INEQUALITIES IN CREATIVE CITIES

ISSUES, APPROACHES, COMPARISONS

EDITED BY ULRIKE GERHARD, MICHAEL HOELSCHER, AND DAVID WILSON

Inequalities in Creative Cities

Ulrike Gerhard • Michael Hoelscher • David Wilson
Editors

Inequalities in Creative Cities

Issues, Approaches, Comparisons

palgrave
macmillan

Editors
Ulrike Gerhard
Geographisches Institut
Universität Heidelberg
Heidelberg, Baden-Württemberg,
Germany

Michael Hoelscher
Deutsche Universität für
Verwaltungswissenschaften
Speyer, Germany

David Wilson
University of Illinois-Urbana-Champaign
Champaign, Illinois, USA

ISBN 978-1-349-95114-7 ISBN 978-1-349-95115-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95115-4

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016955941

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Nature America Inc. New York
The registered company address is: 1 New York Plaza, New York, NY 10004, U.S.A.

Author Biographies

Wendel Henrique Baumgartner is Associated Professor in the Department of Geography of the Federal University of Bahia (Brazil), with research interests in medium and small-sized cities. He followed his studies in Geography at the State University of São Paulo (Brazil) from the graduation to the doctorate. He has a post-doctorate experience in urban geography at the University of Passau (Germany). Wendel is part of a network dedicated to research on medium and small-sized cities in Northwest Brazil and the Argentinean Patagonia. He has been publishing books, articles and chapters about these cities in the last few years. He is the author of *The right to the nature in the city* (O direito a natureza na cidade, 2009) and his more recent publications outside Brazil are: *Les universités dans les petites et moyennes villes au Brésil et en France: mise en place et effets* (with Demazière) and *Small city and new University. Perspectives and conflicts after the establishment of new public Brazilian universities in small cities* (Actes Avignon, 2014). He is currently finishing a larger research project about the urban and regional impacts of the last decade expansion of the Brazilian Federal Universities to medium and small-sized cities.

Justin Beaumont is Assistant Professor in the Department Spatial Planning & Environment, Faculty of Spatial Sciences, RUG, with research interests in urban theory, social and spatial justice and urban politics and governance as well as critical accounts of the secularization thesis. He studied Human Geography at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne (UK) and European Urban and Regional Studies at the Durham University (also UK). Justin is co-editor of several volumes: *Working Faith* (Cloke,

Beaumont and Williams, eds. 2013) at Paternoster Press; *Faith-Based Organizations and Exclusion in European Cities* at The Policy Press (Beaumont and Cloke, eds. 2012); *Spaces of Contention* (Nicholls, Miller and Beaumont, eds. 2013) at Ashagte; *Postsecular Cities* (Beaumont and Baker, eds. 2011) at Continuum; and *Exploring the Postseular* (Molendijk, Beaumont and Jedan, eds. 2010). He is currently working on *The Routledge Handbook of Postsecularity* (Beaumont, ed. 2017) and is also the principal investigator of the Dutch partner of the JPI-NWO SELFCITY project (2015–18), which explores creative governance and self-organization in the face of climate change in the UK, Germany and The Netherlands.

Christiane Brosius is Professor of visual and media anthropology at the Heidelberg Centre for Transcultural Studies. Her research foci examine urban media and everyday cultures in South Asia. With respect to urban studies, Brosius has published widely on the social spatialization of middle-classness in Delhi, and on the notion of public in the context of public art events. She is leader of the collaborative and interdisciplinary research project "Creating the 'New' Asian Woman. Entanglements of Urban Space, Cultural Encounters and Gendered Identities in Shanghai and Delhi" funded by HERA: Humanities in the European Research Area. Moreover, she explored everyday youth cultures and affective declarations of romance in urban India and Nepal. In Kathmandu, Nepal, Brosius has started research on urban art cultures and on the notion of intangible and tangible cultural heritage in urban planning, particularly since the earthquake in 2015. Here, she collaborates with architects and urban planners, also to develop an online database on public space in the old town of Patan for teaching and research. Recent publications include, inter alia, a special issue of *City, Culture and Society* on "Mind the Gap. Thinking about in-Between Spaces in Delhi and Shanghai" (2016, with Schilbach), *Emplacing and Excavating the City. Art, Ecology and Public Space in New Delhi* (Journal of Transcultural Studies 2015) and *India's Middle Class. New Forms of Urban Leisure, Consumption and Prosperity* (2010, second edition 2014).

Ulrike Gerhard is Professor for Human Geography of North America at the Institute of Geography and the Heidelberg Center for American Studies (HCA) at the University of Heidelberg. She held temporary professorships at the University of Würzburg and Munich. She did her PhD at the University of Marburg, after spending two years in Waterloo, Ont.,

and Edmonton, Alb. Her research focuses on urban developments, urban theory as well as urban practices, often with an interdisciplinary and transcultural perspective. Ulrike Gerhard is chairperson of the mobility program "Urban Inequality in the Creative City", member of the Advisory Board of the research network Spaces & Flows as well as Adjunct Professor at the University of Illinois in Urbana-Champaign, IL., Locally, she is head of the living lab "Sustainable Urban Development in the Knowledge-based Society" which runs an Urban Office established at the cutting edge between university, the city of Heidelberg and the International Building Exhibition Heidelberg (IBA). Recent publications analyze race and class in the US-American ghetto (*Geographische Rundschau* 2014 and 2015), urban inequality in comparative perspective (with. E. Rothfuss, *Geographica Helvetica* 2014), urban sustainability discourses as well as the discursive structuring of cities (book contributions with E. Marquardt, 2015, and I. Warnke, 2011). She has written a book on *Global City Washington, D.C.* (transcript 2007) and co-edited volumes on human geography (Springer Spektrum 2015), the cultural geography of the USA (Springer Spektrum forthcoming) and innovative teaching methods at universities (*VGDH* 2008).

