likely to process information in a systematic and thorough way whereas those in a positive mood tend to involve various processing heuristics (see Fiske and Taylor 2013). They note empirical results showing that participants in an induced positive mood are less likely to discriminate among reward allocations based on relative input levels to create an equitable distribution compared to an equal distribution. In contrast, those in a negative mood found an equitable rather than equal allocation to be fairer. They additionally recognize that mood may function as an informational cue.

Van den Bos (2003) specifically considers mood as an information cue. When people face incomplete information in a justice situation, they use other information heuristically to fill in the gaps (van den Bos et al. 2001). For example, when reward recipients do not have information on others' inputs or have information only on their own inputs and outcomes, they use information on procedural fairness to create their distributive justice evaluation (i.e., the “fair process effect”). Extending this argument, van den Bos (2003) suggests that in ambiguous situations, individuals rely upon their moods to direct their distribution judgments. His findings demonstrate that when study participants have information to calculate whether they have been under-, justly, or over-rewarded or fair procedures have or have not been followed, mood matters little. In the absence of that information, however, people in bad moods judge their outcomes or relevant procedures as significantly less fair than those in good moods. Essentially, reliance on moods is a means to manage uncertainty that arises in cognitive appraisals of justice situations lacking more relevant and concrete information.

Although examination of the impact of emotional experience and moods on justice



evaluations offers an alternative analysis to the classical view of emotions as reactions to justice assessments, Mullen (2007) argues that feeling states may actually play both roles, creating a reciprocal relationship between affect and appraisal. Her affective model of justice reasoning incorporates roles for both mood and emotion. When people feel bad, they are more likely to assert that something negative has happened in general or, more specifically, that an injustice has occurred. The appraisal of a situation as good or bad may then stimulate particular emotions. With positive appraisals, a positive emotion like happiness may emerge with little effortful processing about fairness. With negative appraisals, a negative emotion like anger may arise (especially when perceivers are confident about their assessments), which may then stimulate more extensive processing about the situation. The immediate emotion thus colors examination of other available information and ultimately the nature of the response.

In a similar vein, Barsky et al. (2011) offer multiple avenues by which emotion and affect may influence or be influenced by justice judgments. They argue that “emotions and justice perceptions intertwine as a focal justice-related event is experienced” (p. 250). They also note that contextual affect (i.e., incidental emotions and moods) may influence perception of the justice-related event and that affect may more generally impact cognitions and cognitive processing relevant to the justice perception.

Mullen and Barsky et al., in effect, challenge researchers to bring together the multiple roles that feeling states play in justice processes, as both antecedents and consequences. Few studies simultaneously examine moods and emotions in justice situations (see Cropanzano et al. 2011). Additionally, the means by which emotions transform into moods (Doan 2012) may have implications for how individuals cope with injustice and the pathways to restoring justice. Focusing generally on the valence of the emotion as positive or negative, regardless of whether as an antecedent or consequence in the justice process, disregards much social psychological literature that illustrates distinctions, sometimes nuanced, among

emotions that may have consequences for justice appraisals or injustice responses. The following review spotlighting the large body of literature on emotional reactions to injustice illustrates this reliance and, when possible, highlights the importance of distinguishing among emotions.

---

## 6.3 Empirical Investigations of Emotions and Injustice

Although, as detailed previously, scholars discuss types of justice and their relevance to individual, group, and societal behaviors, most empirical examinations focus on individual-level responses to distributive injustice. We begin with that domain and then expand to encompass considerations of different types of justice. And, beyond the focus on own injustice, we consider the role of emotions in situations involving observers and collective responses to injustice.

### 6.3.1 Micro-Level Emotional Responses to Injustice

The classical approaches argue that feelings of “distress” follow perceived injustice, regardless of the nature of the injustice, whereas fair outcomes produce feelings of satisfaction. Below, we first briefly discuss measurement. Then we turn to patterns that emerge with regard to personal experiences of injustice, in both impersonal and intimate relationships. We examine the evidence for how individual differences and situational factors affect these basic relationships and for the proposed mediating role played by emotions. Such analysis provides the basis for suggesting the interplay between cognitive and affective factors in justice processes, creating a process that unfolds over time. We conclude the section by focusing on how observers of others’ injustice respond, which has implications for the role of emotion at the macro level.

#### 6.3.1.1 Measurement Approaches

Researchers’ approaches to measuring distress have varied over the decades. Early investigations

(Austin and Walster 1974) used a 30-item check list of adjectives to create an index of affect that ranged from contentment to distress. Other work (e.g., Hegtvedt 1990; Sprecher 1986; DeCremer and Wubben 2010) relies on Likert scales of intensity or frequency of experience for discrete emotions. With data on discrete emotions, measures may involve composites of positive emotions (e.g., satisfaction, happiness, contentment) and negative emotions (e.g., anger, resentment, frustration) (e.g., Hegtvedt and Killian 1999; Stecher and Rosse 2005) or single items (e.g., De Cremer 2004). The composite strategy enhances measurement reliability but may conceal nuanced responses, mainly those more dependent upon contextual factors beyond ratios of outcomes to inputs (see Hillebrandt and Barclay 2013; Turner 2007). Other research involves narratives asking respondents to identify justice relevant situations and describe the emotions that those situations evoke (Mikula et al. 1998). And a few studies have used physiological measures like heart rate and galvanic skin response (Markovsky 1988) and newer methods of brain imaging (Hsu et al. 2008; Tabibnia et al. 2008). The latter show that inequity activates the insula region of the brain, often associated with negative emotion whereas fair outcomes stimulated brain regions associated with positive emotion (e.g., amygdala, ventral striatum, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex).

### 6.3.1.2 Emotional Responses in Impersonal Relationships

The central predictions of the classic approaches and the more recent theorizing of Turner (2007) suggest that the experience of justice produces positive emotions while the experience of injustice results in negative ones in both in impersonal and personal relationships. Given that the Adams (1965) and Walster et al. (1978) formulations indicate that “distress” results from the experience of inequity, the early study by Austin and Walster (1974) focused specifically on distress. Findings confirm that equitably rewarded study participants were more content and less distressed than those inequitably under- or over-rewarded and that the under-rewarded experienced the most distress. Per Homans’s (1974) formulation,

subsequent work, using a variety of methodological approaches, has unpacked the nature of the distress, and in so doing begun to highlight the experience of discrete and distinct emotions.

Focusing on self-reports using an open-questionnaire format, Mikula (1986) shows that study participants asked to describe their emotions resulting from a personal experience of injustice most frequently called to mind feelings of anger, rage, and indignation, followed by disappointment, surprise, helplessness, and depression. Using a similar methodology in a study involving student respondents in 37 countries, Mikula et al. (1998) asked participants to describe incidents eliciting particular emotions and then to indicate if the eliciting situation was unjust or unfair. They found that anger, and to a lesser degree disgust, sadness, fear, guilt, and shame, stemmed from unjust situations. They note, moreover, that unjust events compared to other soliciting situations stimulated feelings of greater intensity and duration.

The emphasis on anger pervades other investigations of emotional responses to distributive injustice. Employing experimental designs, research consistently demonstrates that equitably or fairly rewarded study participants feel more satisfied and those under-rewarded feel angrier than their equitably or over-rewarded counterparts (Clayton 1992; Gray-Little and Teddlie 1978; Hegtvedt 1990; Williams 1999; see Colquitt et al. 2013). Batson et al.’s (2007) findings refine this pattern by categorizing anger in response to own injustice as “personal,” and contrasting it with empathetic anger resulting from unfair treatment suffered by a cared-for other and moral anger stemming from violation of a moral standard. In addition, Hegtvedt (1990) shows that the under-rewarded experience more resentment and helplessness and Williams (1999) finds that those who perceive their outcomes as unfair feel more sadness than those who assess their outcome as fair. Using a composite measure of negative emotions, including anger, resentment, and frustration, Hegtvedt and Killian (1999) further confirm that when individuals perceive that their own outcomes are unfair, they are likely to experience negative emotions.

Although patterns of findings with regard to the effects of distributive injustice are quite consistent with regard to the experience of anger, they are less so with regard to guilt among the over-rewarded. Gray-Little and Teddlie (1978) find no evidence of guilt. Hegtvedt (1990) demonstrates that the over-rewarded do feel more guilty than the under- or equitably rewarded but the absolute levels of guilt feelings are quite low. Guilt may depend upon whether or not one's own outcomes come at the expense of another person. Reuben and Winden (2010) show that in a gaming situation, proposers experience greater guilt when they take what they consider an unfair amount in a power-to-take game, especially if responders have punished the proposers in the past. And, Hegtvedt and Killian (1999) show that guilt feelings decrease when individuals perceive outcomes to be fair to others, giving some support to the notion that interdependence between individuals is central to evoking guilt when over-rewarded.

Similar to patterns regarding distributive justice, when procedures are fair, individuals are more likely to feel satisfied. For example, De Cremer (2004) shows that accuracy of procedures and leader's neutrality enhance positive affect. The pattern for anger or resentment in response to procedural injustice is more complex than that evidenced for distributive injustice. Such negative emotions are more likely only when unjust organizational procedures tap into an individual's value to the group or are assessed in the context of outcome evaluations (Cropanzano and Folger 1991). De Cremer and Ruiters (2003) show that procedural injustice—represented by failing to provide voice to individuals affected by a decision—can produce feelings of disappointment. Yet Folger and Martin (1986) find no main effect of procedural justice, but show that dissatisfaction, though not resentment, emerges when unfair outcomes stem from a fair procedure.

Weiss et al. (1999) elaborate on why information on outcomes is relevant to procedural justice effects. Once people experience the happiness or disappointment related to favorable or unfavorable outcomes, respectively, they are likely to try to make sense out of their experience. In so doing,

they examine the procedures that produced them, some of which work to favor individuals and some do not. Together, assessments of outcomes and procedures produce an array of emotions. While negative outcomes generally stimulate disappointment, the angriest responses occur when people suffer unfavorable outcomes wrought by unfair procedures. And, while positive outcomes usually produce happiness, guilt emerges when individuals benefit through an unfair process. Pride stemming from positive outcomes, however, remains regardless of the fairness of procedures. Results from Krehbiel and Cropanzano (2000) generally replicate these findings and also signal that frustration parallels the pattern for anger and anxiety parallels the pattern for guilt. And Tepper (2001) shows that feelings of depression are most severe when distributive and procedural justice are both low.

In contrast, Barclay et al. (2005) demonstrate slightly different patterns in response to outcome favorability and procedural justice in a field study involving layoff victims. Their findings suggest that guilt and shame, characterized as inward looking emotions, arise when individuals receive an unfavorable outcome through a fair process; favorable outcomes or an unfair process mitigate feelings of guilt and shame. And, unlike the results of Weiss et al., anger, representing an outward looking emotion, emerges regardless of outcome favorability if people perceive the procedures to be unfair. The differences between experimental and field study may have produced variations in the pattern observed by Weiss et al. and Barclay et al.

While the focus of fewer studies, Stecher and Rosse (2005) argue and provide evidence that violations of interactional justice evoke negative emotions similar to those with regard to distributive injustice. Employing a composite measure of anger, resentment, and bitterness, they confirm that instances of interpersonal disrespect result in negative emotions, regardless of level of procedural justice (represented by accuracy and consistency of information). De Cremer and Tyler (2005) also show that interactional justice, also signified by respect, attenuates sadness and disappointment, while enhancing positive emotions (happiness, satisfaction, and cheerfulness).

This body of research generally signals support for expectations of justice leading to positive emotions and injustice evoking negative emotions. The most consistent pattern emerges for anger resulting from disadvantaged distributive and interactional injustice. Researchers qualify the conditions of procedural injustice that are likely to inspire anger. While a variety of emotions have been examined, only a few studies attempt to differentiate between types of similarly valenced emotions in a meaningful, conceptual way (e.g., inward compared to outward looking). Hillebrandt and Barclay (2013) stress that distinguishing among positive emotions, which play an adaptive role especially in organizations, has been particularly overlooked. Studies of personal relationships provide additional support for the expected tenets but also elaborate upon other relevant issues.

### 6.3.1.3 Emotional Responses in Personal Relationships

Research on justice and emotions in close personal relationships encompasses studies of romantic, unmarried partnerships and married couples. The former includes a narrower age group and less enduring relationships than the latter and thus looks at general contributions to the relationship. Married couple studies often focus specifically on the household division of labor.

Sprecher (1986, 1992, 2001) captures equity and emotion processes in romantic partnerships involving college students. Using a survey responses, Sprecher (1986) assesses the global equity/inequity of the relationship (i.e., who is getting a better deal out of the relationship and who contributes more or less) and asks how frequently respondents experienced eleven positive and 13 negative emotions in reference to their relationship in the previous month. (Some of the emotions, however, such as passionate or companionate love, seem to be sentiments or affective states.) For men, under-benefitting and over-benefitting decreased positive emotions and increased negative emotions; for women, under-benefitting followed the same pattern as for men, but over-benefitting only influenced negative emotions. These patterns emerge for both indices of positive and negative emotions as well as specific emotions. Interestingly, under-

and over-benefitting produce feelings of guilt, contrary to Homans's expectations.

Using a vignette methodology to examine expected emotions in relationships characterized by under- or over-benefit, Sprecher (1992) confirms some of the classic patterns. If anticipating under-benefit, respondents expected to feel greater anger and depression than those anticipating over-benefit, who expected to feel more guilt but also greater happiness, contentment, and satisfaction. When the emotions were compiled into general measures of distress, respondents expecting under-benefit also expected distress whereas those responding to possible over-benefit did not. Sprecher (2001) likewise shows that survey respondents feeling under-benefitted in their own relationships are more likely than those over-benefitted to experience overall distress. Sprecher's studies imply greater emotional acceptance of general over-benefit than under-benefit. Examining discrete emotions associated with particular behaviors, however, may be more useful to more accurately understand these effects.

In married couples, early studies focused largely on depression in response to inequity. Schafer and Keith (1980) examine inequity assessments for five household roles (housekeeper, cook, financial provider, companion, and parent). Results indicate that those who experience under- or over-benefitted inequity in the performance of their roles tend to feel more depressed than those who experience equity. Longmore and Demaris (1997) reveal a similar pattern but also show that high self-esteem buffers the effects of under-benefitted inequity on depression.

Anchored in Affect Control Theory and Kemper's structural model of emotions, Lively et al. (2010) extend work on couples by including composite measures of positive and negative emotions as well as discrete emotions. Results show that perceiving the distribution of household labor as unfair to self is positively related to a composite of negative emotions and negatively related to a composite of positive emotions; perceived unfairness to partner produces the same patterns using composite measures. The effects of unfairness to self and to other, however, differ somewhat for discrete emotions. Self unfairness

exerts relatively strong positive effects on distress (akin to depression), anger, and rage and negative effects on tranquility and excitement. In contrast, unfairness to other exerts a weaker effect on distress and tranquility and no effects on anger or rage but enhances fear and self-reproach. Thus, when over-benefitted, the emotional cocktail includes negatively valenced emotions, and not the more positive emotions that emerge in some experimental work and in Sprecher (1986). Unlike short-term instances of over-benefitting injustice, in longer standing-couples “exploitative behavior appears disturbing—as opposed to satisfying—to the beneficiary” (Lively et al. 2010, p. 375).

Guerrero et al. (2008) provide similar evidence about guilt experienced by an over-benefitted spouse. They show that under-benefit produces anger and, for wives, sadness too. And, beyond emotional experiences, they find that spouses who view their relationships as equitable report using more constructive, prosocial emotional expressions. In contrast, partners who see themselves as under-benefitted employ more destructive, antisocial emotional expressions. Results further suggest that anger and destructive expressions mediate the effects of under-benefitting on marital satisfaction. Thus particular emotions and their expressions affect the quality of the relationship, which may influence subsequent behaviors.

While the patterns of effects of perceived distributive justice, assessed typically in terms of the division of labor in the home, replicate some of the patterns emerging in more impersonal relationships, they also highlight some differences. Importantly, the interdependence in enduring relationships differentially affects the impact of inequity on more in-ward looking emotions like guilt and potentially on the pattern of emotional expression in familiar couples. The extent to which a relationship is personal acts as a moderating factor in the analysis of the justice/emotion relationship. Other moderators include individual-level differences and situational factors.

#### **6.3.1.4 Individual Difference Factors Affecting Emotional Responses**

Even when individuals similarly perceive injustice, they may not experience it in the same way

emotionally. Researchers have considered the effects of several individual difference factors to help account for this variation.

Individuals vary in terms of the extent to which they believe that the world is just. Such “belief in a just world” (BJW) involves deeming that people deserve the outcomes they receive because of who they are or what they did (Lerner 1980). Hafer and Olson (1998) review research demonstrating that strong believers in a just world emotionally respond to their own negative outcomes less negatively and more positively than those who hold weaker beliefs. For example, Dalbert (2002) shows that BJW buffers against the experience of anger in response to unfairness perceptions. Hafer and Correy (1999) argue that strong believers tend to make more internal and fewer external attributions for their receipt of negative outcomes, which reduces the perceived severity of injustice and concomitant emotions. Study results, employing a composite measure of depression, shame, anger, and dissatisfaction indicate that external attributions and injustice perceptions do mediate the BJW/emotions relationship.

Van Prooijen et al. (2008) examine how individuals’ social value orientation (SVO)—the extent to which they are more self/individualistically or socially-oriented with regard to their preferences for outcome distributions—affect emotional responses to procedural justice, represented by the provision or lack of voice in decisions affecting oneself. In two experimental and one field studies, they find that the effects of procedural justice on satisfaction or a composite of negative emotions (anger, disappointment, being mad) was more pronounced for proselves rather than prosocials. In effect and ironically, justice concerns affected those with egocentric tendencies more than those socially oriented, whose tendencies align more with social justice concerns. Yet, for individuals high in interdependent self-construal, procedural justice enhances positive affect (Brockner et al. 2005). Other research likewise signals how dispositional characteristics that take other people into consideration decrease negative reactions to one’s own injustice. For example, a disposition to forgive others attenuates anger



in response to an unfair event (Chan and Arvey 2011) and highly conscientiousness people experience less negative emotions in response to violations of equality (Stouten et al. 2011).

While BJW and SVO tap into underlying beliefs differentially held by individuals, affect intensity refers to a person's predisposition to react more or less emotionally to an event. Murphy (2009) provides results from two distinct contexts involving compliance with the law (taxation and policing). When legal authorities proceed fairly in their decisions (show respect, act neutrally) they reduce the experience of "anger" (a composite of resentment, being bothered, acting out, frustration) at a much higher rate for those low in affect intensity compared those high in intensity. Ensuring fairness may not always quell the negative emotions of those who are predisposed to respond emotionally to an event.

Together, these studies draw attention individual-differences in responding to injustices. In so doing, they contribute to emphasis on evaluations and reactions to injustice as subjective, based on individual characteristics. Situational factors, however, also contribute to how individuals make sense out of situations.

### **6.3.1.5 Situational Factors Moderating the Injustice-Emotion Relationship**

Situational factors may pertain to information available, the nature of the group context, or the like. Austin and Walster (1974) show that when individuals are led to expect distributive injustice, they feel less distress in response to unfair outcomes. Expectations may implicitly underlie how other group context factors affect emotional responses as well.

De Cremer and colleagues have investigated various aspects of how leadership and group member relations moderate the effects of (typically procedural) injustice on affect. Subordinates of confident leaders who allow pre-decision voice (i.e., create procedural justice) experience less negative emotion (combined disappointment and frustration) than those given voice only after the decision; procedural justice conditions, however, had little effect if the leader was low in confidence (De

Cremer and Wubben 2010). Similarly, a strong transformational leadership style ensures the positive effect of procedural justice on affect compared to other types of leadership that fail to reinforce the positive relationship (De Cremer 2006). These studies suggest that the nature of leadership moderates the effect of procedural justice on emotions.

Likewise, a long standing perception of oneself as a member of a work team creates greater emphasis on voice and concomitant positive emotions than having just recently become a team member (De Cremer and Stouten 2005). Not surprisingly, membership heightens concern for one's value to the group and the value of the group itself and in so doing draws attention to other group members. De Cremer et al. (2005) show that to the extent that individuals perceive other group members to experience procedural fairness in performance evaluations and pay procedures, their own sense of process fairness has an amplified effect on a composite of positive emotions. And, in a different way, when people perceive others in need of social support, their emotions signal tolerance of violations of equality (Stouten et al. 2011).

The positive impact of others on people's assessments of types of justice, however, may be limited to situations that promote cooperation rather than competition. De Cremer and van Hiel (2010) find that with competitive interdependence, a person's anger and frustration increase when witnessing "voice" for another but not for oneself. When emphasizing cooperation, the pattern reverses and another's justice reduces negative responses to own injustice.

Together these studies clearly indicate that situational factors matter—at least for the understanding of procedural justice and emotions. Factors moderating the effects of distributive and interactional injustice on emotions require further investigation. Nonetheless, studies examining emotions as mediators include all types of injustice and reactions.

### **6.3.1.6 Emotional Responses to Injustice as Mediators**

The classic distributive justice perspectives suggest that "distress" mediates between perceived injustice and behavioral responses. A growing

number of studies now provide evidence of mediation, with regard to various types of injustice. The focus is typically on anger and responses such as counterproductive work behaviors, loyalty/withdrawal, and retribution.

Evidence from studies employing experimental (Srivastava et al. 2009) and survey techniques involving students (Chan and Arvey 2011), workers (Khan et al. 2013), and layoff victims (Barclay et al. 2005) demonstrate that anger mediates behavioral responses to distributive injustice. Findings from the latter two studies also indicate that other types of emotion (e.g., sadness, shame, guilt), however, do not mediate between perceptions and counterproductive work behaviors or retaliation.

Focusing more specifically on procedural justice, Murphy and Tyler (2008) find that for a sample of taxpayers, unfair procedures used by tax authorities heightened anger, which in turn decreased compliance with rules. In another survey, subordinates' happiness with their workplace mediated the impact of their assessment of procedures on compliance with regulations in the context. A similar pattern emerges in experimentally-oriented work by De Cremer and Den Ouden (2009), which shows that negative emotions mediated the effect of procedural fairness (voice/no voice) on withdrawal when the authority is passionate. Along with distributive and procedural justice, violations of interactional justice also enhance angry responses that in turn affect counterproductive work behaviors (Roy et al. 2012).

One study of loyalty in banking brings together all three types of justice. Chebat and Slusarczyk (2005) surveyed banking clients about the service they received when they filed complaints. Results showed a direct effect of interactional justice (courtesy of treatment by bank employees) and on loyalty behavior (maintaining, not closing, the bank account). Additionally, interactional justice and distributive justice (focused on compensation) affected both negative emotions (anxiety and disgust) and positive emotions (joy and hope), which in turn influenced loyalty behavior. The effects of procedural justice were mediated through only negative emotions. These

results suggest that justice-related emotions may function diagnostically for managers, stimulating a closer examination of what is going on in the situation and, perhaps, cognitive appraisals regarding the source of the emotion.

In addition to the focus on emotions per se, two recent studies emphasize "emotional exhaustion," strain associated with work demands and stressors, as mediating between justice perceptions and employee withdrawal. Cole et al. (2010) demonstrate that distributive and interpersonal injustice increase emotional exhaustion, which decreases organizational commitment leading to withdrawal behaviors. Also, Howard and Cordes (2010) find that both procedural and distributive injustice enhance emotional exhaustion leading to employee absenteeism, turnover intentions, work alienation, and alcohol self-medication.

Revelation of mediating effects not only confirms classic theoretical arguments but also paves the way for considering how motivations, appraisals, emotions, and behaviors may operate in a cyclical fashion, especially in contexts involving on-going behavior. Hillebrandt and Barclay (2013) suggest that an episode of injustice may lead to subsequent interactions each characterized by different emotions, yet few studies address such over-time experiences. The next section describes some embryonic work examining such on-going processes.

### **6.3.1.7 The Interplay Between Motivations, Cognitions, Affect, and Responses in Justice Situations**

In situations that may evoke justice concerns, individuals enter with a variety of motivations, attempt (consciously or unconsciously) to make sense out of the situation (deliberately or automatically) using both cognitive and affective tools, and then respond accordingly, which may generate new information, new evaluations and emotions, and new behaviors. Even though justice is a process, studies typically involve one shot assessments and reactions. In so doing, they fail to capture on-going dynamics. Here we describe a few investigations that attempt to capture more than a snap-shot of justice processes.

Using an experimental design, Stets and Osborn (2008) examine how people's initial motivation for enhancement results in positive reactions to over-reward. They show, however, that over-reward as a disconfirmation of an identity ultimately leads to a desire for consistency and erodes positive responses to over-reward. Their study illustrates that emotions at one point in time affect behavior and subsequent emotions, capturing a dynamic element in justice situations.

A series of studies by Rupp and colleagues show how individuals in service industries not only experience emotions but also manage them in response to their customers. Rupp and Spencer (2006) find that when customers treat service workers with unfairness, the workers experience anger but also must increase the effort by which they manage their emotions. In the absence of unfairness, emotional labor of service workers is more manageable. The maintenance of emotions through surface acting when faced with unfair customers is particularly challenging for workers low in perspective taking ability (Rupp et al. 2008). In addition, when service workers observe their coworkers also facing instances of customer injustice and the need to manage emotions, their own emotional labor grows more intense (Spencer and Rupp 2009). These studies exemplify how contexts affect the experience of emotion and constrain responses to perceived injustice, which has implications for how further interaction will unfold.

Restorative justice arenas, perhaps, most clearly illustrate the unfolding interrelationship between motivations, appraisals, emotions, and justice. As noted previously, the goal is to instill feelings of shame, guilt, and empathy in offenders to provide a basis for reintegration into the community. Rossner (2011) inspects micro-level dynamics represented in a video recording of a restorative justice conference involving the victim, the offender, law enforcement officers, and observers who attempt to negotiate an appropriate punishment. She analyses facial expressions, verbal cues, gestures, and other dynamics to illustrate how an initial situation of anger (on the part of the victim and observers) and anxiety (on the part of the offender) transforms into one of solidarity owing to the development of shared

cognitions and appropriate emotional responses by the offender. Wenzel et al. (2010) argue that shared identities (e.g., university affiliation, company) between the victim and offender facilitate the success of restorative justice conferences. In cases where victim and offender belonged to the same group, feelings of sadness mediated between the justice perceptions and commitment to the restorative justice process. While these restorative justice studies focus mainly on the victim and offender, as illustrated by other research, observers or third parties are potentially integral to understanding responses to injustice, including how they are affected by emotions.

### 6.3.1.8 The Emotional Responses of Third Parties to Others' Injustice

Compared to research on personal injustice, studies of third party responses to others' injustice are relatively recent (see Skarlicki and Kulik 2005). Expressed emotions by others may communicate information to a potential victim of injustice, which may shape his or her subsequent behavior (Hillebrandt and Barclay 2013). Mayer (2012) offers a theoretical model linking others' injustice to moral emotions, and subsequently to negative responses (e.g., punishment, retaliation) and positive, prosocial ones. Studies tend to focus on the former, though as noted above, restorative justice conferences encompass the latter. Emphasis often rests on third parties' "moral outrage" (combined anger, contempt, disgust) and subsequent behaviors.

Lotz et al. (2011b) demonstrate that to the extent that study participants experience moral outrage toward an offender who unjustly distributed rewards between him/herself and another person, they are more likely to compensate victims and punish offenders. Self-focused feelings of threat (combination of anxious, nervous, guilty, confused) also mediated compensation responses, at least when the other was aware of his/her victimhood. In a related study, Lotz et al. (2011a) examine how third parties' sensitivity to others' injustice triggers feelings of moral outrage, which in turn affects behavioral responses. Individuals who demonstrate such sensitivity have stronger feelings of moral outrage and are more likely to use their own resources to punish the offender.

Such a pattern parallels results showing that observers who experience moral character as central to their self-conception are more likely to engage in retribution toward an offender (Skarlicki and Rupp 2010). For individuals low in moral identity, whether they respond to another's injustice depends upon whether they employ a rational (relying on cognitions and counterfactual thinking) or experiential (relying on emotion) processing frame; the experiential frame increases the likelihood of retribution by third parties. Interdependent self-construals (compared to independent ones) likewise generate greater moral outrage among observers and likelihood of retribution-oriented goals (Gollwitzer and Bucklein 2007).

The studies reviewed above typically presume that third parties will act as neutral observers, and that the emotions generated by another's suffering fuels their responses. Blader et al. (2013), however, challenge this assumption. They argue that assessments of justice by third parties may be subjective, colored by the emotions they feel toward the recipient of unfair decisions or unfair outcomes. In five studies, they show that social emotional congruence—positive attitudes toward and a match in response to a recipient's reactions—influences third parties' justice judgments such that they parallel those of the recipient, feeling positive at over-reward but negative with under-reward. Emotional incongruence (negative attitude toward and a desire to distinguish one's responses from those of the recipient), however, allowed third parties to tolerate the disadvantage suffered by a recipient.

Together, these studies illustrate different roles for emotion in the analysis of third parties' response to others' injustice. When conditions allow third parties to experience an evolutionary-based deontic response, such as that captured by moral outrage, they move to help victims. These studies, however, focus on individual level responses, not collective responses.

### 6.3.2 Macro-Level Emotional Responses to Injustice

Increasing research focuses on the role that emotions play in responses to injustice beyond the individual level. Here we briefly examine how

emotions influence the instigation of protest (see also Jasper and Owens, this volume, on the impact of emotions on social movements more generally) and then turn to research on intergroup dynamics pertaining to feelings of collective anger (by the disadvantaged) and collective guilt (by the advantaged).

#### 6.3.2.1 The Role of Emotions in Social Movements

Perceptions of injustice and their resulting emotions play a role in social movements inasmuch as they serve to instigate collective action and determine types of protest activities. People must first perceive a situation as unjust before collective action can occur (McAdam 1982; Turner and Killian 1987). These injustice perceptions spur an emotional response, often anger, which in turn may lead individuals to engage in protest activities (Goodwin et al. 2001). Indeed, van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013) argue that anger and/or contempt animate individuals into specific types of collective action via two distinct “emotional routes” to protest. The “anger route [is] based on efficacy, leading to normative action” (p. 6) while the contempt route occurs “when legitimate channels are closed and the situation is seen as hopeless, invoking a ‘nothing to lose’ strategy leading to non-normative protest” (p. 6).

Similarly, Tausch et al. (2011) examine separate emotional pathways to normative (i.e., conforming to social system norms) versus nonnormative (i.e., violating social system norms) protest activities among three groups of protesters: German students protesting tuition fees; Indian Muslims protesting economic and social disadvantage; and British Muslims' protests of British foreign policy toward Muslim countries. Tausch et al. (2011) show that anger strongly predicts normative (e.g., political participation) but not nonnormative (e.g., violence) action and contempt predicts nonnormative action but not normative action. Building on previous research on anger and contempt (Fischer and Roseman 2007), Tausch et al. explain their findings in terms of the relationship between activists and the targets of their activism. While anger is associated with interpersonal relationships and serves as a constructive emotion to redress violations of moral

conduct, contempt occurs in less personal relationships in which “there is a perceived lack of control over the other person and where reconciliation is no longer sought” (2011, p. 131). In addition, beyond emotions, Tausch et al.’s replicate previous work indicating that the recognition of the ability act—i.e., efficacy—fosters collective action (e.g., McAdam 1982; Tilly 1978).

In addition to social movement protest activity, perceptions of injustices also spur group-level emotional responses. Social categories (i.e., race, gender, and social class) dictate patterns of privilege and discrimination that prompt distinct emotions for different social groups.

### 6.3.2.2 Group-Level Emotional Responses to Injustice

Just as individuals create social identity ties to the groups in which they belong (Tajfel and Turner 1986), so too do they feel “social emotions” in relation to the groups with which they identify strongly, i.e., their ingroups (Mackie et al. 2000; Smith 1999). Here we consider two group-based emotions, anger (felt by members of disadvantaged groups) and guilt (felt by members of privileged groups).

Perceptions of intergroup harm or threat by disadvantaged ingroup members lead to emotional responses like anger. Two studies examine this group-level dynamic by focusing on how sexism impacts the ways in which women (the ingroup) perceive men (the outgroup). (Pennekamp et al. 2007) investigate the role of gender identity (i.e., group-based identity) and the relevance of societal issues regarding gender (i.e., sexism) on the level of group-based anger aimed at a specific outgroup (men). Their findings indicate that, while strong gender identification affects group-based anger indirectly, via relevance of sexism, both outgroup blame and relevance of sexism strongly predicted group-based anger.

Moving beyond the impact of systemic issues of sexism, Chaudoir and Quinn (2010) look at how everyday sexist events affect group-based anger of female observers witnessing catcalls aimed at other women. Their results show that anger is the predominant intergroup response for these third parties. Moreover, they found that bystanders’

gender identity became more salient, suggesting that their emotional response stemmed from their gender group identity. Findings from these two studies illustrate the ways in which instances of sexist behavior coupled with gender identity affect how women, as victims and as observers constituting an ingroup, react to behaviors of men, representing an (advantaged) outgroup.

Focusing on the potential feelings stemming from positions of advantage, collective guilt is “a dysphoric feeling experienced when people perceive their ingroup as responsible for wrongly harming another group, even when they are not personally responsible” (Gunn and Wilson 2011, pp. 14741–14755). Wohl et al. (2006) identify three antecedents to collective guilt, including (1) self-categorization as a member of the harm-doing group, (2) belief that the group is responsible for harmful actions affecting another group, and (3) belief that the harm is illegitimate or immoral. They also argue that the experience of collective guilt depends on perceptions regarding how difficult and costly correcting the situation might be.

Individuals belonging to advantaged groups that have harmed outgroup members experience feelings of collective guilt (Branscombe 1998; Doosje et al. 1998; Miron et al. 2006), although not always particularly intensely (Swim and Miller 1999) or frequent (Wohl et al. 2006). Because ingroup members wish to view their group in a positive light (Tajfel and Turner 1986), they pursue various strategies to assuage their guilt. Gunn and Wilson (2011) show that advantaged groups who have harmed outgroup members are more likely to acknowledge their collective guilt and shame when they can circumvent the threat to their group identity and instead affirm it, paving the way for reparations. Yet other research demonstrates that perpetrator groups blame the harmed group for instigating the harmful actions of the ingroup and thereby justify the actions of the ingroup as necessary (Wohl et al. 2006). In effect, denying or ignoring advantageous inequality attenuates negative affect resulting from unjustified privilege (Napier et al. 2006). Even those unaffected directly by a particular injustice seem to indicate emotions aligning with those of the groups to which they most closely identify.



### 6.3.2.3 Group-Level Emotional Responses to Observed Injustice

In 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall in southeast Louisiana, creating one of the deadliest natural disasters in American history. Evaluation of the resultant relief efforts provided the opportunity for researchers to examine group-level emotion dynamics by assessing public opinion among those not directly affected by the storm. The 5 days that passed between the day of the storm and the beginning of relief efforts raised many questions regarding the ways in which race and class influence responses to disaster. A national opinion poll (Pew Research Center 2005) examined emotional responses to the storm and relief efforts, as well as perceptions of local, state, and federal response to the destruction. The results indicate a highly racialized pattern of injustice regarding perceptions of the federal government's response. While only 17% of Whites believed that the governmental response would have been faster if the victims had been White, over three-fourths of Blacks (77%) believed this to be true. Moreover, 71% of Blacks deemed the relief response to expose a racial inequality problem in our country, whereas only 32% of Whites agreed. Napier et al. (2006) argue that this racial difference reflects "the denial of pervasive and systematic inequality among Whites involved a system-justifying effort to reduce the emotional distress that would come with confronting the inequality in the system" (p. 63). Whites employed several mechanisms in this system-justifying process, including victim blaming (e.g., "They should have left before the storm hit") and drawing on stereotypes (e.g., "New Orleans residents are immoral" and "Blacks are lazy") to rationalize the lamentable relief response.

Drawing upon data from the same Pew poll, White et al. (2007) found that Black Americans compared to Whites were much more likely to report feeling angry and depressed, although the two groups felt similarly sad and shocked. Moreover, Blacks' anger and depression seemed fueled by beliefs of race-based discrimination represented by the government's neglect of Hurricane Katrina's largely Black victims. These patterns suggest how observers who are members

of particular ingroups or outgroups vicariously experience emotions in response to the unjust treatment of their fellow group members.

---

## 6.4 Concluding Remarks

Many scholars have begun to heed the call to examine the role that emotions, or affect more generally, play in justice processes. A cursory count of the empirical articles cited in the foregoing pages indicates that the number of studies published since 2005 (an 8 year period) far exceeds the number appearing on emotion in the first 30 years since Homans's (1974) classic statement. Moreover, the recent literature pertains to procedural and interactional justice as well as distributive, and extends beyond a focus on personal, individual-level injustices to include emotional responses at the group-level. All in all, the studies are varied, employing different methodologies and including different types of samples (though experiments remain largely tied to college students). In conclusion, we make several observations regarding this burgeoning field, reflecting on what we know and suggesting what we should attempt to learn.

First, much evidence confirms that anger (and related, similar negative emotions) emerges both as a reaction to perceived disadvantageous injustice and as an experience affecting subsequent behaviors. The pattern for guilt, however, is less reliable, signaling the need for greater attention to understanding the emotional responses of individuals who benefit from a distribution, procedure, or interaction. Being over-rewarded may be a necessary condition for the experience of guilt but not a sufficient one, at either the individual or group level. Thus, careful examination of conditions stimulating guilt, such as the implications of one actor's advantaged treatment for other group members, or assuaging it (as demonstrated by some of the studies on collective guilt) is required.

In addition, researchers should consider how the combination of guilt and types of positive emotions create nuanced feelings that may drive or hinder justice restoring activities that benefit

the disadvantaged. Such “complex emotions” (see Fiske and Taylor 2013) have hardly been examined. Sociological frameworks like those represented in this volume (e.g., Affect Control Theory, cultural approaches) may be useful in discerning the meaning of such complex emotions (and even previously examined discrete positive and negative emotions). By moving beyond reliance on colloquial usage to more accurately understanding the meaning of an emotion, identification of distinct emotional responses across types of justice and of concomitant behaviors may ensue more precisely.

Paralleling the growing consideration of discrete emotions, a second concern is how particular configurations of social circumstances shape distinct emotions and the behavioral responses they may engender. Research on “moderating factors” has made inroads, but falls short of the types of structural situations involving differences in power, status, and legitimacy implied by Turner’s (2007) theoretical analysis. Consideration of such social conditions, moreover, may augment the nascent work on the management of emotions stemming from unfair circumstances. Most literature examines how people *feel* in response to injustice whereas little addresses how likely they are to *express* those feelings (for an exception, see Johnson et al. 2007). Besides managing emotions in service situations, individuals may constrain their expressions to those who occupy higher status or power-advantaged positions in the workplace. Yet, they may share them with third parties, enlisted in forms of reciprocal emotion management (Lively 2000). Whether it is the feeling or the expression that drives attempts—by either the disadvantaged, advantaged, or observers—to redress injustice also remains to be investigated.

Third, related to the nature of the emotion and of the soliciting situation, various authors have raised the issue of whether affect in injustice situations constitutes moral emotion. Skitka et al. (2008) argue that distributive and procedural justice theories recognize underlying economic and social motivations; violations of justice expectations in situations fueled by these motivations create emotion, as much of the foregoing review

has indicated. They are not, however, moral emotions (e.g., moral outrage, righteous anger) per se. Calling attention to moral motivations, violations of moral convictions, and concomitant intense emotions, Skitka et al. (2008) report results from studies showing that greater anger emerges when outcomes are inconsistent with moral convictions (even if produced by fair procedures) and that such outrage spreads to assessments of fairness of other situational elements.

As Cropanzano et al. (2011, p. 66) point out, moral emotions “can be used to understand why people sometimes value justice for its own sake,” and “lead people to punish a perpetrator even if this reaction is not economically sound for either the victim or a third-party observer.” In effect, moral emotions as injustice responses surface when stakes involve more than one’s own economic or social well-being and concerns for others are activated. Empathy, representing the capacity to identify with and understand another person’s feelings, may enhance justice (as long as it does not result in favoritism) (see Cropanzano et al. 2011) and possibly altruistic responses toward victims (Batson 2006). Although not all justice situations evoke moral emotions, Skitka et al. (2008) point out that it is important to discern *when* different motivational priorities exist, how individuals in the situation work them out, and how they affect behavioral reactions.

Consideration of empathy draws attention to a fourth concern: broadening the research focus to the *social* context. Although implicit in classic distributive and procedural justice approaches, most studies focus on individual responses without consideration of the social dynamics among group members (e.g., distributor and recipient; two or more disputants or recipients; the multiple people constituting a valued group). Research noted previously on restorative justice conferences, begins to address this deficit. Investigations that consider the views of both the advantaged and disadvantaged in the situation, authorities and subordinates, members of a couple, and the like will advance analysis of how one person’s feelings or expressions affect others’ assessments and responses to injustice. Infrequently investigated combinations of justice may also come into

play, such as when a distributive injustice evokes anger, which when expressed leads to disrespectful treatment toward another.

Emphasis on interactional processes raises a fifth concern about understanding justice and emotions: with any ongoing dynamic, an interplay between cognitions, affect, and behavior emerges involving all actors in the situation (see Barclay and Whiteside 2011; Hillebrandt and Barclay 2013; Mullen 2007; Skitka et al. 2008). Existing research themes that tap into this issue include: conceptualizing emotion antecedent to justice evaluations; the involvement of heuristic or deliberate cognitive processing depending upon mood, amount and certainty of information available and the like; and attributions about blame for injustices. Understanding the interplay, moreover, may require consideration of underlying motivations and the impact of structural elements of the situation. Research may reveal how individuals in the same situation—both first and third parties—generate different justice assessments and emotional responses (or vice versa). Clearly the complexity of this interplay will require related and cumulative programs of research.

Justice evaluations and related emotions pervade all social groups. Justice situations constitute an ideal “location” to consider the interplay between cognition and affect, two processes fundamental to human existence. In pursuing these connections, scholars will gain insight into what makes couples work, organizations function, and nations peacefully coexist.

## References

- Adams, J. Stacy (1965). Inequity in social exchange. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 2, 267–299.
- Austin, W., & Walster, E. (1974). Reactions to confirmation and disconfirmation of equity and inequity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 30, 208–216.
- Barclay, L. J., & Whiteside, D. B. (2011). Moving beyond justice perceptions: The role of experience and intensity. In S. W. Gilliland, D. D. Steiner, & D. P. Skarlicki (Eds.), *Emerging perspectives on organizational justice and ethics* (pp. 49–74). Charlotte: Information Age Publishing.
- Barclay, L. J., Skarlicki, D. P., & Pugh, S. D. (2005). Exploring the role of emotions in injustice perceptions and retaliation. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 90, 629–643.
- Barsky, A., Kaplan, S. A., & Beal, D. J. (2011). Just feelings? The role of affect in the formation of organizational fairness judgments. *Journal of Management*, 37, 248–279.
- Batson, C. D. (2006). ‘Not all self-interested after all:’ Economics of empathy-induced altruism. In D. De Cremer, M. Zeelenberg, & K. Murnighan (Eds.), *Social psychology and economics* (pp. 281–299). Mahwah: Erlbaum.
- Batson, C. D., Kennedy, C. L., Nord, L.-A., Stocks, E. L., Fleming, D. A., Marzette, C. M., Lishner, D. A., Hayes, R. E., Kolchinsky, L. M., & Zerger, T. (2007). Anger at unfairness: Is it moral outrage? *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 37, 1272–1285.
- Bies, R. J. (2001). Interactional (in)justice: The sacred and the profane. In J. Greenberg & R. Cropanzano (Eds.), *Advances in organizational justice* (pp. 89–118). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Blader, S. L., Wiesenfeld, B. M., Fortin, M., & Wheeler-Smith, S. L. (2013). Fairness lies in the heart of the beholder: How the social emotions of third parties influence reactions to injustice. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 121, 62–80.
- Braithwaite, J. (1989). *Crime, shame, and reintegration*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Branscombe, N. R. (1998). Thinking about one’s gender group’s privileges or disadvantages: Consequences for well-being in women and men. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 37, 167–84.
- Brockner, J., De Cremer, D., van den Bos, K., & Chen, Y.-R. (2005). The influence of interdependent self construal on procedural fairness effects. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 96, 155–167.
- Carlsmith, K., & Darley, J. M. (2008). Psychological aspects of retributive justice. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (pp. 193–236). San Diego: Elsevier.
- Chan, M. E., & Arvey, R. (2011). The role of forgiveness and anger in unfair events. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 50, 700–705.
- Chaudoir, S. R., & Quinn, D. M. (2010). Bystander sexism in the intergroup context: The impact of cat-calls on women’s reactions towards men. *Sex Roles*, 62, 623–634.
- Chebat, J.-C., & Slusarczyk, W. (2005). How emotions mediate the effects of perceived justice on loyalty in service recovery situations: An empirical study. *Journal of Business Research*, 58, 664–673.
- Clayton, S. (1992). The experience of injustice: Some characteristics and correlates. *Social Justice Research*, 5, 71–92.
- Cohen-Charash, Y., & Spector, P. E. (2001). The role of justice in organizations: A meta-analysis. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 86, 278–321.

- Cole, M. S., Bernerth, J. B., Walter, F., & Holt, D. T. (2010). Organizational justice and individuals' withdrawal: Unlocking the influence of emotional exhaustion. *Journal of Management Studies*, *47*, 367–390.
- Colquitt, J. A., Conlon, D. E., Wesson, M. J., Porter, C. O. L. H., & Ng, K. Y. (2001). Justice at the millennium: A meta-analytic review of 25 years of organizational justice research. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *86*, 425–445.
- Colquitt, J. A., Scott, B. A., Rodell, J. B., Long, D. M., Zapata, C. P., Conlon, D. E., & Wesson, M. J. (2013). Justice at the millennium, a decade later: A meta-analytic test of social exchange and affect-based perspectives. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *98*, 199–236.
- Cropanzano, R., & Folger, R. (1989). Referent cognitions and task decision autonomy: Beyond equity theory. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *74*, 293–299.
- Cropanzano, R., & Folger, R. (1991). Procedural justice and worker motivation. In R. M. Steers & L. W. Porter (Eds.), *Motivation and work behavior* (pp. 131–143). New York: McGraw Hill.
- Cropanzano, R., Weiss, H. M., Suckow, K., & Grandey, A. A. (2000). Doing justice to workplace emotions. In N. Ashkanasy, C. Hartel, & W. Zerbe (Eds.), *Emotions at work* (pp. 49–62). Westport: Quorum Books.
- Cropanzano, R., Stein, J. H., & Nadisic, T. (2011). *Justice and the experience of emotion*. New York: Routledge.
- Dalbert, C. (2002). Beliefs in a just world as a buffer against anger. *Social Justice Research*, *15*, 123–145.
- Darley, J. M., & Gromet, D. M. (2010). The psychology of punishment: Intuition and reason, retribution and restoration. In D. R. Bobbel, A. C. Kay, M. P. Zanna, & J. M. Olson (Eds.), *The psychology of justice and legitimacy* (pp. 229–249). New York: Psychology Press.
- Darley, J. M., & Pittman, T. S. (2003). The psychology of compensatory and retributive justice. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *4*, 324–336.
- De Cremer, D. (2004). The influence of accuracy as a function of leader's bias: The role of trustworthiness in the psychology of procedural justice. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *30*, 293–304.
- De Cremer, D. (2006). When authorities influence followers' affect: The interactive effect of procedural justice and transformational leadership. *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology*, *15*, 322–351.
- De Cremer, D. (Ed.). (2007). *Advances in the psychology of justice and affect*. Charlotte: Information Age Publishing.
- De Cremer, D., & Den Ouden, N. (2009). 'When passion breeds justice: Procedural fairness effects as a function of authority's passion. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *39*, 384–400.
- De Cremer, D., & Ruiters, R. A. C. (2003). Emotional reactions toward procedural fairness as a function of negative information. *Journal of Social Psychology*, *143*, 793–795.
- De Cremer, D., & Stouten, J. (2005). When does giving voice or not matter? Procedural fairness effects as a function of closeness of reference points. *Current Psychology*, *24*, 203–213.
- De Cremer, D., & Tyler, T. R. (2005). Am I respected or not? Inclusion and reputation as issues in group membership. *Social Justice Research*, *18*, 121–153.
- De Cremer, D., & Bos, K. (2007). Justice and feelings: Toward a new era in justice research. *Social Justice Research*, *20*, 1–9.
- De Cremer, D., & van Hiel, A. (2010). 'Becoming anger when another is treated fairly: On understanding when own and other's fair treatment influences negative reactions. *British Journal of Management*, *21*, 280–298.
- De Cremer, D., & Wubben, M. (2010). When does voice have to be more than only listening? Procedural justice effects as a function of confident leadership. *Journal of Personnel Psychology*, *9*, 69–78.
- De Cremer, D., Stinglhamber, F., & Eisenberger, R. (2005). Effects of own versus other's fair treatment on positive emotions: A field study. *Journal of Social Psychology*, *145*, 741–744.
- Deutsch, M. (1975). Equity, equality, and need: What determines which value will be used as the basis for distributive justice? *Journal of Social Issues*, *31*, 137–149.
- Doan, L. (2012). A social model of persistent mood states. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *75*, 198–218.
- Doosje, B., Branscombe, N. R., Spears, R., & Manstead, A. S. R. (1998). Guilty by association: When one's group has a negative history. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *75*, 872–886.
- Fischer, A. H., & Roseman, I. J. (2007). Beat them or ban them: The characteristics and social functions of anger and contempt. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *93*, 103–115.
- Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (2013). *Social cognition: From brains to culture*. Los Angeles: Sage.
- Folger, R. (1986). Rethinking equity theory: A referent cognitions model. In H. W. Bierhoff, R. L. Cohen, & J. Greenberg (Eds.), *Justice in social relations* (pp. 145–162). New York: Plenum.
- Folger, R. (1993). Reactions to mistreatment at work. In J. K. Murnighan (Ed.), *Social psychology in organizations: Advances in theory and research* (pp. 161–183). Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
- Folger, R., & Martin, C. (1986). Relative deprivation and referent cognitions: Distributive and procedural justice effects. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *22*, 531–546.
- Folger, R., & Cropanzano, R. (2001). Fairness as theory: Justice as accountability. In J. Greenberg & R. Cropanzano (Eds.), *Advances in organizational justice* (pp. 1–55). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Folger, R., Rosenfield, D. D., & Robinson, T. (1983). Relative deprivation and procedural justification. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *45*, 268–273.
- Frijda, N. H. (1987). Emotion, cognitive structure, and action tendency. *Cognition and Emotion*, *1*, 115–143.
- Goldman, B. M. (2003). The application of reference cognitions theory to legal-claiming by terminated workers: The role of organizational justice and anger. *Journal of Management*, *29*, 705–728.



- Gollwitzer, M., & Bucklein, K. (2007). Are 'we' more punitive than 'me'? Self-construal styles, justice-related attitudes, and punitive judgments. *Social Justice Research, 20*, 457–478.
- Goodwin, J., Jasper, J. M., & Polletta, F. (Eds.). (2001). *Passionate politics: Emotions and social movements*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Guerrero, L. K., La Valley, A. G., & Farinelli, L. (2008). The experience and expression of anger, guilt, and sadness in marriage: An equity theory explanation. *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 25*, 699–724.
- Gunn, G. R., & Wilson, A. E. (2011). Acknowledging the skeletons in our closet: The effect of group affirmation on collective guilt, collective shame, and reparatory attitudes. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37*, 1474–1487.
- Gray-Little, B., & Teddlie, C. B. (1978). Racial differences in children's responses to inequity. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 8*, 107–117.
- Hafer, C. L., & Correy, B. L. (1999). Mediators of the relation between beliefs in a just world and emotional responses to negative outcomes. *Social Justice Research, 12*, 189–204.
- Hafer, C. L., & Olson, J. M. (1998). Individual differences in belief in a just world and responses to personal misfortune. In L. Montada & M. J. Lerner (Eds.), *Responses to victimizations and belief in a just world* (pp. 65–86). New York: Plenum Press.
- Harris, N., Walgrave, L., & Braithwaite, J. (2004). Emotional dynamics in restorative conferences. *Theoretical Criminology, 8*, 191–210.
- Hegtvedt, K. A. (1990). The effects of relationship structure on emotional responses to inequity. *Social Psychology Quarterly, 53*, 214–228.
- Hegtvedt, K. A. (2006). Justice frameworks. In P. J. Burke (Ed.), *Contemporary social psychological theories* (pp. 46–69). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Hegtvedt, K. A., & Killian, C. (1999). Fairness and emotions: Reactions to the process and outcomes of negotiations. *Social Forces, 78*, 269–303.
- Hillebrandt, A., & Barclay, L. J. (2013). Integrating organizational justice and affect: New insights, challenges, and opportunities. *Social Justice Research, 26*, 513–531.
- Hsu, M., Anen, C., & Quartz, S. R. (2008). The right and the good: Distributive justice and neural encoding of equity and efficiency. *Science, 320*, 1092–1095.
- Homans, G. C. (1974). *Social behavior: Its elementary forms*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.
- Howard, L. W., & Cordes, C. L. (2010). Flight from unfairness: Effects of perceived injustice on emotional exhaustion and employee withdrawal. *Journal of Business and Psychology, 25*, 409–428.
- Jasso, G. (1980). A new theory of distributive justice. *American Sociological Review, 45*, 3–32.
- Jasso, G. (2007). Emotion in justice processes. In J. E. Stets & J. H. Turner (Eds.), *Handbook of the sociology of emotions* (pp. 321–346). New York: Springer.
- Johnson, C., Hegtvedt, K. A., Brody, L. M., & Waldron, K. W. (2007). Feeling injustice, expressing injustice: How gender and context matter. *Advances in Group Processes, 24*, 149–186.
- Jost, J. T., & Kay, A. C. (2010). Social justice: History, theory, and research. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *Handbook of social psychology*, (Vol. 2, pp. 1122–1165). Hoboken: Wiley.
- Khan, A. K., Quratulain, S., & Crawshaw, J. R. (2013). The mediating role of discrete emotions in the relationship between injustice and counterproductive work behaviors: A study in Pakistan. *Journal of Business and Psychology, 28*, 49–61.
- Krehbiel, P. J., & Cropanzano, R. (2000). Procedural justice, outcome favorability, and emotion. *Social Justice Research, 13*, 339–360.
- Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Progress on a cognitive-motivational-relational theory of emotion. *American Psychologist, 46*, 819–834.
- Lerner, M. J. (1980). *The belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Leventhal, G. S., Karuza, J. Jr., & Fry, W. R. (1980). Beyond fairness: A theory of allocation preferences. In G. Mikula (Ed.), *Justice and social interaction* (pp. 167–218). New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Lind, E. A., & Tyler, T. R. (1988). *The social psychology of procedural justice*. New York: Plenum.
- Lively, K. J. (2000). Reciprocal emotion management. *Work and Occupations, 27*, 32–63.
- Lively, K. J., Steelman, L. C., & Powell, B. (2010). Equity, emotion, and household division of labor. *Social Psychology Quarterly, 73*, 358–379.
- Longmore, M. A., & Demaris, A. (1997). Perceived inequity and depression in intimate relationships: The moderating effect of self-esteem. *Social Psychology Quarterly, 60*, 172–134.
- Lotz, S., Baumert, A., Schlösser, T., Gresser, F., & Fechenhauer, D. (2011a). Individual differences in third-party interventions: How justice sensitivity shapes altruistic punishment. *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, 4*, 297–313.
- Lotz, S., Okimoto, T. G., Schlösser, T., & Fechenhauer, D. (2011b). Punitive versus compensatory reactions to injustice: Emotional antecedents to third-party interventions. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47*, 477–480.
- Mackie, D. M., Devos, T., & Smith, E. R. (2000). Intergroup emotions: Explaining offensive action tendencies in an intergroup context. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79*, 602–616.
- Markovsky, B. (1988). Injustice and arousal. *Social Justice Research, 1*, 213–224.
- Mayer, D. M. (2012). Justice. In K. S. Cameron & G. M. Spreitzer (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of positive organizational scholarship* (pp. 316–324). New York: Oxford University Press.
- McAdam, D. (1982). *Political process and the development of black insurgency, 1930–1970*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.



- Mikula, G. (1986). The experience of injustice: Towards a better understanding of its phenomenology. In H. W. Bierhoff, R. L. Cohen, & J. Greenberg (Eds.), *Justice and social relationships* (pp. 103–123). New York: Plenum.
- Mikula, G., Scherer, K., & Athenstaedt, U. (1998). The role of injustice in the elicitation of differential emotional reactions. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *24*, 769–783.
- Miron, A. M., Branscombe, N. R., & Schmitt, M. T. (2006). Collective guilt as distress over illegitimate intergroup inequality. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, *9*, 163–180.
- Montada, L. (1994). Injustice in harm and loss. *Social Justice Research*, *7*, 5–28.
- Mullen, E. (2007). The reciprocal relationship between affect and perceptions of fairness. In K. Törnblom & R. Vermunt (Eds.), *Distributive and procedural justice: Research and social applications* (pp. 15–37). Burlington: Ashgate.
- Murphy, K. (2009). Procedural justice and affect intensity: Understanding reactions to regulatory authorities. *Social Justice Research*, *22*, 1–30.
- Murphy, K., & Tyler, T. R. (2008). Procedural justice and compliance behaviour: The mediating role of emotions. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *38*, 652–668.
- Napier, J. L., Mandisodza, A. N., Andersen, S. M., & Jost, J. T. (2006). System justification in responding to the poor and displaced in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*, *6*, 57–73.
- Pennekamp, S. F., Doosje, B., Zebel, S., & Fischer, A. H. (2007). The past and the pending: The antecedents and consequences of group-based anger in historically and currently disadvantaged groups. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, *10*, 41–55.
- Pew Research Center. (2005). Huge racial divide over Katrina and its consequences: Two-in-three critical of bush's relief efforts. <http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/255.pdf>. Accessed 2 Nov 2013
- Reuben, E., & van Winden, F. (2010). Fairness perceptions and prosocial emotions in the power to take. *Journal of Economic Psychology*, *31*, 908–922.
- Rossner, M. (2011). Emotion and interaction ritual: A micro analysis of restorative justice. *British Journal of Criminology*, *51*, 95–119.
- Roy, J., Bastounis, M. L., & Minibas-Poussard, J. (2012). Interactional justice and counterproductive work behaviors: The mediating role of negative emotions. *Social Behavior and Personality*, *40*, 1341–1356.
- Rupp, D. E., & Spencer, S. (2006). When customers lash out: The effects of customer interactional injustice on emotional labor and the mediating role of discrete emotions. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *91*, 971–978.
- Rupp, D. E., McCance, S. A., Spencer, S., & Sonntag, K. (2008). Customer (in) justice and emotional labor: The role of perspective taking, anger, and emotional regulation? *Journal of Management*, *34*, 903–924.
- Schafer, R. B., & Keith, P. M. (1980). Equity and depression among married couples. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *43*, 430–435.
- Scher, S. J., & Heise, D. R. (1993). Affect and the perception of injustice. *Advances in Group Processes*, *10*, 223–252.
- Sinclair, R. C., & Mark, M. M. (1992). The influence of mood state on judgment and action: Effects on persuasion, categorization, social justice, person perception, and judgmental accuracy. In L. L. Martin & A. Tesser (Eds.), *The construction of social judgments* (pp. 165–193). Hillsdale: Erlbaum.
- Skarlicki, D., & Kulik, C. T. (2005). Third-party reactions to employee (mis) treatment: A justice perspective. *Research in Organizational Behavior*, *26*, 183–229.
- Skarlicki, D., & Rupp, D. E. (2010). Dual processing and organizational justice: The role of rational versus experiential processing in third-party reactions to workplace mistreatment. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *95*, 944–952.
- Skitka, L. J., Bauman, C. W., & Mullen, E. (2008). Morality and justice: An expanded theoretical perspective and empirical review. *Advances in Group Processes*, *25*, 1–27.
- Smith, E. R. (1999). Affective and cognitive implications of a group becoming part of the self: New models of prejudice and of the self-concept. In D. Abrams & M. A. Hogg (Eds.), *Social identity and social cognition* (pp. 183–196). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Spencer, S., & Rupp, D. E. (2009). Angry, guilty, and conflicted: Injustice toward coworkers heightens emotional labor through cognitive and emotional mechanisms. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *94*, 429–444.
- Sprecher, S. (1986). The relationship between inequity and emotions in close relationships. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *49*, 309–321.
- Sprecher, S. (1992). How men and women expect to feel and behave in response to inequity in close relationships. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *55*, 57–69.
- Sprecher, S. (2001). A comparison of emotional consequences of and changes in equity over time using global and domain-specific measures of equity. *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, *18*, 477–501.
- Srivastava, J., Espinoza, F., & Fedorikhin, A. (2009). Coupling and decoupling of unfairness and anger in ultimatum bargaining. *Journal of Behavioral Decision Making*, *22*, 475–489.
- Stecher, M. D., & Rosse, J. G. (2005). The distributive side of interactional justice: The effects of interpersonal treatment on emotional arousal. *Journal of Managerial Issues*, *17*, 229–246.
- Stets, J. E., & Osborn, S. N. (2008). Injustice and emotions using identity theory. *Advances in Group Processes*, *25*, 151–179.
- Stouten, J., Ceulemans, E., van Timmerman, M. E. & van Hiel, A. (2011). Tolerance of justice violations: The effects of need on emotional reactions after violating equality in social dilemmas. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *41*, 357–380.

- Swim, J. K., & Miller, D. L. (1999). White guilt: Its antecedents and consequences for attitudes toward affirmative action. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *25*, 500–514.
- Tabibnia, G., Satpute, A. B., & Lieberman, M. D. (2008). The sunny side of fairness: Preference for fairness activates reward circuitry (and disregarding unfairness activates self-control circuitry). *Psychological Science*, *19*, 339–347.
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup conflict. In S. Worschel & W. G. Austin (Eds.), *Psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 7–24). Chicago: Nelson-Hall
- Tausch, N., Becker, J. C., Spears, R., Christ, O., Saab, R., Singh, P., & Siddiqui, R. N. (2011). Explaining radical group behavior: Developing emotion and efficacy routes to normative and nonnormative collective action. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *101*, 129–148.
- Tepper, B. J. (2001). Health consequences of organizational injustice: Test of main and interactive effects. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *86*, 197–215.
- Tilly, C. (1978). *From mobilization to revolution*. New York: Random House.
- Turner, J. H. (2007). Justice and emotions. *Social Justice Research*, *20*, 288–311.
- Turner, R. H., & Killian, L. M. (1987). *Collective behavior*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
- Tyler, T. R., & Lind, E. A. (1992). A relational model of authority in groups. *Advances in experimental social psychology*, *25*, 115–191.
- Tyler, T. R., Boeckmann, R. J., Smith, H. J., & Huo, Y. J. (1997). *Social justice in a diverse society*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- van den Bos, K. (2003). On the subjective quality of social justice: The role of affect as information in the psychology of justice judgments. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *85*, 482–498.
- van den Bos, K., Lind, E. A., & Wilke, H. A. M. (2001). The psychology of procedural and distributive justice viewed from the perspective of fairness heuristic theory. In R. Cropanzano (Ed.), *Justice in the Workplace* (pp. 49–66). Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- van Ness, D. W., & Strong, K. H. (2010). *Restoring justice: An introduction to restorative justice*. New Providence: Matthew Bender & Co.
- van Prooijen, J.-W., De Cremer, D., van Beest, I., Ståhl, T., van Dijke, M., & van Lange, P. A. M. (2008). The egocentric nature of procedural justice: Social value orientation a moderator of reactions to decision-making procedures. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *44*, 1303–1315.
- van Stekelenburg, J., & Klandermans, B. (2007). Individuals in movements: A social psychology of contention. In B. Klandermans & C. M. Roggeband (Eds.), *The handbook of social movements across disciplines* (pp. 157–204). New York: Springer.
- van Stekelenburg, J., & Klandermans, B. (2013). The social psychology of protest. *Current Sociology*, *61*, 1–20.
- Vidmar, N. (2002). Retributive justice: Its social context. In M. Ross & D. T. Miller (Eds.), *The justice motive in everyday life* (pp. 291–313). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Walster, E., Walster, G. W., & Berscheid, E. (1978). *Equity: Theory and research*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- Weiss, H. M., Suckow, K., & Cropanzano, R. (1999). The effects of justice conditions on discrete emotions. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *84*, 786–794.
- Wenzel, M., Okimoto, T. G., Feather, N. T., & Platow, M. J. (2010). Justice through consensus: Shared identity and the preference for a restorative notion of justice. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *40*, 909–930.
- White, I. K., Philpot, T. S., Wylie, K., & McGowen, E. (2007). Feeling the pain of my people: Hurricane Katrina, racial inequality, and the psyche of Black America. *Journal of Black Studies*, *37*, 523–538.
- Williams, S. (1999). The effects of distributive and procedural justice on performance. *Journal of Psychology: Interdisciplinary and Applied*, *133*, 183–193.
- Wohl, M. J. A., Branscombe, N. R., & Klar, Y. (2006). Collective guilt: Emotional Reactions when one's group has done wrong or been wronged. *European Review of Social Psychology*, *17*, 1–37.

---

# Emotions in Expectation States Theory

# 7

Murray Webster, Jr. and Lisa Slattery Walker

---

## 7.1 Introduction

The study of emotions began before sociology was a separate discipline and contains diverse topics, including natural selection for emotions (Darwin 1872; Turner 2000; Fessler et al. 2004), interrelations of emotion, rationality and ritual (Collins 1993), and effects of culture on encouraging, repressing, and shaping emotional expression (Hochschild 1979, 1983; Gordon 1989). Comprehensive theoretical reviews are available in Cacioppo and Gardner (1999), Niedenthal and Brauer (2012), Ridgeway (2007), Smith-Lovin (1995) Stets (2003), Stets and Turner (2007, 2008), Thoits (1989), Turner (2004, 2011), and Turner and Stets (2005, 2006).

This chapter focuses on emotion, sentiment, and affect as related to status and expectation state processes. We first outline the theory of expectations and behavior, interactional sources of expectations and their consequences for interaction and group structure. We include research on how emotions, affect, and sentiment are involved in these processes. Next we describe the theoretical elaboration that shows how status inequality creates performance expectations, again with related research on feelings. Those two sections describe the foundational theory. Later sections deal with other elaborations and variants, including legitimation, reward expectations, personality attributions, and norm enforcement. The

chapter closes with mention of some promising areas for further research.

An important distinction in theory and research which we will address is *experienced* emotion and *expressed* emotion; a person may feel anger without shouting at someone. The distinction is significant in analyses such as Hochschild's (1983) classic description of "emotion work" by airline flight attendants, expressing emotions that a person is not feeling. Cultural rules often govern emotional expression, and so do social positions. Someone in a position of authority may be freer to express anger, for instance, than someone who is subject to that authority. Conditions under which emotional experience is expressed, repressed, or even transformed into expression of a different emotion become important in many settings, particularly at work and in the family.

Theoretical principles and mechanisms governing the activation and consequences of emotions have received attention. An influential perspective has been developed by Kemper in a series of papers and books (Kemper 1978, 1981, 1984, 1987, 1991). Kemper's work focuses on power and status, dimensions of social hierarchies closely related to phenomena we review here from a different theoretical perspective. The general approach views power and status as generating affect and emotions, positive ones for high or rising power and status, and negative for low or declining power and status. This view is developed by Kemper and other researchers to specify particular positive and negative feelings in response to different kinds of settings.

---

M. Webster Jr. (✉) · L. S. Walker  
University of North Carolina, Charlotte, USA  
e-mail: mwdec10@gmail.com

Thamm (1992, 2004, 2007) also has developed a classification of emotions from four basic cultural norms and sanctions: meeting or not meeting one's own expectations; meeting or not meeting others' expectations, receiving or being deprived of a reward, and others' receiving or being deprived of a reward. The combination of norms and rewards generates different emotions. For instance, norm conformity produces feeling pleased; norm conformity with reward deprivation produces a feeling of powerlessness. Thamm (1992) reports many recall studies of emotional situations, and results confirm the classification and mechanisms of the theory. A later theoretical work (2004) elaborates the theory to incorporate propositions on gaining and losing power from meeting or not meeting normative goals.

While the theory of status and expectations described in this chapter differs from the theories of Kemper and of Thamm, the present theory also involves status, power, and cultural norms, and does not contradict either of those other theories.

---

## 7.2 Overview of the Theoretical Approach

Status characteristics and expectation states, or SCES, refers to a family of interrelated theories that have been developed for analyzing different but related phenomena. Wagner and Berger (2002) and Berger and Webster (2006) describe the overall program, and Berger et al. (2014) have organized recent developments. Turner and Wagner (in Turner 2013, pp. 373–402) locate status theories in historical and intellectual context with other interactionist theories.

In this chapter, the next section describes the theory of performance expectation states and behavior, and the following section describes the theoretical extension for status characteristics and expectation states. Those two sections contain the core ideas of this theoretical approach, some supporting research, and relations with emotions. Later sections describe theoretical variants to encompass other phenomena related to status and emotions: reward expectations and justice, role and norm enforcement, and legitimation processes. The final section contains general themes and next steps.

Theories in this program share certain concepts and ideas. They all link features of social structure, such as existing status characteristics, to face to face interaction and then to changes in social structure. Connections between structure and interaction flow in both directions; status and expectations affect behavior and behaviors affect status and expectations. Emotions, affect, and sentiments are interrelated with the status and expectations processes.

These theories apply to situations defined by scope conditions, of which *task focus* and *collective orientation* are the most important. Task focus means that interactants are primarily motivated to solve a problem, and collective orientation means that everyone's problem solving attempts must be considered. A jury in our society illustrates both of the scope conditions. Jurors meet to reach a verdict rather than to enjoy each other's company, and the unanimity requirement guarantees that every juror's ideas must be heard, even if they are later voted down.

The theories all include the core concept *performance expectation states*. An expectation state is a task-specific anticipation for the quality of future performances. Someone holding high expectations for a given person anticipates that the next performance from that person is likely to be a good one; that is, helpful in attaining the group's goal, moving the group closer to the "success" outcome. Expectation states are theoretical constructs, only partially measurable even under laboratory conditions. Typically they are measured by behavior such as influence. When disagreements arise, the higher the expectations Person A holds for self as compared to Person B, the more likely is A to reject B's influence. Expectations also may be measured with questionnaires and interviews with questions such as "how much ability would you estimate Person C has compared to Person B?" Expectations are only observed indirectly, and they may operate outside of awareness of the individual. Thus a person in a task group may not know accurately how often he or she accepted influence when disagreements arose, and may have difficulty reporting differential conceptions of group members' abilities. Post-session interview responses,

for instance, often start with a normative claim that “We are all equal.” Theories of status and expectations are theories of behavior, not of thought processes. When situations include emotions, as they often do, participants may not consciously connect ideas of ability or status to the emotions they experience.

The theories also share a common approach to theory building, which is to describe relations between social structures, both societal and in small groups, and processes such as distributions of participation, influence, and leadership choices and the creation or maintenance of structured equality and inequality. Berger et al. (1998) have called this approach a “state organized process.” Certain conditions lead to the emergence of states that then govern interaction. For instance, mixed-gender interaction in task groups can make gender a salient status characteristic, meaning that individuals treat gender as a socially important fact and use it to organize their interaction. They activate cultural ideas such as advantages and disadvantages currently linked to the two genders. They may form performance expectation states, anticipations about specific task abilities, for each other on that basis, and if they do, certain interaction consequences such as participation rates and influence are affected by the states. When conditions change, the states can deactivate and their influence disappears. If the task is completed, or if people decide that the task no longer matters, then those effects of gender will no longer be apparent.

The approach of state organizing processes organizes theoretical activity with certain tasks:

- Stating explicit scope conditions for applying the theories;
- Stating initial conditions (including interaction, emotions, and status differences) that trigger the processes of expectation formation;
- Describing the nature and types of expectation states;
- Describing consequences of expectation states in particular situations;
- Specifying consequences of expectation states for perceptions (including emotions), interaction, and social structure;

- Describing conditions leading to de-activation of expectation states.

While we do not always address all of these tasks in describing the theories, the list may be helpful for understanding development of the theories.

---

### 7.3 The Formation of Expectation States and Group Structure

As noted, these theories apply to task focused collaborative situations. Work teams, juries, task forces, and even sports teams fall within the theory’s scope. In task groups, people come together primarily to solve problems or to attain a goal or “best outcome.” Further, they work together to reach a single team product or problem solution, and therefore they are collectively oriented. In comparison, people at a dinner party or other social event usually are not task focused but socio-emotionally focused (they seek the benefits of interacting rather than the benefits of solving a problem). Students taking exams and people discussing favorite movies are individually oriented; that is, they do not or should not share efforts and they may appropriately come to different conclusions.

Task focused, collective situations predominate in many settings, particularly in business organizations and schools, and in such cases inequality rather than equality of members is virtually universal. Some groups begin with inequality, such as those with a designated leader. However even groups that begin with hardly any differentiation, such as juries, quickly develop structures of inequality. The core theory of expectation formation and maintenance (Berger and Conner 1974) describes when and how inequality develops, how it affects group structure, emotions, beliefs, and interaction, and when and how those processes deactivate and disappear.

The intellectual roots of theories of performance expectations trace to research on small task groups conducted by Bales (1950, 1953, 1970, 1999, Bales and Hare 1965) and his colleagues beginning in the 1950s. For our purposes, what is striking is that those groups quickly developed inequality structures with behavioral, perceptual,



and emotional components. Some individuals participated (talked) more than others, received more positive evaluations, exerted greater influence, were seen as having “best ideas” and “showing leadership” by themselves and others. Feelings of liking (or not) developed along with the behavioral inequalities, some people received supportive or critical comments, and they came to see themselves and were seen by others as either “all work” or as “sympathetic.”

The inequality structure is notable for its unitary nature. All measured components of inequality correlate highly, and once an inequality structure emerges, it persists throughout the session and across subsequent meetings if the group meets more than once. That inequality is striking because it is hard to imagine a more homogeneous group of individuals than Harvard sophomores of that period: all male, white, same age, educational level, intelligence, wealth, etc. So the challenge is to understand why and how inequality emerges from equality.

In the earliest formulation of SCES, Berger (1958) theorized that because time is limited, one group “subtask” is to figure out who has good ideas and who has bad ideas for solving the group’s problem. That permits taking advantage of good ideas and encouraging more participation from talented individuals, while avoiding wasting time or being misled by less talented individuals by discouraging them from participating. Put differently, individuals in collective task groups act as if one of their subtasks is to decide how much skill each group member has at their particular task. We say that interaction patterns cause individuals to form performance expectations for themselves and each other early in the group session.

To understand expectation formation, it is helpful to look closely at the different kinds of acts that make up interaction in task groups. Imagine a sequence that begins with one person offering a suggestion, proposing an idea to move the group towards successful task completion. Call that a performance attempt. A performance attempt is likely to be followed by a unit evaluation, a discrete judgment made by everyone as to how useful the performance attempt is. Those

unit evaluations may generalize into a performance expectation state, such as when someone moves from thinking “he’s right” to “he knows how to do this task.” What is significant about the change is that it entails the idea “...and I expect that his next performance attempt will be a good one.” This anticipation of the quality of future performances, whether or not it is consciously reached, is the formation of an expectation state for a group member. Interaction proceeds in this way until every group member has formed expectations for every group member, including for self.

Tajeddin et al. (2012) reported observations of four-person discussion groups. Despite the groups’ being only moderately task-focused, the researchers were able to see the formation of performance expectations (which they called “emerging expertise”) as the result of interaction sequences. This research documents much of the abstract sequence of events in expectation formation described here.

Once expectations have formed, they affect future interaction. Individuals for whom high expectations are formed receive and accept more chances to perform; their performances are more likely to receive positive evaluations; and they become more likely to exert influence in the group. If members respond to questionnaires, they are likely to choose someone for whom they hold high expectations as “skillful,” “showing leadership,” and “having good ideas.” Because all these evaluative and behavioral components correlate highly, it is reasonable to speak of a single *power and prestige structure* of the group that emerges during interaction through the formation of expectation states. Expectation states linked to group members create an inequality structure from a homogeneous group of initially undifferentiated individuals.

Expectations, once formed, tend to persist throughout the group meeting. The primary reason for that is that expectations affect unit evaluations; that is, they affect the type of interaction that led to their formation. Once high expectations form for a given person, future performance attempts “sound better” than they would if low expectations had formed.

**Fig. 7.1** Interaction, Expectation States, and Power and Prestige



The persistence of expectations produces a stable inequality structure in task groups. The existing structure comes to seem right and proper (that is, it is legitimate), and any attempts to change it generate emotion such as outrage and behavior to reinforce the power and prestige structure.

Figure 7.1 shows an overview. Interaction creates performance expectations for all interactants. Expectations then alter interaction patterns creating inequality structures that tend to persist in the groups.

Virtually all classic and recent empirical studies have shown that people high in the group's power and prestige structure participate more, offer more suggestions, and interrupt others more than do people low in the power and prestige structure (e.g., Bales and Slater 1955; Bavelas et al. 1965; Smith-Lovin and Brody 1989; Ng et al. 1993). Further, satisfaction is positively related to participation rates (Bonito 2000). These studies show that expectation states change the nature of interaction and create a power and prestige structure that influences feelings of group participants.

Some early studies of discussion groups reported what researchers called a "status struggle" in the early minutes of the group meeting (Bales 1953; Bales and Slater 1955). People talk over each other, disagree, make attempts to control others' speech and are themselves controlled; they back down or refuse to back down, etc. It is as though everybody wanted to be the high interactor, most influential, and seen as group leader. When the status struggle resolves, the highest interactor is the most influential, seen as having greatest ability, etc., but is not the best liked, particularly when the highest interactor speaks more often than he is spoken to (Bales 1956). (Early Bales groups were Harvard undergraduates and so were all white men. Women task leaders face additional barriers (Ridgeway 1978,

1982), described below.) If a status struggle has occurred, when it resolves, the #1 person is most influential and the #2 person is best liked (Bales 1953; Bales and Slater 1955). However status struggles are far from universal in task groups.

Verba (1961) proposed that the separation of task and socio-emotional leadership may have been because the emergent task leader lacked legitimacy. Burke (1968, 1971) confirmed that idea empirically with discussion groups of students. Hurwitz et al. (1960), Suls and Miller (1978) and Driskell and Webster (1997) found that task leaders were *better* liked than followers. If there is some legitimating principle for the leader's position, such as appointment by an accepted authority or clear superiority on task ability, then leadership is unitary and the task leader is also best liked. On the other hand, if the leadership position is not legitimated, we may expect emotional responses ranging from annoyance through outrage, and various behavioral manifestations of unstable group structure. We return to the topic of legitimation below.

### 7.3.1 Emotions, Expectations, and Group Structure

Theoretical and empirical work provides guides to understanding how expectations and emotions are connected in task groups. Kemper (1978, 1979, 1981, 1987) developed an influential theoretical approach showing how high power and status generate positive affect and emotions and low power and status positions generate negative emotions. The emotions generated may be primary, such as fear, anger, depression and satisfaction, which are linked to physiological states, or secondary, such as guilt, pride, ennui, which are socialized from the primary emotions. If we focus only on high or low power as

associated, respectively, with positive or negative emotions, we have a foundation for understanding how group position and emotions are related. Kemper (1991) elaborated the theory to focus on power and status gain and loss, and accompanying emotions. Analyses of self-reported affect and emotions from eight countries confirmed predictions of the theory. High status, high power, and rising in a status structure and gaining power all are pleasant, while low status and losing status are unpleasant.

A theoretical paper by Ridgeway and Johnson (1990) considered how socioemotional interaction patterns change as result of inequality structures in a task groups. In their analysis, disagreements over performance attempts are central to the emotions experienced and displayed in task groups. An individual with high self-expectations is likely to attribute it to other ("He's annoying me") and to feel at least momentary anger. An individual holding low self-expectations is likely to attribute the cause of disagreement to self ("I made a mistake"), and to feel at least momentary depression. Depression turns inwards and is less likely to be expressed than anger.

Besides the experience of emotions, the group's inequality structure also affects the expression of positive and negative emotions such that positive expressions tend to be about twice as common as negative expressions. Receiving agreement is likely to generate pride, gratitude, or satisfaction, and those emotions are likely to be expressed, both towards those lower and towards those higher in the group structure. Norms usually allow expressing satisfaction, for instance, but proscribe expressing anger, at least for some individuals. Receiving disagreement might generate felt anger, but expression is likely to be considered inappropriate for an individual low in the group's structure. Someone high in the structure is freer to express anger, thus leading to a predominance of anger expression directed downwards, as well as to more positive emotional expressions than negative ones. The predominance of positive expressions tends to strengthen group solidarity, and to have the incidental effect of maintaining the group inequality structure. The structural effects have more ben-

efits for those in high positions, as those in low positions receive more negative expressions and are encouraged to direct their frustrations against themselves.

Ridgeway and Johnson's analysis provides a theoretical foundation for understanding connections between expectation state processes and emotions. It accounts for several features of interaction in task groups, and it identifies important questions for further research. Expectation inequality produces what they call "a top-down pattern," in which negative behavior flows mostly from those at the top towards those below them. Because positive behaviors are not controlled by the inequality structure, the analysis also explains the observation of Bales and Slater (1955) and others that negative behavior is much less common than positive behavior in task groups. And it explains the cohesiveness function of the surplus positive behavior through its effects in reducing status struggles. Predicted emotional consequences of the interaction patterns, including pride and satisfaction at the top and depression, shame and self-doubt among those at the bottom of the structure, could be assessed in further research. Further, negative behaviors such as criticism should be treated as illegitimate before a power and prestige structure emerges, but not afterwards. Finally, Ridgeway and Johnson (1990) suggest investigating how different sorts of negative behavioral expressions affect interaction and group structure.

Several experiments have been conducted to determine whether the sentiment liking affects expectation formation and group structures. Anecdotally, we can imagine parents believing that their beloved children are smarter than a teacher or a test says they are, and conversely, believing that a disliked political opponent doesn't understand history or economics. Yet anecdotes are not theory or data, and research shows a more nuanced view.

Experiments reported by Driskell and Webster (1997) attempted to distinguish two mechanisms. In the first, liking and disliking *combine* with evaluative information to alter expectations; in the second, they *intervene* between expectations and behavior to affect action without affecting

performance expectations. Expectations affect influence, as one ordinarily defers to a more competent partner. To that expectation pattern, they introduced dislike of the more competent person. That reduced the partner's influence. To see whether the reduction in influence was due to changing expectations or was due to changing emotions, in some conditions they increased the importance of the task by paying for correct answers. If dislike combines with expectations, the importance of the task should have no effect; on the other hand, if dislike intervenes between expectations and influence, then the disliked partner should be more influential in the "important" conditions. Results were consistent with the view that sentiment intervenes between expectations and behavior as a separate process. Bianchi (2004) conducted comparable experiments with a different population and found the same result.

Bienenstock and Bianchi (2004) showed that when experimental participants received a small gift, ostensibly from their partner, they came to like the partner. Gift giving and liking the partner increased his or her influence as well. These results complement the first two experiments on negative sentiments, showing positive effects of liking on behavior in task situations.

Sentiment also may affect expectations indirectly through altering behaviors that create and alter expectation states. In a series of theoretical and experimental papers, Shelly (1993, 2001, 2004, Shelly and Webster 1997) has explored multiple sources and expectation consequences of liking and disliking. In one path, acts that are either pleasant or painful may generalize into sentiments such as liking and disliking. The emotion generalizing process has some similarities to expectation formation from unit evaluations. In the other path, existing sentiments such as liking and dislike tend to bias interaction patterns. For instance, a liked group member may on that basis receive more chances to perform, more influence, and more positive evaluations. Any interaction bias can lead to expectation formation also. Shelly's (2004) theory accounts for expectation formation based on either positive or negative behaviors, or biased interaction. Research confirms key steps in both theoretical

paths, providing a good account of ways that sentiment can affect behavior, expectations, and group structure.


Future work might attempt to specify mechanisms that link emotion experience to organizational performance. Several studies have shown that affect, sentiment, and mood can affect performance of groups with differentiated membership. Totterdell (2000) studied effects of mood contagion among professional cricket players, and found that individual players performed better when they perceived teammates as being in a good mood. Amabile et al. (2006) found that positive affect was associated with highly creative organizational work teams. Lehmann-Willenbrock et al. (2011) found that cycles of complaining among workers in German industries led to a group mood of passivity and low activity. Barsade and Gibson (2007) reviewed studies of affect in organizations and found that affect, emotions, and moods affect job performance, quality of decision making, creativity, turnover, prosocial behavior, teamwork, negotiation and leadership. The mechanisms linking affect of self and others to performance need further study. However because of the link between expectations and performances in task settings, a promising avenue for theory and research may be to explore some of the ways that affect, emotion, and mood affect expectations, either directly, or through altering interaction patterns in ways that affect performance expectations.

---

## 7.4 Status and Expectations

Theoretical attention next turns to the more common situations of heterogeneous groups in which members are differentiated on characteristics such as age, gender, race, educational level, wealth, beauty, height, etc. (Berger et al. 1966). Those characteristics and others carry societal evaluations, advantages and disadvantages, as well as culturally shared beliefs about skills and performance capacities. The elaborated theory defines status characteristics as socially evaluated classifications of individuals that carry specific

**Fig. 7.2** Status, Expectation States, and Power and Prestige



and general performance expectations. Thus gender meets the definition because in our society it carries differential esteem and men are widely believed to be more capable at specific tasks and at “most things.” (Societies differ in which characteristics they invest with advantages. If a society were found in which, for instance, gender has no differential status value, then gender would not function in the process described here.) Heterogeneous task groups reproduce the society’s advantages and disadvantages in their own structures unless steps are taken to block the process. For instance, on trial juries in our society men are treated as if they understood the jury task better than women. As a result, men talk more and exert more influence, and they are many times more likely to be chosen as foreperson. Similar results can be seen for occupation, age, and race. In addition, status- heterogeneous groups show inequality from the very outset of interaction and they seldom experience a status struggle.

Groups with initial status heterogeneity thus look very similar to the way that initially homogeneous groups look after they develop a power and prestige structure. The reason is that group members infer performance expectations from visible status characteristics, forming high expectations for those with advantaged statuses and low expectations for those with disadvantaged statuses. The theory of status characteristics and expectation states predicts the forming of expectations from status unless there is clear evidence that status is irrelevant to skill at their task. This means that expectation formation is dependent on the society’s evaluation of status characteristics and not on objective evidence of ability. A sociologist might know that women are generally more educated than men and that fact might make women better jurors. In status generalization, however, no such rational pro-

cess occurs. Jurors notice gender, they know that gender conveys advantages and disadvantages in our society, and they infer that men may be more competent jurors than women.

Theories of status and expectations thus have two kinds of explanatory mechanisms for the formation of performance expectations. The first applies to homogeneous groups, where unit evaluations during a possibly contentious early phase of the meeting generalize into ideas of task competence. The second is inferring task competence from societally valued status characteristics. Neither process involves rationality or calculation, and the formation and operation of performance expectations usually take place below the level of consciousness. Figure 7.2 shows expectation formation from status generalization.

Please note that we are not justifying gender or any other status inequality, nor are we saying that status inequality is “natural.” Status distinctions are social constructions, subject to change across time and place. The theory of SCES describes why and how status often gets imported to task groups where it affects interaction and structure. Understanding the processes at work is the first step to devising interventions to counter them, and many scholars have used the theory to analyze cases and design interventions to improve equality of interaction. Instances include Cohen and Lotan (1997), Entwisle and Webster (1978), Goar and Sell (2005), Lucas (2003), Pugh and Wahrman (1983), and Webster and Driskell (1978).

Early studies of simulated juries by Strodbeck and collaborators (Strodbeck and Mann 1956; Strodbeck et al. 1957) showed interaction advantages from two externally meaningful status characteristics: gender and occupational prestige. In those studies, power and prestige structures of the juries organized around status, as the SCES theory would predict.



Although not discussed as such in Strodtbeck's work, selecting a jury foreperson is a striking illustration of status generalization. Choosing a foreperson means choosing the jury's leader or representative, and we might reasonably expect that jurors would want the most capable person chosen for that role. Jurors usually select someone with status advantages (gender, SES and indicated by clothing and speech, etc.) for foreperson. The selection occurs before any deliberation, and thus before anyone can evaluate performances. The choice of leader is governed by status generalization from external status characteristics.

Another consequence of status differentiation is that it creates a structure of expectations and a group power and prestige structure almost immediately. When status generalization occurs, group members infer performance expectations, and the structure of expectations justifies the power and prestige structure. This means that status struggles are very unlikely in status-heterogeneous groups, so long as members share the cultural definitions of the observable status characteristics. Lewis (1972) analyzed data from discussion groups and found that, in them, the group structure emerges almost immediately, there is no status struggle, and the task specialist is also best-liked.

### 7.4.1 Status and Emotions

Culture carries certain beliefs about interaction of status position and emotions, and most people become aware of those beliefs early. Conway et al. (1999) asked college students to imagine situations involving people described as "high status" or "low status," without mention of any particular status characteristic such as race or occupation. The students reported imagining that low status people felt more sadness, fear, anger, and disgust; and felt less happiness than high status people. Feelings were uniformly related to status position among the students surveyed. We "know" in a cultural sense, that is, how high status and low status people probably feel.

Tiedens et al. (2000) conducted three vignette studies with business school respondents of re-

lations between status and emotion. Participants read descriptions of either a high status or low status employee in a business situation, and rated how likely they thought he was to feel different emotions. They reported that the high status employee was more likely to feel angry than sad or guilty, and vice-versa for the low status person. A second study showed that respondents can infer status from emotions: angry and proud people were thought to be high status, and sad or guilty people, low status. A third study equated target individuals on formal status but differentiated them on task ability. The more skilled person was estimated more likely to feel anger and less likely to feel sadness or guilt. These results show not only that people associate different emotions with occupying different status positions, but also that performance expectations (task ability) have the same effects as status differences. The inferential process thus works the same for status and ability, and in most situations, status generalization will create expectations consistent with status positions.

Diefendorff and Greguras (2009) surveyed MBA students, all of whom also held office jobs, about their experiences and expressions of positive and negative emotions. Display rules prescribe expressing happiness, perhaps somewhat attenuated from the feeling, and suppressing sadness, anger, fear and contempt. Rules differed in different organizations, suggesting that display rules are quite complex and thus are likely to be misunderstood by some. However the basic rules about emotional display that Ridgeway and Johnson (1990) proposed seem to be confirmed in this study.

Lovaglia and his colleagues (Houser and Lovaglia 2002; Lovaglia and Houser 1996; Lucas and Lovaglia 1998) proposed the idea of "compatible emotions," based on the positive or negative feelings rather than on specific emotions or affect. As Ridgeway and Johnson (1990) had predicted, Lovaglia's experiments show that high status group members receive more attention and positive evaluations from others, which result in their feeling positive emotions. Status affects interaction (particularly attention and positive evaluations), and the interaction patterns produce positive and negative feelings.

Lovaglia and Houser (1996) created status-unequal two-person groups and induced either liking or dislike between the members to test those ideas. One dependent variable was accepting influence when disagreements occurred. Positive sentiment (liking) increased willingness to accept influence from the partner, while negative sentiment (dislike) decreased willingness to accept influence. These scholars interpreted the results as showing that compatible status and emotions decrease a group's power and prestige inequality, making it more like a friendship group of status equals, while incompatible pairings increase the amount of inequality in the structure, making it more like a hierarchical organization.

Lucas and Lovaglia (1998) report two experiments in which they created student discussion groups ranging in size from 3 to 6 members who met for two weeks, and they created a status structure by randomly picking one member of each group and describing him or her as having exceptionally high ability at the group task. After the session, students rated their levels of happiness, frustration, anxiety, anger, guilt, satisfaction, disappointment, and resentment. The results show several outcomes consistent with analyses above. Leaders ranked themselves as less likable than average and more willing to contribute to discussion; group members rated the leaders the same ways. Female leaders were more likable than male leaders. There were no important differences in competence ratings of female and male leaders, so apparently Lucas and Lovaglia's competence manipulation overcame status generalization on the basis of gender. Self-rated positive emotions were generally higher for leaders than for followers. Overall, results here show strong confirmation of the emotional consequences of status, with specification of many of the particular emotions that leaders and followers experience differently.

Ridgeway (1978, 1982) has shown that status disadvantage often requires certain interaction strategies to achieve influence in a group. High status people can make suggestions and exert influence, but if someone with low status simply attempts that, she or he is likely to be met with resistance and emotional accompaniments of le-

gitimacy concerns. What does such a person have to do? One answer (Ridgeway 1982) is to express strong group motivation along with the performance attempt. Thus a woman in a mixed-gender group may have to say "I really want this group to succeed and I have a suggestion that might help." The first part of that sentence would be unnecessary for a man to express. Suggestions seem legitimate when coming from a group's leader but they may be suspect when they come from someone low in the power and prestige structure. An illegitimate attempt is likely to produce anger and control attempts.

A growing field of research involves experience and expression of anger in organizations. Tiedens (2001) conducted several experiments on effects of expressing anger, showing some benefits from it. In the first two experiments, participants said they felt more support for a politician when he expressed anger than when he did not. A third study showed that a business company was accorded higher status when its workers sometimes expressed anger. In the fourth study, raters inferred more status to a job candidate who expressed anger than to one who expressed sadness, and they recommended a higher starting salary for the angry candidate. These experiments show that expressing anger give an impression of competence (performance expectations), and impressions of high status. This may be because of cultural beliefs about status and emotions, such as those demonstrated by Conway et al (1999).

A sub-field involves the effect of emotions on negotiations in organizations. Sinaceur and Tiedens (2006) studied how expressing anger affects negotiating outcomes in two experiments. In the first, U.S. student participants read vignettes and imagined themselves in negotiation with someone who either expressed anger or did not. Participants who read about anger expression said they would be willing to give better terms than did participants where the negotiating person did not express anger. In a partial replication, French student participants read vignettes with the anger manipulation, and in addition, they either had or did not have alternatives to the agreement relationship. Again anger gained concessions, and so did lack of alternatives. Anger

and alternatives interacted: anger was less effective when someone had alternatives in reaching agreement. A second experiment extended the research to actual face to face negotiations, and found the same results. Overall, expressing anger seems to strengthen a negotiator's hand, at least in the sense of winning more favorable terms.

Overbeck et al. (2010) studied how feeling angry affects two-person negotiation in six simulated job offer situations. Both emotion and power were manipulated. To create anger, instructions described the other person as having taken unfair advantage of someone; for happiness, instructions describe fairness of the other person. For power, there either were or were not alternative job candidates or job offers. Manipulation checks confirmed success of the procedures. Results showed that powerful negotiators express their anger, and that expression is useful. They report feeling more focused on the task and they win more points. Low power negotiators were less likely to express anger so it had little effect on their behavior or success. This research shows interaction consequences of anger, conditioned by status and power.

Anger has some negative consequences for those around the angry person. Wiltermuth and Tiedens (2011) evoked either anger or sadness in participants by asking them to spend six minutes writing about the last time that they felt the emotion. Then participants reported how appealing they would find the task of rating other people's ideas. Participants who had evoked anger found rating others much more appealing. Participants in a second study actually rated ideas, and those in the evoked anger condition rated others' ideas more negatively than those in a neutral emotion condition. A third study told participants that most of the ideas they would evaluate would be of either high or low quality. This study found that angry participants believed that rating the low quality ideas would put them in a better mood. Taken together, these results show that experiencing anger can make people more eager to evaluate others, can make evaluations more negative, and can make the angry person anticipate feeling good after distributing negative evaluations. If those processes occur in organizations, the consequences are, as the authors note, somewhat disturbing.

However expressing anger is not always a good strategy because interactions usually continue beyond the one negotiation. Wang et al. (2012) report two experiments in which one member of a dyad in negotiation over the price of a cell phone was an actor who expressed anger in words and nonverbally. Wang et al. measured effects by questionnaire and by negotiated price. Participants subjected to the simulated anger reported feeling mistreated, but the angry actor was more successful (gained more) in negotiation. Those findings are similar to findings from several studies, including by Overbeck et al. (2010) above.

Wang, Northcraft, and Van Kleef then told participants they would interact with the same partner in an entirely separate study. In the second study, participants could pick which task the former negotiator would have to perform, and tasks ranged from very pleasant (e.g., investing pay with a 95% chance of winning more), to very unpleasant (e.g., having to gamble pay with a 95% chance of losing it all). Participants who had been subjected to simulated anger retaliated by assigning the negotiator the unpleasant tasks. Covert retaliation was about equally likely from high and low power participants. This covert retaliation, which of course can occur in business organizations and other settings, shows a hidden cost of expressing anger in negotiation. Acting angry may sometimes get a better outcome, but there could well be consequences later. Short term gain; long term losses.

### 7.4.2 Gender Status and Emotions

There is probably more research on the status value of gender than of any other status characteristic. In our society, as in most societies, men enjoy advantages from which women are precluded. However status inequality goes beyond societal advantages and disadvantages to include ideas of general and specific task performance expectations. When status generalization occurs on the basis of gender, people infer without evidence that women in the group are less competent at whatever the group task may be. Rashotte and

Webster (2005) found that gender-linked status beliefs still affected inferences of reading ability, course grades, and even ability to pilot a private plane in the 21st century. Cuddy et al. (2007) found that “housewife” rates well below the average for social groups in status. Fiske et al. (2002) found that “housewife” was seen as similar in competence to the elderly. Ridgeway (2011) has shown how societal gender inequality is maintained by hundreds of daily interactions that are each slightly biased by status generalization processes. The cumulative effect of interactions in which men are, even slightly, more likely to receive positive evaluations and to exert influence is to maintain cultural beliefs in inequality of the genders.

Early studies of simulated juries (Strodtbeck and Mann 1956) found that men were more active, more likely to be chosen foreman, and more influential than women. Mixed-gender discussion groups of college students (Smith-Lovin et al. 1986) found males to be more active than females. Propp (1995) conducted mixed-gender four-person discussion groups of college students. Before discussion began, she gave each person several pieces of useful information, and women introduced about the same amount of information as did men. However information introduced by men was much more likely to be accepted by the group. That was true whether the information was uniquely possessed by one person or was more widely known, though gender had somewhat less effect for widespread knowledge. These findings show rigorously what many women have experienced in organizations: their suggestions attract little attention from the group unless they are echoed by a male group member.

Burke et al. (2007) studied effects of gender on identity verification in four-person mixed-gender groups (2 males and 2 females in each) of college students. (Identity Theory is a theoretical research program presented by Burke and Stets (2009); Stets (2004, 2005) and this volume describe major parts of the theory.) The researchers picked one person to be group leader (or “coordinator”) and then the groups each discussed four different dilemmas. The investigators measured task leadership identity (what the leaders

thought of themselves) and others’ assessments to determine how well the leaders’ identities were verified by others. While the designation as leader affected verification (appointed leaders were more likely to be seen as having leadership traits), greatest interest attaches to effects of gender. Men’s leadership identities were verified more than women’s; that is, others acknowledged the leadership identity of a male more than of a female. Although this study did not measure affective consequences, the Identity Theory perspective (Burke and Stets 2009) predicts that non-verification is disturbing, and if not remediated, it can cause lasting distress or, in some cases, identity change. That would imply that women leaders, who are less likely to receive verification, may feel greater anxiety and come to doubt their identities as leaders.

Recent theory and research has explored the sources of different behaviors typically enacted by men and women. In brief, men are thought to be proactive and to focus on task-relevant speech acts such as performance attempts and evaluations; women are thought to be reactive and to focus on socio-emotional speech acts such as agreement and support. What accounts for those differences? Early studies that found behavioral differences (Strodtbeck and Mann 1956), attributed them to differential socialization to prepare for family roles (Parsons 1942; Parsons and Bales 1955). However Meeker and Weitzel-O’Neil (1977) reviewed many studies of gender-linked behaviors and concluded that most of the differences were produced not by gender socialization but by status position. Of course in our society, mixed-gender interaction entails status advantages for men and corresponding disadvantages for women. But in same-gender groups, after a power and prestige structure emerges, individuals occupying a high position tend to initiate at high rates and in instrumental areas, while those in low positions tend to initiate at lower rates and in socio-emotional areas. The status position, not gender, is the fundamental cause of the different types and rates of interaction.

Most people are quite flexible in their behavior and expressions. It is not true, for instance, that men cannot access feelings or that women can-

not act assertively. Rather, a man in a low status position can and will deal with feelings more often than when he is in a high status position. A woman in a high status position will be quite task focused and assertive. It is easy to overlook the flexibility that most people have because most mixed-gender interaction activates the two behavior profiles reliably for men and women. Gerber (2009) and Webster and Rashotte (2009) reviewed considerable literature to show the behavioral flexibility and behavior differences activated by status position rather than by gender.

Differences in behavior that are associated with group position are likely to be seen by others as indicating personality traits rather than as outcomes of social structure. The theorist Talcott Parsons (1951; Parsons and Bales 1955) advanced an idea that instrumental and expressive differentiation is essential for groups. A legacy of that idea is a persistent view that women are more emotional and more feeling than men, and men are more rational and logical (Bem 1974; Spence et al. 1985).

However newer theoretical and empirical work finds few if any persisting gender differences in emotional experiences (Lively and Heise 2004; Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1999; Simon and Nath 2004). Instead, structural factors, especially status position, are linked to instrumental and expressive behaviors and self-concepts (Gerber 2009; Webster and Rashotte 2009). People—women and men—who find themselves in relatively status advantaged positions (such as a manager interacting with an employee) activate instrumental-directive behaviors. The same person in a status disadvantaged position activates more expressive-emotional behaviors. The confusion of linking gender with instrumental or expressive activity may have arisen because of gender's status significance in our society. Most groups include both genders and women interacting with men are status disadvantaged. That structural position activates expressive and emotional behaviors by the women. Repeated micro-interactions perpetuate the status significance of gender as well as the stereotypes associated with it (Ridgeway 2009). However the same women can be very instrumental and task-focused in an advantaged position; instances are recent U.S. Secretaries of State.

An observer may interpret different behavior profiles associated with different status positions as clues to personality traits rather than to status position. Thus seeing someone in a low status position displaying the appropriate behavior profile might lead to an inference that she (or he) is a caring, sympathetic person; seeing someone in a high status position might lead to an inference that he (or she) is "all business." We socially construct personalities from behavior cues and attach them to people. Unless we see someone in a variety of status positions, it is easy to overlook the flexibility he or she actually possesses and infer a one-dimensional personality because of limited exposure to the settings in which that person actually lives.

The same person "looks different" when enacting a high-status position than a low-status position. In high status positions, we tend to interact at higher rates, to emphasize task acts (suggestions, problem definitions, evaluations of others); in low status positions we display more socioemotional behaviors (agreeing, expressing concern, soothing). We adjust outward emotional display on elements including anger, control, sympathy, concern for others, and we may adjust internal emotional experience as well.

An imaginative study by Gerber (1996, 2001) measured personality attributions in New York City police car teams that were differentiated by status. Police patrol in pairs, and Gerber studied the effects of status differentiation among them. For male-female teams Gerber presumed the gender difference shows status position; for two-male teams, seniority on the force is a salient status characteristic. Gerber found that both members of the pairs attributed dominance to the higher status team member (self-assertive, agentic, and goal-oriented) and expressive sympathetic disposition (interpersonally oriented, communal, and accommodating) to the lower status member. What is most compelling is that those traits, which were often thought of as linked to gender, characterize the two-male officer teams differentiated by seniority. The newer officer is seen, and sees himself, as sympathetic and subordinate; the senior officer is seen and sees himself as instrumental and dominating. Status position, not gender socialization, determines the behaviors and the socially constructed personalities.



Gerber's research confirms the conclusions of Meeker and O'Neil (1977) on the situational nature of instrumental and socioemotional behaviors, and it shows how structural facts can influence the construction of a person. In a new team, both members are wondering "what sort of person" my partner is, and they make inferences based on observed behavior which, as we have seen, is influenced by status position. One officer seems to have a sympathetic communal personality while the other is a "take-charge guy." Both members of the team experience behaviors shaped by status relations, and they tend to interpret them as revealing personality dispositions. Gerber's research shows the social creation of persons (both self and the partner) from the different behaviors elicited by their relative status positions.

### 7.4.3 Societal Status Hierarchies and Emotions

Many field studies show links between societal inequality and feelings. This is not surprising; the socioeconomic structure of society (or SES, socio-economic status) affects more aspects of life than any other sociological fact. It is ordinarily measured by a combination of an individual's or a family's income and educational level and it reflects esteem, life chances, health, residential patterns, and most other important opportunities and rewards.

Despite the adage that "money can't buy happiness," research has repeatedly shown that people with higher incomes are, indeed, happier than those with lower incomes. The effect appears to be linear, with no upper limit (Stevenson and Wolfers 2013); we are, on average, happier the more money we have, and the increase in happiness never tops out. Viewed dispassionately, that should be unsurprising. Many of life's problems are associated with scarcity, from access to health care and childcare to paying for car repairs (Angel et al. 2003; O'Campo et al. 2004). The general trend is that life gets pleasanter as money increases, and there does not seem to be a point at which the trend plateaus.

Turner and Avison (2003) studied stress and depression among white and African American

middle school and high school students. They asked respondents about a large number of recent and chronic stressors and depressive symptoms and analyzed data by race, gender and SES. SES was associated negatively with both exposures to stress and to reporting symptoms of depression. Within SES groups, African Americans experienced more stress than whites, and the genders differed in types but not level of stress experiences. Not surprisingly, greater exposure to stressors was associated with experiencing more symptoms of depression across both genders and racial groups. The psychological consequences of stress fall quite differently on individuals from different positions in the SES structure.

McLeod and Owens (2004) analyzed a large dataset of youth from ages 10 or 11 through 14 or 15 to study effects of various statuses, singly or in combination, on self-concept, scholastic confidence, and various indicators of stress. They found that the status characteristics gender, race, and poverty all had predicted effects on self-concept and scholastic confidence. Those factors are indicators of performance expectations, as would be predicted by the core theory of SCES applied to schools. Effects on more psychological variables (depression and hyperactivity) were more complex than those of the two status characteristics.

Lively and Heise (2004) analyzed the emotions module of the General Social Survey (GSS), a representative sample of non-institutionalized adults, for experiences and expression of 19 emotions. Older respondents reported feeling more positive and more quiescent (calm) emotions; apparently some things get better with age. Other status effects occur with education: better educated respondents report more and stronger emotions; with occupational prestige (higher prestige occupation associated with pleasanter emotions), and family size (having more children associated with feeling greater dominance). The findings show a variety of effects of social structure on emotional life.

Cast, Stets and Burke (1999) studied influence on identity (self-concept) among 286 couples in their first two years of marriage. The researchers measured the individuals' identities through long interviews, daily diaries, and videos of couples'

conversations. Not surprisingly, they found some convergence with time, as individuals' identities were modified by the spouse's views. However status, indicated by education, occupational prestige, and gender also played a part. The more a spouse's status advantage, the greater was his or her influence over the identity. In married couples as in laboratory discussion groups, higher status means greater influence. Because identity verification affects feelings and higher-status people are more likely to experience verification, they also should be more likely to report individual well-being and positive feelings towards their marriages.

Stets (2004) pursued similar issues in a laboratory experiment that simulated a work situation. Pairs of individuals, a "worker" who is a naïve participant and a confederate "manager" work on a task and learn that their performances were average. The manager then gives feedback by awarding the worker either average, above average, or below average points. From the perspective of Identity Theory (Burke and Stets 2009), either positive or negative non-verification is unpleasant, and those ideas were confirmed. Gender status of manager and worker also intervene in the verification process. High status (male) workers reacted more strongly to negative non-verification than did low status (female) workers, perhaps because the males held more positive identities, or perhaps because they were more accustomed to receiving verification. Further research can clarify the exact mechanisms involved, but this research shows how status interacts with identity verification to generate positive or negative emotions in evaluative situations.

Stets and Harrod (2004) analyzed data from a telephone random sample of adults in Los Angeles County to assess how structural factors affect verification of the identities "worker," "academic," and "friend." Among several other findings, these investigators found that status advantages on race, gender, age and education were associated with greater identity verification. Identity verification produces positive feelings, including self-esteem and mastery, and thus status is associated indirectly with those feelings through verification. The findings show that one's position in the social structure affects perceptions that can help or hinder maintaining positive feelings towards the self.

As noted earlier, most researchers distinguish the *experience* of emotions from their *expression*. Naturally a person may feel anger or liking without expressing it, and cultural norms and other constraints usually condition emotional expression. Norms sometimes proscribe expressing felt emotions, such as not directly expressing anger, and sometimes they prescribe expressing an emotion that is not felt, such as enthusiasm. Separating experience from expression can be particularly important for emotions in the workplace (Lively 2000; Sutton 1991; Stenross and Kleinman 1989; Thoits 1996). The distinction first became prominent in Hochschild's path-breaking descriptions of "emotion work" among airline employees and others (Hochschild 1979, 1983). Others have noted the importance of separating experience from expression in romantic relationships (Staske 1996, 1998, 1999), support groups (Francis 1997), and social movements (Britt and Heise 2000), though it also occurs in other settings such as in families (Ross and Van Willigen 1996; Thoits 1986) and among groups of friends (Heise and Calhan 1995).

Lively and Powell (2006) analyzed the same data as Lively and Heise (2004) above, this time to understand emotional expression. They focused on anger because of its potential disruptive consequences, and they studied respondents' expression of anger at work and at home. Respondents who said that a recent incident had evoked anger in them were then asked whether they expressed the emotion to the target, to others, to both, or to no one. Respondents reported being more likely to express anger generated at work than at home, but in different ways: to the target at home and to others at work. The first finding is inconsistent with a view that "emotion management" is especially important at work, and the second finding perhaps shows attempts to activate cultural norms at work to censure the target person. One of the strongest conditioning effects on expression was relative status, indicated by formal authority at work and family role (e.g., parent, sibling, child) in the family. In both settings, individuals angered by a higher status target are less likely to confront that person directly than when the offending person is of equal or lower status. This is consistent with Ridgeway

and Johnson's theoretical prediction of interaction in differentiated groups. It is also consistent with findings of Thoits' (1991) study of college students that found women more likely than men to seek social support for stressful situations. The structural status effect on expression in Lively and Powell's analyses overwhelmed effects of individual characteristics such as gender, age, race, or education. The strongest status effect is for those of lower status who have the most to lose if they anger the person who angered them.

Simon and Nath (2004) also analyzed the emotions module of the 1996 GSS to assess a belief that women and men experience and express emotions differently. Their analyses do not support common beliefs about frequency of emotional experience; men and women in the survey reported about the same rates of feeling emotions, and that finding holds when race, education, income, and other factors are controlled. However advantageous statuses on gender (male) and education are associated with reporting more positive emotional experiences. Differences between men's and women's household income account for a good part of the difference in frequency of reporting negative emotions; higher incomes result in more positive emotions. While there are some gender differences in specific emotions reported (more calm and excitement for men, more anxious and sad for women), there was no gender difference in frequency of reported anger or shame, findings also inconsistent with popular cultural beliefs about gender. However women reported more intense and more enduring anger than men, and their expression (coping) strategies differ. Women are more likely to talk about it with others (as Thoits (1991) also found for college students) and to pray, while men are more likely to use mood-altering chemicals (alcohol, tranquilizers). The lack of differences in experiencing and expressing emotion between women and men is important because of the common view that women are more emotional than men. The effects of advantageous statuses also are important because they again show the significance of social structure for emotional life.

Collett and Lizardo (2010) found that experiencing anger is not linearly linked to SES. Again

analyzing the 1996 GSS module on emotions, these scholars showed that anger is most likely to be experienced by individuals at the bottom and at the top of the structure. Analyses show that control over life events, which typically is lower at the bottom than in the middle, partly explains the relationship. Also, feeling bound by norms of anger management, which typically is strongest in the middle, is a factor.

Stets and Tsushima (2001) studied coping responses to negative emotion, using data from the 1996 GSS emotions module. These scholars worked from the theoretical perspective of Identity Theory (Burke and Stets 2009), in which identity nonverification such as someone treating the respondent in ways inconsistent with the respondent's identity. They focused on respondents' recollections of instances where they felt anger, and analyzed their responses separately for anger at work and at home. Work relationships tend to be role-determined and subject to evaluation, while family relationships tend to be group-determined and characterized by feelings of solidarity. Results showed that anger generated in the family was felt more intensely than at work, but because the workplace generally discourages expression, anger at work lasted longer. Further, respondents who occupied low statuses in both settings reported both greater intensity and duration because of norms opposing anger expression for status-disadvantaged individuals. Finally, anger in the family was more likely to be dealt with cognitively (e.g., acceptance, prayer), while anger at work was more often dealt with behaviorally (e.g., talking with others). This probably again reflects cultural norms against anger expression at work.

Sloan (2012) also explored experience and expression of anger in the workplace, using surveys of several occupations in the U.S. Expressing anger in workplaces is strongly controlled by norms that make it acceptable only in very limited situations such as directing it downwards in the status structure (Conway et al. 1999; Gibson and Schroeder 2002; Lively 2000; Pierce 1995). Sloan finds no gender difference in *experiencing* anger in the workplace. Women *expressed* anger less frequently than men, but that difference was

entirely accounted for by influence over others and freedom to disagree with others, both job characteristics on which men more often are advantaged than women. Here as in other studies, the gender difference in emotional expression is caused not by inherent qualities or predispositions of women and men but by the social circumstances in which they find themselves. Expressing happiness, however, did appear to be conditioned by cultural norms, with men more likely than women to suppress expression of happiness.

### 7.5 Reward Expectations and Justice

Justice studies examine perceptions of “who should get what,” and reactions to failures of what is seen as a proper relationship. Early studies by exchange theorists (Adams, 1963; Homans 1961; Blau 1964) suggested dividing “outputs” such as wage level by “inputs” such as education; if the fractions of two comparison individuals were equal, they would feel justice. Failure of justice to one’s detriment was thought to generate anger, and failure to one’s benefit, guilt. Berger et al. (1972) offered an expectation states approach that incorporates a “referential structure” of others to whom an individual compares, rather than comparing to a single other individual. Jasso (1980, 1986, 2007) has built on both those approaches to develop a comprehensive theory of all comparison processes. Here we describe research linked to the expectation states theory of justice.

Given a situation in which rewards are among the outcomes of interaction, the theory predicts that individuals form expectations for rewards at the same time they form performance expectations, and that the two are closely linked (e.g., high reward expectations from high performance expectations). Formation of reward expectations is conditioned by the kind of system in which individuals work (Webster 1984). In situations of “piece work” employment, reward expectations are linked to task outcomes; in situations based on ability based on test scores or some other basis, reward expectations link to performance expectations; and in situations where “who you

are” matters more than “what you can do,” such as caste or family based systems, reward expectations link to status characteristics. Here we focus on the second case where performance expectations and reward expectations coincide.

An interesting consequence of this theory is that change in either kind of expectations will produce a change in the other kind. Cook (1975) demonstrated that giving differential pay to individuals produced behavior showing corresponding performance expectations. Thye (2000) showed that status value could attach to poker chips previously held by a high status player. Hysom (2009) created performance expectations from purely status-valued objects (an invitation to a reception). These studies explore the basic link of performance expectations and reward expectations in different situations.

Anderson et al. (1969) laid out sixteen possible outcomes to a status structure involving a stable referential structure and other actors. Emotional reactions to inequity, either overpayment or underpayment, depend on features of the social structure in which the inequity occurs. For instance, overpayment alone might garner satisfaction and esteem from others who do not know it is unfair. However if an outsider has the ability to alter outcomes, an overpaid actor may feel threatened or embarrassed and will try to avoid the allocating other person. The experienced emotions thus depend on the kind of inequity, whether it affects only the focal actor or others, whether it is publicly known, whether it is changeable, and how referent actors respond in the situation. Emotional production depends on features of the complex social structure in which equity and inequity appear.

Hegtvedt (1990) studied emotional effects of just and unjust relationships with vignettes in which respondents reported how they would feel in different situations. She found that justice was linked to positive emotions and injustice to negative emotions. In greater detail, power and status were positively associated with feeling grateful and deserving, and negatively associated with feeling resentful and helpless. Guilt varies by level of over-reward, though this emotion was felt only weakly in all conditions of this population.

Lively et al. (2010) studied effects of felt inequity in household division of labor with the 1996 GSS survey of emotions. These investigators found that both inequitable benefit (partner does more than his or her share) and inequitable deprivation (partner does less than his or her share) are linked to reporting more negative emotions than are felt when the division of labor seems fair. Respondents in equitable relationships reported more happiness, contentment, and calm than those who felt their relationships were unfair. The negative emotions differ depending on the type of unfairness. Over benefit is associated with guilt, sadness and self-reproach, while under benefit is associated with anger and rage. The emotions found in this study track closely with predictions from theories of distributive justice (Homans 1961; Jasso, 2007).

---

## 7.6 Norm Violators and Norm Carriers

Johnston (1988; Johnston et al. 2001) developed related ideas on the attribution of personality traits based on emotions and behavior to divorcing couples. Focusing on the approximately 1/3rd of divorces that remain conflictual for more than a year, she abstracted a process that can create ex-spouses' views of who the other one is. (This process is often described by participants as "discovering what sort of person my ex-spouse really is.") Building on ideas of Berger (1988) and Talley and Berger (1983), Johnston proposed that highly emotional interaction can force a person to simplify and focus only on one kind of the other person's behaviors, either the positive behaviors or the negative behaviors. In conflictual divorces, that would mean that only behaviors having negative valence become salient. (Another kind of difficult divorce in which one person persists in hoping for reconciliation, may make only the positive behaviors salient.) When only behaviors having negative implications become salient, they may generalize into a negative personality attribution. The process is one in which negative emotions cause a narrowed focus on negative behaviors, leading to a socially constructed negative personality for the partner.

Johnston argued that negatively evaluated behaviors are most often linked to established norms, such as fidelity, privacy, or trust. Thus the conflict casts one person as a norm violator, and the person attributing that personality becomes the norm carrier. Sometimes when one person adopts the role of norm carrier, the other accepts the role of violator. In that case, the violator feels embarrassed, admits the violation, apologizes, and promises that the violation will not recur. Adopting complementary roles is probably quite common, and entails appropriate emotions: outrage for the norm carrier and guilt and embarrassment for the violator. Keltner and Buswell (1997) reviewed literature on embarrassment and noted its components and consequences. Embarrassment involves reduced self-esteem, social evaluation, and awkward social interaction. Expressing embarrassment is often the first step towards remediation, which may include making amends and appeasement. Keltner et al. (1997) reviewed studies showing that appeasement commonly remediates embarrassment and shame following transgressions. Appeasement and reconciliation evoke sympathy and forgiveness in many cases, thus diminishing the carrier-violator roles and leading to reconciliation.

Some parts of that cycle are seen in two studies by Tiedens and Fragale (2003). Participants interacted with a confederate who adopted either dominant or submissive body language: expansive or constricted, e.g., draping an arm across an adjacent chair, stretching legs out, vs. sitting with legs together and hands on armrests. The researchers found that most, though not all, real participants adopted complementary body language and demeanor. At least as important, participants who did adopt a complementary role reported greater comfort in the situation and greater liking for the confederate; those finding apply to participants who adopted both roles, dominant and submissive. Apparently they felt more positive affect when adopting a complementary role for the interaction. These patterns would be expected during the ordinary course of negotiating hierarchical differentiation when that inequality is not contested.



The most conflictual occurrence is for the person accused of norm violation to accuse the other of norm violation also; both parties contend for the norm carrier role and attempt to alter-cast the other into norm violator roles. These cases are unlikely to be resolved by the parties involved; they may persist for years.

Doan (2012) analyzed the GSS to understand the process by which transitory emotions can transform into persistent moods, a key process in Johnston's explanation for personality inferences. The more intense the emotion and the more an individual reflects on the interaction in which the emotion was experienced, the more likely it is to become a persistent mood. This process may be comparable to the process Johnston describes in which emotions generalize into personality attributions, and if so, then the same theoretical principles might apply to the two situations.

Johnston's theoretical contribution expands and improves the determinacy of the behavior-to-personality attribution process that Gerber identified in her study of police car teams. Johnston specifies conditions that lead to particular sorts of role attributions. The socially constructed individual may be either morally upright or morally depraved, and the individual may be either a norm carrier or a violator or deviant. Most of the time, people attend to all the behaviors of someone in trying to figure out what personality to attribute. Situations characterized by intense emotion, however, cause individuals to limit their attention to either the positive or the negative behaviors, and thus, to attribute a simple good or evil personality to the other person. Such attributions tend to be made in terms of cultural norms, and the subsequent interaction patterns depend on fairly simple patterns of accepting or rejecting the imputed personalities. Johnston's analyses provide a framework for further investigation.

---

### 7.7 Legitimation, Status, Expectations, and Emotion

Legitimation is the feeling that hierarchical relationships are right and proper. The research program developed by Walker and Zelditch

(1993) analyzes legitimation as having two components, propriety or authorization (individual acceptance) and validity or endorsement (a sense that others treat the structure as legitimate). Legitimate group structures are satisfying and are accepted by members; illegitimate structures cause tension and perhaps outrage and hence are likely to be unstable.

Ridgeway and Berger (1986) presented a theory that predicts, among other things, that inequality in initially heterogeneous groups is more likely to be seen as legitimate than is inequality resulting from a status struggle in homogeneous groups. Group members will feel that the structure is fair, and they are likely to feel commitment to the group. They are also likely to accept (rather than to challenge or feel angered by) directive and dominance behaviors by a leader. Comparable effects obtain when external status characteristics are consistent with group position; for instance, when a male supervisor interacts with female subordinates. Those predictions were tested and confirmed experimentally by Ridgeway et al. (1994). Other research (Kivlighan and Kivlighan 2010) found that student members of campus intergroup dialogue groups were more satisfied with, and less likely to want change of, leaders (or "facilitators") whose knowledge closely approximated their trainers; in other words, members were more satisfied with skillful leaders. The more skilled leaders also were more influential in the groups, as we have seen in other cases. When the expectation structure coincides with the authority structure, legitimacy is maximized. When the two structures do not coincide, for instance when an appointed leader is thought to be fairly incompetent, the structure is not legitimate. It generates negative feelings and is likely to be unstable.

Experimental research by Kalkhoff (2005) shows some emotional effects of legitimated structures. Participants viewed simulated chats between interactants who supposedly worked on a set of problems together. Participants also were told that the interactants differed on educational and occupational status. As predicted, the greater the status differentiation of the interactants, the more collective validation (agreement with the

high status interactant) that the participants expressed. Further, the greater the collective validation participants believed existed, the more they reported feeling that the leader's behavior was "appropriate," and that the other interactant "should" defer to him. Kalkhoff notes that highly legitimate groups may offer a pleasant experience because of a lack of disagreements, but they also are susceptible to "groupthink," a tendency to avoid dissent in the interest of maintaining solidarity.

Lucas (2003) reported an experimental study investigating ways to legitimate a female group leader in a group of men. In one condition, the leader was appointed on the basis of publicly known high ability, and in another condition, she was appointed randomly. Women leaders in the first condition attained greater influence in their groups, and were seen as more skillful. A third condition appointed a woman leader based on her ability and added information showing institutional support for having women in leadership positions. This condition added legitimating authorization, and again it increased the leader's legitimacy and influence. While Lucas did not report measures of emotions, it is reasonable to presume that the first condition here would have generated negative emotions from the low legitimacy, while the second and third conditions would generate positive emotions from the greater legitimacy of a female leader.

Further theoretical work by Berger et al. (1998) developed a formal theory of legitimization processes and de-legitimation processes as they occur in task groups. The extended theory describes how status and evaluations affect those processes, accounts for the stability of legitimated groups, and identifies research topics on the effects of evaluations on legitimization processes. Both status and performance evaluations can influence legitimacy, and both are needed for a highly legitimate structure. While theoretical understandings of legitimization processes have progressed in recent years, relations with emotions have yet to be explored. It is reasonable to presume that irritation and outrage can follow de-legitimation of a structure, while pleasure and feelings of security accompany successful

legitimation, but confirmation and development of those ideas awaits further research. As Ridgeway (2007) noted, the other side of the theory of legitimization is that leaders who have some a status disadvantage, say a female supervisor or an African American President, are likely to encounter hostility, even outrage, when they exercise their authority.

Johnson et al. (2000) studied effects of dependency, legitimacy, and justice with vignettes describing conflict between an employee and a manager. Respondents reported the most anger and resentment when they were in the least dependent position and the least when they were most dependent. In other words, being relatively independent of someone gives freedom to feel, and perhaps also to express, anger and resentment. If the superior is weakly legitimated, that increases resentment. These findings show the significance of legitimization of inequality structures, as well as specifying particular emotions generated by inequality and legitimacy.

Shelly and Shelly (2011) analyzed transcripts of discussion groups to assess whether legitimization was only affected by status, or whether other processes are involved. They concluded that legitimization may arise from particular types of interaction, such as facilitation of others and task organization speeches. While they found some effect of status and expectations on legitimization, the particular micro-interaction sequences had a greater effect in the groups studied. This research shows a second path to legitimization of group structure. It may be produced by status and expectations as the Ridgeway-Berger theory proposes, or it may be generated by interaction patterns within the group. Status and expectations may be particularly important for highly task focused groups, while interaction patterns might be important when task focus is reduced.

Thye et al. (2008) reported theoretical analyses and experimental research in which both status processes and exchange processes figured in repeated exchanges. The researchers studied status-unequal (mixed gender) groups at a bargaining task. Several studies (e.g., Thye 2000), have found that men earned considerably more than women in repeated exchange experiments.

However both genders report about equal pleasure and satisfaction with their experiences. The puzzle is how unequal earnings can seem equally satisfying.

In the new experiments, researchers maximized status difference by grouping African American women with Anglo men, and told participants that the men scored higher on a task relevant to their interaction. This produced a powerful inequality based on three consistent statuses. As in prior studies, the advantaged player got most (about 75%) of the winnings. Despite the large power difference, and contrary to other theory and findings (e.g., Kemper 1978, 1984; Lovaglia and Houser 1996; Willer et al. 1997), both players in this study reported about equal feelings of satisfaction. To explain that surprising finding, the analysis of these authors points to two sources of emotions. Exchange processes will lead to those earning less to feel negative emotions. Status processes, however, tend to legitimize the inequality and tend to make the inequality seem fair. Legitimizing inequality reduces negative feelings and generates positive feelings about the situation. Finally, in all conditions of the experiment, frequent exchanges produced positive feelings that generate relational cohesion, confirming a theory of exchange processes (Lawler et al. 2009).

---

## 7.8 Summary and Next Steps

We have reviewed the SCES core theory and some elaborations dealing with related phenomena. The theories involve different initial conditions and mechanisms, but all use the concepts of expectation states and status characteristics. The theories describe behaviors and social structures generated by different patterns of structural facts and interactions. All of the theories involve affect, emotions, and sentiments, though the causes and consequences of those elements are only beginning to be mapped. The study of status, expectations, and emotions has only begun in recent decades. As others have noted about the field of the sociology of emotions (Thoits 1989; Smith-Lovin 1995; Simon and Nath 2004), there are

more plausible ideas and conjecture than data. We have noted some empirical confirmation of theoretical ideas here, but there is opportunity to collect much more.

Theoretical and empirical work in the study of emotions would benefit from shared listings of the emotions of interest, shared definitions of them, and specification of mechanisms of their causes and consequences. For instance, several studies summarized in this chapter study the emotion of anger. While the term has some familiarity, no theoretical definition has been proposed, nor do we have much in the way of general conditions generating anger or its consequences. Theorists, especially Theodore Kemper, Robert Thamm, and Jonathan H. Turner in this volume, have developed answers to those issues, but there is not strong agreement among them nor guides to finding evidence for evaluating and improving the ideas.

For the SCES program also, developing explicit links between its processes and emotional and affective facts has only begun. We have evidence that high status generally accompanies positive feelings while low status accompanies negative feelings; Lovaglia and colleagues have proposed that this illustrates compatible emotions. At present that idea is limited to valences: positive or negative on status, and positive or negative on emotion. Developing greater specificity of specific emotional consequences, and conditions under which they appear, might lead to valuable theoretical principles of the interrelations of status and emotion.

A comparable development in the personality attribution process studied by, among others, Gerber and Johnston might make it possible to track the mechanism by which specific behaviors and emotions generalize into personalities, and how those personalities then structure future interaction. In all such theoretical development, we believe the approach of state organizing processes described above will be useful. A theorist might conceive of emotions as states and then describe conditions activating the states and how they affect future behavior and social structures. The next task would be to specify changed conditions that would cause the states to deactivate so they no longer affect interaction.

Along with developing theoretical mechanisms, understanding will benefit from improved empirical operations. At present we have little in the way of good tools to measure emotions, so we rely on self-report and recollection. Partly this is due to the lack of explicit definitions of the emotions. If we knew what we are looking for, that would help us decide how to observe it. Also, having a clear idea of the consequences we believe emotions have would sensitize researchers to developing measurements for those consequences.

An avenue for developing understanding of how status and expectation processes intertwine with emotions may be to study situations that do not, or do not fully meet the scope conditions of the theories. Natural settings, such as the studies of business organizations, are likely to meet the theory's scope conditions only imperfectly. As noted, these theories were developed for situations of task focused collectively oriented interaction, and they make no claim to predict outside of such cases. Yet several of the studies we have reviewed showed predicted effects of status when collective orientation is met only weakly. A few cases show status effects when task orientation is weak, but in those cases the effects are attenuated. It may be that the theory's predictions are robust across differences in strength of collective orientation, though task focus seems to be more significant. Walker and Cohen (1985), Foschi (1997, 2008, 2014) and Dippong (2012) discuss scope conditions and their place in theory development in greater detail.

A reasonable beginning for studying status and emotion might be to focus on a particular emotion and see how it plays out in strongly and weakly collectively oriented cases. For instance, high status seems to generate feelings of satisfaction and appreciation whether or not the high status individual is engaged in a collective task. (The emotions are much less regular when the situation is not task focused.) This suggests the value of a program of research investigating particular emotions that have been shown to accompany structural facts such as high status. Researchers might map emotions generated by status in individually oriented tasks as well as in collectively oriented tasks. Results might allow

theorists to extend the theories to explain how different levels of collective orientation generate the same or different emotional responses.

Overall, researchers have developed more and more precise understandings than existed when Thoits (1989), Smith-Lovin (1995), and Ridgeway (2007) surveyed the field. There remains much more to learn. Opportunities are limited only by the imaginations and rigorous thinking of sociologists.

## References

- Adams, J. S. (1963). Toward an understanding of inequity. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67*, 422–436.
- Amabile, T. M., Barsade S. G., Mueller J. S., & Staw B. M. (2006). Affect and creativity at work. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 50*, 367–403.
- Anderson, B., Berger, J., Zelditch, M., Jr., & Cohen, B. P. (1969). Reactions to inequity. *Acta Sociologica, 12*, 1–12.
- Angel, R. J., Frisco, M., Angel, J. L., & Chirlboga, D. (2003). Financial strain and health among elderly Mexican-origin individuals. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 44*, 536–551.
- Bales, R. F. (1950). *Interaction process analysis: A method for the study of small groups*. Cambridge: Addison-Wesley.
- Bales, R. F. (1953). The equilibrium problem in small groups. In T. Parsons, R. F. Bales, & E. A. Shils (Eds.), *Working papers in the theory of action* (pp. 111–161). Glencoe: Free Press.
- Bales, R. F. (1956). Task status and likeability as a function of talking and listening in decision-making groups. In L. D. White (Ed.), *The state of the social sciences* (pp. 148–183). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bales, R. F. (1970). *Personality and interpersonal behavior*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
- Bales, R. F. (1999). *Social interaction systems: Theory and measurement*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Bales, R. F., & Hare, A. P. (1965). Diagnostic use of the interaction profile. *Journal of Social Psychology, 67*, 239–258.
- Bales, R. F., & Slater, P. E. (1955). Role differentiation in small decision making groups. In T. Parsons & R. F. Bales (Eds.), *Family, socialization, and interaction process* (pp. 259–306). Glencoe: Free Press
- Barsade, S., & Gibson, D. E. (2007). Why does affect matter in organizations? *Academy of Management Perspectives, 21*, 36–59.
- Bavelas, A., Hastorf, A. H., Gross, A. E., & Kite, W. R. (1965). Experiments on the alteration of group structure. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1*, 55–70.



- Bem, S. L. (1974). The measurement of psychological androgyny. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, 42, 155–162.
- Berger, J. (1958). *Relations between performance, rewards, and action-opportunities in small groups*. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University.
- Berger, J. (1988). Directions in expectation states research. In M. Webster, Jr. & M. (Eds.), *Status generalization: New theory and research* (pp. 450–474). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Berger, J., Wagner, D. G., & Webster, M. (2014). Expectation states theory: Growth, opportunities, and challenges. In Thye, S. R., & Lawler, E. J. (Eds.), *Advances in group processes* (Vol. 31, pp. 19–56). New York: Emerald.
- Berger, J., Cohen, B. P., & Zelditch, M., Jr. (1966). Status characteristics and expectation states. In J. Berger, M. Zelditch Jr., & B. Anderson (Eds.), *Sociological theories in progress* (Vol. 1, pp. 29–46). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Berger, J., & Conner, T. L. (1974). Performance expectations and behavior in small groups: A revised formulation. In J. Berger, T. L. Conner, & M. Hamit Fisek (Eds.), *Expectation states theory: A theoretical research program* (pp. 85–109). Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers.
- Berger, J., Wagner, D. G., & Zelditch, M., Jr. (1998). A working strategy for constructing theories: State organizing processes. In J. Berger & M. Zelditch, Jr. (Eds.), *Status, power and legitimacy: Strategies and theories* (pp. 39–53). New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Berger, J., & Webster, M., Jr. (2006). Expectations, status and behavior. In P. J. Burke (Ed.), *Contemporary social psychological theories* (pp. 268–300). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Berger, J., Zelditch M., Jr., Anderson, B., & Cohen B. P. (1972). Structural aspects of distributive justice: A status-value formulation. In J. Berger, M. Zelditch, Jr. & Bo Anderson (Eds.), *Sociological theories in progress volume II* (pp. 119–146). Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
- Bianchi, A. J. (2004). Rejecting others' influence: Negative sentiment and status in task groups. *Sociological Perspectives*, 47, 339–355.
- Blau, P. (1964). Justice in social exchange. *Sociological Inquiry*, 34, 193–206.
- Bonito, J. A. (2000). The effect of contributing substantively on perceptions of participation. *Small Group Research*, 31, 528–553.
- Britt, L., & Heise, D. (2000). From shame to pride in identity politics. In S. Stryker, T. J. Owens, and R. W. White (Eds.), *Self, identity, and social movements* (pp. 252–268). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Burke, P. J. (1968). Role differentiation and the legitimation of task activity. *Sociometry*, 31, 404–411.
- Burke, P. J. (1971). Task and socioemotional leadership role performance. *Sociometry*, 34, 22–40.
- Burke, P. J., & Stets, J. E. (2009). *Identity theory*. New York: Oxford.
- Burke, P. J., Stets, J. E., & Cerven, C. (2007). Gender, legitimation, and identity verification in groups. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 70, 27–42.
- Cacioppo, J. T., & Gardner, W. L. (1999). Emotion. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 50, 191–214.
- Cohen, E. G., & Lotan, R. (1997). *Working for equity in heterogeneous classrooms*. Teachers College Press: New York.
- Collett, J. L., & Lizardo, O. (2010). Occupational status and the experience of anger. *Social Forces*, 88, 2079–2104.
- Collins, R. (1993). Emotional energy as the common denominator of rational action. *Rationality and Society*, 5, 203–230.
- Conway, M., Roberto, D. F., & Shari, M. (1999). Judging others' emotions as a function of the others' status. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 62, 291–305.
- Cook, K. S. (1975). Expectations, evaluations and equity. *American Sociological Review*, 40, 372–388.
- Cuddy, A. J., Fiske, S. T., & Glick, P. (2007). The BIAS Map: Behaviors from intergroup affect and stereotypes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 91, 631–648.
- Darwin, C. (1872). *The expression of emotions in man and animals*. London: Watts.
- Diefendorff, J. M., & Greguras G. J. (2009). Contextualizing emotional display rules: Examining the roles of targets and discrete emotions in shaping display rule perceptions. *Journal of Management*, 35, 880–898.
- Dippong, J. (2012). The effects of scope condition-based participant exclusion on experimental outcomes in expectation states research: A meta-analysis. *Social Science Research*, 41, 359–371.
- Doan, L. (2012). A social model of persistent mood states. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 75, 198–218.
- Driskell, J. E., Jr., & Webster, M. Jr. (1997). Status and sentiment in task groups. In J. Szymatka, J. Skvoretz, & J. Berger (Eds.), *Status, network and structure: Theory construction and theory development* (pp. 179–200). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Entwisle, D. R., & Webster, M., Jr. (1978). Raising expectations indirectly. *Social Forces*, 57, 257–264.
- Fessler, D. M. T., Pillsworth, E. G., & Flamson, T. J. (2004). Angry men and disgusted women: An evolutionary approach to the influence of emotions on risk taking. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 95, 107–123.
- Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J., Glick, P., & Xu, J. (2002). A model of (often mixed) stereotype content: Competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and competition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 82, 878–902.
- Foschi, M. (1997). On scope conditions. *Small Group Research*, 28, 535–555.
- Foschi, M. (2008). On collective orientation and the standardized expectation-states experiment: Review and assessment. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Boston.
- Foschi, M. (2014). Hypotheses, operationalizations, and manipulation checks. In M. Webster & J. Sell (Eds.),



- Laboratory experiments in the social sciences* (2nd ed.). New York: Elsevier.
- Francis, L. E. (1997). Ideology and interpersonal emotion management: Redefining identity in two support groups. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *60*, 153–171.
- Gerber, G. L. (1996). Status in same-gender and mixed-gender police dyads: Effects on personality attributions. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *59*, 350–363.
- Gerber, G. L. (2001). *Women and men police officers: Status, gender, and personality*. Westport: Praeger.
- Gerber, G. L. (2009). Status and the gender stereotyped personality traits: Toward and integration. *Sex Roles*, *61*, 297–316.
- Gibson, D. E., & Scott, J. S. (2002). Grinning, frowning, and emotionlessness: Agent perceptions of power and their effect on felt and displayed emotions in influence attempts. In N. M. Ashkanasy, W. J. Zerbe, & C. E. J. Hartel (Eds.), *Managing emotions in the workplace* (pp. 184–211). Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.
- Goar, C., & Sell, J. (2005). Using task definition to modify racial inequality within task groups. *The Sociological Quarterly*, *46*, 525–543.
- Gordon, S. L. (1989). The socialization of children's emotions: Emotional culture, competence, and exposure. In C. Saarni & P. L. Harris (Eds.), *Children's understanding of emotion* (pp. 319–349). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hegtvedt, K. A. (1990). Effects of relationship structure on emotional responses to inequity. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *53*, 214–228.
- Heise, D., & Calhan, C. (1995). Emotion norms in interpersonal events. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *58*, 223–240.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1979). Emotion work, feeling rules, and social structure. *The American Journal of Sociology*, *85*, 551–575.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1983). *The managed heart: The commercialization of human feeling*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Homans, G. C. (1961). *Social behavior: Its elementary forms*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.
- Houser, J., & Lovaglia, M. J. (2002). Status, emotions and the development of solidarity in stratified task groups. In S. R. Thye & E. J. Lawler (Eds.), *Advances in group processes* (pp. 109–138). New York: Elsevier.
- Hurwitz, J. I., Zander, A. F., & Hymovitch, B. (1960). Some effects of power on the relations among group members. In D. Cartwright & A. F. Zander (Eds.), *Group dynamics* (pp. 448–456). New York: Harper & Row.
- Hysom, S. J. (2009). Status valued goal objects and performance expectations. *Social Forces*, *87*, 1623–1648.
- Jasso, G. (1980). A new theory of distributive justice. *American Sociological Review*, *45*, 3–32.
- Jasso, G. (1986). A new representation of the just term in distributive justice theory: Its properties and operation in theoretical derivation and empirical estimation. *Journal of Mathematical Sociology*, *12*, 251–274.
- Jasso, G. (2007). Emotion in Justice Processes. In J. E. Stets & J. H. Turner (Eds.), *Handbook of the sociology of emotions* (pp. 321–346). New York: Springer.
- Johnson, C., Ford, R., & Kaufman, J. (2000). Emotional reactions to conflict: Do dependence and legitimacy matter? *Social Forces*, *79*, 107–137.
- Johnston, J. R. (1988). The structure of ex-spousal relations: An exercise in theoretical integration and application. In M. Webster and M. Foschi (Eds.), *Status generalization: New theory and research* (pp. 309–326). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Johnston, J. R., Walters, M. G., & Friedlander, S. (2001). Therapeutic work with alienated children and their families. *Family Court Review*, *39*, 316–333.
- Kalkhoff, W. (2005). Collective validation in multi-actor task groups: The effects of status differentiation. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *68*, 57–88.
- Keltner, D., & Buswell, B. N. (1997). Embarrassment: Its distinct form and appeasement functions. *Psychological Bulletin*, *122*, 230–270.
- Keltner, D., Young, R. C., & Buswell, B. N. (1997). Appeasement in human emotion, social practice, and personality. *Aggressive Behavior*, *23*, 359–374.
- Kemper, T. D. (1978). *A social interactional theory of emotions*. New York: Wiley.
- Kemper, T. D. (1979). Emotion work, feeling rules and social structure. *The American Journal of Sociology*, *85*, 551–575.
- Kemper, T. D. (1981). Social constructionist and positivist approaches to the sociology of emotions. *The American Journal of Sociology*, *87*, 336–362.
- Kemper, T. D. (1984). Power, status, and emotions: A sociological contribution to a psychophysiological domain. In K. R. Scherer & P. Ekman (Eds.), *Approaches to emotion* (pp. 369–383). Hillsdale: Erlbaum.
- Kemper, T. D. (1987). How many emotions are there? Wedding the social and the autonomic components. *The American Journal of Sociology*, *93*, 263–289.
- Kemper, T. D. (1991). Predicting emotions from social relations. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *54*, 330–342.
- Kivlighan, D. M., Jr., & Kivlighan, D. M. III. (2010). Are group leader knowledge structures related to member satisfaction with the leader? *Small Group Research*, *41*, 175–197.
- Lawler, E. J., Thye, S. R., & Yoon, J. (2009). *Social commitments in a depersonalized world*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Lehmann-Willenbrock, N., Meyers, R. A., Kauffeld, S., Neisinger, A., & Henschel, A. (2011). Verbal interaction sequences and group mood: Exploring the role of team planning communication. *Small Group Research*, *42*, 639–668.
- Lewis, G. H. 1972. Role Differentiation. *American Sociological Review*, *37*, 424–434.
- Lively, K. J. (2000). Reciprocal emotion management: Working together to maintain stratification in private law firms. *Work and Occupations*, *27*, 32–63.

- Lively, K. J., & Heise, D. (2004). Sociological realms of emotional experience. *The American Journal of Sociology*, *109*, 1109–1136.
- Lively, K. J., & Powell, B. (2006). Emotional expression at work and at home: Domain, status, or individual characteristics? *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *69*, 17–38.
- Lively, K. J., Steelman, L., & Powell, B. (2010). Equity, emotion, and household division of labor response. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *73*, 358–379.
- Lovaglia, M. J., & Houser, J. A. (1996). Emotional reactions and status in groups. *American Sociological Review*, *61*, 867–883.
- Lucas, J. W. (2003). Status processes and the institutionalization of women as leaders. *American Sociological Review*, *68*, 464–480.
- Lucas, J. W., & Lovaglia, M. (1998). Leadership status, gender, group size, and emotion in Face-to-Face groups. *Sociological Perspectives* *41*, 617–637.
- McLeod, J. D., & Owens, T. J. (2004). Psychological well-being in the early life course: Variations by socioeconomic status, gender, and race/ethnicity. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *67*, 257–278.
- Meeker, B. F., & Weitzel-O'Neill, P. A. (1977). Sex roles and interpersonal behavior in task-oriented groups. *American Sociological Review*, *42*, 91–105.
- Niedenthal, P. M., & Brauer, M. (2012). Social functionality of human emotion. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *63*, 259–285.
- Ng, S. K., Bell, D., & Brooke, M. (1993). Gaining turns and achieving influence ranking in small conversation groups. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *32*, 265–275.
- O'Campo, P., Eaton, W. W., & Muntaner, C. (2004). Labor market experience, work organization, gender inequalities and health status: Results from a prospective analysis of U.S. employed women. *Social Science and Medicine*, *3*, 585–594.
- Overbeck, J. R., Neale, M. A., & Govan, C. L. (2010). I feel, therefore you act: Intrapersonal and interpersonal effects of emotion on negotiation as a function of social power. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *112*, 126–139.
- Parsons, T. (1942). Age and sex in the social structure of the united states. *American Sociological Review*, *7*, 604–616.
- Parsons, T. (1951). *The social system*. Glencoe: Free Press.
- Parsons, T., & Bales, R. F. (1955). *Family, socialization and interaction process*. Glencoe: Free Press.
- Pierce, J. L. (1995). *Gender trials: Emotional lives in contemporary law firms*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Propp, K. M. (1995). An experimental examination of biological sex as a status cue in decision-making groups and its influence on information use. *Small Group Research*, *26*, 451–474.
- Pugh, M., & Wahrman, R. (1983). Neutralizing sexism in mixed-sex groups: Do women have to be better than men? *The American Journal of Sociology*, *88*, 746–762.
- Rashotte, L. S., & Webster, M., Jr. (2005). Gender status beliefs. *Social Science Research*, *34*, 618–633.
- Ridgeway, C. L. (1978). Conformity, group-oriented motivation, and status attainment in small groups. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *41*, 175–188.
- Ridgeway, C. L. (1982). Status in groups: the importance of motivation. *American Sociological Review*, *47*, 76–88.
- Ridgeway, C. L. (2007). Expectation states theory and emotion. In J. E. Stets and J. H. Turner (Eds.), *Handbook of the sociology of emotions* (pp. 347–367). New York: Springer.
- Ridgeway, C. L. (2009). Status construction theory. In J. M. Levine & M. A. Hogg (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of group processes and intergroup relations* (Vol. 2, pp. 848–850). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Ridgeway, C. L. (2011). *Framed by gender*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ridgeway, C. L., & Berger, J. (1986). Expectations, legitimation, and dominance behavior in groups. *American Sociological Review*, *51*, 603–617.
- Ridgeway, C. L., & Johnson, C. (1990). What is the relationship between socioemotional behavior and status in task groups? *The American Journal of Sociology*, *95*, 1189–1212.
- Ridgeway, C. L., Johnson, C., & Diekema, D. (1994). External status, legitimacy, and compliance in male and female groups. *Social Forces*, *71*, 1051–1077.
- Ridgeway, C. L., & Smith-Lovin, L. (1999). The gender system and interaction. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *25*, 191–216.
- Ross, C. E., & Willigen, M. V. (1996). Gender, parenthood, and anger. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, *58*, 572–584.
- Shelly, A. C., & Shelly, R. K. (20 Sept. 2011). An empirical test of legitimation as a status process. *Current Research in Social Psychology*, 1–28. <http://www.uiowa.edu/~grpproc/crisp/crisp.html>.
- Shelly, R. K. (1993). How emotions organize interaction. In E. J. Lawler, B. Markovsky, K. Heimer, & J. O'Brien (Eds.), *Advances in group processes* (pp. 113–132). Greenwich: JAI Press.
- Shelly, R. K. (2001). How performance expectations arise from sentiments. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *64*, 72–87.
- Shelly, R. K. (2004). Emotions, sentiments, and performance expectations. In J. H. Turner (Ed.), *Advances in group processes: Theory and research on human emotions* (pp. 141–165). New York: Elsevier.
- Shelly, R. K., & Webster, M., Jr. (1997). How formal status, liking, and ability status structure interaction. *Sociological Perspectives*, *40*, 81–107.
- Simon, R. W., & Nath, L. E. (2004). Gender and emotion in the united states: Do men and women differ in self-reports of feelings and expressive behavior? *The American Journal of Sociology*, *109*, 1137–1176.
- Sinaceur, M., & Tiedens, L. Z. (2006). Get mad and get more than even: When and why anger expression is

- effective in negotiations. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 42, 314–322.
- Sloan, M. (2012). Controlling anger and happiness at work: An examination of gender differences. *Gender, Work and Organization*, 19, 370–391.
- Smith-Lovin, L. (1995). The sociology of affect and emotion. In K. S. Cook, G. A. Fine, & J. S. House (Eds.), *Sociological perspectives on social psychology* (pp. 118–148). Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- Smith-Lovin, L., & Brody, C. (1989). Interruptions in group discussions: The effects of gender and group composition. *American Sociological Review*, 54, 424–435.
- Smith-Lovin, L., Skvoretz, J. V., & Hudson, C. G. (1986). Status and participation in six-person groups: A test of skvoretz's comparative status model. *Social Forces*, 64, 992–1005.
- Spence, J. T., Deaux, K., & Helmreich, R. I. (1985). Sex roles in contemporary American society. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), *Handbook of social psychology: Special fields and applications* (Vol. 2, 3rd ed., pp. 149–178). New York: Random House.
- Staske, S. A. (1996). Talking feelings: The collaborative construction of emotion in talk between close relational partners. *Symbolic Interaction*, 19, 111–142.
- Staske, S. A. (1998). The normalization of problematic emotion in conversations between close relational partners: Interpersonal emotion work. *Symbolic Interaction*, 21, 59–92.
- Staske, S. A. (1999). Creating relational ties in talk: The collaborative construction of relational jealousy. *Symbolic Interaction*, 22, 213–237.
- Stenross, B., & Kleinman, S. (1989). The highs and lows of emotional labor: Detectives' encounters with criminals and victims. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 17, 435–452.
- Stets, J. E. (2003). Emotions and sentiments. In J. Delamater (Ed.), *Handbook of social psychology* (pp. 309–335). New York: Kluwer.
- Stets, J. E. (2004). Emotions in identity theory. The effect of status. In J. H. Turner (Ed.), *Advances in group processes: Theory and research on human emotions* (pp. 51–76). New York: Elsevier.
- Stets, J. E. (2005). Examining emotions in identity theory. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 68, 39–74.
- Stets, J. E., & Harrod, M. M. (2004). Verification across multiple identities: The role of status. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 67, 155–171.
- Stets, J. E., & Tsushima, T. M. (2001). Negative emotion and coping responses within identity control theory. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 64, 283–295.
- Stets, J. E., & Turner, J. H. (2007). *Handbook of the sociology of emotions*. New York: Springer.
- Stets, J. E., & Turner, J. H. (2008). The sociology of emotions. In M. Lewis, J. M. Haviland-Jones, & L. Feldman Barrett (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (pp. 32–46). New York: Guilford Press.
- Stevenson, B., & Wolfers, J. (2013). Subjective well-being and income. *American Economic Review*, 103, 598–604.
- Strodtbeck, F. L., James, R. M., & Hawkins, C. (1957). Social status in jury deliberations. *American Sociological Review*, 22, 713–719.
- Strodtbeck, F. L., & Mann, R. D. (1956). Sex role differentiation in jury deliberations. *Sociometry*, 19, 3–11.
- Suls, J., & Miller, M. (1978). Ability comparison and its effects on affiliation preferences. *Human Relations*, 31, 267–282.
- Sutton, R. (1991). Maintaining norms about expressed emotion: The case of bill collectors. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 36, 245–268.
- Tajeddin, G., Safayeni, F., Connelly, C. E., & Tasa, K. (2012). The influence of emergent expertise on group decision processes. *Small Group Research*, 43, 50–74.
- Talley, J., & Berger, J. (1983). Social control as a state organizing process. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Sociology, Stanford University.
- Thamm, R. A. (1992). Social structure and emotion. *Sociological Perspectives*, 35, 649–671.
- Thamm, R. A. (2004). Towards a universal power and status theory of emotion. In J. H. Turner (Ed.), *Advances in group processes* (pp. 189–222). San Diego: Elsevier.
- Thamm, R. A. (2007). The classification of emotions. In J. E. Stets & J. H. Turner (Ed.), *Handbook of the sociology of emotions* (pp. 11–37). New York: Springer.
- Thoits, P. A. (1986). Multiple identities: Examining gender and marital status differences in distress. *American Sociological Review*, 51, 259–272.
- Thoits, P. A. (1989). The sociology of emotions. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 15, 317–342.
- Thoits, P. A. (1991). Gender differences in coping with emotional distress. In J. Eckenrode (Ed.), *The social context of coping* (pp. 107–138). New York: Plenum.
- Thoits, P. A. (1996). Managing the emotions of others. *Symbolic Interaction*, 19, 85–109.
- Thye, S. R. (2000). A status value theory of power in exchange relations. *American Sociological Review*, 65, 407–432.
- Thye, S. R., Lawler, E. J., & Yoon, J. (2008). Social exchange and the maintenance of order in status-stratified systems. In J. Clay-Warner & D. T. Robinson (Eds.), *Social structure and emotion* (pp. 37–63). San Diego: Academic Press.
- Tiedens, L. Z. (2001). Anger and advancement versus sadness and subjugation: The effect of negative emotion expressions on social status conferral. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 80, 86–94.
- Tiedens, L. Z., Ellsworth, P. C., & Mesquita, B. (2000). Sentimental stereotypes: Emotional expectations for high-and low-status group members. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 26, 560–575.
- Tiedens, L. Z., & Fragale, A. R. (2003). Power moves: Complementarity in dominant and submissive nonverbal behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 84, 558–568.
- Totterdell P. (2000). Catching moods and hitting runs: mood linkage and subjective performance in professional sport teams. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 85, 848–859

- Turner, J. H. (2000). *On the origins of human emotions: A sociological inquiry into the evolution of human affect*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Turner, J. H. (2004). *Advances in group processes: Theory and research on human emotions*. New York: Elsevier.
- Turner, J. H. (2011). *Theoretical principles of sociology, volume 2 microdynamics*. New York: Springer.
- Turner, J. H. (2013). *Contemporary sociological theories*. New York: Sage.
- Turner, J. H., & Stets, J. E. (2005). *The sociology of emotions*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Turner, J. H., & Stets, J. E. (2006). Sociological theories of human emotions. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 32, 25–52.
- Turner, R. J., & Avison, W. R. (2003). Status variations in stress exposure: Implications for the interpretation of research on race, socioeconomic status, and gender. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 44, 488–505.
- Verba, S. (1961). *Small group and political behavior: A study of leadership*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Wagner, D. G., & Berger, J. (2002). Expectation states theory: An evolving research program. In J. Berger & M. Zelditch, Jr. (Eds.), *New directions in contemporary sociological theory* (pp. 41–76). New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Walker, H. A., & Cohen, B. P. (1985). Scope statements: Imperatives for evaluating theory. *American Sociological Review*, 50, 288–301.
- Walker, H. A., & Zelditch, M., Jr. (1993). Power, legitimacy, and the stability of authority: A theoretical research program. In J. Berger & M. Zelditch, Jr. (Eds.), *Theoretical research programs: Studies in the growth of theory* (pp. 364–384). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Wang, L., Northcraft, G. B., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2012). Beyond negotiated outcomes: The hidden costs of anger expression in dyadic negotiation. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 119, 54–63.
- Webster, M., Jr. (1984). Social structures and the sense of justice. In E. J. Lawler & S. Bachrach (Eds.), *Research in the sociology of organizations* (Vol. 3, pp. 59–94). Greenwich: JAI Press.
- Webster, M. Jr., & Driskell, J. E. (1978). Status generalization. A review and some new data. *American Sociological Review*, 43, 220–236.
- Webster, M., Jr., & Rashotte, L. S. (2009). Fixed roles and situated actions. *Sex Roles*, 61, 325–337.
- Willer, D., Lovaglia, M. J., & Markovsky, B. (1997). Power and influence: A theoretical bridge. *Social Forces*, 76, 571–603.
- Wiltermuth, S. S., & Tiedens, L. Z. (2011). Incidental anger and the desire to evaluate. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 116, 55–65.

Theodore D. Kemper

---

## 8.1 Introduction

Status-power theory provides a broad approach to emotions based on the idea that a large class of emotions results from “real, recollected or imagined outcomes of social interaction,” with interaction defined in status-power terms (Kemper 1978, 2006, 2011).<sup>1</sup> This general theory of emotions has received some support (Kemper 1991; Simon and Nath 2004; Robinson and DeCoster 1999; Robinson 2002). In this chapter, I address the relationship between status-power outcomes and the emotion/feeling of felicity (happiness, satisfaction, contentment or well-being). In prior statements of the theory (Kemper 1978, Kemper and Collins 1990, Kemper 2011) happiness was predicted from the interaction outcome of improvement in status (or standing) in a group, e. g., receiving a compliment, winning a prize, gaining a promotion; and also from the relational condition of providing status to another actor, especially notable in the case of love. This position is still maintained here, but new work in status-power theory (described below) and on how to formulate positive emotions leads to a more differentiated approach to the question of what kinds of social relations make a person feel happy.

First, I will briefly review status-power theory, including an up-dated conceptualization of

happiness-relevant outcomes, focusing on four relational conditions in the status-power approach. Second, I will present some general considerations that bear on status-power outcomes and happiness. Third, I will review the literature pertaining to happiness outcomes in the four relational conditions. Finally, because many students of happiness believe happiness is an outcome of living a “meaningful” life, I will consider the status-power significance of meaningfulness.

---

## 8.2 Status-Power Theory

Status-power theory begins with the proposition that social relations can be usefully described in two dimensions. This approach derives from the empirical findings reviewed by Carter (1954) in which factor analyses of behaviors by actors in small groups produced a technical activity factor (activity directed to that task at hand) and two relational factors. Many subsequent studies found the same two relational factors (see Kemper and Collins 1990) and, as an empirical generalization, I have concluded that social relations in all settings can by-and-large be accounted for by these two factors. Since it is traditionally the privilege of the factor analyst to name factors, the two dimensions are variously labeled, e. g.,

---

T. D. Kemper (✉)  
St. John’s University, Queens, USA  
e-mail: kempert@stjohns.edu

---

<sup>1</sup> Prior to Kemper (2011), status-power theory was presented with the terms reversed, i. e., as power-status theory. However, it is more in keeping with the usual sequence of events in interaction to have status precede power.



Likeability-Assertiveness, Affection-Control, Affection-Dominance, Sociability-Dominance (see Kemper 2006; Kemper and Collins 1990; Gurtman 2009). But because of the two factors' eminently social connotation, I have chosen names out of the sociological lexicon and call them *status* and *power* (Kemper 1978, 2006, 2011). The status-power model has the advantage of being empirically-based (Carter 1954), having cross-cultural support (White 1980) and, nomenclature aside, increasingly in use in the social sciences (for example, Magee and Galinsky 2008; Thye et al. 2006; Fournier et al. 2009; Halevy et al. 2012; Blader and Chen 2012).

For definitional purposes, the status dimension reflects *voluntary compliance* with the wishes, hopes, desires, needs, and interests of other actors through behaviors of deference, caring, attention, respect, admiration, helping, support and the like. The ultimate in voluntary compliance is the relationship we ordinarily call love (Kemper 2006, 2011). With the concept defined in this way, we can speak of status-claiming (where someone presents evidence of worthiness to receive status) and status-accord or conferral (where the behavior actually bestows a voluntarily-granted benefit on another). To say that someone has "high" status means that the person is receiving a great deal of deference, caring, attention, etc. from others. In everyday terms this would include such benefits, necessarily conferred by others, as high income, material possessions, promotions to valued offices, honorific titles, good reputation, popularity and so forth.

Consonant with the definition by Weber (1922/1946b, p. 180), the power dimension of relationship entails behaviors that reflect the gaining of *involuntary compliance*, by means including threat, force, coercion, infliction of physical or emotional pain and/or deprivation, intimidation, manipulation, deception and similar conduct by which the actor attempts to obtain what he or she wants when it is not voluntarily granted as status. To say that an actor has high power in a relationship means that that actor obtains a significant amount of compliance by means of threatened or actual use of coercion or manipulation. In everyday terms this would include sullen responses, a

raised voice, interrupting the other's talk, inattentiveness, expressions of disdain, withholding affection, physical assault, mendacity and so forth. These all mark how power is practiced.

Following Weber (1947/1922, p. 88) and Mead (1934), I deem as "social action" any behavior in which an actor takes the other actor(s) into account when considering what to do in a given situation. (Below I will discuss what it means to take other actors into account.) I maintain that when we observe the relational aspects of social interaction, we will see behaviors that can be classified under the status and power rubric. Other actors, the ones the focal actor takes into account, I call *reference groups*. The anticipated reaction of these others determines what action will be taken. Broadly speaking, higher status and/or power reference groups—parents, teachers, religious authorities, sociometric stars and the like—transmit the *culture* of the relevant group, that is, the norms, standards, values, ideals, and so on that are espoused in the group. Reference groups need not be real or alive. It is enough that they have prescriptions for behavior. In the case of modeling, the focal actor uses the model to guide behavior that is desired or prescribed by one or another reference group. Real reference groups back up their prescriptions with positive sanctions (according status) for compliance and negative sanctions (applying power) for non-compliance. Imagined or dead reference groups provide just as potent positive sanctions for compliance and negative sanctions for non-compliance via evoking appropriate emotions of pride and satisfaction, in the one case, and shame and/or guilt in the other.

In the status-power model of relationship, four motivational conditions that are implicit relational requirements confront each actor. (1) *Own status*. Obtaining it from others. (2) *Other's status*. According it to others in the amount deserved. (3) *Own power*. Managing it so as neither to abuse it or failing to protect oneself if necessary. (4) *Other's power*. Avoiding or escaping others' use of it. The main thesis of this chapter is that felicity, satisfaction or happiness comes in various ways from satisfying these relational requirements. Below I examine each of these relational

bases in respect to happiness or one of its variants. Before doing so, I present some preliminary considerations that prepare the way for what follows.

### 8.3 Preliminary Considerations

#### 8.3.1 The Actor in Status-Power Theory

In the field of psychology (and in society in general) the conventional position is to see the individual actor as agentic, that is, endowed with free will and capable of being pro-active. This means that the person can make choices and choose (intrinsic) goals that “promote his/her own sense of meaning... not that of parents or culture and that reflect his/her own ‘authentic values’” (Lyubomirsky 2013, p. 241).

From a status-power point of view, this is a questionable understanding, heedless as it is of the overwhelming force of culture and social demand in every corner and every moment of human existence. We are not surprised that residents of the United States speak English or that in Pakistan they speak Urdu and in Ecuador, Spanish. Clearly this shows the influence of local social demand. Why would we think that it would be otherwise when it comes to the general run of behaviors, thoughts and beliefs? Every group has its particular body and configuration of (cultural) content and each person in the group has his/her reference group sources of influence with respect to that content—usually parents, friends, teachers, et al. They convey to the individual what they want and they have the means via status-accord to exercise influence and via power to enforce their interests. Even where there is latitude of choice, the roster of possible choices is pre-set by the culture, as transmitted.

When the person chooses from among available choices, this occurs in the context of a history of reference group interests, preferences or prescriptions that are known to the individual. Crucially, if the individual chooses other than what one reference group (parents, for example) prefers, it is not that the individual is now expressing his/her “authentic” self, but is acting in

the manner preferred by some other reference group(s), for example, friends, or an Eastern guru, and so on. Parents may want their offspring to attend law school, but the child wants to study mycology. Why is the latter option considered to reflect the “true” self? For socially vengeful purposes, it is only that another reference group, with its status and power contingencies, has become dominant.

Nor is it any different in the domain of moral choice, matters defined in terms of right or wrong, good or bad. Reference groups insinuate themselves into the individual’s psyche and make their claims when matters arise that are of interest to them. The businessman sees a profitable but illegal short-cut. Will he take it? The moral agony of decision is the agony of reference groups in contention; on one side counseling honesty and on the other side counseling larceny. The choice here will not indicate who the person “truly” is, but rather the strength of one reference group over another.

#### 8.3.2 Doing Things for Their Own Sake

Related to the idea of authenticity is the concept of the autotelic personality, an idea that has some currency in happiness studies. It is flattering to human vanity to think of humans as the apex of creation. In an older tradition (prior to Copernicus and Darwin), this was certainly the prevailing notion. Although this idea succumbed to the theories of Heliocentrism and Evolution, it persists in notions of human self-determination and self-direction. While society and social influence receive lip service, there is also a socially-disseminated but contradictory ideal—cultures are not smoothly harmonized—that valorizes the individual for transcending those influences and acting agentially out of a sense of “self.” Csikszentmihalyi (1997) employs the term “autotelic personality” to refer to “a person who...generally does things for their own sake, rather than to achieve some later external goal” (p. 117).

As if there can be any enjoyment “for its own sake,” divorced from social standards of taste and preference, experience in social contexts and the

requirements imposed by reference groups. This sort of thinking elevates the individual at the expense of the social context that, in any society, gives rise to the menu of what is preferable, desirable, allowable (see Kemper 2011, p. 46).

### 8.3.3 Cultural Variation in the Definition of Happiness

As with most other concepts, the definition of happiness varies by culture (Pedrotti et al. 2009). The classical Chinese sense of happiness sees it as a product of luck and fortune (Oishi and Kurtz 2011). Even Aristotle's *eudaimonia* (his word for happiness) was a prey to circumstances over which one had no control (Nussbaum 1986). Current Western conceptions, on the other hand, entail the idea that happiness can be actively pursued and (according to the self-help literature on happiness, e. g. Lyubomirsky 2013) is there for the taking.

This conception again reflects the agentic nature of Western individualism, where the person is an autonomous actor choosing his or her fate and actively engaging in fostering or changing it. Status-power theory, on the other hand, views the individual as being the mouthpiece of reference groups who speak through and for him or "ventriloquating," as Bakhtin (1981, p. 299) puts it. In this view, reference groups are the true actors in the individual's daily drama of relational encounters. Where reference groups are in conflict, vying for control of the actor's conduct, some vectorial resolution of the acting forces occurs. Perhaps this would be as easy to predict as knowing the algebraic resultant derived from the relative amounts of status and power each reference group wields with the focal actor.

### 8.3.4 The Organism

A very important reference group that needs to be factored into the individual's arithmetic of happiness is the organism itself, referring to what is strictly biological about the individual, including needs for food, sleep, sex and so forth. These too

enter into the happiness equation. The body has its imperatives and sometimes a hearty meal or a nap is the summum bonum. Although there are limits, culture can go quite far in shaping the organism to its design, from how and when to satisfy hunger to how and when to satisfy libido; to how and when to satisfy the demands of the moment, as for example, from pulling an all-nighter to study for an exam at college to staying put on the barricades despite the strong likelihood of death.

### 8.3.5 Human Monsters

Because we have been trained to think so by our reference groups, most of us would judge it a better world if "good" people were happy and "bad" people were unhappy. But the actualities of existence are such that human monsters are often tolerably happy, while their victims are extremely unhappy. Status-power theory accommodates this unpleasant fact, since it is ethically neutral and takes no stand on what is "good" and what is "bad." It views all ethics as ideology, a set of socially-defined-and-transmitted preferences, grounded in nothing more than their invention by those who had these preferences (see Kemper 2011). Even if the ethics and ideology are dedicated to securing happiness for the greatest number, as in classical Utilitarianism (Mill 1863), this is merely a preference for a certain outcome, without any further foundation. "It is good for us as (humans), (Americans), (Christians), (Jews), (Muslims), (Hindus), (Atheists), etc". Even "human dignity" or "reverence for life" is merely an idea that some reference group supports. Yet, other reference groups can point to the view that "redemption" comes from suffering (Romans V: 1–5). There is no ontological or epistemological rationale by which to choose any one of these over the others.

In no sense, then, is there any reason to suppose that human monsters, that is, those whom we categorize as such, are in any way less capable of happiness than are those we categorize as saints. Saint and monster are merely designations that indicate our agreement with the respective conduct of these two types of persons.

Happiness is thus only personal. It depends on the balance of status-power outcomes (as will be described below) and on the relevant reference group inputs about these outcomes and is uninformed with the happiness of others. The majority of the community may be suffering, but this does not affect individual happiness, unless pertinent reference groups have endorsed being concerned over the distress of others. One may interpose the notion of shame or guilt here, emotions that destroy the happiness of someone who has claimed excess status or used excess power. But the human monster who is happy is not necessarily prey to shame or guilt and is thus immune to disturbances from this quarter. For example, the concentration camp guard who hated Jews was not at all disturbed by these emotions.

### 8.3.6 Theory in Happiness Studies

In the field of happiness studies, the attitude toward theory is mixed. Ryff (1989), strongly endorses a theory-guided development of the field, while Csikszentmihalyi and Nakamura (2011, p. 7) ponder whether or not an overarching theory framework for positive psychology is a productive and practical alternative. It is not that there are not many theories in this field (Simon-ton (2009) worries that there may be too many theories), for example, Hope theory (Youseff and Luthans 2011), Place theory (Florida and Rentfrow 2011), Meaning theory (Seligman 2002) and so on. But these are special theories, limited in scope and not formulated to a degree that would allow broad application.

By contrast, status-power theory is a comprehensive approach to social relations that allows for broad consideration of the conditions for happiness. Manifestly, however, it is lacking in one respect, namely it is focused on the wide scope of satisfactions that emerge from social relations, but it does not directly explain the deep pleasure and satisfaction many people obtain from what appear to be non-social sources, for example, panoramic vistas, towering Redwoods, sight of a roiling ocean and other scenes of nature, although there is possibly some reference

group contribution to full understanding here. Tentatively, I suggest the following. The so-called Romantic movement of the late 18th-19th Centuries brought Nature to heightened attention among those in the upper reaches of society. Wordsworth's lines from his "The Tables Turned" will serve as illustration: "Up! up! my Friend, and quit your books/...Come forth into the light of things/Let Nature be your teacher/... Enough of Science and of Art/Close up those barren leaves/Come forth and bring with you a heart/That watches and receives." This sentiment favoring Nature was a change of standard about what was to be regarded as important to appreciate not only when out-of-doors but also in travel, the design of homes, the valuation of emotion, the educational curriculum, the writing of novels, the goals of philosophy and the practice of politics. Appreciating the majesty, authenticity and glory of Nature, both as feast for the eye and as transcendental product, became treasured source for status attainment. One was *au courant* and therefore deserving of consideration (status) if one could report a serious interest and involvement with Nature. This had not generally been the case prior to the Romantic movement (Rigby 2004; Oerlemans 2002; Fry 1996).

### 8.3.7 Psychological Variables and Status-Power Understandings

Every discipline is privileged to choose its own variables and its own labels for them. But sometimes the findings of other disciplines part a curtain that can illuminate some of the issues that are otherwise obscure. For example, psychologists find that happiness is correlated with "number of close friends," "frequency of contact with friends and relatives" and "making new acquaintances" (Watson 2009), but do not explain why these social conditions should lead to happiness. Status-power theory proposes that relations with others (friends, contacts, acquaintances) are replete with opportunities and occasions for status enhancements, both of self and others, and that these feel good. From a status-power perspective, it is no wonder that significant amounts of relational

involvements with others lead to higher subjective well-being.

### 8.3.8 Definitions of Happiness

Researchers have not all agreed on what constitutes happiness. Ryff (1989) looks at two main approaches. The first is hedonic, with happiness considered as psychological well-being. In classic work by Bradburn (1969) happiness is defined in terms of the balance between positive and negative emotions. These different emotions were virtually uncorrelated in his results and each was associated with different variables. Ryff's second conception of happiness derives from Aristotle's approach to well-being and called *eudaimonia*, the Greek term that Waterman (1984) claims is mistranslated as happiness. Rather, according to Waterman, *eudaimonia* refers to "feelings accompanying behavior in the direction of, and consistent with, one's true potential" (p. 16) or the striving for realization of an ideal of excellence or perfection. This is a markedly different approach from the orientation, following Bradburn, to the experience of pleasure (Kahneman 1999) or satisfaction with one's life at any given point in time (e. g., Diener et al. 1999) or over-all life satisfaction (e. g., Neugarten et al. 1961).

Leaning toward the eudaimonic approach, Ryff postulates the importance of several dimensions in this understanding of well-being: *self-acceptance, positive relations with others, autonomy, purpose in life, environmental mastery* and *personal growth*. Factor analyzing measures of these properties in conjunction with life satisfaction, Ryff found three factor that clearly reflect three of the four status-power relational contingencies: First was a factor defined in part by environmental mastery or ability to perform technical activity that leads to status conferral. Second was a factor defined in part by positive relations with others and purpose in life. This points directly to other's status, since one ordinarily has positive relations with others because one is conferring adequate amounts of status on them. A large literature strongly suggests that the feeling of liking depends on the amount of status other is

conferring on oneself (Kemper 1989). The third factor loaded the variable autonomy along with a high negative loading for "powerful others." This factor clearly represents other's power, wherein one is sufficiently independent from the other to nullify his or her power. Oddly, only the first factor, dealing with own status, loaded the dependent variable "life satisfaction." This would seem to negate the idea that happiness (or satisfaction) can come from attaining some optimum standing on *each* of the four relational contingencies. But this is counter-intuitive and appears to be negated by the evidence (discussed below). Furthermore, Ryff finds only three factors instead of four (the number of relational contingencies). The missing factor is own power, and we must attribute the failure to find this factor to Ryff's failure to include items reflecting it. This stems from the ad hoc way in which Ryff recruited concepts for the eudaimonic version of well-being.

I turn now to the relationship between own status, other's status, own power and other's power and felicity, happiness, satisfaction, contentment or well-being.

## 8.4 Own Status

### 8.4.1 Demographic vs Interactional Effects on Subjective Well-Being

Common social structural status markers like income, education and sex are only weakly related to subjective well-being (Argyle 1987; Myers and Diener 1995; Watson 2000; Tay and Diener 2011). This is somewhat surprising, since income, education and sex have clear status implications. Yet, except if they (money and education) are recently acquired, they have likely succumbed to "adaptation" and are no longer available in memory as considerations for happiness (Brickman and Campbell 1971). On the other hand, the same literature reports that happiness is correlated positively with "number of close friends, frequency of contact with friends and relatives, making new acquaintances, involvement in social organizations, and overall level of social activity" (Watson 2009, p. 211) and that



positive emotions are associated with recurring social support and respect.

It can be seen that while some status variables decline in significance for happiness, others remain vital. This is likely because social conditions involving friends, for example, are frequently renewed by increments of status-gain in the most recent interaction, e. g., one reports a satisfying interaction with a disliked boss and friends laud one for one's chutzpah, cleverness and so forth. This is indeed the status service that friends provide to each other—listening, approving, endorsing and confirming. These tidbits of status ultimately take their place in the long chain of similar status enhancements, but when they are still fresh in mind, they serve to elevate one's positive feelings. The same holds true for all of one's socially active involvements with others. Baumeister and Leary (1995) report that most social interactions have positive outcomes, hence, except in unusual circumstances, those who frequently engage in interaction with others—friends, family, fellow members of organizations—are likely to have a positive amount of status in their account.

It is also the case, however, that happy people are more sociable and may therefore attract other people and develop a greater number of lasting and meaningful relationships (Lyubomirsky et al. 2005). Thus there may be a reciprocal relationship between social relations and subjective well-being. Many studies in this area are cross-sectional and correlational and thus lend themselves to the reciprocal interpretation.

### 8.4.2 Types of Status Sought

Although all seek status all do not seek status by the same means or the same currency. This is partly due to the division of labor. The bricklayer does not care how many concertos the pianist can play and the musician doesn't care about bricks. And this differentiation is, of course, fortunate, since it minimizes the competition for a scarce good. But the damping of conflict is opposed by the operation of money, the universal solvent and status marker. This too is a scarce good and com-

petition here is almost universally the case. Thus, the bricklayer wants the pianist to pay more for his house, while the musician want a higher price for a concert ticket.

Some free themselves from the pursuit of money and the things that money can buy (materialism). In fact, for the purpose of happiness, materialism stands in second place relative to experience. Striving for material evidence of status “depletes happiness, [damages] relationships, harms the environment, renders [individuals] less friendly, likable empathic and helpful to others” (Lyubomirsky 2013, p. 171).

### 8.4.3 Play and Subjective Well-Being

Although the approach taken here is to look for the positive consequences normally afforded by behavior in the four relational conditions (own status, other's status, own power and other's power), there is a source of satisfaction outside institutionalized relationships. This is the domain of play, which, as defined in Kemper (2011), is a form of interaction that stands outside formal status-power relations.

Arguably, play is the most satisfying human activity. It is the least restrictive on impulse or imagination, it has no necessary trajectory or teleology (except as this emerges from the play itself). It may have yet to-be-fully-told advantages in preparing a brain template for adult development and happiness (see Panksepp 2007, 2011). As I have argued in Kemper (2011), play's efficacy may stem from the fact that in play the constrictions and limitations of formal status-power systems are set aside. For example, in play, formal roles are abandoned and all participants can drink from the cup of leadership (“It's good to be King”), from the cup of celebrity, from the cup of being the center of attention. Play time is when the penalties of the normally operating status-power system are suspended and even the outrageous may rule.

Panksepp (2011) nominates play as a central feature of the biological substrate of positive emotions. He attributes to play the function of allowing “exploration of intersubjective space”

(p. 64). This seems to mean that in play, children can try out various status and power stances without being totally committed to them. It may be conjectured that play, as such, never ceases, even in adulthood, since there is always new ground to explore with respect to who deserves status and in what amounts. Jokes and other ludic efforts are instances of the non-serious pursuit of status-power.

Play has come to be regarded as so important that it has invaded commerce. Companies in the leading-edge fields of electronic and social media have created work places they call “campuses” and have provided amenities and informalities that duplicate play settings (Time 2013). Certain organizations whose success depends to a high degree on creativity in their employees tend these days to downplay formal status-power relations. “Dressing down” is a feature of this, since it removes one of the ritual borders that separate status-power holders of different degree from each other. Designing work-settings as if they were college campuses and adding such non-institutional amenities as snacks and candy, brainstorming boards and Foosball tables also contribute to the play-like ambiance (see Trendhunter 2013).

In play settings, status can be earned by sheer talent, as formal constraints are abandoned. It is the ultimate form of interaction for status attainment, since, in the moment of contribution all eyes are focused on the contributor, a highly desirable status focus.

#### 8.4.4 Flow

Csikszentmihalyi (1997; Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi 2009) has identified a cognitive-emotional state that people sometimes experience when they are single-mindedly focused on an activity, such as working on a painting, playing chess, mountain climbing and so on. The activity must be valued (this will be discussed further below) and it must be challenging, but within the reach of the actor’s skill and it must provide immediate feedback (Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi 2009, p. 195). When these conditions prevail, the actor can stay with the

activity for extended periods of time, ignoring hunger, fatigue and other bodily discomfort. The occasion of involvement is said to involve loss of awareness of the self and the experience of the activity is rewarding to such a degree that often the end-goal is just an excuse for the activity (Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi 2009, p. 196). Csikszentmihalyi (1997) calls this state “flow.” I propose that the conditions and properties of flow are no more than a description of an ideal form of status attainment and fit well within a relational paradigm. Consider first, as discussed above, that there is no such thing as “activity for its own sake.” To believe otherwise is tantamount to believing in gratuitous action, where there are no causes and no interests besides participating in the action itself. Status-power theory holds that all action has status-power content and relevance.<sup>2</sup> Csikszentmihalyi’s focal actors—painters, writers, chess players, rock climbers, dancers, et al.—are notably intensely competitive strivers after attention, prominence, superiority and so forth, all indicators of status. Engaging in their activity at all is their preferred route to attaining status from others. That the endeavor is itself satisfying is a plus, but it can be understood from the conclusion that it is “going well,” that it will earn the status the actor intends the effort to earn. We may imagine, contrariwise, a state in which the work is going badly, which means that effects are not being realized as intended, moves are foiled, decisions as to what to do next are uncertain and so on. Both Csikszentmihalyi and status-power theory would say that there would be no sense of flow. Not because the work and its challenges have changed, but because one is not meeting the challenges and hence not earning the status that the work is intended for.

Indirectly, Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi (2009) acknowledge the status-power foundation of flow. They say that the challenges of the

<sup>2</sup> Though anecdotal, an inventor’s story provides clear evidence of the status interests behind creative effort. Meredith Perry says about the mental experience: “It’s like being on crack...you can literally get sucked into solving the problem and *all you want to do is tell everyone about it*” (Hitt 2013, p. 3, emphasis added).

task must not exceed skill. Why should they not? Because if they do, there is no chance to earn status for the (successful) outcome or performance. Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi (2009) also speak of “immediate feedback.” What is fed back except the success or failure of the previous effort? Success here means that the work gained the status it was intended to gain. Flow is not a mysterious concept, but one that reflects successful progress toward status attainment and the deep satisfaction that that brings.

### 8.4.5 General Considerations

Obtaining status leads to well-being, but other considerations impinge to moderate the happy outcome in an upward or downward direction:

1. *Interpenetration.* At the theatre, actors take their bows at curtain time and the waves of applause are certainly status-accord. But, consider! The audience consists overwhelmingly of strangers. Does the actor really care about the attitudes of these strangers except in the most abstract way? Suppose, however, that someone the actor knew personally were in the audience. Would the actor not be playing specifically for that person, hoping to receive kudos from him or her, willing to obtain those even over the most enthusiastic applause of strangers? The general principle here is that obtaining status matters when it comes from the person or entity one wants to receive the status from. Thus, Gatsby attained to a lurid public standing, but it was only to impress his former love, Daisy; Hamlet received kind attention from his friends at court, but his focus was on his dead father; one does a good deed and is thanked for it by the grateful recipients, but the reference group that matters is God.
2. *Consistency.* While attaining status is an immediate good and necessarily evokes happiness, attaining status may lead to unhappiness if it creates an inconsistency between the levels of status one receives from different reference groups. The Persian courtier Haman in the Biblical *Book of Esther* attained first rank among the King’s chamberlains, but was frustrated in the extreme because a single court attendant, the Jew Mordechai, did not bow to him. In matters of personal happiness there seems to be a bent toward consistency. Over all, there is a strain toward wanting to be accorded substantially the same amount of deference from all of one’s reference groups. A rise in status received from one reference group instigates a desire for a commensurate status increase from other reference groups. Status-power theory offers the following explanation:  
To receive status from a reference group is new information about the individual as he or she appears to other reference groups. To receive increased status in a relationship is a marker of one’s increased status worth and this sense of deservingness bleeds out into all other relationships. For example, higher pay to people who do “dirty work” elevates their sense of deservingness and hence opens up a sense of disdain for doing “dirty work,” an anomalous state (Kemper 1979).  
The consequences of disparities of this kind are widespread. De Tocqueville (1955/1856) found that many supporters of the French Revolution lived in regions where standards of living had improved. Thus, people should have been *more* content, but weren’t. Protests in Brazil in 2013 reflected a similar discrepancy between a status improvement in one area of life and a continuing lack of improvement in other areas of life (Surowiecki 2013). Thus, well-being in the long run requires some consistency in status receipt across all relationships.
3. *Comparison.* Would one rather be a small fish in a big pond or a big fish in a small pond (see Frank 1985)? Many would choose the latter, since it leads to the most favorable kind of comparison: no one is bigger than oneself. Tversky and Griffin (1991) and Shafir et al. (1997) show that a raise in pay, which in the expected amount is surely satisfying, is rendered unsatisfying when one learns that comparable others received a larger increase. Brockmann et al. (2009) found that in China, despite a decade of significant rise in material living standards and income, overall happiness

declined, due, they reasoned, to comparison with the even larger gains of a small upper-income stratum. Compared with this elite, the income of most Chinese worsened. Not unlike a child–Freud (1953–1974/1914) used the term “His Majesty, the baby”—one wants perennially to be valued in the highest possible degree and that assessment is damaged if someone else, similar enough to warrant comparison, is shown to be valued higher than oneself. This is why salaries are most often not disclosed (but see a contrary view by Hernandez 2013).

Lyubomirsky (2013) considers it deplorable that “the average person cares more about social comparison, about rank and about so-called “positional goods” [which indicate one’s social standing] than about the absolute value of his bank account” (p. 169) and urges people who want to be happier to forego such comparisons. But this may not be possible, since status, as the general surrogate for all such interests, is a comparative concept. First of all, because status involves distribution of a scarce commodity, it is necessarily ordinalized into “more” and “less.” The deference, attention, interest given to one cannot be given to another. Each member of the group is therefore aware of his/her standing in the distribution. Second, except where measures are instituted to occlude transparency, the benefits accruing to different status levels are visible to all, thus affording an appetite for benefits not available at one’s own level.

4. *Curvilinearity*. Although one might think that more happiness is better, happiness seems not to proceed in a straight line. Diener et al. (2002) studied college students in 1976 and then re-studied the same individuals 20 years later. They found that those who reported themselves happier in college (suggesting, according to status-power theory, that they had higher status) had higher incomes in 1996 than those who reported themselves least happy (suggesting, according to status-power theory, that they had lower status) in the earlier years. But, it turned out, those who were only moderately cheerful in 1976 were the happiest in their work 20 years later, although

this odd outcome did not apply to their marital relationship. As far as happiness over the long run is concerned, these results suggest that it may not always pay to have the highest status.

5. *Excess*. The most provocative of Durkheim’s (1897/1951) types of suicide is the one he calls “anomic.” It seems counter-intuitive to suggest that someone who experiences extreme good fortune is in peril from that very fact. Durkheim had a *folie* for social regulation and it is possible that he was wrong. The evidence is not very clear on this. But the notion is still tantalizing, namely that good fortune can lead to demise by one’s own hand, because there is no ceiling or adequate regulation of one’s desires. Being endless, desire presumably leads ultimately to despair, because the desire outstrips the ability to satisfy it, unless, as Durkheim argued, there is a socially imposed horizon about how much is enough (see Chandler and Tsai 1993).
6. *Schadenfreude*. There is a peculiar own-status-linked source of satisfaction that comes from learning of the discomfiture of others. This pleasure has a tinge of malice and is called *Schadenfreude*. The other who suffers the difficulty must somehow be one’s enemy; that is, even though amicable relations may prevail on the surface, there is envy and, because of it, antipathy. The harm to the other must not be caused by one’s own action, but rather by the actions of third parties or impersonal forces. Thus, however cheered by the outcome, one is blameless. Fate has somehow made it work out that one’s status is elevated in comparison with the other. Author Gore Vidal captured *Schadenfreude* in reverse in his classic quip: “Whenever a friend succeeds, a little something in me dies.”
7. *Envy*. Envy is a painful emotion (Rodriguez et al. 2010), focused on one’s own status deficit and with no readily available coping strategy to remedy the situation. But, does envy by others enhance the status of the person being envied and thereby increase his or her sense of well-being? There is some indirect evidence that this is the case. Rodriguez et al. (2010) found that the belief that one was envied led

to increased self-confidence. Self-confidence can be understood as the belief that one will attain the status one is striving to obtain and we may reasonably assume that a rise in self-confidence is pleasing.

8. *Social Support*. Vangelisti (2009), reviewed by Gable and Gosnell (2011), offers three conceptualizations of social support: (1) Structural support, which is measured by the number of social ties a person has; (2) Enacted support, which is the support given when there is a need; and (3) Perceived support, which is the person's belief about what support she will receive when there is a need for it. Strikingly, actual support has no relationship to well-being (Dunkel-Schetter and Bennett 1990; Bolger et al. 2000; but see Little 2011, p. 236). But perceived support does predict positive emotion (Kaul and Lakey 2003; Lakey and Casady 1990). As to why actual support is not better received, Bolger et al. (2000) speculate that to be assisted, even when in need, puts a spotlight on one's own failings and incompetence and hence un-deservingness of status. Perceived support, on the other hand, is like having a deposit in the bank that one believes one can draw on when in need.

In sum, receiving status is central to happiness or well-being, but the relationship between status and happiness is neither simple nor direct.

---

## 8.5 Other's Status

We can easily understand why improvements in own status give rise to well-being. The effect is deep and pervasive, affecting not only the sense of well-being, but also pain tolerance, immunological response and longevity (Lyubomirsky et al. 2005). Yet, the individual who accords status to others not only helps those others to the same benefits, but, remarkably, helps him- or herself too. Reviewing many studies, Heady (2008) found that family-oriented and altruistic goals led to well-being. Steger et al. (2007) found that volunteering and giving money to someone in need helped to realize one's own eudaimonic goals. Frederickson et al. (2008) found that prac-

tices of "loving kindness" toward others released positive emotions in the self. In a study done with internet participants, Mongrain et al. (2011) found that those assigned to engage in compassionate action (by actively helping or interacting with someone in a supportive and considerate way) showed sustained gains in happiness over a 6-month period. These results make sense for a number of reasons relating to status-power dynamics:

1. *Own Power*: Assisting and supporting members of one's own group assists and supports the individual as well. This would be because one way that group members manifest their "groupness" is through mutual assistance in time of need. If one helps others, they will help when one is in need of assistance against an outgroup (Durkheim 1912/1915). In consequence, the group itself is more securely maintained through mutual dependency and mutual help. Each occasion of providing support thus reinforces the mutual bonds and this is experienced as well-being, in the form of *security*, an emotion/feeling that depends in part on own power, which is magnified in coalition with others (Kemper 2011).
2. *Own Status*: While some may argue for an evolutionary provenance for helping others in one's own group, there are also strong motives that depend on the practical effects for one's own status. Aside from the status conferred in gratitude by the immediate beneficiaries of one's assistance, helping others also elicits status from those reference groups that inculcated the principle that is it moral or expedient to provide such assistance. This source of status is entirely independent of whether the recipient expresses gratitude and is, curiously, likely to be a stronger motive for helping out than is the motive to receive expressions of gratitude from the direct recipient. The two motives described here are not mutually exclusive and both could be operating at any given occasion of assistance to others.

To enhance another party's status through gratitude is now understood to have some unexpected positive effects on own happiness (McCullough et al. 2008).



Expressing gratitude leads to subjective well-being according to Emmons and Mishra (2011) through the mechanism of reducing upward comparisons and through reducing attractions to “materialism.” Avoiding upward comparisons as a way of judging the value of one’s own status increments reduces the chance of feeling envy when one finds others receiving more status than oneself (Ger and Belk 1996). Avoiding materialism blocks a focus on prestige and dominance, relational conditions that can rarely avoid invidious comparisons, which frequently threaten happiness (Polak and McCullough 2006). Expressing gratitude also enhances subjective well-being through eliciting positive memories, establishing social resources that make one a more desirable person to interact with, which helps goal attainment (Emmons and Mishra 2011). In their review of the field, Woods et al. (2010) found 12 studies in which gratitude is “robustly” related to indicators of well-being: high positive affect, low negative affect and high satisfaction with life (p. 895). These results are consistent too with those in Gallup (1999) in which 90% of a survey of adults and teens said that they felt “extremely happy” or “somewhat happy” when they expressed gratitude. Finally, for many persons, gratitude directed to God or other transcendent being puts one in a more satisfactory relationship with such entities, an important condition for the feeling of well-being by believers (Durkheim 1912/1915; Krause 2006).

The remarkable fact about gratitude is that not only is the recipient enhanced in well-being, but also the person who expresses it. Status-power theory explains this in the same way Durkheim (1912/1915) explains why the religious communicant feels good after having served his god: he expects to receive blessings (status) at some later stage when he needs them (see McCullough et al. 2008). That is, gratitude completes a circuit involving giving and, reciprocally, expressing thanks for receiving. Reference groups promote this policy as status-based politeness or as a polite move where one is indebted to another.

Gratitude also serves to remove a sense the other party may have of the receiver’s dependen-

cy, ergo vulnerability to power. This power-based easing of obligation is also sounded in the analysis of gratitude by Simmel (1950/1908). Simmel subtly proposed that gratitude, as a response to a benefit or gift provided by another individual, has something coerced about it and lacks the freedom and spontaneity of the original gift. But, perhaps contrary to Simmel, by showing gratitude one evens the score, so to speak, thus reducing the obligation to the other and gaining some relational independence.

### 8.5.1 Happiness vs Elevation, Gratitude and Admiration

Earlier versions of the status-power theory of emotions (Kemper 1978, 2006) assigned happiness to the relational condition of receiving status. In addition there was the happiness of according an extreme amount of status, as in the case of love (Kemper 2006; 2011). No further differentiation was considered in the matter of emotional outcomes from according status to others. Recently, however, Algoe and Haidt (2009) have advanced our understanding, differentiating among what they call “other praising” emotions: elevation, gratitude and admiration. These all involve conferring status on another person, but they are different, even to the extent of accompanying physical aspects (in gratitude and admiration).

Algoe and Haidt define *elevation* as the “emotional response to moral exemplars.” It is felt when “witnessing acts of virtue or moral beauty” and is elicited by acts of charity, fidelity, generosity and leads to the positive feeling that one has been uplifted or elevated and feeling less selfish than previously. It is noteworthy that these acts represent realizations of high (Western) cultural ideals, such as would normally earn status for their performance. But from merely being in the presence of such qualities, one is oneself status-enhanced. *Gratitude* (as discussed above) is triggered when one perceives that one is the “beneficiary of another’s intentionally provided benefit” (McCullough et al. 2008) and that the

other party is being responsive to one's needs and interests, that is, providing status enhancement, as described in this chapter. One wants to repay or return the favor "beyond tit-for-tat." *Admiration* is defined as the response to outstanding achievements or accomplishments that display "non-moral excellence" (Algoe and Haidt 2009, pp. 106–107).

Although all three of these "appreciation emotions" also evoked recollections of just plain happiness as the major experienced emotion, both gratitude and admiration bid for standing as separate emotions by their distinctive physical sensations (as recalled by research participants). In one study, gratitude evoked a sense of muscular relaxation and admiration evoked both tears in the eyes and a lump in the throat (Algoe and Haidt 2009). In another study (also in Algoe and Haidt 2009), elevation was marked by a warm feeling in the chest and admiration evoked chills, goose bumps or tingles in some. In motivational tendencies, both gratitude and admiration led to the desire to express emotion verbally through saying, "Thank you," or hugging the other person. Both of these are status conferrals as described here and, from the hugging proclivity, we must assume that the accompanying feeling is strongly positive.

