

Ethical Archaeologies: The Politics of Social Justice 3

Alejandro Haber
Nick Shepherd *Editors*

After Ethics

Ancestral Voices and Post-Disciplinary
Worlds in Archaeology

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Ethical Archaeologies: The Politics of Social Justice

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
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*“To our wives, Nicola and Silvina.
And to our children, Felix, Francisco,
Giles, Ignacio, Rosa, Santiago,
and Valentina”*

Ethical Archaeologies: The Politics of Social Justice

Archaeology remains burdened by modern/Western values. Codified, these values harden into ethics with specific cultural and temporal foundations; indeed, ethics are contextual, shifting, and negotiated entanglements of intent and practice that often conflict. Yet, archaeologists may uncritically mask these contexts unless they are adequately aware of the discipline's history and of their location in a globalized world order with its imprint of imperial, colonial, and neocolonial values. A responsible and socially committed archaeology must historicize its ethical principles, showing how contingent they are and what kind of needs they are serving.

By adopting a global coverage that brings together academic activism for a historicized ethics, universally created lacunae surrounding disciplinary concepts such as the archaeological record, stewardship, and multivocality, as well as broader concerns of race, class, and gender, can be discussed and acted upon. The four volumes comprising the *Ethical Archaeologies: The Politics of Social Justice Series* discuss historically based ethics in the practice of archaeology and related fields—anthropology, museology, Indigenous and heritage studies, law, and education—and highlight the struggle for social justice, in which the discipline can participate.

In this series we take that social justice is broadly about equality and the right to freedom from any kind of discrimination or abuse. It is about seeking to transform the current order of the world, in which the hegemony of the Western cosmology still reigns with its ideas of individuality, linear time, development, competition, and progress. Thus, social justice is also about the positioning in our research and disciplinary practices of non-modern values about life, time, past, place, and heritage.

Hardened into reified principles, as they continue to be, ethical concerns have served to reproduce epistemic hierarchies and privileges. If archaeologists are content with what the ethical preoccupations of the last two decades have achieved, their trumpeted engagement with politics and justice is meaningless. If the ethics of archaeology continues to simply further embed disciplinary privileges, social justice is not a horizon of fulfillment. If ethics is just a disciplinary preoccupation, a way of better accommodating the discipline to changing times, social justice is an

empty expression. For these reasons, this series aims to position the values of equality and freedom from all discrimination at the center of archaeological thinking and practice. The four volumes are not toolkits or guides for standardized, universal, ethical conduct, but critically informed, self-reflective discussions of ethical problems and potentials.

Cristóbal Gnecco
Tracy Ireland

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Chapter 1

After Ethics: Ancestral Voices and Post-disciplinary Worlds in Archaeology: An Introduction

Alejandro Haber and Nick Shepherd

Discussions of “ethics” in archaeology have come to name a number of discrete areas of concern. On the one hand, they provide a heading for a set of broadly legal, moral and philosophical concerns that govern or outline disciplinary practice in archaeology. On the other hand, they name the often contested conjunction between disciplinary practices and a set of contemporary social, political and economic contexts and concerns. In naming this conjunction they also frame it, in ways that are both enabling and disabling of these concerns.

In this volume we set out to do three things. The first is to track the historical development of a discussion around ethics, in tandem with the development and “disciplining” of archaeology. The second is to examine the meanings, consequences and efficacies of a discourse on ethics in contemporary worlds of practice in archaeology. The third is to push beyond the language of ethics to consider other ways of framing a set of concerns around rights, accountabilities and meanings in relation to practitioners, descendent and affected communities, sites, material cultures, the ancestors and so on.

A number of questions follow around the extent to which discussions of ethics continue to provide a useful frame through which to conceptualise these complex, rival claims. Do conventional discussions of archaeological ethics function as an ameliorative discourse in the interests of development, and of embedded disciplinary interests? Or do they open a set of resistant possibilities? How might such struggles

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be differently named and conceptualised? What are the effects of universalising what are often locally situated struggles under the heading of ethics? What is the relation between disciplinary discussions on ethics, and embedded power and vested interest? In archaeology? And in the world?

There is an established body of work in archaeology critiquing the limitations of a discourse on ethics. In a searching and far-reaching critique of codes of ethics in archaeology, Sarah Tarlow (2001) writes: “Codes of ethics promote conservatism and conformity, reinforce the power of hegemonic institutions and pre-empt ethical debate”. The effect of such codes is to foreclose on debate, smoothing over ethical dilemmas and disagreements. The Wenner-Gren sponsored symposium “Beyond ethics: archaeological moralities and the boundaries of the public and professional” in 2002 produced an important set of papers critiquing standard approaches to ethics in archaeology (Meskell and Pels 2005). In their introductory essay, Lynn Meskell and Peter Pels (2005:2) argue that discussions of ethics tend to disembed, exteriorise and alienate ethics from everyday practice. At their worst they become “a form of public relations aimed at employees and gatekeepers”. Their concern lies in relocating and embedding ethics, focussing on “locations of ethical practice” rather than “the constitutional realm of codes and committees”. Pels argues that codes of ethics enshrine modernist values of individualism, legalism and nationalism, based on a concept of knowledge as a kind of “expert” commodity. In the same volume, Alison Wylie argues that ethical codification displays a kind of “constitutional modernism” whose “fiction of universalism” makes ethics exterior to everyday scientific practice (Meskell and Pels 2005:7).

Developing some of these ideas, Yannis Hamilakis (2007:20) writes: “I want to suggest that what has happened in the last 15 years or so is nothing less than the bureaucratisation and instrumentalisation of ethics, and these transformations have resulted in the depoliticisation of ethical debate in archaeology”. In finding reasons for this, he points to “the structural and disciplinary power of professionalisation, and its effect on ... ethical debate in archaeology” (Hamilakis 2007:20). Ethical matters have been “removed from the arena of conflict in the world, and become a matter of regulation for the professional organisations” (Hamilakis 2007:21). One expression of this shift is the establishment of codes of ethics, in which contentious issues of the day “often become single-sentence principles after a series of internal debates and compromises” (Hamilakis 2007:21). Hamilakis (2007:21) argues that the codification of ethics in archaeology “is inscribed within the broader managerial culture of auditing, dominant in western academia ... in the last two decades”. The logic of the code of ethics “relies on the notion of individual morality, taking as its basis the western notion of the autonomous individual person”, even as it attempts to establish “abstract principles of universal applicability” (Hamilakis 2007:22).

In critiquing the objectivism and positivism of standard discussions of ethics, Hamilakis writes of the tendency of “western official archaeology” to fetishise an abstract, metaphysical entity, the “archaeological record”, ignoring both the constructedness and contingency of the archaeological record, and the human communities that live in association with archaeological sites and remains. Discussions of ethics “become the decoy that can rescue us from politics, and, once we make sure

we comply with the ethical guidelines of our professional organizations, once we have checked the boxes and filled in the forms (along with “health and safety” forms), then we are okay” (Hamilakis 2007:23–24).

Post-disciplinary Worlds

The current volume builds on many of these positions and lines of argumentation. At the same time, it extends this discussion on ethics in two directions. A first broad context has been the transformation of worlds of practice in archaeology in the last two decades. On the one hand, this has resulted from the global growth and proliferation of CRM, or forms of heritage resource management, with their associated ideas, protocols and forms of best practice. On the other hand, it has been a result of the global growth of social movements, including the Global Indigenous Movement, which have framed a challenge to core disciplinary ideas and practices. Both can be understood as complex responses to the contemporary phase of globalisation, although they pull (or appear to pull) in sharply different directions. Taken together they serve substantially to reframe the relationship between the law, the market and the discipline—and by extension—a discourse on ethics in archaeology.

A number of publications attest to the global growth of contract archaeology and cultural resource management in recent decades (Demoule 2012; McManamon et al. 2008; Miksic et al. 2011; Schlanger and Aitchison 2010). According to Lynne Sebastian and William Lipe (2009) as much as 90 % of the archaeology done in the USA today is carried out as contract resource management, and the same can be said for many other regions in the world, including Brazil, Chile and Europe. Less discussed are the epistemological consequences of this wholesale transformation of the discipline, and its consequences for a discourse on ethics. A recent WAC Intercongress on “Disentangling Contract Archaeology” declared in its opening statement: “Contract archaeology—variously known as CRM, urgent, and rescue archaeology—can be defined as the way the discipline engages capitalist expansion, sacrificing its critical stance. Its impact is so pervasive that a significant number of archaeologists work for that growing market. By doing so, they have abandoned any possible intervention in contemporary issues in order to dance to the rhythm of money” (Gnecco and Dias 2013).

If the growth of contract archaeology implies a close alignment between archaeology and a set of market concerns, then the emergence of a range of indigenous movements over the same period implies a more complexly contested conjunction. In a recent review, Tim Murray (2011) notes that “Over the past 25 years the practice of archaeology has been transformed by a broader and deeper engagement with indigenous peoples around the world”. Within archaeology, the growth of sub-fields of indigenous archaeology and community-based archaeology has opened a range of debates around disciplinary accountabilities, the possibilities of collaboration with local communities and the relation between disciplinary knowledge and local and indigenous knowledge of deep time (Atalay 2006, 2012; Chirikure and Pwiti

2008; Colwell-Chanthaphonh and Ferguson 2010; Colwell-Chanthaphonh et al. 2010; Gnecco and Hernandez 2008; Preucel and Cipolla 2008; Silliman 2008; Watkins 2005). We have argued that the growth of the Global Indigenous Movement forms part of a postcolonial identity politics, in which subaltern groups make claims against the state, entrenched disciplinary interests, local and global elites, corporate interests and so on, in the course of a set of struggles around rights, resources and representation (Shepherd and Haber 2011). Framed in primordialist terms, as recoveries of culture and tradition, such struggles are firmly part of contemporary worlds of practice, and are future oriented in their defense of territory and local ways of life. To the extent that they question core archaeological values and entitlements, they represent a potentially powerful challenge to an established discourse on ethics in archaeology.

Shadreck Chirikure's account (Chap. 3) of changing archaeological ethics in Africa points to a transition in the framing of the ethical debate in archaeology. Such a shift can be understood as a move from a frame given by the regulatory disciplining of the national state towards a confrontation with both identity collectives within states, and super-national agents like multilateral organisations and global corporations. This, in turn, might be understood as the difference between disciplinary and post-disciplinary contexts of practice. As Chirikure exemplifies, within disciplinary archaeology, decisions of good practice are taken according to an evaluation of the usually conflictual relation between conservation and disciplinary knowledge. National states, through their heritage legislation and officers, regulate access to archaeological objects and sites, which are ideally to be conserved for the future. Only disciplinary aims of data collecting for knowledge construction justify the access persons (researchers) may have to objects and sites, even if such access implies its destruction, which is compensated by the knowledge thus obtained. Bad practice, within a disciplinary archaeology, appears when access—and destruction—happens without an explicit research aim of knowledge procurement. The alliance between the state and archaeology becomes mutually reinforcing, so that the state ends up being archaeologist's main employer (see Chap. 4).

As Shadreck Chirikure characterises for an African context, local communities have interests in objects and sites that are different both from knowledge procurement and conservation. The sacredness of objects and sites, most visibly but not exclusively of human remains, is not based on disciplinary archaeological nor state criteria of conservation of national heritage, but on locally grounded understandings of the relationships between remains and the community (including people, territory and a broad diversity of agents), as Carina Jofré illustrates in detail for the San Juan region in western Argentina (Chap. 5). While the national state is often unprepared to assist these local interests, the social collectives themselves confront intended disciplinary practices. It is often the case that researchers must incorporate in their decisions of practice criteria other than conservation and/or knowledge production. Such a post-disciplinary context has been codified in some national contexts and multilateral organisations and accords, such as the Vermillion Accord and

the WAC First Code of Ethics. Such codification modulates disciplinary access to remains although it seldom prevents it entirely—once the boxes have been checked, disciplinary practices can proceed (Hamilakis 2007). Post-disciplinary archaeology is framed by contested environments of practice, and elaborates protocols in order to navigate through such confronting landscapes. Within post-disciplinary archaeology, knowledge production is but one among many aims, including the expansion of marketplace-like relationships, usually codified as “development”, as Alex Herrera shows in this volume. While codified ethics of practice considers the diversity of interests confronted in a particular situation, the difference of power among the knowledge backing each particular interest is seldom taken into account. Diversity is acknowledged, and becomes a keyword in modulating forms of disciplinary practice (Lazzarato 2006).

Alex Herrera (Chap. 4) shows how development-oriented post-disciplinary archaeology recapitulates disciplinary taken-for-granted, including the disciplinary understanding of what is to be considered a piece of archaeological heritage. Scrutinising tourism and agricultural development-oriented archaeologies in the Central Andes, Herrera addresses the common situation in which territorial interests of local and indigenous communities are included in what disciplinary archaeology and the state encompasses as part of local development planning. Local development eventually fails because of the operation of territorial interests that collide with the marketplace relationships implied in development plans. But, as shown in Shepherd’s account on the real estate development of Greenpoint, Cape Town, it is rarely the case that development is halted, even when countered by visible and active popular opposition.

Ancestral Voices

The second direction in which this volume extends discussions of ethics is through a concern with the asymmetrical relation between disciplinary knowledge in archaeology and local, indigenous and subaltern knowledge of gone time and practices in relation to the materiality of the past in the present (Haber 2009; Shepherd and Haber 2011). A key category of concern is the status, meaning and fate of the dead (the ancestors), and their subjection to disciplinary practices, canons and regimes of care. A corollary of this concern is the status and meaning of alternative and rival regimes of care, and the manner in which they figure in a discourse on ethics. In myriad local contexts, struggles and debates around the repatriation and restitution of human remains have been at the sharp edge of a set of broadly ethical concerns in archaeology and related disciplines. These have focused attention on questions of rights, accountabilities and access in relation to disciplinary practitioners, descendent and affected communities and the dead themselves (Fforde et al. 2002; Fontein 2010; Garza 2001; Harries 2010; Krmpotich et al. 2010; Legassick and Rassool 1999; Shepherd 2007; Verdery 1999). They have also delineated some

of the lines of tension between disciplinary guiding ideas and forms of practice, and rival knowledge regimes and regimes of care. For many of the papers in this volume, the place, meaning and status of the dead become a key location through which to rethink and resituate a set of broadly ethical concerns in archaeology (Chaps. 2, 3, 5 and 7).

As part of a detailed account of recent archaeological history and indigenous demands in San Juan province, Argentina, Carina Jofré (Chap. 5) develops the relationship between the processes of collective subjectivation and the body of the ancestor. This resonates with Nicole Sarmiento's (Chap. 7) wording of remembrance, where memory is at the same time a reunion of previously dis-membered parts. Memory/remembrance as knowledge is excluded from the disciplinary relation of knowledge (Chap. 8), and Sarmiento links this to indigenisation, as does Jofré. Shepherd (Chap. 2) contextualises such phenomena within the present crises fostered by postcapitalist dynamics, in which "we need to understand the mobilization of the ancestral dead by subaltern groups as points around which to organize local resistance to global designs. The very materiality of the remains of the dead and their embeddedness in a local politics of place becomes key to opposing deterritorialized global practices. In the face of forms of discourse in which the local is always already discounted and disempowered, the dead offer alternative registers and imaginaries through which to organize local responses, counterposing their own magic to the 'magic of capital'" (Chap. 2).

Developing critical accounts of the workings of the discipline and the post-discipline, based on detailed scrutiny of well-informed cases and both deep and dense situated theorising, is one of the focal strategies for moving beyond disciplinary metaphysics and its recapitulation within post-disciplinary contexts. Several authors have formulated this in terms of the challenge of un-disciplining archaeology (Haber 2012; Hamilakis 2007; Chaps. 2 and 8). Nicole Sarmiento's text (Chap. 7) follows a diversity of disciplinary threads seen as unconnected, for "what is evident is that the question of the burial grounds is defined as a problematic about 'science' and about the discipline of history and archaeology—hostage to their evidentiary modes and regimes of truth. The points around public consultation, memory and heritage are understood only within this problematic, within a discourse of linear time in which archeology is framed as a discipline that grapples with material fragments and a 'past' divorced from the present (Chap. 8)". Nick Shepherd's fine-grained description of the archaeological disciplining of ancestors' bodies in Oakhurst Cave and Prestwich Street (both in South Africa) displays the ways in which the discipline excises the ancestors from their relations while at the same time they are embedded within a complete new (disciplinary) regime of care, a process that Haber (Chap. 8) identifies with the workings of disciplinary language.

Jofré too provides a detailed case study in this vein from the San Juan province and the Cuyum Warpe community. Drawing on De Souza Santos's characterisation of abysmal theorising, she scrutinises the recent history of archaeological intervention vis-à-vis the Warpe people's organisations and demands. In doing so,

she provides some clues for working out the roles for a decolonial archaeology within the project of opening up a place of enunciation. Whether this implies a struggle for a new hegemony or its complete abolition seems to be part of the theoretical and political debate of decoloniality in general and particularly for a decolonial un-disciplined archaeology. This point is taken up by José Luis Grosso (Chap. 6), who asks:

Why should we be eternally condemned to deal with “hegemony” (with the “hegemonic” formation, whatever the form it takes; Laclau, 2002, 2006), if there are *matrixes of creation* that alter and burst abruptly out of untamable/indomitable externality: crafty, resentful, shady, baroque, and that configure (refigure, transfigure) *other relationships of power*, not necessarily “hegemonic”? Specifically: they do *other (out of) use of “hospitality.”*

In Grosso’s text, “hospitality” as the trope of othering is scrutinised within Western thought and in the fieldwork context. Hospitality in the Andean context is a way of swallowing up or interpolating colonial othering. The incorporation of the researcher into a web of relations according to local theories of relationality implies him/her being related to the other’s other, that is, to the gods inhabiting the local world. Western othering is eventually deactivated, as the researcher is himself/herself moved from its epistemic home (Haber 2011).

In this sense, one would ask in relation to whom a research practice should be ethically evaluated? In relation to the other, thus recapitulating othering? Or in relation to the other’s world/place/community? Is such a community a constellation of human beings only? Are those humans all alive? And how do they figure in relation to the other’s practice of relationality? Is it not the case that it is my (first person) own capacity of being touched/moved/transformed as part of the conversation of beings implied in the research that should be considered in the first place (Haber 2011 and Chap. 8). Instead of greater objectivity, the challenge of un-disciplining knowledge lies in the expansion of subjectivity, in the sense of intersubjective relations (Chaps. 2, 5–7), countering global projects and interventions (including interventions by disciplinary archaeology).

Modern/colonial disciplining has already cut (excised) former relationalities among things in the world and embedded them in disciplined regimes of care (Chaps. 2 and 8). Sarmiento calls for an archaeology interested by “the spectre of the untold, of repressed histories, and present accountabilities” (Chap. 7). (Un-disciplined) archaeology can be understood as a skill of following (with the body and the soul) disconnected and dis-membered threads expressed in a diversity of languages, textualities and forms of expression, including repressed histories, and spectral presences (Chaps. 6 and 7). Moving beyond ethics does not imply an end to ethical concerns, but rather the move to contextualise them in their broader scenarios of political and epistemic difference towards a decolonisation of knowledge. In this sense, an un-disciplined archaeology “after ethics” may become a lived-in conversation with the ancestral voices and their territorial agencyings.

The Book

The papers in this volume cover a range of topics and concerns, but share an interest in moving beyond established frameworks to map a territory “after ethics”. Our instruction to authors was to think freely around the issues set out in this short introductory statement, and to respond on the basis of their own interests and contexts of practice. Nick Shepherd (Chap. 2) opens the debate on ethics, archaeology and post-disciplinary worlds of practice. He reviews the critical literature on ethics and archaeology. Drawing on two South African case studies—the archaeologist John Goodwin’s excavations at Oakhurst Cave in the 1930s, and the recent excavation of the Prestwich Street site—he shows a disciplinary genealogy of practices regarding territories and ancestors. His chapter ends with a prospectus for un-disciplining archaeology.

Shadreck Chirikure (Chap. 3) reviews recent histories of archaeological practice in Africa, and the growing demands of local communities. In describing the transition from disciplinary to post-disciplinary contexts, he suggests that a stronger concern with *ethics* should be placed “at the center” of archaeological practice. Alex Herrera (Chap. 4) traces the long history of the relationship between disciplinary archaeology and the interests of development. Focusing on tourism and rural developmental projects in the central Andes, he argues for a *situational* ethics where archaeology can work as “promoter of reciprocal interests and understandings” across culture and class boundaries.

Ivana Carina Jofré (Chap. 5) develops the concept of the indigenous body as a *mark* of subalternity vis-à-vis the national state. Building from the recent history of archaeological research and indigenous movements in San Juan, Argentina, she argues for the use of archaeology as a counter-hegemonical practice. Nicole Sarmiento (Chap. 7) draws from a dramaturgical work on the consequences of political and military counter-insurgency repression in the Central Peruvian Sierra. She articulates a concept of *remembrance*, as the working of memory that at the same time implies a conjoining of dis-membered parts of a former whole body. With this in mind, she navigates through the urban landscape of postapartheid Cape Town, listening to the haunting spectres of colonial and disciplinary erasures.

José Luis Grosso (Chap. 6) provides an archaeology of the Western concept of *hospitality*, and its workings in colonial modern othering. He contrasts this sense of hospitality with Andean communities’ excess of hospitality and the potential for incorporating the exteriority (even academics) into its own amplified community of beings. The methodological (or nonmethodological) consequences of this include an understanding of an un-disciplined archaeology as a conversation with sacrificial Amerindian semio-praxis, a conversation where the stranger becomes other.

Finally, Alejandro Haber (Chap. 8) scrutinises the epistemological and ontological assumptions of archaeological discipline in order to show that the decisions concerning others are already taken and codified within the discipline. He describes how this disciplinary pre-ethical structuring still works in post-disciplinary contexts of practice characterised by the ethical debate. He ends sketching the place of archaeology within a decolonial turn.

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Chapter 2

Undisciplining Archaeological Ethics

Nick Shepherd

After Ethics

The question is: What comes after the language of ethics? Put differently: How do we develop a conversation around questions of care, accountability, and responsible or “right” action in the world, outside of the framework of a professionalized discourse on ethics? There is an established body of work in archaeology critiquing the limitations of such a discourse. Yannis Hamilakis (2007) describes the instrumentalization of a discourse on ethics in the service of capitalist development. He notes that codes of ethics frequently fetishize an abstract, metaphysical entity, the “archaeological record”, which stands outside of disciplinary relations and practices of knowledge. Alison Wylie argues that ethical codification displays a kind of “constitutional modernism” whose “fiction of universalism” makes ethics exterior to everyday scientific practice (Meskell and Pels 2005a, b:7; Wylie 2005). Lynn Meskell and Peter Pels argue that codes of ethics tend to dis-embed, exteriorize and alienate ethics from everyday practice. At their worst, they become “a form of public relations aimed at employers and gatekeepers”. More helpfully, they may be used “by the representatives of the people studied as a way of holding the researcher accountable” (Meskell and Pels 2005a, b:2). Their concern lies in relocating and embedding ethics, focusing on “locations of ethical practice” rather than “the constitutional realm of codes and committees”. Pels argues that codes of ethics enshrine modernist values of individualism, legalism and nationalism, based on a conception

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of knowledge as a kind of “expert” commodity, the “property of information.”. Meskell and Pels (2005a, b:8–9) write:

...rethinking ethics implies rethinking expertise, and that implies rethinking modernity as well: as something that emanates not from “us” but from interaction. We should locate ethics not in a Kantian, law-like universal nor in the postmodernist “moral self” whose ethical relation to the elusive other we can only take on trust, but in concrete practices of interaction with others.

Building on these positions, I would argue that conventional, disciplinary discussions of ethics place constraints on a project of refusal. They legislate and contain oppositional energies, framing them within a set of constraining terms, protocols, ways of working, and possible outcomes. Seen in these terms, archaeological ethics becomes an enabling discourse of a particular kind: enabling disciplinary interventions, managing and channelling opposing claims and oppositional energies. Moreover, as an epistemological project, archaeological ethics recapitulates the essential coloniality of disciplinary archaeology. Knowledge lies on the side of the discipline and not on the side of descendant and affected communities, who appear under a different heading: culture, tradition, belief or, more simply, “the indigenous” (Shepherd and Haber 2011). In the standard “ethical” framing of the encounter between disciplinary practitioners and non-disciplinary claimants, “science” meets “tradition”, and “knowledge” meets something else (belief, superstition, local custom). If the first (science, knowledge, the world of the discipline) belongs to the present and to the projective future, then the second belongs to the past and the world of tradition. Discussions around ethics become encounters between incommensurate values: modern, disciplinary science encounters something else (non-disciplinary non-knowledge). We are in the same room, we sit at the same table, but we do not occupy the same time/space. The work of the discourse on ethics is, as it were, simultaneously to bridge this divide and to insist on it, assigning the different protagonists to their separate spaces.

So, to repeat: What comes after ethics? How do we formulate a more embracing concern with questions of care, accountability, and responsible or “right” action in the world, outside of the constraints of a professionalized discourse on ethics? There are many possible answers to this question, although they almost certainly take us outside of accustomed modes and formats of academic practice. For example, Alison Wylie (2005) gives the example of storytelling as an alternative register through which to address an ethical concern and make a moral point. In this chapter I want to explore a different kind of answer. I want to think about the status and meaning of the ancestral dead, and their potential to act as points of mobilization of a set of counter claims (that is, claims that run counter to disciplinary claims and to the claims of neoliberal globalization). Addressing the questions above, I want to think about the ways in which ideas and practices in relation to the ancestral dead begin to articulate an ethics “after ethics”: notions of accountability, forms of empathetic connection, and non-disciplinary regimes of care which take us beyond the formulations of a professionalized discourse on ethics. More generally, I want to think about the peculiar and unexpected centrality of the role that the ancestral dead

have come to play in a postcolonial politics of memory and identity, as figures around which to organize local resistances and a set of claims from the subaltern side of the colonial difference.

As a way of exploring these various ideas, I shall examine two case studies. Both involve forms of disciplinary practice in relation to the ancestral dead, and both involve sets of counter claims, but where the first is set in the colonial past, the second belongs to the world of the postcolony. In the final section of the chapter I draw out some themes and ideas from these case studies, contextualizing them in a broader set of political/ethical concerns articulated around “bone narratives” and “postwars of the dead”.

Oakhurst Cave

In the early-1930s the South African archaeologist John Goodwin excavated the site of Oakhurst Cave on the southern Cape coast. Goodwin was assisted by a number of co-workers, including the man identified as Adam Windwaai (Adam Blowing-in-the-Wind) (Shepherd 2003). Oakhurst Cave is a large and productive site, remarkable for the number of human burials found there and the richness of the associated material culture. It is located about 15 km east of the town of George, a few kilometres inland, in that part of the southern Cape coast known as Wilderness. It was Goodwin’s most ambitious excavation. He returned for six field seasons over the course of 4 years (1932–1935). He had made his name in the 1920s as a laboratory practitioner and stone tool analyst (Goodwin and van Riet Lowe 1929). Oakhurst Cave was intended to establish his reputation as a fieldwork practitioner.

The transcript from the Oakhurst Cave excavations exists in a number of different formats: as a set of field notes, as a published report, and as a set of photographs. Together they invite us to reflect on the different modalities of the archive (the public archive, the official archive, the hidden archive, the illicit archive). The extended report on Oakhurst Cave published in the *Transactions of the Royal Society of South Africa* is a model of timely reportage. Goodwin was its principal author, with sections by J.F. Schofield on the pottery, and M.R. Drennan on the skeletal remains (Goodwin 1937; Drennan 1937a, b; Schofield 1937). Mary Nicol, later Mary Leakey (described in the report as “a European prehistorian” p. 244) visited the shelter and excavated “Grave XVII”. She also commented favourably on Goodwin’s field methods. The idea of method was important to Goodwin. Ten years after the publication of the Oakhurst Cave report he published *Method in Prehistory*, the first manual on archaeological methodology written for local conditions (Goodwin 1945).

Goodwin’s move to install method in the practice of prehistory was part of the modernization of the discipline. He was also reacting against comparatively widespread practices of casual excavation and exhumation. These ranged from trophy hunting to more self-consciously scientific, but often no less casual, harvestings of material. Drennan confirms this in the second part of his report on Oakhurst Cave, on “The Children of the Cave Dwellers”, when he notes that it is rare that “such a good

series of infant skeletons” should be retrieved from excavation and made available for physical anthropological study. This is because of the delicate nature of the remains. The skull bones are “as thin as paper in certain regions”. He writes: “As a result the casual collector usually passes them by in favour of less delicate trophies” (Drennan 1937b:281).

Goodwin reports that the “greatest care” was taken in excavating “skeletons”. Each took an average of 12 h, using a small bricklayer’s trowel and a rubber-mounted distemper brush. This careful practice made it possible to recover “grave furniture”, including ostrich eggshells, arrow points and linkshafts, stone implements, grindstones, tortoise shells containing pigment, ochre, ostrich eggshell beads, marine shells, and bored stones. Many of the bodies are foetally flexed. Some lie on beds of sea grass (*Zostera capensis*), material “used as bedding, both by the living and the dead” (Goodwin 1937:238). Indeed, the dead mirror the living, whose sleeping hollows lie just above them.

Bare Description

The photographs from Oakhurst Cave occupy a number of folders in the Goodwin Collection. Some are mounted on card and annotated. A number are reprinted in large format, 6 by 8 in. black-and-white prints. It was Goodwin’s practice with the better-preserved graves to take photographs at regular intervals during the excavation, in some cases as close as 10 min apart. Meant to indicate order, method, and control, to the contemporary eye there is something more haphazard about the progress that they detail. Sections are cut roughly, rootlets emerge and spread their tendrils, a scatter of tools is left lying about, a skull is rolled out of context and lies gape-jawed on the deposit. The photographs chosen for publication are the most diagrammatic. They show more complete exposure, fewer signs of the work of exhumation. Yet even in these images contrary meanings threaten to overwhelm their purpose, as our responses move in unintended directions (horror, curiosity, sympathy, interest).

The riskiness of the act of exhumation and its attendant documentary project is impressed upon us by these images. The nature of the revealed material is profuse, threatens to outrun attempts to impose order and meaning. In contrast, what emerges in the written report is thin, attenuated, a mixture of empiricism and what might be called “bare description”. Here, chosen more-or-less at random, is a description of Grave III: “Buried beneath a horizontal white sealing layer at a depth of 48 in. Fully flexed, lying on right side, facing south, head to east. The entire skeleton was intact and undisturbed... Smithfield B or C” (Goodwin 1937:248). Of the opening of Grave VII he writes: “The skeleton proved to be that of a child of about 7 years. Most of the skull was broken. The body was flexed and lay on its right side, facing east, head to the south. A number of shells of *Donax serra* lay along the spinal column. A girdle consisting of a single strand of ostrich eggshell beads was strung

round the waist. Red ochre was present on the skull and the neighbouring bones” (Goodwin 1937:252).

Very occasionally the archaeological transcript rises above bare description, to suggest local affective worlds and regimes of care. This is Goodwin’s account of the most dramatic find from Oakhurst: “a large broken crystal, roughly an inch in diameter, and with a diamond facet as large as an eye”, found in the left orbit (eye socket) of Skeleton IX, one of a pair of infant burials. Goodwin writes: “This may be due to chance, or may have been placed in position at the burial. No other crystals were found, nor beads or ornaments” (Goodwin 1937:253). In their book, *San Spirituality*, David Lewis-Williams and David Pearce retell the discovery in these terms:

Perhaps the most suggestive of all the southern Cape grave goods comes from a burial of “twin” infants aged between three and a half and four years at Oakhurst Cave. Touchingly, the two children lay side by side, the left arm of one across the shoulder of the other, as if in an embrace. A large, broken quartz crystal with the faceted end exposed was wedged in the left eye socket of one of the children” (Lewis-Williams and Pearce 2004).

Cutting

As a set of representative objects, the photographs from Oakhurst Cave textualize the experience of exhumation in ways that allow for a more complex response, these images of the remains of the newly exhumed dead, bodies bared for bare description. Our inescapable impression is of the sanctity and intimacy of the grave site and the violence of this act of exposure. Tenderly interred in life, the bodies of the buried dead are exhumed “with the greatest care” by the archaeologist. The sweeping actions of the rubber-mounted distemper brush mirror, in reverse, the actions of the hand that patted the soil home. Bared by excavation, the bodies are subject to a different regime of care, and to the logic of the archive. They are numbered, accessioned, boxed, shelved, catalogued. Their re-animation takes place within the strict limits of this logic. Disciplinary knowledges and the regime of care of the museum/archive are founded on a number of inter-related forms of epistemic violence. One of these is a violence of excision, or cutting, whereby phenomena are excised from one context and set of relations (the regime of care “of life”) and subjected to another, competing regime of care. The dead of Oakhurst Cave existed in relation to known territories and ways of life. Their co-presence conditioned the world of the living, to whom they were linked by memory, descendency, and the powerful and multivalent ties connecting the living and the dead. Their presence in the ground acted as a literal and metaphorical guarantee of rights to territory and the continuity of ways of life.

Their excision from this set of relations began with the laying of a grid. In the hand of Goodwin, a trowel slices the earth. The dead of Oakhurst Cave are laid bare, inscribed within a new logic and a new space/time (“Grave VII”). They pass their second life as subjects of the regime of care of the museum/archive. The human remains from Oakhurst Cave are held in two locations, the archaeological stores of

the University of Cape Town, and of the South African Museum. On the day that I visited the archaeological stores of the South African Museum (in March 2011) the entire, vast collection was being readied for relocation to another part of the museum. Packers moved among the shelves, somewhere a radio played. The archaeological stores of the South African Museum have an estimated 10,000 boxes of material, of which around 1,000 are boxes of human remains. Emplaced on their shelf, the dead of Oakhurst Cave now exist in formal relation to the re-named and numbered dead from sites across Southern Africa. A multitude of networks, territorial claims and forms of deep inscription are uprooted, relocated, collapsed into a single site. Somehow the fluorescent lighting and neatly stacked shelves, the quiet tune on the radio, only served to emphasize the violence of this wrenching.