David Giband is professor of geography and urban planning at the department of geography and land planning, faculty of social science, University of Perpignan (France) since 2011. Before receiving full professorship, he was assistant professor at the University of Saint Etienne (France) and at the University of Perpignan. He received his master degree in urban planning from the University of Lyon II and his PhD from the University of Saint Etienne. Specialized in urban and social geography, he is interested in urban policies, social and racial inequalities, education and governance in western countries. Currently he is the director of ART-DEV, a multidisciplinary research center located in Montpellier and Perpignan dedicated to the understanding of development issues in the Global North and South. He teaches urban planning and urban geography. Giband is currently working on a book about Urban Sustainable Development. Additionally an article written by Barreteau, Schon and himself titled "Bringing together social-ecological system and territoire concepts to explore nature-society dynamics" is going to be published within this year in *Ecology and Society*. In 2014, he published the article "À l'école du pouvoir. Migrants et territoires éducatifs dans les métropoles américaines" in *Outre-Terre*.

Ferenc Gyuris is Assistant Professor of Geography at the Department of Regional Science at Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE), Budapest (Hungary). After studying Geography at the same institution and at Humboldt University in Berlin, he received his master's degree at ELTE in 2008. He obtained his PhD in Geography at the Heidelberg University (Germany) in 2012. As visiting scholar he spent two research periods in the Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography, Leipzig (Germany). In 2015 he received the Junior Prima Award, the most prestigious scientific prize in Hungary for young researchers in all disciplines, financed by the Hungarian Development Bank. His current research interests include urban and regional inequality, the production and utilization of scientific knowledge, and the geographies of Communism and post-Communist transition. He has written several papers, published in English, Hungarian, Chinese, German and Russian, on topics related to these fields. He is author of the book *The Political Discourse of Spatial Disparities: Geographical Inequalities Between Science and Propaganda* (Springer, 2014). His other recent publications in English include the entry *Urban elites* to "The International Encyclopedia of Geography" (Wiley-AAG, forthcoming) and the article *Basic education in communist Hungary: A commons approach* (International Journal of the Commons, 2014). He teaches courses on concepts in human geography, spatial disparities and thematic mapping. He is editorial board member of the journal "Hungarian Geographical Bulletin".

Michael Hoelscher holds a chair of Science and Higher Education Management at the German University of Administrative Sciences Speyer since 2015. Before that he worked as a senior lecturer at the Max-Weber-Institute of Sociology, University of Heidelberg, Germany. Michael received his PhD from Free University Berlin in 2005. From 2006 to 2008 he worked at the University of Oxford. His main fields of interest are higher education, globalization, especially European integration, as well as cultural, economic and urban sociology more broadly. Currently he is working on two comparative projects, one on "New Inequalities in Creative Cities" and one on the interplay of "Varieties of Capitalism and Higher Education Systems". He was guest editor of *Cities, Cultural Policy and Governance* (with Anheier and Isar) for Sage (2012). Other recent publications include *Measuring Social Innovation* (Historical Social Research 2015; with Bund, Gerhard and Mildenberger) and *Potential and Problems of International Creativity Indices* (Creativity Research Journal 2015; with Schubert).

Tom Hutton is Professor in the School of Community & Regional Planning, Faculty of Applied Science, at the University of British Columbia. He holds a BA in Urban Geography from the University of British Columbia and a DPhil from the School of Geography in Oxford University. Tom Hutton's research addresses economic change within larger experiences of urban transformation, specializing in transnationalism, labor markets, production systems, land use and space in cities and urban regions. Hutton's research program has included extended programs of field research in London, San Francisco, Seattle, Singapore and Vancouver, with a specialization in urban-industrial ethnography. Recent publications at the urban system level include *Canada's Urban Regions: Trajectories of growth and change* (coedited with Larry Bourne and Richard Shearmur) for Oxford University Press (2011), *New Economic Spaces in Asian Cities: from industrial restructuring to the cultural turn* (with Peter Daniels and K.C. Ho) for Routledge (2012), *Cities and Economic Change* (with Ronan Paddison) for Sage (2015) and *Cities and the Cultural Economy* for Routledge (2016).

Linda McDowell is the Statutory Professor of Human Geography at the University of Oxford where she is also a Professorial Fellow at St John's College. In 2015–2016 she was the Vice-President of the College. She is a labor geographer and her main research focus is on the changing division of labor at moments of economic crisis or transformation. She has been funded by UK Research Councils (the ESRC and AHRC) as well as by charitable organizations including the Rowntree Foundation and the Leverhulme Trust. Her empirical focus is the UK and she has published books on bankers (*Capital Culture,* Blackwell 1997), young men (*Redundant Masculinities?* Blackwell 2003), Baltic migrants (*Hard Labour*, UCL Press 2005) as well as a series of books about service sector employees, including migrant workers, in the UK (*Working Bodies*, Blackwell 2009, *Working Lives*, Wiley-Blackwell 2013, and *Migrant Women's Voices*, Bloomsbury 2016). She is also a feminist theorist and has published widely on feminism and feminist methods in geography, including her book *Gender, Identity and Place* (Polity 1999). She has published numerous articles in geography, women's history and sociology journals. She is a Fellow of the British Academy and in 2016 was appointed as a Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire (CBE) for services to Geography and Higher Education.