Since elevation and admiration are newly defined in the area of other's status, the literature has not recorded any relationship between these emotions and well-being, although it is not difficult to suppose such a connection via the harmony experienced between own standards and other's qualities or performance (Hamblin and Smith 1966; Kemper 2011). Gratitude, however, has been studied extensively (as discussed above).

### 8.5.2 Altruism vs Self-Interest

Altruism is a notable expression of conferring status and it features prominently in discussions as to whether we are only self-interested when we give to others or can also be truly altruistic. Keltner (2009, p. 9) suggests that while getting

status is pleasing, giving it may be even more in one's self interest. In status-power theory, according status to others has an aspect that enhances own status. Every relationship that falls within normal bounds, thus excluding master-slave, love and outright war (see Kemper 1978), requires the giving of status as well as receiving it. Batson (Batson et al. 1988; Batson and Shaw 1991; Batson et al. 2009), however, argues for the full autonomy of an altruistic motive that does not depend on gaining rewards (status) or avoiding punishments (power) as motivation for the altruistic act. Stets and Carter (2012) also propose a similar agentic type of conduct.

Batson et al. (1988) test the hypothesis of altruistic disinterestedness in a complex study in which participants with either high or low empathy either were, or were not, able actually to aid a person they had previously expressed a willingness to help. The nub of it, Batson argues, is that according to the view in which one receives a benefit for one's altruism, these high-empathy participants would feel better about themselves *only* if they were the actual cause of relief of the victim's need. That is, you may have wanted to help, but if you were helping with the motive of gaining reward or avoiding punishment, then you should feel good only if you actually did help. But Batson found no evidence that high-empathy subjects felt better when the victim's need was relieved by their own action than when it was relieved by other means. In other words, high empathy subjects were happy regardless of whether they got to relieve the victim's distress personally, that is actually doing something to earn a reward or avoid a punishment. Batson concluded from this that altruism was autonomous as motive and action.

From a status-power perspective, I demur at Batson et al.'s understanding of their findings. Absent specifications about the value of the target group—it could be one's family, one's race, one's ethnic group, all humanity, sentient life, etc.—there is little likelihood that the sentiment to help a random other person would be very strong. Thus, when the sentiment to help is activated, one is mainly honoring the reference group that

transmitted the original prescription to help. I propose that the mental shift toward compliance with this prescription to help is what crucially mattered in Batson's experiment, not whether one actually provided the help. Because the "action-readiness" (Frijda 2007) to help had been aroused, one had in effect complied with the directive to help. That circumstances prevented one from helping does not affect the main reward (status) or avoidance of punishment (power) condition, which comes from the pertinent reference groups and not from the potential beneficiary. Batson's supposition that failure to execute would change the mood of any high-empathy people who did get a chance to earn a reward or avoid a punishment is flawed, since what is at stake is a willingness to help, as prescribed, not the helping itself. Accepting the call to act saintly makes one feel saintly, even if one is never called into action as a saint. Sometimes we receive credit (status) for our good intentions. We would not expect that the good mood we might feel from having an action-tendency to help would decline when the need to help is obviated. Yinon and Landau (1987) found that after offering to provide help, research participants were in a more positive mood than those who were not given the opportunity to help. Indeed, merely the affirmation of the intention to help was sufficient to elevate mood. Again, it is hard to imagine that this is unrelated to tutelage by parents, teachers, religious functionaries, etc., about the desirability of helping those in need.

Altruistic behavior may be an operant, emerging by chance and unlikely to become an established aspect of behavior without social interest in its continuance. The child who, unbidden, altruistically helps a playmate is likely to receive a full complement of parental rewards (status) for doing so. These are even likely to dwarf any rewards conferred in gratitude by the beneficiary of the help. Single-trial learning is also highly probable here. Though Batson may not like the fact that altruism is socially supported and therefore, in his terms, delivering egoistic rewards (or avoidance of punishment), it seems closer to social reality to consider it so than to propose altruism as a mode of behavior that is independent of social tutelage and its status-power consequences.

## 8.6 Own Power

Own power is evident in moments of victory, the occasion of overcoming a competitor or enemy after a struggle involving real or symbolic force and counter-force. Street brawls and warfare are settings where own power is unleashed in real terms; wrestling and boxing matches approximate this; and chess and scrabble are bodily-safe game-versions of blood-and-death contests. Except, perhaps, in Pyrrhic triumphs, the successful use of own power is likely to bring extreme satisfaction. Victory parades and their often Dionysian rule-breaking follow-up are ritualized celebrations of this type of relational outcome. In contests where survival is literally at stake, victory signifies safety and security from the power of the other combatant. Defeating an enemy, whether in real terms or symbolically, elicits laughter, among other reactions. This emerges often in the context of humor, where an enemy is mocked and overcome in symbolic terms, even if the opponent cannot be beaten in reality (Kemper 2011).

Scant research has been devoted to the dynamics of exercising real power, as described here. We must therefore accept surrogates for power and look for theoretically predicted associations. For example, the so called "Big Five" personality factor, *Extraversion*, reflects own power in part via its facet of "assertiveness" (McCrae and Costa 1989) and Costa and McCrae (1980) found that extraversion predicted positive feelings. Diener et al. (1992) have also found that Extraversion was related to measures of subjective well-being. The results of these two studies are a step removed from finding that the own power as a relational condition is related to happiness, but it is a step in the theoretically-predicted direction. Tacking into the association between own-power and well-being from another direction, Fredrickson (1998) sees the emotion of *contentment* as arising "when one is certain of safety" (Gable and Gosnell 2011, p. 275). As described here, safety is an emotion that should pertain largely to one's own power. One can be relaxed, so to speak, because one feels secure in one's ability to prevent the other party from exerting undue force, threat or influence.

Yet another entrée into the relationship between own power and happiness is through the association between anger or anger-release in aggression and reward. Does it feel good to vent upon or to strike another person (in other words, using own power) in a fit of anger? Freud (1930/1951) would have called this a “natural” reaction. Indeed, such behavior often obtains its goal, which is satisfying, and is thus reinforced. Ramirez et al. (2005) found a curvilinear relationship between aggression (as recalled) and satisfaction. Medium levels of aggression evoked the highest amount of happiness, as opposed to higher or lower amount of using power on others (see also Ramirez et al. 2003). Mountains of anecdotal evidence also support the view that releasing own power to crush the opposition of another person is satisfying. Taking this to a pathological level, there is the clinical pattern of sadism, which is defined as the obtaining of satisfaction from inflicting pain on another person (Myers et al. 2006). While this trait was elevated to the level of a diagnostic category in DSM-III-R (American Psychiatric Association 1987), it has been removed (inappropriately according to Myers, Burket and Husted) from later editions. In the laboratory, Couppis and Kennedy (2008) found that mice allowed to aggress against intruders in their cage were clearly experiencing being rewarded for their aggressive behavior. Translated to the human level, if a behavior is rewarded, it must feel good to engage in that behavior. While hard evidence for the relationship between own power and well-being is scant, there is no evidence to the contrary. Indeed, the task of socialization consists in large part of getting individuals to control the impulse to use their power, which introduces the possibility of shame and/or guilt which are obviously unfelicitous emotions.

---

## 8.7 Other’s Power

To greater or lesser extent, other’s power is a feature of every relationship except for certain stages of love (see Kemper 2011). It is there in the threatening and/or coercive moves the other person makes or may potentially make. Prudence

(and the reference groups that urge it) suggests that one be somehow armed against the power of the other. One such form or armor is to amass sufficient counter-power so that the other person will be careful in using his or her own power. This was the strategy in use during the years of the Cold War between the U. S. and the USSR. A threat of mutually assured destruction (MAD) kept the world safe from nuclear devastation.

A different strategy for dealing with other’s power comes in the form of autonomy or reduced dependency. This follows from the work of Emerson (1962) who offered the following equations:

$$P_{ab} = D_{ba} \text{ and } P_{ba} = D_{ab}$$

This reads: The power of a over b is a function of the dependence of b on a; and the power of b over a is a function of the dependence of a on b. This formulation has been supported in many studies of interaction (Cook and Emerson 1978; Molm 1990).

Given the above, in instances where autonomy preserves one from the power of the other, there can be no doubt that there is some sort of happiness, perhaps in the form of gratitude for the forethought that kept one from excessive dependence on the other. While the gratitude may sometimes be experienced as directed toward oneself for one’s social savvy, the social-relational and reference-group reality is that the gratitude is owed to those others who counseled or urged a prudential policy in relations with others. (It is highly unlikely that such a considered strategy is invented by each individual who uses it.) It should be noted too that autonomy is featured prominently in the eudaimonic approach to well-being (Ryff 1989; Ryff and Singer 1998; Ryan and Deci 2001) and that autonomy has also been found to be important for relationship well-being (Patrick et al. 2007; Hui, Molden and Finkel 2013).

Autonomy, however, may have a gender tag. For example, Phillips et al. (1997) studied government functionaries in Canada, looking for sentiments about the value of the sense of community and of connection to others in carrying

out their tasks. Female executives valued aspects of task involvement, while males did not. Rather, the men preferred that others “get out of their way” so they could do their job. These males felt hampered by their dependence on other and were yearning for the autonomy that would free them of obligations to others.

Another relational feature of other’s power is the feeling of *trust*. Trust, a positive feeling, is defined here as the willingness to put oneself into the power of another in the belief that that power will not be used (Kemper 2011). A perhaps fanciful but suggestive approach to trust and positive emotion is provided by W. E. B. Du Bois (1936, cited in Gooding-Williams 2009, p. 294): “Somewhere in the world, and not beyond it, there is Trust, and somehow Trust leads to Joy.”

If one does not trust another, then one must accept that one is vulnerable to the power of the other. But there are ways of moderating the power of the other and in incidents where this diminishment occurs, there must be some sense of well-being. Hegel’s notion of the master-slave relationship (presented in his “Phenomenology of Spirit”) points to such an outcome. Though the master is acknowledged to have the power, the master is also dependent on the slave in a double sense and this gives the slave the shred of satisfaction that can be gleaned from the situation. First, the master depends on the slave to recognize him as master and this is a tenuous recognition, as everything from slave humor to outright revolt testifies. Second, the slave is chained to labor, but it is through the labor of producing objects, that the slave comes to realize him- or herself as an independent being who can accomplish things the master cannot (Lavine 1984, pp. 221–223).

Among the strategies of the actor with lesser power is to have a more complete knowledge of the one with greater power than is the case in the reverse direction. Acitelli et al. (1993) found that in marriages with power imbalance, the person with lesser power (mainly the wife) obtains a “sense of control” from understanding her spouse (p. 15). Control is a variant of power and to have power to any degree is satisfying, as discussed above.

Finally, I mention courage, which is to act against the power of the other despite one’s fear of it. The opposite is cowardice, which is a portal to shame. Courage, therefore, must excite a certain happiness, not least on account of the sense that, even if what one is attempting is doomed, one will be well-regarded for the attempt. This means that others will confer status and that relational outcome evokes some form of positive emotion.

In the foregoing, I have examined the happiness prospects that reside in the four relational channels of own status, other’s status, own power and other’s power. I conclude now with a consideration of the status-power foundations of meaningfulness and how these relate to happiness.

---

## 8.8 Meaning and Happiness

Parallel to the four relational channels with respect to gaining happiness and seemingly independent of them, because of its resonance as an item of culture as opposed to social relations, is the notion of *meaningfulness*, as in a ‘meaningful undertaking’ or a ‘meaningful life.’ In many accounts, meaningful action is supposed to lead to happiness. Let us see how meaningfulness ties back to social relations as understood in status-power terms. Myers and Diener (1995) and Watson (2000) have found that people who describe themselves as religious or spiritual report higher levels of happiness than those who do not. Explanations of this center on two notions: First, spirituality provides a sense of meaning and, second, spirituality is most often transacted in the company of others. Taking the second first, it is understandable that some of the benefits derived from spirituality are socially located. Religious settings are virtually always social settings and there one finds like-minded others who are both seeking and, importantly, prepared to give social support or, in terms used here, status, to their fellow communicants. The way meaning affects well-being can also be approached through an understanding of status and power dynamics. Let us now consider the status-power meaning of meaning.



### 8.8.1 Meaning

Among the more vexing questions that humans have considered is that of the meaning (of life). No single answer has emerged, although within religious traditions, particular answers have dominated or been influential. But the rise of secular approaches to philosophical questions has generated multitudes of answers, from the clearly eccentric “figuring out how the world works” (Madrigal 2013, p. 40) to the assertion that life has no inherent meaning, as in Existential Psychology (Park 2011, p. 329). Between the extremes of oddity and of disavowal, most scholars of meaning take a more nuanced stance.

Inspired by the devastating recollections of concentration camp survivor Victor Frankl (1963), many psychologists speak of finding meaning in terms of “being connected to causes greater than oneself” (Park 2011, p. 326; Peterson et al. 2005). Even Existential Psychology can be seen to relent somewhat in its view that despite the indifference of the universe, “people create meaning in their life (or find a belief system that does) [and] develop deeply significant relationships...” (Park 2011, p. 329).

I propose that what provides meaning to involvement in causes greater than oneself is the sense that one is according status to others, according to a reference-group-prescribed scheme for doing so, for example, as in *Imitatio Dei*, or serving humanity, or sacrificing for one’s family and so on. This selflessness is only selfless when considering mainly worldly attainments or satisfactions (pleasures of the belly or of renown), but is not selfless when there is the satisfaction of having conducted oneself according to the prescriptions of the relevant reference group (God, one’s Church, one’s ethnic group, etc.). This follows from the principle that the action instigated by a cause greater than oneself necessarily invokes a status consequence, both for the target and for the individual him- or herself. Meaning is thus understandable in terms of the idealized and often prescribed behaviors that earn status; sociability and “significant relationships” are major domains in which status is gained (see Watson 2009).

### 8.8.2 Finding Meaning in Abandoning the Pursuit of Happiness

Although happiness is a goal in much of Western culture, it may, like mercury, slip away if one pursues it directly. In the footsteps of some Eastern traditions, Leary and Guadagno (2011) propose that abandoning egocentric goals may lead to wisdom and through wisdom to happiness. They argue for “selflessness,” a degree of self-transcendence presumably disconnecting the individual from personal goals. In status-power terms, this means a change in reference groups, from those that endorse organismic satisfactions and status attainment in the customary social world to those that support goals of lesser organismic satisfaction and the shunning of manifest status. Fundamentally, however, the individual who shifts in this way is merely satisfying a different set of reference groups. Because many religions have espoused the modest or ascetic life of little pleasure and no manifest status, this approach has been labeled transcendent or spiritual (Weber 1922/1946a). In reality, however, adherents are not receiving less status over-all, but rather status from a different source. The pleasure derived from serving God, which is of a similar nature, can lead to acts of martyrdom—no small measure of devotion—which commitment to normal organismic satisfaction and manifest status pursuit is not likely to match. Thus, the pleasure obtainable from the transcendental agenda must be greater than that of non-transcendent goal attainment. In art, for example, we have Wagner’s knight, Tannhauser, abandoning the sensual pleasures of the mountain of the Goddess of Love for the organismic self-denial of devotion to God.

Status-power significance inheres even in respect to “ultimate” meaning, the idea that life itself is purposeful and devoted to some sensible end. One view is that the universe is entirely devoid of meaning (Sartre 1957) and that there is no divine locus of interest in human affairs. This can only mean that the human being is alone (or abandoned), which signifies that there is no entity or transcendent being to serve as prescribed, i. e., to enact duties or obligations which provide status to that being, or from whom or which to expect

concern, interest, involvement, love (status). The empty universe is the meaningless universe, since there is no possibility of giving or receiving status from it. Nor is there a punishment (power) consequence for failure to perform duties and obligations, since these are only fancied and there is no relationship in the void, hence no Being who prescribed them. For those who, like Durkheim (1912/1915), see the duties and obligations presumably owed to a divine entity as owed to society itself, meaning inheres in the status and power consequences that stem from reference groups and social relations in the given community.

---

## 8.9 Suggestions for Research

The status-power approach to felicity invites research into a number of questions. First, it has been argued above that actors behave in the way they do in order to obtain status or avoid the power of reference groups. Often these reference groups are not the persons with whom the actors are directly interacting. For example, a man asks his boss for a raise, but the important reference group governing in the situation is not the boss but the spouse who urged the action. Or, a person acts in an altruistic manner, but the reference group governing in the situation is not the recipient but a favorite religious school teacher of childhood whom one still wants to please. Or, a scholar publishes a paper with a challenging thesis, but the reference group in the situation is not likely readers but the pantheon of “greats” in the field who might welcome the bold thinker into their circle. Action is, thus, not necessarily driven, as the old role-theory formula had it, by those to whom is directed. In respect to happiness, it is not necessarily those who provide the manifest rewards—deference, respect, money, etc.—who matter to the actor, but rather a shadow ensemble of those who originally established the desire to act in such a way as to gain status or avoid their power. This understanding suggests that we explore common interaction situations—with spouses, children, bosses, colleagues, friends and so on—in which there is some prospect for status gain, for how action is governed. That is, who

are the important reference groups in these situations, that is, who has the key to happiness? Since the work has not been done, we have no good sense of the kinds of profiles that will emerge and what different profiles may imply for happiness.

A second question for research is about the happiness effect of according status to another person when one has adverse power relations with that person. It can be argued that one would not ordinarily accord status (voluntary compliance) to someone whom one fears (as would be the case in adverse power relations). But there are some rare, but arguably important, situations in which this might happen. Consider the case of actors A and B who are engaged in serious conflict, but who are also both seeking the good opinion of a third party, C, who wants to mediate the conflict. C might be able to induce the warring parties to engage in small status-according actions toward each other. For example, each combatant grants the other a modest concession. We know that these actions are being done by A and B in order to obtain status from C. But the research question is to determine how much satisfaction or well-being comes to each party in the conflict both from own action and from the reciprocal concession from the other.

A third question about status-power and happiness that invites research involves play. Play is a suspension of the everyday rules that structure status-power relations. Much sought, play periods are time-outs that are usually allowed only on a limited basis. It can be argued that play be looked at not as a diversion, but as a necessary feature of relationship, important for serving to re-balance interaction contexts in which customary status and power structures have become burdensome. Just as ritual serves to de-differentiate and integrate members of a group (Kemper 2011), play also de-differentiates actors and serves, perhaps, to give individuals a renewed sense of their value to the group.

---

## 8.10 Conclusion

I have proposed here that a useful way to think about felicity, happiness, satisfaction, well-being and other forms of positive feeling, both in spe-

cific moments in time and in life in general, is to examine the four status-power contingencies: own status, other's status, own power and other's power. Relational outcomes in these contingencies are the possible ways in which one can enjoy or have satisfaction from one's environment, social as well as non-social. This holds true even for moments seemingly lacking in social significance, e. g., the enjoyment of a colorful sunset. Social interest is pervasive, as manifested in the comprehensiveness of the culture presented and prescribed by reference groups. And it is continuing, as in the never-flagging interest in compliance by reference groups to what they have prescribed. Their inducements to the individual to comply reside in the status they offer for compliance and the power they use for non-compliance. Sometimes, these are actual rewards and punishments, e. g., an expression of gratitude or a reprimand. At other times, the effect of the experience with reference groups is internalized and felt as pride (or deservingness) when one has complied and shame or guilt when one has not. In either case, the source of the feeling is social and reposes in the status-power relations that enwrap the individual throughout life.

All thought, conviction, ideology has a similar social provenance. Reference groups provide the ideas and rationales that we claim as guides to our conduct. These elements of thought are acquired and used in the same way as the most commonplace propositions of arithmetic. Acquiring a soulful philosophy of how to lead a meaningful life is no different, from a social perspective, from learning that  $1+1=2$ . Status-power dynamics stand behind both of these.

---

## References

- Acitelli, L. L., Douvan, E., & Veroff, J. (1993). Perceptions of conflict in the first year of marriage: How important are similarity and understanding? *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, *10*, 5–19.
- Algoe, S. & Haidt, J. (2009). Witnessing excellence in action: The 'other-praising' emotions of elevation, gratitude and admiration. *The Journal of Positive Psychology*, *4*, 105–127.
- American Psychiatric Association. (1987). *Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders-III-R* (Revised ed.). Arlington: American Psychiatric Publishing.
- Argyle, M. (1987). *The psychology of happiness*. New York: Methuen.
- Bakhtin, M. M. (1981). *The dialogical imagination*. Austin: University of Texas Press. (Edited by M. Holquist and trans: C. Emerson & M. Holquist)
- Batson, C. D., Dyck, J. L., Brandt, J. R., Batson, J. G., Powell, A. L., McMaster, M. R., & Griffitt, C. (1988). Five studies testing two new egoistic alternatives to the empathy-altruism hypothesis. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *55*, 52–77.
- Batson, C. D. & Shaw, L. (1991). Evidence for altruism: Toward a pluralism of prosocial motives. *Psychological Inquiry*, *2*, 107–122.
- Batson, C. D., Nadia, A., & Lishner, D. A. (2009). Empathy and altruism. In C. R. Snyder & S. J. Lopez (Eds.), *Oxford handbook of positive psychology* (pp. 417–426). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. (1995). The need to belong: desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation. *Psychological Bulletin*, *117*, 497–529.
- Blader, S. L., & Chen, Y.-R. (2012). Differentiating the effects of status and power: A justice perspective. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *102*, 994–1014.
- Bolger, N., Zuckerman, A., & Kessler, R. C. (2000). Invisible support and adjustment to stress. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *79*, 953–961.
- Bradburn, N. (1969). *The structure of psychological well-being*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Brickman, P., & Campbell, D. T. (1971). Hedonic relativism and planning the good society. In M. H. Appley (Eds.), *Adaptation level theory* (pp. 287–305). New York: Academic.
- Brockmann, H., Delhey, J., Welzel, C., & Yuan, H. (2009). The China puzzle: Falling happiness in a rising economy. *Journal of Happiness Studies*, *10*, 387–405.
- Carter, L. F. (1954). Evaluating the performance of individuals as members of small groups. *Personnel Psychology*, *7*, 477–484.
- Chandler, C. R., & Tsai, Y.-M. (1993). Suicide in Japan and in the West: Evidence for Durkheim's theory. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, *34*, 244–259.
- Cook, K. S., & Emerson, R. M. (1978). Power, equity and commitment in exchange networks. *American Sociological Review*, *43*, 721–739.
- Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1980). Influence of extraversion and neuroticism on subjective well-being: Happy and unhappy people. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *38*, 668–678.
- Couppis, M. H., & Kennedy, C. H. (2008). The rewarding effect of aggression is reduced by nucleus accumbens dopamine receptor antagonism in mice. *Psychopharmacology*, *197*, 449–456.
- Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1997). *Finding flow*. New York: Basic.

- Csikszentmihalyi, M., & Nakamura, J. (2011). Positive psychology: Where did it come from, where is it going?" In K. M. Sheldon, T. B. Kashdan, & M. F. Steger (Eds.), *Designing positive psychology: Taking stock and moving forward* (pp. 3–8). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- de Tocqueville, A. (1955/1856). *The old regime and the French revolution* (trans: S. Gilbert). Garden City: Doubleday.
- Diener, E., Sandvik, E., Pavot, W., & Fujita, F. (1992). Extraversion and subjective well-being in a U. S. national probability sample. *Journal of Research in Personality, 26*, 205–215.
- Diener, E., Suh, E. M., Lucas, R. E., & Smith, H. L. (1999). Subjective well-being: Three decades of progress. *Psychological Bulletin, 125*, 276–302.
- Diener, E., Nickerson, C., Lucas, R. E., & Sandvik, E. (2002). Dispositional affect and job outcomes. *Social Indicators Research, 59*, 229–259.
- Du Bois, W. E. B. (31 Oct 1936). Opera and the Negro problem. *Pittsburgh Courier*.
- Dunkel-Schetter, C., & Bennett, T. L. (1990). Differentiating the cognitive and behavioral aspects of social support. In B. R. Sarason, I. G. Sarason, & G. R. Pierce (Eds.), *Social support: An interactional view* (pp. 267–296). New York: Wiley.
- Durkheim, E. (1897/1951). *Suicide* (trans: J. A. Spaulding & G. Simpson). New York: Free Press.
- Durkheim, E. (1912/1915). *The elementary forms of the religious life* (trans: J. W. Swain). London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Emerson, R. (1962). Power-dependence relations. *American Sociological Review, 27*, 31–40.
- Emmons R. A. & Mishra A. (2011). Why gratitude enhances well-being: What we know, what we need to know. In K. M. Sheldon, T. B. Kashdan & M. F. Steger (Eds.) *Designing positive psychology: Taking stock and moving forward* (pp. 248–262). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Florida, R., & Rentfrow, P. J. (2011). Place and well-being. In K. M. Sheldon, T. B. Kashdan, & M. F. Steger (Eds.), *Designing positive psychology: Taking stock and moving forward* (pp. 385–395). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Fournier, M. A., Moskowitz, D. S., & Zuroff, D. C. (2009). The interpersonal signature. *Journal of Research in Personality, 43*, 155–162.
- Frank, R. (1985). *Choosing the right pond: Human behavior and the quest for status*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Frankl, V. E. (1963). *Man's search for meaning*. Boston: Beacon.
- Fredrickson, B. L. (1998). What good are positive emotions? *Review of General Psychology, 2*, 300–319.
- Frederickson, B., Cohn, M. A., Coffey, K. A., Pek, J., & Finkel, S. M. (2008). Open hearts build lives: Positive emotions, induced through loving-kindness meditation, build consequential personal resources. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95*, 1045–1062.
- Freud, S. (1914/1953–1974). On Narcissism. In J. Strachey et al. (Eds.), *The standard edition of the complete works of Sigmund Freud*, (Vol. 14). London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis.
- Freud, S. (1930/1951). *Civilization and its discontents* (trans: J. Riviere). London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis.
- Frijda, N. (2007). *The Laws of emotion*. Mahwah: Erlbaum.
- Fry, P. (1996). Green to the very door? The natural Wordsworth. *Studies in Romanticism, 35*, 535–551.
- Gable, S. L., & Gosnell, C. L. (2011). The positive side of close relationships. In K. M. Sheldon, T. B. Kashdan, & M. F. Steger (Eds.), *Designing positive psychology: Taking stock and moving forward* (pp. 265–279). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gallup. (1999). Survey results on gratitude: Adults and teenagers. *Emerging Trends, 20*, 9.
- Ger, G., & Belk, R. W. Jr. (1996). Cross-cultural differences in materialism. *Journal of Economic Psychology, 17*, 55–77.
- Gooding-Williams, R. (2009). *In the shadow of Du Bois: Afro-modern political thought in America*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Gurtman, M. B. (2009). Exploring personality with the interpersonal circumplex. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 3*, 601–619.
- Halevy, N., Chou, E. Y., Cohen, T. R., & Livingston, R. W. (2012). Status conferral in intergroup social dilemmas: Behavioral antecedents and consequences of prestige and dominance. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102*, 351–366.
- Hamblin, R., & Smith, C. R. (1966). Values, status and professors. *Sociometry, 29*, 183–196.
- Heady, B. (2008). Life goals matter to happiness: A revision set-point theory. *Social Indicators Research, 86*, 213–231.
- Hernandez, T. (26 June 2013). Legally mandate wage transparency. *New York Times*.
- Hitt, J. (13 Aug 2013). The idea. *New York Times Sunday Business Section*.
- Hui, Chin. M., Molden, Daniel. C., & Finkel, Eli. J. (2013). Loving freedom: Concerns with promotion or prevention and the role of autonomy in relationship well-being. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 105*, 61–85.
- Kahneman, D. (1999). Objective happiness. In D. Kahneman, E. Diener, & N. Schwarz (Eds.), *Well-being: The foundations of hedonic psychology* (pp. 3–25). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Kaul, M., & Lakey, B. (2003). Where is the support in perceived support? The role of generic relationship satisfaction and enacted support in perceived support's relation to low distress. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 22*, 59–78.
- Keltner, D. (2009). *Born to be good: The science of a meaningful life*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Kemper, T. D. (1978). *A social interactional theory of emotions*. New York: Wiley.



- Kemper, T. D. (1979). Why are the streets so dirty? Social psychological and stratification factors in the decline of municipal services. *Social Forces*, 58, 422–442.
- Kemper, T. D. (1989). Love and like and love and love. In D. D. Franks & E. D. McCarthy (Eds.), *The sociology of emotions: Original essays and research papers* (pp. 249–268). Greenwich: JAI.
- Kemper, T. D. (1991). Predicting emotions from social relations. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 54, 330–342.
- Kemper, T. D. (2006). Power, status and the power-status theory of emotions. In J. E. Stets and J. H. Turner (Eds.), *Handbook of the sociology of emotions* (pp. 87–113). New York: Springer.
- Kemper, T. D. (2011). *Status, power and ritual interaction: A relational reading of Durkheim, Goffman and Collins*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Kemper, T. D., & Collins, R. (1990). Dimensions of microinteraction. *American Journal of Sociology*, 96, 32–68.
- Krause, N. (2006). Gratitude toward God, stress and health in later life. *Research on Aging*, 28, 163–168.
- Lakey, B., & Cassady, P. (1990). Cognitive processes in perceived social support. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 59, 337–343.
- Lavine, T. Z. (1984). *From Socrates to Sartre: The philosophical quest*. New York: Bantam Books.
- Leary, M. R., & Guadagno, J. (2011). The role of hypoegoic self processes in optimal functioning and subjective well-being. In K. M. Sheldon, T. B. Kashdan, & M. F. Steger (Eds.), *Designing positive psychology: Taking stock and moving forward* (pp. 136–146). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Little, B. R. (2011). Personality science and the northern tilt: As positive as possible under the circumstances. In K. M. Sheldon, T. B. Kashdan, & M. F. Steger (Eds.), *Designing positive psychology: Taking stock and moving forward* (pp. 228–247). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lyubomirsky, S. (2013). *The happiness myth: What should make you happy, but doesn't what shouldn't make you happy, but does*. New York: Penguin.
- Lyubomirsky, S. (2013). *The myths of happiness: What should make you happy, but doesn't what shouldn't make you happy, but does*. New York: Penguin.
- Lyubomirsky, S., King, L. A., & Diener, E. (2005). The benefits of frequent positive affect: Does happiness lead to success?. *Psychological Bulletin*, 131, 803–855.
- Madrigal, A. (July/Aug 2013). The intuition machine. *The Atlantic*.
- Magee, J. C., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008). Social hierarchy: The self-reinforcing nature of power and status. *The Academy of Management Annals*, 2, 351–398.
- McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (1989). The structure of interpersonal traits: Wiggins's circumplex and the five-factor model. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 56, 586–595.
- McCullough, M. E., Kimeldorf, M. B., & Cohen, A. D. (2008). An adaptation for altruism? The social causes, social effects, and social evolution of gratitude. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 17, 281–285.
- Mead, G. H. (1934). *Mind, self and society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mill, J. S. (1863). *Utilitarianism*. London: Parker, Son and West Strand.
- Molm, L. (1990). Action and outcomes: The dynamics of power in social exchange. *American Sociological Review*, 55, 427–447.
- Mongrain, M., Chin, J. M., & Shapira, L. B. (2011). Practicing compassion increases happiness and self-esteem. *Journal of Happiness Studies*, 12, 963–981.
- Myers, D. G., & Diener, E. (1995). Who is happy? *Psychological Science*, 6, 10–19.
- Myers, W. C., Burket, R. C., & Husted, D. S. (2006). Sadistic personality disorder and comorbid mental illness in adolescent psychiatric inpatients. *Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law*, 34, 61–71.
- Nakamura, J., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2009). Flow theory and research. In C. R. Snyder & S. J. Lopez (Eds.), *Oxford handbook of positive psychology* (pp. 195–206). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Neugarten, B. L., Havighurst, R. J., & Tobin, S. S. (1961). The measurement of life satisfaction. *Journal of Gerontology*, 16, 134–143.
- Nussbaum, M. C. (1986). *The fragility of goodness: Luck and ethics in Greek tragedy and philosophy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Oerlemans, O. (2002). *Romanticism and the materiality of nature*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Oishi, S., & Kurtz, J. L. (2011). The positive psychology of positive emotions: An avuncular view. In K. M. Sheldon, T. B. Kashdan, & M. F. Steger (Eds.), *Designing positive psychology: Taking stock and moving forward* (pp. 101–114). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Panksepp, J. (2007). Can PLAY diminish ADHD and facilitate the construction of the social brain?. *Journal of the Canadian Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry*, 10, 57–66.
- Panksepp, J. (2011). The primary process affects in human development, happiness and thinking. In K. M. Sheldon, T. B. Kashdan, & M. F. Steger (Eds.), *Designing positive psychology: Taking stock and moving forward* (pp. 51–85). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Park, C. L. (2011). Meaning and growth within positive psychology: Toward a more complete understanding. In K. M. Sheldon, T. B. Kashdan, & M. F. Steger (Eds.), *Designing positive psychology: Taking stock and moving forward* (pp. 324–334). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Patrick, H., Knee, C. R., Canevello, A., & Lonsbary, C. (2007). The role of need-fulfillment in relationship functioning and well-being: A self-determination



- theory perspective. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 92, 434–457.
- Pedrotti, J. T., Edwards, L. M., & Lopez, S. J. (2009). Positive psychology within a cultural context. In C. R. Snyder & S. J. Lopez (Eds.), *Oxford handbook of positive psychology* (pp. 49–57). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Peterson, C., Park, N., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2005). Orientations to happiness and life satisfaction: The full life versus the empty life. *Journal of Happiness Studies*, 6, 25–41.
- Phillips, S. D., Little, B., & Goodine, L. A. (1997). Reconsidering gender and public administration. *Canadian Journal of Public Administration*, 40, 563–581.
- Polak, E., & McCullough, M. E. (2006). Is gratitude an alternative to materialism? *Journal of Happiness Studies*, 7, 343–360.
- Ramírez, J. M., Marie-Claude, B.-C., & Michel, C. (2003). Impulsive aggression and pleasure. In J. M. Ramírez (Eds.), *Human aggression* (pp. 449–472). Madrid: Centreur.
- Ramírez, J. M., Marie-Claude, B.-C., & Michel, C. (2005). Can aggression provide pleasure? *European Psychologist*, 10, 136–145.
- Rigby, K. (2004). *Topographies of the sacred: The poetics of place in European Romanticism*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.
- Robinson, D. T. (2002). *ACT and the competition: Some alternate models of emotion and identity*. Paper presented at the conference on research agendas in affect control theory, Highland Beach, Florida.
- Robinson, D., & DeCoster, V. (1999). *Predicting everyday emotions: A comparison of affect control theory and social interaction theory*. Paper presented at annual meetings of the American Sociological Association.
- Rodriguez M., Patrica M., Parrot, W. G., & de Mendoza, A. H. (2010). I fear your envy, I rejoice in your coveting: On the ambivalent experience of being envied by others. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 99, 842–854.
- Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2001). On happiness and human potentials: A review of research on hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 52, 141–166.
- Ryff, C. (1989). Happiness is everything, or is it? Explorations on the meaning of psychological well-being. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 57, 1069–1081.
- Ryff, C., & Singer, B. H. (1998). The contours of positive human health. *Psychological Inquiry*, 9, 1–26.
- Sartre, J. P. (1957). *Existentialism and human emotions*. New York: Philosophical Library.
- Seligman, M. (2002). *Authentic happiness: Using the new positive psychology*. New York: Free Press.
- Shafir, E., Diamond, P., & Tversky, A. (1997). Money illusion. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112, 341–374.
- Simmel, G. (1908/1950). *The sociology of Georg Simmel* (trans: K. H. Wolff). New York: Free Press of Glencoe.
- Simon, R., & Nath, L. E. (2004). Gender and emotion in the United States: Do men and women differ in self-reports of feelings and expressive behavior? *American Journal of Sociology*, 109, 1137–1176.
- Simonton, D. K. (2009). Creativity. In C. R. Snyder & S. J. Lopez (Eds.), *Oxford handbook of positive psychology* (pp. 261–269). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Steger, M. F., Kashdan, T. B., & Oishi, S. (2007). Being good by doing good: Daily eudaimonic activity and well-being. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 42, 22–42.
- Stets, J. E., & Carter, M. J. (2012). A theory of the self for the sociology of morality. *American Sociological Review*, 77, 120–140.
- Surowiecki, J. (8, 16 July 2013). Middle-class militants. *New Yorker*.
- Tay, L., & Diener, E. (2011). Needs and subjective well-being around the world. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 101, 354–365.
- Thye, S., Willer, D., & Markovsky, B. (2006). From status to power: New models at the intersection of two theories. *Social Forces*, 84, 1471–1495.
- Time. (2013). [http://www.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1947844\\_2013326,00.html](http://www.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1947844_2013326,00.html). Accessed 3 July 2013.
- Trendhunter (2013). <http://www.trendhunter.com/trends/google-offices-in-zurich-work-space-playground>. Accessed 14 July 2013.
- Tversky, A., & Griffin, D. W. (1991). Endowment and contrasts in judgments of well-being. In R. Zeckhauser (Ed.), *Strategy and choice* (pp. 297–318). Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Vangelisti, A. L. (2009). Challenges in conceptualizing social support. *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, 26, 39–51.
- Waterman, A. S. (1984). *The psychology of individualism*. New York: Praeger.
- Watson, D. (2000). *Mood and temperament*. New York: Guilford.
- Watson, D. (2009). Positive affectivity: The disposition to experience pleasurable emotional states. In C. R. Snyder & S. J. Lopez (Eds.), *Oxford handbook of positive psychology* (pp. 207–215), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Weber, Max. (1922/1946a). Religious rejections of the world and their directions. In M. Weber (Eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in sociology* (trans: H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, pp. 323–359). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Weber, Max. (1922/1946b). *From Max Weber: Essays in sociology* (trans: by H. Gerth and C. W. Mills). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Weber, Max. (1922/1947). *The theory of social and economic organization* (trans: A. M. Henderson and T. Parsons). New York: Free Press.
- White, G. M. (1980). Conceptual universals in interpersonal language. *American Anthropologist*, 82, 759–781.

- Wood, A. M., Froh, J. J., & Geraghty, A. W. A. (2010). Gratitude and well-being: A review and theoretical integration. *Clinical Psychology Review, 30*, 890–905.
- Yinon, Y., & Landau, M. O. (1987). On the reinforcing value of helping behavior in a positive mood. *Motivation and Emotion, 11*, 83–93.
- Youseff, C. M., & Luthans, F. (2011). Positive psychological capital in the workplace: Where we are and where we need to go. In K. M. Sheldon, T. B. Kashdan, & M. F. Steger (Eds.), *Designing positive psychology: Taking stock and moving forward* (pp. 351–364). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jonathan H. Turner

---

## 9.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will try to expand the conceptualization of emotions to produce a more robust view of stratification dynamics. Emotions will be viewed as resources; and like all resources, they are unequally distributed in a society and, hence, stratified. Emotions are not just an outcome response to inequalities of material resources, they *are themselves highly valued resources* when positive, and they have very large effects not only on people but social structure and culture at all levels of social organization. My foray into this topic is not wholly original; others, such as Arlie Hochschild (1979, 1983), Thomas Scheff (1979, 1988), Randall Collins (1975, 1990), and in particular, Jack Barbalet (1998) have devolved hinted at this conception of emotions as a resource. Postmodernists theorists have also addressed the effects of emotions in society, but I find somewhat odd their emphasis on a “post-emotional age” (e.g., Mestrovic 1997) when, in fact, all that we see around the world today are emotionally charged patterns of violence, such as ethnic conflict and efforts at genocide, terrorism, rebellions, and other signs that people are highly aroused emotionally about their social situations.

It is clear that people are experiencing *anger, fear, alienation, shame, humiliation*, and needs for *vengeance* at many levels of social organization from domestic relations in families, through

gang shootings in neighborhoods, to conflicts within societies and across societies. If anything, humans are entering a “new age” of intense emotionality, which is generated by inequalities in societies and the institutional orders that generate and sustain these inequalities. My goal in this chapter is to develop a general theory of these emotional dynamics.

---

## 9.2 A Simple Conceptual View of Societies


### 9.2.1 Levels of Social Organization

For some years now, I have using the model in Fig. 9.1 as a heuristic to conceptualize different levels of social organization, from the micro level of the encounter to inter-societal dynamics. Human social organization unfolds at three levels, the micro, meso, and macro; and while this is an analytical distinction, it is also how social reality actually unfolds empirically. Emotions are aroused among individuals in encounters embedded in corporate units (groups, organizations, and communities) and in categoric units (diffuse status characteristics or categories marking differences in moral worth among their members). In turn, categoric units are embedded in the stratification system because members of valued and devalued categoric units receive varying levels of resources. Similarly, corporate units are embedded in institutional domains (e.g., economy, polity, religion, kinship, education, law, science, etc.), and depending upon people’s location in the divisions of labor of a cor-

---

J. H. Turner (✉)  
University of California, Riverside, USA  
e-mail: jonathan.turner@ucr.edu

**Fig. 9.1** Levels of social reality



Adapted from J. Turner, *Human Emotions: A Sociological Theory* (2007)

porate units in diverse institutional domains, their shares of resources will vary. And, and over time, those with similar shares will begin to constitute something like a social class in the stratification system, as is emphasized by the arrow from institutional domains to stratification system in Fig. 9.1.

### 9.2.2 The Distribution of Generalized Symbolic Media

*Generalized symbolic media* are not only used in discourse and distributed by corporate units as resources; they are also exchanged by actors within and between domains. Intra-institutional exchanges are typically conducted with the generalized symbolic media of a domain. For example, teachers talk and exchange *learning* within the educational institutional domain; across domains, economic actors pay money for those who are certified (with diplomas) to have *learning*, thereby consummating an exchange of the money for learning exchange across institutional domains. Thus, one of the ways that generalized symbolic media circulate across domains is via

exchanges; and, the more generalized symbolic media of powerful actors in dominant domains spend their resources—resources like *money* from economy and *power* as franchised *authority* from polity—for the resources of other domains—say, *learning* (from education), *health* (from medicine), and *verified knowledge* (from science)—the more will all of these media circulate across institutional domains in a society. With the flow of these generalized symbolic media come the *ideologies* built from the symbolic media and, eventually, the codification of these ideologies into composite *meta-ideologies* that provide evaluative standards across a wide swath of institutional domains and, as I will emphasize, the stratification system in a society.

The analysis of stratification and emotions must begin with a conceptualization of institutional domains, which are composed of congeries of corporate units that distribute valued resources unequally. This unequal distribution of resources in a society occurs because individuals have differential access to resource-giving corporate units in the first place; and, once inside a corporate unit, they occupy diverse positions in its

hierarchical division of labor. As members of different social classes as well as different categoric units (e.g., ethnicity, gender, religious affiliation) receive varying shares of resources, these resources contribute to moral definitions about of their worth. And, these standards of moral worth will generally be applied to those who receive larger amounts and greater varieties of resources; they will be morally valued as persons than those who receive fewer levels and varieties of resources. And once these differential moral evaluations are established, individuals with higher or lower evaluations will experience different emotions; those receiving large shares of valued resources and high moral evaluations will experience more positive emotions than those who do not receive larger shares of resources or high moral evaluations. Those experiencing positive emotions will generally have more confidence than those who do not. As a consequence, the respective shares of emotional resources received by individuals will affect the level of access of individuals to resource-giving corporate units and to locations in their divisions of labor. Those with confidence will typically do better than those who lack confidence or, alternatively, those who stores of negative emotions make them less desirable incumbents in high-level positions of corporate units. As these processes play out in a society, the correlation of positive emotional energy with higher levels of other resources meted out by corporate units within diverse institutional will increase, thereby adding one more inequity—the ability to mobilize positive emotional energy—the stratification system.


### 9.2.3 Generalized Symbolic Media and Ideological Formation

As is perhaps evident, I am trying to bring back Georg Simmel's (1907/1990) view of resources as *generalized symbols*. In Simmel's case, he emphasize that *money* is a symbolic medium because it serves in the modern world as a marker of value; the money, itself, is worth very little, but *what it symbolizes* is the value of any other resource, including money itself. Functional theorists like

Talcott Parsons (1963a, b) and Niklas Luhmann (1982, 1988) picked up on this idea and began to visualize each institutional domains as revealing its own, distinctive generalized symbolic medium by which discourse, theme building, world views, *habitus*, and other cognitive processes are conducted. For example, *money* is the generalized symbolic medium of a capitalist economy, and it is the medium of discourse and world-view formation among actors within such economies; *love-loyalty* is the symbolic medium of kinship and family, and hence, it is the medium of discourse and theme building in kinship. But generalized symbolic media are more than the mechanism by which discourse and talk are conducted; as noted earlier, they are also *the valued resources*, or *markers of the valued resources*, that are distributed unequally by corporate units within an institutional domain. For example, *love/loyalty*, *sacredness/piety*, *learning*, *knowledge*, *aesthetics*, and other symbolic media are valued in themselves above and beyond what they denote; and their possession arouses positive emotions, which make these resources even more valuable.

Equally important, as Luhmann emphasized, generalized symbolic media almost always carry *moral overtones*; they not only signify valued resources, but they also moralize discourse and theme building. As use of generalized symbolic media occurs within institutional domains, these symbolic media become the moral premises and constitutive codes used to construct ideologies of each institutional domain. That is, they allow individuals to develop evaluative beliefs of what is right, proper, good, bad, acceptable, and unacceptable within a domain. Symbolic media are thus the symbolic building blocks of institutional ideologies. Without an ideology, an institutional domain is not coherent, nor can it be integrated, but with an ideology over which there is high consensus among actors within a domain, the dynamics actions and transactions within the domain become moralized and subject to moral evaluations. And, these moralized evaluative beliefs serve as premises for the evolution of institutional norms and corporate-unit cultures within an institutional domain. Figure 9.2 outlines these cultural dynamics.





**Fig. 9.2** Generalized symbolic media, ideologies, and moralizing institutional cultures

The moral coding inhering in generalized symbolic media not only makes them more valuable, per se, but this coding allows individuals to evaluate self in a positive light and, hence, experience additional positive emotional arousal if they are able to secure large shares of these symbolic media as resources. The result is yet another layer of value being added to generalized symbolic media as a resource and, hence, still another point of inequality and stratification in societies. The opposite is the case for those unable to secure large shares of resources; they experience negative emotions about self and thus must endure yet another level of punishment through negative self-evaluations.

Before exploring more fully the nature of media and their effects on emotional stratification, let me drive home the points in Fig. 9.2. When institutional domains first begin to develop, actors begin to use a generalized symbolic medium for discourse for building up corporate units to deal with problems of adaptation; and as they do so, this generalized symbolic medium becomes the terms of discourse and theme-building; and, in turn, people's world views within a domain become increasingly structured around the moral overtones inhering in the generalized symbolic medium. This morality comes partly from general and abstract societal values but also from actors' efforts to generate commitments to a particular worldview—a task that is easier to accomplish when expressed as a moral order (Wuthnow 1987). From these dynamics institutional ideologies form, and have reverse causal effects on the very processes that led to their formation. And as these direct and reversal causal processes are iterated and played out, the generalized symbolic medium and ideology take on greater clarity

and morality, thereby constraining institutional norms which lead individuals to act out the morality contained in these norms and the ideologies from which they are derived. Thus, institutional domains all reveal an *ideology*, which specifies in more detail the moral codes of societal-level values. In so doing, value premises of a society are made more concrete and relevant to actors operating within an institutional domain and corporate units within any domain.

In Table 9.1, I briefly list some of the generalized symbolic media for selected institutional domains. These media circulate within a domain; and some move beyond their domain of origin and thereby circulate in other domains. Obviously, *money* circulates across virtually all domains in post-industrial societies, as does *power* as franchised authority given to corporate units within domains by polity. Similarly, *imperative coordination/justice* from law, *learning* from education, and *verified knowledge* from science circulate widely, but I would argue that they do not displace the dominant generalized symbolic medium in any given institutional domain, as some critical theorists complain in their view of instrumental media like power and money invade the "lifeworld" of meaning for individuals (critical theory version of Max Weber's concerns about rational-legal authority and rationalization). But, rather than being colonized or even displaced, the media coming into a domain will exist alongside of the unique medium of a domain. These media, however, do something else: the ideologies piggy-backed onto a generalized medium as it circulates into other domains is blend to form what I term a *meta-ideology*, which is a composite of several institutional ideologies. The media of dominant institutional domains like economy

Table 9.1 Generalized symbolic media of institutional domains

Kinship	<i>Love/loyalty</i> , or the use of intense positive affective states to forge and mark commitments to others and groups of others
Economy	<i>Money</i> , or the denotation of exchange value for objects, actions, and services by the metrics inhering in money
Polity	<i>Power</i> , or the capacity to control the actions of other actors
Law	<i>Imperative coordination/justice</i> , or the capacity to adjudicate social relations and render judgments about justice, fairness, and appropriateness of actions
Religion	<i>Sacredness/Piety</i> , or the commitment to beliefs about forces and entities inhabiting a non-observable supernatural realm and the propensity to explain events and conditions by references to these sacred forces and beings
Education	<i>Learning</i> , or the commitment to acquiring and passing on knowledge
Science	<i>Knowledge</i> , or the invocation of standards for gaining verified knowledge about all dimensions of the social, biotic, and physical-chemical universes
Medicine	<i>Health</i> , or the concern about and commitment to sustaining the normal functioning of the human body
Sport	<i>Competitiveness</i> , or the definition of games that produce winners and losers by virtue of the respective efforts of players
Arts	<i>Aesthetics</i> , or the commitment to make and evaluate objects and performances by standards of beauty and pleasure that they give observers

These and other generalized symbolic media are employed in discourse among actors, in articulating themes, and in developing ideologies about what should and ought to transpire in an institutional domain. They tend to circulate within a domain, but all of the symbolic media can circulate in other domains, although some media are more likely to do so than others

and polity but others as well (say, religion in a theocratic society) will generally circulate the most among other domains, and thus there is often a meta-ideology for the whole society built up from the moral tenets in the ideologies of the dominant domains in any given society. For example, the ideologies of (capitalist) economies, democratic polity, positivistic and universalistic law, state-sponsored and regulated education, science, and perhaps medicine are dominant in American society, and thus, the most inclusive ideology in the United States is a meta-ideology built around the moral tenets of their respective ideologies. If we compare the United States with, say, a less developed country where religion and kinship are dominant domains, then meta-ideologies of such societies will reflect the moral tenets of ideologies from religion and kinship—i.e., *sacredness/piety* and *love/loyalty*—which will be mixed with the ideologies of other dominant institutional domains such as those from polity and economy. Thus, the most comprehensive societal-level meta-ideology will look very different in this society than in a post-industrial society.


There is then a confluence of cultural forces in societies that legitimate the activities of actors in each institutional domain, while provid-

ing moral codes for norms and the cultures of corporate units. As symbolic media circulate to other domains, they bring along the ideology built from these media, which then coalesce into a meta-ideology. A society will usually have one meta-ideology that is dominant because it is built from the dominant institutional domains in that society.

This broader meta-ideology legitimates the entire society, but most importantly, it is typically the ideology that legitimates inequality and stratification generated by the unequal distribution of resources by corporate units within institutional domains. So, there is a tight coupling of generalized symbolic media, ideological formation, and meta-ideological formation that all legitimate particular institutional domains as well as the whole society, and most importantly for my purposes, its stratification system. These dynamics are outlined in Fig. 9.3.

Evaluations of members of social classes and other categoric units, such as ethnicity, gender, age, religious affiliation, or any salient category represent translation of the moral codes of the dominant meta-ideology into *status beliefs* about the characteristics, qualities, and worth of members of categoric units. These status beliefs then

**Fig. 9.3** Institutional dominance, meta-ideologies, legitimation of stratification, and status beliefs



determine the *expectation states* for individuals in all micro-level encounters within corporate units. Thus, individuals are almost always embedded into the two types of meso units—corporate and categoric units—with the normative expectations of corporate units following from the ideologies of the institutional domain in which a corporate unit is embedded and with the expectations on categories of persons in the divisions of labor of corporate units being constrained by these normative expectations and by the expectation-states derived from the status beliefs that were pulled from meta-ideologies legitimating the stratification system. Thus, once again there is a tight coupling of expectations because these expectations operating at the micro level are ultimately derived from the same ideologies and meta-ideologies evident in dominant institutional domains.

What is particularly interesting, I think, is that (1) generalized symbolic media, (2) world views and themes developed by the use of these media in discourse and in transactions within and between institutional domains, (3) ideologies built from this discourse, (4) meta-ideologies constructed from the ideologies of dominant institutional domains, and (5) expectations attached to corporate units and categoric units are all tightly connected, and this coupling gives these cultural forces power. This power is derived not just from tight integration but also from the fact that they moralize the social world, making conformity to moral codes appear necessary, if not compulsory. When we add to these lines of integration that fact that the resources unequally distributed in a society are also can be these same generalized symbolic media or in other cases, symbolic representations of these resources, it becomes evident why stratification systems are difficult to change. They

have been moralized at the macro, meso, and micro levels into a series of integrated symbolic media, evaluative beliefs, and normative expectations that are defined as imperative and moral and that are used to evaluate the moral worth of individuals and members of categoric units.

### 9.3 Reconceptualizing the Dynamics of Stratification

The fact that every institutional domain evidences a generalized symbolic medium, plus media from other domains that circulate through any given domain, forces us to re-conceptualize stratification processes. For most of sociology's history, sociologists have tended to view the stratification system as built around the symbolic media from two institutional domains: polity and economy. *Money* and *power* have been emphasized, which is appropriate because these are the generalized media of two dominant institutional systems; and these are resources that can be used to gain access to other resources. Prestige and honor is the third resource emphasized by sociologists, and this is a generalized reinforcer that has value to humans in all situations. Still, there are many more institutional domains than economy and polity, and moreover, the resources distributed by these other domains are highly valued by individuals. Ever since Marx proclaimed religion as "an opiate" of the masses, sociologists have consistently failed to recognize that, like any opiate, people like their effects; and so, the sense of sacredness, access to the supernatural, and piety are highly valued by many individuals.

Marx's rationale for labeling religion as an opiate indicates what worried him about religion: people find it valuable, and they often feel that this

is sufficient compensation for not having much money or power. And, if such is the case, then the motivation for the revolution that Marx saw as inevitable is not so inevitable. We can make the same case for other symbolic media: *imperative coordination/justice*, from (law) *love/loyalty* (from family), *learning* (from education), verified *knowledge* (from science), *competition* (from sport), *aesthetics* (from art), and other media are highly valued by some sectors of a society; and most importantly, these media tend to be more equally distributed than money, power, and prestige. Thus, what people lose by not having sufficient money, power, or prestige can—and this is the big worry for a revolutionist—provide ample compensation to most people so that they develop positive feelings about the resources that *they do have*. Having these alternative resources or, at least, perceiving that one could have access to them gives persons positive feelings and makes them less likely to incur the costs (risks, uncertainty, failure) of confronting centers of power and wealth in a society. And, given that capitalist systems will market just about anything as a commodity, people sense that they have many options to realize value; and credit markets often make them able to purchase these resources without the ability to pay for them in full. Such a system co-opts people, making them more conservative and less willing to engage in confrontational conflict. This is why, perhaps, the revolution predicted by Marx has never occurred in a fully capitalist society.

Thus, the greater the number and level of resources that individuals and families in a society can realize by their participation in corporate units in non-economic and non-political institutional domains, the less likely will individuals be likely to adopt conflict strategies, and the more likely are they to be influenced by meta-ideologies and accept as legitimate the institutional order. This generalization flies in the face of most sociological analyses of stratification but it is far closer to what has actually occurred—at least so far—than the theories produced by conflict sociology.

This new take on stratification is, I think, necessary, but we can gain more insight into the dynamics that I am outlining. By understanding the conditions that increase or decrease the positive

or negative emotions experienced by individuals as they interact with each other in micro-level encounters embedded in corporate and categoric units and, in turn, in institutional domains and stratification systems. Emotions are critical in two senses for understanding the dynamics of stratification. First, when emotions are positive, they cause individuals to view sociocultural formations in a positive light, thereby increasing their commitments to institutional domains and the society as a whole. Second, a reservoir of positive emotions is very much like prestige in that positively valenced emotions make people feel satisfied, if not happy; and positive emotions give individuals confidence to pursue other resources and to be successful in this pursuit, thereby raising the level of satisfaction and happiness. Thus, we can view emotions not just as a reaction to stratification but also *as valued resources*, per se, that are unequally distributed like all other resources. Once we have this recognition, a revision in sociological theorizing about stratification dynamics is in order.

There is a kind of compounding of effects of emotions and receipt of valued resources. When individuals are able to secure resources, they experience positive emotions, which, as noted above, gives them the confidence to secure more resources, even resources from additional institutional domains. At the same time, they are able to evaluate self positively in terms of the moral codes inhering in ideology built up from generalized symbolic media within domains where resources were secured. Indeed, if resources are not, for example, acquired at high levels in economy and polity, but instead, in kinship, religion, education, sport, aesthetics, and perhaps other domains, people often construct a more *idiosyncratic meta-ideology* for self-evaluation revolving around the particular configuration of domains and their ideologies where they have been successful. And the positive evaluation of self from this meta-ideology goes a long way for compensating persons for less success in dominant domains like economy and polity; and this limited success makes people not only committed to those domains where they have procured resources and, ironically, it makes them

less critical and, hence, less likely to engage in conflict those dominant domains where their resource shares are not high.

As was noted earlier, there is yet another dimension to this compounding: many of the valued resources secured in these less dominant domains—e.g., *love/loyalty* in family, *sacredness/piety* in religion, *competitive success* in sport, *learning* in education, and *aesthetics* in art—are in fact *the* generalized symbolic media of these domains. The medium of a domain can, therefore, also be the valued resource of this domain; and the set of resources in less dominant domains can be much easier to secure by easy access to, and simple participation in, corporate units within less dominant domains. One can secure high levels of these media as resources without great sacrifice, investments, or risks compared to the resources of economy and polity. Thus, people experience moral worth by using the ideologies of domains built from these symbolic media to evaluate self; and they enjoy directly, as a highly valued resource in its own right, the media themselves. As a result, they experience positive emotions from the process of self-evaluation and consumption of symbolic media as resources. This vortex of positive feelings inevitably leads to commitments to institutional domains, which further increases the flow of positive sentiments.

When generalized symbolic media are consumed as resources, they often give individuals dramatically escalated confidence to secure resources in additional domains. For example, the experience of *love/loyalty* from kinship can give family members confidence to secure other resources in, for instance, education and economy; and if there is success in these efforts, confidence increases that much more, and persons may be sufficiently confident to seek new types resources in additional domains. The critical point here is that generalized symbolic media as resources are just that: resources that can be used to secure additional resources, primarily through the positive emotions, positive self-evaluations, and confidence that comes with success in garnering resource shares. Emotions can operate much like money and power in that they allow persons to experience a sense of efficacy and, thereby, to garner additional resources, including money and power.

Thus, some of alienating and anger-arousing effects of inequality in the distribution of money, power, and prestige can be mitigated by this vortex of positive emotional flows enumerated above. And, as becomes very clear, emotions themselves become one more resource; and like all resources, positive and negative emotions will be unequally distributed across institutional domains and, thereby, become stratified in a manner not well conceptualized by existing theories of conflict or stratification. In general, those above the median in the distribution of resources in a society will also be above the medium in their level of positive emotional energy, whereas those below the medium will increasingly experience more negative emotion relative to positive emotions, and increasingly so descending down the class system away from the median. Yet, as I will document shortly, negative emotions are complicated in their effects on individuals because of the potential for repression, which often transmutes the emotion that is repressed into a new emotion and which often increases the intensity of the transmuted emotion the longer that the negative emotion is repressed. Thus, while the ratio of positive to negative emotions among individuals is roughly correlated with their shares of other resources, the negative side of emotions presents us with additional problems of theorizing about the effects of emotions on persons and sociocultural formations.

When people fail to secure resources in institutional domains, they experience negative emotions such as *anger* and *frustration*. They are also likely to experience even more powerful emotions like *shame* and, if they defined the pursuit of resources in moral terms, *guilt* as well. Shame and guilt are extremely powerful and painful emotions, and they are the most likely of all emotions to be repressed (Scheff 1988; Turner 2002). But when repressed, they will often transmute into other negative emotions, such as shame into *diffuse anger* and guilt into *diffuse anxiety* (fear). And, once people carry these emotions with them to encounters in corporate and categoric units, they are likely to experience more shame and guilt in response to the reactions of others. And thus, negative emotions have the opposite effects of positive emotions;



they reduce the likelihood that people will secure additional resources, unless they can find situations where their anger and guilt can be used to gain resources. For example, a very aggressive athlete in a contact sport may possess a great deal of repressed shame as *diffuse anger* channeled into the domain of sport, where this anger allows this athlete to enjoy the success in sports by his or her increased *competitiveness* (a highly valued resource); and the access that competitiveness in sport give this person to other resources, money, fame, prestige, and influence. But, such situations are the exception rather than the rule; people experiencing negative emotions tend to cycle downwards, with negative emotions holding them back from securing other resources that might increase the ratio of positive to negative emotional energy. And, even among successful athletes, they often have great difficulty in adjusting to corporate units in other institutional domains, outside of sport. Thus, we need a more general theory of emotions to untangle the emotional dynamics that intersect with stratification.

---

## 9.4 Conceptualizing Emotional Dynamics

Thus far, I have used the notions of positive and negative emotions rather loosely, and so, a theory of emotions must unpack these general valences into a more nuanced conception of emotions. I draw here on an almost two-decade old research project to theorize emotional dynamics (i.e., Turner, 1994, 1999a, 2000a, b, 2002, 2007, 2010). I will also make reference to tables that appear in my other chapter in this volume on the evolution of emotions; and in some ways, it is best to read that chapter before this one. Still, I will simply cite the pages on which important conceptions of emotions are made rather than repeat the tables in this chapter.

### 9.4.1 The Palate of Human Emotions

Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 on, pp. 18 and 19 in Chap. 2 outline my view of the emotional rep-

ertoire of humans. The tables also represents an evolutionary sequence moving from Table 2.2 to 2.3 and, then, to 2.4. As I have documented in Chap. 1 and in more detail in Turner (2000a), one of the distinctive characteristics of humans is their emotionality—both the breadth of emotions that they can experience and recognize in others as well as the intensity of emotions from low to high valences. On the far left of Table 2.2, I emphasize four primary emotions: *satisfaction-happiness*, *aversion-fear*, *assertion-anger*, *disappointment sadness*. All those who study emotions agree that there are at least these four emotions that are hard-wired into humans, and probably mammalian neuro-anatomy more generally. There are additional emotions listed by other scholars as primary, such as *disgust*, *surprise*, *expectancy*, *interest*, *anticipation*, *grief*, *resignation*, *distress*, *shock*, and so on (see Turner 2007, pp. 4–5 for a more complete listing by a wide variety of scholars). In my scheme many of these additional emotions are not primary but new combinations of primary emotions generated by natural selection working on the neuro-anatomy over the course of hominin evolution. Natural selection first expanded the basic primary palate by creating variants in the intensity of primary emotions, as can be seen by reading across Table 2.2. This would be the easiest route to expanding the emotional repertoire of hominins on the clade to humans, if expanded emotionality had fitness-enhancing value—which, in my view, it did since emotions are the principle bonding mechanisms among humans as evolved apes. As directional selection pushed subcortical areas of the brain toward expanded emotional production, it eventually began to create combinations of primary emotions and their variants; and in so doing dramatically expand the emotional repertoire of humans. In Table 2.3 on page 19 are what I term *first-order elaborations* of primary emotions. These elaborations involve a greater amount of one primary emotion mixed with a lesser amount of another primary emotion. Just how this is done neurologically is not clear, but all humans have relatively little trouble labeling their own emotions and those of others with terms like those listed in Table 2.3.

One of the reasons for expanding the variety of primary emotions and then constructing first-order elaborations is that natural selection had to overcome a very profound problem if emotions were to be used to increase social bonding and solidarity among troops of hominins and eventually human hunter-gatherers. This problem inheres in the fact that three of the four primary emotions are negative, and only one is positive. By expanding the variety of each primary emotion, it is evident that much of the power of the negativity of three of the four primary emotions can be reduced. For example, low-intensity variants of fear in Table 2.2 are less intense than *fear* in its raw, primary form. Emotions like *concern*, *hesitation*, *reluctance*, and *shyness* will not disrupt social relations like high level anxiety or terror; and so, by increasing the variety, each negative primary emotion could be used in more nuanced ways that could promote rather than breach or disrupt social relations. The same argument applies to the first-order elaborations enumerated in Table 2.3 because by combining primary emotions, many more less-intense and negative emotions can be produced. For example, *happiness* combined with a lesser amount of *fear* produces emotions such as *wonder*, *hopeful*, *gratitude*, and *pride*—all of which can be used to promote social bonding and take the fear out of fear. Of course, some very negative and intense emotions can also be produced, as is the case for combining *happiness* and *anger* to generate an emotion like *vengeance* (happiness at harming enemies). This is the emotion that fuels terrorism, feuds, genocide, and war, but if we look at the other emotions generated by this combination, they reduce the power of anger.

In Table 2.4 on page 19, I extend this line of argument further by emphasizing that the two most important emotions for social control—*shame* and *guilt*—are a second-order elaborations of primary emotions, in which all three of the negative primary emotions are combined (in an unknown neurological way) to produce emotions that are highly painful but, at the same time, that motivate people to conform to expectations of others to avoid shame and to adhere to moral codes in order to not experience guilt. Only hu-

mans among the primates experience these emotions; and I have argued that these were the final piece in natural selection's use of emotions to promote social bonding. In the case of shame and guilt, the three negative primary emotions are turned into emotions that motivate people to monitor their own actions and to sanction themselves when failing to meet expectations or to live up to moral codes. They reduce the need of others to monitor and sanction—both of which will produce a negative reaction from those who are monitored and sanctioned—while at the same time pushing persons to abide by expectations of others and moral codes in the culture.

By mixing the three negative primary emotions, natural selection diminished the power of these negative emotions to disrupt social relations and, at the same, time increased their power to control individuals. The dominant emotion in both shame and guilt is *disappointment-sadness* at self, but it is the relative salience of *anger* and *fear* that determines whether persons experience *guilt* or *shame*. As Table 2.4 outlines, *shame* is produced with *assertion-anger* as the second most powerful emotion after *disappointment-sadness*, followed by *aversion-fear*. Thus, when people feel shame, they experience simultaneously and, in order of relative power, *disappointment-sadness* at self, *assertion-anger* at self, and *aversion-fear* at the consequences for self of not meeting the expectations of others. In contrast, when people feel *guilty*, they experience simultaneously and, in order of magnitude, *disappointment-sadness* at self, *aversion-fear* for self, and *assertion-anger* of the consequences of violating moral codes. Thus, reversing the relative power of *anger* and *fear* produces dramatically different emotions. I also hypothesize that the second most salient emotion—whether *fear* or *anger*—is what will appear when shame and guilt are repressed, as I will outline shortly. That is, persons repressing *shame* transmute the shame into *diffuse anger*, at least most of the time, while persons repressing *guilt* transmute the guilt into *diffuse anxiety*.

This is all rather speculative, as is obvious, but we need to understand why the rather large emotional repertoire was produced by natural selection, if we are to fully understand the importance

of emotions in social life. Thus, from the very beginning of hominin evolution some ten millions years ago, natural selection was wiring the hominin brain to enhance emotions as an alternative mechanism for social bonding. Why was this so? The short answer (given in Chapter 2 of this volume) is that humans are evolved apes; the great apes with whom we share a common ancestor are not highly social and form no permanent social groupings. As the forests receded in Africa about ten millions years ago, many species of primates were pushed to the open-country, predator-ridden savanna where group organization would be fitness enhancing. As a result, most apes went extinct because they have no bioprogrammers for strong social ties and group formation. Yet, natural selection hit upon a solution for the hominin ancestors of humans. By selecting on emotions centers in the subcortical areas of the brain, the modules of this portion of the brain became larger and more networked with each other and the neocortex; and as a result the larger palate of emotions that evolved (as is outlined in the Tables in Chap. 2) allowed the hominin line leading to *Homo sapiens* to become more social and group oriented and, as such, more able to beat the odds and survive. All other apes seeking to survive on the open-country savanna went extinct because natural selection had not found this route to get around the extreme individualism and the lack of bioprogrammers for group organization evident in all of the great apes and, hence, the last common ancestor to great apes and humans.

As natural selection rewired the brain for enhanced emotionality, it also dramatically increased the neuro-nets within and between the subcortex (where emotions are generated) and neocortex, particularly the prefrontal cortex. Contained in this rewiring is the capacity for repression or the pushing from consciousness negative emotional experiences. Neurologically, repression pushes emotions from the neo-cortex to subcortical areas of the brain, primarily the hippocampus, where conscious awareness of emotions is reduced, if not taken away. I doubt if this capacity for repression was selected for; rather, this capacity was a by-product of adding wiring and connectivity between the prefrontal cor-

tex, where thought and decision-making occur, and the subcortical areas of the brain where emotions are generated. But, the consequences of repression are significant in understanding not only human behavior but the organization of society as well, including stratification systems.

### 9.4.2 The Activation of Defense Mechanisms

Many scholars in clinical and in sociological works have emphasized repression as a key to understanding emotions, particularly negative emotions and especially *shame* and/or *guilt*. Scheff (1994) and in collaboration with Retzinger (1991) has long emphasized that repressed shame is a force behind collective violence, ranging from feuds through genocide to war. Volkan (1999, 2004, 2006), who is a clinician, has similarly stressed that efforts at ethnic genocide are fueled by shame that has been partially repressed across generations, suddenly emerging as intense and *diffuse anger* at all who are of a particular ethnic group. In the context of stratification, *shame* and *guilt* or their transmuted variants of *diffuse anger* and *diffuse anxiety* are, like all emotions, unequally distributed. People experience these emotions at differential rates, depending upon their locations in the hierarchical divisions of labor of corporate units in diverse institutional domains and in their membership in variously valued categoric units. Those who are successful at garnering resources will generally experience quiet *pride*, which is the converse of *shame* (Cooley 1922; Scheff 1988), and they will likely avoid *guilt* because they have met moral mandates of being successful in securing key resources. The avoidance of *shame* and *guilt*, and its transmutation, allows people to evaluate self positively, to experience positive emotions like *pride*, *happiness*, *contentment*, etc., and to feel confidence in their ability to secure additional resources in other institutional domains. Conversely, those who have failed to secure what they perceive as adequate resources will often experience *shame* or its transmuted manifestation as *diffuse anger*; and if they viewed securing resources in moral terms, they may also

experience *guilt* or *diffuse anxiety* or *fear*. These negative emotions erode the effects of whatever positive emotions a person feels in successful efforts to secure some resources, but more importantly, these emotions erode confidence. Moreover, people get locked into two potential cycles that can often overlap: (1) shame transmuted in diffuse anger leading to angry outbursts that make a person experience more shame that is repressed and that increases the valences for diffuse anger, followed by another and perhaps yet another iteration of this cycle; (2) guilt transmuted into diffuse anxiety, followed by feeling guilty for feeling guilty or for being anxious, and then followed again and again with the sense of guilt and anxiety continuously increasing in intensity. Thus, people become locked into being ashamed of experiencing shame, or being ashamed of angry outbursts that only escalate the shame that is repressed, and/or they can become locked into feeling guilty about feeling guilty, or feeling more guilt about their anxiety. This potentially increasing reservoir of negative emotions about self's failure to meet expectations of others and failure to live up to moral codes erodes further people's positive emotional energy and confidence. By denying them (a) positive feelings of self-esteem, (b) positive moral evaluations of self by the ideologies of institutional domains, and (c) positive emotional energy, they are psychologically blocked from securing resources in institutional domains, even those resources that are relatively easy to get by just participating in particular types of corporate units like churches and families.

Yet, repression is only part of this dynamic causing inequalities in the distribution of positive and negative emotions. I see repression as a master defense mechanisms, which is supplemented by other defense mechanisms that affect the valences of the ensuing emotions and the targets of this emotions. Table 2.5 on p. 21 outlines my views on repression. Once an emotion is repressed from full consciousness, other defense mechanisms kick in. These can be displacement, projection, reaction formation, sublimation, and attribution—as is listed in column (2) of Table 2.5. As is indicated in column (3) of Table 2.5, these additional defense mecha-

nisms affect the valences of the emotions that are experienced and expressed by individuals. Some such as reaction formation and sublimation transmute negative emotions into positive emotions, whereas others transmute negative emotions into *anger* or *fear*. The activation of defense mechanisms also targets the transmuted emotions, and there are just a few basic targets potentially available: self, others, corporate units, categoric units, institutional domains, stratification systems, societies, and inter-societal systems. The most likely targets of each of the defense mechanisms are listed in column (4) of Table 2.5 on p. 21.

### 9.4.3 Attribution as a Key Defense Mechanism

In my view, *attribution* is the most important defense mechanism, at least from a sociological perspective. Individuals are always making causal attributions for their feelings, and since defense mechanisms are always an effort to protect self, the attributions are externalized towards others and social structures. As Lawler (2001) has emphasized, attributions for negative feelings reveal a *distal bias*, moving away from self and often the local situation to categories of others, social structures such as corporate units or even institutional domains and the stratification system, and perhaps the society as a whole. To attribute the cause of negative emotions to self would only increase negative feelings, and so it is natural for people to repress the cause and sometimes even the feeling itself, leading to its transmutation of emotions into anger and targeting of safer objects. If others in local situations can fight back against attributions directed at them, then the attributions will generally be made to more general objects like categories of others (Jew, blacks, women, etc.) or to various levels of social structure that cannot directly fight back and arouse negative feelings about self. If, however, others are dependent and not able to fight back, such as a spouse in an abusive relationship with a diffusely angry man, then the abuse will continue. Yet, as noted earlier, this kind of relationship often becomes a shame-anger-more

shame cycle often intertwined with a guilt-anger/anxiety-more guilt cycle.

The stratification of emotions always involves individuals' efforts to make sense of injustices in the distribution of not only emotions but all other resources as well (Jasso 1993; Weiner 1986, 2006). People try to figure out who and what are responsible for their negative emotions; and if the emotions have been repressed, then these attribution dynamics become complicated. Generally, once the connection between the actual emotion and cause of this emotions is broken by repression, attribution dynamics operate like guidance systems for a heat-seeking emotion such as *diffuse anger*. And, since the underlying emotion itself is lost to repression and since the person is seeking to protect self and to avoid experiencing more *shame* or *guilt* in the local situation, attributions become distal, locking on to categories of others or various levels of social structure and their cultures.

Moreover, because most people experience positive emotions in local encounters and groups, negative emotions aroused in these situations will detract from these positive self feelings, and so individuals repress these emotions to sustain the positive emotional flow and to avoid negative sanctioning from others but, in the process, lose the capacity to make accurate attributions. In contrast, positive emotions reveal a *proximal bias*, with people seeing themselves and/or immediate others as responsible for their feelings (Lawler 2001); and as they experience positive emotions, they express them to others who generally reciprocate—thereby setting in motion what Durkheim (1912) described as “emotional effervescence” or as Collins (1975, 2004) has conceptualized as “interaction rituals” generating positive emotional energy.

These distal and proximal biases pose a problem in a society more generally. If positive emotions evidence a proximal bias and negative emotions reveal a distal bias, how are positive emotions ever to break the centripetal force of the proximal bias and move out to more macrostructures? If this bias cannot be broken, then how can macrostructures like stratification systems or institutions ever be legitimated? And, if negative

emotions are being pushed outward by the power of the centrifugal force of the distal bias, and especially so for repressed emotions that transmute into *diffuse anger*, how is it possible to save macrostructures from a constant bombardment of negative feelings, thereby de-legitimizing macro social structures?

The answer to these questions resides in how consistently individuals experience positive emotions in local encounters embedded in meso-level units that in turn are embedded in macro-level units like institutional domains, stratification systems, and whole societies, or even inter-societal systems.

---

## 9.5 Basic Emotional Dynamics and Stratification

There are two basic conditions that arouse emotions: (1) meeting or failing to meet expectations and (2) receiving positive or negative sanctions from others (Turner 2007). When expectations are met and when people experience positive sanctions from others, they will experience positive emotions and positive evaluations of self; and if they consistently do so, then they will begin to make more external attributions toward the social structures in which encounters are embedded. And, if embedding is strong, with corporate units embedded in each other and then in institutional domains, or categoric units embedded in stratification, then this embedding provides the structural conduits for positive emotions to move outward toward ever more remote and macro-level social structures. And, the more occasions and situations in a wide variety of corporate units in diverse institutional domains where positive emotions are aroused by meeting expectations and by receiving positive sanctions, the more rapid and diffuse will this movement of positive emotions outward be, often targeting all institutional domains and the stratification system generated by corporate units in these domains. People thus begin to see macrostructures as also responsible for their good fortune and thus give legitimacy to macrostructures and their ideologies and meta-ideologies. These external attribu-



tions become more likely when people's identities are consistently verified in local encounters and when they have a sense of efficacy by virtue of meeting expectations, verifying self, and being efficacious (Lawler et al. 2009).

The converse is less true: the centripetal force of negative emotions, particularly repressed and transmuted negative emotions, such as *shame* into *diffuse anger* or *alienation*, is not as easily broken because people seek to protect self for failures to meet expectations or for shaming sanctions by those with power. People try, if they can, to protect their dignity; and they can salvage a sense of self pride and efficacy, if they can blame external objects for negative feelings. Indeed, *anger* can generate a sense of *pride* and efficacy if it is perceived, however inaccurately, to target an evil external force. People can have a sense of fighting back against external forces, even if these are illusionary because of repression. And, yet, the *shame* and sometimes the *guilt* that is at the core of negative feelings have not gone away, and indeed they become a transmutation machine that consistently spews out *diffuse anger* and *diffuse anxiety*.

Now, if we ask which categories of people are most likely to consistently experience positive emotions from meeting expectations and receiving positive sanctions from others and which are more likely to fail to meet at least initial expectations in life and to be on the receiving end of negative sanctions, a reasonable generalization is that those above the median in income are more likely to meet most of their expectations and to receive positive sanctions in corporate units, while those below the median income are more likely to fail to meet at least some expectations and to receive more sanctions because of their subordinates positions in corporate units. And, the further up or down from the median, the more this generalization is likely to hold true. This means that the lower are individuals' and families' class position, the more likely are they to experience *shame* for failing to meet cultural their expectations or for being shamed in relations of authority; and the more likely are they to repress this shame, allowing it to transmute into *diffuse anger*. It is also possible that, if they defined situ-

ations in moral terms, they will also experience *guilt* for failing to meet moralized expectations and for receiving negative sanctions, with this guilt being repressed and transmuted into *diffuse anxiety*.

The same processes hold for members of devaluated categories units. Those in valued categoric units are more likely in local encounters in corporate units to meet expectations (as would be predicted by the large expectation states literature) and to receive positive sanctions. Conversely, those in devaluated categoric units will be less like to meet expectations and more likely to feel negative sanctions, thereby making them feel *shamed* and, if they defined the situation in moral terms, *guilty* as well. They will be more likely to repress this shame and guilt, with the result that they will feel *angry* and *anxious*, which in turn will decrease their chances of securing valued resources in ever-more institutional domains.

At some point in these processes, people will readjust their expectations downward when they consistently fail in meeting expectations for resources, whereas those who consistently meeting expectations may adjust their expectations upward. Thus, with lowered expectations, the sense of failure is less likely and, presumably, so is shame and guilt, but is this really so? I would argue that initial failures to meet expectations and to experience negative sanctions generating *shame* will not disappear as cognitive consistency theory would predict. The reason that I make this prediction is that the emotions arouse are repressed, early on, and once repressed they do not go away; if anything, they increase in intensity. As a result, people will still experience negative emotions, and over time these may transmute into other negative emotions. For example, *alienation* has much the same structure as *shame* in its constituent emotions: sadness, anger, and fear. And so, shame may generate over the long-term *alienation*, with some residue of *diffuse anger*. Moreover, transmutation of shame or guilt into any of its constituent emotions becomes more likely the longer shame and guilt are repressed, thus increasing *sadness* and *depression*, or *anger* for *guilt* and *fear* for *shame*. Thus, adjusting expectations does not remove people from, first of

all, the structures and cultures in which they have been shamed and made to feel guilty nor, secondly, does the lowering expectations have much affect on emotions that have been repressed and, hence, are not answerable to cognitive manipulations.

For those who have been more successful, adjusting expectations upward may lead to them experience more failure, thus increasing negative emotional arousal. But, since the early positive emotions from meeting expectations are not repressed but, rather, stand as a reservoir of self-confidence, individuals are better prepared to ride out an occasional episode of failure, and they are probably more likely to adjust expectations in the ways that cognitive consistency theories would predict into a kind of equilibrium where expectations and outcomes are in balance, causing individuals to experience *satisfaction* and to possess confidence.

The outcome is that the emotionally rich get richer, and the emotionally deprived get poorer. Thus, as I have emphasized, emotions are like other resources; they can be used to secure more resources. With a reservoir of positive energy and confidence, people can secure not only more positive emotions directly but also indirectly by their success in garnering other resources in a wider variety of institutional domains. With a reservoir of negative emotions, buried in repression in the hippocampus and transmuted into one or all of the negative emotions that make up *shame*, *guilt*, and *alienation*, people cannot escape the negative feelings about themselves and situations, and they will not have the confidence to change their situation easily. Being emotionally impoverished imposes the same barriers to upward mobility in the stratification system as being economically poor. And the fewer resources of any kind that people can secure in institutional domains, the greater will be their reservoir of negative emotional energy.

But, as is evident in capitalist systems, there is less polarization than might be expected because some valued resources, as I emphasized earlier, are more readily accessible to those who are poor. *Love/loyalty*, *sacredness/piety*, *learning*, *competitiveness*, and *aesthetics*, for example, can

be secured at lower costs than money, power, or prestige; and in this way, the poor can become somewhat richer in non-monetary resources and thus avoid total emotional impoverishment. They can gain positive self-evaluations, feel that they are meeting some expectations, enjoy positive sanctions, and evaluative themselves positively by the ideologies and meta-ideologies of those institutional domains where they can secure at least some generalized symbolic media as resources. Moreover, some of the resources secured—say, *learning* from schools, *competitiveness* from sport, and *aesthetics* from art—can be used to gain access to money and even power as well as prestige, as is evident with academic stars, great athletes, and artists in music, movies, or theater. Sociologists, starting with Marx's view on religion as an opiate, have tended to underemphasize these kinds of resources and the highly positive emotions that they generate, the sense of efficacy that they impart, and the sense of self-worth that they give people—all of which increase their levels of positive emotional energy and self confidence to be successful. And, even if people are not super-stars in a field, they can keep their emotional head above water by securing valued resources in non-economic and non-political domains.

Even persons who are poor and members of devalued categoric units (in addition to their lower social class position) can overcome the stigma of being a member of a devaluated categoric unit. Coupled with efforts to use law and the power of the state to increase equal opportunities, individuals can be mobile if they acquire key resources and gain confidence in having done so because once the correlation between valued-devalued categoric units, on the one side, and locations in the hierarchies of superordination-subordination in resource distributing corporate units, on the other, is broken, individuals from differentially valued categoric units will reveal higher rates of interaction and, typically, such increases in rates of interaction will reduce the salience of categoric unit memberships and, over time, change status beliefs derived from meta-ideologies and expectations states for formerly devaluated categoric-unit members. The key to this transformation is

access to key resources, often made available by polity, such as education, and use of law by polity to enforce the egalitarian tenets of value premises in capitalist societies at the level of corporate units in key institutional domains.

If, however, the opposite situation exists—membership in valued-de-valued categoric units is correlated with high-lower rankings in hierarchies of authority in corporate units in institutional domains, then status in corporate units and membership in categoric units will *both* increase in salience. When there is a correlation between the worth of members in diverse categoric units, as defined by status beliefs derived from ideologies legitimating stratification, and rank in social hierarchies, the over-representation of valued categoric-unit members in high ranks increases the salience of valued categoric unit and prestige associated with rank, whereas when there is a correlation between low rank and de-valued categoric-unit membership, attention is called to low-rank and over-representation of low-worth incumbents as defined by status beliefs and expectation states. Thus, there is a compounding of rewards and punishments for individuals when rank and worth of categoric units correlate, giving those in higher ranks and more valued categoric units more honor, esteem, deference from others, positive self feelings, and confidence, and those in lower ranks and less valued categoric units little honor, esteem, and deference that lead to less positive self feelings and to a lack of confidence. Whether these negatively valenced emotions are repressed or not does not make that much difference: the repressed negative feelings generally lead to other negative emotional states, such as *alienation*, *shame*, perhaps *guilt*, *sadness*, *anxiety*, and other emotional states that erode confidence and thus keep those in lower ranks from garnering resources in other institutional domains, including the positive emotions that come with success in getting increased shares of any resource. Conversely, those with confidence are more likely to maintain their access to resources and to take the initiative in securing additional resources. Thus, again, the emotionally richer become richer while the emotionally impoverished stay poor.

## 9.6 The Reproduction of the Emotional Stratification System

Once stratification exists, it is difficult to dismantle for a variety of reasons. First, those at the median and above of any distribution of resources are more likely to meet expectations and receive positive sanctions, and as they do so, their positive emotional arousal breaks the proximal bias and leads them to accept the tenets of the meta-ideology legitimating the stratification system. And, since these individuals and families are most likely to have money, influence, and authority in corporate units, they can impose their sentiments on those in subordinate positions in corporate units and below the median of societal-level distribution of resources, at least much of the time. Second, they are motivated to do so because by legitimating the meta-ideology, they are also verifying those identities tied to corporate units and their sense of self-worth as defined by the moralized tenets of ideologies and meta-ideologies; and as their emotional stake in legitimating ideologies promoting their sense of self worth and efficacy increases, they resist any change in the moral tenets of these ideologies. Third, on the other side of the median of resource distribution, the negative emotions aroused among those in lower classes and devalued categoric units could potentially be a force for change, as most conflict theories emphasize. But, I would argue that most of the populations in a modern society hovers on either side of the median, and thus those below the median are not emotionally destitute. They still have access to other symbolic media as resources like *love/loyalty*, *sacredness/piety*, *learning*, *competition*, *aesthetics*, and some economic capital as well as some authority in at least some corporate units. As a result, they are likely to buy into most of the ideology, and in fact, their insecurity about their position (yet another emotional burden to carry) may make them much more conservative and supportive of the status quo. Indeed, they may be unwilling to take the risk of initiating conflict within corporate units or in the broader society. Fourth, resource distributions across categoric units often do not correlate consistently with social class (economic) position. For exam-

ple, women as a categoric unit are discriminated against in virtually all corporate units at all levels of society; and so the result is that, while they have a common interest in changing the status beliefs that devalue women, they are located at very different positions in the class system. Moreover, women in families must live daily lives with “the enemy”: their spouses who often enjoy the benefits of discrimination. This partitioning of the largest block in a society of devalued members of a categoric unit—women—is often splintered and fractured in ways that work to sustain the system, especially by those around the median of income.

The result is that the largest reservoir of negative emotions typically exists among those far below the median in income, but even this population is often divided by categoric unit differences—religious and ethnic, for example—which splits the reserves of negative emotional energy that can be mobilized by charismatic leaders forming a social movement organization. The result is that mobilizing persons by class differences is less likely to occur than by non-class categoric-unit differences, especially when these are not fractured across the class system, as is the case for women. Thus, distinctive ethnic subpopulations or other previously devalued categoric units, such as those in the homosexual community, can more effectively organize—as has been so evident in the civil rights and gay rights (and more broadly, LBTG community as a whole). In contrast, while the women’s movement has been partially successful, it has faltered and often lost its focus for the reasons stated above.

At the level of the micro-level encounter, where emotions are aroused in face-to-face interactions in corporate units, it is difficult to mobilize subpopulations experiencing negative emotions, for the reasons enumerated above. Moreover, negative emotions such as *alienation*, *sadness*, *anxiety*, and *fears* are not what drive social movements; *anger* fueled by a sense of injustice are what make people ready to follow leaders in conflict; and while *diffuse anger* is certainly one of the outcomes of being shamed and frustrated in meeting goals, it is not the only negative emotion. And, as I mentioned earlier, shame and guilt often transmute into other emotions than

anger—variants of *fear* and *sadness*—when experienced over long periods of time.

Moreover, repression breaks the connection between the original negative emotion and the source of this emotion, especially with attribution dynamics or any of the other supplementary defense mechanisms listed in Table 2.5. The result can well be the targeting of the wrong external structures with *anger*. A dramatic example of this problem is gang violence in the urban (and now suburban) areas in the United States). Gang members have failed to meet expectations in most institutional realms—their families, schools, education, politics—and they have consistently experienced negative sanctions in corporate units within these institutional domains. It is reasonable assume that they have experienced *shame* and suffered by their failure to live up to meta-ideologies; and they have clearly repressed much of this shame but, curiously, they do not target the sources of their shame—parents, teachers, employers, for instance—but instead rival gang members over neighborhood tuff control in order sustain the high-risk end of the illegal drug distribution system. They clearly reveal *diffuse anger* but it is targeted at the wrong object, although sometimes the conflict between police and gangs comes closer to an appropriate target. As a result, they are very unlikely to join a social movement that might indeed benefit them or their families in the longer run. In fact, the violence that is meted out in some neighborhoods drives law-abiding citizens to seek help from polity and its coercive arm, thus legitimating government (even as it is held in some contempt for its failures to help them). And so, gang violence causes more violence, more *fear* and *anxiety*, and thus makes both gang members and their neighborhoods live with more negative emotions, paralyzed and unable to do anything about the distribution of other resources in the broader stratification system and about the meta-ideologies legitimating this system that stigmatize them. They can gain some positive emotions from families, if they are stable, or religion, but otherwise, they cannot even do much about the wide swath of negative emotions they must experience on a daily basis.

This immobilization thus works to reproduce the emotional stratification system.

Still another reproductive force is the transmission of shame and its transmutation into other negative emotions across generations. People who have been shamed possess *diffuse anger*, and in their families they often strike out at their spouses and children, venting their anger and frustration on obviously the wrong (but safer) objects. Those who have suffered at this abuse will, themselves experience shame, and repress it in order to avoid the pain that comes from such shame, as well as to hide their emotions from abusive family members. The consequence is that, as they form their own families, these victims of abuse will vent their own (transmuted shame into) *anger* on members of their families, thus setting up another generation cycles of shame-anger-more shame with the family that can go on for many generations.

This kind of venting of *anger* on the wrong objects makes mobilization of shamed person more difficult because the connection between institutional domains as the source of their immediate anger has been partially broken, being displaced instead on immediate others that only compounds the negative emotions that all family members must live with. The result is that any emotional stratification system will persist when the reservoir of accumulated negative emotions at its bottom tiers cannot easily be organized into a coherent and focused social movement organization. In most social movements, these angry persons are the shock troops, but in the society-wide emotional stratification system they are distracted and their emotions deflected in directions that do not work in favor of a social movement organization.

---

## 9.7 Conclusion

The fact that emotions are, themselves, resources distributed unequally often means that they are not resources to be used in mobilization for transformation of stratification. Negative emotions do not automatically lead subordinates in a system to mobilize for conflict, as many theorists have presumed. In fact, negative emotions

can demoralize people and work, as I have described, to reproduce the system of stratification. Thus, sociology needs to develop a new model of stratification, one which emphasized: (1) the availability of many highly valued resources in all institutional domains, not just economy and polity; (2) the unique character of many resources as symbolic media that are the terms of talk and exchange as well as ideological formations legitimating institutional domains and the stratification system; (3) the nature of emotions themselves as rather complex variations and mixes of primary emotions; (4) the dynamics of repression and operation of other defense mechanisms, particularly attributions, which normally are not considered to be defense mechanisms but which may be the most important for sociological analysis because attributions target emotions toward varying types of social objects; and (5) the effects of emotional dynamics on the reproduction of the stratification system.

What is needed, then, is a more robust theory of stratification that takes account of advances in the sociology of emotions and the analysis of emotions as they affect meso-level and macro-level sociocultural formations (Turner 2014). A great deal of progress has been made over just this last decade in viewing emotions as the missing link in the often hypothesized micro-macro gap (e.g., Lawler et al. 2009; Turner 2002, 2010). What occurs in encounters embedded in meso and macro structures has large effects on the culture and structure of these structures, including stratification systems.

---

## References

- Barbalet, J. (1998). *Emotion, social theory, and social structure: A macrosociological approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Collins, R. (1975). *Conflict sociology: Toward an explanatory science*. New York: Academic.
- Collins, R. (1990). Stratification, emotional energy, and the transient emotions. In T. D. Kemper (Ed.), *Research agendas in the sociology of emotions* (pp. 27–57). New York: SUNY Press.
- Collins, R. (2004). *Interaction ritual chains*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.



- Durkheim, E. (1912/1965). *The elementary forms of the religious life*. New York: Macmillan.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1979). Emotion work, feeling rules and social structure. *American Journal of Sociology*, 85, 551–573.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1983). *The managed heart: Commercialization of human feeling*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Jasso, G. (1993). Choice and emotion in comparison theory. *Rationality and Society*, 5, 231–274.
- Lawler, E. J. (2001). An affect theory of social exchange. *American Journal of Sociology*, 107, 321–352.
- Lawler, E. J., Thye, S., & Yoon, J. (2009). *Social commitments in a depersonalized world*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Luhmann, N. (1982). *The differentiation of society* (trans: S. Holmes, C. Larmore). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Luhmann, N. (1988). *Theory of action: Towards a new synthesis going beyond parsons*. London: Routledge.
- Mestrovic, S. (1997). *Postemotional society*. London: Sage.
- Parsons, T. (1963a). On the concept of power. *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 107, 232–262.
- Parsons, T. (1963b). On the concept of influence. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 27, 37–62.
- Scheff, T. J. (1979). *Catharsis in healing, ritual, and drama*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Scheff, T. J. (1988). Shame and conformity: The deference-emotion system. *American Sociological Review*, 5, 395–406.
- Scheff, T. J. (1994). *Bloody revenge: Emotions, nationalism, and war*. Boulder: Westview.
- Scheff, T. J., & Retzinger, S. M. (1991). *Emotions and violence: Shame and rage in destructive conflicts*. Lexington: Lexington Books.
- Simmel, G. (1907/1990). *The philosophy of money* (trans: T. Bottomore, D. Frisby). Boston: Routledge.
- Turner, J. H. (1994). A general theory of motivation and emotion in human interaction. *Osterreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, 8, 20–35.
- Turner, J. H. (1999a). The neurology of emotion: Implications for sociological theories of interpersonal behavior. *Social Perspectives on Emotions*, 5, 81–108.
- Turner, J. H. (1999b). Toward a general sociological theory of emotions. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior*, 29, 132–162.
- Turner, J. H. (2000a). *On the origins of human emotions: A sociological inquiry into the evolution of human affect*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Turner, J. H. (2000b). A theory of embedded encounters. *Advances in Group Processes*, 17, 283–320.
- Turner, J. H. (2002). *Face-to-face: Toward a theory of interpersonal behavior*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Turner, J. H. (2007). *Human emotions: A sociological theory*. London: Routledge.
- Turner, J. H. (2010). *Theoretical principles of sociology: Volume 2 on microdynamics*. New York: Springer.
- Turner, J. H. (2014). *Revolt from the middle: Emotional stratification and social change in post-industrial societies*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books.
- Weiner, B. (1986). *An attributional theory of motivation and emotion*. New York: Springer.
- Weiner, B. (2006). *Social motivation, justice, and the moral emotions: An attributional approach*. Cambridge: Winthrop.
- Withnow, R. (1987). *Meaning and moral order: Explorations in cultural analysis*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Meredith Rossner and Mythily Meher

### 10.1 Introduction

The Opening Ceremony to the 2012 London Olympics was an absolute spectacle. Athletes representing over 200 countries processed through the Olympic Stadium, cheered on by 80,000 spectators and watched by 900 million viewers across the world. Filmmaker Danny Boyle, the ceremony's choreographer, orchestrated an astonishing display of British history and culture, replete with Mary Poppins' floating down from the sky on umbrellas, a flock of sheep grazing on pastoral land, David Beckham driving a speedboat, workers from the Industrial Revolution forging the Olympic Rings, music from the Beatles, Sex Pistols, and Queen, an 18 m tall replica of Harry Potter's Voldemort, the Queen and James Bond (reprised by Daniel Craig) skydiving into the stadium, nurses and hospital volunteers dancing in an ode to the National Health Service, with performances by Paul McCartney, The Arctic Monkeys, and the London Symphony Orchestra. The crowd cheered and sang, and viewers at home were enthralled. Sarah Lyal (2012), writing in the *New York Times*, summed up the ceremony's effect:

With its hilariously quirky Olympic opening ceremony, a wild jumble of the celebratory and the

fanciful; the conventional and the eccentric; and the frankly off-the-wall, Britain presented itself to the world as something it has often struggled to express even to itself: a nation secure in its own post-empire identity, whatever that actually is.

One way to read this event is as Britain's attempt to reclaim a national identity and affirm a shared set of symbols and morals. Another layer of reading may consider the 'face' that Britain presented to the rest of the world. Unlike the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony 4 years earlier, which was a masterpiece of synchronization and grandiosity, this event eschewed an official story of British pride and was self-consciously chaotic, reminding the rest of the world of the best parts of Britain: its diversity, its social democratic values, its humor.

One year earlier, London had the world transfixed by a very different spectacle. Riots broke out in the suburb of Tottenham in August, 2011, quickly spreading through the city's neighborhoods and erupting across the rest of England. The uproar sparked in response to the police shooting of a local teenager, Mark Duggan. Adolescents and adults from a variety of social and ethnic backgrounds channelled their frustrations over police-community relations, racial tension, cuts to public services, increases in tuition fees, a general sense of injustice, as well as boredom and desire for material goods into the furore. Over 4 days, people gathered to riot, protest, battle the police, and loot. About 2,500 shops were ransacked, causing £300 million in damage in London alone. Nearly 2000 people were

---

M. Rossner (✉)  
London School of Economics and Political Science,  
London, UK  
e-mail: m.rossner@lse.ac.uk

M. Meher  
University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia

arrested for rioting, though many more were involved.

In qualitative interviews, many rioters described a feeling of being sucked into the group activity; of finding themselves smashing windows, setting cars on fire, stealing mobile phones and sneakers from shops, and fighting with the police. One rioter told researchers that being part of it was “like a dream...I was actually doing it. I felt alive, there’s no word to explain it. It was like that first day it happened will always be the best day of my life forever—I swear to God” (Lewis 2011). Some reported a sense of euphoria surrounding the looting. As one 16 year old girl recalled, “Everyone was smiling. It was literally a festival with no food, no dancing, no music but a free shopping trip for everyone” (Lewis et al. 2011, p. 30). A third rioter, a 19 year old student, remarked that, “When I went outside for the first time, I could feel like, that the air was, it wasn’t how it normally was, it was like an unspoken kind of feeling just floating around. It actually made me feel really strong. It made me feel really powerful” (Carter 2011).

There are a number of approaches to thinking about these two events. A sociologist might start by looking at the larger social and cultural frameworks encompassing them. They could analyse how Susan Boyle came to represent British culture, or provide an anti-capitalist critique of the spectacle surrounding global sporting events like the Olympics. Sociologists can (and have) also provided important analysis of the context in which the riots took place, documenting the sense of injustice and alienation felt by a generation of British youth.


Another approach is to study the micro-level dynamics of the events themselves. What happens when people come together, either to celebrate a nation hosting the Olympics, or to express their anger and frustration at that same nation? How does the act of participating in such an event (in person, watching it on television, or by reading updates on twitter) help us to define who we are as individuals, what’s important to us, what our values are, what kind of society we belong to? These are the questions that ritual theorists ask, and they will drive this chapter’s discussion.

### 10.1.1 Features of a Ritual


In common parlance, ‘ritual’ connotes something that is done out of habit or tradition, perhaps with a certain hollowness. When we yet again observe a politician engage in empty rhetoric, we dismiss it as ‘mere ritual.’ This dismissal might be issued to describe ceremonial acts deemed token and empty of felt significance. There is a sense that if something is ‘ritualized’ it has lost its power or that those participating in the event are following the herd, enacting routine for routine’s sake. We also often think of rituals as deeply personal habits, like a morning ‘coffee ritual’. We tend to evoke the word ‘ritual’ to describe several little idiosyncrasies or routines about the way we do our business. The ‘ritual’ of ritual theory, however, departs from the ways the word is used in everyday speech.

In sociology, ritual theory is premised on the idea that meaning is generated in and by repeated social interactions. By ‘meaning’ we refer to the forces that compel members of a society to engage in ways that maintain social and emotional solidarity *despite* personality differences. In the course of interactions, morals, symbols and emotions shared by a social group are exchanged, reiterated, strengthened or manipulated. In short, rituals are interactions where people mutually focus their attention on a common object, resulting in a shared reality, a sense of solidarity, and symbols of group membership (Collins 2004). Rituals can be large and small, formal and informal, planned or spontaneous, and are at the heart of all social life; from world-scale spectacles like the Olympic Games, through identified rituals like graduation ceremonies, down to such banal interactions as ‘liking’ a friend’s content on Facebook. Through ritual, collective sentiments are solidified, comprising a felt effect, whether that is nationalism, the poignancy of a rite of passage, or the simple confirmation that one’s contribution to the social network has merit.

Notably, an analysis grounded in ritual theory takes the *encounter*, not the individual, as the key unit to understanding social life. This theoretical position departs from the more common sociological approach that sees social meaning



**Fig. 10.1** Structural view of ritual



**Fig. 10.2** Radical microsociology

as originating within individuals who, in acting upon the world, shape the society they inhabit. Erving Goffman, one of the main sociologists to advance a ritual perspective, famously wrote that the object of study is “not then, men and their moments. Rather, moments and their men” (Goffman 1967/1982, p. 3).

This differs from the more traditional anthropological definition of rituals as rites or ceremonies thought to reflect the larger social structures, cultures, and values found in any given society, but set apart from everyday life (See Fig. 10.1). Symbols and metaphors within these rituals were seen to provide a doorway to the transcendental, or comprised their own model of the ideal cultural system (Geertz 1966; Turner 1969/1995). The ritual tradition in sociology, led by Durkheim, Goffman, and Collins, takes the inverse approach, one that Collins terms radical microsociology (see Fig. 10.2). In this tradition, rituals, the repeated actions of focused attention, are what constitute belief, values, cultures, and ultimately, the social structure.

Rituals create the microfoundation of social life. This is important to the sociology of emotions because rituals are grounded in emotional exchanges, which connect people across a range of different situations in space and time. Though sociology has been criticized for excluding the

emotional life from its purview, ritual theories are an exception, and pave a way towards further remedying this, offering a wide ranging sociological theory that is elegant in design and ambitious in scope.

In this chapter, we will explore the tradition of ritual theory in sociology, and discuss its implications for the sociology of emotions. We begin by tracing the intellectual heritage of ritual theory, initiated by Emile Durkheim, revamped by Erving Goffman, and then further coalescing with the work of Randall Collins. We then consider the different methodologies and approaches available to conduct research on rituals and social interaction, building on this with an exploration of select areas of research in sociology that draw on ritual theory to illuminate the social processes, including the study of criminal justice and punishment, violence, social movements and activism, economics and financial markets and consumption. This list is neither comprehensive nor exhaustive, but provides a select view of how research agendas are being advanced by ritual theory. Highlighting emergent ideas and nascent challenges for contemporary sociology to contend with, we conclude by questioning the concept of solitary and technology-mediated rituals and the uneasy relationship with macro-sociology and social structure.

## 10.2 Lineage of Ritual Theory

### 10.2.1 Emile Durkheim: Collective Effervescence and Sources of Morality

Philosophers, historians, and anthropologists have long been studying the role of rituals in ancient and contemporary cults, practices, religions, and beliefs. This was a popular subject for nineteenth century intellectuals, though the concept and theory of ritual remained relatively abstract in their work. Emile Durkheim's empirical agenda changed this. Durkheim was primarily committed to the development of sociology as a discipline. He wanted to show that behaviors and phenomena that were long considered private or individualistic, such as religious belief, criminal punishment, or even suicide, were actually *social* phenomena that produced our commitment to or membership in a culture or society. Over a number of different works<sup>1</sup>, he explores the idea that interactions between socio-culturally bounded groups of people serve to simultaneously produce and reinforce the symbolic order that unites them.

Durkheim first developed a theory of rituals in his study of Australian Aboriginal rites and religious ceremonies, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1912/1996). The data for this study was largely drawn from Spencer and Gillens' (1898) account of lifeways amongst Australian Aboriginals in and around Alice Springs. Spencer and Gillens' book, with its detailed descriptions and photographs, provided the data for a systematic empirical case study. A contemporary reader

<sup>1</sup> While Durkheim's work on ritual tends to focus on his empirical work on religion, much of his earlier work hints at the ritual basis for social solidarity; one could read the *Division of Labor in Society*, *Suicide*, and *The Rules of the Sociological Methods* as case studies of the different ways of social organization dictate the types of rituals that you participate in. For example, societies characterized by mechanic or organic solidarity dictate what type of rituals people living in those societies participate in. Similarly, the concept of Anomie and later classification of anomic suicide is also a study in the lack of solidarity or shared morals that come from lack of rituals of social integration.

may find this study naïve, as indeed, it has been suggested that Durkheim and his contemporaries saw the Australian Aboriginals as representing some kind of 'primitive' form of social organization in which the sophisticated and complex European society in which these intellectuals were living had its evolutionary roots. However, Durkheim was clear that he meant for this study to reveal our common humanity, rather than single out or exoticize a foreign race.

Durkheim draws on Aboriginal religious practices as well as examples from political history to develop a model of a ritual. These 'elementary forms' are meant to underlie not only religious organization, but all aspects of social life. There are two main features:


1. Group assembly
2. Collective effervescence

Group assembly means that people gather from across a wide geographic area to occupy the same place at the same time, with the express purpose of taking part in a group activity. This implies that there is something physical about ritual interaction; the bodily experience of being part of a group is an empirical reality.

As bodies come together in space and time, there arises a feeling of shared experience or "a condition of heightened intersubjectivity" (Collins 2004, p. 35), where the group becomes aware of a feeling of 'groupness', thus creating a collective conscience that is greater than the sum of its parts. This—Durkheim's notion of collective effervescence—is a significant concept that has catalyzed the sociological study of rituals. The two components that lead to collective effervescence are shared action and shared emotion. People are *doing* things together—praying, singing, watching. They are also *feeling* things together—sharing the electricity or buzz generated by the event. The feeling of collective effervescence is familiar to anyone who has experienced any kind of powerful religious or sporting event, concert, piece of theatre, political rally, riot, and so on. The feeling of 80,000 people singing Beatles songs along with Paul McCartney at the London Olympics opening ceremony described earlier in this chapter is a good example.



**Fig. 10.3** Durkheim's model of ritual



When people come together and focus their attention and their emotions into a state of collective effervescence, the ritual results in two broad outcomes (see Fig. 10.3):

1. Symbols of the relationship
2. A shared set of morals

Durkheim emphasizes the production of symbols, which act as markers of group identity. A symbol is an object (or idea, word, or person) that comes to represent the group and its attendant solidarity. These symbols remind us of the powerful feeling we felt during the ritual. We charge up objects with symbolic meaning as a shortcut to representing the intense feeling of collective effervescence:

The sentiments aroused in us by something spontaneously attach themselves to a symbol which represents them.... For we are unable to consider an abstract entity, which we can represent only laboriously and confusedly, the source of the strong sentiments which we feel. We cannot explain them to ourselves except by connecting them to some concrete object of whose reality we are vividly aware... The soldier who dies for his flag, dies for his country; but as a matter of fact, in his own consciousness, it is the flag that has the first place (Durkheim 1912/1996, p. 250)

Symbols become sacred, which distinguishes them from the profane, or the realm of the everyday. They take on an otherworldly quality, which in religion is often associated with a deity. In the context of Aboriginal religion, sacred symbols take the form of totems, which instil worshippers with a sense of the divine. Perhaps cynically, Durkheim suggests that while participants in a religious ritual may believe that they are experiencing the divine, in reality they are experiencing their own solidarity, that is, the collective effervescence created and reinforced by their actions. The symbols act as a reminder of this. In keeping with this, most forms of contemporary religion

rely on symbols; the cross, the Star of David, the star and crescent, for instance, all evoke the divine.

Symbols, when backed by rituals, can wield enormous power. We come to hold these symbols as sacred, and disrespect and desecration (such as flag burning) are seen to be highly offensive. However, in order for these symbols to retain their power, they need to be 'recharged' by more rituals. This can perhaps explain why the opening ceremonies for the Olympics have become increasingly lavish and over-the-top; each subsequent spectacle renews its symbols, such as the Olympic torch that is carried from Athens to the host city, the flag with its five interlocking rings representing the coming together of all nations, or the anthem that is played to mark the opening of the games. When people lose interest in ritual, for whatever reason, its symbols come to lose meaning. Take for example, current debates in a number of countries across the world over the wearing of a poppy to commemorate fallen WWI soldiers. Poppies were originally worn in the lead up to Armistice Day, November the 11th, as a symbol of remembrance. Over time, rituals to mark this day have faded as new generations are increasingly less invested in them. Some have argued that poppies have lost their meaning, as they are worn by politicians and celebrities as an empty act of populism. The once strong symbol, without meaningful rituals to back it up, has (arguably) faded.

A final feature of rituals is their affirmation or reaffirmation of a shared morality. This is a collective sense that a group's actions and beliefs are right, and that violations of the group norms are wrong. Durkheim describes this in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1912/1996), but he articulates it most clearly in his writings on crime and punishment in *The Division of*

*Labor in Society* (1893/1997), *Moral Education* (1961/2002), and the *Rules of the Sociological Method* (1985/1992).

In the *Rules* (1985/1992), Durkheim makes his now famous case that crime is a ‘normal’ part of any functioning society; a society of absolute conformity would be inflexible and incapable of evolution, whereas deviant behavior is a vehicle for growth and change. Durkheim writes:

Imagine a society of saints, a perfect cloister of exemplary individuals. Crimes properly so called, will there be unknown; but faults which appear venial to the layman will create there the same scandal that the ordinary offence does in ordinary consciousness. If, then, this society has the power to judge and punish, it will define these acts as criminal and will treat them as such. (1985, p. 68–69)

Not only is crime a normal and expected part of any society, but it serves a positive function by allowing us to develop collective rituals of punishment that affirm our moral order. Durkheim argues that we feel emotionally affronted when our norms are violated, and that punishment allows for an emotionally expressive ritual to condemn violators while at the same time reinforcing the very moral order that was violated. Punishment teaches us our boundaries and morals. Garland refers to this as the “moral circuitry” (1990, p. 33) of crime and punishment, where a criminal act, by violating a norm, threatens that norm’s very existence by suggesting that it (and its symbolic representations) are weak and worth of violation. A punishment is a passionate response to this violation, which in turn rebuilds and reinforces that norm, leading to a “virtuous circle set off by crime” (Garland 1990, p. 33).

While contemporary punishment rituals are seemingly rational and mechanized events (Foucault 1977) they have become “routinized expressions of emotion” (Garland 1990, p. 35) that are emotive responses hiding behind a veneer of legal rationality. It is for this reason that Sherman (2003) has criticized contemporary punishment rituals, noting the disconnect between punishment as an emotionally expressive ritual, that at the same time assumes that an offender is a rational actor. He argues for a more “emotionally

intelligent” ritual that can acknowledge the emotional basis of criminal acts while simultaneously condemning the wrongdoing and asserting the larger moral order. Restorative justice, discussed later in this chapter, is an example of this type of punishment ritual.

Durkheim’s studies of the role of ritual in social life reflect an early draft of what Collins (2004, 2009) will later call ‘radical microsociology’. Rather than arguing that rituals are a reflection of the larger social structure and its attendant inequalities, Durkheim argues that rituals come first. Rituals both create and represent the moral force and beliefs of society.

This may leave us wondering, where do rituals come from? How do we develop and transmit these ideas? This question is only indirectly addressed by Durkheim, largely through his conception of social facts. Social facts, he argued, have power in and of themselves. They precede human consciousness and exist independently of it, externally to humans, thus comprising an order that individuals learn their way into. It is through their influence that individuals think and act in certain ways. Durkheim observes that he himself, as a brother, a husband and a citizen,

perform[s] duties which are defined, externally to myself... Even if (these duties) conform to my own sentiments and I feel their reality subjectively, such reality is still objective, for I did not create them; I merely inherited them through my education (Durkheim (1895/1982, p. 1).

Durkheim’s synthesis of culture and socialization was revolutionary and would become the cornerstone of ritual theory in the social sciences. Successive theorists have developed ritual theory towards discerning the origin of social facts, which Durkheim himself never specified. His scope, operating at the level of broader structural and social processes, is deeply sociocentric, leaving little room for understanding the spaces in which individuals engage in more subtle negotiation of cultural norms. Nearly fifty years after Durkheim’s death, Erving Goffman addressed this close-endedness with gusto. Goffman explored negotiations of self and other norms in face-to-face interaction, in doing so, opening possibilities for ritual theory at the micro-level.

## 10.2.2 Erving Goffman: Rituals of Everyday Life

Durkheim's main contribution to the study of ritual was his exploration of the ways that rituals create and affirm a moral order. Erving Goffman both develops and subverts this idea in a series of studies expanding the concept of ritual. If Durkheim's sociology can be said to celebrate society, Goffman's celebrates the individuals therein, for it dwells on the intimate, mundane and micro level of exchange. In Durkheim's conception, social facts exist without a creation story; they precede society. In interacting with one another, exchanging rituals and symbols we reiterate and re-inscribe these social facts, strengthening them. Goffman, by contrast, hones in on the way that each of us use our knowledge of the rituals, symbols, games, rules, and orders to position ourselves strategically in relation to the social facts. Durkheim paints a picture of how rituals create society; Goffman shows how society and its rituals create the self.

Goffman attunes us to the taken-for-granted interaction rituals of everyday life. Traditionally thought of as empty gestures, or just good manners, Goffman shows the ways these exchanges reveal ourselves, our status, and the social organization of our community. They serve similar functions to the types of rituals studied by Durkheim and the social anthropologists. Goffman makes this explicit in 'The nature of deference and demeanour' (1967/1982) where he sets out to 'explore some of the senses in which the person in our urban secular world is allotted a kind of sacredness that is displayed and confirmed by symbolic acts' (1967/1982, p. 47). These symbolic acts are what he calls 'ceremonial rules' or 'rituals' where our obligations to others and our expectations of them (and vice versa) are played out. Examples of these are to be found in the everyday exchanges we have with people as we go about our day—salutations, introductions, pardons, pleasantries, apologies, openings and closings. Even the simple exchange around enquiring after another's well-being 'how are you?' is symbolically rich. Goffman explains:

I use the term 'ritual' because this activity, however informal and secular, represents a way in

which the individual must guard and design the symbolic implications of [their] acts while in the immediate presence of an object that has a special value for [them] (1967/1982, p. 57)

In this definition of ritual, Goffman echoes Durkheim's emphasis on the sacred and symbolic elements of ritual interaction. Indeed, in a footnote to this definition he acknowledges the similarities to a definition by Radcliffe-Brown:

There exists a ritual relation whenever a society imposes on its member a certain attitude towards an object, which attitude involves some measure of respect expressed in a traditional mode of behavior with reference to that object (Radcliffe-Brown, cited in Goffman 1967/1982, p. 57)

So, when an object deserves an attitude entailing some measure of respect (in other words, it is sacred), then the way we express this respect is a kind of ritual. The 'objects' in Goffman's world are the self and other people that we interact with. In his approach, the self and other become sacred, ritual-worthy entities.

As Collins has noted (2004, p. 23–25), Goffman uses many of the same elements of ritual as Durkheim. His analysis of ritual also centers on co-presence and the development of a shared focus (what he calls a 'focused interaction'). There is an emphasis on what is to be treated as sacred as well as a basis of social solidarity. He observes that we are so committed to the interaction order that we will go to great lengths to avoid disrupting it, to almost comic effect. To demonstrate this, Goffman coins the term 'studied non-observance' to describe instances where interactants studiously avoid acknowledging another's faux pas, for example by ignoring the fact that someone has spinach in their teeth. On the one hand, this is to protect the conversational partner from becoming embarrassed by the spinach in their teeth. But also, it is to prevent the spinach observer from becoming embarrassed by pointing out that their partner has spinach in their teeth. Both having spinach in your teeth and having to tell someone they have spinach in their teeth are disruptions to the interaction order that we take pains to avoid.

Over and over again in Goffman's sociology, we see rituals fail, and the lengths we go to correct this, whether it's through protecting the face

of others or saving our own. He depicts this in the essay 'Response Cries' in *Forms of Talk* (1981) where he examines our compulsion to mutter to ourselves when we make a minor gaffe, like saying 'oops' when we trip on the sidewalk. This is a powerful theoretical and methodological point that is later picked up by Collins and others: that the moral order only becomes visible when it is violated, and that we endeavour enthusiastically to restore it. We learn what is important to us when it is challenged (a point made evident in a different context by Garfinkel's (1967) breaching experiments).

Across many different works, Goffman develops a range of metaphors to explore the ways we "pay ritual homage to the projections of self" (Fine and Manning 2003, p. 468). These make up the 'interaction order' or 'the ground rules for a game, the provisions of a traffic code or the rules of syntax of a language' (Goffman 1983, p. 8). He draws on data from a variety of sources, including ethnographic observations of social relations in a small village in the Shetland Islands, the social organization of a mental asylum, observations and interactions with gamblers, con artists, salesmen, as well as advertising materials, etiquette manuals, and works of literature.

Goffman famously develops dramaturgical metaphors from the theatre as well. In *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959), he discusses social interaction as a performance: we present ourselves in the front region, or front stage, where we are aided in the use of props, costumes, our teammates, and the audience. For instance, if we want to project ourselves as a confident intellectual, we may dress a certain way, use certain words, surround ourselves with certain types of colleagues or friends, or carry certain books around. The back region, or back-stage, is where we prepare ourselves for the rituals that occur in the front region. Here, we do the dirty work: reading magazines and blogs to know what kind of books to like and clothes to wear; quietly strategizing with close friends and loved ones about how to project our best self, or just to take a break from the front stage.

Goffman was unique, while sometimes frustrating, in his use of multiple metaphors through


out his scholarship. However, there is a certain consistency concerning ritual interactions, the self, and symbolic action. In later essays, he develops some ideas from *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959), using metaphors of 'the face' or interactions as 'facework'. When we interact with each other, we take a 'line' or a statement of the self and express it in the 'face' we put forward. Co-participants work with us to maintain this face, helping us save face if it slips. Goffman's concept of face is similar to his concept of *demeanor*, or how you present yourself in an interaction to indicate your perceived status relative to those around you, and your expectations for how others should act. *Deference* is the way others help to maintain your demeanor (or face). Considering the example used above, we may slip and lose face when we mispronounce the name of a foreign intellectual, or say something that reveals that we have not actually read the book we claim to have read. Others may attempt to help us save face by sympathizing, or joking about how hard it is to pronounce such names.

In other works Goffman focuses on people who occupy marginal spaces, either because they break the rules (like the patients in *Asylums* (1961)), they are barred from or unable to participate in 'normal' society (the physically handicapped and the criminal in *Stigma* (1963a)), or they are particularly adept at manipulating encounters to their benefit (con men in 'Cooling the Mark Out' (1952) and spies and push salesmen in *Strategic Interaction* (1970)).

His analyses resist simplicity by being embedded in detailed attentiveness to each context and encounter. In *Asylums*, he shows how the structure of the situation compels patients to act 'crazy' whilst institutionalized: the hospital set up, the lack of privacy, curtailment of freedom, and the treatment by doctors and nurses deprive patients of a back stage, and deny them a face. They resort to outbursts or other strategies in order to assert some form of identity.

The individuals that Goffman depicts are keenly sensitive to the rules that pattern what kind of rituals we engage in, and recognize that it is through these rituals that we present ourselves to

**Fig. 10.4** Interaction ritual chains (adapted from Collins 2004)



the world. In his writings, he plays up the fragility of each encounter, the constraining qualities of structure, and the actual work that goes into creating a successful interaction ritual. The social order as he sees it is as flexible and changeable as the individuals engaging in and with it. There is also a playfulness to Goffman that is unique among sociologists. While he treats the topics of the self, social interaction, and symbols as very serious and worthy of intellectual inquiry, he does so from a remove, subtly mocking the process and us for participating in it. This is perhaps what makes him so widely read but rarely imitated - we like to make fun of ourselves but find it hard to do in a meaningful way.

He is known as a sociologist of everyday life, famous for showing how, like the formal rituals of religion, everyday interactions contain elements of the sacred and the moral. His approach, in different writings that span nearly 25 years is at times controversial, exhilarating, and frustrating. Both detailed and expansive, it defies the orderly linear narrative that characterizes most scholars' oeuvres. Nonetheless, his insights struck a chord with readers both inside and out of the academy. He is one of the very few sociologists whose work is read outside of sociology, and although written half a century ago, his work comes across as relevant and timeless.

There can be a cynical reading to Goffman's approach: that society is a facade and we are all sneaky strategists vying to present ourselves in the best possible light. However, Goffman does not say that our front stage—the face we present—is somehow not our true 'self'. Rather, through interaction ritual, we assert our face and also show respect for the faces of others; the ritual is a forum of social collaboration that simultaneously produces identity and morality. He seems to show considerable affection for the

small courtesies and etiquette of everyday life, saying that without them social interaction would be quite difficult, even barbarous. We are morally obliged to uphold the interaction order. Rituals that open, sustain, and close encounters are all important ways that we mark occasions, assert and negotiate our identity, and come to identify the self as a sacred object.

### 10.2.3 Randall Collins: Chains of Ritual Interaction

Goffman illuminates the value of examining encounters and the micro-situational components of an interaction. Building on this, Randall Collins has over the years developed a more robust theory of interaction rituals chains, demonstrating the source of their affect. Much like Goffman, Collins defines rituals broadly as any encounter where participants mutually focus their attention. He conceives of social interaction as a series of rituals that build cumulatively to enable varying levels of positive or negative emotional energy. Building on key concepts from Durkheim and Goffman, and drawing on data from a wide array of courses, he identifies the main ingredients and outcomes for a successful ritual (see Fig. 10.4). The primary elements are:

1. Co-presence
2. Barrier to outsiders
3. Mutual focus of attention
4. Shared mood

As with Durkheim, rituals here are embodied experiences: Collins argues that emotions are contagious and physical co-presence is necessary for the positive benefits of an interaction ritual to be felt. Co-presence can help to create a physical or metaphorical barrier to outsiders, marking this group or this space as sacred. When people gather together



and a space is well demarcated, a shared mood and mutual focus of attention can be created.

In a successful ritual, over time, shared emotions and mutual focus build, feeding back in each other to develop rhythmic coordination and synchronization in conversation, bodily movements, and emotions. This shared focus escalates into what Collins calls ‘rhythmic entrainment’, ratcheting up the feeling that the experience is mutual and shared. Participants become “caught up in the rhythm and mood of the talk” (Collins 2004, p. 48). This feedback loop feeds on itself. As emotions are aroused during an interaction participants become even more invested in and entrained by the interaction. This leads to greater emotional intensity, thus perpetuating and intensifying the feedback loop (see also Hallett 2003).

When this happens, the interaction ritual comes to be marked by the type of collective effervescence described so well by Durkheim. Indicators of this are:

1. Feelings and expressions of solidarity
2. Symbolic representations
3. Emotional energy (in the short and long term variations)
4. A sense of morality coupled with a desire to chastise those who deviate from the moral order

Solidarity is a feeling of interconnectedness within and membership to a social group. It can be observed by watching interactions closely: people synchronize their body movements, make sustained eye contact, and follow the rules of turn-taking. Interactions are smooth, not stilted, and people are more likely to touch, smile, and express emotion. A shared sense of morality arises, whether it be consistent with larger societal norms, as with the patriotism of the London Olympics, or an alternative standard of morality as was on display during the London riots, where rioters felt a shared sense of injustice at the police but also a shared sense of empowerment at their ability to fight them. Similarly, solidarity in a successful interaction ritual is accompanied by momentary bursts of emotional energy or ‘charge’. This is a rush of confidence, invincibility, or power akin to the high rioters described feeling during the furore.

Collins makes a useful distinction between short-term and longer-term emotional outcomes (1990). Short-term outcomes include immediate feelings of group solidarity and a momentary rise in emotional energy. This solidarity creates symbols of group membership which remind participants of positive feelings, and theoretically extend the high emotional energy to future interaction rituals. This way, the ‘charge’ of short term emotional energy can be translated into a long-term emotional state. Participants can add to their stock of symbols and emotional energy and take solidarity-creating interactions into the future. In this way, interaction rituals develop from separate encounters into a series of ritual chains.

Emotional energy is not a constant variable. It waxes and wanes over time, and needs to be recharged with new interaction rituals. Like a battery, an individual will need to engage in more solidarity-producing interactions in order to be ‘recharged’. Once the initial interaction ritual ends, the individual enters the market for ritual interaction (Collins 1993) where they will endeavor to reinvest their stocks of emotional energy in future interaction rituals. The more they invest, the bigger the long-term payoff. In this process, people become emotional energy seekers, always moving toward the highest emotional energy payoffs they can find relative to their current resources.

Power and status play out in interaction rituals by influencing each other and lead to stratified rituals. Broadly speaking, power rituals in an interaction determine who is an ‘order giver’ and who is an ‘order taker’, while status rituals show the extent to which an individual is part of a group. People who have power and status in an interaction are more likely to have more positive long-term benefits in the form of emotional energy. This aspect of ritual theory provides a novel way to study stratification and inequality, from the bottom up. Rather than look at social structure and its impact on the individual, this perspective examines the ways inequalities are played out on the micro interactional level.

While Collin’s model is largely derived from Durkheim and Goffman, he elaborated two concepts that broaden and advance ritual theory, perhaps making it even more relevant to the

sociology of emotions. The first is his concept of emotional energy both as an outcome of a ritual and a motivator for future ones. The second is the idea of a 'market' for ritual interaction where rituals are strung together into chains.

Emotional Energy is a generalized emotional state, referring to the sentiments and affects that a person takes away from an interaction but also brings to further interactions. Successful interaction rituals will increase your emotional energy, endowing you with by confidence, enthusiasm, and initiative. Failed interactions or status depriving rituals reduce stock, amounting to feelings of depression, poor esteem, lack of initiative. It is literally draining. In this sense, emotional energy is a kind of capital. If we happen to have some, we will use it to invest in new interactions in order to gain some more. This is why we look for more interactions rituals that we perceive will result in a boost in emotional energy. For example we may agree to go out to a crowded new restaurant even though we know it will be a long wait and possible poor service. We go because we want to be part of the buzz, and want some of it to rub off on us. This is also why we are especially disappointed when this does not come to fruition, if for instance the atmosphere was wrong at the trendy new restaurant, or the assemblage of people failed to bring about any collective effervescence.

Collins makes the simple yet controversial statement that we are drawn to rituals that make us feel good and avoid ones that make us feel bad. We are constantly seeking to maximize our stock of emotional energy, and once we enter the interaction ritual market, this desire for emotional energy is a motivational force that pulls and pushes us from one encounter to the next. This is an interesting twist on a utilitarian rational choice perspective, one that allows for the theory to broaden out from a micro perspective. It's not that we are rational choice robots calculating utility in every single situation. Rather, as we move from interaction to interaction we seem to maximize emotional energy, and this guides the kinds of interactions that we find ourselves attracted to and in. Chains of ritual interaction connect micro level theory to mezzo and macro levels of

analysis, and also incorporate concepts foundational to sociology, such as conflict, stratification, power, and status. This way, Collins' model is comprehensive yet flexible, proposing a radical microsociology that puts human bodies and human emotions at the core of social institutions.

---

### 10.3 Methodological Approaches and Challenges

Ritual theory can identify rituals as dynamic events that build solidarity, create and reinforce shared symbols, and offer individuals opportunities to choose how they engage with the ritual and the co-participants. It also suggests a means of reading these events, for determining how successful a ritual might be, who its key and peripheral participants are, showing when new cultural symbols come into being and, conversely, when the power of older symbols begins to diminish.

For example, one could read the London riots as a particular form of interaction ritual; as part of a chain of ritual interactions starting with repeated negative interactions with the police over time, building into an outburst over the shooting of Mark Duggan, and culminating into mass riots. As they looted and fought the police, participants developed a rhythm to their mayhem, which culminated in a feeling of solidarity and emotional energy. Ritual theory identifies and names processes that underscore these and other social relationships, namely processes for which there may not be an accurate, existing language. In other words, it gives us a set of concepts and terms through which to make sense of the riots' symbols, morals, and political agendas.

A methodological challenge implicit in ritual theory is that, given its broad applicability, when is it useful to identify an interaction or event as 'ritual'? Or, in Collins' (2004, p. 15) words, "if everything is a ritual then what isn't?" We consider this challenge in more detail when discussing the potential of using ritual theory to understand actions enacted alone. Similarly, the components of a ritual dynamic are seldom that straightforward, for instance, it can be difficult to discern whether collective effervescence is an

ingredient or an outcome. This is not a question that can be directly answered, for each event will be different. Applying ritual theory entails embracing this fluidity, as it concerns processes that are inherently dynamic, and deals intimately with emotions over time.

The dynamic, messy nature of lived life, and therefore rituals, comprise variables that cannot always be pre-determined or measured. Because of this, the use of ritual theory in research tends to rely on qualitative methods (live or video observation, participant-observation, interviews). Observational techniques are important for discerning the components of a ritual event: What are the ingredients of this interaction? How successful is it? What causes variations on mutual focus and emotional cohesion to occur? What are the consequences of these variations on the participants' overall focus and cohesion? Interviews can help researchers glean information on the types of past encounters and narratives that have contributed to the energy and positionality of any particular person participating in a ritual event. At the same time, individuals are not necessarily adept at accurately describing emotions and interactional dynamics to an interviewer. Observational methods are useful for balancing such inaccuracies. Indeed, in an attempt to isolate the micro and situational details of an interaction, sociologists are increasingly using photographic and video data as a supplement to observation (for examples, see Collins 2009, Klusemann 2010, Rossner 2011).

## 10.4 How Rituals Help Us Understand Social Phenomena

Ritual theory has helped us to better understand a wide range of social phenomena, from seemingly mundane interactions such as sharing a cigarette to large-scale global social movements. The theory, especially as conceptualized by Collins, comes with a set of empirically testable precepts that allow for incorporation into a wide range of areas in sociology. We provide an in-depth discussion of how a ritual framework can help us understand punishment and criminal justice, followed

by a select survey of other areas of sociological inquiry that have benefited from ritual analysis.

### 10.4.1 Rituals of Punishment and Justice

Ritual theory has proven extensively valuable in the realm of criminal justice. The concept of ritual has been used to explore architectural and ceremonial aspects of court (Tait 2001), the dynamics of a trial (Rose 2010), the role of victims in court (Rock 2010) prison life (Carrabine 2005), and police citizen interactions (Peterson 2008). It is applied both theoretically—in terms of understanding the institutions, structures, forces and feelings undergirding contemporary punishment – and practically, since by conceiving of restorative justice and post-prison reintegration processes as ritual events, there is scope for comprehending how they may be improved. Indeed, Karstedt (2006) has argued that rituals are particularly important in the justice system because they have the power to transform the negative emotions that tend to be associated with an offence (such as anger or fear) into positive feelings of solidarity and shared morality.

Rituals of punishment are integral to contemporary justice processes. Garland describes punishment as “irrational, unthinking emotion” (1990, p. 32) that is structured and ritualized into a rational guise of justice. In his framing of modern punishment, Garland takes up Durkheim’s contention that punishment for a deviant act, whether it be criminal or simply violating a social norm, affirmed a society’s moral and emotional commitment to that norm. This reading of Durkheim suggests we can truly understand the nature of punishment if we enlarge our focus from offenders to a perspective encompassing punishment and its broader social purposes and forces; in essence, he calls on us to reframe punishment as ritual. This vantage point prompts a slew of questions pertinent to understanding penal systems as social institutions, rather than merely as a tool for crime-control, such as: what social function does punishment perform? How have contemporary forms of punishment come about? And, what might

punishment's unintended costs to and effects on society be (Garland 1991, p. 119)?

Key to Garland's reading of Durkheim is the idea that rituals act as a mode of legitimization through which social groups create beliefs that are ideologically powerful, and so surround that group's practices with legitimacy. Justice rituals take formal, authoritative forms. Consider the imposing grandeur of a judge's bench, the bureaucratized sequences of legal paperwork and the strict choreography of courtroom dynamics. Their semblance of ordered impartiality belies the assault criminal activity poses to our moral order.

One of the limits of this reading is that contemporary punishment is no longer the public display of guillotines and floggings that Durkheim alluded to when composing his theories about punishment as ritualized expression of emotion. Instead, it happens behind closed doors, through legal channels, in courtrooms or deep behind the walls of a prison (Foucault 1977)<sup>2</sup>. What form

<sup>2</sup> While punishment may not be the public spectacle it was historically in France and England, with public executions and floggings, media and technology has since emerged that has allowed for more public access to and participation in punishment rituals, either through the more access to events taking place inside the courts or prisons (such as the live-blogging of high profile trials, sentencing hearings, and executions), 'shaming' punishments such as sex-offender registries, or the recent popularity of websites, blogs, facebook pages, etc. devoted to a form of internet vigilante justice for wrongdoing, either perceived or imagined. Arguably, through new media and its attendant rituals, values are reaffirmed, upheld, and negotiated. This demonstrates the complex texture of emotional communities that make up any society—they may be numerous factions responding differently to the source of stimuli. And so in this way, punishment rituals remain a means through which competing social values can be expressed and disputed. An example that demonstrates the social complexity of justice and punishment is the public response to the capture and execution of Saddam Hussein, whose public hanging was recorded on a mobile phone and broadcast through the internet. Unlike the official footage of the event, which did not show the hanging, this leaked video showed the full event with audio of witnesses jeering at Hussein. Amidst the hot criticism against the US government for Hussein's capture and punishment, this emotional display at the hanging drew added reproach, in part because it exposed the backstage of this supposedly official and rational process.

does the ritual take then? What purpose does it serve? Garland synthesizes Durkheimian rituals of punishment alongside Foucauldian notions of power and discipline in the justice system, and Marxist readings of penal colonies as serving an economic function. These crossovers demonstrate ritual theory's compatibility with other theoretical lineages for understanding social phenomena.

Of course, while punishment rituals may supply onlookers with solidarity and a shared morality, the offender suffers. Many have argued that criminal trial and punishment are meant to degrade an offender, diminish their status, and reduce their stock of emotional energy. A total institution like a prison (or Goffman's *Asylum*), consists of interaction rituals that deny the prisoner status, face, and eventually a sense of self.

Maruna (2011) has aptly noted that there is something missing in this sequence. We have developed elaborate status degradation rituals to mark punishment, but we lack rituals at the other end to re-integrate an offender back into society. Maruna has argued for the introduction of 'redemptive rituals' that symbolize to an offender that they are still part of a moral community after they have served their punishment. Otherwise, an offender is left with nothing but a stigmatized self and little hope for redemption.

John Braithwaite has offered both a theoretical advancement in how we think of justice ritual and the role of emotions, and a practical solution to the problem put forth by Maruna. In *Crime, Shame and Reintegration* (1989), he asserts the ritual importance of shaming as a social response to crime. He sees shaming as serving the social function of chastising offenders and reasserting social norms, but distinguishes between two types of shaming: reintegrative and stigmatizing. Stigmatizing shaming is akin to a status degradation ritual that casts offenders as irrevocably deviant. To be shamed in this manner is tantamount to being symbolically and physically banished from society. According to Braithwaite, this type of ritual is most often enacted in criminal justice.

Its inverse, reintegrative shaming, makes a distinction between the offence and the offender.

While the criminal act is to be condemned, the actor's self and sense of social belonging is to be preserved. Punishment in this schema is a form of symbolic and material reparation, over the course of which an offender is forgiven and welcomed back into the circle of a moral society. Rituals of reintegrative shaming uncouple shame from punishment. Braithwaite (1989, p. 75) explains this using Goffmanian notions of the split self to describe the way an offender's self-hood is managed in such interactions: there is the self that is blameworthy and targeted appropriately, and the self who joins the community in apportioning this blame. This second self is framed as enduring. The first is castigated and cast off; the second is forgiven and reintegrated.

Largely inspired by Braithwaite's work, justice rituals as status-elevation have re-emerged with the growing popularity of the restorative justice movement, where victims, offenders, family, and friends come together to collectively discuss the offence, its impacts, and how best to address the harm. This movement can be seen as an explicit attempt to inject some reintegrative rituals into a justice system that tends towards stigmatization.

Restorative justice conferences are intentionally deeply ritual events, and the language of ritual has long been used to describe restorative justice encounters (Zehr 1990; Retzinger and Scheff 1996; Braithwaite and Mugford 1994; Karstedt 2006; Maruna 2011). Collins' theory of interaction ritual chains lends itself well to understanding the process of restorative justice. Indeed, using concepts derived from interaction ritual chains, Rossner (2011, 2013) has explored the ritual and emotional dynamics of restorative justice conference.

Schematized this way, the conference itself creates an arena for emotional energies to emerge and play out. The general process and the script facilitators use to guide discussion seek to structure these energies into a trajectory, ideally one that begins with unabashed expression of fear and anger, then pivots on apology/remorse to cohere towards reconciliation, forgiveness and solidarity. Over the course of the encounter, participants become rhythmically entrained and

synchronized, culminating in symbolic reparation marked by the expression of remorse and forgiveness. Observations and interviews with facilitators and participants suggest that conferences can be successful at creating intense solidarity within the group, and enabling symbolic and material reparation that leave participants with elevated emotional energy (Rossner 2013). On the other hand, they can also fail to achieve these outcomes, leaving participants flat, deflated, or angry.

Outbursts of emotion are conceived of as central to a conference's success. Participants' expression of emotions makes an opportunity for the conference participants to engage emotionally towards cohesive ends. This positive, uplifting emotional energy carries forward into participants' emergent senses of self in the conference's aftermath (Rossner 2012). To the contrary, of course, when emotional expression is not coupled with a shared focus of attention and the creation of symbols that are meaningful to the group, then this transformation from negative to positive may not occur, leaving participants underwhelmed or with a feeling of unresolved tension (Rossner et al. 2013).

Restorative justice has gained popularity and prowess in the justice system due, in part, to a conference's capacity to reintegrate offenders into the fabric of society, demonstrating the importance of reintegration rituals. However, as Maruna (2011) has pointed out restorative justice rituals are usually part of a sentencing hearing, and are not an option in most cases for an offender who is being released from prison. Maruna argues that reintegration after prison is a process worthy of symbolic and moral re-inclusion rituals. Yet, it is one that many societies with established and intricate penal systems handle awkwardly, if at all. This transition is often secretive and unceremonial. Certainly, it is deeply significant for the families, friends and lovers involved, and in some cases, for victims/victims' families, each of whom may bring personal rituals to bear upon the offender's release. But there is significant imbalance between the severance from society that convicted persons experience through state-level rituals, and the relatively hushed, ritual-poor shift



back into society. As Maruna and others contend, this is an area where sociological scholarship and justice practices could be harnessed towards crafting a more integrative ritual effect.

Indeed, as we have seen, ritual theory can help us better understand the sociology of justice and punishment, highlighting the complex play of emotions at work. Interaction rituals are at play at every point in the justice process, where the self is affirmed, negotiated, or denied; shared morals are asserted or challenged; and solidarity and emotional energy emerge.

### 10.4.2 Smoking and Sex Rituals

In *Interaction Ritual Chains* (2004), Randall Collins explores his particular synthesis of ritual theory as it relates to sex and smoking—two very different, but similarly potent yet ordinary interactions. In the chapters dedicated to each phenomenon, Collins challenges physiology-centric explanations of their appeal. Biology and society cannot be truly divided by a clean line. And bodies and emotions play into social interaction. Consequently, there is more to tobacco dependence than biological addiction, he argues, just as there is more to sexual desire than evolutionary drive.

With smoking rituals, Collins seeks to explain how tobacco is consumed as an object of attachment or of revulsion where context is crucial. The historical location and culture surrounding any instance of tobacco consumption and influences its symbolism and meaning. It is a lifestyle ritual, within which boundaries of inclusion and exclusion are erected. As with all cultural and ritual institutions, such boundaries shift like strata over time. At the turn of last century, for example, smoking and carousing went hand in hand. Carousing was itself deeply symbolic; a private and elite activity that in its bawdiness, sexual licentiousness and hedonism turned a nose up at the religious, civil and familial institutions dear to society's upper echelons. Tobacco was central to this domain and the men participating in it. The only women likely to be joining in were prostitutes. In the changing tides of subsequent

decades, carousing rituals and elegant rituals blended (Collins 2004, p. 330). Women could have responded to this shift with one of two main motives, says Collins. They could have derided tobacco for its unsavoury associations, or overthrown their exclusion by smoking themselves. "This is a typical dilemma created by all exclusionary rituals: to attempt to destroy the ritual that imposes lower status on outsiders, or to force one's way in" (Collins 2004, p. 330).

Collins describes four main kinds of tobacco rituals, dealing with tobacco as a prompt for: tranquillity, carousing, elegance, and work-oriented relaxation and concentration. In every case, social rituals play a part in determining the bodily experience of cigarettes (a point not unlike the one made by Becker (1963/1982) in his study of marijuana use). Addiction cannot explain all tobacco consumption as so many cigarettes are smoked socially, at parties and festivals, by people who associate them with atmospheres of conviviality and play. Addiction is not a purely chemical transaction accumulating at the cellular level. Whether as a respite from factory work, or a marker of teen rebellion, or an evocation subculture, smoking generates distinct kinds of emotional energies with groups. This is constituted by the company, the feeling of smoking in that environs and the postures of bodies together in that space. Each subsequent smoke evokes past energies and refreshes their significance anew. It is not tobacco that is the totem, as much as its smoke, smell, taste and the cigarette itself (Collins 2004, p. 318). "No one would have a stable experience of tobacco, or of coffee or tea, if they were not introduced to it through social rituals," Collins argues. "The completely isolated Robinson Crusoe smoker or coffee-drinker, in my opinion, would never come into being" (2004, p. 305).

Painting a curious picture of the converse, that is, tobacco revulsion, Collins argues that bodies were only sensitive to the ills of cigarette smoke after anti-smoking movements drew attention to its poisonous effects. Prior to that, most non-smokers merely accepted smoke-filled rooms as a perhaps mildly annoying but inevitable and unavoidable part of daily life. "The ostentatious

coughing fits and angry outbursts that occur today are socially constructed in particular historical circumstances; they are constructed in bodies and not merely in minds” (Collins 2004, p. 337).

Collins takes a comparable stance when he claims that “sexual pleasure-constructing behaviour” (2004, p. 227) is learned. Biological determinism may configure sexual desire as fuelled by evolutionary drive and fulfilled by physiological pleasure. But only a portion of the plethora of sexual activities can be classed as exclusively “genital pleasure-seeking” (Collins 2004, p. 224). The rest—from hand-holding and french-kissing to fetish and so on—derive their erotic appeal from symbolic and social associations that are enacted on and replenished through the body. It would be facile to explain this as simple enculturation, Collins argues. Too much is left unexplained. The sociologist’s job is to explain the mechanisms behind the scenes through which sexual excitement and pleasure come about.

In the explanation Collins provides, sexual interaction is framed as a (potentially) solidarity-producing interaction ritual. He isolates four important features of sex, mapping them out in terms of ritual theory: co-presence—sex being bodily co-presence of the highest order; mutual focus on one another’s bodies and pleasure; emotional entrainment over shared mood of sexual excitement; and privacy, meaning a barrier to outsiders and a clearly marked inclusion/exclusion divide.

As with all rituals, these features are variable components, and may range from very low to very high in any counter. Unlike with most rituals, however, rhythmic patterns are a highly discernible and crucial feature of sexual encounter. It is in the intensification, entrainment, and synchronization of rhythms between love-makers that Collins believes an aspect of pleasure is created. These processes move closely alongside physiological rhythms, like a quickening heart pace, and the focus entailed by sharing a breath. There is the potential, if rhythms and focus are mutual and reciprocal to swiftly arrive at a place of collective effervescence and solidarity. “This is because sexual intercourse is the ritual

of love”, Collins claims (2004 p. 236). Through sexualised, intimate and indeed, romantic, exchanges, social ties are generated, reiterated and symbolized. There is a Durkheimian component to this too, in that the solidarity and attachment that sex fosters may fade with time if it is not repeated and reinstated regularly.

### 10.4.3 Micro Level Theories of Violence, Economic Markets, and Social Movements

Collins’ theory has led to an upswing of micro-sociological research that draws on rituals. Following the publication of *Interaction Ritual Chains* (2004), Collins proposes a micro level theory of violent encounters (2009). Taking Goffman’s cue and zooming into to the dynamics of the encounter, he demonstrates how violent interactions are emotionally charged and full of tension and fear. This leads to a particular type of interaction ritual – participants develop a mutual focus and rhythmic entrainment, emotional energy is won or lost, and the interaction tends towards dysfunction. Klusemann (2010) elaborates this to look at mass atrocities during war. Drawing on video evidence of the 1995 Srebrenica massacre, he dissects the evolution of a massacre, pinpointing the ritual build up and swings in emotional energy that led to the atrocity. The Srebrenica massacre has generally been understood as stemming from orders from Serbian political and military leaders amidst a background of long-standing ethnic conflict. But according to Klusemann, such macro level explanations for civil massacres are an illusion. He claims that there are specific “situational mechanisms” that lead towards or away from an accumulation of conflict, and the difference between a day long outbreak of violence and days of massacre lies in each event’s respective interaction ritual chain.

Working in a different vein, Wherry (2008) uses the concept of interaction ritual chains to study the relationship between Thai and Costa Rican handicraft artisans and foreign consumers, detailing the strategies involved in ‘framing authenticity’ and ensuring that the ritual leaves the

consumer charged with emotional energy (and therefore likely to go back for more). Similarly, Brown (2013) uses ritual to theorize the mobilization of ethical consumption. He deftly shows how fair trade producers, promoters and consumers are drawn together in different types of rituals producing symbols and emotional energy of varying strengths, from dedicated activists participating in what they call the 'extraordinary experience' (sacred events) of visiting a fair trade producers' country for a reality tour, which results in high emotional energy and dedication to the cause, to the much lower intensity enjoyment of the status-enhancing and aesthetically pleasing experience of shopping in a fair commercial outlet.

Erika Summers-Effler has extended interaction ritual theory in a number of directions, developing sophisticated models of emotional rhythms, emotional energy, power, and status, drawing on a diverse array of situations and data, including feminist resistance (2002) activists participating in social movements (2010), victims of domestic violence (2004a), and early developing adolescent girls (2004b). She argues for the self as an analytic level of social life which is created by the productive tensions between bodies and the interaction order. Learning processes akin to enculturation are central to this proposition, though grounded in the body. Summers-Effler draws from biology and psychology to explain this. Symbols from collective experiences are stored as somatic markers and associated with bodily responses. Encountering those symbols again activates neural connections that evoke in a bodily way the interaction our bodies experienced with the environment at the time that symbol was generated (Summers-Effler 2007, p. 143). It is this socially and biologically produced response that we experience as emotion.

Summers-Effler further extends our understanding of stratified rituals (what Collins may call status rituals) and also rituals of subversions or resistance. Through in depth study of why and how people come to be affiliated with certain groups, and subsequently partake in their interaction rituals, believe in their symbols, and adopt their standards of morality, Summers-

Effler explored Collin's notion of a market for ritual interaction. Social movements are mobilised when individuals find that their emotional energy can be maximized through these alternative interaction rituals, most notably when an interaction rituals in the 'mainstream' tends towards status-deprivation rituals that lower their emotional energy. Several of these small groups enacting social change met failure regularly. As Summers-Effler explains, both the failures and the mundane daily activities drained members of emotional energy, and it was in these periods of 'flatness' that members were more likely to shift away from the group. The groups also regularly engaged in recovery rituals in attempt to level depleted energy sources, enthusiasm and morale. In this model, she not only shows how we are emotional energy seekers, but documents the ways that we can attempt to maximise or hold on to our stock of emotional energy using a range of defensive strategies to minimize the loss.

The diversity of this research demonstrates the myriad ways that our lives are filled with ritual, even in the most unlikely ways, such as amidst mass disorder and violence, or in the workplaces and cafes of our everyday lives.

---

## 10.5 New Directions for Ritual Theories

Since Durkheim first published the *Elementary Forms of Religious life*, we have been stimulated by a ritual framework through which to view social interaction and social organization. While the theory has become increasingly sophisticated, in many ways it stays true to Durkheim's initial concepts: bodies, workings in sync, leading to collective effervescence, symbols, and shared morality. This way of thinking has helped us to illuminate the social world, theorizing social interaction from its most basic micro-situational elements to the larger macro structures in which these interactions sit.

At the same time, there may still be aspects of ritual and social interaction that are under-theorized and can provide new areas for future research.

### 10.5.1 The Limits of Co-Presence: Solitary and Mediated Rituals

Collective effervescence, the ‘encounter’, co-presence, face-to-face: the proximity of another is assumed in all these phrases. Indeed, throughout the examples and studies presented so far, sociality bears hugely on ritual encounters and their emotional dimensions. Which raises the question of, how many people does it take to make a ritual? What scope is there for understanding how rituals conducted alone, like prayer or emailing, can also bear profound emotional affect? This question takes on especial significance in our current age, as human interactions are increasingly mediated by technology in novel and intimate ways.

Taking on the phenomena of solitary rituals within ritual theory’s lineage, Campos-Castillo and Hitlin (2013) configure copresence as the *perception*, rather than the direct experience of, mutual entrainment with other actors. In doing this, they follow Goffman’s definition of co-presence as describing a situation in which:

persons must sense that they are close enough to be perceived in whatever they are doing, including their experiencing of others, and close enough to be perceived in this sensing of being perceived (Goffman 1963b, p. 17)

Their adaptation of this definition lays emphasis on an actor’s imagination and perception.

Copresence is the degree to which one actor (1) perceives entrainment with a second actor and (2) sees the second actor reciprocating entrainment, where entrainment is a linear function of the synchronization of mutual attention, emotion, and behavior (Campos-Castillo and Hitlin 2013, p. 171)

This configuration also departs from popular sociological thought in which copresence is a discrete variable—either present or absent. Instead, they consider it to be continuous and “intra-individual”.

This allows for situations in which the other might be entirely imagined but willed into being believed, as with ghosts, or where the other is

developed to constitute emotional energy for oneself, as with ancestors or spiritual deity in prayer. To examine the way that prayer operates as a powerful support mechanism for victims of intimate partner violence, Shane Sharp (2010) conceives of prayer as a social interaction between a corporeal person and an imagined counterpart. The women he interviews describe prayerful exchanges as a means of safely expressing or mitigating anger, of mediating emotions, and of self-empowerment towards managing their emotions. As one woman explains, “Talking to God’s always helpful. ... He’ll help you find an answer.... It, it made me less angry at myself for letting it happen... I realized that it wasn’t me... It was [my husband]” (Sharp 2010, p. 426). This configuration of ritual encounter involving unworldly or non-human characters, which can include fictional characters or the deceased, hinges on the recognition that even corporeal and human beings are not socially real unless they are also imagined (Cooley 1902, p. 122, in Campos-Castillo and Hitlin 2013, p. 170).

A similar pattern of relationality can be seen in interactions that are mediated by smartphones or the internet; the other is assumed, imagined, and reacted to accordingly (though, of course, there is scope for misreading textual symbols and misaligning a response, arguably more so in such mediums than in real-time, shared-space encounters). On this note, it is not that the physical and rhythmical synchronicity Durkheim pinned such importance on is rendered obsolete in such configurations. Rather, the capacity for such synchronicity finds relevance in other mediums, such as forms of linguistic matching in textual communication (Niderhoffer and Pennebaker 2002), or pauses and breaks to allow for technical glitches in video conferencing (Licoppe and Morel *forthcoming*).

What do we make of technology mediated rituals and solitary rituals? Do they test the boundaries of the Durkheim–Goffman–Collins model, or are they yet another example of the enduring ubiquity of ritual? Future research and theory can examine this.

### 10.5.2 Ritual, Macro-Sociology and Social Structure

Turner and Stets (2006) have suggested that current theorizing in the sociology of emotions is too focused on micro-situational dynamics and ought to engage further with macro-sociology. In saying this, they touch on an abiding tension within the social sciences to do with consolidating the micro and the macro. It is a matter of scale. On one hand, perspectives that are deeply structural (or macro) can be faulted for underplaying human agency and dismissing the capacity for structural changes to originate at the level of interaction, encounter and exchange. On the other hand, as Turner and Stets suggest, there is the risk that in dealing with the rich and exhaustive detail of a micro-level focus, more structural forces like the operation of power may be obfuscated.

The following questions locate the pertinence of this issue for this chapter's discussion: how can we reconcile the role of ritual in the social structure? Where do rituals come from, or, with respect to Durkheim, where do social facts come from? Ultimately, where does microsociology fit in with the grand scheme of things?

We can begin to address the tension underpinning these questions by tracing its history. Durkheim's legacy is a convenient place to begin. Somewhat ironically, the fork in the road between macro- and microsociology can be traced back to here, for although Durkheim essentially pioneered ritual theory, he is also a renowned structuralist.

Durkheim's tradition of ritual analysis evolved into a school of social anthropology that spread throughout Europe and America in the early part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, most notably by his nephew Marcel Mauss in France and Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski in England. These scholars conducted a variety of studies exploring the ways that cultural ideas and practices are determined through ritual, though, while Malinowski advocated functionalism, Radcliffe-Brown did not consider his own approach functionalist.

At the same time, another wing of the Durkheimian tradition developed into what is now

referred to as a structural or functionalist set of theories. Key theorists include Levi-Strauss, Bourdieu, and Foucault in France, and Merton and Parsons in the US. The 'moral order' that Durkheim wrote of is in keeping with the influential structural entities of Foucault and Levi-Strauss, and all three thinkers emphasize the structure's power over individuals. The significance that Durkheim attributed to symbols of society were talked about by Levi-Strauss in terms of understanding the language, or the rules of the game. Bourdieu (1977) endeavoured to distance himself from Levi-Strauss' binary, structuralist perspective by elucidating with the notion of *habitus* how the structure is inscribed upon and expressed through bodies. This concept retains the essence of ritual theory for its emphasis on how in order to be incorporated into any social niche, one must learn its symbolic moral order and grow into its image.

Contemporary theorists have further reconciled these two wings, most notably Collins with interaction ritual chains. Collins argues that rituals fit somewhere in between structure and ideas; they are "the nodes of social structure and it is in rituals that a group creates its symbols" (2004, p. 26). He argues that in structural thinking, like with Levi-Strauss,

it is methodologically easier simply to correlate ideas with types of society, or, even further from the context of social action, to correlate ideas with each other; one no longer needs to do the micro ethnography of ritual action. Ritual drops out, leaving the system of symbols as the object for analysis (2004, p. 26)

Collins argues that failing to include the study of encounters or rituals, and only focusing on symbols, misses a key element of a structural theory.

Do we need a better theory of power and status in ritual? Kemper (2011) has argued that structural components of relational interactions need to be more explicit in the study of ritual interactions. This is the opposite view of Collins, who argues for a radical microsociology that puts the encounter first. However, it is clear that power and status are 'social facts' that will determine the type of interaction rituals one participate in,



and the type of emotional energy and solidarity that is drawn from it. Summers-Effler has made further headway conducting research on how stratified interaction actually works. This is one of the key areas that contemporary sociologists are compelled to address. There is scope for the sociology of emotions to contribute to this debate, for instance by exploring the role of emotional energy in enhancing or diminishing power.

## 10.6 Summary and Conclusion

This chapter has canvassed the terrain of ritual theory in sociology. We have presented rituals as instances of bodies (real, virtual or imagined) coming together, focusing their attention and emotion into a shared rhythm, producing or reinforcing symbols, group solidarity, and ultimately the social order. Followers of ritual theory take a radical microsociological approach, suggesting that rituals and micro-level interaction are the foundation of all of social life, and the building block of social institutions and macro structures. This is Durkheim's social glue; the interconnectedness of life as we engage in ritual interaction.

We opened this chapter with a comparison of the London Olympics opening ceremony and the London riots. They are analytically similar, and have similar elements: bodies together, sharing the same emotions and focus of attention, feeling a sense of interconnectedness and a swell of emotional energy. This energy manifests itself in one way with Olympic spectators reporting that they felt 'patriotic', and in another with rioters who say they felt 'powerful'. As demonstrated in the examples throughout the chapter, ritual theory allows us an analytic lens through which to make sense of social life, big and small, sacred and mundane.

Rituals are a compelling topic. Most people will experience their intensity, knowingly or not, whether it be the collective effervescence from a religious event or its secular counterpart, the jostling and jockeying over social niceties in polite interaction with acquaintances, or the intense synchronization and emotional attunement with a close friend or loved one. Rituals are not

an abstract or difficult concept to grasp. They are right here, in the moment; we move in and out of them as we go about our lives. Even reading about ritual theory can evoke symbols for us, reminding us of instances of solidarity and emotional energy in our own lives. This itself can enhance our emotional energy. If the main concepts presented in this chapter—shared attention, shared emotion, solidarity, emotional energy, symbolic representations—seem intuitive to us, it is because they are familiar.

## References

- Becker, H. (1963/1982). *Outsiders: Studies in the sociology of deviance*. New York: The Free Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1977). *Outline of a theory of practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Braithwaite, J. (1989). *Crime, shame and reintegration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Braithwaite, J., & Mugford, S. (1994). Conditions of successful reintegration ceremonies: Dealing with juvenile offenders. *British Journal of Criminology*, 34(2), 139–171.
- Brown, K. (2013). *Buying into fair trade: Culture, morality, and consumption*. New York: NYU Press.
- Campos-Castillo, C., & Hitlin, S. (2013). Copresence: Revisiting a Building Block for Social Interaction Theories. *Sociological Theory*, 31, 168–192.
- Carter, H. (2011). Rioter profile: 'I thought of it as like a battle, like a war'. *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/dec/05/rioter-profile-battle-like-war>. Accessed 3 May 2013.
- Carrabine, E. (2005). Prison riots, social order and the problem of legitimacy. *British Journal of Criminology*, 45(6), 896–913.
- Collins, R. (1990). Stratification, emotional energy, and the transient emotions. In T. Kemper (Ed.), *Research agendas in the sociology of emotions* (pp. 27–67). New York: SUNY Press.
- Collins, R. (1993). Emotional Energy as the Common Denominator of Rational Action. *Rationality and Society* 5(2), 203–30.
- Collins, R. (2004). *Interaction ritual chains*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Collins, R. (2009). *Violence: A micro-sociological theory*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Cooley, C. (1902). *Human Nature and the Social Order*. New York: Scribner's.
- Durkheim, E. (1893/1997). *The division of labor in society*. New York: The Free Press.
- Durkheim, E. (1982/1985). *Rules of the sociological method*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Durkheim, E. (1912/1996). *The elementary forms of religious life*. New York: The Free Press.

- Durkheim, E. (1961/2002). *Moral education*. New York: Dover Publications.
- Fine, G. A., & Manning, P. (2003). Erving Goffman. In G. Ritzer (Eds.), *The Blackwell companion to major contemporary social theorists* (pp. 34–62). Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Foucault, M. (1977). *Discipline and punishment*. New York: Pantheon.
- Garfinkel, H. (1967). *Studies in ethnomethodology*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
- Garland, D. (1990). *Punishment and modern society: A study in social theory*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Garland, D. (1991). Sociological perspectives on punishment. *Crime and Justice*, 14, 115–165.
- Geertz, C. (1966). Religion as a cultural system. In M. Banton (Eds.), *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion* (pp. 1–46). London: Tavistock. (ASA Monographs, 3)
- Goffman, E. (1952). On cooling the mark out: Some aspects of adaptation to failure. *Psychiatry*, 15, 451–463.
- Goffman, E. (1959). *The presentation of self in everyday life*. New York: Anchor Doubleday.
- Goffman, E. (1961). *Asylums: Essays on the social situation of mental patients and other inmates*. New York: Anchor Books.
- Goffman, E. (1963a). *Stigma: Notes of the management of spoiled identity*. Englewood Cliffs: Spectrum.
- Goffman, E. (1963b). *Behavior in public places: Notes on the social organization of gatherings*. New York: The Free Press.
- Goffman, E. (1967/1982). *Interaction ritual: Essays in face to face behaviour*. New York: Pantheon.
- Goffman, E. (1981). *Forms of talk*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Goffman, E. (1983). The interaction order: The American Sociological Association 1982 presidential address. *American Sociological Review*, 48(1), 1–17.
- Hallett, T. (2003). Emotional feedback and amplification in social interaction. *The Sociological Quarterly*, 44(4), 705–726.
- Karstedt, S. (2006). Emotions, crime and justice: Exploring Durkheimian themes. *Sociology of Crime Law and Deviance*, 7, 223–248.
- Kemper, T. (2011). *Status, power and ritual interaction: A relational reading of Durkheim, Goffman and Collins*. Burlington: Ashgate.
- Klusemann, S. (2010). Micro-situational antecedents of violent atrocity. *Sociological Forum*, 25(2), 272–295.
- Lewis, P. (2011). A fire lit in Tottenham that burned Manchester: The rioters' story. *The Guardian*. <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/dec/05/tottenham-manchester-rioters-story-england>. Accessed 3 May 2013.
- Lewis, P., Newburn, T., Taylor, M., McGillivray, C., Greenhill, A., Frayman, H., & Proctor, R. (2011). *Reading the riots: Investigating England's summer of disorder*. London: The London School of Economics and Political Science and The Guardian.
- Licoppe, C., & Morel, J. (2014). Mundane video directors in interaction: Showing one's environment in Skype and mobile video calls. In M. Broth, E. Laurier, & L. Mondada (Eds.), *Studies of Video Practises: Video at Work*. (pp. 135–160). New York: Routledge.
- Lyal, S. (2012, 27 July). A five-ring opening circus, weirdly and unabashedly British. *The New York Times*. [www.nytimes.com/2012/07/28/sports/olympics/in-olympic-opening-ceremony-britain-asserts-its-eccentric-identity.html?pagewanted=all&\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/28/sports/olympics/in-olympic-opening-ceremony-britain-asserts-its-eccentric-identity.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0). Accessed 3 May 2013.
- Maruna, S. (2011). Reentry as a rite of passage. *Punishment and Society*, 13(1), 3–28.
- Niederhoffer, K. G., & Pennebaker, J. W. (2002). Linguistic style matching in social interaction. *Journal of Language and Social Psychology*, 21, 337–360.
- Peterson, A. (2008). Who 'owns' the streets? Ritual performances of respect and authority in interactions between young men and police officers. *Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention*, 9(2), 97–118.
- Retzinger, S., & Scheff, T. J. (1996). Strategy for community conferences: Emotions and social bonds. In G. Galaway & J. Hudson (Eds.), *Restorative justice: International perspectives* (pp. 315–336). Montsey: Criminal Justice Press.
- Rock, P. (2010). Hearing victims of crime: The delivery of impact statements as ritual behaviour in four London trials for murder and manslaughter. In A. Bottoms & J. Roberts (Eds.), *Victims in the criminal justice system* (pp. 200–231). Portland: Willan.
- Rose, M., Diamond, S. S., & Bak, K. (2010). Goffman on the jury: Real jurors attention to the "offstage" of trials. *Law and Human Behaviour*, 34(4):310–323.
- Rossner, M. (2011). Emotions and interaction ritual: A micro-analysis of restorative justice. *British Journal of Criminology*, 51, 95–119.
- Rossner, M. (2012). Emotion across the lifecycle: The case for restorative justice with adults. In J. Bolitho, J. Bruce, & G. Mason (Eds.), *Restorative justice and adult offending* (pp. 214–230). Sydney: University of Sydney Institute of Criminology Monograph Series.
- Rossner, M. (2013). *Just Emotions: Rituals of Restorative Justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rossner, M., Bruce, J., & Meher, M. (2013). Understanding the Process of Restorative Justice: Research on Forum Sentencing. *New South Wales Department of Justice and Attorney General and University of Western Sydney*. [http://www.uws.edu.au/\\_data/assets/pdf\\_file/0004/522625/The\\_Process\\_and\\_Dynamics\\_of\\_Restorative\\_Justice\\_-\\_Research\\_on\\_Forum\\_Sentencing.pdf](http://www.uws.edu.au/_data/assets/pdf_file/0004/522625/The_Process_and_Dynamics_of_Restorative_Justice_-_Research_on_Forum_Sentencing.pdf). Accessed 15 July 2013.
- Sharp, S. (2010). How does prayer help manage emotions? *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 73, 417–437.
- Sherman, L. W. (2003). Reason for emotion: Reinventing justice with theories, innovations, and research—The American Society of Criminology 2002 presidential address. *Criminology*, 41(1), 1–38.
- Spencer, B., & Gillen, F. J. (1898). *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*. New York: Macmillan.

- Summers-Effler, E. (2002). The micro potential for social change: Emotion, consciousness, and social movement formation. *Sociological Theory*, 20, 41–60.
- Summers-Effler, E. (2004a). Defensive strategies: The formation and social implications of patterned self-destructive behaviour. *Advances in Group Process*, 21, 309–325.
- Summers-Effler, E. (2004b). Little girls in women's bodies: Social interaction and the strategizing of early breast development. *Sex Roles*, 51(1-2), 29–44.
- Summers-Effler, E. (2007). Ritual theory. In J. E. Stets & J. H. Turner (Eds.), *Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions* (pp. 135–154). New York: Springer.
- Summers Effler, E. (2010). *Laughing saints and righteous heroes: Emotional rhythms in social movement groups*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Tait, D. (2001). Popular sovereignty and the justice process: Towards a comparative methodology for observing courtroom rituals. *Contemporary Justice Review*, 4(2), 201–218.
- Turner, J. H., & Stets, J. E. (2006). Sociological theories of human emotions. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 32(1), 25–52.
- Turner, V. (1969/1995). *The ritual process: Structure and anti-structure*. Piscataway: Transaction Publishers.
- Wherry, F. (2008). *Global markets and local crafts: Thailand and Costa Rica compared*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Zehr, H. (1990). *Changing lenses*. Scottsdale: Herald Press.

Eva Illouz, Daniel Gilon and Mattan Shachak

### 11.1 Introduction

If emotions are so often viewed as universal, it is to a large but definite extent because psychology has produced a considerable amount of studies in which emotions are equated with physical bodily processes (for example, Damasio 2000). These include facial expressions (see Ekman et al. 1969) or brain scans or measurement of heart pulses, etc. In other words, methods of measurement seem to induce the theoretical conclusions with regard to the nature of emotions. Yet, in a recent meta-analysis of studies of cross cultural emotions published between 1967 and 2000 (Van Hemert et al. 2007), the researchers found that method related factors, such as sample characteristics, method characteristics, statistical artifacts or translation methods, explained only 13.8% of the cross-cultural variance in emotion variables, while substantive country-level variables such as mode of subsistence, political variables, stability of a country, and aggregated psychological variables such as individualism, religious values, etc. explained 27.9% of this variance. We may thus say that 58.3% of the observed cross-cultural variance of emotions remains unexplained (Van Hemert et al. 2007, p. 935).

These and others related findings lead the authors to conclude that Cultural diversity of emotions is not yet well understood in cross-cultural psychology (Van Hemert et al. 2007, p. 938).

Another way to say the same thing is to declare with Greg M. Smith (1999) that “since none of the emotive subsystems except the limbic has been shown to be necessary for emotion- yet all of them contribute to emotion in some way- a simple model of an emotion system is not possible. The emotion system requires a model that allows multiple causes [...]” (Smith 1999, p. 108). Such empirical evidence suggests that one need not be an unrepentant cultural sociologist to admit that culture plays a significant, albeit yet undefined, role in the experience and expression of emotions.

Culture provides the framework for the labeling, classification, categorization and interpretation of emotions, and social norms regulate and form their expression and even their experience. In this chapter, we focus on culture as both the causal framework and the terrain for the life of emotions, while trying to put aside or overcome commonly held epistemological dichotomies such as materialism vs. idealism, nature vs. culture, individual vs. society, positivism vs. constructivism, universalism vs. relativism, romanticism vs. rationalism (Lutz and White 1986). If “emotions” per se, as an ideal type, are not available for empirical observation (James 1894; Reddy 1999), we can however observe the social expressions or performances of emotions as they derive from models of the self. Culture is understood as the assemblage of norms, institutions, practices, rituals, symbols, interpretive repertoires, action scenarios, narratives, discourses, and meanings which shape and guide thought

---

E. Illouz (✉) · D. Gilon · M. Shachak  
Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel

and action. Culture then is both the systematic interpretation of social action and the bestowal of meaning to events, persons and processes. This is a rather wide definition of what “culture” is, involving pragmatic, semiotic/interpretive, and structural dimensions.

A caveat is in place: In claiming the importance or primacy of culture, sociology does not deny the existence of psychological life. But it views psychological processes as shot through with cultural models (recurrent images and meanings stating what the world is and how it should be) and ‘social forces’ (defined here as the aggregate effects of many interactions structured by similar patterns—such as class, discrimination, gender differences, patriotism). Emotions are at the interface of the individual’s experience, collective meanings and social constraints (through such social emotions as shame, depression, or anger). To say this differently: emotions are shaped by cultural models of the self, moral codes and forms of sociality. The cultural approach to emotions is thus premised on the view that selves are always both psychological and cultural entities.

Models of selfhood contain prescriptions about what in a person is most important to uphold (e.g., one’s honor; or one’s self-control and rationality; one’s autonomy); they contain implicit models and lines of force motivating a person to act, making some norms or moral views more legitimate than others (e.g., one’s self-interest; one’s desire to self-sacrifice; or one’s uncontrolled emotions); they contain models of action (e.g., fatalistic, determinist, voluntarist). A man taking revenge for an offense in an honor society acts on a different model of selfhood than a man attending a therapist to control his frequent bouts of anger or his fantasies of revenge. Models of the self are inextricably connected to public codes of selfhood, to the narratives and the norms through which members of a group feel and act as competent members of that group (Geertz 1974). To connect emotions to models of the self is thus to suggest that emotions are shot through and through by “outside culture,” that the boundaries of the inner and outer self are forever porous, and more crucially, that they are

at once psychological and collective. If anger or love expresses one’s interiority, they do so only through shared and public definitions of personhood, and at the same time express and constitute a specific form of relating to others.

It follows from this claim that emotions, although learned through intricate language games or social practices (Burkit 1997), are not learned by what Wittgenstein (1953) called ostensive teaching—showing a one-to-one correspondence between words and emotions—nor are they constituted by one’s emotional “private language”. Rather, emotions are the result of a complex set of inferences, from the norms embedded practically in situations, from stories, from discourses about emotions, and from how personhood is culturally defined and socially performed. To learn Emotions is thus not only to know which name to give to one’s emotions but also to know to monitor feelings socially—to be context sensitive, to know how and how much to express an emotion, to decipher others’ emotions, to monitor their intensity (through self-control or through increasing their intensity). This means then that anger or love describe a range or repertoire of experiences, rather than a fixed set of features and properties under a name of emotions. In that sense the cultural approach to emotions is about clarifying a range of semantic meanings in given social contexts and interactions.

In what follows, we portrait the role of culture in the sociology of emotions through four categories: social norms and emotional control; emotional discourse and performance; ritual and the public production of emotions; and fictive and virtual emotions in technologies of mediated interaction.

---

## 11.2 Norms, Emotions and Self-Control

One of the most obvious places to take stock of the influence of culture on emotions is the norm of emotional control, the fact that emotions are experienced by most people as entities that must be controlled, that is, whose expression and intensity must be either regulated or repressed. This is why self-control is such a good point of



entry to a sociology of emotions: it shows clearly that something “external” to the subject—injunctions, norms, discourses—interacts with and shapes that subject’s emotional experience, whether in the form of actual emotional self-control or whether in the form of a feeling of inadequacy at having failed to self-control. We divide two broad lines of inquiry into the relationship between emotions and norms of emotional control. One line of inquiry views norms as a set of more or less fixed rules which bind the expression of emotions, while another line of work suggests that culture and social structure regulate emotional experience from within the feeling subject through the very framing and interpretation of emotions.

In a series of studies, Stearns and Stearns (1985) have focused on the development of self-control in a variety of emotional domains such as anger (Stearns and Stearns 1989), coolness (Stearns 1994), fear (Stearns and Haggerty 1991) and desire (Stearns 1999). They examine the relations between the normative and structural emotion standards, and the felt experience of these emotions, as well as the social consequences of such experiences. Drawing from anthropological works on culture and emotions, they claim that all societies have emotional standards “even if they are sometimes largely unspoken or undebated, and societies differ, often significantly, in these standards” (Stearns and Stearns 1985, p. 814). Emotional standards vary temporarily, spatially, and socially between societies, historical contexts and social classes or groups.

There is however always a gap or a tension between the institutional standards regarding meanings and norms of emotions, and the emotional behaviors and experiences of individuals. The social prohibition to express anger in the Eskimo culture, for example, does not mean they do not experience anger; rather, they experience and express it in other ways in informal social arenas, such as demonstrating extreme violence towards their dogs. It is the complex interplay between these two aspects which produces the dynamics of socio-historical change. The distinction between the normative and the experiential aspects of emotions and their historical account

is conceptualized as the difference between emotionology, that is,

the attitudes or standards that a society, or a definable group within a society, maintains toward basic emotions and their appropriate expression; ways that institutions reflect and encourage these attitudes in human conduct, e.g., courtship practices as expressing the valuation of affect in marriage, or personnel workshops as reflecting the valuation of anger in job relationships.

And emotions themselves, that is,

a complex set of interactions among subjective and objective factors, mediated through neural and/or hormonal systems, which gives rise to feelings (affective experiences as of pleasure or displeasure) and also general cognitive processes toward appraising the experience; emotions in this sense lead to physiological adjustments to the conditions that aroused response, and often to expressive and adaptive behavior. (Stearns and Stearns 1985, p. 813)

These concepts aim to establish an historical perspective on emotions which elaborate the study of the history of emotional standards, with the study of the history of emotional behavior and experience, and examine their interplay by looking at “peoples’ efforts to mediate between emotional standards and emotional experience” (Stearns and Stearns 1985, p. 825). This mediation can take different forms and have various social and cultural consequences.

Arlie Hochschild—one of the pioneers in the sociology of emotions—similarly started from the intuition that the relationship between society and individual emotions was best found in norms of self-control. Her path-breaking line of research focuses on the rules which shape emotions: “[E]motions are greatly influenced by norms since thinking, perceiving and imagining are intrinsically involved in their inducement. In addition, social factors guide the microactions of labeling, interpreting and managing emotions. These microactions, in turn, reflect back on that which is labeled, interpreted, and managed” (Hochschild 1979, p. 555).

In Hochschild’s view, culture or ideology is an interpretive framework which has two completing aspects: framing rules, which are used to as-

cribe definitions and meanings to a situation, and emotion rules, which are “guidelines for the assessment of fits and misfits between feeling and situation” (Hochschild 1979, p. 566). Emotion rules are generally implicit and informal guidelines to what emotions we are expected to feel and in what social context, or what emotions are to be expressed and when. They “delineate a zone within which one has permission to be free of worry, guilt, or shame with regard to the situated feeling.” Such spatial, institutional and cultural zoning outlines a range of specific emotional experience and expression to be performed. Like other interactional rules and rituals, they can be obeyed halfheartedly, or deliberately broken, or unconsciously avoided, but this will be at varying social costs and consequences.

In contrast to Stearns’ concept of emotionology, Hochschild’s concept of “feeling rules” attempts to account not only for the normative constraints over the expression of emotions, but for the actual experience of emotions as well, as they reflect patterns of social membership and are symbolically exchanged in social interactions. The gap between the normative and the experiential is mediated by what she calls emotion management, i.e., the work individuals do while “inducing or inhibiting feelings so as to render them ‘appropriate’ to a situation” and trying to change the degree or quality of an emotion or feeling. Moreover, changing feeling rules, when one decides to adhere to certain feeling rules and to break others, represents changing ideological stance towards social life.

All in all, they focus on the normative aspect of emotions, mostly informal and implicit but public and collective emotion norms, standards or rules, and set to investigate the “work” that is being done by individuals in order to adhere to emotion norms or to actually come to experience what they demand (Hochschild 1983), or the emotional consequences of certain emotional standards (Stearns and Stearns 1985). Focusing on the normative aspect of emotions separates the study of felt emotional experience from its regulation and examines in turn how this gap is handled. We may however wonder if the focus on this tension is not deeply influenced by western

emotionology itself which has been concerned with the tension between authentic emotions and social constraints. That is, in focusing on outward rules and standards, emotionology refrains from challenging the construction of the emotion categories themselves by culture. A far more sophisticated approach to the conundrum of the relationship between cultural standards regulating emotion and social structure is to be found in the early work of Norbert Elias.

In his classic work *The Civilizing Process*, Norbert Elias (1978) explores the development of non violent social interactions in the West from the twelfth century onward. The refinement of behavior and affective reactions was the result of a long socio-historical process in Western societies by which human beings were drawn into ever-denser relations of mutual interdependence.

This process, according to Elias, is a result of the increasingly differentiated and complex networks of social relations, the growth in scope and scale of social interdependencies between individuals, and the centralization of political power to the aristocratic court first, and later to the monopolization of power by the state. This new social figuration and the unique net of interdependencies it promoted increased social control and imposed restraints on aggressiveness and violence. To demonstrate what this transformation looked like, Elias suggests that the valiant knights who were used to practice their political power through violence and aggression, had to learn how to dance and charm in the kings court, as the centralization of political power increased. Moreover, they had to learn how to control their emotions, that is, to avoid their spontaneous expression on one hand and to learn how to read the emotional states of others in order to maneuver their behavior as a central tool of power in the new political order, on the other hand.

Elias explores a variety of etiquette manuals from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and describes a process by which standards applied to violence, sexual behavior, emotional expression, bodily functions, eating habits, table manners and forms of speech became gradually self-policed and increased what we may call the threshold of shame, embarrassment, and repugnance. That

is, a growing variety of forms of behavior and feeling have been put “behind the scenes” of the social, turning them into shameful, disgusting, or deviant.

The main and most interesting claim Elias makes is that ‘the molding of instinctual life, including its compulsive features, is a function of social interdependencies that persist throughout life’, and these interdependencies change as the structure of society changes. ‘To the variation in this structure correspond,’ wrote Elias, ‘the differences in personality structure that can be observed in history.’ (Elias 1978, cited in Krieken 1998, p. 91). It is not norms per se which shape and constraint behavior but rather the increase in length and density of social interactions which create new norms and reshape emotional conduct. Elias argues that what we experience as ‘civilization’ is founded on a particular habitus, a particular behavioral, affective and psychic structure which has developed over time, and which can only be understood in connection with changes in the forms of sociability (Elias 1978).

Exploring the process he called the *Civilizing process*, Elias did not intentionally act as a sociologist of emotions, but his insights and theoretical framework have been elaborated by social theorist and researchers of the history of emotions (Stearns and Lewis 1998; Reddy 2001; Wouters 2007). The most interesting line of inquiry is the one that has focused on emotional habitus (Burkit 1997, p. 43; Calhoun 2001; Illouz 2007, 2008; Kane 2001). In this view, emotions are part of the individual’s inscription into social relationships, they are related to cognitions and involve a sense of “how to act, how to play the game, that is never altogether conscious or purely reducible to rules—even when it seems strategic” (Calhoun 2001, p. 53).

Emotions then are learned and embodied since early childhood through social practices and interactions, while “culture provides for people an *emotional habitus*, with a language and set of practices which outline ways of speaking about emotions and of acting out and upon bodily feelings within everyday life” (Burkit 1997, p. 43). Emotional habitus reflects identity, structures of social differentiation and hierarchy: “Emotional

habitus lies thus at the intersection of three domains of social experience: the interactional, the bodily, and the linguistic. It reflects and signals one’s social class position at these three junctures. Emotional habitus shapes the ways in which one’s emotions are bodily and verbally expressed and used in turn to negotiate social interactions” (Illouz 2008, p. 214).

Elias’s object of study is the system of emotional economy and its relation to social and political structures. It differs from that Bourdieu’s concept of habitus in that it is not based strictly on common social position, but on macro-structures, or social figurations in Elias’ words, defined as the social density, differentiation of social functions, degrees and extension of social interdependencies, distribution of power and its form of exercise. Although the civilized habitus uses as a status marker, this form of habitus, Elias claims, trickled “down” to encompass an ever growing variety of classes and social groups: first the bourgeoisie which adopted/imitated some aristocratic manners and lifestyle, and later other classes as well.

Elias’ work has been elaborated and contested by critics for various reasons and claims, but his general claim regarding the interconnection between individual emotional life, socio-political structures and culture, still persist as a common ground for discussion in the socio-political history of self and emotions. One prominent theoretical strand, which we have just discussed, is the normative theories of emotions. Normative approaches to the sociology of emotions emphasize the importance of culture in providing emotion ideologies, emotional standards (Stearns and Stearns 1985), vocabularies of emotions, framing rules and feeling rules (Hochschild 1979). These elements of culture operate as behavioral guidelines to how emotions should be expressed in a situation and how or what one has to feel and when, as well as to what practices and repertoires are to be used in adjusting emotional responses to specific situations.

Although these approaches differ in their account of the historical dimension of emotion norms, they tend to focus on the relation between emotion norms and individual emotional

experience. However, there could be two major objections to normative theories of emotions. First, they do not account for the ways in which emotional norms themselves are produced and the interplay between cultural reproduction and changes in social structure through emotion categories and norms. Second, they tend to overlook emotional states that do not result from specific emotion norms, or the unintended emotional consequences of socio-cultural structures. A sociology of culture and emotions should not only account for the close correspondence of emotions with their regulation, but also for the ways in which they express a loosening or transformation of the connection of social structure, culture and emotion. These two questions will be discussed in the following sections, respectively.

### 11.2.1 Socio-Historical Conditions, Agents and Institutions in the Construction of Emotion Ideologies and Emotion Norms

Elias' legacy in the sociology of emotions re-frames the key research question in studying emotions historically: Under what historical and structural conditions will some strategic lines of action, and thus some emotional ideology, become dominant? (Thoits 1989, pp. 335–336). Ann Swidler (2001), for example, demonstrates this in relation to love ideologies among the American middle class, while employing a pragmatic conception of culture in which agents have various cultural repertoires which they use as “tools” of meaning making under specific social structures.

One way to approach these questions is to examine the ways in which social structure and culture are intertwined in the production of new forms of organization and control, sociability and emotion management. Eva Illouz (2007, 2008), for example, draws on the work of Norbert Elias in explaining the emergence of norms of emotional control in the capitalist workplace, viewing it as a result of the intensification and variation of social interactions and networks which demand cooperation and reduce conflict—and as a cultural change in the framing and evaluation

of emotional responses—the psychologization and democratization of the workplace—which resulted in new forms of control.

Illouz emphasizes the role of social groups responsible for the formulation of this change: an increasingly expanding group of psychologists, who acted simultaneously as a body of professionals and as producers of culture, who codified emotions in the new context of economic rationality by incorporating models of efficiency, productivity, cost and benefit into emotional repertoires, offering new narrative scripts of conflict. In contemporary post industrial societies, psychologists are the central actors who produce classification systems, cultural repertoires and practices for emotion interpretation and management (or emotional control) not only in the corporation, where they deal with anger, stress, communication, cooperation and teamwork, but in romantic life, where they codify sexuality, intimacy and romantic love, and in the family and child rearing arenas.

Illouz argues that in becoming the object of professional expertise, psychologists carved a realm of action in which mental and emotional health are the primary commodity produced and circulated. Thus, creating in turn an “emotional field”: “a domain of action with its own language, rules, objects, and boundaries” (Illouz 2008, p. 171). This emotional field comes to define emotional life as an object of management, control and regulation through specific techniques, under the incessantly expanding ideal of health channeled by the state, professionals and the market. In this process, the expansion of the category of mental illness and the loosening of its definition is the result of expert scientific logic which attempts to rationalize a growing variety of behaviors and emotional states while charting and defining disorders. It is also the result of the market logic of pharmaceutical industries which utilizes psychological classification schemes and repertoires to expand their consumer audiences, reach more and more specific market segments and produce new commodities for them. That is to say that the construction of emotion norms and pathologies and the production of emotional self-transformation techniques in post industrial

societies is a social process which is carried out by various actors and organizations.

Psychologists give rise to “emotional capitalism” and the “therapeutic emotional style” (Illouz 2008). Psychological institutions and professionals construct healthy versus pathological emotions; positive versus negative emotions; provide the emotion norms and cultural repertoires to label, frame, chart and act upon specific emotions; and finally, they provide techniques of emotional self monitoring and emotion management in various social spheres. While the concept of emotional capitalism refers to the interweaving of market-based rational repertoires into the realm of emotions and the introduction of emotions into the economic sphere of action, the concept of emotional style refers to “the combination of the ways a culture becomes “preoccupied” with certain emotions and devises specific “techniques”—linguistic, scientific, ritual—to apprehend them” (Illouz 2008, p. 14). Culture is the flip side of structural transformation of the figuration of society in the emergence of new emotional styles, concepts of selfhood and forms of sociability.

The notion of emotional style thus does not only focus on the presence of normative injunctions in emotional experiences, but describes a more diffuse quality: it rises when a new “interpersonal imagination” is required in order to provide cultural framework and action scenarios for actors to interpret their social environment and personal experiences, and act in the context of changing institutions and social structures where new forms of sociability are formulated. The therapeutic emotional style is disseminated into the social fabric of various institutions by the professional practice of psychologists, their role in the corporation and public health institutions, and the wide range of popular culture media—self help books, talk shows and movies—which popularize psychological narratives, repertoires and techniques to interpret and act upon emotions. As we have seen, the formulation of emotions in normative approaches is done either through reference to norms or to habitus, which are both reflections of social structure but in different ways and meanings. In this view, social

structure and institutional changes are the causes of emotions and their cultural framing.

### 11.2.2 Structure of Feeling and Cultural Reproduction

Far less focused on the historical agents bringing about a change in norms, Raymond Williams’ concept of “Structure of Feeling” attempts to encompass the experiences induced by the totality of a specific form of life, its resulting contradictions and its actual and possible socio-cultural consequences. What Williams calls Structure of feeling is not the aspect of ideology which deals with emotions, which Hochschild calls “feeling rules” or what Stearns call “emotionology”. Rather, it has to do with the experience produced by the general organization of society and culture, the mode of production and cultural ideals. Hence, it includes the unintended emotional consequences of ideology and social practice, and the possible affect they might have not only on experience but on cultural reproduction as well. Emotions, in this view, do not only result from or exist in relation to “feeling rules” or “emotional standards”, but result from general social structures and cultural frames, similar to Elias’ original claim. But as it is understood in the context of power relations, it enables to form new ways of resistance to hegemony or emergence and acceptance of new ideologies. The term aims to stress the socio-historical particularity of experience, and its dialectic relations to social structure and cultural reproduction—on the one hand, emotions are a result of the whole of social order and symbolic structure, but on the other hand, as they are a reflexive account for these circumstances themselves, emotions encapsulate a possibility for social and cultural changes. Williams highlights the practical aspect of emotional experience:

Practical consciousness (which) is almost always different from official consciousness... For (it) is what is actually being lived, and not only what it is thought is being lived... a kind of feeling and thinking which is indeed social and material, but each in an embryonic phase [...]. (Williams 1977, pp. 132–133 cited in Filmer 2003, p. 208)



Hence, a structure of feeling encompasses the emotional consequences of general beliefs and institutions, so we can speak of the anger and frustration resulting from confronting a bureaucracy, the anxiety resulting from the protestant idea of predestination, or self-irony resulting from internet dating sites and the structure of the romantic encounters they produce. These affects can have different social results. Williams, however, looks at a specific form by which the dynamic structure of feeling is being represented in art and literary works by poets and painters, while he doesn't account for the wider range of agents and institutions engaged with naming, framing and interpreting emotions on one hand, and providing emotion norms and techniques of emotion management on the other. "Structure of feeling" is particularly useful to capture those emotional social experiences that are not well organized under a single label or ideological frame such as Betty Friedan's "problem that has no name," or social climates of unrest and anxiety. In the next section, we will turn to examine approaches which focus on the discursive and performative causes of emotions.

---

### 11.3 Discourse, Performance and Emotions

The term discourse has become popular in philosophy, linguistics and the human sciences in general, especially since the 70's, after what has been dubbed the "linguistic turn". Basically, it refers to the system of spoken and textual objects and events in their spatial, temporal, social and political contexts. More specifically, it refers to the symbolic order in which speaking, writing and reading take place, and the social roles, institutions and practices through which they are carried out. However, the concept gains different meanings depending on the theoretical background on which it is presented, ranging from structuralist (Levi-Strauss 2008 [1963]), constructivist, performative or post-structuralist (Foucault 1971) approaches.

A wide body of literature conceptualizes the relation between culture and emotions through the concepts of discourse and performance. These

approaches highlight the cultural specific elements, the interrelations between language and emotions on the one hand and the performativity of emotions on the other hand, and of course the close relation between culture, social organization and emotions. In what follows, we review the various theoretical strands that focus on the relations between language, culture and emotions grouped around four categories: language as a shaper of reality; discourse and the definition of personhood; intra-cultural discourses and social context; and performativity of emotions.

#### 11.3.1 Language as a Shaper of Reality

The term discourse is used in different ways, ranging from the linguistic, textual and semiotic aspects of social objects and interactions, to the whole of what is generally termed culture, i.e., the totality of actions, practices, institutions, beliefs, values, symbols and relations within a definite group (Gee 2001, p. 17). In this section we review theoretical approaches that examine the relation between language or discourse in its narrow sense, to emotions.

Emotions are occurrences in which the labeling of an event, and the categorization of inner experience play a crucial role in shaping which emotion is experienced and how. The fact that the emotional experience is shaped by language can be seen both in the level of the individual's emotional claim and in emotional claims that different cultures use. Cross cultural studies of emotions revealed the differences between languages in the ways in which they perceive emotions.

The connection between language and emotion is presented in the work of James Russell (1991) who examines the labeling of emotions in different cultures and languages, and argues that cultural similarity and difference in the realm of emotions should be examined in several dimensions: the availability of a signifier for "emotion" in a specific language; the number of words for and folk theories of emotion; the boundaries of the category of emotions; and the concepts and categories of emotions. Russell brings various ethnographic accounts which show the lack of

a word for “emotion” in some cultures, and others which have a relatively close term. In addition, the specificity of emotion words and their number differs significantly from one culture to another: The largest gap lies between over 2000 words that have been found for categories of emotions in the English language (Wallace and Carson 1973) to 7 words that could be translated as categories of emotions in Chewong (Howell 1981). Moreover, in the same way that some English emotions words, including emotions considered basic and therefore universal, have no equivalence in other languages, these other languages have words for emotions without equivalent in English. Emotion words, their referents and meanings represent different symbolic classification systems by which emotion categories are distinguished (Russell 1991, p. 431).

In the same vein, Russell takes language and the cultural categorization and classification it embodies as central to emotions and their meaning, but he does not accept the objectification of emotions by language. Emotion words do not refer to clearly distinguishable mental objects, rather they are action and interpretive scripts (Russell 1991, pp. 442–443). Russell argues that the meaning of each emotion word and the concept it expresses is a script consisting of features which are not hidden essences but knowable sub-events which are ordered in a causal sequence, similar to the way actions are ordered in a playwright’s script. Based on Kahneman and Miller (1986), Russell further claims that some people may understand emotion in terms of more abstract scripts and other in more concrete ones. Moreover, even in the same culture different people might possess slightly different scripts for the same emotion (1991, p. 443).

### 11.3.2 Discourse, Emotions and the Shaping of Personhood

The relation between language, culture and personhood is the mouthpiece of structuralist and post structuralist theories of culture and the subject. The most prominent figure in this field is Michel Foucault. Foucault rejects the two dominant

schools in structural linguistics and cultural analysis: the purely synchronic analysis of language, that views the meaning words as determined by the structure of language as an a-historical system, what the great structural linguist Ferdinand De-Saussure called “Langue” (2013[1903]); and the analysis of symbolic mythic forms in terms of binary deep cultural structures that makes meaning possible (Levi Strauss 2008 [1963]). While these classical structuralist approaches hold a view of discourse as an autonomous and arbitrary linguistic structure constitutive of reality by itself, Foucault (1971) elaborates the concept of discourse in a different direction. He offers a historical (in fact genealogical and archeological), research to uncover the actual social practices and concrete economic, technological, political, professional or administrative activities by which discourse is produced.

According to Foucault, linguistic interaction is embedded in and constitutive of social and political institutions and structures of power, which produce exclusion of certain behaviors and identities that do not fit the conventional rules and frames of the dominant discourse. Discourse then, is constitutive of knowledge systems, power relations and subjectivity. However, Foucault’s approach gives an almost metaphysical status to structural abstract power, although this feature had changed in the course of his work from stressing the production of subjectivity through macro discourse and knowledge systems, to micro technologies of the self.

Along with the focus on language and personhood, anthropologists became increasingly interested in the developing field of emotions, which they viewed as central elements of the constitution of personhood and sociability. Exploring the relations of language to emotions and exposing the cultural variability of emotional meanings, anthropologists argue that the focus of the study of emotions should be the politics of the social rather than the psychology of the individual (Lutz and Abu-Lughod 1990).