Prestwich Street

Oakhurst Cave begins to speak to us of the place of the ancestral dead in local life-worlds and affective relations, and the corresponding violence of the act of excavation. It also speaks of a formative period in the development and “disciplining” of a local project of prehistory in the decade of the 1930s. Fast-forward 70 years to the city of Cape Town, and the most contested instance of archaeological work in post-apartheid South Africa. The story of Prestwich Street begins in the period of Dutch occupation when the area to the north and west of the growing town was the site of a number of formal and informal burial grounds, including the notorious “White Sands”. Those interred in the informal burial grounds included a cross-section of the underclass of colonial Cape Town: slaves, free-blacks, artisans, fishermen, sailors, maids, washerwomen and their children, as well as executed criminals, suicide deaths, paupers, and unidentified victims of shipwrecks (Hart 2003). In the 1820s this area—District One—was divided up for real estate and re-named Green Point. Later still, light industry moved into the area, and it fell into disrepair. In the late-1960s and early-1970s, black and coloured residents of the inner city, working class neighbourhood of Green Point were forcibly removed in terms of the notorious Group Areas Act, a form of ethnic cleansing. In the property boom of 2000–2008 Green Point was reborn as “De Waterkant”, part of the city’s glitzy international zone and a centre of “pink Cape Town”. In May 2003, in the course of construction activities at a city block in Prestwich Street, human bones were uncovered. The developer, “Styleprops Ltd.”, notified the South African Heritage Resources Agency (SAHRA) in accordance with the newly passed National Heritage Resources Act, and construction was halted. An archaeological contractor was appointed to handle the management of the site, and to run a public consultation process.

At this point, the state heritage agency, SAHRA, made the first of a number of questionable decisions. The new heritage legislation provides for a 60-day notification period during which work on site would normally be halted. SAHRA issued a permit for a “rescue exhumation of human remains” to run concurrently with the

notification period (SAHRA 2003a). By the time the first public meeting was held, 7 weeks into the 60-day period, 500 individuals had been exhumed from the Prestwich Street site. The public response was angry. The minutes of the first public meeting record “[a] general feeling of dissatisfaction, disquiet and disrespect” (Malan 2003). Opposition to the exhumations came from several quarters: community activists, many of whom had been active in the struggle against apartheid; victims of forced removals; slave-descended persons; Christian and Muslim faith leaders; community-connected academics; and Khoisan representatives.

On 1 August 2003 SAHRA announced an “interim cessation” of archaeological activity on the site to allow for a wider process of public consultation. Over a 100 submissions were collected as part of the process of public consultation. Mavis Smallberg from Robben Island Museum said “my strong suggestion is to cover up the graves... Apart [from] the recently renamed Slave Lodge, there is no other public space that respectfully marks or memorialises the presence of slaves and the poor in Cape Town society... Only scientists are going to benefit from picking over these bones—of what purpose and use is it to the various communities to which the dead belong to know what they ate 150 years ago or where they came from?” (Smallberg 2003). On 16 August a second public meeting was convened, and on 29 August SAHRA convened a third public meeting at St Andrews Church in Green Point “to wind up the public participation process” (SAHRA 2003b). The verbatim transcript from the meeting records a number of comments from the floor. An unnamed respondent said that

...there are multiple implications for this burial ground and its naked openness in the centre of the city... in this city there’s never been a willingness to take up [the issue of genocide and the] destruction of human communities that were brought from across the globe... This is an opportunity to get to the bottom of that and time means different things to different people, institutions, stakeholders. Time for the dead: we need to consider what that means (SAHRA 2003b:17–18).

Michael Wheeder, who was later to play a central role in the Hands Off Prestwich Street Ad Hoc Committee, said:

Many of us of slave descent cannot say “here’s my birth certificate.” We are part of the great unwashed of Cape Town... The black people, we rush into town on the taxis and we need to rush out of town. At a time many decades ago we lived and loved and laboured here. Nothing [reminds us of that history]... and so leave [the site] as a memorial to Mr. Gonzalez that lived there, Mrs. de Smidt that lived there. The poor of the area—the fishermen, the domestic workers, the people that swept the streets here. Memorialise that. Leave the bones there... That is a site they have owned for the first time in their lives *het hulle stukkie grond* (they have a little piece of ground). Leave them in that ground. Why find now in the gentility of this new dispensation a place with which they have no connection? (SAHRA 2003b:18–19).

On 1 September, despite a clear weight of public opinion opposed to the exhumations, Pumla Madiba, the CEO of SAHRA, announced a resumption of archaeological work at the site.

Forced Removals

On 4 September the Hands Off Prestwich Street Committee (HOC) was launched. At this point opposition to the exhumations shifted outside the officially mandated process of public consultation, to civil society and the politics of mass action. On 12 September the Hands Off Committee lodged an appeal with SAHRA calling for a halt to the exhumations and “a full and extended process of community consultation” (HOC 2003). The appeal document notes that “[the] needs of archaeology as a science seem to have been given precedence over other needs: the needs of community socio-cultural history, of collective remembering and of acknowledging the pain and trauma related to the site and this history that gave rise to its existence”. In opposing the exhumations it argues that “[exhumation] makes impossible a whole range of people’s identifications with that specific physical space in the city. Such a removal echoes, albeit unintentionally, the apartheid regime’s forced removals from the same area” (HOC 2003:8). In the run up to the hearing the Hands Off Committee organized regular candle-light vigils at the Prestwich Street site on Sunday evenings. A billboard was erected outside St George’s Cathedral, a symbolic site of anti-apartheid protest, with the slogan: “Stop the exhumations! Stop the humiliation!” Lunchtime pickets were held in the city centre. On 19 November the SAHRA-convened Appeals Committee handed down a written ruling. The excavation permit awarded to the ACO was revalidated and the rights of the developer upheld.

The Hands Off Committee reconvened as the Prestwich Place Project Committee (PPPC) to launch an appeal directly to the Minister of Arts and Culture. A letter of appeal was lodged with the Ministry on 12 January 2004. Supporting documents call upon the Minister to expropriate the site and “to conserve Prestwich Place as a National Heritage Site” and a site of conscience (PPPC 2003). At this point, all of the human remains on the original site had been exhumed and were in temporary storage in a warehouse on the adjacent block. During the SAHRA appeal process the developer had applied for, and been granted, permits to disinter human remains on the adjacent block. This was expected to result in the exposure of a further 800–1,000 bodies. On 21 April 2004—Freedom Day in South Africa—the remains were ceremonially transferred from Green Point to the mortuary of Woodstock Day Hospital, on the other side of the city. On 22 July the developer was informed that the appeal to the Minister had been dismissed and that construction activities on the site could continue.

With the failure of the appeal, the focus of attention shifted to questions of memorialization and access to the remains. The City of Cape Town initiated discussions with SAHRA and the PPPC around a permanent holding place or “ossuary” for the Prestwich Street human remains, still in temporary storage in the Woodstock Day Hospital. The proposed site was a triangular piece of land owned by the city on the corner of Buitengracht and Somerset Roads, a busy traffic intersection three blocks from the Prestwich Street site. This project went ahead, and construction of the New Prestwich Memorial Building was completed in 2007. With the construction of the Cape Town Stadium in Green Point as part of the preparations for the

2010 FIFA World Cup, this unpromising site was reconfigured through its adjacency to a “fan walk”, laid out from the centre of the city to the new stadium. The dead of Prestwich Street, in their restless transit of the postapartheid city, would be brought into a new set of relationships: this time with the tens of thousands of football fans who walked in mass procession to watch the big games. A number of participants would comment that the last time they had taken to the streets of the city in this way was in the mass marches of the late-1980s, to protest against apartheid.

Time for the Dead

I have written at length about the events around Prestwich Street and their outcome: the failure of the appeal process, the antagonism of many archaeologists towards the anti-exhumation activists of the Hands Off Committee, the construction of a luxury apartment building (*The Rockwell*) on the Prestwich Street site, and the operation of the ironically styled *Truth Café* at the Prestwich Memorial Site (Shepherd 2007, 2013; Shepherd and Ernsten 2007). For the purposes of this chapter, one of the most noteworthy aspects of the events around Prestwich Street was the manner in which the activists of the Hands Off Committee articulated and mobilized a counter-discourse, both as a way of conceptualizing their own relationship to the remains and as a way of mounting a public and legal challenge to the exhumations. In public statements, submissions, and appeals they emphasized the language of memory, experience, and empathetic identification. They sought to articulate an alternative set of values, and alternative notions of space and time. This included notions of the site as a site of memory and conscience (rather than an archaeological site), and in one memorable intervention, the notion of “time for the dead”.

Most of all, they contested the notion of a distanced and objectified past, whose relationship with the present is mediated by expert knowledge. In their more complexly imagined version of this relationship, the re-emergence of the Prestwich Street dead in the world of the living is not described through the trope of discovery (as it is in disciplinary accounts), but rather as a “learning moment”. As such, it represents both a challenge and an opportunity to reflect on neglected and disavowed pasts, and on the unfinished business of social transformation. Achille Mbembe writes of archives and memorials as spaces of consignment, whose work is to sequester the past and isolate it in space and time (Mbembe 2002). In reviewing the thought and practice of the Hands Off Committee one finds the opposite intention: an attempt to proliferate a set of connections, and to give form to the multiple ties that bind communities of the living and the dead. One expression of this was the kind of ontology of respect that described the Prestwich Street dead as dead persons and named individuals, rather than as “skeletons” or “bones” as was prevalent in disciplinary and media accounts.

Significantly, the counter-discourse of the HOC was framed as a challenge to conceptions of knowledge in archaeology. The HOC was critical of what they described as the “archaeologization” of the research process, by which they meant

the foregrounding of archaeological methods at the expense of other approaches: oral history, social history, and archival research. In rejecting the “hidden histories” that archaeologists purported to unearth, they were rejecting a narrowed and restricted conception of history as archaeometric measurement and statements of probability linked to diet and point of origin. In their account, the “learning” to be derived from Prestwich Street is not confined to a catalogue of facts about the past, but includes the status and meaning of the past in its relation to the present. Disavowed histories of slavery at the Cape have their counterpart in a contemporary set of disavowed debates, around the unfinished agenda of social and economic transformation, and the lack of material restitution for apartheid.

The vision of the Hands Off Committee was to preserve the Prestwich Street site as a *vrijplaats*, an open space for memory and identity. The term is Christian Ernsten’s, a graduate student in the Centre for African Studies at the University of Cape Town who followed events closely. He writes: “The Dutch word means something in between the English “shelter” and free zone”, “a space of security and creativity at the same time” (Ernsten 2006). One of the most powerful proposals around memorialization that emerged as part of this counter-discourse, imagined leaving the site as an open, green space in an increasingly densely constructed urban environment: a place to hang out, eat lunch, bring the kids, or snooze in the sun (Mintz 2009). In my own work I wrote in favour of the notion of an “archaeology of silence” (Shepherd 2007). This is premised on the idea that our generation—the first generation after apartheid—stands to learn more by leaving the remains in the ground and starting a conversation around the implications of their “naked openness in the city”, than by exhuming them and subjecting them to disciplinary procedures. For us, the “learning opportunity” is not about imagined pasts sequestered in deep time, but about the far more urgent and difficult matter of how it is that we meet one another as South Africans who stand on opposite sides of a divided history.

Postwars of the Dead

Prestwich Street was not an isolated instance. In the very period in which the Prestwich Street dead were being exhumed, the dead of the African Burial Ground in Lower Manhattan were being reburied on site, as one of the outcomes of a lengthy set of struggles involving federal agencies, African-American community activists, and archaeologists (La Roche and Blakey 1997, 1998; Mack and Blakey 2004). Subaltern struggles around rights, resources and representation mobilized around archaeological sites and human remains form a growing part of contemporary worlds of practice in archaeology. Such struggles occupy a complex political and discursive space, but at least in part they constitute a response—or form of counter-discourse—to the protocols of professionalized heritage and the discourse of CRM (Shepherd 2008).

In South Africa, the period post-1994 has been marked by an intense interest in exploring histories of practice which produced collections of human remains, and

by a practical politics of repatriation (Skotnes 1996; Legassick and Rassool 1999; Rassool and Hayes 2002; Shepherd 2012). One of the most high-profile cases involved the remains of a Khoisan woman, Sarah “Saartjie” Baartman, born in the vicinity of the Gamtoos River in what is now the Eastern Cape, South Africa, some time before 1790. Orphaned in a commando raid, she was passed into the hands of Dutch farmers near Cape Town as a slave. In 1810 she was taken to London, where she was exhibited as a freak-show attraction under the name of the “Hottentot Venus”. She was later sold and taken to France. Sarah Baartman died on 29 December 1815 of an inflammatory ailment, possibly smallpox. An autopsy was conducted and published by the French anatomist Henri Marie Ducrotay de Blainville and republished by the naturalist Georges Cuvier. Her skeleton, preserved genitalia and brain were placed on display in the Musée de l’Homme in Paris, until they were removed from public view and stored in 1974. When the African National Congress came to power in South Africa in 1994, President Nelson Mandela formally requested the return of the remains of Sarah Baartman. After much legal wrangling in the French National Assembly, France acceded to the request on 6 March 2002. Her remains were repatriated, and on 9 August 2002—National Women’s Day in South Africa—reburied on Vergaderingskop, a hill outside the town of Hankey in the Eastern Cape (Crais and Scully 2009). Myriad other cases involve Nama community claimants, the forensic recovery and reburial of victims of southern Africa’s liberation wars of the post-1960 period, and Khoisan ethnic revivalists (Fontein 2010; Hall 2006; Harries 2010; Krmpotich et al. 2010; Werbner 1998).

I would like to make a number of speculative points as a way of drawing together some of the threads of this discussion. First: it is no accident that the ancestral dead should play such a prominent and particular role as a point around which to mobilize forms of local resistance. The contemporary phase of neoliberal globalization has been characterized by the deterritorialization of capital, the declining power of nation states, the growing power of transnational enterprises of various kinds, and by the decline and disestablishment of many of the structures and institutions that safeguarded individual and community life (Appadurai 1996; Castells 1996; Wallerstein 2004). Zygmunt Bauman has described this condition as one of “liquid modernity”, characterized by a new fluidity in the contract between states, citizens and capital (Bauman 2000). Contemporary neoliberal globalization has also been marked by the spectacular growth of the BRIC economies, growing resource hunger, and increasingly aggressive incursions into previously marginal territories on the part of global interests, including transnational mining interests, “big oil”, agribusiness, and global pharmaceuticals. Such incursions take place in previously politically unavailable territories and territories under indigenous control, and might fairly be described as capitalism’s “final frontier”.

This situation amounts to a crisis of global citizenship, and it devolves in particularly sharp and unmediated ways on the world’s poorest and most politically marginalized groups and individuals. It is in such a context that we need to understand the mobilization of the ancestral dead by subaltern groups as points around which to organize local resistance to global designs. The very materiality of the remains of

the dead and their embeddedness in a local politics of place becomes key to opposing deterritorialized global practices. In the face of forms of discourse in which the local is always already discounted and disempowered, the dead offer alternative registers and imaginaries through which to organize local responses, counterposing their own magic to the “magic of capital”.

Regimes of Care

A second point circles back to the questions of ethics with which I began. The case studies that I have presented here counterpose strikingly different regimes of care. On the one hand, disciplinary regimes of care premised on forms of empirical knowledge, epistemic violence, and what might be described as typological boxing. In terms of this regime of care the remains of the excavated dead are photographed, numbered, bagged, boxed, transported, sampled, measured and archived. On the other hand, they speak of regimes of care derived from contexts of life, the kinds of practices and protocols that guided the interment of the Oakhurst dead, for example. Referenced and re-animated in the postcolony such regimes of care “of life” become powerful points around which to organize a local politics of resistance. More generally, they become points around which to articulate non-modern or counter-modern values and ways of being, opening out to senses of the self and to futures not circumscribed by the language and practices of neoliberal globalization and “liquid modernity”. One of the arguments that I am forwarding here is that this does not take place as a form of regressive identification, but as a complexly imagined response to a contemporary crisis.

A third and final point considers the location of such forms of thought and articulation. If, as I have been suggesting, they form the basis—or one possible basis—of an archaeological ethics after ethics, then the question arises of their position vis-à-vis a territory of disciplinary practice. Here I am in agreement with recent interventions by Alejandro Haber, Yannis Hamilakis and others in proposing an “undisciplined archaeology” (Haber 2012; Shepherd and Haber 2013). This argument works in terms of the following set of moves: first, in distinguishing a notion of archaeology from a notion of discipline; second, in considering the ways in which a disciplinary discourse on archaeology presents a narrowed and restricted set of themes and ideas; third, in exploring the epistemic possibilities of an undisciplined archaeology. The kinds of ideas and practices operating in relation to the ancestral dead which I have been exploring here do not originate in the world of the discipline, much less in lists and codes of ethics. Rather, they belong to a non-disciplinary—or undisciplined—terrain of thought and practice whose relation to the discipline is complex, frequently oppositional, and usually discounted in advance as belonging to the realm of culture and tradition. As a way of closing, I want to propose that taking seriously a notion of archaeological ethics after ethics involves at least three things. First, stepping back from a set of disciplinary entitlements that dismiss non-disciplinary regimes of care and forms of thought and

articulation as belonging to a realm other than that of knowledge. Second, developing a discussion around forms of epistemic violence implicit in disciplinary regimes of care. Third, thinking seriously about what it means to engage such non-disciplinary practices and regimes of care as an archaeologist, and about how that transforms our sense of what archaeology is and might become.

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Chapter 3

“Do as I Say and Not as I Do”.

On the Gap Between Good Ethics and Reality in African Archaeology

Shadreck Chirikure

Introduction: On the Need to Walk the Talk

Ethics are standards that guide human action; they are social norms that encourage or forbid certain types of human conduct (Resnik 1998: 14). Standards that promote good behaviour are known as good ethics while those that endorse bad conduct are known as bad ethics (Wylie 1996; Hall 2005; Meskell 2010). In any serious profession, good ethics are encouraged while bad ones are derided; there are rules of conduct that guide professionals at the global level. For example, in the medical, financial and legal fraternities, bad ethics are often associated with heavy consequences such as expulsion from the profession. The Chartered Financial Institute (CFA) training modules emphasizes the need for honesty, integrity, and putting client interest before those of the financial consultant (CFA Institute 2013). Archaeology, however, is yet to reach this highly desirable stage where archaeologists working in many parts of the world are bound by the same code of conduct and can be disciplined or even expelled from the profession for bad ethics. This is despite the spirited attempts made by organizations such as the World Archaeological Congress to work towards this (see for example the Vermillion Accord on Human Remains). In conformity with the global picture, there is no common set of ethics binding archaeologists working in Africa while international standards of best practice are rarely used to improve the local system. Shepherd (2007) laments how the tenets of the Vermillion Accord on human remains were hardly referred to during the debates surrounding the Prestwitch burials accidentally discovered during development in Cape Town. This may be linked to the history of the subject on the continent which was related to the colonialist project and the interest and whims

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of different imperialist powers with the result that there was no common code of practice even in colonies of the same European power. This situation still subsists today.

African archaeology emerged in a largely unethical context characterized by unprofessionalism and plunder of cultural objects and archaeological sites by colonial armies and administrators (Robertshaw 1990). In fact, most of the continent's very first archaeologists were peripatetic scholars who self-educated themselves while damaging under the name of "excavation", some of the most important sites on the continent. For example, Richard N Hall the man who ransacked Great Zimbabwe more than any other individual was not a professional archaeologist. Instead, he was an antiquarian and a protector of Cecil John Rhodes' commercial interests. Richard Hall blatantly disregarded good ethics by appropriating the local past and invoked myths of exoticism to explain it. For instance, Hall's (1905) excavations at Great Zimbabwe were meant to demonstrate that the place was built by Semites, Phoenicians or Hamites and was thus not local in origin. In a bid to prove this external origin, local material culture was thrown away without record while valuables such as gold were looted. The theory of foreign authorship strongly supported Cecil John Rhodes' colonialist agenda on the pretext that the area was previously colonized (Garlake 1973; Hall 1987).

Richard Hall's atrocious and deplorable methods galvanized the colonial government into action resulting in the promulgation of the first antiquities legislation in the then Rhodesia in 1902. The British Association for the Advancement of Science sent the professional archaeologists David Randall-McIver (1906) and Caton-Thompson (1931) to excavate Great Zimbabwe. These researchers concluded that Great Zimbabwe was local in origin and since the early 1930s no serious archaeologist has ever doubted Great Zimbabwe's local authorship (Chirikure and Pikirayi 2008). Similarly, the first excavators of Mapungubwe, Fouche and others were also amateurs who valued objects at the expense of recording their contexts (Fouche 1937; Gardner 1963). The excavations at both Great Zimbabwe and Mapungubwe were often against the wishes of local communities who were seen as cheap sources of labour and nuggets of oral historical data essential for the archaeologists to build their own interpretations (Sheperd 2003; Chirikure et al. 2010). In West Africa, the siege of Benin in 1897 is but one example in which an imperial army attacked the palace of the Oba resulting in the looting of important and sacred objects which ended up in many western museums and also gave fortune to the plunderers (Shaw 1975). The palace in Kumasi, Ghana also experienced a similar fate.

Not surprisingly, a historiography of African archaeology reveals that by the 1950s and 1960s when numerous professional archaeologists had joined the fray and taken over from antiquarians and amateurs, a serious attempt was made to address the issue of ethics in African archaeology (Hall 1987; Deacon 1993). For example, Ray Inskeep, belonging to the first generation of academic archaeologists in southern Africa lamented his unease with the lack of professionalism and by extension good ethics in the subject. Inskeep (1970: 307, quoted in Deacon 1993) stated that "if archaeology were something which could be practised without training, or learned in an armchair at home, a large number of university departments

throughout the world would be wasting their time, and would have been doing so for a very long time. And yet, here in South Africa the notion still exists that archaeology is a subject which anyone with enthusiasm and a little knowledge can pursue at a professional level”. This observation equally applied to other parts of Africa where professionalism and ethics were for various reasons non-existent. Thurstan Shaw one of the first generation of professional archaeologists in West Africa made spirited attempts to stop the illicit trade in Nigerian antiquities and popularized how detrimental this was to African archaeology. Shaw was also instrumental in establishing the department of archaeology at Ibadan in Nigeria and also invested his energies in professionalizing the Nigerian museum service. Similarly, many of Africa’s first generation of archaeologists such as Merrick Posnansky, Graham Connah, David Phillipson, Tim Maggs and many others fought very hard to make archaeology a professional discipline and campaigned for the establishment of archaeology posts in African museums and university departments.

Professional associations such as the Pan African Congress for Prehistory and Related Studies, the West African Association of Archaeologists and the Southern African Association of Archaeologists (SA3) also weighed in and were influential in discussing the subject of ethics and how professional archaeologists were expected to behave. For example, members of SA3 agreed on a Code of Ethics at their Biennial General Meeting in 1990 (Deacon 1993). Unfortunately, the code was only binding to its published list of members willing to do contract work thereby excluding other archaeologists particularly those in the academy and in the museum service. In 2004, SA3 was rebranded the Association of Southern African Professional Archaeologists (ASAPA) and further commitments were made to adhering to good ethics particularly in dealing with the issues of reburial, commercial archaeology and relations with host communities. This was helped by the fact that new heritage legislation such as the South African National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999 contained provisions for dealing with burial grounds and legislates for the need to involve communities in archaeology and heritage management. Similar legislation now exists in Botswana and Namibia but in the majority of African countries, local communities are still very much disenfranchised from the archaeological enterprise (Ndoro et al. 2008). The image of archaeology is still that of an elitist discipline mostly at variance with the expectations of host communities (Chirikure et al. 2010).

A critical evaluation of the history of ethics in archaeology in general and in Africa in particular suggests that since the mid-twentieth century, archaeologists, especially those based in the academy engaged with the issue of ethics in one form or another. Indeed, archaeological associations such as the Society for American Archaeologists, the Society for Africanist Archaeologists, the Pan African Congress for Prehistory and Related Studies, the European Association for Archaeologists, the World Archaeological Congress and many more all have ethical codes that govern the way their members conduct their business. While most of today’s archaeologists recognize the importance of ethics, particularly good ethics, it is difficult to implement them as there are no consequences for bad ones. Therefore, although the talk of good ethics is there, archaeologists of all persuasions are yet to walk this talk.

This paper, with the aid of case studies, discusses the issues of ethics in African archaeology, focusing on the issue of giving back to the communities, contract archaeology, and reburial. It demonstrates that ethical issues have now gone beyond common responsibilities to the archaeological record and also include responsibilities to host communities, the present and the future. Unlike other professions where there are strong consequences for ethical violations, lamentably, no such thing exist in archaeology, resulting in the reality that archaeologists often end up in exactly the same situations that they criticize. For example, while it is universally recognized that burials are highly sensitive, they also represent a lucrative business opportunity such that most archaeologists support burial archaeology ethics in principle with nothing changing much on the ground.

Giving Back to the Community: An Ethical Dilemma

Archaeology in Africa developed in a context of land dispossession, genocide and other processes coterminous with colonialism (Pwiti and Ndoro 1999). The new antiquities legislations and museums that were built during the colonial period had no place for local communities who were either seen more as sources of labour or repositories of historical information and less as consumers of the past (Sheperd 2003; Ndoro et al. 2008). In fact, museums and monuments administration bodies and the laws that established them had no room for host community involvement and participation. The ethical question that was repeatedly posed is: whose past and for whom were the archaeologists studying the past for (Gathercole and Lowenthal 1990). During the colonial times, it seems the past was studied more for archaeologists and posterity than for the excluded communities (Gathercole and Lowenthal 1990). This becomes clear from the fact that although the goal was to protect the past, the local communities were not allowed to use and access this past. The literature is full of examples of contestation that resulted from this situation. For example, Pwiti and Mvenge (1996) talk of how the Rhodesian (now Zimbabwe) colonial heritage authorities banned the communities around Domboshava rock art site from conducting their rainmaking ceremonies at the site. It was assumed that the smoke from the sacrifices disfigured the rock art. This situation had parallels in many places where often the heritage sites were also located on communal land that was turned into private property through land alienation legislation (Pwiti and Ndoro 1999). Although, most archaeologists worked with communities, rarely did they give back to the same communities in the way of knowledge created or any other form of benefit.

The achievement of independence may have raised expectations for many host communities but in most countries, the new crop of archaeologists that emerged in places such as Kenya, Senegal, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and South Africa continued to use the same legislation and administrative structures as in the colonial times (Chirikure et al. 2010). The new breed of post-independence African archaeologists just continued to practice like their counterparts in the colonial period. Museums

and archaeologists saw local communities as repositories of information and nothing more. Global archaeology responded to this ethical challenge by initiating community or indigenous archaeology aimed at giving voice to host and descendant communities in the study of the past (Watkins 2003; Atalay 2006). In the US, the Native American Graves Protection Act was enacted to achieve this (Ferguson 1996). Similarly, First Nation peoples in Canada now have power to accede to or to decline requests by archaeologists to study their ancestor's remains (Nicholas 2007). The same situation exists in Australia where the Aborigines now have a strong say in the study of their ancestors' remains. Although community involvement or indigenous archaeology backed up by legislation has tremendously empowered local and host communities in the study of the past, the issue of how should archaeologists plow back to regions where they work still remains difficult to solve. This becomes important if the fact that archaeologists extract data and information from communities and give back little to none. And yet, such information advances their careers and general well being as it is job related.

The responses to this ethical challenge have varied from archaeologist to archaeologist and country to country. Some archaeologists for example, Thurstan Shaw have strongly campaigned for the end of the illicit trade in African antiquities. In particular, Shaw worked tirelessly to identify stolen objects from Nigeria at art dealership markets in London. Some of the objects were successfully returned to Nigeria although to Shaw's disappointment only to reappear on the same markets. This is but one example in which archaeologists can make a difference to local communities where they work. Recently, the present author worked with local communities at Thomo village in Giyani and taught them how to smelt iron as part of extra attractions to offer tourists visiting the Kruger National Park. In a way, this was plowing back the knowledge that was generated from studying pre-colonial metalworking processes in the area. If more archaeologists can invest the acquired knowledge for the betterment of host communities, they will have made a good contribution to society. Using the acquired knowledge to uplift host communities can be achieved with considerably little budgets. Innocent Pikirayi, one of independent Zimbabwe's first crop of black archaeologists bought copies of his newly published PhD thesis (Pikirayi 1993) and distributed copies to the communities that he worked in. Interestingly, when a team of archaeologists led by the present author failed to locate one of the sites associated with metalworking, in the area, one local community member Mr. S. Baranda produced Pikirayi's book and gazetteer of sites making it easier to identify it. Thus it is no longer sufficient to just walk into an area, survey, dig and publish without giving back to the community no matter how small the contribution maybe.

There are bigger ethical challenges associated with individual researchers giving back to the communities. For example, during the collection of oral historical information we interview local community members and we also rely on their knowledge of sites to help us in the identification process. As such, should we pay them for these services? Of course, some big excavation programs recruit local people as labourers and pay them reasonably well. The only problem with offering financial incentives in the case of interviews is that people may exaggerate thereby compromising the integrity of the information provided. Nevertheless, it is essential

to maybe provide the host communities with the published works based on our studies in their area as well as to use our knowledge to help them address problems affecting them. Furthermore, we can also ensure that their version of the past is also captured alongside that of ours as experts (Hodder 2002).

Garlake (1982) is of the opinion that if more local people are involved in archaeology knowledge production, then they will create information that can be readily used by the host communities. In particular, he takes aim at the “new” cognitive structuralist principles that were being popularized by Huffman arguing that there was need for people who grew up embroiled in the local value system to write the past from their view points. However, very few have responded to Garlake’s call because Africans have no control in archaeology knowledge production. Most of the influential journals are all in the global west (Shepherd 2002). The way in which new thinking is stifled borders on the unethical. For example, there are some bid international journals that give established authors whose ideas are being contested, manuscripts to review. The result is very predictable; they recommend that such ideas should not be published. This means that the interpretations that are dominant have little connection with the locals, except in the minds of their proponents. It is therefore not surprising that local communities do not find much use of the dominant narratives, preferring their own versions (Fontein 2006).

Some antiquities bodies have also invested in the areas where the archaeological sites are located thereby creating job and other economic opportunities. For example, the National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe in the late 1990s invested a significant amount of money in developing and upgrading local roads around Domboshava National Monument. Domboshava has spectacular rock art believed to have been authored by hunters and gatherers. As part of its master plan for archaeological resource development, the National Museum and Monuments of Zimbabwe identified key archaeological sites to be developed for tourism. Because Domboshava was one of the selected sites, NMMZ also considered ways in which the local communities would benefit from these developments. To ensure that tourism could flourish, roads were upgraded while electricity was also for the first time provided in this rural area. Apart from employing local people as tour guides, NMMZ also created a platform for locals to start small businesses. In modern business language, this forms part of a strong corporate social responsibility programme by an antiquities body. Unfortunately, due to limited budgets not many administration bodies are able to make these kinds of interventions. As such, giving back to the communities remains a strong ethical consideration in African archaeology.

Lack of Professional (Self) Regulation in Archaeology: Another Strong Ethical Dilemma

Unlike the more established professions such as the medical field, the legal profession and even the accounting profession, which are regulated by laws at national and international levels, as well as self-regulating, archaeology is not. Although the

practice of archaeology is governed by legislation, virtually all laws in operation in Africa only provide for the establishment of administrative bodies and trustees to ensure that sites are protected. However, there are no provisions for governing the conduct of archaeologists. Of course, most African heritage laws are standard in that they have provisions stating that no person shall destroy or alter heritage places without the permission of relevant authorities (Ndoro et al. 2008). Furthermore, the antiquities laws such as the South African National Heritage Resources Act and many others categorically state that infringement of the law is met by penalties. However, the penalties are not linked to inflation and given that the laws were in operation for many years, the penalties are a pittance. Besides these provisions, Africa's heritage laws are deafeningly silent on the conduct of archaeologists and ethics are only implied.

The antiquities bodies and heritage agencies often establish guidelines and standards of conduct. For example, the National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe has a raft of policies designed to guide practitioners in developer-funded archaeology. Similarly, the South African Heritage Resources Agency has minimum standards for archaeological and paleontological impact assessments. In both countries, there are consequences for failing to adhere to these guidelines. For example, the South African Heritage Resources Agency has for a very long time complained about the poor standard of CRM reports submitted by some archaeologists. Besides returning the reports to be corrected no further action has been taken resulting in the creation of a class of serial offenders. Technically speaking, heritage agencies can sue developers and responsible archaeologists but this is yet to happen. This means that self-regulation may be the only option for enforcing good ethics because nothing much is happening with government agencies. In some countries such as Zimbabwe, there is no provision for contract archaeology in the law. Here, the museum professionals conduct the impact assessments for personal gain, even though they are the ones who are supposed to evaluate the reports. This makes them players and referees at the same time. The same applies to other countries such as DRC and South Sudan which have very few archaeologists such that foreign archaeologists play an important part in this part. Because these foreign archaeologists are working in an environment of weak legislation, they often leave ethics at home and exploit the weak local laws (Kleinitz and Näser 2011).

Professional associations play a strong role in the regulation of the conduct of their members. However, most archaeology associations are not backed up by legislation and are thus not very strong. The Association of Southern African Professional Archaeologists stipulates that its members must adhere to good conduct which includes writing good reports. However, there are no consequences for bad conduct. The only heavy sanction is that membership may be withdrawn but this has never happened. Therefore, this perpetuates bad ethics and gate keeping (see Hall 2005). The Pan African Congress for Prehistory and Related Studies draws its members from Africanists all over the world. It too like local associations is faced with the same problems that it is not backed up by legislation and is not associated with any individual country. Technically, it may prosecute perpetrators of bad ethics using the laws of the land on which the ethics were violated but this is yet to

happen. In fact, associations such as the Society for Africanist Archaeologists pass motions on a number of unethical issues but these too are backed up with little practical action. This means that self-regulation in archaeology may not work in the foreseeable future unless radical interventions are made. Therefore, if one is not involved in any situation requiring adherence to good ethics, then he or she deplors what others are doing but if they are involved, they turn a blind eye.

Ethics in the Archaeology of Death: Some Big Questions

It can be argued that most cultures in the world respect the dead and their final resting places. Burials are viewed as sacred and may not be disturbed. However, archaeology thrives on excavations to retrieve material remains and not surprisingly burials are often encountered with the skeletons taken for detailed scientific studies in the laboratory. In the 1980s, there was a huge ethical debate in the US and in Australia where large collections of indigenous peoples were held in museums. It was universally agreed that most of these early collections across the whole world were built in unethical circumstances. Some were victims of grave excavation while others were killed in the wars of conquest and dispossession. Not surprisingly, the issue of burials and the reburial of human skeletons in museums and other collections gained strong momentum in the world and is often very sensitive. The World Archaeological Congress sponsored the Vermillion Accord on human remains and other tissue in archaeology. It also stated that the rights and beliefs of host communities must also be respected.

Like in other parts of the world, the issue of burials raises important ethical questions and is in fact a human rights issue. Motivated on these considerations, the South African government championed the reburial of human remains from Mapungubwe that were held in the University of Pretoria collections. This was seen as a way of respecting the dead by properly giving them a final resting place and not keeping them in cupboards holding the collections. The Mapungubwe skeletons were reburied following the local traditions of the Venda people.