Eberhard Rothfuß is Professor for Social and Population Geography at the University of Bayreuth. He gained a diploma in geography in 1999 at

the University of Freiburg and received his doctorate 2003 at the University of Würzburg, for which he received in 2005 the Prize of the Austrian Geographical Society. From 2004 to 2010 he qualified as a post-doctoral fellow at the University of Passau and finalized in 2011 his habilitation on the reproduction of urban inequality in Salvador da Bahia (Brazil). In 2010, he received the 'Award for good teaching' of the Bavarian State Minister for Science, Research and the Arts. Between 2011 and 2012, he represented the chair of Social Geography and Geographical Development Research at the University of Bonn. His main areas of research focus on urban inequality in the Global South, especially Brazil, critical theory and intercultural hermeneutics. He is currently leading the European research project SELFCITY on collective governance and urban self-organisation in the face of climate change. Recent publications include inter alia *Exklusion im Zentrum. Die brasilianische Favela zwischen Stigmatisierung und Widerständigkeit* (2012), *Urbane Ungleichheit in komparativer Perspektive. Konzeptionelle Überlegungen und empirische Befunde aus den Amerikas* (Geographica Helvetica 2014; with Gerhard) and *Urban Self-organisation in the Global South: The Everyday Life of the Poor as a Collective Resource to Enhance the Politics of Sustainability* (in Wilson (ed.): The Politics of the Urban Sustainability Concept. Champaign Common Ground, 2015; with Korff).

David Wilson is Professor in the departments of Geography and Geographical Information Sciences, Urban Planning, African American Studies, and the Unit for Criticism and Interpretive Theory at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He teaches and conducts research on cities and urbanization in the USA and the Global West. His most recent books are *The Politics of the Urban Sustainability Concept* (2015, Common Ground), *Urban Inequalities Across the Globe* (2015, Routledge) and *Cities and Race: America's New Black Ghettos* (Routledge, 2007). He is currently completing a book on Chicago's new gentrification frontier and its invasion of blues clubs on the city's South Side. Wilson has sat on the editorial boards of *Urban Geography*, *Social and Cultural Geography*, *Professional Geographer*, *Acme: the Radical Geographical Journal*, *International Journal of Spaces and Flows* and *Syracuse University Press Series*. In recent years, he has delivered keynote lectures at conferences in the USA, Canada, Germany, England, Norway, China and Italy. He is also the lead guitarist for the Urbana-Champaign-based blues band the Painkillers.

Zemiattin Yildiz is a Research Master student at the Faculty of Spatial Science of the University of Groningen. His specific research interests revolve around: (1) the relation between urbanization and inequality, (2) the philosophy in the social sciences and the production of urban knowledge(s) and (3) the articulation between spatial (urban) knowledge and urban (policy) intervention. He is currently writing his master thesis on the relation between urbanization and inequality. He analyzes how several contemporary theoretical and empirical approaches to urban space respectively inform 'the nature of cities' and conceptualize and measure the relation between urbanization and inequality. His research in particular is animated by the production of social scientific knowledge, in general, and knowledge of urban space and urban inequalities in particular. Zemiattin's fieldwork has focused on the relation between creative cities and inequalities in Groningen as well as urban governance and inequalities in the city-region of Diyarbakir in Southeast Turkey.

Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

PART I

Introduction and Theoretical Background

CHAPTER 1

Introduction. Inequalities in the Creative City: A New Perspective on an Old Phenomenon

Ulrike Gerhard, Michael Hoelscher, and David Wilson

Cities across the globe toil mightily to transform in the elusive effort to enhance their prosperity. The mantra of city governances is to bolster competitiveness by becoming a more "creative" city. As cities find themselves seared by the knowledge society, the creative class syndrome, and the cultural and creative industries, this drive relentlessly makes and re-makes urban space and socio-physical realities for people (Baycan-Levent 2010; Knight 1995; Matthiesen 2004; Lever 2002). Yet, the full impacts and consequences of this planning initiative have received at best scant treatment from academics and planners. In short, we know little about how the

U. Gerhard (✉)
Geography Department, Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany

M. Hoelscher
Higher Education and Science Management Department, Speyer University, Speyer, Germany

D. Wilson
Geography and Geographic Information Science Department, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL, USA

U. Gerhard et al. (eds.), *Inequalities in Creative Cities,*
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95115-4_1

creative city movement is affecting cities—their demographics, land-use, and socio-economic consequences.

This book takes up the task of seeking to deepen our understanding of this new drive's impacts on cities across the world. Our starting point is that in current neoliberal, informational, and global times the push to manufacture creative cities generates a host of outcomes in need of excavation. We chronicle something now beginning to gain traction: that the current trend toward creative city policies does not reduce, but rather hides existing inequalities and even births new ones. In this introductory chapter, we outline the current state of the literature and our position in more detail.

The Shift to Knowledge

The term "knowledge society" or "knowledge-based economy" is used to describe the current situation of at least most of the developed societies around the globe. Information and knowledge have become increasingly important in the political, social, and economic spheres. This is reflected in the trend in OECD economies toward growth in high-technology investments, high-technology industries, more highly skilled labor, and associated productivity gains. These "new" industries are seen as a substitute for blue-collar jobs, which are increasingly outsourced to low-income countries.

While information and communication technologies (ICT) are important industries in the knowledge economy, they are not the only ones. In addition, the educational sector, as well as cultural and creative industries, belongs to the so-called knowledge-intensive industries, responsible for economic growth and success. A related development thus is the increased attention toward culture and the arts (Anheier et al. 2012). The concentration of the "beaux arts" in cities is a now well-known phenomenon. Recently, this sector has become central economically (massification in higher education, democratization, change in cultural policies and concepts from preservation to creativity), and the cultural and creative industries are now an important economic factor for the urban economy (Propris et al. 2009; Scott 2006, 2008). In the creative city discourse, they are even supposed to be able to compensate for the decline of more traditional industrial sectors such as the automobile, textile, or steel sub-economies (Kanai and Ortega-Alcázar 2009). For example, in Germany (a large producer of cars), the gross value added by the cultural and creative industries (63

billion Euro) was higher than that of the automobile industry (55 billion Euro) in 2009 (BMWi 2012: 21).