Clifford Geertz is one of the first anthropologists to offer directions of analysis to think about the category of the person as a public construct. In his analysis of the connection between culture,

emotions and personhood in the societies he had studied, Geertz presents the disparity between these emotional habituses cultural models of the person and emotional technologies of the self, from those that had characterized the West:

The goal is to be *alus* in both separated realms of the self. In the inner realm this is to be achieved through religious discipline, much but not all of it mystical. In the outer realm, it is to be achieved through etiquette, the rules of which, in this instance, are not only extraordinarily elaborate but have something of the force of law. Through meditation the civilized man thins out his emotional life to a kind of constant hum; through etiquette, he both shields that life from external disruptions and regularizes his outer behavior in such a way that it appears to others as a predictable, undisturbing, elegant, and rather vacant set of choreographed motions and settled forms of speech.[...] [T]he result is a bifurcate conception of the self, half ungestured feeling and half unfelt gesture. An inner world of stilled emotion and an outer world of shaped behavior confront one another as sharply distinguished realms unto themselves, any particular person being but the momentary locus, so to speak, of that confrontation, a passing expression of their permanent existence, their permanent separation, and their permanent need to be kept in their own separate order. Only when you have seen, as I have, a young man whose wife—a woman he had raised from childhood and who had been the center of his life—has suddenly and inexplicably died, greeting everyone with a set smile and formal apologies for his wife's absence and trying, by mystical techniques, to flat-ten out, as he himself put it, the hills and valleys of his emotion into an even, level plain ("That is what you have to do," he said to me, "be smooth inside and out") can you come, in the face of our own notions of the intrinsic honesty of deep feeling and the moral importance of personal sincerity, to take the possibility of such a conception of selfhood seriously and to appreciate, however inaccessible it is to you, its own sort of force. (Geertz 1974, pp. 33–34)

Emotions are the dimension of culture which represents most clearly the cultural specific model of selfhood and sociability, ethics and morals. The experience of an emotion includes the practices to frame, consult and shape emotions, the role and place of emotional expression (or lack of it), how these are legitimated and valued, the form and extent of individuality in a culture and in relation to a specific cosmology. It is this connection between self, the public performance of

self, culture and emotions which Catherine Lutz and Michele Rosaldo pursued, thus creating an anthropology of emotions.

Lutz (1982) argues that the way in which people talk about emotion words and the ways in which they use them are related to broader ethno-theories about the nature of the self and the values of the specific society. In Western thought, internal feeling states are assumed to be the primary referents of emotion words. The function of these words is to label an internal state and to communicate this state to others. However, examination of the use of emotional world in several Oceanic societies reveals an alternative view of emotion. In these societies, emotion words are seen as statements about the relationship between a person and an event while physiological descriptions of emotion rarely occur (Lutz 1982, p. 113). Lutz examines the connection between emotion words and the social discourse in which they are expressed by looking at the cognitive organization of the domain of emotion words on the island of Ifaluk in relation to the Ifalukian ethos.

Lutz further asked members of the Ifaluk to sort 31 words related to the "inside" into groups. Based on this sorting, Lutz claims that "a person on Ifaluk does not look inward to "discover" the emotional state being experienced so much as he or she evaluates the existing situation" (Lutz 1982, p. 120). As she claims:

These broad evaluations of situations and the finer distinctions made within each cluster have important reference to (1) cultural values that are being either conformed to or violated, and (2) the reactions of other individuals to the behavior of the self within the situation. Individuals must appraise a situation as rewarding, punitive, dangerous, frustrating, or overly complex within the constraints and with the aid of cultural values, as well as in relation to significant others, in order to label themselves with a specific Ifalukian emotion word. (Lutz 1982, p. 120)

In other words, Lutz claims that the language of emotions is used to situate the self in a broader social context and to define and evaluate the situation, its meaning and the possible actions embedded in it.

Lutz concludes by showing the relations between the use of emotion words, language and

the social factors which are used as reference points for evaluation in the construction of emotions. There is a difference, she claims, in the organization of the domain of emotion words between Samoan, the American English and the Ifalukian terms. While in the English case, the dimension of evaluation is focused on pleasant and unpleasant feeling states, on Ifaluk it is centered on the pleasant or unpleasant consequences of the situation. In Samoan emotions words, the focus of evaluation is the social good rather than on pleasant feeling or consequences.

A similar theoretical path has been carried out by Michelle Rosaldo, stressing the interrelations between culture, emotions, social order and notions of the self. Based on her work with the Ilongots, a horticultural and hunting population of Northern Luzon, Philippines. Rosaldo (1983) claims that emotions are culturally dependent, not only as a medium of their expression, but in essence, i.e. different cultural frameworks produce different emotions and different experiential content altogether. She draws on her ethnography to demonstrate this, while focusing on the headhunting activities of adult Ilongot men, and the meaning, existence and place of feelings of shame and guilt in them. Since the Ilongots' feelings and actions are framed by different set of values and a concept of selfhood than those of the West, their emotions turn out to be different as well. According to Western views, guilt and shame are moral affects necessary to constrain the individual and define the borders of the self. Rosaldo argues that "the 'selves' that these, or other feelings, help defend—and so, the ways such feelings work—will differ with the culture and organization of particular societies." (Rosaldo 1983, p. 136).

For Rosaldo then, Ilongot headhunters don't feel guilt, since Ilongots rarely discuss actions with reference to normative codes or formal rules of right and wrong. Instead, their actions are guided by kinship and the fear of the consequence of acting otherwise. "Shame" which operate as stimulus and constraint for the Ilongots, is a concept that can help understand how subjective experiences are related to their social context. Rosaldo highlights the differences

between the Ilongot's and the western concept of shame:

Shame for Ilongots, as for ourselves, involves a set of feelings tied to threatening sociality and threatened boundaries of the self. And yet, for them, it is concerned much less with hiding or constraint than with addressing, or redressing, situations where the fact of hierarchy provides a challenge to ideals of "sameness" and autonomy. Our inner truths are things for shame to mask, whereas for Ilongots "shame" speaks more of reserve than of disguise. The thoughts they harbor deep inside their hearts are more like plans than impulses repressed. And hidden thoughts do not contrast with spoken words as things more vital, true, or rich in inner conflict. (Rosaldo 1983, p. 143)

Ilongot affect works within the framework of a set of images and a moral order that must be understood in order to grasp the Ilongot feeling. Although there are resemblances between emotions Ilongots acknowledge and the shame and guilt we Westerns know "shame for us is not a healthy stimulus; anger inhibited is not a thing forgotten, but at best a thing repressed; violence enacted tends to yield as much of guilt as of relief; and maturity involves submission to a set of moral affects that are focused more upon one's self than on one's interlocutor or social situation." (Rosaldo 1983, p. 148)

However, the path-breaking and insightful works of Lutz and Rosaldo on emotions, culture and the self, present two central problems: they claim for a too-tight a fit between culture and emotional experience; and they overlook different cultural contexts and social arenas in a given society or group. A complementary line of research examines the interrelations between emotional and discursive repertoires which populate different social arenas in a given society. In this view, discourse is differentiated through cultural genres and social spheres, which have quit different emotional affects.

### 11.3.3 Discourses, Contexts and the Deployment of Sentiments

These anthropological works view the self as shaped through and through by language, thus suggesting that it acts as a grammar of emotions.

Leila Abu-Lughod, in her classical fieldwork study with the Awlad ALI Bedouins of the Egyptian Western Desert between 1978 and 1980, offers a less structuralist and more context-based view of sentiments, more specifically, she claims there is incongruity between sentiments that are communicated in the poetic and mundane discourses (Abu Lughod 1985, 1986). When confronted with personal loss, poor treatment or neglect, individuals usually express hostility, bitterness and anger in their ordinary statements. In matters of loss in love they profess indifference or denied concern. However, in their poems they “conveyed sentiments of devastating sadness, self-pity, and a sense of betrayal, and, in the case of love, deep attachment”. (1985, p. 246).

Abu Lughod claims that this difference in discourses of emotional expression results from the embeddedness of emotional responses in cultural contexts which value differently certain sentiments, and put to practice different discourses. Abu Lughod shows that these two cultural contexts enable two distinct forms of sentiments expressions which may seem opposed but actually they strengthen each other.

The Awlad ALI patterning of emotional expression can best be understood in terms of a set of culturally specific ideas that are fundamental to social life in Mediterranean societies: the honor code. In terms of the Awlad ALI’s honor code, only sentiments that create the impression of autonomy are appropriate to self-image and self-presentation. But, the honor code structure individual aspirations and interactions only in certain social context. The sentiments of invulnerability expressed in ordinary public interaction are appropriate to a discourse of honor. However, in the medium of poetry, individuals can express intimate sentiments in response to loss, which betray their vulnerability without forfeiting their claims to being honorable. “This suggests that the ideology of honor, perhaps like any other cultural ideology, neither exists alone nor completely determines individual experience.” (Abu Lughod 1985, p. 247, 251).

One explanation to the puzzle of having two seemingly discourses of selfhood lies in the

social context in which the two discourses come into play. Except at ritual occasions, individuals share poems only with close friends, social peers, or lovers. Ordinary discourse, in which the discourse of honor belongs, is public, not intimate and personal. This is the arena in which the self is judged. From the context-bound nature of the discourses, emotions and models of selfhood it can be concluded that for the individuals there is a split between public and private “which corresponds to self-presentation in terms of cultural ideals versus revelation of ‘inner reality’” (Abu Lughod 1985, p. 253).

By showing the differences of these two discourses, Abu-Lughod enables us to examine the interrelations between them, through an alternative understanding to the psychoanalytically oriented approaches which conceptualize it as repression and sublimation of individual drives or impulses (e.g. Stearns and Stearns 1989) on one hand and the Marxist approaches which conceptualize it in terms of hegemony and resistance (e.g. Williams 1973).

Abu Lughod pays close attention to the intra-cultural discursive differentiation and the different forms of emotional expressions it enables, while understanding discourse as a vehicle of emotional expression, a bridge between individual experience, language and social relations. In contrast, performative approaches denounce the view that emotions have an “inner” residuum on which they are based (Benedicte Grima 1993, p. 7). Instead of focusing on the relations between personal experience of emotions and their cultural framing, the performative approach examines the ways in which emotions are taught by and performed through culture.

#### 11.3.4 Performativity of Language and Emotions

A performative theoretical approach adopts a different concept of language altogether, and hence reformulates the relation between language, culture and emotions while highlighting agency and action. In contrast to the Western view



of statements about emotions as descriptive in character, this approach views them as “performative” in the Austinian sense. Austin’s (1975) speech act theory recognized two types of utterance, descriptive and performative. According to the theory, language is not merely descriptive of outer or inner reality; rather, it is an acting force which enables agents to create and shape aspects of their social world, to do things with words. People use performative utterances to perform or accomplish something rather than to describe it. The by now cliché example is the announcement “I do” in a wedding ceremony, in which it is the performance of this utterance that makes the bride and groom a husband and wife. In the performative view, language is not merely a socio-cultural tool to make sense of one’s emotions by having language shape individual experience or being used means of its expression, rather, language is the means by which emotions come to be present in and act upon the social and political orders (for example Ng and Kidder 2010). This helps conceive of the ways in which emotions are produced in order to organize social protests and political movements and to achieve political goals (Goodwin et al. 2001).

William Reddy (1997, 1999) offers an intermediate or synthetic approach between the expressive (descriptive) and performative dimensions of emotions. Reddy claims that statements about emotions are neither descriptive nor performative. Instead, emotions statements are efforts by the speaker to offer an interpretation to something that is not observable to any other actor. Since such an effort is part of the relationship and identity of the speaker, it has a direct impact of the actual feeling of the speaker. Reddy calls these emotional statements “emotives”.

The concept of emotive encompasses two completing conceptual aspect of emotions and culture: verballity and awareness. Thought material can be verbalized or unverballed, and conscious or non conscious. Results of variants of Stroop color-naming tasks revealed that such material comes in both verbal and nonverbal forms. It was found that naming a word for a thing takes more work than to understand the thing itself and

that translating a cue into words is a harder task than recognizing it. Reddy claims that if “consciousness” is entirely discursive in structure, some types of thought material are more discursive than others. “There is a split between recognition and articulation, a difference between the verbal and the nonverbal. The context in which utterances and discursively structured practices occur must be understood as including a halo of (verbal and nonverbal) activated thought material within a larger background of (verbal and nonverbal) temporarily less accessible thought material.” (Reddy 1999, p. 267).

Emotion claims are attempts to translate into words nonverbal events that are occurring in this halo or enduring states of this halo and its background. Therefore Reddy views emotion claims as constituting a special class of utterances that he named “emotives”. Statements about the speaker’s emotions are type of utterance that is neither constative (descriptive) nor performative. Emotional utterances have (1) a descriptive appearance, (2) a relational intent, and (3) a self-exploring or self-altering effect:

*Descriptive appearance* emotion words are used in predicates that apply to personal states (for example, “I am sad”). Although in first glance these utterances present themselves as semantically the same as “I have red hair,” emotion claims do not admit of independent verification. The only way to determine the “accuracy” of an emotion claim is to notice its coherence with other emotionally expressive utterances, gestures, and acts- all of which make reference to something that can’t be seen, heard, or sensed.

*Relational Intent* statements about emotions in social life occur most frequently as part of specific scenarios or relationships. Some even argue that emotions are nothing but such scenarios. Moreover, it can be claimed that emotional expressions and statements are performative in relation to social relationships: they determine and constitute the nature and content of these relationships, constitute membership and participation or denounce them.

*A self-exploring or self-altering effect* emotions involve widespread activations of thought materials. As studies show “the range and complexity of thought material activated at any given time can be so great, and can so completely exceed the capacity of attention, that attempts to summarize or characterize the overall tenor of such material inevitably fail” (Reddy 1999, p. 269). A first-person emotion claim is such an attempt. This attempt is an endeavor in which the activated thought material itself plays a role and relationships, goals, intentions, and practices of the individual may be at stake. Consequently, the attempt unavoidably affects the activated thought material.

The exterior referent that an emotive point to, emerges from the act of uttering in a changed state. Thus, emotives are performatives in that they do things to the world. They are instruments for directly change, build, hide, and intensify emotions. Although there is an “inner” dimension to emotion, it is never just “represented” by statements or actions. “It is the necessary (relative) failure of all efforts to represent feeling that makes for (and sets limits on) our plasticity. Many ways of expressing feeling work equally well (poorly); all fail to some degree. It is here that a universal conception of the person can be founded, one with political relevance.” (Reddy 1999, p. 270).

To conclude, theories of emotions and discourse, in its narrow or wide meaning, claim that in order to fully understand emotional experience and expression, and to frame intercultural and intra-cultural differences in both, we have to account for the specific socio-cultural settings of emotional experiences and interpretations and to consider the impact of language and the production of speech on emotions. However, this outlook produces a “hermeneutic circle”, in which the discourse, performance and the emotions are co-producing each other. While this approach locates the cultural causes and conditions for the experience and expression of emotions, the next section will deal with the mechanism for the public production of collective emotions, namely, ritual.

## 11.4 Ritual and the Collective Production of Emotions

While the normative and discursive approaches to emotions we have seen so far locate the socio-cultural causes and conditions of possibility for emotional experience and expression, and deal primarily with the role of language in constituting them, this section deals with a specific mechanism for making emotions public, by creating routines, events, temporal and spatial definitions and relevant objects and specific gestures, through which one feels the same emotions with other. Or, more specifically, the collective and public process in which emotions are produced in ritual forms.

Ritual has been one of the main subject of scholarly theorizing and research in the social sciences since the nineteenth century. In general, it is agreed to be an activity in which society is objectified symbolically, while the community appeals and ascends to a “higher” level of being, beyond the daily and casual aspects of life, into the sacred. However, this large body of knowledge has dealt with emotions only scantily. Emile Durkheim is said to be the first and most influential thinker who shed light on the social function of ritual and the social organization of emotions in ritual forms. For him, ritual is a practice of shifting from the realm of the profane to the realm of the sacred. In this process the symbolic representation of society and its moral order are objectified and validated; individuals express and experience their belongingness to the community; and a social bond is produced by sharing a common emotional state.

Ritual is a collective process by which the group constructs its collective consciousness—the collective symbolic and moral universe—through the production of emotions and solidarity, and gets to know itself through it. This view encourages us to understand ritual not as a merely symbolic process of translating myth into practice, or an emotional catharsis of spontaneous emotional expression for preserving the social order, but as a process by which the symbolic and moral order is reproduced by emotional

practice and social coercion. Here, emotions are the social “glue” or the magnetic field in which social structures stand. Ritual is a mechanism for the collective constitution of the group’s representation to itself and its moral code through the production of common emotions.

Emotions and culture are co-produced in ritual in three dimensions: First, Ritual is an affirmation of belonging and submission to collective moral codes through the collective participation, expression and experience of feelings: “[...] when the individual feels firmly attached to the society to which he belongs, he feels morally bound to share in its grief and its joy. To abandon it would be to break the ties that bind him to the collectivity, to give up wanting collectivity, and to contradict himself” (Durkheim 1995[1912], p. 403).

Second, rituals do not just evoke spontaneous individual emotional reactions, but provides guidelines for individuals to perform emotion work—the effort individuals make to foster an emotional state which corresponds to collective practice and common symbolic and moral order: “If the Christian fasts and mortifies himself during the commemorative feasts of the Passion and the Jew on the anniversary of Jerusalem’s fall, it is not to give way to sadness spontaneously felt. In those circumstances, the believer’s inward state is in disproportion to the harsh abstinences to which he submits. *If he is sad, it is first and foremost because he forces himself to be and disciplines himself to be; and he disciplines himself to be in order to affirm his faith.* The attitude of the Australian in mourning is to be understood in the same way. *If he cries and moans, it is not only to express individual sadness but also to fulfill a duty to the feeling—an obligatory feeling of which the society around him does not fail to remind him on occasion*”. (Durkheim 1995[1912], p. 403) (emphasis added). Here clearly, emotional states are induced by ritual practices.

Third, the collective nature of ritual makes it an “amplifier” of emotions: “[...] human feelings intensify when they are collectively affirmed. Like joy, sadness is heightened and amplified by its reverberation from one consciousness to the

next, and then it gradually expresses itself overtly as unrestrained and convulsive movement.” (Durkheim 1995[1912], p. 411).

The centrality of emotions in ritual has been elaborated in psychodynamic social approaches. In a psychoanalytically inspired anthropological account of ritual and emotions, Thomas Scheff (1977) defines ritual in terms of the emotional dynamics of its participants, and claims that rituals function as a mechanism for the social distancing of emotions, and consequently socially organized discharge of distressful emotions, such as grief, fear, shame and anger. In this view, rituals are organized around a recurring sources of collective distress, and acts as to distance them to an extent that allows the discharge of these distressful emotions, instead of suppressing them or reliving them neurotically. Scheff opposes approaches that see ritual as a suppression of individual emotions on one hand, and others that see it a spontaneous expression of emotions on the other. However, this view stresses the universal, individual and psychological functions of ritual, and is influenced by the therapeutic view of ritual and emotions.

Durkheim’s understanding of ritual and its relation to the production of culture, society and emotions was rather influential, and has been elaborated by numerous scholars. While Durkheim’s understanding of ritual was based on the framework of religious ceremonies and their formal and macro aspects, micro-social theories have adopted it for the analysis of daily interaction. Ervin Goffman’s familiar theory of symbolic interaction frames daily interaction as dramaturgical and ritualized actions, in which emotional expressions are symbolically exchanged as part of a wider variety of symbolic actions to produce situated sociability and meaning (Goffman 1955). However, its attempt to avoid either macro structures or psychological structures, and overlooks the relation between macro structures and individual experience (Hochschild 1979). Arlie Hochschild has developed this approach to analyze exactly this relation by focusing on emotion work and feeling rules, the relation between emotional ideologies and individual experiences (see above).

Randall Collins has elaborated this theory in a different direction, examining the ways in which individuals' emotions in micro interactions are used as the material for forging collective and more enduring and symbolized emotional structures. Randall Collins calls the collective emotional sweeping in rituals "collective effervescence", by which he refers to the "buildup of emotional coordination within an interaction ritual" (Collins 2004, p. 108) which produces feelings of solidarity, or should we say solidarity of feelings, as well. Collins distinguishes the short-term emotions that are the specific emotional ingredients of certain interaction ritual (such as sadness and sorrow in funerals or friendliness and humor in a party), from the long-term emotions of group solidarity or status group membership. The process of transforming the former into the latter he calls "interaction ritual chain": "An interaction ritual is an emotion transformer, taking some emotions as ingredients, and turning them into other emotions as outcomes. Short-term situational emotions carry across situations, in the form of emotional energy, within its hidden resonance of group membership, setting up chains of interaction rituals over time" (Collins 2004, p. xii). In this view, different levels of emotional energy reflect differentiation of group membership and thus, it enables us to speak of emotional stratification, or emotional capital (Illouz 2008, 2012).

### 11.4.1 Modernity, Rituals and Emotions

As we have seen so far, ritual interweaves the normative, discursive/symbolic and performative aspects in producing emotions, whether we use the term to frame formal or religious ceremonies and rites, or to frame daily interactions. However, modern ideals and social structures undermine the traditional meaning and practice of rituals and the ways in which they are related to collective and individual emotions. Moreover, some theoretical approaches see ritual as a non-authentic emotional process, since it is compulsive, collective and public and uses to channel, repress or control emotions through social devices (Lutz and

White 1986, p. 413). This is a common tendency not only in the academic circles. As James Wilce (2009) argues, the modern moral imperative of authenticity undermines the collective regulation, experience and expression of emotions in traditional rituals of grief and lament. These rituals and their appeal to collective expression of emotions become suspicious for being unauthentic and phony performances. As Wilce puts it, "the norm of authenticity may prevent moderns from appreciating the traditional-normative *duty* to lament" (Wilce 2009, p. 31, emphasis in the original). Moreover, "The notion that authentic feelings are spontaneous and personal, and that the good life entails following those feelings, has made it harder for 'traditional lament' to survive" (Wilce 2009, p. 102).<sup>1</sup>

However, this does not mean rituals are obsolete in modern society, but that the ideals of emotional authenticity and hedonistic individualism (Campbell 1987) have challenged their collective and coercive nature in some cases and that the life of emotions is now structured by a search and norms of authenticity. Thus, we can look onto the ways in which specific emotions—which are conceived to be individual, authentic, and spontaneous—are produced by modern forms of ritual. In her research of modern romantic practices, Eva Illouz (1997) shows how a modern form of courting ritual is constructed to produce romantic atmosphere and emotions, by spatial organization of dating practices in public places, the use of images, scenarios and artifacts from consumer culture, and consumption activities. Thus, rituals are far from disappearing from social practice, but their spatial, cultural and social organization is transformed, corresponding to changes on social structure, cultural ideals, economic practices (consumer culture), and technology. The shifting logic of emotional production through the intensification of social virtual computer technologies are elaborated in what follows.

<sup>1</sup> See Reddy above for a typology of societies according to their permissiveness of individual emotional freedom, and its peak in modern culture.

## 11.5 Imagination, Narrative and Emotions

In this final section, we want to reflect on the status of emotions in a culture that becomes saturated with virtuality and images. From the perspective of the sociology of emotions, emotions must be understood in the context of cultural repertoires, social practices, rituals, institutions, and discourses, or what we can call language games. In modern cultures, emotions are learned through media cultures, print, TV, movies, and the internet (Wirth and Schramm 2005). Furthermore, the rise of experience economy in the last decades constructs a reality in which people are increasingly engage with engineered experiences mediated through technology and the market (Pine and Gilmore 2011). In addition, the increased engagement with virtual social networks and communication pushes further this trend (Memmi 2006). These processes have major implications for many aspects of social life, modern selves and emotional life. A cultural sociology of emotions needs to examine the impact of these processes. This will be the focus of this section.

It has long been acknowledged that artistic and literary cultural forms comprise emotional components. As far back as Plato's and Aristotle's accounts of poetics, art and aesthetics, the performance of these cultural forms are known to have emotional impact upon their audiences (Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen 1998). However, Plato saw the sensual and emotional aspects of literary and art forms as a sort of illusion, lie or deception, as an attempt to manipulate the correct judgment of reason (Solomon 1993, p. 3). In contrast, Aristotle did not take these cultural forms to be inherently deceptive; rather, he was apparently the first to account for the ways in which they are constructed and their distinctive features as cultural genres (i.e. Poetics) (Solomon 1993, p. 5). In ancient times, and until recently, the main cultural institutions which invoked emotions by myth and imagination were oral story-telling, the public reading of canonic texts, and the theater. This form of emotions production has several distinctive features: it is collective, well scripted and organized spatially and temporally, it is relatively

stable, and it appeals to a higher order of things: the cosmic, moral, spiritual, religious or mystical. It sweeps one away from daily life to the world of spirits and gods, heroes and kings, but these are not conceived of as fictional, rather they appeal to the "real" cosmic and moral orders.

The emergence of print and the rise of the novel, especially during the nineteenth century, brought new mediums, cultural genres and social practices into the relationship between text and reader and between the subject and her emotions (Goody 2010, p. 147) when silent solitary reading has become a common practice among the growing reading public (Goody 2010, p. 8). As Jack Goody suggests, the emergence and spread of fiction in this period, framed the practice of reading as "entertainment", as opposed to serious (Goody 2010, p. 149). The novel in particular and fiction in general not only draw heavily on emotion as never before, but offer new ways to frame emotions and arguably new emotional experiences—romance, thrillers, etc. Moreover, it offers an individualized ritual for producing emotions by interacting with a fictive narrative and the intensive use of imagination. The development of communication technologies from the eighteenth century onwards enabled the production of new mediums and cultural genres, such as erotic literature and gothic novels and the production of new scripts of pleasure and forms of imagination (Harvey 2004; Hume 1969; Kilgour 1995). These new technologies can be said to create fictive emotions in several meanings.

They are not recruited to collective solidarity and identification with a specific moral obligation of a given community, rather, they enable the individualization of their consumption according to one's personal choice. This lead to the dissociation of emotions from actual sociability by the solitary experience of emotions, that in many cases can be subversive, morally transgressive, non conventional or obscene by common standards (Spacks 2003; Regarding Gothic novels see Hume 1969, pp. 283–284).

What this historical development can teach us about the relations between culture, social institutions and emotions is that emotions have to be understood in relation to the form of sociability



in which they occur, the mode of cultural reproduction through which they are framed and the technological means through which they are shaped. These can include face to face interaction, text mediated interaction, book reading, movies, virtual realities, online gaming, social networks sites, etc. This view relates the mode of production of emotions to the social structures, communication technologies, cultural artifacts and social objects which induce emotions, their nature and the ways in which they do so. Emotions are produced in various ways which are not restricted to interpersonal interaction, but involve objects, artifacts, places, images, practices and networks (Latour 2005). This means we can distinguish different ways by which emotions are produced and the role they play, by characterizing the distinct features of their social, cultural and technological production.

These issues are discussed in what follows. First, we will distinguish “real” from fictional emotions and fictional from virtual emotions. Then we will discuss different aspects of virtual emotions: the range of emotional response that can be virtually produced, expression of emotions in social media.

### 11.5.1 “Real” Vs. Fictional Emotions

In contemporary culture, various agents are engaged in the production and manipulation of emotional experiences in different mediums (advertisers, movie producers, novelists and writers, entertainment industry) and by different techniques (narratives, images, rhetoric, sound and music, etc.—cinematic tools). These experiences come to constitute a central part in the consumption of the art/literary/cinematic work. Historically, emotional experiences have become more and more central for producers’ and consumers’ motivations and expectations in engaging with these cultural genres (Illouz et al. forthcoming). These emotional experiences are conceptualized as fictional emotions since, in contrast to “Real” emotions, they are produced by narrative, images and rhetoric devices; they arguably have no further consequences to one’s social relationships;

and they are excluded from one’s experiences and actions in the “real world”. This part will deal with fictional emotions and their distinct features. First, a contemporary discussion dealing with the characteristics of fictional emotions in relation to real life emotions will be presented. Then, we will discuss the relevance of fictional emotions to the connection between emotions and culture.

Young (2010) deals with the paradox of fiction that centers on the question whether it is possible to express genuine emotion toward a character (or event) known to be fictitious. Walton (1978) claims that despite certain similarities between the expression of real emotion and the generation of fictional emotions, fictional emotions are quasi-emotions, since the person experiencing them knows they are fictional. Radford (1977) accepts that one can be truly moved by a fictional character, but claims that the lack of belief in the truth of the events means that the emotional reaction is incoherent to one’s belief in its fictionality (Young 2010, pp. 5–6).

During the years, numerous writers proposed various alternative resolutions for the paradox. However, it is important to note that this is conceived of as a paradox, only in relation to the cognitivist assumption of rationality and emotions, which presumes that “every emotion must be caused by an appropriate belief that is consistent with every other belief one holds at the time” (Hartz 1999, p. 559; quoted in Young 2010, p. 7).

Sociologically, the production of fictional emotions is not ridden with paradoxes as psychologists view it, since it is viewed as inherently dependent on the specific institutional context in which emotions emerge, the cultural repertoires used to frame them; the material, architectural and aesthetic organization of the environment in which they occur; and the form of ritual by which they are provoked. In this light, fictional emotions are the result of new cultural genres, technologies of interaction, and social organization and practices of feeling. In the context of post industrial cultural industries, there are two central aspects of the production and distribution of fictional emotions: First, they are produced in a specific cultural context and for a specific medium,

relying on common interpretive frameworks and emotional scripts; Second, they are distributed globally, hence they export emotional scripts and specific fictional emotions, resulting in either creating a common cross cultural emotional scripts, or adapting and transforming the original emotional scripts so they can correspond to local cultural emotional frames and categorization (for discussion in Hollywood movies global distribution (see Scott 2004).

The production of fictional emotions by means of narratives, images and movies, involves socialization into a new form of media literacy: the practice of “reading” them and acquiring the relevant cultural capital, both in the meaning of learning how to interpret the narrative event and respond appropriately to it, and the use of fictional emotions to construct emotional scripts which frame social expectations and actions in the “real world”, (i.e. how should one act and experience in a romantic date, for example (Illouz 1997). Hence, “fictional” as they are, they have rather material and actual social consequences: “This fictionality shapes the self, the ways in which it emplots itself, live through stories, conceives of the emotions that make-up one’s life project” (Illouz 2012, p. 278).

A central feature of fictional emotions is that they are produced and distributed as part of leisure activities and entertainment in the experience economy (Pine and Gilmore 2011) by the cultural industries supporting it. This feature has two central results: First, it reframes emotions as part of what Collin Campbell calls the “modern autonomous imaginative hedonism” (Campbell 1987) in which individual emotional experiences come to be managed in order to produce satisfaction, excitement and personal well-being; Second, it relates the ability to produce affect with the ability to increase revenue/surplus value for certain cultural industries. This connection sets in motion two processes: the specification of emotions to create a variety of emotional commodities for consumers to choose from, and to differentiate market segments and audiences and in order to meet their needs; and the intensification of emotions which aims to preserve excitement and high level of arousal (Illouz et al. forthcoming).

### 11.5.2 Fictional Emotions Vs. Virtual Emotions

In recent years, significant technological developments enabled the creation of virtual worlds and interactions. This trend includes three main phenomena: First, the construction of interaction with fictional characters in virtual worlds, for example computer generated characters that “participate” in virtual games (Tavinor 2005) or in simulated realities used for psychological research and therapy (Young 2010). Second, the development of electronic communication technologies, which make possible the emergence of social networks sites such as Facebook enabling interactions with other real people. In this case, the interaction is between identifiable individuals, who’s online interaction can be infused into or have consequences for their off-line relations and interaction, i.e. it has socially real results, users interpret profiles as representing real personalities and have ways to identify false profiles (Gershon 2011, pp. 871–872). Third, the convergence of the previous two phenomena, combining social media and virtual worlds. This enables the interactions with other people in virtual worlds who construct themselves a fictional avatars, through the use of electronic communication media. A solid example to this combination can be seen in the website Second Life, an online virtual world in which users can create avatars which interact with other avatars on a virtual platform and take part in many activities and connection similar to real life. These developments have significant consequences for the experience and expression of emotions.

In the following sub-sections we will analyze these three categories of interaction and their consequences for emotional experience and expression through the following analytic axes:

First, the *range* of possible emotional experiences and expressions in virtual worlds expands in relation to those enables by fictional emotions.

Second, *the Absence of the Body* and the substitutions to bodily cues of emotional expressions, by an array of visual and textual techniques. This gives prominence to several technologies of interaction: (a) *Verbal Categorization*, by which

relationships are mediated and which correspond to tastes (musical, cinematic or literary) and to the idea of psychological compatibility; (b) the emergence of *technologies for identification and expression* of emotions, which aim to bring emotions into social media; and (c) it promotes a *Regime of Visibility*, in which social network become visible to oneself and to others and experience is converted into a “public” spectacle.

Third, the social structure of interaction and the ground in which emotions sprout, is characterized by five features: (a) The *volume* of interactions and quantity of social relations has increased in a historically unprecedented rate; (b) Large *prevalence of Weak Ties* and increasing overlap of weak and strong ties; (c) *Ranking Tools* or prevalence of formal tools (e.g., “Like”) to *rank* others, and to be ranked by them; (d) *Virality* of processes of diffusion of emotions, as opposed to the processes of Contagion via direct and collective observation and participation; (e) *Paper Wall Presence*. ICT technologies make presence continuous, in the existential background;

### 11.5.2.1 Virtual Fictions: Expanding the Range of Emotional Responses

While narrative can induce emotions mainly through the reader’s empathy this mechanism is limited to specific types of emotions. Some emotions- like guilt, remorse, pride, shame or jealousy- demand more active involvements of the subject and a sense of a reciprocal relationship. Therefore, they are unattainable to those engaged in traditional fictional pursuits. However, they can be expressed in virtual realities environments, since these environments enable the subject an active role and the experience of relationship, even if it is a fictional one (Young 2010, p. 12). For, example Tavinor (2005) described that he felt guilt and ashamed about the fact that as a character in a video game he used the services of a prostitute and then mugged her.

Similar to fictional emotions, virtual emotions too, may have the same cognitive content as real emotion, but they are generated by involvement with aesthetic forms and genres; they include a wider range of more social emotions (sentiments); and they are a result of interaction

with a real or fictional character. Despite their difference from “real” emotions, psychologists claim that virtual emotion can be generalized to emotional experiences in the real world (Young 2010). Our discussion does not aim to judge what a real emotion is and what is a fictive one, rather we aim to understand the social and cultural processes which underlie the development of new forms of feelings, new emotional repertoires and new technologies of interaction and sociability.

### 11.5.2.2 Technologies of Experience and Expression of Emotions in Social Media

In 2007 Myspace added an option for users to share their mood with others.<sup>2</sup> Since April 2013, Facebook status updates include the option of “share your feeling”; meaning, posting the subject emotions at the moment as a status. Each emotion includes its name and an emoticon—a visual image of a smiley figure with various emotional mood expressions. There are a lot of possibilities for sharing emotions and associate them with other texts, objects or contents.

This emotions sharing attempts to overcome the absence of bodily cues, and has several relevant implications: First, it enables to objectify emotions through rather simple textual and visual means, and give coloring, tone and direction to muted and ambiguous text or visual images. Second, it blurs the distinction between the private and public presentation of self and expression of emotions, and infuses different discursive fields and their specific emotional meanings into one another. Third, it enables to form emotions as basis for self presentation, identification and association with others. It can also create wide world connections between people based on their feeling toward different issues and in the future maybe even based on their feeling in general. One of the leading tools in facebook is a smart search tool that enables to search people based on different

<sup>2</sup> Anon. n.d. “Tell Facebook How You REALLY Feel with MySpace-style Mood Updates.” Retrieved September 18, 2013 (<http://upstart.bizjournals.com/resources/social-media/2013/04/09/facebook-wants-to-know-how-you-feel.html>).

characteristics. It seems reasonable to assume that soon this search will include feelings. Fourth, it permeates a new field of data mining and targeted advertising which focus on emotional categories.

Similar attempts to bring in emotions into virtual platforms by technological means are done in the virtual world of Second life. While the expression of emotions is needed in order to establish a social atmosphere, media for online communication lacks the physical contact and visualization of emotional reaction and contain only text messages (Neviarouskaya et al. 2010, pp. 1–2). In accordance, till lately, emotions in Second Life had to be communicated through verbal categories.

In order to enrich the experiences that emotional expression provide, Neviarouskaya et al. (2010) created a new tool for the expression of emotions in Second life, based on affect analysis model. Based on the text that the user writes his avatar will automatically present suitable emotion (type and degree). This expression will be expressed through an EmoHeart objects attached to the avatar's chest and the avatar's facial expression (See Neviarouskaya et al. 2010, p. 8).

As it seems, technologies of emotional representation and expression in virtual worlds are aiming to make it as direct and reliable as possible, to the point of trying to translate brain activity, bodily reactions or facial expression into virtual representations of emotions (Luck and Aylett 2000).

---

## 11.6 Conclusion

We have identified four main approaches to the sociological study of culture and emotions: (a) The normative approach which focuses on the interplay between emotional norms and their experience and expression. Such interplay is blatant in the case of emotional self-control. The normative approach enables us to look at the ways in which emotion norms emerge, are maintained or changed over time and in relation to social and political structures. This approach has also the advantage of enabling us to look into the unintended consequences of the interplay between

individual and collective emotions, norms, ideology, class or gender differences, and socio-political contexts.

(b) The discursive approach focuses on the ways in which language and symbolic systems come to structure emotional life through institutionalized practices and repertoires which are used to name, label, classify and interpret emotions, and narratives, scenarios and scripts that enable to bestow meaning upon emotional experiences. The performative theory, which we included in this approach, emphasizes the constitution of emotions through symbolic public action, while highlighting agency and the ability to alternate or reformulate symbols and experiences through performance.

(c) The ritual approach focuses on emotions as public and collective occurrences, produced through well scripted symbolic action as part of the reproduction of collective identity, and endorsement of shared moral code. This approach enables to understand how emotions are generated through and in highly constraining social structures. (d) The last category refers to a relatively new form of emotionality produced by new information technologies, starting from fictional emotions induced by textual interaction with narratives and characters of novels and other genres of fiction, to virtual emotions induced by computer mediated human interaction (or alternately, the emotions involved with the human computer interaction).

Each of these approaches point to the constant interaction of emotions and their verbal, institutional, artifactual and technological contexts. The power of these approaches lies in their ability to identify cultural variability, the role of context, the role of various gender and class ideologies, the constitution and transformation of class, gender and group boundaries, and the role of rituals, practices and technologies in shaping and transforming emotions, or even forging new emotional experiences. Emotions play an increasing role in an economy where persons as persons are classified and ranked. To that extent, they are co-extensive with the economy of objects and the commodification of the person that characterizes neo-liberalism.

In other words, instead of examining emotional life on the basis of the subjective-objective or internal-external divide, we should look at them as intermediaries, as an array of modes of attachment and detachment which testify on the intricate interrelation between poles. As Bruno Latour puts it: “Things, quasi-objects, and attachments are the real center of the social world, not the agent, person, member, or participant—nor is it society or its avatars” (Latour 2005, p. 238).

This view relates the ways in which emotions are produced to social structures, communication technologies and practices, cultural artifacts and social objects. They are produced in various ways which are not restricted to interpersonal interaction, but involve objects, artifacts, places, images, practices and networks. This means we can distinguish different ways by which emotions are produced and the role they play, by characterizing the distinct features of their social, cultural and technological production.

For example, if cinema produces new emotional experiences, we can analyze the emergence of emotion norms relating to specific movie genres and their contestation or variation; the development of discourses and narratives around specific genres and the ways in which they forge lines of action, emotion categories, terms, classification systems and concepts; the architecture and aesthetic features of the rituals through which new emotions are experienced in movies (or known emotions are experienced in completely new ways); and the technologies and practices which enable the production of a new or renewed emotional genre.

Another example is from the growing field mediated emotions through ICTs, that are playing an increasingly important role in the market (targeted marketing, facilitating communication and exchange, clearing up ambiguity, forging interpersonal relations), work and social life: How does technology restructure social relations and emotions? What are the new interrelations between sociability, emotional experience and expression, and commercialization enabled by these technologies; what are the consequences of ambiguous emotional norms in social media (e.g. facebook), how emotion norms develop in new

arenas, and what are the emotional consequences of the ambiguity of the interactive practices and their symbolic meaning for actions.

## References

- Abu-Lughod, L. (1985). Honor and the sentiments of loss in a Bedouin society. *American Ethnologist*, 12(2), 245–261.
- Abu-Lughod, L. (1986). *Veiled sentiments: Honor and poetry in a Bedouin society*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Austin, J. L. (1975). *How to do things with words*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Burkitt, I. (1997). Social relationships and emotions. *Sociology*, 31(1), 37–55.
- Calhoun, C. (2001). Putting emotions in their place. In J. Goodwin, J. M. Jasper, & F. Polletta (Eds.), *Passionate politics: Emotions and social movements* (pp. 45–57). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Campbell, C. (1987). *The romantic ethic and the spirit of modern consumerism*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Collins, R. (2004). *Interaction ritual chains*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Damasio, A. R. (2000). *The feeling of what happens: Body and emotion in the making of consciousness*. Boston: Harcourt Incorporated.
- Durkheim, E. ([1912] 1995). *Elementary forms of the religious life*. New York: Free Press.
- Ekman, P., Sorenson, E. R., & Friesen, W. V. (1969). Pancultural elements in facial displays of emotion. *Science*, 164(3875), 86–88.
- Elias, N. (1978). *The civilizing process: The history of manners*. New York: Urizen Books.
- Filmer, P. (2003). Structures of feeling and socio-cultural formations: The significance of literature and experience to Raymond Williams’s sociology of culture. *British Journal of Sociology*, 54(2), 199–219.
- Foucault, M. (1971). Orders of discourse. *Social Science Information*, 10(2), 7–30.
- Gee, J. P. (2001). *An introduction to discourse analysis: Theory and method*. London: Taylor and Francis (e-Library).
- Geertz, C. (1974). ‘From the native’s point of view’: On the nature of anthropological understanding. *Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, 28(1), 26–45.
- Gershon, I. (2011). Un-Friend my heart: Facebook, promiscuity, and heartbreak in a neoliberal age. *Anthropological Quarterly*, 84(4), 865–894.
- Goffman, E. (1955). On face-work: An analysis of ritual elements in social interaction. *Psychiatry: Journal for the Study of Interpersonal Processes*, 18, 213–231.
- Goodwin, J., Jasper, J. M., & Polletta, F. (Eds.). (2001). *Passionate politics: Emotions and social movements*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.



- Goody, J. (2010). *Myth, ritual and the oral*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Grima, B. (1993). *The performance of emotion among Pachtun women*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.]
- Hartz, G. A. (1999). How we can be moved by Anna Karenina, Green Slime, and a Red Pony. *Philosophy*, 74(04), 557–578.
- Harvey, K. (2004). *Reading sex in the eighteenth century: Bodies and gender in English erotic culture*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1979). Emotion work, feeling rules, and social structure. *American Journal of Sociology*, 85(3), 551.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1983). *The managed heart: Commercialization of human feeling, twentieth anniversary edition, with a new afterword*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Howell, S. (1981). Rules not words. In P. Heelas & A. Lock (Eds.), *Indigenous psychologies: The anthropology of the self* (pp. 133–143). San Diego: Academic Press.
- Hume, R. D. (1969). Gothic versus romantic: A revaluation of the gothic novel. *PMLA*, 84(2), 282–290.
- Illouz, E. (1997). *Consuming the romantic utopia: Love and the cultural contradictions of capitalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Illouz, E. (2007). *Cold intimacies: The making of emotional capitalism*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Illouz, E. (2008). *Saving the modern soul: Therapy, emotions, and the culture of self-help*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Illouz, E. (2012). *Why love hurts: A sociological explanation*. Cambridge: Polity.
- James, W. (1894). Discussion: The physical basis of emotion. *Psychological Review*, 1(5), 516–529.
- Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986). Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives. *Psychological Review*, 93(2), 136–153.
- Kane, A. (2001). Finding emotion in social movement processes: Irish land movement metaphors and narratives. In J. Goodwin, J. M. Jasper, & F. Polletta (Eds.), *Passionate politics: Emotions and social movements* (pp. 251–266). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kilgour, M. (1995). *The rise of the gothic novel*. London: Routledge.
- Krieken, R. Van (1998). *Norbert Elias*. London: Routledge.
- Latour, B. (2005). *Reassembling the social—An introduction to actor-network-theory*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Levi-Strauss, C. ([1963] 2008). *Structural anthropology*. New York: Basic Books.
- Luck, M., & Aylett, R. (2000). Applying artificial intelligence to virtual reality: Intelligent virtual environments. *Applied Artificial Intelligence*, 14(1), 3–32.
- Lutz, C. (1982). The domain of emotion words on Ifaluk. *American Ethnologist*, 9(1), 113–128.
- Lutz, C. A., & Abu-Lughod, L. (1990). *Language and the politics of emotion*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Lutz, C., & White, G. M. (1986). The anthropology of emotions. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 15, 405–436.
- Memmi, D. (2006). The nature of virtual communities. *AI and Society*, 20(3), 288–300.
- Neviarouskaya, A., Prendinger, H., & Ishizuka, M. (2010). EmoHeart: Conveying emotions in second life based on affect sensing from text. *Advances in Human-Computer Interaction*, 2010, 1.
- Ng, K. H., & Kidder, J. (2010). Toward a theory of emotive performance: With lessons from how politicians do anger. *Sociological Theory*, 28(2), 193–214.
- Pine, B. J., & Gilmore, J. H. (2011). *The experience economy*. Boston: Harvard Business Press.
- Radford, C. (1977). Tears and fiction. *Philosophy*, 52(200), 208–213.
- Reddy, W. M. (1997). Against constructionism: The historical ethnography of emotions. *Current Anthropology*, 38(3), 327–351.
- Reddy, W. M. (1999). Emotional liberty: Politics and history in the anthropology of emotions. *Cultural Anthropology*, 14(2), 256–288.
- Reddy, W. M. (2001). *The navigation of feeling: A framework for the history of emotions*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Rosaldo, M. Z. (1983). The shame of headhunters and the autonomy of self. *Ethos*, 11(3), 135–151.
- Russell, J. A. (1991). Culture and the categorization of emotions. *Psychological Bulletin*, 110(3), 426–450.
- Saussure, F. de. ([1903] 2013). *Course in general linguistics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Scheff, T. J. (1977). The distancing of emotion in ritual. *Current Anthropology*, 18(3), 483–505.
- Scott, A. (2004). Hollywood and the world: The geography of motion-picture distribution and marketing. *Review of International Political Economy*, 11(1), 33–61.
- Sihvola, J., & Engberg-Pedersen, T. (1998). *The emotions in Hellenistic philosophy*. New York: Springer.
- Smith, G. M. (1999). Local emotions, global moods, and film structure. In C. Plantinga & G. M. Smith (Eds.), *Passionate views: Film, cognition, and emotion* (pp. 103–127). Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Solomon, R. C. (1993). The philosophy of emotions. In M. Lewis and J. M. Haviland (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (pp. 3–15). New York: The Guilford Press.]
- Spacks, P. M. (2003). *Privacy: Concealing the eighteenth-century self*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Stearns, P. N. (1994). *American cool: Constructing a twentieth-century emotional style*. New York: New York University Press.
- Stearns, P. N. (1999). *Battleground of desire: The struggle for self-control in modern America*. New York: New York University Press.
- Stearns, P. N., & Haggerty, T. (1991). The role of fear: Transitions in American emotional standards for children, 1850–1950. *The American Historical Review*, 96(1), 63–94.

- Stearns, P. N., & Lewis, J. (1998). *An emotional history of the United States*. New York: New York University Press.
- Stearns, P. N., & Stearns, C. Z. (1985). Emotionology: Clarifying the history of emotions and emotional standards. *The American Historical Review*, 90(4), 813–836.
- Stearns, C. Z., & Stearns, P. N. (1989). *Anger: The struggle for emotional control in America's history*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Swidler, A. (2001). *Talk of love: How culture matters*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Tavinor, G. (2005). Videogames and interactive fiction. *Philosophy and Literature*, 29(1), 24–40.
- Thoits, P. A. (1989). The sociology of emotions. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 15(1), 317–342.
- Van Hemert, D. A., Poortinga, Y. H., & van de Vijver, F. J. R. (2007). Emotion and culture: A meta-analysis. *Cognition and Emotion*, 21(5), 913–943.
- Wallace, A. F. C., & Carson, M. T. (1973). Sharing and diversity in emotion terminology. *Ethos*, 1(1), 1–29.
- Walton, K. L. (1978). Fearing fictions. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 75(1), 5–27.
- Wilce, J. M. (2009). *Language and emotion*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Williams, R. (1973). *The country and the city*. London: Chatto & Windus.
- Williams, R. (1977). *Marxism and Literature*. London: OUP.
- Wirth, W., & Schramm, H. (2005). Media and emotions. *Communication Research Trends*, 24(3), 3–43.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1953). *Philosophical investigations*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Wouters, C. (2007). *Informalization: Manners and emotions since 1890*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Young, G. (2010). Virtually real emotions and the paradox of fiction: Implications for the use of virtual environments in psychological research. *Philosophical Psychology*, 23(1), 1–21.

Thomas J. Scheff

---

### 12.1 Introduction

This chapter is retrospective, reconsidering my contributions to (1) labeling theory, (2) catharsis of emotions, and my more recent work on (3) pride/shame systems. Because I am now pondering the accuracy of some of the main labeling ideas in terms of emotions, that aspect will be considered in part three as part of my current work on shame.

My study of the Wisconsin “mental health system” formed the basis for my version of labeling theory, and also had considerable impact in itself. However, since the results are well known by now, I will only summarize them here.

At their inception, these studies of the social management of mental illness helped change the system. My first professional study concerned diagnostic practices and commitment to mental hospitals in Wisconsin. In the second year of my teaching job (1954-1959) at the University of Wisconsin in Madison, a committee of the state legislature offered a small grant for the study of the Wisconsin mental hospital system.

Apparently I was the only one who applied for the grant. At any rate, I received funding, just enough to pay a research assistant. I was lucky to hire Daniel Culver, who was a graduate student in the School of Social Work at the time. We attended several court hearings together in Madi-

son. After discussions with him of what we saw, I was confident that he could handle the job.

The basic direction of the Wisconsin study was built on my experience of observation for six months at Stockton State Mental Hospital in California. This material provided the basis for my Ph.D dissertation. It seemed to me that most of the patients there were only as “mentally ill” as the average person on the street. That is to say that I came to visualize Stockton State as a warehouse for people who had been discarded by their society.

The basic question that Stockton State posed for me: how was mental illness diagnosed in the commitment process? There were two procedures in Wisconsin; a court case presided over by a judge, and a meeting for an examination of the patient by two psychiatrists. I observed court cases and psychiatric examinations in Madison and Milwaukee, and I sent Dan to observe examinations in four other counties. The Wisconsin legislators who sponsored my study were so shocked by my final report that they dismissed it as unreliable.

In 1967, one year after the publication of *Being Mentally Ill* (Scheff 1966), I was called on to testify before a subcommittee of the California Assembly that was investigating mental health policy. The audience was large and noisy, but a hush fell when I began presenting data on our observations of psychiatric examinations: they had lasted an average of only nine minutes, and none of the questions on the form were answered by

---

T. J. Scheff (✉)  
University of California, Santa Barbara, USA  
e-mail: scheftj@cox.net

the psychiatrists: they simply wrote: “Is mentally ill.” My study showed that the medical-legal system rubber-stamped commitment, allowing the mental hospitals to become prisons for the old, the poor and non-English speaking immigrants.<sup>1</sup>

The chair of the committee, Jerome Waldie, was surprised and shocked by my testimony. He subsequently read *Being Mentally Ill* and encouraged his staff to do so also. Using my questions, the hearings confirmed in California my findings in Wisconsin. Documentation for this passage can be found in *The Dilemma of Mental Commitments in California: A Background Document: Assembly Interim Committee on Ways and Means* (Crown 1966)

The chief of the subcommittee staff, Arthur Bolton, told me that my book was the “Bible” of the group that wrote the Lanterman bill, which became the new mental health law for California, and later, for the rest of the United States. The new law made it much more difficult to keep patients in a hospital indefinitely. It put immediate pressure on states to close down their large and remote mental hospitals, and to build community mental health facilities.

This law made it difficult to detain mental patients more than 72 hours unless they could be shown to be dangerous to self or other. It ultimately was adopted by every state, including Wisconsin, resulting in either closure or considerable downsizing of state mental hospitals. Crown’s document cites my unpublished report to the Wisconsin legislature (1966). See also Bardach (1972).

One more matter in defense of Waldie. He and his law are often blamed for the mobs of street people that the closures and downsizing created. Actually Waldie anticipated this: his law assigned the considerable monies that would be realized by the closures to county mental health facilities. Their job, initially at least, was to provide care

for the released patients. However, the then Governor, Reagan, vetoed this part of the law. It was Reagan who was largely responsible for the street people, not Waldie.

As a follow-up on my Wisconsin study, I also conducted studies of mental patients in Italy and England (Scheff 2001a). This chapter reports one of them since it is relevant to the shame material. It was in a single mental hospital, Schenley, just north of London. Since I didn’t understand the findings until I began studying shame, this material will also be considered in the section on shame. The first extended discussion, therefore, will summarize my approach to the idea of catharsis.

---

## 12.2 Catharsis of Emotions

This section is an abbreviated and updated version of an earlier article (Scheff 2001b). It first discusses concepts and reviews the literature on catharsis. A theory is then proposed, integrating social, psychological, and physiological components. It proposes that the initiation and climax of bodily emotion process are instinctive, and that conscious feeling occurs to the extent that climax is delayed. The climax idea, together with the concept of an optimal distance for experiencing emotions, may explain otherwise puzzling phenomena. It also points toward the conditions under which certain types of laughing and crying become cathartic. The new theory shows the relationship between distancing, role-taking, pendulation in somatic therapy, and recent studies of mirror neurons.

In the literature on emotion, except for clinical studies, the idea of catharsis is usually dismissed. After a large number of articles in the period 1960–1979, very few studies have appeared. Recent clinical studies continue to support the catharsis hypothesis. It is possible, however, that the dismissal of catharsis in social science was unwarranted.

At this time scholarship and research in social science is much more dependent on vernacular words than on clearly defined concepts. Most research is entrapped within a cultural web of

---

<sup>1</sup> For an example from California, at Stockton State, the hospital laundry system was run entirely by Chinese immigrants who spoke no English. Their putative mental illness didn’t seem to interfere with the great efficacy they showed both as administrators and as workers in the huge laundry.

words. Theories, methods and data sets are distorted by the unnoticed web of assumptions in which they are encased. To arrive at an understanding of human experience and behavior, it might be necessary to first develop clearly defined concepts.

Perhaps the first task facing social science is conceptual, and therefore, pre-scientific. The scientific approach is organized in terms of theory, method and data. But these tools are virtually useless until basic concepts have been clearly defined, because scientists, like everyone else, live in the assumptive world of their own culture. The ocean of assumptions that each culture reflects and generates is virtually invisible to its members. Unless these assumptions are avoided, the tools of science lead nowhere.

### 12.2.1 Metaphors vs. Concepts

The way that cultural assumptions impede science has formulated by the philosopher Quine:

The neatly worked inner stretches of science are an open space in the tropical jungle, created by clearing tropes [ruling metaphors] away. (1979, p. 160)

Before scientific procedures are applicable, a ruling trope may have to be overthrown. Quine's formulation captures the radically intuitive element necessary for scientific advance. Tropes are linguistic/mental routines that both reflect and hide cultural assumptions.

The history of physical science reveals many examples of obstructive tropes. Tycho Brahe, the Danish astronomer, spent his adult life trying to determine the orbit of Venus. He made extraordinarily accurate observations of the position of the planet during his lifetime, but he assumed, like everyone else, that the planets revolved around the earth. For this reason he was one frustrated scientist.

Kepler, Brahe's assistant, inherited the data after Brahe died. For years he made no progress. In his exasperation, Kepler developed a bizarre model in which orbits were cased in transparent solid polyhedrons. The model itself was mere fantasy, but in his play he had unthinkingly placed the sun, rather

than the earth, at the center. Although Kepler's scientific skills were far inferior to Brahe's, he quickly solved the problem (Koestler 1967).

Quine's formulation captures the primitive, intuitive element necessary before scientific methods can lead to new knowledge. Scientific method, no matter how scrupulously applied, is helpless in the face of ambiguous or misleading tropes. Since social science often is based on tropes, rather than precise definitions, we have a long way to go.

### 12.2.2 Resurrecting Catharsis from the Dead

What follows is a brief review of the treatment of catharsis in past and current literature. It was originally defined by Aristotle (Third century B.C.) as the purgation of pity and terror in theatre audiences, and since then has figured largely in theories of drama in the humanities (Belifiore 1992). The word terror obviously refers to the emotion of fear, but the word pity is not an adequate translation of Aristotle's usage. He was referring not to a specific emotion in the modern sense, but to empathic identification with one or more of the characters in the drama.

One part of Aristotle's treatment of catharsis has been especially puzzling to modern readers: his insistence that catharsis in drama was not only a source of entertainment and pleasure, but also a necessity for the survival of a society in the long run. This article will seek to make his proposal understandable.

The dismissal of the idea of catharsis in social/behavioral science has been largely a result of Freud's influence in psychoanalysis, on the one hand, and many studies of what has been called "aggression catharsis" in experimental social psychology, on the other. In both cases, the difficulty arises out of confusion about concepts.

The great majority of psychoanalysts have uncritically accepted Freud's dismissal of catharsis, even though it was brief and casual, compared to his careful documentation of its effectiveness in the case studies that make up *Studies on Hysteria* (Freud and Breuer 1955). Neither Freud nor any



other psychotherapist provided evidence showing that catharsis was ineffective. Nor did they note that the talk-heavy version of psychoanalysis that Freud created after 1905 was lengthy, costly, and of uncertain outcome. Like Freud and Breuer's early study, clinical reports suggest that catharsis may be the main cause of success in psychotherapy (Symonds 1954; Kosmicki and Glickauf-Hughes 1997; Bemak and Young 1998).

In recent years, the effectiveness of a cathartic technique for pathological bereavement (unresolved grief), called "re-grief therapy," also supports the validity of catharsis (Volkan 1975). Volkan's later publications on grief therapy, together with the earlier work of Parkes, imply that crying is necessary in order to complete mourning (Parkes 1988; Volkan and Zintl 1993).

In experimental social psychology the study of the catharsis has involved "aggression catharsis," Berkowitz (1962), Feshbach and Singer (1971), and many, many others have produced a large body of systematic research showing that venting anger and other aggressive behavior does not reduce subsequent levels of hostility. They conclude, therefore, that the idea of catharsis is invalid.

Clinical and experimental findings differ completely because they are not referring to the same thing. Berkowitz and others have tested the hypothesis that catharsis occurs through aggressive behavior. In a typical study, he has shown that active retaliation against an aggressor not only does not lower the level of hostility of the person who is retaliating but may actually raise it. This is an important finding, because most people fervently believe that "venting" is a good way to resolve anger. The findings discussed above have made no difference with the public, as far as I can tell, but they should have.

However, these findings are completely unrelated to the theory of catharsis. Neither Aristotle's doctrine nor Freud and Breuer's technique defined catharsis in terms of behavior. Both dramatic and psychotherapeutic approaches involve the re-experiencing of past emotional crises in a context of *complete security*: in the safety of the theatre or the therapist's office. Catharsis in these contexts is analogous to Wordsworth's definition

of poetry: "emotion recollected in tranquility." The extension of catharsis to include aggressive retaliation is utterly without foundation.

In addition to studies under the rubric of catharsis, more recently studies of the expression of emotions, particularly laughing and crying, have appeared. Several studies of adult crying are reported (Vingerhoets et al. 1997; Vingerhoets 2013; Trimber 2012). Billig (2005) has written about laughter, and there are also many medical studies of laughter and/or crying.

What unites all these studies is that they make no attempt to name and describe the different *types* of laughter and crying. Lumping all types together, they report no benefit. But laughter and crying are complex couplings of physical, cognitive and emotional systems. Faked laughter, for example, would likely have little or no effect on the body, since it is more like a speech act than a complex emotional reaction. Laypersons who cry easily differentiate between what they call "a good cry" and a bad one.

The medical literature seems particularly distorted in this respect. In virtually all studies, emotions are the enemies. This orientation is understandable with respect to rage, but laughing and crying also are almost always treated as pathological. There are many studies of a new pathology called emotional lability (EL), or even a more extreme label, emotional incontinence (EI).

It seems not to have occurred to any of the authors that the absence of emotional expression might be a far wider malady, and also a much more damaging one. I have found only one article that touches even indirectly on this issue. Scoppetta et al. (2005) showed that the SSRI class of anti-depressants suppresses crying even in normal persons. They admit doubt about the wisdom of the widespread use of these drugs:

SSRI are among the most used drugs in the world, every day they are consumed by millions of people including politicians, businessmen, soldiers, army commanders, policemen and criminals. The idea is... worrying that the control of the emotions and behavior of these millions of people can be quickly modified by one SSRI for a few days....

The management of grief provides one example of over-, rather than under-control of emotions.

It may be that the inability to mourn/unresolved grief (Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich 1975; Parkes 1988) particularly among men, is a social institution in modern societies. To the extent that the theory outlined here is true, then the widespread use of drugs that further inhibit crying and other forms of emotional expression would be extremely damaging rather than helpful. This issue, when taken together with others discussed in this section, suggests that the discrediting of catharsis may have been a mistake.

### 12.2.3 A Theory of Catharsis

Combining social psychology and biology points toward a new theory of catharsis. I will seek to re-instate this idea, long out of favor. The emphasis throughout will be on the importance of developing concepts rather than using vernacular words.

This approach outlines socio-biological models for four emotions: grief, fear, shame, and anger. Dewey's early statement (1894) proposed that emotions begin as bodily drives with universal, genetically determined beginning and end points. Mead's idea (1934b) was parallel to Dewey's formulation: acts of any kind, including emotions, have four stages: impulse, perception, manipulation, and consummation. Mead and Dewey furthermore proposed that feeling emotions depends on blockage or delay of completion of this sequence.

The Dewey/Mead approach implies that emotions are instinctive signals of threat, the greater the threat, the more intense the emotional signal. One implication of their signaling approach is that normal emotions are extremely brief, a few seconds, at most. If that is the case, how do we account for long-lasting emotions, episodes of fear or anger that last minutes, hours or days?

Suppose that the biological basis of grief (sorrow) is bodily preparation to cry. One feels grief to the extent that the completion, crying, is delayed. This idea can form the basis for a general approach to emotion. There is a large clinical literature suggesting that the initial stimulus that generates grief is the loss of a loved one. If this

is the case, then grief is occasioned by loss, and completed by crying, that is, sobbing and tears.

Returning to the idea that aggression is cathartic, this idea is contradicted by clinicians. Angry aggression, which they call "acting out anger," is only one of many possible responses to anger, and is usually an undesirable and unnecessary response. Their message, however, appears not to have been widely heard. This issue will be further discussed below.

If fight and flight are not predetermined responses to anger and fear, what are the predetermined inner endpoints? There is no consensus as the answers to these two questions in our society, neither among experts nor the public.

Nichols and Zax (1977) distinguished, as I do here, neurophysiological components of catharsis and described their climatic states: "The somatic-emotional aspect consists of the motoric discharge of emotion in expressive sounds and actions such as the tears and sobbing of grief, or the trembling and sweating of fear." They also indicate that laughter is cathartic, but fail to identify the associated emotion. The answer to this question has been suggested by Helen Lewis, who notes that although laughter may have many different functions, one function is to dispel shame.

Lewis further shows that Freud's analysis of wit and humor, which on the surface appears to involve only anger, also involves shame. The naming of laughter as the catharsis for shame is very much in accord with the popular belief that laughter may bring relief for embarrassment, a shame variant.

There is a large self-help psychology literature that assumes that all laughter is beneficial. However, as Billig (2005) has suggested, it is not the case. Most humor, he points out, involves ridicule of others, rather than acknowledgment of one's own shame. A good laugh in the theatre, for example, occurs only when one identifies with the character that is making a mistake, rather than identifying with those pointing a finger at that character. Most racist, sexist, and ethnic humor is therefore not cathartic.

The stimulus that leads to the impulse of anger might be frustration. One is prevented from

getting what one wants, needs, or it entitled to. For the endpoint, the idea of the expression “the heat of anger” might be a hint at the orgasm of anger: a rise in body temperature, even a small one, could signal rapid metabolism of the adrenaline that is generated in anger.

I will refer to this event as “good anger.” Unfortunately, good anger seems to be rare. Certainly in my own life the proportion of good anger to acting out seems to have been quite small, probably about one time in a hundred. Anger orgasms seem to be difficult to achieve. The discussion of optimal distance, below, may help understand why this is the case.

With respect to fear, the stimulus might be physical danger to life and limb. The consummatory phase could be shaking and sweating. Although there are clinical and biological literatures that associate shaking and sweating with panic attacks, they don’t connect these responses to completion. In my contacts with soldiers during my own stint in the US Army, with students reporting fear experiences, and indeed in my own life, I have become aware of situations involving “good fear,” that is, shaking and sweating that resolves fear rapidly and completely. As with the case of anger, good fear is probably also rare, though more frequent than good anger.

The idea that there is an optimal bodily response to fear, signaled by shaking and sweating might explain an otherwise unsolved problem in the physiology of both fear and anger. These two emotions are especially mobilizing, preparing the body for intense exertion, as in the examples of fight or flight. The bodily chemical that prepares for exertion is adrenalin. Excessive un-metabolized adrenalin not only causes long-lasting consciousness of unwanted arousal, but it also appears to cause physical damage to the body.

In the flight response to fear, it seems likely that much of the excess adrenaline is metabolized by extreme exertion. But many animals respond to danger not by flight, but by becoming completely still. Surely there must be a genetically determined physiological response that metabolizes the excess adrenalin in both animals and humans.

Finally, the impulse and consummatory phases of shame/embarrassment are even less consen-

sual. One possibility: a threat to the social bond, feeling disconnected from another person or persons, might be the occasion for the impulse of shame (Lewis 1971), and good natured laughter at self would signal orgasm, the completion of the shame cycle (Scheff 1990; Scheff and Retzinger 1991; Retzinger 1991; Scheff 1994, 1997, 2006).

I have heard many accounts about embarrassing situations that were resolved by laughter. This excerpt is from a report by a female student on a roller-coaster ride at the age of 13:

When the ride reached full speed I had no control over my body and I peed in my pants! At first, I was in shock. Was everyone going to make fun of me? This was going to be the most embarrassing moment in my life!

When the ride stopped, I turned back to my friends that were sitting behind me. “You guys...I just peed my pants!” We looked at my seat and at my soaking wet jeans, and then at each other. We BURST into laughter. We walked towards the exit laughing so hard that we could barely walk straight.

This story, and many others like it, suggests that good-natured laughter is the orgasm for embarrassment/shame. Orgasm ends arousal very quickly. After a genuine climax, emotional arousal decreases rapidly, the mind is clear: one feels transformed to the point being fully alive.

Although the general definitions proposed here are only speculative, they could at least provide many hypotheses to be tested. One obvious hypothesis concerns long lasting emotions. At a very abstract level the model of emotions proposed here implies that long lasting emotions would arise when an emotion sequence is initiated but not completed. There are faint hints in the literature that might support this explanation.

Retzinger’s (1991, pp. 49-53) analysis of facial expressions that were recorded on video suggests that unless there is completion, signs of anger arousal diminish only very slowly. It seems possible that the completion of anger might be only asymptotic: approaching zero arousal but infinitely slowly. Although each incomplete anger sequence would last only in a tiny, ever decreasing amount of arousal, the lamination of thousands of such paper-thin arousals could be the equivalent of continuous anger.

At a lower level of abstraction, another process prolonging arousal would be recursion, such as being ashamed of being ashamed. Panics in theatre fires may arise in this way: seeing the fear of others works back and forth reciprocally until the audience members stampede attempting to escape the fire. There is a literature also on shame-anger sequences that result in aggression: an insulted person retaliates in anger against the other person, who retaliates back, etc.

This kind of recursion seems to be occurring both within and between each person (Lewis 1971; Scheff 1990; Scheff and Retzinger 1991; Retzinger 1991; Scheff 1994, 1997, 2006; Tangney and Dearing 2002). Retzinger (1991) provides a particularly detailed exploration of this sequence. She shows that unacknowledged shame preceded every one of 18 incidents of angry escalation in the quarrels of four different couples.

The models of the four emotions are repeated in the table below.

Emotion models		
<i>Emotion name</i>	<i>Stimulus</i>	<i>Climax</i>
Grief	Loss	Crying (sobbing with tears)
Fear	Physical danger	Shaking and sweating
Anger	Frustration	Body heat
Shame/ Embarrassment	Threat to bond	Laughter at self

After a genuine climax, emotional arousal decreases to zero, the mind is clear, and one feels fully awake and alert.

But these models don't resolve the other problem mentioned above, the way in which emotions that are ordinarily painful can be as pleasurable. To explain this phenomenon, it will be necessary to discuss the idea of distancing, which forms a crucial part of a theory of catharsis.

### 12.2.4 Distancing

Many of the critics of the idea of catharsis have noted that not all crying and laughing are helpful. However, these critics have been unable to find

variables that make for helpful and non-helpful crying or laughing. The following discussion may point in this direction.

Discussions of catharsis in the humanities in the last 100 years have been based on one central idea, the optimal distancing of emotion. Bullough (1912) was the first to argue that a work of art, such as theatre, needed to be at an aesthetic (optimal) distance from emotion, neither too far (over-distanced) nor too close (under-distanced). This idea has been central to many theoretical discussions of theatre.

Theatre people know, or at least act as if they know, that scripts that don't arouse emotions in the audience will fail. That is, members of the audience must identify with some of the characters. Furthermore the identification must be to the point that they react as if what is happening to the characters is happening to them. For example, if the protagonist is facing danger to life and limb, members of the audience will feel fear. If such identification does not occur, the drama is over-distanced.

However, theatre people seem to also know that there is such a thing as too much identification, leading to overwhelming emotions in the audience. I have heard that some films, such as *Saw* and its sequels, came very close to this point. There are scenes that arouse fear (and/or disgust) to the point that they come close to being, or actually are, unpleasant. In the scheme that is being described here, these films are under-distanced.

Finally, there is the idea in the making of drama that there is an optimal or aesthetic distance in the theatre. At this distance, emotions such as fear, anger, grief and shame, which are ordinarily painful, can be experienced as increasing not only the interest of the audience, but also providing pleasure. How could this be?

It is possible that Mead's idea of role-taking (1934a) can be used to develop an explicit theory of distancing. Society is possible, Mead argued, because humans can momentarily take the viewpoint of the other. That is, children learn very early how to take on the point of view of others. Ordinary language is complex and often so fragmented as to be wildly ambiguous. By the time children are three or four, they can move rapidly

between their own point of view and that of the speaker, in order to understand what is being said to them. This process is learned so early, and becomes so automatic that we forget that we are doing it. As adults, individuals can even see matters from the point of view of imaginary others (“the rational man” in classical economics) or all others (“the generalized other.”).

Mead argued that human societies are based on flexible coordination between its members, unlike the rigid, instinct determined coordination that characterizes the social activity of all other creatures. But flexible coordination, he proposed, was based on role-taking, of seeing one’s activities not only from one’s own point of view, but also from the point of view of others.

As he stated it, Mead’s theory of society was profound, but also extremely abstract. He gave very few examples of instances of role-taking, so that it is difficult to apply his theory to actual events. Most importantly, he didn’t spell out the actual steps involved in the process of role taking. In order to better understand the concept of distancing, it will necessary to visualize the meaning of role-taking second by second in social interaction and in internal dialogue as well.

### 12.2.5 The Role-Taking Process

How does role-taking play out in discourse and in internal dialogue? It seems clear that there must be a process of back and forth between one’s own viewpoint and the viewpoint of others. But neither Mead nor anyone else has considered this issue in sufficient detail.

Koestler’s theory of laughter (1967) provides an application to a specific emotion, embarrassment. Koestler’s idea is that binocular vision, seeing the same thing in two different ways, leads to laughter. According to Koestler, we laugh at a pun because it surprises us with two contradictory meanings of a word. Ordinarily, he says, we are virtually enslaved to each of the separate meanings of the word, unaware of the conflict. The pun or joke is a situation that brings the conflict to awareness, which leads to embarrassment over an “error.” For a moment, we are liberated

from embarrassment through laughter. The idea of role-taking, of visualizing a word from two different points of view, underlies Koestler’s treatment of puns.

In tragedy that brings tears and comedy that gets laughs, the script is ENTIRELY dependent on optimal distance. Bertrand Evans (1960) used the concept of *discrepant awareness* as the focal point for his analysis of Shakespeare’s comedies and romances. He argued that awareness control is the basis of the appeal and power of drama. The well-made drama, he argued, moved audience awareness back and forth between identification with characters in the drama and their own point of view.

### 12.2.6 Discussion

Since the publication of my book on catharsis (Scheff 1997) there have been several lines of study that parallel the idea of distancing in catharsis. The idea of “pendulation” (Levine 1997) seems to be identical to the process of distancing/role-taking. Psychotherapists use alternation between what they call de-regulation and regulation (of emotions) to help patients deal with trauma. For example, the victim of an auto accident is encouraged to relive the moment, but coming and going between it and the present (Heller and Heller 2004). The right rhythm represents optimal distance, a balance between painful and comforting moments.

Another recent discovery that may relate to distancing/role-taking involves what is called “mirror neurons” (Goleman 2006). The first studies were done with primates, showing that merely seeing another monkey’s action caused the initiation of the bodily preparation for same action in the monkey who was merely watching the other (Di Pellegrino et al. 1992). For example, the first monkey’s body automatically prepares to smile by seeing the other monkey smile. The action is not necessarily repeated, however, but only prepared for: the body responds by bringing up what Mead called the “attitude” of smiling (bodily preparation for smiling). The original researchers found that the initiating response by the viewing



monkey occurred in the neurons in the brain. They spoke of this reflecting process as “mirror neurons.”

Later studies found evidence for the same kind of mirroring in humans (such as Fadiga et al. 1995). These studies suggest that empathic preparation is genetically wired into the human brain. To prove the relevance to the role-taking/distancing idea, alternation between the brain structures that represent self and other would have to be demonstrated.

Until such a demonstration, it seems to me that Goleman (2006) overstates the case. He proposes that empathy is always automatic. However, there are also many processes, such as denial and repression, working against empathy, even if it is physiologically available. These studies need further review in order to describe both sides of the equation, processes that work for and against empathy. Another issue is the relationship between limbic resonance and mirror neurons. I suspect they are closely connected, but haven't found this link mentioned in the literature.

The idea of pendulation, although couched in somewhat different terms, is identical to the idea of optimum distance: one goes in and of emotions that would be otherwise unbearably painful or threatening. Perhaps the main basis for the importance of this kind of alternation is that it provides control, that is, if the feeling gets too intense, one can swing out of it. This is also the way distancing works in audiences to a drama; they know they are free to leave if they wish. I recall from my own childhood that I did in fact leave on several occasions.

### 12.2.7 Two Emotion Climaxes from My Own Life

I also had a similar experience of control in a situation in real life, rather than in the theatre. It occurred many years ago, after my first group psychotherapy session. I was telling a friend about the session, how I was amazed that many of the participants were crying. I also told her that I didn't cry, and felt somewhat impotent because

I couldn't. I became very sad while telling her this last part.

To my surprise, I began crying at that point. It was an intense cry, but had no mental content. I was crying with my whole body, like a baby. It felt wonderful, after many years of not crying. After some 15 minutes, the crying stopped, and I no longer felt sad.

As it turned out, the crying was the introduction to the next episode, which was obviously about anger. Again with no mental content, I began snarling and biting at the empty air while my body twisted and writhed. The movements were so extreme that I fell on to the floor that was covered with a shag rug. Seeing the shag, I began biting and chewing on it like an animal.

Up to this point, the anger movements seemed spontaneous. I felt that it wasn't really me acting ridiculous, but that my body had taken over. After only a few moments on the floor however, I wondered how my friend was taking all this. So I stopped, saying to her in an ordinary tone of voice: “Are you OK?” In the hippy style of the time, she answered: “Yes, just do your thing.” So I immediately went back to snarling and chewing on the rug, as if there had been no interruption.

As with the crying episode, this one lasted about 15 minutes. When I stopped, I felt all tension had drained away. I felt better than I could remember ever feeling before. It is possible that it was the distancing, the knowledge that I could stop if I wished, that made both episodes possible. The concept of optimal distance, of pendulating between unresolved emotions and safety, might serve to explain many contradictions in the field of emotions.

How does this idea apply to practical problems of emotion management? To illustrate their application, consider once more the problem of anger management discussed in the introduction. Is there a middle way between too much and too little anger? One possible approach is the formula “I am angry at you because...” This statement should be made, as nearly as possible, in an ordinary conversational tone of voice: firmly, but without undue vehemence.

This approach serves two main ends. First it allows the angry person to voice his anger

verbally, rather than hiding it. That is, anger can be expressed verbally rather than acting it out vehemently. Verbal expression informs others and even self that we are in earnest, but it avoids the kind of excess that makes trouble.

Secondly, in my own experience and from reports by students, verbal expression seems to be the best vehicle for the kind of anger orgasm described above: body heat. That is, virtually all of the “heat of anger” climaxes that I know of have occurred in the course of verbal expression of anger, rather than acting out or complete suppression. Verbal expression would seem an ideal way to alternate between the anger that one feels, and stepping outside it into ordinary conversation.

One of the drawbacks of verbal expressions of anger is that if you are too polite, the other person may not realize that you are in earnest. The remedy for this problem is to be prepared to restate your position until they get the idea. One can be relentless without being rude. This approach is a restatement of Virginia Satir’s notion of “leveling:” being direct but respectful. However, it is advisable to use slightly different words each time you restate your position, lest the other person feel insulted by the repetition.

To provide a final example, here is another from my own life. The next day after the group psychotherapy episode above, I was on an airplane flight. By chance I was sitting next to a colleague from another department on my campus. I had always felt intimidated by him, partly because he was famous, but mostly because I knew that he had a sharp tongue. Nevertheless, I felt impelled to tell him about the exhilarating experience I had had the day before. After only a few sentences, he interrupted my story in order to “psychoanalyze me,” as my students would say.

I surprised myself by quickly interrupting him in turn. In an ordinary voice, and without planning what I was going to say, out came “David, you are trying to reduce my experience to yours without remainder, and I won’t stand for it.” At this point I noticed what I thought of at the time as a rise in the cabin temperature. Next came the really big surprise. He spent most of the rest of the flight apologizing for his rudeness. Far from being intimidating, he was wonderfully respect-

ful and courteous. It appears that in the right format, anger can be instructive rather than disruptive. It might seem impetuous to move from the personal to the societal with the same model, but one of the implications of the theory proposed here is that is necessary to do so.

An example of the need for resolving hidden emotions comes from clinical experience with unresolved grief, already mentioned above. Experienced clinicians have long noted that most adults in our society find it difficult to resolve the emotions associated with profound loss. In modern societies there is a social institution that has been called the denial of death. Most of those who have suffered the loss of a loved one appear to be unable to finish their mourning. For most losses of this kind, working through the grief from a loss requires considerable time and sympathy, certainly more than a year.

But the social network of those who should provide support, the immediate family and friends, usually tolerate mourning for a much shorter time. After a month, at best, the supporters tend to offer advice instead: see a shrink, take a pill, get over it, etc. Bereavement counselors find that they can help with the resolution of grief merely telling the bereaved that what they are going through is completely normal.

As indicated earlier, the repression of emotions might be the key to understanding the repetition compulsion at the collective level. The masking of the vulnerable emotions (fear, grief, and shame) behind a façade of self-righteous aggression is no stranger to the arena of international politics. The way in which the attack on Iraq may have served to cover over the tragedy of 9/11 is a case in point.

Classic Greek drama, following Aristotle, taught that the health of body politic is dependent on collective catharsis. In particular, the classic plays made it clear that nations that don’t mourn their tragedies are doomed to repeat them. The uncanny resemblance between the wars against Vietnam and Iraq is only the latest installment of this prophecy. Persons, groups, and nations need to resolve their hidden emotions rather than cover them over with self-righteous anger and aggression.

## 12.3 Shame: A Social and Psychological Emotion

Shame tends to be hidden in modern societies. A linguistic way of hiding shame would be to misname all but the most intense or obvious occurrences. The word shame is defined very narrowly in English: an intense crisis response to inadequacy or misbehavior. In English also, unlike most other languages, shame is kept distinct from less intense siblings, notably, from embarrassment. Other languages treat shame as a family of feelings that extends into everyday life. In Spanish, for example, the same word, *vergüenza*, is used to mean both shame and embarrassment. And in French, the term *pudeur*, which is translated into English as modesty, is considered a part of the shame family.

There is a social definition of shame in maverick psychoanalysis and in sociology that defines shame broadly, in a way that includes embarrassment and a strong link to guilt and many other shame variants. Erikson, a psychiatrist (1950), rejected Freud's assumption that guilt was the primary moral emotion for adults. He argued instead that shame was more elemental, in that it concerned the whole self, not just one's actions.

This idea was expanded by the sociologist Helen Lynd (1958), who outlined the crucial importance of shame in the constitution of the self and in social life. She was the first to recognize the need for a CONCEPT of shame that would be clearly defined, in order to avoid the misconceptions of vernacular usage.

The next step was taken by the psychologist Silvan Tomkins, who proposed that shame plays a central role in behavior. In his volume on the "negative affects" (Tomkins 1963) he devoted almost 500 pages to a detailed discussion of shame and humiliation. This treatment dwarfs his discussion of the other emotions. His examples of shame imply a broad conception. Indeed, he argued explicitly that embarrassment, shame, and guilt should be recognized as members of a single affect family, as I do here. How does this family enter into the daily life of modern societies?

### 12.3.1 The Looking Glass Self

In his first and most general book, Erving Goffman made a surprising claim:

There is *no* interaction in which participants do not take an appreciable chance of being slightly embarrassed or a slight chance of being deeply humiliated. (1959, p. 243)

This statement occurs only in passing toward the end of the book. Like most of his generalizations, there is little further development, not directly at least. This one asserts that ALL interaction carries with it the risk of exposure to a painful emotion. One of Goffman's main ideas, *impression management*, has a similar implication. The reason we spend such time and care managing our impressions, Goffman argued, is to avoid embarrassment as best we can. Cooley had laid the groundwork for the idea that human life is haunted, if not controlled, by shame, although Goffman doesn't cite him in this regard.

In his discussion of what he called "the looking-glass self" Cooley (1922) implied that both inner and outer human life produces emotions, and that both social and self-process often leads to either pride or shame.

[The self] seems to have three principal elements:

1. The imagination of our appearance to the other person
2. The imagination of his [or her] judgment of that appearance
3. Some sort of selffeeling, such as pride or [shame]. (p. 184)

The paragraph from which these lines are taken proposes a way in which social relationships give rise to a self, which in turn leads to emotions. Cooley's approach implies that social interaction usually produce pride or shame. Although the term he used in #3 is "mortification," the examples he goes on to use all involve the term shame itself.

The paragraph referred to above suggests how, in three steps, either pride or shame might be present much of the time. But what about pride? Cooley's and Goffman's treatment of the looking glass self are quite parallel. Cooley's few concrete

examples all concern shame rather than pride. Goffman provided hundreds of examples of impression management, but none ending in genuine pride. Searching the text of his book (Goffman 1959), I found 16 mentions of either shame or embarrassment, but only three of pride. Moreover, all three of the pride mentions were in long quotes by other authors, in which pride was largely incidental. Goffman himself uses only shame terms, not pride. Why did both authors omit it?

Though neither Cooley nor Goffman name the kind of civilization they analyzed, it is clearly the current one, a modern, rather than a traditional society. Perhaps modernity gives rise to their single focus on shame. Shame is a signal of disconnect, alienation. Relationships in modern societies strongly tend toward alienation, and therefore to the ubiquity of shame.

Modernity is built on a base of individualism, the encouragement to go it alone, no matter the cost to relationships. Persons learn to act as if they were complete in themselves and independent of others. This feature has constructive and creative sides, but it has at least two others: alienation and the hiding of shame.

Emphasis on individual rationality is a key institution in modern societies. Another is the suppression of the social-emotional world in favor of thought and behavior. One of the many outcomes of this suppression is that emotion vocabularies in modern languages are ambiguous and misleading, so that they tend to hide alienation. For example, in the English language, love is defined so broadly that it can be used to hide disconnection (*Women Who Love Too Much*). There are also many other ambiguities, confusions and deceptions. Since shame is elaborately hidden and disguised, a close examination of the verbal, gestural, and contextual details may be needed to uncover it.

In traditional and Asian societies, the central importance of shame is taken for granted. Indeed, in some Asian societies, such as Japan, it is seen as the central emotion. In a traditional society like the Maori, shame (they call it *wakamaa*) is also treated as the key emotion. Indeed, most of the approach to shame and relationships in this essay would be seen as platitudinous by the Maori, news from nowhere. But in Western

societies, treating shame as highly significant in everyday life is counter-intuitive and even offensive.

Western societies focus on individuals, rather than on relationships. Emerson, because of his emphasis on self-reliance as an antidote to blind conformity, was one of the prophets of individualism: "When my genius calls, I have no father and mother, no brothers or sisters." In extreme contrast, in a traditional society, there is NOTHING more important than one's relationships. Freeing up the individual from their relational/emotional world has been at the core of modernization. Since one's relationships and emotions don't show up on a resume, they have been de-emphasized to the point of disappearance. But shame and relationships don't disappear; they just assume hidden and disguised forms.

Individualism is the dominant theme of all relationships in Western societies. This focus disguises the web of personal and social relationships that sustain human life. The myth of the self-sustaining individual, in turn, reflects and generates the suppression and hiding of shame and pride. Since pride and shame, or at least their anticipation, are the predominant emotions in social interaction, suppression supports the status quo, the myth of the self-contained individual. But the obverse is that as we become aware of the massive amounts of emotions and disguising of emotion that occur in social interaction, *we can make visible what is otherwise invisible, the state of any given relationship or set of relationships, including whole societies.*

### 12.3.2 Pride, Shame, and Alienation

The confusion of English vernacular is obvious in the case of pride, since dictionaries and usage both imply two contradictory meanings. The first meaning is negative: pride is interpreted as egotism. ("Pride goeth before the fall"). When we say that someone is proud, it is likely to be condemnatory. *False pride* might be a better name for this kind of self-feeling.

The second meaning is positive: a favorable view of self, but one that has been earned.

This kind of pride is genuine, authentic, justified. However, even adding these adjectives doesn't completely eliminate the negative flavor. In English, the word pride is often tainted by its first meaning, no matter how impressive the justification.

Individualism also causes endless obfuscation about shame. The primary confusion is the practice of leaving out the social component that arises from the looking glass self: viewing ourselves negatively because we imagine that we are viewed that way by another person or persons.

Both in vernacular and scholarly usage, shame typically is assumed to be only an internal matter, condemning oneself. But the looking glass self contains both the internal result and the external source. The typical definition of shame in psychological studies involves gross dissatisfaction with self. Cooley's usage includes this part, but also the social component, imagining, correctly or incorrectly, a negative view of self by others.

Cooley's idea of the social source of shame and pride suggest that these emotions are signals of the *state of a relationship*. As indicated above, whatever the substantive basis for shame, the actual violation or occasion, a more general component is the state of the bond: *true pride signals a secure bond (connectedness), shame a threatened one (disconnect)*. This definition virtually always includes the substantive cause of shame, whatever it might be, since the causes of shame themselves are usually shared with one's society.

Since modern societies produce alienation at many different levels, emotions and relationships are deeply hidden. Shame, in particular, becomes invisible, even for most social and behavioral researchers. A taboo is implied in the many studies of shame that do not use the forbidden word at all. Instead, the focus is on one of the many shame cognates (Retzinger 1995, lists hundreds). One such cognate is the word awkward, as in "*it was an awkward moment for me.*" A further way of hiding shame is to behaviorize it: there are many studies of feelings of *rejection*, *loss* of social status and the *search* for recognition.

I have just completed a study of the occurrence of shame and other emotion terms in the entire content of millions of digitalized books

from 1800 to 2000 in five languages. This data is called Ngrams by its makers, Michel et al. (2011), who use Google's program of digitalized millions of books. This program searches the total interior of books in many languages. On-line one can search the frequency of occurrence of any word over many years. Although searches of earlier years are now available, the very large numbers of books begins to occur in the period 1800–2007.

My initial finding is that the use of the word shame has decreased three-fold during the last 200 years in American and English, French, Spanish, and German. The first three graphs are particularly impressive, since the number of books searched is much larger than in the Spanish and German case, and the decline in frequency is smooth and constant for most of the period. The meaning of these findings is somewhat complex, however. One reason is vernacular shame has meanings that don't refer to actual shame: "What a shame!" means exactly the same thing as "What a pity!" "Shame on you" is another example, since it can be used as a joke. I will describe all of the findings in detail in a later report.

Lewis' study of shame in psychotherapy sessions, to be discussed below, has received many citations, yet they usually ignore or misinterpret her main findings. She complained to me once that people praise her book but don't read it. Similarly, groups headed by Paul Gilbert (1998) for example, has published studies of shame, but with little response.

On the other hand, Evelin Lindner has been able to organize a worldwide following for the study of themes similar to those discussed here. Her success may be due, at least in part, to avoiding the s-word, especially in titles, not only for her organization (*Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies*), but also her books (2006, 2010). In her most recent book, however, she refers to shame as well as humiliation. Another instance is the work of Robert W. Fuller (e.g. Fuller 2006; Fuller and Gerloff 2008). He has been speaking to large audiences all over the world using title words like Lindner's and avoiding the s-word.

The taboo on shame seems to have weakened in the last few years among researchers. The



downward slope for the word shame has slowed in the Ngrams. But it continues to exert a powerful influence in the vernacular and even in research: shame is still close to being unspeakable and unprintable. The next section will outline a theory that can be used to explain this taboo and the possibility that it can have destructive effects.

### 12.3.3 Cooley's Examples and Goffman's Theses

Cooley's explication of his looking-glass idea implies it goes on unconsciously. We only realize it, he states, in extreme or unusual situations:

Many people of balanced mind...scarcely know that they care what others think of them, and will deny, perhaps with indignation, that such care is an important factor in what they are and do. But this is an illusion. If failure or disgrace arrives, if one suddenly finds that the faces of men show coldness or contempt instead of the kindness and deference that he is used to, he will perceive from the shock, the fear, and the sense of being outcast and helpless, that he was living in the minds of others without knowing it, just as we daily walk the solid ground without thinking how it bears us up. (1922, p. 208)

In the following passage, Cooley explains how the looking glass self generates shame:

The comparison with a looking-glass hardly suggests the second element, the imagined judgment, which is quite essential. The thing that moves us to *pride or shame* is not the mere mechanical reflection of ourselves, but an imputed sentiment, the imagined effect of this reflection upon another's mind. This is evident from the fact that the character and weight of that other, in whose mind we see ourselves, makes all the difference with our feeling. We are *ashamed* to seem evasive in the presence of a straightforward man, cowardly in the presence of a brave one, gross in the eyes of a refined one and so on. We always imagine, and in imagining share, the judgments of the other mind. A man will boast to one person of an action—say some sharp transaction in trade—which he would be *ashamed* to own to another. (1922, pp. 184–185, emphasis added)

This discussion suggests less abstract situations. In the following passage, Cooley refers to

particular, though fictional, events in novels, but without quoting any of them in detail:

In most of [George Eliot's] novels there is some character like Mr. Bulstrode in *Middlemarch*.... whose respectable and long established social image of himself is shattered by the coming to light of hidden truth. (1922, p. 208)

Cooley's statement, since it is abstract, gives only a slight sense of how catastrophic the shattering of the social image is, and how far it reaches. In the novel, Bulstrode's wife, Dorothea, although blameless, stands by her disgraced husband. The novel provides detailed particulars so that the reader is alerted to the full force of public humiliation. Using Bulstrode's instance to make his point is somewhat of a departure from Cooley's tendency to abstain from description. However, he doesn't go so far as to quote the passage and comment on how the details in it relate to his thesis, as Goffman does.

Here for example, is a quotation showing one way Bulstrode's disgrace reaches to his wife. Cooley could have used it to illustrate the particulars of his thesis:

When she had resolved to [stand by her husband], she prepared herself by some little acts which might seem mere folly to a hard onlooker; they were her way of expressing to all spectators visible or invisible that she had begun a new life in which she embraced humiliation. *She took off all her ornaments and put on a plain black gown, and instead of wearing her much-adorned cap and large bows of hair, she brushed her hair down and put on a plain bonnet....* (Eliot 1900, p. 338)

Dorothea prepares for a public stripping of her dignity by discarding her socially acceptable appearance, replacing it with what might have been prison or funeral clothing. By only referring to events like this one, rather than quoting them, Cooley was unable to describe the full force of his ideas.

Goffman, on the other hand, freely used a great multitude of concrete examples. His wealth of detailed events may be the key to his popularity and his importance. They remind readers of their own instances: "That's like me!" They can also be used to illustrate many of Cooley's theses.

Here is a Goffman instance that illustrates Cooley themes, with numbers added to help the reader keep track:

Knowing that his audiences are capable of forming bad impressions of him [1], the individual may come to feel ashamed [2] of a well-intentioned honest act merely because the context of its performance provides false impressions that are bad. Feeling this unwarranted shame, he may feel that his feelings can be seen [3]; feeling that he is thus seen, he may feel that his appearance confirms [4] these false conclusions concerning him. He may then add to the precariousness of his position by engaging in just those defensive maneuvers [impression management] that he would employ were he really guilty. In this way it is possible for all of us to become fleetingly for ourselves the worst person we can imagine that others might imagine us to be. (1959, p. 236, numbering added)

This instance is somewhat difficult to understand because it is so complex. It would have helped if Goffman had been even more detailed. Suppose a jokester colleague at the office creates a forbidden sound by pressing a whoopee cushion just as you sit down at your desk. You are embarrassed (2), because you imagine that your colleagues think it was you who made the sound (1). Even though you are not the culprit, you blush (3) because you imagine the others in the office think it was your inappropriate action (4).

In this paragraph, Goffman suggested 4 very brief internal steps, three of which involve living in the mind of the other. Perhaps it was examples like these that led Bourdieu (1983) to call Goffman “the discoverer of the infinitely small.” The minuteness about Goffman’s particulars like this one is the time scale: perhaps portions of a second for each event that is described.

Both Cooley and Goffman imply that shame or its anticipation is virtually ubiquitous in modern societies. It now seems to me that they may have exaggerated the case.

### 12.3.4 The Cooley-Goffman Conjecture May be Overstated

Both Cooley and Goffman envision the pride-shame dimension only as a dichotomy: social interaction usually results in either pride or shame.

However, a larger view results in a somewhat different picture.

Surely there are degrees or levels of shame. The word embarrassment usually implies a lesser, and the word humiliation, a greater degree. Imagining different degrees on the pride-shame axis gives rises to the possibility of a neutral zone where one is not in a state of either pride or shame. Some of my earlier work on the sociology of mental illness can be used to examine this possibility.

### 12.3.5 Degrees on the Pride/Shame Axis

For many years my theory of labeling seemed to imply that diagnosis of mental illness by physicians always involved stigmatizing the patient, shaming them. Recently, however I have broadened that idea to allow other possibilities. These ideas were mostly triggered by a brilliant film, “Lars and the Real Girl” (Oliver 2007). Although a comedy, it also teaches a powerful lesson: how a community might manage mental illness without the social side-effects (“It takes a village...”).

In addition to having this unusual theme, there were many striking moments within the storyline. One involved what might be considered a model diagnostic session. Because Lars has been treating a life-size doll as a real person, his brother, Gus, and sister-in-law, Karin, bring him to their family doctor. This episode changed my thinking because it suggested that two other outcomes of a diagnosis other than labeling may occur: enabling and normalizing.

Early in the session, the Doctor asks:

Has Lars been functional, does he go to work, wash, dress himself?

Gus: So far.

Doctor: Has he had any violent episodes?

Karin: Oh no, no never. He’s a sweetheart—he never even raises his voice.

This dialogue establishes the limits the film sets to normalizing: able to take care of self, unlikely to harm self or others.

Gus: Okay, we got to fix him. Can you fix him?

Doctor Dagmar: I don’t know, Gus. I don’t believe he’s psychotic or schizophrenic. I don’t think this is caused by genes or faulty wiring in the brain.

(Preliminary normalizing statement, rejecting diagnosis)

Gus: So then what the hell is going on then?

Doctor: He appears to have a delusion.

Gus: A delusion? What the hell is he doing with a delusion for Christ's sake?

(Gus's manner implies that Lars's behavior is abnormal)

Doctor: You know, this isn't necessarily a bad thing. What we call mental illness isn't always just an illness. It can be a communication, it can be a way to work something out.

(This is the doctor's central normalizing statement: we can avoid seeing Lars as abnormal, he may be trying to communicate)

Gus: Fantastic, when will it be over?

Doctor: When he doesn't need it anymore.

In the light of this example and many others, it seems to me now that labeling is too general a term for a sociological theory of "mental illness." Notice that the doctor in this example plays down the stigmatizing label, choosing to emphasize instead a non-stigmatizing one: Lars is trying to communicate. The diagnosis can award either pride or shame, but it can also take a neutral stance, as in the Lars example, avoiding both extremes by normalizing.

Furthermore, the use of the terms labeling and stigmatizing cuts labeling theory off from the much more general process discussed above. As Cooley (1922) indicated in his idea of the looking-glass self, most social encounters result in either the awarding of pride or shame. In his book on stigma, Goffman (1963, p. 7, 8, 108, and 131) also clearly equates stigma with shame, as does the Merriam-Webster online dictionary. It defines stigma as "a mark of shame or discredit".

In the light of this example and many others, it seems to me now that labeling is too general a term for a sociological theory of "mental illness." In term of theory, connecting enabling, labeling and stigmatization to the pride/shame system opens up the possibility of understanding some of the dynamics of what is called mental illness. One direction is showing that the diagno-

sis and treatment of "mental illness" can worsen the situation, which is supported in many studies of stigmatization (Link et al. 1999). However, even though their paper on conceptualizing stigma (2001) quotes Goffman's book, they don't make the connection with shame as Goffman does.

Another direction is to conceptualize "mental illness" as social-emotional disorder, at least the secondary deviance part (Scheff 2012). Another direction, finally, discussed below is the proposition that shame and/or shame/anger can lead to withdrawal or depression or, less frequently, violence. This project also requires that a dichotomy, Lewis's idea of acknowledged and unacknowledged shame, be expanded into a continuum.

### 12.3.6 A Study of the Temporary Lifting of Shame

As a visiting researcher at Shenley Hospital (UK) in 1965, I observed all intake interviews of male patients for six months: 83 patients in all. Of this number 70 patients were sixty or older.

The comments that follow concern the older men. Every one of them presented as deeply depressed in their speech and manner. However, to my surprise, there were moments in some of the interviews that seemed miracles of recovery. It took many years for me to understand what I had observed in terms of shame theory.

Many of the patients presented themselves as virtually silent, or gave one-word answers. Long before I came, some of the interviewing psychiatrists had found a way of getting more of a response to their questions. In the interviews I observed, 41 of the patients were asked about their *activity during WWII*. For 20 of those asked this question, the responses shocked me. As they begin to describe their activities during the war, their behavior and appearance underwent a transformation.

Those who changed in the greatest degree sat up, raised their voice to a normal level instead of whispering, held their head up and looked directly at the psychiatrist, usually for the first time in the interview. The speed of their speech picked up, often to a normal rate, and became clear and

coherent, virtually free of long pauses. Their facial expression became lively and showed more color. Each of them seemed like a different, younger, person.

The majority changed to a lesser extent, but in the same direction. I witnessed 20 awakenings, some very pronounced, however temporary. The psychiatrists told me that they had seen it happen many times. After witnessing the phenomenon many times, like the psychiatrists, I also lost interest.

### 12.3.7 Shame and Normalization

Many years later, because of my work on shame, I proposed an explanation (Scheff 2001a): depression involves the complete repression of painful emotions (such as shame, grief, fear, and anger), and lack of a single secure bond. The memory of the patients' earlier acceptance as valued members of a nation at war relived the feeling of acceptance. This feeling generated pride that counteracted the shame part of their depression.

Telling the psychiatrist about belonging to a community during WWII had been enough to remove temporarily the shame of being shameful outcasts. Conveying to the psychiatrist that "once we were kings," had momentarily relieved their shame and therefore their depressive mood.

When the psychiatrists asked the depressed outcast men about their experience during WWII, they were *inadvertently* normalizing the patients, returning them, for just a few moments, to what it felt like to be an accepted member of society, rather than labeled and rejected. My recent article on depression (2009) explained some of the implications for social, rather than medical treatment of mental illness.

However, because I had not used enough concrete instances in my theory, I still had not recognized the way the psychiatrists question could be interpreted in terms of labeling theory. The psychiatrists' intentions were to continue to label the patients: "You are mentally ill, so I need more information to assist me with your diagnosis." However, twenty of the patients understood the meaning as normalizing: "You are not mentally

ill if you were accepted even once as a valuable member of a community." Perhaps a long-term therapy based on this and other social ideas might lead to more than just temporary recoveries.

### 12.3.8 Elias on European History

In an extraordinary study over hundreds of years of European history, the sociologist Norbert Elias analyzed etiquette and education manuals in five different languages (*The Civilizing Process* 1939.) It was first translated from German into English in 1978. There are two main themes: 1. As physical punishment decreased, shame became increasingly dominant as the main agent of social control. 2. As shame became more prevalent, it also became almost invisible because of a taboo.

The following excerpt gives the flavor of Elias's study. It is from a nineteenth-century work (von Raumer 1857) that advises mothers how to answer the sexual questions their daughters ask:

Children should be left for as long as possible in the belief that an angel brings babies.... If girls should later ask how children come into the world, they should be told that the good Lord gives the mother her child... "You do not need to know nor could you understand how God gives children." It is the mother's task to occupy her daughters' thoughts so incessantly with the good and beautiful that they are left no time to brood on such matters.... A mother... ought only once to say seriously: "It would not be good for you to know such a thing, and you should take care not to listen to anything said about it." A truly well brought-up girl will from then on feel shame at hearing things of this kind spoken of. (1978, p. 180)

Elias first interprets the repression of sexuality in terms of hidden shame:

An aura of embarrassment... surrounds this sphere of life. Even among adults it is referred to officially only with caution and circumlocutions. And with children, particularly girls, such things are, as far as possible, not referred to at all. Von Raumer gives no reason why one ought not to speak of it with children. He could have said it is desirable to preserve the spiritual purity of girls for as long as possible. But even this reason is only another expression of how far the gradual submergence of these impulses in shame and embarrassment has

advanced by this time. (1978, p. 180)

Elias raises a host of significant questions about this excerpt, concerning its motivation and its effects. His analysis goes to what may be a key causal chain in modern civilization: denial of shame and of the threatened social bonds that both cause and reflect that denial.

Considered rationally, the problem confronting him [von Raumer] seems unsolved, and what he says appears contradictory. He does not explain how and when the young girl should be made to understand what is happening and will happen to her. The primary concern is the necessity of instilling "modesty" (i.e., feelings of shame, fear, embarrassment, and guilt) or, more precisely, behavior conforming to the social standard. And one feels how infinitely difficult it is for the educator himself to overcome the resistance of the shame and embarrassment which surround this sphere for him. (1978, p. 181)

Elias's study suggests a way of understanding the social transmission of the taboo on shame and the social bond. The adult teacher, von Raumer, in this case, is not only ashamed of sex, he is ashamed of being ashamed. The nineteenth-century reader, in turn, probably reacted in a similar way: being ashamed, and being ashamed of being ashamed, and being ashamed of causing further shame in the daughter. Von Raumer's advice was part of a social system in which attempts at civilized delicacy resulted and continue to result in an endless chain reaction of hidden shame.

Elias understood the significance of the denial of shame to mean that shame goes underground, leading to behavior that is outside of awareness:

Neither rational motives nor practical reasons primarily determine this attitude, but rather the shame (*scham*) of adults themselves, which has become compulsive. It is the social prohibitions and resistances within themselves, their own superego, that makes them keep silent. (1978, p. 181)

Like many other passages, this one implies not only to a taboo on shame, but the actual mechanisms by which it is transmitted and maintained.

It is possible that Goffman's interest in shame was stimulated by Elias's study, although one cannot be sure. Goffman cited the original version of Elias's book, published in German in

1939, in his own 1963 (p. 39). The particular citation concerns the etiquette of sleeping arrangements in a way that is unrelated to Elias's shame thesis. However, the fact that Goffman was enough aware of the German version to cite it at all suggests the possibility of influence.

### 12.3.9 Helen Lewis's Study of Psychotherapy Sessions

Helen B. Lewis, a research psychologist as well as a psychoanalyst, used a systematic method (Gottschalk and Glaser 1969) to locate verbal emotion indicators in many transcriptions of psychotherapy sessions. She seems to have been unaware of Elias's study. She found, to her surprise, that shame/embarrassment was by far the most frequent emotion, occurring more than all the other emotions combined. She also found that these instances of shame/embarrassment, unlike joy, grief, fear, or anger, were virtually never mentioned by either the client or the therapist. She called the unmentioned instances "unacknowledged shame." Her findings provide support, at the word by word level, for Elias's thesis of the prevalence and invisibility of shame at the historical level.

She also found that the shame in these episodes seemed to be hidden in two different ways. *Overt, undifferentiated shame* (OUS) involved painful feelings that were hidden behind terms that avoided the s-word (Elias used the word "circumlocutions"). *Bypassed* shame involved rapid thought, speech, or behavior, but little feeling. OUS is marked by pain, confusion, and bodily reactions such as blushing, sweating, and/or rapid heartbeat. One may be at a loss for words, with fluster or disorganization of thought or behavior, as in states of embarrassment.

Many of the common terms for painful feelings appear to refer to OUS: feeling peculiar, shy, bashful, awkward, funny, bothered, or miserable; in adolescent vernacular, being freaked, bummed, or weirded out. The phrases "I felt like a fool," or "a perfect idiot" are prototypic. Some of the substitute terms involve phrases. The example used earlier, "an awkward moment:" It's not me



that embarrassed (denial), but the moment that is awkward (projection). As indicated above, Retzinger's article (1995) lists over a hundred substitute words and phrases.

Bypassed shame is manifested as a brief painful feeling, usually fleeting, followed by obsessive and rapid thought or speech. A common example: one feels insulted or criticized. At that moment (or later in recalling it), one might experience a very brief jab of painful feeling, followed immediately by imaginary replays of the offending scene. The replays are variations on a theme: how one might have behaved differently, avoiding the incident, or responding with better effect. One is obsessed.

It seems to me that Lewis's use of a systematic method to detect emotion terms and cognates might have led to underreporting of shame episodes. Her finding of episodes of bypassed shame would be one reason, since the method she used would be better at locating OUS terms, sometimes missing the obsessive talk and/or thinking that characterize bypassed shame.

Elias's method was unsystematic, and for that reason, probably much broader than Lewis's. He examined all topics that frequently occur in the books he examined: sexuality, body functions, modesty, delicacy, manners, embarrassment, and what he named "sociogenetic fear." By the last phrase he was not referring to fear in the sense of a response to physical danger. Rather, he used it as another way of referring to shame. This kind of sidestepping of the s-word occurs frequently in everyday conversations: "I fear rejection" has nothing to do with physical danger: it usually means "I anticipate shame."

Both the study by Elias and the one by Lewis can be seen as hinting that shame might be ubiquitous yet invisible in modern societies, but neither makes that point explicitly.

### 12.3.10 A Theory of Repression

The Ngram findings reported above are also relevant to a new theory of repression. The nature of repression was more or less a mystery to its discoverer, Freud, but has been explored by the

English psychologist, Michael Billig (1999). The findings from the Ngram study that support Elias's thesis can also be seen to support Billig's theory of repression. Forbidden areas can not only be hidden by changing the subject, as in Billig's analysis of Freud's cases, but also by ignoring or softening the terms that refer to a forbidden area.

Freud clearly stated in his history of the psychoanalytic movement that "the theory of repression is corner-stone on which the whole structure of psychoanalysis rests." Yet Freud admitted that he knew very little about repression. In *The Introductory Lectures*, published when he was over sixty, the confident head of the psychoanalytic movement, Freud stated: "...so far we have only one piece of information [about repression]... that [it] emanates from forces of the ego." Apart from that, Freud added, "we know nothing more at present." This comment doesn't tell us much, since we have no way of knowing what forces Freud was referring to, nor for that matter, how the ego itself is to be understood.

Based on his thorough examination of Freud's writings, not only his cases but his own letters, Billig proposed that repression arises from social practices regarding topics or feelings that are generally regarded in a particular society as too shameful to discuss. At the time that Freud's lived in Vienna, sexuality was such a topic.

Billig suggested that repression begins in social practices: as described in one of Freud's cases, "Little Hans" learns from dialogue with his mother and father that certain topics (sexuality, anger, aggression, etc.) are not to be discussed. If one of these topics is raised, the parent routinely changes the subject to another topic, one that is not forbidden. This transition is usually marked by small, innocuous phrases, such as "Even so," "Oh, well," and so on.

Billig's new theory of repression suggests that it begins with social practices of avoiding certain topics. Both the practice of avoidance and many of the topics to be avoided are taken up by the individual. How are they internalized?

Billig's theory is not completely articulated. But it suggests two steps. First, learning the social practice of routinely avoiding a certain

topic by changing the subject to another topic. This practice is intentional at first; it results in a collective failure to notice the forbidden topic. Perhaps after many repetitions, the individual takes the second step, learning to routinely avoid noticing his or her practice of avoiding the forbidden topic, as well as by changing the subject to one that is not forbidden.

This second step functions to remove the forbidden topic from conscious awareness. If this second step fails to remove the shame, a third and even subsequent steps can be taken. The idea that one can avoid remembering one's avoidance is suggestive of a recursive process that can go on indefinitely. This process is noticeable, particularly, in Freud's case called "The Rat Man."

### 12.3.11 How Secret Shame Can Lead to Silence or Violence

Goffman also added a further thesis to the looking glass self, a fourth step to the three proposed by Cooley: managing (such as hiding) shame that could not be avoided. Furthermore, there is a fifth step barely hinted at by Goffman: hiding shame during the fourth step can generate a fifth step in the form of behavior. Helen Lewis (1971) noted that shame may result in withdrawal or even depression, on the one hand, or anger and aggression, on the other. The work of Retzinger (1991), the psychiatrist Gilligan (1997), and the sociologist Websdale (2010) follow up on the latter direction. These four studies show how the escalation of anger and violence is caused by hidden shame.

The emotion of shame is the primary or ultimate cause of all violence... The different forms of violence, whether toward individuals or entire populations, are motivated (caused) by **secret** shame. (1997, pp. 110–111)

Gilligan's theory is of great interest, since it proposes an emotional cause for both interpersonal and mass violence. Websdale's (2010) study of 211 cases of familicide (one parent killing the other and the children) found strong support for Gilligan's thesis. A finding of particular interest

in his study was the sizeable minority of perpetrators who had what he calls a *civic-respectable* style (C-R), in contrast to the majority whose style was angry and aggressive.

The C-R killers had no history of violence and little evidence even of anger. They were almost all middle class men (and a few women) who had lost their jobs. They hid the fact by continuing to leave the house every weekday as if going to work. What they did during their absence was to plan the killing of their family, and often, themselves. Proud of their abilities as a breadwinner, they apparently couldn't bear the humiliation of being jobless.

This C-R style of violence, it seems to me, has deep parallels to the preparation of nations for wars of revenge, as was the case of France preparing to make war on Germany in the period 1871–1914 (Scheff 1997). Especially for the leaders, both shame and anger are carefully hidden behind a veil of rationality. The Bush administration may have been deeply embarrassed by the 9/11 attack during their watch, and their helplessness to punish the attackers. The invasion of Iraq on the basis of false premises might have served to hide their shame and anger. The idea of the looking glass self, especially when it is expanded to at least five steps, can serve to generate a large group of general propositions about both interpersonal and collective behavior.

Neither Cooley nor Goffman dealt with the idea of justified pride, nor have many others. Cooley discussed pride and vanity (1922, pp. 230–237), but his version of pride confounds it with egotism, the usual case in vernacular English. Tracy et al. (2009) have recently noted this confound, distinguishing between what they call authentic (justified) and hubristic pride (egotism).

## 12.4 Summary

This essay has concerned three areas of study: labeling, catharsis, and shame as a social system. The third topic, shame, appears to be relevant to a very broad area of concern in human matters. It is certainly involved in the first two topics, labeling and catharsis. For example, in labeling studies,

the way that the term stigma is used, as if it is not virtually identical to shame, throws a new light on the whole field, and connects it with a potentially vast arena of other shame studies.

The Schenley study, where I witnessed the temporary recovery of mental patients, together with the catharsis theory, implies a new theory of the treatment of depression and other so-called mental illnesses: psychotherapy could be formed around the recall of memories in a setting of understanding and acceptance, particular one that would allow the catharsis of shame.

Finally, the idea of the shame system points to the need for a change in whole societies. Shame is harmless in itself, indeed, it is a necessary part of morality. But the idea of recursion of shame and other emotions that unacknowledged lead to withdrawal or aggression suggests the need for fundamental social change: we must learn how to acknowledge, rather than hide emotions. To even begin this kind of change would require that large social institutions, particularly schools and churches, would need to teach that emotions are normal and necessary: they need not be hidden.

---

## References

- Bardach, E. (1972). *The skill factor in politics: Reforming the California mental health law*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Belifiore, E. S. (1992). *Tragic pleasures: Aristotle on plot and emotion*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Bemak, F., & Young, M. (1998). Role of Catharsis in group psychotherapy. *International Journal of Action Methods: Psychodrama, Skill Training, and Role Playing*, 50, 166–184.
- Berkowitz, L. (1962). *Aggression: A social psychological analysis*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Billig, M. (1999). *Freudian repression: Conversation creating the unconscious*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Billig, M. (2005). *Laughter and ridicule: Towards a social critique of humor*. London: Sage.
- Bourdieu, P. (1983). Forms of capital. In J. C. Richards (Ed.), *Handbook of theory and research for the sociology of education* (pp. 2–31). New York: Greenwood Press.
- Bullough, E. (1912). 'Physical distance' as a factor in art and aesthetic principle. *British Journal of Psychiatry*, 5, 87–118.
- Cooley, C. H. (1922). *Human nature and conduct*. New York: Scribners.
- Crown, R. (1966). *The dilemma of mental commitments in California*. Sacramento California Legislature.
- Dewey, J. (1894). The theory of emotion. *Psychological Review*, 1, 553–569.
- Di Pellegrino, G., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V., & Rizzolatti, G. (1992). Understanding motor events a neurophysiological study. *Experimental Brain Research*, 91, 176–180.
- Elias, N. (1978). *The history of manners: The civilizing process, Vol. 1*. New York: Pantheon.
- Eliot, G. (1900). *Middlemarch*. New York: Sully and Kleinteich.
- Erikson, E. (1950). *Childhood and society*. New York: Norton.
- Evans, B. (1960). *Shakespeare's comedies*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Pavesi, G., & Rizzolatti, G. (1995). Motor facilitation during action observation: A magnetic stimulation study. *Journal of Neurophysiology*, 73, 2608–2611.
- Feshbach, S., & Singer, R. D. (1971). *Television and aggression*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Freud S., & Breuer, J. (1955). *Studies on Hysteria. 1895*. London: Standard Edition 2.
- Fuller, R. W. (2006). *All rise: Somebodies, nobodies, and the politics of dignity*. San Francisco, CA: Barrett-Koehler.
- Fuller R. W., & Gerloff, P. A. (2008). *Dignity for all: How to create a world without rankism*. San Francisco, CA: Barrett-Koehler.
- Gilbert, P., & Andrews, B. (1998). *Shame: Interpersonal behavior, psychopathology, and culture*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gilligan, J. (1997). *Violence: Reflections on a national epidemic*. New York: Vintage.
- Goffman, E. (1959). *The presentation of self in everyday life*. Garden City: Doubleday/Anchor Books.
- Goffman, E. (1963). *Stigma*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
- Goleman, D. (2006). *Emotional intelligence*. New York: Random House.
- Gottschalk L. A., & Glaser, G. C. (1969). *The measurement of psychological states through the content analysis of verbal behavior*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Heller, D., & Heller, L. (2004). Somatic experiencing in the treatment of automobile accident trauma. *US Association for Body Psychotherapy Journal*, 5, 42–52.
- Koestler, A. (1967). *The act of creation*. New York: Dell.
- Kosmicki, F. X., & Glickauf-Hughes, C. (1997). Catharsis in psychotherapy. *Psychotherapy Theory, Research, Practice, Training*, 34, 154–159.
- Lindner, E. (2006). *Making enemies: Humiliation and international conflict*. New York: Praeger.
- Lindner, E. (2010). *Gender, humiliation, and global security: Dignifying relationships from love, sex, and parenthood to world affairs*. New York: Praeger.
- Link, B. C., & Phelan, J. C. (2001). Conceptualizing stigma. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 27, 363–385.

- Link, B. C., Phelan, J. C., Bresnahan, M., Stueve, S., & Pescosolido, B. A. (1999). Public conceptions of mental illness: Labels, causes, dangerousness, and social distance. *American Journal of Public Health, 89*, 1328–1333.
- Lynd, H. M. (1958). *On shame, and on shame: The search for identity*. Eugene, OR: Harvest House.
- Levine, P. A. (1997). *Waking the tiger*. Berkeley: North Atlantic Books.
- Lewis, H. B. (1971). *Shame and guilt in neurosis*. New York: International Universities Press.
- Mead, G. H. (1934a). *Mind, self, and society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mead, G. H. (1934b). *The philosophy of the act*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Michel, J.-B., Shen, Y. K., Aviva Presser Aiden, Veres, A., Gray, M. K., The Google Books Team, Pickett, J. P., Hoiberg, D., Clancy, D., Norvig, P., Orwant, J., Pinker, S., Nowark, M. A., & Aiden, E. L. (2011). Quantitative analysis of culture using millions of digitized books. *Science, 331*, 176–182.
- Mitscherlich, A., & Mitscherlich, M. (1975). *The inability to mourn: Principles of collective behavior*. New York: Grove Press.
- Nichols, M. P., & Zax, M. (1977). *Catharsis in psychotherapy*. New York: Gardiner.
- Oliver, N. (2007). *Lars and the Real Girl*. Directed by Craig Gillespie. Cast: Ryan Gosling, Patricia Clarkson, Emily Mortimer.
- Parkes, C. (1988). *Bereavement: Studies of grief in adult life* (3rd ed.). Madison: International Universities Press.
- Quine, W. (1979). A postscript on metaphor. In S. Sacks (Ed.), *On metaphor* (pp. 127–144). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Retzinger, S. (1991). *Violent emotions*. Newbury Park: Sage.
- Retzinger, S. (1995). Identifying shame and anger in discourse. *American Behavioral Science, 38*, 104–113.
- Scheff, T. J. (1966). *Being mentally ill*. Hawthorne. New York: Aldine-Transaction (1989, 1999).
- Scheff, T. J. (1979). *Catharsis in healing, ritual, and drama*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Scheff, T. J. (1990). *Microsociology: Emotion, discourse, and social structure*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Scheff, T. J. (1994). *Bloody revenge: Nationalism, war, and emotion*. Boulder: Westview.
- Scheff, T. J. (1997). *Emotions, the social bond, and human reality: Part/whole analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Scheff, T. J. (2001a). Social components in depression. *Psychiatry, 64*, 212–224.
- Scheff, T. J. (2001b). Catharsis and other heresies. *Journal of Social, Evolutionary and Cultural Psychology, 1*, 98–113.
- Scheff, T. J. (2006). *Goffman unbound*. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.
- Scheff, T. J. (2009). A social theory and treatment of depression. *Journal of Ethical and Human Psychiatry, 11*, 37–49.
- Scheff, T. J. (2012). A social/emotional theory of ‘Mental Illness.’ *International Journal of Social Psychiatry, 12*, 26–37.
- Scheff, T. J., & Retzinger, S. (1991). *Emotion and violence: Shame and rage in destructive conflicts*. Lexington: Lexington Books.
- Scoppetta, M., Gennaro, G. D., & Scoppetta, C. (2005). Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors prevent emotional lability in healthy subjects. *European Review of Medical Pharmacology, 9*, 343–348.
- Symonds, P. (1954). A comprehensive theory of psychotherapy. *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 24*, 697–712.
- Tangney, J., & Dearing, R. (2002). *Shame and guilt*. New York: Guilford.
- Tomkins, S. (1963). *Affect, imagery, consciousness*. (Vol. II). New York: Springer.
- Tracy, J., Cheng, J., Robins, R., & Trzesniewski, K. (2009). Authentic and hubristic pride: The affective core of self-esteem and Narcissism. *Self and Identity, 8*, 196–213.
- Trimble, M. (2012). *Why humans like to cry: The evolutionary origins of tragedy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Vingerhoets, A. (2013). *Why only humans weep: Unraveling the mysteries of tears*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Vingerhoets, A. J. J. M., van Bussel, F., & Boelhouwer, J. (1997). *The (Non) expression of emotions in health and disease*. Tilburg: Tilburg University Press.
- Volkan, V. D. (1975). Re-grief therapy. In B. Schoenberg, A. H. Kutscher, & A. C. Carr (Eds.), *Bereavement: Its psychosocial aspects* (pp. 334–350). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Volkan, V. D., & Zintl, E. (1993). *Life after loss: Lessons of grief*. New York: New York University Press.
- Von Raumer, W. (1857). *The education of girls*. (cited in Elias, Norbert. 1978. *The Civilizing Process*, p. 127).
- Websdale, N. (2010). *Familicidal hearts: The emotional styles of 211 killers*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

David D. Franks

### 13.1 Emotions as Organizing and Moving the Brain

Long ago Aristotle said that cognition by itself moved nothing, and that thought which is practical depends on desire (Galligan 1975). Much later David Hume concurred: reason is perfectly inert and cannot either prevent or produce any action or affection (Falk 1975). These early pronouncements have been supported by two decades of research in neuroscience, which has decisively established the central role that emotion plays in brain functioning. In particular, data give strong evidence to the main assertion of this chapter that emotion *organizes and moves the brain to action*. As LeDoux (2000, p. 225) states:

Emotional arousal has powerful influences over cognitive processing. Attention, perception, memory, decision-making and the cognitive concomitants of each are all swayed in emotional states. The reason for this is simple. Emotional arousal organizes and coordinates brain activity.

#### 13.1.1 The Procedural Unconscious

Sigmund Freud's early effort to understand the power of the unconscious to affect people's thoughts, actions, and emotions has been substantially refined by neuroscience. For example,

in brain studies, we no longer think of the unconscious merely in terms of Freud's forbidden incestuous fantasies or particular repressed memories, but simply in terms of operating beneath the level of consciousness. This refinement has come about by a movement away from the unconscious being viewed exclusively as *content*, like images of incestuous acts, to a routine *procedural unconscious* that regulates such diverse tasks as maintaining homeostasis, perception, breathing, digesting food, or interpreting facial expressions in others. If persons had to think about the myriad of procedural operations to maintain their bodies, they would be totally paralyzed by cognitive overload. As Minski (1986, p. 29) puts it, "In general we are least aware of what our minds do best." The procedural unconscious leaves us free to resolve basic problems of life. The estimates of what the brain does on this routine unconscious level are between 97 and 98% of what people do.

The fact that only 2% of our brain's activities is left over for conscious deliberations should be seen in the context of the vastness of the human brain; it has 30 billion neurons and 1 million billion synapses. A neuron by itself is just a useless piece of meat. It is the interacting synapses that count in the brain's neuronal conversations with itself. If you count these synapses at a rate of one per second, it would take 32 million years to complete the task (Edelman 2004). This is just for the "new" part of the brain's covering called the neocortex that has a ratio of 60 to 1 of the rest of the brain (Edelman 2004). This 2% is more than enough for us to put our conscious minds

---

D. D. Franks (✉)  
Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, USA  
e-mail: davidfranks@comcast.net



to work. It would be hard to ignore the evidence for the procedural unconscious including its vast emotional component.

Many of the concepts we use in sociology imply processes that are below awareness. For example, Tom Scheff (1990) asserts that the speed of social interaction, mainly talk, means that we are all like athletes. Much of the time, good athletes don't have time to think. The great boxer, Sugar Ray Robinson, said that when he found himself conscious of openings left by his opponents, he knew it was time to leave the ring. You have to react more quickly than consciousness allows. Playing the piano well is much the same: concentration on moving one's fingers detracts from playing with feeling. When lecturing to a class, one must keep the point of what one is saying clearly in mind, but only occasionally do we take time to consciously pick our words. They come out of our mouths before we know it, via Broca's area that downloads brain processing of information into sequential talk.

There are many concepts that sociologists are comfortable with that are beyond awareness. Ostrow points out (1990, p. 28) "when we see something in the world around us, we are seldom aware of the eyes enabling us to see unless they hurt." The ethnomethodologist's statement is usually accepted with humor: "We need to use what we don't know in order to know anything at all".

All of this is far removed from Freud's theory of the unconscious and repressed urges and emotions. However, his concept of defense mechanisms, which is a critical part of the self, continues to be useful because our ability to lie to ourselves in order to protect our self-image is an important part of being human (Smith 2004). A conscious defense mechanism is an oxymoron. Once we are conscious of a defense mechanism, it loses its potency. The literature on the procedural unconscious is too vast to ignore and examples alone could fill this chapter easily. David Eagleman's *Incognito* (2011) can be seen as a book completely devoted to the procedural unconscious.

Unconscious emotions are all the more powerful because they evade our conscious control.


According to Zajonc (2001), unconscious affect is like moisture or odor; it can disperse, displace, scatter, permeate, float, combine, fuse, blend, spill over and become attached to any stimulus, even those totally unrelated to its origins. In sum, then, the procedural unconscious was derived from psychology which for some sociologists may give it an alien character, but the brain knows no such academic divisions. The evidence for this concept is overwhelming and it is critical to understanding the way the brain and its emotions work.

### 13.1.2 Emotions and Cognition

Aside from developing the notion of the procedural unconscious, a second area where neurosociology makes a contribution to the sociology of emotion is work on the amygdala, which is the ancient subcortical important for anger and fear that mammals inherited from reptiles. In higher mammals and especially humans, this area has become much larger and more complex, and in many ways, it links the subcortical areas generating many basic emotions with the prefrontal cortex in the neocortex where conscious decisions are made. The amygdala is an almond-sized area consisting of a collection of nuclei attached to the right and left ends of the hippocampus which is critical to memory formation and, as some have speculated (Turner 2000) is potentially the "place" where emotionally charged memories are repressed (Fig. 13.1).

For all reptiles and mammals, the amygdala is critical to survival because animals without fear in the face of danger or without the willingness to engage in defensive anger and aggression when cornered are soon dead. The amygdala thus lets us know how safe we are, both socially and physically, and it facilitates social interaction as we react to social contexts and faces before we can analyze them cognitively. It operates at a speed of 20 ms, which makes it unreliable cognitively but also enables it to save a life when instantaneous responses are essential. The speed of reactions set into motion by the amygdala enables us to react to objects we like and do not like before

**Fig. 13.1** Limbic system



we even know what the object is. It also reads faces and their social messages quickly and, in so doing, facilitates social interaction by its ability to respond to nuances of verbal and body language. The amygdala protects us from sudden social dangers as it does physical ones.

Cognitions often emerge after emotional responses, which can fire off much more rapidly than the prefrontal cortex can assemble necessary cognitive elements for making a decision. Indeed, as people reflect on their emotional responses or simply are moved by them, they often find that their cognitive stores have already been loaded emotionally, thereby allowing for rapid and rational decision making.

### 13.1.3 The Somatic-Marker Hypothesis

Antonio Damasio (1994) and his fellow researchers are well known for their studies of decision making among persons who have damaged neurons connecting the prefrontal cortex with the amygdala and other subcortical emotion centers. Damasio and his teams' findings have vanquished the ancient belief that emotions and rationality exist at opposites ends of a continuum; they are, instead, neurological intertwined and, most importantly, rationality cannot occur without emotionality. Damasio begins his discussion of how emotion is necessary for rational choice by explaining that since *feeling* is a subjective experience stemming from the body, it should be seen as *somatic* (Damasio 1994). This feeling is rapid and marks the image of an anticipated specific choice as being successful

or not. Thus, we use these markers as bodily feelings or hunches as we make everyday rapid decisions.

A somatic marker is a signal to avoid something or embrace it. It is facilitated by stimulus-response learning, and at times, happens too fast for consciousness. The marker is thus an automated alarm system that says, "beware." Such a marker does two related things: it leads to an *immediate* decision, and it drastically reduces the number of options in the process. Because it is so quick, it can be experienced as a quasi-conscious "hunch." Damasio's patients with damaged ventromedial prefrontal lobes would spend hours vainly trying to decide when to set the next office appointment. This was because they had no emotional preference to guide them and, hence, could not reach a conclusion. Without such preferences, they would have to consider everything imaginable alternative: an impossible task.

According to Ronald de Sousa (1987, p. 191) and the philosopher Daniel Dennett (1987), emotion sets the agenda for thought: it provides salience or importance and is "what we see the world in terms of." "No logic sets salience" de Sousa says. When emotion sets importance, it organizes the brain by giving us priorities through tagging cognitions about options with valenced emotions. Emotions even trump something as visible and solid as weather conditions because a cold, rainy day can become inviting when your emotions lead you to cuddle up with the one you love, while a sunny day can lose its luster when you are depressed or grieving (Franks 2006; Franks 2010). Thus, cognitions about the external world—whether the weather or one's social

relations—are constrained by the emotions that are aroused. The world is not just seen but felt.

### 13.1.4 Robots without Emotion<sup>1</sup>

The importance of emotions to rationality and decision making became strikingly clear in early efforts to develop artificial intelligence. Indeed, like Damasio's patients, early computer-driven robots, had trouble making decisions because without emotions to sort options and preferences, decision making became impossibly difficult. Artificial intelligence workers soon discovered that emotion was critical to decision making when they created a robot that was to be purely rational and objective because the machine would give equal and unbiased attention to all the possible imagined outcomes of its actions (See Dennett 1987). Literally everything necessary for making decisions, including especially the procedural unconscious, had to be programmed into the machine. However without emotional predispositions and preferences, it could not narrow down the infinite number of possibilities to those worth considering. Organization was problematic or non-existent.

In their experiments, the robot was placed on a wagon in a hanger. It could move the wagon; but a bomb was placed on the wagon that was designed to go off at a certain time and the robot had to decide when to jump off for safety. Because the robot had to give equal weight to an infinite number of possibilities without the aid of any hunches about relevance, a decision could not be made, and the bomb went off again.

Only emotion can lead us to see some possibilities as affectively so outlandish, shameful or disgusting that we need not consider them. Do we really have time to think about, and hopefully reject, eating our pet for breakfast? We need emotion in the form of preferences for effective decision-making, and emotion was what Damasio's patients did not have, or at least what they could not connect to cognitions. Without an emo-

tional bias, then, the completely objective robots were very similar to Damasio's prefrontal patients. Once again, emotion organizes the brain.

Antoine Bechara worked with Damasio on the question of hunches in 1994 and 1997 (see Eagleman 2011). He added an important twist to Damasio's work. Four decks of cards were put in front of normal subjects and he asked them to choose one card at a time. With each card was a loss or gain of money. The new twist was that the experimenters would stop the players and ask which decks were good and which were bad. Eventually the players realized that two decks made money and one deck lost money, but this took on the average 25 draws before the hunches could develop. According to the skin responses, an unconscious anticipatory spike warned the participants after around 13 draws. Some part of their procedural unconscious was giving them hunches before they could consciously feel them and say why they drew one card and avoided the other.

Hannah Damasio, Antonio Damasio's wife, developed a way to test his somatic-marker hypothesis with a card game called *the gambler*. It depended on the player using somatic-markers in their choices of cards. The player is given a limited amount of money to play the game. Some decks of cards were safe in that they were low risk but did not lead to enough rewards to choose them. Others were high risk in that they might pay a lot, but at times imposed a debilitating fine. Normal people learned quickly what was truly rewarding and what was not in the long run. The "prefrontal" patients, however, were not able to produce these bodily cues because emotional preferences had not been automatically built up in the process of choosing the cards. These patients inevitably lost the game because they had no somatic markers acting as cues about the high-paying, but dangerous cards.

For a current summary of the somatic marker replications see TenHouten (2013).<sup>2</sup> Measuring

<sup>1</sup> A longer version of this can be found in Franks (2010).

<sup>2</sup> Marr (2011) says that although Damasio has not offered a complete picture of how a somatic marker may work, this should not be taken as suggesting that his work on somatic markers is invalid. The research on the importance of the insular refines rather than questions its validity.

skin conductance is the most frequently used indicant of somatic markers, but there are others: heart rate, blood pressure and endocrine response. TenHouten reminds us that persons rated high on psychopathology scales also have lower skin-conductance responses and thus, less effective somatic markers than normals. Like Damasio's "prefrontals," they have a "myopia" for the future and go for short-term gains (See Osumi and Ohira 2010).

### 13.1.5 The Developmental Priority of Emotion to Cognition

For numerous reasons, the amygdala takes center stage in the so-called limbic system (Franks 2006). This system is "so-called" because it is not so much a contained system as it has connections among many parts of the brain. In addition to producing lightning-quick fear responses, the amygdala scans human faces with similar speed as to their emotional character: are they welcoming and safe or negative and dangerous? (See Baxter and Croxson 2012 for current fMRI studies here.) As we have seen, the limbic system and its emotions develop prior to, and are essential for later cognitive development.

Greenspan and Shanker (2004) show that if a child fails to comprehend mutual emotional and social signaling, the child also fails to develop language normally. Tredway et al. (1999) have dramatically illustrated that thought in infants is developed from a firm emotional base (See also Franks 2010). They reanalyzed the old Spitz studies of infants in foundling homes and nurseries from the point of view of neuroscience. The sorrowful story of infants who were deprived of affective emotional inputs illustrates the essentially interactive nature of normal human brain development. Initially these infants had healthy brains, but they could not develop normally because of the absence of human affective stimulation. Nature had done its job but the social environment had not. Since Tredway et al. (1999) describe this in detail, I will be brief here.

The study compared two contrasting environments: in the nursery, mothers cared for their own

or other babies. They identified with their babies enough to compete with others as to whose child was smarter and cuter, etc. While sanitation was not a high priority, the babies' experienced a great deal of attention and cuddling. Ironically, such was not the case with the babies reared in the foundling homes. Here those in authority gave a strict priority to sanitation to such a degree that they separated the babies from each other by a screen and contact with nurses was limited to prearranged feeding times and minimal social interaction. For 15 to 18 months the babies were left almost entirely alone. In spite of the emphasis on cleanliness, in only 3 months every baby had some kind of health problem.

Spitz divided the children into younger and older groups. The younger group had a death rate of 23% and the older group, which should have been less vulnerable, had a 40% mortality rate. As their age increased, the children became worse on other dimensions—decidedly and pathetically so. They met a visitor's attentions with fearful wailing. Smiles had long been gone. Profound suffering characterized the physical survivors.

The babies graded out intellectually as "morons" according to Spitz. The children had started life as healthy organisms ready to develop normally but the impersonal and isolating social environment prevented normal development. Experiencing no smiles and only negative emotion, they could not develop physically or socially; human nature could not develop because our natures are inherently social and require social interaction as a foundation for growth (Franks 2010, p. 57). More recently Romanian babies who were raised in isolation in understaffed state institutions experienced similar outcomes (Cozolino 2006).

A neurological explanation can be offered for why isolation is so harmful to the very nature of humans. Early socialization is basically an emotional enterprise. A strong attachment to the mother begins in the womb where chemicals are produced that nourish a developing limbic system—opiates, oxytocins, vasopressins, and epinephrine among others. A lack of positive social experience after birth deregulates these chemicals over time

which can be a major cause of depression. Interacting brain processes in the infant are put on high alert when exposed to an excessive amount of cortisol, a hormonal secretion from the pituitary gland at the base of the brain. Anxiety and fear in the infant are common triggers for the excess. This process results in an increase in fear that engages the amygdala and makes it very difficult for a baby to calm down without the help of soothing reactions from a caretaker (LeDoux 1996). An excess of glucocorticoids<sup>3</sup> in such cases damage the prefrontal cortex, impairing its ability to calm the amygdala and limiting its positive effect on the infant's emotional status. To make matters worse, such damage may lead to a lack of impulse control and increases the likelihood of eventual antisocial behaviors. Pathological levels of glucocorticoids can also reactivate forgotten fears and make them even worse than they originally were.

The abnormal process is reminiscent of Harlow's infant monkeys who were reared without their natural mother and instead placed with a "mother" frame made from metal net. The frame had a feeding device to provide milk but obviously was very limited in nurturing. These infant monkeys showed fear of anything new that was placed in front of them, and they clung fearfully to the metal frame. Those reared with a cloth surrogate mother carefully inched toward a new object, then ran back and eventually felt secure enough to explore the object. Such similarities across species speak to a similarity in the fundamental natures and needs of such social animals.

In conclusion, neurosociology has put an end to the old belief that there is no such thing as human nature. Human nature is social and much of it is intertwined with our emotional nature (Turner 2000). Indeed, emotions are at the core of this nature, as can be seen from the deprivation studies briefly summarized above. Emotions are what make rationality possible but, equally important, they are what allow humans to respond to each other, form bonds, and develop solidarity. And since emotions are ultimately generated in the brain, explanations of what it means to be

human requires neurosociology; and closer to the subject matter of sociology proper, it is impossible to understand human behavior, interaction, and social organization without studying the emotional underpinnings of these processes.


### 13.1.6 The Right Brain's Penchant for Darkness

No summary of findings about emotion and the organization of the brain would be complete without attention to the right brain's clear association with depression. Richard Davidson was one of the first researchers to demonstrate the connection between the right hemisphere and negative emotions and the left hemisphere and positive ones. He established further that this was present at birth. He gave newborn babies a dab of water, then of sugar water and finally of lemon juice while their small heads were hooked up with an electrode cap for EEG monitoring. The plain water produced no reaction, but the sugar water made them smile and the lemon juice made them draw back their faces and squint their eyes. The EEGs showed greater right side activation in response to the lemon juice and more left side response to the sugar water. Even though the prefrontal cortex is very immature at this stage, the relationship between brain side and positive or negative emotion is still fundamental to brain organization. Furthermore, Davidson discovered that the left prefrontal region was associated with positive emotion along with the ability to hold a continuous goal in mind and develop a plan of action to reach it (Davidson and Begley 2012).

Arguably the most well-known person working in this right brain field is Helen Mayberg. She and two other collaborators successfully treated 8 of 12 profoundly depressed patients by inserting pacemaker type electrodes into a spot deep in the cortex in the right side of the brain close to the Nucleus Accumbens. She described how area 25 (the Nucleus Accumbens) acted like a director of neural traffic between the "thinking frontal cortex and the central limbic system that along with other neural pathways of the brain produces emotion." She found that area 25 was *over*-active

<sup>3</sup> Glucocorticoids are released in response signals from the thalamus when the infant is in under constant continuing stress.






**Fig. 13.2** Brain area relevant to depression

in depressed people while other areas of the brain were *under*-active such as the prefrontal cortex, the hippocampus, amygdala and the insular (Figs. 13.2 and 13.3).

In 2003, influenced by treatments of Parkinson's disease and epilepsy, she inserted pacemaker-like electrodes into the brains of depressed patients in the cerebral cortex. The globus pallidus is another neural network whose dysfunction caused Parkinson's disease as well as depression. It is primarily involved in voluntary movements. Removing it calmed down the tremors of Parkinson's disease. For depression, comparable results occurred by placing small four-volt currents into the cerebral cortex. Once again, the implanted electrical currents relieved two-thirds of her depressed patients. By 2011, Mayberg could report that the subcallosal cingulate gyrus, as well as parts of adjacent areas in the cerebral cortex of the brain, played a significant role in major depression. It acted as a gateway or a conduit of neural traffic between the thinking prefrontal cortex and the limbic system, which plays such a large part in emotion. When this gate is left open, thinking and mood can be overwhelmed. For Dobbs (2006), Mayberg's work strongly confirmed the network model of the brain where reason, passion, thought and emotion are linked and talk to each other instead of being stuck inside themselves as modules.

### 13.1.7 Emotion and Feeling

The distinction between emotion and feeling should be introduced at this point because it is relevant as background for further discussion



**Fig. 13.3** More areas involved in depression

below. *Emotion* is “intentional” in the same sense that, when we are conscious, we are always conscious *of* something. We are never conscious of “nothingness.” Emotion is directed outside of itself toward an object or person in the sense of being “at,” “to,” “over,” or “because” of something. This contrasts with a *feeling*, which is simply there. Feeling is a sensation that is conscious and bodily felt. If a bee stings little Sally and her mother tells her the bee was only protecting herself and didn't mean to hurt her, that does not make the welt and the sting go away. If you turn out to be mistaken about something you took as an offense to you, the emotion of anger dissipates. Damasio's somatic markers move us in other ways as well. Most of his patients were highly intelligent, but the only emotion they could feel was anger. During interviews, patients told stories of their broken social relations and poor business decisions while the interviewers would be close to tears listening to them. But the patients showed no such emotions for themselves. An important indication of emotion is skin-conductance, but these patients showed none. Gory pictures of motorcycle wrecks and broken bodies produced horror from control groups, but there were no such feelings in Damasio's “prefrontal patients.” They could talk about emotions, but they could not experience them.

## 13.2 Basic Emotional processes

### 13.2.1 The Nature of Emotions

One prominent approach to understanding the dynamics of emotions revolves around isolating “primary” or “basic” emotions that are presumed

to be hard-wired in human neuroanatomy. For example, the amygdala is the source for two emotions—fear and anger—that are considered primary. Other candidates for primary emotions—happiness, sadness, surprise, disgust, expectancy, and the like—are also presumed to have specific locations in the brain where they are generated. Since humans reveal the capacity to experience and express a much larger palate of emotions, above and beyond those that are considered basic or primary, many researchers has sought to understand how these emotions are generated by the brain. Some argue that these additional emotions are created by neurological mixing (in an unknown way) of primary emotions to produce various types of emotional elaborations (e.g., Plutchik 1980; Turner 2000, 2007), although there are no unambiguous data on the neurological processes by which these elaborations occur.

There is some indirect evidence that something new is afoot with human neurology because human emotion centers in the brain are, on average, twice as large as those among human's closest primate relatives, controlling for body size (Turner 2000). Moreover, there is dramatically more connectivity within and between emotion centers and the prefrontal cortex, as well as other areas of the neocortex, which might suggest that inhering in these two unique features of the human brain are the capacities to produce new elaborations of primary or basic emotions. Yet, this line of argument remain highly speculative along several fronts. First, as Turner and Stets (2005) document, the list of primary emotions varies considerable by the scholar delineating these basic emotions. They present a table of twenty authors and their different listings of primary emotions, with some convergence in opinion that happiness, fear, anger, and sadness are primary or basic, but with considerable less consensus over another dozen or so other emotions that at least some see as primary.

TenHouten (2013, p. 10), for one, rightfully calls the historical and contemporary discussion about primary emotions is rather “contentious.” Among social constructionists, they simply deny the existence of primary emotions and use the fact that humans have a larger palate of emotions

to buttress their contention that all emotions are, in the end, cultural constructions revealing only very generalized and imprecise neurological origins. In contrast, evolutionarily oriented scholars like Turner (2000) are true believers in their contention that both primary and perhaps many of the elaborations of primary emotions are hard-wired. This controversy over such a fundamental property of emotions—i.e., where do they come from?—is not likely to dissipate until there is firm evidence from neurological studies. However, perhaps emotions do not have such clear boundaries as is often presumed by scholars. As the poet Shelly reminds us in his Hymn to Intellectual Beauty:

Love, Hope and Self-Esteem, like clouds depart  
And come, for some uncertain moments lent.

It is not of course, that a poet's words should dismiss the painstaking work described above, but in efforts to be logical, researchers risk reifying boundaries and distinctions between emotions beyond the empirical evidence. One alternative to the traditional approaches identifying primary emotions and their boundaries is to examine *emotional styles* boundaries of persons since these styles have been shown to have direct links to specific brain systems but do not require us to isolate specific or discrete emotional states. Instead, persons evidence varying styles of emotional arousal, which is perhaps more important in understanding their behaviors than making inferences about specific emotional states.

### 13.2.2 A Focus on Emotional Styles Instead of Emotional States

Davidson and Begley (2012) give us an innovative way of looking at emotion that is tied directly to the human brain, without getting drawn into the controversy over basic, primary, and derived emotional states. It may well be that emotional styles offer a more sophisticated approach than does the current emphasis on basic or primary emotions and their elaborations. The advantage of a focus on emotional styles is that they have been tested and correlated with specific patterns

of brain activity. Moreover, short-term laboratory tests indicate the presence of such emotional styles, but equally important, additional tests suggest that such styles continue over a lifetime in organizing a person's cognitive, emotional, and behavioral experiences.

Davidson and Begley begin by explaining what emotional style is not. An emotional *state* is a feeling that lasts only a short time, like one's response to a compliment. A *mood* is a feeling that persists for an hour or even several days and may be triggered by something that causes nostalgia or irritation. A feeling that characterizes a person for years is a *trait*, such as being a grumpy, sad, happy, or loving person. In contrast to emotional states, moods, and traits, emotional *styles* are consistent patterns of responses and ways of dealing with life; and as the data reveal, these styles are governed by specific brain circuits. Davison and his coworkers are quick to contrast this conception of style with the familiar term *personality*, which is not derived from any neurological mechanism. The styles are:

1. *Resilience*: how slowly or quickly you recover from adversity. Determined by signals occurring between the prefrontal cortex and the amygdala.
2. *Outlook*: how long you are able to sustain positive emotion. Determined by activity in the ventral striatum which comprises one's reward system.
3. *Social intuition*: how skilled you are at picking up social signals from people around you. Determined by communications between the fusiform gyrus and the amygdala.
4. *Self-awareness*: how well you perceive bodily feelings that reflect emotions. Shaped by the interplay between the amygdala and fusiform regions.
5. *Sensitivity to context*: how good you are at regulating your emotional responses to take in the context where you find yourself. Enabled by activity levels in the hippocampus.
6. *Attention*: how sharp and clear your focus is. Regulated by the prefrontal cortex.

The strength of Davidson and his colleagues' approach is that each dimension is subjected to


short-term testing in the laboratory even though "style" implies lifelong tendencies. Longer-term life patterns were measured with paper tests where the subjects answered questions about themselves.

As noted, another important scientific feature of their work is that, for each style, fMRI data indicate distinctive neurological activity in specific areas of the brain. All emotional styles listed above are seen by researchers in terms of a continuum from low to high level for each emotional style. Three of these styles are described in detail below to illustrate the way Davidson and Begley analyze them generally.

### 13.2.2.1 Resilience

As with all personal styles, testing short term resilience in the laboratory is supported by the interesting fact that if one is resilient in a short-term irritation such as a food machine that does not work, one is also less prone to need long time recoveries from the more serious slings and arrows of life, such as significant disappointments in love or careers. In the laboratory tests of resilience, the researchers showed pictures of widows and children crying at a funeral or of people severely injured in a terrible car crash. After participants were exposed to startling noises, resilience was measured by counting the rate of eye-blinking after the noises. The first noise occurred in a few seconds after subjects saw the pictures, again after 30 s and the last time after 1 min. These measurements provided a measure of how quickly the individual recovered from the original negative emotion. The faster this short term recovery, the more resilient is the person generally. It is indeed remarkable that a little thing like strength of eye blink and rate of recovery to upsetting pictures can correlate with real life situations such as betrayed love and the death of loved ones.

The greatest strength of the argument for personal style is that each style is also associated with its own distinctive brain-activity. We have seen that negative emotion is processed in the right prefrontal cortex of the brain while positive emotion is activated in the left. Resilience is marked by greater activity in the left verses




**Fig. 13.4** Resilience

the right prefrontal cortex. Why is the prefrontal cortex involved when emotion is associated with amygdala and hypothalamus activation? The amygdala is not self-contained. It is joined with the prefrontal lobes by large bundles of neurons that make possible executive control of the amygdala. This helps us in recovery from adversity (See Davidson and Begley 2012; Fig. 13.4).

### 13.2.2.2 Outlook

Outlook is complimentary to resiliency. Its key measure is the capacity or incapacity to sustain positive or negative emotions. Outlook can be expressed as the pessimistic or optimistic continuum. In the laboratory, Davidson and his team measured short-term outlook by how long the facial muscles related to smiling remained active after individuals saw pictures that made them smile. Those whose smiles dissipated quickly were seen as possessing a negative outlook. Outlook also includes maintaining emotional dispositions of the past as well as projecting them into the future.

Davidson had 19 healthy volunteers and 27 clinically depressed people volunteer for participating in an fMRI scanning study. The researchers had joyous images that brought smiles to all of the volunteers' faces. They were asked to view the images as they normally would or to try to enhance and sustain the positive emotions up to 20 s afterwards. For both healthy and depressed volunteers, activation in the brains reward circuit increased sizably after seeing the joyous pictures.



**Fig. 13.5** Outlook

This reward circuit is located in the cortical surface of the brain which normally becomes active when we anticipate something rewarding. More precisely a cluster of neurons within the ventral striatum referred to as the nucleus accumbens becomes activated and releases dopamine, a neurotransmitter that plays a role in positive emotion, motivation and desire. For healthy people this “high” remained throughout the session. For depressed participants positive feelings were only momentary (Fig. 13.5).

### 13.2.2.3 Self-Awareness


Persons who are conscious of their emotions and know why they feel a certain way exemplify the self-awareness dimension of emotional style. Self-awareness is measured in the laboratory by how well volunteers can detect their own heartbeats (Davidson and Begley 2012). Volunteers who score in the top 25% in choosing the in-sync tones on this test are designated self-aware. The brain region associated with self-awareness is the insular, which makes possible interception or the perception of body's feelings. Without the insular we would not feel pain or exhaustion. The insular lies deep inside the brain between the temporal and frontal lobes.

Neuroscientists have only recently become knowledgeable about the area because it has been so hard to uncover. High levels of activation here are associated with high levels of self-awareness. The insular is analogous to the motor cortex in that it too has a viscerotopic map of the body. Higher insular activation is also associated with

greater awareness of emotion since emotions like despair and joy are such different subjective feelings. It follows that those with high levels of self-awareness also have greater activation of the insular and vice versa. Neuro-imaging has shown that those subjects who are accurate about gauging their heart rate also have larger insulars. It follows from this finding that persons who are not aware of their feelings are also lower on insular activity (Fig. 13.6).

Davidson and Begley thus have been able to identify the distinctive brain pattern that underlies each dimension of emotional style. In doing so the authors present strong evidence that emotions and reason are intertwined and work together in human life. This conclusion follows from the fact that the circuitry of the emotional brain is integrated across neocortical and subcortical areas of the brain in ways that allow humans develop meanings about the social world and strategies for dealing with this world. Since feelings are involved with everything humans do, it should not be surprising that brain circuits regulate emotions that overlaps with what are often considered essentially cognitive processes. This brings up a question that Davidson and Begley address: Are such fundamental brain processes innate and unmovable, or are they open to change and human will?

*Brain Plasticity and Emotional Styles* One might assume that the brain-oriented approach Davidson and Begley take in discussing emotional styles is deterministic, but they make it very clear that this is not the case. Begley, especially, is known for co-authoring books that deal with the plasticity of the human brain and the ability of the human mind to change the brain. This is not to say that it is easy but only that it is possible (See Franks 2008). The authors also challenge the idea that genetics are deterministic and fixed over a person's lifetime because, in their view, the environment influences both the expression and inhibition of individual genes in a person's phenotype, including the brain. Identical twin studies consistently reveal that some personality traits have a strong genetic basis and that these traits revolve around an emotional styles, such shyness, socia-




**Fig. 13.6** Insular

bility, emotionality, distressfulness, adaptability, impulsivity, and balances between positive and negative emotions (Davidson and Begley 2012, p. 92). Even genetically based traits, however, can be significantly modified by how caregivers treat children and by other experiences that the children have. In their remarks about genes and emotions, Davidson and Begley (2012, p. 97) tell us that “genes load the gun, but only the environment can pull the trigger.”

### 13.2.3 One Emotional State— Empathy—and Mirror Neurons

One of the consistent finds in the empirical literature on higher primates is that they have the capacity for empathy (see Chap. 1). Empathy can be seen as both a mechanisms affecting people's emotional responses, as well as an emotional capacity in itself that, like emotional style, varies considerably in terms of people's propensities to be empathetic. For a trait to be universal among higher primates means that it has a neurological basis; and for humans, this neurological capacity allows individuals to attain perceptions of intersubjectivity by the sharing of same emotions. Originally discovered in higher monkeys, mirror neurons were later found in all higher primates, obviously including humans, giving humans the capacity to feel that they can share a common intersubjective and external world with others. As Iacoboni (2008, p. 267) puts it:





**Fig. 13.7** Mirror neurons and areas of the brain

Mirror neurons are brain cells that seem specialized in understanding our existential condition and involvement with others. They show that we are not alone, but are biologically designed to be deeply connected with each other. This is not slight fair for those interested in how we partake of each other's worlds.

This important social event happens through the process of “simulation” by activating mirror neurons that in turn copy the emotion on the motor cortex (Fig. 13.7).

It may seem strange that we have connected emotions with motor behavior, but that leads us to the core of the story. We end up with behavior because the same mirror neurons become activated when we *watch* the behavior of others as when we ourselves *do* that behavior. Since this execution is accomplished by copying the originally observed action on our motor cortex, we actually do in our brain unconsciously what we see the others doing and at the same time we feel what the others feel.

Since mirror neurons were first discovered in monkeys by Iacoboni (2008) and Sinigaglia (2008) in Parma Italy, many have questioned their existence in humans. Measuring the activity of human mirror neurons was not possible because doing it would severely damage the area measured. The precise measurement of activity in humans had to wait until it could be “piggy-backed” onto some necessary but risky operation. This was accomplished in 2010 with 21 patients who suffered from intractable epilepsy. Intracranial depth electrodes were implanted to locate where the seizures came from and precisely where the operation had to take place. They found mirror neuron activity and the empathetic

ability that came with them to be more widely distributed in these patients' brains than they expected (Murkamel et al. 2010). Mirror neurons are also found in the anterior of the insula. It puts the body and its feelings into emotions. We would not be capable of crying without the insular (Franks 2010). Super mirror neurons come into the picture because they curb empathy. It is important to feel for others but not too much (Ramaschandran 2011)

### 13.3 Conclusion

An implicit thread underlying this chapter is that the brain was built up through an evolutionary process to produce action that has survival value. The brain provides capacities for action and behavior, but what is critically important is that the brain in generating emotion provides the *motivation* necessary for survival actions. Equally significant, emotion also *organizes* the brain by setting its priorities and avoiding ambivalence, which paralyzes a person to the point of inaction. Neurosociology has given the sociology of emotion strong evidence that emotion and the motivation inherent in it, has a central place in brain functioning. This is true both routinely in our daily lives and developmentally, as the Spitz studies showed. They put to rest the old doctrine that there is no such thing as human nature. We have a universal nature, and it resides in our capacities for being social through the operation of mirror neurons and the activation of emotional responses toward others. Emotions are thus critical to the human capacities for intersubjectivity that allow for society to function, but they are also at the very core of the functioning brain.

Long before the neocortex evolved to human proportions, more ancient emotion centers had evolved in the subcortical areas of the brain; and as the neocortex and subcortical emotions centers grew among humans' hominin ancestors, so did the connectivity of the brain, especially within and between the neocortex and subcortex. Emotions became, in a metaphorical but somewhat real sense, the engine driving the brain and, in the end, the social structures that humans with their

integrated brains could create. Thus, sociologists can no longer cede over the study of the brain to neurologists, whose problems and interests differ from those of sociologists.

However, until very recently a nagging problem in emotions research has been the lack of reliable measurement. People are often unable or hesitant to report their emotions. By definition they cannot report unconscious emotions. Neuroscientists at Carnegie Mellon have used fMRI scanners to identify emotions in individual's brains (Kalson 2013). The researchers placed ten talented actors in a scanner and asked them to enter into the emotional states of anger, disgust, envy, fear, happiness, lust, pride, sadness and shame. They were asked to do this multiple times and in random order. Identifying emotions within the brain was done by comparing the results with earlier scans constructed of the actors. The researchers used the neural activation patterns derived from these earlier scans to identify emotions experienced by the same actors in later scans. While random guessing would result in a rank accuracy of 0.50, the computer model resulted in a rank accuracy of 0.84. They found that three main organizing factors underpinned these emotion neural signatures, namely the positive/negative valence of the emotion, its intensity—mild or strong, and its sociality (its involvement or non-involvement with other people).

Other important findings from the Carnegie Mellon group included the fact that very different people tended to encode emotions in very similar ways. Additionally, the emotional signatures were not limited to particular brain regions like the amygdala, but produced characteristic patterns distributed throughout a number of brain regions. Further, the fMRI was least likely to identify lust. Lust may produce a pattern of neural activity that is distinct from other emotions. Finally, their model was best at identifying happiness and envy.

However talented the actors, the natural emotions of people are obviously different. We can speculate that if the brain responds in certain ways to the actor's willful generation of certain emotions, the spontaneous responses will be stronger in the "real world." This has yet to

be tested, however. Further research in this area will be welcomed. This technique has promise of identifying emotions that people suppress and mixed emotions that people experience simultaneously like joy and envy at hearing of a friend's success.

In another vein, Lieberman and Eisenberg (2006) have found that physical and social pain are enabled by different parts of the cingulate cortex. The dorsal part of the cingulate cortex and its subsidiary structures enable social pain or the emotions involved in isolation. The anterior part enables physical pain. This finding is important because once again it indicates that we have a nature as human beings and that it is social. Here we need research concerning the differences between the loss of a loved one by death or because of rejection by that individual. Although our identities are situated socially, it is still possible that personality traits and other factors may be relevant to the relationship between the cingulate cortex and social pain.

But what do we know about other kinds of rejection and loneliness? What are the possible differences between losses of a loved one by death or by voluntary rejection by a loved one? Any findings that qualify or elaborate this relationship would be valuable to neurosociology. It so happens that we are extraordinarily sensitive to social isolation; so much so that we experience social pain even in the slightest case of social rejection. One of the many findings suggesting this is that when throwing a ball with a group of people, subjects experience social pain if they begin to be left out. This is true even when we are told that the game is only being played on cyberspace in a totally impersonal way. Even here subjects take being left out personally. This suggests that social rejection can be easily manipulated. Further research on techniques to protect ourselves in these circumstances and ways in which other characteristics may influence these experiences would be useful research in this important area.

To come full circle, Cornelius (1995) talks about *realization*. It is one thing to know something cognitively but we have seen that this moves nothing. It takes emotion and the motivation inherent within it to move oneself into ac-

tion. Cornelius tells of a bomber pilot in Vietnam who became a life-long activist and opposed the war after he actually visited a site he had bombed and saw the devastation he had imposed on innocent people.

Before that experience, he thought no further than reading coordinates on a map and pressing a button at the bombardier's command. Through this realization, the pilot now had a different kind of knowledge—one that was more accurate because it covered more ground—more ground because it included empathy for the suffering of other persons. According to the theme of this chapter, it also moved him to different life-long behaviors.

We are left then with another realization: this kind of life-changing experience cannot be replicated in the lab. Nonetheless, realization is an essential piece in understanding human emotional experience. One might hypothesize that it relates to empathy and thus to mirror neurons, but clearly much thought and research would be needed before we can make such generalizations. This is just one more area of the neurosociology of emotion where further work aided by modern scanners needs to be done. In such a context it will be important to remember that realization too is arranged on a continuum of intensity. It does not have to involve life-changing experiences in the laboratory. Granted for most sociologists, fMRI scanners, have their own flaws, are not readily accessible and hard to interpret. However this may be, it is up to sociologists to create interesting proposals that attract funding agencies and research oriented hospitals so that they can be a part of this rapidly expanding field.

## References

- Baxter, M. G., & Croxson, P. L. (2012). Facing the role of the Amygdala in emotional information processing. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 52, 21180–21181.
- Bechara, A., Damasio, A. R., Damasio, H., & Anderson, S. W. (1994). Insensitivity to future consequences following damage to prefrontal cortex. *Cognition*, 2, 7–15.
- Cacioppo, J., Visser, P. S., & Pickett, C. L. (2006). *Social neuroscience: People thinking about thinking people*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Carter, R. (1999). *Mapping the mind*. Berkley: University of California Press.
- Cornelius, R. (1995). *The science of emotion: Research and tradition in the psychology of emotion*. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall.
- Cozolino, L. (2006). *The neuroscience of human relationships: Attachment and the developing social brain*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Damasio, A. (1994). *Descartes' error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain*. New York: Avon Books.
- Damasio, A. (1999). *The feeling of what happens: Body and emotion in the making*. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Damasio, A. (2000). A second chance for emotion. In R. D. Lane & L. Nadel (Eds.), *Cognitive neuroscience of emotion* (pp. 12–22). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Davidson, R., & Begley, S. (2012). *The emotional life of your brain: How its unique patterns affect the way you think, feel, and live—and how you can change them*. New York: Hudson Street Press.
- de Sousa, R. (1987). *The rationality of emotion*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Dennett, D. C. (1987). *The intentional stance*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Dobbs, D. (2006). Turning off depression. *Scientific American Mind*, 17(4), 26–31.
- Eagleman, D. M. (2011). *Incognito: The secret lives of the brain*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Edelman, G. M. (2004). *Wider than the sky: The phenomenal gift of consciousness*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Falk, D. W. (1975). Hume on practical reason. *Philosophical Studies*, 27(1), 1–18.
- Franks, D. D. (2006). The neuroscience of emotion. In J. Stets & J. Turner (Eds.), *The handbook of emotions* (pp. 38–62). New York: Springer.
- Franks, D. D. (2008). The controversy of mind over matter: Mead's solution and applications from neuroscience. In N. Denzin (Ed.), *Blue ribbon essays in studies in symbolic interaction* (pp. 61–80). New York: Emerald Group Publishing.
- Franks, D. D. (2010). *Neurosociology: The nexus between neuroscience and social psychology*. New York: Springer.
- Franks, D. D., & Davis, J. (2012). Critique and refinement of the neurosociology of mirror neurons. In W. Kalkoff, T. Shane, & E. Lawler (Eds.), *Advances in group processes: Biosociology and neurosociology 29* (pp. 77–117). New York: Emerald Group Publishing.
- Galligan, E. M. (1975). Irwin on Aristotle. *Journal of Philosophy*, 72(17), 579–580.
- Greenspan, S. I., & Shanker, S. G. (2004). *The first idea. How symbols, language, and intelligence evolved from our primitive ancestors to modern humans*. Cambridge: DaCapo Press.
- Iacoboni, M. (2008). *Mirroring people: The new science of how we connect with others*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

- Kassam, K. S., Markey, A. R., Cherkassky, V. L., Loewenstein, G., & Just, M. A. (2013). Identifying emotions on the basis of neural activation. *Plos ONE*, 8(6), e66032.
- Katz, J. (1999). *How emotions work*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Keysers, C., & Gazzola, V. (2010). Social neuroscience: Mirror neurons recorded in humans. *Current Biology*, 20(8), 353–354.
- Lakoff, G., Johnson, M. (1999). *Philosophy in the flesh: The embodied mind and its challenge to western thought*. New York: Basic Books.
- Lieberman, M. D., & Eisenberger, N. I. (2006). A pain by any other name. (Rejection, exclusion, ostracism) still hurts the same: The role of dorsal anterior cingulate cortex in social and physical pain. In J. T. Cacioppo, P. S. Visser, & C. L. Pickett (Eds.), *Social neuroscience: People thinking about other people* (pp. 167–187). Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
- LeDoux, J. (1996). *The emotional brain: The mysterious underpinnings of emotional life*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- LeDoux, J. (2000). Cognitive-emotional interactions: Listen to the brain. In R. D. Lane, & L. Nadel (Eds.), *Cognitive neuroscience of emotion* (pp. 129–155). NY: Oxford University Press.
- Marr, A. (2011). Freud's signal anxiety: A better explanation for Damasio's somatic marker? <http://mezmer.blogspot.com>. Retrieved 4 Nov 2013.
- Minski, M. (1986). *The society of mind*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Mukamel, R. A., Marco, I., & Itzhak, F. (2010). Single-neuron responses in humans during execution and observation of actions. *Current Biology*, 20, 750–756.
- Ohman, A., Morris, J. S., & Dolan, R. J. (1999). A subcortical pathway to the right Amygdala mediating unseen fear. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences for the United States of America*, 96, 1680–1685.
- Ostrow, J. (1990). *Social sensitivity: A study of habit and experience*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Osumi, T., & Ohira, H. (2010). The positive side of psychopathy: Emotional detachment in psychopathy and rational decision-making in the ultimatum game. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 49(5), 451–456.
- Plutchik, R. (1980). *Emotion: A psychoevolutionary synthesis*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Popper, K. R., & Eccles, J. C. (1977). *The self and its brain*. New York: Springer.
- Ramachandran, V. S. (2011). *The tell-tale brain: A neuroscientist's quest for what makes us human*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Smith, D. L. (2004). *Why we lie: The evolutionary roots of deception and the unconscious mind*. New York: St. Martin's Griffin.
- TenHouten, W. (2013). *Emotion and reason: Mind, brain, and the social domains of work and love*. New York: Routledge.
- Tredway, J. V., Knapp, S. J., Tredway, L. C., & Thomas, D. L. (1999). The Neurosociological Role of Emotions in Early Socialization, Reasons, Ethics and Morality. In D. D. Franks & T. S. Smith (Eds.), *Mind, brain and society. Toward a neurosociology of emotions. Social perspectives on emotions* (Vol. 5, pp. 109–157). Stamford: JAI Press.
- Turner, J. H. (2000). *On the origins of human emotions: A sociological inquiry into the evolution of human affect*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Turner, J. H. (2007). *Human emotions: A sociological theory*. London: Routledge.
- Turner, J. H., & Stets, J. E. (2005). *The sociology of emotions*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wentworth, W. M., & Ryan, J. (1992). Balancing body, mind and culture: The place of emotion in social life. In D. D. Franks & V. Gecas (Eds.), *Social perspectives on emotion* (Vol. 1, pp. 25–46). Greenwich: JAI Press.
- Wentworth, W. M., & Yardley, D. (1994). Deep sociality: A Bio-evolutionary Perspective on the Sociology of Human Emotions. In W. M. Wentworth & J. Ryan (Eds.), *Social perspectives on emotion* (pp. 21–55). Greenwich: JAI Press.
- Zajonc, R. (2001). Closing the debate over the independence of affect. In J. P. Forgas (Ed.), *Feeling and thinking: The role of affect in social cognition* (pp. 31–58). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kimberly B. Rogers and Dawn T. Robinson

### 14.1 Introduction

A requisite for advancing our theoretical knowledge of any empirical phenomenon is a sound measurement strategy. As a rule, the optimal approach for devising a measurement strategy is to begin with a clear conceptual understanding of what is to be measured. The variety and breadth of theories and affective phenomena discussed in this handbook reveal the overwhelming difficulty of beginning with a single, coherent definition of emotion as a starting place. This rich range of work, however, also highlights the importance of being able to measure a variety of affective phenomena under a variety of different social circumstances. Consequently, rather than beginning with a single conception of emotion, this chapter begins with a brief discussion about the different forms of affect and emotion currently theorized by sociologists and an attempt to identify the important features to be measured. These theories are described more fully in other chapters in the volume; the focus here is on the specific measurement requirements motivated by the conceptualizations, concerns, and scopes of these theories.

While sidestepping the task of beginning with a single, consensual definition of affect to

apply to all theories, it is useful to begin with some general distinctions between terms and note exceptions along the way. Affect is the most general term to describe the way we feel about people, ideas, and happenings, and is often used as a primitive in defining other affective terms in the sociology of emotion – including sentiment, emotion, and mood. Gordon (1981, pp. 566–567) defined sentiments as “socially constructed patterns of sensations, expressive gestures and cultural meanings organized around a relationship to a social object.” Sentiments are trans-situational, generalized affective responses to specific symbols in a culture (Robinson et al. 2006). They are more socially constructed and enduring than emotional responses. Emotions are more commonly understood as feeling states with a cultural component and are considered more transient than sentiments. Most sociological definitions of emotions also include reference to physiological responses as well as the “free or inhibited expression” of the feeling (Thoits 1989, p. 318). Lively and Heise (this volume) define emotions as “responses to events ... linked to corporeal manifestations.” Moods are more diffuse feeling states that are longer lasting, milder, and less targeted than emotions (Thoits 1989; Smith-Lovin 1995).

---

K. B. Rogers (✉)  
Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, USA  
e-mail: kbrogers@mtholyoke.edu

D. T. Robinson  
University of Georgia, Athens, USA



## 14.2 Measurement Requirements of Sociological Theories of Emotion

The sociology of emotions is replete with theories that invoke sentiments, emotions, and moods, along with other affective constructs that are more distinctly linked to specific theoretical traditions—for example, emotional energy (ee) in ritualization theory and deflection in affect control theory, both of which will be discussed briefly below. The research literature that investigates the core nature of these forms of affect and the basic processes that involve them is vast and well beyond the scope of this review. Rather, this chapter will begin with a consideration of the various affective concepts invoked by contemporary theoretical traditions in the sociology of emotions in order to allow the theoretical needs of the field to dictate the scope and focus of the review of measurement strategies that follows.

### 14.2.1 Experienced Versus Expressed

Some emotion theories focus on emotion as a signal within interaction and so the expression of emotion is often the fundamental concept of interest (e.g., Leavitt and Power 1989; Robinson et al. 1994; Thoits 1996). Others focus on emotions as an outcome of structured interactions (Kemper 1978; Kemper, this volume) or as a mechanism underlying social behavior (Lawler 2001). Emotion management theory (Hochschild 1983) concerns itself with the structuring of individuals' efforts to comply with emotion culture. Consequently, the distinction between *felt* emotion and *expressed* emotion is paramount and theoretical investigations require methods that capture both separately and, optimally, the interplay of the two. This review will cover techniques that focus on both the experiential aspects of emotion and the signaling aspects. Where appropriate, this review will also note the measures most appropriate for capturing emotion communication, hidden emotion, and consequences of the effortful suppression of emotion.

### 14.2.2 Discrete Versus Dimensional

Early scholarship on emotions included sometimes contentious debates about whether emotions can be better understood as points along continuous dimensions of meaning (and if so, how many?) or as discrete states (and if so, how many?). Can we best understand emotions by presuming that we continually experience *some* level of affect, which varies from very negative to very positive, very intense to very mild, and so on? Or, is it more useful to think about emotions as discrete experiences corresponding to specific labels, which occur separately and on a momentary basis, often with long periods of “un-emotional” states in between? Those questions shape the review of some of the measurement literature below. However, rather than wading deeply into debates about whether emotion can best be understood in two dimensions or three, or exactly how many basic emotions there are, we note the common ground between these theories, identify theories that rely on either a dimensional or discrete conception of emotion or affect, and indicate which dimensions or discrete emotions are of theoretical interest.

Several theoretical traditions in sociology conceptualize specific, discrete emotions as mechanisms or outcomes of the social processes they examine. Justice theory (Hegtvedt and Parris, this volume), predicts that unjust distributions of reward elicit guilt in the over-rewarded and anger in the under-rewarded. Kemper's power and status theory of emotion (Kemper, this volume) uses dimensional aspects (power and status) of social interaction to predict discrete emotions (anger, gratitude, pride, fear, relief, etc.). Scheff's (1988) theory of the deference-emotion system focuses on the discrete emotions of shame and pride. Theoretical variants in the exchange theory tradition (see Lawler and Thye, this volume) rely on conceptualizations of both specific, discrete emotions such as satisfaction, gratitude, shame, and pride, as well as global emotions that vary along a positive–negative continuum. For purposes of testing these theories, the field requires techniques for measuring specific, discrete emotions,

as well as emotion along a positive–negative dimension.

Other sociological traditions rest on a dimensional understanding of emotions. Affect control theory (Lively and Heise, this volume) locates emotions along three dimensions of meaning—evaluation (valence), potency (power), and activity (arousal; Lively and Heise, this volume).” Identity theory relies on both discrete and dimensional conceptualizations of emotion. The core prediction relating the identity control system mechanism to emotion is that identity confirmation leads to positive feelings, while identity disconfirmation leads to negative feelings (Stets and Trettevik, this volume). Work in this tradition elaborates the identity control model to generate predictions about specific, discrete emotions such as moral emotions, including anger, shame, guilt, and empathy (Stets and Trettevik, this volume).

### 14.2.3 Directed Versus Diffuse

Discrete emotions invoked in these various theories include some that are directed at a target (e.g., anger, guilt, gratitude) and some that are relatively diffuse (e.g., satisfaction, sadness). Some sociological theories invoke affect concepts that are even more diffuse—for example, global positive emotions in the affect theory of social exchange (Lawler and Thye, this volume). In addition to making predictions about emotion, affect control theory (Lively and Heise, this volume) also makes specific predictions about the effects of more diffuse moods on social interaction.

A few theories in sociology invoke additional affective concepts that do not correspond tightly with traditional understandings of discrete emotions or moods. Drawing from Durkheim’s work on religious ceremonies, ritual theory (Rossner and Meher, this volume) argues that interaction rituals generate a collective emotional energy (ee) that serves to imbue symbols with deepened cultural meanings. The theory relies on both traditional conceptualizations of discrete, targeted emotions (that must be shared by interactants in order to generate collective emotional energy),

as well as the more diffuse concept of emotional energy, which is defined as “a long term emotional tone that is durable from situation to situation (Summers-Effler 2002, p. 42).” This concept is described as a level of enthusiasm, personal strength, and desire for social interaction and/or a feeling of connectedness. From a measurement perspective, this sounds like a high evaluation, high potency, and high activity feeling. Summers-Effler (2002) describes four affective products of ritual interaction—(1) a transient, shared emotion, (2) longer term, group-directed feelings of solidarity, (3) longer term, individually-directed feelings of emotional energy, and (4) an emotional energy loaded symbol of the group. Thus, this theory relies on concepts of emotions that are transient and discrete (targeted or diffuse) as well as longer term and targeted (toward groups or individuals), and on the concept of sentiments.

Another theoretical construct that may be considered a form of affect is the concept of deflection in affect control theory (Lively and Heise, this volume). Deflection is operationalized as the mathematical distance in evaluation-potency-activity space between the affect associated with a situation’s initial labeling and the affect evoked by social interaction in that situation. Robinson et al. (2004) point out that despite its precise mathematical definition, the affect control theory literature has been less explicit about the direct experience of deflection. They note that this disconfirmation of the affective meanings implied by one’s definition of a situation would lead to a sense of disequilibrium, surprise (shock, in extreme cases), and stress. They further argue that this should result in autonomic arousal that may be detectable regardless of whether/how it is directly experienced.

### 14.2.4 Summary of Key Measurement Concerns

In summary, the theoretical literature in the sociology of emotions is vast and varied enough that, in order to adequately test and advance these

theories, the field requires an array of different measurement strategies. We need methods for measuring sentiments, discrete emotions, and moods. We also need methods for measuring emotions along at least three dimensions—evaluation, potency, and activity. It would be helpful to have a measure of stress, or disequilibrium that was independent of these dimensions. Finally, it would be useful to have ways of measuring the effortful suppression of emotion, or the display of inauthentic emotions.

The search for valid measures of theoretical constructs includes concerns about reactivity as well as degree of intrusion into social life. It is critically important to have measures of emotion that are minimally reactive. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, sociologists generally recognize that emotion has both labeling and physiological components. At times, researchers may be more concerned with labeling than with bodily experience. Even in these cases, however, traditional pen and paper measures of emotion can introduce systemic sources of bias. Respondents may be less willing to report certain emotional experiences than others. Moreover, to the extent that questionnaires are distanced from the experience itself, respondents may report instead new emotion labels based on intervening definitions of the events that produced them. Observational methods can introduce reactivity as well; the very knowledge that one is being observed can alter emotional experience. Several key sociological theories of emotion—including affect control theory, identity theory, affect theory of social exchange, and ritual theory, for examples—make specific predictions about the nature of emotional experiences as interaction unfolds. To optimally test such predictions it would be ideal to measure emotion with as minimal intrusion into the social interaction as possible. Consequently, the measurement approaches described below are organized roughly in order of their expected degree of disruption of social interaction. The review begins with methods with the greatest potential for disrupting ongoing interaction and ends with the least socially intrusive methods.

### 14.3 Survey Measures of Emotion and Sentiment

Many psychological and sociological theories rely primarily on self-report approaches to measure affect and emotion. Whether conceptualizing affect and emotion as discrete states or on particular dimensions, self-report methods typically consist of affect or emotion ratings on semantic differential scales, and therefore depend upon respondents' capacity to accurately report their own affective and emotional experiences, or assess normative or culturally-shared affect. When striving for measures of culturally shared sentiments, concerns about reactivity are minimal. When striving to assess transient feeling states, especially ones that might be unflattering to the emoter, self-report measures are among the most reactive (see review in Robinson and Clore 2002). This is particularly true with self-reported emotion over a longer time frame, compared to over a shorter time frame (Robinson and Barrett 2010). Self-report measures of emotion are almost always retrospective in nature (sometimes over a considerable amount of time). Perhaps even more important than concerns about altering the construct of interest by the act of measuring it through respondent reactivity, self-report measures often have the effect of maximally disrupting social interaction—by removing individuals entirely from the interaction. Nonetheless, these are among the cheapest, most accessible, and most classic forms of emotion measurement. Moreover, these measures assess directly one of the key components of emotional experience—symbolic labeling. So, we begin by describing key issues in self-report measures of emotion that are relevant to contemporary sociological theories.

Scholars emphasizing dimensional approaches have disagreed over the precise dimensions that are essential to the measurement of affect and emotion. A recent review, however, finds that three comparable dimensions have emerged from diverse bodies of research pertaining to emotion perception, verbal and non-verbal communication, behavior, and personality (Scholl

2013). The first dimension relates to positivity versus negativity, the second to strength versus weakness, and the third to activity versus passivity. This view is supported by evidence that links these three dimensions to the physiological underpinnings of emotion (Fontaine et al. 2007) and patterns of neural firing in the brain (Lindquist et al. 2012). Synchrony in dimensionality across diverse manifestations of affect and emotion allows for the coordination of action within groups, with positivity predicting sympathy and consensus, strength predicting social power or control, and activity predicting the urgency or intensity of the task at hand (Scholl 2013).

Assessments of positivity/negativity and strength/weakness are employed by a variety of theories in sociology and psychology alike. For instance, the interpersonal circumplex conceptualizes interpersonal behavior, traits, and motives along the dimensions of friendliness-hostility and dominance-submissiveness (Leary 1957). The stereotype content model has established that people evaluate social groups along two basic dimensions, warmth and competence, which similarly reflect appraisals of whether a group is friendly or hostile (i.e., likely to promote or threaten the goals of one's in-group) and whether they are capable of realizing these good or bad intentions (Fiske et al. 2002; Fiske et al. 2007). Relatedly, Kemper and Collins (1990) propose two dimensions of microinteraction. Status, the ability to elicit voluntary compliance, deference, and acceptance, is generated on the basis of factors such as liking and perceived friendliness; power, the ability to compel others to do what they do not wish to do, is generated on the basis of factors like social dominance versus submission. Thus, positivity/negativity and strength/weakness are often thought to reflect the relative power and status of social groups, elements of social classification that importantly shape emotional experience and behavioral choice (Cuddy et al. 2009; Fiske et al. 2002; Kemper 1978; Kemper and Collins 1990).

Other theories have emphasized assessments of activity/passivity, often in conjunction with positivity/negativity. The circumplex model of

emotion, for instance, characterizes cognitive representations of emotion as a product of the relationship between valence (pleasure-displeasure) and level of arousal (Russell 1980). Moreover, sociological scholars from Durkheim (1912) to Collins (2004) have contended that interaction rituals produce positive emotional arousal (i.e., emotional energy), the accumulation of which is an essential motivating force in social life. According to Collins, those interactions that most foster institutional stability and collective beliefs are also most effective in generating emotional energy, and facilitating commitment and the interpersonal exchange of positive emotion.

A variety of approaches contend that all three dimensions are essential to comprehensive and parsimonious representations of emotion. Much of this work draws upon foundational research by Osgood and colleagues, in which three basic dimensions were found to explain half of the variation in fifty different bipolar rating scales (Osgood 1952; Osgood et al. 1957): evaluation (good/bad), potency (strong/weak), and activity (active/inactive). These dimensions have emerged from studies using both verbal and non-verbal stimuli (Osgood et al. 1957), and cross-cultural studies have produced evidence for their universality (Fontaine et al. 2007; Osgood et al. 1975). Affect control theory uses the dimensions of evaluation, potency, and activity to assess culturally-shared affective meanings for identities, behaviors, traits, and emotions, and to generate predictions about behavioral and emotional responding based on particular interpretations of social events (Heise 2007). Three-dimensional measures contribute useful explanatory value to methods that rely on two dimensions (e.g., the circumplex model), helping to distinguish between emotions that are similar in pleasantness and arousal but differ in dominance, such as fear and anger (Morgan and Heise 1988).

Comparable three-dimensional measurement approaches are used in other literatures as well. For example, the self-assessment manikin uses ratings of pleasure, dominance, and arousal to assess emotional responses to pictorial stimuli, simplifying an earlier approach that required 18

unique ratings (Bradley and Lang 1994). Appraisal theory proposes that our evaluations and interpretations of social events lead to particular emotional responses, which can be characterized on the dimensions of valence, power, and activation (Scherer 2001). While valence is thought to relate to appraisals of goal- and need-congruence, activation reflects the urgency of a behavioral response to the event, and power reflects one's capacity to cope with an event and its consequences (Scherer et al. 1975).

Some dimensional models strive for completeness of affective representation rather than parsimony. Identity theory uses discriminant function analysis to identify a set of dimensions that predict the majority of variation in affective meaning for the identities and institutions under study (Burke and Tully 1977). For instance, the student identity has been measured on dimensions like academic responsibility, intellectual curiosity, sociability, and personal assertiveness (Reitzes and Burke 1980), while the feminine identity has been measured on dimensions like non-competitiveness, passivity, and ease of having one's feelings hurt (Burke and Cast 1997). This approach provides greater specificity in assessing affect within a given social context, but limits comparisons across role domains, since roles are presumed to have different meanings for different people.

Unlike dimensional approaches to affect and emotion, discrete emotion approaches are not often organized around standard measures, but vary depending on the goals of the research at hand. Early discrete approaches to emotion in psychology sought to identify basic, culturally-universal emotions with shared symbolic meaning, distinctive physiology, and broad evolutionary significance (Ekman 1999; Ekman et al. 1972). This research often relied on a forced-choice method, having respondents identify the single emotion category they most identify with a particular facial display. Scholars have debated at great length the discrete emotions which should be considered basic in this sense. Ekman (1992), for instance, makes a case for six basic emotions: anger, fear, disgust, happiness, sadness, and sur-

prise. Others argue for an essential distinction between social and non-social emotions (Izard 1992), and note the fundamental importance of moral emotions such as shame, embarrassment, guilt, compassion, and gratitude (Haidt 2003; Keltner and Haidt 1999). While supportive neural evidence for discrete basic emotions has been mixed, a recent meta-analysis provides support for discriminable neural correlates of at least five basic emotions: fear, anger, disgust, sadness, and happiness (Vytal and Hamann 2010).

In recent years, scholars in both psychology and sociology have shown that our perceptions of emotion are importantly contingent on emotional information from the surrounding social context (Masuda and Nisbett 2001; Masuda et al. 2008), and that emotions vary in both their derivation from and implications for social interaction (e.g., Burke and Stets 2009; Heise 2007). Sociological research using self-reported, discrete measures of emotion generally asks respondents to assess either the normativity of particular emotional experiences or their own emotions within the context of given institutions, role enactments, or social events. While the vast majority of this research has respondents identify and rate emotions using semantic differential scales, the discrete emotions of interest vary considerably by theory and depending upon the institutions, identities, or situations under study.

Many scholars have used measures of discrete emotions to examine how particular emotion norms are generated and how individuals are socialized into them (Lively 2000; Smith and Kleinman 1989; Lofland 1985), to explore the content of particular emotion norms (Clark 1997; Simon et al. 1992) and the likelihood of experiencing or expressing particular emotions (Lively and Powell 2006; Simon and Nath 2004), and to identify strategies for the Emotion Management Theory of our own emotions and the emotions of others (Hochschild 1983; Thoits 1996). Theories arising out of the symbolic interactionist tradition (Mead 1934) view discrete emotions as outcomes of our interpretations of social situations, sources of social information about actors' status and power (e.g., Tiedens 2001; Sinaceur and Tiedens 2006), and



motivators of behaviors that reinforce and sustain aspects of the social order (Burke and Stets 2009; Heise 2007). Identity theorists view emotions as signals of the extent to which a situation confirms the meaning of individuals' self-relevant identities (Burke and Stets 2009), while affect control theorists view emotions as signals of the extent to which a situation upholds the broader institutional order of a society (Heise 2007).

These and other theories utilize both discrete and dimensional approaches to the measurement of affect and emotion. Affect control theorists, for instance, link the two sets of measures by characterizing particular discrete emotions on the affective dimensions of evaluation, potency, and activity (Heise 2007). They have developed a measure known as the emotion spiral, which captures both discrete and dimensional aspects of emotion by allowing respondents to easily identify and rate emotions that vary systematically on the three dimensions, displaying them in a spiral layout on a two-dimensional plane (Heise and Calhan 1995; Heise and Weir 1999).

---

## 14.4 Neural and Physiological Methods

While self-report methods often depend on respondents' ability to consciously process their affective or emotional responses to a stimulus, physiological and neural methods allow researchers to better understand the non-conscious aspects of emotional responding. Methodologies that emphasize physiological responses and emotion processing in the brain provide additional evidence of the affective responses to linguistic stimuli found in research using self-report methods, and additionally help to isolate which types of affective responding require conscious cognitive processing. These methods, however, vary in their intrusiveness and the extent to which they disrupt respondents' engagement in social interaction.

For instance, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and the measure of event-related potentials (ERP) from electro-encephalography (EEG) can offer precise information about the brain basis of emotional responding, even

isolating regions of the brain essential to particular emotional experiences, but require substantial constraints in respondents' bodily movement and surrounding environment to generate reliable results. Physiological measures, including heart rate, respiration, eye blink, skin conductance, muscle tension, and hormone secretion, are less intrusive than brain scanning techniques, though respondents' awareness of the probes and nodes required to assess their physiology may still bias responding. Other research has favored unobtrusive methods such as coding emotion from video footage, often using sophisticated taxonomies of facial behavior like the Facial Action Coding System (Ekman and Rosenberg 1997). Recent methodological innovations, including the use of thermographic cameras to study emotion, have created opportunities for new research designs that can assess physiological responding without disrupting research designs that involve social interaction. In this section, we discuss a selection of physiological and neural methods used in the study of emotions, and consider the advantages and limitations of each method.

### 14.4.1 Central Nervous System Activity

#### 14.4.1.1 Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging

Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) detects changes in oxygenation and blood flow within the brain. Because active brain areas consume more oxygen and demand greater blood flow, the measures collected by fMRI are correlated with and used as a proxy for neural activity. A typical fMRI study lasts around an hour including the initial structural scan of a respondent's brain (baseline measure) and the collection of functional, task-related and control data. Functional data are collected in a series of five to ten runs, which last between three and ten minutes each. Respondents use a viewer to read a computer screen located outside of the MRI tube, and submit their responses to a displayed task using only mouse clicks. Images are taken about every

two seconds throughout the task, producing a huge amount of data, within which researchers compare change in the signal over time.

In many cases, these data are used to analyze change over time in particular subsets of voxels within the brain, the small cubic units of measure (around 1 mm<sup>3</sup>) which comprise its three-dimensional geography; there are more than a million voxels in the human brain, each containing almost a million neurons. Given the number of simultaneous comparisons that even a univariate analysis entails, analyses are often restricted to a particular region of interest and corrected for multiple comparisons; conservative tests of significance are used. In addition, low frequency oscillations result from the respondent's heartbeat, head movements, and breathing, so any frequencies falling below a given threshold must be eliminated prior to analysis. The primary advantage of using fMRI is a precise assessment of *where* something occurs within the brain in response to a particular stimulus.

In recent years, a growing body of emotion research has utilized fMRI, contributing greatly to our understanding of the functional neuroanatomy of emotion. Meta-analyses of this research have identified particular regions of the brain that have been consistently linked with particular emotion functions. The medial prefrontal cortex seems to serve a general role in emotional processing, while fear tends to engage the amygdala, and sadness the subcallosal cingulate (Phan et al. 2002). Moreover, emotions induced by visual stimuli most often activate the occipital cortex and amygdala, while emotions induced via recall more often activate the anterior cingulate and insula (Phan et al. 2002). Positive/approach emotions are linked with greater left-brain activation in the lateral frontal cortex, while negative/withdrawal emotions are associated with more symmetric activation; men seem to experience greater lateralization of emotion than women (Murphy et al. 2003; Wager et al. 2003). More specifically, positive/approach emotions are likely to activate the medial pre-frontal cortex and basal ganglia, while negative/withdrawal emotions are more likely to activate the amygdala, cerebellum, and insula (Wager et al. 2003).

#### 14.4.1.2 Event-Related Potentials from Electroencephalography

Electroencephalography (EEG) is a measure of electrical activity (in microvolts) associated with neuronal firing in the brain, using electrodes placed along the scalp. Event-related potentials (ERPs) are the voltage changes that occur as respondents complete a cognitive task during an ongoing EEG, time-locked in response to a series of events. Respondents wear an electrode cap with 32, 64, 128, or 256 electrodes, which sends EEG data to a computer in an adjacent room. ERPs are measured as respondents complete a series of computer-based cognitive tasks, and signal changes are averaged across a large number of trials to decrease noise. As with fMRI, ERP picks up on eye blink, saccades, respiration, heartbeat, and muscle movement in the face and neck, so the data must be cleaned to remove any artifacts before analysis. Voltage changes reflect neural processes in milliseconds, and therefore offer excellent temporal resolution. However, the spatial resolution offered by ERP is low in comparison with fMRI and dependent upon the number of electrodes used, as potentials are averaged across the fields of neurons adjacent to a given electrode. Thus, ERP provides the most useful information about *when* something occurs in the brain in response to a particular stimulus.

Research that examines affective responses to linguistic stimuli using ERP has identified early semantic effects in language processing (by 100 ms) given repeated serial exposure to concepts, particularly with regard to a concept's goodness or badness; these evoked potentials are pre-attentive, too rapid a response to allow for conscious cognitive processing (Skrandies 1998). The same research identifies late effects associated with conscious cognitive processing, and finds that latencies are larger when processing a concept's activity (active/inactive) than its evaluation (good/bad) and potency (strong/weak). Evoked potentials can be differentiated into six semantic classes that correspond to the word sets displayed to respondents, representing positive and negative sentiment in judgments of evaluation, potency, and activity (Chapman et al. 1978). Following research that relies on

self-report methods, the highest factor loadings and largest distinction between brain responses is found for linguistic stimuli that are high versus low in evaluation, followed by those that are high versus low in potency, and high versus low in activity (Chapman et al. 1980; Skrandies 1998). Recent research has also provided initial evidence of an ERP correlate of deflection (Schauenburg et al. 2012). The N400 event-related potential was largest when respondents viewed linguistic stimuli lower in emotional coherence (i.e., higher in deflection), indicating increased effort in semantic processing (Kutas and Federmeier 2011).

#### 14.4.2 Peripheral Nervous System Activity

Neurological responses, measured directly by brain activity, may have great potential for isolating specific emotional responses. As social scientists, however, we can also benefit from the decades of research before the current emphasis on fMRI and other direct measurement of neurological activity shifted the emphasis in the physiological measurement of emotion to the central nervous system. Measures of activity in the peripheral nervous system are generally more affordable and accessible to sociologists wanting to study emotions in social environments. While most of these methods do not disrupt interaction as dramatically as lying inside of an fMRI scanner, these techniques can, to varying degrees, impinge on routine social interaction.

Three major forms of physiological emotional response include behavioral, autonomic, and hormonal. The behavioral response is governed by the somatic nervous system and includes activation of the skeletal muscles involved in respiration, muscle tension, and bodily movement. The autonomic nervous system primarily involves changes in the functioning of smooth muscles and other internal organs, which have evolved to facilitate behavior and provide a quick mobilization of energy for those actions requiring vigorous motion (e.g., fending off an attacker or running from a mob). Endocrine responses, too, are produced by the autonomic nervous system and reinforce

the other autonomic responses by altering chemical processes determining blood flow and the use of stored energy by the muscles. These systems evolved together to help us respond to the environment in ways that increase survival and reproduction. Unfortunately for measuring these responses as indicators of theoretical concepts, they are related in complex ways to experienced emotion and even more distantly to labeled emotion. More than one action can be implied by a single emotion (e.g., cowering or running in response to fear); and more than one emotion can be implied by a given action (i.e., cry in sadness or cry in joy). Consequently, these responses cannot give us a one-to-one correspondence with a single, socially interpreted, labeled emotion (Gray 1994). However, these approaches, possibly combined, may give us less reactive measures of the bodily aspects of emotions in social life.

The peripheral nervous system consists of all of the neurons throughout the body that are not in the brain, brainstem, and spinal cord and is composed of the somatic nervous system and the autonomic nervous system. The somatic nervous system consists of all of our sensory and motor pathways—including the neurons controlling our skeletal muscles. This system regulates the way that we directly experience—and act upon—our environments. The autonomic nervous system consists of the neurons in several systems that operate outside of our conscious direction—including the cardiovascular system, the respiratory system, the digestive system, and the endocrine system.

Neurons from the middle (i.e., thoracic and lumbar) regions of the spinal cord lead to a variety of organs (e.g., heart, lungs, liver, salivary glands) and comprise the sympathetic nervous system. Neurons from the brainstem and from the lowest (i.e., sacral) regions of the spinal cord lead to many of the same organs (e.g., heart, lungs, stomach, bladder) and comprise the parasympathetic nervous system. Activation of the sympathetic nervous system leads to pupil dilation, decreased salivation, accelerated heartbeat, increased blood flow to/from lungs, secretion of epinephrine and norepinephrine, production of bile, and inhibition of bladder contractions.