However, it is often the commercial archaeology side of things that is increasingly embroiled in ethical issues. Shepherd (2007) discusses the debacle that arose when a routine development at Prestwitch Place resulted in the unearthing of a large number of burials in Cape Town. The South African Heritage law calls for a 60 day commenting period as well as for community consultation to ensure that the wishes of local communities are respected. However, this was not respected for excavations continued during this period. Local communities formed pressure groups demanding that the rights of the dead must be respected. At the end, it was agreed that the dead must be respected and not disturbed.

Prestwitch place is one of the many situations that are taking place in southern Africa. The case showed that although the law calls for consultation, the balance of power is skewed in favour of archaeologists such that not enough consultation is taking place. However, one community in Limpopo sued the Limpopo Road Agency

for disturbing ancestral graves. A settlement was found and increasingly communities are seeking justice through courts. It would, however, considerably help if there were strong ethical guidelines to guide local archaeologists.

In October last year, the largest mobile telecoms operator in Zimbabwe Econet Wireless requested the services of archaeologists to conduct an impact assessment on Sviba Hill near the modern town of Masvingo (Maponga 2012; NewsdzeZimbabwe 2012). Because there are no ethical guidelines on burials in Zimbabwe and that the heritage law is outdated, no community consultation is carried out when dealing with burials. An impact assessment was carried and was authorized by the National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe. Econet engineers started work and in the process disturbed the burials of chiefs in the area. Sviba Hill is a sacred shrine to local Mugabe and Charumbira peoples (Maponga 2012). Irked with the desecration of their ancestors resting peace, the two local chiefs sued Econet in the Zimbabwean High court demanding damages in terms of customary laws. This case will hopefully result in a change of action. Like the Prestwitch place, perhaps communities must do more to protect their heritage because archaeologists cannot be trusted all the time. Again, this takes us back to the issue of consequences—if there are consequences for ethical violations then the situation may be different.

Conclusion

A historiographical study of ethics in archaeology reveals that archaeologists have always been talking about ethics in African archaeology from the establishment of systematic studies in the discipline in the 1950s. Pioneer archaeologists such as Ray Inskeep and Thurstan Shaw were talking ethics and deplored the way in which good ones were disregarded. Indeed, even today, professional archaeologists such as the Pan African Congress for Prehistory and Related Studies and the Association for Southern African Professional Archaeologists still talk ethics. However, it walking this talk is proving to be an insurmountable challenge. Not every archaeologist believes in giving back to host communities and let alone involving the same communities in the study of the past in Africa. Furthermore, there is no professional regulation of archaeologists resulting in the continuation of some bad ethical practices. There is still need to engage with the issue of reburial and international standards that must be incorporated into the study and protection of human remains. At the end of this is the need for decisive action to translate talk into practice. If this is not done the way archaeology is today may not be different from that of the past. Any failure to do that will result in us passing motions and criticizing others for the practices that ourselves are guilty of. Ethics must be therefore planted at the centre of the discipline of archaeology where they will determine how the study and consumption of the past is approached.

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Chapter 4

Archaeology and Development: Ethics of a Fateful Relationship

Alexander Herrera

Introduction

The trajectory of archaeology as a scientific discipline is predicated upon the appropriation of the knowledge it helps produce, knowledge linked to different intentions to effect development since the dawn of the discipline. As the production of particular, de-personalised pasts through “conventional archaeological knowledge” (Atalay 2006) has shifted overall thematic emphasis from the explosive national/ethnic focus of nineteenth and twentieth century Europe (e.g. Arnold 1990; Härke 2002), to addressing inequality and socio-technological change (e.g. Childe 1944), the role of redistribution and trade in the evolution of political economies (e.g. Earle 1991), and onto concerns about socio-environmental relations (e.g. Crumley 1994), the currency of archaeology for development discourse has changed. Scholars, aware that the value of archaeology is measured with reference to the broader ideals of utility of western modernity (Stump 2013), have creatively sought to address shifts in the socio-political contexts of their time, redrawing the relationships of the discipline with local, national and global forces in the process. As an invitation to sharpen discussions on archaeological ethics at the political interface of archaeological practice and development discourse, this chapter seeks to pinpoint junctures at which particular regimes of valuation are deployed by different actors. My discussion attempts to put these in the context of a situational ethics and bring those linkages to the fore that tie disciplinary practice to the political intentions to effect development.

As the importance of archaeology in upholding national histories through testimonial valuation becomes increasingly standardised (Herrera 2013a) its role as

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a facilitator of capital deployment becomes increasingly important (Haber 2013). Industrial practices, such as open cast mining and the construction of roads, dams and cities, are increasingly proving fertile grounds for archaeology to develop. In this process, the testimonial focus of archaeology on the material outcomes of social change in a more or less distant past is being recast in mercantile terms, just as the prerogatives of national archaeologies are challenged.

Rather than argue these developments as important to understand the negative global trend in research funding for archaeology, this chapter discusses ethical issues arising from a selection of attempts to make archaeology more relevant to present-day concerns by producing practical benefits. From a vantage point in the central Andes, it seeks to disentangle parallel strands of ideas regarding the utility of archaeology for different stakeholders by focussing on their place within competing doctrines of development (Cowen and Shenton 1996). It argues that the production of archaeological knowledge is concomitant of different moments in the genesis, articulation and consequence of development doctrines, which are contingently embedded in distinct historical and political processes.

The implementation of measures to affect a short-term development goal on the ground—economic development through profit-making enterprises—itself cast as a means to achieve broader goals is exemplified by the role of archaeology in the production of destinations for the tourism industry. In this context archaeologists are typically called upon by tour operators or state-funded institutions deployed on behalf of the industry, to assist in excavating, restoring, preserving or presenting material remains to an audience. This audience is usually framed as tourists, consumers in the market of experience (Hall and Lew 2009). “Cultural tourists” may indeed seem busier ticking-off visits to heritage sites and museums than actively engaging with their own otherness, yet site-hopping is precisely what many industry planners seek to promote to effect economic development through redirection of capital flows towards areas and sites which were little visited previously. In emerging destination countries especially, archaeologists are often active promoters of the very idea that “the past”, “heritage” or even “archaeology” represents a potential engine for development, economic or otherwise. The ideals and goals about development first conceived and formulated within these conjunctures (e.g. the cultural segment of the tourism industry as a driver of social development), tend to fall well short of the ideals of national development for progress envisaged by the nineteenth century forebears of archaeology. As Funari et al. (2013) and others have pointed out, however, the touristic experience is open-ended because the confrontation of individuals with otherness, even if represented, can bring about unintended consequences, and “public” archaeologists—as cognisant development agents—may seek to promote consequences different to business-orientated goals.

The role of archaeology in the formulation of rural development projects centred on Andean technologies, in contrast, provides an instance of archaeology’s roles along a full cycle of development: from the forge of political and economic intentions, to their actual deployment and implementation and their consequences over the short and long-terms, intended and unintended. (Re)construction of abandoned field systems, usually framed as a way to re-value indigenous heritage

(e.g. Rivas et al. 1999) or, more recently, to inform policy building through the study of past responses to environmental change, however, has not led to large-scale adoption as the alternative to standard practices of rural development through capital investments in mechanisation and agrochemicals intended by their proponents.

The rescue of a fetishized technology (cf. Hornborg 1992, 2014), cast as essentially indigenous (Swartley 2002) is generally considered to have failed in the Altiplano, not because crops withered or techniques were not adopted, but because local farmers did not take up market-oriented production (Herrera 2011a). Archaeological study and experimentation with raised field agriculture has thus helped to highlight the key importance of social and cultural aspects of water and agro-biodiversity management for addressing issues of food (in) security. Scrutiny of small-scale adoption, resignification and integration in communal production strategies as unintended consequence, can additionally bring into sharper focus how testimonial, mercantile and indigenous values of “heritage” intersect.

In lieu of a conclusion, this paper attempts to contrast the experiences and roles of archaeological practice in each development conjuncture in tourism and rural development. It highlights the roles of culture as a commodity, and of technology fetishism at the cross-disciplinary interface as well as the necessary contestation of heritage as a value-free administrative category. Moving on from the postcolonial critique of archaeological ethics, a role for a decolonising archaeology is proposed: as a catalyst for dialogues to transcend boundaries of culture and class, and promote reciprocal understandings of development interests, ideals, and intentions.

The Ethics of Development in Theory

Since the seventeenth century modern development doctrines have been closely tied to the search for a better order for the state, and it is only in the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution that the liberal doctrine of progress became detached from the classic organicist analogy between cycles of life and death and “natural progress” (Cowen and Shenton 1996:12–18), still a metaphor for the growth and expansion of societies in cultural evolution. A key difference between doctrines of progress and modern development doctrines is that the latter delegate intentionality in agents, specialist and technocrats entrusted with developing the capacities of others. Cowen and Shenton’s (1996) historical critique of the concept of development helps illuminate how archaeology is immersed in development doctrines, which is part of the reason such a keystone disciplinary concept has remained little theorised until recently (see Merriman 2004; Herrera 2011a, 2013a and contributions in *Public Archaeology* 13 (1–3)).

In archaeology the term development marks more distinctions than that between processes of growth and transformation and the distinctiveness of events or consequences usually enshrined in dictionaries. The context-dependant deployment of differing meanings and nuances is masked by commonplace shorthand usage. Primary confusions regard its use to refer to the means of transitive action or the results of actions, such as between state policy and its (dis)empowering effects.

The buried variance reflects the modern history of the discipline and provides a gauge for the spatio-temporal impact and diffusion of epistemological borrowings (e.g. Trigger 1968; cf. Londoño 2013).

Across much of the anglophone world the institutionalised role of archaeology is taken for granted. Within contract archaeology especially, development is used as a shorthand to refer to production through construction, the material practices of transformation enshrined in professions related to architecture, building, public utility and property management (e.g. ASDU n.d.:1). In this sense it refers to the actual process of implementing ideals of development, as sanctioned by the state. Discussions on archaeological ethics in this context, under the umbrella of national and international legislation, revolve around the negotiations between “heritage practitioners” on the one hand, and the agents entrusted with the implementation of development goals on the other.

Narratives about what happened in a nation’s past, in contrast, tend to refer an incremental, naturalised notion of transformation more akin to the merger of progress and evolution in the second half of the nineteenth century (Trigger 1968:528) that encapsulates the idea of achieved potential by a preformed entity which was successfully exported out of Europe to the recently decolonised world. I have argued elsewhere (Herrera 2013a) that this merger prefigures the disciplinary practice of modern archaeology in the Andes. Yet, like the former, it tends to also reproduce complex sets of contradictions. Shorthand usage of “development” conflates: the *intentions* to effect change, including the particular vision, ideals, morals and culture that drive such intentions, and the agents and historicity driving them; the *process* of transformation itself, including the political and practical socio-technical means of putting intentions into practice as well as the *policies* and laws that aim to reproduce transformation processes; and the outcome or results of the interplay of different stages within historically contingent development processes, i.e. the *effects* of development intentions once put into practice (Cowen and Shenton 1996).

Such naturalisations uphold the status quo because they eschew discussion and debate on the desires and strategies of subaltern groups in the dark (Sachs 1991; Escobar 1995, 1999a, b). This is problematic because archaeological ethics are, at their core, a historically embedded guiding framework for politically aware action, a means to leave behind the dark past of the discipline in solidarity (Herrera and Hollowell 2007; Hollowell and Herrera 2012). Pondering and considering the risks and benefits of actions to *all* others is an integral aspect of ethics (e.g. Munthe 2011) and it is therefore important that the agency and otherness of *all* stakeholders—including local populations, government agencies, outside investors, regulators—are clearly spelt out (Horton and Roche 2010). This may be particularly difficult in multi-cultural contexts, not only because of asymmetries in power and language barriers. On the one hand, the marginalisation of indigenous people may already be woven into everyday practice (e.g. de la Cadena 2000, 2005). On the other hand, full sets of presuppositions regarding “global concerns” such as environmental degradation, including the externalisation of costs (Gössling and Hall 2006; Holden 2008), need to be translated. Additionally different stakeholders will emphasise certain ethical principles as opposed to others, depending

on context. Preventing physical and structural violence can therefore only be a first step, even if it is in the right direction.

The role of archaeology in development politics ties into broader discussions surrounding property relations (e.g. Hann 1998). Nationalist archaeologies have important histories precisely because they are a means to the development of Nations, modern projects *par excellence*. In tune with the continuous restructuring of the post-colonial world, the place of archaeology in doctrines of national development that promised a brighter future for all citizens in the wake of decolonisation has also begun to shift. Across much of Latin America the projected construction of common pasts and identities in the realm of public education has turned colonialism on itself (endocolonialism) and is increasingly complemented by, or giving way to, the rise of short-sighted preoccupations surrounding the improvement of livelihoods (usually poor and rural) through financial benefits derived from the sale of heritage-related services.

Trusteeship plays a key role in development discourse because as well as bridging processes of development with the intention to effect development as mediated by the state (Cowen and Shenton 1996:ix–x, 12–16) it legitimises property relations. For conventional archaeology, trusteeship is intimately linked to its self-conception through the notion of stewardship (Wylie 2005), a concept whose varying definitions are based on “a relationship that denotes responsibility for taking care of something for someone else” (Hollowell and McGill 2013). Fundamental questions regarding the interests of different agents underpinning the legitimacy of such privilege are easily glossed over in practice with passing reference to the (assumed, hence pre-theoretical) necessity of “national”, “economic” or “social” development (cf. Haber 2013), such as “the struggle against poverty” or “the right to water”. Heritage tourism provides a case in point.

The Experience of Identity for Sale

National archaeologies are grounded in the testimonial value ascribed to certain objects and locales through the narratives about them. Together, objects, places and narratives help constitute sanctioned national histories, the protection of which, in turn, substantiates overarching claims that lead to them being classed as heritage, within the boundaries defining a territory as exerted through national authorities.

Yet the sense of archaeological objects and sites as public goods, which must be jealously protected by the state on the one hand, and made to benefit the national society on the other, derives in a suite of ethical issues. Different interpretations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights can easily pit culture against development, especially in light of the 2007 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In practice, the declaration of “archaeological sites” as intangible cultural heritage in Peru (Ley 28296; cf. Valencia 2008), for instance, typically curtails existing patterns of traditional use and transit even if these can be shown to have been in place since before colonisation. Measures of protection

may include the eviction of “squatters”, including people replicating indigenous patterns of mobility after natural disasters. The implementation of development ideals by recourse to an exclusionary “glass-box approach” to heritage, made possible through and by archaeology, may thus be argued to potentially conflict with the right to free movement and choice of abode (UNO 1948, Article 13), as well as choice of work (UNO 1948, Article 23). Discontent is compounded when, at the same time, heritage sites are given in concession, fully or in part, for the benefit of luxury hotels and restaurants.

Framed as a means to development, the national past becomes a treasure trove (cf. Rostworowski 2002; Herrera 2006, 2011b) from which selected elements may be drawn for economic benefit. One of the corollaries is the representation of identities for show and sale on the tourism market, in restaurants but also increasingly at archaeological sites (Herrera 2013b). Self-exotisation refers to public performances—ranging from more or less accurate historical re-enactments and dance competitions to wholly invented rituals—that attempt to draw from indigenous identities and traditions past and present, that is including colonial narratives to produce narratives geared to promote destinations for tourism. Lack of respect for identity and tradition in the present may not only fly in the face of their legitimacy as rituals. It also leads me to address what may arguably be the most challenging ethical dilemma: the role of the indigenous in the definition of heritage.

Classification as heritage impinges upon the legitimacy of ownership and kinds of tenure over objects, places and, increasingly, practices of performance. As archaeology is made to step down from the high altar of enlightened, modern science and get down to the pursuit of its craft (McGuire 2006) a shift in emphasis onto the technical aspects of recovery and the institutionalised administration of national archaeological heritage are palpable (Gnecco 2004). This brings with it feelings of demotion within the discipline, crisis even (Herrera 2013b), which may seem at odds with high levels of public investment in the culture sector, record levels in countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador and Peru, where 26 million US dollars are earmarked for special projects in 2013 (Ruíz 2013).

Concerns about the global environmental impacts of the tourism industry (Gössling and Hall 2006; Holden 2008), or its negative social repercussions at local level (e.g. Ruíz 2010), in contrast, focus on the aftermath of implemented measures to effect development. Both types of concerns may be compounded, especially when communities are unwilling to accept development plans, unprepared for managing impacts, or both. And yet, protests may quickly fade into the background once people deprived of access control—and lacking the means to set up business—are thrust into seeking strategies to tap into the tourism industry (Herrera 2013b).

On the 2013 “day of the Peruvian archaeologists” the driving questions of early twentieth century national archaeology—“Who are we? Where and when do we come from? Where are we going?” (sic.)—were published in the official state newspaper (Ruíz 2013), adding “that we (sic.) might jointly administer the Peruvian archaeological heritage”. A thinly veiled call to renew the historical alliance between archaeologists and the state—by far the greatest single employer or archaeolo-

gists in the country—frames profit-making engagement with the tourism industry as a vehicle for the realisation of diffuse and understated ideals and goals of national development.

Yet despite the above, the touristic experience can bring visitors closer to local people and history, provided the latter is not reduced to spectacular snippets of materiality. Key problems in rural areas, such as the asynchrony between the traditional calendar of agricultural time, aligned with evolved rhythms of production and ceremonial activity, and that of tourism, more in tune with national and international holidays can be addressed. Traditional fiestas may even provide more suitable arenas for bridging the gulf separating archaeologists from local and descendant communities through the public negotiation of antagonisms, than the enclosed and distant offices of ministry or institute of culture.

Indigenous Technologies

In contrast to the economic exploitation of aesthetics and monumentality by the tourism industry, which clearly benefits from but does not *require* a scientific narrative for successful mercantilisation, a string of rural development projects across the Andes have attempted to increase farming production by recourse to Andean technologies. Some of the first were formulated as a direct response to archaeological studies of and experiments in abandoned and recreated field systems.

Successful experimental fields at Chuqñaqota, near Huatta (Erickson 1996, 1998; Erickson & Chandler 1989) and at the Illpa research station of the National Institute of Agrarian Innovation INIA (Mujica 1997) in the early 1980s inspired dozens of state and NGO funded projects focussed on the rehabilitation of raised field systems (e.g. Swartley 2002; Kehoe 1991; PIWA 2001). At about the same time Masson and his interdisciplinary team (Masson et al. 1984), were moving on from anthropological research on farming in the upper Cañete Valley pioneered by Enrique Mayer, César Fonseca and others (e.g. Mayer 1974; Fonseca and Mayer 1979), calling for the reconstruction of irrigated terraces as a driver of development. The comparative advantages invoked varied in each case, but tended to revolve around combinations of problems assumed evident to any informed outsider; chiefly the link between environmental constraints at high altitude leading to low volumes of production (e.g. threat to crops from seasonal frosts, soil erosion on steep slopes, flooding and droughts), and rural poverty.

The intention to increase farmers' participation in the staple market through the appropriation of archaeological and anthropological knowledge hinges on the recognition of a perceived potential to address local issues better than through standard development practice. Ostensibly, these were tied to a vindication of Andean tradition. Yet in practice, materials and techniques, recast as indigenous technical knowledge, appear to have been better suited to political implementation as it allowed reifying deeply ingrained stereotypical, essentialised view of Andean farmers. Perhaps most importantly the fetichisation of indigenous technologies

made it possible to eschew the social relations of reciprocity and redistribution that articulate vertical control of ecological tiers, as per Mayer's (1974) definition of Andean technologies.

In the 1990s under the aegis of President Fujimori—an authoritarian agrarian engineer driving neoliberal structural reforms—substantial investments in terrace reconstruction continued through the National Programme to Improve Water Catchments and Soils (PRONAMACHS). The lack of accompanying archaeological and anthropological studies of affected terrace systems, the lack of care in execution and the overall political nature of PRONAMACHS suggests that many of these projects were deployed more as a way to provide temporary employment and win votes, than as serious attempts to provide a basis for sustainable irrigation agriculture.

In their book length study of Andean technology as a means to sustainable development González and Trivelli (1999) addressed the crucial questions of land ownership and rural poverty through a focus on farming systems as modified natural capital. They addressed the linkages between (collective) land ownership and (communal) terrace maintenance, and saw that construction and rehabilitation require large groups of people working together. Three paths to rehabilitation were distinguished in their econometric study—market-, farmer- and state-driven—which concluded that, when compared to the expected returns for agricultural produce, the costs of rehabilitation were high. Unless someone could assume these costs—the communities themselves, NGOs or the state—there was little hope of success.

The search for ways to make rehabilitated infrastructure profitable, in sum, has been a long one, in which agronomists, archaeologists, economists and *campesino* farmers have all participated, looking at and trying all sorts of techniques, crops—local and foreign staple and cash-crops—under different hydraulic conditions and property regimes. Considering that most terraces in their areas of study were built well before colonisation and the rise of capitalist relations of production and consumption, it does not seem surprising that they identify more externalities than their models seem comfortable to handle. Yet despite mounting evidence that some indigenous farming techniques may not be “sustainable” in the capitalist sense, communities across the Andes continue to engage in rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Key problems identified in different central Andean case studies include the limitations of standard archaeological data for drawing up development projects (Erickson 1998); an essentialisation of the Indian that recasts the divisions between urban the middle classes and peasant farmers, in Bolivia (Swartley 2002) and elsewhere; and the fetichising distinction of technical aspects—such as terrace shape, soil composition and biodiversity “packages”—that may be successfully commodified (Herrera 2011a). Unsurprisingly, large scale abandonment of state sponsored projects was not only the case for raised and terraced field systems. Projects reintroducing camelids to areas from which they had been absent for centuries (Cedep 1997; FAO 2005) were also quickly stripped of accompanying support programs, and the animals eaten up. Yet some herding communities, like Cajabama Alta, integrated their new alpaca flocks, resignifying the landscape in the process (Lane and Herrera 2005). After only a few years they even successfully

defended their right not to shear and sell fibre at pre-set prices to officials of the Ministry of Agriculture.

We might do worse than assess such successes in terms of communal pride, the diversity and qualities of food and fibres or the beauty to behold a cultural landscape, and remind ourselves that the ethics of practice are all about the creative replication of self. Beauty, taste, health and pride all have a role to play in developing a sense of security grounded in the maintenance of social cohesion on the ground, development that needs to go nowhere. The monetary value of produce and labour appear not to offer the most suitable measuring stick for gauging Andean technologies. Under a communal framework, success may be differently assessed, even if it is not considered heritage.

Definitions of “cultural landscape” may be historically linked to the Andes of southern Peru (Sauer 1925; Mujica 1998), but terraces, canals and field systems are seldom recognised as heritage officially. Reasons for this “oversight” range from the simple circumstance that well-preserved evidence of farming and herding systems is usually found by archaeologists in thinly populated, marginal rural areas to the vast scale of landscape transformations across the Americas (e.g. Denevan 2001; Lentz 2000). Several million hectares of major field systems have been documented across the Andes (Donkin 1979; Masson et al. 1984; Masson 1986), but the documentation of soil modification and anthropic terraforms has barely begun (Herrera 2011a, Fig. 4.1). It is virtually impossible in practice for states to successfully apply an exclusionary principle, such as applied to the monumental core of “archaeological sites” in Peru (see above). Affecting the property relations of millions of people and the burden of protecting the material remains of swathes of farming



Fig. 4.1 The Titijo “sun-dial” has radially disposed raised fields built on relic, linear raised fields. This communal *aynoka* responds to local food security concerns, and seeks to engage the global quinoa market

systems, some of which were probably seasonal or opportunistic, seems a politically daunting endeavour.

Most importantly, however, most such “archaeological features” remain in productive use. Their materiality eschews any neat separation between an indigenous past and a hybrid present, separations upon which all modern notions of heritage, and indeed archaeology, are predicated. They *cannot* be heritage because they are inalienable in practice. This may partly explain why experiments with indigenous farming tend to emphasise their “lost” or “forgotten” nature, and why the role of archaeology in rural development projects continues to be marginal.

After Development

Like development discourse, the values attached to the narratives, collections and sites produced by archaeology are as unstable as they are politically charged. The “discovery” and “rescue” of materials, the compilation of documents and the collection and curation of objects, assemblages and material effects, constitute the principal area of employment for a significant proportion of archaeologists. Through their qualification as archaeological, practices are set in relation to a tacit commons—ethnic, national, class or global—which is valued. It may be valued as testimony, as a source of revenue, as referent for identity or any combination of the above, and will tend to be called heritage by those wishing to be its administrators.

The production of testimonial value in and for the present is inevitably political, and may still be one of the main outputs of archaeology, but it is an increasingly contested driving motive. By placing archaeological practice in historical context the renewed rise of mercantile valuations can be shown to go in hand with the pulsations of global capitalism. Archaeologists may tend to find themselves limited to particular realms of public action, such as increasing social cohesion and self-esteem (e.g. nation-building and regionalisation), rural production and environmental concerns (e.g. techniques of farming, herding and water management), education in schools and universities or the production of destinations. Yet there are swathes of ways, both remedial and propositive, to address social and historical injustices. Visions for the future grounded in moral and ethical imperatives, and predicated upon intentions and actions for change are, of course, at the core of the development doctrines that characterise modern worldviews in particular.

Claims surrounding preferential access to objects and places, including inclusive and exclusionary forms of appropriation, are contested and negotiated on the sloping field of heritage. Once the distinction between testimonial value, attached to the narratives co-produced by archaeology; mercantile value, directly or indirectly derived from access restrictions for the tourism industry; and valuations related to identity, ethnic, national or otherwise, it is set in relation to particular development processes and helps to map the relation of forces in a given place and time. Elements of all are likely to be strategically deployed by different stakeholders in particular contexts, and it is because all are liable to manipulation by political and economic

forces, as well as to the increasing reach of global capital, that heritage has become a contested field. Archaeological practice *upholds* the notion of heritage through the material discovery and documentary rescue of objects, landscapes and material effects. These processes of disengagement (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998) are alienating, may even kill living things (Haber 2010). And yet, depending on the conjuncture in which *archaeological* heritage is deployed in a particular light it may become an inherently conservative administrative category, or a suitably fuzzy umbrella concept for the articulation of social demands. Discussing archaeological heritage, therefore, is an urgent task, and not only because the importance of heritage for development in the Andes, if not globally, is coupled to the rising fortunes of the tourism industry (Gössling and Hall 2006).

Whether archaeological practice has seen itself increasingly reduced to addressing the consequences of development practice recently, or if addressing the negative effects of the advancement of capitalism became ingrained as XIX century development discourse found its way into a young discipline may remain a moot point. That the implementation of development ideals is channelled through broad economic and political intentions driven by the economic expectations of industry and the state, however, is not. Pushing implementation and practice to the fore, may blur ulterior motives and concrete intentions, as well as the linkages between particular development doctrines and deepening of social inequality, negative environmental impacts and the conservation of cultural resources, amongst other issues.

One of the consequences of an archaeology increasingly reduced to addressing the effects of putting economic and political intentions into practice is the current boom in archaeological ethics. These might be critically envisaged as a screen behind which asymmetrical social relations can pretend to be less asymmetric, or as a soothing balm that helps keep social peace by addressing the most salient injustices. If they succeed in engaging stakeholders in horizontal dialogues that are able to openly address issues and actively reform practices that could potentially lead to conflict they might even be seen as an aid in the maximisation of profits over the long-term. Ethical business practice and archaeological ethics may thus be criticised as a way to avert, delay or minimise structural change, such as a redistribution or reallocation of rights over land, water, ruined temples, looted cemeteries or beautiful pots; yet they may also provide a vehicle to build spaces wherein maximal demands may be articulated.

The search for overarching models for looking towards the future—beyond ethnic, nationalist and regionalist particularisms—is as striking as the strength of business as usual resilience. Insightful postcolonial and decolonial critique has given rise to indigenous archaeologies (e.g. Bruchac et al. 2010; Gnecco and Ayala 2011; Watkins 2000), which have articulated a role for the future of archaeology as supporting the demands of access and control over ancestral lands and resources by indigenous groups. The embryonic state of alternative praxis based on decolonial visions of the future, may partly be the consequence of an active shunning by post-development scholars that fear being sucked (back) into capitalist modernity. This void does, however, leave ecological modernity standing as the sole reformist alternative to the hegemonic model of business as usual.

The re-appropriation and re-signification of anthropogenic landscape modifications by Andean communities currently resettling higher altitudes, in response to ecological and social pressures, provides a direction for the search of common ideals, objectives and goals that may bridge the chasm between approaches rooted in modern science and the perceptions and projects of indigenous and descendant communities. Once the boundaries of academia are broken down and stakeholders take their place in the public arena, durable relations may be built up that enable the negotiation of principles of conduct in accordance with local practice. Later, we may turn to ask whether the result should be called indigenous or hybrid archaeology (Stump 2013) or indeed be referred to as archaeological at all.

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Chapter 5

The Mark of the Indian Still Inhabits Our Body: On Ethics and Disciplining in South American Archaeology

Ivana Carina Jofré Luna

This work attempts to enter into dialogue with other theoretical and methodological positions in world archaeology. It aims to place tension on the notions of “ethics” in archaeology in order to lead the discussion further, into the postdisciplinary abysses¹ (Haber 2010, 2012) where the encounter in intercultural contact zones disrupts

¹According to the Argentine archaeologist Alejandro Haber (2012), archaeological disciplining is carried out in two types of well-defined relationships: between times and between subjects: “Both are relationships between separate and distanced terms: past times known in present times, knowing subjects who know subjects (objects) of knowledge. The terms (past, present, archaeological, archaeologists) are consolidated and stabilized in disciplinary boundary-marking, in the consecration of its object and method. The terms become things in themselves as a result of the language of the academic discipline (they become subjects or objects of knowledge, they become past-to-be-known or present-that-knows) and, at the same time, knowledge becomes the privileged way of relating between those terms. Knowledge is understood according to the model of scientific knowledge: the subject, distanced from the object, knows it and eventually modifies it for its own benefit” (Haber 2012:16). The language of the academic discipline serves to turn the other into the grammatical object, and pre-disciplinary relationships are shifted to “another time,” because in doing so it launches a hegemonic struggle over other undisciplined epistemes, tossing them into a time long gone. I believe, however, that disciplinary metaphysics is not abolished in a *postdisciplinary stage*; this latter stage, rather, means a *recapitulation*. “The discipline is recapitulated in at least two ways in the postdisciplinary stage: First, as a provider of the technology for linking the parties permanently separated by the breach of colonial metaphysics—past other, present self—but also the objects of colony and colonizing subjects, or their descendants. That is, it is a device to enunciate reality in terms of the archaeological and its methodological manipulation. Second, as a provider of the ideological underpinnings of historical meaning, the stratigraphically aligned exposure of the passage of time: that is, its objects, its objectivity, and its objectivism” (Haber 2012:20).

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meanings and signifiers, and where what is at issue is ultimately the responsibilities and interests behind the erection of meanings regarding “the Real.”

I want to focus here on the ethical problem that is implicit for South American archaeology in the “restoration of human remains to indigenous peoples,” and to do so I situate myself in a position of *dual consciousness*, as an archaeologist but also as a person of indigenous descent and an engaged activist for our rights as indigenous peoples, historically turned into subalterns in and by the colonial relationship.

African-American sociologist W.E.B. Du Bois defined that position of dual consciousness as a privileged perspective on reality whose positioning is situated on the border between the dominant society and subordinate groups (Du Bois 1989, cited in Rappaport and Ramos 2005). Thus, the mark of the Indian that still inhabits our body evokes our situation, that of those “nonwhite others” who are the racialized product of an othering dialectic that built “Europe” as an epistemic notion:

This nonwhite is not necessarily Indian or African but rather an Other that bears the mark of the Indian or African, the imprint of historical subordination. It is these nonwhites who are the dispossessed masses of people. If these multitudes share any common heritage, it is precisely the heritage of their dispossession, in the exact sense of an expropriation that is both material—of territories, of forms of knowledge that would allow the manipulation of bodies and of nature, and of forms of conflict resolution suitable to their notion of the world and the cosmos—and symbolic—of their own ethnicity and history (Segato 2007:23).

That mark of the Indian that inhabits our nonwhite body is the aftermath of a historical trauma, or rather, the confusing relationship between absence and loss implicit in dispossession. For Dominick La Capra, trauma and its symptomatic aftermath raise fundamental issues for the representation and understanding of history. Looking at cases involving other genocides, such as the Holocaust, La Capra (2005: 68) explains that...

[W]hen absence turns into loss it increases the possibility that nostalgia will emerge for something that does not deserve it, or that an utopian policy will be recreated that seeks to find a new whole, a fully unified community. When loss turns into absence (or is decoded into a indiscriminately general rhetoric of absence), one reaches an impasse of perpetual melancholy, impossible grief, and interminable aporia, in which any process of elaboration of the past and its losses winds up being prematurely concluded or aborted. To blur or confuse the distinctions between absence and loss can be a testimony to the effects of trauma and the post-traumatic situation. Confusion and trauma are proof that one remains possessed or haunted by the past, whose ghosts and shrouds are reflections of the conceptual distinctions that can be drawn between loss and absence.

“To write History is to write drama,” argues La Capra (2005). Pain, suffering, trauma—these are categories that have been used in the philosophy of history to refer to the realm of emotions. They represent another compromise in language, because they refer to not only how one thinks of the world but also how one feels the world; they define a way of *being in the world* (Kusch 1999).

In his definition of “the small voices of history” Ranajit Guha (2002) stresses that these voices are colored by affect, they are charged with emotiveness, they are relegated to corporeality: that is, they are eminently gestural and ritualized, rather than discursive. They are voices strongly felt—dense and dramatic—constituted in

the painful trauma of having experienced or trans-generationally inherited the aftermath of genocide and/or systematic mechanisms of torture and repression. Only with difficulty can their complexity be captured through analysis and thoughtful explanation, and only with difficulty can they be stripped to the core in the face of the *logos*.

This complexity of our emotion-wrought, dense, and dramatic voices configures a particular way of enunciation that transgresses discourse and finds a new home for itself in other forms of communication, gesturally represented in the act of a ritual ceremony, a sacred liturgy, or a collective solidarity that drives a desire for change, often not expressly stated, but certainly presumed, and hence expected. This is more than a militant action; it is, in and of itself, a challenge, a deliberate transgression of hegemonic forms of modern/colonial thought, represented in this case by disciplinary and postdisciplinary archaeology.

Negation of Indigenous Alterity During the Formation and Consolidation of the Argentine National State

After the time of subjection to colonialism imposed for at least three centuries by the Spanish crown, in the nineteenth century the new Republican construction of the emerging Argentine nation-state demanded a new and unified citizen's subjectivity, a "fictive notion of ethnicity" in the sense of "fabricated" (Segato 2007:49), under the precepts of the new criollo hegemony in power, which pursued the standards represented by the modern European and American states as its model. As Segato (2007:49) stated:

[T]he national state, facing the split between the capital and the interior of the country, and the contingents of European immigrants that were being added in, exerted pressure on the nation to behave as an ethnic unit equipped with its own unique culture, homogenous and recognizable. The model of essential and indivisible ethnicity applied to the national society as a whole seems to well represent the idea that guided the actions of state institutions, especially schools and public health institutions... The recurrent theme of national identity, the obsession with creating some ontology of the nation, and attempts to discursively sequester that "being this way" under such formative pressures... constitutes a specific chapter in the literature of Argentina, with numerous examples.