Key to these knowledge-intensive industries is a greater reliance on intellectual capabilities that supplants physical inputs and natural resources (Powell and Snellman 2004: 199). A "radically new system for creating wealth has evolved that depends upon advanced education, research and innovation, and hence upon knowledge-intensive organizations such as research universities, corporate R&D laboratories and national research agencies" (Duderstadt and Weber 2006: 282). These "intellectual capabilities," some authors claim, continue to concentrate in specific places. Cities are not only historically information hubs, they are also central spaces where knowledge is created, distributed, and used. Regional wealth and the concentration of these industries are strongly correlated, as empirical data for Europe show. "If we take into account no other factors, regional creative and cultural specialization explains 60 % of the variance in GDP per capita. Europe's wealthiest regions are home to disproportionate levels of creative and cultural industries concentration" (European Cluster Observatory 2011: 8).

Different characteristics of cities foster the production of knowledge and innovation, for example, their critical mass of people, their density, and their heterogeneity (e.g., Howells 2002; Fischer 1975). While there are many different types of knowledges produced in the city, the dominant economic discourse reduces the notion of knowledge in the city mostly to "human capital" as an essential input into production and consumption. A question, however, remains: how significant is the impact of knowledge industries for urban economic growth? How are they embedded in the urban environment, thus contributing to its overall development? Some researchers apply a comparative perspective to calculate the significance of knowledge production within cities. Gabe et al. (2012), for example, analyzed 287 US and Canadian metropolitan areas in relation to their share of employment in knowledge-related industries, with the help of a cluster analysis that extracted 11 different knowledge profiles for city regions. They ranged from farming regions (high in food production and manufacturing), over making regions (very high in manufacturing, very low in commerce and humanities), to thinking regions (high in arts, humanities, IT, and commerce, low in manufacturing; examples are Portland, Victoria, and Santa Cruz). Cities, where knowledge industries played a significant role in the employment sector, qualified as thinking,

innovating, engineering, teaching, or understanding regions. This quantitative approach thus uses structural employment data and economic performance to measure knowledge but leaves out many other factors.

A less quantitative study that also tried to categorize knowledge cities into certain types is by Van Winden et al. (2007). Here, 11 European cities were analyzed regarding the embeddedness of their strong knowledge sector into the economic development of the city. Following their hypothesis, not all cities profit in the same way from knowledge-based economies. To measure involvement of the knowledge economy into the urban fabric, different factors were extracted (knowledge base, industrial base, quality of life, diversity, accessibility, and social equity) from a wide array of variables (such as number of universities, educational level of the population, subjective assessment of the quality of life). This complex analysis results in six different types of knowledge cities that were called either stars, metropoles in transition, knowledge pearls, star nicheplayers, nicheplayers in transition, or intellectuals. Even though such clustering has its methodological shortcomings (e.g., the definition of variables, the reliability of the data, the access to certain information), this typology can be considered a useful attempt to classify cities in terms of their position within the knowledge-based economy. It helps to structure our thinking about development paths and opportunities of different types of places in the knowledge society. But again it shows that the exact measuring of knowledge and creativeness (or better: defining creativity in rational scales) and its contribution to urban development is a difficult undertaking. There is a lack of comparable data across cities and nations, the question of which data is used for describing knowledge-intensity at all, and the indeterminacy of the creative class (Anheier and Hoelscher 2015).

Creative City Strategies

Despite the lack of empirical evidence about positive impacts, cities all over the world develop creative city strategies hoping to be attractive for the footloose cultural and creative industries. Here, culture again comes into the play, this time with a dual role. The creatives working in knowledge-intensive firms are bound to cities by well paying jobs (often located in the cultural and creative industries) as well as by the vibrant cultural life in the cities. This is one mantra of creative city policy: Cities (or at least their images, see Kong (2012) about city branding by culture) must be creative and vibrant to attract the new “creative people”, which in

turn bring with them (or create) innovative and successful firms. This concentration on cultural and creative industries and on this task for culture in general goes along with—or even is a result of—a more general shift in the concept of culture itself (see O'Connor 2010). It moves from culture as an end in itself ("l'art pour l'art") with its traditional dual task of education and relaxation toward an economic stipulation or meaning of culture.

Thus, city planning and policies have been re-adjusted to produce what is often called the "creative city". Cities invest into new theatres and concert halls (often designed by star architects) and support a great variety of public events (from festivals to marathons and public viewing). Similarly, new investment refurbishes waterfronts, public squares, and city halls. The result: policies across diverse cities exhibit remarkably similar patterns of public investment. What can be observed is a "policy borrowing" or "policy mobility" by city administrations and governments, leading to what neo-institutionalists would describe as "isomorphism" (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). With this isomorphism, actors (without any authoritative knowledge on what is really functional in complex systems) focus on increasing legitimacy instead of functionality (Meyer and Rowan 1977). This is made easily digestible as authors such as Florida (2002) and Landry (2000) foster such legitimacy of action (Grodach and Silver 2012). What becomes apparent here is the importance of narratives and discourses that bind together specific concepts such as the creative city, stories about their success, and certain actions.