Parasympathetic nervous response, on the other hand, includes pupil constriction, increased salivation, decelerated heartbeat, decreased blood flow to/from lungs, release of bile, and bladder contraction. These two sets of responses traditionally were seen as two sides of the same coin. The contemporary view (e.g., LeDoux 1986) is more complex, however. For example, while the sweat glands and peripheral arterioles (small blood vessels in skin) are stimulated by the sympathetic system (producing a “cold sweat”), they are not inhibited by the parasympathetic nervous system (Carlson and Hatfield 1992). Some experiences seem to activate of both systems. For example, when looking at gruesome autopsy photographs, subjects’ heart rates slowed and electrodermal activity increased (Lacey and Lacey 1970, as cited in Carlson and Hatfield 1992). The systems do not appear correspond in any simplified way to general high and low arousal. Rather, it appears that patterns of autonomic nervous response may correspond in a more specific way to discrete emotional experiences.

Below, we review the evidence for particular patterns of physiological expression that correspond to the basic theoretical concepts invoked by the sociological theories described above. Specifically, we organize our discussion around evidence that appears to link physiological responses to discrete emotions, moods, stress, and emotion valence, potency, and activity.

### 14.4.3 Cardiovascular Response

Researchers use various measures to capture cardiovascular activity, including heart rate, heart rate variability, respiration, respiratory sinus arrhythmia, blood pressure, and peripheral vasoconstriction. Heart rate and heart rate variability traditionally are measured either by finger plethysmograph (FP) or electrocardiogram (ECG). While ECG is more reliable and less prone to measurement error due to movement (Giardino et al. 2002), FP is fairly non-intrusive and fairly accurate. It allows researchers to record continuous real time data and link it to other aspects of

social interaction. Blood pressure is a multiplicative function of cardiac output and total peripheral resistance (Maier et al. 2003). Cardiac output is the amount of blood pumped by the heart per minute. Total peripheral resistance is the amount of resistance that is exerted on the blood flow throughout the body. Blood pressure is often measured using a sleeve, making it a somewhat more intrusive measure. It can easily be collected in a laboratory setting or in the field. Unfortunately, sleeve-based measurement is not well suited for collection during interaction.

All of the finger transducer collected heart measures are fairly non-intrusive and can comfortably be used during ongoing interactions. These measurements can be collected either in a laboratory setting or in the field. However, many of the finger-based cardiovascular measures are somewhat sensitive to movement and are somewhat impaired if collected during unrestricted interaction. To maximize the reliability of these measures, one would want to either minimize movement of research participants, or find ways to statistically control for movement. Newer technology allows research participants to wear a transducer on a belt around the chest underneath clothing and collect heart rate, interbeat intervals, respiration, posture and movement data. These data can be wirelessly transmitted to a data collection unit nearby for use in a lab setting where the researcher wants to synchronize the data streams of the physiological responses of several participants. Alternatively, the data can be stored on a flash drive for download by the researcher at a later time, allowing data collection in the field, perhaps in conjunction with experience sampling data collection (e.g., Lizardo and Collett 2013).

Cardiovascular activity may do a better job of assessing discrete emotion than indexing emotion valence. Compared to neutral affect, positive affect does seem to be associated with an increase in blood pressure (Maier et al. 2003), while negative affect has not been reliably linked with blood pressure (Brondolo et al. 1999; Maier et al. 2003). The relationship between affective valence and heart rate is even more mixed (see

review in Robinson et al. 2004). This complexity may be explained by more detailed findings about the relationship between cardiovascular response and discrete emotion. For example, several studies show that blood pressure and finger temperatures rise with anger, compared to fear or sadness (see reviews in Cacioppo et al. 2000 and Robinson et al. 2004).

The evidence from research on discrete emotion suggests that there may be a relationship between cardiovascular response and both potency and activity of emotion. Diastolic blood pressure rises with anger, compared to fear (Schwartz et al. 1981; Roberts and Weerts 1982) or sadness (Schwartz et al. 1981). General activity and arousal are clearly associated with increases in blood pressure (Gellman et al. 1990; Schwartz et al. 1994; Jacob et al. 1999; Pollard and Schwartz 2003). In addition, in general, heart rate seems to be higher for more active emotions (e.g., anger) than for quieter emotions (e.g., happiness, sadness) (see review in Cacioppo et al. 2000).

#### 14.4.4 Skin Temperature

Skin temperature can also be measured relatively unobtrusively, using finger or hand based thermistors. More recent advances in thermography may even allow for finger temperature to be measured less intrusively, using cameras (see discussion in next section). There is some evidence that peripheral skin temperature may be useful in detecting discrete emotion. Several studies report higher finger temperatures for anger than for fear (see review in Cacioppo et al. 2000). McFarland (1985) found that listening to pleasant music increased finger temperature, while listening to unpleasant music decreased finger temperature. Izjerman et al. (2012) found that being excluded from an online ball game corresponded to a drop in finger temperature. These researchers argued that a sense of disconnection may lead to vasoconstriction, a state in which the blood vessels are narrowed, maintaining body heat in the core, but not the periphery. These findings suggest that

finger temperature may be useful for studying loneliness or social rejection.

#### 14.4.5 Electrodermal Activity

Skin conductance refers to the electrical conductivity (or lack of electrical resistance) of the skin. Changes in conductance are a function of sweat gland activity and the skin's pore size. An increase in conductivity arises through increased skin moisture, pre-secretory activity of the sweat gland cell membranes or both. Galvanic skin response is a measure of the skin's conductance between two electrodes. Skin conductance is typically measured by applying a small current through two electrodes, placed on the fingers or toes, and the response is seen as a change in conductance (decrease in resistance) of the skin with time. Electrodermal activity can be measured using small, relatively non-intrusive finger transducers. Using portable data collection units enables research in the field as well as in the laboratory setting.

Skin conductance activity is not likely to be a good measure of emotion valence. Bradley and Lang (2000) found an increase in skin conductance activity with pleasant sounds and unpleasant sounds, compared to neutral sounds. Codispoti et al. (2001) observed a similar pattern with respect to images. It may be that electrodermal activity is more related to activation than to affect valence.

On the other hand, there does seem to be a relationship between arousal and electrodermal response. The assumption of this relationship underlies the use of polygraph techniques, which use electrodermal responses along with respiration, pulse, and relative blood pressure to measure arousal in response to (supposed) lying. Markovsky's (1988) findings on injustice and galvanic skin response referred to above are consistent with the idea that arousal increases electrodermal activity. In addition, Bradley and Lang (2000) found that arousing (pleasant) sounds, compared to neutral sounds, generated increased electrodermal responses. Taken together, we



think that electrodermal activity may be a promising physiological marker of activation.

#### 14.4.6 Facial Electromyography

Facial electromyography (EMG) measures the electrical activation of specific muscles in the face. These methods require attaching electrodes to the skin in order to assess electrical activation of the specific muscles at a specific location. One disadvantage of this method is that the researcher must choose specific muscles to investigate prior to collecting data. Consequently, the method is not well-suited for collecting information about multiple emotions over the course of an interaction. In fact, this method is not well suited for collecting data during interaction, as it is fairly socially intrusive and somewhat sensitive to motion. Electrodes hang from the face and connect an individual to a data collection unit. These data must be collected in laboratory setting, rather than in the field.

When we emote, we move our facial muscles in ways that correspond to recognizable facial expressions. Using facial electromyography (fEMG), researchers can measure *undisplayed* emotions in the face as well. Cacioppo et al. (1986) proposed that visually undetectable micro-expressions corresponding to discrete emotions could be detected by looking at the activation of various facial muscles using electrodes attached to the skin. For example, when we smile we make use of a muscle in our cheeks, the zygomatic muscle. The zygomatic major draws the corners of the lips upward (Hietanen et al. 1998). Researchers frequently use activation of the zygomatic major to measure happiness responses, but the empirical literature on this relationship is somewhat inconsistent (see review in Robinson et al. 2004). The orbicularis oculi, the muscle around the eye area, may also be involved in the expression of positive emotion (Hietanen et al. 1998). The orbicularis oculi is the facial muscle that causes the corners of the eye to wrinkle and bag under the eye when smiling. This muscle is thought to be under less voluntary control of the individual than the zygomatic major.

In facial expressions, the movements of the corrugator supercili distinguish between the negative, powerful emotion of anger and the negative, weak emotion of sadness. This is the muscle that we use to scrunch the brow together when we are angry or sad. When we are angry, we bring the center part of our brow together and down (Ekman and Friesen 1975). When we are sad, the center part of our brow comes together in an upward direction (Ekman and Friesen 1975). Unfortunately, fEMG methods are able to detect activation in muscles, but not direction or intensity of movement. So, these methods cannot help us with this distinction. Much of the research on the corrugator muscle seems to focus on anger, but some on negative affect more generally. This research shows activity in the region of the corrugator supercili muscle in response to various types of negative stimuli and negative thoughts (see review in Robinson 2004). The primary advantage of fEMG methods for measuring facial muscle activation is that it is able to measure activation in muscles whose movements are not visible to the eye (e.g., a suppressed smile). Key disadvantages of this method for purposes of sociological investigations are that researchers must choose specific muscles to investigate, prior to collecting data, and that the method is not able to distinguish between certain pairings of very different emotions that activate the same muscle or muscle groups (like anger and sadness). Consequently, the method is not well-suited for collecting information about multiple emotions over the course of an interaction. More critically, this method is poorly suited for collecting data during interaction, as electrodes hang from the face and connect an individual to a data collection unit.

#### 14.4.7 Hormone Secretion

Many researchers are interested in examining how hormone levels relate to physiology, cognition, emotion, and social behavior. While some hormones can only be measured precisely with a blood or urine sample (e.g., oxytocin, vasopressin), many hormones can be accurately (and less invasively) measured in the saliva (e.g., cortisol,

estrogen, progesterone, and testosterone). Saliva samples are collected with the use of an oral swab; it usually takes less than a minute to obtain the needed sample volume of between 0.5 and 1 ml. In many studies, researchers measure hormone levels in a respondent's saliva at a given interval before and/or after completing a research task. Alternatively, researchers may administer hormones to healthy respondents orally or intravenously, timed in conjunction with the completion of particular research tasks, in order to isolate causal relationships.

Using these methods, a variety of hormones have been identified as essential to emotional responding and regulation. Oxytocin and vasopressin, for example, are hormonal counterparts with complementary effects on emotion and social behavior. Oxytocin levels have been linked with reproductive activity, long-term pair bonding, and maternal bonding in a variety of species, including humans (Carter 2003; Carter et al. 2008; Gonzaga et al. 2006). Oxytocin release increases following supportive physical contact and non-verbal affiliation cues (Gonzaga et al. 2006; Morhenn et al. 2008) and during pregnancy and nursing (Lee et al. 2009), reinforcing close social bonds and helping to establish new ones. Intranasal administration of the hormone can increase humans' tendency to engage in cooperative behavior and accept social risks (Kosfeld et al. 2005).

Variation in the genes known to affect oxytocin has been linked with the ability to recognize others' moods and empathize with others (Domes et al. 2007). The release of oxytocin helps to ameliorate stress and anxiety and extinguish negative emotional responses such as fear (Neumann and Landgraf 2012). In contrast, vasopressin is associated with the up-regulation of anxiety and fear (Neumann and Landgraf 2012). Vasopressin has also been linked with social affiliation among males (Keverne and Curley 2004) and aggressive behavior (Coccaro et al. 1998). Some evidence suggests that vasopressin may bias individuals toward responding to emotionally ambiguous stimuli (e.g., emotionally neutral faces) as a potential social threat (Thompson et al. 2004).

Several major hormones are known to affect our stress responding, including cortisol, catecholamines (epinephrine and norepinephrine), dopamine, and serotonin. Catecholamines initiate our immediate "fight or flight" response to stressful events, help to regulate our blood pressure and heart rate in response to situational demands, promote the storage and retrieval of positive and negative events associated with arousal, and trigger immune system responding (Cahill et al. 1994; Institute of Medicine 2001; O'Carroll et al. 1999). In the minutes that follow a stressful event, cortisol is released and begins to down-regulate bodily functions that are non-essential to immediate responding (e.g., digestion, growth) and to maintain those that help facilitate responding (Institute of Medicine 2001).

Cortisol has implications for our emotional responding, including increased memory for emotional versus neutral stimuli (Buchanan and Lovallo 2001), and has been linked with cognitive appraisals (e.g., challenge, novelty, intensity), basic emotions (e.g., surprise, anticipation), and patterns of rumination or worry that signal immediate or imminent threat (Denson et al. 2009). While these functions improve our short-term responding to difficult situations, chronic stress has a variety of adverse effects including immune vulnerability and chronic disease (Piazza et al. 2013), low bone growth (Michelson et al. 1996), muscle wasting (Peeters et al. 2008), and depression (Snyder et al. 2011). Serotonin aids in the processing of aversive stimuli, and dopamine in the processing of reward, among other important functions. The two seem to play complementary roles in the cognitive activation of particular associations, affective and motivational processes, and decision-making (Cools et al. 2011).

Estrogen, progesterone, and testosterone also have important (and often gender-specific) effects on emotion. For instance, both estrogen and progesterone are related to the regulation of anxiety in women (Walf and Frye 2006; Reddy et al. 2005), and modulate the expression of other hormones within the amygdala, with implications for responding to fear- and anxiety-inducing stimuli (Jasnow et al. 2006; van Wingen et al. 2008). Women have greater accuracy when processing

facial emotion during the follicular phase of their menstrual cycle, when estrogen levels are high, than during the luteal phase, when progesterone levels are high (Derntl et al. 2008). Estrogen also has the potential to increase oxytocin binding in certain brain areas during the follicular phase, which can offset social anxiety and otherwise facilitate reproduction (McCarthy 1995).

High testosterone levels predict increased anger and tension, and selective attention to angry faces (van Honk et al. 1999). Indeed, the hormone has been shown to facilitate amygdala activation among males in response to fear- and anger-inducing stimuli (Derntl et al. 2009). Moreover, testosterone is associated with lower empathy and risk aversion and a higher threshold for conflict, threat, fear, and stress, enabling those with high testosterone levels to make difficult, utilitarian decisions in the face of negative social emotions (Carney and Mason 2010). A growing literature also implicates testosterone in social dominance and status-seeking behavior (Eisenegger et al. 2011).

---

## 14.5 Observational and Computational Methods

### 14.5.1 Observational Methods

Observational methods offer additional opportunities for measuring emotion in ways that are even less disruptive of ongoing social interaction and less reactive than the previously reviewed measures. Cameras are ubiquitous in contemporary life and have consequently become commonplace enough that they have fairly minimal effects on social interaction. Here we will focus on one established technique and one emerging technique—facial expression coding and facial thermography, respectively.

#### 14.5.1.1 Coding of Facial Expressions

While the direct coding of facial expressions predates the use of fEMG measures, these techniques build on the same knowledge about the physiology of facial responses to emotion and are informed by the same research. The premier

method of coding facial expressions was developed by (Ekman et al. 1978) and is called the Facial Action Coding System, or FACS. This system breaks facial muscle movements down into 30 separate action units (AUs) with a specific physiological base and 14 additional miscellaneous actions without an established, singular physiological base (e.g. jaw thrusts). Most of the AUs and miscellaneous actions are coded along categorical intensity scales. There are millions of potential combinations of scorings for any particular facial expression. The FACS scoring approach is a descriptive one, tightly linked to the anatomy and mechanics of the face. It is a learned technique, typically taking a researcher about 100 hours or so of self-instruction and practice to become proficient enough to become certified. Among certified coders, FACS methods have high levels of intercoder reliability (Sayette et al. 2001).

As mentioned earlier, one advantage of fEMG over direct observation is that it is able to measure activation in muscles whose movements are not visible to the eye (e.g., a suppressed smile). However, several studies seem to suggest that suppressed expressions or posed expressions manifest on the face in ways that distinguish them from spontaneous ones, in ways that are accessible through FACS (Hager and Ekman 1985; Ekman and Rosenberg 1997). FACS has a number of advantages over fEMG approaches. The most obvious advantage for sociologists is the ability to record expressions during ongoing interactions, without the interference of electrodes hanging from the face. In addition, while fEMG approaches require researchers to choose in advance specific muscles to investigate, FACS allows researchers to study all of the muscles in the face. fEMG approaches detect muscle activation, but not the direction or the intensity of muscle movement. Thus, brows moving up or brows moving down—associated with the very different emotions of anger and sadness—are not differentiable using fEMG, but are using FACS.

#### 14.5.1.2 Facial Skin Temperature

Recent advances in infrared (IR) techniques for measuring skin temperature may enable

researchers to assess some aspects of emotional experiences directly, without reliance on either self-report or transducer based methods, and without requiring an observable facial behavior. Traditional cameras measure the electromagnetic energy in the visible spectrum range (0.4–0.7  $\mu\text{m}$ ). Infrared cameras measure thermal radiation in the infrared spectrum range at (0.7–14.0  $\mu\text{m}$ ). The IR spectrum includes the reflected IR and the thermal IR wavebands. The thermal bands enable measurement of heat based radiation emitted from human faces. Based on the logic behind measuring emotions using FACS or fEMG, we might expect that facial muscle activation will be associated with regional changes in blood flow patterns, which in turn should be associated with regional temperature changes in the face. Research by Pavlidis and colleagues suggests that infrared imaging may be useful in detecting human emotions (Pavlidis et al. 2002; Puri et al. 2005). Pavlidis et al. argued that lying has a specific thermal signature detectable in the eye region. To measure this signature, Pavlidis et al. (2002) examined blood flow patterns around the eyes. They argued that a fight/flight response accompanies deceitful behavior, which causes blood temperature around the eyes to increase, which is revealed through a warming pattern in thermal imaging. Pavlidis et al. (2002) showed that experimental participants who committed a mock crime and then testified to their innocence were correctly identified using thermal imaging techniques at a rate significantly higher than that of a traditional polygraph technique (83% vs. 70%).

More recently, Puri et al. (2005) have used infrared technology to detect frustration. They utilized a within-subjects design in which they exposed 12 test subjects to a Stroop Color Word Contrast test, which is widely used to evoke stress. While subjects took the Stroop test, they used an infrared camera to detect warming in the frontal vasculature (forehead). Utilizing a frame capture rate of 31 frames per second, they measured the mean temperature of the hottest 10% of the pixels for each subject in the frontal vasculature and then used these measures to calculate blood flow, using an algorithm previously developed by the

research team (Pavlidis and Levine 2002). They also took measures of Energy Expenditure (EE), which are known to vary with stress, in order to validate the infrared measures. The researchers reported that the correlation between the blood flow measures and the EE measure was  $r=.91$  when one outlier was removed from the data (resulting in an  $n$  of 11).

Robinson et al. (2012) demonstrated the potential utility of this measure for sociological theories using data from a laboratory experiment ( $N=114$ ) to test predictions from affect control theory. In their study, they used performance feedback to manipulate identity deflection and measured several types of affective responses—including self-impressions and emotions. Robinson et al. found warming of the brow (near the corrugator muscle) and cheek (near the zygomatic major muscle) related most strongly to emotion valence and self-potency, with those whose brows and cheeks warmed the most feeling less positive emotion and less potent self-impressions. Positive self-views and strong identity disruptions both contributed to warming of the eyes. Most intriguingly, they found that warming in the eye area (near the orbicularis oculi) related most closely to undirected identity deflection. The theoretical variables of interest (evaluation, potency, activity, deflection, emotion) explained more than 35% of the variance in eye temperature change in their study.

Assessing changes in blood flow to different regions of the face is not likely to provide a meaningful measure of all of what sociologists have in mind when we theorize about affect and emotion. Sociological theories of emotion recognize the critical role of language, and make assumptions about the role of symbolic processing in social interactions. However, infrared imaging has the advantage of being robust across visible lighting conditions, and infrared cameras can measure emotions remotely, without the need for reactive measures. Infrared techniques can also generate fast, sensitive measures that can be analyzed dynamically (Anbar 2002). And, most importantly, Pavlidis et al. (2002) confirmed that increased blood flow to facial muscles can be detected using infrared technology. Taking together the

Puri et al. findings that eye temperature increases in response to frustration, the Pavlidis et al. findings that eye temperature increases in response to lying, and the Robinson et al. findings that eye temperature increased with identity deflection it seems clear that eye warming should be the focus of future efforts to measure of deflection/discrepancy as used in sociological theories of emotion.

### 14.5.2 Neuro-Computational Modeling

Cutting-edge work in neurosemantics is using neuro-computational modeling techniques to simulate the functioning, coordination, and communication of millions of neurons within the human brain. Rather than measuring affect directly, the Semantic Pointer Architecture Unified Network (SPAUN) seeks to demonstrate how shallow and deep meanings are linked to one another through coordinated patterns of activity in neural populations (Eliasmith 2013). This novel approach offers a theoretical bridge between neural, linguistic, and behavioral models of affect and emotion. Central to this model is the notion of the semantic pointer architecture, wherein neural representations that carry partial semantic content (semantic pointers) combine to form the broader representational structures that enable complex cognition. Shallow meanings result from symbolic relationships that form between semantic pointers or link these pointers with objects in the world. Deep meanings result from the ability of semantic pointers to represent compressed versions of underlying sensory, emotional, and behavioral representations. Patterns of neuronal spiking encode specific mental representations, allowing for the representation of increasingly abstract concepts through the recursive binding of lower level representations; thus, semantic pointers offer an efficient means of referencing large amounts of mentally-stored data (Eliasmith and Anderson 2003; Eliasmith 2013). While a degree of information loss occurs in binding lower level, more embodied representations with higher level, more symbolic representations, the process allows for large amounts of information to be efficiently processed, transmitted, and stored within the

brain, and for complex symbolic cognition to be embodied in basic sensorimotor representations (Eliasmith 2013).

Recent research by psychological constructionists has similarly found that emotions are constructed dynamically through the interaction of the psychological building blocks of emotion and more basic psychological operations, which are embedded within functional networks in the brain (Barrett 2006; Lindquist et al. 2012). As in the neurosemantic models discussed above, common affective dimensions (such as evaluation, potency, and activity) are thought to stem from intrinsic structural relations between shallow and deep meanings (Schröder and Thagard 2013). Indeed, these dimensions have been shown to relate to deep-meaning features of emotion, such as raising one's eyebrows, feeling one's heart rate increase, or speaking more loudly (Fontaine et al. 2007). Emotions then result from the neural binding of semantic pointers representing physiological states with those representing cognitive appraisals (Thagard and Schröder 2013). Deep meanings result from the association of emotion categories with physiological reactions, appraisal patterns, and bodily responses, while shallow meanings result from the semantic relationship between different psychological emotion categories, as indicated by proximity on affective dimensions like evaluation, potency, and activity.

#### 14.5.2.1 Sentiment Mining and Text Analysis

Over the last decade, web-based digital content has been growing at an exponential rate. Massive amounts of data on the personal sentiments and opinions of millions of people are now publicly shared daily through blogs, forum posts, and social media sites like Twitter, Tumblr, Reddit, and Facebook. In addition, recent efforts in the digital humanities are making important strides toward the digitization and curation of web-based collections, and in mining the large datasets these efforts have created. More digital content is available for analysis than ever before. In response, scholars have begun to develop and refine methodological tools that allow large amounts of data about affect and emotion to be efficiently gathered, organized, and analyzed.



The website's official application-programming interface (API) can be used to extract the desired data from a targeted website, in a particular country or region, at a particular point in time; this can also be accomplished with other types of web scraping tools, which pull data from the website's source code. Sentiment mining techniques allow researchers to identify underlying structures or regularities within a corpus of text data pulled from the web. A variety of techniques have been developed, for example, to seek out and classify potentially significant sentence fragments or affect and emotion terms (e.g., Pak and Paroubek 2010; Procter et al. 2013; for a review see Pang and Lee 2008). Text analysis and other qualitative data analysis techniques are then used to examine the data.

Efforts in the digital humanities are making it possible to expand our analyses beyond the modern context, allowing for the study of long-term historical patterns and fluctuations in affect and emotion. A recent study, for example, used Google's Ngram database to examine change over time in the use of words with emotional content during the twentieth century (Acerbi et al. 2013). The Ngram database (books.google.com/ngrams) contains millions of books in more than ten languages that have been digitized by Google, and are freely and publicly available for use in text analysis. The study found evidence of distinct historical periods of positive and negative moods; while joy was at its peak in the 1920s, sadness peaked in 1941 at the start of America's entry into World War II, and fear terms have been on the rise since just before 1980 (Acerbi et al. 2013).

## 14.6 Conclusions

Theoretical knowledge in the sociology of emotions will be well served by the use of new methods for measuring theoretical constructs of interest. Our theories require measures of a variety of affective constructions—including discrete emotion, dimensional emotion, mood states, deflection, emotional energy, and stress. Our theories also require measures that do not interfere with

ongoing social interaction and that are vulnerable to a minimal amount of reactance. The most frequent method of choice by sociologists, the survey, is perhaps the worst at meeting these last two requirements. This review described, in rough order of social intrusion and reactivity, various measurement approaches for the study of emotions in the lab and in the field that may help us with our endeavor to advance sociological theories of emotion in a rigorous way.

## References

- Acerbi, A., Vasileios, L., Philip G., Bentley, R. A. (2013). The expression of emotions in 20th century books. *PLOS One*, 8, e59030.
- Anbar, M. (2002). Assessment of physiologic and pathologic radiative heat dissipation using dynamic infrared imaging. *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, 972, 111–118.
- Barrett, L. F. (2006). Are emotions natural kinds? *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 1, 28–58.
- Bradley, M. M., & Lang, P. J. (1994). Measuring emotion: The self-assessment manikin and the semantic differential. *Journal of Behavioral Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry*, 25, 49–59.
- Bradley, M. M., & Lang, P. J. (2000). Affective reactions to acoustic stimuli. *Psychophysiology*, 37, 204–215.
- Brondolo, E., Rosen, R. C., Kostis, J. B., & Schwartz, J. E. (1999). relationship of physical symptoms and mood to perceived and actual blood pressure in hypertensive men: A repeated-measures design. *Psychosomatic Medicine*, 61, 311–318.
- Buchanan, T. W., & Lovallo, W. R. (2001). Enhanced memory for emotional material following stress-level cortisol treatment in humans. *Psychoneuroendocrinology*, 26, 307–317.
- Burke, P. J., & Cast, A. D. (1997). Stability and change in the gender identities of newly married couples. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 60, 277–290.
- Burke, P. J., & Stets, J. E. (2009). *Identity theory*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Burke, P. J., & Tully, J. C. (1977). The measurement of role identity. *Social Forces*, 55, 881–897.
- Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., Losch, M. E., & Kim, H. S. (1986). Electromyographic activity over facial muscle regions can differentiate the valence and intensity of affective reactions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 50, 260–268.
- Cacioppo, J. T., Bertson, G. G., Larsen, J. T., Poehlmann, K. M., & Ito, T. A. (2000). The psychophysiology of emotion. In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (pp. 173–191). New York: Guilford Press.

- Cahill, L., Prins, B., Weber, M., & McGaugh, J. L. (1994). Beta-adrenergic activation and memory for emotional events. *Nature*, *371*, 702–704.
- Carlson, J. G., & Hatfield, E. (1992). *Psychology of emotion*. Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Carney, D. R., & Mason, M. F. (2010). Decision making and testosterone: When the ends justify the means. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *46*, 668–671.
- Carter, C. S. (2003). Developmental consequences of oxytocin. *Physiology and Behavior*, *79*, 383–397.
- Carter, C. S., Grippio, A. J., Pournajafi-Nazarloo, H., Michael, G. R., & Porges, S. W. (2008). Oxytocin, vasopressin and sociality. *Progress in Brain Research*, *170*, 331–336.
- Chapman, R. M., McCrary, J. W., Chapman, J. A., & Bragdon, H. R. (1978). Brain responses related to semantic meaning. *Brain and Language*, *5*, 195–205.
- Chapman, R. M., McCrary, J. W., Chapman, J. A., & Martin, J. K. (1980). Behavioral and neural analyses of connotative meaning: Word classes and rating scales. *Brain and Language*, *11*, 319–339.
- Clark, C. (1997). *Misery and company: Sympathy in everyday life*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Coccaro, E. F., Kavoussi, R. J., Hauger, R. L., Cooper, T. B., & Ferris, C. F. (1998). Cerebrospinal fluid vasopressin levels: Correlates with aggression and serotonin function in personality-disordered subjects. *Archives of General Psychiatry*, *55*, 708–714.
- Codispoti, M., Bradley, M. M., & Lang, P. J. (2001). Affective reactions to briefly presented pictures. *Psychophysiology*, *38*, 474–478.
- Collins, R. (2004). *Interaction ritual chains*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Cools, R., Nakamura, K., & Daw, N. D. (2011). Serotonin and dopamine: Unifying affective, activational, and decision functions. *Neuropsychopharmacology: Official Publication of the American College of Neuropsychopharmacology*, *36*, 98–113.
- Cuddy, A. J., Fiske, S. T., Kwan, V. S., Glick, P., Demoulin, S., Leyens, J. P., Bond, M. H., Croizet, J. C., Ellemers, N., Sleebos, E., Htun, T. T., Kim, H. J., Maio, G., Perry, J., Petkova, K., Todorov, V., Rodriguez-Bailon, R., Morales, E., Moya, M., Palacios, M., Smith, V., Perez, R., Vala, J., & Ziegler, R. (2009). Stereotype content model across cultures: Towards universal similarities and some differences. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *48*, 1–33.
- Denson, T. F., Spanovic, M., & Miller, N. (2009). Cognitive appraisals and emotions predict cortisol and immune responses: A meta-analysis of acute laboratory social stressors and emotion inductions. *Psychological Bulletin*, *135*, 823–853.
- Derntl, B., Kryspin-Exner, I., Fernbach, E., Moser, E., & Habel, U. (2008). Emotion recognition accuracy in healthy young females is associated with cycle phase. *Hormones and Behavior*, *53*, 90–95.
- Derntl, B., Windischberger, C., Robinson, S., Kryspin-Exner, I., Gur, R. C., Moser, E., & Habel, U. (2009). Amygdala activity to fear and anger in healthy young males is associated with testosterone. *Psychoneuroendocrinology*, *34*, 687–693.
- Domes, G., Heinrichs, M., Michel, A., Berger, C., & Herpertz, S. C. (2007). Oxytocin improves “mind-reading” in humans. *Biological Psychiatry*, *61*, 731–733.
- Durkheim, E. (1912). *The elementary forms of religious life*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Eisenegger, C., Haushofer, J., & Fehr, E. (2011). The role of testosterone in social interaction. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, *15*, 263–271.
- Ekman, P. (1992). Are there basic emotions? *Psychological Review*, *99*, 550–553.
- Ekman, P. (1999). Basic emotions. In T. Dalgleish & M. Power (Eds.), *Handbook of cognition and emotion* (pp. 45–60). New York: Wiley.
- Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1975). *Unmasking the face*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
- Ekman, P., & Rosenberg, E. L. (Eds.). (1997). *What the face reveals: Basic and applied studies of spontaneous expression using the facial action coding system (FACS)*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ekman, P., Friesen, W. V., & Ellsworth, P. (1972). *Emotion in the human face: Guidelines for research and an integration of findings*. New York: Pergamon Press.
- Ekman, P., Friesen, W. V., & Hager, J. C. (1978). *Facial action coding system (FACS): A technique for the measurement of facial action*. Palo Alto: Consulting Psychologists Press.
- Eliasmith, C. (2013). *How to build a brain: A neural architecture for biological cognition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Eliasmith, C., & Anderson, C. H. (2003). *Neural engineering: Computation, representation and dynamics in neurobiological systems*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J. C., Glick, P., & Xu, J. (2002). A model of (often mixed) stereotype content: Competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and competition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *82*, 878–902.
- Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J. C., & Glick, P. (2007). Universal dimensions of social cognition: Warmth and competence. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, *11*, 77–83.
- Fontaine, J. R. J., Scherer, K. R., Roesch, E. B., & Ellsworth, P. C. (2007). The world of emotions is not two-dimensional. *Psychological Science*, *18*(12), 1050–1057.
- Gellman, M., Spitzer, S., Ironson, G., Llabre, M., Saab, P., DeCarlo Pasin, R., Weidler, D. J., & Schneiderman, N. (1990). Posture, place, and mood effects on ambulatory blood pressure. *Psychophysiology*, *27*, 544–551.
- Giardino, N. D., Lehrer, P. M., & Edelman, R. (2002). Comparison of finger plethysmograph of ECG in the measurement of heart rate variability. *Psychophysiology*, *39*, 246–253.
- Gonzaga, G. C., Turner, R. A., Keltner, D., Campos, B., & Altemus, M. (2006). romantic love and sexual desire in close relationships. *Emotion (Washington, D. C.)*, *6*, 163–179.

- Gordon, S. L. (1981). The sociology of sentiments and emotion. In M. P. Rosenberg & R. H. Turner (Eds.), *Social psychology: Sociological perspectives*. New York: Basic Books.
- Gray, J. A. (1994). Three fundamental emotion systems. In P. Ekman & R. J. Davidson (Eds.), *The nature of emotion: Fundamental questions* (pp. 243–247). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Haidt, J. (2003). The moral emotions. In R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer, & H. H. Goldsmith (Eds.), *Handbook of affective sciences* (pp. 852–870). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hager, J. C., & Ekman, P. (1985). The asymmetry of facial actions is inconsistent with models of hemispheric specialization. *Psychophysiology*, 22(3), 307–318.
- Heise, D. R. (2007). *Expressive order: Confirming sentiments in social action*. New York: Springer.
- Heise, D. R., & Calhan, C. (1995). Emotion norms in interpersonal events. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 58, 223–240.
- Heise, D. R., & Weir, B. (1999). A test of symbolic interactionist predictions about emotions in imagined situations. *Symbolic Interaction*, 22, 129–161.
- Hietanen, J. K., Surakka, V., & Linnankoski, I. (1998). Facial electromyographic responses to vocal affect expressions. *Psychophysiology*, 35, 530–536.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1983). *The managed heart: Commercialization of human feeling*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Ijzerman, H., Gallucci, M., Pouw, W. T. J. L., Weigerber, S. C., Van Doesum, N. J., & Williams, K. D. (2012). Cold-blooded loneliness: Social exclusion leads to lower skin temperatures. *Acta Psychologica*, 140, 283–288.
- Institute of Medicine. (2001). Biobehavioral factors in health and disease. In *Health and behavior: The interplay of biological, behavioral, and societal influences* (pp. 37–86). Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
- Izard, C. E. (1992). Basic emotions, relations among emotions, and emotion-cognition relations. *Psychological Review*, 99, 561–565.
- Jacob, R. G., Thayer, J. F., Manuck, S. B., Muldoon, M. F., Tamres, L. K., Williams, D. M., Ding, Y., & Gatsonis, C. (1999). Ambulatory blood pressure responses and the circumplex model of mood: A 4-day study. *Psychosomatic Medicine*, 61, 319–333.
- Jasnow, A. M., Schulkin, J., & Pfaff, D. W. (2006). Estrogen facilitates fear conditioning and increases corticotropin-releasing hormone mRNA expression in the central amygdala of female mice. *Hormones and Behavior*, 49, 197–205.
- Keltner, D., & Haidt, J. (1999). Social functions of emotions at four levels of analysis. *Cognition and Emotion*, 13, 505–521.
- Kemper, T. D. (1978). *A social interactional theory of emotion*. New York: Wiley.
- Kemper, T. D., & Collins, R. (1990). Dimensions of microinteraction. *American Journal of Sociology*, 96, 32–68.
- Keverne, E. B., & Curley, J. P. (2004). Vasopressin, oxytocin and social behaviour. *Current Opinion in Neurobiology*, 14, 777–783.
- Kosfeld, M., Heinrichs, M., Zak, P. J., Fischbacher, U., & Fehr, E. (2005). Oxytocin increases trust in humans. *Nature*, 435, 673–676.
- Kutas, M., & Federmeier, K. D. (2011). Thirty years and counting: Finding meaning in the N400 component of the event-related brain potential (ERP). *Annual Review of Psychology*, 62, 621–647.
- Lacey, J. I., & Lacey, B. C. (1970). Some autonomic-central nervous system interrelationships. In P. Black (Ed.), *Physiological correlates of emotion* (pp. 205–227). New York: Academic Press.
- Lawler, E. J. (2001). An affect theory of social exchange. *American Journal of Sociology*, 107, 321–352.
- Leary, T. (1957). *Interpersonal diagnosis of personality*. New York: Ronald Press.
- Leavitt, R. L., & Power, M. B. (1989). Emotional socialization in the postmodern era: Children in day care. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 52, 35–43.
- LeDoux, J. E. (1986). Sensory systems and emotion: A model of affective processing. *Integrative Psychiatry*, 4, 237–243.
- Lee, H.-J., Macbeth, A. H., & Pagani, J. H. (2009). Oxytocin: The great facilitator of life. *Progress In Neurobiology*, 88, 127–151.
- Lindquist, K. A., Wager, T. D., Kober, H., Bliss-Moreau, E., & Barrett, L. F. (2012). The brain basis of emotion: A meta-analytic review. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 35, 1–86.
- Lively, K. J. (2000). Reciprocal emotion management: Working together to maintain stratification in private law firms. *Work and Occupations*, 27, 32–63.
- Lively, K. J., & Powell, B. (2006). Emotional expression at work and at home: Domain, status or individual characteristics? *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 69, 17–38.
- Lizardo, O., & Collett, J. L. (2013). Embarrassment and social organization: A multiple identities model. *Social Forces*, 92(1), 353–375.
- Lofland, L. (1985). The social shaping of emotion: The case of grief. *Symbolic Interaction*, 8, 171–190.
- Maier, K. J., Waldstein, S. R., & Synowski, S. J. (2003). Relation of cognitive appraisal to cardiovascular reactivity, affect, and task engagement. *Annals of Behavioral Medicine*, 26, 32–41.
- Markovsky, B. (1988). Injustice and arousal. *Social Justice Research*, 2, 223–233.
- Masuda, T., & Nisbett, R. E. (2001). Attending holistically versus analytically: Comparing the context sensitivity of Japanese and Americans. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 81, 922–934.
- Masuda, T., Ellsworth, P. C., Mesquita, B., Leu, J., Tanida, S., & de Veerdonk, E. V. (2008). Placing the face in context: Cultural differences in perceiving emotions from facial behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 94, 365–381.

- McCarthy, M. M. (1995). Estrogen modulation of oxytocin and its relation to behavior. *Advances in Experimental Medicine and Biology*, 395, 235–245.
- McFarland, R. A. (1985). Relationship of skin temperature changes to the emotions accompanying music. *Biofeedback and Self-Regulation*, 10, 255–267.
- Mead, G. H. (1934). *Mind, self, and society: From the standpoint of a social behaviorist*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Michelson, D., Stratakis, C., Hill, L., Reynolds, J., Galliven, E., Chrousos, G., Gold, P. (1996). Bone mineral density in women with depression. *New England Journal of Medicine*, 335, 1176–1181.
- Morgan, R. L., & Heise, D. R. (1988). Structure of emotions. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 51, 19–31.
- Morhenn, V. B., Park, J. W., Piper, E., & Zak, P. J. (2008). Monetary sacrifice among strangers is mediated by endogenous oxytocin release after physical contact. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 29, 375–383.
- Murphy, F. C., Nimmo-Smith, I., & Lawrence, A. D. (2003). Functional neuroanatomy of emotions: A meta-analysis. *Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioral Neuroscience*, 3, 207–233.
- Neumann, I. D., & Landgraf, R. (2012). Balance of brain oxytocin and vasopressin: implications for anxiety, depression, and social behaviors. *Trends in Neurosciences*, 35, 649–659.
- O'Carroll, R. E., Drysdale, E., Cahill, L., Shajahan, P., Ebmeier, K. P. (1999). Stimulation of the noradrenergic system enhances and blockade reduces memory for emotional material in man. *Psychological Medicine*, 29, 1083–1088.
- Osgood, C. E. (1952). The nature and measurement of meaning. *Psychological Bulletin*, 49, 197–237.
- Osgood, C. E., Suci, G. J., & Tannenbaum, P. H. (1957). *The measurement of meaning*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Osgood, C. E., May, W. H., & Miron, M. S. (1975). *Cross-cultural universals of affective meaning*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Pak, A., & Paroubek, P. (2010). *Twitter as a corpus for sentiment analysis and opinion mining*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Conference on Language Resources and Evaluation, 18 May 2010.
- Pang, B., & Lee, L. (2008). Opinion mining and sentiment analysis. *Foundations and Trends in Information Retrieval*, 2, 1–135.
- Pavlidis, I., & Levine, J. A. (2002). Thermal image analysis for polygraph testing. *Engineering in Medicine and Biology Magazine, IEEE*, 21, 56–64.
- Pavlidis, I., Eberhardt, N. L., & Levine, J. A. (2002). Seeing through the face of deception. *Nature*, 415, 35–35.
- Peeters, G. M., van Schoor, N. M., van Rossum, E. F., Visser, M., & Lips, P. (2008). The relationship between cortisol, muscle mass and muscle strength in older persons and the role of genetic variations in the glucocorticoid receptor. *Clinical Endocrinology*, 69, 673–682.
- Phan, K. L., Wager, T. D., Taylor, S. F., & Liberzon, I. (2002). Functional neuroanatomy of emotion: A meta-analysis of emotion activation studies in PET and fMRI. *NeuroImage*, 2, 331–348.
- Piazza, J. R., Charles, S. T., Sliwinski, M. J., Mogle, J., & Almeida, D. M. (2013). Affective reactivity to daily stressors and long-term risk of reporting a chronic physical health condition. *Annals of Behavioral Medicine*, 45, 110–120.
- Pollard, T. M., & Schwartz, J. E. (2003). Are changes in blood pressure and total cholesterol related to changes in mood? An 18-month study of men and women. *Health Psychology*, 22, 47–53.
- Procter, R., Vis, F., & Voss, A. (2013). Reading the riots on twitter: Methodological innovation for the analysis of big data. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, 16, 197–214.
- Puri, C., Olson, L., Pavlidis, I., Levine, J., & Starren, J. (2005). *StressCam: non-contact measurement of users' emotional states through thermal imaging*. Paper presented at the CHI '05 extended abstracts on Human factors in computing systems, Portland, OR, USA.
- Reddy, D. S., O'Malley, B. W., Rogawski, M. A. (2005). Anxiolytic activity of progesterone in progesterone receptor knockout mice. *Neuropharmacology*, 48, 14–24.
- Reitzes, D. C., & Burke, P. J. (1980). College student identity: Measurement and implications. *Pacific Sociological Review*, 23, 46–66.
- Roberts, R. J., & Weerts, T. C. (1982). Cardiovascular responding during anger and fear imagery. *Psychological Reports*, 50, 219–230.
- Robinson, M. D., & Barrett, L. F. (2010). Belief and feeling in self-reports of emotion: evidence for semantic infusion based on self-esteem. *Self and Identity*, 9, 87–111.
- Robinson, M. D., & Clore, G. L. (2002). Belief and feeling: Evidence for an accessibility model of emotional self-report. *Psychological bulletin*, 128, 934.
- Robinson, D. T., Smith-Lovin, L., & Tsoudis, O. (1994). Heinous crime or unfortunate accident? The effects of remorse on responses to mock criminal confessions. *Social Forces*, 73, 175–190.
- Robinson, D. T., Smith-Lovin, L., & Rogalin, C. (2004). Physiological measures of theoretical concepts: Some ideas for linking deflection and emotion to physical responses during interaction. *Advances in Group Processes*, 21, 77–115.
- Robinson, D. T., Smith-Lovin, L., & Wisecup, A. K. (2006). Affect control theory. In J. E. Stets & J. H. Turner (Eds.), *Handbook of the sociology of emotions* (pp. 179–202). New York: Springer.
- Robinson, D. T., Clay-Warner, J., Moore, C. D., Everett, T., Watts, A., Tucker, T. N., & Thai, C. (2012). Toward an unobtrusive measure of emotion during interaction: Thermal imaging techniques. *Advances in Group Processes*, 29, 225–266.
- Russell, J. A. (1980). A circumplex model of affect. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 39, 1161–1178.



- Sayette, M. A., Cohn, J. F., Wertz, J. M., Perrott, M. A., & Parrott, D. J. (2001). A psychometric evaluation of the facial action coding system for assessing spontaneous expression. *Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 25*, 167–185.
- Schauburg, G., Ambrasat, J., Conrad, M., Schröder, T., & von Scheve, C. (2012). *EEG-correlates of affective coherence in visually presented sentences describing social actions*. Paper presented at Affect Control Theory Conference, 21 April, Nashville, Indiana.
- Scheff, T. J. (1988). Shame and conformity: The deference-emotion system. *American Sociological Review, 53*, 395–406.
- Scherer, K. R. (2001). *Appraisal processes in emotion: Theory, methods, research*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Scherer, K. R., Abeles, R. P., & Fischer, C. S. (1975). *Human aggression and conflict: Interdisciplinary perspectives*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
- Schöll, W. (2013). The socio-emotional basis of human interaction and communication: How we construct our social world. *Social Science Information, 52*, 3–33.
- Schröder, T., & Thagard, P. (2013). The affective meanings of automatic social behaviors: Three mechanisms that explain priming. *Psychological Review, 120*, 255–280.
- Schwartz, G. E., Weinberger, D. A., & Singer, J. A. (1981). cardiovascular differentiation of happiness, sadness, anger, and fear following imagery and exercise. *Psychosomatic Medicine, 43*, 343–364.
- Schwartz, J. E., Warren, K., & Pickering, T. G. (1994). Mood, location and physical position as predictors of ambulatory blood pressure and heart rate: Application of a multi-level random effects model. *Annals of Behavioral Medicine, 16*, 210–220.
- Simon, R. W., & Nath, L. E. (2004). Gender and emotion in the United States: Do men and women differ in self-reports of feelings and expressive behavior? *American Journal of Sociology, 109*, 1137–1176.
- Simon, R. W., Eder, D., & Evans, C. (1992). The development of feeling norms underlying romantic love among adolescent females. *Social Psychology Quarterly, 55*, 29–46.
- Sinaceur, M., & Tiedens, L. Z. (2006). Get mad and get more than even: When and why anger expression is effective in negotiations. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42*, 314–322.
- Skrandies, W. (1998). Evoked potential correlates of semantic meaning: A brain mapping study. *Cognitive Brain Research, 6*, 173–183.
- Smith, A. C., & Kleinman, S. (1989). Managing emotions in medical school: Students' contacts with the living and the dead. *Social Psychology Quarterly, 52*, 56–69.
- Smith-Lovin, L. (1995). Sociology of affect and emotion. In K. S. Cook, G. A. Fine, & J. S. House (Eds.), *Sociological perspectives on social psychology* (pp. 118–148). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
- Snyder, J. S., Soumier, A., Brewer, M., Pickel, J., & Cameron, H. A. (2011). Adult hippocampal neurogenesis buffers stress responses and depressive behavior. *Nature, 476*, 458–461.
- Summers-Effler, E. (2002). The micro potential for social change: Emotion, consciousness, and social movement formation. *Sociological Theory, 20*, 41–60.
- Thagard, P., & Schröder, T. (2013). Emotions as semantic pointers: Constructive neural mechanisms. Manuscript submitted for publication.
- Thoits, P. A. (1989). The sociology of emotions. *Annual Review of Sociology, 15*, 317–342.
- Thoits, P. A. (1996). Managing the emotions of others. *Symbolic Interaction, 19*, 85–109.
- Thompson, R. R., Gupta, S., Miller, K., Mills, S., & Orr, S. (2004). The effects of vasopressin on human facial responses related to social communication. *Psychoneuroendocrinology, 29*, 35–48.
- Tiedens, L. Z. (2001). Anger and advancement versus sadness and subjugation: The effect of negative emotion expressions on social status conferral. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80*, 86–94.
- van Honk, J., Tuiten, A., Verbaten, R., van den Hout, M., Koppeschaar, H., Thijssen, J., & de Haan, E. (1999). Correlations among salivary testosterone, mood, and selective attention to threat in humans. *Hormones and Behavior, 36*, 17–24.
- Vytal, K., & Hamann, S. (2010). Neuroimaging support for discrete neural correlates of basic emotions: A voxel-based meta-analysis. *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 22*, 2864–2885.
- Wager, T. D., Phan, K. L., Liberzon, I., & Taylor, S. F. (2003). Valence, gender, and lateralization of functional brain anatomy in emotion: A meta-analysis of findings from neuroimaging. *NeuroImage, 19*, 513–531.
- Walf, A. A., & Frye, C. A. (2006). A review and update of mechanisms of estrogen in the hippocampus and amygdala for anxiety and depression behavior. *Neuropsychopharmacology: Official publication of the American College of Neuropsychopharmacology, 31*, 1097–1111.
- Wingen, van, Guido, A., van Broekhoven, F., Verkes, R. J., Petersson, K. M., Bäckström, T., Buitelaar, J. K., & Fernández, G. (2008). Progesterone selectively increases amygdala reactivity in women. *Molecular Psychiatry, 13*, 325–333.



---

## Part II

# Social Arenas of Emotions

Jocelyn Pixley, Peter McCarthy and Shaun Wilson

## 15.1 Introduction

In an analytical field dominated by neoclassical economics, emotions are almost absent in economic theory; the pursuit of rationality has relegated them to the sidelines. Emotions appear as irrational states, upsetting rational markets. Recently, however, and invoking Keynes's notion of animal spirits to explain the destructive forces behind the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), economists Akerlof and Shiller acknowledge the need to bring emotions into the picture:

So many members of the macroeconomics and finance profession have gone so far in the direction of “rational expectations” and “efficient markets” that they fail to consider the most important dynamics underlying economic crises.... Conventional economic theories exclude the changing thought patterns and modes of doing business that bring on a crisis. They even exclude the loss of trust and confidence. (2009, p. 167)

These authors highlight the “restless and inconsistent element in the economy” (2009, p. 4) but do so without fully untangling the identification

The authors gratefully acknowledge comments in preparing this chapter from Harry Blatterer, Joseph de Rivera, Neil Hart, Helmut Kuzmics, Christian von Scheve, and Sam Whimster. A version of this chapter was presented at the biennial meeting of the European Sociological Association in Torino, Italy on 28 September 2013.

J. Pixley (✉) · P. McCarthy · S. Wilson  
Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia  
e-mail: [jocelynpixley@gmail.com](mailto:jocelynpixley@gmail.com)

of emotions with irrationality. As Gray (2009) argues in reviewing their *Animal Spirits*: “To suggest that the source of market volatility is unreason is to imply that if people were fully rational markets could be stable”. We think otherwise.

Objections to rationalistic conceptualisations of the economy follow many paths. Sociologists query any distinction that denies the intertwining of social processes. Drawing such a distinction quarantines a special kind of “economic rationality” (advanced in orthodox economics) from “irrational” emotional states involved in individual and organisational decisions. Yet rational calculations involved in utility maximisation, cost-benefit analyses, or calculations of present value have emotional translations. They might emerge from coldness, coolness, greed, selfishness, or indifference. Social representations of economic activity—buying and selling shares, firing workers in a downturn, selling mortgages to the poor—equally invoke emotions.

*Even if* real economies could maximise utility and profits across well-functioning markets, it is doubtful that their dynamics would involve only emotions “as noise that is captured by the error term in the utility function,” as Bandelj (2009, p. 348) puts it. Minsky shows that the neoclassical economy is actually *prone* to emotion-generating uncertainty: “Uncertainty is a deep property of decentralised systems in which a myriad of economic agents make decisions whose impacts are aggregated into outcomes that emerge over a range of tomorrows” (1996, p. 360). Polanyi shows that the “financial market governs by

panic” (1957, p. 229). Workers and consumers, as we are reminded by the GFC, also struggle with insecurities and try to guard against them. These responses range from personal depression and collective anger at mass job loss through to the ‘emotion management’ expected of workers vying to hold insecure jobs.

There is one exception to this exclusion of emotions from the orthodox project. The emotions of happiness. Utilitarian traditions see maximising good (ultimately *utility*) as the pre-eminent social goal of economics (Loewenstein 2000, p. 426). However, recently, economists like Richard Layard have reinvigorated Jeremy Bentham’s legacy, modelling it to the task of maximising *happiness* across society. In a 2003 lecture, Layard claimed that: “rational policy-making is possible since happiness is a real scalar variable and can be compared between people” (2003, p. 21). But Layard’s policy prescriptions work *against* the utility-generating market model, recognising “non-exchange” influences on wellbeing such as social ties. In the examples he cites, the negative emotional impacts of markets—job insecurity and reduced esteem from unfavourable interpersonal comparisons in the presence of inequality—actually emerge as central to the need for policy change.

This chapter has three parts. We first develop these opening remarks about the disciplines of economics and sociology; our goal is to identify what the *sociology* of emotions offers to understanding economics and how that understanding might be extended. The second considers historical figures in sociology and economics and their treatment of emotional factors, ending with a commentary on the *emotionlessness* of modern economics. A focus of our encounters with theorists is to identify the ‘social personas’ of business leaders, traders and merchants that surface. The final section extends discussion to the place of emotions in four areas of the financial economy: the roles of ‘emotion rules’; money itself; its inflation and deflation; and trust and confidence. Our goal is to illustrate key points that we believe to be central but overlooked: the role of macro-processes in generating emotional states; the place of uncertainty in economic life; and related,

the ‘normality’ of disequilibrium and disruptive change in real economies. Not surprisingly, surveying the sociology of emotions in the economy runs into neighbouring territory dealt with elsewhere, such as the sociologies of work (see Chap. 15 of this *Handbook*), organisations (Fine-man 2008) and consumption (Kuzmics 2011).

We adopt a framework derived from economic sociology that acknowledges “the patterns of social interaction and the institutions that people create ... to make a living and a profit” (Swedberg 2003, p. xi). Historically-situated economic actors in capitalist markets and social institutions are the objects of analysis. Some macro-actors in our presentation emerge as key agents: business organisations (including their leaders/entrepreneurs) and financial actors (investment funds, banks and finance markets) are central. States, as producers of economic rules, and as fiscal and monetary agents with their own interests, prove equally important.

---

## 15.2 Framework

### 15.2.1 The Split Between Sociology and Economics

The late nineteenth century *Methodenstreit* (Methods Battle) which divided historical and theoretical economists was, Schumpeter declared, “wholly pointless” (1954, p. 814). When he said that there is no “serious question” about the importance of both approaches to the capitalist economy, he was correct in everything save his own optimism about a reconciliation between the various approaches. Schumpeter wrote his *History of Economic Analysis* in the 1940s, but simultaneously, Parsons “brokered” a “nefarious deal” (Moss 1999, p. 552), extending the split in different directions, when Keynes was in his heyday, by agreeing with orthodox theorist Lionel Robbins that sociology would vacate the field of institutional economics and money (Velthuis 1999; Collins 1986, pp. 11–12; Swedberg 1990, p. 3). Thereafter, sociology neglected, or took-for-granted, the works of Keynes and of recent ‘heterodox’ economists who understood that economic conflicts involve money as a

*social relation* (Ingham 2004), with both civilising and de-civilising tendencies (Elias 1978), in situations of uncertainty and where emotions play a major role.

Overcoming this divide is important, we argue, to integrating emotions into the theoretical constructs about the economy informing both economics and sociology. Heterodox economics has wasted energies disputing neoclassical economics (Pixley and Harcourt 2013). This may change, but tentative signs do not make a spring of rapprochement. At present, there is a diminished emphasis on the history of ideas, heterodox thinking and economic history in teaching programs that would facilitate such openings from the economics side. However, avenues developed in economic sociology (for example, by Richard Swedberg, Randall Collins and Geoffrey Ingham) and by institutional economists (including Hyman Minsky, Sheila Dow and André Or-léan) suggest cause for hope.

### 15.2.2 Why Economics Downplays Emotions

No sociological survey of emotions in the economy can fail to notice the absence of emotional accounts in economics although milder reproaches of the same kind could be levelled at sociology and even psychology until recently. When orthodox economics has not ignored emotions entirely, it has dealt with them in ways that require translation. This obscurity stems in part from the Benthamite foundations of economic science: its project was to promote happiness (later redefined and quantified as utility) through efficient markets that organise consumers and producers. Berezin writes: “History reveals that utility proved a more attractive concept than sentiment” (2005, p. 114). Economic circumstances that maximise utility (assumed to happen in free markets) are an ideal economic order. On such terms set by economics, we contend that these circumstances amount to an ideal emotional order as well; indeed, this is the implication of the “spontaneous order” tradition in economics (see Perrin 1995, p. 795). Such thinking treats emotional states inconsistent with

utility-maximising behaviour as irrational, even dangerous. Durkheim was forceful about the problems accompanying the defence of rationality in economics, brilliantly remarking that:

the economist does not say: things happen in the way established by experience; but instead: they have to happen like this because it would be absurd if it happened in any other way. The word *natural* is therefore to be replaced by the word *rational* (Durkheim 1888: *Cours de Science Sociales: Leçon d’ouverture*; quoted in Steiner 2011:19; author’s emphases).

Economists sometimes defend rationality dogmatically. Eugene Fama’s defense of the ‘efficient markets hypothesis’ in an interview with the *New Yorker* magazine (Cassidy 2010), even rendered as rational what were extreme responses to financial market shifts during the GFC. Commenting on the Great Depression, Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke cites Minsky and Kindleberger on “the inherent instability of the financial system” but criticises them for having to “depart from the assumption of rational economic behavior”. Bernanke does not “deny the possible importance of irrationality in economic life” but adds “it seems that the best research strategy is to push the rationality postulate as far as it will go” (2000, p. 43). In outlining his sociology of economic knowledge, Steiner playfully suggests that “hyper-rational” orthodox economics is a “rent-seeking strategy from a handful of mathematical economists” (2001, p. 452), and a type of knowledge that dominates over other economic knowledge rooted in material interests or that involves “popular economic representations” (2001, p. 445). The latter two knowledges are important to our purposes, not least because they can be readily connected to realistic values and interests (and, by extension, to emotions) generated in the economy.

The denial of overt emotions has an element of *taboo*, especially in a discipline noted for its masculinity (see Meagher and Nelson 2004). But politics and patronage also contributed to this denial in unexpected ways. In the heartland of value-free economics, the United States, the retreat into mathematical formalities had been prompted by the Cold War which, “enforced, if

it did not create, a trend toward economists offering professionally neutral expertise, which contrasted strongly with the ethical, and strongly held, advocacy of the late-nineteenth-century professional economist” (Morgan and Rutherford 1998, p. 16). Social processes help to maintain such pretences. Turner and Stets suggest that market-based societies are prone to conflicts between the “demands of the emotion culture” and “emotions that individuals actually experience” (2006, p. 28). Impression management matters in economic transactions and games, as it does in any context, where financial and status losses are possibilities. Poker-players, superior bankers or teenagers (whether of ghetto or leafy suburb) cultivate cool exteriors. Emotions are a fatal giveaway for the “babyish”, those lacking “self-control” (Lyman and Scott 1970, p. 149). Every effort is devoted to perfecting skills of ‘presentation’. These range from the weapons of the weak—foot-dragging, dumb insolence and go-slow tactics (Scott 1987), to those of the strong—indifference or conformity to whatever the situation and power structure require.

This is not to suggest invariability across economic fields. Hassoun writes: “In banks, for example, social relations are framed by reserve and discretion; expression of emotion is censured, repressed, kept in check, and considered harmful”. He cites an exception—the lack of “sanctions or reprimands for externalizing feelings or showing aggressiveness” on share-markets (Hassoun 2005, p. 114). We show herein that exceptions have broader contexts.

### 15.2.3 Emotions and the Economy— Sociological Approaches

The program of research establishing how emotions, thought processes and different forms of human action interrelate is a vast and developing field. There is now a greater acceptance of the complexity of these interactions in the field of sociology (Turner and Stets 2006, p. 25). In surveying recent developments, von Scheve and von Luede (2005) even suggest that there is room for greater cooperation between neuroscientists, who

imply social structures in their work on emotions, and sociologists (they single out the work of Elias and Bourdieu) who have the sophisticated models explaining such structures.

Investigating emotions is consistent with a central responsibility of sociologists (one shared by us) to identify the *social* in both the technical and in the economic. Some sociology, however, headed in the reverse direction: identifying the rational in the social has been a preoccupation of figures including Coleman (1986) (who focuses on “interests”). Barbalet, who agrees that emotions and cognition are “interlaced”, offers a wider justification for a sociology of the emotions in the economy: major economic theories have “not directly address[ed] the emotional basis of economic action itself” (1998, p. 95).

As we say, economics has had a strong investment in its version of rationality. Definitions of rational action variously ignore, externalise and even rationalise the role that emotions play in evolutionary terms (see Frank 1988; for criticism of this, see Elster 1998, p. 72). But increasing sensitivity to the question of emotions has emerged. There is now acknowledgment that emotions can help order preferences and judge the possible outcomes of decisions. But these insights amount to a limited appreciation. Writing in the *American Economic Review*, Loewenstein recognizes that emotions have “long lasting and important consequences both for individuals and society” (2000, p. 429). Still, he holds out hope that emotions are “systematic...[or] amenable to formal modelling” (2000, p. 431). Elster (1998, 1999) has also written about the importance of emotions to fields, including economics, without diminishing his commitment to rational-choice theory. Even elegant work by Kahneman and Tversky (1974; also Tversky and Kahneman 1986) on heuristics and biases, and on systematic deviations from the normative model of rational choice, pay little attention to emotions as Kahneman concedes (2011, p. 12). Finally, in introducing a series of papers on emotions that build on experimental research in neuroscience and psychology, economist Alan Kirman et al. say it is “possible to speak... of a real emotional rationality, the rationality



not of the isolated agent but of the socially embedded one” (2010, p. 216).

From the classics onwards, criticism of orthodox economics has pointed to the discipline’s neglect of the social “embeddedness” of economic action (Granovetter 1985; see also Krippner and Alvarez 2007). In highlighting factors such as trust and sociability, however, these revised sociological accounts still did not fully recognise the role of emotions in the social institutions for which they sought greater visibility.<sup>1</sup> However, Collins’s “interaction ritual chains” are a prominent sociological attempt to put emotions—or rather the maximisation of “emotional energy”—at the centre of what amounts to an expanded construct of cost-benefit calculation, familiar to economics, which can explain “nonmaterial, emotional and symbolic behaviour” (2004, p. 182). Bandelj (2009) takes further steps, joining the sociological literatures of embeddedness and emotions. Drawing on insights from Bourdieu and Garfinkel among others, she recasts economic action as interactive and practical, embedded in routines, and only sometimes consistent with formal descriptions. Indeed, under conditions of extreme uncertainty, the “clear means-ends logic” of economic behaviour collapses (Bandelj 2009, p. 362) with emotions actually creatively aiding decision-making (2009, p. 362). Her observations suggest that emotions are not only embedding. They are also disembedding, creative and disruptive. Accordingly, emotions are unlikely to play a ‘supporting’ role that merely enriches rational behaviour; they “also influence economic processes because they are generated during the interaction process and cannot be completely anticipated nor controlled” (2009, p. 363).

Working through markets and complex organisations, people look for trusting allies, outmanoeuvre rivals, favour friends, conceal feelings about clients and bosses, and worry about food,

housing and share prices. These interactions, however, are shaped by common patterns that point to the influence of *social structure* that, in turn, require macrosociological explanation. As Turner and Stets observe: “most theories of emotion are microstructural in focus, but surely there are macrodynamic emotional forces” (2006, p. 48).<sup>2</sup>

Studying macro-dynamics focuses our attention on large-scale processes of inequality and differences across group experience. Kemper writes in the first edition of this *Handbook*: “when there is a stable structure of social relations, we propose that there are also emotions that correspond to the position of the actors on the power-status dimensions” (2006, p. 98). Collins (2004, p. 147) makes a related point: “long-term” emotions organise and stabilise stratification systems. Summarising Barbalet’s position, Turner and Stets reiterate the point that emotions are “differentially distributed across segments of a population that possess varying levels of power and prestige” (2006, p. 39). Accordingly, a sociological picture of the economy must make emotional dynamics accessible, particularly by bringing those relationships shaped by unequal economic and power structures into view (i.e. between creditors and debtors, buyers and sellers, and capitalists and workers). From such a vantage point, the stratification of emotional responses to generalised economic conditions (like downturns) becomes clearer. Shareowners, for instance, experience the same recession differently to insecure workers, and have different abilities and opportunities to mobilise their anxieties in economic self-protection.

Although stratification is a predominant focus in explaining macro-emotional variation, social institutions and social change are capable of producing widespread, more homogenous “structures of feeling” (Williams 1989, pp. 96–97) that shift over time. In economic history, earlier attempts were made to classify cycles and waves; see Russian economist Nikolai Kondratiev’s

<sup>1</sup> Bourdieu makes a more general criticism. However sociologically improved, he argues, “interactionist visions” cannot “take account of effects that occur outside of any interaction” (2005, p. 195). His concept of ‘fields’ shares ground with Norbert Elias’s work, and also with later sociologists who use structure in the sociology of emotion.

<sup>2</sup> There are exceptions. Elias (1978) and Barbalet (1998) offer important, though very different, macrosociological accounts.

work, for example. Here, we adopt a position that stresses both the *tendency* for capitalist economies to produce booms and downturns, and the *unpredictable* qualities of these movements. It follows on from this characterisation that the macro-economy can generate overall economic “climates”, to adopt in loose fashion a concept sometimes used in the emotions literature. Such climates, to Rivera and Paez (2007), “are objective in the sense that they are perceived as existing apart from an individual’s personal feelings” (2007, p. 234). In neighbouring studies of crowds and social movements, more is made of all-encompassing moods (see Goodwin et al. 2000). But the impact of macroeconomic moods or fears on economic behaviour is less well theorised in sociology. Depressions, recessions, booms, and bubbles (generally, the trade cycle) can be understood as mere deviation from market processes that smoothly self-correct. Or they can be taken as evidence of the chronic instability of markets (the heterodox view), in which case, emotional processes might emerge as explanatory factors.

We think of market interactions as decentralised, and not particularly ‘collective’ in a strict sense, so a question emerges about how shared moods might be explained by the sociology of emotions. We can extend von Scheve and Ismer’s (2013, p. 4) analysis of ‘emotional atmospheres’; they argue that “shared appraisal structures” create patterns in the economy among individuals who are otherwise only diffusely associated (2013, p. 7). Not strictly ‘collective’ in their aggregate, these individual responses (presumably, to similar economic events or shocks) produce what von Scheve and Ismer calls an “I-mode” response to common events (2013, p. 7).<sup>3</sup> The “irrational exuberance” of the US asset bubbles of the 2000s that built up from broad-based speculation, with other hopeful effects, might be an example of such dispersed mood formation.

Sometimes, however, economic actors mobilise common identities and relate to each other in ways that have other sociological foundations.

These involve what von Scheve and Ismer (2013, p. 7) call “we-mode” responses, drawing closer to collective action and away from dispersed reactions. Anger at wages and conditions across factories that produces a strike wave against employers can generate mutual reinforcements of economic *class conflict*. Another might be relationships that generate severe *distrust* in a credit crisis, for example, when banks act in the same way, refusing to lend to cash-strapped firms.<sup>4</sup> Finally, the intentional acts of powerful actors can affect rapid changes in moods; among the more dramatic was President Nixon’s top-down order to “make [the Chilean] economy scream” in response to the election of Allende (CIA 1970).

Macrosociology, with its focus on social structures, collective or serial emotional states, and large actors adds greatly to our explanatory repertoire. Neoclassical economists do study macro ‘pathologies’ of markets, such as ‘herding’ behaviour, but their accounts stay loyal to the assumptions and tools of micro-analysis. In rethinking market herding, Baddeley stresses the macro: “if the state of confidence is strong and people are optimistic, then the macro-economy will be vulnerable to waves of euphoria, optimism, and overconfidence, precipitating herding and speculative bubbles” (2010, p. 284). She points out that neoclassical economics examines such sharp aggregate movements assuming actor rationality and styles of learning behaviour captured by an array of “mathematical algorithms” (2010, p. 281) including “Bayesian updating models” (2010, p. 282). Drawing instead on Keynes’s insights, as well as neuroscience, evolutionary biology and sociology, Baddeley rejects as an explanation of herding the “dichotomous, binary concept of rationality” enforced via the assumptions of algorithms. Herding is better explained by “socio-psychological factors” (2010, p. 288).

Macrosociology also offers various accounts of the relationship between micro-interactions and their general impacts, with implications for understanding economies. Collins (1981), for example, argues that macro-social processes emerge

<sup>3</sup> Barbalet describes these actions as “serial” or “parallel”, involving separate responses of distinct businesses (1998, p. 96).

<sup>4</sup> Christian von Scheve also suggested this example in correspondence.

**Table 15.1** Emotional influences on the economy—a taxonomy

	Orthodox	Heterodox
Micro	Assumes rational utility-maximising individuals (little or no account of emotions) Recent revisions stress: the ‘evolutionary’ role of emotions for rational action; and the role of emotions in decision-making	In economics, Keynes’s ‘animal spirits’ of investors is an influential characterisation of investor behaviour In sociology, economic actors are variously ‘situated’ or embedded (Polanyi, Bandelj) in ‘interaction chains’ (Collins)
Macro	Macro-states are understood as the aggregate of individual decisions (e.g. ‘herding’) Large-scale shifts and market failures are understood as disturbances to equilibrium states Akerlof and Shiller (for e.g.) acknowledge ‘animal spirits’ and emotions govern decisions and disequilibrium but understand these as irrational processes that justify intervention	Macro-states exist independently of aggregate individual behaviour, with ‘social representations’ (Orléan) and/or paradoxes (fallacy of composition: Keynes) Disequilibrium is ‘normal’ in capitalist markets Conflicts in macro-economy generate emotions. Shared sentiments and moods are powerful determinants of economic action

out of the emotional energies expressed in micro-social scenarios—“situated interactions”:

the growth of a productive economy as well as its cycles of boom and depression should be to an important degree determined by shifts in emotional energies throughout the working population in general, or possibly among entrepreneurs in particular (1981, p. 1011).

Macro-states, of course, are not always straightforward aggregations of micro-states. Barbalet notes: “economies as a whole, in which aggregate investment propensities function, cannot be explained through the proclivities of individual investors” (1998, p. 95). Keynes’s “paradox of thrift” (1973, p. 83–84) illustrates this, highlighting the micro-macro disjuncture in the aggregate consequences of the individual’s emotional effort at self-protective thrift. Caution, risk-aversion and containment by sensible individuals ‘rebounds’ via macro-processes into a recessionary climate, leading the same risk-averse actors into bankruptcy and despair. This prompts one further comment on the role of *uncertainty*. Its endemic presence in market societies necessitates special emphasis on “anticipatory emotions” (Kemper 2006, p. 101–102; see also Pixley 2012; and Insky 1996, p. 360). How economic actors respond to uncertainty focuses our attention on the all-important relationship between emotions and unknown futures.

Because the study of emotions in applied contexts is still emerging, our taxonomy of the role of emotions in economic processes is tentative.

Table 15.1 summarises some distinctions that guide this survey. It is convenient to divide contributions between micro- and macro- approaches: ones that emphasise an analytical focus on individual behaviour and others that emphasise aggregate/overall responses. The second distinction is also methodological. Orthodox approaches, in our simple dichotomy, stress what Colander et al. call the “holy trinity—rationality, selfishness and equilibrium” (cited in Lawson 2006, p. 488). Heterodox approaches, for our purposes, involve a departure from these assumptions and stretch across economics and sociology. They are methodologically diverse, stressing ‘disequilibrium’, non-rational processes and social institutions.

### 15.3 Emotions and the Economy—Insights from Classical Thinkers

Both directly and indirectly, classical thinkers across economics and sociology addressed the subject of emotions in economic life. Here, we make a general claim, asserting the relevance of classical thought to the future shaping of this sub-field of emotions scholarship. Close reading brings surprises. We give particular attention to those in economics and sociology who have an encompassing view of social relations of the “specific economy in which we live”, the kind of phrase that Keynes used. Another focus is the “social persona” of the entrepreneur, who takes centre stage in emergent capitalism, and who

comes to embody both the range and social dynamics of some of the types of capitalism under investigation.

### 15.3.1 Emotions in Commercial Society: Adam Smith and Herbert Spencer

To establish a context for understanding the thought of Adam Smith (1723–1790), we need, as Hirschman shows, to give some attention to the moralists of the seventeenth century and to such thinkers as Montesquieu and Sir John Steuart in the eighteenth. These thinkers were responding to the emergence of political and economic situations with the “general belief that the passions were dangerous and destructive” though in the eighteenth century, views about the passions become more positive (1977, p. 27) and Hirschman writes that, “The most interesting applications of the thesis show how the willfulness, the disastrous lust for glory, and, in general, the passionate excesses of the powerful are curbed by the interests—their own and those of their subjects” (1977, p. 70). What these writers did was “to utilize one set of comparatively innocuous passions to countervail another more dangerous and destructive set” (1977, p. 20). However, with Smith’s *Wealth of Nations*, the distinction is “superseded and obliterated” (1977, p. 69). Passions don’t need to be set against one another; all can contribute to economic improvement (1977, p. 110). So, “private individuals, by pursuing their vices, or simply their self-interest, could contribute to the social welfare” (1977, p. 119). Thus, we arrive at the notion, still ideologically powerful, of the “invisible hand”.

Hirschman usefully situates Smith’s work in a “*doux-commerce* thesis” (the description is derived from Montesquieu): “that commerce was a civilizing agent of considerable power and range” (1982, p. 1464). Thus, for Smith and for Hume, the market “would generate as a by-product, or external economy, a more ‘polished’ human type” (1982, p. 1465). Hirschman points out that the *doux-commerce* thesis is compatible with another interpretation of market society, the

“self-destruction thesis” in which “capitalist society, far from fostering *douceur* and other fine attitudes, exhibits a pronounced proclivity towards undermining the moral foundations on which any society, including the capitalist variety, must rest” (1982, p. 1466). He sees this thesis emerging in the nineteenth century, “among both Marxists and conservative thinkers”. However, we find that it is strikingly apparent in Smith’s work too and re-markably, it turns out that the ‘founder of modern economics’ and patron of its drier practitioners, is the author for whom understanding emotion as a source of both positive and negative consequences for individuals and the public interest is a key to understanding economic life.

The “commercial” stage of economic organisation which Smith saw emerging in Europe in the eighteenth century represented a major ‘improvement’ over earlier feudal society, changing social relations from “servile dependency” for the better and distributing wealth widely. It allowed people to pursue the passion for self-improvement which, in Smith’s view, we all share. But that improvement came at considerable cost. The division of labour, for all its economic benefits, leaves the “common people” emotionally and intellectually stunted while the rising merchant class, driven by “self-love” or “avidity”, could distort the economy and the actions of government to pursue monopoly or the irrational and ultimately doomed projects of colonisation. (Here, we can identify a description of early capitalism as a form of emotional stratification, a concept emphasised by Turner and Stets (2006)). There is a tendency to dismiss Smith’s observation as nothing more than an aside when he writes in the *Wealth of Nations* that “People in the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the publick, or in some contrivance to raise prices” (1981, I.x.c.27). In fact, this is part of his sustained critique of commercial society.

We have within us, according to Smith a disposition to “truck [meaning to trade by exchange of commodities], barter and exchange” which, whatever its origins, enables us to pursue that passion for “improvement”, for bettering our situation. And we learn to engage with one another,

first on the basis of our own feelings and, as we grow, on the basis of “sympathy” for others with sympathy here not meant in the sense of ‘feeling sorry for’, but explicitly redefined as “correspondence of the sentiments” (1984, 1.1.2.4). Here are the origins of the sentiments that lead us to pursue “wealth, power and prehemine (sic)”, in particular our pride in riches and our shame in poverty; indeed, the origins of our deference to the “rich and powerful” which Smith suggests is the source of “the distinction of ranks and the order of society” (1984, I.iii.2.3). (The concept of sympathy in Smith has been harnessed to many later arguments in economics and philosophy (see Frank 1988)). Sympathy connects Smith’s political economy to a sustaining moral order; markets somehow ‘require’ or ‘encourage’ sympathy for commercial exchange to be grounded socially—and emotionally. For Smith, “the man of real constancy and firmness ... thoroughly bred in the great school of self-command, in the bustle and business of the world” is able to adopt “the sentiments of the impartial spectator” (1984, III.3.25; for more on this, see Hill and McCarthy 2004). There is an important question, however, as to whether Smith believed markets encouraged sympathy or required it. The latter view, as Perrin states, is found in the “spontaneous-order theory” of the Austrian school of economics; “self-interest based exchange considerations draw people together and facilitating or regulatory norms emerge almost *pari passu*” (1995, p. 795).

Smith’s sociology of moral sentiments and their relationship to commercial society is at times critical of the effects of markets, suggesting a more complex position. Markets do not appear to automatically create emotional order. While we come to understand others and to bring reason to that understanding, reason is only a kind of aid. Like Keynes later on, Smith makes it clear that reason counts for little in the heat of emotion. And as we develop, our experiences and opportunities differentiate us bit by bit from one another: “habit, custom and education” (1981, I.11.4) will eventually create a gulf between people.

Commercial society brought opportunities for the “common people”. The division of labour meant, because of “the great multiplication of

the productions... that universal opulence which extends itself to the lowest ranks of the people” (1981, I.i). But while the *Wealth of Nations* begins with this analysis of the benefits of the division of labour, it ends with an argument that the sovereign, that is government, should educate the common people, the majority, to protect them against the emotionally crippling consequences of this form of economic activity. The endless repetition of “a few simple operations” leaves a man incapable even of solving any problems that arise in his work:

The torpor of his mind renders him, not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous, noble, or tender sentiment, and consequently of forming any just judgment concerning many even of the ordinary duties of private life (1981, V.i.f.50).

It is a bleak picture; opulence has costs.

For the merchant, life is very different but still in some ways not to be envied. Anticipating later descriptions, the merchant is “bold”, more prepared to take risks, Smith writes, than for example, the country gentleman, and therefore central to the development of the commercial age. But “the chance of gain is naturally over-valued” and merchants have this tendency to combine to the detriment of the “public interest”, not only in the “contrivance to raise prices” but more broadly in the sway they exercise over government to limit markets and set up bounties and particularly in pursuing colonial schemes. Smith is scathing of the “mean rapacity and monopolising spirit” they display. He points to “the absurd confidence which almost all men have in their own good fortune”, illustrated at its worst in the endless colonial ventures of the eighteenth century which usually aimed at discovering silver and gold, ventures which were almost always ruinous but were driven by passion and “human avidity”. Colonialism in the Americas and the Indies had sought: “To promote the little interests of one little order of men in one country, [but] it hurts the interests of all other orders of men in that country, and of all men in all other countries” (1981, IV.vii.c.60). Passion meant that the merchants exercised power in their own interests,



contrary to the interests of the consumer and contrary to “justice and equality of treatment” (1981, IV.viii.30). Ultimately, this pursuit of wealth and power is a delusion: “enormous and operose machines contrived to produce a few trifling conveniences to the body” (1984, IV.i.8). And yet, we only come to this view in moments of despair. Fortunately, according to Smith, our more usual tendency is to imagine “the pleasures of wealth and greatness” and “It is this deception which rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind” (1984, IV.1.9–10).

Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), to the extent that he is even remembered today, is remembered as a social Darwinist, the coiner of the phrase ‘the survival of the fittest’. However, his *Principles of Sociology* (1882, 1885, 1896) is a massive statement about social evolution, putting emotion at the centre of social understanding and earning the ire of Durkheim for what appears to be its ambiguity about the relationship between emotion and social structure.

In what Spencer called the “preliminary” to his *Principles—The Study of Sociology* (1874)—he described “the various perversions produced in men’s judgments by their emotions” (1874, Preface), noting both the difficulty that meant for anyone attempting sociology and the prevalence of these distortions in social life. For the sociologist, as for anyone else, “excited feelings” distorted estimates of probability and importance (1874, p. 147). Indeed, Spencer writes that “trustworthy interpretations of social arrangements imply an almost passionless consciousness” (1885, p. 232). More generally, our beliefs are inevitably distorted: “caused much more by aggregates of feelings than by examinations of evidence” (1874, p. 149). The effects of these passions, according to Spencer, were particularly evident in his time in the extent to which people willingly subordinated themselves to authority, were rabidly patriotic, and, of great importance, showed a “class-bias”: “a joint effort to get an undue share of the aggregate proceeds of social activity” (1874, pp. 174–177, 203–204, 247).

To better understand this idea of social activity, we must examine Spencer’s notion of social evolution: the idea that, analogous to biological

evolution, society might exhibit “progress towards greater size, coherence, multiformity (sic), and definiteness” (1882, p. 585). This involved greater heterogeneity (with increasing social stratification) (1885, p. 644); greater social coherence; greater “definiteness”, for example in political organisation (1885, p. 645); and as “the primary process of evolution” (1896, p. 600), increasing integration as groups combine and subordinate themselves to government (1885, pp. 643–644). Associated with these changes, Spencer even proposed “the law of emotional progress” with emotions becoming similarly more complex (1882, p. 54). Nevertheless, ‘progress’ appears to be a misleading term in this context. Spencer, relying again on the analogy from biology, was equally clear that social evolution didn’t necessarily lead to improvement:

Evolution does not imply a latent tendency to improve, everywhere in operation. There is no uniform ascent from lower to higher, but only an occasional production of a form which in virtue of greater fitness for more complex conditions becomes capable of a longer life of a more varied kind.

What thus holds with organic types must also hold with types of societies (1896, p. 599).

Spencer identified, as “ideal forms” (1885, p. 606), “two social types” based on an extreme contrast between the contrasting “kinds of social activity which predominate” (1882, p. 544). These were the *militant*, the activities of “war-like tribes” and the *industrial*, “in which the agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial organization form the chief part of society” (1882, p. 545). These are ideal types in that no actual society could operate without some way of feeding its members, while most (though not all) would have some form of defence; the difference would be in the “ratio” of these social activities (1882, p. 544). The militant required “compulsory co-operation”; the industrial which usually emerged as militancy declined, involved “voluntary co-operation” (1882, p. 583), deriving from an “elaborate division of labour” and “the system of contract” as a result of social evolution (1885, p. 609). This form of cooperation, this predominant relation in each case, is “daily determining

the thoughts and sentiments” of people (1882, p. 557).

Spencer seems to equivocate on the question of determination, on whether the forms of cooperation determine thoughts and sentiments. On the one hand, he argues that: “These pervading traits... originate in these relations of individuals implied by industrial activities” (1882, p. 557). On the other hand, at the end of the third volume of the *Principles*, he asserts that changes in structure will lead to “corresponding change... expressed in the average feelings and opinions” (1896, p. 583). In Elias’s terms (2000, p. 169), “the structure of society... required and generated a specific standard of emotional control”. And to complicate matters, Spencer also proposed that changes in feelings as the industrial type became more common had less to do with that type than with the reduction in militancy with its “consequent brutalizing effects on the feelings” (1885, p. 640).

Not surprisingly, therefore, Durkheim would criticize Spencer, according to Poggi (2000, p. 17, 34–35), for being insufficiently empirical (for philosophising rather than doing sociology) and for basing his analysis in the psychology of individuals rather than seeing that psychology as deriving from social structure. In Poggi’s words:

Spencer claims that the key to societal dynamics lies in the individual’s pursuit of his/her own advantage; whereas according to Durkheim dynamics must go a long way, propelled by the unfolding of collective processes, before it *itself* brings the individual into existence (2000, p. 35; author’s emphasis).

### 15.3.2 Unregulated Passions of Boom and Bust: Emotions in Emile Durkheim

Spencer’s worldview is important (implicitly to this day) to economics and understandings of the economy; its identification with a ‘spontaneous’ social order, for example, is a polemical theme in Austrian economics. And Durkheim’s sociology is both an offshoot and a reaction to Spencer—Durkheim refuses the idea that contract-based market society can generate the associative

norms necessary for contract or to enable distant market relationships (Steiner 2011, p. 27). Durkheim’s dislike of abstract rationalism, which he identifies with economics, opens the door to important and novel ways of re-conceiving the economy; for example, he sees the inability of individuals to set prices as proof of the invisible force of the “social facts” that dominate his social theory (Steiner 2011, p. 25). Moreover, it is clear that Durkheim’s conceptualisation of reason put him on a collision course with economic abstraction; his is a deeply socially organised reason, one “intimately linked” to collective emotional experience (Weyher 2013, p. 369).

As Jones (1986) points out, Durkheim’s earlier *The Division of Labor in Society* (1997) adopted something close to a spontaneous order worldview. But he “gradually relinquished the evolutionary optimism which underlay this mechanical, ‘self-regulating’ conception” and became more focused on disintegrative forces (Jones 1986, p. 59). The later Durkheim, like Marx and Polanyi, sees market industrialism as involving highly disembedding forces<sup>5</sup> disruptive of social orders. Unlike Marx, however, whose theory is full of emotional implications yet curiously avoids them (Collins 2004, p. 102), Durkheim’s account of capitalist change implies unstable and shifting “emotional climates” (de Rivera and Paez, 2007; also Barbalet 1998).

Durkheim’s *Suicide* (2006) is a study of “social facts” and the exercise of a sociological method. It is a powerful statement about emotions, quietly implicating the capitalist economy in the patterns involved in the most private of anguishes. Flam (2009, p. 78) sees *Suicide* as a study of “extreme” emotions and their social causes. As macrosociology, it offers at least two valuable contributions to this survey. Writing of booms and busts, Durkheim presents the *economic cycle* as an impor-

<sup>5</sup> However, Granovetter (1985, p. 482) is slightly incorrect: the switch or Great Transformation is not to disembeddedness but to the domination of market norms over the entirety of social life; for example, ‘supply and demand’ forces are social relations and not ‘disembedded’ (see Ingham 1996; Pixley 2010a; also Krippner and Alvarez 2005, p. 28).

tant influence on emotions. And he shows how emotional states become stratified.

In a rich description of an overheated economy in his chapter on *anomic suicide*, Durkheim's account of the rule-breaking entrepreneur is situated in frenzied market activity where constraints and rules are subverted for personal gain. Durkheim invokes *anomie*—a concept also identified with the writer's earlier, more optimistic discussion of worker 'alienation' produced by rapid and haphazard changes in the division of labour (1997). However, here, Durkheim captures with the same concept a different emotional state, that of entrepreneurs caught up in their own speculation. Anomic states are highly emotional, and in extreme cases, lead to anomic suicide, brought about by the anxiety and risks generated from the loss of constraint by societal rules (2006, p. 219). Durkheim's account is prescient today, years into a long period of deflation following the speculative bubble that preceded the GFC.

When taken together, Durkheim's different statements about anomie in *Suicide* and *The Division of Labor in Society* offer a second insight: in the macro-structures of emotions in the economy, emotional states are not uniformly distributed. They are stratified. Entrepreneurs emerge as "rule breakers" in *Suicide*—and by implication as the class capable of generating great social disruption. Alienated workers and the impoverished appear as restrained by the social order: "Everything that enforces subordination attenuates the effects of this state" (2006, p. 219). Studying the suicidal impact of the 1882 Paris Bourse crash, Durkheim writes that "economic crises have an aggravating effect on the suicidal tendency" (2006, p. 201) and further notes that "Industrial and commercial functions are really among the occupations which furnish the greatest number of suicides" (2006, p. 218). He continues: "Those who only have empty space above them are almost inevitably lost in it, if no force restrains them" (2006, p. 219). Disruption not only takes place in economic collapse, but clearly in the booms that precede them:

It [anomie] is the same if the source of the crisis is an abrupt growth of power and wealth.... The limits are unknown between the possible and

the impossible, what is just and what is unjust, legitimate claims and hopes and those which are immoderate. Consequently, there is no restraint upon aspirations.... At the very moment when traditional rules have lost their authority, the richer prize offered these appetites stimulates them and makes them more exigent and impatient of control. The state of de-regulation or anomy [*sic*] is thus further heightened by passions being less disciplined, precisely when they need more disciplining (2006, pp. 213–14).

These descriptions, in more dramatic late 19<sup>th</sup> century fashion, say something similar to critical elements in Smith's warning of the consequences of an advancing division of labour: avidity and aggression in the wealthy and stunted development among alienated workers. Durkheim's image of the business entrepreneur as a disruptive force is exemplified in Veblen's work discussed below.

### 15.3.3 The Spirit of Capitalism: Max Weber

In Smith, both the potential for business figures to produce and act through sympathy and to conspire against the public are emphasised with a hope that a social order might be stabilised by respectful relations between traders. By contrast, Durkheim's reference to entrepreneurs and share-traders emphasises rule-breaking and excess. In Max Weber, however, a different set of emotions capture the social persona of the business figure. Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, is perhaps the most read of twentieth century sociological texts; in Barbalet's words: "possibly the most audacious, infuriating, misleading and enduring sociological text written" (2008, p. 14). Weber made clear he was definitely not suggesting "that it was possible to simply derive the capitalist *economic system* from religious motives, or from the ethic of the calling associated with 'ascetic' Protestantism" (response to Rachfahl (2002, p. 258; author's emphases)). Nor was he making a claim about religion in early twentieth century capitalism (2002, p. 313). Wiley (1983) reminds us that Weber was writing at a time prior to capitalism's biggest crisis—the Great Depression—and that his desire to explain

the origins of capitalism stemmed from faith in its unique achievements of rationality.

Instead, Weber wants to know what brings the ‘capitalist’ to life. The “four principal forms of ascetic Protestantism”, which flourished in the later sixteenth and during the seventeenth centuries, emerge as the motivating energies of this new actor. The concept of a “calling” (*Beruf*, but Weber (2001, p. 39) said that the English word was actually more accurate) is central to Weber’s explanation of this drive. There are varying accounts of the motives and energy of the calling represented in Weber’s early entrepreneur. Barbalet, for example, argues that: “In the *Protestant Ethic*, . . . , practices of *Beruf* achieve rationality through the suppression of emotion. In the later vocation lectures, on the other hand, *Beruf* is achieved through and expresses passion and emotions” (2008, p. 9).

Certainly, a colder and more rationally calculating figure—emotionally distant and detached—emerges in Weber’s account.<sup>6</sup> The sympathy of Smith and unregulated passion for profit in Durkheim have vanished. Weber writes, in his discussion of Calvinism, of an “unprecedented inner loneliness” that drives the early Protestant entrepreneur to reject “all the sensuous and emotional elements in culture and religion, because they are of no use towards salvation” (2001, p. 60–62). “Intense worldly activity” could counteract these feelings and, hence, drive a new culture of endless work and accumulation—thereby offering evidence of “the certainty of grace” (2001, p. 67–9). This calling, indeed, persists without its religious foundations: “the religious roots died out slowly, giving way to utilitarian worldliness” during the eighteenth century (2001, p. 119; also 122–123). In summary:

Capitalism at the time of its development needed labourers who were available for economic exploitation for conscience’s sake. Today it is in the saddle, and hence able to force people to labour without transcendental sanctions (2001, p. 259, n. 108).

<sup>6</sup> Bourdieu argues that Weber’s capitalist is more *calculating* than the orthodox agent who instead “makes their choices on the basis of information furnished by prices” (2005, p. 207). To Weber, the capitalist calculates the current social balance of power (Ingham 2004).

Thousands of words have been written about the validity of the Protestant ethic thesis (see Whimster 2007 on this) and we do not rehearse these accounts here. Instead, note one example of its creative application in contemporary times found in Boltanski and Chiapello’s *The New Spirit of Capitalism* (2007). They are, they write, “following the Weberian tradition” in asking how to “induce commitment” among both wage earners and capitalists today (2007, p. 7–11). They conclude that “management discourse . . . today constitutes the form *par excellence* in which the spirit of capitalism is incorporated and received” (2007, p. 14), both because of its technical recommendations to improve efficiency and productivity and because of its “high moral tone” (2007, p. 58). Contrasting the French management literature of the 1960s and 1990s, Boltanski and Chiapello find a significant difference in the treatment of emotions. In the earlier period, the literature called for a “radical separation” of private life (the realm of family and friendship) from the impersonal realm of work. By the 1990s, that separation was being seen as “inhuman because it leaves no room for affectivity” (2007, p. 85). Commitment now required “the rehabilitation of the affective and relational dimensions” (2007, p. 94); emotion (if not Weber’s ‘transcendental sanctions’) persists.

### 15.3.4 The Disruptive Entrepreneurs of Thorstein Veblen

Thorstein Veblen takes a theme from Smith, his critical exploration of the emotions driving merchants, into an impersonal corporate era. In *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (1953), first published in 1899, this class’s conspicuous consumption spreads its influence generally. How much Veblen’s analysis is based on the historical and national habitus of the United States in the late nineteenth century is worth questioning—his work is steeped in European texts and evidence (e.g. Sombart, Marshall and others); but, at the same time, Veblen saw America’s economy as “dominated” by the crackpot realism of “utopian capitalists and monomaniacs” (Mills 1953,

p. vii). Veblen's "businessman" is modelled on the robber barons of the US Progressive era—such as Rockefeller, Vanderbilt, and Carnegie who joined in cartels with financiers like J. P. Morgan. Veblen contrasts this disruptive, insatiable force of the entrepreneur with the practical "engineering" figure of industrialisation who has a sense of finitude and "causal sequence" (Veblen, cited in O'Donnell 1973, p. 209). Both were new drives, very different from the motives of the earlier American small business-entrepreneur in farming and handicraft.

Veblen's analysis puts the motives of major actors at centre stage. Work habits and orientations differ sharply. He boldly states at the outset of his *Theory of Business Enterprise* that he will start from the "habits of thought" and emotional outlook of "the business man" (1904, p. v; also Chap. 4). Not only is 1890s economics criticised for its focus on "industry" and distance from experiences, but so is Marx's focus on the "capitalist enterprise". Concepts like the falling rate of profit, overproduction, speculation and crises are based on the faulty belief that industrial capitalism is "efficient" (1904, p. 236). Not so, claims Veblen. The much-lauded "economies of scale" have nothing to do with "the modern cultural situation", a situation heavily influenced by business methods, principles and motives for "pecuniary gain". Efficiency is irrelevant to captains of industry (the "financiering strategists"; 1904, p. 22), who make "shrewd" deals and bigger profits in a state of "chronic perturbation" (1904, p. 31, 34).

Worse, the businessman is not creative; his motive is not "workmanship"—Veblen's other lifelong interest. Like Durkheim, he sees the businessman as "disruptive", exempt from "scruples" (mere "sentimental constraints") and from "serviceability for the needs of mankind" (Veblen 1904, p. 50–52). He explains that business principles have shifted irrevocably towards the impersonal (far from situations where Smith's sympathy would easily apply). In the "older days" of handicraft, producers and customers had "close and lasting" "personal contact"; a reputation for "workmanship" was as important as "gains" in the "neighbourhood industry". Personal contact imposed the discipline that "honesty was the

best policy". The "new" 1890s businessman has an "easier conscience", "untroubled" by the "aggregates" of consumers who shop in huge retail stores, and is in fact busy drawing on the psychologists of advertising (Veblen 1904, pp. 40–56). All that matters in the new "business view" is realising gain. The developers of US railroads, for example, were indifferent to the "systematic ineptitude" and "waste" of the system that they created and which they relentlessly defended against efforts at sensible consolidation (1904, pp. 39–40).

In the businessman, Veblen identifies a new historical persona—the financier/manager—with a unique set of motivations and emotions. The mindset of "old-fashioned surveillance" by capitalist-owners of their firms gives way to an "active" business mentality that forms, and breaks down, coalitions and trusts in pursuit of "strategic control". This person is not "bound" by permanent ownership but seeks "large and frequent" "disturbances" as the means to the only end—money. Veblen regards these capitalists as saboteurs with self-imposed roles as chief fanatics "in their delusional world" (Heilbroner 2000, p. 234; Mills 1953, p. viii). The businessman's crafted disruptions may help industry—or bring "widespread hardship" (Veblen 1904, p. 24–29). In attributing one social personality to this new "businessman" and another to the admired "craftsman", Veblen anticipates Elias. The social habitus of the "owner" is quite different from that of these new "pecuniary experts" who forever collect and dump diverse enterprises, experts in nothing but gain. However, not only Veblen, but also others including Pareto (see Aspers 2001, p. 533), emphasised that the old "owner" actually *mutates* into the "anxious" rentier, the "passive" shareowner (Veblen's term; 1904, p. 28).

Veblen did not escape criticism for his harsh portrayals. Schumpeter, for instance, accuses Veblen of nearly, *not quite*, taking the line that capitalists are not functional for capitalism, but destructive predators "on the productive activity of others" (1954, pp. 895–896). And it is clear Veblen is not discussing the lone handicraft-entrepreneur who rises and falls on their 'idea'. Instead, he is looking squarely at entirely new entrepreneurial behaviour. Later, Parsons, in his de-



sire to establish sociology as the study of values, complementing neoclassical economics, attacked the American institutional economists including Veblen, whom he describes as a technological determinist, a “radical” empiricist who lacks “abstraction” (cited in Velthuis 1999, p. 632). Yet Veblen’s insights offer crucial and unique perspectives on the emotional energies of business actors that have renewed relevance.

### 15.3.5 Uncertainty, Emotions, and Rationality: Keynes’s Animal Spirits

The Depression ended the period of so-called liberal capitalism, a capitalism better characterised as turbulent and hostile to labour. The up-and-down 1920s finally collapsed with the share-market meltdown on Wall Street in 1929, leading to a banking crisis, and eventually mass unemployment worldwide and the emergence of fascism in Europe. Orthodox prescriptions—cutting wages and spending—failed catastrophically and a new paradigm emerged, justifying the aim to counter depression through government spending. The more democratic program was exemplified in Roosevelt’s Works Program of America. This doctrine became known as Keynesianism, after its most powerful advocate, Cambridge economist John Maynard Keynes.

At the core of Keynesianism, elaborated in the *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*, is a diagnosis of sustained capitalist disequilibrium, worsened by a crisis of confidence added to orthodox prescriptions. As Wiley shows in his comparison of Weber and Keynes, the latter understood capitalism as irrational while the former—without the experience of the Depression—still identified with the “formal rationality” of the entrepreneur (1983, p. 40). In his diagnosis of prolonged recessions, we focus on two variables that Keynes brought to light and re-worked: how investment decisions are made and the role of uncertainty. To explain investment, he applied the concept of “animal spirits”—the “spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction” (Keynes 1973, p. 161–162). This spontaneity appears more convincingly sociological, admitting

a wider range of influences on decision-making and investment than the orthodoxy (see Backhouse and Bateman 2011, p. 126). And such spontaneity of animal spirits gives rise (and responds) to an element of unpredictability—both in the direction of economic judgments and in the type of influences—with a clear emotional content. Keynes links decisions to these spirits:

In estimating the prospects of investment, we must have regard, therefore, to the nerves and hysteria and even the digestions and reactions to the weather upon those whose spontaneous activity it largely depends (Keynes 1973, p. 162).

Crucial to Keynes’s account is the role of unknown futures, of expectations, uncertainty, and confidence, in influencing activity. One can immediately grasp the connection between uncertainty and animal spirits—the latter involve unstable, ever-changing political, emotional, speculative and technical efforts at dealing with the former. Severe market slumps, it follows, are the products of the deepest of uncertainties congealing into very widespread negative sentiment. And so, Keynesian policies by government emerge as an overt attempt at economy-wide ‘emotion management’, aiming to raise business confidence—something beyond the manufacture of even the most powerful market actors.

These tendencies toward breakdown described by Keynes are, in fact, anticipated in Veblen who writes of the “malady” of depression of “the business man” whose “affections” are the “emotional seat of the trouble”. Veblen argued that any effective remedy “must restore profits to a ‘reasonable’ rate” (1904, p. 241). That businessmen often hold out for “more”, is Schumpeter’s main criticism of the 1940s feeble bourgeoisie, always phoning their Senators: “Good God, can’t you help us?” (cited in Swedberg 1991, p. 315).

### 15.3.6 After Marshall: Equilibrium Economics and Parsonian Sociology

The concept of equilibrium has come to dominate modern economics, theoretically secured by post-War work on general equilibrium. Hart

(2003) argues that equilibrium is one of the economics profession's most powerful metaphors, derived as it was from metaphors in physics and biology. But, he continues, "economists have demanded far more from equilibrium analysis, despite the greater difficulties, than their counterparts in evolutionary biology" (2003, p. 1155). Alfred Marshall (1842–1924), though a founder of neoclassical economics, had high hopes for a concept of equilibrium "in which eventual outcomes could be imposed on continuous processes" (Hart 2003, p. 1145) like forces of "life and decay" found in biology (Marshall, cited in Hart 2003, p. 1146). But Marshall was not like the Marshallian thinkers who followed him, or other theoretical economists of the time like Carl Menger or Leon Walras who were aloof from the social life that troubled Marshall. The latter had a "compassionate intelligence" according to Robert Heilbroner, who has an intriguing, critical discussion of Marshall's "most important gift to economic analysis—the element of time" (Heilbroner 2000, p. 210; see also Hart 2003, p. 1156 n.7). The irony was that Marshall's 'time' was still:

abstract time; it was the time in which mathematical curves exfoliate and theoretical experiments may be run and rerun, but it was not the time in which anything ever really *happens*. That is, it was not the irreversible flow of historic time—and, above all, not *the* historic time in which Marshall himself lived (Heilbroner 2000, p. 210, author's emphases).

Marshall indeed had no success whatever (says Hart 2003, p. 1140) in including processes known to be "irreversible and continuous in time". As Heilbroner points out, Marshall would live to see World War I and the Russian Revolution and not long after his death there would be the Great Depression and a Second World War: "Yet, of the relevance of economics to all these overwhelming changes, neither Alfred Marshall nor still less his official colleagues had much, if any, understanding" (2000, pp. 210–211).

Despite their increasing mathematical and computational complexity, especially after World War II, the general equilibrium models that emerged continued down the path to abstraction,

furnished with equally abstract accounts of markets, firms, consumers, information and transactions. Indeed, the merchant or business man or entrepreneur—the crucial actors in the economic story in our own account thus far—start to disappear from mainstream theory in the 1930s (Barreto 1989) even as Keynes gives a central role to the investor's animal spirits. Hart offers a useful summary of the stylised world of general equilibrium that eventually emerged, and that has come to dominate conventional economic analysis, thinking and policy: "Optimising economic agents, endowed with perfect foresight and/or rational expectations, transact in competitive markets where freely operating markets attain equilibrium configuration." Any "random supply side shocks" to markets prompt "new equilibrium configurations" (2011, p. 19).

Hart's summary is instructive, illustrating at two levels how emotional influences in the economy are automatically minimised in equilibrium models. The actor's emotional states are rendered irrelevant given possession of perfect information and rational expectations. And at a macro-level, in the context of widespread economic emotions that shift over time, cyclical fluctuations can never develop distinct and describable features. Persistent disruptions to periods of 'tranquillity' (a term Minsky prefers to 'equilibrium' (2008, p. 197) from investment booms or monetary crises, for example, or simply paths with cumulative causation are untheorised or absent features. Equally, policy changes, or capitalist dynamism from new entrepreneurial ideas that necessarily involve Knightian uncertainty and which frequently disorganise economic life (as Schumpeter emphasises in his term "creative destruction" (1934), for example), cannot have lasting, revolutionary effects because the model's information and rationality assumptions do not allow for this.

One prominent central banker draws out the practical significance of this loss of insight in his field. Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium models have, in his words, "no role for social interaction", no bubbles or busts; no one "misuses power or defaults on a promise" (Goodhart 2013, p. 76). The decrees—that money (promise) is irrelevant and is not itself the active source of

dynamism and that no shock can occur under the Efficient Market Hypothesis (a subvariant of Equilibrium models)—are with us still. This remains, despite all that has happened while this economics escaped mostly into abstraction.

These abstractions from actors are free from the time over which plans go wrong or luck brings surprising success; they are free from hopes and later excitement or despair and therefore free from humankind's dreadful imperfections, decent values and passions. This choice to avoid the social world may be understandable in face of terrible, sudden leaps into horror, but it is not social science. Violent economic change and social tensions, driven by emotions, incubated by hope, ruthlessness or fear, modified by social institutions and democratic policies (with potential civilising, internalised shame and embarrassment (Elias 2000)), are again hidden.

Hopes for returning to equilibrium in depressions have consequences for understanding policy. At worst, this faith conceals an indifference to the human consequences of (allegedly) short-run 'austerity' (or 1930s prescribed liquidation of labour, and fanatic faith in the gold standard) which met a now famous response. In anger at this indifference, Keynes said "*In the long run we are all dead*" (1923, p. 80; author's emphasis). Overcoming this theoretical state of alienation means accepting uncertainty, Keynes said, and ever-possible surprises, however ugly or beneficial. The problem of who decides on and judges what might benefit humankind plays no part in alienated economics, either. There we find a 'timeless' economy in which abstract humans predictably look after number one, in a uniform way. Any question that these economists examine a specific economy, with institutions developed over historical time to cope with uncertainty, is a source of irritation to those fixated on abstract time. Any questioning of this from even supporters of capitalism is derided. For example, in 1921, the Chicago economist Frank Knight made clear that capitalist dynamism, in which new profits are generated by 'surprises', makes no sense without accepting radical uncertainty. Probability he said, can only involve known chances (Knight 1964).

That means equilibrium models are stuck in the past, in that which is known.

So, in this economics, there is no sense of finitude although the emotions necessary to believe in timelessness come from cognitive dissonance. Believing in timelessness also implies a highly predictable and controllable future. And uncertainty, whatever equilibrium economists claim, provokes many emotions which include trust, hope, anxiety, suspicion and, failing all that, the resort to spying, illegal inside information, to collusion and organised 'trusts'. The entire financial industry, for example, is built on impersonal emotions of trust, and their frequent betrayal (see Pixley 2004, 2012).

Parallel trends in post-war sociology (particularly Parsons's efforts to build a systems theory) conclude this section. Barbalet (1998, p. 16–19) comments that Parsons followed the neoclassical commitment to rationality by insisting that the economic sphere was affectively neutral. Certainly, Velthuis (1999, p. 634) argues, the early Parsons undermined institutional economics, seeing sociology's task as complementing an orthodox economic framework by merely emphasising how economies were institutionalised in value structures. Parsons "took the hedonistic basis of orthodox economics to be empirically true for the whole of economic life" (Velthuis 1999, p. 635). However, Parsons did oppose the pervasive utilitarian modes of analysis present in economics, denying that self-interested rationality was a universal, psychological feature (Parsons and Smelser 1956, p. 23). His later systems-theory modelled the economy as an institutionalised subsystem within a larger social system, an approach he believed matched the prevailing reality of a regulated "free enterprise" economy (Parsons and Smelser 1956, p. 15). Barbalet (1998, pp. 90–94) further notes that Parsons's (later) reception of Keynesianism never drew on the creative implications of Keynes for a theory of action. Parsons and Smelser appear to accept Keynes's analysis of investor behaviour, animal spirits, and uncertainty in their *Economy and Society* (1956, pp. 233–224), only to describe the investment market as an "unstructured situation" (1956, p. 236) and one likely to produce irrational, deviant behaviour

(1956, p. 237). Still, they do acknowledge the role of (non-rational) “conventions” and “animal spirits” of entrepreneurs in stabilising investment, edging closer to a view (at least for investment) inconsistent with affective neutrality.

---

## 15.4 Topics in Economics and the Emotions

The final section of this chapter extends our historical and conceptual survey by pursuing four topics that highlight the role of emotions in contemporary economic developments. These topics—financial markets, money, inflation and deflation, and trust and confidence—largely deal with aspects of emotions in the monetary economy. This selection is important given that the recent GFC highlighted the widespread destabilising impacts of money and financialisation. This Crisis illustrates some of our most important themes: the emotions of uncertainty; the role of disequilibrium; and the powerful structuring forces of major economic institutions and actors.

### 15.4.1 Emotion Rules and Uncertainty: the Case of Financial Markets

Ever since Gustave le Bon’s 1896 *The Crowd*, psychologically minded economists have understood ‘panics and manias’ in financial markets as an external ‘contagion’ among the ignorant raging ‘masses’ rather than as an internally generated problem. Even in Charles Kindleberger’s otherwise sensitive history (most recently in Kindleberger and Aliber 2011) of 300 years of crashes, manias are said to operate like a virus. Today, however, financial actors take ‘emotion management’ seriously. We see examples of banks firing risk-averse traders who have “learnt fear” and of disgusted whistleblowers (such as Michael Lewis and Frank Partnoy) who find their satirical criticisms are slavishly copied, transmuted and emulated (Pixley 2004, p. 89; 2012, p. 108). Traders get the most attention from journalists and ethnographers, with their antics typically mapped back to ‘hormones’ or over-abundant ‘self-confidence’.

A better sociological understanding of the operations of emotions in financial markets must look beyond metaphors of wild weather and viruses, and images of testosterone-charged males in primal competition. Following our framework outlined in Part I, we seek to identify how macro-actors deal with uncertainty, partly through the emotion rules of finance (e.g. Pixley 2009). Only a limited view of the financial industry is gained by investigating a single trader and his/her daily interactions. Finance is a global network of trading houses, banks and mutual funds, with peak players whose “interweaving of individual moves” and rapidly shifting positions, to quote Elias, appear to be “following a blind course” (1978, p. 103). Finance is a loosely regulated field; central actors tend to innovate haphazardly, reactively. (Nonetheless, financial markets are highly dependent on major state institutions to underwrite bank money creation.) The web of interdependencies is so complex that it is difficult to understand from any particular vantage point and this generates further problems. Tellingly, when various governments held inquiries into the Crisis, the list of actors involved in conflicts of interest (see, notably, the Levin Report (2011)) was so long that ascribing responsibility seemed impossible.

The emotional content of finance is shaped by specific market rules. Fligstein (2001, p. 40, 15) identifies the “four types of rules relevant to producing social structures in markets—what can be called property rights, governance structures, rules of exchange, and conceptions of control” (2001, p. 32–33). We argue that overlapping this cognitive component of market rules are emotion rules, which define how emotions are (or should be) played out in often ruthlessly competitive environments and uneven games. Given the emotion-charged environment of finance, and the permanent state of uncertainty in which it operates, it makes sense to identify the emotion rules that financial actors develop and deploy. As Pixley shows (2009, 2010b), financial decision-making under uncertainty—where fear of losses is very real and the need for instant judgments is normal—is highly emotional. Emotion rules in finance act much like their overlapping cognitive

equivalents: they can make action possible; and at times, they normalise risk, incompetence, loss, and even injustice. Some examples assist in understanding how they operate:

- Big banks and corporations deal with competition and uncertainty through emotion rules.<sup>7</sup> One increasingly copied emotion rule governing exchange is *caveat emptor* (buyer beware), which may pass on future dangers buried in financial products. It implies emotions of suspicion and distrust, yet unlike toxic food, it denies legal remedy to risk-averse purchasers of allegedly ‘safe products’, say, of income streams from loans. Bourdieu stresses that “the act of *signing* a contract is so harrowing” because of its fatefulness (2005, p. 186). Worse, *caveat emptor* is often only in the fine print, and the ‘product’ is rarely understood either by the salesperson or bank client (Pixley 2012, p. 257–260). It leaves the client not the dubious producer at fault.
- Yet with ‘light touch’ regulation, *distrust* among banks, fund managers and their assessors (law, accountancy and credit rating firms) is a pervasive emotion rule.
- Emotion rules manage uncertainty by promoting the ‘stability’ and security of certain core facts. The emotion rule of *ceteris paribus*—all else being equal—has allowed financial actors to assume continuity by relying on probabilistic models that extrapolate from past economic trends. It too is found in the fine print of contracts.

Given endemic uncertainty, Pixley also shows that money’s emotion rules are typically oriented around time horizons. How a firm creates ‘certainty’ rules in facing the unknown varies by whether the rules look to the *present, past, or future*. In the very short term, or present reality of the last minute’s market activities: “Traders are like fish in the sea, they only think about the next mouthful” (cited in Pixley 2012, p. 77). However, longer-term planning to deal with uncertainty also involves seeking past patterns, and raises

an obvious question: which past to pick? The history of the Great Depression (or of a minor upset in 1962 for that matter) may or may not be meaningful in facing *this* future. A past orientation exercises a different kind of control over present and future. Take, for example, instances of Alan Greenspan’s refrain, “I’ve been on Wall Street since 1948”,<sup>8</sup> as a way of consolidating his leadership at the Federal Reserve. Finally, among those who accept the *unknowable* future, this may produce emotions of ultra-caution or in contrast of recklessness if it is guided by a tacit assumption that governments cannot allow big banks to fail.

Financial actors like bankers—“merchants of debt” (Minsky)—capitalise on uncertain futures by widespread “trading in public hope”, in Drahos’s phrase (2004). This merchandising of hope for security in *money* was offered to the millions after the 1970s when the possibility of secure jobs seemed to have gone. The scene was set, more recently, for severe household indebtedness and personal bankruptcy around the OECD. Interviews with financiers (Pixley 2004, p. 129) reveal occasional regret about these developments and the role banks have played.

At the same time, banks and financial traders prime their organisations for market conditions. Fineman, who writes on emotion in organisations, argues that emotion-management is a critical tool for managing staff: “Emotion is ‘unrolled’ and divided into convenient units” to assess commercial “successes” (2004, p. 721–724), such as acting out “a passion to sell products in a sincere way” (Chapman, cited in Fineman 2004, p. 730). In a boom, boldness, self-confidence and financial ‘literacy’ are fostered to raise risk taking. In a bust, risk aversion is wanted: timidity, reduction in testosterone, a ‘feminine touch’ are favoured.

<sup>7</sup> Flam (1990) explores ‘emotion-rules’ in corporations, under communist-command and capitalist economies; see also Flam (2013).

<sup>8</sup> Alan Blinder alerted Pixley (2004, p. 85) to this FOMC quote ‘behind closed doors’, adding that others asserted authority like this in Treasury, and few committee members could retort that ‘I’ve been on Wall Street for 50 days’. Greenspan’s favourite phrase during his tenure was to say ‘history tells us’, but surely history recounts constant uncertainty under a ‘fog of war’.



### 15.4.2 Money and Emotions

Emotions are central features of financial markets—but what about money itself? Everyone accepts that wild desires and urgent needs for money involve turbulent emotions. But fewer people understand money, and how it is created, particularly by the same banks we have just discussed. Even during a monetary crisis, most economists and sociologists ignore money-creation: as do bankers. Schumpeter wrote in the 1940s “even today” textbooks start with a story about how cash is simply more handy than barter (1954, p. 717). The standard approach to banks likewise gives them a modest, passive role as the intermediary between depositor and borrower. In tranquil times, money is under little scrutiny.

Mainstream financial economics, with one definition of money, ‘money-as-exchange’, has value residing in the goods and services that we madly desire. Money is a modest add-on with no cognitive or emotional significance, a “technical device”, says Schumpeter (1954, p. 277) who denies this view strenuously (1954, p. 717–731). Mainstream sociological views extend ideas of money into social realms, yet only as a convenient ‘thing’ of social use. For instance, they highlight the stratified ways in which money is exchanged, how it has many and varied cultural effects. Zelizer (1994) shows vividly that different social groups attach different symbolic meanings to money; for example, according different significance to wages and to windfalls.

Conventional sociology pushes money-as-barter beyond individual choice but, like conventional economics, it sticks only with money’s convenient exchange function. In Parsons’s systems theory, money, like language, is functional for social integration; money is a mere sign or, in neoclassical metaphors, a “lubricant”, still a neutral expression of the “real” (Ingham 1998, p. 6). The only qualification is that more money is better. Anxieties are allayed or happiness gained if we have enough money to meet needs and to display status.

This tranquil account has deficiencies. Neither conventional economics nor conventional sociology can explain how money can be safely

‘stored’—something claimed by the finance industry in ‘selling hope’ in the form of financial products. How does anyone know when money might deflate or inflate, or if money will be accepted in 40 years’ time? In the 1950s, Paul Samuelson gave an answer to this question—money, as a projection into distant futures, is “accepted because it is accepted” (cited in Orléan 2013, p. 57–60). More recent search models (e.g. the ‘efficient market hypothesis’) dispense with his circularity. Mathematics could, allegedly, bring ‘information’ into the present. Today is tomorrow. Everyone can be blasé. Orléan (2013) demolishes these ‘tranquil’ views, arguing that money is a social-emotional phenomenon of collective representations in the Durkheimian sense. It is not only that ‘routines’ of money are uncertain, rarely permanent, but also that emotional representations of money’s power are striking (Orléan 2013, p. 61–65).<sup>9</sup>

The conventional view of banks is equally tranquil. Bankers are “intermediaries of other people’s money”, collecting it from saver-martyrs, from “innumerable small puddles, where it stagnates, in order to hand it to people who will use it” (a sarcastic Schumpeter 1954, p. 319). Tim Geithner, then US Treasury Secretary, benignly explained in 2009 that:

the purpose of a financial system is to let those who want to save—whether for vacation, retirement or a rainy day—save. It is to let those who want to borrow—whether to buy a house or build a business—borrow. And it is to use our banks and other financial institutions to bring savers’ funds and borrowers’ needs together (cited in Pettifor, with counter arguments; 2013, p. 11–12).

But the role of banks in the monetary system is far more active. Banks have state licences to create money (legal tender) and selling loans is the source of their profit. Schumpeter exposes an unsettling, “frightening” reality: in actual “banking practice” savers have a minor role, because bankers increase “the quantity of money” (1954,

<sup>9</sup> From Daniel Defoe to Isaac Newton, Emile Zola or Samuel Butler, Mark Twain to Michael Lewis, the literature on money’s emotional power deserves further research.

p. 320). Savers' deposits are tiny compared to the loans that banks deposit and the "near money" that financial firms create. Indeed, central bank data show that at present bank money amounts to 97% of the total broad money, with the state accounting for 3% (Ryan-Collins et al. 2011). Andrew Haldane (2010) from the Bank of England, for example, shows that from the 1860s to 1970s in the United Kingdom, bank credit money (assets) remained at around 50% of GDP—in line with economic activity. However, from the 1970s, bank assets rose to 600% of GDP by 2007, the year an obscure English bank collapsed.

The role of banks in producing monetary crises, precisely because of their money-creating ambitions, is highlighted in Minsky's view that newer financial capitalism is increasingly unstable in unpredictable ways (2008, pp. 319–320). This is illustrated by aggressive commercial and investment banking practices that included new types of near money in the lead-up to the GFC. One flogged their 'products' at small airports in Germany (Royal Bank of Scotland) and another to the mentally ill in Hong Kong (Lehman)—right up to their bankruptcies.<sup>10</sup> Following Orlean, monetary crises reveal intense emotions. President Obama even told American bank CEOs in early 2009: "My administration is the only thing between you and the pitchforks" (cited in Johnson and Kwak 2011, p. 3).

However, Schumpeter (1954) and Simmel both agreed, capitalist money can also be socially productive. Simmel (1990, p. 172) marvelled that through 'manufacturing money' its power is magnified. Here lies the key to money's "dual nature" (Ingham 2004). Banks can create money with a dangerous focus on profits alone, and by doing so amplify money's fragility. Alternatively, money can be directed to social investment through hoping for the borrower's success. No doubt conflicts and tensions over the creation and uses of money are endemic to unequal economies with competing social and economic interests. Collective fears

of public debt contributed to right-wing political mobilisation in the United States through the Tea Party movement (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). Indeed, Veblen had more than a century ago noted the longing for "the metaphysical stability of the money unit" (1904, pp. 237–238) as the fraught social hope in capitalism.

### 15.4.3 Emotions of Inflation and Deflation

Our discussion of money extends to two polarised states where money relations become dysfunctional: high inflation and deflation. Inflation is an increase in the "general level of prices"; that is, "when the amount of money required to buy a representative bundle of goods" increases (Flemming 1978, p. 13). But since the last burst of inflation in the rich democracies in the 1970s and 1980s, sociological interest in inflationary processes has waned. Historically, however, bursts of high inflation (especially sharp shocks to the prices of food like rice or bread) have had symbolic and emotional power. And, hyperinflation, characterised by accelerating volumes of money in circulation, is an extreme case and deserves special treatment.

The emotions of high inflation tell us about broader economic conflicts. Looking at the 1848 European revolutions, Berger and Spoerer show statistically that rapid increases in food prices (not just radical ideas) were an important trigger for the economic crisis that in turn produced massive popular discontent (2001, pp. 318–319). In 1979, Margaret Thatcher made a famous appeal to voters about the harm of inflation by holding up two grocery bags, one pathetically emptied by the impact of five years of inflation. There are more recent and dramatic examples. The Asian economic crisis of 1998, which produced a huge depreciation of the Indonesian rupiah, forced up fuel and rice prices and broadened the wave of discontent across Indonesia that ended General Suharto's dictatorship (Freedman 2005, p. 235).

Maier argues: "Social and political structures help shape inflation; conversely inflation alters collective social roles" (1978, p. 39). According-

<sup>10</sup> Pixley saw RBS staff dressed like airline stewards at Dusseldorf, Cologne-Bonn and Frankfurt airports many times in 2007–2008. On Lehman, see Pixley (2012, p. 185).

ly, inflation is a channel for conducting, managing and even intensifying conflicts between economic interests. High inflation in the 1970s—stagflation when combined with unemployment—was produced in part by the ‘hot emotions’ of class conflict with strengthened unions able to press wage claims. The particularly intense conflict in Chilean society during Allende’s government had led to 500 per cent inflation by 1973 (Friedman 1994, p. 235). As Goldthorpe put it at the time: “current inflation ultimately derives from ... [a]... more intense and equally matched social conflict than hitherto” (1978, p. 210). Disfavouring creditors, 1970s inflation became a symbol of “class fear”, to use Barbalet’s (1998) term; in that case, fear by other classes of working class power. The same ‘hot’ industrial climate shifted money relations in other ways. Overburdened governments increased the money supply to placate discontented electorates as well as to manage what Brittan called the “bias of excessive expectation in democracy” (1978, p. 166).

Extremely severe inflation—hyperinflation—goes hand-in-hand with a rapidly expanding money supply chasing finite resources. Hyperinflation is a particularly vicious disturbance of monetary orders and society (often already at breaking point), quite different from inflations produced by rising investment, class conflict or corporate and union power. Governments (and central banks) have a variety of motives for vastly increasing the printing of money. (Quantitative easing in the USA and the United Kingdom since 2010 is not an example *while* deflation persists.) In periods of severe crisis (i.e. to finance a war) massively increasing the money supply rapidly serves an important function and, indeed, powerful interests can even favour hyperinflation. Lenin’s line was that ‘debauching the currency’ would destroy ‘Capitalism’ and Keynes says he was “certainly right” (1971, p. 148–149). Governments “confiscate, secretly and unobserved” and impoverish many while enriching some, raising prices for entrepreneurs. By contrast, Churchill, when Chancellor of the Exchequer, shared Keynes’s equally hostile views on the deflationary path of mass unemployment imposed on Britain in the 1920s (Ahamed 2009, pp. 231–233).

Fear of inflation is a powerful anticipatory emotion, expressing fears about competition for assets, unpredictability and declining purchasing power. Germany, for example, is thought to have ‘inflation averse’ voters, one probable factor in that country’s response to the financial-economic crisis in southern Europe. Whereas today many people are both savers (through pension funds) and debtors (through home mortgages), most people in Germany rent and perhaps this fact makes them more hostile to mild inflation that eases debt (Lanchester 2010, pp. 71–81). Writing about quantitative easing in the financially-battered United States in 2009, James Surowiecki observed that:

there’s something peculiar about how powerful fears of inflation are. In the past ninety years, the U.S. has had one only one sustained bout with high inflation—in the seventies. That track record should engender some faith that central bankers are going to be responsible and that a healthy industrial economy isn’t prone to regular inflationary spirals. It hasn’t (2009).

Perhaps the reason for this fear is that it is quickly re-ignited by the ‘coalitions of interest’ (namely, financial markets, creditors and institutions like the IMF) who favour low inflation. Yet the ‘money illusion’ of nominal, not real, prices in inflationary periods can operate inversely, increasing entrepreneurial confidence and producing booms.

Deflationary periods are outlier scenarios at the opposite end. Money, in a sense, becomes too powerful and debt burdens become greater. Deflation brings out different fears; emotionally, deflation is the anticipation that tomorrow will be worse than today. Deaton shows, for example, that expecting a downturn had an effect on overall American wellbeing—apparently more than the downturn itself (2012, p. 22). And, a 2013 study reveals something further: parents become harsher with their children during downturns; “that changes in macroeconomic conditions, rather than current conditions, affect harsh parenting” (Lee et al. 2013, p. 4). However, the best evidence of the emotional impact of deflation is studiously compiled by health researchers in *The Body Economic* (2013). Stuckler and Basu’s epi-

demiological study shows how “austerity kills”, by comparing countries that applied austerity and stimulus, and casting these contrasting policies as “natural experiments” performed on populations (2013, p. xii). The countries that responded with austerity had a rise in preventable diseases, depression, premature deaths, and suicides. Those that chose stimulus did not, and emerged with greater economic and physical/mental health more quickly than those under austerity (2013, pp. 109–13, 123–137; 142–145).

#### 15.4.4 Trust and Confidence in the Economy

Trust—interpersonal, social and political—is widely considered as vital to democratic functioning. In economic relations, trust is just as important. As Swedberg (2003, pp. 248–249) points out, major economic institutions carry the responsibility for promoting trust by ensuring transparency and predictability as well as by enforcing rules and punishment. By contrast, widespread distrust of other people, or institutions, limits interactions, adds to transaction costs, retards innovation, and leads actors to “insure against losses”. Trust in complex societies takes on particularly *impersonal* characteristics; the varying and often asymmetric conditions, which regulate the styles and content of impersonal trust is examined closely by Shapiro (2012).

How does trust relate to emotions in the economy? Pixley (2004) establishes that they are strongly intertwined because economic life is preoccupied with managing uncertain, even unpredictable, futures that bring out potent emotions. Berezin (2005), by contrast, sees trust as cognitive and perceptual, with emotions only playing a supportive role. In adopting this position, she relies on Coleman’s view of trust as a “bet on the future”, reiterating its cognitive and calculative dimension. Accordingly, one has the impression of a highly isolated actor, outside relationships and grasping them from a distance; as Misztal remarks, Coleman’s “version [of] trust is a less emotional, more calculating, colder device for policing free riders” (1996, p. 79).

The emotional component of trust emerges once the *relational* nature of economic actions is acknowledged. Continual monitoring is potentially inefficient, entails its own risks and, anyway, emphasising this aspect of trust takes too little account of the fusion of interests and mutual projects involved in making business alliances. Barbalet adds that emotions “permit action which would be inhibited if it were to rely on logic or calculation alone” (1998, p. 49). That breaches of trust frequently involve explosive emotions reveals their integral role in all trusting relationships. Even trust in highly impersonal contexts is emotional, protected by stable institutions—buying US dollars as a safe haven in unstable times is connected to feelings about the power and security of the United States; but trust in money vanishes under sudden crises.

Confidence involves an extension of trust, with major institutions playing the leading role. In the macro-economy, confidence involves the *active* process of establishing and maintaining trust across the economy particularly “among those with power and material resources” (Turner and Stets 2006, p. 39), who demand a good climate for investment. Barbalet (1998, pp. 94–101) has considered these dynamics in detail, following Michal Kalecki’s war-time intuitions. and we rely on this account in what follows. Governments are under constant pressure from business enterprises to create certainty by acting predictably and making policy conducive to profitable investment. As Kalecki pointed out, “capitalists [have] a powerful indirect control over Government policy: everything which may shake the state of confidence must be carefully avoided because it would cause a crisis of confidence” (1943, p. 325). Business confidence is highly emotional, as Keynes said in remarking about “fears” of a Labour Government in the United Kingdom (1973, p. 162; see also Barbalet 1998, p. 98). The shattering of business confidence, for example, is the outcome, Barbalet argues (1998, p. 98), of “serial” responses, operating through the information networks of investors. Restoring business confidence, however, is not without contradiction. As Kalecki wryly said (1943, p. 324), businesses will stand in the way of the

resolution of unemployment and idle capacity if this involves ushering into reality the unfavourable “social and political changes” that genuine full employment implies.

## 15.5 Conclusion

This survey cannot claim to have fully integrated the rich and absorbing insights of thinkers identified with this sub-field of the sociology of emotions. Research in this area, we argue, would benefit from closer engagement with perspectives that identify the economy as a flux of macro-actors, processes and institutions, and with the rich traditions of heterodox economic thought. Combining these perspectives, we get a sharply different picture of the economy from that provided in microeconomic texts—one dominated by powerful actors, inequalities, and macro-emotional civilising and de-civilising processes shaped by the business cycle, and its ‘tranquil’ points that Minsky describes. Capitalism is a highly emotional experience. Classical sociologists and economists described the flesh-and-blood actors as well as the historical disjunctures and conflicts that defined the emerging architecture of capitalist economies. The emotional undercurrents in economic life are never far from their core insights and observations. Perhaps the vision of a world dominated by spirited, lone entrepreneurs financed by banks has gone forever. But the task for sociologists, we believe, is unchanged: to continue to characterise and analyse the role of ever-more complex actors (like global banks) and processes (financialisation, for instance) that produce and shape economic sentiments.

Perhaps, finally, Keynes’s concept of “animal spirits” has special significance to future sociology in this area; it is a creative, open-ended account of economic decision-making that is more than ingenious description. Wiley (1983, p. 40) characterises Keynes’s position as: “we act as though we are making a rational decision,... pretending we are using a valid calculus.” What we need, as this chapter argues, is a perspective which goes beyond that pretence; one which rec-

ognises that, in the words we have already quoted from Durkheim, “things happen in the way established by experience” and that emotions are central to that economic experience.

## References

- Ahamed, L. (2009). *Lords of finance: 1929, the great depression and the bankers who broke the world*. London: Heinemann.
- Akerlof, G., & Shiller, R. (2009). *Animal spirits: How human psychology drives the economy, and why it matters for global capitalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Aspers, P. (2001). Crossing the boundary of economics and sociology: The case of Vilfredo Pareto. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 60(2), 519–545.
- Backhouse, R. E., & Bateman, B. W. (2011). *Capitalist revolutionary: John Maynard Keynes*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Baddeley, M. (2010). Herding, social influence and economic decision-making: Socio-psychological and neuroscientific analyses. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences*, 365(1538), 281–290.
- Bandelj, N. (2009). Emotions in economic action and interaction. *Theory and Society*, 38, 347–366.
- Barbalet, J. (1998). *Emotion, social theory and social structure: A macrosociological approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Barbalet, J. (2008). *Weber, passion and profits: ‘The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism’ in context*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Barreto, H. (1989). *The entrepreneur in microeconomic theory: Disappearance and explanation*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Berezin, M. (2005). Emotions and the economy. In N. J. Smelser & R. Swedberg (Eds.), *Handbook of economic sociology* (2nd ed., pp. 109–127). New York: Sage, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Berger, H., & Spoerer, M. (2001). Economic crises and the European revolutions of 1848. *Journal of Economic History*, 61, 293–326.
- Bernanke, B. S. (2000). *Essays on the Great Depression*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Boltanski, L., & Chiapello, E. (2007). *The new spirit of capitalism* (trans. G. Elliott). London: Verso.
- Bourdieu, P. (2005). *The social structures of the economy* (trans. C. Turner). Cambridge: Polity.
- Brittan, S. (1978). Inflation and democracy. In F. Hirsch & J. H. Goldthorpe (Eds.), *The political economy of inflation* (pp. 161–185). London: Martin Robertson.
- Cassidy, J. (2010). Interview with Eugene Fama. *New Yorker*, 13 January.
- CIA. (1970). Notes on meeting with the president on Chile, 15 Sept 1970. The National Security Archive, The George Washington University. Accessed 3 Oct



2013. (<http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/docs/doc26.pdf>).
- Coleman, J. S. (1986). *Individual interests and collective action: Selected essays*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Collins, R. (1981). On the microfoundations of macrosociology. *American Journal of Sociology*, 86(5), 984–1014.
- Collins, R. (1986). *Weberian sociological theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Collins, R. (2004). *Interaction ritual chains*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Deaton, A. (2012). The financial crisis and the well-being of Americans: 2011 OEP Hicks lecture. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 64(1), 1–26.
- de Rivera, J., & Paez, D. (2007). Emotional climate, human security, and cultures of peace. *Journal of Social Issues*, 63(2), 233–253.
- Drahoš, P. (2004). Trading in public hope. *Annals of the American Academy*, 592, 18–38.
- Durkheim, E. (1893/1997). *The division of labor in society* (trans: W. D. Halls). New York: Free Press.
- Durkheim, E. (1897/2006). *Suicide: A study in sociology* (trans: J. A. Spaulding & G. Simpson). London: Routledge.
- Elias, N. (1978). *What is sociology?* (trans: S. Mennell & G. Morrissey). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Elias, N. (2000). The civilizing process: Sociogenetic and psychogenetic investigations (Revised Edition), E. Dunning, J. Gouldsblom, & S. Mennell (Eds.), (trans: E. Jephcott). Malden: Blackwell.
- Elster, J. (1998). Emotions and economic theory. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 36(1), 47–74.
- Elster, J. (1999). *Alchemies of the mind: Rationality and the emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fineman, S. (2004). Getting the measure of emotion—and the cautionary tale of emotional intelligence. *Human Relations*, 57(6), 719–740.
- Fineman, S. (Ed.). (2008). *The emotional organization: Passions and power*. Malden: Blackwell.
- Flam, H. (1990). Emotional ‘Man’. *International Sociology*, 5(1), 39–56.
- Flam, H. (2009). Extreme feelings and feelings at extremes. In D. Hopkins, J. Kleres, H. Flam, & H. Kuzmics (Eds.), *Theorizing emotions: Sociological explorations and applications* (pp. 73–94). Frankfurt: Campus Verlag.
- Flam, H. (2013). The transnational movement for truth, justice and reconciliation as an emotional (rule) regime? *Journal of Political Power*, 6(3), 363–383.
- Flemming, J. S. (1978). The economic explanation of inflation. In F. Hirsch & J. H. Goldthorpe (Eds.), *The political economy of inflation* (pp. 13–36). London: Martin Robertson.
- Fligstein, N. (2001). *The architecture of markets: An economic sociology of twenty-first century capitalist societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Frank, R. (1988). *Passions within reason*. New York: Norton.
- Freedman, A. L. (2005). Economic crises and political change: Indonesia, South Korea and Malaysia. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 31(4), 232–249.
- Friedman, M. (1994). *Money mischief: Episodes in monetary history*. San Diego: Harvest.
- Goldthorpe, J. H. (1978). The current inflation: Towards a sociological account. In F. Hirsch & J. H. Goldthorpe (Eds.), *The political economy of inflation* (pp. 186–216). London: Martin Robertson.
- Goodhart, C. (2013). Group-think and the current financial crisis. In J. F. Pixley & G. C. Harcourt (Eds.), *Financial crises and the nature of capitalist money* (pp. 70–78). Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Goodwin, J., Jasper, J., & Polletta, F. (2000). Return of the repressed: The fall and rise of emotions in social movement theory. *Mobilization*, 3(1), 65–84.
- Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. *American Journal of Sociology*, 91(3), 481–510.
- Gray, J. (2009). We simply do not know! *London Review of Books*, 31(22), 13–14.
- Haldane, A. (2010). The contribution of the financial sector: miracle or mirage? Speech of the Executive Director, Financial Stability, Bank of England, 14 July. <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches>. Accessed 3 Oct 2013.
- Hart, N. (2003). Marshall’s dilemma: Equilibrium versus evolution. *Journal of Economic Issues*, 37(4), 1139–1160.
- Hart, N. (2011). Mainstream macroeconomics: A ‘Keynesian’ revival? *Economic and Labour Relations Review*, 22(1), 17–40.
- Hassoun, J.-P. (2005). Emotions on the trading floor: Social and symbolic expressions. In K. K. Cetina & A. Preda (Eds.), *The sociology of financial markets* (pp. 102–120). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Heilbroner, R. (2000). *The worldly philosophers: The lives, times and ideas of the great economic thinkers* (7th ed.). London: Penguin.
- Hill, L. & McCarthy, P. (2004). On friendship and *necessitudo* in Adam Smith. *History of the Human Sciences*, 17(4), 1–16.
- Hirschman, A. O. (1977). *The passions and the interests: Political arguments for capitalism before its triumph*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hirschman, A. O. (1982). Rival interpretations of market society: Civilizing, destructive, or feeble? *Journal of Economic Literature*, XX, 1463–1484.
- Ingham, G. (1996). Some recent changes in the relationship between economics and sociology. *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 20, 243–275.
- Ingham, G. (1998). On the underdevelopment of the ‘Sociology of Money’. *Acta Sociologica*, 41(1), 3–18.
- Ingham, G. (2004). *The nature of money*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Johnson, S. & Kwak, J. (2011). *13 bankers*. New York: Vintage.

- Jones, R. A. (1986). *Emile Durkheim: An introduction to four major works*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Kahneman, D. (2011). *Thinking, fast and slow*. London: Allen Lane.
- Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. *Science*, 185, 1124–1131.
- Kalecki, M. (1943). Political aspects of full employment. *Political Quarterly*, 4, 322–331.
- Kemper, T. D. (2006). Power and status and the power-status theory of emotions. In J. E. Stets & J. H. Turner (Eds.), *Handbook of the sociology of emotions* (pp. 87–113). New York: Springer.
- Keynes, J. M. (1923). *A tract on monetary reform*. London: Macmillan.
- Keynes, J. M. (1920/1971). The economic consequences of the peace. In D. Moggridge (Eds.), *The collected writings of John Maynard Keynes* (Vol. II). UK: The Royal Economic Society, Macmillan and Cambridge University Press.
- Keynes, J. M. (1936/1973). The general theory of employment, interest and money. In D. Moggridge (Eds.), *The collected writings of John Maynard Keynes* (Vol. VII). UK: The Royal Economic Society, Macmillan and Cambridge University Press.
- Kindleberger, C. P., & Aliber, R. Z. (2011). *Manias, panics and crashes: A history of financial crises* (6th ed.). Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kirman, A., Livet, P., & Teschl, M. (2010). Rationality and emotions. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences*, 365(1538), 215–219.
- Knight, F. H. (1921/1964). *Risk, uncertainty and profit*. New York: A. M. Kelley.
- Krippner, G. R., & Alvarez, A. S. (2007). Embeddedness and the intellectual projects of economic sociology. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 33, 219–240.
- Kuzmics, H. (2011). Emotions. In D. Southerton (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of consumer culture* (pp. 522–525). Los Angeles: Sage.
- Lanchester, J. (2010). *Whoops: Why everyone owes everyone and no one can pay*. London: Penguin.
- Lawson, T. (2006). The nature of heterodox economics. *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 30(4), 483–505.
- Layard, R. (2003). Happiness: Has social science a clue? Lionel Robbins Memorial Lecture Series, 3–5 March 2003. London: London School of Economics. <http://cep.lse.ac.uk/events/lectures/layard/RL030303.pdf>. Accessed 1 Jan 2014.
- Lee, D., Brooks-Gunn, J., McLanaghan, S. S., Notterman, D., & Gar, I. (2013). *The great recession, genetic sensitivity, and maternal harsh parenting*. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. <http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2013/07/31/1312398110.full.pdf+html?sid=c019a2b6-68ac-498f-8fea-46b7862491e2>. Accessed 3 Oct 2013.
- Levin Report [United States Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations; Chairman: Senator Carl Levin]. (2011). *Wall Street and the financial crisis: Anatomy of a collapse*. Majority and Minority Staff Report, 13 April 2011.
- Loewenstein, G. (2000). Emotions in economic theory and economic behavior. *The American Economic Review*, 90(2), 426–432.
- Lyman, S. M., & Scott, M. B. (1970). Coolness in everyday life. In S. M. Lyman & M. B. Scott (Eds.), *A sociology of the absurd* (pp. 145–157). New York: Meredith.
- Maier, C. S. (1978). The politics of inflation in the twentieth century. In F. Hirsch & J. H. Goldthorpe (Eds.), *The political economy of inflation* (pp. 37–72). London: Martin Robertson.
- Meagher, G., & Nelson, J. A. (2004). Survey article: Feminism in the dismal science. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 12(1), 102–126.
- Mills, C. W. (1953). Introduction to T Veblen In V. Thorstein (Ed.), *The theory of the leisure class: An economic study of institutions* (pp. vi–xix). New York: Mentor.
- Minsky, H. P. (1996). Uncertainty and the institutional structure of capitalist economies: Remarks upon receiving the Veblen-Commons award. *Journal of Economic Issues* 30(2), 357–368.
- Minsky, H. P. (1986/2008). *Stabilizing the unstable economy*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Misztal, B. A. (1996). *Trust in modern societies*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Morgan, M. S., & Rutherford, M. (1998). American economics: The character of the transformation. In M. S. Morgan & M. Rutherford (Eds.), *From interwar pluralism to postwar neoclassicism* (pp. 1–26). Durham: Duke University Press.
- Moss, L. S. (1999). Editor's introduction. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 58(4), 551–558.
- O'Donnell, L. A. (1973). Rationalism, capitalism, and the entrepreneur: The views of Veblen and Schumpeter. *History of Political Economy*, 5(1), 199–214.
- Orléan, A. (2013). Money: Instrument of exchange or social institution of value? In J. F. Pixley & G. C. Harcourt (Eds.), *Financial crises and the nature of capitalist money* (pp. 46–69). Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Parsons, T., & Smelser, N. J. (1956/1998). *Economy and society: A study in the integration of economic and social theory*. London: Routledge.
- Perrin, R. G. (1995). Emile Durkheim's division of labor and the shadow of Hebert Spencer. *Sociological Quarterly*, 36(4), 791–808.
- Pettifor, A. (2013). The power to create money 'out of thin air': Understanding capitalism's elastic production of money and moving on beyond Adam Smith and 'fractional reserve banking': A review essay of Geoffrey Ingham's 'Capitalism'. Policy research in macroeconomics, January, London. <http://www.pri-meeconomics.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Ingham-Review-Essay-FINAL-1st-January-2013js3.pdf>. Accessed 3 Oct 2013.

- Pixley, J. F. (2004). *Emotions in finance: Distrust and uncertainty in global markets* (1st ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pixley, J. F. (2009). Time orientation and emotion-rules in finance. *Theory and Society*, 38, 383–400.
- Pixley, J. F. (2010a). Decency in Anglo-American financial centres? *Thesis Eleven*, 101, 63–71.
- Pixley, J. F. (2010b). The use of risk in understanding financial decisions. *The Journal of Socio-Economics*, 39(2), 209–222.
- Pixley, J. (2012). *Emotions in finance: Booms, busts and uncertainty* (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pixley, J. F., & Harcourt, G. C. (2013). Introduction to positive trespassing. In J. F. Pixley & G. C. Harcourt (Eds.), *Financial crises and the nature of capitalist money* (pp. 1–18). Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Poggi, G. (2000). *Durkheim*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Polanyi, K. (1944/1957). *The great transformation*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Ryan-Collins, J., Werner, R., Greenham, T., & Jackson, A. (2011). *Where does money come from? A guide to the UK monetary and banking system*. London: New Economics Foundation.
- Schumpeter, J. A. (1911/1934). *The theory of economic development: An inquiry into profits, capital, credit, interest, and the business cycle*. (trans: R. Opie). New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Schumpeter, J. A. (1954). *History of economic analysis* (Edited by E. B. Schumpeter). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Scott, J. (1987). *Weapons of the weak*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Shapiro, S. (2012). The grammar of trust. In J. F. Pixley (Ed.), *New perspectives on emotions in finance: The sociology of confidence, fear and betrayal* (pp. 99–118). London: Routledge.
- Simmel, G. (1907/1990). *The philosophy of money*. London: Routledge.
- Skocpol, T., & Williamson, V. (2012). *The tea party and the remaking of republican conservatism*. USA: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, A. (1791/1981). An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations (Vols. 1, 11). In R. H. Campbell & A. S. Skinner. *The Glasgow edition of the works and correspondence of Adam Smith*. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
- Smith, A. (1790/1984). The theory of moral sentiments. In D. D. Raphael & A. L. McAfee. *The Glasgow edition of the works and correspondence of Adam Smith*. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
- Spencer, H. (1874). *The study of sociology*. New York: D. Appleton.
- Spencer, H. (1882–1896). *The principles of sociology* (Vols. I–III). London: Williams and Norgate.
- Steiner, P. (2001). The sociology of economic knowledge. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 4(4), 443–458.
- Steiner, P. (2011). *Durkheim and the birth of economic sociology*. (trans: K. Tribe). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Stuckler, D., & Basu, S. (2013). *The body economic: Why austerity kills*. New York: Basic Books.
- Surowiecki, J. (2009). Inflated fears. *New Yorker*, 14 September.
- Swedberg, R. (1990). *Economics and sociology: Conversations with economists and sociologists*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Swedberg, R. (Ed.). (1991). *Joseph A. Schumpeter*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Swedberg, R. (2003). *Principles of economic sociology*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Turner, J. H., & Stets, J. E. (2006). Sociological theories of human emotions. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 32, 25–52.
- Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1986). Rational choice and the framing of decisions. *Journal of Business*, 59(4, Part 2), 251–278.
- Veblen, T. (1904). *The theory of business enterprise*. New York: Charles Scribner.
- Veblen, T. (1899/1953). *The theory of the leisure class: An economic study of institutions*. New York: Mentor.
- Velthuis, O. (1999). The changing relationship between economic sociology and institutional economics: From Talcott Parsons to Mark Granovetter. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 58(4), 629–649.
- von Scheve, C., & Ismer, S. (2013). Towards a theory of collective emotions. *Emotion Review*, 5(4), 406–413.
- von Scheve, C., & von Luede, R. (2005). Emotion and social structures: Towards an interdisciplinary approach. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 35(3), 303–328.
- Weber, M. (1920/2001). *The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism* (trans: T. Parsons). London: Routledge.
- Weber, M. (1905–1920/2002). *'The Protestant Ethic and the "Spirit" of Capitalism' and other works* (trans: P. Baehr & G. C. Wells). New York: Penguin.
- Weyher, L. F. (2013). Emotion, rationality, and everyday life in the sociology of Emile Durkheim. *Sociological Spectrum*, 32(4), 364–383.
- Whimster, S. (2007). *Understanding Weber*. London: Routledge.
- Wiley, N. F. (1983). The congruence of Weber and Keynes. In R. Collins (Ed.), *Sociological Theory* (Vol. 1, pp. 30–57). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Williams, R. (1989). *The politics of modernism*. London: Verso.
- Zelizer, V. A. (1994). *The social meaning of money*. New York: Basic Books.

Amy S. Wharton

### 16.1 Introduction

Work is a central institution in modern life and an important arena for the sociological study of emotion. Sociological interest in emotion began in earnest in the 1980s, as Hochschild's (1979, 1983) social constructionist view of emotion captured researchers' attention. This focus on the social construction of emotion corresponded to—and was in part prompted by—far-reaching changes within the workplace, including the growth of a service economy and the increased labor force participation of women. These developments stimulated an outpouring of sociological research on emotions and work that continues today. This explosion of interest in work and emotion was not confined only to sociologists, however. The study of work has always been a multidisciplinary endeavor. Business-school based organizations researchers, along with industrial and organizational psychologists, have also contributed to the development of an expansive literature on work and emotion (Barsade et al. 2003; Brief and Weiss 2002).

Most would agree that Hochschild's (1983) book *The Managed Heart* provided the spark that fueled sociological interest in work and emotion in the service economy. The concept of emotional labor has inspired hundreds, if not thousands, of studies, and its contribution to the understanding of the twentieth century workplace is unmatched.

However, in both the sociological and organizational arenas, the reach of emotions research on work has expanded considerably over the past three decades. This research identified new topics and issues for study and helped to reframe issues of longstanding interest.

Organizational and sociological approaches differ in their view of the domain or scope of emotions research, however. The stronger influence of psychological perspectives in the organizational literature means that within-person emotional and affective issues receive significant attention. Although within-person topics are not ignored, sociological approaches give more emphasis to the social relational aspects of emotion. There are also differences in the broader aims of researchers in each area. Organizational and management scholars most often seek to understand factors shaping individual and organizational performance. Sociologists are primarily interested in uncovering the structures and processes that govern work organization and experience. Although these aims are not mutually exclusive and often overlap, they produce subtle differences in research agendas.

Despite these differences in scope and focus, there are salient points of convergence and agreement among sociological and organizational researchers. For example, both aim to understand the emotional states of individual workers as well as group-level emotional experience and dynamics at work. They examine the organizational control and management of emotion, but also attend to emotions in the workplace that are more spontaneous and dynamic. Perhaps most important,

---

A. S. Wharton (✉)  
Washington State University, Vancouver, USA  
e-mail: Wharton@vancouver.wsu.edu



sociological and organizational assessments of the work and emotion literature agree that, while emotions matter in the workplace, our knowledge remains incomplete and disjointed in many respects (Ashkanasy and Humphrey 2011; Wharton 2009; Barsade and Gibson 2007; Barsade et al. 2003). Although the research is broad-based and multi-faceted, some wonder about how much and how far our understanding of work and emotion has evolved (Briner and Kiefer 2005).

This chapter addresses these issues by engaging both the sociological and organizational literatures on work and emotion. In a literature characterized by disciplinary, definitional, and conceptual diversity, taking stock of this body of work is no small task. However, the study of work has always been a multidisciplinary endeavor and the study of emotion perhaps even more so. As research on work and emotion moves into the twenty-first century, it is more important than ever to nurture the knowledge-generating potential of cross-disciplinary understanding.

To pursue this agenda, I discuss two broad areas of research on work and emotion. Each highlights a different stream of research on emotion in the workplace and can be used to illustrate points of overlap and disconnection between organizational and sociological views. The first area is the study of emotional expression. Included here are efforts to understand more spontaneous aspects of emotionality, as well as those that are understood as “extra-organizational” in certain respects. A second area includes studies of emotional regulation. This area encompasses emotional labor research, but also includes studies focusing on the regulation, structuring, and management of emotion. I employ the distinction between emotional expression and regulation mainly for analytical reasons, recognizing that these are not independent or separate processes in real life.

---

## 16.2 Emotional Expression: Traits and States

Barsade and Gibson (2007) provide a helpful definitional roadmap for research on emotional expression in the workplace. Affect represents

“an umbrella term encompassing a broad range of feelings that individuals experience” (Barsade and Gibson 2007, p. 36). These feelings include those that may be situational and transitory (i.e., feeling states) as well those that are more long-term and stable (i.e., feeling traits). In their view, emotions are one type of “feeling state,” described as intense, specific, and in part physiological, while moods are a second type. In contrast to emotions, moods are characterized as more expansive and nonspecific (Barsade and Gibson 2007, p. 37).

Research on emotional experience (or expression) in the workplace focuses on feeling traits and feeling states. Studies treat traits and states as both independent and dependent variables. Attention to these issues has deepened our understanding of longstanding concerns in research on work, such as job satisfaction. It has also raised new questions for analysis, such as the sources and expression of discrete emotion in the workplace.

### 16.2.1 Affect and Job Satisfaction

Understanding how people assess their jobs and the impact of these assessments on their behavior at work are long-standing, fundamental concerns in both organizational and sociological studies of work (Brief and Weiss 2002; Cranny et al. 1992). In taking up these issues, the concept of job satisfaction has been paramount and is considered “the most popular solution to measuring overall job quality” (Kalleberg 2011, p. 164). Job satisfaction has been generally understood as people’s affective response to their job (Locke 1976; Cranny et al. 1992). In this view, satisfaction represents a positive or pleasurable emotional state engendered when considering the job or work situation.

Much job satisfaction research is motivated by its presumed consequences for organizations and individuals. High correlations between overall job satisfaction, its various facets, and general happiness are seen as evidence that job satisfaction is an important element in personal well-being. Satisfaction is also viewed as a measure of



subjective job quality. Comparisons in satisfaction levels across occupations, work settings, and worker characteristics thus can yield information about the degree and sources of workplace advantage and disadvantage (Kalleberg 2011). For organizational researchers, the significance of job satisfaction stems from its relationship to job performance and related work behaviors, such as absenteeism or turnover, though these claims have been questioned (Katzell et al. 1992).

### 16.2.1.1 Re-Thinking Satisfaction

Despite its ubiquity in research on work and a widespread belief that job satisfaction matters, this concept has its critics. Organizational psychologists have been at the center of these discussions, which have been motivated at least in part by the inconsistencies in the satisfaction-performance relationship. The critiques converge around the need to clarify the theoretical underpinnings of this construct, how the affective dimension of satisfaction should be conceived and measured, and the significance of job satisfaction for understanding performance and other performance-related behaviors (Barsade et al. 2003; Brief and Weiss 2002; Weiss 2002; Fisher 2000).

The role of affect in job satisfaction has been especially important. Weiss (2002) argues that most job satisfaction research conflates three different constructs: beliefs about jobs, evaluative judgments about jobs, and affective experiences at work. In his view, job satisfaction should be conceived as an evaluative judgment that is independently influenced by people's beliefs and their affective experiences at work. Affective traits and moods may be antecedents (or consequences) of satisfaction, but are not themselves indicators of it. Weiss (2002, p. 176) notes that "By treating job satisfaction as affect we have simultaneously misunderstood what we are assessing while measuring job satisfaction and discouraged the study of true affective responses at work." Measurement issues compound the problem: Job satisfaction has long been understood as reflecting people's "hot" emotional responses to work, yet "cold" cognitive measures of this construct prevail (Fisher 2000). Addressing these issues has helped to produce a more refined and differentiated understanding of

affect as it relates to satisfaction specifically and to people's work lives more generally.

### 16.2.1.2 Traits, States, and Work Outcomes

In studying affective factors that may be linked to job satisfaction, research focuses primarily on the influence of affective traits and moods. As disposition or temperament, affective traits are considered part of the five-factor personality construct used in psychology (Connolly and Viswesvaran 2000; Watson and Slack 1993). Positive affectivity is considered part of the trait of extraversion, while negative affectivity reflects neuroticism (Watson and Clark 1992). Moods represent diffuse feeling states (Barsade and Gibson 2007). They can be more transitory or longer-lasting, though satisfaction research has tended to measure them across shorter durations. Though distinct constructs, moods and traits are similar in that both conceive of affect in terms of a small number of underlying dimensions (i.e., pleasant, positive or unpleasant, negative).

Both traits and moods are related to job satisfaction. Dispositional explanations of job satisfaction have received much attention, gaining traction from research showing some general consistency in people's satisfaction levels across jobs and over long periods of time (Staw and Cohen-Charash 2005). Affective temperament (i.e., positive and negative affectivity) in particular has been linked to satisfaction, though there is disagreement about the causal mechanisms involved (Brief and Weiss 2002; Connolly and Viswesvaran 2000; Levin and Stokes 1989). Within-person satisfaction levels are also affected by moods. For example, Ilies and Judge (2002) found that mood influences satisfaction levels across individuals and helps explain within-individual variations in satisfaction over time. People whose moods varied over time also tended to report fluctuations in satisfaction; satisfaction and mood may be more stable for some individuals than others. The relations between moods, traits, and satisfaction are complex, however, and many issues remain unresolved and poorly understood. Unraveling the causal relations between these constructs has been particularly challenging, as have issues

relating to the potentially different effects of positive and negative affect (Fisher 2000).

Satisfaction is an important variable in organizational research partly because of its presumed effects on performance. Moods and traits have also been linked to performance-related outcomes, such as decision-making effectiveness, creativity, problem-solving ability, and negotiation gains or losses (see Barsade and Gibson 2007; Brief and Weiss 2002). As is the case with job satisfaction, dispositional affect, especially the trait of positive affectivity, has received much more attention than effects of moods on performance outcomes.

Research also examines the factors that shape workplace moods and the effects of moods on work behavior. Miner et al. (2005) used ESM to examine the links between work events, mood, and three behavioral outcomes: engagement in regular work tasks, work withdrawal behavior (e.g., personal tasks, avoiding work, taking a break), and organizational citizenship behavior (e.g., helping a co-worker). Controlling for mood at the beginning of the day, they found that negative and positive work events affected mood at a later time. The relationship between the experience of a negative event and negative mood was much greater than the relationship between positive events and moods, however.

### 16.2.1.3 Implications for Work-Family Research

Research on the antecedents and consequences of moods has become particularly important in the study of work-family relations and gender differences in time use. ESM has been especially useful for researchers studying people's emotional responses to specific activities in daily life and across domains (Schneider 2006). In an early ESM study, Larson and Richards (1994) showed that both partners in a marriage experienced changes in their emotional states as they moved between domains; both also transmitted their emotional states to the other. Husbands' and wives' emotional states diverged at both the beginning and end of the work day. Women's emotions became more positive as they moved from home to work, while men's emotional states became more negative. At the end of the day, these trends reversed

themselves, with men's emotional states becoming more positive as they moved from work back to home and women's emotional states becoming more negative with this transition. Emotional states were also transmitted from one spouse to the other, but these effects were asymmetrical; husbands' mood had stronger effects on wives' moods than vice versa. Judge and Iles (2004 p. 670) refer to the process whereby moods experienced in one setting are carried over to another as "affective spillover." These researchers found that both satisfaction and mood at work affected mood at home, with positive spillover effects more substantial than negative effects.

Other research looks at work and family as contexts that shape emotional responses in daily life. Offer and Schneider's (2011) ESM study of multitasking among dual-earner families is a recent example. In this study, positive affect (i.e., feeling cheerful, relaxed, and good about oneself) and negative affect (i.e., feeling irritated, frustrated, and nervous) were treated as indicators of well-being. Multitasking was associated with reduced positive affect for both mothers and fathers at home and at work. Mothers and fathers both experienced more negative affect when multitasking at work, but only mothers also experienced more negative affect when multitasking at home. Multitasking in the presence of one's spouse and/or children increased positive affect and decreased negative affect for both genders. Multitasking at work was almost always experienced negatively in terms of its affective consequences. Continuing study of temporal variation in individual-level affective experience in the workplace and affective spillover may become even more important in the "new economy," as boundaries between work and non-work grow even more fluid and multitasking becomes commonplace (Offer and Schneider 2011).

### 16.2.2 Discrete Emotions and Emotional Experience

Another research stream in the area of emotional expression involves the study of discrete emotions and emotional experience. Moods

and emotions may both be considered subjective feeling states, but they differ in important respects. In contrast to moods, which are more diffuse, unfocused, and low in intensity, emotions are intense, short-term, and focused on a specific object or target (Barsade and Gibson 2007). Further, moods are normally conceptualized in terms of two dimensions (i.e., pleasant vs. unpleasant), while emotions represent more discrete states. How best to categorize and classify discrete emotions remains a topic of debate, with some arguing for a more relational, dimensional structure and others using a categorical approach that recognizes a set of primary or basic emotions (Larsen et al. 2002).

There has been significant theoretical and empirical attention to the experience of discrete emotions in the workplace. Discrete emotions have been of special interest to sociologists, who have examined how the experience of particular emotions may be linked to situational, social, or structural features of the workplace (Schieman 2007; Lively and Powell 2006; Lively and Heise 2004). Organizational researchers are also interested in the conditions that lead to particular emotions, but are especially attuned to the role of individual characteristics in explaining the dynamics and consequences of emotions.

### 16.2.2.1 The Example of Anger

Anger has been defined in various ways; Miron-Spektor and Rafaeli (2009, p. 153) describe it as “an intense and short-term feeling of displeasure, hostility, or antagonism toward someone or something, typically combined with an urge to attack or change another person’s behavior.” Scholarly interest in anger stems from the frequency with which it is experienced at work and its harmful or disruptive consequences for both workers and organizations (Miron-Spektor and Rafaeli 2009; Mickel and Ozcelik 2008; Schieman 2007; Booth and Mann 2005). One important source of anger in the workplace is unfair treatment, especially by supervisors (Gibson and Callister 2010; Booth and Mann 2005). Anger is also induced by disrespect, incivility, or rudeness (Grandbey et al. 2002; Fitness 2000) and by interpersonal conflict (Gibson and Callister 2010).

The emotion module included in the 1996 General Social Survey (GSS) has been an important data source for sociological studies of emotion, especially anger (Davis and Smith 1996). This module was distributed to a random subsample from the GSS, who were asked to report the frequency with which they experienced a list of eighteen specific emotions during the past week. The module also asked a series of more detailed questions about respondents’ experience of anger, including questions about the target of their anger, who bore most responsibility for its provocation, and how they coped with this emotion.

Sloan (2004) used these data to test hypotheses about the relations between anger and employment in a people-intensive occupation. As expected, those employed in jobs requiring high levels of contact with people reported experiencing more anger at work than those in less people-intensive occupations. When a job requires interaction with others, there is a greater likelihood that the conditions that provoke anger (e.g., disrespect, mistreatment, conflict) may be present. Sloan (2004) found little support for her prediction that these effects would be stronger among workers in lower prestige jobs. However, she did find differences in the reasons people in low- vs. high prestige jobs gave for being angry. Those in low-prestige jobs cited mistreatment as a reason for their anger, while those in high-prestige jobs attributed their anger to having been disrespected.

Lively and Powell (2006) used GSS data to examine expressions of anger in both work and home. They were particularly interested in how these expressions were shaped by gender, the relative status of participants, and the setting where the anger was experienced. They found that anger was affected much more by setting and relative status than by gender. Anger was more likely to be expressed directly in the home than in the workplace and when directed to those with lower- rather than higher status. This research affirms the role that context plays in emotional expression and calls particular attention to the effects of work hierarchies on the expression of anger.

Collett and Lizardo (2010) explore the widely held belief that the conditions giving rise to anger are more likely to occur among those in low status positions. They argue that status differences in anger reflect differences in the sense of control felt by people at higher and lower levels of the occupational status hierarchy, as well as status differences in the strength of norms that discourage expression of this emotion. An interesting extension of their argument is the claim that high occupational status may also engender anger under some specific interactional conditions; in particular, anger should result when the power or dominance of those with high status is challenged by those whose occupational status is lower.

Collett and Lizardo (2010) found a U-shaped relationship between anger and status: The experience of anger was higher at both extremes of the occupational status hierarchy than in the middle range. Different mechanisms may give rise to anger among those with higher- vs. lower occupational status. Anger for people with lower occupational status is more chronic and less situational, engendered by their disadvantaged social location and its association with feelings of powerless, frustration, and inequity. In contrast, those with high occupational status experience anger in settings where their status or more privileged position is challenged by a subordinate. Anger among high status individuals was most likely to occur in public settings, such as the workplace and be directed at someone of lower status. People with low occupational status were more likely to experience anger in private settings, where it was directed toward those more familiar to them.

### 16.2.2.2 Anger, Race, and Inequality at Work

The expression of anger at work has also been linked to the experience of inequality, discrimination, and status derogation more generally (Smith and Ho 2002). Several qualitative studies lend insight into these processes and how they are managed. Research on African-Americans in professional and educational settings shows how emotional restraint—particularly the management of anger—is an important aspect of their experience. Emotion display norms in pro-

fessional settings emphasize congeniality and a pleasant workplace demeanor, and as Lively and Powell (2006) found, direct expressions of anger at work are less likely than in the family. Expressions of anger and irritation are not completely off-limits at work, but Wingfield (2010) found that African-American professionals felt more constrained than their white counterparts in their ability to express these emotions. This was particularly true of African-American men, who felt that expressions of anger or irritation would reinforce the racial stereotype of the “angry black man.” Similar findings are reported in African-American male college students (Wilkins 2012) and faculty (Harlow 2003).

### The Consequences of Workplace Anger

Organizational researchers have devoted extensive attention to the consequences of expressing anger in the workplace, and it is clear that this emotion can lead to many negative consequences for individuals, relationships, and organizations. At the individual level, anger can lead to withdrawal from work, ill health, and efforts to undermine or target the person who provoked anger (Booth and Mann 2005). Disrespect, incivility, and hostility can escalate and spread. If unresolved, anger may also lead to even more destructive workplace behaviors, such as aggression or violence towards individuals or groups (Cuddy et al. 2007; Glomb et al. 2002). In addition, exposure to others’ anger at work may affect the observers’ work experience, behavior, and performance (Miron-Spektor and Rafaeli 2009). As noted (e.g., Miner et al. 2005), negative workplace events produce much greater changes in mood than positive events. This finding underscores the importance of attending to the antecedents, expression, and consequences of anger in the workplace.

### 16.2.3 Emotions in Groups and Work Group Emotions

Groups exert strong effects on people’s feelings, beliefs, and behavior at work. As many types of work move toward a team-based organization,

the influence of groups may become even more significant. Most studies of work groups in organizations view them through a cognitive lens, focusing on how members perceive their environments and one another (George 2002). This emphasis has shifted over time, however, as researchers began to attend to the affective dimension of group functioning and interaction.

Emotions researchers have studied groups at work from two primary vantage points, which Barsade and Gibson (1998) describe as the “top-down” and “bottom up” approaches. The top-down approach focuses on group processes and recognizes that these processes have an affective dimension. The “bottom up” approach treats groups as having emergent emotional properties or affective characteristics. Interest here lies in identifying these properties and examining their possible effects.

One example of a “top-down” approach to group emotion is Parker and Hackett’s (2012) case study of scientific collaborations among an internationally dispersed research group. Emotions contribute to successful collaborations because they “spark creativity, tighten social bonds, and lower barriers to collaboration. Emotional processes also recruit new members and instill commitment to the group and its ideas” (Parker and Hackett 2012, p. 24). The group bonded together emotionally and established cohesiveness by creating intensive opportunities for interaction that combined professional work with time for engaging on personal and informal levels. Parker and Hackett (2012) link these dynamics to the group’s high rates of scientific productivity. When bonding opportunities were disrupted, the group dynamics suffered and productivity diminished.

These researchers argue that the contribution of group emotion to knowledge production and to scientific work, in particular, is distinctive. Scientific breakthroughs demand a group’s focused attention, trust that enables them to put forward new or controversial ideas, and a willingness to challenge the status quo. Although the suggestion that scientific work is distinct in its reliance on group emotion requires additional study, it is well-established that the affective dynamics of

groups shape their cohesiveness, performance, and productivity (George 2002).

The “bottom up” approach to group emotion focuses less on group dynamics and more on capturing a group’s affective state (Niven et al. 2013). Bartel and Saavedra (2000) examine the issue of work group emotions by focusing specifically on observers’ ability to correctly identify these group properties. They found that observers’ assessments of a group’s emotional state generally corresponded with members’ self-reports. However, “high-energy” (e.g., hostile or enthusiastic) states were more easily detected than those that were “low-energy” (e.g., peaceful or sluggish) (Bartel and Saavedra 2000, p. 222). Emotional contagion and what Bartel and Saavedra (2000, p. 200) call “emotional comparison” are two processes that may contribute to the emotional state of a work group. Exposure to similar conditions, such as the same tasks, events, or outcomes, can also create a group-level emotional state or affective tone (George 2002).

Another area of research concerns the affective composition of work groups. Just as work groups have demographic properties (e.g., sex composition), they may also possess an affective make-up. Barsade et al. (2000, p. 802) examine the property of “trait positive affective diversity,” defined as “individual differences in positive affective personality.” Consistent with research on work group diversity more generally, these authors measure affective diversity at both the work group level (i.e., the standard deviation of a group’s trait PA) and at the individual level (i.e., the degree of similarity or difference between an individual member’s trait PA and the group’s trait PA). They find that PA “fit” (or similarity) increases satisfaction with group interpersonal relations and perceived influence on group processes. Further, CEOs with higher PA fit relative to their team members are more participatory in their decision-making than those whose trait PA is more dissimilar. Affective diversity at the work group level had a less straightforward impact: A group’s affective diversity mattered less for groups high in trait PA than for those with lower average levels of this characteristic.



Research on work group emotion raises many issues for future study, but this research also faces some of the same challenges as other research that attempts to identify work group properties. Key issues involve how best to create summary measures of emotional states and the way to use aggregated data (Klein and Kozlowski 2000).

#### 16.2.4 Emotional Expression Summary and Conclusion

Our understanding of emotional expression at work has become increasingly nuanced. Emotional traits, moods, and discrete emotions have each received significant attention. Research also examines how emotions are transmitted to others and/or across domains and are aggregated to the level of a group or team. This research highlights the importance of within-person processes, particularly with respect to mood and affective temperament. Most of this research comes from the organizational arena. Among sociologists, even within the sociology of emotions, attention to mood and affective temperament have received less attention than the study of discrete emotions. However, studies of person-level affect as cause and consequence of job satisfaction or task performance can add value to sociological thinking about the sources of work perceptions and behavior.

Experience sampling methodology is a valuable tool for examining affective experience in real time and a means to capture more immediate or transient states and perceptions. A focus on temporal variations in individual affective experience provides a more dynamic perspective on work experience than can be obtained by more static, cross-sectional approaches to studying work perceptions and behavior. This dynamic approach is consistent with Stets' (2010) call for more sociological attention to "emotion flows."

Identifying the potential sources of durability in individual-level work perceptions and behavior is also important, however. Sociologists have generally been resistant to dispositional explanations for behavior, and this has been especially true regarding work behavior. However, it is important not to dismiss these accounts, given

the robust results they have generated. Affective diversity may be as important as other ways to capture heterogeneity of groups.

Both sociologists and organizational researchers have devoted extensive attention to the experience of discrete emotions in the workplace. The primary focus has been on showing the connections between expressed emotions and particular features of jobs, work situations, or experiences. Mapping the ways in which emotional expression is linked to relations of power, authority, and status at work has been an important contribution. Emotional expression has also been studied as a response to work experiences, such as inequality or discrimination. Sociological studies have helped reveal how status characteristics, such as gender and race, shape these processes. Recognizing that gender and race are not simply characteristics of individuals, but are embedded within the work structures and processes that shape emotional expression is an important area for further exploration.

Overall, the literature on emotional expression at work places special attention on its consequences for individuals and organizations. With respect to job and task performance, the results of this research area are unambiguous: Barsade and Gibson (2007, p. 51) conclude that "The evidence is overwhelming that experiencing and expressing positive emotions and moods tends to enhance performance at individual, group, and organizational levels." Performance is less of a concern in sociological research, which tends to treat positive emotions as an outcome to be explained rather than as a predictor. These differences in emphasis have meant that emotional expression itself has received more attention from organizational researchers than sociologists. In contrast, sociologists have placed more emphasis on the ways in which emotional expression is shaped by work contexts, settings, and experiences.

---

### 16.3 The Regulation of Emotion

Emotions are not simply expressed or experienced at work, they are also managed and regulated. Understanding this process is the primary

objective of the vast literature on emotional labor. The concept of emotional labor originated with Hochschild (1983) as one part of her argument regarding the social construction of emotion. For Hochschild (1983), the expression and management of emotion are social processes; what people feel and express depend on societal norms, their social categories and position, and cultural factors. How to manage feeling and expression are learned largely in the private sphere at first and later through participation in more public realms. Emotional labor represents the employer-directed form these processes assume as they move into the workplace and are embedded in job requirements and performance expectations. For sociologists, emotional labor is virtually synonymous with the study of emotion in the workplace. This concept also serves as an important anchor for organizational research on the regulation of emotion.

In their recent review of emotional labor research, Grandey et al. (2013, p. 3) identify three “lenses” that have been applied to this topic. The first involves a focus on “intrapysic experience.” Drawing from Hochschild, as well as from psychologically-oriented organizational research, these studies examine workers’ emotion management strategies and their psychological effects. A second lens calls attention to emotional displays at work, examining the factors that influence displayed emotions and their congruence (or lack thereof) with emotions that may be felt but not displayed. The third lens is what Grandey et al. (2013, p. 3) call the “occupational requirements” view. Attention here is on the ways that organizations and occupations attempt to influence the emotions that people feel and display on the job.

### 16.3.1 Emotion Regulation and Intrapysic Experience

Efforts to understand the intrapsychic experience of emotion regulation draw heavily from research by Gross et al. Gross (1998, p. 275) characterizes the psychological or intrapsychic study of emotion regulation as concerned with “how individuals influence which emotions they have,

when they have them, and how they experience and express them.” He argues that there are several distinct strategies of emotion regulation that people use in daily life and with different consequences for their well-being (Gross 2001; Gross and Thompson 2007; Gross and John 2003). Antecedent-focused emotion regulation strategies take place early on in process of emotional experience (Gross 2001). They involve efforts to change or modify the situation, to refocus attention, or to cognitively reframe an experience. Response-based strategies are used after an emotional response has occurred and involve attempts to control or modulate this response (Gross 2001).

Grandey and colleagues show how Gross’s views can inform emotional labor research and especially Hochschild’s (1983) concepts of deep acting and surface acting (Grandey et al. 2013; Mikolajczak et al. 2009; Pugh 2002; Grandey 2000). Deep acting, which involves an attempt to create an authentic emotional reaction, reflects an antecedent-focused regulation strategy. Surface acting, or the attempt to display an emotion that is not authentically felt, reflects a response-based approach.

Workers’ use of surface and deep acting have been extensively studied by emotional labor researchers from many disciplines. Early qualitative research by Leidner (1993) showed how food service workers used surface acting in order to comply with the emotional requirements of their jobs. These workers had little formal power and autonomy, and their interactions with customers were highly scripted by employers. Surface acting enabled them to comply with job requirements, but also served workers’ interests in maintaining a barrier between who they were expected to be at work and who they perceived themselves to be (Leidner 1993). Although all types of workers may at times seek to create this sense of distance, it may be particularly important for those in the most structurally disadvantaged positions and whose dignity is most at stake when interacting with customers.

These issues have also been extensively examined with quantitative data. Researchers have sought to identify the individual- and job-level correlates of emotion regulation on the job, and

developed measures of surface and deep acting as emotion management strategies. Recent meta-analysis results show that deep and surface acting are more likely in jobs where employers expect workers to comply with emotional display rules and in work settings where sustained interaction with customers is required (Wang et al. 2011). Positive display rules are more likely to engender deep acting, while surface acting is more common in work settings where negative display rules are present (Wang et al. 2011).

Quantitative researchers have measured emotional labor and the concepts of surface and deep acting in multiple ways. Whereas early research used information about occupations or occupational categories as proxies for the emotion regulation efforts of workers (e.g., Wharton 1993; Hochschild 1983), studies now attempt to measure emotion regulation strategies directly. For example, Grandey (2003, p. 91) asked workers to indicate the average extent to which they “just pretend to have the emotions I need to display for my job” or “work hard to feel the emotions that I need to show to others.” (see also Brotheridge and Grandey 2002). Erickson and Ritter (2001) queried people about their experience of specific emotions on the job and the degree to which they attempted to hide or cover up those feelings. Glomb and Tews’ (2004) Discrete Emotions Emotional Labor Scale (DEELS) asks respondents about their expression of a set of positive and negative discrete emotions, and the extent to which their expression of that emotion was genuine, faked, or suppressed. A more widely used instrument is Brotheridge and Lee’s (2003) Emotional Labor Scale, which has subscales measuring surface and deep acting.

### 16.3.1.1 The Consequences of Emotion Regulation

Understanding the consequences of emotion regulation for psychological well-being is a central pre-occupation among researchers. This topic brings together those motivated by Hochschild’s (1983) interest in this issue, as well as those who build on the emotion regulation literature. Both groups pay particular attention to surface acting and the resulting gap between what emotion is felt and

what is displayed. Hochschild refers to this gap as emotional dissonance and views this state as having long-term negative consequences for psychological well-being. Studies find general support for this claim: Workers who regularly have to display emotions that diverge from their real feelings report higher levels of psychological distress and discomfort (as indicated by several different measures) than those whose jobs that require less surface acting (Wang et al. 2011; Zapf and Holz 2006; Dijk and Brown 2006; Grandey 2003; Brotheridge and Grandey 2002; Erickson and Ritter 2001).

The effects of deep acting on well-being are less consistent, but deep acting seems to have fewer negative consequences than surface acting. Wang et al.’s (2011) meta-analysis revealed a positive association between deep acting and well-being and no evidence that deep acting is related to negative outcomes. Mikolajczak et al. (2009) suggest that standard measures of deep acting actually tap several distinct emotion regulation strategies, each of which may have different effects on psychological well-being.

Other advances in understanding the effects of surface and deep acting come from research on the mediators and moderators of these effects. Using an experience sampling approach, Judge et al. (2009) examine the moderating and mediating effects of moods and affective traits. Consistent with other studies, they found a negative association between surface acting and well-being. Surface acting was also associated with negative mood, and negative mood partially mediated the relations between surface acting and well-being. Judge et al. (2009) also find some evidence that affective traits play a moderating role in these relationships, with introverts (or negative affectivity) more susceptible to the negative effects of surface acting and extraverts (or positive affectivity) more susceptible to the positive effects of deep acting.

### 16.3.2 Emotion Regulation and Displayed Emotions

A second research stream on emotion regulation focuses on displayed emotions in the workplace. What emotions are displayed at work is shaped

by several factors, including occupational and organizational norms about appropriate displays, or “display rules.” (Rafaeli and Sutton 1987, 1989; Van Maanen and Kunda 1989; Ashforth and Humphrey 1993). Individual characteristics, characteristics of the work role, situational factors, and societal or cultural norms about emotion also affect these displays (Pugh 2001; Tsai 2001; Rafaeli and Sutton 1989). Studies mainly focus on general categories of displayed emotions, such as positive or negative emotions, or on displays of emotional neutrality (or suppression of emotion).

Many jobs are governed by formal or informal display rules or norms, but these are more common in some types of jobs than others. Most research focuses on service occupations where workers are required to interact with customers or clients. The aim of emotional display in this context is to influence others’ emotions. Creating positive emotions or an overall sense of well-being in customers are the goals of many service encounters. Less common are situations where workers are encouraged to engender negative emotions, such as fear, in their customers (e.g., Sutton 1991). Professional and managerial work may also be governed by display rules. Emotional neutrality may be used in these jobs to convey expertise and authority. In settings where workers’ emotion regulation strategies are viewed as an important, if not essential, element of successful job performance, employers may monitor workers’ efforts, provide training to improve them, and encourage workers to act strategically to achieve desired effects in customer interaction.

An important concern in this literature is understanding how workers’ emotional displays are molded by organizational and occupational norms. In his qualitative study of bill collectors, for example, Sutton (1991) shows how employers tried to insure that bill collectors complied with organizational norms regarding the emotional demeanor to display with debtors. Bill collectors were “selected, socialized, and rewarded” for their compliance, but organizational control over workers’ emotional displays had its limits

(Sutton 1991, p. 245). An important contribution of this study is its close attention to the interplay between employers’ efforts to shape employees’ emotional displays and the daily realities workers face in attempting to comply with organizational norms.

### 16.3.2.1 Emotional Harmony and Emotional Deviance

“Emotional harmony” occurs when there is consistency between employer expectations for emotional display and employee behavior (Grandey et al. 2013, p. 11). Emotional harmony can be achieved through surface acting, deep acting, or involve minimal emotion regulation of any kind. Hence, it is not presumed to be either intrinsically beneficial or intrinsically harmful for employees. Emotional deviance refers to a discrepancy between what is prescribed and what is displayed. Emotional deviance, like emotional harmony, may be beneficial or harmful for employees’ well-being.

One innovative study of emotional deviance looked at organizational responses to this behavior. Zerbe (2009) analyzed Canadian labor arbitration decisions to identify cases involving disciplinary action against employees’ expression of inappropriate emotions in their work roles. All of the twenty cases examined involved service sector employees, holding jobs such as customer service representative, cashiers, nurses, bus drivers and others. Zerbe (2009) found that the employee’s offense in almost all instances involved discourtesy or rudeness to customers, which was primarily defined as hostility, frustration, or sarcasm in one’s tone of voice or demeanor. In one case, a nurse was disciplined for behaving inappropriately when she cried at a patient’s bedside. Customers’ behavior was a mitigating factor in arbitrators’ decisions; Arbitrators were more lenient in cases where customers were shown to have provoked workers’ response. While employers view compliance with display rules as important, Zerbe (2009) (like Sutton 1991) argues that compliance is very difficult to enforce and the rules themselves may be only vaguely understood by workers.

### 16.3.2.2 Emotional Displays in Professional and Managerial Jobs

Although most research on displayed emotions focuses on interactive service work, there is a growing literature that addresses these issues in professional and managerial settings. Professionals are “privileged emotion managers” with high levels of job autonomy (Orzechowicz 2008, p. 143). The emotional display norms governing professional work are acquired through both formal and informal processes of professional socialization (e.g., Cahill 1999; Pierce 1995; Smith and Kleinman 1989). Emotional regulation and the importance of emotional display are also critical aspects of managerial work, especially in the leadership domain (Ashkanasy and Tse 2000). Leaders regulate their own emotional displays to influence their subordinates’ ability to achieve organizational goals.

#### Gender, Race, and Emotional Displays

Emotional display norms at work are not race- or gender-neutral, but reflect the experiences of dominant social categories. Members of these groups have more latitude in their compliance with display norms, while compliance may be more difficult or problematic for less advantaged categories of workers. For example, although the expression of anger is discouraged in professional workplaces, African-American men feel more pressure to comply with this norm, while simultaneously experiencing more situations likely to provoke it, than their white counterparts (Wingfield 2010). Women and other workers in structurally disadvantaged positions also confront this “emotional double-bind:” They may be more likely than more advantaged workers to experience negative emotions at work, but also face more pressures to suppress these emotions (Erickson and Ritter 2001).

Women may be more expressive than men in their display of emotions and are more likely than men to display positive emotions in the workplace (Nadler and Lowery 2009; Ridgeway and Johnson 1990). This may create another type of double-bind for women, especially those in positions involving authority or leadership. In her study of personal trainers, George (2008) found

that women were believed to be better than male trainers at establishing emotional trust with clients. Some perceived this as advantageous for women, particularly in their ability to attract clients. However, being emotionally supportive could also hinder the trainer’s ability to enact the role of an authoritative professional. Emotion plays a role in leadership and leaders are encouraged to be attentive to the emotions they display. However, compliance with the display norms expected of leaders may penalize women who risk being viewed as violating gender norms.

### 16.3.2.3 Individual and Organizational Consequences of Organizational Display Rules

Employers enforce display rules because these rules are believed to enhance workers’ job performance and, by extension, organizational success. Employees’ emotional displays are presumed to be especially critical in service jobs; displays of positive emotions encourage customers to view workers as helpful and friendly, leading to increased sales. Studies that have investigated these links find mixed results. For example, Sutton and Rafaeli (1988) found that grocery store clerks’ display of positive emotions was negatively associated with store sales. They argue that positive emotional displays were more frequent at less busy times than when sales were brisk and clerks’ jobs were more stressful. Other studies have found that employees’ positive emotions enhance customers’ views of service quality and willingness to return to a store (Barger and Grandey 2006; Tsai and Huang 2002; Tsai 2001).

Leaders’ emotional displays are presumed to have strong effects on subordinates’ emotions, as well as their job performance and satisfaction (Brief and Weiss 2002). These effects are attributed in part to leaders’ power, as research suggests that those with more power have greater influence on others’ emotions than those with less (Cote et al. 2013). Identifying the precise nature of these effects has been more difficult, however. For example, some research shows that leaders who display positive emotions have more success across a range of outcomes than those who display negative emotions, while other studies



show that negative emotions may also be effective for some types of leaders in some circumstances (Cote et al. 2013).

Understanding the process of emotional influence between workers and customers, professionals and clients, or leaders and subordinates calls attention to the larger issue of the interpersonal consequences of emotion regulation. Social functional accounts of emotion suggest that perceivers derive useful information from others' emotional displays and thus are motivated to attend to them (Cote et al. 2013). Observers are also affected by others' emotions, as we saw earlier. Efforts to identify the specific pathways through which emotional displays may affect others' emotions, behavior, or judgment focus on emotional contagion as one central mechanism through which these effects occur (Groth et al. 2013; Pugh 2001). Effects of actors' emotional displays on observers are also dependent on the actors' emotion regulation strategies and the discrete emotion that is being regulated, as well as on situational and other factors (Cote et al. 2013s).

### 16.3.2.4 Authenticity and Inauthenticity at Work

In interactive work, an important factor shaping customers' reactions is the perceived authenticity of the workers' emotional display. Positive emotional displays are more likely to influence customers when these displays are seen as authentic (Grandey 2003). Similarly, some research suggests that leaders perceived as inauthentic in their emotional displays are less effective than those viewed as more authentic (Cote et al. 2013). The value of "authentic leadership" has been emphasized in the management practitioner literature (Gardner et al. 2009). Authentic displays of emotions are those that reflect a person's "real" or "core" self, as evidenced by a correspondence between internal emotional experience and external expression (Cable et al. 2013; Grandey et al. 2005; Erickson and Ritter 2001; Ashforth and Humphrey 1993). Surface acting has often been used as an indicator of inauthenticity, while deep acting is sometimes treated as reflecting a more authentic emotional display. Opportunities to authentically express emotion at work thus are also believed to benefit employees.

Cable et al. (2013, p. 25) conclude that "both employees and organizations are better off when employees are able to be authentic." Analyzing data collected from field and laboratory experiments, they found that encouraging authenticity at work led to more positive outcomes for workers and their organizations than encouraging workers to adopt organizational norms and values. In their view, authenticity can be enhanced by socialization practices focused on personal identity, a strategy that departs from efforts to make organizational identity central to the socialization process.

## 16.3.3 Emotion Regulation and Jobs, Occupations, and Organizations

The final approach to emotion regulation at work puts jobs, occupations, organizations, or society at the center of the analysis. Work-family relations are also addressed in this literature. An important motivation for this research is Hochschild's (1983) distinction between emotion management and emotional labor. In contrast to emotion regulation (or management) that is more personal or private, emotional labor is emotion regulation that is formally or informally governed by economic criteria. Hochschild (1983) used this distinction to explore the implications of a service economy for people's emotional lives. For Hochschild, the numbers of jobs requiring emotional labor represent an extension of the marketplace into more private and intimate realms. For sociologists of work, these ideas prompted explorations of emotional labor across a range of jobs and work settings.

### 16.3.3.1 Foundational Occupational Case Studies: Frontline Service and Professions

Ever since Hochschild's (1983) study of flight attendants, occupational case studies have been a staple in the sociological literature on emotion. Almost exclusively qualitative, these studies examine emotional labor in the context of a particular work setting. They explore the role of both formal and informal display rules and the ways that employees attempt to navigate these

expectations, “Frontline” service occupations, which require direct, face-to-face contact with customers, received most of the attention early on (e.g., Macdonald and Sirianni 1996; Tolich 1993; Leidner 1993; Paules 1991), followed by research on professions such as law (Pierce 1995).

Studies of emotional labor in frontline service jobs helped shape sociological understandings of service work by highlighting the distinctive features of these occupations. These studies also revealed areas of continuity between manufacturing and service, such as the dynamics of standardization and routinization, the impact of technology on work organization, and systems of labor control. Frontline service workers have little formal job autonomy, but aim to control their working conditions, including the emotional labor requirements of their jobs. Frontline service workers face threats to their self-esteem and psychological well-being, but also find sources of dignity and satisfaction in these jobs.

Pierce’s (1995) study of paralegals and lawyers shifted the occupational focus of emotional labor research to the professions. An important aspect of her and others’ research on these jobs was the attention paid to hierarchal relationships within the workplace and how workers manage these relationships. For example, based on interviews with paralegals and legal assistants, Lively (2000) shows how paralegals actively manage their emotions to comply with professional display norms. Paralegals and secretaries also engaged in mutual caregiving and support, or “reciprocal emotion management” (Lively 2000, p. 33). Although this enabled paralegals and secretaries to better cope with attorneys’ expectations and emotional demands, it reinforced work hierarchies.

This literature also calls attention to the gendered aspects of emotional labor and the ways these reproduce inequality in the workplace. Women tend to be disproportionately represented in jobs in which caretaking and deference are formally expected (e.g., paralegal), and jobs that women occupy often develop informal display norms emphasizing these characteristics. Pierce (1995) shows how even among workers in the same job, women and men may encounter differ-

ent expectations for how they are to provide care and support. Female paralegals were expected to be nice, friendly, and supportive of male attorneys, while being helpful, polite, and considerate were expected of men in these jobs.

### 16.3.3.2 Gender, Race, and the Body in Emotional Labor Research

More recent occupationally-focused research builds on these foundational contributions, while also raising new topics for investigation. In particular, this literature reflects a continuing emphasis on the links between emotional labor and inequality and illustrates Schwalbe et al.’s (2000, p. 437) that “the smooth reproduction of inequality depends as much on subordinates managing the emotions of dominants as vice-versa.” A focus on gender and emotional labor extends back to Hochschild, with attention to race and ethnicity, class, and sexuality emerging as more recent concerns (Macdonald and Merrill 2009). Kang’s (2010) study of New York City nail salons reveals the complexities of managing close bodily contact between worker and customer across gender, race, and class boundaries. She urges researchers to look beyond generic descriptions of emotional labor in frontline service work and examine how gender, race or ethnic background, class and other status characteristics shape both workers’ and customers’ emotional experiences.

The rapid expansion of the Chinese service sector has inspired research on gender, service, and inequality in that economy. In her study of women’s service work in Chinese luxury hotels, Otis (2008) shows that the influence on work practices of Western ideas about femininity, specifically expectations about care and deference, has been uneven and constrained by characteristics of local consumers. Hanser (2008) explores how gender and sexuality shape service work in urban China and contribute to the reproduction of class distinctions in that economy. Like Kang, these researchers argue that cultural notions of femininity are embedded in the meanings and definition of “good service” and that these cultural standards are highly variable.

In exploring the connection between service and femininity, this literature extends the realm

of emotional labor to encompass sexuality, the body, and aesthetic labor (Williams and Connell 2010). For example, luxury hotel managers taught Chinese women “new bodily practices,” including how to walk and stand, and sought to shape “intimate details of hygiene, comportment, facial expressions, and even morality” (2008, p. 23–24). As Kang (2010, p. 20) notes, the body is “the vehicle for performing service work.” Mears and Finlay (2005) develop this idea more fully in their study of models, whose emotional labor is geared toward creating visual images for observers and required to promote themselves to agents and clients.

### 16.3.3.3 Emotional Labor and the New Economy

Research on global service work represents one way that the emotional labor literature has begun to engage with features of the “new economy.” In addition to globalization, another characteristic of this economy involves the continued commodification of the personal, private, and familial realms. This theme motivated *The Managed Heart*, but during the past 30 years there has been an even greater “outsourcing” of intimate life (Hochschild 2012). Personal services, which refer to service occupations performed directly for an individual family or customer, have expanded over time as workers pursue jobs that would have been virtually unknown 30 years ago (or available only to the very wealthy), such as dog walkers, life coaches, personal trainers, and professional shoppers. George (2008) argues that many of these jobs represent a new form of interactive service work that is not low-skilled and routinized, but rather is complex, active, and autonomous. She uses the term “expert service work” to describe “the performance of knowledgeable, customized interactive labor” (George 2008, p. 115).

George (2008) uses personal trainers as an example of one expert service occupation. Trainers’ work requires emotional labor for several different ends—to motivate, provide consultation or expertise, and to deliver a product. These tasks are complicated by the social and physical closeness required for trainers to be successful. Like the manicurists Kang (2010) studied, trainers

do bodily labor and must “continually negotiate professional and personal boundaries with their clients” (George 2008, p. 123). These boundaries were especially difficult for women to manage: To be taken seriously as professionals, trainers attempted to enact their roles with objectivity and detachment, but women were also expected to be emotionally supportive.

### 16.3.3.4 Caring, Carework, and Organizational Compassion

In making explicit the caregiving women perform as part of their jobs, studies increasingly treat caregiving as a specific type of emotional labor. Caregiving is an activity that occurs informally both within and outside the workplace and has been examined as a formal job requirement or display norm. Caregiving has been examined this activity in relation to specific occupations and organizations.

Three features of carework have made it of particular interest to sociologists of work. First, caregiving is generally seen as more likely to be attached to realms or activities associated with women than with men. Women are overrepresented in caring fields, such as healthcare, childcare, eldercare, teaching, etc. and in interactive service jobs where friendliness and sociability are formal job requirements. Providing care to others is often informally expected of women, regardless of their formal job description. Second, caregiving is often invisible, unrecognized, and undervalued (England 2005). Third, carework is a unique form of emotional labor, as captured in the distinction between “human” and “commercial” service (Erickson and Stacey 2013). As a job requirement or expectation, caregiving is emotionally demanding and often performed in unequal relationships in which recipients’ needs are primary and providers are disadvantaged. However, not all caregiving in the workplace is exploitative. In addition, even in jobs where workers’ involvement in caregiving is an expectation, providing care may be experienced as emotionally satisfying and intrinsically rewarding.

Understanding the distinctiveness of caring fields or occupations has received increased attention. Studies show how changes in the structure,

practice, and professional norms guiding these fields have the potential to increase or diminish workers' positive experience of caregiving (Huynh et al. 2008; Lopez 2006). Calls for economic efficiency and standardization challenge the "ethic of care" that has historically guided health care professionals. Erickson and Stacey (2013) warn that the ongoing commercialization of human service work requires renewed efforts to understand the emotional demands and experiences of health care workers.

Grant et al. (2009) reject the view that treats health care as either emotionally alienating or fulfilling for employees. Instead, they suggest there are "different pathways to meaning" in caring organizations. They studied a large university hospital that encouraged its nurses to think of their work as "spiritual care" (Grant et al. 2009, p. 338). The nurses in their study interpreted the hospital's views in different ways, with different consequences for their feelings of authenticity. This study raises important questions about the mechanisms that lead to people's work-related meanings.

In addition to renewed attention to formal carework organizations, the literature on compassion in organizations examines caring as an extra-organizational activity. Compassion involves noticing another's suffering, empathetically feeling that pain, and acting to weaken it (Lilius et al. 2008). Central topics include how individuals within organizations respond to others' pain and suffering and how organizations provide a context that makes these actions more or less likely (Rynes et al. 2012; Kanov et al. 2004). Research includes case studies of organizational responses to traumatic events (e.g., Dutton et al. 2006), studies of individuals' involvement in care and compassion (e.g., Grant 2012), and research on the conditions under which organizations might become compassionate (Madden et al. 2012).

Although organizational compassion is a fruitful topic for study, empirical research in this area to date is relatively sparse. It would be useful to differentiate acts of compassion from more general notions of social support and other informal aspects of workers' interpersonal relationships at work, including what Lively calls their (2000,

p. 33) "reciprocal emotion management" for one another. More research is needed to determine whether compassion is distinct from more general acts of care.