In that sociopolitical context, indigenous "others" and their cultural productions not only represented the non-Western but also the static past—distant and foreign—on which basis it was possible to justify their exclusion from the emerging national state. In the name of instrumental reason—accommodated to the purposes of progress and Western civilization—"the indigenous other" had to be symbolically and physically suppressed (Pérez 1989). Therefore, the goal of nineteenth-century science was to dehistoricize the "Indians," to deny them their identity and culture (Stagnaro 1993), as the same time that military campaigns took care of the physical extermination of the indigenous population and the subsequent occupation of their lands.

National constructions or formations of alterity played a leading role in the creation of ethnic diversity (as well as in other types of diversity), a production of local history. That is, “the tensions, patterns of discrimination and exclusion along local boundaries of difference must be understood and treated based on their particular histories and configurations” (Segato 2007:107). These historical formations of alterity involve processes of nation-building and impacted dramatically on the pragmatic practices of the actors in relation to their collective identifications (Escolar 2005, 2007; Briones 2005). That is, these modes of production of difference not only produced categories and criteria of identification, classification, and belonging but also regulated or administered the differentiated conditions of existence of “internal others” who participated in the society over which a particular nation-state extends its sovereignty (Briones 2005).

In our case, Argentine society was the result of an “ethnic terror”: a panic against diversity (Segato 2007). The new political project that led to the Argentine nation would establish a “national episteme”² (Chatterjee 2004) that demanded, as a condition of access to citizenship, the definitive erasure of the traces of its subjects ethnic origins if they wished to participate in the new “imagined community” (Anderson 1993), whose model of Europeanizing modern citizenship, in accordance with a liberal economic model, had placed its hopes for purification in Anglo-Saxon immigration (Grosso 2008; Segato 2011). Rita Segato (2007:31) notes in this regard:

For Argentina, I propose the idea of an “ethnic terror,” the homogenizing institutional patrols and strategic efforts of an ideologically Eurocentric Buenos Aires elite who held control of the state and who sought to “nationalize” a nation perceived of as menacingly multiple in its villages, and foreign. To nationalize meant here to mold it into a tightly unified “fictive ethnicity.” The national subject had to be molded into a neutral profile, void of all specificity. “Civilization” was here defined as “ethnic neutrality,” and “barbarism” as its antagonistic inland Other, in constant retreat and struggling to return.

To the sociopolitical context of this juncture we must add the particular case of the local situation. In the case of the province of San Juan, from approximately 1920 to 1980, a hegemonic model prevailed, exalted by the figure of the “welfare state” (Escolar 2005). This model represented the idea of the state as guarantor of equity and social justice, arbitrator between corporate interests and class conflicts, and promoter of the civic and political incorporation of subaltern social sectors. Following Escolar, this model of the “production of sovereignty” during this period was based on the primacy of “pastoral power” (Foucault 1991, cited in Escolar 2005:65), characterized in practice by the extension of benefits and social security,

²The episteme indicates a mode of perception that is imperceptible to itself, a cognitive schema that establishes an order for seeing and conceiving of a given reality through a discursive apparatus and specific technological assemblages (Foucault 1996, cited in Grosso 2008:23). The national episteme, according to Chatterjee (2004), is expressed through categories of thought and perception that sustain and reproduce the ideology and policies of the national organization. Some of these categories in the Argentine model of national citizenship were city vs. desert and civilization vs. barbarism, dichotomies that became absolute points of departure, the “true facts” of the country, disguising under the meaning of “modernity” and “patriotic greatness” the will to power that inhabited them (Romero 1982; Kusch 1976, cited in Grosso 2008:23).

health care services, and moral training of subaltern groups, now ethnically de-individualized and interpellated by the state as citizens-workers. This new social class, the working class, was culturally homogeneous, and its “differentiating identities compared to the rural interior were defined more in social, and eventually regional or provincial terms than in terms of ethnic or racial specificity” (Foucault 1991, cited in Escolar 2005:65).

Despite this homogenizing project, the modern state has been an efficient producer of diversities, a forger of alterities, given its enormous capacity to interpellate the dramatic plot of the nation (Segato 2007; Williams 1989). This is explained by the relationship of differentiation required in the self/other relationship, which provokes the active, creative, and deliberate mobilization of differences. The key to understanding these discourses on the Other, in this case within the matrix of the national state, is the relationship between colonialism and modernity. In the words of Gnecco (2008), while colonialism (external and internal) held otherness at arm’s length, thus subordinating it in a relationship of domination, modernity demanded its rhetorical inclusion as a consequence of an egalitarian ethic.

The discourses and practices created by this contradictory articulation operate between the attraction and repulsion implicit in the hegemonic mechanism of exclusion/inclusion of difference, the constitutional logic of the national state born of the nonresidual historical relationship between colonialism and modernity. However, the borders of exclusion are essential for the subordination of difference, and hence national states (as producers of otherness) promote the creation of their own discontinuities (both spatial and temporal) along their internal borders. These discontinuities took shape in discourse, generating hierarchies and equivalent tensions (Williams 1993).

For example, within the “national episteme” and in the field of science, the production of cultural diversities work in the temporal key through narratives produced by archaeological series and stratigraphic sequences, whose ultimate goal was to condemn indigenous peoples to prehistory, stitching them up as discontinuous cultural constructs divorced from one another and not linked in the present to the territory that the new criollo and foreign hegemony of the old landed elite and new landowners needed to depopulate:

Mignolo (1995:xi) argued that colonization and modernity established the complicity between the replacement of spatial others with temporal others, and the articulation of cultural differences in chronological hierarchies. Fabian (1983) called this simultaneous phenomenon de-spatialization and temporalization, which established the foundational logic of the colonial order, the denial of contemporaneity. For this reason, one of the essential requirements of modernity was the existence of a chronopolitics. In order for the other (distant in time and space) to be “attracted” to modern times (the locus of culture), history had to be universalized. In order for the other to be attracted, first it was necessary to locate the other in a distant time-space: in this way distance appears to be a prerequisite for the civilizing project, without which that project would not exist. This discourse has typologized temporality and spatiality using political categories rather than disciplinary ones (such as savage, primitive, tribal, mythic)... Thus, the master narrative in this history is simply this: ethnic alterity is different from sameness because it lies elsewhere, and above all, in another era (it is static and should be attracted to our own, dynamic and active, era). Time and space (temporalized) became the basic categories in the rationalization of cultural differences (Gnecco 2008:106–107).

Antecedents to the Treatment of the “Indigenous Body” in the Field of Archaeology in the Province of San Juan, Argentina

Marked by a practice of collecting obsessed with the appropriation of the “body of the dead Indian,” the story of archaeology in San Juan first went through a period of exploratory collecting practiced by well-known and respected members of San Juan society. After the second decade of the twentieth century, those collecting practices, generally characterized by the markers of class, were taken over by a new, scientifically disciplined archaeological practice, this time, marked by the displacement occurring in “the journey” from the national capital to the *hinterland*. Only more recently, toward the 1960s and 1970s, after numerous investigations and isolated archaeological explorations conducted in northern San Juan, as well as in other parts of the province, has another phase in disciplinary archaeology opened up. This new phase of archaeology in San Juan was marked by strong provincial localism, which for over 40 years tried to circumscribe a geographical research space controlled by a small group of researchers led by Mariano Gambier from the National University at San Juan. The expropriation and historical representation of Argentina’s inland territory, which had previously been in the hands of the nation, through scientists such as Salvador Debenedetti, was redeveloped within a local discursive matrix that attempted to exalt the provincial political project of a modern, vibrant city with a “rich prehistory” as its mythical origin predating the national project, and of course, as something to offer up, for example, for the promotional tourism that modern economic development required.

Chronological sequences were constructed using archaeological categories produced within culturalist theories based on the idea of cultural reproduction as a determinant axis of ethnic identity. Such productions were effective discursive technologies for producing new cultural diversities, especially from the 1950s onwards, when typological seriation and stratigraphic sequences were established in the “common sense” of national scientific production. The “indigenous other” in space was replaced by the “indigenous other” in time, and cultural differences were articulated in chronological hierarchies represented by archaeological seriations and stratigraphic sequences. All this work was inscribed within the coloniality–modernity project that established the national state, a political framing project that produced these scientific narratives of otherness.

Indigenous history also was converted into *provincial prehistory*, which, situated in the distant past, stood apart from more closely situated provincial and national historical pasts. Prehistory was attributed to those “other societies” that populated the province and which today are presumed to have disappeared. This is the point of coincidence of the “discontinuist narratives” (Jofré 2008, 2012) that traverse the generality of archaeological research in San Juan, mainly represented by a normative historical/cultural theoretical framework of positivist philosophy.

From the 1980s onwards, the reemergence of indigenous people in the province and the national and global context raised questions of archaeological investigations regarding their classic productions about cultural diversity and ethnic discontinuity; however, those narratives continued to form an inexcusable part of archaeological discourse that even ran counter to practices of inclusion rehearsed by the provincial and national state starting in that period.

All the research conducted in the region was aligned in its discontinuist narratives, through whose interpretations a history of fragmented peoples was constructed and built up. At the same time, such research has fragmented us as subjects in the present, depriving us of the possibility of considering ourselves in history for a project of liberation.

The “heritagization” of indigenous material culture—its appropriation by the provincial state, in this case—creates an antagonistic confrontation with the rights of indigenous peoples (e.g., Endere and Curtoni 2003, 2006; Endere 2005; Jofré et al. 2010; Jofré and Molina 2009). Because of this, Law No. 6801 of San Juan’s provincial legislation does not acknowledge the existence of indigenous peoples, to the extent that it only mentioned them when they are established as coordinates between the archaeological and historical heritage and the people who lived there prior to the arrival of the Spaniards (Jofré et al. 2008). Shifted to the past as obsolete figures of local history, peoples who existed prior to the state have been “disappeared” by the tricky maneuver of their omission from the law on provincial heritage. This negation situates in the realm of *the unthinkable* any possible claims for return and/or recomposition of the subjects and/or communities that associate themselves with indigenous identities in the province, while obliterating the participation of indigenous communities in the Council, or any other area of decision-making or consultation with respect to the management, conservation, protection, and preservation of the “cultural and natural heritage of the province” (Jofré et al. 2010).

In that ontogenic scientific understanding that enabled the expropriation, manipulation, and display of the bodies of indigenous subjects in museums, the turning of the indigenous subject into object, and the repression of meaning surrounding their bodies, a form of terrorism was involved: *it deprived subjects of their identity and therefore their rights* (Jofré et al. 2010). The dispossession of the indigenous body occurs when the case is closed on it as “a body without ethnic and cultural identity linked to current populations.” Historical bonds are thus severed, and along with it their participation in the historical construction of the present and future of the province and nation; they are isolated (closed off) historically in support of their social and political deactivation in the present, becoming what Eric Wolf (1982) has called “people without history.”

To deny the social demands made by communities and self-ascribed subjects as descendants claiming those subjects who have been turned into “heritage” in museums is to deny their memory. These “objectivized” subjects have seen their rights lapse, perhaps because they are situated, in time, far away from the scope of modern discussions of human rights or international conventions of the ILO and

international organizations, or else for being “Indian others,” “not those of today” (Jofré et al. 2010):

The indigenous body thus transformed into heritage can be displayed because it is stripped of certain attributes that allow it to be seen as ‘the body of a subject.’ The regime of truth that guides this disciplining archaeology excludes the self-narration of those subjects who have interests distinct from those of scientists and academics (Haber 2006); for example, they exclude the demands of indigenous descendants who seek to reconstruct their past, recovering the memory of those that have been decimated physically and symbolically in this game of truths (Jofré et al. 2010:180).

Post-abysmal Thought

The Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos uses a different conceptual formula to characterize modern Western thought and its historical operation in the metropolis and in the colonies:

Modern western thought is an abysmal thought. It consists of a system of distinctions, both visible and invisible, with the invisible ones forming the basis of the visible. Visible distinctions are established through radical lines that divide social reality into two universes: the universe of “this side of the line” and the universe of the “other side of the line.” The division is such that “the other side of the line” disappears as a reality. It becomes nonexistent, and in fact is produced as nonexistent. Nonexistent means it does not exist in any relevant or understandable way of being. What is produced as nonexistent is radically excluded, because it is situated beyond the universe of that which the accepted concept of inclusion considers to be its other. Fundamentally, the most characteristic aspect of abysmal thought is thus the impossibility of the co-presence of the two sides of the line. This side of the line prevails insofar as the field of relevant reality is narrowed. Beyond that, we only find non-existence, invisibility, non-dialectic absence (Santos 2010:11–12).

Western modernity possesses a sociopolitical paradigm based on the tension between social regulation and social emancipation, and this, says Santos, is the visible distinction of all current modern conflicts. But as I pointed out earlier, this visible distinction is supported on an invisible distinction that governs it and forms its foundation. “That invisible distinction is the distinction between metropolitan societies and colonial territories” (Santos 2010:12). Thus, the dichotomy “regulation/emancipation” was only conceived of and applicable in the metropolis, while in the colonies, in contrast, another kind of dichotomy was applied, tailored to the invisible distinctions of “appropriation/violence.” To strengthen these two sides of the line, modern knowledge and modern law consummated Western abysmal thought:

In the field of knowledge, abysmal thought consists of granting science a monopoly over the universal distinction between what is true and what is false, to the detriment of two alternative bodies of knowledge: philosophy and theology. The exclusionary nature of this monopoly is at the center of modern epistemological disputes between scientific and non-scientific forms of truth. These tensions between science, philosophy, and theology have become highly visible but, as I assert, all of them take place on this side of the line. Their visibility is erected on the invisibility of forms of knowledge that cannot be adapted to any

of these forms of knowledge. I refer to the knowledge of the popular classes, of lay people, of the plebe, of peasants and indigenous peoples, located on the other side of the line. They disappear as relevant or commensurable forms of knowledge, because they are beyond the scope of truth and falsehood. It is unimaginable to apply to them not only the scientific distinction of true/false but also the unverifiable scientific truths of philosophy and theology, which three constitute all acceptable forms of knowledge on this side of the line. On the other side of the line there is no real knowledge; there are beliefs, opinions, magic, idolatry, intuitive or subjective understandings, which, in the majority of cases, could become the objects or raw materials of scientific research. Thus, the visible line that separates science from other modern forms of knowledge grows on top of an invisible abysmal line, which places science, philosophy, and theology on one side and, on the other, incommensurable and incomprehensible forms of knowledge that fail to obey either scientific methods of truth or the recognized alternative forms of knowledge in the realm of philosophy and theology (Santos 2010:14)

Meanwhile, in the field of modern law we have the legal and the illegal on one side and the other of the line; these are the only relevant ways of existing, according to the official state or international law. These two domains of modern Western abysmal thought, that of science and law, the divisions made by the global lines that they helped draw, “are abysmal to the point that they effectively eliminate any reality that is on the other side of the line” (Santos 2010:14), managing to obliterate the possibility of temporospatial co-presence that leads to any radical difference in the present.

The global abysmal dividing lines of the modern period were not static; instead, they were subject to shifts, just like the lines of friendship established by international cartographic treaties. Santos argues that in the past 70 years, these lines were affected by two major tectonic shocks: one during the anticolonial struggles and the processes of independence, and the other during a second movement that he calls “the return of the colonial and the return of the colonizer,” which fact triggered a counter-movement identified as “subaltern cosmopolitanism.”

“The return to the colonial is the abysmal response to that which is perceived of as threatening to the colonial intrusion in metropolitan societies..., and it adopts three main forms: the terrorist, the undocumented migrant worker, and the refugee” (Santos 2010:21). Each of these forms involves applying the logic of the global abysmal line by which their radical exclusion and their illegality are defined. This return to the colonial represents a regression from an abysmal logic that is different from that which prevailed in the colonial period. For example, it violates its own technologies of power. The colonizer is bursting onto the scene in the territory of metropolitan societies, applying old-fashioned invisible distinctions of *appropriation/violence* designed in and on colonial territories. “Under these circumstances, the abysmal metropolitan sees itself trapped in a contracted space and reacts by blurring the abysmal line” (Santos 2010:22). The individual cannot situate himself between clear and neat lines distinguishing between old and new world, whites and blacks, between the metropolitan and colonial. “What used to be unequivocal for this side of the line is now a dirty territory crossed by a winding abysmal line” (Santos 2010:22). These new abysmal lines support a dirty cartography leading to dirty practices; on the other side of the line there is room only for the

existence of an incomprehensible subhuman territory. An example of this are the anti-terrorist laws driven by U.S. diplomacy, which voided the civil and political contents of basic constitutional rights and guarantees adopted by countries through international treaties:

Since all this happens without a formal suspension of such rights and guarantees, we are witnessing the emergence of a new form of state, the state of exception, which, contrary to the old forms of the state of siege or state of emergency restricts democratic rights under the premise of safeguarding or even expanding them. Human rights are thus violated in order to be defended, democracy is destroyed to safeguard democracy, and life is eliminated to preserve life. Abyssal lines are being drawn in a literal and metaphorical sense. In the literal sense, these are lines that define borders as fences and killing fields, that divide cities into civilized areas (more and more gated communities) and wild areas, and prisons into places of legal confinement and places of brutal and illegal destruction of life (Santos 2010:23–24).

The return of the colonizer is also expressed in neocolonial territorial land-use planning, both in the metropolises themselves and in the former European colonies; this is the new mode of “indirect government.” This is nothing other than the state removing itself from its involvement in social regulation through the privatization of public services now transferred to powerful nonstate actors who obtain, in the bargain, “control over the lives and welfare of vast populations, control over health, land, drinking water, seeds, forests, or environmental quality” (Santos 2010:24). Now the legal subject not only is tied to the modern constitutional state but also finds itself absorbed by new privatized and depoliticized contractual obligations; this is a regime of unbalanced and disproportionately asymmetric power by which “the strongest part is granted veto power over the lives and livelihoods of the weaker part” (Santos 2010:25). This is what Santos calls “social fascism,” a new form of the state of nature in perfect coexistence with liberal political democracy, which, in turn, has at least three current manifestations, to wit: the fascism of social apartheid, contractual fascism, and territorial fascism. In my analysis here, it is territorial fascism that is of particular interest, described by the Santos as the creation of new colonial territories through appropriation/violence, exercised by social actors with strong financial or military capital who fight for the state’s control over the territories in which they operate, “or neutralize that control by co-opting or coercing state institutions and exerting social governance over the inhabitants of the territory without their participation and against their interests” (Santos 2010:26).

To recognize abysmal thought and its persistence is a condition *sine qua non* to start thinking and acting beyond it, and in terms not derived from it, says Santos. The proposal for overcoming abysmal thought would be a radical shift towards a post-abysmal place, to an epistemological diversity of the world (as a diverse ecology of knowledge), a place of primordial co-presences among contemporary agents on both sides of the global abysmal line, abandoning linear conceptions of history and abolishing war as an expression of intolerance and denial of co-presence (Santos 2010). This post-abysmal thought does not require the abolition of science and other modern knowledge; rather, it demands a counter-hegemonic use of these forms of knowledge and the promotion of interconnection and interdependence between

scientific knowledge and other forms of knowledge, seeking intersubjectivity and intercultural translation, accepting the internal and external limitations that the various types of knowledge possess (Santos 2010):

[I]ndigenous movements are, in my point of view, those whose conceptions and practices represent the most compelling emergency in post-abysmal thought. This fact is the most favorable for the possibility of a post-abysmal thought, given that indigenous people are the paradigmatic inhabitants of the other side of the line, the historical field of the paradigm of appropriation and violence (Santos 2010:30).

Return of Human Bodies to Indigenous Peoples in Argentina. The Case of San Juan

Claims for return of human bodies to their original places of burial, communities, or families of origin were and are an active part of the demands that indigenous peoples have brought forth over several decades against governments and science. In the particular case of the province of San Juan, Argentina, the first public claims were made through the news media, and specific activities were undertaken by the Warpe Community of Cuyum Territory, the first group in the Cuyo region to receive legal status from the national government, which recognized its status as an indigenous community in 1996. Both before and after the Warpe Community's public demands, several other claims for indigenous bodies exhumed from their sacred memorial places of rest have been brought in the Province of San Juan, some of which never went further than the local level, and others of which only fueled the silent critical subjectivity of villagers in communities accustomed to these historic practices of looting.

For its part, Law 25,517 (2001), The Restoration of Human Bodies to Indigenous Peoples Act, was not put into practice through administrative regulations until 2010, as a result of a specific request made by a sector of the indigenous militant movement to President Cristina Fernández within the context of the bicentennial celebrations in Argentina. And although this law attempts to remedy only one aspect of the demands of the indigenous peoples, and in its origin it does not reflect the spirit of representing a territorial reorganization (the return of the bodies of our ancestors to the territory), from our point of view, this law implies the exercise of a right to demand respect for the body of our ancestors and forefathers, opening the door for reinforcement of a territorial order and placing limits on the scientific practices of archaeology and biological anthropology. Precisely this last sector—the scientific—is the one that has put up the most resistance to the regulation and the enforcement of this law of restorations. San Juan's case is a good example of this antagonism between scientist approaches still anchored in the discourse of the extinction of indigenous peoples, and therefore the nonrecognition of rights won in our struggle, such as the "right to identity by affiliation," the right to claim respect, and the right to make decisions with respect to our cultural heritage, materials, and territories.

Background to Claims for Restoration at the Local and National Level

In the province of San Juan, claims for indigenous bodies that have been turned into “heritage” by science and the state have been brought by the Warpe Community of Cuyum Territory since the 1990s. Understood through the context of a continuity strongly anchored in territorial memory, and pointing to a public acknowledgment of the same “contemporaneity” of the community—and therefore its legitimate capacity as spokesperson in the dispute—these claims takes on a new dimension to the extent that they challenge traditional voices “authorized” to recount the history of San Juan (Jofré et al. 2011). These regional discourses from the “moral elite” of Cuyum (Escolar 2007) are institutionalized in the academic and government sectors. They have been characterized as wielding stereotyped, ahistorical, essentializing notions of indigenous identities through which they reject the legitimacy of all claims on account of the scientific impossibility of proving genetic and cultural affiliation (Jofré et al. 2011).

Thus the Warpe Community of Cuyum Territory, through letters addressed to the National University of San Juan (UNSJ) and numerous news stories in local media, requested the return of bodies considered to be Warpe ancestors. A distinguishing fact in the history of this Warpe Community was the holding of the First Re-encounter of Native Elders of the Southern Hemisphere, at which various indigenous elders from different groups, through ceremony, called on the ancestors in their original abode, in the Morrillos Grottoes and Cerro Alcazar to “ask for pardon” for the ignominy committed by archaeologists against their sacred graves. As a result, and in the context of this meeting, a document was drawn up whose points include one petitioning for the return of the desecrated bodies of the ancestors to their original place of burial. This event, unprecedented in the region, was supported by the departmental governments and had a major social impact in the province, representing a significant step forward for the Warpe people.

The public and media-directed demand of the Warpe Community in Cuyum Territory for the return of the bodies of the ancestors to their sacred resting places, their removal from display in museum halls, as well as requesting the prohibition of the sale of “science tourism” advertising material using photographs of the dead bodies of Warpe ancestors, did not move beyond the legal realm and ultimately was rejected by the Institute of Archaeological Research and Museum “Professor Mariano Gambier” of the National University of San Juan (UNSJ). The institution’s archaeologists rejected the foundations of the claim, arguing that the biological and cultural kinship between the plaintiffs and the individuals whose bodies were in the museum’s possession had not been proven (Escolar 2007), although this was never directly stated to the community, nor did they personally meet with the plaintiffs. The public refusal of Institute of Archaeological Research and Museum “Professor Mariano Gambier” professionals was rooted in a positivist conceptual bases that situated archaeology as the discipline that was responsible for “providing physical evidence” of the relationship between past and present Warpes in order to elucidate

the debate over indigenous identities “usurped” because of some political benefit or welfare, a position that has been shared, with slight nuances, between historians and archaeologists in the province and in the region of Cuyo (Jofré et al. 2010).

Years later, at the beginning of 2000, questioning the demands of the Warpe people, other claims have been processed in different sectors of the province of San Juan, such as the case of the petition for return of the body of the Young Man buried in the Incaic *Capacocha* [ceremonial child-burial] of Cerro El Toro (known locally as the “Mummy of Cerro El Toro”), also in the possession of the National University of San Juan since 1964, when the body was exhumed. This claim for return was made through a letter prepared by students and teachers at a rural school in the village of Malimán, in the north of Iglesia Department.³ The letter was endorsed with the signature of the departmental council members and was addressed to the current governor of the province, but has not received a response to date. Since 2006, teachers and students of that school, together with the Cayana Archaeology Collective, have conducted various activities aimed at strengthening this petition at the local, national, and international levels. Thus, the claim for the return of the body of the Young Man of Cerro El Toro was endorsed by a majority vote of archaeologists and anthropologists who gathered at the plenary session of the fourth Meeting of South American Archaeological Theory held by the WAC (World Archaeological Congress) in 2007 in the province of Catamarca. A year later this support was confirmed in the plenary session of the Fourth World Archaeological Congress held in Dublin, Ireland.

Other claims put forth locally by San Juan communities (with and without legal status recognizing them as indigenous through government-instituted procedures) demonstrate each day the historic debt that science and the state owe to the peoples whose ancestral territorial memories have been expropriated. The petition from the parliamentary seat of the department of Iglesia made in 2010 by a well-known resident of Rodeo, requesting the “cessation of archaeological excavations in indigenous cemeteries and their transfer to the Institute of Archaeological Research and Museum Professor Mariano Gambier”, is another case that clearly expresses the urgent need to effect change in the methodologies of plundering indigenous memory which continued to occur with remarkable force in the province of San Juan, in contravention of existing laws such as Law No. 25,517 and its Regulatory Decree no. 701/10. This legislation provides that “the mortal remains of aboriginal persons, whatever their ethnic characteristics, which are part of museums and/or public or private collections, will be made available to affiliated indigenous peoples and/or communities that claim them.”

Agreements and declarations from academic and professional associations, such as the (Declaración de río cuarto 2005) committed the archaeologists assembled at the National Archaeological Congress to agree to respect the “sacred places” of peoples

³For a more detailed treatment of this claim for the return of the young man exhumed from the *Capacocha* of El Toro, see Jofré et al. 2011 and Jofré 2012. The documentary “Hijos de la montaña” [Children of the Mountain] (2011), sponsored by INCAA and directed by San Juan filmmaker Mario Bertazzo, offers a perspective on this claim. To consult it visit <http://www.bacua.gob.ar/>

and not to conduct archaeological excavations or handle or place bodies on display, without the prior, freely given, and informed consent of the communities. This accord was ratified in the conclusions of the recent Eighth Conference of Anthropology and Archaeology of Patagonia held in October of this year, following efforts driven by indigenous representatives.⁴

Locally, in 2010 Warpe organizations in San Juan and Mendoza expressed their forceful condemnation of these scientific and state practices of looting of the bodies of ancestors and places of indigenous memory. The recent Waro Warpe Territorial Organization, which was established on May 12, 2010, in connection with the First Peoples March, “Marching for the Truth towards a Plurinational State” (whose members include the Warpe Community of Cuyum Territory, the Cacique Cochawual community of San Juan, the San Juan Cienaguita community, the Arroyo Gaquinchay community of San Juan, the Warpe Pablo Carmona community and the Warpe Peletay community), in its memorandum of agreement declares a manifesto, in which Point 5 reads as follows: “That our spirituality be reclaimed, and our calendar of sacred dates be restored, that the remains of our ancestors who are today on display in various museums be returned.”

The Warpe Waro demands were also expressed in the debates and conclusions of the Plurinational Forum for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples convened on August 2, 2010, in the city of San Juan, taking place for the first time in the Vice Chancellor’s office of the National University of San Juan. On that occasion, the forum brought together seven indigenous peoples (Warpes, Diaguitas, Capayanes, Wichis, Quechua-Aymara, Coyas, and the Bolivian Community of San Juan), and 46 social, political, and cultural organizations and national and provincial institutions (such as the Central of Argentine workers, National Institute against discrimination, xenophobia and racism, social movements, cultural centers, and university student organizations of the Faculty of social sciences of the National University of San Juan, among others).

The precedents to this petition also include the document produced by the First International Meeting of Indigenous Cultures held in San Luis in May 2010. Paragraph 4 of this meeting’s final document states:

We support and urge that the abuse and removal of remains in the hands of archaeologists be halted, and everything that was not recorded in subsequent excavations..., taking as an antecedent the recovered Baradero Cemetery, we also request the urgent return of all remains that have been desecrated and taken to museums or laboratories.

At the national level, several returns of human bodies to Indigenous Peoples established important precedents that permitted, among other things, progress in the design and enactment of Law 25,517 and its regulatory decree 701, recently enacted

⁴See note from the newspaper Los Andes, October 11, 2011: <http://www.losandes.com.ar/notas/2011/10/11/ratifican-restos-arqueologicos-indigenas-propiedad-pueblos-origina-rios-599370.asp> (Page last visited on October 19, 2011).

in 2010 by the office of the president.⁵ The return of the remains of Cacique Inakayal to the Teka community (Cacique Inakayal Civil Association) through National Law No. 23,940, passed in the Chamber of Deputies in May 1991, was the first to take place in the country. However, the actual return of the complete body did not take place until 2006. Other returns of mortal remains to indigenous peoples also occurred in the country, jeopardizing the reactionary conservative discourses of important institutions such as the Museum of Natural Sciences of the National University of La Plata, the institution that was sued in 1989 by descendants of Cacique Inakayal through the Mapuche Tehuelche Indian Center of Chubut. Subsequently, return of the skull of the Rankulche cacique Mariano Rosas or Paghitruz Güor (lion-hunting fox) occurred in 2001 under the auspices of National Law No. 25,276. More recently, in June 2010, the remains of Damiana, a 15-year-old Aché teenager whose body was listed under No. 5602 and also held in the Lehmann-Nietzsche collection at the Museum of La Plata were returned to the Community of Kuetuwive (district of Villa Ygatimí, Canindeyú) and legal representatives of the Indigenous Organization of Paraguay Linaje (Native League for Autonomy, Justice and Ethics).

It is important to state that in the case of the return of the body of Damiana. This was returned to the Aché indigenous community for reburial, along with the remains of the body of one unnamed subject identified as part of the same ethnic group in museum catalogs. This precedent signals an important pathway that has been opened to facilitate returns of indigenous human bodies “deprived of their identity,” as happened with the bodies of indigenous ancestors “objectified” through inclusion in museum inventories, whether they are less than 100 years old, or older. In this same vein, it is also important to note that in the laws of other countries, such as the United States, returns (which in that country are called “repatriations” to native peoples) recognize the historical tie of native communities to bodies as old as 10,000 years, the date that anthropological theories have acknowledged as the start of the process of settlement of the continent.

Finally, the most recent story of the restoration of human remains to native peoples in Argentina is the case of the significant return of 50 bodies to the Mapuche people, which had been housed at the Gobernador Eugenio Tello Museum in the city of Viedma, in the province of Rio Negro, an event that occurred in June 2012.⁶

⁵To see recent debates and discussions concerning the return of human bodies to indigenous peoples taking place in Argentina, and informed analysis of these claims, see Curtoni and Chaparro (2009), Curtoni y Chaparro (2009), Pepe et al. (2008), the first edition of the virtual journal CORPUS (Lazzari eds. 2011) and the volume edited by Jofré (2010).

⁶See notes and related videos at:

<http://grupoguia.blogspot.com.ar/2012/06/restitucion-de-restos-humanos-al-pueblo.html>

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=54ITSZv5vgw>

<http://argentina.indymedia.org/news/2012/06/815246.php>

<http://www.mapuche-nation.org/espanol/html/noticias/ntcs-484.htm>

The Petition to the National University of San Juan

In October 2011, in the context of the Seminar on Human Rights and Genocide held by the Office of the Vice-Chancellor of the National University of San Juan and the National Institute against Discrimination, Xenophobia and Racism (San Juan Delegation), with the noteworthy presence of historian and renowned human rights activist Osvaldo Bayer (honored by the National University of San Juan with an honorary doctorate) and the Amta Warpe Paz Argentina Quiroga, a petition containing eight points was ceremoniously submitted to the Vice-Chancellor of the university (Fig. 5.1).

The petition contained a folder with the fundamentals and history outlined in this presentation, the fruit of meticulous research work and militant activism, whose opening paragraph declares the following:

This document is a petition, under the framework of National Law No. 25,517, addressed to the Vice-Chancellor of the National University of San Juan, Dr. Benjamín Kuchen, and through him to the High Council of the institution. This document contains a series of points demanded by the Warpe community of the territory of Cuyum and the Warpe Waro Territorial Organization, asking that the return of remains of indigenous bodies housed and displayed in the facilities of its museums and research institutes be addressed.



Fig. 5.1 Handing over of a petition of restitution of bodies to Indigenous Peoples to the National University at San Juan. October 28th 2011, Presidency of the National University at San Juan. Sitting from *left to right*: Amta Warpe Paz Argentina Quiroga, wampen warpes, Osvaldo Bayer, known human rights militant, and the author (Photo by Colectivo de Arqueología Cayana)

The bodies of our ancestors are part of the memory of an ancient territory that was subjugated for more than five hundred years, and their right to eternal rest in their sacred dwelling places is part of the “rights of the Mother Earth” to welcome her children into the maternal womb. To care for, respect, and defend the memory of our ancestors, and thus our Mother Earth, means to care for, respect, and defend our rights as subjugated indigenous peoples, who were raped, forcibly expropriated, and decimated by the modernizing and colonial projects of the territories founded on a legal system imposed by capital. The claim to return the bodies of our ancestors to the earth has a profound meaning in terms of identity; it implies an act of reaffirmation of our preexistence in the millennial territory, the renewal of a commitment to unity between our body and the territory. One cannot be acknowledged without the other; they are part of an inseparable whole. From this knowledge, our aboriginal knowledge, we proclaim the right to honor the memory of our dead, who still live through us and thanks to whom we exist today and are present in the territory.