The Consequences: Urban Inequalities

While many authors, city administrators, and politicians hail these "new systems for creating wealth" and generating (economic) sustainability, concerns that inequalities are exacerbated have emerged. A dominant charge is that many people are left behind in this new growth. Workers in the new low-wage dead-end economic sector—a rapidly growing economic realm in cities—are proclaimed as dramatic losers in this new urban growth focus. Thus, despite its overal economic impetus, urban economies are becoming immensely diverse; one strata's resurgence is often accompanied by another one's stasis and eclipse.

Moreover, some groups are excluded as they do not fit into the expected hyper-mobile, active, or flexible world of the so-called creative or knowledge-intensive industries. Peck (2005: 756), for example, talks about Richard Florida's inclination "to revel in the juvenile freedoms of

the idealized no-collar workplaces in this flexibilizing economy, while paying practically no attention to the divisions of labor within which such employment practices are embedded". Other authors have analyzed the ambivalent role of women or migrants in the service or high-tech sector who are often discriminated against in the industry (e.g., McDowell 2009; Mayer 2008). Even Florida (2013) himself lately mentions the ambivalent relationship between creativity and inequality, when admitting that "talent clustering provides little in the way of trickle-down benefits".

This set of exclusions, it is increasingly realized, pivots around a deceptively simple thing: the construction of the new neoliberal subject across these cities. With deepened neoliberal sensibilities in these cities, the established demarcation between two kinds of urban residents—the important and needed versus the dependent and problematic—has become clearer and more pronounced. In this context, the mainstream script has revolved around two constructions, the ideal businessperson subject and the non-ideal (but potentially recoverable) low-income subject. Making these characters and striving to embed them in the common population's imaginings accomplish something important. It enables a host of policies to focus on attracting and retaining the supposed engines to city economic growth and prosperity. Thus, new re-entrepreneurializing city programs—tax increment financing, business improvement districts, historic preservation, tax abatement provision—become cast as being authored and carried out by innovative, civic-serving actors in the latest round of city economic progressivity and city ingenuity. They supposedly court elements essential to city survivability in ominous global times: "the creative class", "creative industries", and "new urbanist followers and adherents".

Our Book

This book sheds light on the diverse forms of inequalities that follow from the governance drive to forge creative cities focusing on a distinctive kind of place: "ordinary cities". This book offers complex and challenging appraisals of the "drive to go creative", recognizing that many cities across the globe now find themselves struggling to generate wealth, tactical competitive advantage, and social solidity as they cope in a world of neoliberal dominance. But all is not so simple and well known. Despite global trends of retrenched government, rolled back welfare statism, stepped-up economic privatization, and growing declarations and acceptances of individualized causes for social processes, the production of inequalities

appears to be also remarkably contingent and place precise. That means that emerging pressing urban inequalities today—poverty, segregation, class marginalization, punishing identity ascriptions—appear to take many forms, have diverse place historical roots, and embody contingent socio-political processes. A messy causality, paraphrasing Doreen Massey (2014), appears to be at work. It is this specification, how existing urban inequalities can be explained via sensitivities to multi-scalar processes and contingent-conjunctural forces, which at the moment eludes us.

Why this focus on ordinary cities? While these places remain in the analytic shadows of creative growth stories from cities like Austin, London, and Shanghai, we believe such a focus is important. First, ordinary cities exhibit enormous economic and demographic growth. It is here that tremendous change and urban re-making can often be discovered. Second, city re-making can be extracted and analyzed even more carefully here because the development path is not so much superimposed by overall growth trends due to the global concentration of headquarters and command centers of the world economy. Alternatively, cities such as Paris, Berlin, Toronto, and New York may be less representative of what is evolving in far-flung systems of cities than their ordinary city ("knowledge pearl") brethren.

We are also interested in fostering comparative analysis to advance our understanding of this new creative city re-making. By looking at various cities, we are able to assess differences and similarities in inequalities and relate these to recent trends in the context of the knowledge society. Yet the aim here is not so much to compare cities within various national contexts but rather to learn from insights, experiences, and perceptions. Such a "comparative gesture", as it has been suggested by Robinson (2010) as well as others (e.g., Kantor and Savitch 2005; McFarlane and Robinson 2012; Ward 2010), is not meant to find similarities or dissimilarities between certain cities via a one-to-one comparison, but tries to extend the view on urban inequalities. Inequality is a complex phenomenon that needs to be analyzed from different perspectives and frameworks. By learning from these cities, we will deepen a new phase of comparative urban research (Robinson 2010; McFarlane 2010) that is still experimental as it uses theoretically rigorous criteria for analyzing urban inequalities in the growing service society.

Two guideposts are relevant for contextualizing this global analysis. First, the chapters emphasize the reality of socio-spatial polarization as an ongoing persistent force that responds to new city re-making efforts.

Current creative redevelopment, we suspect, could have major consequences for cities already balkanized by spatial divisions of labor and patterns of segregation that have remained entrenched. Saskia Sassen's *The Global City* (2001 [1991]) underscores this point, identifying cities across the global west afflicted by socio-spatial fracturing and splintering that problematically absorb new creative city endeavors (see also Friedmann 1986; Mollenkopf and Castells 1991; Hamnett 1994; Marcuse and van Kempen 2000; Fainstein 2001; Gerhard 2004). This work identifies current city formation as acutely sensitive to this creative urban re-making that makes this the leading edge of emergent growth, economic decline, booms, busts, and inequalities.

Second, our chapters emphasize the power of discourses as a powerful purveyor of possible inequalities from this new city re-making. Discourses, as now widely recognized, are crucial instruments in constructing realities through which this creative city drive gains legitimacy. Discourses thus propel or stultify creative growth strategies, motoring them along or obstructing their implementing. For this reason, fashioning a supportive discourse needs to be seen as an ongoing human accomplishment, a necessary step to fostering this city re-making.