### **Unpaid Care Work as Emotion Management**

Research on emotional labor as caregiving has prompted greater attention to emotion work at home, or unpaid care work. Whether paid or unpaid, carework is more likely to be the responsibility of women than men. Erickson (2005) suggests that studies of the household division of labor should be as attentive to the division of emotion work in the home as they are to other kinds of household work. She argues that, like the emotional labor involved in paid caregiving, unpaid emotion work requires time, energy, and effort. In this view, "emotional carework"—defined as providing emotional support and enhancing others' well-being—is an important activity in families and a type of household work. There has been considerable interest in making visible the emotional activities of family members that are taken-for-granted or unappreciated (e.g., Lois 2012; Garey and Hansen 2011).

Finally, MacDermid et al. (2002) suggest that more attention be paid to the management of emotion at the work-family interface. They note that much of the literature examining this interface focuses on negative consequences, such as work-family conflict, or rooted in a scarcity model of emotional energy. By focusing on emotion regulation strategies, they suggest that we might learn more about the conditions that facilitate enhancing effects of multiple roles.

### **16.3.4 Summary and Conclusion: The Regulation of Emotion**

Virtually all aspects of emotion have a social component. People feel, express, and manage their emotions in ways that are shaped by their social context. Emotion is also influenced by social structural factors. While organizational researchers have significantly influenced our understanding of the expression of emotion at work, sociological studies have helped shape awareness

of how the regulation of emotion is shaped by the structure, organization, and social context of work.

The regulation of emotion occurs at multiple levels within the workplace. Research on intrapsychic processes examines individuals' emotion management strategies. Bringing together research on emotion regulation with studies derived from Hochschild's (1983) concepts of surface and deep acting, this research area is lively and flourishing. The literature has moved beyond early questions about the consequences of surface or deep acting to consider emotion regulation as a more general process with the potential to have both positive and negative consequences for workers.

Studies of displayed emotions are especially interested in what factors shape emotional displays and the effects of displays on the employee, others at work, and on the organization. Much research on the consequences of employees' emotional displays focuses on their implications for others at work or for the organization more generally. Although this literature continues to be concerned with workers' compliance with display norms, researchers are taking a closer look at what compliance means and the mechanisms through which it occurs. At stake in these debates are questions about how and under what conditions do employees come to embrace their employers' work values and meanings.

Interest in the emotional requirements of particular jobs, occupations, and work settings continues to inspire qualitative research. Service work remains a primary focus, but researchers have turned their attention to new sets of issues. Among these are the ways that class, race, and gender infuse service work and attention to more intimate forms of body labor. An important, yet underexplored area for study includes new service occupations and locales, such as "expert service work" and service in the global economy. Carework has become an important concern as well, as researchers continue to examine the implications of commodification and markets on emotional experience and as the care sector expands to accommodate an aging population.

Perhaps the most overarching concern of this research area, however, involves the commo-

dification of human emotional experience and the balance between private and public, or authentic and inauthentic. A recurring theme in Hochschild's (1983, 2012) work has been to understand how the personal, private, and familial realms have been encroached upon and invariably altered by the increasingly global marketplace. This theme has seen renewed attention in emotional labor research and its focus on carework and the care sector, body labor, and work-family connections.

---

## 16.4 Taking Stock: The Present and Future of Work and Emotions

In one of many assessments of the organizational research on emotions, Briner and Kiefer (2005, p. 301) note that while the field has become older, "are we any wiser about the experience of emotions at work?" Their answer, in brief, is not very much. Several developments since their assessment lead me to a more optimistic response to this question.

Emotion has made its way into virtually every aspect of the study of work. From the intrapsychic- to the organizational-level, researchers have incorporated emotion into their research frameworks. Substantively, this wide-ranging literature can be divided into studies reflecting a concern with emotional expression and those focused on emotion regulation. Even within each broad area, however, there is no single object of analysis. The research on emotional expression includes studies focusing on overarching aspects of emotional experience, as reflected in concepts such as well-being, research on more generalized affective traits or moods, and studies of discrete emotions. The literature on emotion regulation contains studies focused on individual- or group-level processes, as well as research on the ways that emotion is regulated by external factors.

Contributing to the breadth of the work and emotions literature are differences between research that takes emotion as its primary focus and studies that view emotional expression and regulation as antecedents or consequences of other foci that are more theoretically or substantively



central. In general, organizational researchers have devoted somewhat more attention to emotion per se than sociologists of work, who tend to examine emotion in the context of other, more salient outcomes or processes. In their efforts to understand the factors that shape the performance of individuals, groups, and organizations, organizational researchers have focused intensively on the psychology of emotional expression and regulation. Sociologists of work have a more expansive view of emotion research. A longstanding concern with people's affective reactions to work has been accompanied by more recent research on discrete emotions and the ways that features of jobs and workplaces shape emotional display and regulation. Overall, the work and emotion literature has demonstrated how emotional expression and regulation are involved in many aspects of work experience and organization.

Wider acceptability and use of new methodological techniques have enhanced researchers' ability to do emotions research. Along with survey research and laboratory experiments, qualitative, ethnographic, and mixed methods approaches are all part of the methodological toolbox in work and emotions research. Though limited in some respects, the emotions module of the GSS has proven a rich data source for understanding emotional expression among a national, representative sample. Experience sampling methods have been especially useful for collecting information about emotional expression and regulation in real time, and connecting that information to work tasks, experiences, and events as they occur. These techniques have been valuable for studying both within-person processes related to emotion and its effects, as well as identifying differences in between persons or groups.

Despite developments on the methodological front, the emotions and work literature still contains many more conceptual papers than those based on empirical research. In part, this reflects the inherent difficulty associated with studying emotion, especially outside the laboratory. The large number of conceptual papers on emotion and work also reflects efforts to synthesize and find common ground around particular topics. As emotion has come to be viewed as embedded

in all aspects of work and organizations, these efforts to forge conceptual and theoretical integration have value. For example, Grandey and colleagues' efforts to integrate sociologically-based emotional labor research with the emotion regulation literature have been remarkably fruitful. An emotion regulation perspective provides a coherent frame in which to situate past research and raise new questions for analysis.

#### **16.4.1 What Next? The Future of Emotions and Work**

Many suggest that we are now on the verge of a "new economy," whose main features diverge significantly from the service economy of the past (Williams et al. 2012; Sweet and Meiksins 2008). Along with the blurring of boundaries between work and non-work, this economy is expected to have other features that deserve increased attention from emotions researchers. While the study of work and emotion is flourishing and full of possibilities, the task ahead is to identify what lines of research within this field are most critical to our ability to understand the twenty-first century workplace.

One key area for future research involves emotions and workplace inequality. Included here is a call for more attention to discrete emotions—as they may be linked not only to work tasks or activities, but also to work relations and experiences. The association between status and emotion is well-established and social-psychological research has explored emotional responses to inequities of various kinds. Yet this literature has only begun to be systematically incorporated into studies of workplace inequality (e.g., Collett and Lizardo 2010; Lively et al. 2010). The study of work and emotion would also benefit from greater attention to the social context of work. Studies of intergroup relations and stereotypes, longstanding concerns among work researchers, have also become increasingly attentive to emotions (e.g., Cuddy et al. 2007), and this is an important development. Although attention to emotions at the group level is growing, we need to know more about both the ways

that group characteristics and dynamics shape and are shaped by emotions. Other research on the social context of work and inequality includes studies of emotional labor and emotion management, especially qualitative studies of women's and racial minorities' experiences in particular workplaces and jobs. Future research should aim to situate these experiences within a framework that links emotion regulation strategies to the reproduction of inequality.

Attention to these issues is important for several reasons. The first is their centrality not only to the study of emotion, but also to our understanding of work and organizations. Inequality and related processes have long been significant concerns among work researchers. They promise to become even more so in the coming years, due to factors such as growing wage inequality, globalization, and the increased demographic diversity of the labor force. A second reason for pursuing research on inequality and emotions stems from the theoretical richness of this area. Social psychological theories of emotion, including affect control, social interactional, and identity theory, all speak to the ways in which unequal social relations shape emotional responses (Lively et al. 2010). Similarly, theories of intergroup relations and interactionist approaches to inequality recognize the role of emotion in the reproduction of inequality in daily life (Schwalbe et al. 2000). Continuing attention to the larger question of emotions and inequality is a key task for the future.

Research on inequality reminds us of the social relational dimension of emotions. The social relations of work engender emotional responses in others and understanding these relational processes is critical to knowledge of work and work experience. The social relational aspects of emotion also include the knowledge that the emotions experienced by one person can be shared or transmitted to others—both within and across domains. Studies of emotional transmission thus can also help us understand the critical social relational dimension of emotion. Emotional expression is not simply an individual-level process, but one that shapes the larger fabric of social life.

In addition to research on inequality, several other topics deserve increased attention in the

future. Experience sampling methodology has given emotion researchers new tools for understanding emotional experience in real time. We need to continue to deploy these techniques to help us understand how emotional experience unfolds over time and across domains. As technologies blur the boundaries between work and non-work, these issues promise to become even more salient to the workplace. It is not enough to focus only on the individual-level experience of emotion; rather, we must more fully incorporate the role of social context in these studies and more systematically understand how status characteristics shape emotional experience.

Although emotions may be relevant for every type of job and workplace, researchers must still consider how emotion display norms or requirements for emotion regulation may be embedded in new or emerging jobs or occupational sectors. Research on “expert service work,” globalization in the service sector, and carework are important in this regard. The new economy may also be marked by new forms of work organization, including teams and more fluid hierarchies. Attending to these topics from an emotions perspective is important and underscores the need for more attention to the social relational aspects of emotion at work. Emotional labor emerged at a time when frontline service work was largely done face-to-face. As face to face relations in the workplace disappear at every level—from the customer service representative to the college classroom—it is important to study emotional expression and regulation in virtual encounters (e.g., Flowers 1998). All of these topics are reminders that in context matters in understanding emotional expression and regulation at work.

Perhaps one of the most significant contributions of emotions research to the study of work has been its role in broadening or reshaping understanding of fundamental workplace processes, such as inequality, and outcomes like performance that are of particular concern in organizational research. Issues such as control, identity, culture, gender, and other topics have all been subject to the “affective revolution.” Not all of these efforts have paid off, but they have opened the door for further attention to emotion as a

fundamental aspect of human experience that is implicated in all that we do and who we are.

## References

- Ashforth, B. E., & Humphrey, R. H. (1993). Emotional labor in service roles: The influence of identity. *Academy of Management Review*, 18(1), 88–115.
- Ashkanasy, N. M., & Humphrey, R. H. (2011). Current emotion research in organizational behavior. *Emotion Review*, 3(2), 214–224.
- Ashkanasy, N. M., & Tse, B. (2000). Transformational leadership as management of emotion: A conceptual review. In N. Ashkanasy, C. E. J. Härtel, & W. J. Zerbe (Eds.), *Emotions in the workplace: Research, theory, and practice* (pp. 221–235). Westport: Quorum Books.
- Barger, P. B., & Grandey, A. A. (2006). Service with a smile and encounter satisfaction: Emotional contagion and appraisal mechanisms. *Academy of Management Journal*, 49(6), 1229–1238.
- Barsade, S., & Gibson, D. E. (1998). Group emotion: A view from top and bottom. In D. Gruenfeld, M. Neale, & E. Mannix (Eds.), *Research on managing in groups and teams*, (Vol. 1, pp. 81–102). Greenwich: JAI Press.
- Barsade, S. G., Ward, A. J., Turner, J. D. F., & Sonnenfeld, J. A. (2000). To your heart's content: A model of affective diversity in top management teams. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 45, 802–836.
- Barsade, S. G., Brief, A. P., & Spataro, S. E. (2003). The affective revolution in organizational behavior: The emergence of a paradigm. In J. Greenberg. In *Organizational behavior: The state of the science* (pp. 3–52). Mahwah: Erlbaum.
- Barsade, S. G., & Gibson, D. E. (2007). Why does affect matter in organizations? *Academy of Management Perspectives*, February, 36–59.
- Bartel, C. A., & Saavedra, R. (2000). The collective construction of work group moods. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 45, 197–231.
- Booth, J., & Mann, S. (2005). The experience of workplace anger. *Leadership and Organization*, 26(4), 250–262.
- Brief, A. P., & Weiss, H. M. (2002). Organizational behavior: Affect in the workplace. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 53, 279–307.
- Briner, R. B., & Kiefer, T. (2005). Psychological research into the experience of emotion at work: Definitely older, but are we any wiser? *Research on Emotion in Organizations*, 1, 281–307.
- Brotheridge, C. M., & Grandey, A. A. (2002). Emotional labor and burnout: Comparing two perspectives of 'people work'. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 60, 17–39.
- Brotheridge, C. M., & Lee, R. T. (2003). Development and validation of the emotional labour scale. *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology*, 76(3), 365–379.
- Cable, D. M., Gino, F., & Staats B. R. (2013). Breaking them in or eliciting their best? Reframing socialization around newcomers' authentic self-expression. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 58(1), 1–36.
- Cahill, S. (1999). Emotional capital and professional socialization: The case of mortuary science students (and me). *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 62, 101–116.
- Collett, J. L., & Lizardo, O. (2010). Occupational status and the experience of anger. *Social Forces*, 88(5), 1–26.
- Connolly, J. J., & Viswesvaran, C. (2000). The role of affectivity in job satisfaction: A meta-analysis. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 29(2), 265–281.
- Cote, S., Van Kleef, G. A., & Sy, T. (2013). The social effects of emotion regulation in organizations. In A. A. Grandey, J. M. Diefendorff, & D. E. Rupp (Eds.) *Emotional labor in the 21st century: Diverse perspectives on emotion regulation at work* (pp. 79–100). New York: Routledge.
- Cranny, C. J., Smith, P. C., & Stone, E. F. (Eds.). (1992). *Job satisfaction: How people feel about their jobs and how it affects them*. New York: Lexington Books.
- Cuddy, A. J. C., Fiske, S. T., & Glick, P. (2007). The BIAS map: Behaviors from intergroup affect and stereotypes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 92, 631–648.
- Davis, J. A., & Smith, T. W. (1996). *General social survey, 1972–1996, cumulative codebook and datafile*. Chicago: NORC and University of Chicago.
- Dutton, J. E., Worline, M. C., Frost, P. J., & Lilius, J. (2006). Explaining compassion organizing. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 51(1), 59–96.
- England, P. (2005). Emerging theories of care work. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 31, 381–399.
- Erickson, R. J. (2005). Why emotion work matters: Sex, gender, and the division of household labor. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 67(2), 337–351.
- Erickson, R. J., & Ritter, C. (2001). Emotional labor, burnout, and inauthenticity: Does gender matter?. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 64(2), 146–163.
- Erickson, R. J., & Stacey, C. L. (2013). Attending to mind and body: Engaging the complexity of emotion practice among caring professionals. In A. A. Grandey, J. M. Diefendorff, & D. E. Rupp (Eds.), *Emotional labor in the 21st century: Diverse perspectives on emotion regulation at work* (pp. 175–196). New York: Routledge.
- Fisher, C. D. (2000). Mind and emotions while working: missing pieces of job satisfaction. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 21, 185–202.
- Fitness, J. (2000). Anger in the workplace: An emotion script approach to anger episodes between workers and their superiors, co-workers, and subordinates. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 21, 147–162.
- Flowers, A. (1998). *The fantasy factory: An insider's view of the phone sex industry*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Gardner, W. L., Fischer, D., & Hunt, J. G. (2009). Emotional labor and leadership: A threat to authenticity. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 20, 466–482.

- Garey, A., & Hansen, K. V. (Eds.). (2011). *At the heart of work and family: Engaging the ideas of arlie hochschild*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- George, J. M. (2002). Affect regulation in groups and teams. In R. G. Lord, R. J. Klimoski, R. Kanfer (Eds.), *Emotions in the workplace: Understanding the structure and role of emotions in organizational behavior* (pp. 183–218). New York: Wileys.
- George, M. (2008). Interactions in expert service work. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 37(1), 108–131.
- Gibson, D. E., & Callister, R. R. (2010). Anger in organizations: Review and integration. *Journal of Management*, 36(1), 66–93.
- Glomb, T. M., & Tews, M. J. (2004). Emotional labor: A conceptualization and scale Development. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 64, 1–23.
- Glomb, T. M., Steel P. D., & Arvey R. D. (2002). Office sneers, snipes, and stab wounds: Antecedents, consequences, and implications of workplace violence and aggression. In R. G. Lord, R. J. Klimoski, & R. Kanfer (Eds.), *Emotions in the workplace: Understanding the structure and role of emotions in organizational behavior* (pp. 227–259). New York: Wiley.
- Grandey, A. A. (2000). Emotion regulation in the workplace: A new way to conceptualize emotional labor. *Journal of Occupational Health Psychology*, 5, 59–100.
- Grandey, A. A. (2003). When “the Show Must Go On”: Surface acting and deep acting as determinants of emotional exhaustion and peer-rated service delivery. *Academy of Management Journal*, 46(1), 86–96.
- Grandey, A. A., Tam, A. P., & Brauburger, A. L. (2002). Affective states and traits in the workplace: Diary and survey data from young workers. *Motivation and Emotion*, 26(1), 31–55.
- Grandey, A. A., Fisk, G. M., Mattila, A. S., Jansen, K. J., & Sideman, L. A. (2005). Is ‘Service with a Smile’ enough? Authenticity of positive displays during service encounters. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 96(1), 38–55.
- Grandey, A. A., Diefendorff, J. M., & Rupp, D. E. (2013). Bringing emotional labor into focus: A review and integration of three research lenses. In A. A. Grandey, J. M. Diefendorff, D. E. Rupp (Eds.), *Emotional Labor in the 21st century: Diverse perspectives on emotion regulation at work* (pp. 3–27). New York: Routledge.
- Grant, A. M. (2012). Giving time, time after time: Work design and sustained employee participation in corporate volunteering. *Academy of Management Review*, 37(4), 589–615.
- Grant, D., Morales, A., & Sallaz, J. J. (2009). Pathways to meaning: A new approach to studying emotions at work. *American Journal of Sociology*, 115(2), 327–364.
- Gross, J. J. (1998). The emerging field of emotion regulation: An integrative review. *Review of General Psychology*, 2(3), 271–299.
- Gross, J. J. (2001). Emotion regulation in adulthood: Timing is everything. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 10(6), 214–219.
- Gross, J. J., & John, O. P. (2003). Individual differences in two emotion regulation processes: Implications for affect, relationships, and well-being. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 85(2), 348–362.
- Gross, J. J., & Thompson, R. A. (2007). Emotion regulation: Conceptual foundations. In J. J. Gross (Ed.), *Handbook of emotion regulation* (pp. 3–24). New York: Guilford Press.
- Groth, M., Hennig-Thurau, T., & Wang, K. (2013). The customer experience of emotional labor. In A. A. Grandey, J. M. Diefendorff, D. E. Rupp (Eds.), *Emotional labor in the 21st century: Diverse perspectives on emotion regulation at work* (pp. 127–152). New York: Routledge.
- Hanser, A. (2008). *Service encounters: Class, gender, and the market for social distinction in urban china*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Harlow, R. (2003). ‘Race Doesn’t Matter, but...’: The effect of race on professors’ Experiences and emotion management in the undergraduate college classroom. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 66(4), 348–363.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1979). Emotion work, feeling rules, and social structure. *American Journal of Sociology*, 85, 551–575.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1983). *The managed heart: The commercialization of human feeling*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hochschild Arlie, R. (2012). *The outsourced self: Intimate life in market times*. New York: Macmillan.
- Huynh, T., Alderson, M., & Thompson, M. (2008). Emotional labor underlying caring: An evolutionary concept analysis. *Journal of Advanced Nursing*, 64(2), 195–208.
- Ilies, R., & Judge, T. A. (2002). Understanding the dynamic relationships among personality, mood, and job satisfaction: A field experience sampling study. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 89, 1119–1139.
- Judge, T. A., & Ilies, R. (2004). Affect and job satisfaction: A study of their relationship at work and at home. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 89(4), 661–673.
- Judge, T. A., Woolf, E. F., & Hurst, C. (2009). Is emotional labor more difficult for some than for others? A multilevel, experience-sampling study. *Personnel Psychology*, 62(1), 57–88.
- Kalleberg, A. L. (2011). *Good jobs, bad jobs: The rise of polarized and precarious employment systems in the United States, 1970s to 2000s*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Kang, M. (2010). *The managed hand: Race, gender, and the body in beauty service work*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Kanov, J., Maitlis, S., Worline, M. C., Dutton, J. E., Frost, P. J., & Lilius, J. M. (2004). Compassion in organizational life. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 47(6), 808–827.



- Katzell, R. A., Thompson, D. E., & Guzzo, R. A. (1992). How job satisfaction and job performance are and are not linked. In C. J. Cranny, P. C. Smith, & E. F. Stone (Eds.), *Job satisfaction: How people feel about their jobs and how it affects their performance* (pp. 195–218). New York: Lexington Books.
- Klein, K. J., & Kozlowski, S. W. J. (Eds.). (2000). *Multi-level theory, research, and methods in organizations: Foundations, extensions, and new directions*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Larson, R., & Richards, M. H. (1994). *Divergent realities: The emotional lives of mothers, fathers, and adolescents*. New York: Basic Books.
- Larsen, R. J., Diener, E., & Lucas, R. E. (2002). Emotion: Models, measures, and individual differences. In by R. G. Lord, R. J. Klimoski, & R. Kanfer (Eds.), *Emotions in the workplace: Understanding the structure and role of emotions in organizational behavior* (pp. 64–106). New York: Wiley.
- Leidner, R. (1993). *Fast food, fast talk: Service work and the routinization of everyday life*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Levin, I., & Stokes, J. P. (1989). Dispositional approach to job satisfaction: Role of negative affectivity. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 74(5), 752–758.
- Lilius, J., Worline, M. C., Maitlis, S., Kanov, J., Dutton, J. E., & Frost, P. (2008). The contours and consequences of compassion at work. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 29, 193–218.
- Lively, K. J., Steelman, L., & Powell, B. (2010). Equity, emotion, and the household division of labor. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 73(4), 358–379.
- Lively, K. J. (2000). Reciprocal emotion management: Working together to maintain stratification in private law firms. *Work and Occupations*, 27(1), 32–63.
- Lively, K. J., & Heise, D. R. (2004). Sociological realms of emotional experience. *American Journal of Sociology*, 109(5), 1109–1136.
- Lively, K. J., & Powell, B. (2006). Emotional expression at work and at home: Domain, status or individual characteristics? *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 69(1), 17–38.
- Locke, E. A. (1976). *The nature and causes of job satisfaction*. In M. D. Dunnette (Ed.), *Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology* (pp. 1297–1349). Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Lois, J. (2012). *Home is where the school is: The logic of homeschooling and the emotional labor of mothering*. New York: New York University Press.
- Lopez, S. (2006). Emotional labor and organized emotional care: Conceptualizing nursing home care work. *Work and Occupations*, 33(2), 133–160.
- MacDermid, S. M., Seery, B. L., & Weiss, H. M. (2002). An emotional examination of the work-family interface. In R. G. Lord, R. J. Klimoski, R. Kanfer (Eds.), *Emotions in the workplace: Understanding the structure and role of emotions in organizational behavior* (pp. 402–428). New York: Wiley.
- Macdonald, C. L., & Merrill, D. (2009). Intersectionality in the emotional proletariat: A new lens on employment discrimination in service work. In M. Korczynski & C. L. Macdonald (Eds.), *Service work: Critical perspectives* (pp. 113–134). New York: Routledge.
- Macdonald, C. L., & Sirianni, C. (Eds.). (1996). *Working in the service society*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Madden, L. T., Duchon, D., Madden, T. M., & Plowman, D. A. (2012). Emergent organizational capacity for compassion. *Academy of Management Review*, 37(4), 689–708.
- Mears, A., & Finlay, W. (2005). Not just a paper doll: How models manage bodily capital and why they perform emotional labor. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 34(3), 317–343.
- Mickel, A. E., & Ozelik, H. (2008). When executives get angry: The importance of anger and its triggers to ethical awareness and sensitivity. *Research on Emotion in Organizations*, 4, 131–154.
- Mikolajczak, M., Tran, V., Brotheridge, C., M., & Gross J.J. (2009). Using an emotion regulation framework to predict the outcomes of emotional labor. *Research on Emotion in Organizations*, 5, 245–274.
- Miron-Spektor, E., & Rafaeli, A. (2009). The effects of anger in the workplace: When, where, and why observing anger enhances or hinders performance. *Research in Personnel and Human Resources Management*, 28, 153–178.
- Miner, A. G., Glomb, T. M., & Hulin C. (2005). Experience sampling mood and its correlates at work. *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology*, 78, 171–193.
- Nadler, J. T., & Lowery, M. R. (2009). Emotional expression, gender, personality, and workplace appropriate behaviors. *Research on Emotion in Organizations*, 5, 23–44.
- Niven, K., Totterdell, P., Holman, D., & Cameron, D. (2013). Emotional labor at the unit level. In A. A. Grandey, J. M. Diefendorff, & D. E. Rupp (Eds.), *Emotional labor in the 21st century: Diverse perspectives on emotion regulation at work* (pp. 101–124). New York: Routledge.
- Offer, S., & Schneider, B. (2011). Revisiting the gender gap in time-use patterns: Multitasking and well-being among mothers and fathers in dual earner families. *American Sociological Review*, 76(6), 809–833.
- Orzechowicz, D. (2008). Privileged emotion managers: The case of actors. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 71(2), 143–156.
- Otis, E. M. (2008). Beyond the industrial paradigm: Market-embedded labor and the gender organization of global service work in China. *American Sociological Review*, 73(1), 15–36.
- Parker, J. N., & Hackett, E. J. (2012). Hot spots and hot moments in scientific collaborations and social movements. *American Sociological Review*, 77(1), 21–44.
- Paules, G. F. (1991). *Dishing it out: Power and resistance among waitresses in a New Jersey restaurant*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.



- Pierce, J. L. (1995). *Gender trials: Emotional lives in contemporary law firms*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Pugh, S. D. (2001). Service with a smile: Emotional contagion in the service encounter. *Academy of Management Journal*, 44(5), 1018–1027.
- Pugh, S. D. (2002). Emotional regulation in individuals and dyads: Causes, costs, and consequences. In R. G. Lord, R. J. Klimoski, & R. Kanfer (Eds.), *Emotions in the workplace: Understanding the structure and role of emotions in organizational behavior* (pp. 147–182). New York: Wiley.
- Rafaeli, A., & Sutton, R. I. (1987). Expression of emotion as part of the work role. *Academy of Management Review*, 12, 23–37.
- Rafaeli, A., & Sutton, R. I. (1989). The expression of emotion in organizational life. *Research in Organizational Behavior*, 11, 1–42.
- Ridgeway, C., & Johnson, C. (1990). What is the relationship between socioemotional behavior and status in task groups? *American Journal of Sociology*, 95(5), 1189–1212.
- Rynes, S. L., Bartunek, J. M., Dutton, J. E., & Margolis, J. D. (2012). Care and compassion through an organizational lens: Opening up new possibilities. *Academy of Management Review*, 37(4), 503–523.
- Schieman, S. (2007). Anger. In J. E. Stets & J. H. Turner (Eds.), *Handbook of the sociology of emotions* (pp. 493–515). New York: Springer.
- Schneider, B. (2006). In the moment: The benefits of the experience sampling method. In M. Pitt-Catsouphes, E. E. Kossek, & S. Sweet (Eds.), *The work and family handbook: Multi-disciplinary perspectives and approaches* (pp. 469–488). Mahwah: Erlbaum.
- Schwalbe, M. S., Godwin, S., Holden, D., Schrock, D., Thompson, S., & Wolkomir, M. (2000). Generic processes in the reproduction of inequality: An interactionist analysis. *Social Forces*, 79(2), 419–452.
- Sloan, M. M. (2004). The effects of occupational characteristics on the experience and expression of anger in the workplace. *Work and Occupations*, 31(1), 38–72.
- Smith, E. R., & Ho, C. (2002). Prejudice as an intergroup emotion: Integrating relative deprivation and social comparison explanations of prejudice. In I. Walker & H. Smith (Eds.), *Relative deprivation: Specification, development, and integration* (pp. 332–348). Boulder: Westview Press.
- Smith, A. C. III, & Kleinman, S. (1989). Managing emotions in medical school: Students' contacts with the living and the dead. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 52(1), 56–69.
- Staw, B. M., & Cohen-Charash, Y. (2005). The dispositional approach to job satisfaction: More than a mirage, but not yet an oasis. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 26, 59–78.
- Stets, J. (2010). Future directions in the sociology of emotions. *Emotion Review*, 2(3), 265–268.
- Sutton, R. I. (1991). Maintaining norms about expressed emotions: The case of bill collectors. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 36(2), 245–268.
- Sutton, R. I., & Rafaeli, A. (1988). Untangling the relationship between displayed emotions and organizational sales: The case of convenience stores. *Academy of Management Journal*, 31(3), 461–487.
- Sweet, S., & Meiksins, P. (2008). *Changing contours of work: Jobs and opportunities in the new economy*. Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge.
- Tolich, M. B. (1993). Alienating and liberating emotions at work. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 22(3), 361–381.
- Tsai, W.-C. (2001). Determinants and consequences of employee displayed positive emotions. *Journal of Management*, 27(4), 497–512.
- Tsai, W.-C., & Huang, Y.-M. (2002). Mechanisms linking employee affective delivery and customer behavioral intentions. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 87(5), 1001–1008.
- Van Dijk, P. A., & Brown A. K. (2006). Emotional labour and negative job outcomes: An evaluation of the mediating role of emotional dissonance. *Journal of Management and Organization*, 12(2), 101–115.
- Van Maanen, J., & Kunda, G. (1989). Real feelings: Emotional expression and organizational culture. *Research in Organizational Behavior*, 11, 43–103.
- Wang, G., Seibert, S. E., & Boles, T. L. (2011). Synthesizing what we know and Looking ahead: A meta-analytical review of 30 years of emotional labor research. *Research on Emotion in Organizations*, 7, 15–43.
- Watson, D., & Clark, L. A. (1992). On traits and temperament: General and specific factors of emotional experience and their relation to the five-factor model. *Journal of Personality*, 60(2), 441–476.
- Watson, D., & Slack A. K. (1993). General factors of affective temperament and their relation to job satisfaction over time. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 54(2), 181–202.
- Weiss, H. M. (2002). Deconstructing job satisfaction: Separating evaluations, beliefs and affective experiences. *Human Resource Management Review*, 12, 173–194.
- Wharton, A. S. (1993). The affective consequences of service work: Managing emotions on the job. *Work and Occupations*, 20(2):205–232.
- Wharton, A. S. (2009). The sociology of emotional labor. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 35, 147–165.
- Wilkins, A. (2012). 'Not Out to Start a Revolution.' Race, gender, and emotional restraint among black university men. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 41(1), 34–65.
- Williams, C. L., & Connell, C. (2010). 'Looking Good and Sounding Right.' Aesthetic labor and social inequality in the retail industry. *Work and Occupations*, 37(3), 349–377.
- Williams, C. L., Muller, C., & Kilanski, K. (2012). Gendered organizations in the new economy. *Gender and Society*, 26(4), 549–573.
- Wingfield, A. H. (2010). Are some emotions marked 'Whites Only'? Racialized feeling rules in professional workplaces. *Social Problems*, 57(2), 251–268.

- Zapf, D., & Holz, M. (2006). On the positive and negative effects of emotion work in organizations. *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, 15*, 1–28.
- Zerbe, W. J. (2009). Emotional deviance and organizational discipline: A study of emotions in grievance arbitration. *Research on Emotion in Organizations, 5*, 123–150.

Rebecca J Erickson and Marci D. Cottingham

### 17.1 Introduction

Portrayed as nearly synonymous with emotional experience (DeVault 1999; Lasch 1977), families serve as an institutional context in which emotional selves are both created and maintained. In providing primary socialization and emotional support, interaction within families locates emotion within social relationships (Kemper 1978) and serves as a central conduit through which emotions link social order and social action (Barbalet 2001; Bourdieu 1996). Despite early theoretical work on the role of emotions in self-development (Cooley 1909/1962, 1902/1964; Mead 1934), the mid-twentieth century dominance of Parsons and Bales' (1955) instrumental-expressive role differentiation masked much of the emotional complexity within families. During this period, expressivity was conceptualized as a mere functional necessity that reflected and non-consciously reproduced the emotion norms associated with the Standard North American Family (SNAF, Smith 1993; Cancian 1987; Zahn-Waxler 2010). In the 1980s, however, scholars' interest in the emotional dimensions of social structure, culture, and individual development re-emerged and the emotional lives of family members became

a prominent topic for investigation once again (Daniels 1987; Gordon 1981; Halberstadt 1986).

Research on the emotional dimensions of family life reflects the interdisciplinary history of emotion scholarship, integrating insights from affective neuroscience with those of cognitive social psychology and sociology. Sociologists have long drawn on the work of psychologists (Ekman 1982; Freud 1961; James 1890; Schacter and Singer 1962) in developing their theoretical accounts (Hochschild 1979; 1983; Kemper 1978; Scheff 2000; Thoits 2004; Turner 2007). More recently, psychologists investigating socialization and its outcomes have incorporated sociological frameworks into their models to better account for variations in cultural context and differential access to valued resources (e.g., Halberstadt and Lozada 2011; Morelen and Thomassin 2013). To the extent that sociologists of emotion seek to specify macro-micro linkages within social systems (Turner and Stets 2006), they could benefit from the work of developmental emotion scholars examining the activation of biological predispositions within the context of specific social environments. Families provide an ideal context for pursuing this type of multilevel interdisciplinary research on emotion.

In the current chapter, we review the literature on families and emotion beginning with emotion's role in the socialization process. We then examine theory and research on the gendered performance of emotion work in families. We conclude with a discussion of how the concept of emotional capital serves to connect these topics as well as showing some of the ways that emotion

---

R. J. Erickson (✉)  
University of Akron, Akron, USA  
e-mail: rericks@uakron.edu

M. D. Cottingham  
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill,  
USA

in families affects members' experiences within other institutional arenas. Given that families are embedded within the larger social fabric and are charged with passing on emotion knowledge, skills, and capacities to the next generation, we see family as a critical site for understanding how emotion contributes to the reproduction of inequalities. As such, emotional experience and management in families inform us of ways that the embodied experience of social actors helps to maintain social systems over time. And yet, because emotions signal changes within bodily, cognitive, and sociocultural systems (Hochschild 1983; Turner 2007; Larsen et al. 2008), they are also central to mobilizing transformational practices. The acquisition and activation of emotional capital draws attention to how meanings, ideologies and behaviors circulate through families and back into the larger social context.

---

## 17.2 Socialization of Emotion

It is because the human personality is not "born" but must be "made" through the socialization process that in the first instance families are necessary. (Parsons and Bales 1955, p. 16)

All human infants begin life in families. Our shared biological evolution provides us with a baseline of affective capacities and the innate responses needed to develop as emotional beings (Plutchik 1980; Turner 2007). These biologically-based capacities and neurological systems enable the experience of primary emotions (e.g., anger, fear, sadness, and happiness) and, through interaction with others, the development of self-regulated and secondary role-taking emotions (e.g., guilt, shame, and pride; Calkins and Hill 2007; Hariri and Forbes 2007). *Emotional socialization* is the process through which humans develop such capacities as well as learn the emotional culture appropriate to their social statuses (Gordon 1989; Peterson 2006; Thoits 2004). It is through emotional socialization that individuals acquire the ability to understand their own and others' emotions, develop values about which emotions are desirable and undesirable, and learn how to experience, express, and manage emotion in ways that reflect power-status relations (Kem-

per 1978) and the surrounding cultural context (Gordon 1990; Lutz and White 1986; Pollack and Thoits 1989; Saarni 1999). Thus, it addresses the question of how infants transform from beings that experience sensations into social selves who experience emotions (Johnson 1992).

Regardless of whether it focuses on emotion or not, two general goals underlie the primary socialization process that occurs within families (Gecas 1981): (1) the reproduction of social systems through the development of individuals who tend to conform to *normative* role expectations and values; and (2) the development of a *social self*. Researchers explore the first goal within studies of how emotional competence serves as a facilitator of children's later social competence, academic achievement, and mental health (Eisenberg et al. 1998; Saarni 1999; Trentacosta and Fine 2009). Emotional competence refers to an individual's ability to experience, express, and manage or regulate emotion in line with one's emotion culture (Gordon 1981) and to understand or "make sense" of one's own and others' emotions (Denham et al. 2007; Eisenberg et al. 1998). As such, emotional competence captures from a microsociological viewpoint the same sort of knowledge, skills, and capacities reflected in the more macrosociological concept of emotional capital (Cahill 1999; Froyum 2010; Thoits 2004). Although the two terms are defined similarly, emotional capital (discussed in greater detail below) links the study of emotion in families to traditions within general sociological theory (e.g., Bourdieu, Marx) and examines the differentiation of emotional resources across unequal status characteristics such as racial-ethnic background, class, gender, age, sexuality (Froyum 2010; Shields 1995; Thoits 2004; Wallace 2007).

Primary socialization's second goal of developing a social self is the focus of much of the symbolic interactionist theorizing on emotional socialization (Gordon 1981; Johnson 1992; Mead 1934; Shott 1979). In addition to maintaining social order, research on the socialization of emotion within families illustrates how infants who are born with a preset capacity for primary emotions (Damasio 1994; Turner 2007) are transformed into agentive selves (Mead 1934) who use emotions to motivate behavior in ways that are

aligned with self-concept and social context (Epstein 1973; Markus and Kitayama 1991). In what follows, we discuss the theoretical foundations of primary emotional socialization, followed by a review of the contemporary empirical literature. We suggest that while the empirical literature on family-related emotional socialization does not generally draw on sociological theory, the field would be advanced by doing so. In particular, it would generate studies of emotional socialization in families that better specify how emotions link individual actions to social order and reproduce or modify resource-based inequalities (Barbalet 2001; Cahill 1999; Froyum 2010; Thoits 2004).

### 17.2.1 Theoretical Foundations of Emotional Socialization

Conceiving of families as unities of interacting persons (Burgess 1926), the symbolic interactionist approach sees families as integral to the socialization process because it is through interactions with early caregivers that an initial sense of self, emotion, and personhood develops (Cooley 1902/1964; Lewis et al. 1989; Mead 1934). Born into an already existing culture, human infants are asocial (Stryker 1959), needing interaction with other humans to shape their innate impulses into meaningful behavior. Expressions of “emotion” by infants operate as communication signals that have evolved over time to increase the human organism’s chances for survival (Plutchik 2003). For example, an infant’s crying and smiling behaviors provide information about the surrounding environment, elicit responses from caregivers, reflect the adequacy of the caregiver’s response, and influence the development of caregiver-infant attachment (Gordon 1981; Rheingold 1969; Thompson and Meyer 2007).

Although the original work of Mead and Cooley do not contain an elaborated theory of emotional selves (Johnson 1992), they along with James (1890) provided the foundation for later theorizing. In addition to approaching the relationship between self and society as inseparable parts of a common whole, Cooley (1909/1962) emphasized the importance of primary groups

(such as families) for providing individuals with their earliest sense of self, sentiment and social unity. For instance, through the process of the looking-glass self and other forms of sympathetic observation, individuals develop both a “my-feeling” (1902/1964, p. 169) and a “we-feeling” (1909/1962, p. 23). Over time, feelings of pride or shame come to be linked with perceptions of how others view us, suggesting the critical role that others’ appraisals have for the self’s emotional development (Lewis et al. 1989). The idea that the self is *instinctively* grounded in emotion can also be found in Cooley’s writings (1909/1962), as he was among the first to draw on the evolutionary psychologies of James (1890) and Stanley (1895) related to the development of self-feeling. Cooley in fact grounded his conceptualization of self in feeling and emotion, observing that: “There can be no final test of the self except the way we feel” (1902/1964, p. 172).

Mead (1909/1964) also located the growth of one’s sense of self in interactions with significant others, recognizing that it is not until these others provide meaning to the outflow of emotional expressions that they gain social (and personal) significance. Mead further noted that many emotions identified by psychologists as instinctual must nonetheless be seen as “social”—relying on the stimulation of another for their evolutionary significance to emerge (Turner 2007). This early view of emotion anticipates recent calls for multilevel emotion models that more fully consider how emotion operates across biological, micro- and macro-level social processes (Rogers and Kavanagh 2010; Smith-Lovin and Winkelman 2010). Although Mead’s stages of self-development emphasize cognitive development of the self over that of emotion (Johnson 1992), they nonetheless provide a theoretical foundation for later work on the socialization of emotion that emphasizes the connection between self and social control (Shott 1979; Ward and Throop 1992)—a connection that initially emerges within familial relationships.

Reflecting the interdisciplinary approach taken by earlier interactionist theorists, late twentieth century theorizing on emotional socialization (e.g., Gordon 1981, 1989; Johnson 1992;



Scheff 1990; Shott 1979) integrates knowledge of innate biological impulses and the psychology of child development with the self-society connections of early theorists (Geertz 1959). Johnson (1992) builds on Mead's approach to self-development to describe how the reaction of significant others transform infants' initially meaningless responses to physical sensations into such primary emotions as joy, anger, and fear. For example, caregiver-infant interaction results in the transformation of initially random upturns of the mouth into meaningful smiles of delight during a game of peek-a-boo. Sociological discussions of socialization also often focus on what Shott (1979) refers to as the role-taking emotions (e.g., shame, pride, embarrassment, guilt; also see Turner 2007) or what Gordon (1981, p. 565) terms the social sentiments that link "bodily sensations and gestures with social relationships and cultural meanings."

Although cognitive developmental and symbolic interactionist accounts reference the role of primary group members in the socialization of emotion and stress the importance of early interaction with emotionally competent socialization agents (see Stets 2003 for a review), little sociological work has focused specifically on the socialization of emotions by family members. For example, the most often cited empirical work on socialization within sociology examines socialization of children within day care settings (i.e., Leavitt and Power 1989; Pollak and Thoits 1989). As we discuss further in a later section, the one exception to this may be the early writings of Hochschild (1979, 1983, 1990) on emotion management. To date, however, studies of how interactions with family members (particularly parents) nurture emotional understanding, expression, and regulation remains more common among developmental psychologists.

Psychological approaches to emotional development originated in the psychoanalytic tradition of Freud (1965), psychophysiological and evolutionary approaches (Ekman and Oster 1979; Izard and Malatesta 1987), social learning theory (Bandura 1971), and Piaget's cognitive developmental theory (Lewis 2007). As interest in the development of emotion management or regulation

has grown, these approaches have been joined by functionalist and social constructivist models (Campos et al. 1994; Saarni 1999). Instead of tying the goal of emotional socialization to the requisite needs of society (Parsons and Bales 1955), developmental functionalism assumes that emotions have evolved over time to promote human survival, having both intrapsychic and interpersonal regulative dimensions (Bretherton et al. 1986). That is, emotions function as tools for self and social control, alerting an individual or group that behavior may need to be modified. For example, sensing anger in another tells the individual to be on the lookout for aggression or violence and to prepare oneself for fight or flight. Within this functionalist approach, social meaning is given significant weight; always with the underlying goal of establishing, maintaining, changing, or terminating a social relationship that is of individual import (Campos et al. 1994). Developmental functionalism thus shares a common *relational* stance with Kemper's (1978) power-status theory of emotion. Kemper theorizes about the conditions under which specific emotions are likely to emerge given people's relative power and status positions (i.e., whether rising, declining, or remaining the same).

Although early developmental research focused on emotions that are considered universal and biologically-fixed (e.g., fear, anger, sadness, happiness; see Turner 2007 for a more complete list), more recent research has examined such second-order, role-taking emotions as empathy, shame, and guilt (Decety and Ickes 2009; Lewis 2007; Zahn-Waxler and Radke-Yarrow 1990). Moreover, recent empirical work in psychology has provided support for the view that emotional socialization processes, content, and outcomes are all influenced by the different resources available within a family's broader cultural context (Gordon 1989, 1990). In the remainder of this section we highlight the key dimensions of this empirical research on emotional socialization, mapping the normative and self-oriented perspectives on socialization (Gecas 1981) onto the more specific processes of how emotional expressiveness, regulation, and knowledge emerge within the familial context. Given the relative lack of

sociological research on emotional socialization within families, we discuss some of the ways that more general theorizing within the sociology of emotions could be applied to this area of study in ways that address some of the key gaps in current empirical work.

### 17.2.2 Families and the Development of Emotional Competence

While the symbolic interactionist approach to socialization emphasizes the development of self within the context of primary group relationships, the more common approach to such processes stems from the view that the socialization of children is required for the continued functioning of society and the normative role expectations underlying the reproduction of social order (Parsons and Bales 1955). The functionalist approach to emotional experience, expression, and regulation in psychology is similar in its view that emotion is embedded within relationships (Campos et al. 1994; Lazarus 1991) and that its developmental process is oriented toward achieving particular goals. Although they are not usually applied to studies of emotion within families, such an approach is also generally consistent with other relational and identity-focused theories (Kemper 1978; Burke and Stets 2009; Thoits 2004).

For psychologists, the functional prerequisites of emotional socialization concern the achievement of individual-level goals (e.g., to survive and thrive). For sociologists, these are extended to achieving goals which allow for the continuation of well-functioning social systems. This difference in approach has led to psychologists being more concerned with how and when children learn emotional competence while sociologists tend to be more interested in the content of such socialization efforts—that is, *what* children are learning compared to examining their relative *skill* in understanding or regulating emotion. In either case, the socialization of children's emotions within families remains an essential facet of understanding individual and societal-level order and change.

Emotionally competent individuals are able to understand their own and others' emotions as well as experience, express, and regulate emotion in ways that follow culturally appropriate feeling and display rules (i.e., rules governing the type, intensity, and duration of emotional experience and expression; Hochschild 1983; Johnson 1992). The development of each aspect of emotional competence begins within the family context and extends outward as children interact within other institutional settings. Research on emotion-related socialization suggests that it can be both unintentional and intentional, occurring through a family's general emotional climate as well as parents' modeling of emotional expression, talking or teaching about emotion, and reactions to children's emotional displays (Denham et al. 2007; Eisenberg et al. 1998).

Overall, psychologists and an increasing number of sociologists accept the influential role of biology in process of emotional development. The relatively long tradition of examining parental reactions to infant expressive behaviors during the first year of life (see Sullivan and Lewis 2003; Tronick 1989) has affirmed the hard-wiring of human's neurological capacity for emotion (Derryberry and Rothbart 2001; Turner 2007). But the activation and shaping of these capacity's only takes place through social and, ultimately, symbolic interaction. Examining adult emotional socialization within work and family contexts (Thoits 2004) might be usefully extended to include investigations of how interactions within particular cultural and structural locations contribute to the *primary* emotional socialization of children. As described below, recent developmental research has shifted to emphasize the role of cultural variations in emotional development, though current work would benefit from more frequently locating these processes within the context of family resource access across larger community (e.g., neighborhoods) and societal structures.

Research on parental socialization of emotional competence relates aspects of emotional experience, knowledge, and regulation to both social competence and mental health (Morelen and Thomassin 2013). For example, Denham

et al. (2003) investigated the current and future influence of preschooler's emotional competence on peer- and teacher-rated social competence. They reported that positive emotional expressiveness (i.e., happiness rather than anger or sadness), emotion knowledge, and emotion regulation were predictive of later social competence, measured in this study as peer likability and teacher ratings of the children's ability to form relationships with others. Children's ability to manage their emotions appropriately was particularly important in that lapses in such regulation had relatively stronger effects on measures of social competence than did the expression of positive emotions. Consistent with cultural stereotypes about girls' "nice" or "friendly" emotional behavior (Ridgeway 2011), uncontrolled negativity among girls was rated as being more problematic than that for boys.

Similarly, in their longitudinal examination of the emotional correlates of children's mental health, Eisenberg et al. (2005) found that negative emotionality and poor emotion management skills at Time 1 were associated with both internalizing (e.g., anxiety and depression) and externalizing (e.g., aggression) problems 2 years later. Emotional competence has also been shown to influence young adult mental health. As Ciarrochi and Scott (2006) illustrated in their study of Australian university students, lower levels of emotion knowledge were associated with increased anxiety and decreased positive mood and difficulties with managing emotions predicted fewer reported experiences of positive emotions at Time 2.

Until relatively recently, most studies examining the social and psychological outcomes of emotional socialization processes have focused on what Smith (1993) refers to as the Standard North American Family (i.e., white, middle class, comprised of a heterosexual breadwinner husband, homemaker wife, and 2.5 children living in suburbia). As a result, despite attempts to differentiate the forms and effects of family-related socialization practices, the tendency for researchers to take a monocultural and astructural approach has unintentionally universalized the very processes they are seeking to differentiate. When

cultural differences have been targeted, there has been a tendency to emphasize global approaches to such distinctions (e.g., individualistic vs. communitarian societies). This allows for cross-cultural comparisons but lacks the specificity to examine group differences *within* societies. Emotions scholars might more easily transcend such limitations by differentiating groups along cultural (i.e., beliefs and values) and structural dimensions (i.e., access to resources), attending as well to their mutual interrelationships (Schooler 1996).

Because all individuals and societies require some form of emotional competence, family members do tend to pass on knowledge and practices that conform to culturally-based emotion norms (Saarni 1999). Nonetheless, cultures differ in regard to how emotions are conceived, when and how they should be expressed, and how to respond to others' emotional displays. As Cole and Tan (2007) observe, this process is often implicit (i.e., passed on unconsciously through everyday social practices) and begins early in the life of all infants as they interact with caregivers to form *emotional attachment*.

Cultural distinctions in emotional socialization often have focused on the individualism-collectivism divide which demarcates Western and Eastern philosophical traditions and self-schemas (Markus and Kitayama 1991). So although the development of infants' secure emotional attachment through sensitive caregiving is considered a universal precursor to developing emotional competence (Bowlby 1969; Cole and Tan 2007), the way in which primary caregivers reflect sensitivity and whether security and sensitivity can be defined similarly across cultures has yet to be established.

For example, European American mothers define 4- and 5-year old children who whine and cling to them upon separation as being emotionally insecure. By contrast, Japanese mothers are more likely to perceive such behavior as a reflection of their having successfully cultivated valued feelings of *amae* (i.e., indulgent dependence; Doi 1996; Rothbaum et al. 2000). Such differences in mothers' interpretations of young children's behavior are linked to differences in

the cultural meanings surrounding individuality and interdependence. In this case, the concept of “secure attachment”—while valued in both cultures—has quite different implications for how particular emotional expressions are viewed and, as a result, the extent to which mothers are seen to have provided sensitive care.

Expanding the scholarship on emotional attachment within families, Smith and Nomi (2000) use Affect Control Theory (ACT) to more fully understand the variations in meaning and identity that are likely to result for American as compared to Japanese mothers in relation to behaviors that are associated with feelings of *amae*. Smith and Nomi constructed prototypical mother-child relationships in both cultures using evaluations of semantic differentials in a cross-culture lexicon. Their findings demonstrate the conditions under which similar behaviors (embodying or lacking *amae*) have different emotional meanings and outcomes (for both mother and child) across the two cultural contexts. ACT’s model of emotion posits that such maternal feelings reflect the extent to which the mother is confirming her own identity as well as the related identity and behavior of the child. Each identity, meaning, outcome, and behavior is distinguished by the three universal dimensions of evaluation (good-bad), activity (lively-quiet), potency (dominance-vulnerability) (see Lively and Heise 2004). Smith and Nomi’s analysis indicates that American mothers best confirm their identities through acts of “coaching” (as defined in the lexicon) that facilitate independence (see Gottman et al. 1997 for further information about the benefits of “emotional coaching” within the U.S. context). The simulation results for Japanese mothers show that they confirm their identities through nurturing behaviors that foster greater dependence (e.g. hugging or carrying the child). Interestingly, Smith and Nomi’s analysis also indicates that the American mother-child relationship is more sensitive to the sex of the child than that of Japanese mothers, such that American boys are socialized to be more independent than girls. While these results are merely suggestive, they do indicate one way that affect control processes might be usefully applied to better understand how emotional ide-

ologies operate across cultural contexts and the ways in which similar emotion-related socialization behaviors may hold quite different meanings and consequences for families in different settings. ACT has the additional benefit of being able to examine such relationships both cross-nationally and among groups located within any given society.

In addition to fostering secure attachments, *parental expression* of positive emotion is another universal strategy for reinforcing children’s normative behavior and for modeling the situational appropriateness of certain emotional displays (Denham and Kochanoff 2002; Eisenberg et al. 1998). The relative emphasis that parents place on positive emotion is not only age and gender sensitive (Brody 2000) but also varies across collectivist and individualist cultural contexts. Similarly sensitive to contextual meaning, parents’ expression of negative emotions helps inform children about culturally normative behavior but has also been seen as a risk factor in predicting later mental health outcomes for children and adolescents (Klimes-Dougan et al. 2007; Lau et al. 2009). For example, Dallaire et al. (2006) found that positive and negative displays of emotion among parents were significantly and oppositely related to children’s depressed mood. While high levels of parents’ positive emotional expressions were associated with fewer depressive symptoms, these positive displays did not buffer the relationship between high levels of parents’ negative emotions and children’s depressed mood. On the basis of their results, the authors suggest that positive and negative emotions should be seen as each contributing to children’s depressive symptoms rather than as opposite, mutually-exclusive ends of a single continuum (also see Bradburn 1969 on this point).

Again, however, these relationships are likely to vary depending on the normative meanings associated with different emotional experiences and displays. Cole and Tan (2007) suggest, in particular, that the effects of parental expressions of emotion must be understood within the context of more sensitive conceptualizations of culture and its correlates. This would include not only the consideration of a child’s age, gender

and a family's particular cultural priorities (e.g., independence-interdependence), but also would place emotion-related socialization practices within the context of caregiver identity and the extent to which, for example, stress emerging from chronic strain or acute life events (Pearlin et al. 1981) may interfere with parents' ability to express culturally appropriate emotions.

As this point suggests, expanding research on emotional socialization may provide a body of research that has the potential to address Simon's (2007) call to address linkages between emotion and mental health. The topic not only provides a venue for evaluating emotion theories and concepts but it also addresses gaps in the mental health literature. For example, Simon notes that a core insight from the sociology of emotions is that individual emotional responses (e.g., experience, expression, regulation) to stressful social situations may be due to "important group differences in norms and beliefs about the appropriate experience and expression of emotion" (p. 240). While research on emotion and mental health has contributed to our knowledge about the *distribution* of emotions and distress across socio-demographic groups in the U.S., scholars have yet to specify *how* the influence of social factors may vary cross-culturally, particularly in non-Western societies (Simon 2007). The substantive literature on emotional socialization may help extend understanding of group differences and emotional well-being by focusing attention on how chronic or acute stressors (e.g., economic hardship, unemployment) affecting parental emotional well-being may, in turn, affect the emotional competence and well-being of children and adolescents.

For example, in a multi-method longitudinal study of 220 families, Klimes-Dougan et al. (2007) found that adolescent psychopathologies (both internalizing and externalizing) varied systematically with parental emotional socialization practices. Parents of adolescents with internalizing (e.g., anxiety, depression) and/or externalizing (e.g., aggression, rule-breaking) problems were less likely to respond supportively to expressions of sadness and, in response to expressions of anger, more likely to respond with punishing, magnifying, or neglecting—all non-supportive

practices. The authors conclude that parents who tend to be "dismissive of their children's feelings, particularly their vulnerable emotions, may predispose their child to developing acting out problems" (p. 337). These "vulnerable emotions" include sadness and fear. Although it was beyond the scope of their study, Klimes-Dougan et al. (2007) further note that parents who are themselves suffering from mental illness or other life stressors may be less able to deal effectively with the emotional upheavals of their adolescent children (also see Goodman and Gotlib 1999). For example, maternal depression has been associated with being less responsive to children's emotional states (Lovejoy et al. 2000) and to less effective emotion regulation (Zahn-Waxler et al. 1990). Modeling the effects of other sources of parental stress, Nelson et al. (2009) report that in addition to depressive symptoms, marital distress, home chaos, and job dissatisfaction are all associated with the use of more non-supportive emotional socialization practices. Nelson and her colleagues go on to suggest the need for assessing how stress may operate in a cumulative fashion—similar perhaps to Thoits' (2010) stress accumulation model—to impact emotion socialization.

These types of studies have the potential to address other questions of sociological interest such as how particular coping strategies are learned and the extent to which these vary across groups. For example, examining the extent to which modeling or coaching responses to different types of negative emotions (e.g., anger vs. sadness) contribute to the development of emotion- or problem-focused coping (see Lazarus and Folkman 1984; Simon 2007) would be a helpful addition to both the mental health and emotion literatures. Being able to better specify the conditions under which parental emotional socialization behaviors contribute to the development and distribution of emotional competence and mental health further contributes to our understanding of how social control becomes self-control and thus the maintenance or disruption of the normative order over time.

Similar issues emerge in research on *emotional control or regulation*, the display rules that govern them (Matsumoto 2006) and how (primarily) maternal socialization behaviors vary



cross-culturally in terms of managing such emotions as anger or shame (Cole et al. 2002). Developmental researchers have shown, for example, that shame is valued more highly in Asian contexts because it reflects commitment to maintaining hierarchical respect and relationship harmony. In American society, however, expressions of anger are more likely to be tolerated given their connection with maintaining individual rights (Stearns and Stearns 1986) and as a means through which children are able to maintain self-esteem (Cole et al. 2002). As a result, parents within each cultural context tend to value, instruct, and structure children's emotional socialization in ways that promote selves reflective of these broader emotion norms (Mesquita and Albert 2007).

Sociological approaches to cultural variation in the socialization of self and emotion are rare but have the potential to extend the developmental literature in key ways. For example, recent work on identity (e.g., Burke and Stets 2009) could help to specify the extent to which parents with different backgrounds have internalized expected cultural differences such as the valuation of individualism and collectivism. Moreover, because identity theory has developed methods that are able to assess *where* these meanings might be held within the self-structure, it would allow for differentiation within groups that are often portrayed as monolithic (e.g., East Asian and American). Applying identity theory to family-related emotional socialization would enable the differentiation of traditional moral codes and their associated identity meanings (e.g., individualism-collectivism) from those grounded in particular social identities (e.g., nationality, race-ethnicity, gender) and role-identities, including any variations that may occur across multiple role-identities associated with the family group (e.g., father, husband, son; Burke and Stets 2009). These dimensions of self-structure might then be linked with self and reflected appraisals regarding such facets of emotional competence as experience, expression, regulation, and the understanding of own and other emotion.

Questions that might guide sociological research in this area include: To what extent are particular self-structures associated with the

frequency and intensity of particular emotions or the use of antecedent- (i.e., before emotional responses occur) or response-focused (i.e., after responses are generated) coping (Gross and Thompson 2007)? And, in turn, how might these reports of experience and regulation correlate with a parent's emotional reactions to children's behavior, tendencies to adopt an emotion-coaching or emotion-dismissing approach, and children's observed emotional competence? Incorporating identity theory processes into the investigation of emotional socialization behaviors and their outcomes has the potential to provide further clarification of the mechanism through which structure and culture influence self, emotion, and socialization as well as advance empirical understanding of the conditions under which children develop emotional competence.

---

### 17.3 Emotion Work

From the start, the sociology of emotions has addressed how feelings are managed and the relationships between these processes, gendered structures and cultural norms. After initially positing a distinct sociology of emotions (Hochschild 1975), Hochschild's theory of emotion management linked people's structural locations to their associated feeling and expression rules (see Peterson 2006 for a general review). Synthesizing Goffman's (1959, 1974) impression management model of interaction with Freud and Darwin's organismic accounts, Hochschild (1979) constructed an interactive approach that bridges the elements of these foundational sources. Hochschild's emotion management perspective attends to how people try to feel, how they consciously feel, and to theoretical connections between feeling, management of feeling, feeling rules, and social structure. Her work has captured the imagination of scholars who have since generated thousands of articles examining work, family, inequality, and how emotions and their regulation lie at the heart of these issues (Garey and Hansen 2011; Grandey et al. 2013).

Emotion management is the "act of trying to change in degree or quality an emotion or

feeling” (Hochschild 1979, p. 561). Two related terms locate this more general regulation process within particular social locations. Individuals are involved in “emotional labor” when the emotion management is exchanged for a wage in the context of paid employment (see Hochschild 1983). “Emotion work” takes place when the management of emotion occurs within a private context and is not involved in direct economic exchange. Within families, emotion work often involves the provision of emotional support and the enhancement of another’s well-being (Erickson 1993). Regardless of the interactional context under consideration, emotion management goes beyond mere suppression or masking of emotion to include the evocation and modification of felt experience. These efforts arise as individuals attempt to bring feeling and/or display in line with the social guidelines governing the situation and thus indicate the extent, direction, and duration of emotion and its expression. Feeling and display rules link individuals to the surrounding cultural and structural context. As Thoits (2004) observes, a central contribution of the sociology of emotions is that it draws attention to how the emotion norms underlying feeling and display reflect and contribute to larger processes of social order and social change.

Consistently theorized and studied in the context of the family as a gendered institution, emotion work is a particularly productive area for examining the processes underlying social reproduction and change (DeVault 1999; Lively 2013; Wharton and Erickson 1993). However, outside of the newly emerging literature on emotional capital (discussed in depth below; e.g., Froyum 2010; Reay 2000; O’Brien 2008), the study of *emotional* experience and management across social locations (e.g., race, class, age and sexuality as well as gender) remains at the margins of most discussions of family-related care work. As illustrated in our review below, examining how emotion norms and emotion work perpetuate inequities within families and influence the ways that family members interact within other institutional contexts has the potential to draw attention to how inequalities are reproduced and, in so doing, to hasten positive movement toward social justice.

### 17.3.1 Contextualizing Emotion Work Scholarship

Although interest in the socioemotional behavior of family members had been an aspect of family scholarship since the mid-twentieth century, connecting the concept of “work” to the emotional facets of family life occurred well after scholars had redefined housework and child care as “work” in the mid-1970s (Erickson 1993; see Ferree 1976 and Oakley 1974 for early examples). Following World War II, work and family in the United States were mythically characterized as “separate worlds” (Kanter 1977). As a result, it seemed oxymoronic to characterize emotional experiences within families as “work” (DeVault 1999). In addition, despite early research on the importance of socioemotional behavior for marital well-being (Levenger 1964), Parsonian functionalism in the mid-twentieth century framed socioemotional behaviors as “natural” and “functional” expressions of women’s familial love rather than as skilled and effortful tasks (Tingey et al. 1996). This tendency began to change, however, as Hochschild (1975, 1979, 1983) and Daniels (1987) reframed emotion management as a critical dimension of women’s family work and argued that its recognition as “work” was central for achieving the moral validation of reproductive labor and for advancing women’s equality (see Hochschild 2011 for a global perspective).

Hochschild’s early conceptual work on gender and emotion work centered on situations where feelings rules involved familial roles and rituals. For example, she describes a new bride’s reflections about how her felt emotions violated her own and others’ feeling rules, requiring her to engage in the cognitive strategy of telling herself to “be happy” on the way to the ceremony (Hochschild 1979, p. 564). These examples illustrate that feeling rules may not be consciously considered and, as such, form the “bottom side” of ideologies that contribute to the operation of “inequality regimes”—or the “interrelated practices, processes, actions, and meanings” create and maintain structural inequality (Acker 2006, p. 443). While ideologies are sets of related concepts and ways of thinking that perpetuate particular social

systems and inequalities, feeling rules intertwine with these ways of thinking to produce emotive compliance with one's status or identity. Hochschild explains: "[E]ach of two *mothers* may *feel guilty* about leaving her small child at a day care *while working all day*. One mother, a *feminist*, may feel that she *should not feel as guilty* as she does. The second, a *traditionalist*, may feel that she *should feel more guilty* than, in fact, she does feel" (1979, p. 567, emphasis added).

Extending this, Hochschild (1989) demonstrates in *The Second Shift* how the emotional underside of husbands' and wives' gender ideologies can shape behavioral and marital outcomes. In the case of Evan and Nancy Holt, for example, feelings of inequity surrounding the family work of the "second shift" threatened to end the Holt's marriage as both spouses worked full-time in demanding jobs but Nancy was responsible for all of the housework and child care. Such an arrangement just didn't "feel right." In a final attempt to avoid a divorce that neither wanted, Evan and Nancy divide the work into "upstairs and downstairs." Evan is responsible for the downstairs which includes the garage, the car, and the family dog. Nancy is responsible for everything else "upstairs." To bring her feelings in line with this new arrangement, Nancy engages in a great deal of complex emotion work as she suppresses feelings of inequity and comes to believe and behave in ways that are consistent with reality of the second shift now being "shared." As this example suggests, investigations of emotion work in families have the potential to yield new insights into the ways that status, identity, belief and behavior interconnect within the everyday practices of family members.

### 17.3.2 Theoretical Bases of Emotion Work in Families

With gender and emotion work in families linked (Hochschild 1983, 1989), theoretical grounding in this area parallels gender scholarship on the familial division of labor (see Coltrane 2000 for a review). For example, in her initial reconceptualization of family work, Erickson (1993)

suggested that just as with other types of family work, emotion work had continued to be seen as an expression of intimacy rather than a behavior requiring tie, effort, and skill because cultural belief systems tied emotion to women's natural state of being rather than to particular structural and cultural circumstances. Following this initial specification of emotion management as part of the family work performed, quantitative researchers examining these issues applied traditional theories about the household division of labor to predict its allocation across partners and the consequences that emerged as a result (Erickson 2005; Stevens et al. 2001). Such theories included those related to economics and exchange (e.g., Becker 1981; Brines 1994), time availability (Coverman 1985), demand-response or spillover (Kanter 1977) and socialization into roles and ideologies (Blair and Lichter 1991; Shelton and John 1996).

In the 1990s, gender construction theory challenged these more traditional approaches (Ferree 1990; Twiggs et al. 1999). Gender constructionists suggest that other theoretical models fail to account for the gendered meanings that men and women derive from performing family work. More than mere tasks to be performed, housework symbolically distinguishes femininity and masculinity in the home. Transgressing these normative boundaries then, calls into question what it means to be a man or woman. Drawing on these ideas, Kroska (2003) applies measures of task meaning that emerge from Affect Control Theory (Heise 2007) to her analysis of the affective meanings attached to housework and child care. She found that family work tasks do carry specific gendered meanings and that these are linked to how the family work is divided and the extent to which individuals hold themselves accountable to feminine and masculine norms for behavior. These connections to gendered norms suggest that the micro-level meanings measured by Kroska operate within the context of larger ideologies that surround family life and that, together, these micro- and macro-level processes combine in complex ways to affect the reproduction of gendered belief systems and practices (Ridgeway 2011).

Although the theoretical foundations are somewhat different, both Erickson (2005) and Kroska (2003) note that gender construction theory shares much in common with theories emerging from the symbolic interactionist tradition (e.g., Affect Control Theory, Identity Theory). One commonality lies in the emphasis placed on individuals *holding themselves* accountable to gendered emotion norms rather than experiencing such norms as being externally imposed (also see Johnson 1992). For example, Identity Theory (IT) posits that individuals are more likely to engage in behaviors that verify important identities or self-meanings rather than seeing their behavior as merely conforming to social norms. Thus, IT would predict (along with gender construction theory) that women who construct their sense of self in more “feminine” terms would be likely to experience gendered emotion work as an authentic expression of selfhood (Burke 2004; Burke and Stets 2009)—and therefore such work would not diminish emotional well-being nor would it catalyze behavioral change.

More theoretical work is needed to extend the overlapping insights of gender construction theory with ideas emerging from identity theory, ACT, as well as Ridgeway’s (2011) theory of gender framing and expectation states theory more generally. Although Hochschild’s conception of emotion work processes posited links to both gender and social class, little has been done to build on her theoretical argument or examine her ideas empirically. Because families interact with a number of other institutional contexts (e.g., work, education, health care, politics), it remains an ideal setting for examining how biology, interaction, structure, and culture interconnect within the performance of emotion work. An expanded focus on emotion work might thus serve as one way that theories concerning the social psychology of emotion might make inroads with more structural theories of inequality. While Kemper (1978) recognized early on that emotional *experience* emerges out of the structural relations of power and status, scholars also need to attend to the ways in which such relationships extend to the *management* of these felt emotions.

Future theoretical work should also seek to extend structural theories of emotion specifically to the study of emotion work *in families*. We suggest, however, that such applications might be usefully synthesized with the work of such feminist scholars as Ferree (2010), Acker (2006), and Risman (2004) who have argued for complex, structural and intersectional models of power and status (also see Ridgeway 2006). To date, neither the universal power-status theorists nor the most prominent theoretical models of the gendered division of household labor have systematically extended their work to account for processes of emotion management. Because the incorporation of emotion management processes requires the inclusion of cultural and identity concerns, extending structural feminist and emotion theorizing to account for emotion work in families will further their consideration of how structure, culture, and agency are interrelated. For instance, Risman (2004) argues for the importance of understanding *how* gender inequality is reproduced through the household division of labor. But while she recognizes a role for socialization, interaction, and institutions, nowhere is the role of emotions in each of these domains theorized in regard to the reproduction of inequalities.

Theorizing within each tradition may be transformed once the influence of emotion norms, ideologies, and emotion management are accounted for. As interactionist-based theories also suggest, the meanings underlying status-based and normative expectations are sensitive to the identities under consideration. Such theoretical possibilities have been suggested by Lively’s (2008) theory of emotional seguing (also see Lively and Heise 2004). Lively describes emotional seguing as the process of transitioning through specific emotions before reaching an emotional outcome. For example, moving from a feeling of tranquility to one of anger tends to require a transition through the feeling of pride. Although the likelihood of experiencing particular emotional outcomes do not vary by gender, Lively finds that emotional segues do. Thus, despite suggestions that status characteristics such as gender are not significant predictors of general levels of emotional *experience* (e.g., Simon and Nath

2004), they nonetheless have real implications for the co-occurrence of emotions and the *management* pathways represented in emotional transitions (Lively 2008). To be sure, emotion is part of any relationship and is a fundamental link between social agents, order, and change (Barbalet 2002)—but so is emotion management. As such, systematic theorizing about how emotion management processes contribute to the maintenance of relational selves, intimate partnerships, families, and connections between families and other institutional realms remains an open challenge.

### 17.3.3 Research on Emotion Work in Families

“The deeper the bond, the more emotion work, and the more unconscious we are of it” (Hochschild 1983, p. 68). This statement suggests one reason that relatively little empirical work has focused on the performance of emotion work in families: such work remains below the level of conscious awareness. In addition, cultural beliefs suggest that family life is one of the few places where one can truly be oneself, outside the reach of rules governing the management of emotion. Yet, as Hochschild recognized, no human interaction—not even the most intimate of family relationships—is devoid of emotion norms and, as a result, emotion work is prevalent in family life (Elliot and Umberson 2008). While *The Managed Heart* is best known for its insights into paid emotion management (i.e., emotional labor), this work also provides the first empirical insights into private forms of emotion management (see Hochschild 1983, pp. 76–86 and 156–161).

Characterizing emotion work as one form of social exchange among others, Hochschild illustrates the relational, power-status concerns (Barbalet 2001; Kemper 1978) underlying even the most intimate of relationships. Using an economic metaphor, Hochschild argues that when emotional debts are not paid spontaneously (e.g., through “authentic” feelings of guilt or shame), family members engage in emotion work in order to satisfy such debts and thereby maintain these fundamental social bonds. Thus, pretending to one’s parents that

one is feeling joyful at the Bar Mitzvah or college graduation ceremony constitutes a voluntary payment of emotional deference. As Kemper suggests in regard to felt emotion, the skilled *management* of emotion reflects and reaffirms power and status between family members as well as strengthening the emotional bonds that they embody.

The literature on family emotion work suggests, however, that emotional debts, credits, and payments are not universally experienced but are shaped by culturally-prescribed family roles and in terms of such social identities as gender, race, and social class (Hochschild 1990). For early exemplar of is DeVault’s (1991) complex ethnographic account of *Feeding the Family*. Although her more general focus on the caring work performed by women in families and other household forms extends beyond a definition of emotion work as limited to self-focused management of feeling and display, DeVault’s study presents one of the best empirical accounts of how women support and enhance others’ emotional well-being. In analyzing the varied decisions and tasks that go into the practice of “feeding,” DeVault illustrates the ways that the material tasks associated with feeding a family are simultaneously constructed by women as agentic demonstrations of love, nurturance, and individualized care at the same time that they are rendered invisible and oppressive—not merely to family members but also to the women themselves. This complex interrelationship between agency, cultural norms, and structured inequality runs through the literature on emotion work in families. DeVault’s study demonstrates better than most, however, the ways in which doing family work produces family, reinforces women’s sense of who they are in relationships with others, and also enables the reproduction of oppressive institutional structures and cultural scripts (see Stacey 2011 for a similar argument in regard to paid home care work).

Following this early ethnographic account, emotion work research shifted to the development of quantitative survey measures for operationalizing the performance and effects of emotion work. For example, Erickson’s (1993) initial quantitative study applied the performance of emotion work to traditional models that posited a



positive relationship between men's performance of family work and women's perceived marital and individual well-being. She found that among her sample of dual-earner spouses, not only did men's performance of emotion work correlate positively with women's reported marital quality but it also had a stronger effect on perceptions of marital well-being and burnout than their performance of housework or child care.

Stevens et al. (2001) extended this work by examining the contributions of both husbands' and wives' housework, emotion work, and status-enhancement activities to marital satisfaction. They also explored whether respondents' satisfaction with each type of family work mediate the direct effects of family work allocation. Reinforcing the importance of conceptualizing family work as a multidimensional construct, Stevens et al. report that all three dimensions of family work contribute to husbands' and wives' marital satisfaction. The authors also find that satisfaction with the division of household labor, rather than just the division itself, is a significant correlate of marital satisfaction. For men, satisfaction with emotion work allocation, that is, the distribution of emotion work between husbands and wives, was the most important factor for their overall marital satisfaction. In contrast, women's marital satisfaction was affected more by the division of housework than the division of emotion work. Stevens et al. concluded that the correlates of marital satisfaction are complex and that, as a group, they differ by gender.

Erickson (2005) also examined the potentially complex influences on emotion work performance suggesting that gender identity more than gender ideology, relative resources, and time constraints will affect the allocation and outcomes of family work. Erickson's results suggest that studying emotion work provides different information about the gendered meaning and allocation of family work. Using survey data from a community-based sample of dual-earner, married parents, she finds that emotion work was more closely linked to the construction of gender than were housework and child care. Specifically, Erickson reports that it is men's and women's construction of gender identity (i.e., masculine-instrumental and feminine-expressive) that were

most strongly associated with their performance of emotion work but not the other types of family work tasks. Moreover, men's feminine-expressive gender construction was positively associated with their performance of emotion work. Among the women, however, both masculine-instrumental characteristics and feminine-expressive ones correlated with emotion work. This suggests that for women the performance of emotion work is not merely an expression of their love and support but is perceived as an instrumental task. For men, however, emotion work reflected their interpersonal connection with their wives. Based on these gendered results, Erickson argues that neglecting to examine the part that emotion work plays in the creation and maintenance of selves, marriages, and families helps to perpetuate the view that emotional competence emerges "naturally" for some people and not others and, in so doing, to reproduce systems of inequality.

Importantly, the most recent empirical examinations of emotion work in families have extended the concept beyond traditional conceptualizations of domestic labor to include aspects of family life that extend outward to other social contexts as well as inward to intimate relationships, both in complex and gendered ways (see DeVault 1999 and Garey and Hansen 2011 for further extensions). In Lois' (2010, 2013) ethnographic examination of mothers who home school their children, she links the management of emotion with the mothers' experience of time to formulate the concept of "temporal emotion work." Homeschooling mothers report being challenged to find any time for themselves apart from the demands of home, family, *and* the responsibility of educating their children. Lois finds that mothers' use of two forms of temporal emotion management—sequencing and savoring—enables them to cope with the emotional challenges of homeschooling.

The ability to engage in effective sequencing depended on mothers' (note, only mothers) ability to engage strategically with nostalgia and regret to transcend the present and its problematic emotions of frustration and resentment. Successful sequencing, in turn, enabled mothers to emotionally savor the here and now with their children even amidst their sense of losing "me-time."

Homeschooling mothers used nostalgia to remind themselves that time passes quickly and that they should savor each moment they have with their children. As an innovative example of cognitive reappraisal, this form of temporal emotion work helped dampen mothers' desire for time away from their children (thus enabling them to continue to feel positively about the homeschooling experience). Lois notes that, as with other emotion management strategies, invoking nostalgia was linked to expectations beyond the mothers and their families. In this case, the temporal emotion work strategy of nostalgia was linked to the emotion norms of the homeschooling subculture and discourse (similar to the descriptions of gendered discourse in Hochschild 2003).

The second form of sequencing emotion work described by Lois (2010, 2013) is regret. Regret also enables mothers to move beyond present concerns but in this case the strategy requires them to engage with negative feelings about their past actions so that they could use them as personal "cautionary tales" to motivate their current and future behavior (Hochschild 1989). In this way, mother's saw taking time for themselves away from the children was likely to lead to regret later on, a feeling that should be avoided if at all possible. Attempting to heed others' advice to "just relax and enjoy it," the mothers were able to manipulate their temporal experience in ways that sought to manage their feelings of frustration and resentment as they took refuge in nostalgia and envisioned a future without feelings of regret.

In contrast to the emotional demands presented by caring for and educating children, Elliot and Umberson (2008) expand the empirical scope of emotion work by examining the emotion work associated with sexual activity in long-term marriages. In their study of the "management of desire," Elliot and Umberson remind us that emotion work involves the active management of both one's own and others' emotions (Thoits 1996) and that these processes are often guided by the gendered obligations underlying norms of exchange (Hochschild 1983). Ironically, the authors point out, even though Hochschild argued that emotion work is likely to be the strongest in the context of intimate relationships, there

has been relatively little research on this topic when compared to that examining occupational contexts and relationships. In their study of "performing desire," Elliot and Umberson analyze the experiences of 31 married couples to examine the expectations and management of feeling around marital sex. Showing how sex does not exist apart from its social expression and management, their study examines how marital partners think "desire should be both felt and performed." Such feelings and behavior are "in turn linked to individuals' own and their spouse's expectations, beliefs, and experiences, of gender, marriage, and heterosexuality" (2008, p. 394).

Elliot and Umberson's in-depth interviews suggest the internalization of gendered cultural discourses surrounding marriage and sex. For example, they find that women try to change their feelings about sex in order to increase their interest in it. As a result wives report having to perform intensive emotion management as they work to appear more sexually interested while trying to make it appear that their interest is spontaneous and authentic. Elliot and Umberson's interviews also lend support to the culturally held belief that housework and sex are interrelated. The authors find this to be a distinctly gendered pattern, with men engaging in household labor in an effort to increase the frequency of sexual intercourse and wives' willingness to engage in sex being linked to perceptions about their husbands' performance of family work or with their attempts to be more emotionally engaged.

Extending these ideas further, Pfeffer's description of the relationship between household labor and emotion work among members of transsexual families provides new insight into how gender constructions (Erickson 2005) and gender ideologies (Hochschild 1979) operate within families to shape the construction and maintenance of family life through gender strategies and family myths (Hochschild 1989). Pfeffer's work also illustrates the infiltration of a gender "regime" within families (Acker 2006). Similar to Hochschild's (1989) claim that men who made less money than their wives tended to perform less family work, relationships that were considered "lesbian" at their start had the most unequal

division of labor following a partner's transition to another sex. This result suggests that when conditions allow for behavioral expectations to be separated from cultural scripts about biological difference (Ridgeway 2011), the relatively unconscious practices, processes, actions, and meanings of the gender regime tend to be strengthened rather than challenged. In this case, gender inequalities within transsexual families were reproduced in ways that are similar to heterosexual couples; that is, by framing family work divisions as matters of individual choice rather than as stemming from structured inequality.

Pfeffer goes on to show that this process is amplified through women's performance of emotion work related to their partner's transition. She describes a relatively "unidirectional investment of emotional resources" that reproduced the trans men's privilege and in which the women got the "short end of the stick" (2010, pp. 174–175). This work extended beyond relational issues within the couple to those surrounding the trans partner's medical and health care needs. Consistent with DeVault's (1999) suggestion that advocacy outside the family often requires a great deal of emotion work, Pfeffer describes how women's management and support of their partner's emotional and physical well-being extended to interactions with health care providers and other health-related institutions. In sum, each of these studies suggests the range of ways that family members draw on emotional knowledge and skill to fulfill individual and social functions that, often unintentionally, reproduce gendered inequalities. Further research is needed to examine how these skills might be activated in ways that have the potential to promote egalitarianism within families and how such a change also might contribute to movement toward social justice outside the family realm.

---

## 17.4 Emotional Capital

The family plays a decisive role in the maintenance of the social order, through social as well as biological reproduction, i.e., reproduction of the structure of the social space and social relations. (Bourdieu 1996, p. 22)

One way to understand the implications that emotional socialization and emotion work have for institutions outside the family and for reproducing social order and facilitating social change is through the analogy of capital. Just as cognition develops at the cross-section of neurological development and environmental stimuli, emotion-based knowledge, skills, and capacities to feel are elements of embodied social learning that are acquired within the context of family interactions (Reed-Danahay 2005). These elements become part of what Elias (1939/2000), Mauss (1973) and Bourdieu (1977) refer to as an individual's habitus or the structured habits of mind, disposition, and bodily skills that are both individual and collective (Bourdieu 1996).

The habitus does not just produce actions and reactions but is a product of the structural and cultural conditions that individuals encounter early in the life course. Lizardo (2004, p. 376) reflects this view in describing the habitus as a "generative dynamic structure" that develops a set of available resources as a function of adapting itself to the situated practices of other actors within particular social institutions (or fields of play; Bourdieu 1977). The emotional knowledge and skills gained through family-related socialization behaviors (e.g., understanding of self and others' emotions, modes of expression and regulation) contribute to one's *emotional capital* and thus provide the resources that both reflect and shape interactional behavior or practice. From this perspective, dispositions toward internalizing or externalizing emotions (Simon 2007) or the emotion work strategies employed by husbands and wives reflect the activation of emotional capital in the family field.

Providing an original definition of emotional capital as well as a critique of women's relegation to private life, Nowotny (1981) integrates Bourdieu's social theory with feminist attention to the family sphere. Nowotny's work on Austrian women in public life was the first to theorize emotional capital. Paralleling the more expansive approach to conceptualizing what "counts" as emotion work in families that DeVault (1999) and others (Berhau et al. 2011; Seery and Crowley 2000; Larson and Richards 1994) provide,

Nowotny defines emotional capital as “knowledge, contacts, and relations as well as access to emotionally valued skills and assets” (p. 148).

Froyum (2010, p. 39) extends this definition, with emotional capital acting as an interpersonal resource that “treats emotions and their management as skills or habits that translate into social advantages.” Knowledge of situationally appropriate emotional experiences and expressions thus complements the skills needed to manage emotions—just as it does within the socialization of emotional competence (Saarni 1999). Adding to this definition further, Thoits (2004) argues that emotional capital encompasses not only emotion-based knowledge and emotion management skills, but also the capacity to experience “social emotions,” that is, emotions predicated on role-taking, such as shame, guilt, and embarrassment (Mead 1934; Shott 1979). Combining these definitions, we use emotional capital to refer to *one’s trans-situational, emotion-based knowledge, emotion management skills, and feeling capacities*. Following Thoits (2004, p. 372), we view “social order, social inequality, and social cohesion [as] byproducts of an individual’s emotional capital.”

Because emotional capital is the product of the human organism’s adaptation to social conditions, it tends toward the conservation of social systems (Bourdieu 1992). However, the habitus and the capital it has access to also constitutes an embodied matrix of generative action that through both conscious and non-conscious means (Gould 2009) opens up possibilities for mobilization and change (Collins 1990; Gould 2009; Jasper 1998; Lizardo 2004). Framing emotions and family life in terms of the creation (e.g., socialization) and activation (e.g., emotion work) of emotional capital has the benefit of connecting these practices to the larger social and cultural context in a way that addresses the limitations of traditional interactionist approaches to the family (Erickson 2003; Hutter 1985) and without sacrificing their agentic components. It is with this in mind that we examine the burgeoning literature on emotional capital and families.

Drawing on Bourdieu’s conception of capital, scholars have used the concept of emotional

capital to link individual competencies with the reproduction of structural inequality. Family, particularly mothers, provide (or fail to provide) children with the emotional resources needed to navigate interaction within other social institutions or fields. In that the educational field is the one which children inhabit most frequently outside of family, it has served as the site for most of the research and theory on this topic. Our review suggests that emotions scholars consider expanding theory and research focusing on emotional capital to further delineate links between individual action and social systems as well as enabling scholars to develop an “intersectional, institutional agenda” where the reciprocal relationships among families-state-market-community (see Ferree 2010, p. 433) are seen as central to the sociological study of families and emotion.

#### 17.4.1 Acquiring and Activating Emotional Capital in Families

Working within feminist theory but not engaging the sociology of emotions Nowotny (1981) frames her discussion of emotional capital in the context of a sharp separation between the public and private spheres. For her, as for Bourdieu (1996), the “work” of the family is the responsibility of women; a relational responsibility which reflects and reproduces feminized forms of capital. This feminization of the concept is carried forward in later emotional capital literature (Gillies 2006; O’Brien 2008; Reay 2000, 2004), largely closing off potential theorizing about the reciprocal relationship between masculinity, emotional capital, and men’s everyday emotion practice in the family field. As a result, current theory and research on emotional capital in families focuses on the ways *mothers* devote the skills they have acquired to the well-being of their children, usually in regard to educational achievement.

For example, Reay’s (2000) investigation of a diverse group of mothers involved with two primary schools in London, England traces the intense activation of emotional capital between mothers and their children as they seek to improve educational outcomes despite the broader

climate of economic uncertainty. Similar to the results that Lareau (2011) reports for the operation of cultural capital across class and race, Reay finds complex relationships between mothers' activation of emotional capital and the transformation of this capital into profitable outcomes for their children. First, Reay's study affirms that the *meanings* underlying emotional experiences and their expression vary across social location. While mothers from all classes expressed guilt, anxiety, frustration, empathy and encouragement, the effects of expressing these feelings to their children were *not* consistent across social class. What appeared to influence this relationship was how mothers conceptualized their children's happiness. Working class mothers' emotional involvements appeared to have had greater "success" when happiness was defined in terms of the child's emotional well-being rather than educational success—the latter being the more common meaning of success applied by middle class mothers. This suggests that unlike the other forms of capital (i.e., economic, social, cultural, and symbolic; Bourdieu 1986) emotional capital is not inextricably linked to positive outcomes. Depending on the family's social class, activating emotional resources on behalf of another may negatively impact one's educational success while increasing the likelihood of positive mental health outcomes, or vice versa.

Second, what appeared to constitute effective emotional capital also varied across classes (Reay 2000). Intense emotional involvement by middle class mothers was found to have a consistent positive effect on educational success; it was a good investment. By contrast working class mothers' emotional investments often did not help their children's educational achievement and often did so with a high cost to mothers' and children's emotional well-being. Among working class mothers, invoking a degree of emotional disengagement or neutrality appeared better able to generate positive emotional resources (e.g., confidence) in their children. Reay concludes that while high levels of anxiety about the importance of education cut across social location, because middle class mothers were able to draw on higher levels of economic, social, and cultural resources,

their activation of emotional capital in support of their children's educational success was more likely to succeed. At the same time, her results suggest that the meanings underlying emotional experiences can create "complex contradictions" across classes when in the context of activating a form of capital that is all about one's investment in others rather than oneself (Reay 2000, p. 583).

These contradictions raise theoretical and empirical questions about the utility of conceptualizing emotional capital in gendered ways. Because she links emotional capital solely to the reproductive labor of women in families, Nowotny suggests that it develops in response to barriers rather than possibilities. However, to what extent is this empirically accurate? To be sure, the benefit of examining emotional capital derives from its ability to draw attention to the structured relationships and cultural norms that are being transmitted from one generation to another. This further suggests that those holding similar raced, classed, or gendered statuses would share similar emotional habitus and thus be able to draw on similar forms of emotional capital. Nonetheless, there is nothing inherent in the definition of emotional capital that links it inextricably to female experience. Thus, it falls to future researchers to document the content and process of developing and deploying emotional capital not merely among women but across a range of status characteristics.

In following up on her earlier work, Reay (2004) seeks to address these sorts of theoretical issues. She draws on the work of Illouz (1997) and Lorde (1984) to further delineate the range of resources constituting emotional capital and situating their effectiveness within the context of structured differences in power and status. Reay suggests that emotional detachment, not just emotional involvement, must be brought into view—an emotional resource that likely would have emerged sooner had men's experiences been part of the initial scholarship on emotional capital.

Reay also argues for considering the distinct meanings of anger expression across race and gender. Reflecting a feminized form of privilege, middle class, married mothers achieved positive



outcomes from activating resources to support their intense emotional involvement with their children's schooling. Working class, single mothers however, had better results deploying a more detached approach—one that might be more consistent with masculine forms of emotional privilege. In addition, black mothers generated a range of positive outcomes from the use of negative responses to mainstream schooling. Drawing on Lorde's (1984) description of how the political work associated with confronting racism generates a capacity among black women to be angry and to use anger to positive effect, Reay (2004) shows how black mothers' anger yields more positive outcomes for their children than might be expected. Because anger is considered the emotion of power (Kemper 1978), its effective deployment within these maternal relationships raises new theoretical and empirical questions about how individual status characteristics intersect with broader institutionalized contexts (e.g., family, education, politics) and processes (e.g., racism, sexism) to influence the meaning and effect of drawing on emotional resources in particular ways (see Acker 2006 and Ferree 2010 for similar intersectional approaches).

Along similar lines, Gillies' (2006) study of working class mothers' use of emotional resources illustrates how situated meanings can clash with the institutionalized expectations embedded within gender and class hierarchies. As with Reay's (2000) study, Gillies documents the tendency to equate the 'profitable' use of mothers' emotional resources with children's educational achievement. Illustrating that this approach assumes the existence of other forms of material and social resources, she shows how the profitable activation of mothers' emotional involvement in regard to their children's education differs between working class and middle class mothers. Working class mothers experienced much higher 'pay-offs' when their emotional involvement in school life focused on their children's safety, soothing feelings of failure and vulnerability, and challenging injustice. These types of investments enabled their children to survive the school experience in ways that the use of emotional pressures to succeed in academic work

would not. Far from the stereotyped assumption of unfeeling and ignorant parents, this study demonstrates how structural location shapes the value, expression, management, and outcome of activating emotional capital.

While fear, anger, happiness, and sadness may indeed be experienced as primary, universal human emotions (Plutchik 2003), the meaning and consequences of their expression within interaction are profoundly influenced by relational, institutional, and societal characteristics. The results of Reay (2000, 2004) and Gillies (2006) extend assumptions related to universality in particular ways. For example, Kemper (1978) proposes that when a particular emotion such as anger is said to arise from a particular social relational outcome (i.e., status loss) this is assumed to hold across all social locations. What the cultural and interactional approaches bring to Kemper's structural model is an explanation for how the experienced anger will influence behavior (e.g., reinforcing it or motivating change) as well as variations in other individual (e.g., health) and social (e.g., moral standing) outcomes (Gordon 1989; Simon 2007; Turner and Stets 2006). Conceptualizing anger in the context of family and emotional capital draws attention not merely to the intersectionality of individual status characteristics but also to the inherent connections between subjective and objective processes that are themselves shaped by the larger institutional and ideological context.

In their examinations of emotional capital activation in the context of education, O'Brien (2008) and Froyum (2010) further demonstrate how intimate emotional investments in the educational and emotional well-being of others tends to reproduce traditional (class, gender, and race) ideologies through the ways in which emotional resources are and are not activated. For example, the mothers in O'Brien's (2008) study could rely on their husbands' emotional care and involvement when larger decisions about schooling were being made but it was seen as outside the normative gendered boundaries of fathers' emotional resources to have them provide daily, hands-on involvement and care. The extent to which the perceived limitations of paternal emotional

capital was due to the view that men did not have as *many* resources as women or had particular *types* of emotional resources that were not useful in facilitating the family-education connection remains for future researchers to consider.

Froyum's (2010) examination of an after-school program for low-income black girls in the southern U.S. provides one of the few discussions of how the development of emotional capital might be affected by race as well as by gender and class. While her study did not include family members, Froyum provides baseline information that others might extend to family relationships. Her results indicate that while the primary resources being transmitted to black girls participating in the program concerned strategies for engaging in emotional restraint, the process was aimed not toward achievement or individual mental health but rather to "fit the expectations of powerful others around them" (p. 50). Demonstrating that the girls learned to stifle the negative emotions that might challenge others' authority and to develop emotional resources that enable one to develop positive emotional connections to those in power, Froyum's study skillfully highlights the structural and ideological background against which children develop emotional knowledge, skills, and capacities. In so doing, she shows how caregivers' emotional lessons subtly reproduce the race, gender, and class-based structural and cultural inequalities they believed they were equipping the girls to overcome.

---

## 17.5 Conclusion

As our discussion of each of the preceding topics suggests, emotion in families is intimately connected to social structures and processes operating outside the familial context. This fact provides a crucial reason that sociological analysis of families and emotion should continue to grow and expand. Although there may continue to be resistance to the idea that emotions experienced within families are "worked on" or are subject to structural and cultural influence, further sociological theorizing about these relationships coupled with their empirical examination

will provide valuable insights into the feelings and activities that lead family members to sustain themselves and the broader socio-cultural contexts in which they are embedded. Future research within in this area should concentrate on processes of socialization and activation of emotion resources within diverse family forms. As long as the research principally represents the experiences of the Standard North American Family (Smith 1993), scholars will be limited in their ability to distinguish the relative contributions of biology, cognition, emotion, culture, and structure to individual and societal functioning.

As Von Scheve and Von Luedon (2005, p. 304) point out, insights emerging from social neuroscience suggest that "the mechanisms underlying mind and behavior are not fully explicable by a biological or a social approach alone but rather that a multilevel integrative analysis may be required" (Cacioppo et al. 2000). Consistent with the case we have made regarding the potential value of *emotional capital* for linking micro and macro processes, these authors present a convincing argument for how Bourdieu's (1977) theoretical approach provides a useful theoretical frame with which to connect interdisciplinary approaches to emotion in ways that are concerned with linking individualized embodied experiences with social structures.

In sum, while emotions may be synonymous with family relationships, their interconnections have yet to be fully theorized or empirically documented. Future researchers are encouraged to integrate the full range of interdisciplinary scholarship on emotion in families as they work toward the development of multilevel theoretical and empirical models that elucidate how emotions operate within the family and beyond it. In that the experience of emotion represents the presence of systemic change, examining emotion in family relationships inevitably reflects the dynamism and potential for change embedded within all family members, relationships, and varied institutional forms across the globe. As such, the study of families and emotions has the potential to yield a broad range of sociologically significant insights for many years to come.

## References

- Acker, J. (2006). Inequality regimes: Gender, class, and race in organizations. *Gender and Society, 20*(4), 441–464.
- Bandura, A. (1971). *Social learning theory*. New York: General Learning Press.
- Barbalet, J. (2001). *Emotion, social theory, and social structure: A macrosociological approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Barbalet, J. (Ed.). (2002). *Emotions and sociology*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Becker, G. S. (1981). *A treatise on the family*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Berhau, P., Lareau, A., & Press, J. E. (2011). Where families and children's activities meet: Gen, meshing work, and family myths. In A. I. Garey & K. V. Hansen (Eds.), *At the heart of work and family* (pp. 43–60). New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Blair, S. L., & Lichter, D. T. (1991). Measuring the division of household labor: Gender segregation of housework among couples. *Journal of Family Issues, 12*, 91–113.
- Bourdieu, P. (1977). *Outline of a theory of practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of capital. In J. E. Richardson (Ed.), *Handbook of theory of research for the sociology of education* (pp. 241–258). New York: Greenwood.
- Bourdieu, P. (1992). *The logic of practice*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1996). On the family as a realized category. *Theory, Culture, and Society, 13*(3), 19–26.
- Bowlby, J. (1969). *Attachment: Attachment and loss: Volume 1*. New York: Basic Books.
- Bradburn, N. M. (1969). *The structure of psychological well-being*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Bretherton, I., Fritz, J., Zahn-Waxler, C., & Ridgeway, D. (1986). Learning to talk about emotions: A functionalist perspective. *Child Development, 57*, 529–548.
- Brines, J. (1994). Economic dependency, gender, and the division of labor at home. *American Journal of Sociology, 100*, 652–688.
- Brody, L. R. (2000). The socialization of gender differences in emotional expression: Display rules, infant temperament, and differentiation. In A. H. Fischer (Ed.), *Gender and emotion: Social psychological perspectives* (pp. 24–47). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Burgess, E. W. (1926). The family as a unity of interacting personalities. *The Family, 7*, 3–9.
- Burke, P. J. (2004). Identities and social structure: The 2003 cooley-mead award address. *Social Psychology Quarterly, 67*(1), 5–15.
- Burke, P. J., & Stets, J. E. (2009). *Identity theory*. NY: Oxford University Press.
- Cacioppo, J. T., Berntson, G. G., Sheridan, J. F., McKlintock, M. K. (2000). Multilevel integrative analyses of human behavior: Social neuroscience and the complementing nature of social and biological approaches. *Psychological Bulletin, 126*(6), 829–843.
- Cahill, S. E. (1999). Emotional capital and professional socialization: The case of mortuary science students (and Me). *Social Psychology Quarterly, 62*(2), 101–116.
- Calkins, S. D., & Hill, A. (2007). Caregiver influences on emerging emotion regulation: Biological and environmental transactions in early development. In J. J. Gross (Ed.), *Handbook of emotion regulation* (pp. 229–248). New York: Guilford.
- Campos, J. J., Mumme, D. L., Kermoian, R., & Campos, R. G. (1994). A functionalist perspective on the nature of emotion. *Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 59*(2–3), 284–303.
- Cancian, F. M. (1987). *Love in America: Gender and self-development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ciarrochi, J., & Scott, G. (2006). The link between emotional competence and well-being: A longitudinal study. *British Journal of Guidance and Counselling, 34*(2), 231–243.
- Cole, P. M., Bruschi, C. J., & Tamang, B. L. (2002). Cultural differences in children's emotional reactions to difficult situations. *Child Development, 73*, 983–996.
- Cole, P. M., & Tan, P. Z. (2007). Emotion socialization from a cultural perspective. In E. Grusec & P. D. Hastings (Eds.), *Handbook of socialization: Theory and research* (pp. 516–542). New York: Guilford.
- Collins, R. (1990). Stratification, emotional energy, and the transient emotions. In T. D. Kemper (Ed.), *Research agendas in the sociology of emotions* (pp. 27–57). Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Coltrane, S. (2000). Research on household labor: Modeling and measuring the social embeddedness of routine family work. *Journal of Marriage and the Family, 62*(4), 1208–1233.
- Cooley, C. H. (1902/1964). *Human nature and social order*. New York: Schocken Books.
- Cooley, C. H. (1909/1962). *Social organization*. New York: Schocken Books.
- Coverman, S. (1985). Explaining husbands' participation in domestic labor. *Sociological Quarterly, 26*, 181–197.
- Dallaire, D. H., Pineda, A. Q., Cole, D. A., Ciesla, J. A., Jacquez, F., LaGrange, B., & Bruce, A. E. (2006). Relation of positive and negative parenting to children's depressive symptoms. *Journal of Clinical Child and Adolescent Psychology, 35*(2), 313–322.
- Damasio, A. R. (1994). *Descartes' error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain*. New York: G. P. Putnam.
- Daniels, A. K. (1987). Invisible work. *Social Problems, 34*(5), 403–415.
- Decety, J., & Ickes, W. (Eds.). (2009). *The social neuroscience of empathy*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Denham, S. & Kochanoff, A. T. (2002). "Parental Contributions to Preschoolers' Understanding of Emotion." *Marriage & Family Review, 34*(3–4), 311–343.

- Denham, S. A., Blair, K. A., DeMulder, E., Levitas, J., Sawyer, K., Auerbach-Major, S., & Queenan, P. (2003). Preschool emotional competence: Pathway to social competence? *Child Development, 74*(1), 238–256.
- Denham, S. A., Bassett, H. H., & Wyatt, T. (2007). The socialization of emotional competence. In J. E. Grusec & P. D. Hastings (Eds.), *Handbook of socialization: Theory and research* (pp. 614–637). New York: Guilford.
- Derryberry, D., & Rothbart, M. K. (2001). Early temperament and emotional development. In A. F. Kalverboer & A. Gramsbergen (Eds.), *Brain and behavior in early development* (pp. 967–990). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- DeVault, M. L. (1991). *Feeding the family: The social organization of caring as gendered work*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- DeVault, M. L. (1999). Comfort and struggle: Emotion work in family life. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 561*, 52–63.
- Doi, T. (1996). Forward. In D. W. Shwalb & B. J. Shwalb (Eds.), *Japanese childrearing: Two generations of scholarship* (pp. xv–xvii). New York: Guilford.
- Eisenberg, N., Cumberland, A., & Spinrad, T. L. (1998). Parental socialization of emotion. *Psychological Inquiry, 9*(4), 241–273.
- Eisenberg, N., Sadovsky, A., Spinrad, T. L., Fabes, R. A., Losoya, S. H., Valiente, C., Reiser, M., Cumberland, A., & Shepard, S. A. (2005). The relations of problem behavior status to children's negative emotionality, effortful control and impulsivity: Concurrent relations and prediction of change. *Developmental Psychology, 41*(1), 193–211.
- Ekman, P. (1982). *Emotions in the human face*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ekman, P., & Oster, H. (1979). Facial expressions of emotion. *Annual Review of Psychology, 30*, 527–554.
- Elias, N. (1939/2000). *The civilizing process: Sociogenetic and psychogenetic investigations*. Malden: Blackwell.
- Elliot, S., & Umberson, D. (2008). The performance of desire: Gender and sexual negotiation in long-term marriages. *Journal of Marriage and Family, 70*, 391–406.
- Epstein, S. (1973). The self-concept revisited or a theory of a theory. *American Psychologist, 28*, 404–416.
- Erickson, R. J. (1993). Reconceptualizing family work: The effect of emotion work on perceptions of marital quality. *Journal of Marriage and the Family, 55*, 888–900.
- Erickson, R. J. (2003). The familial institution. In L. T. Reynolds & N. J. Herman-Kinney (Eds.), *The handbook of symbolic interaction* (pp. 511–538). Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.
- Erickson, R. J. (2005). Why emotion work matters: Sex, gender, and the division of household labor. *Journal of Marriage and Family, 67*, 337–351.
- Ferree, M. M. (1976). Working-class jobs: Housework and paid work as sources of satisfaction. *Social Problems, 23*, 431–441.
- Ferree, M. M. (1990). Beyond separate spheres: Feminism and family research. *Journal of Marriage and the Family, 52*, 866–994.
- Ferree, M. M. (2010). Filling the glass: Gender perspectives on families. *Journal of Marriage and Family, 72*, 420–439.
- Freud, A. (1965). *Normality and pathology in childhood: Assessments of development*. London: Hogarth.
- Freud, S. (1961). *Civilization and its discontents* (Trans: J. Strachey). New York: Norton.
- Froyum, C. M. (2010). The reproduction of inequalities through emotional capital: The case of socializing low-income black girls. *Qualitative Sociology, 33*, 37–54.
- Garey, A. I., & Hansen, K. V. (2011). *At the heart of work and family: Engaging the ideas of Arlie Hochschild*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Gecas, V. (1981). Contexts of socialization. In M. Rosenberg & R. H. Turner (Eds.), *Social psychology: Sociological perspectives* (pp. 165–199). New York: Basic Books.
- Geertz, H. (1959). The vocabulary of emotion: A study of Javanese socialization processes. *Psychiatry, 22*, 223–236.
- Gillies, V. (2006). Working class mothers and school life: Exploring the role of emotional capital. *Gender and Education, 18*(3), 281–293.
- Goffman, E. (1959). *The presentation of self in everyday life*. Garden City: Doubleday.
- Goffman, E. (1974). *Frame analysis*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Goodman, S. H., & Gotlib, I. H. (1999). Risk for psychopathology in the children of depressed mothers: A developmental model for understanding mechanisms of transmission. *Psychological Review, 106*(3), 458–490.
- Gordon, S. L. (1981). The sociology of sentiments and emotion. In M. Rosenberg & R. H. Turner (Eds.), *Social psychology: Sociological perspectives* (pp. 562–592). New York: Basic Books.
- Gordon, S. L. (1989). The socialization of children's emotions: Emotional culture, competence and exposure. In C. Saarni & P. L. Harris (Eds.), *Children's understanding of emotion* (pp. 319–349). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gordon, S. L. (1990). Social structural effects on emotion. In T. D. Kemper (Ed.), *Research agendas in the sociology of emotions* (pp. 145–179). Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Gottman, J. M., Katz, L. F., & Hooven, C. (1997). *Meta-emotion: How families communicate emotionally*. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Gould, D. B. (2009). *Moving politics: Emotion and ACT UP's fight against AIDS*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Grandey, A. A., Diefendorff, J. M., & Rupp, D. E. (Eds.). (2013). *Emotional labor in the 21st century*. New York: Routledge.
- Gross, J. J., & Thompson, R. A. (2007). Emotion regulation: Conceptual foundations. In J. J. Gross (Ed.),



- Handbook of emotion regulation* (pp. 486–503). New York: Guilford.
- Halberstadt, A. G. (1986). Family socialization of emotional expression and nonverbal communication styles and skills. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 51, 827–836.
- Halberstadt, A. G., & Lozada, F. T. (2011). Emotion development in infancy through the lens of culture. *Emotion Review*, 3, 158–168.
- Hariri, A. R., & Forbes, E. E. (2007). Genetics of emotion regulation. In J. J. Gross (Ed.), *Handbook of emotion regulation* (pp. 110–132). New York: Guilford.
- Heise, D. R. (2007). *Expressive order: Confirming sentiments in social actions*. New York: Springer.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1975). The sociology of feelings and emotions. In M. Millman & R. Kanter (Eds.), *Another voice* (pp. 280–307). Garden City: Doubleday.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1979). Emotion work, feeling rules, and social structure. *American Journal of Sociology*, 85(3), 551–575.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1983). *The managed heart: Commercialization of human feeling*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hochschild, A. R., & Machung A. (1989). *The second shift*. New York: Viking Books.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1990). Ideology and emotion management: A perspective and path for future research. In T. D. Kemper (Ed.), *Research agendas in the sociology of emotions* (pp. 117–142). Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Hochschild, A. R. (2003). *The Commercialization of Intimate Life: Notes from Home and Work*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Hochschild, A. R. (2011). Emotional life on the market frontier. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 37, 21–33.
- Hutter, M. (1985). Symbolic interaction and the study of the family. *Studies in Symbolic Interaction*, (Suppl 1), 117–152.
- Illouz, E. (1997). *Consuming the romantic utopia: Love and the cultural contradictions of capitalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Izard, C., & Malatesta, C. (1987). Perspectives on emotional development: I. differential emotions theory of early emotional development. In J. Osofsky (Ed.), *Handbook of infant development* (pp. 494–554). New York: Wiley.
- James, W. (1890). *Principles of psychology*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Jasper, J. M. (1998). The emotions of protest: Affective and reactive emotions in and around social movements. *Sociological Forum*, 13(3), 397–424.
- Johnson, C. (1992). The emergence of the emotional self: A developmental theory. *Symbolic Interaction*, 15(2), 183–202.
- Kanter, R. M. (1977). *Work and family in the United States: A critical review and agenda for research and policy*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Kemper, T. D. (1978). *A social interactional theory of emotions*. New York: Wiley.
- Klimes-Dougan, B., Brand, A. E., Zahn-Waxler, C., Usher, B., Hastings, P. D., Kendziora, K., & Garside, R. B. (2007). Parental emotion socialization in adolescence: Differences in sex, age and problems status. *Social Development*, 16(2), 326–342.
- Kroska, A. (2003). Investigating gender differences in the meaning of household chores and child care. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 65, 456–473.
- Lareau, A. (2011). *Unequal childhoods: Class, race, and family life* (2nd ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Larsen, J. T., Berntson, G. G., Poehlmann, K. M., Tiffany, A. Ito, & Cacioppo, J. T. (2008). The psychophysiology of emotion. In M. Lewis, J. M. Haviland-Jones, & L. F. Barrett (Eds.), *The handbook of emotions* (Third Edition). New York: Guilford.
- Larson, R., & Richards, M. H. (1994). *Divergent realities: The emotional lives of mothers, fathers, and adolescents*. New York: Basic Books.
- Lasch, C. (1977). *Haven in a heartless world: The family besieged*. New York: Basic Books.
- Lau, A. S., Fung, J., Want, S. W., Kang, S. M. (2009). Explaining elevated social anxiety among Asian Americans: Emotional attunement and a cultural double bind. *Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology*, 15(1), 77–85.
- Lazarus, R. S. (1991). *Emotion and adaptation*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lazarus, R. S., & Folkman, S. (1984). *Stress, appraisal, and coping*. New York: Springer.
- Leavitt, R., & Power, M. B. (1989). Emotional socialization in the postmodern era: Children in day care. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 52(1), 35–43.
- Levenger, G. (1964). Task and social behavior in marriage. *Sociometry*, 27, 433–448.
- Lewis, M. (2007). Early emotional development. In A. Slater & M. Lewis (Eds.), *Introduction to infant development* (pp. 216–232). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lewis, M., Sullivan, M. W., Stanger, C., & Weiss, M. (1989). Self development and self-conscious emotions. *Child Development*, 60, 146–156.
- Lively, K. J. (2008). Emotional segues and the management of emotion by women and men. *Social Forces*, 87(2), 911–936.
- Lively, K. J. (2013). Social and cultural influencers: Gender effects on emotional labor at work and at home. In A. A. Grandey, J. M. Diefendorff, & D. E. Rupp (Eds.), *Emotional labor in the 21st century: Diverse perspectives on emotion regulation at work* (pp. 224–249). NY: Psychology Press/Routledge.
- Lively, K. J., & Heise, D. R. (2004). Sociological realms of emotional experience. *American Journal of Sociology*, 109(5), 1109–1136.
- Lizardo, O. (2004). The cognitive origins of bourdieu's habitus. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 34(4), 375–401.
- Lois, J. (2010). The temporal emotion work of motherhood: Homeschoolers' strategies for managing time shortage. *Gender and Society*, 24(4), 421–446.
- Lois, J. (2013). *Home is where the school is: The logic of homeschooling and the emotional labor of mothering*. New York: New York University Press.



- Lorde, A. (1984). Age, race, class, and sex: Women redefining difference. In *Sister outsider: Essays and speeches* (pp. 114–123). Berkeley: Crossing.
- Lovejoy, M. C., Graczyk, P. A., O'Hare, E., & Neuman, G. (2000). Maternal depression and parenting behavior: A meta-analytic review. *Clinical Psychology Review, 20*, 561–592.
- Lutz, C. A., & White, G. M. (1986). The anthropology of emotions. *Annual Review of Anthropology, 15*, 405–436.
- Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. *Psychological Review, 98*(2), 224–253.
- Matsumoto, D. (2006). Are cultural differences in emotion regulation mediated by personality traits? *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 37*(4), 421–437.
- Mauss, M. (1973). Techniques of the body. *Economy and Society, 2*(1), 70–88.
- Mead, G. H. (1909/1964). Social psychology as counterpart to physiological psychology. In A. J. Reck (Ed.), *Selected writings: George herbert mead* (pp. 94–104). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mead, G. H. (1934). *Mind, self, and society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mesquita, B., & Albert, D. (2007). The cultural regulation of emotion. In J. J. Gross (Ed.), *Handbook of emotion regulation* (pp. 486–503). New York: Guilford.
- Morelen, D., & Thomassin, K. (2013). Emotion socialization and ethnicity: An examination of practices and outcomes in African American, Asian American, and Latin American families. *Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine, 86*, 168–178.
- Nelson, J. A., O'Brien, M., Blankson, A. N., Calkins, S. D., & Keane, S. P. (2009). Family stress and parental responses to children's negative emotions: Tests of the spillover, crossover, and compensatory hypotheses. *Journal of Family Psychology, 23*(5), 671–679.
- Nowotny, H. (1981). Austria: Women in public life. In C. F. Epstein & R. L. Coser (Eds.), *Access to power: Cross-national studies of women and elites* (pp. 147–156). London: George Allen and Unwin.
- O'Brien, M. (2008). Gendered capital: Emotional capital and mothers' care work in education. *British Journal of Sociology of Education, 29*(2), 137–148.
- Oakley, A. (1974). *The sociology of housework*. New York: Random House.
- Parsons, T., & Bales, R. F. (1955). *Family, socialization and interaction process*. Glencoe: Free Press.
- Pearlin, L. I., Lieberman, M. A., Menaghan, E. G., & Mullan, J. T. (1981). The stress process. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 22*, 337–356.
- Peterson, G. (2006). Cultural theory and emotions. In J. E. Stets & J. H. Turner (Eds.), *Handbook on the sociology of emotions* (pp. 114–134). New York: Springer.
- Pfeffer, C. A. (2010). 'Women's work'? Women partners of transgender men doing housework and emotion work. *Journal of Marriage and Family, 72*, 165–183.
- Plutchik, R. (1980). *Emotion: A psychoevolutionary synthesis*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Plutchik, R. (2003). *Emotions and life: Perspectives from psychology, biology, and evolution*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Pollak, L. H., & Thoits, P. A. (1989). Processes in emotional socialization. *Social Psychology Quarterly, 52*(1), 22–34.
- Reay, D. (2000). A useful extension of Bourdieu's conceptual framework? Emotional capital as a way of understanding mothers' involvement in their children's education. *The Sociological Review, 48*, 568–585.
- Reay, D. (2004). Gendering Bourdieu's concepts of capitals? Emotional capital, women, and social class. *The Sociological Review, 52*, 57–74.
- Reed-Danahay, D. (2005). *Locating Bourdieu*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Rheingold, H. L. (1969). The social and socializing infant. In D. A. Goslin (Ed.), *Handbook of socialization theory and research* (pp. 779–790). Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Ridgeway, C. (2006). Expectations states theory and emotion. In J. H. Turner & J. E. Stets (Eds.), *Handbook of the sociology of emotions* (pp. 347–367). New York: Springer.
- Ridgeway, C. (2011). *Framed by gender: How gender inequality persists in the modern world*. NY: Oxford University Press.
- Risman, B. (2004). Gender as social structure: Theory wrestling with activism. *Gender and Society, 18*(4), 429–450.
- Rogers, K. B., & Kavanagh, L. (2010). Bridging emotion research: From biology to social structure. *Social Psychology Quarterly, 73*, 333–334.
- Rothbaum, F., Pott, M., Azuma, H., Mihake, K., & Weisz, J. (2000). The development of close relationships in Japan and the United States: Paths of symbiotic harmony and generative tension. *Child Development, 71*(5), 1121–1142.
- Saarni, C. (1999). *The development of emotional competence*. New York: Guilford.
- Schacter, S., & Singer, J. E. (1962). Cognitive, social and physiological determinants of emotional state. *Psychological Review, 69*, 379–399.
- Scheff, T. J. (1990). *Microsociology: Discourse, Emotion, and Social Structure*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Scheff, T. J. (2000). Shame and the social bond: A sociological theory. *Sociological Theory, 18*(1), 84–99.
- Schooler, C. (1996). Cultural and social-structural explanations of cross-national psychological differences. *Annual Review of Sociology, 22*, 323–349.
- Seery, B. L., & Crowley, M. S. (2000). Women's emotion work in the family: Relationship management and the process of building father-child relationships. *Journal of Family Issues, 21*(1), 100–127.
- Shelton, B. A., & John, D. (1996). The division of household labor. *Annual Review of Sociology, 22*, 299–322.
- Shields, S. A. (1995). The role of emotion beliefs and values in gender development. In N. Eisenberg (Ed.), *Review of personality and social psychology* (pp. 212–232). Thousand Oaks: Sage.

- Shott, S. (1979). Emotion and social life: A symbolic interactionist analysis. *American Journal of Sociology*, 84, 1317–1334.
- Simon, R. W. (2007). Contributions of the sociology of mental health for understanding the social antecedents, social regulation, and social distribution of emotion. In W. R. Avison, J. D. McLeod, & B. A. Pescosolido (Eds.), *Mental health, social mirror* (pp. 239–274). New York: Springer.
- Simon, R. W., & Nath, L. E. (2004). Gender and emotion in the United States: Do men and women differ in self-reports of feelings and expressive behavior? *American Journal of Sociology*, 109(5), 1137–1176.
- Smith, D. (1993). The standard North American family: SNAF as an ideological code. *Journal of Family Issues*, 14(1), 50–65.
- Smith, H. W., & Nomi, T. (2000). Is Amae the key to understanding Japanese culture? *Electronic Journal of Sociology*, 5, 1. <http://www.sociology.org/content/vol005.001/smith-nomi.html>. Accessed 18 Aug 2013.
- Smith-Lovin, L., & Winkelman, P. (2010). The social psychologies of emotion: A bridge that is not too far. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 73, 327–332.
- Stacey, C. L. (2011). *The caring self*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Stanley, H. M. (1895). *Studies in the evolutionary psychology of feeling*. New York: Macmillan.
- Stearns, C. Z., & Peter N. (1986). *Anger: The struggle for emotional control in America's history*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Stets, J. E. (2003). Emotions and sentiments. In J. Delamater *Handbook of social psychology* (pp. 309–335). New York: Kluwer/Plenum.
- Stevens, D., Kiger, G., & Riley, P. J. (2001). Working hard and hardly working: Domestic labor and marital satisfaction among dual-earner couples. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 63, 514–526.
- Stryker, S. (1959). Symbolic interaction as an approach to family research. *Marriage and Family Living*, 21, 111–119.
- Sullivan, M. W., & Lewis, M. (2003). Emotional expressions of young infants and children. *Infants and Young Children*, 16(2), 120–142.
- Thoits, P. A. (1996). Managing the emotions of others. *Symbolic Interaction*, 19(2), 85–109.
- Thoits, P. A. (2004). Emotion norms, emotion work, and the social order. In S. R. Manstead, N. Frijda, & A. Fischer (Eds.), *Feelings and emotions* (pp. 359–378). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Thoits, P. A. (2010). Stress and mental health: Major findings and policy implications. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 51(S), S41–S53.
- Thompson, R. A., & Meyer, S. (2007). Socialization of emotion regulation in the family. In J. J. Gross (Ed.), *Handbook of emotion regulation* (pp. 249–268). New York: Guilford.
- Tingey, H., Kiger, G., & Riley, P. J. (1996). Juggling multiple roles: perceptions of working mothers. *The Social Science Journal*, 33(2), 183–191.
- Trentacosta, C. J., & Fine, S. E. (2009). Emotion knowledge, social competence, and behavior problems in childhood and adolescence: A meta-analytic review. *Social Development*, 19, 1–29.
- Tronick, E. Z. (1989). Emotions and emotional communication in infants. *American Psychologist*, 44(2), 112–119.
- Turner, J. H. (2007). *Human emotions: A sociological theory*. New York: Routledge.
- Turner, J. H., & Stets, J. E. (2006). Moral emotions. In J. H. Turner & J. E. Stets (Eds.), *Handbook of the sociology of emotions* (pp. 544–566). New York: Springer.
- Twigg, J. E., McQuillan, J., & Ferree, M. M. (1999). Meaning and measurement: Reconceptualizing measures of the division of household labor. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 61, 712–724.
- Von Scheve, C., & Luede, R. V. (2005). Emotion and social structures: Towards an interdisciplinary approach. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 35, 303–328.
- Wallace, D. M. (2007). 'It's a M-A-N Thang: Black male gender role socialization and the performance of masculinity in love relationships. *The Journal of Pan African Studies*, 7(1), 11–22.
- Ward, L. G., & Throop, R. (1992). Emotional experience in Dewey and Mead: Notes for the social psychology of emotion. *Social Perspectives on Emotion*, 1, 61–94.
- Wharton, A. S., & Erickson, R. J. (1993). Managing emotions on the job and at home: Understanding the consequences of multiple emotional roles. *Academy of Management Review*, 38(3), 457–486.
- Zahn-Waxler, C. (2010). Socialization of emotion: Who influences whom and how? *New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development*, 128, 101–109.
- Zahn-Waxler, C., & Radke-Yarrow, M. (1990). The origins of empathic concern. *Motivation and Emotion*, 14(2), 107–130.
- Zahn-Waxler C., Iannotti, R. J., Cummings, M. E., & Denham, S. (1990). Antecedents of problem behaviors in children of depressed mothers. *Development and Psychopathology*, 2, 271–291.

Amy C. Wilkins and Jennifer A. Pace

---

## 18.1 Introduction

Emotions are central to inequalities. As Schwalbe et al. (2000, p. 434) write, “sustaining a system of inequality, one that generates destabilizing feelings of anger, resentment, sympathy, and despair, requires that emotions be managed.” Yet emotions have not been central to class and race scholarship, while emotions scholarship itself has only begun to examine how race and class affect the distribution and experience of emotions, and how emotions themselves might contribute to race and class inequalities. Despite a longstanding interest in the relationship between emotions and inequality, empirical research on emotions has focused almost exclusively on gender.

Like other social psychological research, research on emotions tends to assume that the experiences of middle class white people are generic, and can thus be extended to understand the experiences of people with different class or race statuses. Similarly, whiteness and middle classness tend to be treated as neutral, as if race is inconsequential to the experience of whiteness and class is inconsequential to the experience of being middle class. Mirchandani (2003) argues that class and race are not just variables effecting gendered processes, but may transform the experience and meaning of gen-

dered emotions in ways that challenge presuppositions about the relationship between gender and emotions (see also Wilkins 2012a). Race and class thus remain both underexamined empirically and undertheorized in the emotions literature. Moreover, inasmuch as scholarship focuses on race and emotions, it tends to address the experiences of African Americans. We know much less about emotions in other racialized groups.

Adding to the complexity, class and race entangle in both the American imagination and in scholarship. Because class and race hierarchies often overlap, laypeople and academics alike often assume that white people are also middle class, and that black people (and, often, Latino/as) are always class-disadvantaged (a term we use throughout to describe both the poor and the working class) (Ortner 1989). (Other ethnic and racial groups are often simply invisible). Because overlapping hierarchies can make it difficult to disentangle class and race processes, we will show that places where they do not overlap (e.g., poor and working class whites, middle class blacks) can often shed light on how class and race operate as distinct, yet mutually constitutive, processes. In this review, we weave together the existing emotions literature addressing race and class with other scholarship on race and class inequalities to generate some starting points for a more robust sociology of race, class, and emotions.

---

A. C. Wilkins (✉) · J. A. Pace  
University of Colorado, Boulder, USA  
e-mail: Amy.Wilkins@colorado.edu

### 18.1.1 Chapter Overview

In the first section, we draw heavily on literature from the scholarship on mental health to examine the impact of class and race disparities on the distribution of emotions. Unsurprisingly, class and race disadvantages have deleterious effects on emotional wellbeing, but these effects are not always parallel, raising questions about the social and cultural influences that might mediate the effect of disadvantage on emotions. In the second section, we begin to examine how social and cultural influences associated with class and race shape emotions. We begin with childhood, asking how differently situated people develop dissimilar emotional habits that both prepare them to cope with the conditions they will face in adulthood, and contribute to the reproduction of those conditions. Emotional socialization continues in adulthood. Processes of emotional socialization do not just inculcate emotional skills, but, as we discuss in the third section, tie emotions to identities. People learn to believe that race and class shape people's emotional natures, and use these beliefs to create emotional expectations for themselves and others. In this section, we also examine the emotional contradictions that can emerge because people occupy multiple social locations.

In the fourth section, we examine emotions in the workplace, focusing especially on the well-studied concept of "emotional labor"—the work that people do to manage their own and others' emotions at work. While the literature on emotional labor has focused primarily on gender, we attend to the class and racial dimensions of these processes, paying particular attention to the ways emotional labor reflects and sustains class and race workplace inequalities. Each of these issues sheds light on how race and class differences in emotions are experienced and reproduced in everyday life. Finally, we examine emotional hierarchies, looking at how people come to see some emotions as better than others and the wrong emotions as a reason for disadvantage, and to impose their emotional standards on others. We also examine the role of emotions in mediating

interactions between class and race disparate people. Emotions, then, are central to sustaining, justifying, and making manageable class and race hierarchies.

---

## 18.2 The Distribution of Emotions

Do class and race affect the likelihood of experiencing negative (or positive) emotions? In this section, we examine the classed and raced distribution of emotions, charting the emotional consequences of inequality for disadvantaged populations in the U.S.. As we explain, socioeconomic disadvantage seems to have a negative effect on emotional wellbeing, but racial disadvantage affects emotions in more contradictory ways.

Emotions scholars offer a number of explanations for the unequal distribution of emotions. First, bad experiences cause bad emotions. Disadvantaged people experience both more chronic and more episodic stressors that prompt negative feelings (Turner et al 1995). Second, class-disadvantaged people tend to have fewer effective coping mechanisms and less supportive emotional networks, and are consequently less able to buffer themselves from the emotional costs of difficult life conditions (McLeod and Kessler 1990; Thoits 1989). Third, class-disadvantaged people are also more likely to have their social status or power reduced in interaction. Kemper (1978, 1990) argues that people experience bad feelings in interactions where they do not receive emotional deference. Social disadvantage leads to a large number of such interactions, and thus likely contributes to higher rates of bad feelings among the socially disadvantaged. Fourth, class-disadvantaged people are also more likely to experience situations in which their social identities fail to be confirmed—in which others do not see them as they see (or wish to see) themselves. Such interactions also lead to bad feelings (Heise 1979; Smith-Lovin 1990). These theories, however, do not adequately explain why class and racial disadvantage do not seem to impact emotions in the same ways.

### 18.2.1 Socioeconomic inequality

Abundant research shows that people with less education, lower family income, and lower status occupations are more likely to experience mild to severe emotional distress (Kessler and Cleary 1980; Simon 2007; Yu and Williams 1999). Although positive emotions have been less well studied, emerging research in the area of “happiness studies” also suggest that social advantage is associated with good feelings. For example, using General Social Survey data since 1972, Easterlin (2001) finds that white people tend to report more happiness throughout the life course than black people do, and that better educated people report more happiness than less educated people. Some researchers argue that there is no relationship between income and subjective well-being (measured as life satisfaction plus positive affect), but others argue that wealth can buy happiness—both by facilitating better health and providing resources to solve episodic problems. Thus, the literatures on both mental health and happiness indicate that inequality in the distribution of other kinds of social goods can also lead to inequality in the distribution of emotions. But, as we’ll show, the relationship between inequalities and emotions does not always work in uniform ways.

Qualitative studies provide further insights into the emotional costs of socioeconomic disadvantage. Classic ethnographies document “hidden injuries of class” (Sennett and Cobb 1972) and “worlds of pain” (Rubin 1992 [1976]) in the lives of working class families. Working class pain does not just result from the difficulties entailed in sustaining families in the face of persistent resource limitations, but also from the shame and stigma that arise when one is unable to meet the cultural and institutional norms of the middle class. Scheff (2001, p. 1) defines shame as “a class name for a large family of emotions and feelings that arise through seeing self negatively, *even if only slightly negatively*, through the eyes of others, or even for only anticipating such a reaction.” He thus sees it as a routine emotion, rather than one that arises in a crisis, experienced in everyday life by working class people when

they fail to meet the normative standards of the middle class.

Many aspects of class disadvantage may engender shame. In the contemporary U.S., occupational achievement and the ability to meet the consumer standards of the middle class define one’s right to self-worth and dignity. Because the myth of meritocracy holds individuals accountable for economic mobility and success, and because gender norms expect men to be family breadwinners, poor and working class men often feel shame (Rubin 1976; Sennett and Cobb 1972). Low-income working mothers and their children experience shame in the judgments of institutional actors (such as teachers) who often deem them deficient because of their inability to achieve middle class standards of family care in the face of inflexible working conditions—though they may also experience pride in their ability to shoulder the burden (Dodson and Luttrell 2011). Because raising “successful” children means fostering upward class mobility (in the face of overwhelming class reproduction), working class parents more often experience “heartache” when their children do not meet these expectations (Lareau 2011), or become a source of shame—a “warning,” rather than a model—for their children who do (Sennett and Cobb 1972). Although less frequently studied, children also experience shame from class-disadvantage. Nenga (2003) finds that working class women recall girlhood shame from violating peers’ clothing norms. This shame arose both from not having the resources to dress like their peers *and* from not having middle class knowledge of how they were expected to dress.

Scheff (2001) argues that people often hide their shame, because admitting shame causes embarrassment. Hidden shame, in turn, leads to anger; angry reactions further threaten social bonds, prompting more shame. He calls this dynamic a “shame/anger spiral.” In Sennett and Cobb’s research, working class men responded to their shame by hiding it: through withdrawal and silence. Rios (2011) similarly finds that persistent criminalization induces shame in poor black and Latino boys, who then must repress these feelings in order to maintain a “tough” front. This dynamic leads to emotional alienation, caus-



ing them to internalize the idea that they deserve poor treatment and to respond by engaging in “crimes of resistance,” which further entangle them in the criminal justice system.

Class-disadvantaged people may also combat shame and reclaim a sense of dignity and self-worth by adjusting their comportment to make it better fit dominant expectations, by redefining worthy behavior, or by distancing themselves from shameful class behavior by attributing it to others. For example, Skeggs (1997) finds that working class British women attempt to manage feelings of shame by “getting things right.” Mobile home residents resist the shame of seeing themselves as “trailer park trash” by drawing on the emotional codes in broader cultural stories, expressing pride, for example, in homeownership, or presenting their current circumstances as a launching pad for upward mobility (Kusenbach and Loseke 2013). Sometimes, people deflect stigma through what Schwalbe et al. (2000) call “defensive othering”—in which they accept the stigma associated with a particular identity, but portray themselves as exceptions (e.g., Kusenbach 2009). Other times, they claim dignity by drawing moral boundaries between themselves and others (Lamont 2002). For example, white working class men distinguish themselves from others whom they see as working less hard, while black working class men portray themselves as more caring than white working class men (Lamont 2002).

Purser (2009) shows how two groups of Latino day laborers each reclaim dignity by defining the other group as feminine. Purser emphasized the importance of gender in dignity claims; being dignified entails being adequate *men*. The emotion work entailed in managing stigmatized identities and alleviating shame, however, is not always successful. For example, class peers may counter claims to dignity because exceptions to the rule can undermine emotional coping methods: as Newman and Ellis (1999, p. 157) write, “Keeping everyone down prevents any particular person from feeling that creeping sense of despair that comes from believing things could be otherwise but aren’t.” In addition, inequalities in emotional and other resources make it more dif-

ficult for disadvantaged people to manage their identities, and thus does not successfully alleviate emotional pain (Snow and Anderson 1987).

### 18.2.2 Race

Theories about the social causes of negative emotions would lead us to suspect that racially marginalized people would experience more anger, anxiety, frustration, sadness, shame, and humiliation than racially dominant (white) people. Because class and race hierarchies often overlap, racially marginalized people are also often socioeconomically disadvantaged, suggesting that emotional stress would be compounded for members of racially marginalized groups. Moreover, racism itself is a source of chronic stress. However, the existing literature, while slim, suggests a more complicated relationship between race and emotions, at least for African Americans. While chronic stress compromises the *physical* health of African Americans, the relationship between chronic stress and African American *mental* health is less clear (Simon 2007). Some studies have found that black people report higher levels of distress and anger/hostility than non-blacks (Jackson et al 2010; Taylor and Risman 2006), while other studies find that black Americans report lower rates of anxiety and depressive disorders (Turner and Gil 2002; Williams and Harris-Reid 1999), and do not feel or express more anger (Mabry and Kiecolt 2005), than white people. Moreover, class does not seem to moderate the emotionally stressful effects of racism for black people in the ways we might expect.

On the one hand, consistent with the literature on socioeconomic disadvantage, a number of scholars argue that perceptions of racism increase levels of stress and depression (Beauboeuf-Lafontant 2007; Taylor and Turner 2002; Mossakowski 2007) and feelings of anger and hostility (Simons et al 2006; Brown 2003; Thomas and Gonzalez-Prendes 2009). Stressful and oppressive daily interactions (including what some critical race scholars call “microaggressions”) engender experiences of disrespect, blocked opportunities and devaluation. Such

treatment can invoke feelings of anger and hostility (Thomas and Gonzalez-Prendes 2009; Brown 2003). Moreover, cumulative exposure to racist experiences may increase the propensity of racism to engender negative emotional reactions. For example, people who immigrate to the United States at earlier ages report higher levels of depression and psychological distress, suggesting that the longer the time ethnic immigrants spend in racist US culture (and the longer they spend cultivating U.S. based identities), the more discrimination leads to emotional problems (Mossakowski 2007).

Disruptive emotions like anger cannot be maintained for prolonged periods (Stets and Tsushima 2001). Because of this, some scholars argue that the need to manage anger creates a cyclical relationship between feelings of anger and feelings of powerlessness (Beauboeuf-Lafontant 2007; Thomas and Gonzales-Prendes 2009) that causes serious depression (Brown 2003; Elliot et al 2005; Ryff et al 2003), or that has mental health effects that extend beyond depression to include nihilistic tendencies, anti-self issues (a poor self-concept due to dislike of one's racial group), delusional denial tendencies and extreme racial paranoia (Brown 2003). Self-perceptions of 'mattering' (or believing that one makes a difference in the lives of others) strongly influence self-esteem, such that feelings of not mattering and being of no social value can result in large spikes in suicidal ideation (Elliott et al 2005). In a study of Mexican-Americans and African Americans, Ryff et al. (2003) found that in the face of race-related adversity, perceptions of discrimination resulted in decreased feelings of eudaimonic well-being (a sense of flourishing) and negative feelings about one's life and self.

In addition, socioeconomic advantage does not always alleviate the triggers that cause negative emotions for African Americans. Instead, as journalist Cose (2009) notes, middle class African Americans may be especially likely to experience rage. As a number of studies have noted, class status does not buffer African American exposure to racist incidents (Anderson 2011; Lacy 2007), nor does it eliminate racial barriers to achievement, occupational mobility, and resi-

dential integration (Anderson 2011; Cose 2009). Indeed, middle class black people may be subject to settings and experiences that increase their exposure to stress and discrimination. For example, a 2003 study found that middle class black people faced distinct forms of workplace stress and psychological distress, including tokenization and social rejection and isolation (Jackson and Stewart 2003; also Wingfield 2010).

Although not all scholars find that middle class African Americans report negative feelings (Hughey 2008; Wilkins 2012a), studies of the black middle class offer a useful vantage on the ways experiences of racism contribute to negative emotions independent of socioeconomic stress. Cose (2009) argues that black middle class rage originates in the discrepancy between the promise of upward mobility and the reality of continued racial discrimination. And as Anderson (2011) suggests, the experience of having class identities repeatedly disconfirmed prompts bad feelings—anger, distrust, and resignation—in many middle class black people.

Other studies, however, find that black people experience *less* anger and anxiety than white people do (Turner and Gil 2002; Williams and Harris-Reid 1999). Mabry and Kiecolt (2005) find that, although African Americans have a lower sense of control and are more mistrustful than whites, they nonetheless report lower levels of anger. They argue that race mediates the relationship between eliciting states and anger: while mistrust leads white people to feel angry, it does not in African Americans. Conversely, incremental increases in sense of control reduce feelings of anger for black people more than for white people. Despite inconsistencies in the findings across these studies, they all point to the importance of *perceptions* of race and racism in shaping feelings.

Some scholars hypothesize that African Americans may report fewer negative emotions because they are embedded in strong networks of support (Simon 2007). The company of sympathetic co-ethnics can provide a space in which black people may ventilate their anger over racist treatment (Lacy 2007). These networks may also provide emotionally protective resources. Just as

reclaiming dignity and self-worth can help the class-disadvantaged cope with shame, racial and ethnic pride may provide emotional shields. Identification with ethnic or minority status decreases depression among US born Mexican-Americans and African Americans, although depression rates increase with more exposure to racism (Ryff et al 2003). For Filipino immigrants, close emotional connections to ethnic identities seem to serve as a buffer against negative emotional responses to discrimination (Mossakowski 2007). Strong ethnic ties lessen discrimination-precipitated depression in Southeast Asian refugees living in North America (Noh et al 1999). Thus, positive feelings about one's identity can lessen the negative emotional impact of racism, and can even, as Lacy (2007) argues, be a source of pleasure.

Undoubtedly, social and economic disadvantages are hard on people's emotions. Disadvantage makes everyday life more difficult, amplifies bad treatment from others, leads to more loss and fewer resources to solve problems, and marginalizes people. It is no surprise, then, that disadvantaged people, on average, have more mental health problems and more bad feelings. These bad feelings, in turn, can sometimes perpetuate disadvantages, by undermining successful coping skills. But bad feelings are not an inevitable outcome of bad experiences: indeed, class and race disadvantages do not seem to effect emotions in identical ways. These differences suggest that other social and cultural processes mediate the relationships between conditions and emotions.

---

## 18.3 Learning Emotional Habits

Social conditions and institutions engender emotional responses, but not in straightforward ways. Instead, cultural processes mediate how people respond to the circumstances they face by shaping how people think about and give meaning to social conditions, the strategies they use to respond to negative experiences, and their expectations about the emotional habits of different kinds of people. Scholars working in the tradition of Hochschild argue that emotions are not inevita-

ble responses to specific eliciting conditions but are learned and produced. People learn "feeling rules" about situationally-appropriate emotions; do "emotion work" to produce, contain, or transform emotions in self and others; give meaning to particular emotions; and use emotions strategically to achieve particular ends.

Feeling rules vary cross-culturally, but they also vary within cultures. Class and race effect the ways differently situated people learn to experience and display emotions. In this section, we examine the processes through which people learn culturally-specific ways to respond to eliciting states and to display emotions, before turning to emerging research on the links between emotions and racial identities. These processes mediate the emotional impact of class and race conditions by instilling ways of thinking about everyday experiences, rules about appropriate emotional responses, and skills for responding to them.

### 18.3.1 Class

Parents are key agents in the socialization of children. In addition to the other things they teach their children, parents train their children in how to feel and express their emotions. These lessons are not generally explicit, but instead are embedded in other components of family life. As parents discipline, reward, and interact with their children, they impart expectations for emotional comportment and provide opportunities to practice culturally appropriate emotional habits.

Social class influences the ways parents integrate emotional patterns into interactions with their children, and the specific emotions they elicit and reward. These practices, in turn, instill class-based emotional habits that children carry into adulthood. Middle class parents encourage emotional monitoring by emphasizing feelings and intentions as the basis for discipline. Middle class children learn to reflect on their own and others' feelings, and to use these reflections as the basis for emotional and behavioral modifications. Through this process, they internalize their parents' emotional standards, practice strate-

gies of emotional restraint, and become skilled at using emotional displays to manipulate outcomes. In contrast, working class parents use a more authoritarian parenting style that emphasizes external control and deference to authority. Rather than learning to transform emotions to align with parental expectations, working class children learn to suppress emotions to obey authority. These socialization processes, as we discuss in the section on work, train children for class-differentiated employment by instilling children with different emotional dispositions (Hochschild 1983; see also Lareau 2003).

Parents do not just provide emotional training but also use their own emotions to influence children's outcomes. Reay (2000) argues that mothers pass emotional resources onto their children through "processes of parental involvement" (569). She conceptualizes maternal involvement as "emotional capital." For Reay, emotional capital refers not to the emotional skills children learn in the home but to the emotions mothers expend on behalf of their children, and the ways in which those emotions aid the accumulation of other forms of capital. In this usage, emotional capital is not tied neatly to class distinctions: working class and middle class mothers both invest emotionally in their children; some class-disadvantaged mothers may be more emotionally skilled than some middle class mothers and maternal emotional investment may have uneven or contradictory emotional effects. For example, a middle class mother's emotional investment in her child's education may cause anxiety, reducing educational performance.

Nonetheless, class matters. First, because economic deprivation requires energy to be directed toward survival, poor mothers have less surplus emotional energy to invest in their children. Second, class shapes mothers' definitions of happiness. In her study, working class mothers were concerned with *present* happiness or emotional wellbeing, while middle class mothers focused on *future* happiness, which they linked to professional success in adulthood. These different emotional priorities shape the kinds of investments mothers make in their children. Third, "middle class emotional investments in education gener-

ate higher, more secure returns for the same level of investment compared to that of working-class parents for whom any level of emotional investment is relatively risky and insecure" (582). Thus, other kinds of class resources make emotional capital more or less effective.

Children do not just develop emotional habits from parental socialization, but, also from everyday lived experiences. Nenga (2003, p. 171) argues that shared class experiences in childhood lead to common emotional responses or "structures of feeling" ("expressed through individual class subjectivities.") Her view builds on Bourdieu's (1984) notion that social class shapes life experiences and perspectives, producing shared ways of being in the world, including common feelings. Structures of feeling originate in common class experiences, and become embedded in perceptions about what it means to be working or middle class. For example, in her study, middle class women were more likely to describe disgust when encountering a food associated with class or ethnic outsiders, while working class women were more likely to report positive emotions about new foods, such as pleasure or surprise. Nenga attributes these patterned emotional responses to ideas about the meaning of social class differences, in which eating foods associated with higher status can be seen as a treat, while foods associated with lower status are stigmatized as dirty or gross. Shared class experiences lead to shared structures of feeling not just because people encounter similar conditions but because they encounter collective meanings about the status of those conditions.

Like other forms of capital, emotional socialization is implicated in processes that put children on different class trajectories. She does not specifically theorize emotional socialization, but Lareau's (2003) research on parenting styles provides insights into the cumulative processes that lead to the "transmission of differential advantage." Like the researchers above, Lareau argues that parenting styles diverge dramatically by class. The style practiced by middle class parents, "concerted cultivation," inculcates cultural capital that corresponds with institutional expectations. Thus, when middle class children

enter kindergarten, they have already learned to handle peer conflict and to interact with adults in ways that educator's value. Because these children are likely to respond in ways that conform to teachers' emotional expectations, teachers are more likely to see them as having potential, and to reward them accordingly. These dynamics, in turn, facilitate their educational success. The parenting style valued by more authoritarian working class and poor parents encourages children to solve their own problems and to defer to authority. These skills, however, are unrecognized by teachers but are seen instead as evidence of (children's and parents') incompetence, leading teachers to evaluate class-disadvantaged youth as less promising and to track them accordingly.

Thus, childhood provides emotional foundations that set the stage for different emotional habits in adulthood. The emotional skills associated with class status confer advantages on middle class children, not because their emotions are necessarily more socially desirable (indeed, Lareau critiques middle class parenting for cultivating a sense of entitlement in their children), but because they incur more institutional rewards. These findings suggest that providing opportunities for training in middle class emotional habits could ameliorate some aspects of social disadvantage and facilitate upward mobility, but, as Froyum (2010) argues, the relationship between emotional habits and race complicates that assumption.

### 18.3.2 Race

Lareau (2003) finds that class conditions parenting practices more than race. That is, black middle class parenting looks more like white middle class parenting than like black working class parenting. But, as race scholars note, racially marginalized parents must also prepare their children to deal with a racist society. Thus, in addition to more general emotional skills, parents of color instill specific emotional skills aimed at coping with the various effects of racism (Hill 2005). Although empirical research on racial socialization of emotions is scant, the broader race scholarship

suggests that emotional socialization about race is often explicit, at least among African Americans.

For example, in their 2000 review, McLoyd et al. find that African American parents are more likely than other parents of color to provide specific messages about racial prejudice to their children, probably because of the high degree of racism this group still encounters (Mexican Americans are somewhat more likely to discuss racial prejudice with their children than Japanese Americans.) Black parents train their children to navigate white settings in ways that will not only minimize the emotional toll of racism but that will also minimize white perceptions that black children (and adults) are defiant, angry, or uppity. The specific strategies black adults use vary, however. Rather than focusing primarily on prejudice, some parents emphasize racial pride aimed at countering negative messages about black people (McLoyd et al. 2000). Simons et al (2006) identify a style of parenting they label 'supportive parenting' which teaches young black boys, in particular, how to manage and restrain feelings of anger and hostility. 'Supportive parenting' teaches racialized children to disconnect discrimination from angry responses, and to manage any anger in ways that do not result in violence. Lefever (1981) describes how the cultural practice of "the dozens," in which black boys and men ritually trade insults, teaches black boys to retain emotional control in the face of racist assaults.

Other adults teach strategies of emotional deference to white authority, hoping to smooth black children's interactions in white institutions (Ferguson 2000; Kaplan 1997; Morris 2007; Tyson 2003). Froyum (2010) observes that these different approaches seem to be linked to class; black adults who have newly experienced entrance into the middle class or are worried about maintaining middle class status are more likely to teach deference (Brown and Lesane-Brown 2006; Hill 2005). She argues that socialization in emotional deference can be counterproductive, as it undermines the racial pride (discussed in the section on emotional disparities) that is an important source of emotional resilience (Froyum 2010).



Emotional socialization continues in adulthood. While most studies of emotional cultures do not examine race or class, Hughey (2008) shows that the emotional culture of black Greek virtual communities teaches its class privileged members how to talk about race and emotions. By telling and endorsing “struggle and success” stories, black Greeks socialize members to deemphasize anger over racial obstacles, focusing instead on the ability to *overcome* racism. Wilkins (2012a) also finds that black college men teach each other to *not see*, or redefine, everyday incidents of racism as a strategy for achieving positive, restrained feelings about campus life. By discounting the importance of everyday racism, black college men did not need to restrain their anger, but instead avoided feeling it in the first place. This emotional strategy allows them to cultivate good relationships with white peers, but jeopardizes both their ability to perceive racial obstacles to their future success and their ability to create racial alliances with black women. Jackson and Wingfield (2013) find that black college men in a collegiate service organization strategically deploy anger at each other to enforce front-stage performances of black respectability. These studies reveal that racialized emotion strategies, at least among class-privileged African Americans, often begin with cognitive processes that teach people how to interpret their life conditions, entail ongoing efforts at emotional socialization, and are aimed at managing public images of black masculinity.

Research on emotional socialization reveals one way in which class and race expectations mediate the emotional implications of race and class conditions. As with other areas of emotion research, the literatures on class and race socialization are not parallel, but they both suggest that class and race differences in parenting practices instill distinct emotional competencies in children, and that these emotional competencies differentially groom children for adult life. Shared emotional cultures prepare people for the emotional expectations of adulthood, providing them with class and, perhaps, race differentiated emotional skills and habits. By teaching people how to think about and give meaning to everyday

experiences, socialization shapes how people respond to the conditions they encounter.

---

## 18.4 Emotions in Identities

Another avenue through which people shape their emotions is identity work. According to identity theory (Burke and Stets 2009), people use existing social categories to develop identities. By placing themselves and others into existing social categories, people hold themselves and others accountable to ideas about how members of that category should behave. Identity work refers to the individual and collective efforts people engage in to give meaning to those social categories (Schrock and Schwalbe 1996). In contemporary society, class and race are omnirelevant social categories, and are central to identities, and thus, emotions (West and Zimmerman 1996). Identities influence how people experience and express emotions because they communicate expectations about how certain types of people *should* feel. People use ideas about different emotional natures (whether they think those “natures” are biological or cultural) to create ideas about what kinds of people they (and others) are, and how “people like us” should feel. Emotional stereotypes create identity templates people use to evaluate their own emotional responses. Rather than asking, *is this how a person should feel?*, they ask, in effect, *is this how a person like me should feel?* The link between emotions and identities may emerge from shared class experiences that become lodged in class subjectivities, as Nenga (2003) argued (discussed above), or it may be produced through collective identity work aimed at creating collective identities, as Wilkins (2008a, b, 2012a, b, c) argues in a series of work.

The broader emotions literature provides a number of examples of emotions as components of collective identity and belonging, but this perspective has not been well extended to understand the race and class dimensions of emotional experiences. Yet, emotions are important components of race and class stereotypes; these stereotypes constitute cultural building blocks out of which

people craft ideas about what they and others are like. Wilkins (2012b) shows how black women use the image of the (emotionally) strong black woman to create collective racialized gender identities in the context of predominantly white colleges. By telling stories about interracial relationships in which they “talk back” to black men and white women, black women adopt a persona of anger and emotional strength. They also produce shared feelings about relationships between black men and white women, and identify those feelings as central to what it means to be a ‘real’ black woman. Their collective storytelling elides individual differences in emotional orientations and displays, perpetuating the idea that all black women are emotionally strong. The black women in her study view emotional strength as a positive attribute, but they also recognize its burdens, bristling in particular against the stereotype that they are always angry. This example shows how people can lean on racialized emotional expectations to create feelings of connection in the absence of shared experiences.

Emotional stereotypes thus create opportunities for connection and belonging, but they can also have emotional costs when people feel they have to live up to constrictive emotional expectations in order to be authentic members of racial groups. For example, Beaufboeuf-Lafontant (2007) finds that expectations that black women should be independent and exhibit “strength” normalize high levels of emotional stress and constrain their ability to seek help to cope with bad feelings, resulting in feelings of powerlessness, selflessness, and depression. Lu and Wong (2013) similarly find that expectations that they be emotionally tough are emotionally stressful to Asian American men, making it difficult for them to seek help, in part, because they do not want to challenge others’ views of them as emotionally strong. These findings suggest one way that racial identities may mediate the link between social disadvantage and negative emotions, leading black women, for example, to report fewer bad feelings but experience worse physical health.

People do not always attempt to comply with emotional stereotypes to fashion identities, however. Sometimes, they resist stereotypes, insisting

that their emotions do not comply with racialized expectations. For example, Wilkins (2012b, c) found that black college men resisted the stereotype of “the angry black” by teaching each other strategies for achieving emotional restraint in the face of everyday racism (2012b), and defied stereotypes of black men as sexually predatory and uncaring by emphasizing feelings of romantic intimacy (2012c). Black college women’s (2012b) and men’s (2012a, c) different responses to racialized emotional stereotypes are likely due, in part, to gendered differences in experiences of racism. Some research finds more tolerance in dominant settings for black women’s displays of anger than black men’s (e.g., Wingfield 2009). Accordingly, black men may need to cultivate more stringent strategies of emotional restraint, at least within predominantly white spaces.

In the examples above, black people use explicitly racialized (and gendered) ideas about emotions to create individual and collective identities, either by cultivating or resisting these ideas. White people may make more implicit links between race, emotions, and identity. In her comparative ethnography of three young adult subcultures, Wilkins (2008a) shows how young people use emotions to create identities that were *implicitly* linked to their shared locations as white people. Because whiteness is often an invisible, or taken for granted, component of identity (Frankenberg 1993), it makes sense that white young adults would not explicitly articulate the racial component of their emotional distinctions. Yet, Wilkins finds that each group of white young people uses emotional distinctions to achieve their identities and to position themselves relative to “mainstream” emotional expectations. “Puerto Rican Wannabes” (white women involved in intimate relationships with black and Latino men) have “attitude”: they openly express anger and aggression. Goths reject the “fetishized happiness” they associate with the white middle class by cultivating melancholy and comfort with the macabre. Christians claim to be “happier” than other people.

Each emotional style is a way of claiming subcultural authenticity, but it is also a means of managing dominant emotional expectations.

Attitude allows Wannabes emotional expression outside the bounds of expectations that middle class white young women be passive, deferential, and nice. Goth darkness allows the expression of socially undesirable emotions such as extreme pain and sadness. Happiness proves the moral “rightness” of Christianity, and provides a clear set of behavioral expectations for Christians. Together, these cases suggest that emotions can create and mark racialized identities even when race remains unstated. Moreover, they demonstrate that people can link a range of (sometimes opposite) emotional norms to whiteness. Yet, despite their differences, each group built on dominant emotional assumptions, and used their emotional norms to see themselves as morally superior. At the same time, they sometimes used emotions to resist constricting racial identity expectations. For example, Puerto Rican Wannabes used both interracial intimacy (romantic emotions for the “wrong” type of man) and “attitude” to resist expectations that white women be nice, pure, and safe. Although white people are often featured in emotions scholarship, much more research is needed to uncover the racialized components of white people’s emotional experiences and strategies.

Because people occupy multiple identities (as raced, classed, and gendered), they may encounter contradictory emotional expectations. As simultaneously raced, classed, *and* gendered people, people face conflicting expectations about emotional displays. These contradictions likely complicate their efforts to comply with emotional expectations. For example, masculinities scholarship has identified emotional control as central to notions of masculinity and a key feature of men’s power (Schrock and Schwalbe 2009), but class and race disadvantaged men often find themselves in circumstances where they have to accept being ordered around by others.

Some scholars argue that race- and class-subordinated men “compensate” for their low status by exaggerating emotions associated with masculinity, for example by enacting aggressive emotions in other contexts (Ezzell 2012; Schrock and Schwalbe 2009). Ezzell (2012) describes how therapeutic modalities in a substance abuse treat-

ment facility encourage marginalized men to engage in horizontal aggression. These expressions of aggression compensate poor and black men for their institutional and social disempowerment by allowing them to control others (by making other men angry) and to practice emotional control (by refusing to get angry themselves). But by channeling their anger toward each other, they leave unexamined the institution’s power and the broader social structures that disadvantage them.

Class and race disadvantages do not always lead men to compensate by exaggerating “masculine” emotions. For example, in a study examining the emotional costs of transnational migration, Montes (2013) identified an increase in caring emotions on the part of poor Guatemalan men. Declines in circular migration require poor Guatemalan families to say permanent good-byes to family members. She argues that these conditions push Guatemalan men to examine and change their relationships with children and other family members, prompting them to display more nurturing and expressive, less aggressive, emotions.

Comfort (2008) also found that incarcerated men (who were usually poor and often of color) displayed more caring emotions toward their female partners, at least while they were incarcerated. She argues that, in the context of prison, men relied on emotive displays typically associated with femininity to keep their female partners involved in the relationship. Thus, the inability to meet masculine emotional expectations may constrict men’s emotional expression, pushing them to be emotionally harder, but it may also expand it, encouraging them to enact previously unavailable emotional displays. More research is needed on the factors that create different emotional trajectories among similarly-situated men.

Emerging research on emotions in race and class identities reveals that emotions do not just emerge from raced and classed experiences, but are central to ideas about who people are and how they are expected to feel and react. Emotional expectations can create a sense of authenticity and belonging, but they can also be constrictive, costly or conflicting. Class and race conditions may also make it difficult for some people to achieve

emotional expectations associated with gender. Efforts to fulfill emotional expectations associated with specific racial (and other) identities can undermine wellbeing by prompting people to engage in harmful behavior. On the other hand, the inability to live up to expectations sometimes creates openings for new, potentially positive emotional repertoires.

## 18.5 Emotions in the Workplace

Both social class and race strongly effect who works, at what kinds of jobs, and doing what kind of work; the availability and conditions of employment, in turn, have a big impact on how people feel, spilling over into other dimensions of one's life (Barnett 1994). Yet emotions are also a form of labor demanded and directed by employers. Especially under conditions of late capitalism's service economy, workers are expected to create and express specific emotions, and to create particular emotions in clients and customers. Hochschild (1979) calls these expectations, which often require workers to suppress or alter other feelings, emotional labor.

A major stream of research on emotions examines emotional labor in the workplace. Workplace emotions are an important dimension of social hierarchies. Occupational hierarchies contribute to class and race patterns in the distribution of emotional experiences by demanding different kinds of emotional labor from different kinds of people. Lower status workers are subject to greater emotional exploitation and control, and have to do more, frequently uncompensated, emotional labor. The concept of "emotional labor" refers to "the act of trying to change in degree or quality an emotion or feeling" (Hochschild 1979, p. 561). Emotional labor entails generating and displaying an expected emotional state in oneself so as to shape the emotions of another person.

In most research, service workers perform emotional labor in interactions with customers. The literature on emotional labor has focused primarily on gender, and, especially, the ways expectations about emotional labor correspond

with cultural stereotypes about feminine emotions. However, class inequality is implicit in many of these studies, which originally examined the emotional demands of low-status and routinized service jobs, such as flight attendants (Hochschild 1983), waitresses (Paules 1991), fast food workers (Leidner 2003), and paralegals (Lively 2002; Pierce 1995), and subsequently turned a lens on emotional labor in professional occupations (Orzechowicz 2008; Pierce 1995). Outside of the related literature on care work, which we discuss at the end of this section, scholars have only recently begun to ask how race might matter in processes of emotional labor and how racialized emotional expectations might affect workplace dynamics.

### 18.5.1 Class

Class status is linked to workplace emotions in three ways: first, the class-differentiated emotional socialization we discussed above differentially prepares people for jobs. Working class children learn the deference to authority required of working class jobs, but do not develop the emotional autonomy and restraint expected in middle class jobs. Cahill (1999) refers to people's emotional foundations as "emotional capital" (note that his use of the term means something different from Reay's discussed above) both because it is a resource that facilitates adult occupational placement and because it a sign of prestige or status (we discuss this latter idea in more detail later). Second, in Hochschild's formulation, emotional labor itself is a mechanism of capitalist regulation through which workplaces extract unpaid work from low-status workers, and maintain organizational control. Third, occupational position shapes the kind of emotional labor employees do, such that higher status employees have more control over their workplace emotions than lower-status employees.

As discussed above, childhood emotional socialization prepares children for class-stratified adult workplace expectations. This process is not absolute, as people continue to experience emotional socialization in professional training

and on the job (Cahill 1999; Hochschild 1983; Otis 2011; Smith and Kleinman 1989). Cahill (1999) argues that people choose particular jobs, in part, because their emotional capital fits with the emotional expertise needed in the occupation. Conversely, the wrong emotional capital makes it more difficult to enter occupations, often requiring people to unlearn previous emotional habits.

Bourgois's (1995) ethnography of the East Harlem crack economy illustrates how difficult it can be to transform existing emotional habits to accommodate new occupational demands. To be a successful crack dealer, one must evoke fear through erratic displays of anger. The emotional strategies that work in the crack economy, however, do not match the "modes of interaction" expected in professional workplaces (145). Consequently, when the Puerto Rican men in his study found jobs in the formal economy, they were often unable to transform their emotional habitus to accommodate the distinctive emotional demands of service work, in which they were expected to defer to their organizational superiors—often white women. These emotional expectations so profoundly jeopardized these men's sense of self-respect that formal jobs were often unsustainable. Importantly, it's not just that these poor, Puerto Rican men brought the wrong emotional capital to the workplace, but also that workplace emotional expectations challenged their masculine identities. The ability to mold one's emotions to accommodate organizational demands is a critical skill, and is thus part of the process through which existing workplace inequalities are reproduced.

Emotional labor regulates by extending organizational control over service workers' bodies and minds. Moreover, because emotional labor is an expected but typically unacknowledged component of service work, it is often both unrecognized and unremunerated, especially when done by people (in most studies, women) who are assumed to be "naturally" emotionally suited for particular kinds of work. Although employees are not compensated for emotional labor, workplaces profit from it. Moreover, emotional labor exerts workplace control by fostering workers' "consent to unequal arrangements by condition-

ing workers to self-regulate, display loyalty, and suppress conflicts of interest" (Froyum 2012, p. 3; Jocoy 2003; Kunda and Maanen 1999). This process is effective because workers do not just comply with workplace emotional expectations so as to minimize job loss, but rather often come to believe in, and identify with, the organizations' emotional mandates.

In addition to these exploitative dynamics, Hochschild (1983) and others worry about the personal costs of emotional labor. Specifically, Hochschild speculated that emotional labor could cause emotional alienation, as workers are expected to exhibit emotions that may or may not correspond with their "real" feelings. She described two levels of emotion management: "surface acting," in which a person conforms with expectations for emotional display but does not change her deeper feelings, and "deep acting," in which a person displays the expected emotions because she has brought her own feelings into line with the expected display. Quantitative research has found some support for her concerns: workers report high levels of alienation and burnout when they experience dissonance between expected and actual emotions—when their emotional displays seem "fake"; that is, when they engage in surface acting rather than deep acting (Erickson and Ritter 2001; Wharton 2009). However, service workers do not universally experience negative emotional consequences. Instead, workers with high emotional demands can also experience satisfaction, dignity, and positive emotions from their work (Rodriguez 2011).

High-status professionals and managers also do emotional labor, but organizational status (i.e., class privilege) shapes both the quantity and quality of their emotional labor. Orzechowicz (2008) argues that "privileged emotion managers" occupy organizational positions that allow more autonomy in emotion management, have more occupational resources (such as secretarial "mothering") to draw on to manage their emotions, are able to express anger, and receive deference from subordinates. These features of their work, he argues, mean that they are more likely to have their feelings match emotional expecta-



tions because they can exercise more control over their own emotion work.

### 18.5.2 Race

In a pathbreaking article, Mirchandani (2003) calls for analytic attention to race, contending that race may revise more general propositions about emotional labor, not just adding to theories but changing them. Although other scholars have begun to answer her call, her concerns are still relevant ten years later: the implications of race for emotional labor remains both undertheorized and empirically undeveloped. Using the case of self-employed women, Mirchandi shows that race alters both how workers do emotional labor and the kinds of labor they need to do. She finds that race provides women with different resources for doing emotional labor. Regardless of race, self-employed women feel anxious about the prospects of their business endeavors, but they manage this anxiety in different ways.

White middle class women use their privileged class location as a resource to manage the emotional stress associated with business ownership, adopting a “rhetoric of choice,” in which they are able to see their business venture as low-risk (“I have other choices so it doesn’t matter if I fail”). Less privileged women without other economic options, in contrast, adopt a “rhetoric of constraint” (“I don’t have any other choices so I have to proceed”) to manage their anxiety. Thus, race influences how workers solve their emotional dilemmas.

Race also conditions the emotional expectations workers encounter. Because emotional labor is relational, participants’ race(s) changes interactional expectations for emotional labor. Kang (2003) finds that racialized assumptions about the docility and dexterity of Asian women feed a preference for Asian-owned nail salons, facilitating the growth of this racialized economic niche. Customers’ status characteristics also matter. Korean manicurists adjust their body and emotional labor to meet the racialized and classed expectations of clientele in different shops. For example, they provide class-privileged white

women with pampering and emotional attentiveness, and class-disadvantaged, racially mixed clientele with more “efficient” service that entails less emotional labor.

Harlow (2003) also found that student perceptions compel African American professors to do more (and different) emotional labor in the classroom than white professors. Black professors do emotion work to combat student perceptions that they are less competent than white professors, but they also do emotion work to minimize their negative feelings about their interactions with students, often by convincing themselves that race doesn’t really matter. Otis (2011) found that women service workers in China adjust their emotional labor depending on the status of the clientele. For example, women working in hotels catering to high status businessmen learned, anticipated, and attended to the personal preferences of their clientele; service provision based on intensive personal attention confirmed the status of the clients. Women working in hotels with middle class clientele engaged in less personal service, doing more work to protect their own respectability. Embodied emotional labor, Otis argues, does not just confirm status but *creates* it through the differential performance of deference and attentiveness.

Race changes occupational feeling rules even for high-status employees. In the U.S., workplace hierarchies frequently map onto racial hierarchies, such that white people more often occupy organizational positions in which they can exercise more emotional control, and racially marginalized people occupy organizational positions in which they are expected to be emotionally deferential (Bonacich et al. 2008; Froyum 2012). When black people occupy high-status positions, however, they encounter more stringent emotional standards than their white co-workers. Wingfield (2009) argues that professional workplaces have “racialized feeling rules.”

Racialized feeling rules also vary by gender; black men face more penalties for expressing anger than black women. As tokens in predominantly white workplaces, black professionals face social isolation, marginalization, and heightened visibility, and have no acceptable channels

for dealing with frustration or anger about racial issues that arise. These difficult emotional expectations are consequential for black professionals' careers, as they demand levels of emotional labor that some black professionals may find unacceptable. Beasley (2011) finds that anticipation of the emotional toll of racist workplace dynamics pushes some elite black college students to preemptively opt out of prestigious and lucrative fields.

Emotional labor is not just an additional burden for racialized employees but it also perpetuates workplace racial inequalities. Froyum (2012) argues that workplace emotional labor constitutes a "racial project"—that is, a means of both constituting and explaining an organizational structure in which white people occupy positions of authority over black workers. Using the case of "Kidworks," a nonprofit youth agency aimed at helping "disadvantaged children become productive adults," she examines white supervisors' expectations of emotional deference from black workers. She argues that black workers complied with the expectation of deference because they wanted to see themselves and be seen as professional, and by using a discourse in which they put youth needs first. The discourse of professionalism sustained racial hierarchies by creating allegiance between the goals of black workers and white administrators, and by muting racial conflict.

The emerging literature on race and emotional labor identifies three dynamics. First, differently situated people have different resources to use to do emotional labor. Second, to create connections with clients, workers of color must negotiate emotional expectations associated with racial (and class) differences. Third, workers face different expectations for their emotional displays depending on their race. Race differences in emotional labor sustain white advantages in the workplace, by extracting less labor from them, evaluating their emotional displays more positively, allowing them to experience more emotional freedom and authenticity, and providing them with more emotional support relative to African Americans and other workers of color. In contrast, race differences in emotional labor not

only disadvantage people of color but may track them out of prestigious and lucrative occupations, contributing to other dimensions of racial inequality. At the same time, racialized emotional rules ensure compliance with racialized hierarchies within workplaces.

### 18.5.3 Carework

The literature on carework does not formally examine emotional labor, but its focus on the paid provision of care—a kind of emotion—affords another window on the intersection of race, class, and gender, and workplace emotions. Carework illustrates the degree to which emotional labor is built into, but undercompensated in low-status service work; the ways emotional labor increases not just the amount of labor workers do, but also their vulnerability to emotional (and not just financial) exploitation; and the ways raced and classed ideas about different people's emotional natures naturalize employment hierarchies.

In care work, race and class (and gender) hierarchies correspond with occupational hierarchies; race- and class-disadvantaged women are most likely to do the work, and care work itself is low status. The notion of 'care' includes emotions such as affection and love, and a sense of responsibility to provide for the needs of others (Duffy 2005; Cancian and Olicker 2000). Although these are emotions that are often associated with women, in care work, race- and class- subordinated women tend to the emotional needs of more privileged people, including other women. Carework jobs—for example, nannies, hospice workers, and home health aides—are low-paying, low-status and emotionally and physically demanding (Uttal and Tuominen 1999; Duffy 2005; Dodson and Zincavage 2007; Nakano-Glenn 2010). These positions are primarily filled by women who are both racially and ethnically marked, and class-disadvantaged (Nakano-Glenn 2010; Dodson and Zincavage 2007; Uttal and Tuominen 1999).

Historically, carework has been conceptualized as private, unpaid work primarily performed by women in the home. Scholars have empha-

sized the devaluation of this work, primarily because of its association with women (Nakano-Glenn 2010; Duffy 2005; Uttal and Tuominen 1999). The increasing transfer of carework into the paid labor market has shifted ideas about which kind of women should be doing it. As women with race and class capital (white, middle-class women) moved into managerial and administrative paid work, they allocated the care of their family onto others, primarily women of color and immigrant women (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997; Nakano-Glenn 2010).

Carework often entails considerable emotional labor, including managing one's own emotional responses to being devalued. Because these jobs require constant interaction between employers and employees, they demand a high level of emotional labor aimed at putting the needs of the employer or patient (or the children of the employer) first (Dodson and Zincauge 2007; Uttal and Tuominen 1999; Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997). Moreover, women of color, in particular, who work in paid care often confront both physical and verbal abuse from those they care for (Dodson and Zincauge 2007). In nursing homes, blatant racism in the form of racial slurs is common in interactions between care workers of color and white patients. Such situations require racially-marked care workers to restrain their emotional responses; one way they do this is to define the behavior as being out of the control of the patients (Dodson and Zincauge 2007).

Carework can also entail emotional dilemmas that extend beyond the workplace itself. Careworkers are often in circumstances where caring for other families disallows them to care for their own families, causing feelings of sadness, worry, stress and guilt for what they (and others) perceive as their abandonment of their own children (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997). They may cope with these emotions by transferring love and attachment to the children of the employers, and by judging white women employers as 'bad mothers' for not performing childcare themselves. These strategies allow immigrant childcare workers to see themselves positively as mothers to their employer's children, and to their

own children (for providing financial resources) and as good mothers in comparisons to their white employers (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997).

Emotional attachments to those they care for creates emotional dilemmas for care workers, however. Workplace feeling rules often demand that caregivers feel sincere affection without getting "too close" (Dodson and Zincauge 2007). Given the expectation of authentic care, genuine feelings often develop between patient and provider, causing considerable pain for the provider when employment ends. For example, Latina domestic workers described feelings of pain and loss at times when their white employers fired them, after they had bonded with the children in their care (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997). Similarly, Dodson and Zincauge (2007) found that caregivers of color in nursing homes were not allowed to mourn the deaths of their patients or express negative feelings, such as grief. Carework thus demands that workers love and bond with their employers or patients, while disallowing the emotions that accompany such bonds.

Employers often naturalize the subordinate location of race- and class-disadvantaged women as careworkers by using a biological narrative in which women of color are portrayed as "naturally better" suited for carework than white women or men (Dodson and Zincauge 2007; Nakano-Glenn 2010). Moreover, employers, patients and clients draw on cultural narratives about the familial orientation of women of color to create expectations for careworkers of color, whom they imagine will be motivated by an 'ideology of family' to perform selfless and loving kin-care (Dodson and Zincauge 2007). At the same time, the professionalization of some carework jobs, such as nursing, has pushed women of color out. As the emotional dimensions of the work are made more invisible, white women are seen as better suited for the work. Thus, emotion labor is not just unequally experienced by differently classed and raced workers, but ideas about racialized and classed emotional natures are used to justify the occupational hierarchies that contribute to patterns of emotional exploitation.

## 18.6 Emotional Hierarchies

In these final sections, we examine the use of emotions to create, sustain, and justify class and race inequalities. Class and race differences in emotions are not just an outcome of inequalities, but are also a form of social distinction, implicated in creating, sustaining, and justifying inequalities. As discussed earlier, Cahill (1999) argues that emotional capital facilitates the reproduction of inequality by socializing middle class children for middle class jobs, but he also claims that emotions *signal* class status. “Emotional capital,” he writes, is

the dominant cultural arbitrary of emotionality, defining the emotional currency of social prestige and standing... Like the cultural capital of aesthetic judgments, perceptions, and taste, different forms of emotional capital distinguish the refined from the coarse, the socially honorable from the dishonorable (114).

Historical research traces the ascendance of emotional restraint and “good cheer” (positive affect) as emotional standards in the contemporary U.S.. Positive, restrained emotions enabled the smooth relationships required of late capitalism, and thus facilitated participation in middle class professions, but they also indicated (middle) class position (Kotchemidova 2005; Stearns 1994). Wilkins (2008b) argues that happiness is a contemporary emotional expectation associated with middle class status. She examines how Unity Christians learn to create and sustain happiness in their everyday lives, and to connect happiness to their identities as “good people.” Inasmuch as they see happiness as signaling goodness, Unity Christians create a moral hierarchy between happy (“good”) people and unhappy (un-good) people. The emphasis on the social desirability of happiness, she argues, extends well beyond the example of Unity Christians; happiness has become a cornerstone of contemporary (middle class) ideas about the good life. Thus, cultural emotional standards sustain inequalities in two ways: they reward those who are best able to achieve them (people who are most likely to be members of dominant groups) with easier access to dominant institu-

tions, and they accord status to people with the “right” emotions.

Emotional distinctions deem some emotions more culturally desirable than others, but, as the case of Unity Christians shows, they also sustain hierarchies because emotions are thought to expose something about a person’s self. If good emotions reveal that one is a good person, bad emotions reveal that one is not. At the same time, race and class disadvantage itself signals the wrong emotions, as emotions are thought to be responsible for social conditions. One way that this cultural logic manifests is through efforts to impose dominant emotional standards on members of subordinated groups. Ethnographic research on programs for criminalized women illustrates this process.

Premised on the belief that ‘bad’ emotions cause ‘bad’ behavior (criminality, addiction, prostitution, and so forth), therapeutic programs share the assumption that emotional rehabilitation is central to recovery. These programs emerged full force in the 1990s (Haney 2010; McCorkel 2004). The therapeutic model posits emotions as the key link between structural disadvantage and women’s criminalistic behavior. In this logic, inequalities of race, class and gender create circumstances that ‘damage’ women’s emotional health and self-esteem, causing them to engage in criminalistic behavior. Rather than addressing structural inequalities in women’s lives, rehabilitation often entails ‘fixing’ the bad feelings they create (Haney 2010).

Accordingly, rehabilitation programs use therapeutic modalities aimed at exposing ‘bad’ emotions in an effort to replace them with ‘good’ emotions. For example, in a study of an alternative program in which women prisoners were housed with their children, Haney (2010) found that staff members required prisoners to publicly reveal painful memories and feelings, insisting that they deal with their “deeper” emotional issues before being offered state services to address the structural problems in their lives. For white women, she finds, this process entailed exposing intimate details of their lives; for black women, it entailed reframing their experiences so that they blamed themselves rather than others for their

circumstances. Staff members reconceptualized “pleasure” as “unhealthy” when it did not conform to institutional expectations, and mandated that women learn to desire and find pleasure in different things (e.g., motherhood, emotional exposure). Many of the pleasures that women were asked to replace reflected classed ideas about appropriate femininity.

For example, women were asked to swap their desire for Top Ramen noodles—an inexpensive, widely available food—with a desire for Luna Bars—an expensive food unavailable in poor neighborhoods (Haney 2010). This process, Haney argues, not only exerts emotional control over class- and race-disadvantaged women, stripping them of their right to define their own emotional experiences, but it also perpetuates the class and race injustices in their lives: “By turning injustice into an emotional issue, Vision’s therapeutics transformed social vulnerability into personal pathology and left the inmates less able to protect themselves on the outside” (153). Although therapeutic programs vary in specific content and programming, other studies have documented similar emotional dynamics (e.g., Hackett 2013; McCorkel 2004; Ezzell 2012 analyzes emotional reform in programming for men; Froyum 2010 examines an after-school program for low-income girls). The wide range of these studies suggest that emotional reform may be a growing avenue for imposing middle class standards on people whose lives do not conform to dominant norms.

---

## 18.7 Emotional Segregation

Race scholars have argued that one of the mechanisms sustaining racial inequality is the inability of whites to see black people as emotional equals (Feagin et al. 2001). Beeman (2007, p. 690) defines “emotional segregation,” as “an institutionalized process, whereby racially oppressed and racially dominant groups are unable to see one another as emotional equals or as capable of sharing the same human emotions and experiences.” In a content analysis, she finds that contemporary US films portray intimate relationships involving

white men as emotionally successful, and interracial or intraracial relationships involving black men as primarily sexual and emotionally unsuccessful. She argues that these different portrayals contribute both to perceptions of black people as emotionally inferior to white people, and to the idea that people cannot make sustainable or authentic emotional connections across racial borders. Beeman argues that barriers to sexual intimacy between white and black people contribute to emotional segregation, allowing white people, in particular, to (perhaps unintentionally) avoid the kinds of cross-racial emotional intimacies entailed when black people enter their families and close social networks. This segregation, in turn, sustains racialized emotional hierarchies. Thus, emotional *otherness* is central to processes through which groups create racial (and likely, class) otherness.

The cultural mechanisms that sort emotional hierarchies do not just depend on objective differences in emotional display, however. Instead, ideas about different kinds of people intersect with ideas about emotions to lead to differential interpretations of emotional displays. For example, a few studies show that people use race to interpret emotional motivations and displays. People are more likely to evaluate the same facial expressions as “happy” if the face is white, and “sad” or “angry” if the face is black (Hugenberg 2005). Educators interpret behavior differently depending on the race of the child, in part because they impute different emotional meaning to the same behaviors. Adults interpreted black boys as “willfully bad,” but saw white boys as “innocent” and thus inculpable for their behavior. Differential punishment, in turn, had a cumulative effect: black boys began to see themselves, and to be seen by others, as troublemakers (Ferguson 2000).

A study circulating in the popular media shows that people tend to assume that black people experience less pain over the same eliciting conditions than white people. Differential interpretations of emotions effect people’s lives in large and small ways. In Ferguson’s study, black boys received harsher punishment than white boys for the same behavior. A recent study found that peo-



ple believe that black people feel less pain than white people. This belief has consequences for both empathy and medical treatment. For example, in emergency rooms, black patients receive less pain medication than white patients (Trawalter et al. 2012). Thus, people aren't evaluated according to the same emotional standards, but instead are held to different expectations according to raced and classed stereotypes and rules of interaction. Moreover, a person's embodied race (and possibly, though this has not been studied empirically, class) effects perceptions of his or her emotional displays.

Emotional segregation requires processes whereby white and class-privileged people learn apathy or disgust toward people of color and class-disadvantaged people. These processes include evasive language that denies race and racism, justifications for race and class inequities, and the construction of group boundaries (Frankenberg 1993). In his 2001 study of racism in post-civil rights United States, Bonilla-Silva found that many white people engaged in a rhetoric of *color-blind racism*. Color-blind racism refutes the continued significance of race and racism, disallowing discussion of racial inequality and protecting the legitimacy of unearned racial status. Color-blind racism cultivates a lack of empathy towards people of color by holding them accountable for unequal social conditions. It also eases white people's emotional discomfort about participating in morally unethical systems of oppression and about the illegitimacy of their own status and success. Discomfort and unresolved anxieties about privilege are common emotional consequences of privilege (Reay 2008; Skeggs 1997).

It is not always possible to deny difference, however. Political and cultural environments help supply white middle-class people with justifications for their privilege. The rhetoric of "neo-liberalism" (or "abstract liberalism") in the United States (Reay 2008; Bonilla-Silva 2001) shifts accountability away from the collectivity (or the state) and onto individual responsibility. This 'every person for his or her self' ideology justifies actions that serve the best interests of the

individual or in-group, while demoting the interests of others. The idea that one should first protect self and family rationalizes participation in inequality, allowing those who are privileged to avoid negative feelings associated with unearned privilege. For example, in her study of white middle-class parents whose children attended mixed-class and raced schools, Reay (2008) found that parental feelings of fear and anxiety about their children's potentially compromised well-being took precedence over feelings of guilt for being exclusionary. Privileged parents did report discomfort and ambivalence about the conflicts between the collective good and their individual needs, but their fears for their children allowed them to override feelings of guilt and shame resulting from their privilege.

Another common strategy for managing feelings of unearned privilege is to actively blame those who occupy subordinated statuses. White middle-class people often imagine race and class subordinated others as excessive, child-like, dirty, incapable and dangerous (Kang 2010; Reay 2008), and attribute these characteristics to biological or cultural inferiority (Bonilla-Silva 2001). This process replaces guilt and shame associated with unearned privilege and participation in a racist, classist society with feelings of fear and disgust for those who are constructed as dangerous undesirables. For example, white Americans have repeatedly responded to waves of Asian immigration with "yellow peril" panics in which they associate Asians with disease and contagion (Kang 2010). These fears justify policies and everyday practices aimed at controlling Asian Americans.

In her 1993 study of white women, Frankenberg found that fears about racialized others were most visible in white middle class responses to interracial marriages and children. When family members partnered with non-whites and/or had mixed race children, many white families would respond with stress and concern for the social status of the family. Social and symbolic distance between privileged and less privileged people maintains heightened status and calm anxieties about potential loss of status. Strategies of

boundary making can be seen in patterns of racial and classed residential segregation in the United States (Bonilla-Silva 2001).

### 18.7.1 Inequality in Interactions

While boundaries allow white and class-advantaged people to avoid many of the discomforts of privilege, interactions between people who occupy unequally privileged statuses still occur. Disparities in power and status influence interaction and emotional response, and cause inequity in negative and positive feelings between social actors (Kemper 1984; Summers-Effler 2002; Houser and Lovaglia 2002). The distribution of power in an interaction determines both the feeling rules and the display rules in the exchange (Hochschild 1979; 1983). Class and race are both status positions created and sustained by practices that assign deference to some and require deference from others. Thus, emotions—giving or receiving deference—are central to the everyday experience of inequality.

When interacting with racialized others and the working class and poor, white and class-advantaged people are given more leeway with their feelings and emotional expression, while racialized and classed subordinates are required to restrain their negative emotions and to only display positive emotions when it suits those with privilege. One's emotional position in interaction symbolizes and confers social status. In addition, lower status people are expected to mask or manage their own emotions with the aim of creating positive emotions in higher status people. Thus, in interactions, the emotions of higher status people matter more. At the same time, higher status people have more latitude to express anger, and lower status people are more likely to be the recipient of anger. These general propositions, however, intersect with emotional stereotypes about particular types of people to complicate the (race, class) emotional landscape. This disparity in emotional rules can cause feelings of anger, sadness and depression in racially marginalized people and the lower classes, while simultaneously boosting positive emotions, such

as satisfaction, security and confidence, in white and class-advantaged people (Summers-Effler 2002; Hochschild 1979, 1983, Kang 2010).

Sometimes racial others interact as ostensible equals. In her study of black and white romantic couples, Steinbugler (2012) argues that interracial intimacy requires members of couples to negotiate racial inequalities *inside* the couple. She conceptualizes the emotion work entailed in mediating internal conflict as a kind of "race-work." Racial segregation creates different ways of understanding the racial world that couples must negotiate. They do not all do this in the same ways. Some adjust their behaviors to fit with partners' expectations; others "translate" racialized interactions for their partners. Some couples use racial joking to defuse anger. Some "conceal emotions," deflecting racial conflict in ways that generally sustain the racial privileges of the white partner. Others engage in critical dialogues in which white partners attempt to understand the worldview from the perspective of their black partners.

While these different strategies have different consequences for the couples, they all, Steinbugler argues, exact an emotional toll on the couple. Her work, importantly, challenges the notion that interracial relationships always reflect the triumph of love over inequality, showing instead that intimacy across racial borders requires its own forms of emotional labor, and can sustain, rather than subvert, racial hierarchies.

## 18.8 Conclusion

Class and race inequalities create social experiences and conditions that generate both negative and position emotions. Class and race mediate exposure to negative experiences such as stress, discrimination, poverty, and punitive institutional interventions, and to positive experiences such as material comfort, good health, having one's needs accommodated, and having one's ideas endorsed. But people's emotional responses to these conditions vary, in part because class and race mold expectations about what one's life should be like, how one's life compares to oth-

ers, or what one thinks she deserves, and because people learn emotional habits and expectations in class and race stratified families, social spaces, and institutions.

Class and race positions are accompanied by feeling rules: expectations about how people should feel under what circumstances, and how they should display those feelings. Compliance with emotional expectations has consequences for how one sees oneself, for everyday interactions, for employment, and for experiences in other institutions. Moreover, emotions themselves are a source of inequality—not just because lower status people have reduced access to good feelings, but also because ideas about emotions make inequality seem okay, create barriers to cross-racial and cross-class understanding, and are a mode through which the disadvantaged are further exploited.

These general patterns aside, we think it is a mistake to assume that emotions always operate similarly across different dimensions of inequality. As our review revealed, classed and raced emotional dynamics may be similar in some ways, but they are also often different, underscoring the need for more empirical research on both class and race in emotions scholarship. The limited research on race often challenges the research on class. For example, although access to dominant emotional capital could facilitate upward mobility for white working class youth, it would not work in the same ways for black youth (of any class) because they are subject to racialized feeling rules (Froyum 2010). Moreover, some evidence suggests that the black *middle class* seems to experience more emotional distress over inequality than their class disadvantaged co-ethnics. Racial and ethnic identities influence both the kind and quality of discrimination people experience and the chronic stressors they face, and thus likely condition emotional patterns among differently racialized groups as well. More research is needed on differences in emotional experiences, meanings, expectations, and habits between racial and ethnic groups.

Emotional expectations themselves are a source of inequality that needs much more empirical attention. We know that differently situ-

ated individuals are forced to contend with different experiences that result in a wide spectrum of emotional responses. These individuals learn different rules about how to feel and how to display those feelings to others. They are held to different emotional standards in institutional environments, yet are often held to blanket expectations that are possible for some, and impossible for others, to achieve. These emotional inequalities contribute to individual and collective identities, while both creating and maintaining social hierarchies in a cyclical process that sustains inequity. Yet, the sociology of emotion literature is surprisingly bare in its consideration of how race and class shape positionality, and how positionality is both influenced by and influences emotion.

Race and class are often entangled, as the literature reviewed in this chapter reveals, but such entanglement can make invisible differences in the ways class and race impact emotions. Moreover, social actors are never only a member of a racial group or a class group, but instead experience distinct constellations of categorization that influence how they experience the world and how others interpret their emotions. Thus, places where race and class isomorphism are disrupted provide potential windows into the different ways race and class impact emotions, and the ways race and class may impact each other to challenge more general patterns.

---

## References

- Anderson, E. (2011). *The cosmopolitan canopy: Race and civility in everyday life*. New York: WW Norton and Company.
- Barnett, R. C. (1994). Home-to-work spillover revisited: A study of full-time employed women in dual-earner couples. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 56, 647–656.
- Beasley, M. (2011). *Opting out: Losing the potential of America's young black elite*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Beauboeuf-Lafontant, T. (2007). You have to show strength: An exploration of gender, race, and depression. *Gender and Society*, 21(1), 28–51.
- Beeman, A. K. (2007). Emotional segregation: A content analysis of institutional racism in US films, 1980–2001. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 30(5), 687–712.

- Bonacich, E., Alimahomed, S., & Wilson, J. B. (2008). The racialization of global labor. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 52(3), 342–355.
- Bonilla-Silva, E. (2001). *White supremacy and racism in the post-civil rights era*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Bourdieu, P. (1984). *Distinction: A social critique of the judgment of taste*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Bourgois, P. (1995). *In search of respect: Selling crack in El Barrio*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Brown, T. N. (2003). Critical race theory speaks to the sociology of mental health: Mental health problems produced by racial stratification. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 44(3), 292–301.
- Brown, T. N., & Lesane-Brown, C. L. (2006). Race socialization messages across historical time. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 69(2), 201–213.
- Burke, P., & Stets, J. (2009). *Identity theory*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cahill, S. E. (1999). Emotional capital and professional socialization: The case of mortuary science students (and me). *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 62(2), 101–116.
- Cancian, F. M., & Olicker, S. J. (2000). *Caring and gender*. Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Comfort, M. (2008). ‘The Best Seven Years I Could’a Done’: The reconstruction of imprisonment as rehabilitation by former prisoners and their partners. In P. Carlen (Ed.), *Imaginary penalties* (pp. 252–274). London: Willan Publishing.
- Cose, E. (2009). *The rage of a privileged class*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Dodson, L., & Luttrell, W. (2011). Families facing untenable choices. *Contexts: Publication of American Sociological Association*, 10(1), 38–42.
- Dodson, L., & Zinavage, R. M. (2007). “It’s Like a Family” caring labor, exploitation, and race in nursing homes. *Gender and Society*, 21(6), 905–928.
- Dohrenwend, B. P., & Dohrenwend, B. S. (1969). *Social status and psychological disorder: A causal inquiry*. New York: Wiley-Interscience.
- Duffy, M. (2005). Reproducing labor inequalities challenges for feminists conceptualizing care at the intersections of gender, race, and class. *Gender and Society*, 19(1), 66–82.
- Easterlin, R. A. (2001). Income and happiness: Towards a unified theory. *The Economic Journal*, 111(473), 465–484.
- Elliott, G. C., Colangelo, M. F., & Gelles, R. J. (2005). Mattering and suicide ideation: Establishing and elaborating a relationship. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 68(3), 223–238.
- Erickson, R. J., & Ritter, C. (2001). Emotional labor, burnout, and inauthenticity: Does gender matter? *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 64(2), 146–163.
- Ezzell, M. B. (2012). “I’m in Control” compensatory manhood in a therapeutic community. *Gender and Society*, 26(2), 190–215.
- Feagin, J. R., Vera, H., & Batur, P. (2001). *White racism: The basics*. New York: Psychology Press.
- Ferguson, A. A. (2000). *Bad boys: Public schools in the making of black masculinity*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Frankenberg, R. (1993). *White women, race matters: The social construction of whiteness*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Froyum, C. M. (2010). The reproduction of inequalities through emotional capital: The case of socializing low-income black girls. *Qualitative Sociology*, 33(1), 37–54.
- Froyum, C. (2012). “‘For the betterment of kids who look like me’: Professional emotional labour as a racial project.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 36(6), 1070–1089.
- Froyum, C. M. (2013). ‘For the betterment of kids who look like me’: Professional emotional labour as a racial project. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 36(6), 1070–1089.
- Hackett, C. (2013). Transformative visions: Governing through alternative practices and therapeutic interventions at a women’s reentry center. *Feminist Criminology*, 8(3), 221–242.
- Haney, L. A. (2010). *Offending women: Power, punishment, and the regulation of desire*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Harlow, R. (2003). “Race doesn’t matter, but...”: The effect of race on professors’ experiences and emotion management in the undergraduate college classroom. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 66(4), 348–363.
- Heise, D. (1979). *Understanding events: Affect and the construction of social action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hill, S. (2005). *Black intimacies: A gender perspective on families and relationships*. New York: Rowman Altamira.
- Hochschild, A. (1979). Emotion work, feeling rules, and social structure. *American Journal of Sociology*, 85(3):551–575.
- Hochschild, A. (1983). *The managed heart: Commercialization of human feeling*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hondagneu-Sotelo, P., & Avila, E. (1997). “I’m here, but I’m there”: The meanings of Latina transnational motherhood. *Gender and Society*, 11(5), 548–571.
- Houser, J. A., & Lovaglia, M. J. (2002). Status, emotion, and the development of solidarity in stratified task groups. *Advances in Group Processes*, 19, 109–137.
- Hugenberg, K. (2005). Social categorization and the perception of facial affect: Target race moderates the response latency advantage for happy faces. *Emotion*, 5(3), 267–276.
- Hughey, M. (2008). Virtual (Bro)others and (Re)sisters: Authentic black fraternity and sorority identity on the internet. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 37(5), 528–560.
- Jackson, P. B., & Stewart, Q. T. (2003). A research agenda for the black middle class: Work stress, survival strate-



- gies, and mental health. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 44(3), 442–455.
- Jackson, B. A., & Wingfield, A. H. (2013). Getting angry to get ahead: Black College men, emotional performance, and encouraging respectable masculinity. *Symbolic Interaction*, 36(3), 275–292.
- Jocoy, C. L. (2003). “Vying for hearts and minds: Emotional labour as management control.” *Labour and Industry: A Journal of the Social and Economic Relations of Work*, 13(3), 51–72.
- Kang, M. (2003). The managed hand: The commercialization of bodies and emotions in Korean immigrant-owned nail salons. *Gender and Society*, 17(6), 820–839.
- Kang, M. (2010). *The managed hand: Race, gender, and the body in beauty service work*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Kaplan, E. B. (1997). *Not our kind of girl: Unraveling the myths of black teenage motherhood*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Kemper, T. D. (1978). *A social interactional theory of emotions*. New York: Wiley.
- Kemper, T. D. (1984). Power, status, and emotions: A sociological contribution to a psychophysiological domain. In K. R. Scherer & P. Ekman (Eds.), *Approaches to Emotion* (pp. 369–383). Hillsdale: Erlbaum.
- Kemper, T. D. (1990). “Social relations and emotions: A structural approach.” In T. D. Kemper (Ed.), *Research Agendas in the Sociology of Emotions* (pp. 207–237). Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Kessler, R. C., & Cleary, P. D. (1980). Social class and psychological distress. *American Sociological Review*, 45(3), 463–478.
- Kotchimidova, C. (2005). From good cheer to “drive-by-Smiling”: A social history of cheerfulness. *Journal of Social History*, 39(1), 5–37.
- Kunda, G., & Van Maanen, J. (1999). Changing scripts at work: Managers and professionals. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 561(1), 64–80.
- Kusenbach, M. (2009). Salvaging decency: Mobile home residents’ strategies of managing the stigma of “trailer” living. *Qualitative Sociology*, 32(4), 399–428.
- Kusenbach, M., & Loseke, D. R. (2013). Bringing the social back in: Some suggestions for the qualitative study of emotions. *Qualitative Sociology Review*, 9(2), 20–38.
- Lacy, K. (2007). *Blue-chip black: Race, class and status in the new black middle class*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Lamont, M. (2002). *The dignity of working men: Morality and the boundaries of race, class, and immigration*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Lareau, A. (2003). *Unequal childhoods: Class, race and family life*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Lareau, A. (2011). *Unequal childhoods: Class, race and family life. Second edition. A decade later*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Lefever, H. G. (1981). “Playing the Dozens”: A mechanism for social control. *Phylon*, 42(1), 73–85.
- Leidner, R. (2003). *Fast food, fast work: Service work and the routinization of everyday life*. Berkeley: California University Press.
- Lively, K. J. (2000). Reciprocal emotion management Working together to maintain stratification in private law firms. *Work and occupations*, 27(1), 32–63.
- Lively, K. J. (2002). Client contact and emotional labor Upsetting the balance and evening the field. *Work and occupations*, 29(2), 198–225.
- Lu, A., & Wong, Y. J. (2013). Stressful experiences of masculinity among U.S.-Born immigrant Asian American men. *Gender and Society*, 27(3), 344–370.
- Mabry, J. B., & Kiecolt, K. J. (2005). Anger in black and white: Race, alienation and anger. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 46(1), 85–101.
- McLeod, J. D., & Kessler, R. C. (1990). Socioeconomic status differences in vulnerability to undesirable life events. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 31(2), 162–172.
- McCorkel, J. (2004). Criminally dependent? Gender, punishment, and the rhetoric of welfare reform. *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society*, 11(3), 386–410.
- McLoyd, Vonnie, C. A. M., David, T., & Leon, W. (2000). Marital processes and parental socialization in families of color: A decade review of research. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 62(4), 1070–1093.
- Mirchandani, K. (2003). Challenging racial silences in studies of emotion work: Contributions from anti-racist feminist theory. *Organization Studies*, 24(5), 721–742.
- Montes, V. (2013). The role of emotions in the construction of masculinity: Guatemalan migrant men, transnational migration, and family relations. *Gender and Society*, 27(4), 469–490.
- Morris, E. W. (2007). ““Ladies” or “Loudies”?” Perceptions and experiences of black girls in classrooms.” *Youth and Society*, 38(4), 490–515.
- Mossakowski, K. N. (2007). Are immigrants healthier? The case of depression among Filipino Americans. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 70(3), 290–304.
- Nakano-Glenn, E. (2010). *Forced to care: Coercion and caregiving in America*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Nenga, S. K. (2003). Social class and structures of feeling in women’s childhood memories of clothing, food, and leisure. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 32(2), 167–199.
- Newman, K. S., & Ellis, C. (1999). “There’s no shame in my game”: Status and stigma among Harlem’s working poor. In M. Lamont (Ed.), *The cultural territories of race: Black and white boundaries* (pp. 151–181). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Noh, S., Beiser, M., Kaspar, V., Hou, F., & Rummens, J. (1999). Perceived racial discrimination, depression, and coping: A study of Southeast Asian refugees in Canada. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 40(3), 193–207.
- Ortner, S. (1998). Identities: The hidden life of class. *Journal of Anthropological Research*, 54(1), 1–17.