Finally, the petition posed eight clear points, to wit:

Based on these fundamentals expressed in this document, the Warpe Community of Cuyum Territory and Warpe Waro Territorial Organization beseeches the Vice-Chancellor of the National University of San Juan to attend to the following list of demands so that they may be addressed and decided on by the High Council of this institution of higher education:

WE REQUEST

- That all its units, in all its departments of Museums, Institutes and Research Centers (such as the Archaeological Research Institute and the “Prof. Mariano Gambier” Museum), be immediately ordered to implement and comply with National Law No. 25,517, whose enforcement authority is the National Institute of Indigenous Affairs (INAI), with respect to the Return of Human Bodies to Indigenous Communities, whose Article One establishes “that the remains of indigenous persons, whatever their ethnic characteristics, which are part of museums and/or public or private collections, will be made available to relevant indigenous peoples and/or communities who claim them.”
- Acknowledge and follow up on petitions containing claims for the return of human bodies to their original burial places, publicly demanded by the Warpe Community of Cuyum Territory and the Malimán Community (Iglesia Department) for the bodies exhumed from the sacred sites of Morrillos and the Capacocha of Cerro El Toro, and follow up on other claims that may be submitted, taking into account the legal frameworks that address such claims.
- Immediately order that ALL indigenous human bodily remains in possession of all UNSJ units and faculties be removed from display.
- Prepare a comprehensive inventory of indigenous human bodily remains, whatever their origin, ethnicity, or chronological age, that are housed in its museums and research institutes, so that the return processes can be initiated, pursuant to the provisions of the aforementioned law, as well as ensuring the respectful treatment of the remains while their return to the communities is being decided on.

- Order the implementation of prior and informed consultation with indigenous communities—with or without official legal status as such—before carrying out any research project or archaeological impact studies that includes the study of human remains and places of indigenous memory.
- Ensure indigenous participation in University Councils (associated with their departments, institutes, and museums) that make decisions relating to the administration, custody, research, and management of indigenous remains and the historical and archaeological heritage of the original communities.
- Negotiate the means by which UNSJ may review the content and methodologies used in its Educational and Cultural Policies for Indigenous Peoples, ensuring respect for the autonomy of indigenous communities and organizations that are the subject of the various programs and work plans implemented by this institution of higher education.
- Respond to this petition within six months.

The petition is supported by a long list of signatories, along with letters of support from indigenous communities and peoples in the province, in the Cuyo region, and the country, as well as a list of professionals, including some in high academic regard, and even some of the provincial museums.

To officially address this petition, a case was opened by the Vice-Chancellor's Office of the UNSJ, whose office number is 01-7750, dated October 30, 2012. From the time it was submitted, the Office continued adding pages to the case file after it was discussed by the University Council and then forwarded to the School of Philosophy, Humanities and the Arts for processing, and from there to the Professor Mariano Gambier Museum.

Ethics and Disciplining in South American Archaeology

The vision, wisdom, and knowledge adopted in the work make de-colonial thought its weapons, whose pluriversal genealogy is structured by the colonial difference (Mignolo 1992, 1998). De-colonial thought is produced in contact zones or spaces of colonial encounters where geographically and historically distant peoples come into contact to constitute one another mutually (Pratt 1997) through hegemonic power relations constituted in modern Western thought. This abysmal though consists of drawing invisible and visible lines which determine the impossibility of the co-presence of distinct forms of existence on the other side of “the abysmal line.” Born in the fifteenth century under Spanish mercantilist expansion, Western abysmal thought established by the Eurocentric myth of modernity (Dussel 2003) was the source of a number of Western dichotomies that centuries later would end by granting modern science a monopoly on the universal distinction between truth and falsehood, the origin of modern epistemological disputes between scientific and nonscientific forms of truth (Santos 2010; Mignolo 2000, 2001, 2007).

Just as de-colonial thought produced in contact zones or colonial borders is a critical border through which the production and political and social activism of peoples of indigenous and African descent are historically recognized, it can also be a radical shift towards a post-abysmal space, a space of primordial co-presence among contemporary agents on either side of the global abysmal line. This de-colonial, post-abysmal thought calls for the plurality of wisdom and knowledge and does not require the abolition of science and other modern forms of knowledge. Rather, it demands a counter-hegemonic use of such forms of knowledge, and it promotes the uprising of subjugated forms of knowledge (Santos 2010). Because of this, genealogy—as a tactic or theoretical perspective of research—maneuvers within these contact zones, at the intersection of these forms of knowledge and wisdom that confront the scientific hierarchy of knowledge and its intrinsic effects of power.

Looking for de-colonial, post-abysmal paths, I adhere to an experience in progress recognized as a collective construction of knowledge (Jofré 2012) from which standpoint it is possible to release oneself from subordination to preestablished archaeological disciplinary ethical canons.

The indigenous archaeology to which I subscribe is fed by collective experience, which is seen as a new space of social practice where knowledge is produced and new forms of sociability are tested. In this theoretical-activity trajectory I furthermore explore, I speak out loud as I go, I think and I feel certain categories of thought from indigenous archaeology that allow me to narrate the starting points of my research, mainly concerning my personal involvement or the process of self-recognition in the face of the aftermath of transgenerational historical trauma. From this standpoint I create my own political self-determination in a place defined as one of “dual consciousness” (Jofré 2012). I situate my research within indigenous intellectual production, deciding on a place of enunciation that allows me to raise my own voice. And thus, in this way, I demand and propose a polyphony within the discipline that leads to the decolonization of its categories of thought and colonial hierarchical forms of sociability.

In this paper I emphasize the fact that archaeological narratives, and therefore the ethics to which they are bound, are linguistic productions thought up and written largely by intellectuals from anthropological and archaeological academia, who also mediate and arbitrate their own interests and the interests of national, provincial, and global political projects that include them in, and exclude them from, social networks, with their hegemonic frameworks of power.

The subversion of these scientific narratives within the projects of the communities themselves, such as happens in the demands for the return of the bodies housed in Argentina’s archaeological museums, acquires a political dimension which obliges disciplinary boundaries to be forced open, and re-situates the problematic in the arena of hegemonic disputes, where the rewriting of “our history” is settled in order to achieve another, more just, sociopolitical reality.

Some noteworthy specifics of the claims for the return of the bodies of our ancestors raised by the Warpe Community of Cuyum Territory are seen in the fact that scientific research itself, in the hands of indigenous peoples (in this case

anthropological and archaeological research), can also be put to the service of the struggle to defend our rights. This throws the old paradigms into crisis and historically dismantles the scientific discourse of normative archaeology which, in turn, informs laws on heritage, both provincial in the case of Law No. 6801, and national, as with Law No. 25,743.

Finally, the responses of the institutions affected by the claim from the Warpe Community Cuyum Territory—the UNSJ High Council and the Prof. Mariano Gambier Archaeological Museum, make it clear how obsolete and inconsistent the legal framework on the issue is. But above all, this debate openly exposes the fact that at the local level we still lack the political will to address these legitimate demands for the defense and exercise of our rights as indigenous peoples.

It will not suffice to symbolically recognize our human rights as indigenous peoples through the creation of internal university apparatuses, such as endowed chairs, scholarship programs, university volunteers, and programs addressing indigenous affairs and human rights, if these do not serve to support claims arising from the peoples themselves who are the objects of their so-called policy of increasing visibility. This same university delays and denies rights guaranteed by the national constitution, international conventions, and declarations to which Argentina is a signatory member. It puts forth scientific discourse in the name of “disciplinary ethics” that only serves the modernizing project applicable to the format of “archaeological heritage” as the road toward development. All this occurs in order to continue protecting a violently discriminatory hegemonic ideology that is implicated in the ethnocide of our peoples, produced and sustained by a small sector that is reactionary toward changes in the recognition of rights of indigenous peoples who until recently had been relegated to the display case of prehistory.

The mark of the Indian that still inhabits our body mobilizes and represents the emancipation of our small voices. It does not seek representation, or demand a new space of enunciation situated in the dialogic space where the co-presences of a plurality of voices recognized in a nonlinear multitemporality are mutually constituted. As Gayatri Spivak argues (1994), the voices silenced by power are unrecoverable; any attempt to restore the voice of the subaltern consciousness runs the risk of falling into the space of a logocentric violence. In other words, to build a representation of the subaltern from the standpoint of the historiography of power serves only to remove the voices of domination; it is the very reproduction of that power that continues subjecting them (reducing them) to such a representation. There are no subaltern voices to make speak; there are only textual designations. The subaltern (in this case, the indigenous or nonwhite intellectual) would then be a blocked subjectivity. She cannot speak, not because she is mute or does not have her own voice, but because she lacks a space of enunciation. To escape from the position of subordination, the subaltern needs to acquire her own voice, to speak for herself; otherwise, while the subordinate is subalternized, she cannot speak (Spivak 1994). Hence, and for this purpose—that of ceasing to be subalterns—we raise our voices, so long silenced. We cry out our pain “without asking permission”; we look at our dark faces and hands, we embrace the recollection of memory, we tell “our history” and

in that way we try to put into words the vacant space occupied by painful silence, knowing that this silence has been a space of both punishment and survival.

Claims for the return of the body of our ancestors in the context of our territorial struggles run counter to “territorial fascism” (Santos 2010) involved in the “return of the colonizer” that characterizes this postdisciplinary stage. The latter consists in applying the logic of the global abysmal line through which the radical and illegal exclusion of other thoughts or epistemes are defined, the ones that belong to persons who are denied co-presence in a single time-space. But as Haber (2012) suggests in his reflection of the “dark side of heritage,” this return to the colonial (this recapitulation of the disciplinary stage of archaeology, in the words of the author) supposes a return to an abysmal logic distinct from that prevailing in the previous period, since as Santos quite rightly points out, it transgresses its own technologies of power. These new abysmal lines applicable to postdisciplinary ethics in archaeological science support (feed) a dirty cartography that leads to dirty practices. On the other side of the line there is only room for the existence of an incomprehensible subhuman territory: bodies of “the disappeared” stripped of their own history, bereft of an identity that would locate them in a genealogy and that would unite them to the territory, which would join them to the fight put forth by indigenous communities forced to uproot their ancestral memory in the name of a promise of development within this new form of indirect government for which the state delegates our welfare into the hands of transnationalized capital for the unlimited extraction of minerals, metals, and fossil fuels.

One remarkable feature of this claim for the return of human bodies to indigenous peoples and communities in San Juan (it should be noted, a province “launched toward mega-mining development” in the hands of transnational companies such as Barrick Gold and Xstrata Copper, among others) is that it highlights the territorial nature of this claim, pointing to the fact of the cosmological bond between body and territory inseparable entities reconstituted in the memory of the peoples, even after thousands of years. Thus, it is openly suggested that the claim for the return of the bodies of our ancestors is for their reburial in their sacred resting places, demanding thus the recognition of these places as part of an ancient territorial memory. That is, the dispute over their bodies is one that is arranged by territory. This same territory is, from the other side of the abysmal line, given the name of “exploitable resource sold to capital.” This struggle calls for the reaffirmation of our identities in relation to a territorialized memory, demarcated also by the body of our ancestors and their cultural affiliation, which are no longer allowed to be thought of as archaeological heritage that produces returns on the flexible market of state-sponsored tourism. The same state which is now manipulated by a new transnationalized politico-economic power, with which it coexists and negotiates the past of our people and communities in the name of the future of an increasingly flexible capital.

Thus, rebellion against this postdisciplinary ethics mobilizes a hegemonic contest in which their struggle brings territories into being. It is a question of counter-hegemonic social and cultural practices denouncing the scaffolding of power that works through expropriation/violence perpetrated against our people in South America. Critical reflection on postdisciplinary archaeological ethics at this stage

cannot be abstracted away from this hegemonic dispute unleashed in and by the territories enslaved by capital, because it is the product of this neocolonial territorial restructuring, this territorial fascism, a new form of the state of nature in perfect coexistence with liberal political democracy.

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Chapter 6

Excess of Hospitality: Critical Semiopraxis and Theoretical Risks in Postcolonial Justice

José Luis Grosso

The Suspect Topos of Hospitality

Europe has transported around the entire world, along with its discourses, compulsively, its imperative will to found things: to found itself and found its contextual “other;” to found (above all) the terms of that relationship.

Grosso (2005:42).

This epigraph, taken from my own work, describes the phallogotropic member¹ of the discourse of “hospitality,” which the West has used to open up space to be welcomed by all those peoples from whom such welcome has been required. These were the arguments of Francisco de Vitoria in the Spanish court in the sixteenth century. Anthony Pagden emphasizes the role of Vitoria in his academic work linked to the Royal Council (Pagden 1982): his assessment of the indigenous populations sets the “city”—in its Mediterranean tradition—as the standard. It is recognizable in its sowing of distances: between different estates and social castes, between the measured interactions in speaking and listening, between the realms of the sacred and the profane, between monogamously constituted families. Hospitality was considered the proper mode of interaction for the relationship among members of different cities, and in its protocols the stranger (who in this sense already was, at least, not fully “strange”), flaunting his respect for “civil” distances (within his own group

¹“Phallogotropic” refers here to the *trope* orienting the crossroad of *lógos* with *phallogocentrism*.

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Fig. 6.1 Tomb-apacheta of Rodolfo Kusch in the Christian Cemetery of Maimará, Quebrada de Humahuaca, Jujuy, North of Argentina

and under the watchful eyes of his hosts), made clear the distinction between his unsettling presence and that of an ever-feared invasion, or of the threat of corruption by outsider values or anti-values. In this way, Vitoria established himself as worthy of a friendly reception (Pagden 1982:77) (Fig. 6.1).

In colonial encounters the eventualities happened to Europeans among the “Indians” became a major theme of discussions and justifications about the policies implemented therein (Hulme 1986:249). Abuse towards the newly arrived Spaniards, which violated the “universal” laws of hospitality, was a clear sign of “barbarian peoples” for European common sense (Pagden 1982:25). In fact, in Francisco de Vitoria’s argument, this was the main rational motivation to view the violent seizure of the new lands as legitimate self-defense (!) the one that made possible to turn the land violent seizure in self-defense as such, ensuring for the “men of the cities” free access to all roads and places throughout the world. (Pagden 1982:77). This denial of requested “hospitality” was the rational and legal authorization for the “right of conquest.” Together with “the civilization” and the Gospels came territorial occupations, the extraction of gold that would finance those enterprises, and trade. “Hospitality” was thus thoroughly interwoven with exchange in this mercantile logic, prior to the moralizing Maussian operation, which imperceptibly slips the ritual gift—potlatch, kula—as a commensurable foundation and genealogy with the supposed universality of market logic (Mauss 2012).

Refusal to enslave the Indian forms part of the discourse of “hospitality” insofar as the “Indian”—in terms of a tyranny of the senses, of the passions, of the body—is the material basis on which the European Spaniard would build (as he had previously

built within himself and over other people) his “citizen-civilized” dominion on distances. The European “form” must triumph over the “Indian” and, thanks to that enterprise, Europe would reconstitute itself, taking new strength from its Greek and Hebrew roots: roots that are, thus, political (from *polis*) and Edenic. If Paradise and Barbarism are found again, in a nude standing there in front, it is only for restarting the differentiated self-construction with renewed vigor. To enslave the “Indian” would mean losing a mirror in which it should be possible to take a privileged gaze at one’s own humanistic work: the “humanization” of the Indian is important as a renewed Europeanization of the whole. This is especially true in the case of Spain, which found in dominion over peoples (Seed 1992) an unquestionable blessing of its moral uncertainty and guilty conscience in carrying out the Spanish Reconquest from the Moors (Bennassar 1976).

Colonial discourse on “hospitality,” a ubiquitous device in the European relationship with “others,” conceals an early image of the Self versus/over the Other, naturalized and universalized. The discourse of “hospitality,” the body-of-language that inspires the praxis of “civilization” and “modernity,” is nothing more than a tacit justification of a universal European “presence,” exclusive in its providential fate, excluding in the pretending need that it satisfies. All peoples must make way for Europe and welcome it, not because it is lacking and incomplete, but especially and primarily because, in reality, Europe is nothing without them. Europe lives for its mission of “Othering” them and feeds off the perception that they are not “so totally” different, but rather, at heart, simply and nevertheless Europe’s “others,” those peoples who have no other Self than their providential founding European reference. The Monotheism crushes the relationships that it inhabits: an *ex nihilo* creator Other that can only be welcomed as an absolute, unique, and monolithic gift.

“Europe” certainly is a rhetorical and mythological creation that amalgamates the diverse, conflicting, and complex historical processes that constitute it. It is true for its simplistic reduction to only and homogenized two “cultural wellsprings”: the “Hebrew” and the “Greek.” Likewise happens with “the East” (Clifford 1988, Chap. 11). But neither can these rhetorical constructs be unknown insofar as they constitute working fictions that are highly effective in constructing the identities of the Western European nations during the centuries following the fall of the Western Roman Empire, the invasions of the northern peoples, and the Islamic expansion over the Mediterranean: that is, throughout the Middle Ages, especially starting in the eighth and ninth centuries. Ideology has its specific strength; it must be criticized in order to break it down into its heteroclitic silenced elements, but this cannot lead us to ignore its symbolic power in structuring social action and collective representations, because such a hypercritical pursuit makes us to fall into naïveté.

The metaphor of “hospitality” is the colonial *tópos* of modern European consciousness, discursively constituted as such (White 1978). In it, the foundational gesture-language always erects the relationship with an “other” represented under the potential motion of a movable superiority and an absorbable inferiority which is actually realized in each case and circumstances. These metaphors are part, therefore, of a *dramatic* setting: “representation” that is as such not only in its strictly (restrictively) linguistic, eidetic-referential character, but also (it might be better to

say: rather) in a broader discursive sense—noted by Foucault (1996) as archaeological “episteme” in sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and by Voloshinov and Bajtin (1992) extending to the scenic unfolding of its literary theatricality (Said 1979:55), and even to the playful, radical aesthetic theatricality that is constitutive of language and knowledge themselves (Gadamer 1984:154–222). Metaphors within dramas, “poetics of the other” (which Said... ..) within “dramatics of the other” that ... (which Said establishes as analogous to Bachelardian phenomenological “poetics”) within “dramatics of the other” that surrounds and intensifies them.

The Euro-centrally labeled “discovery of America” launched and supplied an endless stream of fuel to the European conquistador-colonizer prime mover that crossed the Atlantic as if it was a “New Mediterranean.” The “invention of America” would, thus, be a peculiar enterprise of European expansionism from the sixteenth century onward, founded, says O’Gorman, in the complex of an overweening conscience and in its defensive technical command over space: transportable chariot, victorious over all distances (O’Gorman 1984). Europe colonizes the (its) “Rest of the World” (Pratt 1992).

Hayden White suggests that two European traditions, ideologically self-perceived as constitutional, are the foundational metaphors of the “other.” The first is the Hebrew horizon, in which we find the distinction between “our own” faith versus the “pagans,” dramatizing a progressive physical and cultural “diversification.” It could arguably be said that the Babelic multiplication of languages and distance—linguistic, geographical, religious—with respect to the predecessors and from the places of the Revelation grants to the “other” a secondary role as the “lost.” The second is the Greek horizon, the distinction between one’s “own” civilization and the “barbarians,” dramatizing a marked moral and metaphysical “division.” Here it could be said that the Greek political argument, in the face of the natural tyranny of the passions found in the non-Greek exteriority, gives the “other” a secondary role as the “acratic,” who, by excess or by fault, in any case, is ever no virtuous (White 1978).

Both, for Plato in *The symposium*, where the mythos of the restless Eros, son of Poros and Penia, of Resource and Necessity, is subjected to philosophical reflection in pursuit of definitions that are essential to logical and linguistic coherence and consistency, on one “side,” and, on the other “side,” for the Hebrew myth, where Adam’s aloneness in Paradise in the face of the One God finds the counterpart for reproduction, in both cases, the imagined “other” and the “self” are a mutually constituting lack, a monadic system of symmetrical opposites, congruent and complementary, systemic. This implies a “self”—nearby, male, central, a pious man or free citizen; a dissatisfaction of that “self” in its incompleteness; and a lack that turns into the embrace of the “other” in a new resentful power of conquest and mission. What this task over the “other” cannot accept is incompleteness, because own difference is perceived as “incompleteness”: a happened after, secondary, altered being, from the beginning put in relation, a being-from-the-other but (defensively) not anyone other, except a monotheistic Other, an Other-in-HimSelf, monologic, monolingual, unique, totalizing, a squashing colonizer that does not leave any slit to breathe (Derrida 1997). European conscience combats “difference” because it

suffers from it, and does not enjoy it: it is weighed down by the rigor of a unique and exclusive appreciation over itself.

We should note, in Derrida's work, the weight of this One God on the constitutive "monolingualism of the Other" in terms of a specifically Jewish experience. In the popular religious experience of our diverse Latin American regional contexts the Catholic monotheism that ensued with the Conquest and the colonial period through to the present day has never been so totalizing: perhaps because of the Trinitarian theology within which the monotheism is inscribed and spills out into an infinite number of saints; perhaps because of the complex conjunction of Christian and autochthonous deities in which that experience is configured, and which establishes a popular-intercultural agency of relational-territorial assemblages in the ritual context (Grosso 1994, 2007, 2008a). The deconstruction of monotheism in our human and social sciences is a work in progress. At the same time, the study of religion in our *intercultural postcolonial relations* demonstrates complex multi-angled practices that implies *space-times ruptures, other emotive economies and agency of subaltern matrixes of creation* (Grosso 2009, 2010a, b, 2011, 2012a, b). This is the main motivation for this text. *Space-time Others*, which alter the singular, linear, continuous, empty, and homogeneous space-time of the Nation-State: the space-time of "progress" and of "development" (Benjamin 2010; Comaroff and Comaroff 1991; Guha 2002; Chatterjee 2008; Grosso 2012b) naturalized as a mere "sense of reality" in the "state-of-being," enacting its imposition with symbolic violence (Bourdieu 1997). *Other emotive economies*, other to the dominant, which is featured out of reason/sensitivity, reason/emotions, reason/passions equations under the disciplinary rigor and surveillance of "dominion of the Self," constraining "aggression" and controlling "overflows" (Elias 1993). Such *other emotive economies* put in play other senses (Marx 1985) and meanings in gestures milieu, bodily movements and displacements, proxemics, smells, tastes, colors, songs and music, myths and other accounts, manners of speaking, of dress, of doing and ways-of-being, in intercultural modes of knowing (Grosso 2006). "Structures of feeling" (Williams 2000) do their drifting *deed* and *gestae* there (Grosso 2010a). Finally, the *agency of subaltern matrixes of creation* take hold of the collective learning of those subjected to the most adverse social conditions. *Matrixes* sedimented in historical experience giving rise to the so-called "Indigenous malice," "black maroonage," "mestizo ladino-ness," and "creole cunning" (Grosso 2008b, 2009, 2010a, 2011, 2012b), all them deviations and forces of style.

Deconstruction has been left even further behind that *practical ruptures*. It belongs to the history it critiques, like the inverse of its own text. Deconstruction, opening the proscribed territory of "difference," what it actually does, rather than clarify the multiple processes of "sameness," is to delay and rest in the former "difference," the one that generates its own fixity and impotence simultaneously operating as margin and forewarning of its perversion. At this first level, the *gift* and the *welcoming gestures* break down into forces of meaning and sense at the same time completing and transforming the relationship (Derrida 1997). A "triumphant revolt of slaves" (Nietzsche 1986) can only be reversed by the triumph of the rebellion of the enslaved: this is the historical intuition of post-Hegelian critical thinking,

which grows out of Marx to Gramsci. Derrida thinks in terms of margins, and not “revolution,” though. How many of these totalizing, counter-(para-) hegemonic tropes have to do with the monotheistic God? Why should we be eternally condemned to deal with “hegemony” (with the “hegemonic” formation, whatever the form it takes; Laclau 2002, 2006), if there are *matrixes of creation* that alter and burst abruptly out of untamable/indomitable externality: crafty, resentful, shady, baroque, and that configure (refigure, transfigure) *other relationships of power*, not necessarily “hegemonic”? Specifically: they do *other (out of) use of “hospitality.”*

Other uses of “hospitality” that are neither what is required by the others for their salvation through integration (that I refer above), nor remain in the schematisms of the symmetrical “mis-encounter” that reproduces *ad extra* the everlasting and the very same at last intra-European history with its times of before and now, self-perceived by the monism of the superseding-conservative dialectic. That is, other uses of “hospitality,” not the History of the Same, such as, for example, Tzvetan Todorov (1985) in *The conquest of America. The question of the Other* perceives the first encounters of Europeans with the American communities as a “communicative fact.” However, that world of misunderstandings and paradoxes is quickly enclosed by the antipodes of “pre-modern” and “modern” of Europe’s own history. So much so, so much does Moctezuma seem like Columbus and distinct from Cortés that perhaps if it had been Columbus who arrived at Tenochtitlan they would have managed to understand one another by exchanging symbols and gods. Indeed, Todorov’s contrast between Moctezuma and Cortés is an analogous displacement, via similarities, of the Columbus/Cortés contrast. Todorov is talking about none other than the Same (Him)Self. The structural system of differences urges it on. Moctezuma and the power groups in his environment are conceptually enclosed within a communication system that addresses its signs to the “world” as a great, nebulous realm of the gods, of the “supernatural.” Cortés, meanwhile, as vanguard of the modern Europeans (including in Spain), had already secularized the signs against an “other” of flesh and blood, intelligible, and who can be manipulated. Todorov understands nothing about what “hospitality” meant to Moctezuma and his people; just as Cortés also failed to understand it, and was unable to read *hospitality, combat, and sacrifice* at the same time.

Inga Clendinnen (1991:78)—through an oblique reading of the narratives of the “second phase” of the Conquest of Mexico (from the *Noche triste (Sad night)* until the fall of Tenochtitlán), using sources such as the *Letters* of Cortés, the *True history of the conquest of New Spain* by Bernal Díaz del Castillo, and the *Universal history of the things of New Spain* (the Florentine Codex) by Bernardino de Sahagún, along with native pictographic sources—glimpses that heterodox intercultural conjunction in the general contours of the conduct of the natives on the battlefield. The primary notes of this behavior are the central place of the battlefield in the imagination of the warrior societies of Central Mexico; the sacred nature of the confrontations; the equality of forces required between opponents; the symbolizing of conquest in the burning of the temple of the vanquished and in capturing the images of their tutelary god, who was transferred to the “house of the captive gods” in Tenochtitlán; a short period of looting and destruction before the imposition

of tribute on the vanquished; the singular nature of the warrior: his preparation through songs and the painting and adornment of his body, the particular nature of combat, hand-to-hand, one-on-one, the dramatic enhancement of the clash; and finally the capture of a few significant prisoners from the enemy's faction (Clendinnen 1991:78–79).

In the “failed communication” between Spaniards and Mexicans, Clendinnen indicates, the Spaniards did not understand why the besieged did not surrender (with dignity); while Mexicans, with their individual warriors, understood that the Spaniards, attacking *en masse* and taking refuge (embarrassingly) behind their guns, were not of a defeat, but of the utter, final and inevitable destruction of the Age of the Aztec Empire, the final humiliation of its collapse. The devastating onslaught of the Tlaxcalans—who were previous subjects under Aztec rule and Spanish allies at the time of the Conquest, and whose “ferocity and unnatural cruelty” against the besieged Mexicans and their city (as Cortés saw and reported it in his account) far exceeded the Spaniards’ expectations—made them into the face of the most absolute form of “otherness.” Cortés was perplexed at the ultimate failure of his strategic predictions (although he had triumphed militarily): the “unnatural” indifference in the face of suffering and death distanced the natives (both Tlaxcalans and Aztecs alike) from any “Spanish” understanding of humanity: “a terrifying and definitive demonstration of ‘otherness,’” says Clendinnen (1991:94).

In the explicitly ritual context (but however it is to be noted that ritual ensembles are often implicit and not acknowledged such as), the new alterity was already being included/invested in the Greco-European tradition of the “savage,” starting with the skeptical and paradoxical *On Cannibals* by Michel de Montaigne. “Archaeologically” referencing the quotation from *Book IV* of Herodotus’s *Histories*, in the most general, comprehensive, and hyperbolic manner, Michel de Certeau states in *Heterologies* that which the Mediterranean tradition had to offer was used by Montaigne to forge a halo over the cannibals (de Certeau 1986). Thus, ancient warrior heroes shift the modern Christian valuation of American “cannibalism,” since it is the power of the body—given over to death with bravery and courage—which is what, in fact, is actually incorporated through ingestion. But this skeptical inversion is only accomplished through reference (once again though in another manner) to the European sources themselves. Michel de Certeau notes how the mediation of the European world itself in the construction of the “other” ultimately leaves native ritual in an uncommunicative radical strange(r)ness, because critical interpretation and its meaning only speak of the Same.

Peter Hulme (1986) has shown how the paradoxical “dialogue” of colonial narratives with the “other” always culminates, whether in agreement or in conflict, within the interior of the European’s own traditions: a colonizing “monological” intertextuality. This intimate discussion takes place in the text about the “other” silences and imperatively rises up, as de Certeau points out, over the confused voices and dark signs of the Indians. And the various figures that Hulme reconstructs speak in various ways of the suspect colonial topos of “hospitality.” Marking the monological closure in the face of the externality of the “other” Hulme shows imperceptibly navigating through that monological intertextuality the “en masse”

differentiation of colonial writing versus, and above, the native germinality of meanings. In the case of Shakespeare's *Tempest*, this is evident in the contrast between the "narrative of Prospero" and the potential "Caliban's own history" (Hulme 1986:124–125). In the case of the "story of Pocahontas" (in its various sources and versions), the grandiose replica of a discourse of sociopolitical privileges (Pocahontas converted into "*princess*") is imposed on uncomprehended practices and words issued within the Algonquin context of "reciprocity": within the logics and interests of the Algonquin natives, Hulme emphasizes that the English were too dangerous to be kept at a distance: an alliance with them should be established, perhaps in order to absorb them into the confederation (Hulme 1986:150); and Pocahontas' reproaches to John Smith, years later in England, would only be understandable through reference to those indigenous practices (Hulme 1986:152).

Finally, Anthony Pagden also notes the use of "*loci communes*" (commonplaces) of the Euro-Mediterranean tradition in the Spanish "colonial discourse"; these *loci* operate in the form of "sub-texts" in the construction of "otherness" (Pagden 1982:7). The Aristotelian/scholastic theory of slavery and barbarism was reformulated to suit the needs of Indian subjugation, but potentiating at the same time (in inverse proportion) its own civilizing ideals. America, in the sixteenth century, was seen as "an extension, in a new geographical space, of the familiar and fantastic dimensions of the Atlantic World"; thus, "the new could always be satisfactorily described by means of a simple and direct analogy with the old" (Pagden 1982:11).

All these mimetic rhetorical practices reiterate the self-empowerment of Europe vis-à-vis America. And among them, specifically, the Spanish concern with earning "honor" finds (as noted above) in the skirted declaration of the "natural slavery" of the Indians and the inclination to rather see them as defenseless "children" a powerful qualification of the field of self-recognition (Bennassar 1976). Europe invents its own world mission: that is the only and devastating "hospitality" that it recognizes and needs.

Excessive Hospitality: Gift, Expenditure, and Sacrifice

Marcel Mauss, in his classic *The gift*, points out how, in the study of the forms of exchange and contracts in "primitive" or "archaic" societies, economic, religious, legal, and moral institutions and aesthetic and morphological phenomena are intermingled, constituting "total social phenomena" (Mauss 1991:147, 274–275). Within that all-encompassing theme, Mauss specifically examines the question of what is the rule of law and interest which, in backwards or archaic societies, makes it so the gift received necessarily must be repaid; what force is there in the thing that causes it to make the recipient repay it (Mauss 1991:148).

It is a question, Mauss emphasizes, of the moral purposes that seek to return capitalism to the original sources of the "gift," not that of an absence of the market but rather another type of market, with its own economy and morality, which underlies contemporary forms of economy and society (Mauss 1991:148). In that

other market, it is not individuals who are obligated to one another and who exchange and enter into contracts, but rather groups (either directly or through intermediaries) (Mauss 1991:150); they exchange not only economic goods, but also celebrations, military aid, rituals, etc., and they do so in a simultaneously voluntary and compulsory manner: “contractual gifts.” All this constitutes the *system of total prestations* (Mauss 1991:151), system that is collective and involves multiple goods. This reciprocity of the gift is not something merely “primitive” but rather “archaic”: it is at the base of any economy and of all social life: it is on top of a system of gifts offered and repaid over time that we build, on the one hand, barter (uniting the time of giving and its repayment), and on the other, purchase and sale (through currency)... and also the price (Mauss 1991:199).

In the Chinook expression “*potlatch*” (whose meaning would be, *sicut* Mauss *traduttore-traditore*, “to feed”=maussian to give, and “place where one is satisfied”=maussian to receive²), Mauss stresses the principle of rivalry and antagonism, which becomes hyperbolic in the sumptuary destruction that seeks to eclipse the rival: the *potlatch* constitutes a form of “total prestation of an agonistic type” (Mauss 1991:152–153). What is at stake in these “prestations”³ is the *mana* or force of authority and respect (Mauss 1991:155): “the spirit” (Maori *hau*: wind of reciprocity) that circulates in “prestations,” intensifying the mutual gestures and objects exchanged, force/intentionality/sense that “comes from the jungle” and is in the thing itself, in its relationality, in its origin as such a gift (Mauss 1991:158–160).

Mauss’s emphasis is on the spiritual-substitutive character of “mana” versus the mere “thing.” In the materiality of this cosmic force, that wind drives the original relational strength of the gift: its strength of folding, of turning-back-on, the plastic torsion that constitutes the “thing.” In truth, there is no such “thing,” but rather a gift,⁴ always *sacrificial*: never unilateral, monologic, since in that case it would not be a “gift” but rather neglect: an act carried out in indifference. Thus, the three moments of the *potlatch* would be: (1) giving; (2) receiving; (3) repaying what was received, which exert their force one over another in both directions.

The *potlatch* therefore acts not only from/on human communities and things (which would be the reductive sociology which has emerged from the rationalization of modern semiotics), but also from/on “nature” (Mauss 1991:164–165), because it is the gods who made the original gift (166–168). But Mauss’ emphasis will not be on these extra-sociological relationships, but rather on the anthropic evolution that has led to trade, to social peace, to equity (under the metaphor of King Arthur’s Round Table), to civility, to civic-mindedness, which are the foundation of a modern “society” and a modern “sociology” (Mauss 1991:278–279). He is concerned about the reduction of social life to the individualism of the “useful”: we must, as a moral conclusion and in counter to the “utilitarianism” of modern

²Franz Boas (1966), who makes the first anthropological register of *potlatch*, states that in *chinook* the term refers to “what is consumed by fire.”

³“Prestations” is the word used in English language translations of Mauss’ *Essay on the gift*.

⁴As there is no *voiceless thing* for Bajtin (1999a:383) there are no things without words or without signification for Appadurai (1991:19).

economics (Mauss 1991:266), return to a new solidarity (Durkheimian) that is not traditional but rather archaic, like the “rock” of all social life: the solidarity of the gift (receiving-repayment) (Mauss 1991:263–264). But the price of that “foundation” is the projection of the unique “sense of reality” that flattens the *gift* compared to “exchange.”⁵

We see the critiques of this dissolution of the *gift* into exchange: Says Georges Bataille, in *The expenditure* (1933), that human activity cannot be reduced entirely to processes of production and preservation (Bataille 2008:113). As terrible as it may be, human misery never had sufficient influence on societies to allow the concern for preservation, which gives production the appearance of a purpose, to prevail over unproductive expenditure, and the impoverished have no other means to enter into the circle of power than the revolutionary destruction of the classes that occupy it, i.e., a blood and absolutely unlimited social expenditure (Bataille 2008:118).