Still there is the question of how to select the case studies. Here, a functional approach was applied. We looked for urban researchers with a diverse portfolio of themes and interests, thereby not only allowing a comparison of different cities, but also a complementary look at different facets of inequality. Common to all of them was their contribution to critical perspectives on urban development and urban inequalities especially under the current phase of urban re-structuring. These authors then met at different occasions to develop a more integrated joint research agenda. The initial meeting took place at Heidelberg University in 2013, resulting in a panel at the Association of American Geographers (AAG)-meeting in Chicago in 2014. The research was further developed during a symposium and workshop at the University of Urbana, Champaign, in the same year. Drafts of chapters were finally discussed in the group at a meeting in Perpignan in 2016. Thus, the book is a first result of an ongoing transatlantic research process.

The book begins with two introductory chapters that set the stage for the empirical analyses. Thomas **Hutton's** chapter examines the cultural and political practices that underpin current drives to re-make cities creatively. Hutton's work focuses especially on the economic restructuring within inner cities with cycles of growth and decline permeating the service economy. Ferenc **Gyuris's** chapter debates the many sides of the notion of inequality. He has written extensively on the theoretical discourse of social inequality.

The second part, featuring empirical case studies, begins with Linda **McDowell's** investigation of **Oxford, UK**. This analysis complements her recent array of studies on the consequences of this city's re-making for the construction and marking of gender in local labor markets. David **Wilson** follows with an investigation of racial inequalities in **Cleveland, USA**, and **Glasgow, UK**. He has extensively examined such inequalities in US rust belt cities. Ulrike **Gerhard's** and Michael **Hoelscher's** analysis of labor market and housing inequalities in **Heidelberg, Germany**, comes next. While Hoelscher is a sociologist with an interest in the knowledge sector and cultural industries in Europe, Gerhard is an urban geographer who had done substantive work on recent changes from urban restructuring processes across European and American cities. David **Giband's** chapter focuses on the perplexing new inequalities that pervade **Montpellier, France**, as its growth governance strives to creatively re-make the city, connecting discourses of knowledge growth and sustainability. Giband has done important research on dilemmas around social and ethnic heterogeneity of French cities. Justin **Beaumont's** and Zemiattin **Yildiz's** chapter focuses on urban governance and politics in relation to social and spatial justice in **Groningen, The Netherlands**. Beaumont has worked extensively on the recent upsurge of housing struggles over problematic state-funded provision in European cities.

Even though our case studies are already quite diverse, we cast our gaze beyond the Global North. With two further chapters in a third part of the book we look beyond the Western world, understanding urban inequalities connected to knowledge growth as a global phenomenon or planetary process. What does the case of **Cachoeira, Brazil**, contribute to the discussion? We find here a specific urban growth strategy closely related to the creativity discourse. Eberhard **Rothfuß** and Wendel Henrique **Baumgartner** are the two specialists on this perspective. Christiane **Brosius** contributes another story of a city trying to become "world-class": **Delhi, India**, is restructuring its public space in order to be part of this global aspiration process of going creative.

These authors all address different themes, underlined by their individual research, that make up inequalities when cities are trying to go creative. Thus, we can detect a new spatiality of urban inequality in the appraised creative city. Urban inequality has not diminished, but is only hidden behind the knowledge discourse. It is less pronounced, more subtle, but at least as severe as in the past.

Bibliography

Anheier, Helmut K., and Michael Hoelscher. 2015. Cultural Sustainability in Small and Medium-Sized Cities. What Are the Issues? In *Culture and Sustainability in European Cities. Imagining Europolis*, ed. Svetlana Hristova, and Milena Dragićević Šešić, 17–31. Abingdon: Routledge.

Anheier, Helmut K., Yudhishthir Raj Isar, and Michael Hoelscher (ed). 2012. *Cities, Cultural Policy and Governance*. London: Sage Publications.

Baycan-Levent, Tüzin. 2010. Diversity and Creativity as Seedbeds for Urban and Regional Dynamics. *European Planning Studies* 18(4): 565–594.

BMWi (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie) and Michael Söndermann. 2012. *Monitoring zu ausgewählten wirtschaftlichen Eckdaten der Kultur- und Kreativwirtschaft 2010* . Berlin: BMWi. Langfassung

DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W. Powell. 1983. The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. *American Sociological Review* 48(2): 147–160.

Duderstadt, James J., and Luc E. Weber. 2006. *Universities and Business: Partnering for the Knowledge Society*. London: Economica.

European Cluster Observatory. 2011. *Priority Sector Report: Creative and Cultural Industries*. Europa Innova Paper. Luxembourg: European Union.

Fainstein, Susan S. 2001. Inequality in Global City-Regions. In *Global City-Regions. Trends, Theory, Policy*, ed. Allen J. Scott, 285–298. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fischer, Claude S. 1975. Toward a Subcultural Theory of Urbanism. *American Journal of Sociology* 80(6): 1319–1341.

Florida, Richard. 2002. *The Rise of the Creative Class. And How It's Transforming Work, Leisure, Community and Everyday Life*. New York: Basic Books.

———. 2013. *More Losers than Winners in America's New Economic Geography*. The Atlantic City Lab, Jan 30, 2013. Available from http://www.citylab.com/work/2013/01/more-losers-winners-americas-new-economic-geography/4465/.

Friedmann, John. 1986. The World City Hypothesis. *Development and Change* 17: 69–83.

Gabe, Todd, Jaison Abel, Adrienne Ross, and Kevin Stolarick. 2012. Knowledge in Cities. *Urban Studies* 49(6): 1179–1200.