- Orzechowicz, D. (2008). Privileged emotion managers: The case of actors. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 71(2), 143–156.
- Otis, E. (2011). *Markets and bodies: Women, service work, and the making of inequality in China*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
- Paules, G. F. (1991). *Dishing it out: Power and resistance among waitresses in a New Jersey restaurant*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Pierce, J. L. (1995). *Gender trials: Emotional lives in contemporary law firms*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Purser, G. (2009). The dignity of job-seeking men: Boundary work among immigrant day laborers. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 38(1), 117–139.
- Reay, D. (2000). A useful extension of Bourdieu's conceptual framework?: Emotional capital as a way of understanding mothers' involvement in their children's education. *The Sociological Review*, 48(4), 568–585.
- Reay, D. (2008). Psychosocial aspects of white middle-class identities: Desiring and defending against the class and ethnic other in urban multi-ethnic schooling. *Sociology*, 42(6), 1072–1088.
- Rios, V. (2011). *Punished: Policing the lives of black and Latino boys*. New York: New York University Press.
- Rodriquez, J. (2011). It's a dignity thing: Nursing home care workers' use of emotions. *Sociological Forum*, 26(2), 265–286.
- Rubin, L. (1976 [1992]). *Worlds of pain: Life in the working class family*. Boston: Basic Books.
- Ruff, C. D., Keyes, C. L. M., & Hughes, D. L. (2003). Status inequalities, perceived discrimination, and eudaimonic well-being: Do the challenges of minority life hone purpose and growth?. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 44(3), 275–291.
- Scheff, T. (2001). Working class emotions and relationships. Socy.UCSB.edu. <http://www.soc.ucsb.edu/faculty/scheff/main.php?id=22.html>. Accessed 30 July 2013.
- Schrock, D., & Schwalbe, M. (1996). Identity work as group process. *Advances in Group Processes*, 13, 113–147.
- Schrock, D., & Schwalbe, M. (2009). Men, masculinity, and manhood acts. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 35, 277–295.
- Schwalbe, M., Godwin, S., Holden, D., Schrock, D., Thompson, S., & Wolkomir, M. (2000). Generic processes in the reproduction of inequality: An interactionist analysis. *Social Forces*, 79(2), 419–452.
- Sennett, R., & Cobb, J. (1972). *The hidden injuries of class*. New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.
- Simon, R. W. (2007). Contributions of the sociology of mental health for understanding the social antecedents, social regulation, and social distribution of emotion. In W. Avison, J. McLeod, & B. Pescosolido (Eds.), *Mental health, social mirror* (pp. 239–274). New York: Springer.
- Simons, R. L., Simons, L. G., Burt, C. H., Drummund, H., Stewart, E., Brody, G. H., Gibbons, F. X., & Cutrona, C. (2006). Supportive parenting moderates the effect of discrimination upon anger, hostile view of relationships, and violence among African American boys. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 47, 373–389.
- Skeggs, B. (1997). *Formations of class and gender: Becoming respectable*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Smith, I. II, Allen, C., & and, S. K. (1989). Managing emotions in medical school: Students' contacts with the living and the dead. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 52(1), 56–69.
- Smith-Lovin, L. (1990). Emotion as a confirmation and disconfirmation of identity: An affect control model. In T.D. Kemper (Ed.), *Research Agendas in Emotions* (pp. 238–270). New York: SUNY Press.
- Snow, D. A., & Anderson, L. (1987). Identity work among the homeless: The verbal construction and avowal of personal identities. *American Journal of Sociology*, 92(6), 1336–1371.
- Stearns, P. N. (1994). *American cool: Constructing a twentieth-century emotional style*. New York: New York University Press.
- Steinbugler, A. C. (2012). *Beyond Loving: Intimate race-work in lesbian, gay, and straight interracial relationships*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Stets, J. E., & Tsushima, T. M. (2001). Negative emotion and coping responses within identity control theory. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 64(3), 283–295.
- Summers Effler, E. (2002). The micro potential for social change: Emotion, consciousness, and social movement formation. *Sociological Theory*, 20(1), 41–60.
- Taylor, T., & Risman, B. J. (2006). Doing deference or speaking up: Deconstructing the experience and expression of anger. *Race, Gender and Class*, 13(3/4), 60–80.
- Thoits, P. A. (1989). The sociology of emotions. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 15, 317–342.
- Thomas, S. A., & Gonzalez-Prendes, A. A. (2009). Powerlessness, anger, and stress in African American women: Implications for physical and emotional health. *Health Care for Women International*, 30(1/2), 93–113.
- Trawalter, S., Hoffman, K. M., & Waytz, A. (2012). Racial bias in perceptions of others' pain. *PLoS ONE*. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048546.
- Turner, R. J., & Gil, A. G. (2002). Psychiatric and substance use disorders in South Florida: Racial/ethnic and gender contrasts in a young adult cohort. *Archives of General Psychiatry*, 59(1), 43.
- Turner, R. J., Blair, W., & Donald, A. L. (1995). The epidemiology of social stress. *American Sociological Review*, 60, 104–125.
- Tyson, K. (2003). Notes from the back of the room: Problems and paradoxes in the schooling of young black students. *Sociology of Education*, 76(4), 326–343.
- Uttal, L., & Tuominen, M. (1999). Tenuous relationships: Exploitation, emotion, and racial ethnic significance in paid child care work. *Gender and Society*, 13(6), 758–780.
- West, C., & Fenstermaker, S. (1995). Doing difference. *Gender and Society*, 9(1), 8–37.
- Wharton, A. S. (2009). The sociology of emotional labor. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 35, 147–165.

- Wilkins, A. C. (2008a). *Wannabes, Goths and Christians: The boundaries of sex, style, and status*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Wilkins, A. C. (2008b). Happier than Non-Christians: Collective emotions and symbolic boundaries among evangelical Christians. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 71(3), 281–301.
- Wilkins, A. C. (2012a). Not out to start a revolution: Race, gender, and emotional restraint among black university men. *Journal Of Contemporary Ethnography*, 41(1), 34–65.
- Wilkins, A. C. (2012b). Becoming black women: Intimate stories and intersectional identities. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 75(2), 173–196.
- Wilkins, A. C. (2012c). Stigma and status: Interracial intimacy and intersectional identities among black college men. *Gender and Society*, 26(2), 165–189.
- Williams, D. R., & Harris-Reid, M. (1999). Race and mental health: Emerging patterns and promising approaches. In A. Horwitz, & T. Scheid (Eds.), *A handbook for the study of mental health: Social contexts, theories and systems* (pp. 295–314). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wingfield, A. H. (2009). Racializing the glass escalator: Reconsidering men's experiences with women's work. *Gender and Society*, 23(1), 5–26.
- Wingfield, A. H. (2010). Are some emotions marked "Whites Only"? Racialized feeling rules in professional workplaces. *Social Problems*, 57(2), 251–268.
- Yu, Y., & Williams, D. R. (1999). Socioeconomic status and mental health. In C. S. Aneshensel & J. C. Phelan (Eds.), *Handbook of the Sociology of Mental Health* (pp. 151–166). New York: Springer.

Douglas Schrock and Brian Knop

### 19.1 Introduction

Scholarship in both the sociology of emotions and the sociology of gender blossomed in the last quarter of the twentieth century. According to Sociological Abstracts, about 96% of 14,430 articles listing 'gender' and 89% of the 1219 listing 'emotion' as subject areas that were published in the twentieth century appeared *after* 1970. Before the turn of the century, sociologists of gender worked out how to theorize gender in distinctly sociological ways and used empirical research to show its usefulness in studying socialization, interaction, relationships, organizations, etc. and sociologists of emotions were doing the same with regard to emotions. Although work in the two areas sometimes overlapped in subtle and explicit ways, it typically proceeded independently from each other—only about 1% of these pre-millennium articles listed *both* gender and emotion as subjects.

Even though there was not much overlap in these two lines of research, it may not have been a coincidence that these subfields established themselves during this time period. As second wave feminism found its way into academia, masculinist assumptions were challenged and new questions were asked. Whereas there had been a tendency in sociology to assume that men represented all of humanity or that men and

women played “complementary” roles, it became reasonable to assume both men and women enacted gender and that analyzing the extent and dynamics of gender inequality was a legitimate form of social inquiry. In addition, whereas there had been a masculinist tendency to privilege notions of the rational actor and neglect emotions, it became more acceptable to assume that humans were emotional beings and ask questions about the social and cultural dynamics of emotions. Although it may have had less influence than in other disciplines (Stacey and Thorne 1985), feminism arguably created a critical mass of scholars and disciplinary gatekeepers open to these new forms of inquiry.

The links between emotions and gender have deep historical roots. Simone de Beauvoir (1949/2009), for example, showed how the ancient mind/body dualism was mapped onto the division of the sexes in a way that defined women as “The Other.” The dualism defined men as rational actors built for leadership and women as closer to nature and inherently emotional and thus requiring more control. As Aristotle put it, “Woman is more compassionate than man, more easily moved to tears... more jealous, more quarrelsome, more apt to scold... more prone to despondency and less hopeful... more void of shame or self respect, more false of speech, more deceptive and of more retentive memory” (quoted in Brownmiller 1984, pp. 207–208). Thus the cultural transformation of a few physical differences between males and females into a symbolic

---

D. Schrock (✉) · B. Knop  
Florida State University, Tallahassee, USA  
e-mail: dschrock@fsu.edu

and socially consequential gender binary has long been tied to a discourse of emotion.

As emotions scholars such as Catherine Lutz (1996) point out, the cultural construction of the idea of ‘emotion’ itself is also tied to womanhood in an essentialist fashion. Like the construction of women, emotion in the West “has typically been viewed as something natural rather than cultural, irrational rather than rational, chaotic rather the ordered, subjective rather than universal, physical rather than mental or intellectual, unintended and uncontrollable, and hence often dangerous” (Lutz 1996, p. 152). In a contradictory fashion, as Lutz also points out, emotion is often valorized as a spirited refuge from the alienation of self and from others in the contemporary world. The reverse might be said of the linking of the concepts ‘unemotional’ and ‘man’, though men are typically valued for their rationality and, at times, pitied for their alienation. Overall, such discussion suggests that as “social representations” (Moscovici 1984), emotions and gender have long been entangled.

Because of the devaluation of and links between emotion and women, it is perhaps not surprising that sociology more fully developed emotions and gender scholarship after feminist intervention in the 1970s—even if some of the scholars involved were men or did not identify as feminist. And since the turn of the century, work in both areas has dramatically accelerated. About 62% of all articles listing ‘gender’, 80% of all articles listing ‘emotion’, and 83% of all articles listing ‘gender’ and ‘emotion’ as subjects were published from 2000 to mid-2012. Although more work now addresses *both* gender and emotion, since 2000 it still accounts for only 3% of published articles on gender or emotion.<sup>1</sup> Considering the surge in work on gender *or* emotion, as Simon and Nath (2004, p. 1141) put it, “there is surprisingly little sociological research that

compares men’s and women’s everyday feelings and expressive behavior.”

We organize this chapter according to the following three areas of research because both sociologists of gender and emotion have devoted much attention to them: (1) socialization, (2) intimate relations, and (3) organizations. Although we cover research that explicitly addresses the links between gender and emotion, we also include work on gender *or* emotion that does not necessarily focus on the links but nonetheless presents data relevant for understanding them. This organization and approach enables us to draw on a large body of ethnographic and survey research about these processes and contexts, although it hinders addressing the breadth of experimental and more historical or cultural research. Overall, our aim is to encourage emotions and gender scholars to see how each other’s work can be mutually beneficial and spark questions on the gender-emotion nexus in need of further research.

We do not approach work on gender or emotions with a blank slate, however, but from the broad perspective of critical interactionism. Grounded in pragmatist philosophy and an underlying concern with how inequalities are reproduced or challenged (see, e.g., Schwalbe et al. 2000), the approach is well positioned to see how cognition, culture, interaction, power, identities, and emotions are intertwined with gender inequality. From this perspective gender is more than “sex differences,” it is a form of inequality embedded in selves, institutions, and relationships and often intertwined with other inequalities such as sexuality, race, and class (e.g., Acker 1990; Howard and Hollander 1997; West and Zimmerman 1987; Collins 1989).

---

## 19.2 Socialization

Let us begin by addressing three key ways that emotions and gender are linked in socialization processes. First, we explore how emotions are involved in socializing children to attribute gender categories to themselves and others as well as the role of emotions in learning how to signify gen-

---

<sup>1</sup> Listing emotion *and* gender as a subject area does not necessarily mean that such work contributes substantially to understanding the links—it may just mean, for instance, that ‘sex’ and ‘emotion’ were variables or a group of stoic men were observed.

der identity. Second, we examine how children are socialized to adopt gendered feeling rules and strategies of emotion talk, and how sexuality, race, and class shape such processes. Third, we examine how gendered emotional cultures of school and athletic contexts further emotionalize gendered lives. Overall, examining how children are socialized to develop gendered emotional orientations and capital can reveal how the gender system is reproduced.

### 19.2.1 Learning to Attribute and Signify Gender Identities

Gender, as system of differentiation and inequality, is at its core centered on the notion that people ought to identify as boys/men or girls/women. Although parents and other family members typically frame pre-verbal children as gendered via naming, gift giving, room decorating, etc. (Pomerleau et al. 1990), the process through which children themselves come to see themselves as boys or girls appears to be an emotional one. Key is the “looking glass self,” which Cooley (1902/1992) describes as seeing oneself from the perspective of others, imagining a judgment, and then feeling variations of shame or pride. Cahill (1986) found that parental praise for children who acted in desired or mature ways involved being labeled as “big boys/girls” and derision of uncivil children as “babies” fostered adoption of gender identities. Such affirmation or rejection, as Cahill notes in passing, shapes self-esteem. The implication here is that others’ reactions trigger emotions that orient children toward defining themselves in gendered terms.

Emotional micropolitics, which involves invoking emotions in others in ways to situate themselves in a hierarchy of place (Clark 1990), also appear central in teaching children a gendered “identity code” (Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock 1996), or what types of signifying acts they should engage in if they want to elicit audience labeling as a boy/girl. As Cahill (1986) also suggests, the baby vs. girl/boy discourse is also used by adults and other children to sanction, culturally speaking, normative gendered be-

havior, instilling a “behavioral commitment” to a gendered identity code. Cahill reported, for example, a child ridiculing a boy who put on a dress he found in the pre-school dress-up box. Gender scholars have similarly noted such parental policing, often suggesting it is more rigid for boys (e.g., Coltrane and Adams 1997, Maccoby 1998). Kane (2006) found parents, irrespective of race and class, sanctioned sons for non-normative gendered displays such as wearing pink fingernail polish. Because children have not developed secondary sex characteristics that audiences can interpret as signs of gender identity, such policing creates emotional incentive in children to regulate how they signify gender.

Shott (1979) pointed out that role-taking emotions such as shame and pride are implicated in social control, encouraging people to become self-regulating subjects. The aforementioned research suggests a gendered variation of the process. More specifically, agents of socialization, regardless of intentions, use emotional micropolitics to incentivize adopting a gender identity as well as adopting behaviors and displays culturally coded as signifying membership in one’s sex category. Whereas identity theorists might emphasize that positive (e.g., pride) or negative (e.g. shame) emotions arise and vary in intensity in relation to how salient an identity is to an individual (Stryker 1987), or how committed one is to that identity (Burke 1991), research on gender socialization suggests that emotions are key to making gender a salient identity to which children become committed in the first place.

Parents also appear to use a taken-for-granted frame of gender to read stereotypically gendered emotions into children’s ambiguous displays. Condry and Condry’s (1976) classic study found that when watching the same videotape of a baby respond to various stimuli, subjects who were told the baby was a girl were more likely to perceive the baby as scared than those told s/he was a boy, who labeled “him” as showing anger. As children learn about gendered emotional stereotypes, as evidenced by studies comparing children’s interpretations of children’s books that vary only the sex category of the lead character (Parmley and Cunningham 2008; Russell and Widen 2002),



they similarly are more likely to paint boys as angry/disgusted and girls as sad/afraid. Similarly, changing only the gendered hairstyling and clothing of a picture of a person with an ambiguous emotional expression leads people to frame the emotional display of the “male” as anger and the “female” as sadness (Plant et al. 2004). Thus agents of socialization—whether adults or children—use their own emotionally gendered framing to differently make sense of and respond to children’s presumed emotional displays.

### 19.2.2 Gendering Feeling Rules and Emotion Talk

Children, of course, also learn that feeling and display rules, which are cultural guidelines indicating how someone should feel or display emotion in a particular situation (Hochschild 1983), are also gendered. Girls are typically socialized to value empathy and are encouraged to express fear or sadness, whereas boys and men are often encouraged to display anger but restrain other emotional expressions (e.g., Shields 2002). For example, Chaplin et al.’s (2010) experimental research found parents less supportive and more punitive when female toddlers expressed anger about having to wait to play with a desired toy. Controlling boy’s sadness is another common research theme; for example, one father in Kane’s (2006, p. 161) study said of his son: “I want to see him strong, proud, not crying like a sissy.” McGuffey (2005, p. 227) found similar proclamations in his study of parents of sexually abused boys: “He’s already been made into a woman sexually, I can’t let him turn into one emotionally, too!” said one father who feared his abused son was acting too emotional. Both McGuffey and Kane additionally point out that underlying heterosexual parents’ emphasis on their children’s behavioral and emotional conformity to gendered feeling rules was the fear that to do otherwise might cause them to become or be labeled by others as gay. Heteronormativity thus influences efforts to emotionally differentiate males and females in stereotypically gendered ways.

More generally, analyses of parent-child talk about everyday life reveals parents use more emotional discourse when talking with daughters compared to their sons (Kuebli and Fivush 1992; Fivush et al. 2000), suggesting girls are typically steered toward reflecting on and processing emotions. Some research suggests that girls and boys bring such gendered emotional strategies into adulthood. For example, women often more extensively process emotions (Lively 2008) and are more likely to talk through difficult emotions with others than men, who are more apt employ individualist strategies such as drug and alcohol consumption (Simon and Nath 2004).

Some research suggests how gendered emotional socialization is also intertwined with social class and race. For example, in her comparison of middle and working class parents, Lareau (2003) found middle class parents—particularly mothers—seemed to make a more concerted effort to cultivate a child’s emotional and intellectual development. Chin (2000) found that upper-class mothers carefully managed their own and their children’s emotions during the process of applying for prestigious private schools in order to better motivate their children to become the “perfect applicants.” In a study comparing how race and class shape how parents interact with babies while talking to them about picture books, Garret-Peters and colleagues (2008, p. 141) find that Black mothers and fathers—especially those with relative higher incomes—are more likely than their non-Black and less well off counterparts to engage in emotion talk. The authors suggest this may be due to an “orientation toward emotional vigilance in a climate of prejudice and discrimination” and a more Afrocentric idioculture of “interdependence [and] emotional expression” that may be more common in middle class families. Overall, this work suggests processes of emotional socialization may also be geared toward passing on class status or preparing minority children for the emotional consequences of everyday racial discrimination (Feagin 1991).

### 19.2.3 Gendered Emotional Cultures in Educational and Athletic Contexts

Socializing organizations, such as schools, of course, are also key contexts for gendered emotional socialization. Research suggests much of this involves gender segregated peer interaction. In their analysis of popularity among pre-adolescent school children, for example, Adler et al. (1992) found that boys fostered a “culture of coolness” that emphasized emotional invulnerability, essentially positioning more emotionally expressive boys outside popular in-groups. Simon et al. (1992) found that adolescent girls in school transmit feeling and expression norms about heterosexual romantic love by, for example, joking and teasing, gossiping, and sometimes confrontation. As Lashbrook (2000) suggests in a compatible way, embarrassment and shame are instrumental in pressuring girls and boys’ to “fit in” as gendered beings. Again, we can see how emotions are both products that signify gender identity as well as central to interactional processes through which people are held accountable for doing gender in a culturally recognized fashion.

Racial and class inequality further complicates understanding gender and emotion in school contexts. For example, Ferguson (2001, p. 194) found a number of boys in a predominantly poor and Black school don oppositional poses in which they broke rules, often trying to intimidate teachers and their peers and that “a sense of anger and frustration born of marginalization in school intensifies the nature of these performances.” She also found a preponderance of Black boys labeled as having Oppositional Defiant Disorder and then segregated into classes of low-achieving students, suggesting that expressions of emotional deviance is not only used by oneself in mental disorder labeling (Thoits 1986), but used by school authorities in a gendered and racialized manner to label others.

In a popular after school program designed to teach Black girls how to deal with emotions, Froyum (2010) found the staff helped the girls develop emotional capital—or habits of feeling and emotion work (Cahill 1999)—that empha-

sized emotional restraint and deference. Froyum points out that this had the consequence of reinforcing ideologies key to race/class/gender inequality, distancing them from their families, and hindering racial pride. Resonating with other work (see e.g. Fordham 1993), we can see here how cultural stereotypes of Black girls’ alleged emotional problems often hinder adults efforts to help.

Gendered emotional socialization is also intertwined with school and non-school related sports cultures, which are typically sex segregated and “provide the context in which gendered identities and separate ‘gendered cultures’ develop and come to appear natural” (Messner 1990, p. 429). Children often come to see certain sports as “girls’ sports” and others as “boys’ sports” through making emotional distinctions: they associate sports played mostly by boys as involving more aggression (Schmalz and Kerstetter 2006). Boys who participate in alleged girls’ sports (skating or gymnastics) might be labeled “girlie girls” (Schmalz and Kerstetter 2006) and girls who play alleged boys’ sports (like rugby) might be labeled “lesbians” (Ezzell 2009), which might evoke embarrassment and foster strategies to manage it. In sports that emphasize combat, such as Mixed Martial Arts, male newcomers often learn how to strategically minimize fear of losing and injury and foster fear in opponents in ways that bolster gendered identities and prepare them to physically dominate others (Vaccaro et al. 2011). We can see here, again, how gendered culture and identities are intimately tied up in emotional socialization. Overall, girls typically develop a kind of deferential emotional capital whereas boys develop emotional capital that is more useful for dominance.

---

### 19.3 Intimate Relationships

Intimate relationships and families are a key context in which to explore the links between gender and emotions. In relationships, people construct gender identities, employ gender ideology, and manage their own and each others’ feelings in ways that can reproduce interpersonal inequality.

In this section, we first address research on the gendered distribution and processes of emotion work and move on to examine the role of emotions in the gendered division of domestic labor. Next, we examine how emotions are entwined with sexual negotiations among intimates as well as the gendered parenting of children. We then examine research on relationship satisfaction and end by examining research on emotions and violence against women. Throughout, we will explore—but to a lesser extent, reflecting gaps in the research—how class, sexual identity, and race shape such processes.

### 19.3.1 Gendered Division of Emotion Management

Although it is increasingly accepted that “both [heterosexual] partners should experience emotional fulfillment and attend to the emotional needs of each other and children” (Minnotte et al. 2010, p. 747), research typically reflects Cancian and Gordon’s (1988) analysis of twentieth century women’s magazines that paint women as primarily responsible for regulating family members’ emotions. Erickson’s (2005) survey research found that women partners engaged in more everyday familial emotion work than did men—even if they reported more masculine traits—presumably because such work was a means of constructing gender identity. In her qualitative study, Devault (1999) found that women often strategically work to create familial experiences that evoke in others feelings of comfort, whether via child care, food preparation, providing soothing support, or, more indirectly, advocating for children. She also argues that such work may be particularly important and difficult in families of color and sexual minority families due to prejudice and discrimination. Even during family outings and vacations, women engage in a disproportionate share of emotion work in hope of facilitating a “good time” (see e.g., Shaw’s 2008 review). Overall, such research supports Bartky’s (1990) observation that in heterosexual relationships, women’s relationship emotion work involves “feeding egos and tending wounds.”

As qualitative work suggests, women’s relationship emotion work may bolster their own and partner’s gender identities when they are precarious or threatened. Pfeffer (2010), for example, shows how women do much emotion work for transmen partners during their transition. Health crises pose additional dilemmas and opportunities for gendered emotion management. For men, the physical and emotional vulnerability accompanying illness can hinder feelings of worth *as men*. As Emslie et al. (2009) show in their study of heterosexually partnered men with cancer, however, they often compensate by signifying manhood by suppressing their own fears (Emslie et al. 2009) and neglecting to disclose their illness to others. This strategy, in turn, leaves their women partners to deal with family members and friends’ emotions (Gray et al. 2000). Women diagnosed with breast cancer, for example, also face emotionally difficult identity dilemmas because of the possibility of losing a culturally defined embodied signifier of womanhood via mastectomy and also the reversal of their typical role of emotional caretaker of others; yet research show that many women use disclosing their illness as an opportunity to care for others by emphasizing the need to take care of their health and, when they accept others’ support, use the opportunity to foster closer social bonds (Yoo et al. 2010). Thus, even when gendered crises and transformations arise in relationships, women and men often engage in emotion work in ways that reinforces gender identities and inequalities.

### 19.3.2 Emotions and the Gendering of Domestic Labor

Gender ideologies and identities are also intertwined with women and men’s feelings about the division of domestic labor more generally. Hochschild (1989), for example, shows how one’s commitment to traditional or egalitarian gender ideals shaped their feelings of gratitude and resentment with regard to the division of domestic labor. Thus women subscribing to traditional ideology may feel gratitude toward husbands doing a minimal amount of work, whereas women sub-

scribing to egalitarian principles may feel resentful towards husbands doing the same amount of work.

Beyond ideology, gendered identities and fear and anger shape the reproduction and, at times, challenging of the unequal division of domestic labor in heterosexual relationships. Kroska (1997), for example, suggests that females' commitment to the identity 'woman' may emotionally motivate their disproportionate domestic labor. Her work (Kroska 2004) showing how women typically engage in domestic work culturally coded as feminine (e.g. cleaning) and men engage in domestic work coded as masculine (e.g., mowing the grass) provides some support. Other research (Mannino and Deautsch 2007, p. 319) suggests that women who try to foster a more egalitarian division of housework give up in order to avoid feeling frustrated: "After years of trying, I've given up. It's just less stress on me if I just do it all and not even count on him to help me." Thus while one's egalitarian ideals can shape how couples feel about the division of labor, one's feelings can also loosen commitment to those very ideals. Feelings of frustration and anger over male partners' lack of domestic work, however, can motivate women to challenge the inequality and put their pragmatic interests before their identity stakes (Benjamin 2003).

Class and employment status can also color how couples experience feelings about how chores are divided. Middle class men in Pyke's (1996) study could avoid chores by claiming work obligations whereas lower class men relied on more explicit patriarchal ideologies to secure similar privileges. Because middle class men's excuses for avoiding housework were culturally legitimate and aligned with the hegemonic image of the career-driven male, their wives were more likely than lower class wives to feel that the unequal division was fair. Legenski and Cornwall's (2010) examination of how men's unemployment shaped the gendered division of household labor found that while some movement toward inequality was observed, women's continued focus on care work and men and women's gendered identities forestalled significant change. As they concluded, the women "remained unwilling to press

for a more permanent and equitable division of labor given their husband's emotional state" (Legenski and Cornwall 2010, p. 469). Thus, women and men's emotional stakes in preserving their own and each others' gender identities can also forestall developing a more equitable division of domestic labor even when men's unemployment provided them more time to contribute.

Such emotionally-infused gender identity dilemmas can also reproduce inequality when women earn more than their male husbands/partners. Although framed to emphasize gender identity rather than emotions, Tichenor (2005) found that higher-earning women often defer to lower-earning male partners even when they did not want to because they felt that being "good" wives involved preserving male partners' pride and they also feared doing otherwise would put them at risk of being a "bitch." As one respondent explained, "I try not to mention the fact that I make more money, because that's just a taboo thing. It would send him through the roof" (Tichenor 2005, p. 202). Here we can see how women's desire to minimize or pre-empt their male partner's anger as well as to avoid the likely emotional consequences she would feel, results in maintaining her husband's male status and power.

### 19.3.3 Emotions and Gendered Sexual Relations

Sexual activity, which can be a cathartic practice and thus a form of bodily emotion work, can also reveal important links between gender and emotion. Orgasms, for example, are often experienced in heterosexual relationships through cultural discourses of gender and entwined with gendered politics of reciprocity and identities (see Frith 2013, for a recent review; see also Lorentzen 2007 on men and Jackson and Scott 2007 on women). More generally, research suggests couples with a more traditional gendered division of labor are more satisfied with their sex lives (Schwartz 1995) and more frequently engage in sex than those in egalitarian relationships (Kornrich et al. 2013). Schwartz suggests

that the emphasis on gender difference in heterosexual relationships may bolster sexual tension and desire and Kornrich et al. suggest that adherence to traditionally gendered sexual scripts may motivate men in traditional relationships to more frequently initiate sex and women in such relationships to see deferring as part of their wifely duty. Women and men's commitment to traditional gender identities thus shapes even the most physically intimate and emotionally-laden relational experiences.

Emotions can also be part of the process through which men and women negotiate sex in gendered ways. Kompter's (1989) study of marital power found that wives sometimes expressed guilt about not meeting their husbands' alleged sexual needs, which deferring could assuage. Elliot and Umberson (2008) found that some women engage in emotion work to invoke their own sexual desire, in part because they wanted to avoid emotional blowback from resentful husbands who felt entitled to sex. But in contrast to the larger culture, some husbands did emotion work to repress their own desire to minimize conflict and some engaged in more domestic labor with the hope it would create the conditions under which wives' sexual desire would arise. As men age and have less sexual desire or experience erectile dysfunction, they may feel stress and shame due to a depleted sense of manhood and women in relationships with such men may also experience sense of shame related to feeling unattractive or, if they try to initiate sex, transgressing gendered sexual scripts (Lodge and Umberson 2012). Overall, we can see here how gendered power and cultural ideals infuse the emotional dynamics of sex.

### 19.3.4 Emotionally Gendered Parenting

Parenting provides additional opportunities to gender emotion management. Culturally, women are often defined as primary caregivers who use expert-guided emotionally absorbing parenting techniques (e.g., Hays 1996). In heterosexual relationships, such ideologies are often reflected

through a gendered division of emotional parenting. For example, Zaman and Fivush (2013) found that when the white middle class parents in their study talked with their children about various emotionally themed events (sad times, happy times, special outings, etc), mothers more frequently helped children understand and talk about various emotions and work through emotional difficulties. Similarly, psychologists have found that fathers are more likely to discount or minimize children's sadness than are mothers, who are more apt to encourage expression (Casano et al. 2007). Thus an inequitable gendered division of labor seems to spill into parental emotional socialization.

Examining the case of mothers who homeschool their children reveals how an emphasis on intensive mothering invokes difficult emotions that must be managed to sustain their efforts and relationship inequality (Lois 2010). Lois reveals, for example, that constant childcare and schooling preparation and the relative lack of help from men fostered frustration that needed to be muted before turning into resentment. As a subculture, homeschoolers developed emotion work strategies emphasizing time, such as imagining themselves in the future feeling nostalgic for their homeschooling days or regret if they gave up, and consciously trying to savor the quality time they presently had. More generally, this study suggests that in order to sustain gender inequality in child-rearing practices, it is important to examine how parents use the larger gendered culture (e.g., ideals of motherhood) in creative ways to feel good.

There are, of course, exceptions to such a traditionally gendered division of emotion labor in families. For example, the young fathers in Henwood and Procter's (2003) study welcomed a "new fatherhood" model that rejected the emotionally detached fathering role of previous generations. Risman and Johnson-Sumerford's (1998) study of families working to be egalitarian found that although a few retained women as the "emotional expert," most men and women engaged in shared or parallel children-centered emotion work. In her study of Guatemalan migrant men, Montes (2013) found that the migration experience allowed the interviewees to transgress gen-



dered emotional norms such as crying in front of family members. Erickson (2005) found that men who identified with more feminine traits were more likely to engage in emotion work in the family than did men who identified with more masculine traits. Thus although research on emotions and family life typically mirrors other forms of gender inequality, the exceptions prove there are alternative paths.

### 19.3.5 Gendered Relationship Satisfaction

Equitable gendered divisions of domestic and emotional labor in heterosexual unions have been associated with overall feelings of relationship satisfaction. Most relevant survey research resonates with Bernard's (1972) classic findings that women are most likely to report negative affect due to relational inequality. For example, in their analysis of trends in marital happiness over the past 30 years, Corra et al. (2009) found that White men have consistently reported the highest degree of happiness, followed by White women, and, until recently, Black men followed by Black women. Lively, Steelman, and Powell (2010) found that one's perception of doing more than one's fair share of household work bolsters feelings of distress, anger, and rage. Thus one's perception of fairness as well as how one is located in other axes of inequality are important to consider when investigating relationship satisfaction.

It is also important to consider how the division of emotion management in intimate relationships shapes satisfaction. Erickson (1993) found that women's feelings of relationship satisfaction is significantly associated with men's emotional support. Minnotte, Pedersen, and Mannon (2010) found that receiving emotion work from a spouse bolsters satisfaction for both men and women. They also found that men's satisfaction increases when they engage in emotion work with children, though it declines when it surpasses the amount performed by their women partners. In a mixed methods, longitudinal study of sexual minority long term relationships, Gottman et al. (2003) found that lesbian couples' marital satisfaction

was associated with a partner's expressions of affection whereas for gay men it was associated with a partner's validation. It thus appears that marital satisfaction is intertwined with complex associations between not only gendered division of domestic and emotion work, but the gendered identities and emotional orientations people bring into their relationships.

### 19.3.6 Emotions and Men's Violence Against Women

Men's violence against women is perhaps the quintessential form of gender inequality, and qualitative and quantitative research reveals it as an emotional processes. Whether domestic or sexual violence, research shows how men's suppression of empathy toward women (Goodrum et al. 2001; Scully 1988) and, more generally, emotional invulnerability is linked to men's violence (Umberson et al. 2003). Survey and interview research furthermore shows that men are most likely to engage in violence against women when their sense of traditional manhood—and its associated privileges—have been threatened (Atkinson et al. 2005; Dobash and Dobash 1998). As Retzinger (1991) shows, violent men often transform their unexpressed shame or embarrassment into rage against women. It is as if men avoid expressing emotions that might place them lower on a relationship hierarchy, and instead express anger and violence to assert control and elevate their authority.

Other gender-related emotional threats also appear to foster men's violence against women. Card and Dahl (2011) found that when a local professional football team had an upset loss, there was a 10% increase in domestic violence in the home team city. Men may experience such unexpected losses as uncontrollable assaults to their masculine pride, and use violence as a compensatory manhood act to reassert control (e.g., Schrock and Schwalbe 2009). On the other hand, researchers suggest that stopping men's violence may involve changing their commitment to patriarchal gender identities and invoking stigma-related shame: "What I don't want to do is make

my child see me as a monster,” said a man in Stanley et al.’s (2012, p. 1312) study. However, studies of batterer intervention programs reveal that efforts to transform convicted batterers into respectful partners often exacerbate gender-based emotional dilemmas that fuel participant resistance (Schrock and Padavic 2007). Overall, we can see here how men’s violence is connected to gendered emotional conditioning and cultural feeling rules and codes of manhood.

Emotions are of course central to women’s experience of abuse as well. Golding (1999) reports in her meta-analysis that such violence results in 48% of abused women reporting depression and 64% experiencing PTSD. Others have found in addition that such victimization triggers self-blame and shame (Beck et al. 2011) and reduced self-efficacy (Umberson et al. 1998). Such emotional difficulties can be passed on to children, especially if they witness the violence and their mothers have PTSD symptoms (Levendosky et al. 2013). After assaulting women, men often try to convince women that they provoked it (Cavanagh et al. 2001) and some women, in turn, blame themselves, stay in abusive relationships, and try to act in a more submissive manner (see e.g., Walker 1979).

Post-violence, women often struggle with how to make sense of themselves as ‘victims’ or ‘survivors,’ which have nuanced consequences regarding the garnering of sympathy and one’s sense of control and self-blame (Leisenring 2006). Victims/survivors may use prayer to manage emotions; by expressing anger *privately* to God and likewise forgiving their abusers they avoid some personal shame as well as upsetting friends and family (Sharp 2010). As Mills and Kleinman (1988) show, some women in abusive relationships may also experience a feeling-state of “numbness” in which they suspend reflexivity yet sometimes experience spontaneous emotion like anger and interpret it as a cue motivating them to leave. Research thus suggests that women in abusive relationships experience negative emotional consequences, which can—depending on how it is managed—keep them under or free them from violent men’s control.

## 19.4 Organizational Life

Work and organizational life is another area of the social world where gendered and emotional processes are constantly being played out. Sociologists of gender have come to view organizations as gendered, meaning that gender shapes identities, ideologies, interactions, and divisions of labor within an organization (Acker 1992). Although research situated most squarely in the tradition of work and occupations has traditionally neglected emotions, it has become more common for researchers to recognize the “emotional organization” (Fineman 2009). And if we broaden our understanding of organizations as not only focused on paid work and we look into emotions and gender scholarship more generally, we find much more work contributing to our understanding of gender, emotion, and organizational life than at first meets the eye. Let us start by discussing organizational socialization, then gender segregated work and emotional cultures, followed by a discussion of variations in gendered emotional work cultures, including how race shapes gendered emotional experiences, emotion rules, and labor.

### 19.4.1 Emotional Socialization in Gendered Organizations

Although women and men beginning a new job may bring some emotional orientations and strategies of emotion management—emotional capital (Cahill 1999)—that help them to adjust to the emotional demands of an organization, new workers often have to learn new emotional norms and management strategies. For example, new medical students have to learn how to become “affectively neutral”—akin to masculine inexpressiveness (Sattel 1976)—in order to deal with potential embarrassment, disgust, or arousal that may accompany their work with living and dead bodies (Smith and Kleinman 1989). Organizations may attempt to transform (or promise to transform) new members’ feelings in ways that benefit organizational goals. For example, Schrock, Holden, and Reid (2004) show how

transgender activists encouraged potential recruits to feel anger instead of shame whenever they encounter transphobic people.

Organizations sometimes draw explicitly on gendered meanings to socialize members into specific emotion cultures. In Wolkomir's (2004) study of a support group for wives of "ex-gay" Christian men, members were taught to cope with their husbands' sexual transgressions by redefining homosexuality as a psychological disorder and emphasizing submission to God rather than to their husbands. In the military, the training of new soldiers is often described as a process that symbolically transforms recruits from boys to men (Barrett 1996). Failure to perform tasks or displays of fear or doubt—a sign that one is not a "real man"—results in physical or verbal punishment. In each of these organizational contexts, new members become acclimated—either through overt or covert practices—to the emotional states and gender identities expected of them.

#### 19.4.2 Gender Segregated Emotional Cultures at Work

Women and men are often segregated into different kinds of work (e.g., Padavic and Reskin 2002) and cultural assumptions surrounding emotions are implicated in the process. For example, women are often funneled into work providing services for customers or higher status (typically male) coworkers because of not only their assumed submissiveness but also their alleged ability to help others feel comfortable and their presumed less intense and more controllable anger. For example, many bosses feel like that they can rely on women as secretaries because they can respectively deal with clients and employees who are angry or emotionally draining (Wichroski 1994). Relatedly, workers in Leidner's (1991) study of fast-food work believed men's alleged quick tempers was why women dominated counter rather than kitchen work. Thus employers may use the cultural coding of women's emotionality to segregate women into lower status and paying jobs.

However, perhaps as theorists emphasizing the emotional consequences of unequal interactional power and status might predict (e.g., Kemper 1978), subordinated service work often invokes frustration and anger in such women workers. Because there are rules prescribing the expression of such emotions in service work, managing such emotions becomes part of the job or "emotional labor" (Hochschild 1983). Although some research suggests that both men and women report agitation at work (Erickson 2005), the conditions under which it arises and is managed is often gendered. As Hochschild pointed out in *The Managed Heart*, women flight attendants often experienced frustration and anger because of the way male passengers altercast them in gendered ways, leading the women to control their anger, as required by management, to try to make passengers feel like they were at home. Women strippers (Barton 2002) and restaurant servers (Leidner 1991) are similarly guided to and motivated (i.e., "tips") to publically repress customer-invoked anger, at least frontstage.

Women's jobs often also emphasize doing emotion work for (primarily male) superiors. In the legal profession, for example, women paralegals generally carefully attend to the emotional needs of trial attorneys, most of whom are men (Pierce 1995). They must stay calm when attorneys lose their temper and serve as emotional "caretakers," withholding criticism and massaging their egos whether they lose or win a case. Women engaging in such emotion work sometimes say they feel good about it because they view it as nurturing, as Kennelly (2006) found in her study of secretaries. Like women's emotion work in the family, women's workplace emotion work is often devalued and invisible to organizations (Wichroski 1994), but its reinforcement of traditional gender ideologies and identities to which they may be attached can foster pride. As Bulan et al. (1997, p. 252) conclude in their survey research on service work emotional labor, "those jobs that offer affective validation of traditionally feminine skills may be perceived as more rewarding to women than those that do not." Emotion norms in work and organizations can thus be used to reaffirm gendered identities,

which may—regardless of intentions—enable some women to “trade power for patronage” (Schwalbe et al. 2000).

In addition to work that positions women as customers’ and coworkers’ helpmates, some types of female-dominated labor is designed to empower women, although this can raise additional emotional dilemmas. For example, advocates for victims of domestic violence are expected to be empathetic and compassionate toward victims, but they often feel anger and frustration when victims re-enter abusive relationships—although such workers may mitigate such feelings by distancing themselves from their work (Powell-Williams et al. 2013). In another study (Kolb 2011), shelter workers invoked sympathy for women seeking help by blaming abusers, but sometimes the clients broke rules or failed to express some fear or anger towards abusers and workers worried they might not be deserving of services (see also Loseke 1992). Similar to women volunteers in homeless shelters (Holden 1997), feeling irritated or angry with clients can then challenge one’s identity as a sympathetic woman/social worker, making one susceptible to topping off the anger with guilt or shame. Thus although women are often socialized to develop gendered emotional capital geared toward caring for others, below the surface such work is embedded in emotional dilemmas that make living up to gendered emotional ideals challenging.

Men are often overrepresented in organizational roles that require them to often engage in emotional labor to suppress empathy with or evoke anger towards subordinates or targets in efforts to control them. Trial lawyers sometimes use intimidation to diminish the credibility of a witness during cross-examination and at other times use “strategic friendless” (Pierce 1995), all in an attempt to control the other. Often superiors will direct male workers to use strategic displays of anger; for example, Hochschild (1983, p. 146) found that a manager at a bill-collecting firm goaded one of his male employees to more aggressively confront debtors by yelling, “Can’t you be a man?” Bill collectors, in turn tried to be more aggressive by imagining debtors as lazy cheaters to evoke some righteous anger.

Green et al. (2010)’s study of the military found organizational feeling rules discouraging the expression of distress or fear, that male soldiers used masculinist camaraderie to manage more troubling emotions, and that such rules and strategies can make seeking help when one needs it extra difficult (see also Holyfield 2011). Police officers, similarly predominantly male, are expected to be stoic and try to avoid expressing feelings in front of other officers because they do not want to be viewed as incompetent (Pogrebin and Poole 1995). Yet as Stenross and Kleinman (1989) found, male detectives often must engage in emotional labor with victims, although they devalued and disliked this gender-discrepant work (see also Martin 1999). As Cohn (1987) shows in her study of defense intellectuals, organizational discourse can limit empathy towards enemies in ways that might otherwise hinder such work—for example using abstractions and euphemisms (e.g. “collateral damage”). Thus male-dominated occupations often develop gendered emotional cultures that better enable conforming men to enact dominance when called to do so by their superiors.

### 19.4.3 Variations in Gendered Emotion Cultures

Examining how both women and men may work in similar jobs with similar emotional demands can also reveal ways in which gender shapes emotional dynamics. Lois found (2001), for example, that members of search and rescue teams had faced similar difficulties, but followed distinct “emotion lines” before, during, and after the rescue missions. For example, the men looked forward to the challenges a mission might entail and thrived on excitement during the mission, whereas the women interpreted their heightened state of alertness during a mission as anxiety and thus expressed more self-doubt in their abilities. Research of men doing women’s work reveals a similar gendering process. For example, male paralegals in Pierce’s (1995) study were not expected to be emotional caretakers for lawyers and male waiters in Hall’s (1993) study were similar-

ly not held to the same standards of friendliness and quasi-flirtation as their female counterparts. Thus cultural notions of gender shape how workers experience and process emotions on the job as well as how customers and superiors expect workers to manage and display emotions.

Understanding how constructions of race are entwined with gender in emotional organizations further reveals the importance of intersectionality. Black men must navigate, for example, the controlling image of the “angry Black man” (Collins 2004). Thus whereas the occasional or strategic expression of anger can be a gender and status confirming act for white men it may not be so for Black men. As Wilkins (2012) shows in her analysis of Black collegiate men on predominantly white campuses, Black men aiming to sustain or achieve middle class status often emphasize emotional restraint, in part by engaging in a colorblind approach to politics and interactions with whites. Backstage, collegiate Black men might turn to each other and cope with the emotional difficulties derived from marginalization by being vulnerable (Jackson 2012) and may even strategically use anger against each other to promote self-presentations aimed largely at making whites feel comfortable (Jackson and Wingfield 2013).

In the corporate world, Wingfield (2010) found that although it was acceptable for White men to express anger, feeling rules were racialized and gendered so that Black men were not allowed to express anger in similar ways. In her analysis of a gender-segregated program for disadvantaged minority youth, Froyum (2013) found that white administrators created the conditions under which Black workers used emotional strategies aimed to support fundraising and making White volunteers and administrators feel comfortable, which reproduced colorblind racism and made their own emotional needs secondary. Such research makes clear that racial identities and ideologies are central yet still too often overlooked components of gendered emotion work in organizations.

Another line of research that implicates emotions in the reproduction of gender inequality focuses on sexual harassment at work. Men’s

harassment of women at work is a form of emotional micropolitics that not only invokes unwanted emotion, but also lowers women’s status relative to men’s (Clark 1990). Women’s place in the organizational hierarchy shapes this process. The combination of economic dependence and expectation of deference in low status service work may allow workplace sexual harassment to be swept under the rug, as Mkono (2010) found in her study of female workers in the hospital industry. Women with more organizational authority, as Sasson-Levy (2003) shows in her study of high ranking women in the Israeli military, often react to sexual harassment by ignoring it or interpreting it as a joke. Sasson-Levy points out that the women had few options that would not discredit them: if they expressed they felt insulted or hurt, they would confirm their position as a gendered subordinate; if they reacted with anger and reported it, they risked being seen as the source of a “gender problem.”

Minority women face additional burdens surrounding harassment. Martin (1994) found that the majority of the harassment Black women police officers deal with was both gender and race-based and carried out by white male coworkers. Challenging it would thus amount to calling attention to both sexism and racism. When they were harassed by Black men, however, they faced an emotional dilemma surrounding whether to fight the sexism or preserve cross-racial solidarity in an environment where racism was pervasive. Overall, research suggests that sexual harassment is not only a form of emotional micropolitics, but also that it generates gendered emotional dilemmas according to one’s place in the organizational hierarchy as well as the racial hierarchy of the larger society.

---

## 19.5 Conclusion

For the past several decades, sociologists have worked diligently to understand how the seemingly biological notions of gender and emotion are thoroughly sociological in nature. Because such scholarship is often fragmented into compartmentalized subfields, however, it has too



often proceeded independently without cross-fertilization. This is somewhat surprising considering the cultural links between gender and emotion that we noted earlier. But if we cast our nets wide enough there in fact is much research that has implications for understanding the links between gender and emotion. As we have shown, emotions appear central to learning to adopt, attribute, signify, and negotiate gender identity and hierarchy across diverse social contexts.

Moving forward requires, at minimum, a sustained questioning of the links between gender and emotion. Sometimes emotions scholars do not seem to ask, "What might gender have to do with this?" and gender scholars neglect to ask, "What might emotions have to do with this?" As our chapter suggests, however, often such work has answers to these unasked questions within reach. Likewise, we hope that gender scholars—like others primarily concerned with other subfields such as social movement research—will work to substantively engage existing research and theorizing on emotions rather than merely invoking emotions in passing, trying to reinvent the wheel, or ignoring emotional implications. Such questions and concerns about the gender-emotion link should be incorporated into the research from beginning to end.

Focusing our attention on the links between gender and emotion opens up many empirical challenges. Avenues for future research might include inquiries into how gendered emotional capital is developed and employed, how emotions are involved in the construction of gender identity, how diverse emotional economies and exchanges work in intimate relationships, and how emotion cultures reproduce or challenge inequalities at work. It is also important to address the interactional give and take of emotional experiences and management and conduct comparative research across situations, settings, and temporal periods. Another challenge is to continue to devise research that fosters analyses of not only gender, but also how race, class, sexuality, age, and ablebodiedness may be intertwined with emotions and inequality.

As the chapters of this and previous Handbooks show, emotions research has diversified and developed new theoretical approaches. Although it is useful for scholars to specialize in particular approaches to advance emotions research, boundaries can become so thick that it may be difficult to see beyond them. Yet much groundbreaking work on emotions links various universes of discourse. We have surely come a long way since sociologists first argued that both emotions and gender scholarship deserved a place at the sociological table. Yet it seems to us that we are still merely at the cusp of integration.

---

## References

- Acker, J. (1990). Hierarchies, jobs, bodies: A theory of gendered organizations. *Gender and Society, 4*(2), 139–158.
- Acker, J. (1992). From sex roles to gendered institutions. *Contemporary Sociology, 21*(5), 565–569.
- Adler, P. A., Kless, S. J., & Adler, P. (1992). Socialization to gender roles: Popularity among elementary school boys and girls. *Sociology of Education, 65*(3), 169–187.
- Atkinson, M. P., Greenstein, T. N., & Lang, M. M. (2005). For women, breadwinning can be dangerous: Gendered resource theory and wife abuse. *Journal of Marriage and Family, 67*(5), 1137–1148.
- Barrett, F. J. (1996). The organizational construction of hegemonic masculinity: The case of the US Navy. *Gender, Work and Organization, 3*(3), 129–142.
- Bartky, S. L. (1990). *Femininity and domination: Studies in the phenomenology of oppression*. New York City: Routledge.
- Barton, B. (2002). Dancing on the Möbius strip: Challenging the sex war paradigm. *Gender and Society, 16*(5), 585–602.
- Beck, J. G., et al. (2011). Exploring negative emotion in women experiencing intimate partner violence: Shame, guilt, and PTSD. *Behavior Therapy, 42*(4), 740–750.
- Benjamin, O. (2003). The power of unsilencing: Between silence and negotiation in heterosexual relationships. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 33*(1), 1–19.
- Bernard, J. S. (1972). *The future of marriage*. New York City: World Pub.
- Bulan, H. F., Erickson, R. J., & Wharton, A. S. (1997). Doing for others on the job: The affective requirements of service work, gender, and emotional well-being. *Social Problems, 44*, 235.
- Brownmiller, S. (1984). *Femininity*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Burke, P. J. (1991). Identity processes and social stress. *American Sociological Review, 56*(6), 836–849.

- Caill, S. E. (1986). Language practices and self definition: The case of gender identity acquisition. *Sociological Quarterly*, 27(3), 295–311.
- Caill, S. E. (1999). Emotional capital and professional socialization: The case of mortuary science students (and me). *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 62(2), 101–116.
- Cancian, F. M., & Gordon, S. L. (1988). Changing emotion norms in marriage: Love and anger in U.S. Women's magazines since 1900. *Gender and Society*, 2(3), 308–342.
- Card, D., & Dahl, G. B. (2011). Family violence and football: The effect of unexpected emotional cues on violent behavior. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 126(1), 103–143.
- Cassano, M., Perry-Parrish, C., & Zeman, J. (2007). Influence of gender on parental socialization of children's sadness regulation. *Social Development*, 16(2), 210–231.
- Cavanagh, K., Dobash, R. E., Dobash, R. P., & Lewis, R. (2001). 'Remedial Work': Men's strategic responses to their violence against intimate female partners. *Sociology*, 35(3), 695–714.
- Chaplin, T. M., Casey, J., Sinha, R., & Mayes, L. C. (2010). Gender differences in caregiver emotion socialization of low-income toddlers. *New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development*, 2010(128), 11–27.
- Chin, T. (2000). 'Sixth Grade Madness' parental emotion work in the private high school application process. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 29(2), 124–163.
- Clark, C. (1990). Emotions and micropolitics in everyday life: Some patterns and paradoxes of 'Place.' In T. Kemper (Ed.), *Research agendas in the sociology of emotions* (pp. 305–333). Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Cohn, C. (1987). Sex and death in the rational world of defense intellectuals. *Signs*, 12(4), 687–718.
- Collins, P. H. (1989). The social construction of black feminist thought. *Signs*, 14(4), 745–773.
- Collins, P. H. (2004). *Black sexual politics: African Americans, gender, and the new racism*. New York City: Routledge.
- Coltrane, S., & Adams, M. (1997). Children and gender. In T. Arendell (Ed.), *Contemporary parenting: Challenges and issues, Understanding families* (Vol. 9, pp. 219–253). Thousand Oaks: Sage
- Condry, J., & Condry, S. (1976). Sex differences: A study of the eye of the beholder. *Child Development*, 47(3), 812–819.
- Cooley, C. H. (1992). *Human nature and the social order*. Piscataway: Transaction Publishers.
- Corra, M., Carter, S. K., Carter, S. J., & David, K. (2009). Trends in marital happiness by gender and race, 1973 to 2006. *Journal of Family Issues*, 30(10), 1379–1404.
- de Beauvoir, S. (2009). *The second sex*. New York City: Random House LLC.
- Devault, M. L. (1999). Comfort and struggle: Emotion work in family life. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 561(1), 52–63.
- Dobash, R. E., & Dobash, R. (1998). *Rethinking violence against women*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Elliott, S., & Umberson, D. (2008). The performance of desire: Gender and sexual negotiation in long-term marriages. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 70(2), 391–406.
- Emslie, C., et al. (2009). 'Getting Through' not 'going Under': A qualitative study of gender and spousal support after diagnosis with colorectal cancer. *Social Science and Medicine*, 68(6), 1169–1175.
- Erickson, R. J. (1993). Reconceptualizing family work: The effect of emotion work on perceptions of marital quality. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 55(4), 888–900.
- Erickson, R. J. (2005). Why emotion work matters: Sex, gender, and the division of household labor. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 67(2), 337–351.
- Ezzell, M. B. (2009). 'Barbie Dolls' on the pitch: identity work, defensive othering, and inequality in women's rugby. *Social Problems*, 56(1), 111–131.
- Feagin, J. R. (1991). The continuing significance of race: Antiracial discrimination in public places. *American Sociological Review*, 56(1), 101–116.
- Ferguson, A. A. (2001). *Bad boys: Public schools in the making of black masculinity*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Fineman, S. (2009). *The emotional organization: Passions and power*. Hoboken: Wiley.
- Fivush, R., Brotman, M. A., & Buckner, J. P. (2000). Gender differences in parent-child emotion narratives. *Sex Roles*, 42(3/4), 233–253.
- Fordham, S. (1993). 'Those Loud Black Girls': (Black) women, silence, and gender 'passing' in the academy. *Anthropology and Education Quarterly*, 24(1), 3–32.
- Frith, H. (2013). Labouring on orgasms: Embodiment, efficiency, entitlement and obligations in heterosexual. *Culture, Health and Sexuality*, 15(4), 494–510.
- Froyum, C. (2010). The reproduction of inequalities through emotional capital: The case of socializing low-income black girls. *Qualitative Sociology*, 33(1), 37–54.
- Froyum, C. (2013). 'For the Betterment of Kids Who Look Like Me': Professional emotional labour as a racial project. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 36(6), 1070–1089.
- Garrett-Peters, P., Mills-Koonce, R., Adkins, D., Vernon-Feagans, L., & Cox, M. (2008). Early environmental correlates of maternal emotion talk. *Parenting: Science and Practice*, 8(2), 117–152.
- Golding, J. M. (1999). Intimate partner violence as a risk factor for mental disorders: A meta-analysis. *Journal of Family Violence*, 14(2), 99–132.
- Goodrum, S., Umberson, D., & Anderson, K. L. (2001). The Batterer's view of the self and others in domestic violence. *Sociological Inquiry*, 71(2), 221–240.
- Gordon, S. (1990). Social structural effects on emotions. In T. Kemper (Ed.), *Research agendas in the sociology of emotions*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Gottman, J. M., Levenson, R., Gross, J., Frederickson, B., McCoy, K., Rosenthal, L., Ruef, A., & Yoshimoto, D. (2003). Correlates of gay and lesbian couples' relation-

- ship satisfaction and relationship dissolution. *Journal of Homosexuality*, 45(1), 23–43.
- Gray, R. E., Fitch, M., Phillips, C., Labrecque, M., & Fergus, K. (2000). To tell or not to tell: Patterns of disclosure among men with prostate cancer. *Psychoncology*, 9(4), 273–282.
- Green, K. T., Calhoun, P. S., Dennis, M. F., & Beckham, J. C. (2010). Exploration of the resilience construct in posttraumatic stress disorder severity and functional correlates in military combat veterans who have served since September 11, 2001. *The Journal of Clinical Psychiatry*, 71(07), 823–830.
- Hall, E. J. (1993). Smiling, deferring, and flirting doing gender by giving ‘Good Service’. *Work and Occupations*, 20(4), 452–471.
- Hays, S. (1996). *The cultural contradictions of motherhood*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Henwood, K., & Procter, J. (2003). The ‘Good Father’: Reading men’s accounts of paternal involvement during the transition to first-time fatherhood. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 42(3), 337–355.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1983). *The managed heart: Commercialization of human feeling*. Berkeley: University California Press.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1990). Ideology and emotion management: A perspective and path for future research. In T. Kemper (Ed.), *Research agendas in the sociology of emotions* (pp. 117–142). Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Hochschild, A. R., & Machung, A. (1989). *The second shift*. New York City: Viking.
- Holden, D. (1997). ‘On Equal Ground’ sustaining virtue among volunteers in a homeless shelter. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 26(2), 117–145.
- Holyfield, L. (2011). *Veterans’ journeys home: Life after Afghanistan and Iraq*. Boulder: Paradigm.
- Howard, J. A., & Hollander, J. A. (1997). *Gendered situations, gendered selves: A gender lens on social psychology*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Jackson, S., & Scott, S. (2007). Faking like a woman? Towards an interpretive theorization of sexual pleasure. *Body & Society*, 13(2), 95–116.
- Jackson, B. A. (2012). Bonds of brotherhood emotional and social support among college black men. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 642(1), 61–71.
- Jackson, B. A., & Wingfield, A. H. (2013). Getting angry to get ahead: black college men, emotional performance, and encouraging respectable masculinity. *Symbolic Interaction*, 36(3), 275–292.
- Kane, E. W. (2006). ‘No Way My Boys Are Going to Be Like That!’ parents’ responses to children’s gender non-conformity. *Gender and Society*, 20(2), 149–176.
- Kemper, T. D. (1978). *A social interactional theory of emotions*. New York City: Wiley.
- Kennelly, I. (2006). Secretarial work, nurturing, and the ethic of service. *NWSA Journal*, 18(2), 170–192.
- Kolb, K. (2011). Sympathy work: Identity and emotion management among victim-advocates and counselors. *Qualitative Sociology*, 34(1), 101–119.
- Kompter, A. (1989). Hidden power in marriage. *Gender and Society*, 3(2), 187–216.
- Kornrich, S., Brines, J., & Leupp, K. (2013). Egalitarianism, housework, and sexual frequency in marriage. *American Sociological Review*, 78(1), 26–50.
- Kroska, A. (1997). The division of labor in the home: A review and reconceptualization. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 60(4), 304–322.
- Kroska, A. (2004). Divisions of domestic work revising and expanding the theoretical explanations. *Journal of Family Issues*, 25(7), 890–922.
- Kuebli, J., & Fivush, R. (1992). Gender differences in parent-child conversations about past emotions. *Sex Roles*, 27(11-12), 683–698.
- Lareau, A. (2003). *Unequal childhoods: Class, race, and family life*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Lashbrook, J. T. (2000). Fitting in: Exploring the emotional dimension of adolescent peer pressure. *Adolescence*, 35(140), 747–757.
- Legenski, E. M., & Cornwall, M. (2010). Working-class job loss, gender, and the negotiation of household labor. *Gender and Society*, 24(4), 447–474.
- Leidner, R. (1991). Serving hamburgers and selling insurance: Gender, work, and identity in interactive service jobs. *Gender and Society*, 5(2), 154–177.
- Leisenring, A. (2006). Confronting ‘Victim’ discourses: The identity work of battered women. *Symbolic Interaction*, 29(3), 307–330.
- Levendosky, A. A., Bogat, G. A. & Cecilia, M.-T. (2013). PTSD symptoms in young children exposed to intimate partner violence. *Violence against women*, 19(2), 187–201.
- Lively, K. (2008). Emotional segues and the management of emotion by women and men. *Social Forces*, 87(2), 911–936.
- Lively, K. J., Steelman, L. C., & Powell, B. (2010). Equity, emotion, and household division of labor response. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 73(4), 358–379.
- Lodge, A. C., & Umberson, D. (2012). All shook up: Sexuality of mid- to later life married couples. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 74(3), 428–443.
- Lois, J. (2001). Peaks and valleys: The gendered emotional culture of edgework. *Gender and Society*, 15(3), 381–406.
- Lois, J. (2010). The temporal emotion work of motherhood homeschoolers’ strategies for managing time shortage. *Gender and Society*, 24(4), 421–446.
- Lorentzen, J. (2007). Masculinities and the phenomenology of men’s orgasms. *Men and Masculinities*, 10(1), 71–84.
- Loseke, D. R. (1992). *The battered woman and shelters: The social construction of wife abuse*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Lutz, C. (1996). Engendered emotion: Gender, power, and the rhetoric of emotional control in American discourse. In R. Harre & W. G. Parrott (Eds.), *The emotions: social, cultural and biological dimensions* (pp. 151–170). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Maccoby, E. (1998). *The two sexes: Growing up apart, coming together*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

- Martin, S. E. (1994). 'Outsider Within' the station house: the impact of race and gender on black women police. *Social Problems, 41*(3), 383–400.
- Martin, S. E. (1999). Police force or police service? Gender and emotional labor. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 561*(1), 111–126.
- Mannino, C. A., & Deutsch, F. M. (2007). Changing the division of household labor: A negotiated process between partners. *Sex Roles, 56*(5–6), 309–324.
- McGuffey, C. S. (2005). Engendering trauma race, class, and gender reaffirmation after child sexual abuse. *Gender and Society, 19*(5), 621–643.
- McGuffey, C. S., & Rich, B. L. (1999). Playing in the gender transgression zone: Race, class, and hegemonic masculinity in middle childhood. *Gender and Society, 13*(5), 608–627.
- Messner, M. (1990). Boyhood, organized sports, and the construction of masculinities. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 18*(4), 416–444.
- Mills, T., & Kleinman, S. (1988). Emotions, reflexivity, and action: An interactionist analysis. *Social Forces, 66*(4), 1009.
- Minnotte, K. L., Pedersen, D., & Mannon, S. E. (2010). The emotional terrain of parenting and marriage: Emotion work and marital satisfaction. *The Social Science Journal, 47*(4), 747–761.
- Mkono, M. (2010). Zimbabwean hospitality students' experiences of sexual harassment in the hotel industry. *International Journal of Hospitality Management, 29*(4), 729–735.
- Montes, V. (2013). The role of emotions in the construction of masculinity: Guatemalan migrant men, transnational migration, and family relations. *Gender and Society, 27*(4), 469–490.
- Moscovici, S. (1984). The phenomenon of social representations. In R. M. Farr & S. Moscovici (Eds.), *Social representations* (Vol. 3). New York City: Cambridge University Press.
- Padavic, I., & Reskin, B. F. (2002). *Sociology for a new century: Women and men at work* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Parmley, M., & Cunningham, J. G. (2008). Children's gender-emotion stereotypes in the relationship of anger to sadness and fear. *Sex Roles, 58*(5-6), 358–370.
- Pfeffer, C. A. (2010). 'Women's work'? Women partners of transgender men doing housework and emotion work. *Journal of Marriage and Family, 72*(1), 165–183.
- Pierce, J. L. (1995). *Gender trials: Emotional lives in contemporary law firms*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Plant, E. A., Kling, K. C., & Smith, G. L. (2004). The influence of gender and social role on the interpretation of facial expressions. *Sex Roles, 51*(3/4), 187–196.
- Pogrebin, M., & Poole, E. (1995). Emotion management: A study of police response to tragic events. In D. D. Franks, M. G. Glaherty, & C. Ellis (Eds.), *Social perspectives on emotion* (pp. 148–169). Greenwich: JAI.
- Pomerleau, A., Bolduc, D., Malcuit, G., & Cossette, L. (1990). Pink or Blue: Environmental gender stereotypes in the first two years of life. *Sex Roles, 22*(5-6), 359–367.
- Powell-Williams, M., White, S. D., & Todd, P.-W. (2013). 'I Help the Ones That Want Help': Emotion work and the victim advocate role. *Sociological Spectrum, 33*(3), 258–275.
- Pyke, K. D. (1996). Class-based masculinities: The interdependence of gender, class, and interpersonal power. *Gender and Society, 10*(5), 527–549.
- Retzinger, S. M. (1991). *Violent emotions: Shame and rage in marital quarrels*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Risman, B. J., & Johnson-Sumerford, D. (1998). Doing it fairly: A study of postgender marriages. *Journal of Marriage and Family, 60*(1), 23–40.
- Russell, J. A., & Widen, S. C. (2002). Words versus faces in evoking children's knowledge of the causes of emotions. *International Journal of Behavioral Development, 39*(2), 97–103.
- Russell, J. A., & Fehr, B. (1988). The role of context in interpreting facial expression-reply. *Journal of Experimental Psychology-General, 117*(1), 89–90.
- Sasson-Levy, O. (2003). Feminism and Military Gender Practices: Israeli Women Soldiers in "Masculine" roles. *Sociological Inquiry, 73*(3), 440–465.
- Sattel, J. W. (1976). The inexpressive male: Tragedy or sexual politics? *Social Problems, 23*(4), 469–477.
- Schmalz, D. L., & Kerstetter, D. L. (2006). Girlie girls and manly men: Children's stigma consciousness of gender in sports and physical activities. *Journal of Leisure Research, 38*(4), 536–557.
- Schrock, D. P., & Padavic, I. (2007). Negotiating hegemonic masculinity in a batterer intervention program. *Gender and Society, 21*(5), 625–649.
- Schrock, D., Holden, D., & Reid, L. (2004). Creating emotional resonance: interpersonal emotion work and motivational framing in a transgender community. *Social Problems, 51*(1), 61.
- Schalbe, M., & Mason-Schrock, D. (1996). Identity work as group process. In B. Markovsky, M. Lovaglia, & R. Simon (Eds.), *Advances in group processes* (pp. 113–147). Greenwich: JAI.
- Schalbe, M., Holden, D., Schrock, D., Godwin, S., Thompson, S., & Wolkomir, M. (2000). Generic processes in the reproduction of inequality: an interactionist analysis. *Social Forces, 79*(2), 419–452.
- Schrock, D., Schalbe, M. (2009). Men, masculinity, and manhood acts. *Annual Review of Sociology, 35*, 277–295.
- Schwartz, P. (1995). *Love between equals: How peer marriage really works*. New York City: Simon and Schuster.
- Scully, D. (1988). Convicted rapists' perception of self and victim: Role taking and emotions. *Gender & Society, 2*(2), 200–213.
- Sharp, S. (2010). How does prayer help manage emotions? *Social Psychology Quarterly, 73*(4), 417–437.
- Shaw, S. M. (2008). Family leisure and changing ideologies of parenthood. *Sociology Compass, 2*(2), 688–703.
- Shields, S. A. (2002). *Speaking from the heart: Gender and the social meaning of emotion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.



- Shott, S. (1979). Emotion and social life: A symbolic interactionist analysis. *American Journal of Sociology*, 84(6), 1317–1334.
- Smith, A. C., & Kleinman, S. (1989). Managing emotions in medical school: Students' contacts with the living and the dead. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 52(1), 56–69.
- Simon, R. W., & Nath, L. E. (2004). Gender and emotion in the United States: Do men and women differ in self-reports of feelings and expressive behavior? *American Journal of Sociology*, 109(5), 1137–1176.
- Simon, R. W., Eder, D., & Evans, C. (1992). The development of feeling norms underlying romantic love among adolescent females. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 55(1), 29–46.
- Stacey, J., & Thorne, B. (1985). The missing feminist revolution in sociology. *Social Problems*, 32(4), 301–316.
- Stanley, N., Fell, B., Miller, P., Thomson, G., & Watson, J. (2012). Men's talk men's understandings of violence against women and motivations for change. *Violence against women*, 18(11), 1300–1318.
- Stenross, B., & Kleinman, S. (1989). The highs and lows of emotional labor: Detectives' encounters with criminals and victims. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 17(4), 435–452.
- Stryker, S. (1987). Identity theory: Developments and extensions. In K. Yardley & T. Honess (Eds.), *Self and identity: Psychosocial perspectives* (pp. 89–103). Oxford: Wiley.
- Thoits, P. A. (1986). Social support as coping assistance. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, 54(4), 416–423.
- Tichenor, V. (2005). Maintaining men's dominance: Negotiating identity and power when she earns more. *Sex Roles*, 53(3–4), 191–205.
- Umberson, D., Anderson, K., Glick, J., & Shapiro, A. (1998). Domestic violence, personal control, and gender. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 60(2), 442–452.
- Umberson, D., Anderson, K. L., Williams, K., & Chen, M. D. (2003). Relationship dynamics, emotion state, and domestic violence: A stress and masculinities perspective. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 65(1), 233–247.
- Vaccaro, C. A., Schrock, D. P., & McCabe, J. M. (2011). Managing emotional manhood: fighting and fostering fear in mixed martial arts. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 74(4), 414–437.
- Walker, L. E. (1979). *The battered woman*. New York City: Harper and Row.
- West, C., & Zimmerman, D. H. (1987). Doing gender. *Gender and Society*, 1(2), 125–151.
- Wichroski, M. (1994). The secretary: Invisible labor in the world of women. *Human Organization*, 53(1), 33–41.
- Wilkins, A. (2012). 'Not Out to Start a Revolution' race, gender, and emotional restraint among black university men. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 41(1), 34–65.
- Wingfield, A. H. (2010). Are some emotions marked 'Whites Only'? Racialized feeling rules in professional workplaces. *Social Problems*, 57(2), 251–268.
- Wolkomir, M. (2004). 'Giving It up to God': Negotiating femininity in support groups for wives of ex-gay christian men. *Gender and Society*, 18(6), 735–755.
- Yoo, G. J., Aviv, C., Levine, E. G., Ewing, C., & Au, A. (2010). Emotion work: Disclosing cancer. *Supportive Care in Cancer*, 18(2), 205–215.
- Zaman, W., & Fivush, R. (2013). Gender differences in elaborative parent-child emotion and play narratives. *Sex Roles*, 68(9–10), 591–604.



Robin W. Simon

## 20.1 Introduction

From its inception as an academic discipline, one of the core goals of sociology has been to elucidate the link between individuals' various social positions in society or *social statuses* and their private feelings, emotional behavior and mental health. Indeed, in what is arguably the first sociological study, Emile Durkheim (1897) used sociodemographic data from death certificates to document social status differences in rates of suicide among adults in nineteenth century France—which he attributed to social status differences in normative regulation, social integration and feelings of anomie. Although he did not have data on deceased individuals' prior emotional states, Durkheim theorized that men, non-married persons and Protestants were more likely than women, married people, Catholics and Jews to kill themselves because they were subjected to less normative regulation and experienced greater feelings of anomie and social isolation.

Since the time of Durkheim's classic study, sociologists have continued documenting social status variations in mental health and emotion, and they have developed sophisticated method-

ologies for capturing individuals' inner feelings, outward expressive behavior and emotional well-being/distress as well as nuanced theories for explaining the social patterning of mental health and emotions the population. Interest in this and closely related topics escalated in the 1970s and 1980s and culminated in the formation of the American Sociological Association's (ASA) section on emotions in 1987. The new section provided opportunities for the exchange of ideas among scholars working on similar topics and resulted in major methodological, theoretical and substantive advances. Five years later, the ASA formed the section on mental health, which also ushered in a period of significant progress in our understanding of the social determinants of emotional well-being and distress. To date, there has been considerable theory and empirical work on social status—particularly gender, marital status and socioeconomic status—differences in mental health and emotion.

Although these two areas of sociology have different theoretical traditions, there is considerable substantive, methodological and theoretical overlap between the sociologies of “emotion” and “mental health.” Sociologists of both emotion and mental health emphasize the social structural, sociocultural and social psychological roots of social status differences in subjectively experienced feelings, outward affective behavior and emotional well-being/distress. They also argue that people's feelings and expressions are influenced by the larger social, economic, and cultural context surrounding them. Additionally, while they

---

I am grateful to Jan Stets and Jonathon Turner for inviting me to contribute to this volume and for their suggestions for and patience receiving my chapter.

---

R. W. Simon (✉)  
Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, USA  
e-mail: simonr@gmail.com

specify somewhat different underlying processes that produce status differences in feelings and affective behavior, sociologists of mental health and emotion contend that persons who possess advantaged social statuses in society tend to enjoy more frequent positive emotions and higher levels of emotional well-being than people who hold disadvantaged statuses. Sociological theories about mental health tend to attribute social status differences in emotional well-being/distress to social group differences in exposure and vulnerability to social stress. In contrast, sociological theories about emotion argue that people's feelings—both positive and negative—emerge in social interaction with others and that they often manipulate or “manage” their emotions and/or expressions in order to conform to cultural emotion norms. Overall, by identifying macro- and meso-level social causes of micro-level emotional processes, theory and research on status differences in emotion and mental health represent the unique strength of the sociological perspective.

In this chapter, I provide an overview of scholarship on gender, marital status and socioeconomic status differences in emotion and emotional well-being/distress among adults in the United States, highlighting important methodological innovations, major substantive findings and key theoretical developments that have emerged in the sociologies of mental health and emotions from the late 1970s to the present. Although there is a great deal of overlap between the experience and expression of *emotion* and *emotional well-being/distress* (see Simon 2007 and Simon and Lively 2010 for elaborate discussions of the similarities between these concepts), I use the term “emotion” to refer to discrete feelings (e.g., sadness, happiness and anger) and use the term “emotional well-being/distress” to refer to a constellation of emotions or feeling states such as depression. The organization of the chapter is as follows: I first describe findings on the social distribution of mental health and emotions by gender, marital status and socioeconomic status. I then discuss hypotheses and theories from the sociologies of mental health and emotions that help explain these observed patterns as well as recent attempts to integrate the theoretical perspectives from the sociologies

of mental health and emotions. Finally, I point to some important gaps in knowledge about and compelling topics for, future research on social status variations in the experience and expression of emotion and emotional well-being/distress.

---

## 20.2 Research on Social Status Differences in Mental Health and Emotion

### 20.2.1 Gender Variation in Emotion and Emotional Well-Being/Distress

One of the most consistent social status differences in emotion and emotional well-being/distress that has emerged from sociological scholarship is the gender difference in subjectively experienced feelings, expressive behavior as well as mental health problems among adults in the U.S. Decades of research based on community and national surveys since the 1970s repeatedly find that women report significantly more symptoms of depression than do men (see Rosenfield and Mouzon 2013; Simon 2014a, b for recent reviews). Similar to sociological studies of other social status variations in mental health and emotion (e.g., marital and socioeconomic status differences), these findings tend to be based on symptom scales such as the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D, Radloff 1977) and the Symptom Checklist—90 (SCL-90, Derogotis and Cleary 1977), which have high reliability and validity in general population surveys. Depending on the study, respondents report how often in the past week, month, 6 months, or year they experienced somatic (e.g., appetite and sleep) problems as well as feelings of sadness, worthlessness and hopelessness.

Epidemiological studies of the incidence and prevalence of psychiatric disorders among adults living in the community over the same period of time report similar findings to those described above (Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend 1976; Kessler 2013). This research also indicates that women have higher rates of anxiety and meet criteria for affective disorders at a rate that is double

that of men (Kessler 2013). These findings are based on valid and reliable categorical measures such as those from the Composite International Diagnostic Interview (CIDI, Kessler 2013) in which trained interviewers assess respondents' symptoms of recent and lifetime mental health problems based on criteria from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Computer algorithms translate these symptom responses into the presence or absence of recent and lifetime psychiatric disorders. Although sociologists of mental health continue to debate about the best way to measure mental health problems in the general population of adults (see the 2002 special issue of the *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* devoted to this issue), there is close correspondence between the findings from symptom scales and categorical measures of depression with respect to gender (as well as marital and socioeconomic status) differences in mental health. Psychologists report similar findings on the relationship between gender and depression in the U.S. as well (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema 2001).

The female excess of depressed affect in the U.S. is an intractable, recalcitrant and highly complex social problem that has personal and society-wide impacts. Not only is depression the leading cause of disease-related disability among women but it is associated with a host of other adverse social and economic consequences for themselves, their families and their communities (World Health Organization 2000).

Recognizing that depression is only one of many dimensions of emotional well-being/distress (see Simon 2007 for a review), researchers over the past two decades have also assessed gender differences in the experience of "everyday" negative and positive emotions. These studies tend to be based on self-reports of the frequency with which respondents experienced a number discrete feelings in the past week or month, including some of the same emotions used in symptom checklists for depression, anxiety and generalized emotional distress. Paralleling findings for depressed affect and anxiety, these studies reveal that women report significantly more frequent negative emotions (including anger, sadness and anxiety) as well as significantly

fewer positive emotions (such as happiness and calm) than do men (Ross and Van Willigen 1996; Simon and Nath 2004; Simon and Lively 2010; Stevenson and Wolfers 2009, but also see Yang 2008 for an exception). The gender gap in these indicators of emotional well-being/distress represents a challenging paradox for gender and mental health scholars across many disciplines who assumed there would be greater gender parity in mental health as women's social roles and social relationships began to resemble those of men (Simon 2014a).

However, at the same time that research finds a gender difference in the experience of positive and negative feelings, one study also reveals that when the frequency of *both* negative and positive emotions is included in a summary measure of emotional experience, there is *no* significant gender difference in the frequency of subjectively experienced feelings (Simon and Nath 2004). The latter finding is noteworthy because it belies widespread beliefs that have long been part of Americans' emotion culture about women's heightened emotionality and men's emotional reserve or stoicism (Balswick 1988; Brody 2001). Because most sociological research on mental health focuses on measures of *emotional distress* (which include the experience of an array of negative feelings) rather than on measures of *emotional well-being* (which include the experience of an array of positive feelings), studies that assess gender differences in the experience of both negative and positive emotions are a much needed addition to our understanding of gender differences in affect. An important limitation of mental health research is that researchers often assume that the absence of symptoms of emotional distress is an indication of emotional well-being—an assumption that should be subjected to empirical tests in surveys that include measures of emotional well-being as well as measures of emotional distress.

Although there is no evidence that women are more *emotional* than men in the U.S., there is evidence that they are more likely than their male counterparts to openly express their feelings. Studies of gender differences in coping with stressful life experiences find that men tend

to have an inexpressive coping style and are more likely to control or suppress their feelings. In contrast, women tend to have an expressive coping style and seek emotional support (Simon and Nath 2004; Thoits 1991). Though not yet explored, gender differences in emotional expressiveness may only apply to negative emotions. That is, it is possible that there is no gender difference in the expression of positive feelings—another important topic that warrants future research.

Adding to these observations, research on mental health further finds that while women have higher rates of affective disorders (and their psychological corollaries of symptoms of depression and anxiety), men have higher rates of antisocial personality and substance disorders (and their psychological corollaries of antisocial behavior and substance problems) (Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend 1976). The National Comorbidity Survey Replication indicates that 29% of women and 18% of men suffer from depression sometime in their lives, whereas 35% of men and 18% of women abuse substances during their lifetime (Kessler 2013). Interestingly, research on adolescent mental health echoes these findings for adults. By mid- to late-adolescence, girls report more depressive symptoms and boys report more symptoms of substance problems and anti-social behavior (Hagan and Foster 2003; Rosenfield et al. 2005). Psychologists have also documented these gendered patterns of emotional distress (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema 2012). These findings represent a challenge to extant theories about the etiology of social status differences in mental health and emotion that emphasize the social structural rather than the sociocultural roots of gender differences in affect—a point to which I will return.

Overall, on the basis of these findings, sociologists have concluded while there are gender differences in the prevalence of specific types of mental health problems, there are *no* gender differences in the *overall* prevalence of mental health problems in the U.S. Females tend to express emotional distress with *internalizing* problems including depression, whereas males tend to express emotional distress with *externalizing* problems such as substance abuse.

Interestingly, sociologists are beginning to examine the links between male and female typical *mental health* problems and male and female typical *physical health* problems. A recent study (Needham and Hill 2010) showed that internalizing emotional problems are closely associated with chronic health conditions such as arthritis, headaches and seasonal allergies, which more common among women. In contrast, externalizing mental health problems are closely associated with life threatening health conditions such as stroke, heart disease and high blood pressure, which are more common among men. This study also revealed that gender differences in the expression of emotional upset vis-à-vis internalizing and externalizing emotional problems help explain gender differences in physical health problems among adults. In other words, gendered responses to stress may provide clues into the etiology of differences in the *types* of physical health problems experienced by males and females in the U.S.

Overall, the past several decades of sociological research on mental health and emotion has produced a rich and extensive body of work on gender differences in emotional experience, expressive behavior and emotional well-being/distress among adults in the U.S. While I have highlighted *differences* between women and men, numerous studies have also examined differences in mental health and emotion *among* women and *among* men. Much of the observed *within gender* variation is due to marital status differences in mental health and emotion.

### 20.2.2 Marital Status Variations in Emotion and Emotional Well-Being/Distress

Sociologists have also produced an extensive and impressive body of empirical work on the relationships among marital status, emotion and emotional well-being/distress. In fact, one of the most oft-cited findings from the sociologies of mental health and emotions since the 1970s is that marriage is associated with significantly higher levels of emotional well-being and significantly lower levels of emotional distress. For example,

studies that compare the mental health of married and non-married individuals repeatedly find that the married report lower levels of depression and generalized distress than their non-married (including never- and previously-married) counterparts (see Simon 2014a; Umberson et al. 2013 for recent reviews). This robust finding is evident in community and national samples, cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses as well as across a variety of household types. Although the marital status disparity in mental health is greater between currently married and formerly married people than between currently married and never married persons, it appears that marriage confers an emotional advantage for adults in the U.S.

Moreover, while earlier studies focused on marital status differences in symptoms of depression and non-specific psychological distress (e.g., Kessler and McRae 1984; Marks and Lambert 1998; Menaghan 1989; Pearlin and Johnson 1977; Thoits 1986), the past two decades of research on this topic has expanded its focus to include additional dimensions of mental health—including substance problems as well as the frequency of negative and positive affect. This research documents that in addition to reporting significantly fewer symptoms of depression and generalized distress, the married report significantly less substance problems, significantly less frequent negative emotions (including anger) and in some studies significantly more frequent positive emotions (e.g., happiness) than their non-married peers (Caputo and Simon 2013; Simon 2002; Simon and Nath 2004; Umberson et al. 1996; Williams 2003). Here again, the findings based on symptom scales and discrete feelings parallel epidemiological studies, which find lower prevalence rates of almost all psychiatric disorders including affective substance disorders among married than non-married adults in the U.S. (e.g., Williams et al. 1992).

However, although these patterns are unequivocal, the direction of the marital status-mental health association has long been a topic of debate. While most sociologists agree that social causation is responsible for married persons' relatively more frequent positive feelings and greater emotional well-being, some concede that social

selection may underlie the link between marital status, mental health and emotion. In contrast to the social causation hypothesis, which argues that marriage improves mental health, the social selection hypothesis posits that persons who enjoy more frequent positive feelings and higher levels of emotional well-being are more likely than persons who experience more frequent negative emotions and greater emotional distress to become (and remain) married in the first place. Because earlier studies on this topic tended to be based on cross-sectional data, they were unable to adjudicate between these two competing hypotheses about the relationships between marriage, mental health and emotion.

#### **20.2.2.1 Social Causation or Social Selection? Marital Transitions, Emotion and Mental Health**

Over the past 20 years, sociologists have evaluated the social causation and selection hypotheses by assessing the degree to which marital status transitions result in *changes* in emotion and mental health. This research also examines whether individuals' prior emotional states predict marital status change over time. Several longitudinal studies find that becoming married (and remarried) results in a significant decrease in negative feelings as well as symptoms of depression and substance abuse. In contrast, becoming divorced and widowed results in a significant increase in negative feelings and these symptoms of emotional distress (Barrett 2000; Booth and Amato 1991; Caputo and Simon 2013; Marks and Lambert 1998; Simon 2002; Umberson et al. 1996; Wheaton 1990; Williams 2003).

These findings clearly support the social causation hypothesis of the relationships among marital status, mental health and emotion. At the same time, there is also some support for the social selection argument with respect to marital loss. For example, based on national data, I found that although prior mental health does not predict selection into marriage, persons who reported more symptoms of depression and alcohol abuse were significantly more likely to experience a subsequent divorce than persons who reported fewer symptoms of emotional distress (Simon



2002). These and other findings (e.g., Forthofer et al. 1996; Mastekaasa 1992; Menaghan 1985; Wade and Pevalin 2004) indicate that complex social causation and selection processes are *both* involved in the relationships among marriage, mental health and emotion.

The past two decades of research on the emotional and mental health impact of marital status transitions also sheds light on another issue that has long captured the attention of sociologists. That is, whether the emotional advantage of marriage is greater for men than for women. In contrast to Gove's (1972) early sex-role theory of mental illness—which argues that marriage is advantageous for men but disadvantageous for women (also see Bernard 1982)—an accumulating body of evidence reveals that the emotional advantage of becoming married and the emotional disadvantage of becoming divorced and widowed are evident among both men and women when gender-typical expressions of distress are considered. The positive impact of marriage and remarriage, and the negative impact of divorce and widowhood, tends to show up among depressive symptoms among women and substance problems among men (Horwitz et al. 1996; Simon 2002; Umberson et al. 1996; Williams 2003). My 2002 study further (Simon 2002) revealed that there are no gender differences in selection into or out of marriage on the basis of prior mental health. In other words, emotionally healthy women are neither more nor less likely to become or remain married than emotionally healthy men.

### 20.2.2.2 Variations in Emotions and Mental Health Among Married and Non-Married Adults

It is important to note that studies over the past several decades have also documented variations in emotion and emotional well-being/distress *among* married and *among* non-married adults. This research has also identified the social conditions under which marriage is more or less emotionally beneficial for women and men. For example, studies show that the mental health advantage of marriage is greater for men and women in more than less equitable marriages (Lennon and Rosenfield 1994; Lively et al. 2010;

Ross et al. 1983) as well as in higher than lower quality marriages (Hawkins and Booth 2005; Umberson et al. 1996; Williams 2003). In an especially innovative study, Wheaton (1990) found that under certain conditions (i.e., a high level of prior chronic marital stress), divorce and widowhood actually improve mental health. Wheaton argues that for this group of people, divorce and widowhood represent “stress relief.”

In view of these findings, it is possible that non-married adults are less distressed than persons in highly stressful and/or low quality marriages. Moreover, persons who are “single by choice” may enjoy the same high level of emotional well-being as their married counterparts. Indeed, beliefs about the importance of marriage appear to moderate the relationship between marital status and emotional distress. Simon and Marcussen's (1999) longitudinal study found that persons who hold strong beliefs about the importance of marriage derive a greater mental health benefit from the transition to marriage than persons who do not hold strong pro-marriage beliefs. On the flip side, the negative emotional impact of divorce is greater for persons who attach more than less importance to marriage.

In addition to documenting variation in emotional well-being/distress among the married that is due to variation in marital equity, marital quality, marital stress and marital beliefs, sociologists have been examining heterogeneity in the mental health of non-married adults. Because they are a growing population in the U.S. (Cherlin 2010, Klinenberg 2012), this is an important addition to research on marital status variations in mental health and emotion. In response to increases in non-marital heterosexual cohabitation over the past several decades, researchers have investigated the extent to which these marriage-like relationships offer the same mental health benefits as conventional marriage. Marcussen (2005) finds that men and women in non-marital cohabiting relationships report significantly more depressive symptoms and substance problems than married persons, which is partially explained by their poorer quality relationships (see Brown 2000 for similar results). In her study of social attachments and mental health, Ross (1995) shows

that while persons in cohabiting relationships report more depressive symptoms than the married, they enjoy better mental health than single adults.

In a recent study that focused on emerging adults, Barrett and I (Simon and Barrett 2010) found that young men and women in a non-marital romantic relationship report fewer symptoms of depression and substance problems than their non-romantically involved peers. Recent trends in marriage—including the delay of first marriage, non-marital childbearing and increasing rates of non-marital heterosexual cohabitation—as well as cultural shifts undergirding these changes in marital patterns in the U.S. among current cohorts of young adults—may narrow the marital status gap in mental health in the next decades of the twenty first century. Potentially foreshadowing these trends, a recent study (Uecker 2012) indicates that married young adults exhibit levels of distress that are similar to those of young adults in any kind of romantic relationship.

Although we have much more to learn about the mental health and emotions of the increasingly diverse population of unmarried persons, research is clear about the emotional well-being of single-parents who are disproportionately women. Studies have long shown that single-mothers living with dependent children report significantly more depressed affect than their married counterparts (Avison et al. 2007; Evenson and Simon 2005; McLanahan 1983; Pearlin and Johnson 1977; Simon 1998). Since there is an intergenerational transmission of emotional distress, single-mothers' greater emotional distress—especially among poor single-mothers—has consequences not only for themselves but also for their children's mental health.

Indeed, research reveals that children growing up in poor single-parent families are significantly more likely to have internalizing and externalizing mental health problems in childhood, adolescence and young adulthood than children growing up in two-parent families and female-headed single-parent families that are not poor (Amato and Cheadle 2005; McLeod and Shanahan 1993, 1996). Given the recent increase in non-marital childbearing among more

educated women (Cherlin 2010), it is important for researchers to compare their emotions and emotional well-being/distress relative to their less educated counterparts. While parents are more distressed (and angry) than non-parents in general (Evenson and Simon 2005; Ross and Van Willigen 1996), this particular group of single-mothers may enjoy higher levels of emotional well-being than their less educated peers. They may also enjoy better mental health than working mothers in non-equitable and low quality marital relationships.

At the same time that research is clear about the mental health of single-mothers, we know far less about the emotional lives of both custodial and non-custodial single-fathers as well as non-custodial mothers. Because they continue to be perceived by self and others as “deviant,” non-custodial mothers may be even more distressed than single-mothers. Evenson and I (2005) found support for this idea: Non-custodial mothers of young children report significantly more depression than single-mothers residing with their minor offspring. Moreover, despite the preponderance of depression among women, non-custodial fathers report significantly more depressive symptoms than custodial single-mothers and fathers residing with their young children. We attributed these findings to non-custodial fathers' lack of involvement in their children's everyday lives, which is highly stressful and distressing. Feelings of guilt may also underlie the poor mental health of non-custodial parents of both genders—another worthwhile topic for future research on social group variations in mental health and emotion.

### **20.2.3 Socioeconomic Status Differences in Emotion and Emotional Well-Being/Distress**

The third social status difference in mental health and emotion that has received a great deal of attention is the socioeconomic status difference in emotion and emotional well-being/distress among adults in the U.S. Consistent with sociologists' preoccupation with the myriad of ways in

which social class affects persons, literally hundreds of sociological studies document a strong relationship between individuals' placement in the complex system of structured social inequality and their emotional lives. Although most of this work focuses on socioeconomic status differences in subjectively *experienced* feelings and mental health rather than on socioeconomic status differences in the *expression* of emotion and emotional distress, it is clear that social class exerts a significant influence on the frequency with which men and women report negative and positive feelings as well as symptoms of emotional well-being/distress.

Epidemiological studies in the U.S. dating as far back as the 1930s (Faris and Dunham 1939) repeatedly find that all types of mental health problems (ranging from the mildest forms of emotional discomfort to the most severe forms of mental illness) are more common among persons with lower levels of education and household income and lower status occupations (e.g., Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend 1969; Hollingshead and Redlich 1958; Kessler 1979a; Kessler and Cleary 1980; Link et al. 1993; Yu and Williams 1999; also, see McLeod 2013 for an exhaustive recent review). Some early work finds that happiness is also closely associated with socioeconomic status and is more frequently experienced by members of advantaged than non-advantaged social classes (Bradburn 1969; Bradburn and Capoliz 1965).

More recent research on the experience of a variety of emotions verifies and adds to these findings. That is, studies reveal that people with lower levels of education and household income report negative feelings more often, and positive feelings less often, than persons with higher levels of education and income (Simon and Nath 2004). Although Nath and I did not find educational or household income difference in the frequency of anger, researchers should continue to investigate socioeconomic status differences in anger since this particular feeling tends to be an emotional response to frustration and injustice (Jasper 2014; Simon and Lively 2010). It is possible, if not likely, that socially disadvantaged men and women who feel their situation is unjust

are angrier than their peers who accept their relative social disadvantage.

### **20.2.3.1 Social Selection Versus Social Causation? Socioeconomic Status, Emotion and Mental Health**

While the associations among socioeconomic status, mental health and emotion are clear, sociologists have engaged in a lively debate over the direction of these associations. As in the case of marital status differences in emotion and emotional well-being/distress, some researchers have argued that individuals' poor mental health is responsible for their low socioeconomic status rather than that low socioeconomic status leads to more frequent negative emotions, less frequent positive feelings and higher levels of emotional distress. Although there is greater support for the social causation than the social selection hypothesis of the relationships among socioeconomic status, mental health and emotion, a few studies find that both processes underlie these complex associations (Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend 1969; McLeod and Kaiser 2004).

In sum, decades of sociological research find a strong and significant association between indicators of socioeconomic status (i.e., education, household income and in some cases occupational status) and emotional well-being/distress. Although mental health researchers have conducted more research on this topic than have emotion scholars, it is clear that individuals' placement in our complex stratification system is both a consequence and a cause of their more frequent negative emotions, less frequent positive feelings as well as their higher levels of emotional distress. Since this is a core substantive issue for sociologists, emotions researchers should continue examining the associations among components of socioeconomic status and a variety of "everyday" feelings including anger, fear and pride. Another pressing topic for emotions researchers is the extent to which there are socioeconomic status differences in the *expression* of emotion as Arlie Hochschild (1983) argued in her seminal theory about emotion management and Pierce (1995) demonstrated her work on occupations within law firms.

## 20.3 Hypotheses and Theories about the Etiology of Social Status Differences in Mental Health and Emotion

Not surprisingly, sociologists of mental health and emotion have developed compelling hypotheses about and theories for explaining social status—including gender, marital status and socioeconomic status—differences in emotion and emotional well-being/distress among adults in the U.S. I will first discuss the two main hypotheses put forth by sociologists of mental health. I will then turn to three main theories developed by sociologists of emotion. I will also discuss a recent attempt to integrate mental health and emotion theories for explaining gender differences in both the experience and expression of emotion and emotional well-being/distress.

### 20.3.1 Hypotheses from the Sociology of Mental Health: The Stress Process

Sociologists of mental health have developed two main hypotheses about social status differences in emotional well-being/distress. The first is the exposure hypothesis and the second is the vulnerability hypothesis. Both of these hypotheses focus on *why* socially disadvantaged individuals (including women, unmarried persons and individuals with low socioeconomic status) report more negative feelings, less positive emotions, and more symptoms of emotional upset. However, while they both emphasize the role of stress for explaining status differences in emotion and emotional distress, these two hypotheses differ with respect to *how* stress affects men's and women's mental health and emotions.

#### 20.3.1.1 The Exposure Hypothesis

Simply stated, the *exposure hypothesis* argues that persons who hold disadvantaged social statuses in society such as women, unmarried persons and people with lower socioeconomic status tend to experience more frequent negative emotions, less frequent positive feelings and more

symptoms of emotional distress because they are more exposed to acute and chronic stress. This hypothesis tends to focus on proximate stressors that are rooted in individuals' daily lives—such as the structure and nature of their work and family roles, the availability and quality of their social relationships as well as their access to both material and psychosocial resources.

For example, Gove's (1972; Gove and Tudor 1973) influential sex-role theory of mental illness attributes women's greater emotional distress to their social roles in society, which are presumably more arduous, less satisfying, less well compensated and ultimately more stressful than are men's. Decades of research evaluating the exposure hypothesis of gender differences in mental health finds that women are more exposed to certain types of stress than are men. Much of the empirical work evaluating the exposure hypothesis has focused on gender differences in stress and mental health among employed parents. The inequitable division of household labor within marriage and marriage-like relationships has taken center stage in this body of work (see Simon 2014a). Dozens of studies indicate that employed mothers report more negative and fewer positive emotions than employed men because they come home from a full time job only to start a second full time job caring for home and family (e.g., Bird 1999; Hochschild 1989; Kessler and McRae 1982; Menaghan 1989; Lennon and Rosenfield 1994; Lively et al. 2010; Nomaguchi et al. 2005; Ross et al. 1983; Simon 1995; Thoits 1986). They also find that irrespective of employment status, single-mothers are exposed to an even greater level of stress than employed wives and mothers (e.g., Avison et al. 2007).

There is also support for the exposure hypothesis of the relationships among marital status, mental health and emotion. Since the time of Durkheim's classic study of suicide (1897), mental health researchers have attributed married persons' greater emotional well-being to the greater normative regulation they are subjected to and higher levels of social integration. Similar to other adult social relationships, marriage provides behavioral guidelines as well as connects individuals to others, which are essential for the development and maintenance of

emotional well-being (see House et al. 1988 but also Putnam 2000 and Gerstel and Sarkisan 2006 who find that the married are less engaged in the community than the non-married). Other studies indicate that a reason why divorce and widowhood have deleterious emotional consequences for men and women is because they disrupt their social networks (Gerstel et al. 1985; Umberson et al. 1992). Taking these insights one-step further, scholars have argued that the married enjoy greater emotional well-being than the non-married because they have more psychosocial resources (i.e., greater mastery and self-esteem as well as social support) and a greater sense of purpose and meaning in life—all of which confer a mental health advantage for individuals (Kessler and Essex 1982; Thoits 1986). Although the married may not be more involved in the larger community than their non-married counterparts, they are more likely to have an intimate partner they could confide in and from whom they receive emotional, instrumental and financial support.

Research further shows that socioeconomic status differences in both symptoms of emotional distress and psychiatric (including affective) disorders among adults in the U.S. are partially explained by socioeconomic differences in exposure to a wide range of stressors—including stressful occupations that involve high demands but little control, insufficient economic resources and residence in unsafe neighborhoods (see McLeod 2013 for an exhaustive review). Studies also find that persons with lower levels of education and household income report fewer psychosocial resources than persons with higher levels of education and household income, which have been shown to also contribute to their higher level of emotional distress. More than three decades ago, Hochschild (1983) argued that persons with lower socioeconomic status may also be employed in occupations that require *emotional labor*, which is stressful and produces a host of negative as well as inauthentic emotions. However, with the exception of some excellent case comparison studies conducted by qualitative emotions scholars (e.g., Pierce 1995), there has been little quantitative research assessing socioeconomic status differences in jobs requiring

emotional labor in the general adult population—which is another important topic for future research. It is likely that occupations requiring a great deal of emotional labor, which are highly stressful, fall disproportionately on persons with less than more education.

Overall, while this research indicates that gender, marital status and socioeconomic status differences in exposure to stress help explain these status differences in emotion and emotional well-being/distress, sociologists recognize that there is no single explanation of the complex and seemingly intractable social status disparities in mental health. In other words, structurally based inequality in the family, workplace and society are necessary but not sufficient for explaining the persistence of women's, unmarried persons and lower socioeconomic status individual's greater emotional distress. To more fully understand disparities in emotional well-being, sociologists have developed the *vulnerability hypothesis*, which posits that socially disadvantaged persons are also more vulnerable to the adverse emotional effects of stress than their more advantaged peers.

### 20.3.1.2 The Vulnerability Hypothesis

Pearlin and Schooler (1978), Kessler (1979a) and Thoits (1982) were among the first sociologists to argue that members of socially disadvantaged groups in the U.S. are not only more exposed to life stress but also possess fewer personal resources, which directly enhance emotional well-being as well as reduce (i.e., buffer) the negative emotional impact of stressful life circumstances. Whereas the exposure hypothesis locates the etiology of status differences in emotion and mental health in structurally-based social inequality, the vulnerability hypothesis attributes these disparities to the *social psychology of inequality*—particularly in the possession of psychosocial resources that moderate the emotional effects of stress. In methodological terms, the exposure hypothesis posits that stress *mediates* the relationships among social status and emotion well-being. In contrast, the vulnerability hypothesis contends that individuals' psychosocial resources *moderate* the relationships between stress and mental health. In an influential study using a novel



analytic technique, Kessler (1979b) showed that differential impact is a more important determinant of the relationship between social status and distress than is differential exposure.

However, despite considerable enthusiasm for the vulnerability hypothesis, research has produced mixed findings with respect to gender differences in the possession of psychosocial resources and vulnerability. Studies consistently find that men and women have different coping styles and strategies for dealing with stress. For example, while men tend to have an inexpressive coping style and are more likely to control their emotions, women tend to have an emotional and emotionally expressive style of coping (Simon and Nath 2004; Thoits 1991). These studies also show that men are more likely to use problem-focused coping strategies, whereas women are more likely to use emotion-focused coping and seek social support. Moreover, there appear to be gender differences in perceptions of control, which also play an important role in gender differences in depressed affect (Mirowsky and Ross 2003; Thoits 1991, 1995). Research is more equivocal with respect to gender differences in self-esteem. While some studies find little evidence of women's lower self-esteem (Miller and Kirsh 1989; Thoits 1995), others show that women continue to report lower self-esteem than do men (McMullin and Cairney 2004; Robins and Trzesniewski 2005; Rosenfield and Mouzon 2013; Thoits 2010; Turner and Marino 1994; Turner and Rozell 1994). Women do, however, report more social support than do men (Thoits 1995; Turner and Marino 1994; Turner and Turner 1999). Although an abundance of studies document that efficacious coping resources and social support reduce the negative emotional impact of eventful and chronic stressors (Thoits 1982, 1987; Turner and Turner 1999), gender differences in the possession of psychosocial resources do not explain gender differences in emotional upset (see Aneshensel 1992 and Thoits 1995, 2010 for reviews).

There is also little evidence that women are more vulnerable than are men *in general* (Aneshensel et al. 1991, Aneshensel 1992; Lennon 1987; Newman 1986; Simon 2014a, b; Turner and

Avison 1989). Rather, studies reveal that certain stressors are more distressing for women, while others are more distressing for men. Women tend to be more reactive to family-related and interpersonal stress (i.e., including stress that affects others), whereas men tend to be more reactive to employment-related stress and stress that affects themselves (Conger et al. 1993; Pearlin and Lieberman 1979; Kessler and McLeod 1984; Simon 1992, 1998, Simon and Lively 2010, Simon and Nath 2004 but also see Ensminger and Celentano 1990; Lennon 1987; Newman 1986 for exceptions with respect to the greater impact of work-related stress on men). Scholars attribute these findings to gender socialization in childhood as well as the different adult role-responsibilities that are socially assigned to women and men (e.g., Simon 1992, 1995, 1998).

Interestingly, there is greater support for the vulnerability hypothesis with respect to marital status than gender differences in mental health. Studies show that in addition to reporting more positive emotions, fewer negative feelings and lower levels of emotional distress, research finds that the married are less vulnerable than the non-married to a variety of undesirable life events (Kessler and Essex 1982; Thoits 1986; Turner et al. 1995) and chronic strains (Pearlin and Johnson 1977; Simon 1998). Though not yet explored, it is possible that in addition to their greater psychosocial resources, social support and sense of purpose in life, the married experience lower levels of distress and vulnerability because they feel that they *matter* to others—particularly their spouse. As House and his colleagues noted several decades ago (1988), close intimate social relationships with people individuals perceive they could count on for emotional and other forms of social support is uplifting and emotionally protective in the face of life stress. Of course, the married also tend to have greater financial resources than the non-married—a pivotal resource that helps explain why single-parents, especially those headed by women and are poor, are among the most stressed, vulnerable and distressed social groups in the U.S. (Avison et al. 2007; McLanahan 1983; Pearlin and Johnson 1977; Simon 1998).

Research also provides support for the vulnerability hypothesis with respect to socioeconomic status differences in emotion and emotional well-being/distress. Not only are they more exposed to acute and chronic stressors but studies show that socially disadvantaged persons report fewer psychosocial resources (including a lower sense of mastery and self-esteem as well as less social support) with which to buffer the negative emotional impact of life stress than their more advantaged peers (Mirowsky and Ross 2003; Kessler 1979a; Pearlin and Schooler 1978; Turner and Rozell 1994 as well as Aneshensel 1991 and Thoits 1995, 2010 for exhaustive reviews). However, while they are more vulnerable than their more advantaged counterparts, it is possible that persons with low socioeconomic status are also less likely than persons with higher socioeconomic status to *manage* their emotions by suppressing negative feelings and replacing them with more positive feelings. Three decades ago Hochschild (1983) suggested that there may be class-based emotion cultures in the U.S., which contain class-based emotion norms and emotional socialization. Although there has been no research to my knowledge testing this compelling hypothesis in general population surveys, it is possible that socioeconomic status differences in emotion and emotional well-being/distress are partially attributable to socioeconomic status differences in emotion management. Given the persistence of socioeconomic status disparities in mental health and emotion, this is a topic that should have priority in future research on the relationships among socioeconomic status, mental health and emotion (see Schnittker and McLeod 2005 for a more in-depth discussion of the social psychological antecedents of socioeconomic status inequality in mental health).

In sum, sociologists of mental health have developed two compelling hypotheses about why members of socially disadvantaged groups in the U.S. such as women, unmarried persons and individuals with low socioeconomic status experience fewer positive emotions, more negative feelings as well as higher levels of emotional distress than men, married people and individuals with higher socioeconomic status. Overall,

empirical research finds that both social structural and social psychological factors play an important role in these social status variations in mental health and emotion. Before turning to theories about social status differences in emotion and emotional well-being developed by sociologists of emotion, there is a third hypothesis about the relationships among gender, stress, emotion and mental health. Unlike the other two hypotheses I discussed above, this hypothesis is eclectic and draws on stress theory as well as theories about emotion, particularly Hochschild's theory of emotion management.

### **20.3.1.3 The Gendered-Response Hypothesis: Men and Women Express Distress and Respond to Stress with Different Types of Mental Health Problems**

The inability of the vulnerability hypothesis to account for the gender gap in emotion and emotional well-being/distress led to the development of the third main hypothesis about the relationships among gender, stress, emotion and mental health. Referred to as the *gendered-response hypothesis*, advocates of this hypothesis argue that women are neither more distressed nor more vulnerable than men, but that males and females *express* emotional distress and *respond* to stress with gendered-types of emotional problems. I noted earlier that research finds that men and women tend to respond to stressful life circumstances in highly specific and deeply gendered ways (i.e., women respond to stress with internalizing emotional problems including depression, whereas men respond with externalizing emotional problems such as substance problems). Because males and females tend to express emotional distress with different emotional problems, it is important for mental health and emotions researchers to continue examining a range of emotions and mental health problems. Indeed, the failure of earlier studies to examine male-typical expressions of emotional disturbance has resulted in overestimates of women's distress and psychological vulnerability and underestimates of men's.

Sociologists have developed provocative and compelling explanations of why males and

females tend to express emotional upset and respond to stress with different types of mental health problems. For example, viewing gendered-patterns of distress and vulnerability through a sociology of gender, stress, mental health and emotions lens, I attribute gender differences in the prevalence of internalizing and externalizing mental health problems to the larger emotional culture of the U.S. and gender-linked norms about the appropriate experience and expression of emotion for males and females (Simon 2000, 2002, 2007; Simon and Nath 2004). Drawing on insights from Hochschild's seminal theory about emotion, I argue that embodied in Americans' emotional culture are beliefs about the "proper" emotional styles of males and females as well as emotion norms that specify "appropriate" feeling and expression for men and women (also see Hochschild 1979, 1983; Smith-Lovin 1995; and Thoits 1989). Because feelings of depression signal weakness to self and others—and weakness is a permissible personality characteristic for females but not for males in the U.S.—it is an acceptable emotion for females but a sanctioned emotion for males. A consequence of gender-linked emotional socialization is that females learn to express emotional upset with internalizing emotional problems such as depression, while males learn to express distress vis-a-vis externalizing problems such as substance abuse. Men's higher rate of substance problems reflects their tendency to manage (i.e., suppress) culturally inappropriate feelings of depression with mood-altering substances in order to avoid being labeled "weak" by others and one-self.

However, while the gendered-response hypothesis begins to unravel the complex set of social factors that contribute to gender differences in both the experience and expression of emotional upset, other factors are also involved in the female excess of depressed affect. Lively and I (2010) recently argued that intense and persistent angry feelings—more common among women than men—also play a role in their higher levels of depression. While most sociologists of mental health have focused on anger as an outcome of social disadvantage (Mabry and Kiecolt 2005; Ross and Van Willigen 1996), our study showed

that anger mediates the relationship between gender and depressed affect among adults. In other words, women's more intense and persistent anger—an emotional response to their unequal work and family roles and relationships—also help explain their higher level of depression relative to men. Going forward, an important set of topics for research is to assess whether members of other socially disadvantaged groups (including but not limited to unmarried persons and persons who have lower socioeconomic status) also experience more frequent angry feelings than their advantaged peers as well as whether there are social status differences in the management of these unpleasant emotions.

Bear in mind that while both of these arguments focus on *gender* differences in emotion and emotional well-being/distress, they highlight some of the benefits of integrating theoretical insights from the sociologies of mental health and emotion with respect to social status variations in subjectively experienced feeling, outward affective behavior and symptoms of emotional distress more generally. I now turn to theories from the sociology of emotion, which emphasize the sociocultural and/or social structural roots of social status inequalities in the experience and expression of emotions and emotional well-being/distress among adults in the U.S.

---

## 20.4 Theories from the Sociology of Emotions

Sociologists of emotion have also developed several compelling theories that help explain social status variations in emotion and emotional well-being/distress. In contrast to sociologists of mental health (who tend to focus on lower status persons' greater exposure and vulnerability to stressful life circumstances), emotions scholars tend to focus on their lack of power in social interactions (particularly social interactions that involve status unequals), which produce a range of negative emotions including depression. Before discussing these more structural theories of emotion, it is worth returning to Hochschild's theory about emotion management, which contains

hypotheses about both the sociocultural and social structural determinants of status differences in subjectively experienced feelings, affective behavior and mental health.

#### 20.4.1 Cultural Theories about Social Status Variations in Emotion and Mental Health

As I noted above, Hochschild's groundbreaking theory about emotion management (1975, 1983) sheds light on the sociocultural roots of social status differences in subjectively experienced feelings and affective behavior. She argues that societies contain emotion cultures, which include feeling and expression norms specifying the emotions individuals should (and should not) feel and express in particular situations and in general (see Smith-Lovin 1995; Thoits 1989 for an elaboration). According to Hochschild, when people's feelings and expressions depart from emotion norms, they engage in emotion management, expression management, or both in order to create a culturally appropriate emotional response. I have suggested that Hochschild's theory provides insight into *why* women in the U.S. tend to express emotional upset with depression while men tend to suppress these feelings with mood-altering substances. Men's and women's distinct ways of expressing emotional upset are consistent with deeply gendered cultural beliefs about emotion and a lifetime of gendered emotional socialization (Caputo and Simon 2013; Simon 2002, 2007; Simon and Nath 2004; Simon and Barrett 2010).

However, in addition to shedding light on gender differences in the experience and expression of emotion and emotional well-being/distress, Hochschild's theory provides insight into both the sociocultural and social structural roots of socioeconomic status differences in mental health and emotion. Although this has not been as well researched as other parts of her theoretical argument, Hochschild (1979, 1983) contends that there are social class differences in beliefs about emotion, emotion norms as well as emotional socialization, which result in social class differenc-

es in the use of emotion management as a coping strategy for reducing life stress. I mentioned earlier that a reason why members of lower social classes experience more frequent negative emotions, fewer positive feelings, and higher levels of emotional distress may be because they are less likely to manage (i.e., suppress) their negative feelings.

Hochschild further argues that individuals with lower socioeconomic status are also more likely than their higher status counterparts to be employed in occupations that require *emotional labor*, which is itself stressful and results in a variety of negative feelings including feelings of inauthenticity, alienation and emotional distress (Erickson and Wharton 1997; Erickson and Ritter 2001; Hochschild 1979, 1983; Pierce 1995). These ideas suggest that persons with lower levels of education not only lack control over and receive less financial compensation for the work they do outside the home but that they are also more likely to work in occupations that are emotionally taxing (see Pierce 1995 for a comparison of the emotion work required of paralegals and secretaries compared to lawyers). Although this is an important component of her theory, there has unfortunately been less empirical research on socioeconomic status than on gender differences in emotion beliefs, emotion norms, emotion socialization and emotional labor.

#### 20.4.2 Structural Theories about Emotion and Mental Health

In contrast to Hochschild's theory that contains cultural and structural arguments, Kemper's (1978) influential social interactional theory focuses entirely on the social structural determinants of emotions. Kemper argues that status and power—two fundamental dimensions of social relationships—elicit certain emotions in social interaction when peoples' relational status and power are unequal. Individuals with more status and power in society (e.g., men, married persons and individuals with high socioeconomic status) tend to experience more positive emotions including happiness, excitement and calm. Persons

with less social status and power (e.g., women, unmarried people and persons with lower socioeconomic status) tend to experience more negative emotions such as sadness, anxiety and anger. Because unequal social interactions are ubiquitous in societies characterized by a high level of social inequality such as the U.S., Kemper posits that these “everyday” feelings ultimately become enduring feeling states or moods such as depression and happiness. When viewed through this theoretical lens, gender, marital status and socioeconomic status differences in the frequency of negative and positive feelings as well as emotional well-being/distress are attributable to gender, marital status and socioeconomic differences in status and power in social interactions, especially in the family and workplace where gender, marital status and socioeconomic status inequalities persist.

Although he emphasizes somewhat different underlying emotion processes, Collins provocative theory about interaction rituals (2004) also argues that individuals’ structural location and subsequent social interactions affect their everyday or “transient” feelings (sadness, anger, excitement and joy) as well as enduring moods (depression and happiness)—the latter of which he calls “emotional energy.” In social interactions comprised of status unequals, individuals with lower status tend to experience more negative transient emotions, which over time result in a degradation of emotional energy and feelings of depression. In contrast, persons with higher status experience more positive transient emotions, which lead to heightened emotional energy and feelings of happiness. Because women, unmarried people and persons with less education and income in the U.S. have lower status than men, married people and persons with higher socioeconomic status, they are more likely to experience frequent transient negative emotions, which over time reduce emotional energy and result in depressed affect.

Interestingly, the emotion processes Kemper and Collins describe are illustrated in Hochschild’s qualitative studies of female airline attendants (1983) and wives in dual-earner families (1989) in which their feelings of sadness, anxiety,

frustration and anger from repeated unfair social interactions were ultimately transformed into depression. Pierce’s (1995) comparative qualitative analysis of emotions among paralegals (who tend to be women) and lawyers (who tend to be men) in a law firm also provide strong support these theoretical ideas. Using data from the General Social Survey and these theoretical insights as a guide, Lively and I (2010) found that intense and persistent feelings of anger, which are more common among women than men, help explain the relationship between gender and depressed affect.

Overall, irrespective of whether they focus on the sociocultural, social structural and/or social psychological roots of gender, marital status and socioeconomic status differences in emotion and emotional well-being/distress, theoretical insights from the sociology of emotion complement and expand hypotheses from the sociology of mental health. Together, these theoretical insights provide important clues into the origins of social status variations in the experience and expression of emotion and emotional well-being/distress among adults in the U.S. Individuals’ subjective feelings and expressive behavior emerge in on-going social interaction with others and are shaped by their cultures and structural positions in society.

---

## 20.5 Future Research

Despite the plethora of sociological scholarship that both identifies and explains gender, marital status and socioeconomic status differences in emotion and mental health among adults in the U.S., there are nonetheless several important gaps in current knowledge on this topic. Among the most significant gaps in knowledge is that we know much less about the etiology of emotional well-being than the etiology of emotional distress. The assumption (long held by many sociologists of mental health) that the absence of symptoms of emotional distress is equivalent to emotional well-being should be subjected to empirical tests in surveys that include measures of emotional well-being such as happiness and



other positive emotions (e.g., pride, joy, elation and contentment) as well as measures of emotional distress. In addition to this rich line of investigation, it behooves sociologists to examine the linkages between a wide range of “everyday” emotions (e.g., happiness, calm, pride, anger and fear) and physical health.

With regard to gender differences in emotion and mental health, we need more research investigating the extent to which individuals’ other ascribed and achieved statuses, particularly their socioeconomic status, race/ethnicity, age and sexual orientation, interact with their gender to produce complex variations in emotion and emotional well-being/distress *among* women and *among* men. Springer et al. (2012) recent special issue of *Social Science and Medicine* devoted to this topic represents a positive first step in this direction. Because norms about “appropriate” experience and expression of emotion may vary by socioeconomic status, race/ethnicity, age and sexual orientation as they do for gender, these studies must examine both positive and negative “everyday” emotions as well as both mental and physical health.

With respect to marital status differences in mental health and emotion, we need more research on the ways in which a variety of intimate adult relationships—not just marital and cohabiting relationships—influence people’s emotion and emotional well-being/distress. This is a pressing topic as an increasing number of adults are postponing and opting out of traditional marriage (Cherlin 2010). Given rapid social changes in public acceptance of same-sex relationships as well as recent changes in both state and national laws governing them (Powell et al. 2010), sociologists should also examine whether the emotional benefits of marriage extend to gay and lesbian legal and extra-legal intimate relationships in the U.S.

Finally, our knowledge of the social determinants of mental health and emotion would be greatly enhanced with more scholarship on socioeconomic status differences in both the experience and expression of emotion and emotional well-being/distress. Although it has been more than three decades since Hochschild (1979, 1983) argued that persons with higher socioeconomic

status are freer than persons with lower socioeconomic status to openly express their “authentic” emotions, there has been far less research on this deeply sociological issue. Our understanding of the ways in which persons’ social class location influences their mental health and emotions would also be enriched by investigations of socioeconomic status differences in emotional socialization, emotion beliefs, emotion norms and emotion culture.

---

## 20.6 Conclusions

I began this chapter noting that one of the core goals of sociology from its inception as an academic discipline was to elucidate the links between individuals’ various social positions or statuses in society and their private feelings, outward affective behavior and mental health. Following Durkheim’s early study of the social basis of suicide (1897), decades of sociological research on the general population of adults in the U.S. has documented social status variations in mental health and emotion. Both reflecting and contributing to renewed interest in this and closely related topics, the formation of the American Sociological Association sections on the sociologies of mental health and emotions in the 1980’s resulted in an explosion of methodological, theoretical and substantive advances in theory and research on this topic.

In this chapter, I focused on sociological scholarship on gender, marital status and socioeconomic status variations in subjectively experienced feelings, expressive behavior and mental health problems among in the U.S. I discussed important methodological innovations, key substantive findings as well as major theoretical developments that have emerged from the sociologies of emotion and mental health since the 1970s to the present. I also noted that while these two areas of sociology have different theoretical traditions, there is considerable substantive and theoretical overlap between the sociologies of “mental health” and “emotions.”

Sociologists of mental health and emotion emphasize the social structural, sociocultural

and social psychological roots of social status differences in subjectively experienced feelings, outward affective behavior and emotional well-being/distress. Not surprisingly, they also argue that people's feelings and expressions are influenced by the larger social, economic, and cultural context surrounding them. Additionally, while they specify somewhat different underlying processes that produce status differences in feelings and affective behavior, sociologists of mental health and emotion continue to document that persons who possess advantaged social statuses tend to enjoy more frequent positive emotions and higher levels of emotional well-being than people who hold disadvantaged statuses in society. Sociological theories about mental health tend to attribute social status differences in emotional well-being/distress to social status differences in exposure and vulnerability to social stress. In contrast, sociological theories about emotion argue that people's feelings—both positive and negative—emerge in social interaction with others and that they often manipulate or “manage” their emotions and/or expressions in order to conform to cultural emotion norms. Finally, I reviewed a recent attempt to integrate theoretical insights from the sociologies of emotion and mental health in order to explain persistent gender differences in the experience and expression of emotion and emotional well-being/distress. Indeed, because they focus on different aspects of social context, future research on social status variations in mental health and emotion should draw on theoretical ideas from these different, though highly interrelated, areas of sociology.

Overall, by elucidating the social structural, sociocultural and social psychological determinants of gender, marital status and socioeconomic status differences in subjectively experienced feelings, expressive behavior and mental health among adults in the U.S., sociologists have made a significant contribution to knowledge about *social* influences on human emotion. In light of the enthusiasm for work on this important topic, there is good reason to be optimistic that the next generation of sociological scholarship will continue to expand our understanding of persistent social status differences in mental health and emotion.

## References

- Amato, P. R., & Cheadle, J. (2005). The long reach of divorce: Divorce and child-well-being across three generations. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, *67*, 191–206.
- Aneshensel, C. S. (1992). Social stress: Theory and research. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *18*, 15–38.
- Aneshensel, C. S., Rutter, C. M., & Lachenbruch, P. A. (1991). Social structure, stress, and mental health: Competing conceptual and analytic models. *American Sociological Review*, *56*, 166–178.
- Aseltine, R. H., & Kessler, R. C. (1993). Marital disruption and depression in a community sample. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, *34*, 237–251.
- Avison, W., & McAlpine, D. (1992). Gender differences in symptoms of depression among adolescents. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, *33*, 77–96.
- Avison, W., Ali, J., & Walters, D. (2007). Family structure, stress, and psychological distress: A demonstration of the impact of differential exposure. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, *62*, 911–926.
- Balswick, J. (1988). *The inexpressive male*. Toronto: Lexington Books.
- Barrett, A. E. (2000). Marital trajectories and mental health. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, *41*, 451–464.
- Bernard, J. (1982). *The future of marriage*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Bird, C. E. (1999). Gender, household labor, and psychological distress: The impact of the amount and division of housework. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, *40*, 32–45.
- Booth, A., & Amato, P. (1991). Divorce and psychological stress. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, *32*, 396–407.
- Bradburn, N. M. (1969). *The structure of psychological well-being*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Bradburn, N. M., & Capolitz, D. (1965). *Reports on happiness*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Brody, L. (2001). *Gender, emotion, and the family*. Cambridge: Harvard.
- Brown, S. (2000). The effect of union type on psychological well-being: Depression among cohabitators versus marrieds. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, *41*, 241–255.
- Caputo, J., & Simon, R. W. (2013). Physical limitations and emotional well-being: Gender and marital status variations. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, *54*, 241–257.
- Carr, D., & Springer, K. W. (2010). Advances in families and health research in the 21st Century. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, *72*, 744–761.
- Cherlin, A. (2010). Demographic trends in the United States: A review of research in the 2000s. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, *72*, 403–419.
- Collins, R. (2004). *Interactional ritual chains*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Conger, R. D., Lorenz F. O., Elder Jr. G. H., Simons, R. L., & Ge, X. (1993). Husband and wife differences in

- response to undesirable life events. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 34, 71–88.
- Deragotis, L. R., & Cleary, P. (1977). Confirmation of the dimension structure of the SCL-90: A study of construct validation. *Journal of Clinical Psychology*, 33, 981–989.
- Dohrenwend, B. S., & Dohrenwend, B. S. (1969). *Social status and psychiatric disorders: A causal inquiry*. New York: Wiley.
- Dohrenwend, B. S., & Dohrenwend, B. S. (1976). Sex differences in psychiatric disorders. *American Journal of Sociology*, 81, 1447–1454.
- Durkheim, E. (1897). *Suicide: a study in sociology*. (Translated by J. Spaulding and G. Simpson, 1951). New York: Free Press.
- Ensminger, M. E., & Celentano, D. D. (1990). Gender differences in the effect of unemployment on psychological distress. *Social Science and Medicine*, 30, 469–477.
- Erickson, R., & Ritter, C. C. (2001). Emotional labor, burnout, and inauthenticity: Does gender matter? *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 64, 146–163.
- Erickson, R., & Wharton, A. S. (1997). Inauthenticity and depression: Assessing the consequences of interactive service work. *Work and Occupations*, 24, 188–213.
- Evenson, R., & Simon, R. W. (2005). Clarifying the relationship between parenthood and depression. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 46, 3411–3358.
- Faris, Robert, E. L., & Dunham, W. H. (1939). *Mental disorders in urban areas: An ecological study of schizophrenia and psychoses*. New York: Haefner.
- Forthofer, M. S., Kessler, R. C., Story, A. L., & Gotlib, I. H. (1996). The effects of psychiatric disorders on the probability and timing of first marriage. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 37, 121–132.
- Gerstel, N., & Sarkisian, N. (2006). Marriage: The good, the bad, and the ugly. *Contexts*, 5, 16–21.
- Gerstel, N., Riessman, C. K., & Rosenfield, S. (1985). Explaining the symptomology of separated and divorced women and men: The role of material conditions and social networks. *Social Forces*, 64, 84–101.
- Glass, J., & Fujimoto, T. (1994). Housework, paid work, and depression among husbands and wives. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 35, 179–191.
- Gove, W. R. (1972). The relationship between sex roles, marital status and mental illness. *Social Forces*, 51, 34–44.
- Gove, W. R., & Tudor, J. F. (1973). Adult Sex Roles and Mental Illness. *American Journal of Sociology*, 78, 50–73.
- Hagan, J., & Foster, H. (2003). S/He's a rebel: Toward a sequential theory of delinquency and gendered pathways to disadvantage in emerging adulthood. *Social Forces*, 82, 53–86.
- Hawkins, D., & Booth, A. (2005). Unhappily ever after: Effects of long-term, low-quality marriages on well-being. *Social Forces*, 84, 451–471.
- Hill, S. A., & Sprague, J. (1999). Parenting in black and white families: The interaction of gender with race and class. *Gender and Society*, 13, 480–502.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1975). The sociology of feeling and emotion: Selected possibilities. *Sociological Inquiry*, 45, 280–307.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1979). Emotion work, feeling rules, and social structure. *American Journal of Sociology*, 85, 551–575.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1983). *The managed heart: Notes on the commercialization of human feeling*. Berkeley: University of California.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1989). *The second shift: Working parents and the revolution at home*. New York: Viking.
- Hollingshead, A. B., & Redlich, F. C. (1958). *Social class and mental illness: A community study*. New York: Wiley.
- Horwitz, A. V., White, H. R., & Howell-White, S. (1996). The use of multiple outcomes in stress research: A case study of gender differences in responses to marital dissolution. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 37, 278–291.
- House, J. S., Landis, K., & Umberson, D. (1988). Social relationships and health. *Science*, 241, 540–545.
- Hughes, M. E., & Waite, L. J. (2009). Marital biography and health at mid-life. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 50, 344–358.
- Jasper, J. (2014). *Thinking hearts* (Forthcoming). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Journal of Health and Social Behavior*. 2002. Special Issue on Measurement.
- Kemper, T. D. (1978). *A social interactional theory of emotions*. New York: Wiley.
- Kessler, R. C. (1979a). Stress, social status, and psychological distress. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 20, 259–272.
- Kessler, R. C. (1979b). A strategy for studying differential vulnerability to the psychological consequences of stress. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 20, 100–108.
- Kessler, R. C. (2003). Epidemiology of women and depression. *Journal of Affective Disorders*, 74, 5–13.
- Kessler, R. C. (2013). Overview of descriptive epidemiology of mental disorders. In C. C. Aneshensel, J. C. Phelan, & A. Bierman (Eds.), *Handbook of the sociology of mental health* (2nd ed., pp. 169–182). NY: Springer.
- Kessler, R. C., & Cleary, P. D. (1980). Social class and psychological distress. *American Sociological Review*, 49, 620–631.
- Kessler, R. C., & Essex, M. (1982). Marital status and depression: The importance of coping resources. *Social Forces*, 6, 484–507.
- Kessler, R. C., & McLeod, J. D. (1984). Sex differences in vulnerability to undesirable life events. *American Sociological Review*, 49, 620–631.
- Kessler, R. C., & McRae Jr., J. (1982). The effect of wives' employment on the mental health of married men and women. *American Sociological Review*, 47, 216–227.
- Kessler, R. C., & McRae, J. A. (1984). Trends in the relationships of sex and marital status to psychological distress. *Research in Community and Mental Health*, 4, 109–130.

- Kessler, R. C., McGonagle, K. A., Schwartz, M., Blazer, D. G., & Nelson, C. B. (1993). Sex and depression in the national co-morbidity survey I: Lifetime prevalence, chronicity, and recurrence. *Journal of Affective Disorders, 25*, 85–96.
- Kessler, R. C., McGonagle, K. A., Zhao, S., Nelson, C. B., Hughes, M., Eshleman, S., Wittchen, H.-U., & Kendler, K. S. (1994). Lifetime and 12-Month prevalence of DSM-III R psychiatric disorders in the United States: Results from the national co-morbidity survey. *Archives of General Psychiatry, 51*, 8–19.
- Klinenberg, E. (2012). *Going solo: The extraordinary rise and surprising appeal of living alone*. New York: Penguin.
- Lennon, M. C. (1987). Sex differences in distress: The impact of gender and work roles. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 28*, 290–305.
- Lennon, M. C., & Rosenfield, S. (1994). Relative fairness and the division of household work. *American Journal of Sociology, 100*, 506–531.
- Link, B. G., Lennon, M. C., & Dohrenwend, B. S. (1993). Socioeconomic status and depression: The role of occupations, control, and planning. *American Journal of Sociology, 98*, 1351–1387.
- Lively, K., Steelman, L. C., & Powell, B. (2010). Equity, emotion, and household division of labor. *Social Psychology Quarterly, 73*, 358–379.
- Mabry, J. B., & Kiecolt, J. (2005). Anger in black and white: Race, alienation, and anger. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 46*, 85–101.
- Marcussen, K. (2005). Explaining differences in mental health between married and cohabiting individuals. *Social Psychology Quarterly, 68*, 239–257.
- Marks, N. F., & Lambert, J. D. (1998). Marital status continuity and change among young and midlife adults: Longitudinal effects on psychological well-being. *Journal of Family Issues, 19*, 652–686.
- Mastekaasa, A. (1992). Marriage and psychological well-being: Some evidence on selection into marriage. *Journal of Marriage and the Family, 54*, 901–911.
- McLanahan, S. (1983). Family structure and stress: A longitudinal comparison of two-parent and female-headed families. *Journal of Marriage and the Family, 45*, 347–357.
- McLeod, J. D. (2013). Social stratification and inequality. In C. S. Aneshensel, J. C. Phelan, & A. Bierman (Eds.), *Handbook of the sociology of mental health* (2nd ed., pp. 229–254). New York: Springer.
- McLeod, J. D., & Kaiser, K. (2004). Childhood emotional and behavioral problems. *American Sociological Review, 69*, 636–658.
- McLeod, J. D., & Shanahan, M. J. (1993). Poverty, parenting, and children's mental health. *American Sociological Review, 58*, 351–366.
- McLeod, J. D., & Shanahan, M. J. (1996). Trajectories of poverty and children's mental health. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 37*, 207–220.
- McMullin, J. A., & Cairney, J. (2004). Self-esteem and the intersection of age, class, and gender. *Journal of Aging Studies, 18*, 75–90.
- Menaghan, E. G. (1985). Depressive affect and subsequent divorce. *Journal of Family Issues, 6*, 296–306.
- Menaghan, E. G. (1989). Role changes and psychological well-being: Variations in effects by gender and role repertoire. *Social Forces, 3*, 693–714.
- Menaghan, E. G., & Lieberman, M. A. (1986). Changes in depression following divorce: A panel study. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 48*, 319–328.
- Meyers, J. K., Weissman, M. M., Tischler, G. L., Holzer C. E., Leaf P. J., Orvaschel H., Anthony J. C., Boyd J. H., Burke Jr. J. D., Kramer, M., & Stolzman, R. (1984). Six-month prevalence of psychiatric disorders in three communities. *Archives of General Psychiatry, 41*, 959–967.
- Miller, S. M., & Kirsh, N. (1989). Sex differences in cognitive coping with stress. In R. C. Barnett, L. Biener, & G. K. Baruch (Eds.), *Gender and stress* (pp. 278–307). New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Mirowsky, J., & Ross, C. (2003). *Social causes of psychological distress*. New York: Aldine.
- Needham, B., & Hill, T. (2010). Do gender differences in mental health contribute to gender differences in physical health? *Social Science and Medicine, 71*, 1472–1479.
- Newman, J. P. (1986). Gender, life strains, and depression. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 27*, 161–178.
- Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2001). Gender differences in depression. *Current Directions in Psychological Science, 10*, 173–176.
- Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2012). Emotion regulation and psychopathology: The role of gender. *Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 8*, 161–187.
- Nomaguchi, K., Milke, M., & Bianchi, S. (2005). Time strains and psychological well-being: Do dual earner mothers and fathers differ? *Journal of Family Issues, 26*, 756–792.
- Pearlin, L. I. (1989). The sociological study of stress. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 30*, 241–256.
- Pearlin, L. I., & Johnson, J. (1977). Marital status, life strains, and depression. *American Sociological Review, 42*, 704–715.
- Pearlin, L. I., & Lieberman, M. A. (1979). Social sources of emotional distress. In R. Simmons (Eds.), *Research and community mental health* (Vol. 1, pp. 217–248). New York: JAI Press.
- Pearlin, L. I., & Schooler, C. (1978). The structure of coping. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 19*, 2–21.
- Pierce, J. L. (1995). *Gender trials: Emotional lives in contemporary law firms*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Powell, B., Bolzendahl, C., Geist, C., & Steelman, L. C. (2010). *Same sex relations and Americans' definition of family*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling alone*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Radloff, L. S. (1977). The CES-D scale: A self-report depression scale for research in the general population. *Applied Psychological Measurement, 1*, 385–401.



- Robins, R. W., & Trzesniewski, K. H. (2005). Self-esteem development across the lifespan. *Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14*, 158–162.
- Rosenfield, S. (1989). The effects of women's employment: Personal control and sex differences in mental health. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 30*, 77–91.
- Rosenfield, S. (1992). The costs of sharing: Wives' employment and husbands' mental health. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 33*, 213–225.
- Rosenfield, S., & Mouzon, D. (2013). Gender and mental health. In C. S. Aneshensel, J. C. Phelan, & A. Bierman (Eds.), *Handbook of the sociology of mental health* (2nd ed., pp. 277–298). New York: Kluwer.
- Rosenfield, S., Lennon, M. C., & White, H. R. (2005). The self and mental health: Self-salience and the emergence of internalizing and externalizing problems. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 46*, 323–340.
- Ross, C. (1995). Re-conceptualizing marital status as a continuum of social attachment. *Journal of Marriage and the Family, 57*, 129–140.
- Ross, C., & Mirowsky, J. (1988). Childcare and emotional adjustment to wives' employment. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 29*, 127–138.
- Ross, C., & Van Willigen, M. (1996). Gender, parenthood, and anger. *Journal of Marriage and the Family, 58*, 572–584.
- Ross, C., Mirowsky, J., & Huber, J. (1983). Dividing work, sharing work, and in-between: marriage patterns and depression. *American Sociological Review, 48*, 809–823.
- Roxburgh, S. (1996). Gender differences in work and well-being: effects of exposure and vulnerability. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 37*, 265–277.
- Schnittker, J., & McLeod, J. D. (2005). The social psychology of health disparities. *Annual Review of Sociology, 31*, 75–103.
- Smith-Lovin, L. (1995). The sociology of affect and emotion. In K. Cook, G. A. Fine, & J. S. House (Eds.), *Sociological perspectives of social psychology* (pp. 118–148). New York: Allyn Bacon.
- Springer, K. W., Hankivsky, O., & Bates, L. M. (2012). Gender and health: Relational, intersectional, and bio-social approaches. *Social Science and Medicine, 74*, 1661–1666.
- Simon, R. W. (1992). Parental role strains, salience of parental identity, and gender differences in psychological distress. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 33*, 25–35.
- Simon, R. W. (1995). Gender, multiple roles, role meaning, and mental health. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 36*, 182–194.
- Simon, R. W. (1998). Assessing sex differences in vulnerability among employed parents: The importance of marital status. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 39*, 37–53.
- Simon, R. W. (2000). The importance of culture in sociological theory and research on stress and mental health: A missing link? In C. Bird, P. Conrad, & A. Fremont (Eds.), *Handbook of medical sociology* (5th ed., pp. 68–78). New York: Prentice Hall.
- Simon, R. W. (2002). Revisiting the relationships among gender, marital status, and mental health. *American Journal of Sociology, 107*, 1065–1096.
- Simon, R. W. (2007). Contributions of the sociology of mental health for understanding the social antecedents, social regulation, and social distribution of emotion. In W. Avison, J. McLeod, & B. Pescosilido (Eds.), *Mental health, social mirror* (pp. 239–274). New York: Springer.
- Simon, R. W. (2014a). 20 years of the sociology of mental health: the continued significance of gender and marital status for emotional well-being (Forthcoming). In R. Johnson, B. Link, & R. J. Turner (Eds.), *Sociology of mental health: Selected topics from forty years, 1970s–2010s*. New York: Springer.
- Simon, R. W. (2014b). Sociological scholarship on gender differences in emotion and emotional well-being in the United States: A snapshot of the field (Forthcoming). *Emotion Review*.
- Simon, R. W., & Barrett, A. E. (2010). Non-marital romantic relationships and mental health in early adulthood: does the association differ for women and men? *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 51*, 168–182.
- Simon, R. W., & Lively, K. (2010). Sex, anger, and depression. *Social Forces, 88*, 1543–1568.
- Simon, R. W., & Marcussen, K. (1999). Marital transitions, marital beliefs, and mental health. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 40*, 111–125.
- Simon, R. W., & Nath, L. K. (2004). Gender and emotion in the U.S.: Do men and women differ in self-reports of feelings and expressive behavior? *American Journal of Sociology, 109*, 1137–1176.
- Stevenson, B., & Wolfers, J. (2009). The paradox of declining female happiness. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 1*, 190–225.
- Thoits, P. A. (1982). Life stress, social support, and psychological vulnerability: Epidemiological considerations. *Journal of Community Psychology, 10*, 341–362.
- Thoits, P. A. (1986). Multiple identities: Examining gender and marital status differences in distress. *American Sociological Review, 51*, 259–272.
- Thoits, P. A. (1987). Gender and marital status differences in control and distress: Common stress versus unique stress explanations. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 28*, 7–22.
- Thoits, P. A. (1989). The sociology of emotions. *Annual Review of Sociology, 15*, 317–342.
- Thoits, P. A. (1991). Gender differences in coping with emotional distress. In J. Eckenrode (Ed.), *The social context of coping* (pp. 107–138). New York: Plenum.
- Thoits, P. A. (1992). Identity structures and psychological well-being: Gender and marital status comparisons. *Social Psychology Quarterly, 55*, 236–256.
- Thoits, P. A. (1995). Stress, coping, and social support: Where are we? What next? *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 35*(Extra Issue), 53–79.



- Tohito, P. A. (2010). Stress and health: Major findings and policy implications. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 51*, 41–53.
- Turner, R. J., & Avison W. (1989). Gender and depression: Assessing exposure and vulnerability to life events in a chronically strained population. *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 177*, 443–455.
- Turner, R. J., & Marino, F. (1994). Social support and social structure: A descriptive epidemiology. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 235*, 193–212.
- Turner, R. J., & Rozell, P. (1994). Psychosocial resources and the stress process. In W. R. Avison & I. H. Gotlib (Eds.), *Stress and mental health: Contemporary issues and prospects for the future* (pp. 179–210). New York: Plenum Press.
- Turner, R. J., & Turner, J. B. (1999). Social integration and support. In C. S. Aneshensel & J. C. Phelan (Eds.), *The handbook of the sociology of mental health* (pp. 301–319). New York: Kluwer.
- Turner, R. J., Blair, W., & Donald, A. Lloyd (1995). The epidemiology of social stress. *American Sociological Review, 60*, 104–125.
- Uecker, J. E. (2012). Marriage and mental health among young adults. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 53*, 67–83.
- Umberson, D., & Williams, K. (1999). Family status and mental health. In C. S. Aneshensel & J. C. Phelan (Eds.), *The handbook of the sociology of mental health* (pp. 225–253). New York: Kluwer.
- Umberson, D., Wortman, C. A., & Kessler, R. C. (1992). Widowhood and depression: Explaining long-term gender differences in vulnerability. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 33*, 10–24.
- Umberson, D., Chen, M. D., House, J. S., Hopkins, K., & Slater, E. (1996). The effect of social relationships on psychological well-being: Are men and women really so different? *American Sociological Review, 61*, 837–857.
- Umberson, D., Thomeer, M. B., & Williams, K. (2013). Family status and mental health: recent advances and future directions. In C. S. Aneshensel, J. C. Phelan, & A. Bierman (Eds.), *The handbook of the sociology of mental health* (pp. 405–432). New York: Kluwer.
- Wade, T. J., & Pevalin, D. J. (2004). Marital transitions and mental health. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 45*, 155–170.
- Waite, L., & Gallagher, M. (2000). *The case for marriage: Why married people are happier, healthier, and better off financially*. New York: Doubleday.
- Weissman, M. M., & Klerman, G. L. (1977). Sex differences and the epidemiology of depression. *Archives of General Psychiatry, 34*, 98–111.
- Wheaton, B. (1990). Life transitions, role histories, and mental health. *American Sociological Review, 55*, 209–223.
- World Health Organization. (2000). International consortium of psychiatric epidemiology: Cross-national comparisons of mental disorders. *Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 78*, 413–426.
- Williams, K. (2003). Has the future of marriage arrived?: A contemporary examination of gender, marriage, and psychological well-being. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 44*, 470–487.
- Williams, D. R., Takeuchi, D., & Adair, R. K. (1992). Marital status and psychiatric disorders among blacks and whites. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 33*, 140–157.
- Yang, Y. (2008). Social inequalities in happiness in the U.S. 1972–2004: An age-period-cohort analysis. *American Sociological Review, 73*, 2004–2226.
- Yu, Y., & Williams, D. R. (1999). Socioeconomic status and mental health. In C. S. Aneshensel & J. C. Phelan (Eds.), *The handbook of the sociology of mental health* (1st ed., pp. 151–166). New York: Kluwer.

Sarah K. Harkness and Steven Hitlin

## 21.1 Introduction

Morality has long been at the root of sociological theorizing, explicitly in the work of Durkheim and Weber, as scholars have been concerned with the taken-for-granted notions of right and wrong that suffuse society and its constituent groups. The study of morality waned in the last third of the twentieth century (Stivers 1996), but has undergone something of a recent resurgence (see Hitlin and Vaisey 2013). The psychology of morality has flourished in the past decade (Haidt 2008; Haidt 2012), with morality's emotional aspects being at the forefront. Concurrently, work on cultural-level moral systems has blossomed, ranging from the classic focus on justice (Kohlberg 1981) to the most recent iterations examining multiple foundations of morality (e.g., Graham et al. 2011). Sociologists are becoming re-engaged with what was once a core set of sociological questions (see Hitlin and Vaisey 2010), and emotionality is at the root of this resurgence (Turner 2007; Turner and Stets 2006).

Morality involves individual, group, and societal orientations toward understandings of right and wrong, praiseworthy and shameful, that appears to people to exist apart from themselves as binding external standards (Smith 2003; Taylor 1989). Morality draws lines around what is considered “wrong” or “good” in societies (Hitlin

2008), with an element of ‘should’ and ‘should not’ attached to potential behaviors and life goals (Bandura 1999). Morality is related to, but distinct from, altruism (Penner et al. 2005; Piliavin 2008), the notion of helping others at a cost to oneself. Much behavior that is altruistic can be considered moral, though there are societies and subgroups for whom the “proper” thing to do involves not helping others in particular situations. Similarly, pro-social behavior overlaps with moral behavior, but there are societies and groups in which actions thought to be made for the greater good might mean being immoral to others (e.g., internment camps in WWII). We thus remain agnostic about what the content of a moral system should be, instead focusing on the social scientific understanding of those potential moral systems and their links to individual functioning and emotional experience. A core point is that morality is “felt” as binding within cultures; morality draws its power largely through feelings of disgust, empathy, shame, and related emotions.

We begin this chapter with a discussion of core sociological theorizing related to morality and moral emotions before considering how the philosophy of morality links to modern psychological debates regarding the role emotions play in moral thought and action. This culminates in an overview of recent work on dual-process models bridging emotion and cognition, incorporating the empirical support obtained from recent work in neuroscience. We then turn to how this model of cognition informs the way culture shapes the internalization and use of moral codes,

S. K. Harkness (✉) · S. Hitlin  
University of Iowa, Iowa City, USA  
e-mail: sarah-harkness@uiowa.edu

including the various moral foundations that societies differentially emphasize. The chapter ends with a consideration of cross-cultural differences in the prevalence and affective experience of moral emotions before issuing a call for more sociological and interdisciplinary research.

### 21.1.1 A Brief History of Moral Theory

Philosophers and moral theorists have debated for centuries about the form, causes, and consequences of morality and the role that moral emotions play in this process. Classical sociological theorizing about morality identifies its significance for creating and sustaining social order and solidarity. Durkheim (1973, 1982, 1992) proposed that morality is a social fact that is critical for solidarity and coordination and is essentially universally internalized by group members (Hitlin and Vaisey 2013; Powell 2010). Vaisey (2007) finds evidence in a modern example of this process wherein he argues that solidarity in urban communes is brought on by moral consensus over and above structural factors such as shared practices, homophily, and resource investment.

For Durkheim, moral emotions arise when people either meet or break moral expectations; when these expectations are violated this often results in other group members experiencing outrage and the offenders feeling emotions akin to shame. These emotions show the violators that they committed a transgression and hopefully keep them from acting in their own self-interests in the future (Durkheim 1973; Lukes 1985). Emotions are thus critical for moral systems as they give an indication of when a behavior either goes against a moral code or is exemplary of what a proper person in that society would do. Moral emotions serve as functional sign-posts for evaluating people's behavior and can provide instantaneous feedback as to how greatly the act either supports or breaks the strictures of moral systems (Blasi 1999; Owens and Goodney 2000). The thrust of Durkheim's arguments about morality regarded macro-level processes of group cohesion. Although he theorized about moral emotions, his treatment of the place they have

in the micro-processes that generate moral judgment and action was relatively sparse.

Weber's (1978) conception of morality involves a decision-making process whereby individuals internalize values of right and wrong. Moral standards prompt action by helping actors decide which course of action will achieve desired, socially appropriate ends. For example, one of Weber's most cited arguments about capitalism (1930[2001]) rests on the notion that religious adherents, Protestants in particular, internalize religious doctrine. The informational portion of these beliefs motivates action that is in alignment with these religious moral guidelines, but, importantly, part of the internalization process also creates emotional states for the followers. These emotional states become a "psychological motive force" (1930[2001], p. 259) that compels believers to behave in accordance with these beliefs and sanction those who do not (see Campbell 2006 for a thorough analysis of motives in Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*). Additionally, a hallmark of Weber's work is the argument that individuals are constrained by multiple structures, including class, status, and party, and must struggle to make decisions against these hidden constraints, such as whether to engage in moral behavior (Weber 1949; Powell 2010). Thus, motives for behavior, emotional or otherwise, are bound by culture and social structures and are in no way universal (Campbell 2006).

For these early theorists, the power of the "ought" to compel action was emotional, though they did not have modern terms to explicate these non-conscious processes. In this vein, Simmel's (1950) theorizing about morality delves into how the self is implicated in moral decision making through socialization into a society's moral codes. Though societies may differ in the content of these normative strictures, the societal objective is for people to behave in a "socially efficient manner" (Simmel 1950, p. 101). When confronted with a moral dilemma, individuals internally contend with a "second subject" version of the self (Simmel 1950, p. 99), a concept similar to Mead's "me" (Mead 1967), which conveys emotionally charged information about how

one ought to behave in a situation given their society's moral codes. It is through this internal conversation with the second self that moral action is achieved—an implicit measuring of one's options against societal standards. For Simmel, individual psychological analysis was to be a core aspect of the sociology of morality, linked to scientific analysis of social life and historical forces (Levine 2010), but was distinctly not a rational process.

Goffman (1959, 1967) also places great emphasis on the role of the self in moral behavior (Rawls 1987); individuals are motivated to portray a particular image of themselves when interacting with others. Feedback received from other people tells the person how successfully they are playing their role with regard to cultural expectations in general and moral guidelines in particular. Goffman (1977) provides an example that, for women, appearing disheveled in public gives the image of having loose morals, whereas the moral code about appearance is less restrictive for men. People also experience an emotional reaction when processing this feedback, which provides further information about the successfulness of one's performance. When individuals receive feedback that they have failed to live up to a moral code, for instance, they feel embarrassment or shame at their blunder. Goffman's theory of morality stipulates that individuals are motivated to behave in alignment with culturally constructed moral codes, but he is not concerned with how these rules are internalized as part of their identities. Instead these codes are merely the "rules of the game" to which people are held accountable (Gouldner 1970), and the proper object of study involves interactional pressures and constructions (Rawls 2010). At issue are the deep ways in which societal expectations become infused with non-conscious individual moral processes to shape behavior within an ongoing flow of interaction, which does not often allow for logical, conscious reflection on action and self-presentation.

Identity theorists have moved beyond these initial sociological insights to testable hypotheses about how internalized moral expectations guide social interaction. On the whole, iden-

tity theorists maintain that people have a moral identity that they attempt to verify in interaction with others, and it is this process of verification that produces moral behavior (Stets and Carter 2011, 2012; see also Blasi 1984). Stets and Carter (2011, 2012) argue that moral identities (Aquino and Reed II 2002) are comprised of stable self-views that vary along a continuum of attributes, including facets such as care (Gilligan 1982) and justice (Kohlberg 1981; Turiel 1983). In interaction, people may come to understand that they behaved immorally (e.g., others reacted to the actor with shock, others may have openly informed the actor of the misdeed, the actor behaved in a way that goes against a commonly-held moral code in that particular situation such as not cheating on an exam, etc.). This situational realization would not be in accord with their moral identities, especially if the behavior was particularly bad or if the actor has a moral identity that is extremely caring or justice-oriented. This inconsistency would lead to a negative emotional reaction within the actor. If, on the other hand, the actor behaved in a conventionally moral fashion in a morally suffused context (such as not cheating on a task when it was rather easy and advantageous to do so), then the actor will experience positive emotions. Both survey and experimental work support this approach. Stets and Carter (2011, 2012) also theorize that negative emotional reactions would motivate the actor to behave in a way to rectify their immoral act so as to begin to verify their moral identity. Thus, emotions do not necessarily drive initial behaviors but serve as guides for devising subsequent action if moral identities are not verified. The identity theory project offers an important corrective on Goffman's limited internal social psychology: a vague supposition that people feel a 'do no harm' obligation within the social order (Rawls 2010).

In Goffman's and Stets and Carter's account of moral emotions, emotions provide information about how well an interaction is fulfilling either moral rules of behavior for the former or moral identity standards for the later. Thus, one may have committed a mistake on moral grounds, others react to this act in a negative fashion, and the actor feels a negative emotion, like embar-

rassment, after appraising the response given by others. Emotions provide signals that a rectifying action needs to be made to save face or verify the moral identity. The bulk of the work on adjudicating the role emotions play in determining behavior and judgment, however, has largely occurred not within sociology but instead within the cognitive processing traditions of moral psychology.

---

## 21.2 Moral Reasoning and Moral Emotions

### 21.2.1 Rationalist Perspective

Building off of the work of philosophers, psychologists have been concerned with the understanding of the cognitive and affective processes underlying the ways in which individuals process moral information, with a more recent focus on the precise role that moral emotions play in the moral reasoning, judgment, and action. Arguments about how individuals process moral emotions and make moral judgments generally fall into two camps that stem from a classic philosophical distinction: the rationalist and the social intuitionist (Haidt 2001; Haidt and Bjorklund 2008; Vaisey 2008). Much like in sociological theories of emotion, psychologists understand emotions to convey information, but how a scholar conceptualizes the processing and utilization of such information differs by this rationalist or intuitionist stance. Haidt (2001) locates the roots of this rationalist conception of moral judgment to Plato's *Timaieus* (fourth century B.C. [2000]), in which Plato argues that the universe and all its constituent parts are the result of divine, and divinely rational, intent. All the features of the world, including humans, are rationally and purposefully ordered to the extent that chaos will allow. In creating humans, the gods embodied immortal and rational souls inside mortal and needy bodies. It is then the role of the immortal intellect to reign in the urges of mortal bodies, and the world's achievement of divine perfection is blocked to the extent people are unable to do so (Zeyl 2013). Conscious, considered, rational de-

isions are the ultimate goal of decision making as it brings individuals in alignment to the divine.

The supremacy of reason for determining moral action carries through in Kant's influential rationalist ethical theory (1785 [1959]), which states that actors are inherently rational and use their powers of reasoning to formulate the morally correct course of action. This rational decision making process shaped early work in moral psychology by cognitive psychologists such as Piaget (1932 [1960]), Kohlberg (1969), and Turiel (1983), who essentially argue that individuals consciously deliberate on all facets of moral dilemmas, perhaps taking emotions like sympathy into account in their thought process, before deciding on a proper course of action or moral opinion about an event. Those subscribing to a rationalist view of moral judgment would generally argue that the bases of moral reasoning are universal, anchored within issues related to justice, harm, and fairness. Morality still binds groups together through its normative structure—a similarity found between this line of thought and classical sociological understandings of morality; however, in the rationalist view, moral standards are consistently and universally internalized across cultures, though individuals may differ on their stage of moral development (Kohlberg 1969; Turiel 1983). All matters of moral concern, and all situations that trigger moral emotions (see discussion below), are ultimately anchored within this justice-harm framework for these theorists.

Turiel and Nucci (Nucci 1981; Nucci and Turiel 1978; Turiel 1983), for example, argue that part of the development of moral reasoning lies in the extent to which people realize the inherent harmfulness or injustice that certain events cause to others, such as violent acts or stealing. Children develop this sense by viewing the emotional reactions that events such as these cause (Nucci and Turiel 1978). Because these acts are understood to be inherently harmful, they become universally immoral behavior and the level of harm that an event may create becomes a means by which to determine whether the event would be immoral. Cross-cultural research indicates that those in North America (Turiel et al. 1987, 1991),



the U.S. Virgin Islands (Nucci et al. 1983), Korea (Song et al. 1987), and Nigeria (Hollos et al. 1986) identify the harmfulness or injustice of an event to be a basis of moral judgment. Even actions that might not seem to directly cause harm (e.g., burning a flag), in this view, can become morally laden issues through a sense of harming the collective good. However, the emergence of other perspectives suggests dissatisfaction with this expansion of harm/fairness to encompass all moral actions.

### 21.2.2 Social Intuitionist Perspective

Haidt (2001) has been at the forefront of arguing that the wrong philosophical tradition has guided psychological analysis, instead turning to Hume and the Scottish philosophical tradition to anchor his social intuitionist framework. Hume argued that people have an innate capacity to feel pleasure when behaving in accordance with societal moral strictures and to experience negative affective states when reacting to situations of immorality. Importantly, emotional states drive action; they are not simply one source of information. This model views moral judgment as the result of implicit processes in which emotions play a critical, causal role (Haidt 2001, 2008; Haidt et al. 1993; Nussbaum 2005; Sayer 2005; Wilson 1993). In one of Hume's more ardent stances on this subject, he states that "reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions" (1739 [1978], p. 451), and thusly holds the opposite position on the role of reason and emotions than the rationalists and much of earlier moral psychologists. Both views, it should be noted, generally assume that individuals internalize normative moral codes, though, in addition to this fundamental division over the causal role of moral emotions, the social intuitionist camp is also less developmental and universalistic in its approach.

In the social intuitionist framework, people may use reason to solve a moral dilemma, but this occurs *after* the original emotional reaction to the dilemma has occurred. In Haidt et al.'s (1993) now classic example, individuals are

asked to make a judgment about whether an action that does not harm another person or breaks a law can be considered immoral, such as whether it is morally wrong to eat your dog that had been killed in a car accident or clean your toilet with your nation's flag. When faced with these scenarios, individuals have intense emotional reactions and make an instantaneous decision that these situations are morally wrong. Yet, they struggle to generate a reason why this is the case since these disgust-inducing vignettes do not directly impinge on ethics of justice and harm. Some ultimately took a permissive stance toward the action on the grounds that it does not harm others, but, for the majority of those studied, these initial emotional reactions of disgust and being generally bothered were better predictors of their ultimate moral judgments than were concerns about the potential harmful outcomes of these behaviors. People reason like lawyers, Haidt (2001) contends, finding logical-enough arguments that support an intuitively derived conclusion after the fact, rather than unbiased scientists following the data where it leads. If one's 'gut' reaction tells you something is wrong, you are motivated to find reasons to support that, and most people adhere to their moral decision even when all logical supporting reasons are removed (Haidt 2001).

As a further example, emotional reactions more fully explain moral decisions made by American conservatives and liberals when discussing issues related to non-traditional sexuality, for instance (Haidt and Hersh 2001; see Graham et al. 2011 for an overview). Specifically, experiencing disgust or repulsion after reading about sexual acts, such as incestual relationships or masturbation, leads to moral denunciation of the acts, with conservatives experiencing greater negative affective reactions to descriptions of gay and lesbian sexuality than liberals. Indeed, when participants were asked to justify their decisions, many who had these strong emotional reactions struggled to come up with a reason and showed signs of being "dumbfounded." For instance, one participant responded "Gosh, this is such a hard thing because I think I'm probably contradicting myself throughout this tape, and you're going to listen to it and think I don't know what

I'm talking about [laughter]" (Haidt and Hersh 2001, p. 210). Yet, this inability to justify their decisions did not change their initial, emotionally driven decision.

Interestingly, the experience of moral emotions, like disgust, can have an influence on moral decisions even when the emotion is unrelated to the moral dilemma at hand but is experienced concurrently. Schnall et al. (2008) induced disgust in participants as they reacted to a series of morally questionable situations, such as those mentioned formerly, through such techniques as exposing them to a bad smell (a "fart spray") or working in a filthy room. Participants who worked in a disgust-inducing environment were more likely to form harsher moral decisions about these scenarios.

Haidt (2001, 2005, 2008) argues that it is this initial emotional reaction that serves as a guide to making a moral judgment about the event. According to Blasi (1999), emotions play this critical role in decision making because they are so spontaneous: "It is precisely because they are involuntary that emotions can be trusted as sincere expressions of the person's attitudes" (p. 8). Moral reasoning of the rationalist sort may occur, but it happens after these emotionally charged intuitions have begun the process, if at all. This argument that decision making largely occurs rapidly and without deliberation is in line with more contemporary findings that cognition does indeed generally operate in this fashion (Bargh and Chartrand 1999; Fazio and Olson 2003; Greenwald and Banaji 1995); a point we will turn to shortly. Moreover, Haidt argues that because moral stances always have an emotional component to them, any post hoc rationalizations most likely gain influence because they spark an affective reappraisal of the situation.

Typically, however, people tend to look for reasoned justifications for their initial reactions when asked for them. A consistent stream of research demonstrates this process as people attune to information that supports their initial reaction and disregard that which conflicts (Lord et al. 1979) as people are motivated to avoid cognitive and affective dissonance (Burke and Stets 2009; Chaiken et al. 1996; Festinger 1957; Heise 1979,

2007). Changing one's intuitive, emotionally derived decision rarely occurs, though it is thought to happen more often when we learn the reactions of our family, friends, and acquaintances (Chartrand and Bargh 1999; Chen et al. 1996). In this case, people's reasoning occurs under the social influence of significant others, which may also facilitate the internalization of more nuanced and precise moral codes over time.

---

### 21.3 Neuroscience and Morality

The social intuitionist framework argues that the emotional content of these reactions form the moral bases for reasoning, and it is this content that makes moral messages so powerful. This argument is supported by recent advances in neuroscience that have elucidated the role emotions play in decision making. Damasio and his colleagues were among the first to explore how emotions direct action with their somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio 1994, 1996; Damasio et al. 1991). According to this hypothesis, as people learn and experience new situations, they internalize the ways that certain decisions and actions made them feel, and this affective information is stored within the brain as a somatic marker. When faced with dilemmas that harken back on these past scenarios, individuals' recall either consciously or subconsciously the feelings that certain courses of action have sparked in the past. Emotional information from these somatic markers then guides decisions as people attempt to avoid a negative outcome in the present (Damasio 1994). Considering a potential course of action may bring forth expectant feelings of shame or embarrassment, for instance, and such projected feelings motivate the person to disregard this possibility and search for another that produces a more positive anticipated emotion. Damasio suggests people use somatic markers especially when the decisions are cognitively complex or uncertain, like in many moral scenarios, as conscious cognitive processing can become easily overloaded in these situations. Somatic markers help to simplify the decision. As Damasio (1996, p. 1417) states, somatic markers "...could act co-

vertly to highlight, in the form of an attentional mechanism, certain components over others, and to direct, in effect, the go, stop, and turn signals necessary for much decision making and planning on even the most abstract of topics.”

Damasio and colleagues have tested their somatic marker hypothesis by examining the decision making processes of people who have damaged ventromedial prefrontal cortexes (VMPFC) and associated areas of the brain, including the ventrolateral cortex (OFC/VL). These areas are critical for the processing of emotions as they allow for the formation of emotional memory and for this information to be conveyed to other portions of the brain. Damage to the VMPFC or OFC/VL hinders the formation of somatic markers linked to new experiences, and those with such damage are also unable to process the emotional markers generated before the damage occurred. For example, Damasio et al. (1996) demonstrate that those with VMPFC damage do not react to emotionally charged pictures, such as those of catastrophes and bodily mutilations, whereas those without damage react in the typical fashion with feelings akin to pain.

One of the most famous instances of this is the case of Phineas Gage—the railroad worker who had a metal bar driven through his head by an explosion. The bar traveled from the base of his chin through the top of his head damaging his frontal lobe. While he was considered to be a very serious, sober man before the accident, some reports suggest that once recovered from his injuries he became erratic, selfish, and no longer followed social rules of morally proper conduct. His former employer would not rehire him and his friends and family had difficulty reconciling this new behavior to what they knew of him before the explosion (Marazziti et al. 2013).

Those with recent lesions to these areas do retain their moral knowledge about normative codes of conduct, but this damage disrupts emotional processing. Their decision making cannot be guided by emotions (Bechara et al. 1994; Camille et al. 2004; Lough et al. 2006), and despite knowledge of moral rules, their behavior often deviates from societal norms. For

instance, patients are typically motivated for immediate personal gain no matter the social cost, and can exhibit criminal behaviors such as stealing and violence against others (Anderson et al. 1999, 2000). The younger this damage occurs, the more aberrant and antisocial the behavior becomes.

Those with damage to the VMPFC or OFC/VL do not react emotionally to violations of moral codes and largely do not feel empathy for the victims of such violations. This damage may impair the typical functioning of the moral emotions of shame, guilt, pity, and pride (Anderson et al. 1999; Koenigs et al. 2007), and those with this kind of damage cannot put themselves in another’s position to understand their feelings (Blair and Cipolotti 2000; Koenigs et al. 2007; Lough et al. 2006; Shamay-Tsoony et al. 2003). Blair and Cipolotti (2000) also demonstrate that those with lesions to the VMPFC quickly deem potential violations to widely shared moral codes as completely acceptable, such as deciding whether to smother one’s own baby or push another person in front of a runaway boxcar to save five others. Patients in these studies consistently developed utilitarian solutions to complicated, emotionally charged scenarios and showed no negative reactions in deciding to personally kill one for the sake of the sparing others. These decisions may be strictly logical, but non-patients commonly view them as abhorrent.

Thus, this area of the brain appears to be a key component in the processing of emotional information in general, and morality in particular (see Marazziti et al. 2013 and Moll et al. 2008 for a review of the extant neurobiological research on this topic, including a discussion of other areas of the brain that are implicated in this process). Overall, this research supports the contention that reason is not a sufficient cause for moral behavior—this process requires emotion. Recent work has begun to explore these links through a sociological framework (Firat and Hitlin 2012; Firat and McPherson 2010; Franks 2010), though theorizing is in its infancy.

## 21.4 Dual-Process Models of Cognition, Emotion, and Culture

This work detailing the automaticity of information processing and the critical role emotions play has culminated into what are popularly termed dual-process models of cognition (Chaiken and Trope 1999; Evans 2008; Greene et al. 2004). Haidt (2005) uses a particularly evocative heuristic for this model: a rider on an elephant. The rider represents the portion of our cognition that is deliberate and intentional, and this is the part that philosophers who valued reason, like Plato, believed to be in complete command of the elephant. Yet the elephant, a representation of our implicit, emotional, automatic cognitive abilities, is a difficult beast to direct—control is limited. As Haidt (2005, p. 4) puts it, “When the elephant really wants to do something, I’m no match for him.” Thus, although the conscious, reasoning part of our cognition can have some say in what we do, it is relegated to the position of “advisor” (Haidt 2005, p. 17) to the automatic portions of our cognition, including our emotions. Often, the rider is forced to come up with justifications for a behavior that the elephant unknowingly dictated.

This dual-process model, now relatively standard in psychology, has recently been employed within the sociological study of culture, offering a useful bridge to understanding how culture shapes moral codes and reactions. In one of the most direct statements of the dual-process model of culture, Vaisey (2009) sets up a dichotomy between culture-as-toolkit models and practice theories of culture. In the basic toolkit premise, individuals are able to pull from a repertoire of cultural scripts when compelled to justify their actions (Boltanski and Thévenot 1999; DiMaggio 1997, 2002; Swidler 1986, 2001). This is also akin to how Haidt (2001, 2005, 2008) conceives of the role of conscious reasoning in his social intuitionist model, as these rationales are post hoc. Swidler (2001) demonstrates this with her findings that married individuals’ are consistently inconsistent when asked to provide justifications for their behavior and past choices in their relationships. For instance, her couples

frequently examine their love lives through both the rosy glasses of the storybook version of true love and through the more mundane, realistic lens that relationships are difficult and couples must “work” to make them functional. These couples select cultural ideologies as needed largely to develop post hoc explanations for their choices or to reason about the causes of others’ behavior.

Vaisey (2009) reports similar contradictory and inconsistent reasoning given by teenagers who were asked to describe how they decided to behave in a situation that challenged their ability to select the “right” from the “wrong” course of action. For instance, some were highly utilitarian in their accounts where the anticipated consequences drove the choice, whereas others talked about religious reasons for behaving as they did, and still others relied on what their parents taught them or how they thought their parents might react. Some even reported using multiple bases of justification without realizing they were being contradictory or indefinite.

Culture, in this toolkit view, motivates action in the sense that it may restrict possible courses of action if people do not know of a particular cultural “tool”. Vaisey (2009) argues that in order to accept this standpoint, one must assume that the only way for cultural messages to cause behavior is for people to use them in a deliberate, logical fashion, much like the way utilitarian rationalists conceive of decision making as described above. Nevertheless, as many have demonstrated, these messages tend to be conflicting; therefore, the messages could not possibly direct action as that action would itself be as inconsistent as the messages themselves.

Drawing on dual-process psychology, and taking seriously the work of the practice theorists like Bourdieu (1984, 1990), this assumption becomes largely untenable. According to these opposing arguments, portions of culture become internalized and guide action and preferences in an automatic, implicit fashion, much like how emotions guide behavior in the social intuitionist model. Popularized by Bourdieu’s *habitus* (1990), culturally defined, internalized “dispositions” (1990, p. 53) guide behavior and organize

preferences without conscious awareness or intentionally attending to a set of cultural rules for taste and the like. This embodied sense of morality has begun to be expanded within sociology (Ignatow 2009, 2010). Winchester (2008), for example, explores the construction and internalization of a Muslim moral *habitus* among recent converts by observing how learning about and participating in these newfound ritual practices, especially those related to prayer, eating, and dress, lead to a conception of the moral strictures of the Muslim religion.

People do not internalize all cultural messages to the same depth, and only those that are deeply internalized affect the implicit processes that drive automatic behavior and judgment (D'Andrade 1995; Vaisey 2009). D'Andrade (1995) argues that when cultural beliefs are internalized as beliefs, they gain emotional weight and feel inherently true. In keeping with this, although Vaisey (2009) found evidence to support the toolkit model of cultural messages in the interview reports described previously, he also found that the teenagers' main base of moral judgment, which he argues is a proxy for their most ingrained moral schema, is a strong predictor of their engagement in immoral behavior years later. Thus, in the dual-process model of culture, cultural scripts and messages impact behavior partially through the intentional, deliberate reasoning portion of the conscious under certain situations, such as when people are asked to provide a rationale for a past action; however, behavior is largely affected by the intuitive, implicit, automatic part of the self. It is here that internalized cultural schemas and their associated emotions most likely play a strong, causal role in the decision making process, though there remains a good deal of work to be done in order to fully explicate these processes.

By blending the intentional with the implicit, dual-process models are able to account for a wide range of cognitions and behaviors, and emotions play a key role in this process. This dual understanding of cognition opens the door for more varied, wide-ranging questions about the extent of cultural and emotional variation in the domain of morality. Although we have uni-

versal, innate capacities for moral emotion and these are a driving-force behind most decisions and judgments, how do cultures vary on which type of moral schema are differentially more important for moral action and emotional reactions? And what is the extent to which these emotions vary cross-culturally in meaning, intensity, and type? This discussion turns now to a consideration of these issues.

---

## 21.5 Forms of Cultural Variation and the Impact of Culture

To this point, the dominant models linking culture to cognition and decision making have been relatively unconcerned with the details of the emotional processes that undergird these important links. As such, these cultural models are largely bereft of a refined social psychology. Taking seriously the implications drawn from cognitive psychology that implicit, emotionally driven, culturally determined moral intuitions are a driving force behind behavior, it becomes important to elucidate the ways in which culture shapes these intuitions and emotions. When individuals are born, we arrive with a capacity for all possible bases of moral intuitions and capacities for emotion (Huttenlocher 1994, 2009; Higgins 1996), yet only those intuitions that are backed by codes and ethics learned while growing up in a particular culture persist into adulthood (Huttenlocher 1994, 2009; Spear 2000). Researchers argue that the development of culturally delimited moral systems is evolutionarily adaptive; if individuals never pruned their potential moral intuitions, they would become frozen when confronted with situations highlighting multiple intuitions that are potentially, highly contradictory. Instead, cultures specialize in certain bases of morality while deemphasizing or disregarding others, such as accentuating autonomy over sanctity. These priorities define the particular moral culture of a society, thereby forming foundations for, as Durkheim believed, common intuitive understandings of the social world (see, for example, Inglehart and Baker 2000).



These cultural specializations in moral foundations vary across societies and time (Zerubavel 1991). As one prominent example, the work of Bellah et al. (1985 [2007]) highlights this kind of cultural shift within American society. They argue that American values have generally revolved around four different moral cultures of expressive individualist, utilitarian individualist, civic republican, and biblical (though in the American context, each of these moral cultures ultimately represents a form of individualism). Using historical records as well as interviews, the authors demonstrate the rise and eventual decline of morality based on norms of community and biblical strictures with a newfound emphasis on individualism rising in their wake.

Emotionally based intuitions that are prominent in a particular culture as part of the moral discourse are strengthened, become more nuanced, and are deeply internalized, while those that are not culturally reinforced fall by the wayside (Higgins 1996). This predominantly occurs during childhood and adolescence when there is a great deal of neural plasticity. For instance, if morality is largely “housed” in the prefrontal cortex, the wiring of this area of the brain occurs in late childhood and becomes basically set in adolescence (Huttenlocher 1994). This suggests that most moral learning occurs during this relatively early time period in the life course, and this is supported by some ethnographic evidence. Minoura (1992) interviewed and observed Japanese children and adolescents who lived for a period of time in the United States. The children that experienced American culture early in their childhoods acculturated at a very superficial level: they knew the norms but had not formed emotional connections with them. Once they returned to Japan, these norms had no lasting effect. Children who lived in the United States between the ages of 9 and 15 were able to not only learn American norms but also imbued them with emotional content and internalized them. These adolescents reacted emotionally to friends, family, and dilemmas typically as American adolescents would.

Perhaps the most influential perspective linking individual functioning to wider cultural

contexts involves the ubiquitous distinction between “Eastern” and “Western” cultures: the individualist/collectivist dimension (Markus and Kitayama 1991; Triandis 1995). This perspective argues that people in these two types of cultures fundamentally perceive the world in different ways (Nisbett 2004; Nisbett et al. 2001), with Easterners being holistic thinkers—paying more attention to the entire situation and using fewer analytic categories and formal logics—than Westerners, who are more analytic thinkers. Kondo (1990) offers an ethnographic treatment of the subtle ways that collectivist thinking infuses interpersonal relations in her exploration of Japanese workplaces. She finds, for example, that many workers receive ethics training highlighting the importance of family and teams over the individual. This moral value is reinforced through the activities and rules at company retreats. Workers live with and participate in events with their squad so fully that when individuals’ transgressed, it was their entire team who was punished, thereby emphasizing the importance of the workers’ group. This kind of training, Kondo argues, suffuses workers with a respect and reliance on group values and family, including workers’ corporate family.

These two broad cultural categories tend to differ in their experience of guilt and shame, with collectivist cultures defining the self more in line with interdependence, group expectations, and the maintenance of conformity to the social order. Shame is more likely to be triggered in collectivist cultures because shame is a reaction to a loss of face and a sense of who one is (Babcock and Sabin 1990; Bedford and Hwang 2003; Niedenthal et al. 1994). Western, individualistic nations are more likely to traffic in guilt, which is more often the result of having done the wrong thing, by causing harm to another for instance, and is thus a reaction against the act and not the self (Lewis 2008; Wong and Tsai 2007).

Some have argued that the font of these distinctions derives from religious differences. Bedford and Hwang (2003) note that Confucian ethics emphasize duty and social goals, as opposed to Western culture’s reliance on the importance of personal rights and independence. The Confucian

view of the self is also different from that found in Western cultures as the self is highly connected to one's ancestors and family, and these social relationships and group memberships weigh heavily in the construction of the Eastern self (Markus and Kitayama 1991).

Moral emotional functioning also occurs in response to salient social changes. Inglehart's modernization thesis (Inglehart 1990, 1995) links trends in individual values to broad structural changes, empirically modeling a presumed structural shift within nations in line with global trends of economic development. This tradition essentially finds that less developed countries report concerns about law, order, and economic stability; as countries develop, their values shift in a more "modern" direction toward quality-of-life issues, as economic security feels more certain. This general trend is moderated by the particular cultural history of a nation (Inglehart and Baker 2000) such that religious tradition shapes the form that this value-shift takes over time. People's orientations to moral issues, this work finds, shift in path dependent, yet predictable ways toward more quality of life issues as nations develop. Moral priorities, and the attendant emotional force that suggests which possibilities 'feel' right, are thus linked to both structure and cultural tradition.

## 21.6 Codifications of Morality

The use and interpretation of emotional and cultural information is highly intertwined and utilizes the same cognitive processing systems. With a firmer grasp of the myriad of ways cultures shape their members' moral strictures, we are better equipped to more fully appreciate cross-cultural differences in the prevalence and affective experience of moral emotions, as well as morality more broadly. We believe this nexus to be one of the most fruitful avenues for future research in the cross-cultural aspects of moral emotions.

Many researchers have turned their attention to codifying the types or bases of morality that function across societies, often with the intent of accounting for cross-cultural variation in moral-

ity. Significantly for future research, the most influential theories of morality's bases have not expressly linked emotion to either culture or structure. These anthropological and psychological theories about the bases of moral judgment and decision making can be arranged along a dimension of complexity, starting with simple, universal, intentional rationalizations to culturally varied, implicit information processing. Building off rationalist notions of universal justice, discussed above, Kohlberg offered one of the first explicit theories of moral functioning that has roots in the developmental theorizing of Piaget 1932 [1960]). Kohlberg (1981) posited a universal pattern of moral development; later work complicated this supposed pattern, but the original influential foray into psychological moral functioning was, in fact, based in a notion that the human organism learns moral strictures in a uniform pattern.

Kohlberg posited six (later five) stages whereby children develop morally, with morality understood in a largely pro-social fashion. Early on, children follow moral rules because they are afraid of the consequences for not acting in this way, and, as children mature, they do so because an authority dictates such behavior and they want to live up to social standards. Only later in life do some individuals develop abstract moral understandings of justice based in understanding universal moral principles. Just a small percentage of the population (1–2%) reaches the highest levels on the Kohlberg scheme. Kohlberg argues that as people develop their moral reasoning and principles, they will behave in a more moral fashion; however, an important criticism of characterizing moral development as forming around a singular structure of morality is that people considered 'moral exemplars' tend to not score very highly on the Kohlberg scale (Hart and Fegley 1995; Youniss and Yates 1999).

This approach is fundamentally utilitarian, without much discussion of the feelings involved in moral reasoning (Liebert 1984), and its basic strength and weakness involves its parsimonious notion of morality: the motivation for justice and to avoid harm (see also the work of Turiel 1994; Turiel et al. 1987). Criticisms abound regarding the Kohlbergian approach (Helwig et al.

1996; Walker and Pitts 1998); including the fact that children are much more advanced in their observed reasoning than his scheme predicts (Killen 2007) and are therefore not morally disadvantaged; they simply have less impulse control than adults (Steinberg 2007). The missing interpersonal component of this tradition has been extensively and famously criticized by Kohlberg's student Carol Gilligan (Gilligan 1982). In response to the seemingly 'masculine' concern with abstract rules of fairness that motivated moral psychology, Gilligan posited a 'feminine' way of reaching moral decisions based in care and empathy. Gilligan argued that women may score lower, on average, on the Kohlberg scale of morality but were not less moral. They simply reached moral conclusions differently; a deficit in the theory, not women.

Nevertheless, the care approach does not fare well in empirical tests (Nunner-Winkler 1984), and gender differences in moral reasoning appear overstated, as men and women typically reach similar moral conclusions when asked to make judgments about moral dilemmas (Jaffee and Hyde 2000; Walker 2006). Situational factors instead influence which of these two styles is employed as opposed to simply the gender of the actors (Smetana et al. 1991). Haidt (2001) has also offered a reinterpretation of this work as being particularly good for learning colloquial theories of morality, such as the particular moral codes that are called upon to justify a moral reaction, but they are probably not best suited to explaining how morality functions in practice, as these theories are highly intentional, objective, and utilitarian. Typical research methods used to test these theories ask people to respond to moral situations, like the aforementioned boxcar vignette, which by design call upon intentional, post hoc reasoning-based cognition and does not assess what people would actually feel and do if faced with these situations. As Sunar (2009) suggests, the sorts of abstract reasoning found in Kohlberg's work is likely more the product of after-the-fact rationalizations legitimizing the immediate experience of these emotions.

Critiques of Kohlberg's justice-approach in many ways triggered new cultural theories of morality (Sunar 2009). For example, Shweder et al.

(1987) pointed out that moral notions of duty and obligation were, in the Kohlbergian scheme, considered lower forms of moral reasoning when, in fact, they form the basis for many societies' notions of right and wrong. Since this early attempt, there are three influential schemas linking culture and/or structure to individual moral worldviews, though the role of emotion is largely implicit within these theories. If Kohlberg posited one moral framework, and Gilligan two, the next three coincidentally post three, four, and five+ foundations, respectively (Graham et al. 2013).

The anthropologist Richard Shweder directly engaged the limits of Kohlberg and Turiel's approach through a deep involvement with India, suggesting that the justice framework is but one of three frameworks cultures use to establish a collective sense of morality (Shweder et al. 1987, 1997). In addition to the 'ethic of autonomy', the rational ethic at the root of Kohlberg's scheme, cultures might evidence the 'ethic of community' and/or the 'ethic of divinity'. Communally oriented moral systems highlight the collective's needs over that of the individual, what falls into the "Eastern" end the individualist-collectivist hypothesized spectrum. An emphasis on divinity focuses on local conceptions of the sacred moral order—practices intended to protect the sacred nature of the spiritual realm for individuals and the society as a whole (Sunar 2009).

This Big Three model, also known as the CAD model (Community, Autonomy, Divinity), is more explicit about emotional experience than other cultural models. In a broad sense, the relative weight of each of these Big Three dimensions affect emotional experience, expression, and conceptualization within a particular culture (Shweder and Haidt 2000; Shweder et al. 1997). Rozin et al. (1999) have offered the most explicit statement in this vein, linking moral judgments from the three domains to particular moral emotions. Specifically, they demonstrate that people feel anger for autonomy violations, contempt for community violations, and disgust for divinity violations. One's emotional experience is a product of the interaction of perceived moral violation within a larger culture.

There is some evidence to suggest that one's social position in the socioeconomic hierarchy is related to these bases of morality even within a dominant culture. In Haidt et al.'s (1993) previously mentioned work, individuals typically experienced disgust in response to stories that violated taboos related to sexuality and food, yet people from higher socioeconomic classes reasoned that these events are not immoral since they are not harmful to oneself or others, did not break any law, and were done privately—statements that upheld their dominant value of autonomy. Respondents from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, however, maintained that these events are still immoral and used non-harm based stances to justify their decisions, particularly about threats to community. For example, nearly half of the lower SES adults said that the person who used the American flag to clean a toilet should be stopped and punished but none of the higher SES adults said this person should be stopped regardless of how offensive they felt the event to be. Future sociological work might profitably explore the intersection of class and culture with respect to moral emotions.

In the most recent theoretical treatment of moral bases, Haidt and Graham explicitly built off of Shweder's work to develop first five, now perhaps six, moral foundations (Graham et al. 2011, 2013; Haidt and Graham 2009) that offer more nuance than the aforementioned Big Three. They argue that there are approximately two 'individualizing' foundations (fairness and care/harm-based moral systems) and three 'communal' foundations (ingroup loyalty, hierarchy, and purity). Current work in this tradition is exploring how many more foundations are necessary to, somewhat ironically, parsimoniously capture the true range of human moral foundations and is examining whether concerns related to liberty, efficiency, ownership, and honesty should be included as additional moral "foundations" (Graham et al. 2013).

While Shweder and Haidt's research programs discuss the foundations of moral functioning found around the world, a related, but distinct anthropological approach focuses on structural relationships and their influence on moral foundations. Fiske (Fiske 1992; Fiske and Haslam 2005)

posits four basic social bonds, or relationships, that foster certain types of regulatory expectations and behaviors (Rai and Fiske 2011). These relationship regulation models build on previous theory by "grounding the foundations in a theory of social relationships and thereby predicting when and how people will rely on one foundation over another" (Rai and Fiske 2011, p. 66).

In short, Fiske and colleagues posit that human relationships take the form of (a) hierarchy (authority ranking), (b) unity (communal sharing), (c) equality (matching), and (d) proportionality (market pricing) as their root forms. Particular relationships can certainly be combinations of these four, but the type of framework calls forth particular moral motives. A relationship that calls on one form of morality (say, market pricing) conjures particular moral logics, the violation of which will be experienced negatively by one or both members of that relationship. There is a sense that more primitive human societies were oriented around unity and authority ranking forms, and more recent cultures prioritize equality and market logics. There is empirical support for this overall view (Haslam and Fiske 1999), though work linking these forms to morality is just beginning (Sunar 2009). Here, like in most of these theories, emotions are posited as reactions to violations of one's cultural moral order (e.g., anger and disgust) or as vital aspects upholding relationships (e.g., love). The theory is largely speculative with respect to different emotions, suggesting that market pricing relationships garner the strongest emotional reactions linked to a focus on extrinsic consequences of an action (Fiske 2004); much more work needs to engage the causal role emotions play in action.

---

## 21.7 Moral Emotion Variation

Moral emotions link moral standards to moral behavior and range from positive to negative: from disgust and shame to gratitude and elevation (Haidt 2003; Tangney et al. 2007; Turner and Stets 2006). Turner and Stets (2006) and Haidt (2003) divide moral emotions into four general categories: (a) the self-critical emotions of

shame, guilt, and embarrassment, (b) the other-critical emotions of contempt, anger, and disgust, (c) the other-suffering emotions related to empathy, sympathy, and compassion, and (d) the other-praising emotions of gratitude and elevation. Turner and Stets (2006) also argue that there are many more moral emotions that are elaborations of this basic typology, including reverence, awe, pride, vengeance, betrayal, regret, and grief. Many of these emotions are considered primary emotions that are recognized cross-culturally (Ekman 1994; Ekman and Friesen 1971; Haidt and Keltner 1999), with moral expressions related to anger and disgust generally having the highest rate of consistent recognition across societies and are coded into our neuroanatomy (Turner and Stets 2005).

Although societies appear to largely draw on and use these particular moral emotions, the nuance of these emotional experiences and meanings does vary considerably cross-culturally. Eastern and Western cultures for instance, differ with respect to types of guilt and shame they experience and the types of situations that elicit these responses. Japanese people, for instance, feel a particular form of guilt arising from feeling as though one is not working diligently to achieve daily or long-term goals, thereby going against strong moral codes of hard work (De Vos 1960). Many Eastern cultures do not distinguish between the sensations of shame, embarrassment, shyness, and modesty, often experiencing them in concert (Menon and Shweder 1994; Shweder et al. 2008); any violation of a norm in front of others or the threat of doing so triggers self-conscious feelings of shame and embarrassment as it threatens one's social identity and face (Goffman 1959; Haidt 2003; Keltner and Buswell 1997).

Shame is one of the emotions with pronounced variation in meaning and form (Bedford 2004; Haidt and Keltner 1999; Li et al. 2004; Shaver et al. 1992). The Mandarin language, for instance, differentiates between multiple forms of guilt and shame that do not translate easily into English (Bedford 2004; Li et al. 2004). Li et al. (2004) report that the Chinese have at least 113 distinct shame concepts that can be categorized in broad strokes as feelings associated with los-

ing face (i.e., concerns with losing personal integrity and others' idea that one is a competent and good person), guilt, disgrace, embarrassment, and condemnation of others' shamelessness. For those in Western cultures, shame is considered to generally be a negative emotional state, similar to anguish, yet for those in Eastern countries, like Japan, shame may take on more positive (or at least a less negative) state (Romney et al. 1997).

Shame can be socially beneficial in certain Eastern cultures (Menon and Shweder 1994). When asked whether anger, shame, or happiness was most unlike the others, Americans respond that happiness is the most distinct emotion. When the same question is asked of Hindus, they state that anger is the most unlike the others. This indicates that shame has a more positive connotation in Hindu culture as they grouped it with happiness, and anger is the more socially damaging of the three (Menon and Shweder 1994; Shweder et al. 2008). Menon and Shweder (1994) link this back to the Hindu parable of the goddess Kali and how her shame stopped her from destroying the world. In the story, Kali enters into a blind rage at having been deceived by the other gods and is intent on demolishing the world. In this fevered state, she accidentally steps on the chest of her husband, Siva, which is an extremely disrespectful action. When Kali realized her literal misstep, she comes back to her senses, experiences a state of *lajja*, and demonstrates this by biting her tongue.

*Lajja* is typically translated as "shame," but the term means something quite different from Western conceptions of shame and is particular to the Hindu culture. This state recognizes respect for social hierarchy and the importance of civility, responsibility, and personal restraint (Menon and Shweder 1994; Shweder et al. 2008); maintaining a sense of *lajja* is socially productive and generally more positive than the experience of shame in Western countries like the United States. This example is one of many wherein only the surface translations of the words match, as the underlying emotional schema is much more nuanced and distinct, thereby making direct comparisons across societies more difficult (for further comparisons see Shweder 2008).



This variation complicates many of the assertions discussed in this chapter that moral emotions are recognized across cultures. Indeed, even if one attempts to standardize the affective experience of an emotional state connoted by a particular word, like guilt, thereby crudely subsuming these kinds of meaning distinctions, we still see large variations cross-culturally in these affective meanings. One source of data that contains such affective information is the *Interact* dictionary (<http://www.indiana.edu/~socpsy/ACT/interact.htm>), used by affect control theorists to examine and model diverse social events in multiple cultures (Heise 1995; see Lively and Heise, Chap. 4, for more information about affect control theory). Affect control theorists measure affective meaning along three dimensions: evaluation (good vs. bad), potency (powerful vs. powerless), and activity (active vs. inactive). Osgood and his colleagues (Osgood et al. 1975) identified these three dimensions to be a universal means by which people describe their sentiments towards all facets of their social worlds, including emotional states.<sup>1</sup> Together, these three dimensions provide a profile, termed an EPA profile, for how individuals in a particular culture affectively experience and feel about each concept. To construct these dictionaries of affective meanings, respondents are asked to rate a concept, like embarrassment, according to its evaluation, potency, and activity using semantic differential scales that range from infinitely ( $\pm 4.3$ ), extremely ( $\pm 3$ ), quite ( $\pm 2$ ), somewhat ( $\pm 1$ ), and neutral (0).

When examining cultural differences in the affective experience of these various emotions, there is a striking amount of variation in affective meaning of these moral emotions, though ratings tend to be of the same valence. Feelings of remorse, for instance, are fairly neutral in goodness in the United States ( $-0.17$ ) but are quite bad in Canada ( $-1.31$ ), Japan ( $-2.09$ ), and China ( $-1.43$ ). Feelings of disgust are extremely bad in Germany ( $-3.39$ ) but are about one entire level less negative in the remaining countries (evaluation ratings: United States= $-2.18$ ; Can-

ada= $-1.90$ ; Japan= $-2.55$ ; China= $-2.13$ ). The powerfulness of these moral emotions also differs cross-culturally. Being ashamed, guilty, or embarrassed are somewhat to quite impotent in all countries except China where these emotions are neither potent nor impotent (for example, potency ratings of ashamed: United States= $-1.37$ ; Canada= $-1.33$ ; Germany= $-1.97$ ; Japan= $-1.94$ ; China= $-0.32$ ). Disgust also stimulates conflicting potency ratings: those in North America report that it is somewhat impotent to neutral (potency ratings: United States= $-0.40$ ; Canada= $-0.59$ ); conversely those in Germany and Japan experience this emotion to be somewhat potent (potency ratings: Germany= $1.21$ ; Japan= $0.88$ ). The most complex and divergent affective meanings are those related to how the activity, or liveliness, of these emotional experiences. Depending on the moral emotion examined, the Japanese data indicate that those in this culture tend to experience the emotion as somewhat to quite active (activity ratings: remorseful= $1.06$ ; disgusted= $1.92$ ; guilty= $0.80$ ), whereas those in the remaining cultures generally report that these emotions are somewhat to quite inactive, especially in the German and Canadian data (German activity ratings: remorseful= $-1.85$ ; disgusted= $0.69$ ; guilty= $-0.74$ ; Canadian activity ratings: remorseful= $-0.56$ ; disgusted= $-0.06$ ; guilty= $-0.17$ ). The ratings of sympathy also indicate variations in affective experiences: in the Chinese data, this emotion is somewhat to quite active ( $1.69$ ), whereas in the other cultures it is either neutral to quite inactive (German activity rating of sympathy= $-2.19$ ).

These reported differences are suggestive of cross-cultural disparities in how an emotion is typically experienced. They indicate that each type of emotion may be caused by dissimilar events in each culture, perhaps even in a systematic fashion such that the cultural variation in moral foundations described earlier are able to predict variation in these emotional reactions. The interaction may also unfold in divergent ways as particular behaviors are called on to respond to the specific moral dilemma. Future work is needed to assess these possibilities, as

<sup>1</sup> Some cultures likely employ more dimensions, but these three cut across societies.

links between macro-moral cultures and micro emotional functioning is just in its infancy.

---

## 21.8 Conclusion

This is an especially propitious time to be exploring the social psychology of moral emotions, especially as it intersects with cross-cultural work on moral foundations. There is a good deal of theory and research on morality, on emotions, and on cultural variation, but the stage is set for work subsuming these factors under a single umbrella that captures the richness of each subfield. This is certainly an ambitious exercise; tools for such models span neuroscience, psychology, anthropology, and sociology.

Given that this field is only developing, and (apart from Stets's and Turner's scholarship) is rarely the explicit focus of sociologists, there are a wide range of avenues for potential future research. We simply highlight a few to give a sense of where this fledgling field might grow. Primarily, work explicitly linking culture and structure to moral emotions might be useful. Many chapters in this Handbook discuss the links between these factors and specific emotions, but the focus on morality's centrality to the social order is only recently reemerging and needs a fuller social psychology to make adequate theoretical progress. There are speculative treatments (e.g., Turner 2008) linking structures to particular moral reactions (e.g., shame, pride), but these have not been considered comprehensively with a detailed linkage to a general theory of how variation in the prominence of certain bases of morality affect emotion. Turner (2008) suggests, for example, that moral emotions will be experienced with greater intensity in situations that are especially weighted with societal values and ideologies. Assertions like this, linking symbolic material with individual experience, are worth empirical exploration.