Uncritically (or perhaps rather to the contrary, from a defensive stance), Bataille notes that classical economics imagined that primitive exchange was handled in the form of barter: in fact, there was no reason whatsoever to suppose that one means of acquisition such as exchange did not originate in the need to acquire that it currently satisfies, but rather the opposing need of destruction and loss (Bataille 2008:119). Thus, as a game, the *potlatch* is the opposite of a principle of preservation: it brings an end to the stability of fortunes as they existed in the totemic economy, in which possession was hereditary⁶ (Bataille 2008:122).

From that popular perspective, Bataille reinterprets historical materialism, scratching the outer shell of “capital” and allowing us to see what shows through underneath the *gift* (not integrated into exchange), which is *expenditure*, and *sacrifice*: “popular conscience is reduced to keeping the principle of expenditure in the background” (Bataille 2008:126). It is a “concept of agonistic social expenditure”: class struggle becomes the greatest form of social expenditure when it is taken up and deployed, this time by workers, with a breadth that threatens the very existence of the masters (Bataille 2008:129). And, in historical turmoil, only the word Revolution dominates over the usual confusion and brings with it some promises that reflect the boundless demands of the masses... That is the bloody hope that every day becomes confused with the popular existence, and which summarizes the insubordinate content of class struggle (Bataille 2008:131).

In his *Theory of religion* Bataille affirms that sacrifice is “abandoning and giving” (Bataille 1998:52): “sacrifice is the antithesis of production,” of its accumulation and its duration across foreseeable time; “it is the consumption that has no interest

⁵Lévi-Strauss (1975) does the same with the binary logic that operates already in *The savage mind*. These (Maussian, Lévi-Straussian) are thoughts concerned above all with salvaging the arbitrariness of the imposition with an historicizing, archaizing mythology; the thing that prevents them from opening themselves to the *intercultural ruptures* and strengthens their Eurocentrism.

⁶The “State” fixation of a unique “sense of reality” and a “state-of-being,” with its space-time, its identities, and its epistemes, seems to hinge on an elective affinity with the cumulative economy of capital that rationalized the expense (restricts it) or excludes it from “reason” (“rational” calculation and measurement), “a reason which keeps accounts.”

except for the moment itself,” and therefore usually is metaphorically represented in the burning of fire (Bataille 1998:53).⁷ Sacrifice brings into question capitalist accumulation and the military logic of war as instruments of violence, as well as in domination and in the domestication of “revolution.”

Jean Baudrillard, in the opening pages of *Symbolic exchange and death*, sets an escape route from the cumulative closure of the gift and counter-gift, in a “*symbolic violence*” exercised as extreme structural violence “revolting” the reversibility of the term against itself. Being this a Nietzschean nihilism operation as the hyperbolic end point that finds an opening in exhaustion, absurdity, and contradiction. It is the escape from all systems of differences to a negative outside; thus, in Baudrillard’s terms, “one must interpret Mauss against Mauss, Saussure against Saussure, and Freud against Freud... Reversibility of the gift in the counter-gift, reversibility of the exchange in sacrifice, reversibility of time in the cycle, reversibility of production in destruction, reversibility of life in death, reversibility of each term and value of language in the anagram: one single great form, the same in all domains, of reversibility, of cyclical reversal, of annulment; that which everywhere puts an end to the linearity of time and of language, of economic exchanges, and of accumulation, to that of power” (Baudrillard 1993:6).⁸ For Baudrillard, the only strategy is *catastrophic*, and absolutely dialectic. One must take things to the limit, where they are naturally inverted and collapse... such is the unique symbolic violence, equivalent to and triumphant over the structural violence of the code (Baudrillard 1993:9): “We are left with nothing more than theoretical violence. Speculation unto death: whose only method is the radicalization of all hypotheses” (Baudrillard 1993:10).

In his article *Political economy and death* Baudrillard labels as “inhuman” this exclusion that finds an escape route from the reciprocal relationship. There is a secret link between sacrifice and the wider community of beings (“animism”): an “inhuman” milieu. *Sacrifice* implies a dialogic relationship with animals, gods, cosmic elements (paradigmatically, with fire), and objects; while “exchange” flattens the relationship to a social topography of humans with humans. Says Baudrillard (1993:144, note 1):

And not only with regard to children and cannibals; our culture, on deepening its rationality, has removed the inhuman over time toward inanimate nature, to animals, to the inferior races... Savages who hypostatise neither the soul nor the species, recognize the earth, the animal and the dead as *socius*.

⁷ War, on the other hand, unlike sacrifice, “subordinates violence to the most complete reduction of humanity to the order of things” (Bataille 1998:62); violence-calculation, a means in relation to an end. That colonial network of hospitality and war indicates a *logic* of sacrifice, or the sacrifice subjected to the argumentative continuity of the *logos*. Thus, “without slavery, the world of things would not have achieved its fullness (of ‘thing’)” (Bataille 1998:62). Morality establishes the sacred/profane dualism in terms of pure/impure, and reason allows it to endure and to be put into operation, establishing the “order of things” through the determination of the universal form—always identical to itself—of the thing and the action (Bataille 1998:73–75): “the divine becomes rational and moral and it rejects the ill-fated sacred (‘black’; that in archaic sacrificial intimacy was in polarity with the good-fated sacred, ‘white’) of the profane side” (Bataille 1998:76).

⁸ Arjun Appadurai (1991:19) also notes that “to over-sociologize transactions in things” is a trend attributed to Mauss.

The spirits and gods “are also other real beings, living and different, and not an idealized essence” (Baudrillard 1993:163).⁹

This rupture or restriction of that *extensive cosmic dialogue* that operates in the *sacrificial praxis* leads to understanding in a new web of beliefs: death as final, outside of life, and the cumulative one-sidedness of the “truth” and the imperative of duty (even with the dead and death) in the solitude of the life of humans among humans. One of his obsessions is death; perhaps because of its unsettling proximity to the human community of the living that it splits apart and cancels out. For Baudrillard (1993:170, note 20) death as not-alive, separate from all life, and life separated from all the dead bodies: the distinction live/not-alive (death as not-alive, where the logic of “life is life/death is always death” prevails) consolidates an opposition that only we (moderns) make, and on which we found our “science” and our operational violence. Science, technology, production, all suppose this rupture between the live and the not-alive (dead as not-alive), privileging the not-alive, which is what forms the foundation of science in all its rigor. There is no real object (scientific) but that which is dead, i.e., relegated to inert and indifferent objectivity (Baudrillard 1993:153, note 7).¹⁰ The “double primitive”: “shadow, specter, reflection, image, material spirit almost still visible,” is subjected to a unilateral and unifying reduction: “in everything, the One God has to do with the form of a unified political power, and not at all with the primitive gods. Similarly, the soul and the conscience have everything to do with a unifying principle of the subject, and they have nothing to do with the primitive double” (Baudrillard 1993:162).

The “principle of ideal subjectivity that is the soul” refers to the proliferation of doubles and of the spirits to the “spectral, larval corridors of unconscious folklore, as the ancient gods transformed into demons by Christianity”; “the killer shade, the image of the rejected and forgotten dead and those who, as is quite normal, do not ever accept being nothing for the living” (Baudrillard 1993:164); “twice hostile, the hostile dead embodies nothing other than the failure of the group to preserve its material of symbolic exchange” (Baudrillard 1993:165, note 16).

Dangerous-powerful forces are encouraged and unleashed outside of the ritual that aims to close off the calculated reciprocities with a balanced closure (mourning), but which are unable to consume the *forces of the muddy and wandering specters of life-death* in the everlasting and distant glory set on high (Arteaga 2013).

As Baudrillard (1993:168) indicates, “in the finished form of the religious universal, as in that of the economic universal—capital—each of which finds itself alone once again;” both universals destroy the “archaic communities” and internalize the agony of death. The only universal: God, Capital, Reason, State, Subject, each

⁹Thus Baudrillard radicalizes his critique of capitalism, which rests on the *habitus* (in Bourdieu’s sense) of the “exchange”: “the ‘social’ itself does not exist in ‘primitive societies.’ The term ‘primitive’ has nowadays been eliminated, but we should also eliminate the equally ethnocentric term ‘society.’” (Baudrillard 1993:158, note 13).

¹⁰Bajtín (1999) also noted that the natural sciences, in contrast with the human sciences, deal with “things” rather than talking to them.

one in his fitting into the other, individualizes, mobilizes each one with its own, reflexively, it pulls each one away from the *infinite refractions of the others* (Bajtin 1999) and from *extensive cosmic relationships*. There, Baudrillard puts, “Real/imaginary death—our own (modern, since the sixteenth century)—can only rescue itself in an individual work of mourning, that the subject fulfills for the death of others and for himself from his own life” (Bajtin 1999:171).

The *death-out-of-life*, individual, detached, is anticipated as a threat of loss of that which has been accumulated, and as *anguish for the self*. There is no longer any *celebration, waste, squandering, expenditure, gift, sacrifice*—which in no case are an anguished and defensive loss of the accumulated goods. The *festive sacrifice* that squanders/expends capital is *critical semiopraxis* in the hands of the *local community of beings* (Grosso 2012a). Against it, the political economy of reciprocity is established, calculated, and adjusted to exchanges, and the colonialism of exchange, which is unilaterally accumulative.

A common meaning of “exchange” homogenizes the entire broad spectrum of relations; it turns the “gift” and the “sacrifice” into mere counterparts of a universal commerce. As Baudrillard (1993:161–162) reveals the distortion to which psychoanalysis subjects primitive societies is of the same order as that which they are subjected to under Marxist analysis, only in reverse:

For the anthro-Marxists, the economic instance is present and is determinant in this type of society as well; it is simply hidden and latent. Among ourselves, instead, it is manifested. But this difference is considered secondary; the analysis does not stop there and passes on without any difficulty to its materialist discourse... For the anthro-psychoanalysts, the instance of the unconscious is present and is determinant in this kind of society as well: it is manifest, exteriorized, simple and spontaneous. Among us, in contrast, it is latent, repressed. But this difference does not affect the essence, and the analysis imperturbably continues its discourse in terms of the unconscious.

Thus, Baudrillard (1993:165) concludes,

...if there are those who overestimate their own psychic processes—to the point of exporting their theory, as we have done with our morals and our techniques, to the heart of every culture—this is Freud and our whole psychologist culture. The jurisdiction of psychological discourse over all symbolic practices—those dazzling ones of the savages, death, the double, magic, but also in our current ones—is even more dangerous than the economist’s discourse; it is of the same order as the repressive jurisdiction of the soul or of the conscience over all the symbolic virtues of the body. The psychoanalytic reinterpretation of the symbolic is reductive.

The *comic*, the *laughter*, conspires against the everyday seriousness of this common sense of every “gift” reduced to “exchange” and its institutions (among which we include the own social and human sciences). Jacques Derrida (1989) in this regard returns to Bataille’s critique of the Hegelian dialectic. The opening quote of the text is taken from Bataille’s *Hegel, death and sacrifice*: “He [Hegel] did not know to what extent he has reason” (Derrida 1989:344). This quote subjects the seriousness of the reaches to the comicalness of their limits. Nihilism, as hammered out by Nietzsche-Bataille-Derrida, carries laughter away down its slope; it throws

the sense over the cliff out exacerbating it into the ridiculous, the absurd, the guffaw. Says Derrida:

Only laughter is beyond dialectics and the dialectical: it just bursts forth from the absolute renunciation of meaning, from the absolute risk of death, from what Hegel calls abstract negativity (that is, irreducible to positiveness through any serious “work” of the negation)... The absolute comic is the anguish in the face of the expenditure as sunk cost, in the face of the absolute sacrifice of meaning, with no return and without reserve (Derrida 1989:351–352).

Bataille—emphasizes Derrida—does not take the negative seriously:

Getting “to the bottom” of the “absolute sundering” and the negative, without “measure,” without reserve, is not to pursue its *logic* (the logic of negation) consequently to the point that, in discourse, the *aufhebung*—the discourse itself—makes it collaborate in the constitution and in the internalized memory of meaning, (that is) in the *erinnerung* (Derrida 1989:356; italics in the original).

This is what is serious in Hegel, which covers up all laughter, all randomness, all luck. Derrida (1989:385) concludes: “The need for *logical* continuity is the main decision or the milieu of interpretation, for all Hegelian interpretations” (italics in the original). It is the assumed common sense. The logic, the dialectical logic of *aufhebung* is part of the ordinary consciousness consciousness, and in that sense, part of the social “fabric of belonging,” as Bataille says in *Method of Meditation*.¹¹ Therefore,

What (the “We” of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of the spirit*) do not *see* is the bottomless game in which the history—of sense/meaning—arises. To this extent, philosophy, Hegelian speculation, absolute knowledge and all that they dominate and shall dominate interminably in their closure, remain determinations of [the so called and disdained by Hegel like] natural, servile and vulgar consciousness (Derrida 1989:381).

The *general economy* of the *expenditure* is subjected to the *restricted economy* of preservation, accumulation, and exchange. Jean Duvignaud (1997) as well questions the reduction of the *gift* to calculated reciprocity, to exchange: the gift has been made subject to the market, while sacrifice goes further; it is *the gift of nothing*, the *useless sacrifice*:

...giving so that it is returned, here is a term that smacks of its market economy and its dealer... Have we not... with the terms of exchange, of “waste,” of gift and counter-gift, and of obligation to return, projected *our* image of value? (Duvignaud 1997:139; italics in the original).

Homologies-maker Semiology passes over *alterities and intercultural ruptures*, with impunity, due to the hermeneutical desire that homogenizes the diversity of sense/meaning into “logic.” This abounds in the Social and Human Sciences, and in translating Anthropology. Duvignaud states: “God has been made into an accountant to better invest the gift in the system of changes as has been done the change a savage premeditation of the market economy” (156).

¹¹As the *social need* in Elias (2000), and the material conditions of the intended a priori of transcendental subjectivity in Alfred Sohn-Rethel (see Žižek 2003).

The gift opens the soil/other soil; it is not the mere gesture alone; it is what *opens up the soil* for us in the *intercultural intercorporality*. What kind of *sense* is in play there, and how? What *meaning*? What “*it-is-being*” (“*está-siendo*,” Kusch 1978) *sense/meaning*? Here operates a *universal-popular-intercultural* as antagonistic outbreak, broken and relational; a dialogic, critical, dislocating universal (Grosso 2012a). *Cultural struggles* (Gramsci), which are *symbolic struggles* (Bourdieu): the various figures of the “gift” struggle to assert their appreciation of things and the network of relationships that comes with them. “Contests of value,” Appadurai calls them (Appadurai 1991:37 ff.).¹²

¹²A similar motif, modeled after Mauss, is that which prompts Appadurai: In the origin of capitalism there is a “cultural narration” in which “things” are used with a rhetorical and political sense of social differentiation and distinction (Appadurai 1991:56), intensifying its “semiotic virtuosity” (that of pepper in cuisine, silk in fashion, jewelry in self-presentation; as had been the case with relics in the cults of saints) (Appadurai 1991:57). Capitalism is a “complex cultural system” (Appadurai 1991:68) which in financial speculation as “meta-fetishization of goods” (it is not just that goods conceal the social relations that sustain and produce them but also that movement in prices hides the very goods themselves, in standing in representation of them) is on display in all its agonistic, dramatic and playful, rhetorical and semiotic glory: as in the *kula* and the *potlatch*, the stock market, the cockfight, the horse race, the casino... where the thing that matters is appearance, confidence, rumor... (Appadurai 1991:70–71). Still these frictions as “contests of value” do not come to be described as *symbolic struggles*, which would be more radical fights, ones of *intercultural ruptures*. Despite what is said here, something similar (analogical) occurs with the concept of “field” (*champ*) in Bourdieu, which turns out to be (quasi)determinant. Bourdieu sees in the economic field of “*management*” the performative generation of its own “reality,” a theory between positive and normative, which brutally confronts the struggle between commercial and financial interests, with a cynicism “entirely opposed to the denegation and sublimation that tends to prevail within the universes of symbolic production” (Bourdieu 2001a:228). “Objectivism” in the field of science was denounced by Bourdieu as that position most interested in showing the greatest indifference, interested in disinterest itself, as shown in *Practical sense* (Bourdieu 1991). Here there is a pragmatic “objectivism” at work in the “economic field.” But Bourdieu here softens the symbolic twisting in the economic field and strengthens the determinant force of big business and *first movers* of production and market in the performative definition of “reality”; as well as simultaneously, in the scientific field, he will be ensuring ever more explicitly the illustrated “truth” of the mutual critique between scientists as the realism of Reason (see Bourdieu 2001b). Thus is lost what Bourdieu had identified as inherent in *symbolic distortion* (transfiguration and disfigurement): that the bets and struggles, the original inversion and the belief in the dominant value in the field, are naturalized in the interest in disinterest (see Bourdieu 1998). The economic “structure” is precisely symbolic: imposed as “reality,” and this is what causes competition to emerge among market agents as “indirect conflict” (in the words of Simmel, quoted by Bourdieu 2001a:232). In the economic field (and in the socio-analyzed scientific field) would there not still be a *symbolic distortion* at work? Or would we rather be looking at their most accomplished operations as “symbolic violence”? The fact that Bourdieu sees such things as the following as “external” factors of change introduced in the economic field—the oil discoveries of the nineteenth century, demographic changes (such as low birth rates or extending lifespan) or in lifestyles (such as women in the workforce and their new markets) (Bourdieu 2001a:232)—is indicative of the stability with which Bourdieu has invested the “economic field,” and it indicates how narrow Bourdieu’s insight has become in (not) accounting for bio-power as the politics of consumer capitalism; as if these changes had not been generated by the economic agents themselves (by their own internal forces in competitive struggle, anticipating and intervening *symbolic struggles*, drowning them in the capitalist realism of “modernity” and “development”), in his hegemonic eagerness, which always

But, (1) It is one thing to stress the market from the “zero degree” of the “calculation” as opposed to the pregnant valuation of “culture” (as Appadurai does)¹³; (2) It is quite another, to stress it from the triple systemic and functionalist movement of the gift/receipt/repayment (as Mauss does; where it stresses, with a purpose that some might think of as “humanist,” the radically for-other “social use value,” which is the social pawning of all “goods” and takes it out of its “fetishism” of mere accumulation revealing the inequality in the political economy of capitalism and announcing a universal egalitarian complementarity quite outside it, as Marx proposed); (3) Yet another thing is to stress the market from the ethnographic concepts of the “gift,” the “expenditure,” and “sacrifice” (as Bataille does); (4) And yet another is to stress it from the “ritual gesture” that operates in *matrixes of creation* that sedimented in the collective “seminal sense” of “being” [“estar”] (see Kusch 1978).

The critique of exchange and of accumulation through the *gift*, the *expenditure* and the *sacrifice*, is based on the existential experience of their critics and the conceptual maps they produce. But that which in *postcolonial justice* operates as *inter-cultural politics* and *critical semiopraxis* is a *relational and collective making-sense* that is enveloped in the *local matrixes of creation* through the *ritual gestures* (Kusch 1976) and the *emotive economy* (its pauses, its affects, its intuitions, its sensibilities, its states of consciousness) that animate it. It is not a strategy of interpretation, an analytical scheme born of a phenomenological-hermeneutic immersion, an “intellectual” translation, but rather a *semio-practical knowing* in the midst of *being* [“estar”] that makes *to become imperceptible* (Deleuze and Guattari 1994). Here happened a dislodging of all anchorage in the separate subject, *death-in-life* and *life-in-death* obliquely “Christian” that in these ways anticipate the cosmic

runaway from the minimum of the “structural” institutions, because otherwise they would deactualize and perish. Economics is cultural to the point that it does not seem so, to the point that it does not show itself to be thus under sociological critique, because, rather than being supported on firm “structures,” it is supported on the solid rock of trust, “the granitic fanatical solidity of ‘popular beliefs,’ which have the same energy as ‘material forces,’” in the words of Gramsci (1998:82). And this must not (or rather, has the power to not) be confused, despite all the rigidity of its “realism,” with the objectivism of the “structures.” In those beliefs, the “symbolic struggles” cannot be canceled under any formation of “symbolic violence” because they depend on neither conscious will nor objective forces—in this sense, the options are not either interactionism or structures (see Bourdieu 2001a:235), as in the old dispute between phenomenology and structuralism, which Bourdieu himself said he had been surpassed some time ago, in an explicit and programmed mode (Bourdieu 1991), but that are active in the *oblique semiopraxis of the discontented*, in the *infinite heteroglossia of the discourse of bodies*, ever already underway and never finished in their (ant)agonizing replicas. I return to the concept of *symbolic struggles* and I do it, in any case, paraphrasing Baudrillard (1993), putting Bourdieu up against Bourdieu.

¹³If everything is goods (either actually or potentially), in Appadurai’s (1991:33) terms: if anything can go through a phase of its social trajectory as “goods,” and if “goods” means a single thing—as opposed to “culture” and associated with “calculation,” “the calculated exchange rate that, in my opinion, is at the center of mercantile exchange” (Appadurai 1991:35)—then there are no *symbolic struggles* surrounding a market that has become autonomous. Appadurai’s “market” remains prisoner to capitalist realism: the capitalist reification of hegemonic “reality” that turns back its own terms as ruler that measures everything and cultural-hermeneutic universal realm.

material knowledge in which it sediments. But *semiopraxis* that is always realized in the *mass* of a particular discursive deictic, with its *narratives* of locally oriented *beings-in-relation* that only later on, and in further supplementary ways, come to have tongues.

Matrixes of Creation and Postcolonial Justice

Popular thought is clearly not interested then in concentrating on the truth in the proposition, but rather in referring to a truth that sets itself up in the very existence, with which it makes a bet to just-being [“estar nomás”].

Rodolfo Kusch (1975:32)

I feel that we have been touched, with Alejandro Haber, by those *local matrixes of creation* and their *communities of beings*. And that old friendship has brought it back together now, from the ties in which we were wrapped by the peoples of Antofalla (Haber 2010), of Bombori (Grosso 1994), and of Santiago del Estero (Grosso 2008a), with whom we decided to turn “research” into a “just-being” [“estar-nomás”], a “non-methodology” (Haber 2011).

There are words, gestures, manners that circle around us for a long time.... Since some years ago I perceive the narrative turn in Alejandro’s writing and spoken expression. I had understood, more years ago, in dialogue with the writing of Michel de Certeau (de Certeau 2000; Grosso 2005, 2007, 2008a, 2010b), what is entailed by the *semiopraxis of narrating*. It had been the very element on which I had elaborated the concept of *semiopraxis*. But I have felt it on hearing and reading Alejandro. Taken by the narration I finish this text by arriving at what, finally, and after *so much hospitality*, I mean to say: In April 1993 I went up for the first time, walking from Macha in northern Potosí, to Santiago de Bombori, which is located in the Bolivian Altiplano at an altitude of 3,800 m. Motor vehicle traffic was very sporadic between Macha and K’ulta, and climbing towards Bombori there was none. Only in the month of July, the feast of Santiago, the patron saint of the *yatiris* (shamans), did the flow of vehicles become stronger, transporting contingents of pilgrims who arrived with their *yatiris* from the wide surroundings, in a radius that stretches from Lake Titicaca and northern Chile to Santa Cruz de la Sierra and the northern border region with Argentina. I walked alone from six in the morning until—at some point past noon, as I began to ascend the mountain where Bombori is located—I found myself on the road with Teófilo Cabezas Estrada, who was returning to his community, Kayni, near Bombori, with his herd of llamas. They were laden with rice, potatoes, spices, corn, wool... all received in barter in the valleys, descending towards Sucre, a week away, in exchange for the fava beans and *ch’uño* (dried potato) that he had taken with him in the outbound journey. From there on we walked together on the road to Bombori, and it was his house that would be my arrival point in the area throughout that year. Teófilo also accompanied me on several stretches of the investigation. I was there at the invitation of Tristan Platt to conduct research for my

master's thesis in Andean history, on the topic of divination, mestizaje, and cult, specifically regarding the image and cult of Santiago de Bombori.¹⁴

Teófilo was a young man of about 20 years old; he spoke Quechua and a little Aymara as his native language, and he had learned Spanish in school, where he had attended the primary grades. From that moment on we spent hours talking. He became very interested in my thesis topic, and I found in him a hand to guide me, footsteps to follow in, and a voice that would translate since, with my beginner's Quechua, I could barely make out single words of the Aymara-Quechua, spoken in the region. I was thus introduced to local hospitality, from the moment we arrived that evening at the home he shared with his parents and brothers, and where I was welcomed to spend the night. Teófilo gave me his room, some 20 m from the house of his parents next to the llama corrals, where he usually slept on a straw mattress.

As in all houses in the region, daily life was divided among tasks in the field, work in the patio where the corrals were, and the living and dining room, where a large basket of grain is kept. In this space we ate ground corn with potatoes and a few fava beans. On the walls hung a large world map that took up most of the wall facing the door, along with two photos: one of the city of Frankfurt and the other a landscape with mountains, lakes, and forests. Teófilo's father told me that he liked to learn about other places, and he asked me that evening many things about Argentina and Colombia (which is where I had come from at that time, where I had met Tristan Platt and where I was doing my master's program). The daily opening of the world that was on display clashed with my prejudices and expectations, and I never ceased to wonder on finding—in that little room, in the midst of the overwhelming expanse of the Altiplano, at 3,800 m in altitude—those images, those people, that interest, that conversation. I was simply welcomed from that little place in the world, which opened itself up and offered me a spot, in every gesture of hospitality: an outstretched hand, a seat, a conversation, some food, a room to sleep in, a bed....

Teófilo was the oldest brother, and therefore he was the one who worked alongside his father all the time. In those 6 h of walking we had shared the previous day, while I was telling Teófilo about what interested me in studying Bombori, I asked if he could join me in the following days. He told me that he would like to and that he should discuss it with his father. That morning he spoke with his father, who gave him permission to go around with me that entire day. Teófilo was amused by the fact that things that were so ordinary for him could interest me so much and prompt so many questions surrounding them, and that they had brought me to travel such distances and to be with him in Kayni and Bombori. I had brought with me a camera and a small tape recorder. Then he told me: "I'll go with you, and you take for me some pictures of my family and record me singing some songs with the charango." And we agreed, to something that was not an exchange but rather a meeting of gifts, incommensurable, valuable for both, but with no currency or calculation to mediate. Thus I entered, with what I brought with/in me, into a ritual matrix that was a

¹⁴For a further discussion see Grosso (1994).

sacrificial one for the measureless expenditure which made impossible to contain the replacement or the bartering of goods.

We walked that day through Bombori, traveling the length and the breadth of it, looking, touching, conversing (through his dialogues) with the local people. Teófilo asked me about the research, because he wanted to know what it was that interested me. He broke in with his opinions and set up the questions that he would ask his neighbors. Afterwards, when we were once again in conversation as we went from house to house, he told me with surprise those things that he did not know and that the people were telling him through “our” questions. Sometimes we met old people, who spoke only Aymara, and someone in the family translated to Quechua for Teófilo, and he translated for me into Spanish. The languages were part of the incommensurable gifts that were being poured out in dialogue, with their misunderstandings and ambiguities.

We went up that afternoon to one of the mountains surrounding Bombori, then we went down again and we visited an abandoned ore plant, referred to as “belonging to the Spanish,” and we picked up some ceramic sherds in that place. Until the ending of that afternoon we sat on the hillside, away from the houses, to listen to the stories that we had recorded. We talked. One story spoke of Bolívar, when he had gone through Bombori. Another tale was of the Tata Bombori (as they call Santiago) and the Tanka Tanka (the mountain that dominates the region, “the hunchback”), about a struggle between Tata Bombori and the *diablos* that had taken place on the peak of that mountain. Then Teófilo took out his charango and asked me to record him singing. The songs were his own, about matters of love. We recorded for an hour, then he asked me to let him listen to himself singing. He found it very amusing to hear himself sing: he had never had that experience.

The following days he spent working in the field with his father, and so I went around by myself through Bombori. I stayed a week, as planned, and when I returned I set aside the community of Kayni so I could not depart from the road, since I had to reach Macha that day on foot, about 14 h of travel.

Almost a month later I returned to stay another week in Bombori. I arrived first at Kayni, to the house of Teófilo and his parents. I had brought prints of the photographs that I had taken the month before in the patio, with the llamas in the corrals, for the whole family. Their joy was immense. That day I continued on towards Bombori, less than an hour away, crossing the river. We agreed with Teófilo to meet up the next day, after he had spoken with his father for permission to accompany me that day. In the morning he arrived at the community of Bombori, where I had rented a room. We went around the area together that whole day. I brought with me the audio recordings from the previous visit, and we went back to listen to them and collect new ones. By the end of the afternoon, Teófilo asked me to listen to his songs once again. He laughed uncontainably on hearing himself. When night came, we laid on our backs in the grass and talked awhile about the star. From that night this story came to me just a year ago: It was at 3,800 m above the sea level, in the Altiplano of northern Potosí, that an idea turned from the earth towards the heavens some 19 years ago, with a star-studded night against our noses, covering with its cloak the ancestral power of the guardian mountain, re-baptized San Cosme,

sleeping in the vicinity of Bombori. And I thought, like a program not yet finished but largely performed by the beings who inhabit it, in making the nighttime topography by tracing those plotlines of overhead signs in the living rock, or, conversely, raising the roads and gestural relationships of the soil over the dark background of the heavens from whence the incommensurable and sacrificial gift of the lightning comes. Thus the ritual circuits of Tata Bombori inundate the life, the *ayllus*, in an inverted agriculture. And then I was overwhelmed to know with Teófilo, who imagined smiling the craziness of saying it, when it was common for the beings of the place to count with this without having to specify the number nor figure nor cartography: just intersecting lines in the community of love and misunderstandings. But in me it produced a shiver... and still I feel it under my feet, that uneasiness with which it passed through and dug in there its suspense the irrepressible hope of what comes to save us in its oblivion, full of silences and gratitude. And that safe promise remained in me, in having its fulfillment in those who make their passes day by day, night by night, and I rest in them” (Grosso 2012c).

Late at night, Teófilo returned to Kayni, and I continued on by myself that entire week at Bombori.

I returned many times that year, every 2 or 3 weeks, to Kayni and Bombori. In November I arrived at the house, and Teófilo had recently gotten married, about 12 days before, to a girl from the village of K’ulta, at the bottom of the other way that ascends to Bombori, which runs more to the East. All the same, he offered me his room while he switched to another with his new bride. My protestations could not overcome his insistence. This time I brought more photographs and some foods that are scarce in the Altiplano: I came from Sucre, from the valleys, where I was residing.

When I came back a few weeks later, we agreed to make a visit to a *yatiri* from Bombori that “made the hills speak” in a ritual called “*kawiltu*” (“cabildo/council”), the most powerful practice of divination and consultation in the region, and which very few people could perform. We went with Teófilo, his brother, Virginie Royer de Véricourt (a research colleague who happened to be around this time) and myself. I brought the cigarettes, the alcohol, and the coca needed for the ritual. Teófilo translated, because the *yatiri* did not speak Spanish. In the house of the *yatiri*, we were enveloped in total darkness despite it being broad daylight outside. A storm was approaching, and the sky was overcast and mighty thunders were sounding. “*The Tanka Tanka is angry,*” said the *yatiri*. And he carefully and prudently began the *kawiltu*. Teófilo asked about his llamas, because some of them were dying. He was given some instructions from Santa Wara Wara (Santa Barbara), who arrived with her llamas and sheep: Teófilo should bring some guano from K’ulta and spread it around in his corral at Kayni. The problem was that Santa Wara Wara, the patron saint of K’ulta, was angry because he had not married his wife in K’ulta, but in Bombori, and then the celebration was held there also. The *ch’allas* to Santa Wara Wara had been forgotten. We, with Virginia, asked whether Tata Bombori was pleased with us, with our research. The *turri mallk’u* (“tower hill” beside the church of Santiago de Bombori) replied that we should do our research “with respect,” making *ch’allas* and asking permission, so that things would go well. “Always with

respect,” said the *turri malk’u*, what means letting ourselves be touched by the relationship with that powerful source that was opening way for us.

December of that year was the last time that we would find ourselves with Teófilo. I stopped by his house but had very little time to stay. It was a quick trip we put together with Virginie, in her jeep, coming from Sucre. She went over some sections of her research in Macha for one last time, and I did the same in Bombori. It was December, Christmas was approaching, and we were traveling back to our home countries. My father was very ill in Argentina; he was already in the very advanced stage of a terminal illness. There were several questions that I should have asked Teófilo about the interviews we had done. There were some that had yet to be translated. Teófilo spoke with his father and we agreed that on this occasion: I should give him money (without specifying how much) for that day’s work. It was 1 day of work, a few hours, and a lot of pressure. It did not seem at all like the previous stays. At one moment, when communication had become strained, Teófilo endeavored to answer my questions, which kept going back over the same parts of the interviews or over a single topic. Violence and sacrifice had become instrumental, in pulling out the information. But I feel that at that moment I did not understand anything, and that everything there was to learn had already been accomplished already, in previous stays. We had to rush back to Sucre with Virginie that same day. We did the work, and I gave Teófilo some money, of which he took only a part, in banknotes and coins; he didn’t want to receive anything more. We parted sadly. I quickly returned to Sucre in the jeep with Virginie.

There is still a part of me that I left back there; I do not know how much it is, and what has been taken in those meetings of *gifts* and *sacrifice* in the *matrixes of creation* of Kayni and Santiago de Bombori. It is what binds me yet to those forces. It is also my source of power and protection. I owe to those local ties, but not on the narcissism of debt (it is something I could not repay with money at our last meeting), but rather for the *disruptive relational magnetization of their gifts*.

I knew from then on that a thesis, like any research, is a type of existential learning that touches me/us “in the field” and that, because of the protocols of academia, is written on blank pages. But like everything in life, what matters is what’s left behind, what continues to be.

From the perspective of who arrives, Amerindian communities and persons range between cryptic taciturnity and naive reception: beside the grim silence, the friendly gesture. But the foreigner dimly perceives that in the act of receiving, people open up a site and give a new place that recreates, in large scale, the entire constellation of relationships. There, *archaic epistemic-practical matrixes of creation* show their greatest flexibility through and along the adversities of colonialism. These silent languages are the *semiopraxis of sacrifice* in which an extreme gift *from other space-times* introduces new beings in ritual relationships. Amidst them, we are transformed, we become others. Colonial ethics is inverted/invested by an *excessive hospitality*. Silence, delay, and affection abruptly touch the edges of dominant order that is dislocated. We, as former (and perhaps permanent) strangers, arrogant, armored upstarts, have ignored and despised this *justice that comes from others who do not dominate*. While this *intercultural postcolonial justice* in its *critical semiopraxis* takes *the largest theoretical risks* in a *non-illustrated revolution*.