Gerhard, Ulrike. 2004. Global Cities. Anmerkungen zu einem aktuellen Forschungsfeld. *Geographische Rundschau* 56(4): 4–10.

Grodach, Carl, and Daniel Silver (ed). 2012. *The Politics of Urban Cultural Policy: Global Perspectives*. London: Routledge.

Hamnett, Chris. 1994. Social Polarisation in Global Cities: Theory and Evidence. *Urban Studies* 31(3): 401–424.

Howells, Jeremy R.L. 2002. Tacit Knowledge, Innovation and Economic Geography. *Urban Studies* 39(5/6): 871–884.

Kanai, Miguel, and Iliana Ortega-Alcázar. 2009. The Prospects for Progressive Culture-Led Urban Regeneration in Latin America: Cases from Mexico City and Buenos Aires. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 33(2): 83–501.

Kantor, Paul, and H.V. Savitch. 2005. How to Study Comparative Urban Development Politics: A Research Note. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 29(1): 135–151.

Knight, Richard V. 1995. Knowledge-Based Development: Policy and Planning Implications for Cities. *Urban Studies* 32(2): 225–260.

Kong, Lily. 2012. City Branding. In *Cities, Cultural Policy and Governance*, ed. Helmut Anheier, Yudhishthir Raj Isar, and Michael Hoelscher, 87–98. London: Sage.

Landry, Charles. 2000. *The Creative City: A Toolkit for Urban Innovators*. London: Earthscan.

Lever, William F. 2002. Correlating the Knowledge-Base of Cities with Economic Growth. *Urban Studies* 39(5/6): 859–870.

Marcuse, Peter, and Ronald van Kempen (ed). 2000. *Globalizing Cities. A New Spatial Order?* Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Massey, Doreen. 2014. *For Space*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Matthiesen, Ulf (ed). 2004. *Stadtregion und Wissen : Analysen und Plädoyers für eine wissensbasierte Stadtpolitik*. Wiesbaden: VS Verl. für Sozialwiss.

Mayer, Heike. 2008. Segmentation and Segregation Patterns of Women-Owned High-Tech Firms in Four Metropolitan Regions in the United States. *Regional Studies* 42(10): 1357–1383.

McDowell, Linda. 2009. *Working Bodies: Interactive Service Employment and Workplace Identities*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

McFarlane, Colin. 2010. The Comparative City: Knowledge, Learning, Urbanism. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 35(4): 725–742.

McFarlane, Colin, and Jennifer Robinson. 2012. Introduction—Experiments in Comparative Urbanism. *Urban Geography* 33(6): 765–773.

Meyer, John W., and Brian Rowan. 1977. Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony. *The American Journal of Sociology* 83(2): 340–363.

Mollenkopf, John H., and Manuel Castells (ed). 1991. *Dual City. Restructuring New York*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

O'Connor, Justin. 2010. *The Cultural and Creative Industries. A Review of the Literature*. Newcastle Upon Tyne: Creativity, Culture and Education.

Peck, Jamie. 2005. Struggling with the Creative Class. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 29(7): 740–770.

Powell, Walter W., and Kaisa Snellman. 2004. The Knowledge Economy. *Annual Review of Sociology* 30: 199–220.

Propris, Lisa de, Caroline Chapain, Philip Cooke, Stuart MacNeil, and Juan Mateos-Garcia. 2009. *The Geography of Creativity*. Interim Report. London: NESTA.

Robinson, Jennifer. 2010. Cities in a World of Cities: The Comparative Gesture. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 35(19): 1–23.

Sassen, Saskia. 2001 [1991]. *The Global City*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Scott, Allen J. 2006. Creative Cities: Conceptual Issues and Policy Questions. *Journal of Urban Affairs* 28(1): 1–17.

———. 2008. *Social Economy of the Metropolis. Cognitive-Cultural Capitalism and the Global Resurgence of Cities*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Van Winden, Willem, Leo van den Berg, and Paul Pol. 2007. European Cities in the Knowledge Economy: Towards a Typology. *Urban Studies* 44(3): 525–549.

Ward, Kevin. 2010. Towards a Relationale Comparative Approach to the Study of Cities. *Progress in Human Geography* 34(4): 471–487.

CHAPTER 2

The Cultural Economy of the City: Pathways to Theory and Understanding Inequality

Tom Hutton

Introduction: Situating Culture, Creativity, and Inequality in the City

Culture has throughout history represented a key signifier of political control, national symbolism, social class values, and territory within cities (Scott 1997, 2000; Miles 2007). Within the states and societies of East Asia, culture in its material and symbolic forms has been central to the primacy of capital cities in history and underpins key features (customs, social organization, and work practices) of transformation in pivotal cases such as Tokyo, Beijing, Seoul, Hanoi, Hong Kong, and Singapore (Kim et al. 1997). To illustrate, Kazuko Goto (2012) has written about the deep traditions of artisanship that have sustained forms of cultural production over many centuries in Kyoto, while Sarah Turner (2006) and Bjőrn Surborg (2006) have each described the characteristics of cultural production networks operating between central city creative workers in Hanoi and suppliers in the countryside over a similar historical span. In Europe, culture has played key roles in cities at moments of ascendancy and influence, as Peter Hall has described in his magisterial *Cities and*

T. Hutton (✉)
Centre for Human Settlements, School of Community & Regional Planning, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada

U. Gerhard et al. (eds.), *Inequalities in Creative Cities*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95115-4_2

Civilisation (1998), exemplified by classical Athens and Greece, Florence as capital of the northern Italian Renaissance, and Berlin in the Weimar.