The ways in which social norms shape, inhibit, and motivate moral reactions are underexplored. There is a large assumption that moral emotions are universal, in their form at least if not their content, with some (Shweder and Haidt 2000) suggesting that the richness in cross-cultural emo-

tional experience is obscured with some totalizing, universalizing patterns. Cultures vary on how much 'looseness' they allow their members with respect to following social norms (Gelfand et al. 2006). Cultures that are 'tighter' with respect to social norms allow less deviance (Gelfand et al. 2011); we would hypothesize that such cultures would experience stronger sanctioning moral emotions toward others, and perhaps towards oneself, when committing social violations. Additionally, in times of cultural flux, newfound social norms may not be thoroughly internalized, which may necessitate moral emotion work (Hochschild 1983) to block the moral reactions learned from the previous era, with deep acting perhaps facilitating the internalization process.

In short, the cross-cultural study of moral emotions offers exciting opportunities for forming genuinely interdisciplinary theories and research programs that can operate in the service of linking micro and macro forces in systematic ways. The focus on morality implicates issues of selfhood and identity, cultural standards, and universal processes of group boundary formation (e.g., what is good, right, and evil) within a single—if broad—conceptual umbrella. Moral emotions simultaneously implicate the deepest core of the individual and the strongest and most important community standards; they define selves, social groups, and societies. As such, they connect what it means both to be an interpersonally active person and a member of a meaningful social entity, highlighting those times such standards are upheld or violated. A host of questions remain, however, about how these core constructs are shaped, transmitted, employed, and even altered across time, history, and culture.

---

## References

- Anderson, S. W., Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Tranel, D., & Damasio, A. R. (1999). Impairment of social and moral behavior related to early damage in human prefrontal cortex. *Nature Neuroscience*, 2(11), 1032–1037.
- Anderson, S., Damasio, W. H., Tranel, D., & Damasio, A. R. (2000). Long-term sequelae of prefrontal cortex damage acquired in early childhood. *Developmental Neuropsychology*, 18(3), 281–296.

- Aquino, K., & Reed, A. II. (2002). The self-importance of moral identity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 83(6), 1423–1440.
- Babcock, M. K., & Sabini, J. (1990). On differentiating embarrassment from shame. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 20(2), 151–169.
- Bandura, A. (1999). Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 3(3), 193–209.
- Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (1999). The unbearable automaticity of being. *American Psychologist*, 54(7), 462–479.
- Bechara, A., Damasio, A. R., Damasio, H., & Anderson, S. W. (1994). Insensitivity to future consequences following damage to human prefrontal cortex. *Cognition*, 50, 7–15.
- Bedford, O. A. (2004). The individual experience of guilt and shame in Chinese culture. *Culture and Psychology*, 10(1), 29–52.
- Bedford, O., & Hwang, K. K. (2003). Guilt and shame in Chinese culture: A cross-cultural framework from the perspective of morality and identity. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 33(2), 127–144.
- Bellah, R. N., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W. M., Swidler, A., & Tipton, S. M. (1985 [2007]). *Habits of the heart: Individualism and commitment in American life*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Blair, R. J. R., & Cipolotti, L. (2000). Impaired social response reversal: A case of ‘Acquired. Sociopathy’. *Brain*, 123(6), 1122–1141.
- Blasi, A. (1984). Moral identity: Its role in moral functioning. In W. M. Kurtines & J. L. Gewirtz (Eds.), *Morality, moral behavior, and moral development* (pp. 128–139). New York: Wiley.
- Blasi, A. (1999). Emotions and moral motivation. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 29(1), 1–19.
- Boltanski, L., & Thévenot, L. (1999). The sociology of critical capacity. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 2(3), 359–377.
- Bourdieu, P. (1984). *Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1990). *The logic of practice*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Burke, P. J., & Stets, J. E. (2009). *Identity theory*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Camille, N., Coricelli, G., Sallet, J., Pradat-Diehl, P., Duhamel, J.-R., & Sirigu, A. (2004). The involvement of the orbitofrontal cortex in the experience of regret. *Science*, 304(5674), 1167–1170.
- Campbell, C. (2006). Do today’s sociologists really appreciate Weber’s essay *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*? *Sociological Review*, 54(2), 207–223.
- Chaiken, S., & Trope, Y. (1999). *Dual-process theories in social psychology*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Chaiken, S., Giner-Sorolla, R., & Chen, S. (1996). Beyond accuracy: Defense and impression motives in heuristic and systematic information processing. In P. M. Gollwitzer and J. A. Bargh (Eds.), *The psychology of action: Linking cognition and motivation to behavior* (pp. 553–578). New York: Guilford Press.
- Chartrand, T. L., & Bargh, J. A. (1999). The chameleon effect: The perception-behavior link and social interaction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 76(6), 893–910.
- Chen, S., Shechter, D., & Chaiken, S. (1996). Getting at the truth or getting along: Accuracy versus impression-motivated heuristic and systematic processing. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 71(2), 262–275.
- D’Andrade, R. G. (1995). *The development of cognitive anthropology*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- D’Andrade, R. G. (2008). *A study of personal and cultural values: American, Japanese, and Vietnamese*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Damasio, A. R. (1994). *Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain*. New York: Avon Books.
- Damasio, A. R. (1996). The somatic marker hypothesis and the possible functions of the prefrontal cortex. *Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences*, 351(1346), 1413–1420.
- Damasio, A. R., Tranel, D., & Damasio, H. C. (1991). Somatic markers and the guidance of behavior: Theory and preliminary testing. In H. S. Levin, H. M. Eisenberg, & A. L. Benton (Eds.), *Frontal lobe function and dysfunction* (pp. 217–229). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Damasio, A. R., Everitt, B. J., & Bishop, D. (1996). The somatic marker hypothesis and the possible functions of the prefrontal cortex [and discussion]. *Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences*, 351(1346), 1413–1420.
- De Vos, G. (1960). The relation of guilt toward parents to achievement and arranged marriage among the Japanese. *Psychiatry*, 23, 287–301.
- DiMaggio, P. (1997). Culture and cognition. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 23, 263–287.
- DiMaggio, P. (2002). Why cognitive (and cultural) sociology needs cognitive psychology. In K. A. Cerulo (Ed.), *Culture in mind: Toward a sociology of culture and cognition*. New York: Routledge.
- Durkheim, E. (1973). *Moral education: A study in the theory and application of the sociology of education*. New York: The Free Press.
- Durkheim, E. (1982). The rules of sociological Method. In S. Lukes (Ed.), *Durkheim: The rules of sociological method and selected texts on sociology and its method* (pp. 31–166). New York: The Free Press.
- Durkheim, E. (1992). *Professional ethics and civic morals*. London: Routledge.
- Ekman, P. (1994). Strong evidence for universals in facial expressions: A reply to Russell’s mistaken critique. *Psychological Bulletin*, 115(2), 268–287.
- Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1971). Constants across cultures in the face and emotion. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 17(2), 124–129.
- Evans, J. S. B. T. (2008). Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgement, and social cognition. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 59, 255–278.

- Fazio, R. H., & Olson, M. A. (2003). Implicit measures in social cognition research: Their meaning and use. *Annual Review of Psychology, 54*, 297–327.
- Festinger, L. (1957). *A theory of cognitive dissonance*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Firat, R., & Hitlin, S. (2012). Morally bonded and bounded: A sociological introduction to neurology. *Advances in Group Processes, 29*, 165–199.
- Firat, R., & McPherson, C. M. (2010). Toward an integrated science of morality. In S. Hitlin & S. Vaisey (Eds.), *Handbook of the sociology of morality* (pp. 361–384). New York: Springer.
- Fiske, A. P. (1992). The four elementary forms of sociality: Framework for a unified theory of social relations. *Psychological Review, 99*(4), 689–723.
- Fiske, A. P. (2004). Relational models theory 2.0. In Haslam, N. (Ed.) *Relational models theory: A contemporary overview* (pp. 3–25). New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Fiske, A. P., & Haslam, N. (2005). The four basic social bonds: Structures for coordinating interaction. In M. W. Baldwin (Ed.), *Interpersonal cognition* (pp. 267–298). New York: Guilford Press.
- Franks, D. D. (2010). *Neurosociology: The nexus between neuroscience and social psychology*. New York: Springer.
- Gelfand, M. J., Nishii, L. H., & Raver, J. L. (2006). On the nature and importance of cultural tightness-looseness. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 91*(6), 1225.
- Gelfand, M. J., Raver, J. L., Nishii, L., Leslie, L. M., Lun, J., Lim, B. C., Duan, L., Almaliah, A., Ang, S., & Aradottir, J. (2011). Differences between tight and loose cultures: A 33-nation study. *Science, 332*(6033), 1100–1104.
- Gilligan, C. (Ed.). (1982). *In a different voice psychological theory and women's development*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Goffman, E. (1959). *The presentation of self in everyday life*. Garden City: Doubleday Press.
- Goffman, E. (1967). *Interaction ritual: Essays on face-to-face behavior*. Garden City: Anchor Books.
- Goffman, E. (1977). The arrangement between the sexes. *Theory and Society, 4*(3), 301–331.
- Gouldner, A. (1970). *The coming crisis of western sociology*. New York: Basic Books.
- Graham, J., Nosek, B. A., Haidt, J., Iyer, R., Koleva, S., & Ditto, P. H. (2011). Mapping the moral domain. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101*(2), 366–385.
- Graham, J., Haidt, J., Koleva, S., Motyl, M., Iyer, R., Wojcik, S., & Ditto, P. (2013). Moral foundations theory: The pragmatic validity of moral pluralism. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 47*(1), 55–130.
- Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2004). The neural bases of cognitive conflict and control in moral judgement. *Neuron, 44*(2), 389–400.
- Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes. *Psychological Review, 102*(1), 4–27.
- Grimm, S. D., Church, A. T., Katigbak, M. S., & Reyes, J. A. S. (1999). Self-described traits, values, and moods associated with individualism and collectivism: Testing I-C theory in an individualistic (U.S.) and a collectivistic (Phillipine) culture. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 30*(4), 466–500.
- Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgement. *Psychological Review, 108*(4), 814–834.
- Haidt, J. (2003). The moral emotions. In R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer, & H. H. Goldsmith (Eds.), *Handbook of affective sciences* (pp. 852–870). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Haidt, J. (2005). *The happiness hypothesis*. New York: Basic Books.
- Haidt, J. (2008). Morality. *Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3*(1), 65–72.
- Haidt, J. (2012). *The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Haidt, J., & Bjorklund, F. (2008). Social intuitionists answer six questions about morality. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), *Moral psychology, volume 2: The cognitive science of morality: Intuition and diversity* (pp. 181–217). Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Haidt, J., & Graham, J. (2009). Planet of the Durkheimians, where community, authority, and sacredness are foundations of morality. In J. Jost, A. C. Kay, & H. Thorisdottir (Eds.), *Social and psychological bases of ideology and system justification* (pp. 371–401). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Haidt, J., & Hersh, M. A. (2001). Sexual morality: The cultures and emotions of conservatives and liberals. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 31*(1), 191–221.
- Haidt, J., & Keltner, D. (1999). Culture and facial expression: Open-ended methods find more expressions and a gradient of recognition. *Cognition and Emotion, 13*(3), 225–266.
- Haidt, J., Koller, S. H., & Dias, M. G. (1993). Affect, culture, and morality, or is it wrong to eat your dog? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65*(4), 613–628.
- Hart, D., & Fegley, S. (1995). Prosocial behavior and caring in adolescence: Relations to self-understanding and social judgement. *Child Development, 66*(5), 1346–1359.
- Haslam, N., & Fiske, A. P. (1999). Relational models theory: A confirmatory factor analysis. *Personal Relationships, 6*(2), 241–250.
- Heise, D. R. (1979). *Understanding events: Affect and the construction of social action*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Heise, D. R. (1995). *Interact: A computer program for studying cultural meanings and social interaction*. Bloomington: Indiana University.
- Heise, D. R. (2007). *Expressive order: Confirming sentiments in social actions*. Springer.
- Helwig, C. C., Turiel, E., & Nucci, L. P. (1996). The virtues and vices of moral development theorists. *Developmental Review, 16*(1), 69–107.



- Higgins, E. T. (1996). Knowledge activation: Accessibility, applicability, and salience. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), *Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles* (pp. 133–168). New York: Guilford Press.
- Hitlin, S. (2008). *Moral selves, evil selves: The social psychology of conscience*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hitlin, S., & Vaisey, S. (2010). Back to the future: Reviving the sociology of morality. In S. Vaisey & S. Hitlin (Eds.), *Handbook of the sociology of morality* (pp. 3–17). New York: Springer.
- Hitlin, S., & Vaisey, S. (2013). The new sociology of morality. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 39, 51–68.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1983). *The managed heart: Commercialization of human feeling*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hollos, M., Leis, P. E., & Turiel, E. (1986). Social reasoning in IJO children and adolescents in Nigerian communities. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 17(3), 352–374.
- Hume, D. (1739[1978]). In L. A. Selby-Bigge (Ed.), *A treatise of human nature*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Huttenlocher, P. R. (1994). Synaptogenesis, synapse elimination, and neural plasticity in human cerebral cortex. In C. A. Nelson (Ed.), *Threats to optimal development: Integrating biological, psychological, and social risk factors* (Vol. 27, pp. 35–54). Hillsdale: Erlbaum.
- Huttenlocher, P. R. (2009). *Neural plasticity: The effects of environment on the development of the cerebral cortex*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Ignatow, G. (2009). Culture and embodied cognition: Moral discourses in internet support groups for overeaters. *Social Forces*, 88(2), 643–669.
- Ignatow, G. (2010). Morality and mind-body connections. In S. Hitlin & S. Vaisey (Eds.), *Handbook of the sociology of morality* (pp. 411–424). New York: Springer.
- Inglehart, R. (Ed.). (1990). *Culture shift in advanced industrial society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (1995). *Inglehart, Ronald*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.
- Inglehart, R., & Baker, W. E. (2000). Modernization, cultural change, and the persistence of traditional values. *American Sociological Review*, 65(1), 19–51.
- Jaffee, S., & Hyde, J. S. (2000). Gender differences in moral orientation: A meta-analysis. *Psychological Bulletin*, 126(5), 703–726.
- Janoff-Bulman, R., & Carnes, N. C. (2013). Surveying the moral landscape moral motives and group-based moralities. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 17(3), 219–236.
- Kant, I. (1785[1959]). *Foundations of the metaphysics of morals* (trans: L. W. Beck). Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Keltner, D., & Buswell, B. N. (1997). Embarrassment: Its distinct form and appeasement functions. *Psychological Bulletin*, 122, 250–270.
- Killen, M. (2007). Children's social and moral reasoning about exclusion. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 16(1), 32–36.
- Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., & Damasio, A. (2007). Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements. *Nature*, 446(7138), 908–911.
- Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and sequence: The cognitive-developmental approach to socialization. In D. A. Goslin (Ed.), *Handbook of socialization theory and research* (pp. 347–480). Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Kohlberg, L. (1981). *The philosophy of moral development, Vol I, moral stages and the idea of justice*. New York: Harper Row.
- Kondo, D. (1990). *Crafting selves: Power, gender, and discourses of identity in a Japanese workplace*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lewis, M. (2008). Self-conscious emotions: Embarrassment, pride, shame, and guilt. In M. Lewis, J. M. Haviland-Jones, & L. F. Barrett (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (3rd edn., pp. 742–756). New York: Guilford Press.
- Levine, D. N. (2010). Adumbrations of a sociology of morality in the work of Parsons, Simmel, and Merton. In Hitlin, S. & Vaisey, S. (Eds.), *Handbook of the Sociology of Morality* (pp. 57–72). New York: Springer.
- Li, J., Wang, L., & Fischer, K. (2004). The organization of Chinese shame concepts? *Cognition and Emotion*, 18(6), 767–797.
- Liebert, R. M. (1984). What develops in moral development? In W. M. Kurtines & J. L. Gewirtz (Eds.), *Morality, moral behavior, and moral development* (pp. 177–192). New York: Wiley.
- Lord, C. G., Ross, L., & Lepper, M. R. (1979). Bias assimilation and attitude polarization: The effects of prior theories on subsequent considered evidence. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 37(11), 2098–2209.
- Lough, S., Kipps, C. M., Treise, C., Watson, P., Blair, J. R., & Hodges, J. R. (2006). Social reasoning, emotion, and empathy in frontotemporal dementia. *Neuropsychologia*, 44(6), 950–958.
- Lukes, S. (1985). *Emile Durkheim. His life and work: A historical and critical study*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Marazziti, D., Baroni, S., Landi, P., Ceresoli, D., & Dell'Osso, L. (2013). The neurobiology of moral sense: Facts or hypotheses? *Annals of General Psychiatry*, 12, 6.
- Markus, H., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. *Psychological Review*, 98(2), 224–253.
- Mead, G. H. (1967). In C. W. Morris (Ed.), *Mind, self, and society from the standpoint of a social behaviorist*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Menon, U., & Shweder, R. A. (1994). Kali's tongue: Cultural psychology and the power of shame in Orissa, India. In *Emotion and culture: Empirical studies of mutual influence* (pp. 255–297). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Minoura, Y. (1992). A sensitive period for the incorporation of a cultural meaning system: A study of Japanese children growing up in the United States. *Ethos*, 20(3):304–339.



- Moll, J., de Oliveira-Sousa, R., Zahn, R., & Grafman, J. (2008). The cognitive neuroscience of moral emotions. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), *Moral psychology: The neuroscience of morality: Emotion, brain disorders, and development* (pp. 2–17). Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Niedenthal, P., Tangney, J., & Gavanski, I. (1994). “If only I weren’t” versus “If only I hadn’t”: Distinguishing shame and guilt in counterfactual thinking. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 67(4), 585–595.
- Nisbett, R. (2004). *The geography of thought: How Asians and Westerners think differently...and why*. New York: Free Press.
- Nisbett, R. E., Peng, K., Choi, I., & Norenzayan, A. (2001). Culture and systems of thought: Holistic versus analytic cognition. *Psychological Review*, 108(2), 291.
- Nucci, L. P., & Turiel, E. (1978). Social interactions and the development of social concepts in preschool children. *Child Development*, 49(2), 400–407.
- Nucci, L. (1981). Conceptions of personal issues: A domain distinct from moral or societal concepts. *Child Development*, 52(1), 114–121.
- Nucci, L., Turiel, E., & Encarnacion-Gawrych, G. (1983). Children’s social interactions and social concepts: Analyses of morality and convention in the Virgin Islands. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 14(4), 469–487.
- Nunner-Winkler, G. (1984). Two moralities? A critical discussion of an ethic of care and responsibility versus an ethic of rights and justice. In W. M. Kurtines & J. L. Gewirtz (Eds.), *Morality, moral behavior, and moral development* (pp. 348–361). New York: Wiley.
- Nussbaum, M. C. (2005). Emotions and the origins of morality. In W. Edelstein & G. Nunner-Winkler (Eds.), *Morality in context* (pp. 61–117). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Osgood, C. E., May, W. H., & Miron, M. S. (1975). *Cross-cultural universals of affective meaning*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Owens, T. J., & Goodney, S. (2000). Self, identity, and the moral emotions across the life course. In T. J. Owens (Ed.), *Self and Identity Through the Life Course in Cross-Cultural Perspective* (pp. 33–53). Stamford: JAI Press.
- Oyserman, D., Coon, H. M., & Kemmelmeier, M. (2002). Rethinking individualism and collectivism: Evaluation of theoretical assumptions and meta-analyses. *Psychological Bulletin*, 128(1), 3–72.
- Penner, L. A., Dovidio, J. F., Piliavin, J. A., & Schroeder, D. A. (2005). Prosocial behavior: Multilevel perspectives. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 56, 365–392.
- Piaget, J. (1932[1960]). *The moral judgment of the child*. Glencoe: Free Press.
- Piliavin, J. A. (2008). Altruism and helping: The evolution of field: The 2008 Cooley-Mead presentation. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 72(3):209–225.
- Plato. 4th Century B.C. [2000]. *Timaeus* (trans: D. J. Zeyl). Indianapolis: Hackett.
- Powell, C. (2010). Four concepts of morality: Differing epistemic strategies in the classical tradition. In S. Hitlin & S. Vaisey (Eds.), *Handbook of the sociology of morality* (pp. 35–56). New York: Springer.
- Rai, T. S., & Fiske, A. P. (2011). Moral psychology is relationship regulation: Moral motives for unity, hierarchy, equality, and proportionality. *Psychological Review*, 118(1), 57–75.
- Rawls, A. W. (1987). The interaction order sui generis: Goffman’s contribution to social theory. *Sociological Theory*, 5(2), 136–149.
- Rawls, A. W. (2010). Social order as moral order. In S. Hitlin & S. Vaisey (Eds.), *Handbook of the sociology of morality* (pp. 95–122). New York: Springer.
- Romney, A. K., Moore C. C., & Rusch, C. D. (1997). Cultural Universals: Measuring the Semantic Structure of Emotion Terms in English and Japanese. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 94, 5489–5894.
- Rozin, P., Lwery, L., Imada, S., & Haidt, J. (1999). The CAD triad hypothesis: A mapping between three moral emotions (contempt, anger, disgust) and three moral codes (community, autonomy, divinity). *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 76(4), 574–586.
- Sayer, A. (2005). *The moral significance of class*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schnall, S., Haidt, J., Clore, G. L., & Jordan, A. H. (2008). Disgust as embodied moral judgment. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 34(8), 1096–1109.
- Shamay-Tsoony, S. G., Tomer, R., Berger, B. D., & Aharon-Peretz, J. (2003). Characterization of empathy deficits following prefrontal brain damage: The role of the right ventromedial prefrontal cortex. *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience*, 15(3), 324–337.
- Shaver, P. R., Wu, S., & Schwartz, J. C. (1992). Cross-cultural similarities and differences in emotion and its representation. In M. S. Clark (Ed.), *Review of personality and social psychology* (pp. 175–212). Newbury Park: Sage.
- Shweder, R. A., & Haidt, J. (2000). The cultural psychology of the emotions: Ancient and new. In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (pp. 397–414). New York: Guilford.
- Shweder, R. A., Mahapatra, M., & Miller, J. (1987). Culture and moral development. In J. Kagan & S. Lamb (Eds.), *The emergence of morality in young children* (pp. 1–83). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Shweder, R. A., Much, N. C., Mahapatra, M., & Park, L. (1997). The big three of morality (autonomy, community, divinity) and the big three explanations of suffering. In P. Rozin & A. Brandt (Eds.), *Morality and health* (pp. 119–169). New York: Routledge.
- Shweder, R. A., Haidt, J., Horton, R., & Joseph, C. (2008). The cultural psychology of the emotions. In M. Lewis, J. M. Haviland-Jones, & L. F. Barrett (Eds.), *Handbook of emotions* (3rd ed, pp. 409–427). New York: Guilford Press.
- Simmel, G. (1950). *The sociology of George Simmel* (edited and translated by K. H. Wolff). New York: Free Press.
- Smetana, J. G., Killen, M., & Turiel, E. (1991). Children’s reasoning about interpersonal and moral conflicts. *Child Development*, 62(3), 629–644.

- Smith, C. (2003). *Moral, believing animals: Human personhood and culture*. USA: Oxford University Press.
- Song, M., Smetana, J. G., & Kim, S. Y. (1987). Koren children's conceptions of moral and conventional transgressions. *Developmental Psychology*, 23(4), 577–582.
- Spear, L. P. (2000). Neurobehavioral changes in adolescence. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 9(4):111–114.
- Steinberg, L. (2007). Risk taking in adolescence: New perspectives from brain and behavioral science. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 16(2):55–59.
- Stets, J. E., & Carter, M. J. (2011). The moral self: Applying identity theory. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 74(2):192–215.
- Stets, J. E., & Carter, M. J. (2012). A theory of the self for the sociology of morality. *American Sociological Review*, 77(1), 120–140.
- Stivers, R. (1996). Towards a sociology of morality. *The International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, 16(1/2):1–14.
- Sunar, D. (2009). Suggestions for a new integration in the psychology of morality. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, 3(4):447–474.
- Swidler, A. (1986). Culture in action: Symbols and strategies. *American Sociological Review*, 51(2), 273–286.
- Swidler, A. (2001). *Talk of love: How culture matters*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Tangney, J. P., Stuewig, J., & Mashek, D. J. (2007). Moral emotions and moral behavior. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 58, 345–372.
- Taylor, C. (Ed.). (1989). *Sources of the self: The making of the modern identity*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Triandis, H. (Ed.). (1995). *Individualism and collectivism*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Turiel, E. (1983). *The development of social knowledge: Morality and convention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Turiel, E. (1994). Morality, authoritarianism, and personal agency in cultural contexts. In R. J. Sternberg & P. Ruzgis (Eds.), *Personality and intelligence* (pp. 271–299). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Turiel, E., Killen, M., & Helwig, C. C. (1987). Morality: Its structure, functions and vagaries. In J. Kagan & S. Lamb (Eds.), *The emergence of morality in young children* (pp. 155–243). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Turiel, E., Hildebrandt, C., & Wainryb, C. (1991). Judging social issues: Difficulties, inconsistencies, and consistencies. *Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development*, 56(2), 1–103.
- Turner, J. H. (2008). Emotions and social structure: Toward a general theory. In D. Robinson & J. Clay-Warner (Eds.), *Emotions and social structure* (pp. 319–342). New York: Elsevier.
- Turner, J. H. (2010). Natural selection and the evolution of morality in human societies. In S. Hitlin & S. Vaisey (Eds.), *Handbook of the sociology of morality* (pp. 125–145). New York: Springer.
- Turner, J. H., & Stets, J. E. (2005). *The sociology of emotions*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Turner, J. H., & Stets, J. E. (2006). Moral emotions. In J. E. Stets & J. H. Turner (Eds.), *Handbook of the sociology of emotions* (pp. 544–566). New York: Springer.
- Turner, J. H. (2007). *Human emotions: A sociological theory*. New York: Routledge.
- Vaisey, S. (2007). Structure, culture, and community: The search for belonging in 50 urban communes. *American Sociological Review*, 72(6), 851–873.
- Vaisey, S. (2008). Socrates, Skinner, and Aristotle: Three ways of thinking about culture in action. *Sociological Forum*, 23(3), 603–613.
- Vaisey, S. (2009). Motivation and justification: A dual-process model of culture in action. *American Journal of Sociology*, 114(6), 1675–1715.
- Vaisey, S. (2013). Structure, culture, and community: The search for belonging in 50 urban communes. *American Sociological Review*, 72(6), 851–873.
- Van Leeuwen, F., & Park, J. H. (2009). Perceptions of social dangers, moral foundations, and political orientation. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 47(3), 169–173.
- Walker, L. J. (2006). Gender and morality. In M. Killen & J. Smetana (Eds.), *Handbook of moral development* (pp. 93–115). USA: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Walker, L. J., & Pitts, R. C. (1998). Naturalistic conceptions of moral maturity. *Developmental Psychology*, 34(3), 403–419.
- Weber, M. (1930[2001]). *The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism*. New York: Routledge.
- Weber, M. (1949). 'Objectivity' in social science and social science policy. In E. A. Shils & H. A. Finch (Eds.), *The methodology of the social sciences* (pp 50–112). Glencoe: Free Press.
- Weber, M. (1978). Value-judgements in social science. In E. Matthews (Ed.), *Weber: Selections in translation* (pp. 69–98). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wilson, J. Q. (1993). *The moral sense*. New York: Free Press.
- Winchester, D. (2008). Embodying the faith: Religious practice and the making of a Muslim moral habitus. *Social Forces*, 86(4), 1753–1780.
- Wong, Y., & Tsai, J. (2007). Cultural models of shame and guilt. In J. L. Tracy, R. W. Robins, & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), *The self-conscious emotions: Theory and research* (pp. 209–223). New York: Guilford Press.
- Youniss, J., & Yates, M. (1999). Youth service and moral-civic identity: A case for everyday morality. *Educational Psychology Review*, 11(4), 361–376.
- Zerubavel, E. (1991). *The fine line: Making distinctions in everyday life*. New York: Free Press.
- Zeyl, D. (2013). Plato's Timaeus. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), *The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy*. <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/plato-timaeus>. Accessed 14 Sept 2013.

Jody Clay-Warner

### 22.1 Introduction

Lay understandings of crime often focus on emotion as a proximal cause of criminal behavior. References to “crimes of passion” and “angry criminals” are part of the national conversation on crime, serving to distance criminals from law abiding citizens. At the same time, criminal behavior is also attributed to sociopaths who lack the capacity for certain emotions, such as shame and empathy. These differing perspectives on the role of emotion in criminal activity highlight both the salience of emotion in accounts of crime and also general uncertainty as to the ways in which emotions and criminal behavior are related. Similarly, a paradox exists with respect to the culture of fear that causes people to alter their behavior in response to real or perceived threats of predatory crime. The paradox is that in some cases those who report high levels of fear of crime are among those with the lowest risk of victimization. In these ways, emotion is viewed as a cause of criminal behavior and desistance, as well as a consequence of experienced and anticipated crime. Yet the exact role of emotion in these processes is unclear.

---

This work was supported by National Science Foundation grant # 0966536 awarded to Jody Clay-Warner, Dawn T. Robinson, and Lynn Smith-Lovin.

---

J. Clay-Warner (✉)  
University of Georgia, Athens, USA

Confusion regarding the role of emotions in criminal behavior is reflected in the dominant contemporary theories of crime. Most of these theories either leave out emotion altogether or include emotions as an implicit—and unexamined—mechanism (e.g., Burgess and Akers 1966; Osgood et al. 1996). In contrast, some theories see emotion as the proximal cause of criminal behavior and propose very specific hypotheses about the role of a variety of emotions in facilitating crime and other deviant behavior (e.g., Agnew 1992). Still others focus on the role of moral emotions in reducing the likelihood of criminal offending (Braithwaite 1989). In any case, there is little agreement among criminologists regarding the relationship between emotions and crime. Recognizing this, Katz (2001) called criminologists to task for their failure to see the importance of emotions in social life, insisting that criminological theories must bring emotions to the foreground if they are to provide complete explanations of criminal behavior (see also Katz 1988). Echoing this position, De Haan and Loader (2002) argued that the field of criminology must engage actively with the sociology of emotions if it hopes to understand the reality of criminal offending.

Though there is a lack of attention to emotion as an antecedent of criminal behavior in the extant criminological literature, there is a large literature devoted to understanding fear of crime. Scholars are interested in how a number of individual- and community-level characteristics, including previous experiences with victimization,

affect levels of fear. Like the literature on causes of criminality, however, the fear of crime literature borrows little from the sociology of emotions. As a result, some of this literature suffers from problems in the conceptualization and measurement of fear.

Meanwhile, many contemporary sociological theories explicitly address the role of emotions in crime. Perhaps best known is Katz's (1988) phenomenological analysis of the intrinsic pleasures of engaging in illicit behavior. Katz argued that strong positive emotions, particularly excitement, are the primary motivating force in many criminal acts. He labels these behaviors 'sneaky thrills,' which highlights the role of thrill-seeking in criminal behavior. He also contends that persons may become seduced by their own emotions, as occurs when humiliation turns to rage, which propels one to corrective action (see also Cohen et al. 1996). More recently Collins (2009) has used his interactional ritual theory to explain acts of violence. He argues that acts of violence go against our fundamental tendencies and, in fact, we must overcome significant emotional barriers before engaging in violence. Emotions also activate violence, as violence is an expressive response to social situations that evoke panic and fear. Despite the widespread attention given to these theories in the larger sociological literature, few criminologists draw from either perspective in a meaningful way.

The purpose of this chapter is to review the role of emotions in the sociological literature on crime. I focus this review around three central questions: What is the role of emotions in contemporary theories of criminal behavior? How can emotions shape desistance? What are the antecedents of fear of crime? Because this chapter focuses on sociological explanations, I will not review the role of emotions in psychological and biological theories of crime or desistance. I will, however, address the role of emotions in biological and psychological processes that are incorporated in sociological theories. Similarly, I examine fear of crime through a sociological lens and do not review literature on personality traits and pathologies that predict heightened levels of fear. Throughout, I suggest how insights from

sociology of emotion theories can enhance our understanding of the relationship between crime and emotion. I conclude with a discussion of unanswered questions and new areas for research.

---

## 22.2 The Role of Emotion in Theories of Criminal Behavior

Emotions are generally under-theorized in the major sociological theories of crime. According to Frazier and Meisenhelder (1985), emotion is virtually absent from theories of crime. They argued that failure to consider the emotions of offenders and would-be-offenders results in an incomplete understanding of criminal behavior. Though recent advances in criminological theory have shifted greater attention to emotions, the level of attention is far from uniform across theories. Below I introduce the major theoretical explanations for criminal behavior and discuss both the stated and implied roles that emotions play in each theory. The review is organized roughly by the extent to which theories incorporate emotions, beginning with rational choice explanations and ending with general strain theory. I omit two major perspectives on crime: social disorganization and labeling theories. Social disorganization theory is often conceptualized as a macro-level strain theory. Thus, discussion of a possible role for emotions in social disorganization theory would be largely redundant with strain theory explanations. Social disorganization theory is also relevant to understanding fear of crime, and so I discuss the theory in that section. Likewise, I present the theory of shame and reintegration as a modern version of labeling theory in the section on desistance.

### 22.2.1 Rational Choice Theories

Most rational choice explanations for crime focus on rationality to the exclusion of emotion. The earliest application of rational choice principles to understanding criminal offending is found in classical criminology. This theoretical tradition assumes a rational basis for criminal behavior

(Beccaria 2009; Bentham 1948). The basic tenant of the theory is that individual behavior is a result of a rational calculation of the likelihood of pain versus pleasure. Thus, individuals consider the likelihood and the harshness of punishment in choosing whether to engage in crime. The deterrence doctrine, which is a direct extension of classical criminology, proposes that people will choose not to engage in criminal activity when punishment is appropriate to the crime (severity), punishment is swift (celerity), and when they believe that they are likely to be caught (certainty). Classical criminology makes no mention of emotions, and its focus on rational calculus seems to argue against a role for emotions in the elicitation of criminal behavior.

Like classical criminology, modern rational choice explanations posit economic models of criminal decision making (Becker 1968). These theories move away from 'pure rationality,' however, recognizing the role that constraints on behavior and lack of information play in the decision to commit crime. This is consistent with McCarthy's (2002) argument that rational choice explanations of crime can be expanded to incorporate emotions, as negative emotions may be considered a cost in the rational calculation of outcomes. Similarly, positive emotions may be a desired outcome motivating offending. Research in this vein finds that emotions are a factor in criminal decision-making (De Haan and Vos 2003). Akers and Sellers (2009) argue, however, that such broadening of rational choice principles makes contemporary applications of the theory indistinguishable from other criminological theories that lack the rational actor assumption.

Routine activity theory is perhaps the most widely known contemporary rational choice perspective on crime. Routine activity theory proposes that offenders are rational actors who select criminal targets based upon accessibility, target value, and likelihood of escape (Cohen and Felson 1979). The theory has been used to explain macro-level variation in crime rates across time and space (Cohen and Felson 1979), as well as individual differences in victimization risk (e.g., Bunch et al. 2014; Lynch 1987; Miethe et al. 1987; Mustaine and Tewksbury 1998).

Due to its focus on the situations in which crime occurs, routine activity theory does not make predictions regarding what motivates people to commit crime. Instead, the theory takes offender motivation as a given and focuses on the ways in which the routine activities of likely offenders and potential victims bring them into contact with one another. As a result, emotions are not central to the theory. Some elaborations of routine activity theory, however, focus on offender behavior and motivation, which would be a likely place for the articulation of the role of emotions in criminal behavior (Osgood et al. 1996). These elaborations, though, do not extend the theory in this way and, instead, continue to offer explanations of crime that focus on rationality to the exclusion of emotions.

Though there has not been significant discussion of emotions in rational choice theories of crime, a few scholars have suggested how emotions may be incorporated into the basic rational choice model of offending. For example, some have noted that negative emotions, such as shame and guilt, may be a cost factored into the rational calculus of behavior (Grasmick and Bursik 1990; Paternoster 1989). Empirical research has also begun to examine the role of anger in the rational choice model (Bouffard 2002; Carmichael and Piquero 2004), though it is unclear whether anger interferes with rational decision making or in some other way facilitates criminal offending. Elaborating on this issue, Piquero, Gomez-Smith, and Langton (2004) found that low self-control led individuals to perceive that punishments were unfair, resulting in anger, which they argue may reduce the deterrent effect of punishment. Any attempt to incorporate emotions into rational choice models of offending, however, must first address the basic assumptions of rational choice theory with regards to emotion. While the absence of emotions in these theories leaves open many opportunities, it may be that emotions are incompatible with strict rational choice models, making it impossible to include emotions without violating the theory's core principles.



## 22.2.2 Control Theories

Like rational choice approaches to crime, control theories assume that people are fundamentally orientated to their own self-interest. As a result, people will engage in criminal activity unless there are social controls in place that prevent them from doing so. The two dominant control theories are social control theory and self-control theory.

### 22.2.2.1 Social Control Theory

Social control theory, also known as social bond theory, proposes that adolescents who lack strong social bonds are likely to engage in delinquency (Hirschi 1969). Bonds are characterized by four elements: attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief. Attachment refers to the existence of affectional bonds with others that result in a desire to meet their expectations. Commitment is defined as having a “stake in conformity” (Toby 1957) or an investment in conventional society. Involvement refers to engagement in conventional activities. Belief is defined as endorsement of conventional beliefs, values, and norms.

It would seem that emotions would serve a key role in social control theory, given that emotions are inherent to attachment and commitment processes. Indeed, Frazier and Meisenhelder (1985) claimed that social control theory was the only criminological theory to link emotions to criminality. There is little explicit reference to emotion in the original specification of the theory, however. As a result, tests of the theory do not typically include measures of either felt or expressed emotions. Nonetheless, there is considerable opportunity for inclusion of emotions—and theorizing about emotions—in models of social control theory. Scheff (2000, 2003), for example, suggests that shame serves a primary social control function because it represents a threat to social bonds. People behave in socially acceptable ways in order to avoid the shame they would experience by displeasing those with whom they share social bonds. Similarly, individuals feel or anticipate pride in response to socially acceptable behavior (Scheff 1988). Seen in this way, shame and pride are likely mechanisms that link social

bonds to law abiding behavior. Criminologists have not yet utilized Scheff’s theories of emotion to understand the role of social bonds in criminality, however. Doing so could lead to a more nuanced understanding of the social control function of social bonds.

### 22.2.2.2 Self-Control Theory

Like social control theory, self-control theory assumes that people are fundamentally motivated to lawlessness. Self-control theory, also called the general theory of crime, differs from social control theory in arguing that individual propensity to commit crime is a result of early childhood socialization (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990). Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) proposed that children develop high levels of self-control when their parents are strongly attached to them, exercise close supervision, and punish deviant behavior. They also assert that self-control becomes fixed by approximately 10 years of age, remains relatively stable throughout one’s life, and predicts participation in a wide range of crime and analogous behaviors.

A central argument in the general theory of crime is that people who have low self-control have a low tolerance for frustration, which causes them to be quick to anger and likely to act on their impulses. Original measures of self-control, however, did not include measures of emotional response, focusing instead on behavioral measures (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990). In response to criticisms of the original measure, given the potential tautology involved in predicting behaviors with related behaviors, Grasmick et al. (1993) developed a 23-item scale of self-control that includes four “temper” measures. These items primarily assess trait-level anger (e.g., “When I have a serious disagreement with someone, it’s usually hard for me to talk calmly about it without getting upset.”).

Beyond the inclusion of trait anger as a component of low self-control, however, the role of emotions in self-control theory is under-theorized, and expressions of emotion are not seen as mediating the self-control-crime relationship. As a result, research testing self-control theory often includes emotion as either a control variable or

a variable designed to test predictions of other theories. Some research has, however, expanded self-control theory to consider the role of self-control in moderating the effects of trait anger on criminal activity (Restubog et al. 2010). Other research outside the general crime theory tradition considers the relationship between emotion regulation and self-control (Gilliom et al. 2002; Tice and Bratslavsky 2000). Though such research goes beyond direct tests of the theory, it does suggest interesting ways that emotions may be integrated more thoroughly into models of self-control and crime. For such research to be successful, it will be necessary to distinguish between state- and trait-based emotions as well as to consider whether emotions other than anger and frustration provide a link between low self-control and criminal behavior.

### 22.2.3 Learning Theories

Sutherland (1947) is credited with first applying principles of learning to the study of crime in his Differential Association Theory. As a Chicago School symbolic interactionist, Sutherland focused on how interactional dynamics facilitated criminal behavior. The central tenant of differential association theory is that criminal behavior is learned in the same way that all other behavior is learned. As a result, the theory predicts that criminal activity is more likely when individuals are reinforced both for attitudes conducive to crime and for engaging in criminal behavior. Because the theory assumes that behavioral reinforcement occurs through interaction, a key determinant of criminal activity is the company one keeps. Thus, the theory is termed “differential association” to emphasize the important role of interaction in shaping criminal activities.

In an attempt to elaborate upon and clarify the mechanisms in differential association theory, Burgess and Akers’s (1966) developed social learning theory (see Pratt et al. 2010 for review). Social learning is the general name given to the body of behaviorist theories in social science that recognize the role of interaction and reinforcement in shaping human behavior. It is no

coincidence, therefore, that Burgess and Akers (1966), chose ‘social learning’ for the name of their crime theory, as their perspective identifies reinforcement and punishment as the primary mechanisms by which criminal activity is learned and performed. Akers (1966) later elaborated the theory, adopting the ‘soft behaviorism’ of Bandura (Bandura and Walters 1963; Bandura 1977), which makes predictions based upon behaviorist principles while acknowledging human agency (Akers and Sellers 2009). As such, social learning theory recognizes the role of direct and vicarious reinforcement in the learning of both attitudes favorable to the commission of crime, as well as criminal behaviors. Though there are a large number of possible reinforcers, the most common measure used to test social learning theory is association with deviant peers.

Emotions have an important, yet implicit, role in social learning theory. The theory recognizes the power of ‘positive feelings’ as reinforcers of behavior (Akers and Sellers 2009), which is consistent with Bandura’s (1977) description of emotions as integral to the social learning process. Bandura stated that the value that one places on potential reinforcing agents, such as people, places, and events, is affected by the emotional experiences that one has had with those agents. This causes individuals to engage in behavior that they anticipate, based on prior direct or vicarious experience, will evoke a positive emotional response. Similarly, people will avoid engaging in behavior that they anticipate will cause negative emotions, such as fear or anxiety. Bandura noted that the act of avoiding activities that evoke negative emotions sets into motion a reinforcement cycle, such that people continue to engage in avoidance behavior because engaging in the behavior effectively reduced anticipatory anxiety.

Emotions have not been given a central place in social learning theory, however. Instead, far more attention has been given to the role of so-called ‘social’ reinforcers, such as association with deviant peers. A notable exception is research by Wood et al. (1997). Following Katz (1988) who pointed out the intrinsic rewards of risk-taking behaviors, Wood et al. (1997) argued that people

who repeatedly engage in criminal behavior find these activities to be inherently pleasurable. They describe the reinforcement as a result of the “combination of the symbolic meaning of the acts and the ‘neurophysiologic’ high such acts produce” (p. 336). They contend that those who are unable to achieve gratification through conventional means turn to deviant, risky behaviors for gratification. These individuals then interpret the high arousal state achieved through engagement in criminal behavior as pleasurable, setting into motion a cycle of reinforcement. They predict, then, that habitual criminals will be more likely to anticipate experiencing positive emotions during the commission of illegal acts than will non-criminals. Supporting their predictions, Wood et al. (1997) find that incarcerated inmates anticipated feeling pride, a sense of accomplishment, happiness, and excitement when committing a crime, while college students anticipated guilt, depression, worry, and fear.

Brezina and Piquero (2003) also highlight the relationship between the non-social or ‘sensation’-based arousal and the social reinforcers more typically emphasized in social learning theory. They contend that the social environment shapes the way that adolescents interpret the high arousal state that accompanies delinquent behavior. Drawing from Becker’s (1953) study of marijuana use, they argue that adolescents who associate with delinquent peers interpret the arousal experienced while committing crime as positive emotion because their delinquent peers will frame the experience in a positive way. These positive emotions then reinforce criminal behavior. Meanwhile, youths who have internalized conventional morality will likely feel guilt and shame when engaging in delinquent acts, causing them to interpret the arousal as negative stimuli (see also Grasmick and Bursik 1990). The result would be an avoidance of future delinquency. Brezina and Piquero (2003) tested their argument by examining the association between the anticipated rewards associated with alcohol and marijuana use and actual use of these substances and found support for their predictions. Their arguments also apply to experienced/anticipated emotions as reinforcers of other forms of deviant behavior.

## 22.2.4 Strain Theories

### 22.2.4.1 Classic Strain Theory

Drawing from Durkheim’s (1893/1964) theory of anomie, Merton (1938) developed his classic strain theory to explain deviance and criminal offending among lower class youths. He argued that anomic structures develop in societies, such as the United States, in which monetary success goals are over-emphasized, while the norms for achieving such goals are under-emphasized. As a result, individuals in such societies who do not have access to legitimate means for acquiring middle class monetary status may experience frustration. There are a number of possible responses to this frustration, some of which involve criminal behavior. The most often discussed criminal reaction is “innovation,” which is the engagement in illegal activities for the purpose of acquiring wealth.

Though frustration is a proximal cause of criminal behavior in classic strain theory, most tests of the theory have not focused on emotional responses. Instead, researchers have examined the relationship between the gap in aspirations for monetary success and expectations for monetary success and criminal offending, assuming that youths who have high aspirations and low expectations feel frustration (Burton et al. 1994; Farnworth and Leiber 1989; Jensen 1995). These studies largely find that a disjuncture between aspirations and expectations is not predictive of criminal offending, failing to support classic strain theory predictions. One study directly measuring dissatisfaction/frustration with one’s monetary status, however, found that dissatisfaction/frustration significantly predicted participation in both drug use and income-producing crime, though the effects sizes were small (Agnew et al. 1996).

### General Strain Theory

In an attempt to address limitations of classic strain theory, Agnew introduced general strain theory, which proposes a central role for emotion in the elicitation of criminal behavior (Agnew 1992). While classic strain theory was developed to explain deviance and criminal offend-

ing among members of the lower class, general strain theory was designed to explain variation in offending across persons of all income groups, with a particular focus on adolescent offenders. According to general strain theory, everyday adverse events (strains) evoke negative emotion. Negative emotional responses are particularly likely when one perceives that the adverse event is unjust. When adolescents lack conventional coping resources, they are likely to alleviate these negative emotions through engagement in delinquent behavior. Agnew proposed that a number of different negative emotions may mediate the relationship between strain and delinquency, including anger, disappointment, depression and fear.

Most empirical tests of general strain theory's emotion predictions have focused on the role of anger in mediating the strain-delinquency relationship. Anger is known to occur when people perceive that they have experienced an undeserved wrong (Averill 1982). It also energizes people for corrective action (Shaver et al. 1987), while at the same time distorting cognitive processes (Brezina 2010). Thus, it is a logical starting point for tests of general strain theory. In general, research confirms that anger mediates the relationship between strain and violent crime/aggressive behavior (e.g., Brezina 1996; Broidy 2001; Capowich et al. 2001; Hay 2003; Mazerolle and Piquero 1998; Mazerolle et al. 2000; Mazerolle et al. 2003). Many of these studies, however, do not measure situational anger (i.e., anger in response to a negative event). Instead, they measure trait anger, which reflects an individual's underlying tendency to feel angry (e.g., Brezina 1996; Hay 2003; Mazerolle and Piquero 1997). This is problematic not only because general strain theory specifically predicts situation-based responses, but also because those with high levels of trait anger may be more likely to perceive strain, thus calling into question the causal ordering of theoretical predictions (Capowich et al. 2001). Researchers counter that 'angry people' are more likely to respond to strain with anger than are those who score low on measures of trait anger, thus arguing that trait anger is a reasonable proxy for situational anger. Some

researchers attempt to avoid problems with trait anger measures by tapping peoples anticipated emotional responses to strain as presented in vignettes. Such research generally supports general strain theory predictions (e.g., Scheuerman 2013).

Despite limitations of the empirical research, there is general agreement that anger mediates the relationship between strain and violent behaviors (Agnew 2006). There is less evidence, though, that anger mediates the relationship between strain and other forms of delinquent/criminal behavior, such as property crimes, status offenses, and drug use (Capowich et al. 2001; Mazerolle and Piquero 1998; Mazerolle et al. 2000; Piquero and Sealock 2000). An exception is research finding that trait anger partially mediated the relationship between some forms of strain and a general index of criminal behavior among a sample of street youths (Baron 2004). Rebellon et al. (2012) recorded a similar finding. Using a situational anger measure, they found that anger mediated the relationship between perceived injustice at school and a general index of delinquency and rule breaking.

A growing body of research has begun to examine the role of depression in mediating the relationship between strain and criminal behavior, focusing primarily on drug use and property crime. This research has yielded inconsistent findings. For example, some studies report that depression mediated the relationship between strain and offending for males but not for females (Ostowsky and Messner 2005; Manasse and Ganem 2009). In contrast, Bao, Haas, and Pi (2004) found that depression mediated the effects of strain on minor school delinquency but not on either property or violent offending. Piquero and Sealock (2000) also failed to document the predicted relationship between strain (measured as physical abuse), depression, and property offending among a sample of offending youths (see also Hollist et al. 2009). Meanwhile reserach using data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health found that a state-based measure of depression partially mediated the effect of strain on both marijuana use and property crime (Jang and Rhodes 2012). These studies vary greatly on their measures of

both strain and emotion, however, making them difficult to compare, and perhaps explaining why they reach divergent conclusions.

In trying to make sense of the conflicting literature, Ganem (2010) proposed that different types of strains elicit different negative emotions, thus facilitating different forms of criminal/deviant behavior. She noted, for example, that frustration and anger are fundamentally different, as anger typically requires a perception of unfairness coupled with external attribution of blame, while frustration results from basic goal blockage and does not offer the sustained, powerful response associated with anger. Ganem also argued that fear is a response to perceived physical or social harm (Shaver et al. 1987), making it likely that fear-invoking strains elicit escapist behavior. Using a vignette design to measure anticipated emotional and behavioral responses to a variety of strains, Ganem (2010) found general support for her predictions. She also found that negative emotions tended to co-occur, with frustration ameliorating the effects of anger on anticipated aggression and fear heightening the effects of frustration on anticipated avoidance behaviors (see also De Coster and Zito 2010).

As the above review suggests, there are a number of on-going debates in the general strain theory literature regarding emotions. This is not surprising given the key role that emotion plays in the theory. These debates generally coalesce around three themes that also overlap with ongoing debates in the sociology of emotions literature: emotion measurement, the co-occurrence of emotion, and gendered responses to emotion and strain. Regarding emotion measurement, scholars debate whether trait-based measures of emotion are adequate proxies for the situational emotion responses required by the theory (see Manasse and Ganem 2009 for overview). They also discuss whether measures of anticipated emotions, as measured in vignette studies, are appropriate to use in tests of general strain theory (Scheuerman 2013). The effect of co-occurring emotions has received recent attention, which suggests that elaboration of the general strain theory arguments regarding negative emotion responses may be warranted (Ngo and Paternoster 2012).

Such research could benefit from recent scholarship in the sociology of emotion addressing co-occurring emotions (Turner 2000, 2007). Finally, debates about gendered responses to strain speak to larger issues in the sociology of emotions regarding gender differences in felt and expressed emotions (e.g., Simon and Nath 2004).

### 22.2.5 Conclusion

As this review indicates, crime theorists do not agree on the role of emotion in the elicitation of criminal behavior. Some of this disagreement is due to fundamental differences in assumptions about human behavior, as is the case with rational choice and behaviorist theories. There is also disagreement as to whether emotions are important antecedents of crime or whether they are simply implicit mechanisms. The research indicates that emotions do, in fact, bridge environmental stimuli and criminal behavior. Research is still needed, however, to determine what specific emotions are important, as well as how the context of the emotional experience moderates the effect of emotion on criminal behavior. These issues are addressed explicitly in the literature on desistance, as discussed below.

---

## 22.3 Emotions and Desistance

While much of the criminological literature is focused on explaining offending behavior, a growing literature focuses on desistance. Here, researchers are interested in determining what processes and events lead offenders to cease or reduce participation in criminal activities. While some research on desistance applies traditional criminological theories, other research employs theories designed specifically to explain desistance behaviors. Two of the best known of these theories are the theory of reintegrative shaming and the age-graded theory of social control (Braithwaite 1989; Sampson and Laub 1995). While emotion is integral to reintegrative shaming theory, there is much less focus on emotional responses in the age-graded theory. A recent



extension of this theory, however, posits a central role for emotions in the desistance process (Giorlando et al. 2007).

### 22.3.1 Reintegrative Shaming

Drawing heavily from labeling theory, reintegrative shaming theory proposes that when punishment results in stigmatizing labels that disallow reintegration into conventional society, reoffending is likely (Braithwaite 1989). In contrast, when the shaming process is followed by reintegration, criminals are less likely to reoffend. According to Braithwaite, most western countries have high recidivism rates because they lack formal mechanism for forgiving offenders once sentences have been served and mete out punishment in ways that do not facilitate remorse. They also create barriers to reintegration, in the form of limited employment opportunities and in some cases limits on voting rights. In contrast, reintegrative shaming is enacted in many tribal communities through restorative justice conferences in which the offender is supported as a member of the community and welcomed back into the community following punishment.

While a number of case studies and historical analyses support reintegrative shaming predictions (Braithwaite 1989, 2001; for overview see Braithwaite 2002), direct empirical tests of reintegrative shaming have produced mixed results. In the first major test, Makkai and Braithwaite (1994) examined the effects of reintegrative shaming on compliance with regulatory standards in a nursing home. Consistent with predictions, they found that rates of code compliance during follow-up inspections were highest when inspectors held disapproving attitudes toward initial code violations while also approaching the process with a reintegrative ideology. Other studies, however, report results that either contradict the theory or lend only partial support to predictions (Ahmed 2001; Hay 2001; Tittle et al. 2003; Vagg 1998; Zhang et al. 1996). Data limitations make it difficult to interpret the results of some research, such as Miethe, Lu, and Reese's (2000) study of the effects of participation in drug courts

on recidivism. Though drug courts would seem to operate under a reintegrative shaming model, Miethe et al. interpreted the positive relationship between participation in drug courts and recidivism as supportive of Braithwaite's theory. Without measures of the procedures used in these courts, however, it is not possible to determine how these findings speak to reintegrative shaming theory.

A central problem with early research on reintegrative shaming was the failure to measure shame and to account for emotions that may co-occur with shame. More recently, reintegrative shaming theorists (Ahmed 2001; Ahmed and Braithwaite 2004; Braithwaite and Braithwaite 2001; Braithwaite 2002) have drawn from Scheff and Retzinger (Retzinger 1991; Scheff 1990; Scheff and Retzinger 1991; Scheff 1994) to argue that shame is a complicated emotion that manifests in many different ways. Citing Scheff and Retzinger's work, Ahmed and Braithwaite (2004) proposed that acknowledged shame reduces the likelihood of offending, while displaced shame (i.e., blaming others, which results in anger) increases the likelihood of offending. They tested their hypotheses by asking children to report their anticipated emotions and behavior in response to a series of bullying vignettes. They found that shame acknowledgement did reduce perceived likelihood of future aggression among the children in their sample, but they did not find that reintegrative shaming was more likely to lead to shame acknowledgement than was disintegrative shaming. Ttofi and Farrington (2008) reported similar findings in their vignette study of peer and sibling bullying (see also Ahmed and Braithwaite 2005).

Rebblon et al. (2010) expanded Braithwaite's theory to elaborate on the role of shame in mediating the relationship between punishment and future offending. Offering an integrated model, these scholars proposed that the anticipation of shame following a criminal act mediates the relationship between delinquent associations, strain, and self-control on intent to commit crime. They found empirical support for their mediation predictions and also that anticipated shame has direct effects on intention to commit crime, suggesting

a key role for this emotion in theories of crime (see also Murphy and Harris 2007).

Research on reintegrative shaming has produced mixed support for the theory. Nonetheless, the basic framework of the theory holds great promise for helping us understand the role of shame and other moral emotions on criminal behavior. Though typically categorized as a theory of desistance, reintegrative shaming theory can also be used to explain primary offending via observational learning (Braithwaite 1989). As a result, the theory could have wide applicability. For this to occur, however, researchers must give greater theoretical and empirical attention to the emotions that are produced by the shaming process. Recent research and theory has begun to move in this direction with the recognition of shame acknowledgment and displacement processes (e.g., Ahmed and Braithwaite 2004). This research, though, has not considered differences in shame and guilt (Ttofi and Farrington 2008). Research has also neglected to address the role of pride in the process of reintegration, which Retzinger and Scheff (1996) contend is an important component of restorative justice. Thus, there are great opportunities for elaborating on the ways in which emotional processes may link punishment to deviant behavior.

### 22.3.2 Age-Graded Theory of Social Control

Sampson and Laub's age-graded theory of informal social control is arguably the most influential modern theory of desistance (Laub et al. 1998; Laub and Sampson 2003; Sampson and Laub 1995). According to the theory, certain lifestyle changes in adulthood increase the likelihood of crime desistance, as these changes result in increased social control via larger investments in conventional society and a modification of routine activities. The theory focuses in particular on the role of marriage in desistance, though it also recognizes the potential for other social control agents, such as the military, children, and employment, to effect positive change. Like other social control theories, the age-graded theory

does not see a central role for emotions in the desistance process. Instead, the theory assumes that processes work outside the individual to limit criminal behavior.

In challenging the age graded theory of informal social control, Giordano, Schroeder, and Cernkovich (2007) offered a multi-faceted theory that brings in arguments from sociologists of emotion and focuses on the role of symbolic interaction in the experience and expression of emotion. They suggested that emotional changes across the life course have direct effects on desistance. Specifically, they contended that as adolescents mature into adulthood, they experience a reduction in negative emotions that are linked to criminal behavior, such as anger, as well as a reduction in the positive emotions that individuals experience as a result of engagement in crime, such as excitement. They also argued that people develop emotion regulation and management skills as they age that result in the declining effect of emotions on criminal involvement over time. Consistent with the age-graded theory, Giordano et al. argued that marriage can be an important turning point, but they also contended that the effects of marriage on desistance operate through emotion. Here the authors engaged with the theory of reintegrative shaming, noting the theory's tenet that shaming must take place within the context of love and concern in order to be effective.

Giordano et al. (2007) found general support for their theory in an analysis of longitudinal quantitative data from a group of male and female offenders and through analysis of qualitative data from a subgroup of these participants. In particular, they found that participants showed changes in emotional responses over time and that depression and an angry identity both reduced the likelihood of desistance. They also found that the role of marriage on desistance was affected by spouse's criminality and by marital happiness, with spouse's criminality having the strongest effect on criminality when marital happiness was highest.

Subsequent applications of Giordano et al.'s (2007) theory have focused on the role of emotions in mediating the effects of other life course events on desistance. Schroeder, Giordano, and

Cernkovich (2010) proposed that the strength of the parent-child bond in adulthood is an important predictor of desistance, and that the effects of this bond on desistance are mediated by emotions in much the same way as they are for marriage. In support of their predictions, they found that the effects of the parent-child bond in adulthood operated primarily through their effect on depression and anger identity, indicating the importance of emotional self-concept as a proximal cause of desistance. Schroeder and Frana (2009) theorized about the ways in which emotions mediate the effects of religion on desistance and found that religious involvement served as an ‘emotional turning point’ for some offenders. These studies indicate that not only does Giordano et al.’s (2007) theory have great potential for explaining desistance, but also that it may help bridge control theories with theories from the sociology of emotions.

### 22.3.3 Conclusion

As this burgeoning literature demonstrates, emotions play an important role in the desistance process. The exact nature of this relationship and the specific emotions involved, however, is still under discussion. While the theory of reintegrative shaming focuses primarily on shame, Giordano et al. (2007) see a role for a wide variety of emotions in desistance. These theories are not contradictory, but they do focus on different mechanisms and different contextual events. Thus, sociologists of emotion will have much to contribute as these theories continue to be tested and refined.

---

## 22.4 Fear of Crime

No discussion of crime and emotion is complete without addressing fear of crime. There is a voluminous literature on fear on crime, so I do not attempt a comprehensive review (see Hale 1996). Instead, I focus on summarizing the literatures on the conceptualization and measurement of fear of crime and on the antecedents of fear of crime, as these topics provide the most points of intersection with the sociology of emotions.

### 22.4.1 What Is ‘Fear of Crime’?

There is widespread agreement among emotion scholars that fear is a primary emotion (Turner 2000). Primary emotions have survival value, are universal, and manifest as ‘hard-wired’ physiological responses to environmental stimuli (Kemper 1987). Fear is associated with the fight-or-flight response that alerts individuals to danger and causes them to assess their options and act in ways consistent with their interests (Barbalet 1998). As such, physiological responses to fear include quickening of the pulse and reduction in peripheral skin temperature, which reflect movement of blood to the core of the body where it is used to marshal resources to either defend one’s self or flee. According to Kemper (1978) individuals experience fear when they lose power or do not receive the power they had expected to receive. This could include situations of either physical or non-physical threat.

The conceptualization of ‘fear of crime’ is not as straightforward. Early research on fear of crime was plagued by inconsistent definitions and conflation of ‘fear’ with key predictors, such as risk perceptions. These problems led Ferraro and LaGrange (1987) to declare that “even a casual review of the literature indicates that the phrase ‘fear of crime’ has acquired so many divergent meanings that its current utility is negligible” (p. 71). In particular, they noted that researchers often conflate fear of crime with cognitive assessments and that this conflation is evident in the measures of fear of crime. For example, the question ‘How safe would you feel walking alone at night in your neighborhood,’ is often used to measure fear of crime, yet it is more accurately a measure of perceived neighborhood risk. Ferraro and LaGrange argued, instead, that fear of crime is correctly conceptualized as a “negative emotional reaction generated by crime or symbols associated with crime” (Ferraro and LaGrange 1987, p. 73) and cite physiological response as a component of this reaction. Though their definition was a significant improvement upon definitions used in much of the early research, Ferraro and LaGrange did not differentiate fear from other negative emotions that individuals may feel in response to crime. In recognition of this

critique, most recent literature is careful to separate risk perceptions from emotional responses. Problems remain, however, in the operationalization of fear of crime.

Indeed, much of the literature on “fear of crime” could be more accurately characterized as a literature on “worrying about crime.” This is evident in survey instruments utilized in many well-regarded studies. For example, Rountree (1998) measured fear of crime with a series of questions asking respondents whether they worried at least once a week about a variety of specific crimes (see also Rountree and Land 1996). So common is the substitution of ‘worry’ for ‘fear’ that Warr and Ellison (2000) commented on this issue in their article on altruistic fear of crime. They state that asking people how much they worry about crime/safety is an appropriate measure of fear of crime because ‘worry’ measures a related emotional response. They acknowledged, however, that questions about worry “measure *anxiety* about future victimization rather than *fear* of an immediate threat” (p. 557; emphasis theirs). Most of the literature follows this measurement trend and thus records anxiety or worry surrounding crime, (e.g., Brunton-Smith and Sturgis 2011; Nellis and Savage 2012; Wilcox et al. 2007). Surveys that ask respondents how afraid they are of particular crimes are also problematic, since survey participants may interpret being afraid of an event occurring as believing that it is likely (e.g., Cook and Fox 2011; Lane and Fox 2013; Melde 2009; Warr and Stafford 1983).

Researchers have also debated whether intensity or frequency measures better capture emotional responses to crime. Farrall (2004) argued that questions about intensity of either worry or fear tap emotionally-laden attitudes about crime and are not reflective of emotional responses to discrete events (see also Gray et al. 2011). He suggested that researchers also ask about frequency of feeling afraid/worried about crime within a narrow time frame, as this is more likely to reflect actual emotional experiences. In rebuttal, Hough (2004) argued that frequency measures of fear and worry reduce emotions to events, while emotions are more accurately characterized as states.

Lack of clarity in both the conceptualization and measurement of fear of crime has led some researchers to develop new approaches to studying emotional responses to crime. Rader (2004) argued for relabeling, contending that ‘threat of victimization’ is a more appropriate label for what researchers are actually interested in studying and proposed that threat of victimization includes emotional, cognitive, and behavioral components. Fear of crime represents the emotional component, perceived risk the cognitive component, and constraints on activities the behavioral component. Rader contended that this reconceptualization could be used to resolve some of the inconsistencies in the empirical literature, as well as to disentangle temporal ordering between fear, risk assessment, and avoidance behaviors. In attempting to validate the model, Rader, May, and Goodrum (2007) examined the relationships between the three suggested components of ‘threat of victimization.’ They find some support, as measures of fear were related to both behaviors and perceived risk. Fear was unrelated to the behavioral component, however, suggesting additional theorizing is necessary (see also May et al. 2010).

#### 22.4.2 Antecedents of Fear of Crime

In introducing their theory of the fear of crime, Liska, Lawrence, and Sanchirico (1982) hypothesized that variation in fear of crime across cities could be predicted by structural characteristics, such as racial composition and crime rates. They found support for this basic prediction, but they also found that different structural characteristics predicted fear of crime for whites than for non-whites. Since the publication of Liska et al.’s seminal piece, researchers have investigated a number of individual- and community-level factors that predict fear of crime, as well as the ways in which different factors interact to affect levels of fear. Much of this research focuses on gender, age, race, prior victimization, and neighborhood characteristics.

## Gender

One of the most consistent findings in the fear of crime literature is that women report higher levels of fear of crime than do men (see Hale 1996; Lane 2013; Warr 1994). This finding holds true in most studies that examine generalized fear of crime, as well as those that examine emotional responses to particular crimes (e.g., Chiricos et al. 1997; Clemente and Kleiman 1977; Fisher and Sloan 2003; Gibson et al. 2002; Liska et al. 1988; May 2001). In dispute of these findings, though, Rountree (1998) found no gender differences in reported fear of property crime in a sample of Seattle residents. Other researchers have found that different factors are associated with fear of crime in males and females (Schafer et al. 2006). Some research also suggests that gender interacts with risk perceptions in predicting fear of crime. In fact, Reid and Konrad (2004) found that men who perceived high levels of risk for robbery reported levels of fear that were even higher than those reported by women.

Though there is general agreement that women report higher levels of fear of crime than do men, scholars do not agree on why these gender differences exist. There are four primary theoretical explanations for gender differences in reported levels of fear of crime: differential socialization, patriarchy, physical vulnerability, and the shadow of sexual assault hypothesis (Lane and Fox 2013; see also Lane 2013). According to the socialization argument, women are taught to be delicate and fearful, while men are expected to be strong and fearless (Hollander 2001). The socialization argument is related to the patriarchy perspective, which posits that women's fear of crime serves a social control function because it makes men the default protectors of women and encourages women to structure their lives in ways that seemingly reduce victimization risk (Stanko 1985). In the shadow of sexual assault hypothesis, women's general fear of crime is a result of their specific fear of sexual violence (Ferraro 1996).

The best supported explanation for gender differences in fear of crime is the shadow of sexual assault hypothesis. Ferraro (1995, p. 87) argued that women fear rape and its consequences so much that it serves as a 'master offense' (see also Warr 1994). As a result, women transfer

their fear of rape onto their fear of crime more generally. This is particularly true of crimes in which there is potential contact between victim and offender, because such events may evolve to include sexual violence (Ferraro 1996). In support of this argument, Ferraro (1996) found that women's fear of rape predicted their fear of other crimes. Once fear of rape was controlled, gender differences in the fear of many types of crime either disappeared altogether or men's level of fear became higher than women's. Subsequent research has confirmed Ferraro's findings (Fisher and Sloan 2003; Hilinski 2009; Lane and Fox 2013). Scholars have since expanded the basic argument to suggest that the harms induced by rape, and not its sexual nature, may account for the fear-inducing effects of rape (Cook and Fox 2012; Lane and Meeker 2003). Lane and colleagues have also documented that perceived risk of criminal victimization is a stronger predictor of fear of crime for men, while fear of rape is a more important predictor for women (Lane et al. 2009; Lane and Fox 2013).

Though the shadow of sexual assault hypothesis is the dominant explanation for gender differences in reported levels of fear of crime, some scholars argue that these findings are a function of reporting bias caused by gendered social expectations. In this vein, Sutton and Farrall (2005) contended that gender differences in reported levels of fear of crime are due, at least in part, to men's unwillingness to admit fear. While female gender roles allow and even encourage fear, male gender roles require men to avoid the appearance of vulnerability. As a consequence, social desirability bias prevents men from admitting fear of crime. In support of this prediction, Sutton and Farrall found a strong correlation between men's reported fear of crime and responses on a 'lie scale' designed to measure respondents' efforts to answer survey questions in socially acceptable ways, while no such correlation was found among women. Cops and Pleysier (2011) extended this logic, arguing that women's admission of fear of crime and men's denial reflect 'doing gender' (West and Zimmerman 1987). In an empirical test of this argument, they found that those with stronger masculine identities reported lower levels of fear of crime.



### 22.4.2.1 Age and Race

Age and race are often hypothesized to be related to fear of crime, but the nature of the relationship between these two demographic variables and fear of crime remains unclear. Though early research concluded that age was positively associated with fear of crime (e.g., Clemente and Kleiman 1977; Kennedy and Silverman 1984; Skogan and Maxfield 1981), more recent research challenges these findings (Ferraro and LaGrange 1992; LaGrange and Ferraro 1989). Other research suggests that once neighborhood and other demographic characteristics are controlled, age no longer predicts fear of crime. There is also uncertainty regarding the relationship between race and fear of crime. Some research finds that members of racial and ethnic minority groups are more afraid of crime than are whites (e.g., Chiricos et al. 1997; Clemente and Kleiman 1977; Lane and Fox 2012), while other research finds few differences between these groups (e.g., Gibson et al. 2002).

### 22.4.2.2 Prior Victimization

There is a large literature examining the relationship between previous victimization and fear of crime. Much of this literature finds that persons who have experienced criminal victimization report higher levels of fear of crime than those who have not been victimized (e.g., Akers et al. 1987; Box et al. 1988; Rountree and Land 1996; Skogan 1987; Skogan and Maxfield 1981). Other research finds, however, that prior victimization is either not related to fear of crime or that prior victimization is associated with lower rates of fear of crime (e.g., Fisher and Nasar 1992; Lane and Fox 2012, 2013; Liska et al. 1988; May 2001; Wilcox et al. 2007). Some research also finds that indirect victimization (e.g., knowing someone who was a recent crime victim) predicts fear of crime (Box et al. 1988; Ferraro 1996; Skogan and Maxfield 1981). This finding, however, does not hold in all studies (e.g., Cook and Fox 2011; Fisher and Sloan 2003). It is very difficult to compare across these studies, however, as some studies examined fear of particular crimes while others examined generalized fear of crime. Similarly, there is great variation in

the types of victimization experiences that have been used to predict fear of crime. Speaking to this issue, Wilcox, Jordan, and Pritchard (2007) argued for greater specificity, suggesting that research should avoid generalized measures of fear and victimization in favor of examining fear of specific crimes in particular contexts.

While the relationship between prior victimization and fear of crime is unclear, there is a strong and consistent relationship between perceived risk of victimization and fear of crime. Ferraro and LaGrange (1987) conceptualized perceived risk of victimization as a cognitive assessment of the likelihood of victimization (see also Warr and Stafford 1983). In introducing his risk interpretation model, Ferraro (1995) argued that in order for humans to feel fear they must first perceive a situation as at least potentially dangerous. Thus he argued that perceiving victimization risk is a necessary precursor to fear of crime. Consistent with this argument, research finds that perceived risk is positively related to fear of crime (Box et al. 1988; Hicks and Brown 2013; May 2001; Rader et al. 2007), though some gender differences in the relationship have been documented (Lane and Fox 2013; Reid and Konrad 2004). Perceived risk has also been shown to mediate the relationship between prior victimization and fear of certain crimes (Melde 2009; Rader et al. 2007). At least one study, though, has documented a reciprocal relationship between fear of crime and perceived risk, suggesting the need for longitudinal data to tease out the precise nature of the relationship between fear and risk perceptions (Rader et al. 2007).

### 22.4.2.3 Neighborhood Characteristics

Finally, research has examined whether neighborhood characteristics predict fear of crime among community residents. Such research is generally couched in social disorganization theory, which was developed by Shaw and McKay (1942) to explain variation in crime rates across communities. According to the theory, neighborhoods with high rates of residential mobility, poverty, racial/ethnic heterogeneity, female-headed households, and unemployment lack adequate informal social controls, which results in high crime rates

(Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Bursik 1988). Extending this argument, Hunter (1978) argued that visible signs of social disorder signal crime risk, which evokes fear of crime in neighborhood residents (Wilson and Kelling 1982). These signs of disorder include graffiti, vacant buildings, noisy neighbors, unkempt yards, and unsupervised teenagers.

Research consistently finds that perceptions of neighborhood disorder are positively related to fear of crime (Ferraro 1995; LaGrange et al. 1992; Markowitz et al. 2001; Rader et al. 2007). Studies utilizing independent assessments of disorder also find a relationship between disorder and fear of crime (Brunton-Smith and Sturgis 2011). In support of the underlying argument in the social disorganization perspective, LaGrange, Ferraro, and Supancic (1992) found that perceived risk mediated the effect of perceived incivilities on fear. When direct measures of social disorganization and crime risk were included in models predicting fear of crime, however, the effect of perceived incivilities was only partially mediated by perceived risk and the effects of the direct measures remained (Wyant 2008). This indicates that social disorganization and perceived incivilities exert independent effects on fear of crime and that these effects are not solely due to their effects on risk perceptions.

Research also finds that neighborhood characteristics moderate the effects of individual characteristics on fear of crime. Analysis of data from the British Crime Survey revealed that neighborhood crime rate boosted levels of fear among those who had previously been victimized but had little effect on non-victims (Brunton-Smith and Sturgis 2011). Similarly, visible disorder had a heightened effect on fear of crime for women and those in poor health. Lane and Fox (2012) also documented variation in the effects of neighborhood characteristics on fear of crime in their sample of incarcerated offenders. They found that perceptions of disorder were better predictors of fear of crime among non-gang members than among either current or former gang members. These findings suggest that modifications to the social disorganization model may be needed if the model is to explain variation in fear of crime.

### 22.4.3 Conclusion

The fear of crime literature is wide and varied, though its primary focus has been on documenting predictors of fear of crime. With the possible exception of social disorganization theory, there are few overarching theories that have been used to explain fear of crime. There are, instead, theories designed to explain particular phenomena—such as the shadow of sexual assault hypothesis as an explanation for gender differences in fear of crime. Research in this area also has relatively little engagement with sociological theories of emotion. Application of such theories could enrich research on fear of crime and help to organize the empirical findings.

---

### 22.5 Directions for Future Research

There is no doubt that there is interest among both criminologists and sociologists of emotion in understanding the relationship between emotions and crime. The literature on this topic is growing, due in large part to the emphasis on emotions in general strain theory and sustained interest in fear of crime. Looking forward, researchers should give greater attention to intersections between theories of emotion and theories of crime. Greater attention to extant theory could advance our understanding of the ways in which emotions facilitate both criminal behavior and desistance. Similarly, theories of emotion could be brought to bear on the conceptualization and measurement issues that limit the fear of crime literature (for overview see Clay-Warner and Robinson 2008).

An obvious point of intersection is between Collins' (2004) interaction ritual theory and theories of crime causation. Though Collins has recently extended his theory to address commission of violence explicitly (Collins 2009), there are few mentions of the theory in the criminological literature. This may be a result of the theory's portrayal of humans as reticent to commit criminal activity, which is counter to the basic assumption of many major crime theories. Nonetheless, interaction ritual theory is compel-

ling as a general theory of human behavior and so should be appealing to criminologists interested in understanding crime as part of a larger system of interaction.

Similarly, Scheff's (2000) theory of shame has much to contribute to the desistance literature. Though reintegrative shaming theorists have incorporated many of Scheff's ideas into their research, they have not exploited the full range of his theory. Scheff, for example, described a much wider range of responses to shame than is considered by those studying reintegrative shaming processes. The way in which many of these theorists measure reintegrative vs. integrative shaming also conflates the shaming process with the emotions that result from the process. A more complete application of Scheff's theory would involve measuring a wide range of positive and negative emotions in response to punishment, as well as considering how shame links to these emotions, as in the shame-rage spiral. Reintegrative shaming theory shares underlying assumptions with Scheff's theory, as both are based on symbolic interactionism. As a result, a more thorough integration of these perspectives could easily be accomplished.

There is also a need for more refined measures of fear of crime. Warr has long called for separating the cognitive and emotional components of fear of crime. Though measurement of fear of crime has improved over the last two decades, many of the existing measures continue to conflate attitudes about crime with fear of crime. Any retrospective report of emotion risks recall and social desirability bias. This issue is even more of a concern with 'fear of crime,' which is not only a culturally-laden term but a term that evokes gender, and potentially racial, identity issues. To combat these problems, researchers must discover ways to measure fear of crime either without invoking these larger concerns or by holding them constant. One possibility is to employ experimental methods. Here, researchers could present visual stimuli of different criminal events and ask participants to report on the emotions that they are feeling in that moment using validated emotion measures. Such measures would not reference crime, thus avoiding some of

the biases of traditional fear of crime measures. By asking participants about a large number of emotions, researchers could also determine if fear is the chief emotional response to crime, and whether there are predictable combinations of emotional responses.

Fundamentally, research on fear of crime could benefit from greater conversation between crime theorists and emotion theorists. This approach is evident in Giordano et al. (2007), who bring together social control theory, life course theory, and classic symbolic interactionism to understand the various ways in which emotions affect the desistance process. This research also provides insight into the role of emotions in social life, which demonstrates how theories of crime may elucidate more general social processes. More research in this vein would be beneficial to both the study of crime and to the study of emotion.

---

## References

- Agnew, R. (1992). Foundation for a general strain theory of crime and delinquency. *Criminology*, 30, 47–88.
- Agnew, R. (2006). *Pressured into crime: An overview of general strain theory*. Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing.
- Agnew, R., Cullen, F. T., Burton, Jr V. S., Evans, T. D., & Dunaway, R. G. (1996). A new test of classic strain theory. *Justice Quarterly*, 13, 681–704.
- Ahmed, E. (2001). *Shame management through reintegration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ahmed, E., & Braithwaite, V. (2004). What, me ashamed? Shame management and school bullying. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 41, 269–294.
- Ahmed, E., & Braithwaite, J. (2005). Forgiveness, shaming, shame and bullying. *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, 38, 298–323.
- Akers, R. L., & Sellers, C. S. (2009). *Criminological theories*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Akers, R. L., Greca, A. J., Sellers, C., & Cochran, J. (1987). Fear of crime and victimization among the elderly in different types of communities. *Criminology*, 25, 487–506.
- Averill, J. R. (1982). *Anger and aggression*. New York: Springer.
- Bandura, A. (1977). *Social learning theory*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
- Bandura, A., & Walters, R. H. (1963). *Social learning and personality development*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.

- Bao, W.-N., Haas, A., & Pi, Y. (2004). Life strain, negative emotions, and delinquency: An empirical test of general strain theory in the People's Republic of China. *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology*, 48, 281–297.
- Barbalet, J. M. (1998). *Emotion, social theory, and social structure: A macrosociological approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Baron, S. W. (2004). General strain, street youth and crime: A test of Agnew's revised theory. *Criminology*, 42, 457–484.
- Beccaria, C. (2009). *On crimes and punishments and other writings*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Becker, H. S. (1953). Becoming a Marijuana user. *American Journal of Sociology*, 59, 235–242.
- Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. *Journal of Political Economy*, 76, 169–217.
- Bentham, J. (1948). *A fragment on government: An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Bouffard, J. A. (2002). The influence of emotion on rational decision making in sexual aggression. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 30, 121–134.
- Box, S., Hale, C., & Andrews, G. (1988). Explaining fear of crime. *British Journal of Criminology*, 28, 340–356.
- Braithwaite, J. (1989). *Crime, shame and reintegration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Braithwaite, J. (2001). Crime in a convict republic. *The Modern Law Review*, 64, 11–50.
- Braithwaite, J., & Braithwaite, V. (2001). Shame and shame management. In N. H. E. Ahmed, J. Braithwaite, & V. Braithwaite (Eds.), *Shame management and reintegration* (pp. 3–69). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Braithwaite, J. (2002). *Restorative justice and responsive regulation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brezina, T. (1996). Adapting to strain: An examination of delinquent coping responses. *Criminology*, 34, 39–60.
- Brezina, T. (2010). Anger, attitudes, and aggressive behavior: Exploring the affective and cognitive foundations of angry aggression. *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*, 26, 186–203.
- Brezina, T., & Piquero, A. R. (2003). Exploring the Relationship between social and non-social reinforcement in the context of social learning theory. In R. Akers & G. F. Jenson (Eds.), *Social learning theory and the explanation of crime* (pp. 265–288). New Brunswick: Transaction Publishing.
- Broidy, L. M. (2001). A Test of General Strain Theory. *Criminology*, 39, 9–36.
- Brunton-Smith, I. A. N., & Sturgis, P. (2011). Do neighborhoods generate fear of crime? An empirical test using the British Crime Survey. *Criminology*, 49, 331–369.
- Bunch, J. M., Clay-Warner, J., & Lei, M. K. (forthcoming). Demographic characteristics and victimization risk: Testing the mediating effects of routine activities. *Crime and Delinquency*. doi:10.1177/0011128712466932
- Burgess, R. L., & Akers, R. L. (1966). A differential association-reinforcement theory of criminal behavior. *Social Problems*, 14, 128–147.
- Bursik, R. J. (1988). Social disorganization and theories of crime and delinquency: Problems and prospects. *Criminology*, 26, 519–552.
- Bursik, R., & Grasmick, H. G. (1993). *Neighborhoods and crime: The dimensions of effective community control*. New York: Lexington Books.
- Burton, V. S., Cullen, F. T., Evans, T. D., & Dunaway, R. G. (1994). Reconsidering strain theory: Operationalization, rival theories, and adult criminality. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, 10, 213–239.
- Capowich, G. E., Mazerolle, P., & Piquero, A. (2001). General strain theory, situational anger, and social networks: An assessment of conditioning influences. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 29, 445–461.
- Carmichael, S., & Piquero, A. R. (2004). Sanctions, perceived anger, and criminal offending. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, 20, 371–393.
- Chiricos, T., Hogan, M., & Gertz, M. (1997). Racial composition of neighborhood and fear of crime. *Criminology*, 35, 107–132.
- Clay-Warner, J., & Robinson, D. T. (Eds.). (2008). *Social structure and emotion*. San Diego: Elsevier/Academic Press.
- Clemente, F., & Kleiman, M. B. (1977). Fear of crime in the United States: A multivariate analysis. *Social Forces*, 56, 519–531.
- Cohen, L. E., & Felson, M. (1979). Social change and crime rate trends: A routine activity approach. *American Sociological Review*, 44, 588–608.
- Cohen, D., Nisbett, R. E., Bowdle, B. F., & Schwarz, N. (1996). Insult, aggression, and the southern culture of honor: An experimental ethnography. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 70, 945.
- Collins, R. (2004). *Interaction ritual chains*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Collins, R. (2009). *Violence: A micro-sociological theory*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Cook, C. L., & Fox, K. A. (2011). Fear of property crime: Examining the effects of victimization, vicarious victimization, and perceived risk. *Violence and Victims*, 26, 684–700.
- Cook, C. L., & Fox, K. A. (2012). Testing the relative importance of contemporaneous offenses: The impacts of fear of sexual assault versus fear of physical harm among men and women. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 40, 142–151.
- Cops, D., & Pleysier, S. (2011). 'Doing Gender' in fear of crime: The impact of gender identity on reported levels of fear of crime in adolescents and young adults. *British Journal of Criminology*, 51, 58–74.
- De Coster, S., & Zito, R. C. (2010). Gender and general strain theory: The gendering of emotional experiences and expressions. *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*, 26, 224–245.
- De Haan, W., & Loader, I. (2002). On the emotions of crime, punishment and social control. *Theoretical Criminology*, 6, 243–254.



- De Haan, W., & Vos, J. (2003). A crying shame: The over-rationalized conception of man in the rational choice perspective. *Theoretical Criminology*, 7, 29–54.
- Durkheim, E. (1893/1964). *The division of labor in society*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe.
- Farnworth, M., & Leiber, M. J. (1989). Strain theory revisited: Economic goals, educational means, and delinquency. *American Sociological Review*, 54, 263–274.
- Farrall, S. (2004). Revisiting crime surveys: Emotional responses without emotions? Or look back at anger. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, 7, 157–171.
- Ferraro, K. F., & LaGrange, R. L. (1987). The measurement of fear of crime. *Sociological Inquiry*, 57, 70–97.
- Ferraro, K. F., & LaGrange, R. L. (1992). Are older people most afraid of crime? Reconsidering age differences in fear of victimization. *Journal of Gerontology*, 47, S233–S244.
- Ferraro, K. F. (1995). *Fear of crime: Interpreting victimization risk*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Ferraro, K. F. (1996). Women's fear of victimization: Shadow of sexual assault? *Social Forces*, 75, 667–690.
- Fisher, B. S., & Sloan, J. J. (2003). Unraveling the fear of victimization among college women: Is the shadow of sexual assault hypothesis supported? *Justice Quarterly*, 20, 633–659.
- Frazier, C. E., & Meisenhelder, T. (1985). Exploratory notes on criminality and emotional ambivalence. *Qualitative Sociology*, 8, 266–284.
- Ganem, N. M. (2010). The role of negative emotion in general strain theory. *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*, 26, 167–185.
- Gibson, C. L., Zhao, J., Lovrich, N. P., & Gaffney, M. J. (2002). Social integration, individual perceptions of collective efficacy, and fear of crime in three cities. *Justice Quarterly*, 19, 537–564.
- Gilliom, M., Shaw, D. S., Beck, J. E., Schonberg, M. A., & Lukon, J. L. (2002). Anger regulation in disadvantaged preschool boys: Strategies, antecedents, and the development of self-control. *Developmental Psychology*, 38, 222.
- Giordano, P. C., Schroeder, R. D., & Cernkovich, S. A. (2007). Emotions and crime over the life course: A neo-meadian perspective on criminal continuity and change. *American Journal of Sociology*, 112, 1603–1661.
- Gottfredson, M. R., & Hirschi, T. (1990). *A general theory of crime*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
- Grasmick, H. G., & Bursik, R. J. (1990). Conscience, significant others, and rational choice: Extending the deterrence model. *Law and Society Review*, 24, 837–861.
- Grasmick, H. G., Tittle, C. R., Bursik, R. J., & Arneklev, B. J. (1993). Testing the core empirical implications of Gottfredson and Hirschi's general theory of crime. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 30, 5–29.
- Gray, E., Jackson, J., & Farrall, S. (2011). Feelings and functions in the fear of crime: Applying a new approach to victimisation insecurity. *British Journal of Criminology*, 51, 75–94.
- Hale, C. (1996). Fear of crime: A review of the literature. *International Review of Victimology*, 4, 79–150.
- Hay, C. (2001). An exploratory test of Braithwaite's reintegrative shaming theory. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 38, 132–153.
- Hay, C. (2003). Family strain, gender, and delinquency. *Sociological Perspectives*, 46, 107–135.
- Hicks, S., & Brown, S. (2013). Perceptions of risk: A review of the effects of individual and community-level variables on perceptions of risk. *International Review of Victimology*, 19, 249–267.
- Hilinski, C. M. (2009). Fear of crime among college students: A test of the shadow of sexual assault hypothesis. *American Journal of Criminal Justice*, 34, 84–102.
- Hirschi, T. (1969). *Causes of delinquency*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hollander, J. A. (2001). Vulnerability and dangerousness: The construction of gender through conversation about violence. *Gender and Society*, 15, 83–109.
- Hollist, D. R., Hughes, L. A., & Schaible, L. M. (2009). Adolescent maltreatment, negative emotion, and delinquency: An assessment of general strain theory and family-based strain. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 37, 379–387.
- Hough, M. (2004). Worry about crime: Mental events or mental states? *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, 7, 173–176.
- Hunter, A. (1978). *Symbols of incivility: Social disorder and fear of crime in urban neighborhoods*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Criminal Justice Reference Service.
- Jang, S. J., & Rhodes, J. R. (2012). General strain and non-strain theories: A study of crime in emerging adulthood. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 40, 176–186.
- Jensen, G. F. (1995). Salvaging structure through strain: A theoretical and empirical critique. In F. Adler, W. S. Laufer, & R. K. Merton (Eds.), *The legacy of anomie theory* (pp. 139–158). New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Katz, J. (1988). *Seductions of crime: Moral and sensual attractions in doing evil*. New York: Basic Books.
- Katz, J. (2001). *How emotions work*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kemper, T. D. (1978). *A social interactional theory of emotions*. New York: Wiley.
- Kemper, T. D. (1987). How many emotions are there? Wedding the social and the autonomic components. *American Journal of Sociology*, 93, 263–289.
- Kennedy, L. W., & Silverman, R. A. (1984). Significant others and fear of crime among the elderly. *The International Journal of Aging and Human Development*, 20, 241–256.
- LaGrange, R. L., & Ferraro, K. F. (1989). Assessing age and gender differences in perceived risk and fear of crime. *Criminology*, 27, 697–720.
- LaGrange, R. L., Ferraro, K. F., & Supancic, M. (1992). Perceived risk and fear of crime: role of social and



- physical incivilities. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 29, 311–334.
- Lane, J. (2013). Theoretical explanations for gender differences in fear of crime: Research and prospects. In C. M. Renzetti, S. L. Miller, & A. R. Gover (Eds.), *Routledge international handbook of crime and gender studies* (pp. 57–67). New York: Routledge.
- Lane, J., & Fox, K. A. (2012). Fear of crime among gang and non-gang offenders: Comparing the effects of perpetration, victimization, and neighborhood factors. *Justice Quarterly*, 29, 491–523.
- Lane, J., & Fox, K. A. (2013). Fear of property, violent, and gang crime: Examining the shadow of sexual assault thesis among male and female offenders. *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, 40, 472–496.
- Lane, J., & Meeker, J. W. (2003). Fear of gang crime: A look at three theoretical models. *Law and Society Review* 37, 425–456.
- Lane, J., Gover, A. R., & Dahod, S. (2009). Fear of violent crime among men and women on campus: The impact of perceived risk and fear of sexual assault. *Violence and Victims*, 24, 172–192.
- Laub, J. H., & Sampson, R. J. (2003). *Shared beginnings, divergent lives: Delinquent boys to age 70*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Laub, J. H., Nagin, D. S., & Sampson, R. J. (1998). Trajectories of change in criminal offending: Good marriages and the desistance process. *American Sociological Review*, 63, 225–238.
- Liska, A. E., Lawrence, J. J., & Sanchirico, A. (1982). Fear of crime as a social fact. *Social Forces*, 60, 760–770.
- Liska, A. E., Sanchirico, A., & Reed, M. D. (1988). Fear of crime and constrained behavior: Specifying and estimating a reciprocal effects model. *Social Forces*, 66, 827–837.
- Lynch, J. P. (1987). Routine activity and victimization at work. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, 3, 283–300.
- Makkai, T., & Braithwaite, J. (1994). The dialectics of corporate deterrence. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 31, 347–373.
- Manasse, M. E., & Ganem, N. M. (2009). Victimization as a cause of delinquency: The role of depression and gender. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 37, 371–378.
- Markowitz, F. E., Bellair, P. E., Liska, A. E., & Liu, J. (2001). Extending social disorganization theory: Modeling the relationships between cohesion, disorder, and fear. *Criminology*, 39, 293–319.
- May, D. C. (2001). The effect of fear of sexual victimization on adolescent fear of crime. *Sociological Spectrum*, 21, 141–174.
- May, D. C., Rader, N. E., & Goodrum, S. (2010). A gendered assessment of the “threat of victimization”: Examining gender differences in fear of crime, perceived risk, avoidance, and defensive behaviors. *Criminal Justice Review*, 35, 159–182.
- Mazerolle, P., & Piquero, A. (1997). Violent responses to strain: An examination of conditioning influences. *Violence and Victims*, 12, 323–343.
- Mazerolle, P., & Piquero, A. (1998). Linking exposure to strain with anger: An investigation of deviant adaptations. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 26, 195–211.
- Mazerolle, P., Burton, V. S., Cullen, F. T., Evans, T. D., & Payne, G. L. (2000). Strain, anger, and delinquent adaptations specifying general strain theory. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 28, 89–101.
- McCarthy, B. (2002). New economics of sociological criminology. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 28, 417–442.
- Melde, C. (2009). Lifestyle, rational choice, and adolescent fear: A test of a risk-assessment framework. *Criminology*, 47, 781–812.
- Merton, R. K. (1938). Social structure and anomie. *American Sociological Review*, 3, 672–682.
- Miethe, T. D., Stafford, M. C., & Long, J. S. (1987). Social differentiation in criminal victimization: A test of routine activities/lifestyle theories. *American Sociological Review*, 52, 184–194.
- Miethe, T. D., Lu, H., & Reese, E. (2000). Reintegrative shaming and recidivism risks in drug court: Explanations for some unexpected findings. *Crime and Delinquency*, 46, 522–541.
- Murphy, K., & Harris, N. (2007). Shaming, shame and recidivism: A test of reintegrative shaming theory in the white-collar crime context. *British Journal of Criminology*, 47, 900–917.
- Mustaine, E. E., & Tewksbury, R. (1998). Predicting Risks of Larceny Theft Victimization: A Routine Activity Analysis Using Refined Lifestyle Measures. *Criminology*, 36, 829–858.
- Nellis, A. M., & Savage, J. (2012). Does watching the news affect fear of terrorism? The importance of media exposure on terrorism fear. *Crime and Delinquency*, 58, 748–768.
- Ngo, F. T., & Paternoster, R. (2012). Stalking strain, concurrent negative emotions, and legitimate coping strategies: A preliminary test of gendered strain theory. *American Journal of Criminal Justice*, 38, 1–23.
- Osgood, D. W., Wilson, J. K., O’Malley, P. M., Bachman, J. G., & Johnston, L. D. (1996). Routine activities and individual deviant behavior. *American Sociological Review*, 61, 635–655.
- Ostrowsky, M. K., & Messner, S. F. (2005). Explaining crime for a young adult population: An application of general strain theory. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 33, 463–476.
- Paternoster, R. (1989). Decisions to participate in and desist from four types of common delinquency: Deterrence and the rational choice perspective. *Law and Society Review*, 23, 7–40.
- Piquero, A. R., Gomez-Smith, Z., & Langton, L. (2004). Discerning unfairness where others may not: Low self-control and unfair sanction perceptions. *Criminology*, 42, 699–734.
- Piquero, N. L., & Sealock, M. D. (2000). Generalizing general strain theory: An examination of an offending population. *Justice Quarterly*, 13, 449–484.
- Pratt, T. C., Cullen, F. T., Sellers, C. S., Thomas, W. L., Madensen, T. D., Daigle, L. E., Fearn, N. E., & Gau, J.

- M. (2010). The empirical status of social learning theory: A meta-analysis. *Justice Quarterly*, 27, 765–802.
- Rader, N. E. (2004). The threat of victimization: A theoretical reconceptualization of fear of crime. *Sociological Spectrum*, 24, 689–704.
- Rader, N. E., May, D. C., & Goodrum, S. (2007). An empirical assessment of the threat of victimization: Considering fear of crime, perceived risk, avoidance, and defensive behaviors. *Sociological Spectrum*, 27, 475–505.
- Rebellon, C. J., Piquero, N. L., Piquero, A. R., & Tibbetts, S. G. (2010). Anticipated shaming and criminal offending. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 38, 988–997.
- Rebellon, C. J., Manasse, M. E., Van Gundy, K. T., & Cohn, E. S. (2012). Perceived injustice and delinquency: A test of general strain theory. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 40, 230–237.
- Reid, L. W., & Konrad, M. (2004). The gender gap in fear: Assessing the interactive effects of gender and perceived risk on fear of crime. *Sociological Spectrum*, 24, 399–425.
- Restubog, S. L. D., Garcia, P. R. J. M., Wang, L., & Cheng, D. (2010). It's all about control: The role of self-control in buffering the effects of negative reciprocity beliefs and trait anger on workplace deviance. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 44, 655–660.
- Retzinger, S. M. (1991). *Violent emotions: Shame and rage in marital quarrels*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Retzinger, S., & Scheff, T. (1996). *Strategy for community conferences: Emotions and social bonds*. Monsey: Criminal Justice Press.
- Rountree, P. W. (1998). A reexamination of the crime-fear linkage. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 35, 341–372.
- Rountree, P. W., & Land, K. C. (1996). Perceived risk versus fear of crime: Empirical evidence of conceptually distinct reactions in survey data. *Social Forces*, 74, 1353–1376.
- Sampson, R. J., & Laub, J. H. (1995). *Crime in the making: Pathways and turning points through life*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Schafer, J. A., Huebner, B. M., & Bynum, T. S. (2006). Fear of crime and criminal victimization: Gender-based contrasts. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 34, 285–301.
- Scheff, T. J. (1988). Shame and conformity: The deference-emotion system. *American Sociological Review*, 53, 395–406.
- Scheff, T. J. (1990). *Microsociology: Discourse, emotion, and social structure*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Scheff, T. J. (1994). *Bloody revenge: Emotions, nationalism, and war*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Scheff, T. J. (2000). Shame and the social bond: A sociological theory. *Sociological Theory*, 18, 84–99.
- Scheff, T. J. (2003). Shame in self and society. *Symbolic Interaction*, 26, 239–262.
- Scheff, T. J., & Retzinger, S. M. (1991). *Emotions and violence: Shame and rage in destructive conflicts*. Lexington: Lexington Books.
- Scheuerman, H. L. (2013). The relationship between injustice and crime: A general strain theory approach. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 41, 375–385.
- Schroeder, R. D., & Frana, J. F. (2009). Spirituality and religion, emotional coping, and criminal desistance: A qualitative study of men undergoing change. *Sociological Spectrum*, 29, 718–741.
- Schroeder, R. D., Giordano, P. C., & Cernkovich, S. A. (2010). Adult child-parent bonds and life course criminality. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 38, 562–571.
- Shaver, P., Schwartz, J., Kirson, D., & O'Connor, C. (1987). Emotion knowledge: Further exploration of a prototype approach. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 52, 1061–1086.
- Shaw, C. R., & McKay, H. D. (1942). *Juvenile delinquency and urban areas*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Simon, R. W., & Nath, L. E. (2004). Gender and emotion in the United States: Do men and women differ in self-reports of feelings and expressive behavior? *American Journal of Sociology*, 109, 1137–1176.
- Skogan, W. G. (1987). The impact of victimization on fear. *Crime and Delinquency*, 33, 135–154.
- Skogan, W. G., & Maxfield, M. G. (1981). *Coping with crime: Individual and neighborhood reactions*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Stanko, E. A. (1985). *Intimate intrusions: Women's experience of male violence*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Sutherland, E. H. (1947). *Principles of criminology*. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott.
- Sutton, R. M., & Farrall, S. (2005). Gender, socially desirable responding and the fear of crime: Are women really more anxious about crime? *British Journal of Criminology*, 45, 212–224.
- Tice, D. M., & Bratslavsky, E. (2000). Giving in to feel good: The place of emotion regulation in the context of general self-control. *Psychological Inquiry*, 11, 149–159.
- Tittle, C. R., Jason, B., & Gertz, M. G. (2003). A test of a micro-level application of shaming theory. *Social Problems*, 50, 592–617.
- Toby, J. (1957). Social disorganization and stake in conformity: Complementary factors in the predatory behavior of hoodlums. *The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science*, 48, 12–17.
- Tofi, M. M., & Farrington, D. P. (2008). Reintegrative shaming theory, moral emotions and bullying. *Aggressive Behavior*, 34, 352–368.
- Turner, J. H. (2000). *On the origins of human emotions: A sociological inquiry into the evolution of human affect*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Turner, J. H. (2007). *Human emotions: A sociological theory*. New York: Routledge.
- Vagg, J. (1998). Delinquency and shame data from Hong Kong. *British Journal of Criminology*, 38, 247–264.
- Warr, M. (1994). Public perceptions and reactions to violent offending and victimization. In A. J. Reiss Jr. & J. A. Roth (Eds.), *Consequences and control*, vol. 4 of

- Understanding and preventing violence* (pp. 1–60). Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
- Warr, M., & Ellison, C. G. (2000). Rethinking social reactions to crime: Personal and altruistic fear in family households. *American Journal of Sociology, 106*, 551–578.
- Warr, M., & Stafford, M. (1983). Fear of victimization: A look at the proximate causes. *Social Forces, 61*, 1033–1043.
- West, C., & Zimmerman, D. H. (1987). Doing gender. *Gender and Society, 1*, 125–151.
- Wilcox, P., Jordan, C. E., & Pritchard, A. J. (2007). A multidimensional examination of campus safety: Victimization, perceptions of danger, worry about crime, and precautionary behavior among college women in the post-Clery era. *Crime and Delinquency, 53*, 219–254.
- Wilson, J. Q., & Kelling, G. L. (1982, March). Broken windows. *Atlantic Monthly, 29*–38.
- Wood, P. B., Gove, W. R., Wilson, J. A., & Cochran, J. K. (1997). Nonsocial reinforcement and habitual criminal conduct: An extension of learning theory. *Criminology, 35*, 335–366.
- Wyant, B. R. (2008). Multilevel impacts of perceived incivilities and perceptions of crime risk on fear of crime: Isolating endogenous impacts. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 45*, 39–64.
- Zhang, L., Zhou, D., Messner, S. F., Liska, A. E., Krohn, M. D., Liu, J., & Lu, Z. (1996). Crime prevention in a communitarian society: Bang-Jiao and Tiao-Jie in the People's Republic of China. *Justice Quarterly, 13*, 199–222.

Gretchen Peterson

### 23.1 Introduction

It has already been 5 years since sports journalist, Dave Zirin, admonished sports sociologists in an article in *Contexts* to “get off the bench” (Zirin 2008). He argued that the academic work completed by sports sociologists needed to be made accessible to those outside of academia and it needed to have an impact on sports. Zirin’s call to arms follows from Bourdieu’s explanation that “the special difficulties that the sociology of sport encounters: scorned by sociologists, it is despised by sportspersons” (1988, p. 153). In their review of sport and society, Washington and Karen also argued that sociologists need “to make sports more central to our analysis of society” (2001, p. 206). But, it is not only sports sociology in general that needs to enter the fray, but a particularly vital area where contributions can be made is through the connection between the sociology of sports and the sociology of emotions. Indeed, Maguire (2011) critically examines the interplay between leisure and emotions and argues that the interconnections between emotions and leisure have been relatively neglected in social research. Given both the amount of time and money people invest in leisure activities as participants and as spectators, leisure activities play an important role in social life. This is true not only for the present day, but has also been true historically

and cross-culturally. While sporting contexts may vary, sport has been a ubiquitous feature of communities and societies. One connection between sports and emotions highlighted by Maguire (2011) is that involvement in leisure and sports can be more or less pleasurable. While this provides one link between sports and emotions, pleasure is not the only emotion experienced by those involved in sports and leisure. Connecting the sociology of emotions and the sociology of sports involves both using sports as an arena to test emotions theories as well as using emotions theories to understand sports.

Bringing emotions and sports together requires making an important distinction between the “sociology of sport” and “sociology through sport.” The sociology of sport treats sports as a social phenomenon whereas sociology through sport uses sport as an arena for testing sociological theories (Ferguson 1981). The Sociology of emotions can be brought to bear in understanding the emotional aspects of sports as part of the social phenomenon of sports. As this chapter will show, sport provides an emotional outlet for many people in society and emotions play a critical role in sports performance and in sports spectatorship. Beyond using emotions to understand sports, the sociology of emotions would also benefit from using sports as an arena for testing theories of emotions. Each of theories discussed in the first half of this volume could be tested within a sporting context.

This chapter reviews the literature connecting sports and emotions. Beginning with early work

---

G. Peterson (✉)  
California State University, Los Angeles, USA  
e-mail: gpeters@calstatela.edu

by Elias and Dunning, the chapter then moves to a discussion of emotion work and emotional labor. This leads into a discussion of emotions in sports interactions, identities, and communities. Consideration is then given to the role that gender plays in the connection between emotions and sports. Then, the chapter examines research on sports performance and how it is affected by emotions. Ultimately, the chapter concludes with directions for future research connecting sports and emotions.

### 23.2 Early Work Connecting Emotions and Sports

Among the pioneers of research connecting emotions and sports is Norbert Elias. His work on the civilizing process and state formation led to a number of studies that extended his ideas more specifically into the realm of sport. As Elias and Dunning (1986) explain, social standards of conduct began to change rather dramatically in the sixteenth century and onward. This was particularly true for members of the upper classes. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the emergence of sport played a role in the civilizing process by evolving a non-violent form of physical contact. The upper classes were thus able to use sport as a means to refrain from actual violence. In essence, sport became a means to regulate the balance between emotional impulses and emotion-controlling impulses. During this time period, the main forms of sport that Elias and Dunning could examine were cricket, fox hunting, and folk football. These pastimes evolved based in competition and developed regulations to reduce the potential for actual physical injury for participants.

The three main forms of leisure activities identified by Elias and Dunning were sociable activities, activities involving motility, and mimetic activities. Mimetic activities are important for emotions because they elicit the excitement of real life situations without involving the real risks or dangers. The evolution of some sports have come to resemble actual battles between hostile groups and thus evoke emotions simi-

lar to those aroused in real life situations. Further, Elias and Dunning argue that the principal function of leisure is the “arousal of pleasurable forms of excitement”. As society grows more serious, leisure sports begin to take on a more central role in the lives of individuals as a socially approved arena for the experience of pleasurable excitement. Leisure serves to prolong the pleasurable experience of victory through activities that approximate a mock battle. In particular, the arousal of excitement comes from the tensions involved in sporting activities, even spectators get drawn into feeling hope for success and fear of failure or defeat. This arousal of excitement is enhanced by the collective effervescence of an entire group focused on a single event (Elias and Dunning 1986).

Maguire (1991) critiques Elias and Dunning (1986) arguing that they focus only on certain sports and neglect others, they cannot account for the emergence of women’s sport, and their focus on identity and excitement is only a part of the sports experience. Sports such as cricket, fox hunting, and folk football are most like real battles and thus serve to support the claims of Elias and Dunning through their focus on masculine identities. Maguire further argues for a return to a point made by Elias and Dunning on the similarity between sport and religion since, “the emotions engendered [in sport] may be amplified and/or controlled both through processes of ritual and taboo and the excitement generated by sports encounters and thus lead to the experience of sport as sacred and radically separate from the flow of profane life” (Maguire 1991, p. 31). This notion has been touched upon in more recent studies of sports fandom (Cottingham 2012), but it also highlights an area for further research connecting emotions and sports.

Early work on sports drew significantly from a figurational approach that sought to move away from the dichotomies that have characterized sociological research (i.e., micro and macro, individual and society) and focus on process and interdependence (Jarvie and Maguire 1994). A figurational approach takes as its units of analysis figurations and development. Figurations are “the webs of interdependence which link and



both constrain and enable the actions of individuals” (Maguire 1988, p. 188). Development refers to the processual nature of the dynamics of figurations. Using a figurational approach requires seeing humans as interdependent, seeing that the lives of humans revolve around figurations, seeing figurations as continually in flux, and seeing that development in figurations is largely unplanned. At the root of a figurational approach is an emphasis on the “nonintentional interconnections between intentional acts” (Jarvie and Maguire 1994, p. 132). A figurational approach in analyzing sports accounts for the constant flux of moves and power between interconnected players within the figuration of a game. In a sporting event, players are interconnected and there is a flow to the action of the game such that players act intentionally but are connected to all other players in the game (in nonintentional ways). This type of figurational approach is a hallmark of Elias’ approach and focuses on synthesis of the whole as opposed to analysis of components (Dunning 1986).

Another early work on emotions that can be used to understand sports is Scheff’s distancing theory of catharsis. Scheff’s (1979) theory argues that socialization results in the repression of grief, fear, embarrassment, and anger, but the negative consequences of such repression can be ameliorated through catharsis. These emotions create tension in the body that needs to be relieved through actions such as laughing, sweating, or sobbing. Ritual and dramatic entertainment forms in society can induce catharsis through the associated spectatorial role. Spectator sports provides an ideal venue for such catharsis since it creates the necessary distancing and can deal with all four of the repressed emotions. When balance is achieved, this is characterized as a state of aesthetic distance. Aesthetic distance occurs when observers become emotionally involved in what they are observing but still maintain emotional distance as observers. Thus, Scheff’s theory can be useful for understanding fan behavior and fan identity because of the cathartic effects associated with being a spectator at a sporting event.

Each of these early works connecting emotions and sports lay the groundwork for further

studies. The emotions connected to sports can range from positive enjoyable experiences (as described by Elias and Dunning 1970) to more negative emotional states that are repressed and require cathartic release (as in Scheff 1979). While the distancing theory of catharsis focuses on how spectators can achieve their catharsis through maintaining their aesthetic distance. Elias and Dunning’s (1970) theory, on the other hand, focuses on the rise of enjoyable tension-excitement instead of the repression of emotions. Ferguson (1981) explains that neither of these theories can fully account for the range of emotional expression by spectators so it remains to be seen whether either of these theories on their own or some combination of these theories could be utilized to clarify the role of sports in maintaining social order and/or providing psychotherapeutic benefits. In order to examine the emotional experiences of participants, the chapter next turns to a discussion of emotion management and emotional labor in sports. Athletes participating in sports and workers in sports industries must often manage their emotions and emotional expressions.

---

### 23.3 Emotion Management and Emotional Labor in Sports

One fruitful area of connection between emotions and sports has been the use of the concepts of emotion management and emotional labor in examining sports participation and sports occupations. Emotion management, also known as emotion work, refers to the act of “trying to change in degree or quality an emotion or feeling” (Hochschild 1979, p. 561). As in any social situation, there are feeling rules that define appropriate emotional behavior in sporting contexts. In order to perform successfully in sports, a person must internalize the values of the culture and manage feelings appropriately (Maguire 2011). In terms of emotion management, Snyder and Ammons (1993) explain how baseball players attempt to manage their emotions to achieve heightened performance. Players were very invested in their roles as athletes and their identities were often highly connected to their sports performances. Before

the games, players would report feelings of nervousness and anxiety and following the game they reported excitement and joy (following a successful performance) or frustration, embarrassment, and disappointment (following an unsuccessful performance). In line with Thoits' (1990) discussion of emotion management strategies, Snyder and Ammons (1993) found that players used three main categories of emotion management techniques to create the appropriate level of tension and anxiety for heightened performance. Players would use physical strategies that included certain routines and rituals before performing (i.e., adjusting one's batting gloves or touching one's bat on home plate before batting), they would use cognitive strategies such as listening to others or engaging in self talk, and they would use meditation to invoke positive thinking.

As with baseball, gymnasts participate on a team, yet sports performance is individual as only one athlete performs at a time. The gymnasts reported feeling emotions such as nervousness, fear of pain and injury, frustration, and disappointment. These gymnasts used emotion work to get socially psyched up and to concentrate in an effort to control their emotions prior to their performance (Snyder 1990). This study extends our understanding of emotion management since one of the techniques that gymnasts relied upon was the social aspect to psyching oneself up for performance. Teammates engaged in clapping and chants to support one another, thus making emotion management a joint activity, not just an individual one.

Earlier work on emotion management in sports tended to focus on how athletes get "psyched up" for competition and how socialization agents direct players in proper emotion management through game situations. One such study by Gallmeier (1987) examined the world of minor league professional hockey and found that athletes had to work to "put their game face on". For athletes, one's "game face" is a balance between emotional expression and emotional repression. Athletes are expected to mute displays of negative emotions such as fear or anxiety, but to still appear excited and emotionally invested in the game. Gallmeier's work supported even earlier

research by Zurcher (1982) on the work done by college football players to stage their emotions as part of the athletic contest. Coaches and trainers encouraged players to get into the appropriate serious mood for the game by providing cues as to when emotion management was expected. Athletes in Gallmeier's (1987) study saw the game as largely mental and engaged in emotion management before, during, and after the game. While it may seem that emotion management in this context often involves muting emotional expression, the opposite is true particularly as game time approaches when an overt display of emotion is expected. Locke's (2003) study also demonstrated the athletes saw nervousness before a game as normal and athletes saw the lack of emotion before a game as negative. These studies contribute to our understanding of emotion management by particularly highlighting the role the coach and teammates play in guiding athletes to using the correct feeling rules and leading to the correct display (or nondisplay) of emotions (Gallmeier 1987; Snyder 1990; Zurcher 1982).

Research on sports and emotions has further extended our understanding of emotion management by introducing the concept of control management. Control management is "the process of gaining, managing, exerting, and enforcing control in situations, interactions, and relationships" (Ortiz 2010, p. 321). It refers to strategies designed to control resources, access to resources, or deal with stress. Because the world of professional sports is hypermasculine, wives of athletes must often cede control not only to their husbands, but also to the mothers of their husbands in order to maintain their relationships. The wives of professional athletes must use both control management and emotion management to maintain family relationships. While the focus of the Ortiz study was on control management in family relationships, this concept could be fruitfully applied to interactions within sports as well. For example, the dynamics of a team may require one player to cede control to another player in order for the team to be successful. These team dynamics contribute to success or lead to failure and are enmeshed with emotion management.

In addition to emotion management, the professional arenas of sports related occupations require the performance of emotional labor. Two such sports related jobs requiring emotional labor are personal training (Maguire 2001) and professional wrestling (Smith 2008). While these studies help us to understand these sports careers, more importantly, each extends our understanding of the concept of emotional labor. Maguire (2001) argues that personal training, while still a service occupation requiring emotional labor, is different from other service work in that it is not deskilled or emotionally alienating. For a personal trainer, emotional labor comes into play in terms of how they go about motivating different clients. They must adapt their style to suit the client and must cultivate their relationships with clients to do so. While Hochschild (1983) argued that emotional labor can result in emotional exhaustion, Maguire (2001) finds that personal trainers experience high levels of job satisfaction because of the autonomy and flexibility they have in performing their emotional labor. Her work also supports the work of Paules (1991) which demonstrated that service workers in some circumstances can take on the role of entrepreneurs (even when representing a company) and that this also contributes to feelings of autonomy. Thus, Maguire demonstrates that it is not emotional labor in and of itself that can be alienating, but it is the context in which that emotional labor is performed.

Emotional labor can also be construed as a joint production as in the case of professional wrestling. Smith (2008, p. 159) coins the term “passion work” and defines it as “jointly performed emotional labor intended to elicit a passionate response from subjects through an impression of extreme states such as joy, agony, or suffering.” Unlike other sporting contexts where there is an outcome to be determined (winning or losing), professional wrestling has the explicit outcome of eliciting emotional responses from spectators. In order to accomplish this, the wrestlers must engage in interactive backstage emotion teamwork. Wrestlers would plan some aspects of their matches in advance, but they largely had to respond in normative ways to the actions of their partners. New wrestlers must learn the common

scripts that allow partners to anticipate one another’s moves and to produce a joint performance that is built on mutual trust and respect. The wrestlers that Smith observed showed empathy and care for their partners in the emotional labor by trying to avoid inflicting actual pain or injury, although they would at times use corrective action (inflicting pain intentionally) when someone was not performing appropriately (as in not executing moves well, disrespecting one’s partner, or threatening the group’s hierarchy). Smith’s (2008) work not only provides insight into the world of professional wrestling, but it also elucidates how emotional labor may be jointly produced, just as emotion management for players is a joint production by sports teams (Snyder 1990).

The research on emotion management and emotional labor in sports clearly exemplifies both the sociology of sport and sociology through sport. The concepts of emotion management and control management can be used to understand team dynamics and thus help us to understand sport. The findings that emotion management and emotional labor can be joint productions reflect sociology through sport as they extend our understanding of these concepts.

---

### 23.4 Interactions, Identities, and Communities

While athletes must manage their emotions and workers in sports industries must perform emotional labor, sports fans and those involved in sports communities must also deal with the emotions that arise from spectating. A number of studies have examined how sports fans are emotionally impacted by their participation as spectators at a sporting event. In contrast to Elias and Dunning’s approach, Cottingham (2012) uses interaction ritual theory to understand sports fandom (which includes fan identity and fan behavior). In the initial instantiation of interaction ritual theory, Collins argued that sports fans are a group consisting of “a community that has no other coherence, and no other purpose, than the experience of the peaks of ritual emotion itself” (2004, p. 59). Thus, he viewed sports fans as outside the

scope of interaction ritual theory arguing that the collective effervescence achieved as a sporting event was situationally specific and contrived. He did not see strong group solidarity emerging from being a sports fan. However, Cottingham's (2012) research found clear evidence of interaction ritual chains not only inside the stadium setting, but also outside the stadium at tailgating events and at local bars. Indeed, the symbols of fandom (apparel and other paraphernalia that use team logos or symbols) remain potent even outside the sports setting and were used at occasions such as the weddings and funerals of fans. Thus, the identity of sports fan was a potent one across different settings and emotional energy and successful interaction rituals occurred even outside the confines of a stadium setting. When a fan encounters another fan of the same team even when not at a sporting event, their connection as fans creates emotional energy and enhances group solidarity. Even though it was not Collins' intent, interaction ritual theory provides a strong framework for understanding sport fandom.

Even before the emergence of interaction ritual theory, studies of the community building power of sports fandom have a longer history. Most notably, Lever's (1983) work on soccer in Brazil demonstrated how sport can connect people in modern societies. Sports links people through ever-widening circles of competition with different identities becoming prominent at each level. While a fan may favor a local team in some settings, they would cheer on a national team in other settings. Each of these settings provides opportunities for multiple identities as a sports fan and multiple connections to others in society. People may be fans of several different teams and, in each case, their identity as a fan connects them to other fans. The ritualized conflict inherent in sport can evoke shared interests and create excitement because of fan loyalties. These loyalties are emotionally charged and can even be coupled with nationalist discourse and contribute to national identity (Iliycheva 2005).

Sports have strong emotional meaning for spectators and fans. In addition to spectating for oneself, sporting incidents are singled out by the media and used to represent societal values

of courage, gameness, integrity, and poise. Athletes can be seen as demonstrating their character through their behavior in sporting contests and community is built through the stories that are told about these athletes (Birrell 1981). Thus, while sports provides gratification for the individual participant, it can also provide significance for the community and address community needs. The stories that are told about players can impact how a fan feels about their team and the identity they hold as a fan.

Although Putnam (2000) argues that playing sports would be a more active way to build community and sports spectating would be more passive, several studies demonstrate that the act of simply observing a sporting contest can have an effect on fans. However, variations in those sporting contexts can yield significantly different emotional responses. Goldstein and Arms (1971) demonstrated observing athletic contests can have an effect on feelings of hostility. In their study, they interviewed spectators before and after either a football game or a gymnastics meet. Not surprisingly, spectators at the gymnastics meet reported no change in feelings of hostility after watching the contest. However, spectators at the football game did report greater hostility after watching a football game than before watching the game. While this study may suffer from some selection bias in terms of the spectators most likely to attend football games or gymnastics meets, it establishes that there is a potential connection between observing an aggressive sport and feeling hostile. Clearly, not all sports are the same in this regard so further research is needed to establish the connection between variations in sporting context and emotional responses.

While much of the research on sport spectating focuses on more competitive levels of sport, local level recreational sports can contribute significantly to a sense of community. In research on a "floating" community centered on following a recreational softball team, Munch (2005) illustrates how fleeting and anchored relationships develop among these groups of spectators. She characterizes fleeting relationships as "social connections that evoke recognition and some level of emotional connection between people"

(Munch 2005, p. 116). Anchored relationships are “personal relations that evince some aspects of a primary relationship in terms of their emotional interdependency, sharing of multiple aspects of the self, and temporal durability but that are tied to particular public contexts” (Munch 2005, p. 117). The community of spectators developed these relationships (beginning as fleeting and becoming anchored) and developed into a community underscored by mutual care, support, and respect. Over the course of the softball season, the spectators developed strong friendships that transcended just attending the softball games.

The development of community occurs not just among spectators, but also among recreational players. Dynamics that occur within the context of the game can contribute to the development of team solidarity and trust. For example, “going middle” in adult recreational softball can develop team solidarity. Going middle occurs when a batter in slow pitch softball intentionally hits at the opposing team’s pitcher. This can be very dangerous given how technology has increased the speed at which a ball leaves the bat when hit. While this is a potentially injurious action, it builds social solidarity as it is used by players to retaliate against another team (similar to a pitcher in baseball throwing at a batter). When the salience of conflict is high in a softball game, players will hit middle to protect their own pitcher, thus enhancing team solidarity. Players trusted their teammates to “have their back” and this trust enhanced the feeling of team unity or community (Peterson 2012).

The sense of community and the emotional connections that emerge at all levels of sports spectating and participating illustrate how sports engender successful interaction rituals. Being a sports fan or participant is not just a singular event, but rather represents a larger identity that is associated with strong emotions.

---

### 23.5 Gender and Emotions in Sports

One factor that has not yet been discussed is the role of gender in affecting the emotions experienced by sports participants and spectators.

Messner (1993) argues that the male sport model can be contrasted with female sport participation in that the male model focuses on competition, seriousness, hard work, intimidation, and achievement. In their study of adult coed softball, Snyder and Ammons (1993b) found that male players indicated they should tone down their aggressiveness and their seriousness when playing coed softball. This is in line with research by Wachs (2002, 2005) that found that the gendered rules in coed softball were based in presumptions that females were less competent as players. Even when men and women are playing together in a sport, gendered norms of masculine performance as superlative carry over into the rules of the game. However, while the presumption of female incompetence persists, Snyder and Ammons (1993b) found that the female players were considered more important to team success in coed softball. Male players are presumed to cancel each other out in terms of competence so that variations in the skill levels of female players are seen as more significant to team success. Although their importance was discussed even by the male players, the language used to refer to the female players still evoked presumptions of incompetence as they were generally referred to as “girls”. Even when playing coed sports, women are generally perceived as less capable and demonstrations of competent play are seen as exceptional rather than as normative for women (Biernat and Vescio 2002). This diminishing of women’s performance is also reflected in the work of televised sports commentators who do not make overtly sexist comments, but did diminish women athletes by referring to them as girls or only by their first names (Messner et al. 1993).

While women athletes face presumptions of being less competent, they must also deal with role conflict and its emotional consequences. For women in sports, the gendered norms associating sport with masculinity have led to potential role conflict between being female and being an athlete. This role conflict often gets confounded with issues of sexuality. Snyder and Ammons (1993b) found that women softball players who were seen as good players were often labeled as gay or as masculine. Halbert (1997) found similar issues



for women professional boxers in that women who challenge the social construction of femininity through engaging in a sport like boxing are assumed to also be rejecting heterosexuality. Being involved in a sport that is considered deviant for women, women boxers must use impression management strategies to deal with the discrimination and stereotyping they encounter. In terms of their motivation for participating in boxing, the female professionals identified “the intense competition, the adrenaline rush, the thrill of performing in front of a crowd, the love of the sport, the development of skill, psychological strength, or the demanding training needed to prepare for the competition.” (Halbert 1997, p. 15) In order to manage the discrimination and stereotyping, the female professional boxers that Halbert studied would engage in behaviors such as maintaining a feminine appearance and hiding their sexuality (if homosexual or bisexual) to evoke more feminine presentations of self.

This tendency by female athletes to overemphasize femininity was evident in Malcom’s (2003) research on girls playing softball. Malcom identifies this behavior as the “apologetic defense”, a coping strategy used to compensate for participating in sports (a masculine pursuit) with an overemphasis on stereotypically feminine behaviors and appearance particularly outside of sports. Malcom found, however, that the girls were able to successfully combine femininity and athleticism without using the apologetic defense. Rather than dismissing their athleticism from their identity, these girls were able to embrace both their athleticism and their femininity. Despite Malcom’s findings from her in-depth ethnographic research, Davis-Delano et al. (2009) used a quantitative questionnaire to compare apologetic behaviors across sports. They found that women might engage in numerous apologetic behaviors on an occasional basis or few apologetic behaviors on a more regular basis. They also found that apologetic behaviors (efforts to look feminine, apologizing for aggression, and highlighting heterosexuality) were more common among softball players than among soccer or basketball players. While it is not clear why these sports differ in terms of invoking the apologetic

defense, further research could elucidate how the sporting context affects female athlete’s sense of identity. It appears some sports push women to overemphasize femininity as part of their identity, while other sports may not place such pressures on women athletes.

While these studies examined how the athletes themselves felt about their involvement in sports, Angelini (2008) found that from the viewers’ perspective, involvement in gender inconsistent sports led to greater arousal. Female viewers felt happier watching female athletes compete as opposed to watching male athletes. However, watching men participate in feminine sports also resulted in increased happiness and viewers were more aroused by watching either sex participate in gender inconsistent sports. While female viewers may appreciate seeing women succeed in the male dominated arena of sports, it is not clear why increased arousal results from viewing male participation in a stereotypically female sport. Viewing sports can also have emotional implications that differ based on the gender of the spectator in that women and men gravitate to different sports when acting as spectators or viewers. Men prefer contact sports and fast-paced sports whereas women prefer more slow-paced and less violent sports. However, both men and women show greater emotional involvement in the viewing experience when fan favorites performed well. For those people viewing fast-paced sports, greater happiness and sadness were reported in response to how their team was performing (Wenner and Gratz 1989).

Research should focus on reconciling the perceptions of the athletes themselves with the perceptions of viewers, particularly in terms of the participation of women in male dominated sports. Watson’s (1987) work on how female athletes manage incongruent identities of being female and being an athlete further highlights the need to connect the experiences of the athletes themselves with the perceptions of others. While this study used a very small sample, results indicated that the identity of female athlete is viewed more positively than a female is viewed, but not as positively as a male athlete is viewed. The identity of athlete was viewed more positively

than the female identity so the combination of athlete and female was a more positive identity than that of just female. Thus, while it may seem that emotion management is needed by female athletes to manage incongruent identities, their identity as athletes seems to boost the perceptions others have of them.

Many of the gender stereotypes related to sport center on issues of aggression and toughness. Men are expected to be aggressive whereas women are expected to act in more feminine ways, even in the sporting context. As described above, not enacting the feminine stereotype leads to stereotyping and discrimination against female athletes. When it comes to aggressive behavior, Nixon (1997) found that women who participated in a contact sport were more likely to engage in physical aggression outside of sport. For men, participating in a contact sport was also significantly related to physical aggression outside of sport as was participating in a team sport and having hurt other athletes. Although this study was based on self-reports among college students at one campus, Nixon (1997) concluded that participation in contact sports reinforces or induces aggressive nonsports behaviors, particularly for women (although it should be noted that men were far more likely than women to engage in physical aggression outside of sport).

Another masculine sport where women's participation may be seen as deviant or incongruent with gender identities is hockey. While men's hockey is highly aggressive and involves rough contact, women's hockey is seen as different from men's because of rules that limit body contact. Theberge (1997) found that women who play hockey were mixed in their feelings on the rules that limited body contact. Limitations on body contact transform the women's game away from one of physical aggression to one based on speed and playmaking. In some respects, this would mark the game as superior to the men's game, but instead it was seen as inferior. While women hockey players felt empowered by their sports experiences, the framing of women's hockey as not the same as men's hockey diminished the challenge to masculine hegemony that female hockey players represent (Theberge 1997). While

sports provides an avenue for women to achieve some higher status, it is coupled with the marginalization of women by relegating their participation to a secondary status (Frey and Eitzen 1991).

These studies point to women adopting a masculine model of male sports participation and this idea is further reinforced in the work of Collinson (2005). Using an autoethnographic approach, Collinson examines the emotional aspects of dealing with injury. Previous research by Young and White (1995) showed that the only difference between how male and female elite athletes understand injury is a matter of degree. Women hockey players in Theberge's (1997) study adopted the ethic of toughness in the face of injuries. These players indicated that it was a measure of a player's ability how well they could play despite being injured. Collinson (2005) examines the case of injury in a "serious leisure" pursuit. Serious leisure is distinct from more recreational activities in the investment of athletes into developing knowledge, training for the activity, and putting forth personal effort. Athletes learn to normalize the pain experience when playing competitive sports and this can be extended to cases of serious leisure as well. Over the course of her research, Collinson (2005) found that emotion work was a critical part of rehabilitating from an injury. Leisure athletes may not be taken seriously when seeking treatment (from medical practitioners who see the injury as self-inflicted) and they may also need to manage emotions during rehabilitation when progress suddenly declines.

While the above studies highlight the emotion management women perform to handle the emotions of sports participation, Lilleaas (2007) interviewed 16 male handball players who were either currently playing at the elite level or had formerly played at the elite level (all were current players). She found that men on the team used their sport as a means to let off steam or to manage their emotions. This is in line with the work of Thoits (1990) which found that hard exercise was an emotion management technique. While not explicitly focused on the emotion management properties of sport, van Ingen (2011) describes a program in Toronto designed to teach

recreational boxing to female and transgendered survivors of violence. In describing the program, van Ingen says, “Shape Your Life provided participants with a social space that enabled them to claim their anger and to work on developing tools to face it constructively” (2011, p. 181). The participants in the program would use the act of boxing as a means to vent the emotions arising from the violence they experienced. More research is needed to fully understand how sports can be used to manage emotions that arise from other social contexts, not just as a source of emotional arousal itself.

The men in the Lilleaas (2007) study also reported that they were allowed to express emotions in the sports arena, but they had to navigate the line between playing tough and being violent. Lilleaas (2007) found that the men often used joking as an emotion management technique, particularly when they wanted to cover embarrassing feelings. While all the men reported using emotion management, there was an age difference in the ability to show feelings as younger men seemed to be more open with their emotions, despite all men describing their identity based on their masculinity. Klein’s (1995) study of men playing on a Mexican League baseball team also supported this notion of men having to balance being tough, but not too tough. Klein coined the term “tender machos” to highlight that the machismo displayed by Mexican men could range from hypermasculine macho to nonmacho styles. Tender machos were evident in the behavior of players in interactions with fans (particularly children), in expressions of feelings and vulnerability, and in physical affection with one another. Klein found that the Mexican men on the team seemed to more easily express vulnerability and physical affection than the North American men. While Klein’s (1995) concept of tender machos is used as part of a machismo continuum, it could be used to better understand the feeling and expression rules for men in sports and could enable a fuller understanding of the gendered aspects of emotion management.

Emotion management also comes into play when athletes experience a “double bind” in sports since they acknowledge the importance

of emotions to their performance as athletes and athletic identity, but do not want to be seen as being “too emotional” (Currier 2004). While men in sports have greater freedom to express themselves emotionally as compared to in other arenas of social life, women in sports feel they must be more restrained to be taken seriously as athletes. Thus, emotion management becomes critical for these athletes so that they can deal with their emotions while following the feeling rules appropriate for their gender (or for their status as an athlete of a certain gender).

Examining the role that gender plays in the connection between sports and emotions facilitates both a greater understanding of sports and of emotion concepts. The sports setting reveals the gendered aspect of emotion management in that players are required to manage their emotions in line with expectations for their gender. In addition, the emotional experiences of athletes and spectators are impacted by gender and have consequences for one’s identity.

---

### 23.6 Sport Performance and Emotional Reactions

While gender plays a role in how athletes respond emotionally to sports participation, the emotional outcomes resulting from sports performance transcend gender. The home field or home court advantage is a phenomenon that has often been discussed in sports and is often presumed to affect athletic performance. The expectation is that teams will do better when playing at home surrounded by their fans. An examination of the home advantage is rooted in Durkheimian theory and focuses on the effects of community support on the performance of athletic teams.

Schwartz and Barsky (1977) studied the extent of the home advantage in four different sports: baseball, basketball, football, and hockey. Using data from Major League Baseball games, American and National Football Conferences, the National Hockey League, and college basketball games played by 5 Philadelphia teams, the authors constructed a large dataset for quantitative analysis of game outcomes. Overall, Schwartz

and Barsky found that the home advantage is smallest in baseball, intermediate in football, and largest in basketball and hockey. When they further examined the basis for the home advantage, they postulated that it is most pronounced when the fans are closer to the action (as is the case in an indoor arena) and when their emotional expressions are sustained instead of intermittent. The data support this idea and it seems that even in professional sports, the players feed off the energy of the crowd as the home advantage is largely attributable to increased offensive output by the home team.

To examine further the factors contributing to home advantage, Greer (1983) conducted a field investigation of the effects of sustained crowd protest on a basketball game. Greer defined sustained protest as lasting for at least 15 s and then examined performance by the teams in the 5 min following each protest. While there were only 15 incidences of sustained protest in the 2 seasons of observation, the evidence indicated a notable decline in visiting team performance following sustained crowd protest (booing, whistling, or chanting insults). This data confirmed that the emotional energy of the spectators can impact game performance. However, it should be noted that the performative source of the home advantage appeared different in Schwartz and Barsky (1977) and Greer (1983). Schwartz and Barsky (1977) found that the home advantage resulted from improved offensive output whereas Greer found it resulted from declining visiting team output. Further study could focus on elucidating how emotional crowd behavior impacts athlete performance in different sports and disentangling its effects on home and visiting teams.

In sports based more on individual rather than team performance, the question arises as to how to promote excellence. Chambliss (1989) is able to demonstrate through an ethnographic study of swimmers that excellence is the result of a number of mundane activities that are turned into habits. These swimmers were motivated by the daily social rewards of sports participation and not by long term goals like winning the Olympics. While others might view the experiences of these swimmers as sacrificing for their sport, the swim-

mers themselves derive enjoyment from what they do and do not see it as sacrifice. Another aspect of performance for these athletes is to normalize the experience of competition through the use of rituals (i.e. a warmup, visualization, etc.) so that the athlete is not paralyzed by fear during the competition and feels that they belong there. This study ultimately illustrates that excellence is achieved not just through increasing the quantity of activity, but through qualitative improvements in how activity is performed. Ultimately, the commitment to making these qualitative improvements derives from an athlete's enjoyment of the activity. While not focused on excellence, the work of Whisenant and Jordan (2008) show that another factor in the enjoyment of sports (for school sponsored youth sports) is interpersonal justice. Whether student athletes felt they were treated with respect, dignity, and in a polite manner by the coaches significantly impacted their enjoyment of sport and affected their likelihood of continued participation.

One of the outcomes of sports participation can be failure. In team sports, failure may be covered by the play of other teammates, but ultimately an athlete may face consequences for not living up to the standards associated with their goal-related performance. Certainly, the emotional consequence of failure can be embarrassment as a self is not able to fulfill the expectations of their role (Goffman 1956). Ball (1976) examines how failure is treated in two professional arenas: baseball and football. Ball describes two possible group reactions to failure: degradation and cooling out. In degradation, a player is forcibly removed from their former position whereas cooling out (Goffman 1952) involves making a player feel estranged from their former position so that they leave on their own. In professional baseball, failure means being sent down to the minor leagues and Ball found that such failures are treated as nonpersons by coaches and former teammates. It is as if the player never existed once they are sent down. On the other hand, football has no minor league system so failure means leaving the game entirely. In football, failures are treated with sympathy and solidarity. Ball further argues that uncertainty and anxiety characterize the baseball

player's experience so that the reaction to failure in the sport has an impact on players' emotional experiences while actively playing the sport.

In the minor league arena of ice hockey, failure can result in being traded, waived, or "gassed". Each of these consequences of failure has different interactional consequences for the individual who fails (Gallmeier 1989). A player who is "gassed" is released outright from the team and has no possibility of continuing to play. These players are then ostracized and treated as non-persons similar to the treatment of players being sent down to the minors in major league baseball. While Ball's (1976) work does not include being traded as a form of failure, Gallmeier (1989) does address this since being traded may create a self-definition of failure for the individual. A player who is traded is "cooled out" as a means to protect the self-esteem of the traded player and to preserve solidarity within the group of remaining players. Gallmeier (1989) found that one way players can respond to being "cooled out" is through the formation of cliques and cabals. As described by Burns (1955), cliques are voluntary group formations of individuals who have been deemed by the organization to be failures. Cabals are groupings designed to deal with the anxiety that arises from the possibility of failure. Cabals form among players who have been placed on waivers, which serves as a stopping point between being gassed and being traded. Players placed on waivers have the possibility of being picked up by a team (and, in essence, traded), but if they are not, they are eventually gassed. While the research on failure has largely focused on professional sports, failure at the recreational levels can be better understood using emotions theories.

Understanding how embarrassment affects sports behavior for both youth and adult recreational players could provide insight into interactions between players. One question to examine would be how failure influences violent interactions on the field. Players who experience embarrassment while playing may be inclined to lash out violently in their interactions with others. One example of this can be found in the work of Peterson (2013). In her study of "going middle"

in adult recreational softball (hitting at an opposing team's pitcher intentionally), Peterson found that some players hit middle in response to being shown up by another team. The embarrassment that results could contribute to a player's willingness to respond with a potentially injurious behavior (hitting at an opponent).

In terms of success and failure in sport, Messner et al. (1993) found that success and failure were conceptualized differently for men and women by commentators for televised sports. For women, success was attributable not only to hard work, talent, and intelligence, but also to emotion, luck, togetherness, and family. When failing, women were often described as nervous, lacking confidence, lacking aggression, and not being comfortable. Men who were failing in a sports performance were said to be doing so because of their opponent's prowess. These gendered constructions of success and failure illustrate an assumption that female athletes are dominated by their emotions and that success and failure are dependent on their emotions, not just on their athletic skills. Messner and colleagues also noted that the gender of the commentator did not affect how success and failure were framed for the female athletes. Thus, while the reactions to failed performance may be gender neutral, perceptions of failed performance were not.

Sports performance is clearly impacted by an athlete's emotions. While success leads to positive feelings, the consequences of a failed performance are embarrassment and even anger. Further research could use Kemper's (1990) social relational approach to emotions to explain athletes' responses to success or failure. Sports contests involve power and status dynamics and could provide an arena for testing Kemper's theory. This would contribute both to the sociology of sport and sociology through sport.

---

## 23.7 Conclusions

As Eckstein et al. argue, "Sports sociologists, perhaps more than most sociologists, have a great untapped potential to practice meaningful public sociology" (2010, p. 512). While this exhortation



may focus on the work of sports sociologists, it should be further argued that the sociology of emotions has a critical role to play in tapping the potential of sports as an arena of study. As mentioned in the introduction, research should focus on both “sociology of sport” and “sociology through sport”. Emotions researchers have much to contribute to understand sports phenomena and sports can contribute to the sociology of emotions as an arena for testing theories of emotion. Eckstein and colleagues further argue that sports provide a highly accessible arena for field research (which explains why the bulk of research on sports has taken a micro-level approach). This accessibility, coupled with the enormity of sport as a part of our social experience, make it a fertile arena for research on emotions. The untapped potential of sports sociologists to practice public sociology lies largely in the great interest that the public has in sports so research connecting sports and emotions could serve to educate the public about emotions while capturing their interest because of the emphasis on sports. As Frey and Eitzen explain, “no other institution, except perhaps religion, commands the mystique, the nostalgia, the romantic ideational cultural fixation that sport does” (1991, p. 504).

Given the ubiquity of sports in social life, the study of sports and emotions has cross-cutting implications for other arenas of social life. This review has highlighted several ways that emotion concepts and theories can be elaborated or extended. For example, the emotional labor performed by workers in sports industries was shown to be distinct from emotional labor in other occupations. Also, emotion management was shown to be a joint production by athletes, teammates, and coaches. The section on community illustrated how interaction ritual theory could be used to better understand fan communities and fan behavior. These are just a few of the examples from this chapter of how connecting emotions and sports has served to elucidate emotions concepts and theories.

This review of the research on sports and emotions has highlighted several avenues for research agendas connecting emotions and sports. One such avenue is on the collective effervescence

engendered by sports spectating and fandom. Different sports have different effects on fans, yet research has not delved fully into how sports induce these emotional reactions, both individual and collective. In addition, given how widespread sports participation is among both adults and children, further research is needed to understand how athletes handle their emotions and how the community of spectators affect the athletes.

Another direction for future research on sports and emotions would be through the applications of theories to sporting contexts. Many of the theories discussed in this volume could be used to successfully explain dynamics of sports and sports interactions. The work of Peterson (2012) provides an example of how our understanding of social exchange theory can be enhanced through the study of sports. Peterson’s research demonstrated that the generalized exchange of punishments operates differently from the generalized exchange of rewards. By applying principles of generalized exchange to the softball setting, a new hypothesis was generated that could then be tested in the laboratory setting regarding the emergence of social solidarity in generalized exchanges. Another way that exchange theory could be applied to the sports setting would be through the application of Lawler’s (2001) affect theory of social exchange. Lawler argues that the successful completion of exchanges generates affective responses. Interactions on the sports field involve exchanges between athletes and these exchanges generate emotional responses. Because of the salience of conflict between teams, the emotions generated by completing exchanges (which may involve the exchange of punishments) may not be explained by Lawler’s theory currently and could point to avenues for further theoretical development.

As with exchange theory, Kemper’s (1990) power and status theory could be applied to sports interactions among athletes and between athletes and fans. The work of Adler and Adler (1989) on the gloried self illustrated how athletes interactions with fans served to inflate their sense of their sports self. As a result, the gloried self would emerge and athletes would lose sight of other identities. These interactions between ath-

letes and fans could be analyzed using Kemper's dimensions of power and status. While fans normally show great deference to athletes, this may not be so following a poor performance. An athlete may experience lowered status in interactions with fans if they have not been performing well and this could result in emotional reactions to the loss of status (the exact emotion would depend on who the athlete blamed for their poor performance). The work of Ball (1976) and Gallmeier (1989) on failure by athletes illustrates how the loss of status due to poor performance leads to nonperson treatment from fellow athletes and coaches. This type of treatment also engenders emotional reactions on the part of the player who is seen to have failed.

Teammates' evaluations of one another's performance could be examined in light of expectation states theory. Athletic contests could be seen to fit within the scope of expectation states theory since the team is working together to achieve an outcome where success is clearly defined. While athletes on established teams would have performance expectations for one another already, athletes on newly forming teams must develop performance expectations quickly in order for the team to be successful. Research by Biernat and Vescio (2002) illustrates the gendered nature of expectations for sports performance where a man who is average in athletic ability would still be preferred as a teammate and assumed to be more competent at sports than a woman who is seen as superlative in sports ability. Thus, in sports, women face an interactional disadvantage where they must demonstrate that they are superior on the task (playing sports) in order to be seen as contributing to the joint task. This situation parallels Cohen and Roper's (1972) classic study on interracial interaction disadvantage.

For most sociologists of emotions, sports is not typically an arena that comes to mind for extending emotions theories. However, each of the theories described briefly above can be applied in sporting contexts. The result of those applications would be the possible extension of the theories as well as furthering the understanding of sports. The challenge remains for emotions researchers to take a leading role in conducting these types of

synthesizing analyses. It is time for sociologists of emotions to join sociologists of sports and to "Get Off the Bench!"

---

## References

- Adler, P. A., & Adler, P. (1989). The gloried self: The aggrandizement and constriction of self. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 52, 299–310.
- Angelini, J. R. (2008). How did the sport make you feel? Looking at three dimensions of emotions through a gendered lens. *Sex Roles*, 58, 127–135.
- Ball, D. W. (1976). Failure in sport. *American Sociological Review*, 41, 726–739.
- Biernat, M., & Vescio, T. K. (2002). She swings, she's great, she's benched: Implications of gender-based shifting standards for judgment and behavior. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 28, 66–77.
- Birrell, S. (1981). Sport as ritual: Interpretations from Durkheim to Goffman. *Social Forces*, 60, 354–376.
- Bourdieu, P. (1988). Program for a sociology of sport. *Sociology of Sport Journal*, 5, 153–161.
- Burns, T. (1955). The reference of conduct in small groups: Cliques and cabals in occupational Milieux. *Human Relations*, 8, 467–486.
- Chambliss, D. F. (1989). The mundanity of excellence: An ethnographic report on stratification and olympic swimmers. *Sociological Theory*, 7, 70–86.
- Cohen, E. G., & Roper, S. S. (1972). Modification of interracial interaction disability: An application of status characteristic theory. *American Sociological Review*, 37, 643–657.
- Collins, R. (2004). *Interaction ritual chains*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Collinson, J. A. (2005). Emotions, interaction and the injured sporting body. *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, 40, 221–240.
- Cottingham, M. D. (2012). Interaction ritual theory and sports fans: Emotions, symbols, and solidarity. *Sociology of Sport Journal*, 29, 168–185.
- Currier, D. M. (2004). *Gendered athletes: The social construction of gender, sexuality, and emotion among college athletes*. Ph. D. Dissertation.
- Davis-Delano, L. R., Pollock, A., & Vose, J. E. (2009). Apologetic behavior among female athletes: A new questionnaire and initial results. *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, 44, 131–150.
- Dunning, E. (1986). "Preface." pp. 1–18 in *quest for excitement: Sport and leisure in the civilizing process*. New York: Basil Blackwell.
- Eckstein, R., Moss, D. M., & Delaney, K. J. (2010). Sports sociology's still untapped potential. *Sociological Forum*, 25, 500–518.
- Elias, N., & Dunning, E. (1970). The quest for excitement in unexciting societies. In G. Lueschen (Ed.), *The cross-cultural analysis of sport and games*. Champaign: Stipes Publishing Company.

- Elias, N., & Dunning, E. (1986). *Quest for excitement: Sport and leisure in the civilizing process*. New York: Basil Blackwell.
- Ferguson, J. D. (1981). Emotions in sport sociology. *International Review of Sport Sociology*, 16, 15–25.
- Frey, J. H., & Stanley Eitzen, D. (1991). Sport and society. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 17, 503–522.
- Gallmeier, C. P. (1987). Putting on the game face: The staging of emotions in professional hockey. *Sociology of Sport Journal*, 4, 347–362.
- Gallmeier, C. P. (1989). Traded, waived, or gassed: Failure in the occupational world of ice hockey. *Journal of Sport and Social Issues*, 13, 25–45.
- Goffman, E. (1952). Cooling the mark out: Some adaptations to failure. *Psychiatry: Journal for the Study of Interpersonal Relations*, 15, 451–463.
- Goffman, E. (1956). Embarrassment and social organization. *American Journal of Sociology*, 62, 264–274.
- Goldstein, J. H., & Arms, R. L. (1971). Effects of observing athletic contests on hostility. *Sociometry*, 34, 83–90.
- Greer, D. L. (1983). Spectator booing and the home advantage: A study of social influence in the basketball arena. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 46, 252–261.
- Halbert, C. (1997). Tough enough and woman enough: Stereotypes, discrimination, and impression management among women professional boxers. *Journal of Sport and Social Issues*, 21, 7–36.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1979). Emotion work, feeling rules, and social structure. *American Journal of Sociology*, 85, 551–575.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1983). *The managed heart: Commercialization of human feeling*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Iliycheva, M. (2005). Faithful until death: Sports fans and nationalist discourse in Bulgarian internet forums. *Polish Sociological Review*, 3, 251–270.
- Jarvie, G., & Maguire, J. (1994). *Sport and leisure in social thought*. London: Routledge.
- Kemper, T. D. (1990). Social relations and emotions: A structural approach. In T. D. Kemper (Ed.), *Research agendas in the sociology of emotions* (pp. 207–237). Alban: State University of New York Press.
- Klein, A. M. (1995). Tender machos: Masculine contrasts in the Mexican Baseball League. *Sociology of Sport Journal*, 12, 370–388.
- Lawler, E. J. (2001). An affect theory of social exchange. *American Journal of Sociology*, 107, 321–352.
- Lever, J. (1983). *Soccer madness*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lilleaas, U.-B. (2007). Masculinities, sport, and emotions. *Men and Masculinities*, 10, 39–53.
- Locke, A. (2003). If I'm not nervous, I'm worried, does that make sense?: The use of emotion concepts by athletes in accounts of performance. *Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, 4, Article 10.
- Maguire, J. (1988). Research note: doing figurational sociology: Some preliminary observations on methodological issues and sensitizing concepts. *Leisure Studies*, 7, 187–193.
- Maguire, J. (1991). Towards a sociological theory of sport and the emotions: A figurational perspective. *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, 26, 25–35.
- Maguire, J. S. (2001). Fit and flexible: The fitness industry, personal trainers, and emotional service labor. *Sociology of Sport Journal*, 18, 379–402.
- Maguire, J. A. (2011). Welcome to the pleasure dome?: Emotions, Leisure, and Society. Sport in. *Society*, 14, 913–926.
- Malcom, N. L. (2003). Constructing female athleticism: A study of girls' recreational softball. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 46, 1387–1404.
- Messner, M. A., Duncan, M. C., & Jensen, K. (1993). Separating the men from the girls: The gendered language of televised sports. *Gender and Society*, 7, 121–137.
- Munch, A. (2005). Everyone gets to participate: Floating community in an amateur softball league. In C. Morrill, D. A. Snow, & C. H. White (Eds.), *Together alone: Personal relationships in public places* (pp. 111–133). Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Nixon, H. L. (1997). Gender, sport, and aggressive behavior outside sport. *Journal of Sport Social Issues*, 21, 379–391.
- Ortiz, S. M. (2010). Competing with her mother-in-law: The intersection of control management and emotion management in sport families. *Studies in Symbolic Interaction*, 35, 319–344.
- Paules, G. F. (1991). *Dishing it out: Power and resistance among waitresses in a New Jersey restaurant*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Peterson, G. (2012). The generalized exchange of punishments in adult recreational softball: The case of 'Going Middle'. *Current Research in Social Psychology*, 19, 25–34.
- Peterson, G. (2013). Middle's open!: Norms regarding hitting in adult recreational softball. *Social Sciences Directory*, 2, 3–13.
- Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Touchstone.
- Scheff, T. J. (1979). *Catharsis in healing, ritual, and drama*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Schwartz, B., & Barsky, S. F. (1977). The home advantage. *Social Forces*, 55, 641–661.
- Smith, T. R. (2008). Passion work: The joint production of emotional labor in professional wrestling. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 71, 157–176.
- Snyder, E. E. (1990). Emotion and sport: A case study of collegiate women gymnasts. *Sociology of Sport Journal*, 7, 254–270.
- Snyder, E. E., & Ammons, R. (1993). Baseball's emotion work: Getting psyched to play. *Qualitative Sociology*, 16, 111–132.
- Snyder, E. E., & Ammons, R. (1993b). Adult participation in coed softball: Relations in a gender integrated sport. *Journal of Sport Behavior*, 16, 3–15.
- Theberge, N. (1997). It's part of the game: Physicality and the production of gender in women's hockey. *Gender and Society*, 11, 69–87.

- Tohito, P. A. (1990). Emotional deviance: Research agendas. In T. D. Kemper (Ed.), *Research agendas in the sociology of emotions* (pp. 180–203). Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Van Ingen, C. (2011). Spatialities of anger: Emotional geographies in a boxing program for survivors of violence. *Sociology of Sport Journal*, 28, 171–188.
- Wachs, F. L. (2002). Leveling the playing field: Negotiating gendered rules in coed softball. *Journal of Sport and Social Issues*, 26, 300–316.
- Wachs, F. L. (2005). The boundaries of difference: Negotiating gender in recreational sport. *Sociological Inquiry*, 75, 527–547.
- Washington, R. E., & Karen, D. (2001). Sport and society. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 27, 187–212.
- Watson, T. (1987). Women athletes and athletic women: The dilemmas and contradictions of managing incongruent identities. *Sociological Inquiry*, 57, 432–446.
- Wenner, L. A., & Gratz, W. (1989). Experience with sports on television. In L. A. Wenner (Ed.), *Media, sports, and society* (pp. 241–269). Newbury Park: Sage.
- Whisenant, W., & Jordan, J. S. (2008). Fairness and enjoyment in school sponsored youth sports. *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, 43, 91–100.
- Young, K., & White, P. (1995). Sport, physical danger, and injury: The experience of elite women athletes. *Journal of Sport and Social Issues*, 19, 45–61.
- Zirin, D. (2008). Calling sports sociology off the bench. *Contexts*, 7, 28–31.
- Zurher, L. A. (1982). The staging of emotions: A dramaturgical analysis. *Symbolic Interaction*, 5, 1–22.

Daniel B. Shank

---

## 24.1 Introduction

Technology alters how people feel, creates outlets for people to express their emotions, and provides social scientists with new tools and data on emotions. Because both emotions and technology are studied from a variety of disciplines, their intersection, likewise, can be examined from different viewpoints. This chapter presents a sociological approach to technology and emotions, relying not only on sociology literature and theory but also a wider sample of social science research.

There are many different definitions of technology, and here I leave it broadly defined as my purpose is to survey a range of scholarship which purports different interpretations and definitions. Given the limited space in this chapter, I neglect certain topics, such as emotions in cultural movements brought about by technology (e.g., fear of new weapons), emotions surrounding a philosophic position about technology (e.g., social construction of technology), or affective outcomes due to long-term economic and demographic changes undergirded by technology (e.g., modern sewage, highway, or aviation systems). Instead of pre-electric, specialized, industrial, or military technology, I concentrate primarily on the widely-available, modern, digital, information and communication technology.

First however, I frame the context of emotions and technology by briefly noting the historical

and cultural progression of emotion is concurrent with the world's technological developments. Emotions allowed early humans to interact with larger numbers of potentially unknown others (Turner 2000) setting the stage for the development of more complex societies, which simultaneously required developments in production, organizational, and survival technologies (Nolan and Lenski 1996). As humans evolved, rational thought developed and was reinforced by the culture of advanced technologies.

Human neurological developments, however, preferred emotion first and rationality later, leading to an asymmetrical relationship between the two (Massey 2002): emotions often influence, overwhelm, or bypass rational thinking, whereas rational thinking is slower, more systematic, and less influential over emotions (Damasio 1994; Goleman 2006; Turner 2000). This is why in a modernist culture that elevates rationality, science, and technology above emotion, social scientists continue to argue that socioemotional bonds guide much human thought and behavior (Frank 1988; Heise 2007; Illouz 2007; Lawler et al. 2009; Massey 2002). This distinction also provides a major division between the capacities of humans and the digital computer technology I focus on in this chapter. While modern computer technology often surpasses humans in rational tasks based on calculations, memory, and algorithms, machines currently do comparatively worse on what I would call emotion-centered tasks: those involving the mind (Wolfe 1991), emotional and social intelligence (Goleman 2006), sociolinguistic interaction (Christian

---

D. B. Shank (✉)  
University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia  
e-mail: daniel.shank@unimelb.edu.au



2011), aesthetic judgments, creativity, and humor (Kurzweil 2000).

I develop the chapter in four sections, generally progressing from broader, macrosociological issues to more specific microsociological topics. First, I overview the contemporary social structure of technology, including how both emotions lead to technology use and technology use influences emotions. In this section I also consider the case of how youth use technology, particularly within the context of families. Second, I examine how affective processes manifest and change when interacting with others over communication technologies, especially the Internet. This discussion includes how mediated interactions through technologies exist in a variety of forms that impact affective processes. Within this section I focus on the substantive transformations in the areas of mediated work, virtual worlds, and online romance as three contexts where mediation technology has greatly affected the social and relational landscape.

Third, I turn to emotions in human-computer interaction including the cultural and affective consequences when human sociality is directed toward machines. This section incorporates social theories of emotion when interacting with computers and robots, and how those theories can be incorporated in the design of machines. Fourth, I break from topical and substantive coverage of the chapter to consider technologically innovative methodologies such as big data analysis, new Internet methodologies, non-invasive emotion measurement, and experiential sampling. These methods are important and timely as advances in emotions research often utilize cutting-edge methodological developments to obtain more precise or novel data. I conclude with ideas for future research, with a specific emphasis on how sociology of emotion theories can be extended and applied to research on technology.

---

## 24.2 Emotions and the Use of Technology

The use of technologies can be intricately tied to affective processes, both with emotions altering technology use patterns and technology

use altering one's emotional state. I begin with an argument that the culture built around modern technologies has increased people's negative emotions and pathologies (Stivers 2004). This argument suggests that people experience increased anxiety from the abundance of stimuli, stress from the always-on nature of information and communication technology, and fear from the media's information soundbites of worldwide events. Some empirical studies correspond to this assessment, finding, for example, that media multitasking is associated with anxiety, depression and lack of well-being (Becker et al. 2013). Similarly, heavy gaming increases multiple forms of anxiety (Mehroof and Griffiths 2010) while decreasing the quality of interpersonal relationships (Lo et al. 2005).

In contrast, others find opposite trends. Using the Internet for gaming and entertainment can be associated with greater happiness (Mitchell et al. 2011). For older adults, using the Internet can increase well-being and reduce depression (Cotten et al. 2012), while for distressed adolescents, communicating online can increase emotional well-being (Dolev-Cohen and Barak 2013). Using the Internet for health purposes is associated with decreased psychological distress, however Internet users engaging in a greater number of online health behaviors have increased levels of distress (Cotten et al. 2011). Overall, as these few studies indicate, technology use can lead to both positive and negative emotions, conditioned on how often people use technology and for what purposes. The overarching trend is for moderate technology use to produce positive outcomes, whereas extremely high, obsessive, or addictive use typically leads to negative affective consequences.

Evidence also indicates support for the reverse causal direction: emotions, both positive and negative, can be the catalyst for increased technology use. Lonely people go online more than the non-lonely and they go online when they feel depressed, anxious, or desire emotional support (Morahan-Martin and Schumacher 2003), allowing for the positive experience of engaging in social interaction in the online context (Bonetti et al. 2010). Those reporting high anxiety in fact benefit the most from using mediated, online

communication compared to traditional face-to-face communication (Yen et al. 2012). One example of the complexity of emotions leading to differential technology use involves bank managers. Bank managers' experiences of happiness increased their levels of information technology use, whereas their anger and anxiety had mixed—both positive and negative—direct and indirect effects on information technology use (Beaudry and Pinsonneault 2010). Based on the circumstances, it is reasonable that both positive and negative emotions could increase (or decrease) technology use. This is because emotions are often catalysts to take action—fighting, withdrawing, and seeking information, social contact, and support—which can lead to changes in needs or desires to access different technologies depending on the specific situation.

Technology use is a particularly affect-laden issue within the family. Parents often guide and oversee their children's technology use, while those same children may possess superior knowledge on how to use digital technologies. Parents frequently use technology to enable or restrict relational, education, and socioeconomic goals, enhanced by their worrying about issues such as Internet addiction, bullying, cyberstalking, violent video games, and their children's online encounters. One perspective on this is parental mediation theory, which traditionally considers how parents restricted media, especially television, in order to reduce the negative effects of prolonged exposure (Clark 2011). More recent scholarship reveals that parents engage in emotion work for a variety of purposes: to restrict media, to monitor or keep in touch with their children, and to promote values of trust, independence, or family. This follows from not only their values and experience with digital technologies, but from socioeconomic status and resources (Clark 2013).

It is not surprising that parents respond to technology in multiple, sometimes contradictory, ways given the trends in technology and media use among youth. Children and teenagers consistently report the highest levels of technology and media usage including mobile phone use, computer and Internet use, video game playing, and accessing of social media (Lenhart et al. 2010).

Video games, a particularly salient concern for parents, can produce antisocial behavior and negative emotions in children. Heavy video game use produces long-term aggression in all children (Anderson et al. 2010), especially boys (Hofferth 2010), and is associated with negative emotions such as social anxiety (Mehroof and Griffiths 2010). Even with high levels of technology use on average, the “digital natives” generation is not monolithic in their use of technology (Hargittai and Hinnant 2008). Not only are family values and resources incredibly influential in technology use (Clark 2013), but social networks and personal interests in technology and media subcultures shape youth's technology and media engagement (Ito 2010). Therefore, youth's emotions involved in issues of technology use depend on a range of interpersonal, family, cultural, and personality factors as well as the particular use of the technology. Next, I examine one of the most important uses of technology for both youth and adults: communicating and interacting with others.

---

### 24.3 The Mediation of Emotion via Technology

Individuals often use computers and computerized devices to mediate and thereby influence their emotions in communication and social interaction. These mediated interactions both replicate and expand traditional forms of offline communication as well as creating new possibilities and new areas for interaction. I focus on those that have been most transformative, that are heavily associated with traditional social institutions, and that illuminate the greatest use of emotions and affect: work, virtual worlds, and online relationships. Before exploring those domains, it is important to understand the different forms of affective mediation.

#### 24.3.1 Forms of Affective Mediation

Similar to face-to-face interaction, technologically mediated communication can be both task-oriented and socioemotionally-oriented,

although much research will focus on one to the exclusion of the other (see Lui 2002 for an overview and comparison). How emotions can be conveyed through technology depends primarily on the number of channels, synchronization, and directionality of that technology. The number of channels concerns the presence and amount of visual and auditory information, and how similar or distant this is from face-to-face interaction. This suggests that if fully immersed in a realistic virtual environment, one's emotions should operate similarly to face-to-face settings, whereas simple one-channel mediation such as text (e.g., letters, instant messages, text messages, emails) or audio (e.g., phones) restricts the amount of information conveyed (Menchik and Tian 2008).

In face-to-face interaction, facial cues convey a great deal of information including affective information (Ekman and Friesen 2003). In mediated communications, people may identify different emotions using one's mouth and eyes based on their cultural orientation toward which part of the face is most dominant for expressing emotion. In both real faces and emoticons, Americans perceive more information about emotions through observing the mouth, whereas Japanese conclude more based on the eyes (Yuki et al. 2007). A relatively new channel present in some advanced technologies is affective haptics or mediated social touch (Levy 2007; Tsetserukou and Neviarouskaya 2012). Affective haptics enable people to hug, feel, and experience sensory perception from other people at a distance, for example people in the virtual world *Second Life*. The haptic technologies include belts which can simulate hugs, warming and cooling devices, ticking devices, and simulated heartbeat devices, which in specific combinations can artificially enhance the wearer's feelings or simulate the emotions of another (Tsetserukou and Neviarouskaya 2012).

Greater numbers of communication channels can convey greater amounts of affective information, yet minimal channel interaction is often used to express or interpret emotion. Humans are especially good at filling in information and making social judgments with only minimal information, and the attributions made in this process

are fundamental to emotions (Weiner 1986). In both minimal-channel mediated and face-to-face interaction, people must engage in cognitive processing to interpret the intentions, motivations, and beliefs of others. Nonverbal communication serves, among other things, to display one's emotions, and when these display signals are not present in mediated communication, people often compensate with detailed cognitive explanations and other forms of emphasis (Menchik and Tian 2008). These schema and explicit emotional emphasis evoke questions about how emotions in mediated interaction might not parallel emotional processes in face-to-face interaction. One might ask: to what degree does a lack of channels lead to more cognitive stereotyping of others as the exemplars of their social groups, therefore changing one's emotional reaction? Or, does the flow of emotion, its expression, and its management in conversation become disrupted in mediated interaction in such a way as to enhance or diminish particular emotions? Both of these are important questions for researchers.

While the number of information channels determines the type and amount of information conveyed, a second factor in mediated interaction is synchrony—whether communication is simultaneous or not. Synchronous communication includes instant messages, interacting in a virtual environment, or talking on the phone, whereas asynchronous communication includes email, blogs, and profiles such as on a dating site. While this division is important for considering technological mediation, it applies equally to the less technological conversation forms, such as talking in person and written letters. It is no surprise that synchrony could be important for emotions, which are ephemeral. However, specific predictions about the effect of synchrony on emotions may depend on one's theoretical assumptions. Following a Durkheimian perspective on emotion, both asynchrony and restricted channels suggest that mediated communication lacks the co-presence necessary in order to facilitate emotional energy. In contrast, from the perspective of symbolic interactionism, emotion can ensue from any interaction, real or imagined (McCall 2006)—a wide berth that could encompass mini-

mal or more extensive channel interactions that are either synchronous or asynchronous.

While a great deal of technology-mediated communication is two way, technology also allows for more restrictive directionalities: one-way, primarily one-way, or one-to-many communication. Blogs, newsletters, websites, and webcams enable one to communicate with an audience not defined in advance by time and place. At one extreme is video surveillance where the parties often do not know each other, do not meet, and most often are not intentionally communicating. Surveillance workers observe a wide range of human behaviors without direct communication or interactive responses. Surveillance workers experience mixed emotions as they negotiate the boundaries between being professionally dispassionate while observing and interpreting acts such as violence, vandalism, and in general nonnormative behavior (Smith 2012). This often leads to longer-term fear, stress, and distrust and a distorted view of the world referred to as a “damaged subjectivity” (Smith 2012).

At the other extreme might be one-to-many posting for which one hopes to elicit responses from others. Whether posting a microblog update (e.g., Twitter), a blog, a news story, or a video, the poster typically controls the content or moderates the responses to the mediated communication. Within social movements, posting and communication on social networking sites, websites, and to mobile devices can be used to carefully facilitate an emotional tenure of a group. For example, one regional chapter of the Tea Party used Facebook to coordinate in person rallies and build up support by carefully monitoring and shaping online comments to focus people on the Tea Party’s message (Rohlinger and Klein 2014). Technological platforms both enabled Tea Party members to individually post and communicate, while at the same time allowing the group’s leaders to refocus the emotional energy through carefully crafting, controlling, and monitoring the posted content. Forms of affective mediation manifest themselves differently in different substantive contexts, so now I consider three such contexts that have been transformed by digital interaction over the Internet.

### 24.3.2 Areas of Affective Mediation: Work, Worlds, and Romance

A major context of affective mediation is paid labor, where telecommuting and Internet-based communication have become quite common. Emotions are central to work, especially service oriented work, which often involves emotional labor, that is an effort to control, express, and manage ones’ emotions to conform to the job’s rules and requirements. Technology can shape emotional labor as well as the culture of the workplace by enabling new arrangements between work and personal time and space.

Melissa Gregg in her book *Work’s Intimacy* (2011) finds that technology-enabled arrangements, such as home and mobile offices, being on call, and being able to monitor and check work-related information away from the office, are hailed as solutions to utilize wasted time and to keep abreast of important projects. In reality, she finds these often backfire, breaking down traditional barriers between work and home, occupation and intimacy, and personal and professional. Workers often spend additional hours checking email or doing other work-related tasks in order to keep up with the demands of their job, usually without additional compensation. Further they engage in impression management and emotional expression management through technological communication in order to insure that lack of face time is not equated with lack of commitment to work (Gregg 2011). This is especially prominent in those companies that still hold to the traditional work values of a nine-to-five work day.

Workers in some jobs, such as on-call personnel and traveling journalists, find it difficult to separate work from personal lives as the time and space is not clearly designated for one or the other. In her conclusion, Gregg cautions the reader regarding the dominance of work by comparing it with a Marxian perspective. Exploited workers in poor countries often have a “loveless” relationship with their work, displayed in coercion, lack of autonomy, and alienation. Modern white-collar workers—empowered by technology—are “lovers” in their relationship to their

work, giving and sacrificing emotion labor, personal time and space, and other intimate relationships for a possibility of a satisfying career or job (Gregg 2011).

In contrast to the demands of paid labor, people often choose to spend their leisure time online or engaged with technology. Perhaps the most immersive social environments are massively multiplayer online games and virtual worlds. Online games and indeed all games can be important for relaxation, entertainment, communication and connection, and solving real world problems (McGonigal 2011). Massively multiplayer online games (including massively multiplayer online role playing games) are an especially fascinating sociological phenomena because of their scope: millions of players are registered and actively play. Some have argued that online gaming has profound implications for the real world if people are drawn in mass to the pleasures of the virtual worlds (Castronova 2007), whereas others analyze how gaming worlds have their own cultures which reproduce some elements of real world cultures while also transforming them (Bainbridge 2013).

Virtual worlds and online game worlds are similar, but virtual worlds tend to have fewer rules and instead reproduce more mundane life activities. *Second Life*, currently one of the most popular virtual worlds, allows people to reproduce real world objects, places, and activities such as building houses, selling wares, interacting with others, exploring, creating, and learning (Boellstorff 2008). The emphasis is that it is “Your World. Your Imagination” (*Second Life’s* slogan) instead of an imposed environment for a particular purpose.

Aside from reproducing actual world activities, *Second Life* expands people’s ability to engage in activities within it that cannot be accomplished in the actual world: flying without equipment, existing as an animal, extensively changing one’s body, teleporting, and engaging in side conversations without any bodily manifestations of communicating. Despite these capabilities, most people using *Second Life* focus their time on interactions with other people such as buying, selling, conversations, classes, sexual encoun-

ters, and celebratory or commemorative events (Boellstorff 2008). It is no surprise that many report a range of emotions that go along with these fairly typical social interactions. One major difference is that these activities are sped up both in time and emotional intensity in comparison to the actual world activities (Boellstorff 2008). People make friends, date, invite people to their *Second Life* houses, attend events with strangers, and more quickly express opinions and beliefs than is typical of actual world activities. One resident commented that “it is very intense here. The emotions and feelings are magnified...The time you spend with someone here is more, and you can feel it” (Boellstorff 2008, p. 159). Time speed-up is not surprising both because people feel less inhibited to engage in conversation or particular behaviors in an online environment (Joinson 2007) and because different environments and emotional situations lead individuals to experience time differently (Flaherty 1999). A similar speed-up process commonly occurs in other mediated online interactions with strangers such as online dating.

Websites for finding dates and romantic partners are tied to emotions, perhaps more than any other mediated form of interaction. When one first signs up, he or she may be first overwhelmed, excited, or nervous, then, as contact with potential matches are made, ambivalent, fearful, or blissful (Bridges 2012). Fear and distrust are common feelings throughout the online dating process, especially for those that have had negative experiences with relationships, on or offline. Many of the feelings present in online relationship seeking are similar to their offline counterpart: fear of intimacy, attraction and rejection, and dealing with emotional baggage (Bridges 2012).

While one difference between online and offline dating is the speed and intensity in the online dating context, other processes are specific to the structure of online relationship sites. Due to the competition over potential matches, romance-seekers want to make their own profile as desirable as possible leading them to both selectively disclose and lie outright about themselves (Bridges 2012). Profiles are the part of the dating



website where one displays personal information and often a photograph in order to facilitate finding potential matches, and are therefore the first, and often last, point of contact for potential suitors. Profile creators balance their desire to present an authentic version of their self with a more desirable, attractive version of their self (Whitty 2007). Sometimes their profile projects the self they would like to become or reflects the cultural scripts of what is desirable (Illouz 2007), instead of a more authentic self-reflection. Though the data indicates that most people are not completely honest in their profiles (Bridges 2012; Whitty 2007), this critique is countered with evidence for similar levels of lying to a romantic partner for relationships begun both online and offline (Albright 2007).

Lying also occurs to compensate for the mismatch of online daters' objectives which range from one time or short term relationship sexual partners to longer term relationships with the hopes of marriage. Still others join the dating websites to boost their self-esteem and emotional health through the positive attention of others' responses, comments, and emails (Bridges 2012). Many sign up because prior relationships, including marriages, have ended, leaving them desperate to find someone to fill the void, while others are simply curious about who they might meet. With such a range of motivations, life goals, and emotional needs among individuals populating dating sites, it is no surprise that many relationships do not work out, often because one person determines they are in a "different place" in their life in regards to romantic attachment (Bridges 2012). It also becomes easier for those seeking romance online to disregard others. The sites lure individuals into a capitalist mindset when they codify their personality and preferences into standard formats, market themselves as a product, and implicitly enter in to competition with thousands of others (Illouz 2007). To best accomplish these goals people often routinize and standardize their profile, criteria, first emails, get-to-know-you questions, and even first dates (Illouz 2007) in a Weberian process of rationalization of the traditionally affective and intimate. As markets develop around

the intimate, people turn to professionals to manage aspects of their relational and intimate life, such as "love coaches" who assist people in marketing themselves on dating websites and guide them through the process of dating (Hochschild 2012).

This rationalization and commercialism does not mean that emotion is absent from the entire process. On the contrary, most people experience the actual communication between potential matches as exhilarating, meaningful, and emotion-filled. At the beginning of a budding relationship, these emotions are expressed through the frequent and intense written conversations, all the while replacing the nonverbal cues of face-to-face interaction (Baker 2007). These written communications regularly disclose large amounts of personal, affect-laden information due to the mask of mediated communication, access to personal profile information, and the targeted, rather than a naturally-forming, relationship situation (Bridges 2012). Because of the heightened emotions associated with initial contact and the lack of experiential information on the other person, people often imagine and fantasize about the other by filling in the gaps in their knowledge. A Goffmanian approach suggests that the lack of bodily copresence explains why the in-person meeting is disappointing for so many. One's self-presentation, centered in the body, cannot be captured in the categorical and disembodied profile information, but requires a give and take of fluid affective conversation and nonverbal signaling (Illouz 2007).

Although online dating websites provide outlets for many, technology-mediated romance is not limited to those dating websites. Sometimes people who briefly meet or even just notice someone in the actual world attempt to connect with this stranger through the means of technology. On Craigslist's Missed Connections individuals leave messages for people they encountered offline, but have no way to contact. By leaving a message for a romantic interest that is a practical stranger and unlikely to find the message, these posters engage in cultural scripts about love, evoking both the possibility of love and the failure of love (Forstie 2013). While not a two-way

mediation, television too is a potent transmitter of romance, intimacy, and emotion. While romance on television is not new, some argue that there is a stronger affective draw of reality television compared to other programming (Kavka 2008). This stems from its amplification of the form of intimacy that television delivers: one-to-many public communication of the most private and intimate of situations.

Humans engage with technology to pursue romance or intimacy, hoping it will bring them happiness, but technology has a negative side when it comes to ending relationships or unwanted romantic interest. While there is a strong norm against breaking up through communication technology, it is still a common strategy to avoid the emotional confrontation of a face-to-face breakup (Gershon 2010). Much worse than a breakup, cyberstalking—stalking someone using electronic communication or the Internet—is also common, especially from former romantic partners, regardless of whether that relationship began online or not (Jerin and Dolinsky 2007). Scholars argue whether those who have tendencies toward obsession, addiction, and stalking behavior are simply manifesting it online (Spitzberg and Cupach 2007), or if those simply searching for relationships are drawn in by the illusion of intimacy (Bridges 2012). Because there is “very limited research on actual and perceived risk of victimization as a result of engaging in online relationships,” (Jerin and Dolinsky 2007, p. 152) “little to nothing is known about the motives of cyberstalkers” (Spitzberg and Cupach 2007, p. 138). Mediated stalking can utilize social networks, mobile communication, and public data, thereby situating it as another important topic for future research at the intersection of social emotions and technology.

In this section, I have highlighted some of the most technologically profound and emotionally evocative areas of research: the workplace, social worlds and games, and online dating and mediated romance, while neglecting many other areas such as auction websites, social networking, pornography, sexting, cyber bullying, and crowd sourcing. Next, I turn to interactions with technology itself.

## 24.4 Emotions in Interaction with Technology

Technology can be the basis for emotional reactions due to its novelty, ability, malfunctions, or social function. In this section, I focus on how technology changes individuals’ emotions on its own, not as a medium for transmitting social and emotionally charged actions. People interact with all types of objects, nonhumans, and technology and do so in social ways (Cerulo 2009). These interactions with technology have implications for interactants’ emotions, networks, relationships, and cultural beliefs about technology and humanity.

I start this section by considering Sherry Turkle’s research which focuses on the implications for individuals in a society which replaces ties to humans with ties to computers and robots (2011). By looking at a broad swath of technologies and cultural practices that have developed alongside those technologies, she argues that cheap and stable technologies are replacing the often socially-challenging interpersonal relationship. People’s desire to care for the elderly without frequent visits and to augment raising children with media indicates, to Turkle, the dangers of technological innovation. She argues that without careful consideration, we as a society may end up denigrating the intimate relationships most find important (Turkle 2011), because people invest themselves emotionally into technological objects and creations (Turkle 1984/2005).

While Turkle’s tone is cautious, even pessimistic, others such as David Levy (2007) are more optimistic about humanity’s emotional relationship with robots and technologies. He argues that the progression of these technologies into caretaking and intimate roles primarily fulfill unmet needs and, therefore, are a technological triumph in the area of interpersonal relationships. As his title *Love and Sex with Robots* (Levy 2007) suggests, the most intimate desires will soon be met by machines, once the technology develops and our cultural view of machines changes from hard plastic and metal laptops, phones, and ATMs, to the softer, human-looking

and human-acting androids. Turkle's volume (2011) responds directly to his philosophic stance and his book by asking: are the conveniences and self-fulfillment are worth the costs of loneliness and emotional disconnection? Levy (2007) counters that the emotions and relationships with machines are equally as real with equally real socioemotional effects.

I would like to consider this Turkle-Levy debate—a relational version of technological utopianism and dystopianism—in the context of a larger debate in the social sciences about the strength of interpersonal and affective ties. The sociological debate began when scholars asked if community involvement and close friendships are on a decline in the United States (McPherson et al. 2006; Putnam 2001), potentially due to people's use of technology and other cultural or structural factors. Part of the response considered how people adapt and transform the ways they make affective ties and maintain those ties in the face of a commercial, networked, and mediated world (Lawler et al. 2009; Rainie and Wellman 2012; Wang and Wellman 2010). While there is no doubt that technology has played a role in changing social relationships, intimacies, and even definitions of friendship, few studies address how technologies might or might not be substitutable for affective relationships with people. The technological capacity to emulate human behavior, appearance, and emotions using artificial intelligence techniques (Levy 2007) poses a new challenge to strong affective bonds traditionally reserved for person-to-person relationships.

While both Turkle and Levy find examples supporting their arguments, a theoretical research program could link the affective outcomes of human-technology interaction with the larger societal trends. To me, this is the most important issue in the research domain of emotions and technology, and a particularly appropriate undertaking for sociologists. I review some research and theory that has contributed to this issue, specifically those focused on how human interaction with technology alters emotions, behaviors, and social life.

### 24.4.1 Theory and Research on Interaction with Technology

One theory, actor-network theory, argues for the direct inclusion of technological objects and other nonhumans into sociological analysis. Its theoretical argument involves deconstructing the presupposition that humans are the only agentic actors in interactions. Instead, actor-network theorists consider that objects or networks of objects can be studied as the producers of actions (Latour 2005). These interactions are often imbued with emotional significance for the object especially when it is both important to people and complex enough to produce different—i.e., not completely predictable—results (Law and Singleton 2005). For example, scientific equipment can be central to a research process, and can express a human-like difficulty in terms of technical malfunctions, usability, and results, leading to emotional responses about that technology (Walby and Spencer 2012).

Another theoretical program, *computers are social actors*, replicates social psychological experiments replacing a human partner with a computer agent, robot, or other machine (Nass and Yen 2010; Reeves and Nass 1996). The results from this program indicate most classic psychological experiments produce analogous trends when one's interaction partner is technological. The *computers are social actors* argument is two-fold: first, humans react to agents in similar ways as they would to other humans (Reeves and Nass 1996); and second, this is based on automaticity or mindless processing (Kim and Sundar 2012). Studies in this tradition focus on a range of topics including personality traits, norms, communication cues, cooperation, and emotion.

Often when a computer engages in a positively or negatively evaluated behavior the resulting emotions of its human interactant are exactly what would be expected from the parallel human-human interaction (Ferdig and Mishra 2004). For example, when a computer agent displays other-oriented or empathic emotion participants respond with rating the computer agent as more likeable, supportive, and trustworthy (Brave et al. 2005). In contrast, when the agent displays

self-oriented emotions, people do not alter their view of the agent. When computer agents or robots exhibit more displays of realism—visually, linguistically, socially, and emotionally—people tend to respond in traditional social ways, i.e., as humans do to each other. This parallels the findings in human mediated communication, in which a greater number of affective mediation channels lead to increased emotional and affective communication.

Several studies employ direct comparisons of human-agent interaction with human-human interaction, often using mediated interaction to control for features and status markers of the humans and agents. These studies are particularly important for application of sociological theories of interaction, which tend to be more macro than theories in communication, human-computer interaction, and psychology. If in fact the most social elements of interaction are retained when one is interacting with a nonhuman digital or mechanical partner, then theories constructed for evaluating humans can easily be adapted to interaction with technology. In contrast, if there are differences and these differences are systematic, then theory must be developed and expanded to bridge the human-only and human-computer interaction divide.

When interacting with human versus computer partners some report no emotion differences after one shot interactions (Ferdig and Mishra 2004) while others find differences after more sustained interactions (Shank 2013). In one study, interaction with a computer or human altered one's emotional outcomes by decreasing the strength of receiving a positive or negative outcome on being angry and upset (Shank 2013). An individual's perception of an interactant as a computer agent instead of a human weakens the perceivers' reactions including some emotions, behavior, and impressions of justice and goodness (Shank 2012, 2013). The research on interactions with computers not only contributes to the debate about affective bonds in society, but also contributes to the foundational knowledge from which engineers, programmers, and scholars can incorporate theoretical models of emotion into computer agent design.

#### 24.4.2 Designing Computer Agents based on Theories of Emotion

Incorporating theory on emotional intelligence and expression into the design of virtual agents—known as affective computing (Picard 1997)—improves agent's ability to approximate human behavior and therefore the realism of the human-agent interaction. One part of this is a consistency among the agent's speech, actions, and non-verbal communication (Brave and Nass 2008). Because emotion is primarily expressed through the face, coding human facial expressions into agents constitutes a major step in affective human-agent interaction. Based on Ekman's facial action coding system (Ekman and Friesen 2003) researchers have been able to create robotic faces that emulate human facial movements (Wu et al. 2009) as well as computer agents that change their facial expressions based on emotions (Rosis et al. 2003).

Appraisal theories are commonly used to develop a mental model of emotions for computer agents (Scherer et al. 2010) basing the agent's reactions on a cognitive structure and attributions of causality for events that concern them (Ortony et al. 1988). For sociologists, the most relevant research incorporates multiple social factors—including emotions, relationships, identity, and culture—into the mental model of an agent. Few sociological theories have been applied in this way; however some affect control theorists are developing research and design toward this end. Affect control theory (Heise 2007), which provides theoretical connections among social interactions, emotions, and identities within a cultural context, can be extended to account for the related emotional facial expressions of virtual agents (Heise 2004) and the functioning of such agents in virtual worlds. Because affect and identity are key components both in social interaction and virtual worlds, interaction follows similar affective processes to the extent that virtual worlds allow for social, personal, and environmental presence (Troyer 2008).

To determine if affect control theory's predictions could be applied to interaction with technological agents, it is necessary to have data on

technological agents and expansion of the theoretical model to include nonhumans. One pilot data collection of technological terms indicates a close correspondence between human-human and human-technology interactions (Troyer 2004). A larger affect control theory dictionary of the sentiments of 80 technological items includes those that could be classified as social actors, settings, or actions dealing with technology (Shank 2010a). Comparing the sentiments of technology terms with other affect control theory dictionaries confirms that technology terms conform to similar distributions as non-technology terms (Shank 2010a). Affect control theory can model several types of human-nonhuman interactions, including humans' trust in technological agents (Shank 2010b) and how the design of technological and nontechnological products elicits human emotions (Lulham 2013). A formal Bayesian model of affect control theory extends the theory to incorporate learning from past interactions and therefore could allow autonomous agents to probabilistically determine an interactant's identity (Hoey et al. 2013).

For a computer agent to competently interact with humans the agent requires implementation of wide range of social, mental and physical processes. Most sociological theories do not cover all of these, focusing on affective, interactive, or cultural processes instead of cognitive or physiological processes. One solution, modeled itself on computer programming, is to modularize theories, essentially allowing different theoretical components to be added or removed according to need (Markovsky 2010). This would allow for the reciprocal and iterative development of computer agents and sociological theory.

---

## 24.5 Technology-Based Methodologies

While this chapter has primarily focused on theoretical and empirical developments, I turn now to a discussion of methodological developments. Technology-enabled methods including big data analysis, Internet surveys and experiments, non-invasive emotion measurement, and experiential

sampling each allow social scientists to enhance emotion measurements and capture nuanced processes. While not exhaustive, I hope this sampling of new methods and their uses will exemplify how they might contribute not only to empirical results, but also to theoretical refinement.

Due to the growth of information technology, especially the Internet, the amount of data available to researchers continues to increase at unprecedented levels. Just as programs developed for microcomputers transformed the process of statistical analyses, big data analysis tools that are being rapidly developed and implemented greatly expand the breadth of social science research (Lazer et al. 2009). One example involves an analysis of Google's collection of books (Google's *N-gram Viewer*) to study the historical pattern in the expression of emotions over the course of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Acerbi et al. 2013). The authors' expectation was that there would be a consistency of emotion terms over time as many books that were technical or not focused on current events. However, the data indicates that the number of positive or negative affective terms changes greatly during major historical events, such as turning more negative during the Second World War. Interestingly, the overall trajectory is a decrease in affective words over time. Another application of big data for emotions research is charting geographic and temporal affective patterns. Analyses using Twitter data from across the globe indicate patterns and variations in mood based on season, time of day, and work norm differences across cultures (Golder and Macy 2011).

A related methodological development is the expansion of diverse data collection over the Internet. Specifically, while the Internet continues to serve as a medium for surveys, more recently experimental Internet research has grown. Amazon's *Mechanical Turk* was designed as a micro-task market to facilitate the crowdsourcing of tasks, yet provides a convenient subject pool for psychologists and social scientists lacking a physical laboratory, time, or a diverse population. While methodological, ethical, and logistic concerns differ between *Mechanical Turk* and a more traditional laboratory setting, scientists suggest that, if used carefully, the data quality can be just



as high (Buhrmester et al. 2011). Using this online resource, social scientists study diverse topics, such as emotional reactions involved in the process of entering lotteries (Eriksson and Simpson 2010) and the relationship between compassion, religiosity and pro-social behavior (Saslow et al. 2013).

Because websites such as *Mechanical Turk* generally allow access to more diverse populations than university samples, there is excellent potential for emotions research. For theories of emotion such as identity theory, affect control theory, expectation states theory, and emotion management that focus on roles and identities, this provides an opportunity to consider a wider array of participants with a diversity of roles. For theories attentive to power, structure, and networks this diversity may be a disadvantage, yet recruiting larger numbers of people simultaneously could be an advantage. While *Mechanical Turk* and similar sites of the future might be popular for a number of sociological studies on emotion, researchers may be frustrated by limitations as such sites not designed specifically for social scientists. An excellent alternative is *Time-sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences* (TESS), an ongoing, NSF-funded program for delivering social science experiments to large, nationally-representative populations (tessexperiments.org 2013).

Another way to experiment, observe, or survey in a more nuanced research environment involves conducting research within virtual worlds. While virtual worlds have their own cultures, including affective meanings (Boellstorff 2008), they also can allow for research unavailable in the real world. This includes existing data about huge social networks over time, the manipulation of physical appearances in the virtual environment, and the ability to see the results of alternate government or organizational forms on individuals' emotions, behaviors, and perceptions (Bainbridge 2007).

Another technologically improved method for emotions research is in the application of advanced techniques for understanding the physiological aspects of emotions. Promising technologies include fMRIs, PET and related brain scans,

biomarkers such as heart-rate, temperature, skin conductivity, levels of cortisone and adrenaline, and infrared video. An example of the utility of the latter is an experiment using non-invasive infrared thermography to measure social emotions, specifically those resulting from a student being praised or criticized by another student (Robinson et al. 2012). The authors find evidence of facial thermographic differences relating to both the participant's self-reported emotions and the identity disruption caused by the praise or criticism. In this handbook, Chap. 12 by Robinson and Rogers fully discusses advanced technologies used to measure social emotions.

Another technological advancement involves improvements to experiential sampling techniques—sampling participants during their daily life activities. Experiential sampling is a reliable way to unobtrusively obtain social data over a period of time in one's life (Burke and Franzoi 1988) and a particularly appropriate technique for considering the relationship between emotions and routinely enacted situational identities (Smith-Lovin 2009). With high levels of mobile device ownership, especially smartphones with programmable apps, experiential sampling is not only easier to do, but facilitates new possibilities. Individuals' mobile phones and devices can include global positioning systems (GPS), voice recognition, basic medical scanners and other biomarkers, as well as social network connection information. These technologies enable researchers to combine disparate areas of emotion research, such as empirically considering both situation and physiology or accounting for causality in longer term affective states such as moods.

Technological development also presents challenges to methodologies. Experimental work in the sociology of emotions often uses fictitious others as interaction or exchange partners sometimes providing little more than a name and other times using computer interfaces, voices, dialogues, and videos to produce a much more elaborate cover story or manipulation (Webster and Sell 2007). While the developments in laboratory technology and technique continue to improve and standardize experiments, the continual development of technology creates new challenges

for experiments (Troyer 2007). One challenge is rooted in participants' increased exposure to intelligent computer agents, such as artificial intelligence in computer games, automated phone systems, and websites with intelligent interfaces. Participants that believe they are interacting with computer programs when they are told that they are interacting with other people can bias experiments as participants can have weaker social and emotional reactions to computer agents compared to humans (Shank 2012, 2013). The use of computer agents without deception regarding their identity can also be an advantage for social science experiments. Using computer agents as interactants eliminates the costly and often problematic use of confederates and can more accurately control for some social characteristics (Nass and Yen 2010). Similar to experiments in virtual worlds (Bainbridge 2007), these techniques hold promise for separating mechanisms that have traditionally been highly correlated.

---

## 24.6 Conclusion and Future Directions

This chapter was intended as a bird's eye view of different connections between emotion and technology of relevance to sociology and its sister disciplines. Our flight path has generally transitioned from the more abstract, macro, cultural, and philosophic toward the more concrete, micro, interactive, and applied. This ordering was my intentional effort to display the continuum of research as a mental diagram useful for facilitating new connections, research, and interdisciplinary collaboration. Structural patterns, mediated communication, technological interaction, and methodological innovation each highlight the different and important ways technology and emotion coexist. My suggestion for researchers in each area is to consider theory, findings, assumptions, and framing from the others in order to enrich the applicability of this area. Here I present just a few ideas, building on the earlier discussions in this chapter.

Theories on the sociology of emotion can help elucidate the mechanisms and processes involved in patterns of digital technology use. While it is

important to understand the demographics and related inequalities of changing technology access, use, and experiences, it is equally important to connect those patterns to underlying social-psychological, and often affective, processes. For example, we know that people vary in their skill at managing their own or others' emotions in person (Hochschild 1983). This could be posed as the mechanism to explain why adolescents with weaker social skills opt for increased online communication (Bonetti et al. 2010) as online expressions of emotion are more controlled and less visible. If it is a contributing mechanism, there could be a cyclical effect whereby adolescents learn or fail to learn emotion management skills through mediated interaction. In another example, consider the research question of how commitment to a virtual world might equal or exceed commitment to the real world, or real world groups such as one's family. Applying theoretical research on affective commitment (Lawler et al. 2009), a process for developing an affective tie and commitment for a virtual world might involve positive emotions toward people in that world—a person-to-person affective bond—transformed over time into an affective commitment toward the entire virtual world community—a person-to-group bond. Therefore, a comparison of strength of the individual's relational ties within and outside of the virtual world could be one explanatory mechanism for differential levels of commitment to the virtual world.

Some might view affective mediation as the purview of communication or new media scholars who have the largest bodies of research on these topics. I note, however, that affective mediation is currently an ideal frontier to expand sociological theories of emotion. Affective mediation has become more sociological as technology evolved from the simplicity of emails and telephony to rich social interactions realized in context such as virtual worlds, video conferencing, online romance, and social networking sites. A key concern for sociologists is how to leverage current theories of emotion to explain outcomes in different technological domains. My suggestion would be to consider aspects of the domain that most readily convert into concepts in

the theories, such as identity for online profiles, network structure for social networking sites, and emotion expression for avatars in virtual worlds. Like theories, some technological domains preference particular aspects to the neglect of others.

The forms of affective mediation—number of channels, synchrony, and directionality – imply not only differences between mediated interaction, but how different forms could modify social and emotional processes. Researchers should compare mediated communication and interaction to their face-to-face counterparts as well as consider the power of channels, synchrony, and direction to essentially modify the basis of social processes. Often theories of emotion explicitly or implicitly suggest what forms might be essential to a particular social process. For example, expectations states theory specifies explicit scope conditions which can be met through mediated interaction, as seen in the status characteristics theory's standard experimental setup. The theory of emotion management usually applies to face-to-face interaction, but discursive discussions often revolve around managing specific external channels such as word choice, facial expressions, and vocal tone. An integration of forms of affective mediation into theories of emotion is needed to expand the scope of these theories into the realm of mediated interaction.

Similarly, theories of emotion must be expanded and carefully examined in order to apply them to the area of human-agent interaction. Not only is it more common for humans to interact with computer agents as mobile devices and networks become more ubiquitous, but the nature of those computer agents is rapidly changing. Whether we consider Siri the intelligent personal assistant, Amazon's recommender system, GPS directions, or bots in immersive games, many aspects of computer agents are more closely emulating aspects of humans. While it may only require minimal cues to get people to treat computers like humans (Reeves and Nass 1996), advanced agents possess many characteristics typical of social interaction. It is therefore essential for future research to precisely specify the social aspects that are essential to affective processes and those that are peripheral.

Many sociological theories of emotion must simplify the real world to be able to produce testable, parsimonious predictions. Affect control theory handles situations that can be translated into an interaction or series of interactions between two actors within a particular cultural vantage. Power and status theory conceptualizes the relative levels of power and status within a relationship between people and how that shapes the emotions produced and expressed. These and other theories, therefore, give prominence to particular concepts while ignoring others. Mediated interaction in most contexts reduces the channels of information, disentangling the status characteristics and identities that operate in face-to-face interaction, or allowing relationship to begin in the absence of a community or other social ties. In essence, mediated interaction produces an environment of control, similar in some ways to laboratory experiments. I envision the possibility of researchers applying theories of emotions to technology mediated domains that provide more control than natural settings, while less artificiality than a traditional laboratory.

Sociologists of emotions should not ignore cutting edge methodologies, but should carefully consider which might relate to the current strengths of our subfield. Big data analysis and Internet data collection are particularly important for cultural, demographic, and macrostructural research on emotion, which has recently relied heavily on the General Social Survey 1996 Emotions Module dataset. Wikis, websites, blogs, forums, and virtual interaction are excellent supplements in ethnographic research, but are also important as the place where people interact, express feelings, and pursue important life goals. New opportunities and challenges exist for experimental research to move from the physical laboratory to cyberspace, or to adapt the laboratory for important innovations in computer agents and populations' technological enculturation. Furthermore, theorists of emotion, both of formal and discursive theories, may consider how a theory's scope might operate in relation to virtual or mediated interactions and places, and how the concepts might be clarified by precise and new measures of emotion.