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Chapter 7

On Burial Grounds and City Spaces: Reconfiguring the Normative

Nicole Sarmiento

*Now and then
I walk backwards.
It is my way of remembering.
If I only walked forward,
I could tell you
about forgetting.*

Humberto Ak'abal

I

In their work *Adiós Ayacucho* the Peruvian performance group Yuyachkani works through the story of a man named Alfonso Cánepa, from the southern Andean region of Peru, who disappeared in the 1980s by military death squads. In this piece, Alfonso returns from the dead in order to search for the remains of his body so that he can provide his physical and material fragments with an integral burial. In his travels into the world of the living he encounters a traditional Andean figure of the comic dancer, known as a Qolla. Alfonso asks the Qolla to lend him his body in order to be able to locate his remains and stitch the fragments together. The Qolla lends him his body and in this way Alfonso is able to tell his story and go about his journey of collecting pieces of his dispersed self.

The work revolves visually around a central platform in which Alfonso's clothes have been laid out with care by his family for a wake that takes places over 8 days— a practice that emerged out of the massive period of organised state violence that led

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to the disappearance and displacement of thousands of people across Peru. The ritual involving the deceased's clothes, fragments of a body that was, allows for a sense of re-remembering—of stitching together the materiality of the person who has been lost. Unlike traditional burial practices that revolve around the very materiality of the deceased person's body, this ritual revolves around a regime of care for a life unaccounted for in corporeal form. The senses of touch and smell are central in the construction of the wake. In the case of the violence of disappearance, one is left with fragments—pieces of clothing, shoes, possibly some photographs and stories. Through the burning of candles and the assemblage of various objects variously arranged, space, material fragment and time are imbued with meaning, relationality and association. As the performance unfolds, Alfonso, in the body of the Qolla dancer, finds pieces of his own body scattered in different places until finally his corporeality is reassembled and is prepared for burial.

I begin within this narrative of travel between life and death, unfolding in the spaces of experimental theatre/performance, as it offers a point of departure to consider questions of co-presence and relationality that lies outside of a binary frame or linear movement of life to death (Shepherd and Haber). The place and meaning of the dead in relation to the living and the role of the body both in life and beyond life defy an instrumentalist notion of the body and open towards a social ontology of the place of the body and of burial in this world of meaning. These are questions that force an opening of the terrain of memory in the context of historical effacement and historical oblivion. Where effacement operates through modes of disavowal and disarticulation of body, space, experience and memory, the battle against silence becomes a necessary and a political one. It inaugurates an ethical moment (Butler and Athanasiou 2013).

In the context of a regime that organised the forceful disappearance of people, and the disappearance of remains combined with a denial of that very violence—the act of re-remembering and stitching together, along with finding alternative forms of memorialisation, becomes an act of radical defiance. The act of assemblage, burial and sacred ritual a transmission, and an assertion that I am here, we are here—or rather we are still here and you have not yet disposed of us. Opening towards this question of hereness, of coevalness and relationality is the basis for this exploration.

In the spaces of the city of Cape Town, a postcolonial, post-apartheid urbanity, I want to think about the reality of ancestors buried in unmarked spaces under the city and underneath the built structures of the University of Cape Town. At the same time, bodies no longer living and living bodies gathered in large numbers on the streets through carnival practices together assert a hereness that is physical and material, and is spatialised in particular ways.

In Yuyachkani's work, space is not an empty vessel to be filled with meaning. The fragments of Alfonso's once integral body should be buried with care, uniting body and land in a grammar of memory that operates within a syntax that speaks of spatialised memory and embodiment. It speaks to a paradigm that does fit neatly within narratives of linear time, nor of perverse binaries that divide the living from the dead. Rather, it speaks of coeval time and space, and of multiple and conflicting temporalities operating in a singular space (Shepherd and Haber 2013). Time in this

sense is not a neat linear progression from life to death to the afterlife. Rather it can be understood as a space of coeval time, of fractures and ambiguities in which ancestors and the living are intimately intertwined. Space includes the above-ground, the below ground and other navigational registers that are not the neatly mapped, Cartesian form of spatiality that define colonial modernity. Within this framework lands are not easily mapped, bodies are never entirely contained and cartographies are living and breathing—shifting with time and within multiple forms and registers.

In his travel between his death and his time of re-collecting his body that had been materially dis-membered Alfonso enacts a ritual of memory that ties bodies of the living to the bodies of the dead in space and in time. He travels to the spaces where bits and pieces of his once whole body can be found, not in order to relive that which has passed or to reassess the events, nor is his travel about truth or trying to reconstruct a truth that fits within particular evidentiary modes and archival registers. There can be no rest, for the living or the dead, until the bodies have been located, reassembled and afforded a proper ritual of passing.

The regimes of care involved in this work speak of knowledge forms and memorial practices that lie outside of traditional political processes of truth and reconciliation—offering alternative ways of thinking about memory, materiality and the body. The status, the times and the rationalities at play are in conflict with how modern political processes have come to understand, evaluate and assess periods of extreme violence such as the one experienced in Peru or in South Africa that led to the implementation of truth commissions (Grünebaum 2011). In this version, those who have been victimised and their families, dead and living, are preoccupied with the passage from life to death, with the status and location of the body and with a certain accountability, or accounting for.

Re-remembrance pieces together the body that was taken apart, and unites landscape with bodies that as coeval entities. Regimes of care, in other words, are forms of alternative rationalities that lie outside of functionalist understandings of violence and its afterlives. Memory is not merely a property of cognition, but rather is something that is socially maintained and transmitted—an ongoing memorialisation in the face of a constant and ever-present institutional logic of erasure (Butler and Athanasiou 2013). We can think of modes or points of transmission in which the body is central. We can think of embodied cartographies that offer different registers of seeing, in the interstices of an active and willed forgetting, or dis-membering.

In this narrative I also find an opening to think about conflicting rationalities. Different from the way truth telling, witness testimony and the multiple evidentiary modes employed by truth commissions have been upheld as sacrosanct forms in the contemporary neoliberal historical conjuncture (Lalu 2009), this performance offers a set of competing rationalities. The place of the dead—of ancestors—their names and the spaces and material objects associated with their lives and deaths are central and belie the tendency to treat the dead as beyond the scope of meaning for the present (Trouillot 1995). It offers another sense to the idea of accounting and accountability. Within this order of meaning, “material objects, ghostly presences, nature, technology, biological matter and animal life, are now appearing as parts of, or

extensions to, life in cities” (Amin 2008). However, I would argue that it is not an emerging phenomenology as Amin suggests, but part of an order of meaning present in many spaces that have been largely denigrated as superstition, animism and irrationality within an Enlightenment paradigm of knowledge and seeing.

II

Beyond the horizon of the trees it was too black to see the sky. But the music was there, loud as gospel to a believer’s ears. It was the music of the Steel Drums, hard, strident and clear: a muscled current of sound swept high over the tonnelle.

George Lamming (1960)

The epigraph that opens this section, which is the opening line of George Lamming’s novel *Season of adventure*, offers another entry point into a paradox of meaning and sense operating in the lifeworlds of many cities and towns across the former colonial world. Lamming begins his novel: “Beyond the horizon of the trees it was too black to see the sky. But the music was there, loud as gospel to a believer’s ears. It was the music of the Steel Drums, hard, strident and clear: a muscled current of sound swept high over the *tonnelle*”.

Amidst the silence and darkness of the evening, when nothing is available to the eye besides the night—the sound of music, of the Steel Drums, was there, “loud as gospel to a believer’s ears”. At once there is the presence of sound, of music, so loud that it is beyond obvious and present. And yet the paradox, as Lamming suggests, is that it is only audible, only really obvious and “loud” to those who are “believers”. Lamming’s novel offers a story of two worlds coeval on a fictitious island in the Caribbean. He continues with a description of what he calls a ceremony of souls: “The women’s voices followed, chanting a chorus of faiths that would soon astonish the night. They sang in order to resurrect the dead”. Lamming’s opening disorients the normative sensory positionality of the reader, accustomed to focus on the primary sense of sight, of visual cues that describe a setting. Shutting off sight, he embeds the reader in a sensorial regime in which the senses of sound and touch, and the co-presence of the living and the dead, become the primary modes of relating, of knowing and situating the self.

Moving from Lamming, I want to think about the question of the body (of the living and of ancestors and the yet to be born)—as well as of performance and multi-sensorial aesthetic worlds—as a sort of alternative and embodied archive. This archive, I argue, offers a genealogy of power that is important for thinking about the present conjuncture. It allows for a starting point to think about time and space in the present moment, and about what it means to live as inheritors of colonial violence and colonial forms of knowledge (Shepherd and Haber 2013). In the following text, I tell a story about burial grounds underneath the visible, audible city forms, and a story about contemporary carnival practices in the city of Cape Town. In this way I will stitch together a way of thinking about the city, about spatiality

and cityness differently, in a manner that disrupts linear time and dominant knowledge of what matters and how meaning is negotiated in spaces that live within the many “posts” that were inaugurated with colonialism, slavery, anti-colonial resistance, apartheid and their afterlives.

III

As the century spanning the production of Kant and Marx progresses, the relationship between European discursive production and the axiomatics of imperialism also changes, although the latter continues to play the role of making the discursive mainstream appear clean, and of making itself appear as the only negotiable way

Gayatri Spivak (1999)

Thinking about the question of ethics in the context of the disciplinary worlds of archaeology is necessarily thinking broadly about the disciplines and the disciplinisation of subjects and imaginaries. In a neoliberal global context, where students and staff of university institutions are both employed by and employed in the work of knowledge production as subjects, not only are our “objects” of study conditioned within particular institutional and knowledge configurations, but also as “subjects” we are disciplined in very specific ways.

One of the ways in which power and knowledge intersect within the university is the silent way that power simultaneously inscribes itself and erases its multiple inscriptions in the process, presenting certain paradigms, methodologies and ways of seeing as natural or common sense. History—with a capital H—is always about power and the institutions that facilitate contemporary power dynamics to remain firmly in place and normative. An example of this operating mode is the assumption that research is about the radical separation between subject and object, as a way of functioning and as a way of seeing the world (Garuba 2012a, b). But such an assumption rests on the acceptance of a particular hierarchy and configuration of power as normative. This hierarchy is one where certain social formations can be understood as producers of “knowledge”—while those who do not form part of this selection of humans constitute something else that is not producing knowledge. This “else” can be studied, as objects of research by the subject. Such an assumption also accepts hierarchies and divisions of labour as somehow natural, erasing the genealogy that facilitated such a configuration to emerge and become operative (functioning as common sense). This assumption inflects the common designation of certain aesthetic practices as “art” and other aesthetic formations as “culture” or “tradition”—“animism” or “superstition”.

In the epigraph that opens this text Gayatri Spivak asks us to think about the relationship between disciplinary discursive production and “the axiomatics of imperialism” and how these relate to render the mainstream, the “core” disciplines appear clean, natural and common sense. Her thinking is useful in the work of weaving the question of ethics in relation to the discipline of archaeology—because it calls us to think the disciplines more broadly, as well as the university as institution

in which the disciplines are situated. Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2008) offers a way of thinking about the question of ethics and the disciplines, when he writes that thinking about ethics from the position of those who have been historically oppressed translates into a different orientation and a different set of considerations. Such an intellectual project, he argues, is by definition political, in that it speaks necessarily to contemporary social injustice and configurations of power.

Maldonado-Torres argues that it is necessary to rethink ethics beyond Emmanuel Levinas and more importantly to start with the colonial project and the experiences and intellectual/artistic production that emerge from the former colonies as tools for thinking the contemporary historical conjuncture. For him, Frantz Fanon offers a body of theory that grapples with the question of ethics—albeit of a different form and language than that offered by continental theorists and bodies of work emerging from the Euro-American academy. Frantz Fanon, Aimé Césaire and Sylvia Wynter, among others, offer a way of reconfiguring a set of concerns and questions around the human and the subject in our present historical conjuncture, and the way in which people construct meaning within the context of violence and ever-present crisis. This reconfiguration must necessarily begin with the experiences of racial slavery and genocide as well as their meanings and legacies in the present. It is thus about genealogy, or the tracing of power along its various trajectories and intersections in the present (Foucault 2005).

In this context, I want to think about the space where I am located and find myself working as a doctoral researcher—the University of Cape Town (UCT)—and some broader questions in relation to power, the disciplines and materiality. In this way I want to summon these spectres, as it were, to tell a story and intimate at a set of questions for thinking after “ethics” and towards a reconfiguring of the normative in relation to questions of land, bodies and burial grounds in the contemporary city of Cape Town.

Walking around the University of Cape Town, or passing by the university while on moving transport, I often feel a profound sense of disjuncture. Tourist adverts and city branding campaigns are fond of referring to Cape Town’s physical beauty, the majesty of its mountains and its so-called natural landscape. My relationship to space and time in this context cannot but be impacted by that violent architecture and landscape of UCT and its environs, a humanly constructed landscape that inscribes itself on lands and bodies as fragments of an imperial vision that is constantly being re-inscribed. Cecil John Rhodes acquired the land that UCT is currently built on, which had been a colonial farm owned by the Dutch East India Company (VOC), known as Rustenburg. After purchasing the land, Rhodes proceeded along his vision of empire to remake the natural, visible landscape of that side of Table Mountain in order to accommodate it within his imaginary of space and time. What is today named “Cape Town” was for Rhodes a space without history, a people outside of time—on which new imaginaries, ways of seeing and stylisations of self and place could be inscribed.

A familiar trope of the African terrain is one of wide, empty space devoid of people and history, idealised and fabricated to fit an imaginary befitting a proprietary relationship to land (Coetzee 1988). South African art history is replete with

this kind of spatial imaginary: from the idealised landscapes of Jacobus Hendrik Pierneef to Pranas Domsaitis and Erik Laubscher, among many others. Idealised landscapes and portraits of unidimensional “natives” testify to the way in which this imaginary inhabits interior lives in such a way that it conditions ways of seeing the world, ways of relating and thinking about as well as forms of representation. Irma Stern, Walter Battiss, Maurice Van Essche, Anton Van Wouw and Vladimir Tretchikoff, to name a few, immediately come to mind in terms of embodying these subjects in their oeuvre over a lifetime. Their work also illustrates that although imaginaries operate in the realm of the mind and of desire, imaginaries materialise themselves in very real and concrete ways.

As Audre Lorde writes, there are many kinds of power, acknowledged and otherwise—and in silence lies a particular kind of power (Lorde 1984). In Rhodes’ stylisation of an imaginary landscape outside of time, what is already included by its very exclusion? What I am interested in is what has been left out, covered over, at UCT and in the shadows of what we call Table Mountain. What lies underneath the visible landscape, often in bits and pieces, fractured and silent? What voices and orders can be discerned beyond the hegemonic mappings of the city into fashionable districts and design precincts—ordering units that are central to the operation of neoliberal forms of spatiality?

Rhodes systematically removed local plant life and in their places planted Stone Pines to make the space resemble an ancient Greek rural landscape. Other plants were brought in to make a patchwork of imperial visual symbols representing the multiple shores of empire. This side of Table Mountain became an entirely new landscape: power was spatialised, inscribing itself on the biosphere. Colonial conquest at the Cape and in what is known today as South Africa was a massive project of dispossession, of violent inscriptions of empire onto lands and bodies, through what Mohamed Adhikari has described as genocide, as well as through a project of racial slavery that began at the Cape and extended itself across the rest of what is today called South Africa (Adhikari 2010 and Grünebaum 2007).

Subjects to be controlled, described, demarcated—lands to be mapped, taxonomised and domesticated (Garuba 2002). Order, schema, taxonomy—the colonial project’s quiet weapon. The language of archaeology and the disciplines can be discerned within these visceral inscriptions. Besides the shadow of Table Mountain, botanical gardens were constructed in Kirstenbosch and a Dutch East India Company (VOC) garden close to the seashore. A zoo was constructed next to what is today the University of Cape Town—replete with a lion’s den and various flora and fauna representing the conquests of lands and people beyond the shores of Europe.

The spaces of Rhodes’ feverish constructions were lands that had been central to local people and knowledge practices, expropriated and repurposed for the fabrication of a synthetic time/space suitable to a massive imperial appetite. In the middle of this territorialised fantasy world, the Rhodes Memorial overlooks what is today the city of Cape Town and UCT itself. Many are familiar with the various Rhodes monuments around the UCT campus and the city, fragments of time that is out of joint. In a city where not a single monument exists to the anticolonial resistance or the individuals who led these struggles, the embodiment of Rhodes in stone

scattered across the city is always quietly convulsive. These are not monuments to a past long gone, but the very materiality that forms the present, part of a patchwork of elements that constitute the present moment.

What I am describing forms part of a genealogy that suggests an operating of power in and through multiple inscriptions on bodies and land. This is not necessarily a biopolitics in Foucault's sense, but rather, I'd like to think about what decolonial thinkers have described as coloniality—and its deep inscriptions. In an echoing vein, Anthony Bogues has suggested the concept of historical catastrophe to think about power and subjectivity in the context of colonial modernity. Similar to the decolonial theoretical departures (Moraña et al. 2008). Bogues draws on Michel Foucault as well as Aimé Césaire, W.E.B. Du Bois and Frantz Fanon, arguing that a focus on colonial modernity is key to constructing a genealogy of modern liberal power. In his formulation we begin with conquest and the afterlives of conquest not as a linear periodisation, but as a way of rethinking trauma, memory and politics today. The notion of historical catastrophe describes a project of domination that operates on and through bodies, not as a singular event located in a contained past, but as an event that is defined by its very repetition and that occurs over the *longue durée*. It is a project whose effects linger in the present in the form of contemporary social injustice that exists in direct relation to this past, not as an unbroken chain, but in the form of social, spatial, economic injustice today. Thus, it is related to the way in which coloniality is conceived of as a form of deep inscription and related to the question of knowledge. Epistemic violence becomes a key way to deconstruct the ways in which languages, disciplinary modes of seeing and of conceptualising subject, object and methodology is part of this genealogy. Gayatri Spivak's work very much elucidates this point when she writes:

Postcolonial studies, unwittingly commemorating a lost object, can become an alibi unless it is placed within a general frame. Colonial Discourse Studies, when they concentrate only on representation of the colonized or the matter of the colonies, can sometimes serve the production of current neocolonial knowledge by placing colonialism/imperialism securely in the past, and/or by suggesting a continuous line from that past to our present.

These theoretical tools are useful for a threading of alternative archives that can help to think through the legacies and inscriptions of colonial modernity in the present-day post-apartheid experience and lived reality.

IV

“This time is out of joint”, wrote Jacques Derrida—just as is time, space is also layered and multiple (Derrida 1994). One cannot pass through the city of Cape Town without that jarring visual reference point in the middle of the mountain, as one enters the city on the N2 or even moving through one end of main road to another. Thus I return to UCT because I cannot pass through this space, by this place, without finding myself co-opted by a particular spatial configuration that

determines my relationship to the aboveground/Cartesian map and logics of the city. The above, the surface, the architectural form—the visual, ocular perspective—dominates the senses.

Groomed as modern subjects, as conscripts of modernity, we are enveloped in sensorial regimes that set up hierarchies among the senses. This hierarchy conditions our subjectivities in terms of how we see the world around us, as well as the languages we employ and rationalities we accept as normative. This sensorial regime, in many ways, reflects contemporary forms of knowledge production and the disciplinisation of knowledge that permeates the disciplines in universities across the globe. In the construction of a normative experience, normative history and normative subject—in relation to which all other experiences are a deviation or representations of a lack—is a point well deconstructed by Dipesh Chakrabarty, who suggests that histories of the subaltern, experiences of those on the other side of modernity and histories called “Indian”, “Caribbean” or “Chinese” always become a way of filling in or adding to the master narrative of “Europe”, in this way reinforcing the assumption that all other histories are somehow deviant (Chakrabarty 1992). In many ways, I want to suggest that this epistemological foundation of disciplinary thinking is connected to modern sensorial regimes and the body. Sight, the visual and textual are on the top of this hierarchy—while all senses related to body are subordinate and somewhat add-ons to central sense of sight. Frantz Fanon (1967) wrote that Europe and “whiteness” became associated with the mind, language and knowledge, while “blackness” became the body, the subordinate senses and culture (as opposed to “knowledge”). This Manichean operating principle carried itself into the world of knowledge production, and the realm of the disciplines.

Harry Garuba writes that “many of the disciplines of the humanities and social sciences, being disciplines of modernity, were invariably defined in opposition to Africa—African animism, African irrationality, African orality, etc.” Garuba continues, “Africa was the ultimate sign of the non-modern that was not available to disciplinary attention, except within the domain of anthropological knowledge” (Garuba 2012b). Thus, at its very foundations, Fanon’s Manichean principle operates. The contemporary knowledge system and configuration of disciplinary knowledge in its very foundation excluded Africa from the domain of knowledge and pushed it into anthropology—the discipline mandated for the study of “the other”. Anthropology, archaeology and linguistics were some of the fields that emerged out of this order—disciplines in which linear temporality defines its core assumptions and operating principles. As Johannes Fabian writes, anthropology rests on a suspension of time in order for research to be carried out (Fabian 2002). A notion of a fixed and contained past as well as the idea that peoples, cultures and territories belong to different temporalities (that can be situated on a linear trajectory from “primitive” to “modern”) are central to these disciplines.

When we encounter the racialised, patriarchal spatialities and built environments of city spaces, the tendency is to focus on the visible, material structure or a view from above (Irigaray 1985). This is what makes the panoramic such a common and desirable field of vision, why taking photos from on top of Table Mountain, from Robben Island, from the Rhodes Memorial or Lion’s Head is the most common

artifact of the tourist imaginary, and even the city's own representations of Cape Town (Grünebaum 2007). The Mayor's office hosts a massive panoramic view of Table Mountain and most documentary films on Cape Town use an optic constructed from Robben Island, or from some high point, gazing downward at the mainland. It is the ideal view of the city. It mirrors an epistemological inheritance that divides the head from the body, subject from the object—privileging mind over the embodied and multi-sensorial, the above/below, the living/dead, subject/object and all the modes “of self/group/Self imagining, and of its mode of Sameness and Difference” (Wynter 1984). The University of Cape Town, as Rhodes' imperial fantasy turned material structure, turned imprint on land and space, reflects this inheritance. UCT perched high on the mountain, a space from which subjects, researchers, professors and professionals in the making, can gaze as subjects at the objects of study below—seemingly divorced and far away.

What if we begin to think about disjunctive experiences of space/time in the city of Cape Town, and in spaces such as UCT, and think about, look at, feel and listen to the world below, the underground? The spaces beneath the visible edifice? Can other normative orders be discerned in these interstices? The underneath of the city, its unseen and silenced burial grounds, I argue, offers a possible rupture of linear conceptions of time and space—of time presented as neat chronological time of presents, pasts and posts. It allows us to think of the time of the dead and the time of returns. I want to turn to UCT's silenced burial grounds, as a way of considering the legacies of the past in the present.

V

In the plans around the rollout of capital expenditure at UCT that began around 2007, in particular plans for a new upgrading and building on middle campus, some academics were approached around the question of a burial ground lying underneath part of the middle campus—a burial ground from the colonial period that through the archives is known to be a burial ground where many enslaved peoples' bodies lie. The area where the burial ground is estimated to be located was part of the Rustenburg property, and this space would have been an area where enslaved people “owned” by the VOC worked and lived. Slavery at the Cape, along with the practices of extermination carried out by settler populations, forms part of denigrated histories and successive disavowals that characterise this city. The legacies and afterlives of historical catastrophe, in many ways, remain an absent present, or unnamed in Cape Town.

Post-1994 there has been a tendency to focus on the impacts of apartheid spatial planning and racial terror, focusing less on the ways in which apartheid forms of governmentality were inherited from the colonial project and not in any way aberrant. Few physical, material markers exist in this city that remind people in the city of Cape Town's past as a slave-holding society, as a port city intricately connected to the circulation and consumption patterns of the emerging capitalism that unfolded

with the imperial project. Much less is there an acknowledgement of a community of descendants of slaves and indigenous people who were submitted to a politics of extermination, displacement and erasure. Last year marked the centenary of the 1913 Land Act, and land continues to be seen within a legalistic frame that presupposes a modern liberal conception of private property. Importantly, the 1913 Land Act did not apply to the Cape Colony, as dispossession had already taken place at the Cape (Campbell 2011).

In this context, the existence of slave burial ground underneath UCT—a university that prides itself to be a centre of “excellence” with an “Afropolitan” mandate—points to spectres that haunt the city and the university as institution itself. There is a need to grapple with an expanded geographical and spatial imagination that incorporates these various tracks and layers, as Ash Amin suggests. More importantly, the emergence of questions around a slave burial ground lying somewhere underneath campus came at a time when the city had seen multiple fractures and disruptions in space and time associated with colonial period burial grounds around what is today the city centre.

In 2003 a burial ground in Prestwich Street, located in what is named as Green Point (which in an earlier iteration, pre-Group Areas Act, was part of an area known as District One), was uncovered during the construction of a luxury New York loft-style apartment complex (Shepherd 2007). Close to 2,000 human bodies were found in this site and a process of public consultation and contestation unfolded, revealing a set of competing rationalities. The process led to a prioritising of the needs of the developers, resulting in the removal and relocation of the bodies and the construction of a memorial site/ossuary for their eventual storage, assisted by UCT archaeologists. This decision by the South African Heritage Resource Agency, SAHRA, meant a severing of the Hands Off Prestwich Movement, which had been formed to articulate a different set of concerns in relationship to the bodies of the dead and their relationship to present-day Cape Town’s population. Any further delving into the status and meaning of the burial ground, of bodies and land, was short-circuited with this decision. The rupture in normative logics of the city was in many ways postponed.

Not far after the Prestwich burial ground events, UCT’s slave burial grounds debate entered the public realm around 2008. According to the SAHRA report following from initial excavations and consultation process, the existence of the burial ground lying somewhere below the ground of UCT middle campus is undeniable (SAHRA 2008). Exactly where that burial ground is located, what it means for the present, or its configuration within the wider historical context and trajectory of UCT and public memory is something that remains unresolved. More recently, UCT has moved ahead with its development plans and has not gone further than an initial archaeological assessment and series of public meetings. Besides the assessment and meetings, UCT has published visions of what a possible memorial around the site could look like. This year, the first annual memorial took place at UCT commemorating the site, with a mere three students present. The event was highly secretive and held in a small room in UCT’s Law School—an uncomfortable reality called into question by several participants in the event.

What is clear in the SAHRA report and the language of memory employed by UCT is that these set the terms, language and framework through which the question of the burial ground should be discussed, understood, evaluated and memorialised. The question of the burial grounds is defined as a problematic about “science” and about the discipline of history and archaeology—hostage to their evidentiary modes and regimes of truth. The points around public consultation, memory and heritage are understood only within this problematic, within a discourse of linear time in which archaeology is framed as a discipline that grapples with material fragments and a “past” divorced from the present. The spectre of the untold, of repressed histories, and present accountabilities in the debate around the slave burial ground at UCT is absent.

After the public consultation process called a few meetings with what it termed “the community” and carried out their archaeological assessment, SAHRA wrote, “Since no human remains were discovered during the excavation of the three trenches, it is recommended that construction may proceed in the designated area”. All ethical protocols having been followed, according to SAHRA and UCT, the development plans moved forward and the matter was closed. A memorial, goes the argument, is all that remains in checklist.

The uncomfortable materiality of the underneath of UCT’s campus is one few students have the opportunity to engage with. In 2014 a call will be made to students and artists to propose concepts for a permanent memory space near the site. What is clear is that there is unease in grappling with the status and meaning of the dead in the present, particularly when the dead are those who were historically relegated to the peripheries—in fact who were denied forming part of the category of human altogether. The return of Cape Town’s unwanted and unnamed recalls the multiple and layered histories of dispossession and displacement that haunt the present historical moment and spatial realities of the present-day city.

In the 1960s, following the Group Areas Act, families who lived in the area around UCT, an area known as Rondebosch, were forcibly removed—like so many other areas of the city and the country. Many who lived in the area around UCT were moved to places like Mitchell’s Plain. Like Green Point, where the Prestwich burial ground was found, families were moved out of the city centre and relocated on the peripheries of the city constructed for housing people designated as “not white”. What I want to suggest in this linking of forced removals of the past and silent burial grounds that occasionally erupt in the present is related to what Ash Amin writes: “Cartographies derived from political and planning jurisdictions and settlement patterns capture only a small part of city making” (Amin 2008). In this vein, he highlights “the need to work with the multiple registers of urban formations, including territorial ones” (Amin 2008). The burial ground existing underneath the campus speaks to this alternative register outside of the visible, pointing to questions of co-presence and the relationship if the living to the dead/the past to the present—as relational and coeval rather than points on a linear plane.

Jacques Derrida, further, presents us with the idea of haunting as the return of that which history has repressed. He writes:

If I am getting ready to speak at length about ghosts, inheritance, and generations, generations of ghosts, which is to say about certain others who are not present, nor presently living, either to us, in us, or outside us, it is in the name of justice. Of justice where it is not yet, not yet there, where it is no longer, let us understand where it is no longer present, and where it will never be, no more than the law, reducible to laws of rights. It is necessary to speak of the ghost, indeed to the ghost and with it, from the moment that no ethics, no politics, whether revolutionary or not, seems possible and thinkable and just that does not recognize in its principle the respect for those others who are no longer or for those others who are not yet there, presently living, whether they are already dead or not yet born (Derrida 1994).

Derrida's hauntology offers a way of thinking the links between the living and dead and the multiple rationalities that inhabit a particular space and time. In this way, I will outline an archive of culture and contemporary aesthetic practices that I argue speaks to, and in the upkeep with, these ghosts.

VI

When Cecil John Rhodes handed over his land and property to the University of Cape Town, British colonial architect Edwin Landseer Lutyens was asked to design the buildings of the new university. Lutyens designed UCT's campus on top of the former colonial farm in neoclassical style, and went on after Cape Town to design much of imperial New Delhi. Martin Hall points out that, in a grotesque irony, Lutyens design for UCT was inspired by Thomas Jefferson's designs for the University of Virginia—Jefferson, himself a participant in slave-holding structures in the USA. In a strange way this echo spatially and structurally reinscribes a genealogy of violence that remains invisible and unspoken at UCT.

In constructing a patchwork fantasy landscape and sculpting the mountain in his imperial vision, Rhodes spatialised this gaze over his subjects and territories. This was part of constructing a field of vision/regime for seeing and episteme on which an entire system of knowledge was founded and through which much of the knowledge architecture we inhabit today is firmly entrenched. In this act of simultaneous creation and erasure, the object was materiality, objects and nature—captured, taxonomised and domesticated—but also bodies, knowledge and regimes of care. When people were forcibly removed from their lands they were also severed from ancestors, and knowledge practices were disrupted—a severing that is constantly recapitulated through neoliberal forms of privatisation and spatial planning practices.

An important example that speaks to the question of erasure is the struggle in contemporary Cape Town around what has been called the Princess Vlei. What appears as an ostensibly "green" issue around biodiversity and environmental concerns is to many a battle around contested imaginaries of the city and conflicting rationalities (Ernstson and Sörlin 2013). An area of Cape Town located in what has been called Grassy Park, the Vlei is a natural wetland—one of the few still

remaining in the city. Much of the Cape Flats and townships that were created for re-settlement of populations who were being contained and moved to accommodate a “white” city were natural wetlands that were drained in order to allow for the rapid development of cheaply constructed spaces of exclusion. Australian Gum Trees were brought in for their capacity to drain landscapes of water and mountains of sand brought in to soak the water, as they had throughout the colonial period. A monument to this violence lies in the central business district of Bonteheuwel—where a central connector road is named Blue Gum Street.

In the attempts of developers to construct yet another mall in the city, a movement of environmental activists and people who self-identify as descendant communities of enslaved and indigenous populations of the Cape mobilised around blocking the development of a mall. What emerged was another register of knowing—a conflicting imaginary of the city, its histories and memories. Part of the counter-articulation of significance of space and nature to that of conventional green narratives was the significance of the space in local memory. Stories around the Vlei and a Khoi princess, captured by the Portuguese who first ventured into the Cape as part of the emerging imperial venture, had been kidnapped and tortured by soldiers. Captured and taken to Elephant’s Eye Cave, her tears formed the Vlei and haunt its shores today.

Besides the symbolic importance of the Vlei in articulating the untold of colonial violence, activists spoke about the way in which the Vlei has been a site for local cultural and spiritual practices—from the staging of baptisms to spaces where families connect with nature in a city where access to nature is regimented spatially as well as is racialised. Building a mall on top of the Vlei, the movement argued, would reinscribe the violence of the past on a community that has experienced multiple forced removals and acts of erasure. Within the textures of this conflict emerges a set of conflicting normativities around spatial memory, knowledge and contemporary social injustice.

Back to UCT’s quiet burial grounds—what of burial grounds and the relationship between the living and ancestors in contemporary Cape Town? How is the spectre of dispossession, untold violence and forced removal being daily recapitulated, in multiple forms and guises? What do these fragments and fractures, sediments and palimpsests speak of?

Colin Dayan and Maya Deren in different rehearsals describe rituals of memory and regimes of care associated with the dead in Haiti—where much of their work is based. In their work they think through aesthetic worlds contained within contemporary Vodou practices (Dayan 1995; Deren 1953). Neither work within an anthropological frame. Rather, their work proposes a radical relationality, grappling with the lifeworlds of Vodou. Dayan and Deren find that Vodou aesthetic practices and ceremonial rituals contest the drum and trumpet histories of empire and speak of other registers and rationalities at play than the one hegemonic subjectivity inscribed by empire. Prompted by their work, I argue that these fragments/fractures in the present rupture the strict dichotomy between the living and the dead, allowing us to think about subjugated knowledge and hauntings. In other words, they open the terrain of memory beyond memory as simply a property of cognition or a repeated ritual sanctioned by public discourse.

I want to suggest an alternative archive that allows for unthinking the normative, bringing together the living and the dead, bodies and spaces. I return to Yuyachkani and their work *Adiós Ayacucho*, when the deceased Alfonso returns through the body of a carnival figure from Andean mythology—the Qolla. This suggests an alternative way of thinking about carnival practices and popular culture, outside of the ethnographic, descriptive and containerising gaze. These practices, as sustained forms of defiance in the face of silence, are important sites of knowledge and form part of a complex and layered matrix of memory in which the past and the present combine to present a complex reading of coloniality and its multiple inscriptions on lives, bodies and lands.