In conclusion, I want to advocate that the biggest issue facing scholars with regard to technology is the impact of socioemotional digital technology—those programs, devices, agents, avatars, and robots that people are caring for and attaching to. Most people agree that technologies like these will continue to be developed, likely with increasing sophistication and emotional intelligence. What is unknown is the level of emotional engagement and affective commitment that individuals can hold toward these technologies and the effect this could produce for human relationships. Likewise, little is known about how societies and cultures will respond, regulate, or promote these social technologies. A sociological perspective on emotion is beneficial for understanding of both these micro and macro issues, leading to an enhanced understanding of people's emotions in general and toward technology.

## References

- Acerbi, A., Lampos, V., Garnett, P., & Bentley, R. A. (2013). The expression of emotions in 20th century books. *PLoS ONE*, *8*, e59030.
- Albright, J. M. (2007). How do I love thee and thee and thee: Self-presentation, deception, and multiple relationships online. In M. T. Whitty, A. J. Baker, & J. A. Inman (Eds.), *Online matchmaking* (pp. 81–93). Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Anderson, C. A., Shibuya, A., Ihori, N., Swing, E. L., Bushman, B. J., Sakamoto, A., Rothstein, H. R., & Saleem, M. (2010). Violent video game effects on aggression, empathy, and prosocial behavior in eastern and western countries: A meta-analytic review. *Psychological Bulletin*, *136*, 151–173.
- Bainbridge, W. S. (2007). The scientific research potential of virtual worlds. *Science*, *317*, 472–476.
- Bainbridge, W. S. (2013). *Egods: Faith versus fantasy in computer gaming*. Oxford: Oxford University.
- Baker, A. J. (2007). Expressing emotion in text: Email communication of online couples. In M. T. Whitty, A. J. Baker, & J. A. Inman (Eds.), *Online matchmaking* (pp. 97–111). Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Beaudry, A., & Pinsonneault, A. (2010). The other side of acceptance: Studying the direct and indirect effects of emotions on information technology use. *MIS Quarterly*, *34*, 689–710.
- Becker, M. W., Alzahabi, R., & Hopwood, C. J. (2013). Media multitasking is associated with symptoms of depression and social anxiety. *Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking*, *16*, 132–135.
- Boellstorff, T. (2008). *Coming of age in second life: An anthropologist explores the virtually human*. Princeton: Princeton University.
- Bonetti, L., Campbell, M. A., & Gilmore, L. (2010). The relationship of loneliness and social anxiety with children's and adolescents' online communication. *Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking*, *13*, 279–285.
- Brave, S., & Nass, C. (2008). Emotion in human-computer interaction. In A. Sears & J. A. Jacko (Eds.), *The human-computer interaction handbook: Fundamentals, evolving technology and emerging applications, human factors and ergonomics* (pp. 77–92). New York: Taylor and Francis.
- Brave, S., Nass, C., & Hutchinson, K. (2005). Computers that care: Investigating the effects of orientation of emotion exhibited by an embodied computer agent. *International Journal of Human-Computer Studies*, *62*, 161–178.
- Bridges, J. C. (2012). *The illusion of intimacy: Problems in the world of online dating*. Santa Barbara: Praeger.
- Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon's mechanical turk a new source of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data? *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, *6*, 3–5.
- Burke, P. J., & Franzoi, S. L. (1988). Studying situations and identities using experiential sampling methodology. *American Sociological Review*, *53*, 559–568.
- Castronova, E. (2007). *Exodus to the virtual world: How online fun is changing reality*. New York City: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Cerulo, K. A. (2009). Nonhumans in social interaction. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *35*, 531–552.
- Christian, B. (2011). *The most human human: What talking with computers teaches us about what it means to be alive*. New York: Doubleday.
- Clark, L. S. (2011). Parental mediation theory for the digital age. *Communication Theory*, *21*, 323–343.
- Clark, L. S. (2013). *The parent app: Understanding families in the digital age*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cotten, S. R., Goldner, M., Hale, T. M., & Drentea, P. (2011). The importance of type, amount, and timing of internet use for understanding psychological distress. *Social Science Quarterly*, *92*, 119–139.
- Cotten, S. R., Ford, G., Ford, S., & Hale, T. M. (2012). Internet use and depression among older adults. *Computers in Human Behavior*, *28*, 496–499.
- Damasio, A. R. (1994). *Descartes' error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain*. New York: Putnam.
- Dolev-Cohen, M., & Barak, A. (2013). Adolescents' use of instant messaging as a means of emotional relief. *Computers in Human Behavior*, *29*, 58–63.
- Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (2003). *Unmasking the face: A guide to recognizing emotions from facial expressions*. Los Altos: Malor Books.
- Eriksson, K., & Simpson, B. (2010). Emotional reactions to losing explain gender differences in entering a risky lottery. *Judgment and Decision Making*, *5*, 159–163.



- Ferdig, R. E., & Mishra, P. (2004). Emotional responses to computers: experiences in unfairness, anger, and spite. *Journal of Educational Multimedia and Hypermedia*, 13, 143–161.
- Flaherty, M. (1999). *A watched pot: How we experience time*. New York City: New York University.
- Forstie, C. (2013). *Hopeful and then disappointed in the end love as social practice in craigslist missed connections*. In American Sociological Association Annual Meeting 2013, New York City.
- Frank, R. H. (1988). *Passions within reason: The strategic role of the emotions*. New York: Norton.
- Gershon, I. (2010). *The breakup 2.0: Disconnecting over new media*. Ithaca: Cornell University.
- Golder, S. A., & Macy, M. W. (2011). Diurnal and seasonal mood vary with work, sleep, and daylength across diverse cultures. *Science*, 333, 1878–1881.
- Goleman, D. (2006). *Social intelligence: The new science of human relationships*. New York: Bantam.
- Gregg, M. (2011). *Work's intimacy*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Hargittai, E., & Hinnant, A. (2008). Digital inequality: Differences in young adults' use of the internet. *Communication Research*, 35, 602–621.
- Heise, D. R. (2004). Enculturating agents with expressive role behavior. In S. Payr & R. Trappl (Eds.), *Agent culture: Human-agent interaction in a multicultural world* (pp. 127–142). Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Heise, D. R. (2007). *Expressive order: Confirming sentiments in social actions*. New York: Springer.
- Hochschild, A. R. (1983). *The managed heart: Commercialization of human feeling*. Berkeley, : University of California.
- Hochschild, A. R. (2012). *The outsourced self: Intimate life in market times*. New York: Metropolitan.
- Hoey, J., Schröder, T., & Alhothali, A. (2013). *Bayesian affect control theory: In affective computer and intelligent interaction*. Geneva: IEEE.
- Hofferth, S. L. (2010). Home media and children's achievement and behavior. *Child Development*, 81, 1598–1619.
- Illouz, E. (2007). *Cold intimacies: The making of emotional capitalism*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Ito, M. (2010). *Hanging out, messing around, and geeking out : Kids living and learning with new media*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Jerin, R. A., & Dolinsky, B. (2007). Cyber-victimisation and online dating. In M. T. Whitty, A. J. Baker, & J. A. Inman (Eds.), *Online matchmaking*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Joinson, A. N. (2007). Disinhibition and the internet. In J. Gackenbach (Ed.), *Psychology and the internet: Intrapersonal, interpersonal, and transpersonal implications* (pp. 75–92). San Diego: Academic Press.
- Kavka, M. (2008). *Reality television, affect and intimacy: Reality matters* (Edited by S. Health, C. MacCabe, & D. Riley). Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Kim, Y., & Sundar, S. S. (2012). Anthromorphism of computers: Is it mindful or mindless? *Computers in Human Behavior*, 28, 241–250.
- Kurzweil, R. (2000). *The age of spiritual machines: When computer exceed human intelligence*. New York: Penguin.
- Latour, B. (2005). *Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor-network theory*. Oxford: Oxford University.
- Law, J., & Singleton, V. (2005). Object lessons. *Organization*, 12, 331–355.
- Lawler, E. J., Thye, S. R., & Yoon, J. (2009). *Social commitments in a depersonalized world*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Lazer, D., Pentland, A. S., Adamic, L., Aral, S., Barabasi, A. L., Brewer, D., Christakis, N., Contractor, N., Fowler, J., & Gutmann, M. (2009). Life in the network: The coming age of computational social science. *Science*, 323, 721.
- Lenhart, A., Purcell, K., Smith, A., & Zickuhn, K. (2010). *Social media and mobile internet use among teens and young adults*. In Pew Internet and American Life Project, Pew Research Center.
- Levy, D. (2007). *Love and sex with robots: The evolution of human-robot relationships*. New York: Harper.
- Lo, S.-K., Wang, C.-C., & Fang, W. (2005). Physical interpersonal relationships and social anxiety among online game players. *CyberPsychology and Behavior*, 8, 15–20.
- Lui, Y. (2002). What does research say about the nature of computer-mediated communication: Task-oriented, social-emotion-oriented, or both? *Electronic Journal of Sociology*, 6, 191–233.
- Lulham, R. (2013). *A theory of affective experience*. In 19th International Conference on Engineering Design, Seoul, South Korea.
- Markovsky, B. (2010). Modularizing small group theories in sociology. *Small Group Research*, 41, 664–687.
- Massey, D. S. (2002). A brief history of human society: The origin and role of emotion in social life. *American Sociological Review*, 67, 1–29.
- McCall, G. J. (2006). Symbolic interaction. In P. J. Burke (Ed.), *Contemporary social psychological theories*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- McGonigal, J. (2011). *Reality is broken: Why games make us better and how they can change the world*. New York: Penguin.
- McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L., & Brashears, M. E. (2006). Social isolation in America: Changes in core discussion networks over two decades. *American Sociological Review*, 71, 353–375.
- Mehroof, M., & Griffiths, M. D. (2010). Online gaming addiction: The role of sensation seeking, self-control, neuroticism, aggression, state anxiety, and trait anxiety. *Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking*, 13, 313–316.
- Menchik, D. A., & Tian, X. (2008). Putting social context into text: The semiotics of e-mail interaction. *American Journal of Sociology*, 114, 332–370.
- Mitchell, M. E., Lebow, J. R., Uribe, R., Grathouse, H., & Shoger, W. (2011). Internet use, happiness, social support and introversion: A more fine grained analysis



- of person variables and internet activity. *Computers in Human Behavior*, 27, 1857–1861.
- Morahan-Martin, J., & Schumacher, P. (2003). Loneliness and social uses of the internet. *Computers in Human Behavior*, 19, 659–671.
- Nass, C., & Yen, C. (2010). *The man who lied to his laptop: What machines teach us about human relationships*. New York: Current Hardcover.
- Nolan, P., & Lenski, G. (1996). Technology, ideology, and societal development. *Sociological Perspectives*, 39, 23–28.
- Ortony, A., Clore, G. L., & Collins, A. (1988). *The cognitive structure of emotions*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Picard, R. W. (1997). *Affective computing*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Putnam, R. D. (2001). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Rainie, L., & Wellman, B. (2012). *Networked: The new social operating system*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Reeves, B., & Nass, C. (1996). *The media equation: How people treat computers, television, and new media like real people and places*. New York: Cambridge University.
- Robinson, D. T., Clay-Warner, J., Moore, C. D., Everett, T., Watts, A., Tucker, T. N., & Thai, C. (2012). Toward an unobtrusive measure of emotion during interaction: Thermal imaging techniques. *Advances in Group Processes*, 29, 225–266.
- Rohlinger, D. A., & Klein, J. (2014). From fervor to fear: ICT and emotions in the tea party movement. In N. van Dyke & D. S. Meyer (Eds.), *Understanding the tea party movement* (pp. 125–147). New York: Ashgate.
- de Rosis, F., Pelachaud, C., Poggi, I., Carofiglio, V., & B., Carolis De (2003). From Greta's mind to her face: Modelling the dynamics of affective states in a conversational embodied agent. *International Journal of Human-Computer Studies*, 59, 81–118.
- Saslow, L. R., Willer, R., Feinberg, M., Piff, P. K., Clark, K., Keltner, D., & Saturn, S. R. (2013). My brother's keeper? Compassion predicts generosity more among less religious individuals. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 4, 31–38.
- Scherer, K. R., Bänziger, T., & Roesch, E. B. (2010). *Blueprint for affective computing: A sourcebook and manual*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shank, D. B. (2010a). An affect control theory of technology. *Current Research in Social Psychology*, 15, 1–13.
- Shank, D. B. (2010b). Trusting technological actors: A foundation in structure and cultural sentiments. In D. Latusek & A. Gerbasi (Eds.), *Trust and technology in a ubiquitous modern environment: Theoretical and methodological perspectives*. Hershey: IGI Global.
- Shank, D. B. (2012). Perceived justice and reactions to coercive computers. *Sociological Forum*, 27, 372–391.
- Shank, D. B. (2013). Are computers good or bad for business? How mediated customer-computer interaction alters emotion, impressions, and patronage toward organizations. *Computers in Human Behavior*, 29, 715–725.
- Smith-Lovin, L. (2009). To thine own self be true? Social structural sources of self, situation, and emotional experience. In J. C. Chin & C. K. Jacobson (Eds.), *Within the social world: Essays in social psychology* (pp. 164–175). Boston: Pearson.
- Smith, G. J. D. (2012). Surveillance work(ers). In K. Ball, K. D. Haggerty, & D. Lyon (Eds.), *Routledge handbook of surveillanace studies* (pp. 107–115). Oxon: Routledge.
- Spitzberg, B. H., & Cupach, W. R. (2007). Cyberstalking as (mis)matchmaking. In M. T. Whitty, A. J. Baker, & J. A. Inman (Eds.), *Online matchmaking*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Stivers, R. (2004). *Shades of loneliness: Pathologies of a technological society* (Edited by C. Lemert). Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
- tessexperiments.org. (2013). *Tess: Time-sharing experiments for the social sciences*.
- Troyer, L. (2004). Affect control theory as a foundation for the design of socially intelligent systems. In American Association for Artificial Intelligence Symposium on *Architectures for modeling emotion: Cross disciplinary foundations*, Menlo Park, CA, AAAI Press.
- Troyer, L. (2007). Technological issues related to experiments. In M. Webster & J. Sell (Eds.), *Laboratory experiments in the social sciences* (pp. 174–191). Amsterdam: Academic Press.
- Troyer, L. (2008). A strategy for incorporating social intelligence in the design of virtual environments. In J. Clay-Warner & D. T. Robinson (Eds.), *Social structure and emotion* (pp. 95–106). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Tsetserukou, D., & Neviarouskaya, A. (2012). Emotion telepresence: Emotion augmentation through affective haptics and visual stimuli. *Journal of Physics: Conference Series*, 352, 1–5 (IOP Publishing).
- Turkle, S. (2011). *Alone together: Why we expect more from technology and less from each other*. New York: Basic Books.
- Turkle, S. (1984/2005). *The second self: Computers and the human spirit*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Turner, J. H. (2000). *On the origins of human emotions: A sociological inquiry into the evolution of human affect*. Stanford: Stanford University.
- Walby, K., & Spencer, D. (2012). How emotions matter: Objects, organizations, and the emotional climate of a mass spectrometry laboratory. In D. Spencer, K. Walby, & A. Hunt (Eds.), *Emotions matter: A relational approach to emotions* (pp. 181–200). Toronto: University of Toronto.
- Wang, H., & Wellman, B. (2010). Social connectivity in America: Changes in adult friendship network size from 2002 to 2007. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 53, 1148–1169.
- Webster, M., & Sell, J. (2007). *Laboratory experiments in the social sciences*. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

- Weiner, B. (1986). *An attributional theory of motivation and emotion*. New York: Springer.
- Whitty, M. T. (2007). The art of selling one's 'self' on an online dating site: The bar approach. In M. T. Whitty, A. J. Baker, & J. A. Inman (Eds.), *Online matchmaking*. Basingstoke: MacMillan.
- Wolfe, A. (1991). Mind, self, society, and computer: Artificial intelligence and the sociology of mind. *American Journal of Sociology*, *96*, 1073–1096.
- Wu, T., Butko, N. J., Ruvulo, P., Bartlett, M. S., & Movellan, J. R. (2009). *Learning to make facial expressions*. In IEEE 8th International Conference on Development and Learning, 2009, IEEE, pp. 1–6.
- Yen, J.-Y., Yen, C.-F., Chen, C.-S., Wang, P.-W., Chang, Y.-H., & Ko, C.-H. (2012). Social anxiety in online and real-life interaction and their associated factors. *Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking*, *15*, 7–12.
- Yuki, M., Maddux, W. W., & Masuda, T. (2007). Are the windows to the soul the same in the east and west? Cultural differences in using the eyes and mouth as cues to recognize emotions in Japan and the United States. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *43*, 303–311.

James M. Jasper and Lynn Owens

*Take the case of anger. We must say what state men are in when they are angry, with what people they are accustomed to be angry, and in what circumstances. For if we have one or two, but not all, of these, it would be impossible to engender anger.*

Aristotle

---

## 25.1 Introduction

Over the last twenty years the study of emotions in protest and social movements has grown rapidly, from a state of apathy or denial in the early 1990s to widespread acknowledgement today. Emotions fill several gaps in the literature on movements: they provide theories of motivations absent from structural approaches, they advance cultural approaches beyond the simplicity of frames and identities, they bring attention to the role of bodies in political action, and they highlight interaction and performance.

Aristotle launched the study of emotions and politics with strikingly sociological insights about the causes of emotions, especially anger. As the epigraph suggests, anger arises from interactions among individuals, and there are different forms of anger depending on these interactions. Aristotle admired one form in particular, the indignation people feel when not treated according

to their proper status in society. Expressing their outrage helps them reassert their rightful place in the social structure. Whatever disgust we might feel today about the social structure of ancient Athens, we must acknowledge anger as one of the central tools of politics and self-assertion even now. The moral anger that we dub indignation is the core of social movements, and thus of social change and justice. So we will structure the bulk of this chapter through a series of social-interaction contexts, or arenas, to observe their emotional dynamics.

The intellectual history of the study of emotions in protest has been told elsewhere (Goodwin et al. 2000; Goodwin and Jasper 2006). Suggestible crowds were once thought to turn rational individuals into seething masses of extreme, especially violent, emotions, sometimes due to the hypnotic influence of demagogues. The structural and organizational paradigm that displaced collective behavior in the 1970s denied any serious role for emotions, preferring an implicit view of rational humans in pursuit of political inclusion and material interests. Even the cultural turn that began in the late 1980s favored highly cognitive definitions of key mechanisms such as frames and collective identities, perpetuating the longstanding association of emotions with irrationality (Benford 1997).

---

We thank Jan Stets for comments and Gabriele Cappelletti for assistance.

---

J. M. Jasper (✉)  
Graduate Center, CUNY, New York, USA  
e-mail: [jjasper@gc.cuny.edu](mailto:jjasper@gc.cuny.edu)

L. Owens  
Middlebury College, Middlebury, USA

Research on the women's and LGBTQ movements eventually helped bring emotions back into the consciousness of social-movement researchers. Women have traditionally been linked to emotions (and irrationality), and the goals and strategies of these movements addressed this issue, criticizing the way (a narrow definition of) rationality is privileged over emotions (Ferree 1992). These movements tried to clear space for emotions in the public sphere, and feminist theories of protest sought to legitimate their work not by avoiding emotions, but by embracing them. For example, Taylor (1996) and Hercus (1999) brought a feminist analysis of anger suppression to the study of social movements. Other studies of women-centered movements contributed to this development. Luker's (1984) analysis of anti-abortion protesters stressed the motivating importance of anger, outrage, and moral indignation at the legalization of abortion. Queer movements and theorists pushed even further, examining the complex emotional cultures of movements based on the cultivation of both identity and difference (Gamson 1995; Gould 2009). In many cases animal rights activists, mostly women, nonetheless deployed men as speakers to give the movement a "dispassionate," scientific feeling (Groves 1997).

While structuralist theories reversed the negative assumptions about the social value of protest, and culturalist theories reversed the negative assumptions about meaning and subjective experiences, only recently has the taboo against emotions been similarly challenged. Emotions are now seen as central to many of the fundamental theoretical concepts of social movement theory, including motivation, organization, culture, and difference. Still, despite considerable progress, important limitations remain. First, the glib contrast between emotions and rationality, although challenged by some, remains a form of common sense that needs to be overcome by showing specific relations between the two. Second, as with many other social scientific concepts, emotions are both a scientifically specified term and part of natural language. The confusions between these two still limit sociological knowledge. Finally, emotions are often treated as a catch all, general category, whereas there are, in fact, many differ-

ent types of feelings, which do not all operate in the same way.

The next five sections address the role of emotions in a series of interactive arenas including different pairs of strategic players (Jasper and Duyvendak 2015). After that, we turn to four additional special topics in the relationship between emotions and protest, including a long discussion of the impact of protest on emotions.

---

## 25.2 Recruitment

Social movements must recruit new members by turning bystanders into participants, using the trust and love of networks, a population's fears and threats, and the moral emotions of a culture. Highlighting, or in some cases constructing, new threats is a way to trigger anxieties, which disrupt our everyday habits and expectations. We respond by focusing our attention and seeking new information (Marcus et al. 2000). Movements can exploit these fears to attract new members. Blee (1991) shows how the 1920s Ku Klux Klan combined a rhetoric of women's rights with a virulently racist agenda through inflammatory (and sexually titillating) portrayals of the sexual abuse of white Protestant women by blacks, Catholics, and Jews—themes still present, Blee has found, in the worldview and propaganda of contemporary hate activists (Blee 2002). Frame alignment (Snow et al. 1986) is an emotional process as much as a cognitive one (Benford 1997).

In a similar manner, moral shocks can leave people questioning whether the world is truly as they understood it. The resulting effort to reconcile this dissonance, both cognitive and emotional, makes individuals more open to recruitment, with political action promising a form of redress (Jasper 1997). Moral shocks play a critical role in the stories of the emergence of many social movements, linking otherwise disparate cases, such as the animal rights movement (Jasper and Poulsen 1995), the movement for peace in Central America (Nepstad and Smith 2001; Nepstad 2004), abolitionism (Young 2001), antiracist movements (Warren 2010), and the famous *Madres* in Argentina (Risley 2011).

As powerful as they can be for an individual, moral shocks still require collective work to effectively construct and exploit their emotional openings. Analyzing a memorial against the 2003 Iraq invasion, Scheff (2006) argues that moral shocks depend on surprise, emotional “attunement” with others (Scheff’s pride), and the acknowledgment of a previously hidden emotion (grief, in his example). The moral shock did not simply happen, but rather resulted from the interplay between the memorial, conversations with other people, and the perspectives of the viewer. Moral shocks are most often part of a flow of action toward political activism, not a single great leap (Gamson 1992, p. 73). They do not change people’s underlying values; they clarify or activate them.

In a study of anti-abortion activists, Munson (2008) demonstrates that recruits did not generally have an ideology of opposition before they were recruited. Some even had mild pro-choice views. Circumstances in their lives (graduating from college, moving to a new place) combined with social networks to lead them into activism. Like most discussions of social networks, Munson underplays the emotional bonds that animate the networks, but his evidence suggests that they are as or more important than cognitive processes.

Traini (2009b, p. 200) points to the power of eyewitness accounts in creating moral shocks and sympathies. In a distinct narrative form, witnesses recount their own emotions when they encountered practices they are now trying to stop. In one of the classic tricks of rhetoric and theater, these accounts suggest to the audience what they are supposed to feel by showing someone else (in the narrative) having those feelings in reaction to the same information we are getting. There is both direct contagion and empathy for the storyteller. The power of stories comes from their emotions, and not simply their cognitive intelligibility.

Populations can be primed for recruitment through their emotional training, often reflecting larger structural transformations. Efforts to control populations by creating emotion rules to encourage certain behaviors can bring unintended consequences, empowering those populations

in other spheres of life. For instance eighteenth-century British manufacturers, seeking to sell luxury entertainments and goods, promoted the feeling of “sensibility.” Barker-Benfield (1992, p. xxvi) argues that this sensibility, the capacity to be swept up by excesses of pathos, pity, and sympathy, “disciplined” women’s attachments “into tasteful domesticity,” stimulating the demand for domestic objects and encouraging the growth of consumer capitalism. But sympathy did more than draw women out of the house and into a public world of shopping and luxury entertainment; it also encouraged middle-class women to speak publicly and collectively about their sufferings at the hands of men, nurturing a proto-feminism. As part of the same sensibility, they also developed new sympathies for animals and the poor. The changing gender makeup of public life created new demands to manage emotions.

---

### 25.3 Internal Connections through Identification

Once people get involved in a movement, what keeps them coming to regular events? Groups are strengthened when members share reflex emotions in response to events and when they share affective loyalties to one another (dubbed shared and reciprocal emotions, respectively: Jasper 1998), with each one reinforcing the other. A sense of belonging is a basic human need, involving emotions such as love (Berezin 2001), pride (Scheff 1994), and emotional excitement (Collins 2004). Group identification builds affective commitments that tend to persist, sometimes long after the group itself ceases to be. Negative shared emotions can sometimes strengthen positive reciprocal emotions: “Even the experience of fear and anxiety, not uncommon in the midst of protest, can be a strong force in creating a sense of collectivity and be an attractive force in collective actions” (Eyerman 2005, p. 43).

Positive and negative feelings work together to define and defend group boundaries. The same myths that arouse positive feelings of national and ethnic belonging often inspire fierce hatred and resentment of other nations and ethnicities



(Kaufman 2001; Petersen 2002). Hatred for opponents is a powerful force for group solidarity, binding groups as tightly as love and affection do (Scheff 1994; Le Cour Grandmaison 2002). More than the absence of love, hatred is a passionate obsession with the other (Alford 2006).

Even strong hatred (or love) does not motivate action by itself, even if it is frequently a background condition. In violent attacks, Collins (2008) shows, bystanders can heighten tensions and fears, which can propel a group into attacking others to release that tension—what Collins calls forward panics. This especially occurs when the attackers outnumber or are more heavily armed than their victims. Collins also observes that such incidents are rare, since humans have a strong tendency to empathize with those around them.

Personal connections can attract people and keep them involved in movements, but they can just as easily pull, or push, them out. Goodwin (1997) shows how affections for families and sexual partners can interfere with loyalty and the fulfillment of duties to the collective (also Klatch 2004). Tensions between attachment to the nuclear family and to the rebellion are close to the Band of Brothers Dilemma in strategic interaction: A large group tries to attract an individual's affective loyalty, but that loyalty often instead settles on a sub-unit of the large group, just as soldiers are most loyal to the members of their immediate fighting unit (Jasper 2004, p. 13). Showing that this problem is not unique to “brothers,” Echols (1989) explains how the intense bonds of “sisterhood” promoted by the radical feminist movement alienated some activists who felt stifled by those bonds. Many tightly knit protest groups, including SNCC, fell apart because they could not negotiate the Band of Brothers Dilemma: the groups had trouble integrating newcomers, and any disagreements felt like personal betrayal (Polletta 2002, p. 85). This suggests one way that emotions, even emotions based on strong personal connections to others in the movement, can motivate exit.

Movements often create or strengthen the social networks through which emotions flow. In work that parallels Munson's, Nepstad and Smith

(2001) point to the religious networks that left certain Americans especially open to indignation over the killing of nuns and Archbishop Romero in El Salvador in the mid-1980s. In what they call “subjective engageability,” “the cultural and social values connected to a group identity may infuse this information with a sense of urgency and a compelling need to respond” (Nepstad and Smith 2001, p. 166). There is a social structure behind moral shocks, due to the affective loyalties involved, and not merely because of the moral commitments.

---

## 25.4 Rituals and Other Internal Pleasures

Not all emotional satisfactions are so deep and potentially long lasting as these affective ties. Protest also depends upon more short-term emotions, such as the heady rush of a street confrontation or Lofland's (1982) crowd joys. Rarely the primary motivations for sustained political action, bodily urges and immediate reactions nevertheless affect how people react in situations, and can potentially disrupt coordinated action, such as protests or meetings. Organizers seek to suppress or redirect them to make plans run smoothly. Likewise, authorities may seek to incite them, to justify repression, or use them as a means of repression, as in cases of torture. Urges can be manipulated so that we can do nothing until they are satisfied, especially intense pain that eliminates all other awareness (on the other hand, in hunger strikes prisoners use control of the body to gain advantages over their captors: Siméant 2009). Sensual motives such as urges privilege immediate over longer-term projects, sometimes disrupting the latter, although this does not mean they are irrational. Organizers and activists cannot simply will them away, and must learn to balance immediate bodily needs with longer-term goals.

Rituals generate internal movement enthusiasm. Combining Durkheim's concept of collective effervescence and Goffman's insights into interaction rituals, Collins (2004, Chap. 10 in this handbook) has developed a theory of rituals and emotional energy, which he has applied

to social movements (2001). Face-to-face social interactions can generate emotional energy that people crave, seeking out situations that generate more of it. Rituals involve the physical copresence of individuals, who share awareness of one another, a focus of attention, and a mood (the positive counterpart of forward panics). They synchronize their actions and develop symbolic and moral representations of their activity or group—thus helping to sustain it. Among other outcomes, righteous anger over infractions of the norms generated in the rituals may lead to collective action. Well-known processes of emotional contagion do part of the work of rituals (Fillieule and Péchu 1993).

Rituals help reinforce group boundaries, demonize enemies, praise insiders, and promulgate symbols. Researchers have remarked on a number of these mechanisms (e.g. Epstein 1991; Hirsch 1986, 1990), but they have tended to focus on the symbols that emerge as a kind of precipitate out of the interactions rather than on the interactions themselves—no doubt because of easier methodological access to brochures and websites. This research has gone in two directions somewhat different from Collins'. On the one hand, it is clear that some symbolic and presumably emotional resonance occurs in settings beyond the face-to-face, through more impersonal media (Jasper and Poulsen 1995). The vast literature on collective identities is filled with emotional solidarities not always connected to rituals—and not always acknowledged (Polletta and Jasper 2001). On the other hand, there are numerous emotions generated in personal interactions that fill in the notion of emotional energy: angry reactions, lustful responses, the joys of crowds, the fears of engagement. We need more research on the relationship between short-run reflex emotions and the longer-lasting moods and loyalties they help to generate. Research needs to both extend and further specify the emotional energies that rituals generate.

Central to rituals, collective locomotion and music have unusual capacities to melt people into a group in feelings of satisfaction, perhaps because so many parts of the brain and body are involved at once. Protest songs have long

been a focus of research that examines the ideology and slogans expressed through the lyrics (Eyerman and Jamison 1998; Danaher and Roscigno 2004). But many recent protests incorporate lyric-free dance music, using rhythm, not words, to arouse the emotions of the crowd (McDonald 2006). Music has a strong emotional impact on participants who sing, dance, and move together (McNeill 1995), encouraging emotional connections and group identification (Traïni 2008).

According to McDonald (2006), another recent protest innovation, the giant puppet, is important for activists less for its symbolic meanings than for its rituals of creation—people are brought together through the collective joys and suffering of producing objects unlikely to outlast the time spent making them by very long. Berezin (2001) has shown how Italian fascists employed public rituals to induce strong feelings of national belonging—the neglected underside of political identities, according to Berezin—a cultural project that other movements have also pursued. Rituals are enjoyable in part because they reactivate affective bonds, in part because of the coordinated action.

Just as affective bonds can weaken as well as strengthen a movement, so the pleasures of participation have their negative counterpart in frustration and fatigue. In Hirschman's (1982, p. 120) account, people "burn out" and retreat from the public to the private sphere because "participation in public life offers only this unsatisfactory too-much-or-too-little choice and is therefore bound to be disappointing in one way or another." Voting offers too little political involvement; social movements often demand too much. We become addicted to protest activities, commit huge amounts of time to them, and become exhausted; we have unrealistic expectations of social change and are easily disappointed. Hirschman's description of these dynamics depends (mostly implicitly) on emotions such as excitement, disappointment, and frustration: "The turns from the private to the public life are marked by wildly exaggerated expectations, by total infatuation, and by sudden revulsions" (1982, p. 102). It is not always easy to return to

the more humdrum experiences and emotions of normal life. But Hirschman is wrong about many activists who manage to continue their activism throughout their lives.

Although intense emotions drive some participants out before the movement is over, in other cases intense emotions can sustain a movement long after it is effectively dead. Rupp and Taylor's research on "abeyance structures" reveals the affective ties that permeate and sustain movements during difficult times (Taylor 1989; Rupp and Taylor 1987). The National Women's Party (NWP) persisted by means of purposive commitment, exclusiveness, centralization, and internal culture. Emotions were important for all these dimensions. "Personal ties of love and friendship among members were an important cultural ideal," Taylor (1989, p. 769) observed. "A willingness to shape personal relationships around the cause was, in large measure, what made possible the intense commitment of members." Some activists were part of activist couples, and most had an intense personal devotion to the Party's leader, Alice Paul.

Emotions are also sequenced (Barker 2001). Examining whether people returned a year later to a Reclaiming camp (a feminist new-age religious movement), Williamson (2011) found that an increase in hope during the event increased someone's chance of returning, whereas an increase in fear lowered it. An initial surge in confusion also increased the odds, reflecting a common religious recruiting technique. Changes in courage had no effect. Emotions provide important reasons to join, to stay, to leave, and also, for some, to return to political activism.

---

## 25.5 Leader Dynamics

Not all interactions within a movement or group are horizontal, but consist of leaders interacting with followers. Leaders and leadership have fallen out of fashion with both movements and the academics who study them (cf. Barker et al. 2001), yet most movements have leaders, either formal or informal. Most rituals are carefully planned and orchestrated by key individuals, who

often gain the most emotional energy by placing themselves at the center of attention.

Leaders also work to ensure the discipline for individual participants to perform their expected roles. Sometimes, this control is intended to enable actors to better carry out their plans. One disruption is fear, which can paralyze or panic. Goodwin and Pfaff (2001) identify "encouragement mechanisms" that organizers used to mitigate or manage fear in both the U.S. and the East German civil rights movements: intimate social ties and support, emotional mass meetings, identification with the movement, faith in their ultimate victory, shaming, training in civil disobedience, and media coverage. Two additional mechanisms in the U.S. movement were the possession of firearms and faith in divine protection.

Leaders and rank and file members sometimes follow different emotion norms. Lalich (2004) sought to understand how leaders produced loyalty in two authoritarian groups, Heaven's Gate and the Democratic Workers Party. Strong group loyalty depends on "singlemindedness, a way of thinking characterized by dogmatism and rigidity, and no identity outside the context of the group" (255). The meanings and uses of emotions differentiate participants in even the most strongly connected groups. Members may both love and fear their leaders, who in Lalich's examples were distant, disapproving, paranoid, and able to arouse intense guilt in members. The result was an overwhelming sense of duty to and unity with the group. Recruits who were not susceptible to these emotional pressures left the groups at various points. Although most movements do not demand the absolute devotion that these two groups did, they rely on milder versions of these dynamics to build commitment.

Often, some leaders do the work of building in-group solidarity while other leaders represent the group to the external world. In her study of women in the civil rights movement, for instance, Robnett (1997) pointed out that while national spokesmen like Martin Luther King, Jr., used emotional appeals to mobilize audiences, grassroots leaders, predominantly women, did a different kind of emotion work. Their day-to-day interaction with residents of Southern commu-

nities built the emotional loyalty necessary for persuading the latter to act in dangerous circumstances.

## 25.6 External Arenas

Protestors display emotions in order to affect external audiences, namely other strategic players in a conflict (whether hostile, sympathetic, or neutral); they also try to affect those players' emotions. Successful movements learn how to manage the emotions of the messenger, the message, and the audience. Different movements draw on the same norms in very different ways. As we saw, Groves (1997) found that animal rights activists furthered their cause by using the same emotion norms criticized by feminist movements. Worried they would otherwise appear too emotional, and thus irrational, they selected male spokespersons for this otherwise heavily female group. They relied on the gender stereotype of men as more rational and professional in order to bolster the legitimacy of the cause. This also provided a rational context that then legitimated the more emotional responses of the women. The same women may challenge gendered feeling rules as feminists and exploit them as animal protectionists. Protestors always appeal to some mainstream emotions in order to challenge others.

Women's emotions (and those of other relatively powerless groups such as immigrants, the poor, racial-ethnic minorities, or the physically disabled) are often stereotyped in ways that blunt their challenges to authorities or cultural norms. Women are particularly susceptible, Campbell (1994, p. 55) argues, to having their opinions dismissed as bitterness or sentimentality, which "are used to interpret our expressions narrowly and critically as always either being on the edge of excess, or already excessive." Sentimentality is paradoxically encouraged in women but only in certain (private or domestic) spheres; it is thus used to control and limit the public occasions on which women may express emotions. Emotions are interpreted differently depending on who is expressing them. In Kleinman's (1996) study of a holistic health center, she found that men and

women were rewarded differently for expressing the same emotions, with men praised for exhibiting caring emotions (or any emotions at all!), and women discouraged from being too emotional.

Emotional displays can be deployed either to threaten or to reassure audiences, depending on what protest groups want from them. Sometimes protestors' emotions must be restrained as part of a "cool" style (Stearns 1994). A group praying or singing seems under control; a group shouting or running does not (in affect control terms, its activity level is higher). The two kinds of displays are useful for different purposes, as part of the Naughty or Nice Dilemma: opponents and authorities may capitulate under threat from aggressive tactics, or they may redouble their efforts at containment and repression (Jasper 2006, p. 106). The emotions generated in these interactions influence whether repression succeeds or backfires.

Normally the control of emotions is meant to improve the external image of the protesters. The working class, like women and other marginalized groups, has historically had their emotions used against them to disqualify them from having a public voice. The wild emotions that so worried crowd theorists have largely been constrained over time, as activists have sought to legitimate themselves as political actors. The past 200 years has seen the taming of the unruly nature of street demonstrations (Fillieule and Tartakowsky 2013, p. 65). Since emotions are supposed to be excluded from the public sphere, to occupy that space meant suppressing unwanted emotions, part of Elias's (1978 [1939]) larger class-based "civilizing process." Like women, the working class had to prove they were rational enough to participate in politics.

Highly charged emotional rhetoric can have similarly contradictory outcomes. The same message that inspires commitment and action among insiders may alienate and exclude many outsiders. Mika (2006) found that People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) ads successfully motivated those already supporting the cause of animal rights, but these same messages turned off most others, including some potential sympathizers.

Protestors may find they need to display different emotional packages in different settings, while at the same time trying to avoid appearing duplicitous. Whittier (2001) shows that the activist survivors of child abuse display different emotions in conferences dominated by fellow survivors, on talk shows, and in courts of law. When among their own, survivors experience and express strong emotions—grief and shame but also anger and pride at overcoming their victimization. When pressing claims for crime victims' compensation, survivors must demonstrate grief, fear, and shame in order to legitimate their claims of injury, but not anger or pride. Justified as "strategy," the emotional injunctions Whittier describes reveal activists' normative assumptions about gender, feeling, and rationality.

This is a common tradeoff: the emotional appeals and displays that will have the desired effect on one audience will have an undesirable effect on others. In the days of Aristotle and face-to-face communication, the orator had to think about his audience as a whole, largely ignoring individual differences. This is still a challenge, but one matched by differences among entire groups. Thanks to modern communications, words, gestures, and bodily expressed emotions can go to friends, foes, authorities, and bystanders all at once. Telling your group that your opponents are incorrigibly evil may strengthen your group, but it won't help you deal with those you have demonized once they find out. Jasper (2006, p. 132) calls this the audience segregation dilemma: sending different messages to different audiences is desirable but difficult.

Interactions with other strategic players constantly change the emotions of protestors. For instance moral shocks do not just motivate initial participation, they can also deepen existing commitment and radicalize beliefs. The anti-abortion movement radicalized in response to the *Roe v. Wade* decision (Luker 1984). Gould (2009) describes a similar effect of Supreme Court decisions on the gay and lesbian movement, showing how a simple, single emotion, pride, can over time motivate very different forms of protest, even in the same movement. Since the Stonewall riot pride has been the de-

sired stance among lesbian and gay men. In the years immediately following Stonewall, pride justified more militant, confrontational protest. This same pride later settled into more moderate action, such as volunteerism, remembrance of the dead, and quiet lobbying in the early years of the AIDS crisis. Five years into the epidemic, the movement's emotion rules changed again. Shocked and angered by the Supreme Court's *Bowers v. Hardwick* anti-sodomy decision, as well as by government inaction and state legislatures' willingness to consider quarantines, gay men and lesbians began to express indignation and outrage—and to form militant groups like ACT UP. "Pride" once again demanded militant confrontation. Pride generates action, but does not itself determine the specific action to take. Identities and emotions are both ongoing projects. This example reminds us that our common sense understandings of, and our everyday language for, emotions may not do the best job of describing the complexity behind even a single emotion term like pride.

Radicalization can also tear movements apart. Owens (2009) shows how strong emotions over differences in strategic goals undermined group solidarity in the Amsterdam squatters' movement. Radical activists sought ever more intense emotional experiences, driving more and more confrontations with authorities, and leaving many participants looking for different strategic options. Just as hope of an impact helps motivate participation (Gupta 2009), frustration of that hope can push people out of a movement. When desired changes do not quickly materialize, hope can descend into frustration and despair.

Under certain circumstances, frustration may remobilize actors, particularly when they appreciate the divide between how the political system should work and how it actually works. For example, violent repression of peaceful protest is a frequent source of moral shock, dubbed "backlash" by Hess and Martin (2006), who also describe techniques used by authorities and protestors in battling over the emotional understanding of the backlash (Martin 2006). Outrage over state repression, far from curtailing protest, can sometimes ignite it (Brockett 2005).



## 25.7 The Pride of Recognition

We have examined several internal and external engagements, but internal and external arenas interact. Internal and external audiences influence each other's emotions. Pride is a good example. It is a central component of human dignity: we are comfortable with ourselves, command respect from significant others, and are taken seriously as agents of our own fates. This kind of recognition occurs in at least two interactive contexts: within a group itself, and in the group's interactions with outsiders, especially authorities. These settings affect one another.

Pride and shame are an example of opposing pairs of emotions that Jasper (2011) dubs moral batteries, because people are motivated to avoid one and are attracted to the other. Scheff (1990, 1994) sees pride and shame as central to politics. These two emotions are eminently social, depending on our attachment to others—pride issuing from positive connections, shame from disconnection. Unacknowledged shame, in particular, “leads directly to anger, insult, and aggression” (Scheff 1994, p. 5), at an individual, group, or even national level. And when people feel ashamed of their anger, a “shame-rage” spiral can quickly spin out of control. Exploiting this dynamic, leaders mobilize through appeals to these emotions, and especially promises to avenge shame. Equally important are feelings of respect. When groups lack certain kinds of recognition from others—affectionate bonds, respect for their rational autonomy, and esteem—they develop a righteous anger that leads to mobilization. Eventually, they force others to grant them the basic recognition due to all humans (Honneth 1995).

As Stein (2001) argues in her research on Christian antigay activists, transforming shame into pride can be accomplished by transferring that shame onto other groups. Tired of the shame of feeling like victims of larger forces, these activists reconstructed themselves as strong and independent, projecting that shame onto gays and lesbians. This example highlights the relational nature of pride, which depends on co-recognition by others. Movements must often make stra-

tegic decisions about whose opinions they will value most highly. Conflicts marked by two sides struggling with their own shame, attempting to project it onto the other, make escalation and polarization more likely.

Pride can also be a more internal matter, additive rather than zero sum. Women's movements, in particular, have focused on self-help in repairing women's emotional experience (Taylor 1996; Whittier 2009). Faced with the Janus Dilemma (Jasper 2006, p. 125), these movements have often specialized in “reaching in” to attend to the needs of their own members rather than “reaching out” to fix the world—or so many critics have claimed (Echols 1989; Brown 1995).

The conversion of shame into pride is a common goal of stigmatized, excluded groups. Britt and Heise (2000) trace the emergence of pride from shame via affect control processes involving fear and then anger. The relations between pride, shame, and anger are not simple, and activists can find it challenging to manage them effectively. Pride does not always just replace shame; the two can coexist, often in tension. According to Gould (2009), lesbian and gay men's ambivalence about their sexual orientations—proud but also ashamed—discouraged expressions of anger in favor of demonstrating a quiet nobility in the face of the AIDS epidemic.

Even if not the only goal, pride and dignity can provide some impetus for marginalized people to act politically, particularly when achieving official goals seems unlikely. Humiliation sparks revenge as a primary goal, as in the case of Palestinian suicide bombers (Brym 2007, p. 42). In her study of Salvadoran peasants struggling against the landed elites, Wood (2003) argues that some participated primarily as an end in itself, well aware of the long odds against any meaningful success. Acting, even in a lost cause, granted them a dignity otherwise unavailable. Only later in the war, after the worst repression had passed, did some insurgents further their material interests through coordinated action. According to Bell (1992, p. xvi), many black civil rights protestors in the U.S. participated to gain dignity in their lives through struggle and moral expression, not necessarily

because they expected to gain equal rights from that struggle. As he says of one participant, “her goal was defiance, and its harassing effect was likely more potent precisely because she did what she did without expecting to topple her oppressors.”

## 25.8 Fusions of Ends and Means

As the example of pride demonstrates, emotions frequently blur the distinction between the ends and means of political action, which is often taken to be necessary for strategic or even rational action. Ultimate ends may be enough to inspire some people to participate, but they are rarely enough on their own to sustain ongoing participation for most people. Instead, the means of action themselves have their own rewards, tied to generating positive emotions in those taking part. Rather than existing as easily separable features of action, means and ends instead exist in a continuous dynamic. Ends require specific means to reach them, which generate additional goals in the process. Likewise, once ends are reached, they can become the means for further action. Emotions help explain how social movements grapple with tradeoffs among means and ends.

Changing emotion norms can be both a goal and a means to political action. As we saw, the emotions tied to political agency—rationality and connectedness on the one hand, anger, indignation, and pride on the other—were traditionally denied to women, who were forced to challenge the dominant feeling rules used to exclude them from politics. Here, one goal is key to attaining future ones. Mobilization is clearly a means for action, but in some ways it is also a central goal, since it is necessary for the movement to exist. As both ends and means, mobilization provides its own form of satisfaction as well as providing the basis for future action.

This dynamic can be understood through the lens of mood. Accomplishments create a mood of confidence and political empowerment; failures can lead to despair and frustration. Collins (2004) observes that positive emotional energy

generated in one interaction gives people confident moods they can take to their next interaction. This helps explain why movements might devote enormous resources and time to achieving small victories, since their goal is to shift the mood for future engagement. Commemorating these victories, in ritual or symbols, provides another means for carrying this emotional energy forward. Taking moods seriously helps us better understand the meaning of many of the opportunities of political process theory. An event like *Brown v. Board of Education* in 1954 was less a signal of the structural weakness of racist government than a source of hope that victories were possible (Jasper 1997, p. 118).

Emotions as simultaneously means and ends can create strategic dilemmas for movements. For example, anger, outrage, and other aggressive emotions are often ineffective tactics, so that many movements seek to present themselves as more reasoned and calm. But to accept that anger is always a losing method creates its own limitations, boxing activists into a narrow set of accepted behaviors, denying them some elements of innovation or surprise. Holmes (2004, p. 211) criticizes approaches that “assume that the political outcome of anger is determinable in advance,” arguing that anger is more contingent and ambiguous in its effects. Movements face the Naughty or Nice dilemma (Jasper 2006): they must decide whether it is better to work within existing norms or to break them. As both means and ends, emotions sometimes put activists in the situation of having to make hard decisions about which aspect to privilege at any given time.

Collective identification is both an end in itself, a basic human satisfaction, and also a means. Pride in one’s group, especially in its moral Worth, Unanimity, size (Numbers), and Commitment [Tilly’s (2004) “WUNC displays,” which he primarily took as oriented toward external audiences but which also have internal audiences], enhances commitment to collective action. To the extent I identify with a group, its goals become mine. But that same identification also aids collective action by giving me the attention and energy to participate. In addition, my ends are an organizer’s means. This fusion of ends and

means in collective identity explains why participants can feel despondent or bitter when a movement ends, even when it has attained its stated goals (Adams 2002).

Hope and frustration strike a delicate balance. One of the deepest satisfactions of collective action is a sense of confidence and agency, an end that in turn becomes a means to further action (Wood 2003). However, as Jasper and Poulsen (1993) argue, successfully reaching your goals, where hope triumphs over frustration, can have the ironic effect of complacency and demobilization on your side, while spurring counter-movements against your gains. In their pleas for support, activists must temper the pleasures of accomplishing an impact with a continued sense of fear, anger, and threat that demands continued action. The emotions supporting energy and confidence may be undermined by too great a sense of accomplishment, not just by too little.

---

## 25.9 Place and Emotions

Place matters to emotions in several ways, extending political struggles to new arenas. First, places stimulate or carry cultural meanings that are entwined with emotions. Activists build spaces and form geographies of emotions, but they also draw on existing affective ties and emotional relationships to place. People form emotional loyalties to places just as they do to groups. Environmentalism, in particular, relies on strong attachments to land and landscape. These emotional ties to place can produce contradictory “rational” responses to environmental threats, such as conflicts over the location of renewable energy projects (Cass and Walker 2009). Places have political resonances.

Activists sometimes draw on emotional connections to place created by other movements, as when Polish LGBT activists chose to march in the same place that Solidarity had decades before, tapping into the public’s special link to that location (Gruszczynska 2009). But not all audiences share the same associations. In solidarity work between indigenous and non-indigenous activists, Barker and Pickerill (2012) argue, non-

indigenous activists bring with them different understandings of place and land, unconsciously marked by the history of colonialism, creating barriers to forging meaningful social connections with indigenous peoples.

The resonance of place can be indirect. The Slow Food movement cultivates the sensuous experience of eating, reshaping one’s relationship to food from the simple satisfaction of hunger to a more complex experience of pleasure, guilt, and anger. The movement then politicizes these feelings by situating them within a political geography of food production and consumption (Hayes-Conroy and Martin 2010).

Second, places structure activities that take place in them, especially in the form of strategic arenas. Electoral conventions draw media coverage; courtrooms enforce decorum; public squares offer places to camp. They all contain symbols that suggest what participants are supposed to do, think, and feel.

Free spaces are special settings with physical traits that allow some privacy for movements to build internal solidarity. Brown and Pickerill (2009) show that radical autonomous spaces provide room to do the emotion work necessary for sustaining activism, with different types of location shaping (as well as being shaped by) the specific emotions that are encouraged and excluded from them. While they see these locations as critical to the success of movements, Brown and Pickerill also note the dangers of activists’ becoming caught in the emotional safety of spaces that isolate them from others (another case of the Janus dilemma). Feigenbaum et al. (2013) find a similar dynamic in the spontaneous “campfire chats” that emerged in Occupy camps, helping to build affective and emotional ties between activists. This type of emotional connection, as well as the creating and protecting of the spaces that house it, is both an end and a means of anarchist organizing, according to Clough (2012). At the same time, he notes that these spaces and connections, while key to maintaining the movement, also provide means for the police to disrupt and deform these emotional experiences. This is the nature of arenas: various players can use them for their own purposes.

Third, place matters to emotions in that we can observe their distribution across place and time. Pain (2009) studies the creation and experience of “globalized fear.” But the “global” can mask variations of emotional experiences at smaller scales. She argues for situating emotions in existing places and groups, and studying how they move across social landscapes, as well as up to the global. Pile (2010) calls for better explanations of how emotions move one scale to another, particularly what he calls that which is “in-between” the local and global. While geographers often rely on the metaphors of circulation, transmission, and contagion, he argues that none of these models effectively explains this complex process.

Fourth, emotions move as people do (Conradson and McKay 2007). We need to explore “how emotions travel, how they circulate” (Askins 2009). Mobility brings with it its own emotional experiences, from the pleasures of travel to the despair of displacement (Fielding 1992). At times we flee from certain emotional experiences, at others we move toward them.

---

## 25.10 The Impact of Protest on Emotions

Almost all research on emotions and protest shows the former’s impact on the latter. But changes in emotions can be one goal of protest, with some social movements specifically aiming to change the way society thinks about specific emotions and feels about certain groups, particularly the moral framework that stigmatizes certain emotional displays and the groups that perform them. If emotions are either part of culture and language or are deeply shaped by them (Barrett 2006), then protest movements can change them. They may not be able to rewire our biology, but they can affect what triggers emotions, how we display them, and how we label and interpret them.

Some movements try to influence our bodily urges, or what Elster (1999) calls “strong feelings.” We seem to have most of the same bodily urges our ancestors have had for millennia: lust, thirst and hunger, the need to urinate or defecate, substance cravings, avoidance of pain. But these

urges have altered in certain ways, sometimes because of social movements.

Some objects of our urges have changed over time, often due to political action. It is no longer acceptable to lust after beasts or children. It is becoming unthinkable and so, perhaps, less widespread. For some, children may remain objects of lust, but protection movements have increased the penalties for acting upon that lust. Feminists have pushed hard to limit the unwelcome expression of male lust toward women, with striking success in most advanced industrial countries (Dominique Strauss-Kahn notwithstanding).

The anti-smoking movement has been enormously successful in the last two decades, both limiting the urge to smoke (by discouraging people from starting) and raising the costs of doing so. Anti-smoking commercials link tobacco to frightening health outcomes, in an effort to make us disgusted by tobacco. In a similar way the food we seek when hungry has frequently been affected by moral and public-health movements (Stuart 2007).

Social movements have also addressed addictions, attempting to change their legal status, their cultural definitions, and to some extent even their felt experiences. The main thrust of these efforts was once to stigmatize substance abuse as immoral (Gusfield 1963), but recent efforts have more often tried to redefine them as medical conditions rather than moral (or immoral) choices, removing the blame and stigma from addicts.

Because addicts themselves often internalize that stigma, they experience an additional set of emotions revolving around shame that may prevent them from seeking treatment (Elster 1999). Levine (1978, p. 154) traces the invention of the modern concept of addiction to the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century: “In colonial society there may have been isolated individuals who felt ‘overwhelmed’ by their desires for drink, but there was no socially legitimate vocabulary for organizing the experience and for talking about it; it remained an inchoate and extremely private experience.” In contemporary America, overflowing with 12-step and similar self-help groups, addiction is private no more. Thanks to

social movements, it is a recognized pattern (if still contested: Nolan 2002).

In politics, urges are even more influential when they are used against protestors, as in techniques of torture that take advantage not only of pain but of urges such as the need to sleep or defecate. The elimination of pain from the repertory of modern police has been a central goal of movement after movement for hundreds of years, and the contemporary human rights movement is one of the world's largest protest efforts. Many regimes still resort to various forms of torture, but protest movements have promoted international norms that make these regimes uncomfortable.

Social movements that aim at bodily urges and violations are almost all trying to improve, expand, and extend the meaning of human dignity. People should never be dismissed as subhuman because of addictions; they should never be reduced to pure objects under the control of others.

Mobilization has also affected our reflex emotions, which are quick reactions to changes in our immediate environments, especially anger, fear, joy, sadness, disgust, and surprise. Anger has been transformed in a number of ways, most of them having to do with curtailing the aggression that often accompanies it, as in the calmer ways that crowds of protestors typically behave today (Broqua and Fillieule 2009, p. 164). Less aggressive protest reflects a much broader turn away from violence in daily life, in what Elias (1978 [1939]) dubbed "the civilizing process."

Oppressed groups are almost inevitably discouraged from expressing anger, as Kemper (1978, 2001) suggests in his argument that anger is typically felt by those higher in hierarchies of status or power, compared to the fear and related emotions felt by those below. Anger is aimed downward in hierarchies. The ability to feel and the right to display anger become goals when oppressed groups mobilize. The reason is that anger, as Aristotle insisted, is a useful means for asserting one's rights and status. It is part of a "right to disrupt" the existing order, based on what Piven (2006) calls the "disruptive power" of those with few other sources of power. If they cannot interrupt things, they cannot fight their oppression ef-

fectively. For example Mao faced a challenge in overcoming peasants' reticence to express anger (Solomon 1971). This kind of deference is found in caste societies, and most societies take on certain aspects of ascribed, caste differences.

The most documented struggle over anger is the women's movement's efforts to make it more acceptable for women to express negative emotions, especially anger. Echoing Kemper, Hochschild (1975) cites Ekman's finding that women are more likely to suppress their anger, while men are more likely to mask their fear. Calling self-help "the taproot of feminism," Taylor (1996, p. 175) argues that "women's self-help plays a major role in challenging the emotion norms surrounding love and anger and is contributing to an historical shift in American society toward free expression, individualism, and self-development." The ability to feel and display the emotions associated with political agency—anger, indignation, pride, and so on—represents a kind of "emotional liberation" (Flam 2005) every bit as necessary as "cognitive liberation" (McAdam 1982).

Disgust, another reflex emotion that has been used to oppress groups, centers on bodily fluids, which many oppressive societies have used to pseudo-speciate a dominated group (Nussbaum 2004). In many cultures women have been considered disgusting for their vaginal secretions, and often sequestered during menstruation. African Americans were forced to use segregated water fountains so that whites could avoid their saliva. Immigrants and the working class have been framed as smelly, sweaty, and dirty. Homophobia has been built upon disgust over anal sex. In the most developed and explicit caste system, Brahmin Hinduism, those at the bottom could not touch their superiors or even cast their shadows on them. Liberation movements succeed only when—and as—they remove sources of human disgust that portray the lower orders as subhuman.

Social movements also affect our more enduring emotions, our affective loyalties and our moral commitments. Some of our affective loyalties already exist but are enhanced by social movements. Religious conservatives attempt to



bolster family ties; nationalist movements promote patriotic identification. Of course, these movements transform the content of these identities at the same time that they strengthen them. Sometimes social movements can even create a sense of collective identity from scratch, such as the black bloc, “those who believe in global justice,” or “ecologists.” In some cases this new identity is based on a strategy, such as nonviolence, or on an organizational identity, such as EST or the Communist Party (Jasper 1997, pp. 85–90).

Outlets for affective commitments have shifted in the modern world, with the nation becoming a major new object of allegiance. Romanticism, propagated by both intellectual and political movements, proposed that each “people” has its own inherent genius, a notion that had its fiery epitome in fascism, which added the wretched idea that this collective identity could be captured by a single great leader. Like many social movements, nationalism was driven by elites, who needed to mobilize citizens for war and who crafted monuments, folk traditions, rituals and so on in order to create “imagined communities” (Anderson 1983).

We have less lethal commitments to a number of other collectives. Movements of professionals, most successfully doctors and lawyers, have not only advanced member interests by crafting sympathetic identities but also promulgated ethical rules that can trigger powerful moral feelings. Whistleblowers are the most prominent case: professionals whose loyalty to their professional ethics leads them to feel a moral shock when these are violated (especially when they are asked to violate them).

Trust is another affective commitment, akin to liking or respect, that has received considerable attention in recent years. Putnam (2000) famously believes that collective action itself generates trust, both for specific others and for generalized others, although Kaufman (2002) counters that the trust is often restricted to one’s own group, generating mistrust for outsiders.

Affective commitments can be negative as well as positive, and movements can promote hate as well as love. Among our affective com-

mitments are anxieties over groups and the activities that symbolize them. These anxieties are a form of fear, but more permanent than a sudden, reflex fear. Activists can mobilize people on the basis of their anxieties, typically reinforcing and elaborating them in doing so—in what have been dubbed “moral panics.” In research on British panics over child abuse, Jenkins (1992) insists that each mobilization built upon and reinforced existing anxieties. The image of a “sex beast” that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s was successively applied to gay men, foreigners, Satanists, and elite criminal networks. Even supposed satanic rituals, for which there was never any plausible evidence, reverberated emotionally and left anxieties upon which future panics could build. The repetitions increased the plausibility of future claims, largely because the symbolic traces changed patterns of anxieties.

Other movements pursue positive affective commitments toward those currently disliked or hated. Alexander (2006) sees the “institution” of the civil sphere as having its own tendency to incorporate new groups, and uses examples such as African Americans, women, and Jewish Americans.

We also have affective commitments—positive and negative—to words and symbols, especially those that stand for groups. David Sears and others have developed theories of “symbolic politics,” addressing how people develop opinions and vote by relying on deep-seated emotional reactions to symbols, developed at an early age. Protest groups often work to shape media representations of the groups they represent. GLAAD (Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation) is an especially successful example, with an enormous impact on public attitudes in the 1990s as sympathetic gay and lesbian characters appeared on popular American television series.

Of all the types of feelings, it is our moral emotions where we see the largest intended impact of social movements on emotions. Movements affect both moral principles and intuitions on the one hand and the emotions that result from them on the other. We see three main families of moral emotions: shame and pride; empathy and compassion; and a sense of fairness.

We have already seen various movements aimed at transforming shame into pride, a key moral accomplishment, such as lesbian-gay rights (Gould 2009) and the women's movement. In the stigmatized identity dilemma, "You want to mobilize to change or eliminate the identity, but you need to use that same identity to mobilize people. So you run the risk of strengthening the label you are opposed to. This is a dilemma both at the level of means, of how to get what you want, and at the level of ends, since moral dignity arises both from abolishing the stigma and from organizing politically" (Jasper 2010, p. 29). Successful movements make themselves obsolete by eliminating stigma, even if their organizations continue by adopting new goals (or focusing on remaining pockets of stigma).

Analyzing post-partum depression, Taylor (1996) showed how women who did not have the "right" feelings battled American society's cheery norms about motherhood, while Whittier (2009) has traced several decades of contention over child sexual abuse. Far from an exclusive focus on internal repair, Whittier found efforts to engage outsiders as well. "The shame that victims felt about having been abused was not simply a psychological artifact, but a product of social forces. Thus, challenging that shame by undertaking emotional work in self-help groups and speaking publicly about one's experiences was not simply psychological change, but social change" (Whittier 2009, p. 68). If shame is the central emotion that needs to be reduced, some public effort seems necessary, since shame entails imagining oneself in others' eyes. Struggles over identities unfold on two fronts, both internal and external to a group.

Movement efforts to reduce and eliminate shame for stigmatized groups often entail changes in sources of disgust. Like anger, disgust comes in different forms, ranging from gut-level bodily revulsion, a kind of gagging, up through abstract moral repugnance. The most successful status hierarchies fuse these forms, so that the low-status group is considered both morally but also physically disgusting, as we saw above. Groups that challenge such systems, in turn, attain dignity by erasing the disgust previously felt toward them.

Compassion is the most obvious transformation in our moral emotions, since it has broadened markedly in the modern world, perhaps the clearest moral legacy that generations of activists have left us. There seems to have been a gradual extension of compassion, occasionally punctuated by agitation. At the extreme, animal protectionists hope to strengthen human compassion for other species, and ecologists for nature as a whole. Haskell (1985) and others have shown that markets help spread compassion, but social movements are also a mechanism through which this happens. It may be something about the daily life of the urban middle class—without productive interactions with nonhuman species or agricultural nature—that encourages the imaginative identification that extends compassion beyond humans.

Empathies may include a concern not simply for others' pain but for their sensibilities, based on changes in what disgusts them. Elias described civilizing processes by which individuals began to be more sensitive to one another in the early modern world. Europeans came to be disgusted by those who spit on the floor, blew their nose in their hands, ate out of common bowls with their hands, and so on. They grew more private about sex and less immediately aggressive. Elias (1978 [1939], p. 129) attributes the "civilizing process"—note his use of the singular—to social sensitivities at royal courts, demographic crowding, and increasing centralization of violence in the hands of monarchs, but notes that "the social standard to which the individual was first made to conform by external restraint is finally reproduced more or less smoothly within him, through a self-restraint which may operate even against his conscious wishes." The civilizing process consists of new patterns of empathy and disgust.

Not all the impetus for civilizing came from demography or courtly manners: intellectual and moral movements of the bourgeoisie were another factor. Some of this refashioning of manners was a self-help movement of ambitious bourgeoisie mimicking their social superiors, and some was a revolt by humanists against the violence and crudeness of the aristocracy. The decline of the old feudal aristocracy, Elias (1978 [1939], p. 73)

observes, gave “the representatives of a small, secular-bourgeois intellectual class, the humanists, and thus Erasmus, not only an opportunity to rise in social station, to gain renown and authority, but also a possibility of candor and detachment.” Pacifist movements trace their ideas to the same sources, especially Erasmus, since part of their disgust with aristocrats was over their role in perpetrating wars (Howard 1978). Compassion for others was part of this humanist movement, which was not precisely what we would today label a social movement but which was certainly an intellectual movement.

Fairness and justice are a third set of moral goals for social movements. Unlike pride or shame in oneself or one’s group, and unlike gut-level compassion, fairness tends to reflect a more abstract ideology of how rewards should be distributed, notably in market societies (Henrich et al. 2001). But even an abstract sense of justice moves us to act because of its associated emotions, such as indignation. It is hard to know how the feeling of indignation has changed over time, but it is obvious that the underlying sense of justice has.

Movements against injustices try to reallocate the blame that their societies attach to social problems. Blame and credit are often seen as a kind of explanatory tally (Tilly 2008), but they are deeply emotional products. Blame is a feeling of disapproval, with varying admixtures of contempt, hate, disappointment, anger, and more. Credit is a feeling of admiration, which might include love or liking, pride in a shared identity, even joy about particular actions. Due to “the power of the negative,” blame is probably a stronger motivator of action than credit (Jasper 1997, p. 362).

The moral outrage necessary for mobilization depends on finding humans to blame; we do not become indignant over acts of God or nature (Jasper 1997, p. 118). Controversies over how to understand unemployment, AIDS, floods, and many other calamities center on the emotions of blame. For example pro-capitalist movements have tried to deflect blame away from capitalists and corporations, while anti-capitalist movements have attempted the opposite.

Credit and blame have lasting impacts in part because they affect whom we see as victims, villains, and heroes—the basic political characterizations that derive from rhetorical battles. Claims making around characters is part of what the Greeks called epideictic rhetoric, and it has flourished in the age of vast publicity machines. Each character implies the emotions we are supposed to feel: we pity victims for their weakness and suffering, admire heroes for their goodness and strength, and despise villains for their evil intentions and fear them for their strength. Some protest movements try to establish victims first, in order to demonstrate injustice, whereas others first make claims about villains in order to arouse fears and a sense of urgency. In a rough way, pride has to do with the power and autonomy we associate with heroes. Compassion tends to focus on victims, although in a way that can encourage us to help transform them into heroes, or at least survivors. Fairness is more likely to focus our attention on villains, since those who live in modern market societies tend to see fairness as natural unless disturbed.

When we think of the impacts of social movements, our first images are of laws and regulations enacted, new rights and protections for vulnerable populations, perhaps a change of government or the polity. If culturally minded, we may think of a legacy of new tropes or master frames available for future organizing efforts. We rarely think of transformations in emotions.

But emotions do change, and those changes are often the goals of social movements. Other emotional changes are unintended, emerging from political interactions or through moral examples. Either way, changes in what people feel, when, and how they display them are among the most profound impacts that protestors can have on the world around them.

Admittedly, movements often promote emotional changes that transformations of social structures and practices would encourage even in their absence. But movements can resist or accelerate many changes. They invent striking images and tropes to embody those emotions. Artistic and intellectual movements have especially altered our moods, affective commitments, and

moral commitments, but so have the intellectual wings of all social movements. Our emotional repertoires—what we feel and what we display—have changed enormously over time, due in part to social movements.

---

## 25.11 Conclusions and Future Research

Much of the work we have reviewed is exploratory, the beginning of various research agendas rather than their conclusion. Recruitment, internal solidarities, rituals, leaders, strategic engagement, pride and shame, the relationship between ends and means, the effects of place, and the impact of movements on emotions: all deserve greater attention in the years to come. Another natural topic for future research is the combinations and sequences of emotions that people experience, since emotions rarely come neatly distinguished, one at a time (Jasper 2011). The epidemiology of emotions, as they spread across space through networks and media, is another poorly understood process.

Future work must also examine more carefully the methods activists use to elicit various emotions. Trañi (2008, 2009a) offers a catalogue of “sensitizing apparatuses” that include the physical aspects of each setting, objects deployed (including various art forms), and the stage directions through which interactions are shaped to have an emotional impact. Those who organize protest understand emotional dynamics extremely well, but we have not yet tapped their knowledge.

More comparative research is also needed. How do movements differ in the emotions they deploy? Are there different mixes of emotions that motivate participants? Have these changed over time, so that mobilizations of past centuries entailed different mixes of emotions? Historical cases, studied through archives, and contemporary cases, studied through participant observation and interviews, are difficult to compare, but we need to try. Even contemporary movements differ in how they feel to participants, what emotion displays they encourage or discourage, what emotional reactions they arouse in other players.

The rediscovery of emotions in protest and politics has already changed the way we think about social movements, encouraging attention to micro-level dynamics instead of the broad historical and structural factors that guided research in the late twentieth century. It remains to work out just how feeling processes are part of but also interact with thinking processes, and how both of these penetrate the big structures with which this field is familiar.

---

## References

- Adams, J. (2002). Gender and social movement decline: Shantytown women and the prodemocracy movement in Pinochet's Chile. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 31, 285–322.
- Alexander, J. (2006). *The civil sphere*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Alford, C. F. (2006). Hatred of thought. In S. Clarke, P. Hoggett, & S. Thompson (Eds.), *Emotions, politics, and society* (pp. 84–102). London: Palgrave-Macmillan.
- Anderson, B. (1983). *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Askins, K. (2009). ‘That’s Just What I Do’: Placing emotion in Academic activism. *Emotion, Space and Society*, 2, 4–13.
- Barker, C. (2001). Fear, laughter, and collective power: The making of solidarity at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk, Poland, August 1980. In J. Goodwin, J. Jasper, & F. Polletta (Eds.), *Passionate politics: Emotions and social movements* (pp. 175–194). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Barker, A., & Pickerill, J. (2012). Radicalizing relationships to and through shared geographies: Why anarchists need to understand indigenous connections to land and place. *Antipode*, 44, 1705–1725.
- Barker, C., Johnson, A., & Lavalette, M. (2001). *Leadership and social movements*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Barker-Benfield, G. J. (1992). *The culture of sensibility*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Barrett, L. (2006). Solving the emotion paradox: Categorization and the experience of emotion. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 10, 20–46.
- Bell, D. 1992. *Faces at the bottom of the well*. New York: Basic Books.
- Benford, R. (1997). An insider’s critique of the social movement framing perspective. *Sociological Inquiry*, 67, 409–430.
- Berezin, M. (2001). Emotions and political identity: Mobilizing affection for the polity. In J. Goodwin, J. Jasper, & F. Polletta (Eds.), *Passionate politics: Emotions and social movements* (pp. 83–98). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.



- Blee, K. (1991). *Women of the Klan*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Blee, K. (2002). *Inside organized Racism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Britt, L., & Heise, D. (2000). From shame to pride in identity politics. In S. Stryker, T. J. Owens, & R. W. White (Eds.), *Self, identity, and social movements* (pp. 252–268). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Brockett, C. (2005). *Political movements and violence in Central America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Broqua, C., & Fillieule, O. (2009). ACT UP Ou Les Raisons de La Colère. In C. Traïni (Ed.), *Emotions... mobilisation!* Paris: Sciences Po, Les Presses.
- Brown, W. (1995). *States of Injury*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Brown, G., & Pickerill, J. (2009). Spaces for emotions in the spaces of activism. *Emotion, Space and Society*, 2, 24–35.
- Brym, R. J. (2007). Six lessons of suicide bombers. *Contexts*, 6, 40–45.
- Campbell, S. (1994). Being dismissed: The politics of emotional expression. *Hypatia*, 9, 46–65.
- Cass, N., & Walker, G. (2009). Emotion and rationality: The characterisation and evaluation of opposition to renewable energy projects. *Emotion, Space and Society*, 2, 62–69.
- Clough, N. (2012). Emotion at the center of radical politics: On the affective structures of rebellion and control. *Antipode*, 44, 1667–1686.
- Collins, R. (2001). Social movements and the focus of emotional attention. In J. Goodwin, J. Jasper, & F. Polletta (Eds.), *Passionate politics: Emotions and social movements* (pp. 27–39). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Collins, R. (2004). *Interaction ritual chains*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Collins, R. (2008). *Violence: A micro-sociological theory*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Conradson, D., & McKay, D. (2007). Translocal subjectivities: Mobility, connection, emotion. *Mobilities*, 2, 167–174.
- Danaher, W., & Roscigno, V. (2004). Cultural production, media, and meaning: Hillbilly music and the Southern textile mills. *Poetics*, 32, 51–71.
- Echols, A. (1989). *Daring to be bad*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Elias, N. (1978). *The civilizing process*. New York: Urizen Books.
- Elster, J. (1999). *Strong feelings*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Epstein, B. (1991). *Political protest and cultural revolution*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Eyerman, R. (2005). How social movements move: Emotions and social movements. In H. Flam & D. King (Eds.), *Emotions and social movements* (pp. 41–56). New York: Routledge.
- Eyerman, R., & Jamison, A. (1998). *Music and social movements*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Feigenbaum, A., McCurdy, P., & Frenzel, F. (2013). Towards a method for studying affect in (micro) politics: The campfire chats project and the occupy movement. *Parallax*, 19, 21–37.
- Farree, M. M. (1992). The political context of rationality: Rational choice theory and resource mobilization. In A. Morris & C. McClurg Mueller (Eds.), *Frontiers in social movement theory* (pp. 29–52). New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Fielding, T. (1992). Migration and culture. In A. Champion & T. Fielding (Eds.), *Migration processes and patterns* (pp. 201–212). London: Belhaven.
- Fillieule, O., & Péchu, C. (1993). *Lutter ensemble: Les théories de l'action collective*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Fillieule, O., & Tartakowsky, D. 2013. *Demonstrations*. Winnipeg: Fernwood.
- Flam, H. (2005). Emotions' map: A research agenda. In H. Flam & D. King (Eds.), *Emotions and social movements* (pp. 19–40). New York: Routledge.
- Gamson, J. (1995). Must identity movements self-destruct? A queer dilemma. *Social Problems*, 42, 390–407.
- Gamson, W. (1992). *Talking politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Goodwin, J. (1997). The libidinal constitution of a high-risk social movement: Affectual ties and solidarity in the Huk Rebellion, 1946 to 1954. *American Sociological Review*, 62, 53–69.
- Goodwin, J., & Jasper, J. (2006). Emotions and social movements. In J. E. Stets & J. H. Turner (Eds.), *Handbook of the sociology of emotions* (pp. 611–635). New York: Springer.
- Goodwin, J., & Pfaff, S. (2001). Emotion work in high-risk social movements: Managing fear in the U.S. and East German Civil Rights Movements. In J. Goodwin, J. Jasper, & F. Polletta (Eds.), *Passionate politics: Emotions and social movements* (pp. 282–302). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Goodwin, J., Jasper, J., & Polletta, F. (2000). The return of the repressed: The fall and rise of emotions in social movement theory. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 5, 65–83.
- Gould, D. (2009). *Moving politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Groves, J. McAllister (1997). *Hearts and minds*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Gruszczynska, A. (2009). 'I Was Mad about It All, about the Ban': Emotional spaces of solidarity in the Poznan March of Equality. *Emotion, Space and Society*, 2, 44–51.
- Gupta, D. (2009). The power of incremental outcomes: How small victories and defeats affect social movement organizations. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 14, 417–432.
- Gusfield, J. (1963). *Symbolic crusade*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Haskell, T. (1985). Capitalism and the origins of the humanitarian sensibility. *The American Historical Review*, 90, 547–566.
- Hayes-Conroy, A., & Martin, D. (2010). Mobilising bodies: Visceral identification in the slow food movement. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 35, 269–281.



- Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., & McElreath, R. (2001). Cooperation, reciprocity and punishment in fifteen small-scale societies. *American Economic Review*, *91*, 73–78.
- Hercus, C. (1999). Identity, emotion, and feminist collective action. *Gender and Society*, *13*, 34–55.
- Hess, D., & Martin, B. (2006). Repression, backfire, and the theory of transformative events. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, *11*, 249–267.
- Hirsch, E. (1986). The creation of political solidarity in social movements organizations. *The Sociological Quarterly*, *27*, 373–387.
- Hirsch, E. (1990). Sacrifice for the cause: Group processes, recruitment, and commitment in a student social movement. *American Sociological Review*, *55*, 243–254.
- Hirschman, A. (1982). *Shifting involvements*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hochschild, A. (1975). The sociology of feeling and emotion: Selected possibilities. In M. Millman & R. Kanter (Eds.), *Another voice* (pp. 280–307). Garden City: Anchor.
- Holmes, M. (2004). Feeling beyond rules: Politicizing the sociology of emotion and anger in feminist politics. *European Journal of Social Theory*, *7*, 209–227.
- Honneth, A. (1995). *The struggle for recognition*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Howard, M. (1978). *War and the liberal conscience*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Le Cour Grandmaison, O. (2002). *Haine(s)*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Jasper, J. (1997). *The art of moral protest*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Jasper, J. (1998). The emotions of protest: Affective and reactive emotions in and around social movements. *Sociological Forum*, *13*, 397–424.
- Jasper, J. (2004). A strategic approach to collective action: Looking for agency in social-movement choices. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, *9*, 1–16.
- Jasper, J. (2006). *Getting your way*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Jasper, J. (2010). Strategic marginalizations and emotional marginalities: The dilemma of stigmatized identities. In D. K. Singh Roy (Ed.), *Surviving Against Odds: The Marginalized in a Globalizing World* (pp. 29–37). New Delhi: Manohar Publishers.
- Jasper, J., & Duyvendak, J. W. (2015). *Players and arenas*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Jasper, J., & Poulsen, J. (1993). Fighting back: Vulnerabilities, blunders, and countermobilization by the targets in three animal rights campaigns. *Sociological Forum*, *8*, 639–657.
- Jasper, J., & Poulsen, J. (1995). Recruiting strangers and friends: Moral shocks and social networks in animal rights and anti-nuclear protests. *Social Problems*, *42*, 493–512.
- Jenkins, P. (1992). *Intimate enemies: Moral panics in contemporary Great Britain*. New York: Hawthorne.
- Kaufman, S. (2001). *Modern hatreds*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Kaufman, J. (2002). *For the common good?* New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kemper, T. (1978). *A social interactional theory of emotions*. New York: Wiley.
- Kemper, T. (2001). A structural approach to social movement emotions. In J. Goodwin, J. Jasper, & F. Polletta (Eds.), *Passionate politics: Emotions and social movements* (pp. 58–73). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Klatch, R. (2004). The underside of social movements: The effects of destructive affective ties. *Qualitative Sociology*, *27*, 487–509.
- Kleinman, S. (1996). *Opposing ambitions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lalich, J. (2004). *Bounded choice*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Levine, H. (1978). The discovery of addiction; changing conceptions of habitual drunkenness in America. *Journal of Studies of Alcohol and Drugs*, *39*, 143–174.
- Lofland, J. (1982). Crowd joys. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, *10*, 355–381.
- Luker, K. (1984). *Abortion and the politics of motherhood*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Marcus, G., Neuman, W. R., & MacKuen, M. (2000). *Affective intelligence and political judgment*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Martin, B. (2006). *Justice ignited*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
- McAdam, D. (1982). *Political process and the development of black insurgency, 1930–1970*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McDonald, K. (2006). *Global movements*. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.
- McNeill, W. (1995). *Keeping together in time*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Mika, M. (2006). Framing the issue: Religion, secular ethics and the case of animal rights mobilization. *Social Forces*, *85*, 915–941.
- Munson, Z. (2008). *The Making of pro-life activists*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Nepstad, S. (2004). *Convictions of the Soul*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Nepstad, S., & Smith, C. (2001). The social structure of moral outrage in recruitment to the U.S. Central America Peace Movement. In J. Goodwin, J. Jasper, & F. Polletta (Eds.), *Passionate politics: Emotions and social movements* (pp. 158–174). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Nolan, J. L. (2002). Drug court stories. In Joseph E. Davis (Ed.), *Stories of change* (pp. 149–177). Albany: SUNY.
- Nussbaum, M. (2004). *Hiding from humanity*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Owens, L. (2009). *Cracking under pressure*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Pain, R. (2009). Globalized fear? Towards an emotional geopolitics. *Progress in Human Geography*, *33*, 466–486.
- Petersen, R. (2002). *Understanding ethnic violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Pile, S. (2010). Emotions and affect in recent human geography. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 35, 5–20.
- Piven, F. F. (2006). *Challenging authority: How ordinary people change America*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Polletta, F. (2002). *Freedom is an endless meeting*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Polletta, F., & Jasper, J. (2001). Collective identity and social movements. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 27, 283–305.
- Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Risley, A. (2011). Rejoinder. In J. Goodwin & J. Jasper (Eds.), *Contention in context: Political opportunities and the emergence of protest* (pp. 108–113). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Robnett, B. (1997). *How long? How long?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rupp, L., & Taylor, V. (1987). *Survival in the doldrums*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Scheff, T. (1990). *Microsociology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Scheff, T. (1994). *Bloody revenge*. Boulder: Westview.
- Scheff, T. (2006). Mobilization and silence: Emotional/relational dynamics. Working Paper, University of California at Santa Barbara. <http://www.soc.ucsb.edu/faculty/scheff/44.html>. Retrieved 26 Sept 2012.
- Siméant, J. (2009). *La Grève de La Faim*. Paris: Sciences Po, Les Presses.
- Snow, D., Burke Rochford, E. Jr., Worden, S., & Benford, R. (1986). Frame alignment processes, micromobilization, and movement participation. *American Sociological Review*, 51, 464–481.
- Solomon, R. (1971). *Mao's revolution and the Chinese political culture*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Stearns, P. (1994). *American cool*. New York: New York University Press.
- Stein, A. (2001). *The stranger next door*. Boston: Beacon.
- Stuart, T. (2007). *The bloodless revolution*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Taylor, V. (1989). Social movement continuity: The women's movement in abeyance. *American Sociological Review*, 54, 761–775.
- Taylor, V. (1996). *Rock-a-by baby*. New York: Routledge.
- Tilly, C. (2004). *Social movements, 1768–2004*. Boulder: Paradigm.
- Tilly, C. (2008). *Credit and blame*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Traïni, C. (2008). *La Musique En Colère*. Paris: Sciences Po, Les Presses.
- Traïni, C. (2009a). *Emotions...Mobilisation!* Paris: Sciences Po, Les Presses.
- Traïni, C. (2009b). L'Opposition À La Tauromachie. In C. Traïni (Ed.), *Emotions...mobilisation!* (pp. 193–213). Paris: Sciences Po, Les Presses.
- Warren, M. (2010). *Fire in the Heart*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Whittier, N. (2001). Emotional strategies. In J. Goodwin, J. Jasper, & F. Polletta (Eds.), *Passionate politics: Emotions and social movements* (pp. 233–250). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Whittier, N. (2009). *The politics of child sexual abuse*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Williamson, E. (2011). The magic of multiple emotions. *Sociological Forum*, 26, 45–70.
- Wood, E. (2003). *Insurgent collective action and civil war in El Salvador*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Young, M. (2001). A Revolution of the soul: Transformative experiences and immediate abolition. In J. Goodwin, J. Jasper, & F. Polletta (Eds.), *Passionate politics: Emotions and social movements* (pp. 99–114). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

John N. Parker and Edward J. Hackett

## 26.1 Introduction

...Only intuition, resting upon sympathetic understanding, can lead to [these scientific laws]; ...the daily effort comes from no deliberate intention or program, but straight from the heart.—Albert Einstein (quoted in Hoffman and Dukas 1973, p. 22).

What is that which swells a man's breast with pride above that which any other experience can bring to him? Discovery! To know that you are walking where none others have walked. ... To do something, say something, see something, before anybody else—these are the things that confer a pleasure compared with which other pleasures are tame and commonplace, other ecstasies cheap and trivial. -Mark Twain (1869)

The sociology of emotions and the sociology of science rose to prominence during the same period (circa 1975-present), but little research or theory connects the two. At first consideration this separation may be attributed to the cool, logical, dispassionate character of science, which when properly conducted remains unsullied by the polluting influence of emotion. The roots of this notion extend from earliest recorded Western thought through modern philosophy and into the current era (Plato 1970 [350 B.C.E]; Descartes (1960) [1641]; see Damasio 1994). One might plausibly argue that maturation of the sociologies of science and emotions was prerequisite to

considering relations between these apparently discrete areas of social life.

But this is hardly the case. Early American and European contributions to the sociology of science dealt specifically and in fine detail with emotional aspects of science, researching systematically topics ranging from affective interactions in scientific collaborations through the emergence and establishment of science as a social institution (Weber, 1918; Fleck 1935a; Merton 1938). A handful of midcentury sociological observers were also keenly attuned to such issues, building upon this foundational work and extending it in new directions (Hagstrom 1965; Merton 1969; Mullins 1972; Mitroff 1974; Collins 1975). Still, these disparate efforts were never synthesized into an holistic understanding of the reciprocal relations between emotion and science. What is odd is not that emotion shapes science—this has been known for almost a century—but rather that the vital role of emotion in science, so clearly seen early on, is only now re-emerging as a cumulative area of sociological research.

This chapter examines the role of emotion in the practice, profession, and social institution of science. We characterize the role of emotion in each aspect of science, noting key processes and relationships, illustrating them with scientists' reflections on their work, and summarizing findings from empirical studies. Furthermore, to acknowledge, relate and build upon classical works (which remain the richest analyses of the

---

J. N. Parker (✉) · E. J. Hackett  
Arizona State University, Phoenix, USA  
e-mail: john.parker@asu.edu

subject), we integrate aspects of those early studies into contemporary research themes.

Section one reviews literature on emotional facets of scientific perception, observation and discovery. Section two describes affective components of scientists' work lives. Section three considers emotion, collaboration and scientific social movements, while section four examines the emotional underpinnings of science as a social institution. We close with observations about the way forward for research on emotions in science.

## 26.2 Scientific Perception, Observation, and Discovery

Perception and observation are elemental facets of scientific research, but their affective dimensions have rarely been considered. Pioneering explorations of emotion and perception have been largely overlooked, and existing research is scattered across the sociology and philosophy of science. Ludwik Fleck's (1935a, 1935b, 1936, 1947) long-neglected monographs provide the earliest and most comprehensive treatment of affect, observation, cognition and scientific change. For Fleck, science is a fundamentally *social* activity conducted not by individuals but by 'thought collectives'—'a community of persons mutually exchanging ideas or maintaining intellectual interactions' (Fleck 1935a, p. 39). Through persistent interaction and debate thought collectives develop a distinctive 'thought style'—a shared cognitive framework characterized by common research problems, evaluative standards, methods, techniques and literary styles (Fleck 1935a, p. 99)<sup>1</sup>. Thought styles are deeply emotive, evoking 'a certain mood' enabling '[the readiness for] directed perception, with corresponding mental and objective assimilation of what has been so perceived' (Fleck 1936, p. 99).

Thought-styles operate as powerful epistemological filters, enabling and channeling observation and perception in directions corresponding

to those operative within a specific thought collective, and disabling or diminishing perception of evidence or patterns that do not fit. The perception of any definite form, discovery, or formation of a view depends on specific intellectual readiness following from 'the intellectual mood of style' (Fleck 1936, p. 98). This style and its corresponding perceptive abilities are transmitted across generations through scientific socialization and induction ceremonies (Fleck 1936, p. 99). Scientific training bestows the unconscious emotional sensibilities necessary to notice and appropriately evaluate patterns and relationships valued by the thought collective (Fleck 1936, p. 148). Trained expectations thus enable observation, perception and selection of germane evidence from an otherwise unlimited array of potential sensory information and empirical foci.

Fleck further argues that the obduracy of thought-styles is such that to perceive things differently requires an emotional shift within the thought collective. He writes,

One cannot, simply and immediately, see something new and different. First, the entire thinking style must be changed, the entire intellectual mood must be unsettled, and the brute force of the directed mental readiness must cease. A specific intellectual unrest must arise and a change of the moods of the thought collective, which is the necessary condition for creating simultaneously the possibility and necessity of seeing something different (Fleck 1935b, pp. 74–75).

Emotional change permits change in scientific perception. Collective emotions also allow the collective to develop a consistent, cumulative, interlocking system of scientific beliefs and evidence.

The general structure of a thought-collective entails that the communication of thoughts within the collective, irrespective of content or logical justification, should lead for sociological reasons to the reinforcement of the thought structure. Trust in the initiated, their dependence upon public opinion [i.e. of the collective], intellectual solidarity between equals in the service of the same idea, are parallel social forces which create a special shared mood and, to an ever-increasing extent, impart solidity and conformity of style to these thought structures. (Fleck 1935a, p. 106 original emphasis)

<sup>1</sup> Farrell's (2001) concept of 'collaborative circles' bears a striking resemblance to this early concept.

In fact, Fleck makes the much more radical claim that what is considered ‘rational’ or ‘objective’ thought is not at all emotionless. Rather, things are considered (or, better, ‘felt’) to be rational, objective, and emotionless precisely because they correspond to and are suffused with the distinctive emotional tenor of the collective, and so

any thinking, to be emotionless, must be independent of momentary and personal mood, and flow from the average mood of the collective. This concept of absolutely emotionless thinking is meaningless. There is no emotionless state or pure rationality as such. How could these states be established? There is only agreement or disagreement between feelings, and the uniform agreement of emotions in a society is, in this context, called freedom from emotions. This permits a type of thinking that is formal and schematic, and that can be couched in words and sentences and hence communicated without major deformation. The power of establishing independent existences to it is conceded emotively. Such thinking is called rational (Fleck 1935a, p. 49).

Scientists openly discuss the role of emotion and feeling in the practice of science, and no one has described the intricate weave of conscious reason and subconscious intuition more eloquently than French biologist François Jacob who distinguished “day science” from “night science”:

Day science employs reasoning that meshes like gears, and achieves results with the force of certainty....Conscious of its progress, proud of its past, sure of its future, day science advances in light and glory.

Night science, on the other hand, wanders blindly. It hesitates, stumbles, falls back, sweats, wakes with a start....It is a sort of workshop of the possible, where are elaborated what will become the building materials of science. Where hypotheses take the form of vague presentiments, of hazy sensations....Where thought proceeds along sinuous paths, tortuous streets, most often blind alleys. At the mercy of chance, the mind frets in a labyrinth, deluged with messages, in quest of a sign, of a wink, of an unforeseen connection....Ceaselessly, it goes from hope to disappointment, from exaltation to melancholy ... What guides the mind, then, is not logic. It is instinct, intuition. (Jacob 1995/ [1987], p. 296)

We would put the point more strongly: day or night a scientist relies on emotion, feeling, and intuition to a degree that has been widely report-

ed but not systematically analyzed. For example, Anna Brito discussed her research on Hodgkin’s disease in language that did not conceal emotion and did not sequester the emotional from the scientific. Of one finding she wrote “very lovely results....the reality so beautifully simple, that one feels a little moved at the microscope” (November 12, 1975, quoted in Goodfield 1981, p. 62). A week later, she “woke up terribly serious with a sense of reverence I tried to analyze....But I could not explain how I find myself so serious after such moments of pure, unadulterated joy” (November 19, 1975, quoted in Goodfield 1981, p. 62).

For similar reasons Barbara McClintock repeatedly advised colleagues in biology to develop “a feeling for the organism,” which she would acquire through a personal and extended relationship with a plant: “I start with the seedling, and I don’t want to leave it. I don’t feel I really know the story if I don’t watch the plant all the way along. So I know every plant in the field. I know them intimately, *and I find it a great pleasure to know them*” (Keller 1984, p. 198; emphasis ours). A feeling for the organism, an intimate understanding of each plant and the pleasure that produced were essential to McClintock’s science; they were not inspirations or personal satisfactions, they were integral to the research.

Emotion is not limited to the life sciences but entered directly and decisively into Robert Millikan’s research on the charge of the electron. Engaged in a heated dispute with Felix Ehrenhaft, who had been using an apparatus similar to Millikan’s to produce contradictory evidence, Millikan performed a series of experiments that resolved the matter in a way that has lived on in controversy for decades. Examination of his notebooks from the critical series of experiments revealed notations alongside many observations. Those that did not support Millikan’s hypothesis that the electron bore unit charges were notated “*very low, something wrong,*” or with other words that cast doubt upon the data (which were subsequently excluded from publication), whereas those that agreed bore such notations as “This is almost exactly *right* & the best one I ever had!!!” and “Beauty Publish” (quoted in Goodstein 2000, p. 4; emphases are Millikan’s).



## 26.2.1 Fleck's Themes in Contemporary Research

Jack Barbalet (2002, 2009, 2011) builds upon Fleck's ideas, asking: What is the nature of these emotions? What are the unconscious mechanisms by which they influence scientific thought and behavior? Barbalet seeks the answer in "self-transcending emotions," an entire class of affect almost totally neglected by sociology. Sociologists typically focus on 'self-asserting' emotions—those in which a behavioral response is implicit in the meaning of the emotion. Anger, for example, can create a desire to leave or to retaliate against the object of one's rage. These are 'foregrounded emotions'—the emotions with which we are most familiar (Barbalet 2011, p. 39). They draw attention to the objects and events that generate our emotions, and to these internal emotional states themselves. We are conscious of experiencing them. 'Primary emotions' (i.e. anger, fear, sadness, satisfaction and disgust) are of this type. In contrast, Barbalet is concerned with 'self-transcending' emotions that have no explicit behavioral expression. Grief, longing, raptness, and aesthetic pleasure belong to this class. They induce internal behaviors such as contemplation or silent enjoyment.

Sociologists have neglected self-transcending emotions due to their low expressivity and weak physiological corollaries. They are 'backgrounded' emotions operating in a primarily unconscious fashion; they are hard to notice and to measure. Whereas foregrounded emotions allow for *consciousness of emotions*, backgrounded emotions create *emotional consciousness*. They allow for unconscious emotional perception of external reality but do not create subjective awareness of themselves within the person. These 'unnamed' emotional substrata are background programs within our consciousness, the "physical architecture, engineering, circuitry and hydraulics that underlie and facilitate the involvement constitutive of emotion" (Barbalet 2011, p. 36). These inchoate emotional states serve as socially conditioned filters enabling and organizing subjective consciousness. Barbalet claims that these emotions are integral to scientific perception and

pose no danger of contaminating scientific objectivity by introducing emotional bias. Implicit in this claim is that their counterpart, foregrounded or self-asserting emotions, ideally should be absent from scientific work because they tend to "narrow the consciousness of those who experience them" and can lead to self-interested behavior rather than objective truth seeking (Barbalet 2009, p. 64).<sup>2</sup>

This can be demonstrated using the self-transcending emotion of 'aesthetic pleasure' (Barbalet 2009, p. 65). There often arises in science a situation in which a researcher must choose a course of action, but equally valid reasoning supports various choices. Since the facts equally support each option, the decision cannot be rendered on strictly factual grounds. In such circumstances aesthetic criteria become the grounds for decision making. Scientific aesthetics are learned during scientific training. They are a shared set of emotionally-laden values shaped by, transferred among, and recognizable to a specific research community (though they may be hard-pressed to consciously specify them). Aesthetic experience is 'a response to a correspondence between these values of the scientific thought collective and the conditions encountered in a particular research episode' (Barbalet 2009, p. 66).

Intellectually, aesthetic experience proceeds via a sustained concentration on the structure or appearance of the object of scientific inquiry rather than its instrumental or practical attributes. The perception of order or form in apparent disorganization is the central aspect of this aesthetic experience. This perception of order, in turn, brings joy and wonder precipitated by 'the realization of values, of attaining a correspondence between the values which guide a scientist's choice and the conditions that that scientist encounters and perceives' (Barbalet 2009). This joy guides the researcher toward one decision rather than another because the aesthetic values

<sup>2</sup> This does not stop Barbalet from claiming that backgrounded emotions directly influence scientific decision making, though he maintains that this only occurs under special circumstances wherein emotional valence is the sole basis on which to make such decisions.

of their thought community can be felt in one set of conditions or circumstances but not the other. Barbalet emphasizes that aesthetic pleasure only determines scientific decisions when there is a lack of objective criteria for choice selection. It does not sully the objective nature of the scientific process. Again, we would put the matter more strongly, proposing that aesthetics—beauty, elegance—are part of an objective assessment of scientific evidence. In this sense scientists know more than they can say, *feel* that something is right (or must be right), *sense* that a proof is elegant, and *believe* that “God does not play dice with the universe”... in other words, the emotional and the rational in science support and perhaps derive from one another, rather than oppose or avoid one another. The entanglement of objectivity and aesthetics arises repeatedly in accounts of scientific discovery.

Fiona Rose-Greenland (2013) takes a more holistic approach to studying emotionally toned scientific observation in conjunction with other emotive facets of scientific work. The study analyzes social interactions occurring at an archeological field site, and the events surrounding a potentially important archeological discovery. Rose-Greenland finds that extended isolation from the scientific community at remote field sites (or ‘dirt time’) leads to the rapid development of a distinctive morally and emotionally infused idioculture<sup>3</sup>—the distinctive culture that a group creates (see also Parker and Hackett 2012). Furthermore, senior scientists used specific strategies to enhance the group’s emotional excitement (and commitment) by raising expectations of making a major discovery (or ‘prospective loading’), thus motivating difficult scientific work and creating a generative sense of gravitas. Rose-Greenland nicely details the socialization processes by which senior scientists engrain in juniors embodied knowledge and emotionally informed perceptive skills (or ‘dirt sense’). Rose-Greenland’s group perspective and comparative,

*in vivo* analysis provides a level of explanatory power and empirical resolution absent in many studies of these phenomena.

Rose-Greenland breaks new ground by linking dirt sense to the broader sociological phenomena of local power dynamics and processes of scientific legitimation. She observes that dirt sense is a resource for gaining and maintaining power, determining who can make which sorts of knowledge claims and how those claims will be received or rejected. It is thus both a scientific ability and a social resource. And while the power of dirt sense derives from scientific socialization and thousands of hours of observation and analysis, the perception of having it derives from the bearer’s perceived proximity to the cultural heart of the dig site. Those with natal ties to the area (or those perceived to have them) are allocated greater credit and power in their knowledge making claims. Rose-Greenland also finds that dirt sense (at least in this context) is gendered, and that the dirt sense of those perceived as masculine is typically accorded more power. Her argument is nuanced—local ties do give special knowledge ‘not transferrable through didactic training’ (Rose-Greenland 2013, p. 32), lending dirt sense an intensely emotional character, but at the same time it is wielded as an instrument of power and legitimacy.

Overall, significant amounts of work have been done to link scientific observation and perception to affective social processes, but most of these rich insights await conceptual development, empirical substantiation, and integration into a comprehensive theoretical framework. As Rose-Greenland’s analysis indicates (and Fleck’s and Barbalet’s before her) emotionally conditioned observational skills interact with group solidarity, stratification, and scientific legitimation in complicated and non-intuitive ways.

---

### 26.3 Scientific Work Life

Perhaps the most popularly recognized emotion related to the scientific enterprise is the joy of discovery. Archimedes’ (perhaps apocryphal) bath time discovery that water displacement could

---

<sup>3</sup> “a system of knowledge, beliefs, behaviors, and customs shared by members of an interacting group to which members can refer and employ as the basis of further interaction” (Fine 1979, p. 734).

be used to measure an object's volume is said to have set him running naked through the streets of Syracuse shouting, "Eureka!" ("I have found it!") in a euphoric frenzy. Such popular accounts are common, even though discovery is rarely definitive and often highly qualified (Merton 1969). Still, the elation of discovery is a palpable reality. In Kepler's 'confession' of ideas related to his discovery of the third law of planetary motion, he freely admitted that "...I give myself up to holy raving. I mockingly defy all mortals with this open confession" (*Harmonices Mundi*, book five). Or, more recently, Jacob's reports "Three or four years spent studying bacterial conjugation ... [which was] a period of jubilation. A time of excitement and euphoria." Tellingly, the feeling does not endure but, after being "crystallized in articles and reviews, abstracts and lectures. It has lost its color, dried up in a story too often told, too often formulated. A story that has become so logical, so reasonable as to have lost all juice, no longer conveying the sound and the fury of the daily research" (Jacob 1995/[1987], p. 281).

### 26.3.1 Priority Disputes

The joy of scientific discovery—"the Eureka Syndrome" (Merton 1969)—has its counterpart in the *anger and acrimony* associated with disputes over credit for priority of discovery. Priority disputes are axial features in the history of science, and the sociological breadth and historical depth of Robert Merton's treatment of the subject remains unequalled (see 1969 and cites therein). His contemporaries bemoaned the priority ambitions and disputes related by James D. Watson in *The Double Helix*<sup>4</sup> as a strictly modern form of scientific malaise; Merton labored under no such delusions. His investigations revealed the ubiquity of priority disputes and the anger, jealousy, bitterness and animosity accompanying them. Newton, for instance, organized, directed, and strongly influenced the outcomes of a Royal Society committee designed to adjudicate *his*

*own* priority dispute with Leibniz over the invention of the calculus. Let this example stand for myriad others. In other words, priority disputes were nothing new, and actual rates of disputation relative to cases of simultaneous discoveries had lessened significantly over the history of science (Merton 1969)<sup>5</sup>.

Merton maintained that priority disputes and accompanying negative emotions were neither dysfunctional for science nor personally ignoble (see Merton 1969, p. 219). He recognized that goal displacement—focusing on extrinsic rewards (e.g. fame, money, or position) rather than the production of certified knowledge—was potentially corrupting of the scientific process. Still, he argued that priority disputes reflect ambivalences contained within the scientific system itself, and that they reinforce its proper functioning. The scientific norm of originality is emphasized at the same time as is the norm of selfless dedication to advancing scientific knowledge. The interplay of these norms creates both strong drives for priority *and* ambivalence about advancing priority claims. Additionally, seeking acknowledgement of priority can be viewed as a form of self-validation and social-approval, assuring the researcher that their work is sound and useful. Megalomania is the extreme, not modal, case—rather, appropriate recognition by the scientific community that comes from resolution of priority disputes certifies knowledge while reinforcing individual scientific motivation. In this sense both the ebullience of discovery and the bitterness and subsequent reconciliation of priority disputes advance the institutional purposes of science. Merton closes, "Thus, rather than being mutually exclusive, as the new mythology of science would have it, joy in the quest for scientific discovery and the quest for recognition by scientific peers are stamped out of the same psychological coin. In their conjoint ways they both express a basic commitment to the value of advancing knowledge" (Merton 1969, p. 224).

We here part ways with Merton, predicting instead that priority disputes and attendant profes-

<sup>4</sup> Tellingly, the book begins "I have never seen Francis Crick in a modest mood."

<sup>5</sup> See also Collins (2002) on the acrimoniousness of intellectual disputes.

sional acrimony will increase in the foreseeable future. We may now be entering a moment when the level of competition in science, its enactment and consequences attain levels and modes of expression that cross over from supporting the institution of science to undermining it. Two main factors support this assessment. First, scientific research is now linked to economic profitability, national health and wellbeing, and political power, accompanied by metrics of performance and accountability, to a degree unprecedented in history (Hackett 1990; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004; Parker et al. 2010). Increasingly tight linkages between scientific discoveries, financial gain and power will likely intensify conflict over priority of discovery. Second, science in the last several decades has become an increasingly competitive occupation as pressure to publish increases, available grant monies fall further behind demand, quantitative indicators of performance replace qualitative, and fewer and fewer tenure-track positions become available (Goodstein 1995; Hermanowicz 2012). We thus expect priority disputes to become more ruthless as competition for recognition, status, and professional positions becomes more ferocious. We may in fact be witnessing a phase shift from a net positive emotional experience for most academic researchers to one of bitterness, disappointment and dissatisfaction with the scientific life (Goodstein 1995).

### 26.3.2 Shame and Pride

The scientific life is also characterized by experiences of *shame* and *pride*. Charlotte Bloch (2002, 2012) has noted the relationship between negative evaluations by one's peers during the scientific review process and the shame that results from such assessments. Following Scheff (1988, 1997), she maintains that negative peer reviews communicate not only a poor assessment of a specific scientific product, but also a lack of respect for the submitting person or group as an intellectual equal (see also Hagstrom 1965, p. 22; Lamont 2009). This leads to unacknowledged shame and alienation among the judged. Alien-

ation, in turn, can take the form of either isolation or engulfment: Isolation causes recipients of negative reviews to leave the research community, whereas engulfment causes them to accept and embody reviewers' negative assessments, losing confidence and lowering performance. At the extreme, then, negative peer evaluations can lead to shame and the abandonment of the project or of the scientific life, or to conformity in research standards and practice.

Bloch also considers the role of *pride* in scientific work. She notes that science and academe are intensely competitive enterprises, yet they are governed by norms of social etiquette that proscribe bragging or boasting about accomplishments. Expressions of pride must be carefully managed. Researchers thus find ways of 'ventriloquizing' successes so as not to appear uncouth or insensitive. Casual mentions of 'having to serve' on a high-profile review panel or 'doing a chore for the national academies,' or speaking knowingly of what it takes to publish in a high-profile journal allow researchers to signal successes without giving offense. Bloch and Scheff (1988) contend that the rewarding experience of pride associated with scientific success will motivate future research, and so socially acceptable modes of expressing pride are valuable. This accords with Collins's notion that highly successful researchers will experience high levels of emotional energy, confidence and pride, motivating future successes (Scheff 1988; see also Hagstrom 1965, p. 13). This dynamic may be the emotional engine that contributes to the 'Matthew effect' of accumulative advantage in science (Merton 1968).

### 26.3.3 Commitment

Scientific work, particularly highly creative research, also necessitates a significant degree of deep emotional *commitment* to one's ideas. Commitment is particularly important for managing insecurity over one's research, shame over negative evaluations, and maintaining momentum while avoiding isolation or engulfment. Ian Mitroff's (1974) study of the Apollo moon scientists

revealed researchers' emotional commitment to pet theories regarding the moon's geography. He found that those regularly judged the most creative, outstanding scientists were also the most emotionally committed to their ideas. Though violating the norm of scientific disinterestedness, Mitroff argues that emotional commitment is nonetheless necessary to advance science because it protects controversial but potentially important ideas from an early death at the hands of skeptics. This explains in part 'premature' scientific discoveries (see Hook 2002). Sufficient emotional commitment can keep potentially fertile theories alive even in the face of severe criticism.

### 26.3.4 Job Satisfaction and Career Evaluation

Studies of scientists' work lives rely on abstract, inclusive concepts such as 'job satisfaction' and 'organizational commitment.' While useful at large scales, such concepts and measures inadequately represent the lived experience of scientific work life. François Jacob (1995/[1987], p. 242) expresses the complexity of emotions a scientist may feel in the workplace in these spare sentences describing the first days of his employment at the Pasteur Institute in Paris:

Each morning also, it was a delight to arrive in "my" laboratory. To have "my" place in a team. To be part, finally, of an institution, one of the most prestigious. An institution where, for more than half a century, discoveries had been made that had transformed medicine. I was flooded with both the pride of belonging to the line of scientists sprung from Pasteur and the fear of not proving equal to the height of my ambition. With the idea of trying, as it were, to drive a car without a driver's license; of insinuating myself into this place like a housebreaker.

These personal reflections take systematic shape in the research of Joseph Hermanowicz (2003, 2005), who has added qualitative detail to the study of scientists' job satisfaction by considering its opposite –self-doubt and uncertainty—within a sample of physicists working at six US universities in three different university tiers. 'Elite' universities emphasize research. 'Pluralist' universities emphasize research, teaching and

service. 'Communitarian' universities emphasize teaching and service. Each tier constitutes a different academic social world, with characteristic norms regarding performance and morally correct career paths. Elite universities mandate continual, high-quality research productivity. At communitarian universities research matters much less, while teaching and service matter much more, and professional ambitions ease after tenure. Pluralist universities fall between these models, with some pluralist researchers adopting the elite model of success, while others embrace communitarian values. In all three cases professional expectations interact with the local availability of research resources to shape the degree and character of scientist's self-doubt. Elite scientists enjoy substantial resources, have well-defined professional expectations, and are morally committed to realizing them. But they worry most, mainly about research productivity, and self-doubt pervades all career stages. Communitarian scientists have low levels of research resources, and so their professional expectations are diffuse and unrelated to research, and their self-doubts are fewer and typically non-work related (e.g., family relations). Pluralists have middling levels of resources and adopt either elite or communitarian standards. They worry less than elites but more than communitarians, and their worries are more heterogeneous (reflecting professional and non-professional concerns) than those expressed by elites and communitarians (Hermanowicz 2003, 2005)

All of this shapes job satisfaction. Elites are best prepared to realize their career ambitions and meet professional expectations, and so have the greatest opportunities for the emotional 'highs' of scientific discovery. Concomitantly, however, unrelenting institutional demands for high performance create greater opportunities for failure, involvement in priority disputes, and doubt about progress. As a result, elite scientists often feel that they never quite live up to these standards and that their contributions should continue at accelerated rates. Communitarians are positioned to experience emotional 'lows' and dissatisfactions because they lack adequate resources for conducting meaningful research. However, they



quickly adjust expectations and develop new professional performance benchmarks (i.e. teaching, service), reducing divergences between expectations and reality and enhancing job satisfaction. Pluralists have latitude in selecting among professional standards, reasonable resources for realizing them, and are the only group able to adopt elite expectations early in the career, and then embrace communitarian standards if research fails or interest wanes. Pluralists thus have the greatest ability to shape their careers and enjoy satisfactions associated with different academic environments. Overall, this research advances understanding by detailing how interactions between professional expectations, organizational environments, and career evaluations shape perceptions of scientific work<sup>6</sup>.

### 26.3.5 Fieldwork, Knowledge and Emotions

A venerable sociological research tradition maintains that a researcher's own emotional experiences and empathetic capacities are critical for producing meaningful analysis. This tradition has roots in debates about differences between natural and social science. Max Weber, Wilhelm Dilthey and others contended that social science should seek to understand social relations subjectively. Weber famously espoused the method of *verstehen*, or empathic understanding, which consists of analyzing social situations from participants' points of view to understand their perceptions and actions. Interpreting meaningful social behavior requires one to attempt to think and *feel* as do their research subjects. Borrowing from Weber, Edmond Hursel, William James and others, Alfred Schutz developed a phenomenological theory of commonsense understanding. Employing concepts such as the *natural attitude* (the presymbolic awareness of all persons), *stocks of knowledge* (shared perceptions about

reality), and *typification* (taken for granted reality) allowed analysis of the production of meaningful behavior in everyday life (Altheide 1977).

### 26.3.6 The Sociology of Everyday Life

The 'sociology of everyday life' as described in *Existential Sociology* (Douglas and Johnson 1977) provides a more contemporary and nuanced statement of the implications of interpretive sociology for understanding how emotions influence scientific knowledge. The authors focus on the implications of interpretive sociology for producing valid sociological analyses, but their model is readily applicable to other scientific domains. Existential sociology is the study of human experience-in-the-world (Douglas and Johnson 1977, p. vii); direct personal experience is its primary method. Its broader implication is that all forms of scientific understanding ultimately derive from and are situated in scientists' personal experiences in research and in their daily life. Understanding knowledge production necessitates understanding the life circumstances of knowledge producers. This perspective is distinctive (as compared to close cousins like ethnomethodology and cognitive sociology) in its specific emphasis on how scientists' emotional experiences shape the content of knowledge they produce (Douglas and Johnson 1977, p. xiii).

John Johnson's *Doing Field Research* (1975) exemplifies this perspective. While conducting dissertation research on child welfare social workers, Johnson decided that an adequate understanding of his research subject demanded a rigorous analysis of his daily experiences in the field. He notes, "When one is concerned with the methods used to establish scientific truth, presumably the relevant questions are those asking *how* the claims were generated or *how* the research was accomplished" (Douglas and Johnson 1977, p. 204; original emphasis). We all realize that private feelings shape our behavior, but traditional methods elide this fact so as to create a patina of objectivity. Instead, true objectivity results from being as honest as possible about one's own feelings and biases.

<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, high consensus fields have stricter standards for professional success. Self-doubt should therefore be more intense and uniform in high consensus fields (Hermanowicz 2005).

Johnson's analysis of his behavior and feelings during fieldwork is frank and courageous. He catalogues stressful interactions with research subjects, fears of being knowingly deluded, and profound sadness over unfair child welfare decisions. He goes so far as to report his marital infidelities with one of the social workers, and his deep guilt and fear that his wife would learn about it<sup>7</sup>. His observations led him to conclude that the researcher's emotions shape the conduct and content of research in several important ways: initial anxiety about one's place in the field site and unfamiliarity with its settings, tasks, social rules and expectations can cause stress and waning motivation; feelings like love, hate, admiration and resentment shape one's scientific judgment about the scene, its members, their interactions and relations with the researcher; close ties to the colleagues and mentors with whom one discusses fieldwork can result in uncritical adoption of their perspectives rather than allowing them to emerge from the data; finally, emotionally inscribed motives for engaging in research (e.g. acceptance by one's peers, comfort, security, membership, status) may shift over the course of fieldwork, shaping one's propensity to continue to do so.

### 26.3.7 Symbolic Interactionist Approaches

*Emotions and Fieldwork* (1993) provides another important synthesis of emotional aspects of fieldwork and their shaping of scientific knowledge. The authors, Sherryl Kleinman and Martha Copp, both symbolic interactionists, assume emotions are social products and to a significant extent individually manipulable. They note that though ethnography is prized for its nearness to the stuff of social life, including subjectivity, it is unclear whether and how the ethnographer's feelings should be incorporated into the analysis. There

also exist significant emotional costs to conducting ethnographic fieldwork in a discipline dominated by the positivistic ethos. These situations result in emotional tensions for the field worker *as a professional*, consequentially affecting their research. Fears about professional security and censure for 'unscientific' topics can shape the fieldworker's topical selection and research strategy through conscious and unconscious pressures. Additionally, the substantial time required to conduct fieldwork can result in anxiety and taking analytic shortcuts. Aspects of the field researcher's emotional self also ramify through the analysis. Kleinman, for example, indicates how her commitment to the ideology of ethnic equality blinded her to important differences between black and white seminary students. Finally, the desire to appear scientifically neutral combined with sympathetic understanding can lead to a normalizing or romanticizing of immoral or illegal activities.

Second, tensions between *the ideas of total immersion in a field site and analytic rigor and objectivity* create issues. Anxiety about analysis may lead to compulsively writing field notes, using this 'demented recording ritual' (Johnson 1975, p. 152) to feel productive while avoiding negative feelings. The time pressure and energy associated with analysis can also lead to omitting important material or underspecifying data, to ritualistic obsession with hyperfine data coding, or to reducing qualitative data to quantitative data in a bid to save time and legitimate the process, disallowing holistic understanding—the *raison d'être* of fieldwork. Such anxieties (compounded by feeling rules indicating that one must write objectively) can spill over into the writing-up process, potentiating crippling writer's block.

Finally, *feelings about participants* matter. Fieldworkers are expected to become emotionally involved in their subject, though the degree to which such involvement is expected varies. Feelings about study subjects—note the clean, emotionless, objective ring to that term—shape the conduct and findings of field research. Feelings of sexual attraction, anger, boredom or moral judgment determine in part how one apportions their attention to different aspects of the field

<sup>7</sup> See also Irwin (2006), in which the author discusses the ethical and epistemological implications of intimate interactions in ethnographic fieldwork by considering her experience dating, marrying and ultimately divorcing one of her key informants.

site. In many cases there is also a strong need to suppress and manage the expression of such deep emotional experiences, requiring significant psychic energy. At the same time, however, total emotional suppression biases and inhibits analysis. There also exists the trap of cultivating (consciously as a research strategy, or unconsciously through sustained interaction) too much affection between observer and subjects, blinding the researcher to issues of power or inequity<sup>8</sup>. It may also cause respondents to exaggerate claims to the research for reasons of social desirability. Alternately, an observer's avoidance of settings or individuals that make them uncomfortable will lead to incomplete analysis. Generally speaking, there are real costs associated with feeling good in research.

Applying this perspective to science has profound, unsettling, and yet fruitful implications for it leads to hypothesizing that scientific knowledge production in other fields proceeds through the same uncertain, negotiated, collectively constructed social processes. Researchers' life circumstances may influence the development of scientific knowledge, and may raise questions about its validity. The 'new sociology of ideas' represents a contemporary refinement of this general notion (Camic and Gross 2004). Neil Gross (2002), for instance, has argued that topical selection among philosophers is shaped by their biographies and 'intellectual self-concepts'. Work such as this, integrated with insights from above and that indicating that scientific work is shaped by non-work related lifestyle choices (e.g. marriage, childbearing; see Long and Fox 1995), also supports a more radical claim that not only topical selection, but perhaps also scientific productivity and the content of scientific knowledge, is shaped by such socio-emotive influences. These issues are now being paid systematic attention but beg for further refinement, empirical support and elaboration.

<sup>8</sup> Note the similarity to the 'band of brothers' phenomenon examined by Parker and Hackett (2012). Here the researcher becomes a member of the band in an emotional relationship similar to Stockholm Syndrome.

## 26.4 Scientific Collaboration and Social Movements

### 26.4.1 Scientific Collaboration

#### 26.4.1.1 Interaction Rituals

Among the first of the emotions to be identified with creativity and productivity in scientific collaborations are *social solidarity* and *emotional energy*. For more than a quarter of a century Randall Collins (1975, 1998, 2000) has documented the importance of these two collective emotional states for motivating the rapid production of highly creative scientific ideas. Social solidarity refers to the degree of identification and integration within a social group—in this case a scientific collaboration. High levels of social solidarity are produced when collaborators engage in persistent, intense face-to-face interactions ('interaction rituals'). Social solidarity causes collaborators to identify themselves strongly with the group, its members, and the ideas they produce, manifesting the group as an independent social entity and instilling loyalty to it. In addition to generating social solidarity, successful participation in intense group interactions also produces high levels of emotional energy within individual collaborators. Emotional energy is a vivifying force imbuing collaborators with the confidence, enthusiasm, and strength for individual scientific work (Collins 1998). Physical and social barriers to outsiders, a mutual focus of attention, use of group symbols, bodily and vocal entrainment and mirroring combine to synchronize participants' nervous systems, infusing collaborators with emotional energy, and recharging and reinforcing emotionally the group's symbols and ideas<sup>9</sup>. Moving from the sociological to the psychological, it is against one's emotional energy baseline that more transient emotions (anger, fear, sadness, satisfaction) are constructed. Interactions among collaborators thus determine the distribution of participants' long-term motivation for

<sup>9</sup> See also Fleck (1935a, p. 43, 106, 1936, p. 101) on how writing style awakens solidarity or rouses enmity in the reader.

collaborating, their degree of in-group solidarity, and scientists' immediate emotional experiences.

If solidarity and emotional energy precipitate scientific productivity, '*group flow*' is one of several emotional processes and relationships that catalyze high levels of scientific creativity. Flow is a heightened state of consciousness characterized by total immersion in the task at hand, an energized focus of attention, loss of self-consciousness, distorted perception of time, and a feeling of personal control over what is happening (Csikszentmihalyi 1996). Flow is experienced individually (colloquially, 'being in the zone'), and in groups ranging from basketball teams to improvisational jazz ensembles (Sawyer 2007). Group flow induces deep forms of collective creativity. A respondent in Parker and Hackett (2012) noted,

Another moment that we had that was fantastic was when I thought we became like more or less a collective brain, or a collective soul. We were sitting out on the porch—about five or six of us ... And we started to talk, and then suddenly you couldn't any longer feel who talked about what, it was like a unified experience. It was pretty amazing. And that generated so many new hypotheses—just that 45 minutes or so—it was sort of, I wouldn't say another level of consciousness, but level of communication that generated new insights. And you couldn't really say afterwards who had said what. That was fantastic.

Fleck (1935a, p. 44; see also 1936, p. 89) notes the same emotional dynamic,

He is a poor observer who does not notice that a stimulating conversation [between two scientists] soon creates a condition in which each utters thoughts that he would not have been able to produce either by himself or in different company. A special mood arises, which would not otherwise affect either partner of the conversation but almost always returns whenever these persons meet again.

What we are suggesting is that mutual focus and bodily and vocal entrainment not only produce (in combination with other elements) social solidarity and emotional energy, but also under the correct conditions they facilitate group flow and high levels of creativity. In this sense group creativity via flow and group motivation via emotional energy percolate from the same social psychological and physiological wellsprings. Collins and Csikszentmihalyi are examining the

same social process through different ends of the theoretical telescope<sup>10</sup>.

#### 26.4.1.2 Trust

*Trust* is also an important socio-emotional precursor to collective scientific work. It serves first as an important precondition for the rise and maintenance of the scientific institution writ large. Steven Shapin (e.g., 1995) has in a large body of scholarship demonstrated the importance of this sort of trust for the proper functioning of science. During the nascent period of seventeenth century epistolary science the credibility of other scientists and their discoveries proceeded largely through the expectation that gentlemen (the only group practicing science) would behave honorably. In short, codes of honor and integrity held by the dominant social classes determined who was scientifically credible. Gentlemen scientists trusted others who they knew could be trusted to behave *as gentlemen*. Science today remains dependent on a substrate of interpersonal trust, despite and in part as a consequence of radical transformations in its organization and professional conduct (Shapin 2008).

Trust in the credibility of other scientists and their findings and discoveries generally can be juxtaposed with specific, interpersonal trust between collaborating scientists. Most relevant here is Burke and Stets' (1999, pp. 348–349) definition of trust as: 'a belief that the other holds both goodwill and benign intent towards us'. This conceptualization matches commonsense understandings of trust, including the implication that trust is allocated to specific individuals and arises from knowledge of their good intentions as evinced through sustained interaction. Trust of this sort has both social and emotional bases. Knorr Cetina (1999) found such interpersonal trust to be important for high-energy physics collaborations due to the huge task variety and heterogeneity of knowledge required to conduct experiments in this area. Owen-Smith (2001) has shown the importance of establishing trust through sustained skepticism in molecular

<sup>10</sup> There exists the strong potential for a theoretical synthesis of Farrell, Sawyer, Fleck and Collins.

biology, while Parker and Hackett (2012) found trust essential for transformative interdisciplinary environmental science. Trust that others will do what they say they will do and know what they purport to know is critical for scientific collaboration. Its importance is heightened in projects requiring a substantial functional interdependence and a plurality of distinctive expertise<sup>11</sup>.

The most intimate form of trust, and the one best associated with creativity, is *instrumental intimacy*, a type of social exchange “denoted by trust, mutual support, and free exchange of ideas (Corte 2013, p. 27; Farrell 2001). Creative science is fundamentally deviant in opposing orthodox scientific thought and practice. Deviant science, in turn, requires substantial emotional support to strive against orthodoxy and formulate alternate thoughts and actions (Farrell 2001). Instrumental intimacy supports this type of deviance. As the collaboration develops, members begin working in pairs. Persistent interaction, combined with other factors, fosters deep trust, freeing the pair to share ideas that are radical, wild, or even mad relative to existing scientific standards. Such ideas would never be aired in the presence of an unsympathetic and mistrusted other. This process begins with formal exchanges and becomes gradually more intimate once norms of trust, openness, mutual exchange, and proprietary rights are established. Through *mirroring* and sustained interaction their ‘ideas, experiences and ways of thinking’ ... ‘become like two linked computers, sharing one another’s hard drive memories and software programs’ (Farrell 2001, p. 23). They become in Wiley’s (1994) terms ‘permanent visitors’—enduring characters in each other’s consciousness towards whom they orient their research, and against whose standards it is judged, even when physically absent. Such pairs often produce the major generative theories, concepts and discoveries that come to de-

fine the collaboration’s successes (Farrell 2001, p. 23). Mutual trust, openness and intimacy promote fearlessness in pushing the boundaries of scientific acceptability, significantly enhancing the novelty of the group’s work. Controversial ideas, perspectives and the emotional relations that precipitate them can become infused into the larger group via these pairs, substantially shaping interactions and knowledge production within the entirety.

### 26.4.1.3 Escalating Reciprocity

Collaborative pairs, and arguably larger subsets of collaborations, are also characterized by emotionally motivated exchange. A norm of *escalating reciprocity* develops, wherein members push themselves to match and exceed the work of their partners, the collective result of which is the refinement and enhancement of the group’s novel scientific perspective (Farrell 2001, p. 185; Corte 2013). This process accounts in part for the ‘bursty’ nature of productivity within these associations; idealization and obligation are its primary sociological antecedents. Heightened exchanges within pairs resemble the courtship process, often involving significant degrees of *idealization*, in which the other is viewed in almost exclusively positive terms and upheld as a professional (perhaps personal) paragon (Farrell 2001, p. 155). This imbues in the researcher a sense of gravitas and concomitant standards of excellence. Moreover, through their exchange of materials and ideas researchers come to feel that each owes it to the other to produce work apace that is of equal or higher quality. Together, instrumental intimacy and escalating reciprocity occurring in these pairs positively augments and amplifies the degree of creativity and productivity achieved by the group, while also enforcing stricter standards of scientific excellence.

## 26.4.2 Scientific Social Movements

Scientific and intellectual social movements (or ‘SIMs’) are social movements occurring within scientific communities that pursue research programs that challenge the current state

<sup>11</sup> But see Shrum et al. (2001), who find that trust is not associated with performance in large-scale organizational collaborations. Their result likely stems from the fact that their work focuses on inter-institutional collaborations in high-energy physics, which are more akin to corporate contracts or mergers than they are to the interpersonal and intra-group processes that concern us here.



of knowledge (Frickel and Gross 2005). Movements sparking molecular biology, quantum physics, and ethnomethodology are among the best documented (Griffith and Mullins 1972; Mullins 1972). Frickel and Gross (2005), in the most comprehensive treatment of the subject, discuss emotions in three parts of their argument. First, the authors maintain that SIM participation is not motivated by crass careerist ambitions, but instead by more deeply held and emotionally toned commitments (Frickel and Gross 2005, pp. 210–211). Second, they note the significance of emotionally charged interactions in local research contexts for SIM recruitment (Frickel and Gross 2005, p. 219). Third, they observe that emotive aspects of ideological production have gone largely unexplored (Frickel and Gross 2005, p. 221). These claims are true and important, but the emotional elements of SIMs remain under theorized.

#### 26.4.2.1 Coherent Groups and Revolutionary Science

This situation primarily results from the level of analysis at which Frickel and Gross theorize. Their concern with large-scale scientific social movements absorbs the small social groups operating as the focal points and dynamos of SIMs. SIMs are instantiated by ‘coherent groups’—the most emotive of all forms of scientific association. These small, resolute, tightly networked research groups are oriented towards common intellectual goals that place them in opposition to current scientific trends (Griffith and Mullins 1972; Parker 2010; Parker and Hackett 2012). Operating much like kinship groups, they socialize members into a controversial perspective and impart the requisite intellectual and emotional support to develop and transmit alternative forms of science (Farrell 2001). They establish the challenge and define the intellectual space in which the new SIM will operate by airing objections, crafting programmatic statements, and institutionalizing their position via publications, institutions, and new professional positions.

In their role as instigators of SIMs, coherent groups frame and articulate intellectual grievances against mainstream science and communicate

them to the scientific community in order to win acceptance of their vision. Participation thus involves substantial professional risk as members eschew established forms of scientific practice in favor of research that has yet to win professional support, and divert time, resources and emotional energy to constructing the new area. Frickel and Gross (2005) rightly note that participation is unlikely unless members think that something is substantively wrong with the current state of their fields. Similarly, participation is unlikely unless members *feel* that something is wrong. In developing grievances coherent groups establish members’ emotional orientation towards and resistance to other intellectual groups (Collins 1998). Internally, coherent groups often identify a scapegoat—a member held to conform too closely to the mainstream<sup>12</sup>. When present, the scapegoat is ritualistically baited into arguments and made the butt of in-group humor; when absent, members may engage in ritualized story telling about his or her faults. Externally, an outside tyrant seen to embody the mainstream and threaten the group may be identified and made the object of collective animus. The group ‘lightning-rod’—someone particularly adroit at expressing the group’s intellectual position and emotional stance *vis-à-vis* the mainstream, leads this process (Farrell 2001; See also Parker and Hackett, 2012 fn. 6). These dynamics are most typical in early group development, and imbue intellectual grievances with deep emotional significance. Fleck (1935a, p. 43) notes, “Words which were formerly simple terms become slogans; sentences which were once simple statements become calls to battle ... they no longer influence the mind through their logical meaning.” There arises a

feeling of hostility to the ‘stranger,’ to a man who worships foreign gods, uses foreign words devoid of the charm felt within the collective. He is a ‘dumb’ one, and his sentences are either nonsense or illusions. His utterances, which destroy the

<sup>12</sup> These roles and social dynamics are best related in Farrell’s (2001) theory of collaborative circles. He finds these roles and group dynamics to be general and to occur within creative artistic, social movement, and scientific groups. More work is needed to isolate social dynamics specific to coherent groups.

intellectual mood of the collective, rouse hatred (Fleck 1936, p. 101).

The famously heated interaction between Wittgenstein and Popper exemplifies the deep emotional antipathy among intellectuals from competing camps (Edmonds and Edinow 2005).

Coherent groups produce revolutionary science. Once engaged, members enact in the most deviant forms of scientific behavior outside of outright misconduct. Deviance of this magnitude requires emotional support of the highest order. Members must craft a socio-emotional culture capable of generating the extremely high levels of solidarity, emotional energy, instrumental intimacy, escalating reciprocity, commitment and flow required for producing revolutionary science and defending it from outside critique (Parker and Hackett 2012). They must *convince* themselves of the correctness of their position and be absolutely *committed* to its realization—all of this on the basis of untested ideas and scant empirical evidence. In this, there is a real element of *faith*. Unsurprisingly, coherent groups resemble and have been likened by outsiders in the depth and force of their belief to religious cults. For example, the phage group was also known as ‘the phage church’ (Stahl 2001). The Columbia Skinnerians were critiqued as cult (Wendt 1949); their western outpost at Arizona State University was called ‘Fort Skinner’ (Uttal 2007). Nasaday (2001) has referred to ‘the gospel of resilience’.

The production of emotions of this extreme amplitude is facilitated by intense face-to-face interactions among members at local research centers, conferences, and especially isolated research retreats that limit attendance to group members. Initiation ceremonies, collective rituals and informal activities are key elements of these processes (e.g. rock climbing and ping-pong among the quantum physicists; camping in remote deserts and retreats to Cold Spring Harbor among the phage group; limerick contests, musical performances, and induction into secret societies among the Resilience Alliance) (Fleck 1936, p. 99; Griffith and Mullins 1972; Collins 1998; Farrell 2001; Parker and Hackett 2012). A durable collective identity and characteristic mode of scientific thought develop, orienting members and guiding group work. So intellectu-

ally and emotionally absorbing is this framework that members come to analyze group relations and even their own lives in its terms (Parker and Hackett 2012, p. 38). Personal biographies and professional identities impinge; the line between friend and colleague dissolves. The group looms large in members’ consciousness. Interactions become akin to those in teenaged gangs, members goading each other on to more deviant forms of scientific rebellion (Farrell 2001).

#### 26.4.2.2 Essential Tensions and Paradoxes

However, these processes are also characterized by essential tensions and paradoxes (Hackett 2005; Parker 2006; Parker and Hackett 2012). Maximizing social solidarity, emotional energy, instrumental intimacy, reciprocity, and emotional commitment to the group allows research to develop in an environment sheltered from premature criticism (Gouldner 1965)<sup>13</sup>. Concomitantly, however, these same social processes create the risk of falling victim to the ‘band of brothers’ dilemma (Jasper 2004). In the emotional intensity of their collaboration the group may develop social bonds the strength of which far surpass those with the rest of the scientific community. Two risks are associated with this phenomenon. First, there exists the potential for ‘group think’ as members become totally convinced of the absolute truth of their position, committed to its realization, and resist outside opinion (Homans 1950; Janis 1972; Collins 1998, p. 24). Fleck maintains the same,

If a collective is quite sizeable and lasts for many years in a uniform mood ... it will produce solidarity and the feeling of mutual dependence among its members. They will see the same characteristic overall forms, they will believe in the dogmas of the collective philosophy of life, they will think using solely the categories of a certain style. For, “what thinks in a man, it is by no means himself, but his social community” (Fleck 1947, p. 148).

<sup>13</sup> Mullins (1973) distinguishes between ‘elite’ and ‘revolutionary’ coherent groups, noting that emotive processes are of greater intensity in revolutionary groups as their positions are more alien and require greater emotional support to sustain, and because they typically encounter greater resistance from outsiders. He also notes a direct relationship between group size and emotional intensity. Smaller groups achieve more intense interactions.

This tendency can lead to criticism and the publication of critical materials by mainstream scientists who feel their perspectives have been slighted or ignored (i.e., attacks on ethnomethodology by James Coleman (1968) and Jack Douglas (1970)). Second, highly solidary groups exclude outsiders and react rashly or even violently against those who attack or oppose them (Durkheim 1915; Simmel 1955). The same social processes that energize the group and motivate it to develop and defend its deviant perspective and practices can at their apex make skepticism more likely and complicate its management.

A second paradox is ‘getting big while remaining small’ (Parker 2006; Parker and Hackett 2012). Coherent group success requires creating deep affection among a small cadre of adherents and generating the enabling emotional conditions that allow the group to produce and defend deviant science. Ironically, however, group success can disable the same emotive dynamics that supported it in its earlier phases. With rising success the group attracts the attention of the scientific community. The network surrounding the group grows larger and research begins to diversify as experts from different areas begin colonizing the emerging research front. To continue expanding the ambit of its influence amid these developments the coherent group must also get bigger and more diverse. Doing so poses a major challenge because strong affective relationships are best realized in small group interactions (rituals) among long-term colleagues. The group’s ability to create and sustain these relationships and emotional states atrophies as it grows and diversifies. Furthermore, specific individuals play particular social roles, and as they retire or move on important socio-emotive dynamics are lost. As Griffith and Mullins (1972, p. 963) observed, “the penalty of success ... is the death of the group as a distinct social and intellectual entity.”

#### 26.4.2.3 Coherent Groups and Strategic Action Fields

Coherent groups do not exist in ether, instead occupying a ‘strategic action field’ of cultural production wherein multiple coherent groups compete over a finite amount of ‘attention space’ in

journals, conferences, and academic departments within their disciplines (Bourdieu 1990; Collins 1998; Fligstein and McAdam 2012). There exist within a discipline at any one time a relatively small number of coherent groups struggling to forward their SIM in the face of resistance from other groups attempting to do the same (i.e., ‘the law of small numbers’ Collins 1998). Disciplines are thus in part economies of competing emotional alliances among groups to win the support of the general population of active researchers. Soreanu and Hudson (2008), for example, use citation analysis to examine the emotional structure of relations in the field of international relations, finding that feminist scholars form a hub of creativity connecting the emotional energies of several research communities. In similar fashion, emotionally catalyzed fractionation of a coherent group can shape future research in the area (Krantz 1971; Coleman and Mehlman 1992; Parker and Hackett 2012). Understanding how emotionally structured interaction and competition among coherent groups shape the successes and failures of social movements within a discipline and lead (or do not) to major transformations within it are poorly understood, and remain a high research priority within this area of study.

---

## 26.5 The Institution of Science

Consideration of the affective aspects of scientific observation, work life and collaboration leads to scrutiny of the emotional foundation of science as a social institution—that is, of science as a holistic set of norms, values, and practices governing and patterning social life. The sociology of science has from its inception considered such issues (though this research has been all but overlooked by contemporary sociologists) and continues to do so today. Such work has examined the key role of emotions and sentiments for the rise and effective functioning of science as a distinct social institution. It has examined how emotions enable social control in science, and how they shape the functioning and outcomes of peer review panels. We consider each issue in turn.

### 26.5.1 The Rise of Science as a Social Institution

Robert K. Merton's (1938) pioneering work in the sociology of science began with his dissertation, and he continued throughout his life consciously to developing make this subfield into a vital subject of sociological inquiry. Early on Merton emphasized the affective scaffolding undergirding science as a social institution. His theoretical orientation as a structural functionalist occasioned a deep interest in the social conditions giving rise to science as a distinctive sphere of social activity, of the norms and values propagating its continuance, and of its (potentially contaminating) interactions with other social institutions.

*Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England* (Merton 1938), the first major American contribution to the sociology of science, specifically includes emotions as one of several explanatory factors contributing to the origin of science. This meticulous, multi-method historical investigation makes a sophisticated multi-causal argument in which cultural (i.e. values and emotions) and material (economic, demographic, militaristic) factors interact to catalyze the rise of science as a social institution wherein the quest for knowledge is justified as an end in itself.

Merton begins by establishing quantitatively that from mid-seventeenth century onward science "claimed an increasing meed of attention," and was no longer 'an errant movement finding faltering expression in occasional discoveries' (Merton 1938, p. 55). He then discusses the cultural factors that (among others) created this situation. Religion was the dominant expression of cultural values during this period, and Puritanism was the sect most notably incorporating those values. It thus became the benchmark for gauging the value of social activities. Merton's cultural analysis examines interactions between this religious ethic and science. He carefully specifies that his concern is not the content of such religious ideas, but rather 'the sentiments which give them meaning' (Merton 1938, p. 56) because the 'religious component of thought, belief and action becomes effective only when it is reinforced

by strong sentiments which lend meaning to certain forms of conduct' (Merton 1938, p. 56). Indeed, once the sociologist has 'uncovered the sentiments crystallized in religious values and the cultural orientation which governs their expression, when he has determined the extent to which this led men toward or away from scientific pursuits and perhaps influenced them not at all, then his task is, in its initial outlines, complete.' (Merton 1938, p. 56)

Merton argues that the various Protestant sects subscribed to 'a substantially identical nucleolus of religious and ethical convictions' (Merton 1938, p. 57). Calvinism spread its roots in all of these sects, and 'differences in theological minutia were brought to convergence in the actual social ethic' (Merton 1938, p. 57). Calvinists viewed the world as essentially evil, making it incumbent upon them to conquer its temptations through ceaseless work. He states, 'The sentiments with which the various Puritan sects were imbued, despite different rationalizations and theological views, led to approximately identical implications for social conduct.' (Merton 1938, p. 58). Modes of life were not so much influenced by the logical implications of the system as they were 'dominat[ed] by a particular group of sentiments' (Merton 1938, p. 59 footnote).

Merton analyzes Protestant sermons to identify the specific values on which these sentiments are centered and which they in turn support. Two main theological motives dominate these modes of life: the glorification of God through social utilitarianism and the Calvinist doctrine of predestination. In turn, these imparted values conducive to science, including diligence in one's calling; systematic, methodic, and constant labor; entry into useful and learned vocations; lauding the human faculty of reason; profitable education; knowing and glorifying God through discovery of the structure of His works; and science as the handmaid of technological utility. These emotionally sustained values interacted with a variety of material factors to give rise to science. They may be contrasted with sentiments and beliefs prevalent during the medieval period, wherein rapture was believed imminent and

scientific inquiries treated with ‘contumely and contempt’ (Merton 1938, p. 73). The seventeenth century thus witnessed the drawing together of the prerequisites for establishing science as a social institution, including a network of talented intellectuals, a maturing experimental method, systematic and accumulating empirical scientific knowledge, and an emotionally animated ‘complex of social attitudes which, for various reasons, religious, economically utilitarian and idealistic, was favorable to scientific interests’ (Merton 1938, p. 78).

### 26.5.2 Norms and Interactions with Other Institutions

Merton insisted that deep emotional commitments by scientists to a specific professional ethos permitted the proper functioning of the scientific institution. From his essay “*Science and the Social Order*”:

The ethos of science refers to an emotionally toned complex of rules, prescriptions, mores, beliefs, values and presuppositions which are held to be binding on the scientist ... This ethos, as social codes generally, is sustained by the sentiments of those to whom it applies. Transgression is curbed by internalized prohibitions and by disapproving emotional reactions which are mobilized by the supporters of the ethos. Once given an effective ethos of this type, resentment, scorn, and other attitudes of antipathy operate automatically to stabilize the existing structure. (Merton [1938], 1973, FN 15)

Science is thus enabled by the existence among its practitioners of emotionally sustained adherence to particular norms governing practice, and by emotionally permeated moral opprobrium from other scientists when these norms are transgressed. Emotional commitment to the scientific ethos thus acts simultaneously as an instrument of social coordination and as an agent of social control to allow for institutional stability. The norms governing scientific practice are in turn legitimized by institutional values and imperatives related to the primary goal of science: the extension of certified knowledge.

The emotionally impregnated scientific norms identified by Merton (1973) include *universalism*—truth claims are assessed by impersonal criteria; *communism*—scientific findings are the product of social collaboration and assigned collectively to the community; *disinterestedness*—knowledge is sought and rewarded for its own sake; *organized skepticism*—all scientific findings are subject to scrutiny by the scientific community. We may add to this well-known list the norms and corresponding sentiments specifying that science must be *pure* in the sense of being unadulterated by the concerns or controls of other social institutions, and that science should be grounded in *basic* as opposed to applied inquiry (see Merton 1973, pp. 260–261).

Merton also foreshadowed the emotionally laden conflict between science and society that arose in the late twentieth century. Emotionally reinforced scientific norms contradict the mandates of other social institutions. For instance, the normative requirement of basic research leads to social conflict when powerful social groups oppose the implications or uses of such research (Merton 1973, p. 261). Such was the case with weapons technologies during the mid-twentieth century US (Moore 2008). With impressive foresight Merton wrote “Insofar as these effects are deemed socially undesirable, science is charged with responsibility ... Examined from this perspective, the tenet of pure science and disinterestedness has prepared its own epitaph.” (Merton 1973, p. 263). Additionally, universalistic scientific standards oppose the nationalist (or racist or classist) programs of totalitarian rule, while organized skepticism appears sacrilegious to those maintaining the autonomy of ‘sacred’ social phenomena from the harsh light of objective scientific analysis (Merton 1973, pp. 259–261, 264–266)<sup>14</sup>. Finally, Merton argues that scientific

<sup>14</sup> Religion is the obvious antagonist of science, today as it was during the Enlightenment. However, all social institutions involve ‘a sacred area that is resistant to the profane examination in terms of scientific examination and logic.’ (Merton 1938, p. 265). Thus, these considerations are not limited to conflicts between science and religion. For instance, the norm of organized skepticism is itself



ic specialization and esoteric knowledge results in an increasing gap between scientists and the general public, who ‘retain a certain suspicion of these bizarre new theories’ (Merton 1938, p. 164). Contemporary ‘debates’ about evolution, climate change, and stem cell therapies may be understood in this context.

### 26.5.3 Social Control and Peer Review

#### 26.5.3.1 Hagstrom’s Gift Exchange Model

Warren Hagstrom’s (1965) classic, *The Scientific Community*, offers a gift exchange model of social control in science that is at its basis affectively maintained. Hagstrom begins with a functionalist claim that scientific progress requires investigators to concern themselves only with scientific truth seeking; science should be unadulterated by rational calculations of reward or punishment (Hagstrom 1965, p. 11). Still, it is obvious that gratification results from recognition for one’s work by the scientific community, that anger and/or shame result from rejection, and that their combined effects shape the behavior and motivation of individual scientists (Hagstrom 1965, p. 13). Here arises an obvious tension. How is it possible to maintain a strong commitment to scientific values within the community while also allocating individual recognition in an unbiased manner?

Hagstrom argues that these seemingly antithetical requirements are possible because science is based on a gift-exchange economy. Gift exchange economies work well in systems that rely on the ability of well-socialized people to operate independently of formal controls, where strong value commitments are expected, and where rational calculation of personal advantage or disadvantage is considered an improper basis

for decision making (Hagstrom 1965, p. 21). Scientific discoveries, manuscripts and inventions are ‘gifts’ given by scientists to the community. This remains the case. We do not sell our discoveries to the highest bidder, but are expected to give them freely to others in what is ostensibly the pursuit of basic scientific knowledge. In some fields scientists themselves pay publication fees. In science as in gift exchange, gifts are given without consideration of reciprocity, other than diffuse gratitude. That they are freely given ensures the continued autonomy of the scientist and purity of their research because formal economic exchanges have not occurred and so no dependence on others is created. Gifts freely given to the scientific community also reinforce the universality of scientific standards (Hagstrom 1965, p. 22).

Once given, scientific gifts may or may not receive recognition at various levels within the scientific community<sup>15</sup>. *Institutionalized recognition* occurs through publication in scientific periodicals. *Elementary recognition* occurs through interpersonal acclamation at scientific conferences, workshops, and in the corridors and offices of academic departments and research centers. And much of this also works as a gift-exchange system also, albeit less formalized than publication, as scientists trade penultimate preprints of forthcoming articles, scientific materials, methodological esotericism, tacit knowledge, and the like. Both forms of recognition generate gratitude and pride (Hagstrom 1965, p. 13), reinforce scientific values and standards, and (implicitly, but clearly, in Hagstrom’s account) motivate continued scientific work. Anticipating contemporary research by 40 years (i.e. Farrell 2001; Parker

‘sacred’ to science and in an important sense an untestable article of faith. Scientists exhibit strong emotional reactions when the principle of organized skepticism is leveled reflexively at the assumption that organized skepticism is good in and of itself. The sacred is hardly limited to religion.

<sup>15</sup> A lack of recognition also has very real emotional consequences, despite the fact that the gift is ostensibly given without that expectation. Hagstrom notes, “While this orientation is consistent with the scientist’s need for autonomy ... it also contains a strong element of the tragic. Scientists learn to *expect* injustice, the inequitable distribution of rewards (Hagstrom 1965, p. 22). We join Hagstrom in citing Weber on this aspect of the scientific vocation, “Do you in all conscious believe that you can stand seeing mediocrity after mediocrity, year after year, climb beyond you?” ... I have found only a few men who can endure this situation without coming to grief.”

and Hackett 2012; Corte 2013), Hagstrom argues that the interpersonal and informal esteem of elementary recognition are the more direct forms of gratification, and formative of the scientific confidence required for developing creative work. Thus, elementary recognition allocated in primary groups of scientists makes research meaningful and reinforces the effects of the institutional recognition (Hagstrom 1965, p. 36). Social control of the scientific institution is derivative of social control within interpersonal scientific groups and networks.

### 26.5.3.2 Peer Review Panels

Emotions are also present within and substantially influence institutionalized scientific peer review. Lamont (2009) examines the affective dynamics of social interaction and scientific evaluation in professional peer review panels. She first notes that inclusion in high profile peer review panels gives panelists the pleasure, pride and motivation associated with being at the center of academic attention space (see also Collins 1998). Additionally, correctly functioning peer review panels necessitate substantial emotional control and engineering. Professional staff who manage peer review committees must prevent the formation of excessive alliances, forestall acrimonious disagreement, and undertake emotional repair work of those who feel jilted by other panelists (Lamont 2009, p. 46). The quality of a panelist is judged by his or her ability to present an appropriate professional 'self,' including convincing moral and emotional characteristics (Lamont 2009, p. 113). Overly collegial panels can wind up subtly reinforcing each other's evaluations because they respect and like others with similar opinions, and come to trust their judgment (Lamont 2009, p. 150; see also Janis 1972; Parker and Hackett 2012). Low levels of collegiality are corrosive because tension ridden interactions undermine the group's ability to achieve consensus (Lamont 2009, p. 140). Body language and unconscious verbal expressivity play key roles in these processes.

Emotions also directly shape panelists' judgments of scientific excellence. One's emotional experiences, professional and personal, influence

the emotional appeal of scientific proposals and products, and thus color one's evaluation. Scientists reward work (symbolically, via publication, and financially, via funding) that corresponds to their own affective attachment to particular ideas or phenomena. Moreover, evaluations are influenced by perceptions that the proposing researcher exhibits positive moral qualities (e.g. humility, boldness, determination, authenticity and work ethic). That is to say, panelists choose, and are emotionally geared to accept and positively evaluate, ideas from scholars whom they view to be worthy of moral admiration (Lamont 2009, pp. 189–195). To this we may add that proposals and products exhibiting exceptional aesthetic qualities (e.g. achieving a perfect balance between research questions, theory, methods, and evidence) elicit emotional approval, valorization and positive evaluations, though these may in fact be ancillary to their scientific merit (Lamont 2009, p. 182). It is thus not that scientific review panels need to be emotionless, but rather they need to be emotional in appropriate ways.

---

## 26.6 Looking Forward

Taken together, research suggests several potentially fruitful avenues for advancing understanding of the role of emotions in contemporary science. Research bridging organizational environments, scientific work, emotion and knowledge production is particularly needed. It remains unclear how and to what extent different methods of organizing research structure scientific work life, researchers' emotional experiences, and the form, content and creative potential of their research. Systematic examinations across strategically sampled disciplines and research environments can substantially advance understanding of these issues, and also have the potential to advance science policies aimed at promoting innovation and transformative research. Discovering the conditions enabling propitious emotional experiences and creative episodes may allow scientific work to be consciously orchestrated to better effect in the research centers and laboratories of the future.

We need to know more about small group dynamics, emotions, and knowledge production. Scientific collaboration has become ubiquitous and small group collaboration remains the rule across most fields (Wuchty et al. 2007). Still, much of what is known or has been implied about emotions within scientific collaborations is drawn from other social groups (e.g. art groups or philosophical networks—Farrell 2001; Collins 1998) or relate to more general sociological processes (e.g. flow, instrumental intimacy). Much work remains to confirm the existence and importance of these emotions within scientific collaborations, and to identify emotional states, processes and relationships unique to them. *Key questions include:* What are the emotional dynamics underlying group stability, change and collapse? and How do these interact with intellectual processes to shape the group's scientific performance and fate within the broader research community?

We must also begin rigorous empirical testing of relations among flow, bodily and vocal entrainment, emotional energy, and creativity. To date, such research has proceeded qualitatively and been linked to creativity mainly through historical recreation. *In vivo* observations of flow states leading to creative breakthroughs are rare; attempts to measure and correlate emotional energy with creativity are rarer still. This work pleads for quantitative cross-validation. Advanced sociometers—wearable sensors capable of measuring face-to-face interactions, vocal prosody, mirroring and bodily energetics quantitatively at micro-second resolutions—now provide the ability to measure directly the precipitates of flow and emotional energy in small groups (Pentland 2010). Sociometric data, blended with ethnographic observations of creative scientific episodes, survey data, and in-depth interviews with researchers, will permit testing causal links between emotional production and scientific creativity.

We also need better comparative data across scientific associations and disciplines. For instance, corporate and academic sciences proceed through similar epistemological processes but the context and consequences of their work are quite

different (Schleifer and Penders 2011). How are the emotional elements of scientific work that is conducted for profit different from those in higher education? What are the emotional cultures of these environments, how do they compare to academe, and what do these conditions mean for the emotional experiences of researchers within them? Relatedly, different disciplinary cultures imbue strong emotional attachment to particular values systems, ideas and methods (Scheff 1995; Becher and Trowler 2001). The same is likely true of different professional sectors charged with producing scientific knowledge (i.e. public policy makers, academics, private think tanks—see Hampton and Parker 2011). Advancing holistic scientific knowledge, human well-being, and solving pressing social and environmental problems will require understanding and overcoming such barriers.

Another potentially fruitful and unexplored line of research lies in understanding emotional dimensions of interactions between scientists and the public. Scientific norms, practices and findings often challenge the beliefs and values of other communities and groups (Merton 1973). Public engagement with science can lead to emotionally charged conflict. Current controversies about teaching evolution, or the use of advanced computer science techniques to monitor all of the world's electronic communications, are indicative of the deep emotional nature of these exchanges. Emotional responses to scientific advancement determine much about whether, how, and when scientific knowledge will be resisted or integrated into society. Researching emotive relations between science, governance and society are key aspects of public understanding of science and the new political sociology of science.

Linking the sociology of emotion to the sociology of science also advances the sociology of knowledge. Whereas classical work used primarily ahistorical, deterministic theories of intellectual production, 'the new sociology of ideas' and the 'sociology of thinking' instead argue for the importance of biography, historical contingency, local social environments and intellectual self-conceptions for shaping ideas and research trajectories (e.g. Camic and Gross 2004). Such

research has focused on individuals rather than groups (Li 2010), and has yet to systematically apply the sociology of emotions to these issues. Understanding how emotions shape scientific knowledge production will advance understanding of the sociology of knowledge, ideas, and thinking.

Finally, emotions may offer an unrealized means to explain deviant scientific practice (e.g. Wakefield's fraudulent association of MMR vaccine with autism). The fiercely competitive nature of contemporary science, the current dearth of jobs and specter of losing one's position for failing to meet ever greater tenure requirements, and the potential for pecuniary benefit as science becomes linked to other social purposes can create strong emotional incentives to cut corners and engage in scientific misconduct (Hackett 1994). Furthermore, the same emotional conditions that facilitate highly creative scientific work (i.e. deep commitment to a group and its ideas, in-group solidarity, instrumental intimacy and escalating reciprocity) can lead to the discovery and verification of scientific chimeras (e.g. N-rays, the Allison Effect), or 'pathological science' wherein 'people are tricked into false results ... by subjective effects, wishful thinking, and threshold interactions' (Langmuir 1953). Indeed, it should come as no surprise that when such groups isolate themselves too completely from the scientific mainstream or fail to engage in adequate intra-group skepticism that they may adopt as articles of faith scientific truths that have yet to be adequately tested.

The study of the interplay between emotions and science is rapidly emerging as a generative research area nearly a century after its potential was first glimpsed by foundational researchers. This situation, combined with the reemergence of small group studies as a vital subject matter (c.f. Farrell 2001; Fine 2012, 2014; Corte 2013), new work in the sociology of knowledge and creativity, all aided and abetted by new methods and advanced research technologies, have set the stage for exciting new research with the potential to fundamentally transform our understanding of science as a process, profession and social

institution. We are poised to capitalize on fresh ways of theorizing, analyzing and encouraging the creation of original scientific knowledge and new technologies. Insights gleaned from this emerging research front will also advance general sociological understanding by shedding new light on the elemental social processes of knowledge production, creativity, sociality, and collective action. We must now rise to the intellectual challenge first expressed by our far-sighted intellectual forbearers and work to realize its full potential.

---

## References

- Altheide, D. L. (1977). *The Sociology of Alfred Schultz*. In Existential Sociology, edited by Jack Douglas and John M. Johnson. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Barbalet, J. (2002). Science and emotions. In J. Barbalet (Ed.), *Emotions and sociology* (pp. 132–150). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Barbalet, J. (2009). Consciousness, emotions, and science. In D. Hopkins, H. Kuzmics, H. Flam, & J. Klrerer (Eds.), *Theorizing emotions: Sociological explanations and applications* (pp. 39–72). Frankfurt: Camus.
- Barbalet, J. (2011). Emotions beyond regulation: Backgrounded emotions in science and trust. *Emotion Review*, 3(1), 36–43.
- Becher, T., & Trowler, P. (2001). *Academic tribes and territories: Intellectual enquiry and the cultures of disciplines*. Berkshire: Open University Press.
- Bloch, C. (2002). Managing the emotions of competition and recognition in academia. In J. Barbalet (Ed.), *Emotions and sociology* (pp. 113–131). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Bloch, C. (2012). *Passion and paranoia: Emotions and the culture of emotion in academia*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Bourdieu, P. (1990). *Homo academicus*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Burke, P. J., & Stets, J. E. (1999). Trust and commitment through self-verification. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 62(4), 347–366.
- Camic, C. & Gross, N. (2004). The New Sociology of Ideas. In J. R. Blau, *The Blackwell Companion to Sociology*. Malden-Oxford: Blackwell.
- Coleman, J. S. (1968). Review of: Studies in ethnomethodology. *American Sociological Review*, 33(1), 126–130.
- Coleman, S. R., & Mehlman, S. E. (1992). An empirical update (1969–1989) of D. L. Krantz's thesis that the experimental analysis of behavior is isolated. *The Behavior Analyst*, 15, 43–39.
- Collins, R. (1975). *Conflict sociology: Toward an explanatory science*. New York: Academic.



- Collins, R. (1998). *The sociology of philosophies: A global theory of intellectual change*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Collins, R. (2000). *The sociology of philosophies: A précis*. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 30, 157–201.
- Collins, R. (2002). On the acromoniousness of intellectual disputes. *Common Knowledge*, 8(1), 47–70.
- Corte, U. (2013). A refinement of collaborative circles theory: Resource mobilization and innovation in an emerging sport. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 76(1), 25–51.
- Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1996). *Creativity: Flow and the psychology of discovery and invention*. New York: Harper Perennial.
- Damasio, A. R. (1994). *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain*. New York, NY: GP Putnam's Sons.
- Descartes, R. (1960). *Meditations on First Philosophy*. Pearson.
- Douglas, J. D. (1970). *Understanding everyday life: Toward the reconstruction of sociological knowledge*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Douglas, J. D., & Johnson, J. M. (1977). *Existential sociology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Durkheim, E. ([1915]/2001). *The elementary forms of religious life*. New York: Free Press.
- Edmonds, D., & Edinow, J. (2005). *Wittgenstein's poker: The story of a ten-minute argument between two great philosophers*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Farrell, M. P. (2001). *Collaborative circles: Friendship dynamics and creative work*. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
- Fine, G. A. (1979). Small groups and culture creation: The idioculture of little league baseball teams. *American Sociological Review*, 44(5), 733–745.
- Fine, G. A. (2012). *Tiny Publics: A Theory of Group Action and Culture*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation Publications.
- Fine, G. A. (2014). *The Hing: Civil Society, Group Culture, and the Interaction Order*. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 77(1), 5–26.
- Fleck, L. ([1935a]/1981). *Genesis and development of a scientific fact*. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
- Fleck, L. ([1935b]/1986). Scientific observation and perception in general. In R. S. Cohen & T. Schnelle (Eds.), *Cognition and fact: Materials on Ludwick Fleck* (pp. 59–78). Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
- Fleck, L. ([1936]/1986). The problem of epistemology. In R. S. Cohen & T. Schnelle (Eds.), *Cognition and fact: Materials on Ludwick Fleck* (pp. 79–112). Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
- Fleck, L. ([1947]/1986). To look, to see, to know. In R. S. Cohen & T. Schnelle (Eds.), *Cognition and fact: Materials on Ludwick Fleck* (pp. 129–152). Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
- Fligstein, N., & McAdam, D. (2012). *A theory of fields*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Frickel, S., & Gross, N. (2005). A general theory of scientific/intellectual movements. *American Sociological Review*, 70(2), 204–232.
- Goodfield, J. (1981). *An imagined world*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Goodstein, D. L. (1995). After the big crunch. *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-), 19(3), 53–60.
- Goodstein, D. L. (2000). In defense of Robert Andrews Millikan. *Engineering and Science*, 4, 31–37.
- Gouldner, A. W. (1965). *Enter Plato*. New York: Basic Books.
- Griffith, B., & Mullins, N. C. (1972). Coherent groups in scientific change: “Invisible Colleges” may be consistent throughout science. *Science*, 177, 959–964.
- Gross, N. (2002). *Becoming a Pragmatist Philosopher: Status, Self-Concept, and Intellectual Choice*. *American Sociological Review* 67, 52–76.
- Hackett, E. J. (1990). Science as a vocation in the 1990s: The changing organizational culture of academic science. *The Journal of Higher Education*, 61(3), 241–279.
- Hackett, E. J. (1994). A social control perspective on scientific misconduct. *The Journal of Higher Education*, 65(3), 242–260.
- Hackett, E. J. (2005). Essential tensions: Identity, control and risk in research. *Social Studies of Science*, 35(5), 787–826.
- Hagstrom, W. O. (1965). *The scientific community*. New York: Basic Books.
- Hampton, S. H., & Parker, J. N. (2011). Collaboration and productivity in scientific synthesis. *BioScience*, 61(11), 900–910.
- Hermanowicz, J. C. (2003). Scientists and satisfaction. *Social Studies of Science*, 33(1), 45–73.
- Hermanowicz, J. C. (2005). Scientists and self-doubt across strata of academic science. *Research in Higher Education*, 46(3), 309–326.
- Hermanowicz, J. C. (2012). The sociology of academic careers: Problems and prospects. In M. B. Paulson (Ed.), *Higher education: Handbook of theory and research* (pp. 207–248). New York: Springer.
- Hoffman, B., & Helen, D. (1973). *Einstein: Creator and Rebel*. Penguin Group.
- Homans, G. C. (1950). *The human group*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Hook, E. B. (2002). *Prematurity in scientific discovery*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Irwin, K. (2006). *Into the Dark Heart of Ethnography: The Lived Ethics and Inequality of Intimate Field Relationships*. *Qualitative Sociology* 25, 199–175.
- Jacob, F. ([1987]/1995). *The statue within: An autobiography*. Plainview: Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press.
- Janis, I. L. (1972). *Victims of groupthink: A psychological study of foreign-policy decisions and fiascoes*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
- Jasper, J. M. (2004). A strategic approach to collective action: Looking for agency in social-movement choices. *Mobilization*, 9, 1–16.
- Johnson, J. M. (1975). *Doing field research*. New York: Free Press.
- Keller, E. F. (1984). *Feeling for the organism: The life and work of Barbara McClintock*. New York: Freeman.



- Kleinman, S., & Copp, M. A. (1993). *Emotions and field-work*. New York: Sage.
- Knorr-Cetina, K. (1999). *Epistemic cultures: How the sciences make knowledge*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Krantz, D. L. (1971). The separate worlds of operant and non-operant psychology. *Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis*, 4, 61–70.
- Lamont, M. P. (2009). *How professors think: Inside the curious world of academic judgment*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Langmuir, I. (1953). Pathological science. Colloquium at The Knolls Research Laboratory. <http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~ken/Langmuir/langmuir.htm>. Accessed 9 June 2014.
- Li, J. (2010). Intellectual's political orientations: Towards an analytic sociology. *Asian Social Science*, 6(12), 3–15.
- Long, J. S. & Mary F. F. (1995). *Scientific careers: Universalism and particularism*. *Annual Review of Sociology* 21,45–71.
- Merton, R. K. ([1938]/1970). *Science technology and society in seventeenth century England*. New York: Howard Fertig.
- Merton, R. K. (1968). *The Matthew effect in science: The reward and communication systems of science are considered*. *Science*, 159(3810), 56–63.
- Merton, R. K. (1969). Behavior patterns of scientists. *The American Scholar*, 38(2), 197–225.
- Merton, R. K. (1973). *The sociology of science: Theoretical and empirical investigations*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mitroff, I. I. (1974). Norms and counter-norms in a select group of the Apollo moon scientists: A case study of the ambivalence of scientists. *American Sociological Review*, 39(4), 579–595.
- Moore, K. (2008). *Disrupting science: Social movements, American scientists, and the politics of the military, 1945–1975*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Mullins, N. C. (1972). The development of a scientific specialty: The phage group and the origins of molecular biology. *Minerva*, 10(1), 51–82.
- Mullins, N. C. (1973). *Theories and theory groups in contemporary American sociology*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Nasaday, P. (2008). Adaptive co-management and the gospel of resilience. In D. Armitage, F. Berkes, & N. Doubleday (Eds.), *Adaptive co-management: Collaboration, learning, and multilevel governance* (pp. 208–227). Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
- Owen-Smith, J. (2001). Managing laboratory work through skepticism: Processes of evaluation and control. *American Sociological Review*, 66(3), 427–452.
- Parker, J. N. (2010). Integrating the social into the ecological: Organizational and research group challenges. In J. N. Parker, N. Vermeulen, & B. Penders (Eds.), *Collaboration in the new life sciences* (pp. 85–109). London: Ashgate.
- Parker, J. N., & Hackett, E. J. (2012). Hot spots and hot moments in scientific collaborations and social movements. *American Sociological Review*, 77(1), 21–44.
- Parker, J. N., Vermeulen, N., & Penders, B. (2010). *Collaboration in the new life sciences*. London: Ashgate.
- Plato. 2007. *The Republic*. Penguin Classics.
- Pentland, A. (2010). *Honest Signals: how they shape our world*. MIT Press; Cambridge, MA.
- Rose-Greenland, F. (2013). Seeing the unseen: Prospective loading and knowledge forms in archaeological discovery. *Qualitative Sociology*, 36, 251–277.
- Sawyer, K. (2007). *Group genius: The creative power of collaboration*. New York: Basic Books.
- Scheff, T. J. (1988). Shame and conformity: The deference-emotion system. *American Sociological Review*, 53(3), 395–406.
- Scheff, T. J. (1995). Academic gangs. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 23(2), 157–162.
- Scheff, T. J. (1997). *Emotions, the social bond, and human reality: Part/whole analysis*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Schleifer, D., & Penders, B. (2011). Food, drugs, and TV: The social study of corporate science. *Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society*, 36, 431–434.
- Shapin, S. (1995). *A social history of truth: Civility and science in seventeenth-century England*. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
- Shapin, S. (2008). *The scientific life: A moral history of a late modern vocation*. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
- Shrum, W., Chompalov, I., & Genuth, J. (2001). Trust, conflict and performance in scientific collaborations. *Social Studies of Science*, 31(5), 681–730.
- Simmel, G. (1955). *Conflict and web of group-affiliations*. New York: Free Press.
- Slaughter, S., & Rhoades, G. (2004). *Academic capitalism and the new economy: Markets, state, and higher education*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Soreanu, R., & Hudson, D. (2008). Feminist scholarship in international relations and the politics of disciplinary emotion. *Millennium—Journal of International Studies*, 37(1), 123–151.
- Stahl, F. (2001). *Alfred Day Hershey. Biographical memoirs*. Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences.
- Twain, M. (1869). *The Innocents Abroad*. Hartford: American Publishing
- Uttal, W. (2007). *The immeasurable mind: The real science of psychology*. Amherst: Prometheus Books.
- Weber, M. (1918). Science as a vocation. In C. W. Mills & H. H. Gerth (Eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in sociology* (pp. 77–128). New York: Oxford.
- Wendt, G. R. (1949). The development of a psychological cult. *American Psychologist*, 4(10), 426–426.
- Wiley, N. (1994). *The semiotic self*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Wuchty, S., Jones, B. F., & Uzzi, B. (2007). The increasing dominance of teams in production of knowledge. *Science*, 316(5827), 1036–1039.

---

# Index

## A

Activity  
  dimension 55, 58  
  dynamics 55  
  processes 55  
Adulthood 162, 386, 390–393, 414, 435, 459, 482, 483  
Advantage  
  economic 390  
  racial 402  
Affect control theory (ACT)  
  emotion model 51, 53, 69  
  emotion dynamics in 54  
  framework on emotions 51  
  three affective dimensions 51  
Affection 156, 207, 267, 399, 400, 419, 504, 532, 559, 564  
Affective commitments 80, 90, 93, 531, 542, 544  
Affective meaning  
  fundamental dimensions of 59  
  activity 51  
  evaluation 51  
  potency 51  
Affective mediation 513, 515, 520, 523, 524  
Affective space  
  three dimensional 51, 63, 72  
Age-Graded Theory of Social Control 480, 482  
Aggression 65, 169, 224, 247–251, 254, 263–268, 318, 340, 362–366, 394, 415, 480, 481, 503  
Alienation (emotional) 387, 397  
Altruism  
  own status and 165, 166  
Amygdala 16, 110, 268–276, 279, 290, 295, 296  
Anger 21, 136, 137, 250, 312, 339, 340, 479, 541, 552  
  identity 483  
Angry 42, 65, 103, 105, 115, 119, 135–137, 190, 192, 196, 212–216, 249–253, 264, 340, 377  
Anomie 318, 429, 478  
Anthropology 217, 230, 466  
Anxiety 111, 116, 136, 138, 188, 195, 228, 272  
  diffuse 20, 186, 189, 190, 192, *see also* Fear  
Apathy 403, 529  
Apes  
  behavioral propensities 12, 22  
  ecology 15, 21  
  species of 11, 13, 15, 21  
  sociality 18

  social structures 12  
  social ties 12  
  traits of 14  
Appraisal theory 69, 70, 107, 288  
Ashamed 190, 240, 251, 262, 465, 537  
Assimilation–accommodation processes 69  
Authenticity 157, 159, 214, 236, 347, 350, 394, 395, 399, 568  
Autonomy 160, 167–170, 222, 232, 343, 346, 348, 396, 397, 459, 462, 463, 499, 515, 537, 544, 566, 567  
Attributions 3, 58, 82, 87, 89–94, 97, 98, 113, 121, 127, 139, 145, 190, 191, 196, 514  
  as defense mechanisms 21

## B

Band of brothers 532, 563  
Barriers 131, 193, 341, 376, 389, 402, 405, 474, 481, 515, 539, 559, 569  
Belonging 70, 118, 212, 235, 261, 393–395, 531, 533, 556  
Blame 95, 98, 118, 121, 192, 212, 403, 420, 480, 540, 544  
Bodily emotion work 417  
Body language 23, 24, 144, 269, 568  
Boundaries (moral) 388  
Brain  
  imaging 110  
  plasticity 277  
Burnout 372, 397

## C

Care 161, 163, 246, 255, 348–351, 362, 365, 368–372, 416, 417  
Catharsis 4, 234, 245–249, 251–254, 264, 265, 497  
Causal role 455, 459, 463  
Characteristic emotion 59–62  
Childhood emotional socialization 68, 396  
Circumstantial emotion norms 59  
Cladistic analysis 12–14  
Class 385, 390, 396  
Classic strain theory 478  
Classical criminology 474, 475  
Close personal relationships 112

- Cognition 3, 6, 106, 107, 121, 267, 268, 271, 294, 298, 310, 374, 378, 412, 451, 456, 458, 459, 462, 550
- Cognitive  
 assessments 486  
 component 62, 88, 324, 484
- Coherent groups 562–564
- Cohesion 82, 97
- Collaboration 7, 85, 87, 94, 96, 189, 207, 341, 523, 550, 559–566, 569
- Collective effervescence 80, 202, 203, 208, 209, 214–218, 236, 496, 500, 507, 532  
 chains of ritual interaction 207
- Comparison 14, 40, 81, 90, 94, 104–108, 129, 143, 163, 218, 258, 290, 321, 341, 414, 438, 442, 514, 516, 523
- Compression 70
- Community 14, 62, 71, 88, 234, 246, 261, 375, 438, 460, 481, 484, 501, 507
- Compassion 59, 288, 349, 350, 464, 522, 542–544
- Contempt 107, 116–118, 135, 195, 258, 462, 464, 544, 566
- Continuance commitment 80
- Coping (mechanisms) 386
- Co-presence 96, 97, 205, 207, 214, 216, 514
- Courage 170, 500, 534
- Crime 473, 483, 484
- Criminal justice 201, 210, 211
- Criminological theory 474, 476
- Cultural differences 58, 234, 364, 367, 452, 461, 465
- Culture-as-toolkit models 458
- D**
- Dating websites 516, 517
- Deep acting 64, 65, 343–347, 351, 397, 466
- Defense mechanisms 21, 189, 190, 195, 196, 268
- Defensive othering 388
- Demeanor 64, 71, 144, 206, 340, 345
- Depression 132, 321, 430
- Desistance 6, 473, 474, 480–483, 487, 488
- Despair 164, 277, 316, 323, 385, 388, 536, 538, 540
- Deterrence doctrine 475
- Deviants' emotions 56
- Differential Association Theory 477
- Digital  
 computer technology 511  
 technology 523, 525
- Dignity 104, 158, 192, 259, 343, 348, 387–390, 397, 505, 537, 541, 543
- Disadvantage  
 economic 386–388, 390  
 racial 386
- Disappointment 47, 106, 110–114, 136, 187, 479, 498, 533, 544, 555
- Discourse  
 of emotion 412  
 of honor 232  
 of professionalism 399
- Discrimination 103, 118, 119, 195, 222, 340, 342, 389–392, 404, 405, 414, 416, 502, 503
- Discursive 228, 231–236, 240, 241, 524
- Disgust 107, 110, 115, 116, 135, 187, 251, 274, 279, 288, 391, 403, 420, 451, 455
- Distal bias 21, 190, 191
- Distinctive sentiments 57
- Distress 34, 43, 62, 63, 105, 109, 110, 159, 344, 389, 422, 429–444
- Distributive and procedural justice theories 120
- Distributive injustice 103–106, 109–111, 114, 115, 121
- Distrust 312, 325, 329, 389, 515, 516
- Divinity 462
- Division of labor 112, 113, 144, 161, 181, 317, 350, 369, 370, 374, 417, 418
- Domestic labor 372, 416–418
- Dual-process models 451, 458, 459  
 collective effervescence and sources of morality 202  
 unregulated passions of boom and bust 317
- E**
- Ecological analysis 12, 14
- Economy 307, 310–313, 329, 349
- Educational 130, 134, 140, 145, 159, 180, 375, 377, 391–393, 415, 436
- Elevation 166, 167, 212, 463, 464
- Embarrassed 52, 143, 144, 205, 259, 263, 264, 465
- Embarrassment 19, 38, 39, 56, 144, 224, 249, 252, 255, 259, 262, 288, 362, 375, 388, 415, 419, 453
- Emotion  
 anticipated 47, 456, 478–481  
 authentic 224, 444  
 co-occurring 480  
 cultures 421, 422, 440, 442  
 distribution of 366, 372, 386, 387, 396  
 dynamics 54–56, 62, 70, 119  
 experienced 127, 167, 291  
 expressed 127, 284  
 equations  
 gender equations in 58  
 fictional 238–241  
 as a form of social distinction 401  
 habits 386, 390–392, 397  
 inauthentic 286, 438  
 ineffable 3, 51, 64, 68, 69, 71, 72  
 justice 113  
 labels 53, 63, 68, 70, 71, 286  
 labor  
 as a racial project 399  
 embodied 398  
 management  
 four-factor model of 62  
 interpersonal 62, 64  
 measures 4, 488  
 models 251, 361  
 moral 120, 255, 459  
 variation 463, 464–466  
 naturalized 279, 397  
 norm  
 prescriptive 59, 71  
 potency 54, 55, 58, 63  
 primary 18, 187, 188, 483

- reformulative 71
- regulation 343–347, 350–353, 364, 366, 477, 482
- repression of 254, 497
- as resources 4
- socially-constructed 62
- sociology 70, 72, 268, 278, 283, 405, 441, 443, 474, 480, 512, 523, 569
- space
  - three dimensional 63
- stratification of 191, 311
- structural model of 112
- theories of 69
- transmutation of 190
- types of 115, 240, 274
- virtual 240
- wellbeing 166, 168, 308, 366, 386, 387, 391, 396, 438, 440, 445, 555
- work 353, 369
- Emotional**
  - arousal 4, 26, 106, 182, 193, 194, 250, 251, 274, 287, 504
  - capital 5, 236, 359, 360, 368, 374, 375, 391, 396, 397, 401, 405, 415, 422, 424
  - capitalism 227
  - compensation 115, 116, 515
  - contradictions 386
  - and cognition 6, 268, 310, 451
  - control 222, 223, 226, 317, 366, 392, 395, 398, 402, 568
  - cultures 393, 413, 415, 420–422, 530, 569
  - dilemmas 398, 400, 420–423
  - displays 25, 68, 343–347, 351, 363–365, 391, 395–403, 414, 535
  - distinctions 394, 401, 415
  - distress 119, 387, 405, 431–444
  - dynamics 4, 7, 51–55, 77, 179, 187, 191, 196, 212, 235, 311, 402, 405, 418, 422, 529, 545, 569
  - energy 21, 181, 186, 187–195, 207–218, 236, 284–287, 299, 311, 350, 443, 500, 505, 514, 515, 532–538, 555, 559–563, 569
  - expectations 5, 386, 392–399, 405
  - exploitation 396, 400
  - expression 5, 58–61, 64, 71, 113, 127, 141, 143, 212, 224, 230–234, 241, 248, 249, 336, 342, 351, 353
  - and feeling 273
  - foundations 392, 396
  - freedom 236, 399
  - habits 5, 386, 390–392, 397, 405
  - habitus 225, 230, 376, 397
  - hierarchies 5, 386, 401, 402
  - inequality 348, 353, 385, 424
  - intimacies 402
  - investment 376, 377, 391
  - label 61
  - labor 5, 6, 116, 335, 336, 343–353, 368, 371, 386, 396–400, 404, 419, 421, 438, 442, 496–499, 507
  - liability 17, 18
  - micropolitics 413, 423
  - monitoring 390
  - norms 226, 241, 242, 395, 419, 420
  - performance 359, 372
  - rehabilitation 401
  - resilience 392
  - responses 4, 33, 40, 53, 59, 70, 103–106, 114–121, 225, 277, 337, 353, 391, 400, 404, 484, 502, 507, 519
  - restraint 340, 378, 391, 394, 401, 415, 423
  - segregation 402–405
  - skills 386, 391–393
  - socialization 68, 360–367, 374, 386, 392–396, 415, 418, 420, 440–444
  - standards 223, 224, 227, 386, 390, 398, 401–405
  - stations 3, 51
  - stereotypes 393, 394, 404, 413
  - strength 394
  - style 227, 274–277, 394, 441
  - subcultures 213, 394
- Emotives 233, 234
- Empathy 2, 24–27, 43, 71, 103, 107, 116, 120, 167, 168, 240, 253, 277–280, 285, 296, 362, 376, 403, 414, 419, 422, 451, 457–464, 473, 499, 531, 542, 543
- Enacting identity 51, 59, 60
- Entitlement 392
- Envy 2, 164, 166, 279
- EPA
  - space 71
  - three dimensional 68
- Expressive
  - actions 57, 71
  - behaviors 64, 83, 139, 363
- Evaluation
  - dimension 55
  - dynamics 54
  - processes 55
- Evaluation-Potency-Activity, *see* EPA
- Euclidean distance 59
- Exchange theory 1, 69, 77, 81, 284, 507
- Excitement 6, 77, 82, 84, 113, 142, 214, 239, 323, 422, 442, 478, 482, 496–498, 500, 533, 553, 554
- Expectation state processes 127, 132
- Evolutionary sociology 12, 22
- F**
  - Facial expressions 68, 71, 116, 221, 250, 294, 296, 349, 402, 520, 524
  - Family 359–378
  - Fear 328, 483, 484, 516
    - of crime 473–476, 483–488
  - Feeling rules
    - racialized 398, 405
  - Feminine 38, 57, 63, 288, 325, 369, 370, 372, 388, 396, 417–421, 462, 502, 503
  - Flow 17, 20, 92, 128, 132, 297, 496, 497, 514, 531, 532, 560, 563, 569
  - Framing 43, 65, 66, 71, 78, 89, 103, 210, 214, 223–228, 232, 370, 374, 375, 414, 503, 523

- Frustration 66, 110–114, 132, 136, 186, 199, 200, 249, 340, 372, 373, 388, 418, 421, 422, 436, 478, 533, 536
- Fundamental  
 affective meaning 54, 59  
 impressions 53  
 meaning 54, 69  
 sentiments 53, 56, 63, 70
- G**
- Garland, David 204, 210, 211
- Gender  
 differences 57, 58, 63, 70, 139, 142, 222, 241, 338, 431, 432, 437, 439, 441, 462, 485, 487  
 identities 394, 413, 415–419, 421, 503
- General strain theory 474, 478–480, 487, 488
- Generalized symbolic media  
 as ideologies 185  
 as moral codes 182  
 as resources 182
- Good people as a moral distinction 158, 401
- Group boundaries 241, 403, 531, 533
- Gratitude 18, 132, 165–169, 188, 284, 285, 288, 416, 463, 464, 567
- Guilt 19, 106, 111, 143
- Guilty 106, 111, 116, 135, 188–193, 259, 369, 465
- H**
- Happiness 158–160, 166, 170, 171, 395  
 comparisons with others and 105  
 cultural variations in definitions of 160, 391  
 curvilinearity of effect of own status on 164  
 definitions of 160, 391  
 demographic variations in 486, 511, 523  
 envy and 279  
 meaningfulness and 170  
 money (materialism) and 161  
 other's power and 160  
 own power and 169  
 own status and 403  
*Schadenfreude* and 164  
 status-consistency and 105  
 theory in studies of 159
- Hardship 320, 366
- Harmfulness 454, 455
- Health  
 mental 429–445  
 physical 388, 394, 432, 444  
 psychological 421
- Heartache 387
- Heteronormativity 414
- Hobbesian problem of social order 78
- Hominins 11, 12, 18, 20–28, 187, 188
- Hostility 38, 146, 232, 248, 287, 339, 340, 345, 388–392, 500
- Household division of labor 112, 144, 350, 369, 370
- Human-human interaction 520
- Human monsters 158
- Human-nonhuman interactions 521
- Humiliation 19, 38, 39, 179, 255–259, 264, 388, 474, 537
- I**
- Ideal emotional states 71
- Identity  
 code 413  
 evaluation 55, 56, 71  
 moral 39, 40, 43, 44, 117, 453, 454  
 non-verification 3, 34, 35, 39–48  
 sentiments 54, 58, 71  
 social 79, 118, 464  
 theory 35, 40, 46, 285, 288  
 verification 3, 34–36, 39, 42, 44, 46, 47, 138, 141
- Identities, behaviors, and emotions 53
- Identity, impression, and emotion 52  
 relation between 53
- Ideologies 26, 180–186, 190–195, 224–227, 236, 241, 360, 365, 368–370, 373, 377, 415–420
- Implicit processes 455, 459
- Impression  
 evaluation 55, 71
- Individual difference 109, 113, 114, 341, 394, 475, 536
- Individualist/collectivist dimension 460
- Ineffable emotions 3, 51, 64, 68–72, *see also* Unlabeled emotions
- Inequality  
 class 396, 415  
 middle class 377  
 working class 377
- gender 138, 370, 411, 412, 415, 418, 419, 423
- privilege  
 anxieties about 403, 404  
 justifications for 403  
 unearned 398
- race  
 white 403, 404  
 whiteness 384, 394, 395  
 black/blackness 394, 395  
 ethnicity 2, 183, 348, 367, 444  
 African American 59, 103, 140, 146, 147, 340, 385, 388–392, 541  
 Latino(a) 385, 387, 388, 394  
 Mexican-Americans 389, 390  
 Filipino 390  
 Southeast Asian 390  
 Asian American 394, 403  
 Japanese Americans 392  
 Guatemalan 395, 418  
 immigrants 246, 389, 390, 535, 541  
 color-blind racism 403  
 race and class capital 400  
 race work 386  
 racialized emotional expectations 394, 396  
 racism 377, 388–394, 400, 423
- racial 119, 399, 402, 403
- structural 368, 375



- status
    - socio-economic 140
    - disparities 433
  - Inequity 105, 110–113, 143, 144, 181, 340, 369, 404, 405, 559
  - Injustice 103–110, 114–120, 191, 199, 208, 377, 402, 437, 455, 544
  - Institutional commitments 67
  - Instrumental actions 24, 57, 71
  - Intentionality 168, 234, 261, 391, 413, 458, 462, 499, 506, 544, 560
  - Interact 22, 54, 59, 61, 80, 81, 87, 89, 96, 98, 137, 139, 166, 185, 205, 206, 239, 345, 363, 364, 368, 370, 390
  - Interact's (visual display of emotion) 64
  - Interaction ritual
    - theory 215, 487, 499, 500, 507
  - Interactional
    - analysis level 69, 208
    - expectations 398
    - justice 104–107, 111, 115, 119
    - ritual theory 474
  - Interpersonal emotions
    - management of 62, 64
  - Interpersonal relations
    - management of 64
  - Interracial relationships 394, 404
  - Intimate relationships 5, 109, 372, 373, 394, 402, 415, 419, 424, 444, 516, 518
- J**
- Jealousy 2, 43, 44, 62, 71, 240, 554
  - Joint tasks 3, 80, 81, 87–90, 94, 96
  - Justice 3, 7, 71, 103, 104, 109, 112–116, 120, 121, 143, 146
- L**
- Labeling theory 245, 260, 261, 474, 481
  - Labels 62, 63, 68, 70, 284, 474
  - Legitimation 3, 21, 127, 128, 131, 145, 146, 553
  - London Riots 208, 209, 218
  - Looking glass self 33, 36, 255–260, 264, 361, 413
  - Love 2, 23, 169, 172, 193, 214, 222, 226, 399, 400, 482
- M**
- Marked identities 46
  - Marking 57, 179, 207
    - as attribution 56
  - Massively multiplayer online games 516
  - Meaning 38, 61, 65, 66, 83, 104, 129, 170, 171, 182, 213, 240, 377, *see also* Framing
  - Meaningfulness
    - abandoning search for happiness and 171
    - other's status and 155, 170
    - own status and 170
  - Mediated interaction 4, 222, 238, 512–514, 520, 523
  - Melancholy 59, 61, 62, 394
  - Mental health 5, 360, 366, 429–445
  - Meta-ideologies 180, 183–185, 191–195
  - Micro-aggressions 388
  - Micro, microsociology 1, 201, 204, 209, 217
  - Micro-to-macro process 79, 87
  - Military 15, 103, 214, 421, 422, 482, 511
  - Modernity 236, 256
  - Modernization thesis 461
  - Monkeys 13, 14, 27
    - social structures 15, 16
  - Moods 42, 108, 133, 284, 286, 292, 337, 522
  - Moral
    - emotions 2–6, 34, 43, 116, 120, 285, 288, 451–459, 464, 466
    - expectations 452, 453
    - identity 39, 40–44, 117, 453, 454
    - judgments 454, 455, 462
    - outrage 107, 116, 117, 120, 544
    - reasoning 454, 456, 461, 462
  - Morality 2, 6, 26, 182, 207, 451, 454, 466
- N**
- Narrative 207, 226, 237–239, 400, 531
  - Negative
    - emotions 3, 18–21, 25–27, 34–47, 63, 69, 90, 95, 107–115, 120, 132, 135, 141–144, 160, 185, 346
    - feelings 33, 37–47, 90, 108, 135, 145
  - Neighborhood characteristics 484, 486
  - Neuroscience 6, 28, 70, 97, 267, 271, 310, 312, 359, 378, 451, 456, 466
  - Neurosociology 28, 268, 272, 278, 280
  - Non-confirming identities 66
  - Nonverbal behavior 64
  - Norm
    - carrier 144, 145
    - violator 144, 145
- O**
- Olympics 199–203, 208, 218, 505
  - Online dating 516–518
  - Organism 158, 461, 551
  - Organizations 5, 77–82, 90, 95, 98, 112, 121, 129–139, 148, 160–162, 179, 227, 335–343, 347, 350
  - Outlook 275, 276
- P**
- Parenting 393
    - authoritarian 391
    - supportive 392
  - Performance expectation states 128, 129
  - Performativity 228, 232
  - Person-to-group ties 79, 91
  - Person-to-person ties 78, 79
  - Phenotypes 12, 15
  - Physiological arousal 62, 65
  - Physiology 64, 65, 213, 250, 289, 294, 522
  - Play 6, 99, 119, 161, 162, 208, 232, 459, 449, 504
  - Pleasure 16, 77–82, 146, 171, 402

- Positive  
 emotion 38, 45, 46, 54, 85–91, 109, 170, 272, 275, 287, 297, 365  
 feelings 36, 42, 45, 80, 83, 87–98, 141, 147, 168, 186, 208, 276, 436, 440, 443, 447
- Potency  
 dynamics 54, 55
- Power 4, 155, 165, 168, 169, 524  
 and prestige structure 130–136  
 other's 160, 161, 169, 170, 173  
 own 160, 165, 169, 170  
 extraversion and 168
- Practice theories of culture 458
- Pride 111, 256, 259, 536, 537, 555
- Primates 11, 12, 24, 189
- Procedural 107  
 and interactional justice 103–106  
 unconsciousness 267, 268, 270
- Prominence 35–39, 162, 466, 524
- Pro-social behavior 93, 451, 522
- Protest 6, 103, 163, 318, 319, 429, 452, 530–535, 565
- Proximal bias 21, 191, 194
- Psychologists 108, 159, 171, 226, 227, 238, 359, 363, 431, 454, 521
- Psychology 171, 466
- Punishment 4, 40, 44, 105, 168, 173, 194, 204, 211, 212, 329, 477, 567
- Pure emotions 68
- R**
- Race 385, 388, 392, 398, 399, 402, 405, 486
- Race/ethnicity 2, 444
- Rational choice 80, 96, 476  
 explanations 474, 475
- Rationalist 6, 307, 454, 456, 458, 461
- Realization 86, 166, 279, 280, 552, 563
- Reference groups 156–159, 163, 166, 171, 173
- Reframe situations 62
- Reinforcement 312, 421, 477, 478
- Reintegrative shaming 211, 212, 480–483, 488
- Relational ties 77, 79, 92, 523
- Remorse 212, 240, 465, 481
- Remoteness 62
- Repression 186, 189, 191, 232, 253, 263, 497
- Resentment 106–111, 136, 146, 372, 373, 416, 531, 558, 566
- Resilience 79, 275, 392, 563
- Resource 45–47, 91, 182, 452
- Respectability 393, 398
- Restorative justice 104–107, 116, 120, 212, 481, 482
- Retributive justice 104–107
- Rhetoric 200, 238, 403, 530, 531  
 of choice 398  
 of constraint 398
- Ritual theory 4, 200, 201, 209–213, 218, 286
- Routine activity theory 475
- S**
- Sadness 18–20, 135, 144, 194, 195, 274, 279, 288, 362, 388, 395, 502
- Salience 35, 36, 46, 91, 194
- Satisfaction 77, 82, 95, 106, 110, 112, 132, 133, 147, 156, 159, 160, 193, 239, 284, 336–338, 404, 419
- Scientific social 7, 550–562
- Scorned identity 58
- Self  
 actualization 66  
 awareness 26, 27, 276, 277  
 -control theory 476, 477  
 -evaluation 186  
 and ideologies 185  
 interest 167, 314, 315, 476  
 meaning 66, 67  
 -sentiments 66  
 -understandings 52  
 -worth 106, 193, 194, 387, 390
- Semantic  
 differential scales 53, 286, 465  
 pointers 70, 298  
 framework 298
- Sentiments  
 across racial groups 57  
 gender differences in 57
- Service economy 335, 347, 352, 396
- Shame 19, 20, 211, 231, 256, 257, 264, 265, 555
- Situational  
 identity 52, 61  
 meaning 41
- Social  
 bonds 4, 21, 22, 295, 387, 463, 476, 563  
 categorizations 56  
 classifications 57  
 commitments 77, 80, 81, 87, 96, 98  
 interaction 53, 79, 96  
 elements of 53  
 repeated 87, 88, 200  
 teamwork in 60  
 intuitionist 6, 454, 457  
 framework 455, 456  
 movement 245, 261, 262, 530, 531, 538–543  
 pain 279  
 structure 5, 21, 34, 81, 128, 139, 141, 179, 190, 191, 208, 223, 226, 227, 236, 238, 242, 367
- Social control theory 476, 488
- Social desirability bias 485, 488
- Social disorganization  
 perspectives 487  
 theory 474, 486
- Social learning theory 362, 477, 478
- Societies 15, 58, 137, 182, 183, 223, 364, 466  
 levels of 194
- Solidarity 4, 18, 20, 24, 25, 91, 92, 99, 142, 188, 200, 203, 208, 209, 214, 218, 452, 505, 539

- Somatic  
 experience 61  
 marker hypothesis 269, 270, 456, 457
- Specific emotions 2, 34, 38, 43, 105, 137, 142, 344, 396, 483, 539, 540
- Sports 495–508
- State organizing processes 129, 147
- Status  
 accord of 156, 157, 163, 401  
 beliefs 77, 138, 183, 184  
 change of 193, 195  
 characteristics 56, 58, 59, 128, 133, 140, 147, 370  
 expectation states 3, 51, 59, 145, 147  
 generalization 134–138  
 hierarchies 140, 543  
 other's 156, 160, 161, 165, 167, 170, 173  
 own 156, 160, 161, 165, 166, 170  
 -power theory 1, 3, 155, 157, 158, 162–164, 167  
 actor in 157  
 processes 3, 146, 147
- Stigma 193, 206, 265, 388, 540, 543
- Stigmatized 3, 46, 51, 54, 56, 70, 71, 211, 388, 537, 543  
 identities 3, 46, 70, 71, 388, 543  
 self 56, 211
- Stratification 7, 180, 184–187, 190–196, 209  
 dynamics of 184–186  
 emotional bias of 522  
 legitimization of 184
- Stress 6, 106, 112, 140, 292, 362, 403, 432, 438–441, 558
- Structural emotions 59, 67
- Structure of feeling 227, 228
- Sub-cultures 70
- Support 37, 69, 97, 138, 263, 359, 372, 483, 539
- Surface acting 64, 116, 343, 344, 347, 397
- Symbolic  
 interaction 4, 33, 235, 363, 482  
 interactionist 3, 288, 360–363, 370, 477, 558
- Sympathy 2, 24, 34, 254, 315, 384, 464, 531
- T**
- The Civilizing Process 224, 225, 261, 496, 543
- Teamwork 60, 62, 133, 226, 499
- Technology 511–525  
 -enabled methods 521
- “The Dozens” 392
- Theorizing 1, 7, 36–39, 79, 82, 370, 424, 570
- Therapeutic model 401
- Third parties 103, 116–121, 164
- Thoits' four factor model of emotion 51
- Trait anger 476, 477, 479
- Transactional ties 77
- Transient  
 affective meaning 54  
 impressions 51–55, 58, 64, 108
- Trust 85, 104, 170, 308, 329, 341, 501, 542, 560, 561
- U**
- Uncertainty 5, 83–86, 185, 307, 313, 321–325, 486
- Unlabeled  
 emotions 67  
 feeling 68
- Unmarked identities 56
- V**
- Victimization 420, 473, 485, 486, 518, 536
- Violence 4, 57, 71, 117, 179, 189, 195, 201, 214–216, 223, 231, 260, 264, 340, 362, 392, 416–422, 474, 485, 487, 496, 504, 515, 541, 543  
 sexual 419, 485
- Virtual  
 agents 520  
 worlds 239, 241, 516, 520–524
- W**
- Work & Occupation  
 carework 349–353, 399, 400  
 careworkers 400  
 employment 78, 339, 400, 417, 482  
 jobs 347, 351, 353  
 managers 115, 325, 397  
 occupation 42, 140, 397, 499, 515  
 paid work 400, 420  
 professional occupations 396  
 professionals 226, 227, 346–349, 517, 542  
 service jobs 346, 348, 349, 396  
 service workers 116, 343, 348, 397, 499  
 workplace 103, 120, 142, 349, 397, 518  
 workers 133, 136, 307, 311, 351, 399
- Workplace 2, 36, 120, 141, 335–345, 396, 397, 518, 556
- Worry 224, 295, 311, 400, 478, 484, 556