In *Adiós Ayacucho*, as in carnival practice and in the silenced burial grounds, the body is always central. In all of these spaces vulnerability and activity are combined. As Judith Butler writes bodies are both precarious and persisting. In a context where entire populations have been singled out as not counting, as not important or part of the category of humanity at all, bodies become important sites of transmission of memory and the fight against historical oblivion (Butler and Athanasiou 2013). The hereness implied in the gathering of bodies on the streets or in the visceral presence of human bodies in unmarked and unsung graves underneath the city—contests a notion of the past as simply contained and allowing for the emergence of a variety of posts. As Walter Benjamin suggests, it points to an ongoing struggle for a history of the oppressed, and an accounting for the silenced people, experiences and lives that form part of the making of the present. Such a struggle is an ethical moment, a moment of recognition beyond the superficial gaze or psychoanalysis, but rather suggestive of radical relationality—a key moment of the political.

VII

In constructing another self, another collective identity whose coding and signification moved outside the framework of the dominant ideology, the slaves were involved in a long and sustained counterstruggle.

Sylvia Wynter (1979)

In present-day Cape Town, carnival practices form part of an important creative language for many people living across the various townships, as well as for communities living in areas in and around the city centre such as the Bo Kaap, Walmer Estate, Woodstock and beyond. Rendered outside the realm of what is considered desirable for contemporary city branding—carnival practices are viewed as dissonant and distasteful working class popular culture. Carnival is a spatial and embodied practice that has existed for hundreds of years at the Cape; but rather than a celebrated form of popular culture, carnival is relegated to the periphery of the city's public art calendar and thus heavily policed, containerised and controlled (Fig. 7.1).

Klopse carnival is practiced and visited mainly by the revellers themselves, their families and vast support networks. This means that its map of bodies gathering in the streets moves centrally from the large townships across the peripheries of the city into the city centre for a single day, reclaiming streets momentarily and



Fig. 7.1 Carnival troupe marching past City Hall on Darling Street. Throughout the entire march police barricades and extensive control are placed on the movement of bodies, of both troupes as well as audience. Photo by Ismail Farouk

returning to the townships at the end of the march. The remaining months of carnival practices take place mainly within the peripheries of the city, becoming insignificant and invisible in the city centre. Discursively, when one says “the city”, one means the centre. Even riding on a mini bus taxi into town, we ride on taxis going in the direction of “Cape Town”. Thus, even through language there is a violent reinforcement of the spatialisation of inequality.

As a practice that exists in conversation with the aesthetics of minstrelsy and carnival masquerade in the USA and the Caribbean, it brings into this threading of burial ground and landscapes the question of symbolic worlds and worlds of the mind (Wynter 1979).

Throughout much of the history of carnival’s existence in Cape Town—for hundreds of years, dating back to the early days of racial slavery at the Cape—carnival has navigationally structured itself around a particular cartographic imaginary. With its own internal mapping of space, bodies and time, the carnival revellers have always followed a route through what is today the city centre. Marching from Kaizersgracht on the edge of Walmer Estate and the former District Six, the *klopse* move through to Darling Street, up Wale Street into Rose Street in the Bo Kaap (Fig. 7.2). The march stops there—at the border of Rose Street where contemporary spatial planning designates a distinction between the Bo Kaap and what is known as De Waterkant. The route is not insignificant, as the lines drawn by Group Areas are evident and starkly present in this embodied cartography. Prior to Group Areas, the *klopse* would march all the way to the edge of the sea, past what is today Green Point to the edge of Sea Point. A vital connection and geography—embodied through performance—were violently disconnected with the advent of Group Areas and remain firmly in place today (Fig. 7.3).




Fig. 7.2 Route taken by the carnival march on Tweede Nuwe Jaar, beginning in the former District Six and ending in the Bo Kaap, at the edge of de Waterkant. Image by Nicole Sarmiento



Fig. 7.3 The beginning and the end of the march are heavily policed, as enforcement of the boundaries and restrictions on the movement of bodies in the city is part and parcel of how the carnival practice unfolds. Photo by Ismail Farouk

Every year carnival troupes prepare their months of serenades and competitions across the Cape Flats throughout December, January, February and into March. And every year the klopse struggle to make sure that their Tweede Nuwe Jaar (second day of New Year, which was known as the new year of the bonded at the Cape)

march can take place in the streets, borders and demarcations between Kaizersgracht Street and the Bo Kaap. One day a year of licensed heresy and bodies gather in spaces haunted by violence and forced removal. Those who were forcibly removed from the city, who are the descendants of people who built the foundations of what is today Cape Town, march from the Cape Flats into the city centre following their own internal and embodied cartographies.

In this sensory mapping of the city, the stark disconnection between centre and periphery that was sedimented into lands and bodies, lives and dreams, is disrupted. At once, we see that the townships and the centre are intimately connected and cannot be studied or analysed as separate entities. As Faranak Miraftab suggests, “Neither the neoliberal governing of spatiality nor the social restructuring of the post-apartheid city for the accumulation of capital should be imagined as an uncontested global roll-out of neoliberalism” (Miraftab 2007). And as Sylvia Wynter suggests, within the interstices of carnival minstrelsy, a sustained counterstruggle against amnesia and oblivion can be discerned. A rupture of logics and normativities can be read into the dance and music that moves across space and time in ritual fashion every year.

Finally, it is central to note that the Prestwich burial ground where the massive colonial era slave burial ground was uncovered, and lies in what is designated as Green Point. Throughout the colonial period this area was inhabited by people enslaved in life and by many who were classified as “free blacks”—and thus many burial grounds, formal and informal, were located there. As Cape Town’s unwanted dead, these burial grounds lying underneath Sea Point and Green Point haunt the city in many ways. When the klopse march, the alternative cartographies speak of an embodied memory and the intimate connection of land and bodies (Fig. 7.4).



Fig. 7.4 Important to carnival performance are the networks of support and alliance that allow the practice to persist. Every troupe traces members and support networks around the entire city. At the same time, the policing of carnival relies heavily on dividing the performers from the audience. Photo by Ismail Farouk

Carnival and burial grounds, the disciplines and the dead, invite an opening to consider alternative normativities besides the one inscribed by colonial power, other orders of rationality that lie outside of totalising force of capturing lands, bodies and subjectivities.

VIII

Bodies that haunt the living, burial grounds that refuse to remain silenced and aesthetic practices that construct alternative cartographies point to what Sylvia Wynter calls “collective identity whose coding and signification moved outside the framework of the dominant ideology”. Carnival is a practice that has been constantly under threat of erasure, containment and control—never remaining static and always adapting the power dynamics in operation (Fig. 7.5). Wynter’s point is significant, because she signals a challenge of epistemological rupture: of thinking, seeing and relating in a different way than the disciplinary gaze that inhabits us. She signals cultural practices of the liminal as an archive that speaks to power. Wynter suggests the need for working with and through cultural forms, or the life of forms contained in the aesthetic worlds of historically oppressed people. She argues that in the constitution of alternative cultures that lie outside the normative, of different forms of life and lifeworlds, the oppressed have been “involved in a long a sustained counterstruggle”. This long and sustained counterstruggle exists as a form of archive, sometimes written and within language, other times performative and embodied.



Fig. 7.5 Illegal evening serenades in the build-up to Tweede Nuwe Jaar are part of the yearly repertoire. Serenades and mini-practices happen all over the city and take place without permission. This serenade took place in early December 2013 in Woodstock. Photo by Ismail Farouk



Fig. 7.6 Reveller dances at illegal evening serenade, Woodstock. Photo by Ismail Farouk

These fragments speak of co-presence, of multiple temporalities that inhabit a particular space and time. Focusing on the contemporary salience of grappling with these burial grounds and their status and meaning in the present is not a matter of correct procedure or disciplinary ethics—but rather are central questions that help us to unsettle ways of seeing that reinforce modes of erasure and silencing (Fig. 7.6).

UCT's contemporary stylisation as a “world-class” university, and the city of Cape Town's branding of the city as a “world-class” city—forms part of an old tradition and grotesque proprietary imaginary as well as inscriptive fabrication of a synthetic no place/time. This logic has presupposed the removal and effacements of the vast majority of people residing within a particular space. The idea of a place as “world class” assumes that there are certain spaces, whose forms and frameworks constitute the normative and worldly, while other spaces deviate from this and present a site of lack. In the imagineering of contemporary Cape Town, world classness operates as a discourse that frames Cape Town as a site of lack in relation to the global normative. It is a space that aims to attain “world class” status, entering the apex of the linear imaginary, which we call developed or civilised or first world. A discourse of Afropolitanism and world classness is intimately bound up with Rhodes' imperial fantasies and feverish dreams that gloss over and erase local histories and global power dynamics (Fig. 7.7).

Edgar Pieterse, in his call to take seriously culture and aestheticism, myths and notions of beauty in the city, asks us to challenge this normative framing of the good and the desirable (Pieterse 2009). At the same time, he argues that this task is not in opposition to functionalist models and considerations of dwelling, mobility, sociality and economy as urgent tasks. However, his point is that new languages and methods that involve decolonising epistemologies and disciplinary modes are



Fig. 7.7 Illegal evening serenade in Lower Main Road, Woodstock, next to the Woodstock Exchange. Photo by Ismail Farouk

needed in this pursuit of alternative ways of knowing the contemporary African city in the post-apartheid present.

Burial grounds underneath the visible edifice re-member that which history has repressed, that which refuses to remain buried. Some of the questions that lie buried outside the curriculum relate to what it means to live as inheritors of colonial violence and about ways in which that violence is carried on in contemporary forms and institutional arrangements. Humberto Ak’abal’s poem at the beginning of the text speaks about walking backwards, reminding us that the dead are not relegated to the past, but now and again they force us to walk backwards, or look backwards. Time becomes disjointed. What are the consequences of the colonial origins of UCT not being fully acknowledged, and the dead who lie unhonoured under the ground, ask Pierre de Vos and Jaco Bernard-Naudé at the small memorial event concerning the Rustenburg burial in November 2013? This raises more questions than it answers, but compels us towards a deeper listening.

Disparate threads—burial grounds, ancestors and carnival practices—point to the ongoing displacement of elements needed to think a different kind of transformation than the one offered by neoliberal orthodoxy. They offer important threads, among many others, for unthinking the present order as the only negotiable way.

As Gayatri Spivak (1999) tells us, “the mainstream has never run clean, perhaps never can. Part of mainstream education involves learning to ignore this absolutely, with a sanctioned ignorance”. How can we begin with taking on this sanctioned ignorance and the production of silences this entails? What kind of an archive is carnival and what stories does it tell of the social world we inhabit? These are some of the questions that I feel help guide a reconsideration of accountability and memory in the present historical moment.

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Chapter 8

Archaeology After Archaeology

Alejandro Haber

Since the 1980s an increasing consideration of archaeological ethics replaced the former 1960s' and 1970s' paramount preoccupation with archaeological epistemology. Issues of good practice, restitution and repatriation, and ethics of conservation, have become a mandatory topic in the archaeological discipline. Archaeologists often assume that certain principles and/or guidelines may orient practical decisions concerning archaeological finds and or sites, communication of research and relations with descendant communities (Chap. 3). While the increasing field of contract archaeology and its market-like tensions appear to challenge established standards of practice, debates on ethics in contractual archaeology have a well-gained development. The last-decade establishment of the field of public archaeology has evolved around issues of ethics. Within what can be called an 'ethical turn', ethics has come to guide archaeological practice in the contemporary world, under the assumption that key ethical decisions towards the others can be responsibly adopted once a discussion of practical consequences on stakeholders, materials and public is developed (see Chap. 4). This chapter aims to relativize such an assumption, and the following is forwarded: key decisions were already taken by the discipline before the 'ethical turn' in archaeology, and these involve specific epistemic options while excluding others. What can be understood as an epistemic violence is thus not an option for discipline practitioners, but epistemic violence is already built-in the discipline (see Chaps. 2, 5, and 7). Disciplinary ethics towards the other cannot but reproduce the violence coded in the disciplinary frameworks, unless such frameworks are dismantled from the basement, and built anew on the basis of a trans-epistemic conversation (see Chap. 6); such a position remains implied in the title of

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this chapter, devoted to examine ways towards an (undisciplined) archaeology after (disciplinary and post-disciplinary) archaeology (and see the last paragraph in Chap. 2).

In developing this argumentation the steps here taken will be the following: (a) a set of specific positions regarding time, materiality and knowledge (including knowledge on others and other's knowledge) historically knitted within the Western historiographical tradition were incorporated within the frameworks of archaeological discipline (before the 'ethical turn') and (b) these disciplinary assumptions are recapitulated by archaeological post-discipline (the ethical 'turn' included here). The ethical and political consequences of the 'ethical turn' are explored, and the need for (c) un-disciplining archaeology from its ontological assumptions is developed, and its consequence on the role of ethics is sketched.

Western Ontology Knitted Within the Fabric of Archaeological Discipline

Archaeological discipline aims knowing the past through its material remains. Whatever the particular definitions of knowledge, past and materiality involved, something about a past time is to be said departing from some kind of observation of an objectual reality. These are things that presumably have an origin in the past time that is the subject of what archaeology says. Starting from such a pedestrian understanding of the archaeological discipline, it would prove to be convenient to scrutinize how the different terms included are herein related.

The archaeological discipline assumes a series of related transformations: from past to present time, from thingness to discourse, from perception to writing and from other to self. These transformations are already codified within the archaeological discipline, which admits only particular modes of relating past and present, thingness/discourse, perception/writing and other/self. The ways of relating those terms that are different to the disciplinary ones are considered imperfect knowledge, and/or illicit ways of dealing with the archaeological things (see Chaps. 2 and 5). This is because even before things are perceived, the discipline (a particularly structured relationship between objects and methods) already attributes to the world certain values regarding matter, perception, time and the other (see Chaps. 6 and 7). Theretofore it is hardly surprising that those same values are found out there in the world. Such attribution of values delimits and bounds the space for ethical considerations. That is why a consideration of archaeological ethics should start with a consideration of the epistemic violence codified *within* disciplinary frameworks and the already adopted decisions towards the other.

The archaeological object (i.e., as it is understood by the archaeological discipline) is originally a thing. Its thingness is turned into its facticity through the attribution of proper values of the archaeological object. Such an attribution

happens when the disciplinary language names the thing, and the thing stops being such in order to be a case within a category of facts. Such a category of facts has a name and thus it can be said and written (recorded). The first attribution is the *muteness*: the archaeological object is neither a piece of writing nor a contemporaneous talk or action; hence archaeology gains specificity and independence from history and ethnography disciplines. Such a neighboring situation of archaeological discipline defines its object as the negative of communication. The ethnographer communicates with the object-people through some kind of linguistic communication, either direct or mediated. The historian communicates with the object-people through the linguistic communication inscribed in writing. People say something (usually but not always with words) to ethnographers and (with written words) historians. This is not the case with disciplined archaeologists, whose objects say nothing to them. Material remains don't talk. Even while some archaeologists say that they 'read' the archaeological remains (Hodder 1989, and many others applying to archaeological discipline hermeneutic methods), this is accepted as a metaphor, that is, as an extension to material objects of the kind of relation with non-verbal communication, oral language or written texts. Material remains are considered analogous to text, and they can be read *as if they were* texts, a metaphorical extension of a meaning that material objects 'really' lack.

This non-communicative and non-linguistic capacity is to be transformed into a linguistic discourse. Whatever the archaeologist says/communicates about the object, it is about a non-saying/communicating thing. Whatever the archaeologist says, whatever the meaning of the thing, is not said by the thing. The thing as considered by the archaeological discipline is *mute*; the one who talks is the archaeologist, and he/she talks about what he/she *sees*. The relation between the mute object and the talking and seeing archaeologist can only have one way: the archaeologist visually perceives the exterior of the thing and talks and writes about the thing. Once considered an archaeological object, the thing can't even return a word to the archaeologist who says a word about the thing. Whatever the kind of relation (communication) between past people and their things, these remain in the present of the archaeologist in their material—that is non-communicative—capacity. Communication with the people of the archaeological past is thus secluded; the relationship with them is featured in a particular archaeological unidirectional way. Meaning attributed to archaeological objects, sites, contexts, etc. is dependent from the intersubjective consensus of the disciplined subjects. Whether this thing is a flake, a house or a ritual deposit is to be attributed to the object through the implicit demonstration, through the simple and automatic act of naming, that this thing is a case within a nominal category. Disciplinary linguistic naming of mute objects attributes them the values (their 'natural' incommunicative capacity); and such value attribution permeates to the people of the archaeological past, makers and users of flakes, inhabitants of houses and devotees participating in rituals (Haber and Scribano 1993; also see Chaps. 2, 5 and 7).

Knowledge of the archaeological (people from the) past depends on the disciplinary attribution of the values of muteness and externality (materiality) to things in the world. Whatever the relationship assumed between people and lithic flakes, the archaeological disciplinary language already decides that those things are lithic flakes and those people makers/users of lithic flakes. Once it has been decided that the world of things is mute and no communication is possible with things, there is a broad way open to the unilateral attribution of values (Haber 2008). But this attribution is not casual or hazardous; it depends on being backed by the disciplinary intersubjective language that gives names (words) to things (Haber and Scribano 1993, also Chap. 2).

These decisions are not invented anew by archaeological discipline, though. A long-lasting historiographical tradition provided the basics, then adapted by archaeology (Chap. 6). It was Herodotus who in the fifth century BC coupled within his historiographical founding work the different ontological operations that were afterwards consolidated in Western epistemological tradition. Herodotus coupled a common Greek classification of peoples and a classification of sources of historical knowledge. Greeks classified peoples as having or lacking a true language (that is, Greek language) (Santiago 1998). Greeks and Barbarians (non-Greek language speakers) were classified at each side of a line of cultural/linguistic intimacy or difference to the writer (Herodotus himself, for instance). Sources of knowledge were classified from eyewitnesses' accounts of facts (closer to truth) to second-hand legends and traditional lore (closer to falseness). Sources of knowledge about past events were linguistically communicated to Herodotus (either in oral or written text). Herodotus himself didn't witness the events, but he knew them as already worded in his sources. The wording of facts was made by every kind of people, also people that fought on either side of the Medes wars (Greeks vs. Persians), but the eye witnessing of facts by Greek-speaking people had the opportunity to be communicated to the (Greek) historian as a knowledge of the highest hierarchy and closest to the truth. Collective memory, traditional knowledge and Barbarian knowledge were classified in the lowest hierarchies, even if it was knowledge about Barbarians themselves. Cultural othering was thus coupled to the idea of facts as knowledgeable through an external individual observation worded in the language of the historian. The other had no chance for a word, not even for returning the gaze. Such decisions were later consolidated within Western historiographical tradition, within the hard-core framing of the discipline of history as the expert knowledge on the past. The ontological understandings of knowledge and past were correspondingly naturalized.

Archaeological discipline would extend such ontology to the archaic past, that is, the linguistically un-mediated past. The operation of unilateral observation and wording, gaze and monologue, once delimited within linguistic/cultural intimacy by Western historiography, ended bounded within the methodological operations of the archaeologist himself/herself, who sees facticity and writes down the words that make it communicable (interpretable, explainable, etc.). The discipline, thus, attributes the thing with the value of not being able of returning the gaze nor the

word. Moreover, once we closely see the thing, we note that the thing, even before being perceived and named, is already attributed as lacking relationship with ourselves: the thing is preconceived as if it could be only thing without its constitutive relationships.

That is why the archaeological discipline pre-understands the thing not only in its lack of linguistic capacity, but it even neglects any other no-linguistic meaning capacity. At least this is such from the ontological and epistemological viewpoints, given that we then note that the archaeological discipline ‘interprets’ non-linguistic meanings of things, for instance, the practical meanings. Nevertheless, it is worth noting for the moment the paramount importance that the constitutive repression of meaning of things has for the disciplinary ontological status of objects as objects of knowledge.

History—what it is said about what happened—is thought as a textual representation of history—what actually happened. Textuality representing facticity, already codified within a cultural intimacy with the historian, means that certain specific cultural understandings concerning time, knowledge and matter are shared (or assumed to be shared) between the historian and the author of the written source (the original textualizer of things). Cultural otherness (other ontologies different from the historian’s) is excluded from the sources or otherwise neglected—and in this respect is relevant here to highlight the decolonial sense of oral history (Rivera 2010). *Epistemic violence is codified within the historical method* of the hierarchy of sources, which excludes other sources, and correspondingly other epistemes, as lacking seriousness and constituted by falseness (as several chapters in this volume aptly illustrate).

Archaeological discipline textualizes facticity within its own methodology: the archaeologist writes down texts on facts (field forms, recordings, sketches, field reports, papers, etc.) instead of ‘discovering’ already written texts in archival repositories. Archaeological textualization is done *within* the disciplinary social collective and *in* the disciplinary language. *Epistemic violence is introduced by archaeological language, that is, before methodology*. Once a thing is considered to be an archaeological object (an object to be known by the archaeological discipline), a whole set of possible relations to that thing is implied and a whole series of other relationships is excluded from the disciplinary relation. As was shown before in this chapter, this implied a former ontological violence: the excision of things from the relations in which they are (and see Chap. 2). Within disciplinary relations, every attribution of meaning or interpretation occurs *after an original repression of meaning*.

While archaeology studies material remains, it implicitly disregards both non-remained material and non-material remains. These two erasures implied in the objectification of material remains are differently considered by archaeological discipline. The first erasure, of materials that have not remained in the present, is managed as an external critique of the sources of knowledge, under the banners of formation process studies and/or taphonomy. The second erasure, being part of an internal critique of the sources of knowledge, is not completely attended yet: descent

and memory as sources of knowledge are excluded from the disciplinary framing of object and method (see Chaps. 2, 5 and 7). Relations of descent and memory with the archaeological objects cannot happen to oneself in the capacity of a disciplined subject (Chap. 5). Descent and memory are not relationships to be seen from an exteriority, but are internally constitutive of subjectivity (Chap. 7). This has only occasionally been considered, and when such a consideration of the internal critique has been consistent, for instance in some developments of indigenous archaeology, it was able to break down the restrictive boundaries of archaeological discipline (Chap. 5). Much more often, the disciplinary objectification strategy has been resilient to the internal critique; in those cases, indigenous archaeologies either have been reduced to the absorption of indigenous individuals to disciplinary language, or archaeology limited make-ups were subservient to the aim of not questioning disciplinary frameworks.

Western time is hard-wired within archaeological discipline as it is within historiography. It can be almost said that in the first place the West is a theory of history. Western time has a lineal shape. A straight line goes from the past to the present. Having an origin point and an orientation, Western time is a vector. Since the onset of monotheistic Abrahamic religions, time originates in the Creation and is oriented towards the Resurrection of the Dead. While different origin points and orientations have replicated the originals, the shape of time remains virtually the same. Renaissance Western European colonialists were oriented towards salvation of the souls, nineteenth-century Europeans towards Civilization, and since mid-twentieth century time is oriented towards Development. Points of origin also can change from Creation to the Big Bang, and also replicated by avatar-origins (the advent of Jesus, the discovery of the Americas, national independence day, etc.) when particular collectives within the West look for their particular origins. Vector time admits locating each person, people and nation, along the vector, each one seriated *vis-à-vis* the next towards the origin or the orientation. Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spaniards (even more if male and proprietors) were closer than Andean peoples to the Salvation of their Souls in Christ. Nineteenth-century British men were closer to civilization than gauchos. Twentieth-century USA was closer to development than Argentina. Vector time also implies that history is spatially related, in the sense that history moves on time through space accordingly to the progression along the vector. In such way, each point in the vector tends to move in direction of the orientation. An Andean person should move towards Christianization, a gaucho should move towards civilization, Argentina should move towards increasing industrialization and capitalism (following the US model). Common interpretive categories within archaeology (complexity, political differentiation, domestication and so forth) are coined within this vector template, and when interpreted in the past serve to naturalize the ontology of vector time. Such an expansion of the West (its ontology) to times and spaces and peoples beyond its boundaries seems to be one of the main tasks of archaeological discipline. No other discipline is so well equipped to put everyone, even the most distant and archaic peoples, within the formerly delimited boundaries of Western time. While Western theory of history is not restricted to archaeological discipline, its particular coupling with the epistemology of gaze and

monologue and the anthropology of othering makes it a particularly useful body of knowledge for naturalizing Western ontology as universally valid, which is of the most importance in contexts of expansion as the present (see Chaps. 6 and 4).

Such a systemic usefulness has nothing to do with ethical decisions, although it includes fundamental decisions regarding practical action in the world towards others. This is to say that what is usually considered as dependent of individual ethical decisions in contexts of practice is already overdetermined by the epistemic decisions adopted during *disciplining processes*. Two kinds of such processes can be described. An *ontogenetic disciplining* occurs as the person undergoes years of institutionalized conversion to the disciplinary language, epistemology and ontology. A *phylogenetic disciplining* occurs as the discipline develops and adopts its own language, becomes institutionalized, and in the case of archaeological discipline evolves into the hegemonic means for dealing with the ancestors of the defeated peoples. Both disciplining processes are mature enough when the disciplinary language is adopted as one's own, and when the disciplinary frameworks are safe from the internal critique of descent and memory (and usually descent and memory become repressed as sources of knowledge).

Once disciplined, a broad range of methods and theories are available, but the frameworks of the discipline are kept safe. Epistemic violence is already coded within the disciplinary framework, and once the subject is disciplined and the discipline becomes the authorized means for dealing with a particular region of reality (ancestors of the defeated, archaeological heritage and so forth), there is no real choice within those frameworks but to reproduce epistemic violence. In that context, ethical evaluations of practice, even assuming the best of decolonial intentions by the individuals involved, can at the best provide the appearance of decolonial practices or what is usually called 'political correctness' while, at the same time, reproducing the same epistemic framework that codifies violence over other knowledge. That is the reason why a decolonial consideration of ethics *must* evaluate epistemic and ontological assumptions that inform languages (as the disciplinary ones) giving values to the world in such a way that the world is made available for the expansion of colonial relationships.

Having arrived to this point, it has to be said that the panorama heretofore provided is virtually inexistent in its pure state, although it provides the basic ontology still operating within the discipline. Both the premises on the working of the world and the axiology of the archaeological discipline have changed in the last decades, and much more has to be said in order to put some actual flesh into the bony sketch just provided.

Post-discipline in Territorial Entanglements

In the last 20 years capitalism has entered into an expansive phase. Territories formerly neglected by capital investment are being highlighted. Resources formerly unexploited are subjected to new technologies of extraction and/or processing.

Aspects of reality formerly neglected by economic circulation are developed into new commodities. The late capitalist marketplace has expanded into every corner of the world, aspect of reality and piece of lore, knowledge or curiosity. Even the expansion of the West has been developed into a capitalist commodity itself, capturing otherness, exoticism, tradition, outbacks, adventure and frontier. Ruins, history, the passing of time and any kind of sign of the manageable difference to capitalist world are privileged targets for commodity development. Urban and rural development projects remove sediments containing remains from the past almost everywhere in the postcolonial world. Archaeological disciplinary reconstructions of past lives are transformed into attractions for increasing numbers of public ready to consume these new goods. Diversity is celebrated across the universe, and of course it is converted into new tourist commodities. It is not surprising that archaeology often finds itself amidst *postcolonial entanglements* of different forces and interests of capital, life and knowledge.

At these entanglements, capital, state and social movements struggle for their own territorialized regimes of care. *Territorial entanglements* imply knowledge contests in contexts of hegemony/subalternity. Archaeology is not a neutral observatory within these entanglements. Being the discipline within the hegemonic (scientific/academic) knowledge in charge of dealing with the territorialized remains of the (defeated) ancestors of the subalterns, it is usually called for intervene within an *already structured epistemic battlefield*.

Archaeological discipline has undergone deep transformations in order to be able to serve additional values besides truth. Such additional values (as social justice, development, market, income and so forth) operated something like a technological reconversion of an academic/scientific discipline formerly oriented to the only pursuit of true knowledge. CRM, indigenous archaeology, forensic archaeology, archaeological tourism and public archaeology are some of the names of the disciplinary reconversions into post-discipline. Particular pieces of legislation (mainly CRM and indigenous legislation) modulate the specifics of archaeological intervention in such territorial entanglements. Ethical evaluation of the intervention is the usual means of *modulation* of the relationship with territorial materials (things) and peoples. Ethics of archaeological interventions regarding consequences on territorialized things and peoples often occupies within archaeological post-discipline the importance that formerly had epistemology within disciplinary contexts. Protocols are defined to formalize the contexts of intervention; stakeholders are listened in order to identify their diverse claims regarding the archaeological record; indigenous claims to remains are modulated by legislation and state administration. Heritage legislation (and international and multilateral conventions) incorporates disciplinary definitions of archaeological remains and disciplinary regimes of care towards them. The same can be said of post-disciplinary interventions in territorial entanglements. *Post-discipline recapitulates disciplinary ontological assumptions regarding the archaeological remains, that is, regarding territorialized constitutive relations between particular peoples and specific agents/things*. Thus, even while the usual importance of ethical consideration of the eventual consequences of the intervention is acknowledged, and even considering the best of the

intentions of the professionals involved, *the archaeological post-disciplinary interventions are already structurally laden*.

The ontological assumptions that are transported within the disciplinary frameworks are coherent with Western hegemonic ontology of time, matter and knowledge. Because such ontology is assumed as part of the hegemonic epistemic status that allows the intervention, it is rarely questioned (Chap. 4). Subaltern regimes of care have little space for negotiation and almost none for changing their subaltern position. It is often the case of archaeological interventions guided by ethically and politically minded principles and protocols that end being confronted by territorialized social movements countering development/knowledge projects. The archaeologists involved in such contested entanglements see themselves politically aligned with capital and the state and against local peoples. This situation usually leads to reinforcing hegemonic positions within the Western episteme, but can also be an opportunity for acknowledging the perversity and pervasiveness of disciplinary assumptions that constitute the political and epistemic subjectivity of (disciplined) people beyond their own ethical and political purported decisions (in life) (Chap. 6).

Vector time recapitulates former theories of history within the same Western tradition. Development is the orientation of the current hegemonic time. Such *vector time happens to be the same as the archaeological time*; and this is the reason for the complete complicity between archaeology and development. When post-disciplinary archaeology intervenes in the assessment of the effects of a particular capital investment project oriented towards development, archaeology assumes a particular ontology regarding time, matter and knowledge that is already hard-wired within its own disciplinary frameworks. The linear time implicit in the archaeological report is the same linear time implied in the assumption of inevitability of capitalist expansion (under the shape of the particular development). Other-times coded in other-knowledge are altogether excluded from the project evaluation, and ethical evaluation on good practice can only decide over the protocolization (modulation) of the expansion of Western ontology beyond its frontiers. Post-disciplinary archaeology is included within schemes that modulate capitalist expansion, in the sense that capitalism is never opposed nor questioned as a fatal consequence, but guided through the ways that allow it being an actual possibility. The discipline, its frameworks and language already took the fundamental ethical decisions.

It may seem that this argumentation tends to lead the reader to a conservative stance. By questioning the activism implied in the multicultural view that promotes ethics as a crucial point in the establishment of standards of good practice in archaeology (Díaz-Polanco 2006), it may be thought that the corollary is one of no-intervention, letting things follow their own pace, and to remain aside from the consequences of archaeology in the world by regaining a disciplinary stance of basic research. But such idea would be quite apart from my intentions. By exposing the genealogy of post-disciplinary archaeology within disciplinary archaeology, the complicity between archaeological and capitalist ontologies and the decisions regarding others already taken and knitted within the disciplinary fabric/language, my next step is to claim for a deep questioning of the disciplinary ontological and epistemological assumptions, what I have been calling a move towards *un-disciplining archaeology*.

Un-disciplining Archaeology

Anatomizing the discipline is a needed contribution towards un-disciplining archaeology, but this should also imply an insubordination from its disciplinary assumptions. This includes an effort to cease the automatic adherence to the belief on the exclusive materiality of the archaeological object; the vestigiality of a past located at a distance along a vector line; the archaeological discipline as the only means for relating with the past otherwise inaccessible; asymmetrical knowledge as the normal relation and the illicitness (and displacement along the vector line) of the relations other-than-disciplined. Such an effort is neither simple nor straightforward, and un-disciplining archaeology is not a job to be undertaken in the solitude of the academy. De-linking (Mignolo 2006) the architecture of academic languages from its complications with coloniality may be recoded within academy if let alone to academics. It should be noted that there are places of theory outside the university already building their thought insubordinately from the hegemonic categories. People in such places of theory are not theorizing because they are paid for that but because to think themselves and their geopolitical contexts and to decolonize language and relationships are central aspects of their struggle for survival. *Border theorizing* is what every subaltern movement has to do in order to detach themselves, their worlds and their projects from hegemonic discourse, often directly or indirectly derived from academic discourses.

Several processes happen to archaeology while un-disciplining. I would like to comment very briefly two of them—and to refer to other texts for broader developments of these ideas (Haber 2011, 2013a, b). In the first place, archaeology becomes *localized*. This has many implications. Archaeology ceases its attachment to general or universal theory and ontology. It becomes related with *local theories* and gains relevance for *local interests*. In this sense, un-disciplining archaeology threatens the university project, in its classical sense of a unified and universally valid version of the world. At the same time, it becomes moved and changed by the local theories in the territorial entanglements of the postcolonial frontier with whom it is related in conversation (Haber 2013a). It is not that archaeology abandons impartiality in order to become a partisan because archaeology has always been partisan, either overtly or not (McGuire 2008). But it means that it acknowledges its *place of writing*, its *home address*. Un-disciplining archaeology makes it intervene in territorial entanglements against global projects and designs, and to localize archaeology is its first job in that sense.

On the second place, there is nothing that bounds archaeology in terms of a regional ontology. There is not a particular group or region of beings or objects that is to be considered the field of expertise neither of a discipline nor of the collective of practitioners. Archaeology is not a certain knowledge about something, but *a kind of knowledge* or a skill for relating different kinds of knowledge, a kind of bridging—but not necessarily conjoining—diverse knowledge based on different local theories (Haber 2013b). Archaeology is not a kind of translation of the meaning of a piece of knowledge into the language of another knowledge, but the threading,

weaving and plotting of relations across the colonial difference. Instead of aiming at collapsing the object, the meaning or the sign of another world into the language of my own world, archaeology makes *me* move across the colonial difference and transforms *me* during that movement. It is not a way for knowing and changing the other, but of being able to converse across the colonial difference and be affected in that conversation. The conversation is about knowledge, politics and ethics; ethics is not something that should come in a debate before practice but after the disciplining that informs that practice. The consequences of archaeological practice in the others (including peoples, nature, objects, gods) should be included in the composition of interests in the conversation, an open process of learnship, acknowledgement and solidarity (Haber 2011). A key concept in that process is the inseparability of knowledge and social relations. The world is not universally available to knowledge, as there is no such a thing as universality for social relations. *To know is to relate as a concrete social being* as much as an intellectual being. Knowledge implies an openness to be changed by the world. When the interests of knowledge are composed (put together) instead of being defined on the basis of exclusive academic interest, knowledge stops being the intervention of oneself on the other, to become *an ongoing conversation* among an *amplified community or constellation of beings* (Chap. 6).

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