The great cities of North America came to prominence within national urban systems and economic régimes owing mostly to high concentrations of advanced manufacturing and specialized services. But over the twentieth century, the economies and urban imaginaries of metropolitan centers such as New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Montréal were shaped in many ways by culture and creativity, in fields such as film and music, architecture, and industrial design. And more recently the rise of metropolitan cities of the Global South, including Mumbai, Johannesburg, Istanbul, and Rio de Janeiro, is attributed in part to the strength of cultural assets, identity and talent, as well as the influence of political power, urban scale and industrial agglomeration (Appadurai 1996).

Over the past two decades or so 'culture' in its various forms and expressions has assumed manifestly larger roles within urban-regional economies: representing not merely factor inputs to the fabrication of products and services, but comprising complex ensembles of industries, firms, and labor, situated within both advanced and 'transitional' societies. While the contours of the 'industrial city' were shaped by factories, warehouses, and production labor, and the 'post-industrial city' by office complexes, retail industries, and segmented services labor, the cultural economy of the city encompasses greater complexity in terms of development history, industrial and institutional structure, enterprise configuration, and labor markets.

We can think of the structure of the cultural economy of the city as comprising five principal ensembles. There are the familiar *cultural institutions* such as museums, galleries, exhibition spaces, theatres, symphony halls, and other performance spaces which are well established in many cities (supported by arts schools, colleges of design, and the like). These are important both as centerpieces of the cultural tourism sector and as key elements of urban identity formation within global markets, and thus conferring competitive advantage for host cities. A second ensemble encompasses clusters of *cultural production*, which perform a propulsive role in many advanced urban-regional economies, and which includes established industries such as architecture, advertising, graphic design, and the film and music industries—increasingly reshaped by digital technologies and the Internet, as well as by increasing outsourcing, exemplified by video games production and other interactive media. A very large and rapidly growing *consumption sector* comprises a third foundational element of the

cultural economy of the city, including boutique hotels, restaurants, artisanal food production, fair trade coffee houses, and specialty retail.

Another important element of the cultural economy of the city is represented by major public events encompassed within the realm of *spectacle*. These include, notably, the Olympic Games, international fairs and expositions, the World Cup of football and the European championships, and regularly scheduled festivals of the performing and visual arts, exemplified by the Venice Biennale and the Cannes Film Festival.

The qualities of certain *cultural spaces* in the city themselves constitute foundational elements of the contemporary economy of the city. In this reading, industrial districts, cultural quarters, and certain neighborhoods encompass clusters of creative labor and cultural industries. But the design features, consumption amenities, heritage built environment, and embodied histories and (often contested) social memories of these places also provide cues and stimuli to creativity, attract visitors, and form essential features of the 'urban imaginary' exploited in place-remaking and marketing (Mckenzie and Hutton 2015), with examples including the Oltrarno (Florence), El Raval (Barcelona), and Suzhou Creek (Shanghai) (Zhong 2011, 2012a, b).

A distinctive and emblematic feature of the cultural economy takes the form of influential multinational companies (MNCs) which represent the face of the global new economy, and which encompass innovation in marketing, public outreach and access, and corporate imageries, exemplified by Microsoft, Apple, Google, Adobe, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn. In each of these otherwise disparate MNCs a near-constant experimentation in labor tasks, product mix, marketing innovation, and consumer interface reflects defining contrasts to the structure and practices of dominant industrial corporations of the twentieth century (see also Amin and Thrift 2004; Hutton 2015: pp. 2–23).

The growth of culture as economic trajectory is measured in terms of the expansion of industries (e.g.) enterprise formation, labor markets and employment, and sales and revenues (Hesmondalgh 2007; Pratt 1997, 2014). There is now a substantial literature which acknowledges the value of creativity and cultural industries in the development of advanced economic systems, in community regeneration, and in individual self-actualization and identity formation (Grodach and Loukaitou-Sideris 2007; Grodach and Silver 2013). Further, 'culture' and creative industries are acknowledged as defining features of first-order global cities, such as London, Paris, New York, and Shanghai, along with the established

specializations of banking, intermediate finance, business services, and 'power and influence' (Hall 2000, 2006; GLA 2012).

In theoretical terms cultural industries have been acknowledged as critical features of 'flexible specialization' in post-Fordist production régimes within capitalist systems following the hollowing out of basic industry in the late twentieth century, reflecting the enhanced importance of creativity to successful product design and marketing (Hutton 2000). More recent propositions include Allen Scott's acknowledgement of creative industries as central to the 'social economy' of 'cognitive-cultural capitalism' among advanced societies (Scott 2008), and Stefan Krätke's articulation of the saliency of the 'creative capital of cities' as foundation of urbanization economies within systems of 'interactive knowledge creation' (Krätke 2011).

In this chapter I construct a theoretical frame for identifying problematic features of the cultural economy of the city, informed by a substantive critical literature on culture both in its instrumental and more symbolic meanings. I start with a review and synthesis of influential concepts advanced over the course of the present century, as a means of tracking the evolution of the discourse and identifying both problematic and constructive features, including recent theory which attempts to address issues of inequality associated with the cultural economy of the city. Next, I offer an account of the multiple causalities of inequality in the cultural employment structure, starting with an acknowledgement of the broader context of change in production systems and the labor force under neo-liberalism. What follows is a discussion of inequality produced by the qualities of space in the city, and more specially the dislocative impacts of upgrading in situ, as well as overspill displacement experienced in proximate, mostly low-income communities. 'Inequality' as experienced by workers in the cultural economy of the city is generated by 'difference' in skills, work conditions, and (increasingly) access to technology, but is also shaped by class, gender, ethnicity, and spatial and demographic factors. I conclude with a concise summary of principal observations and suggestions for further study.

The Cultural Economy: Theoretical Proposals and Conundrums

Efforts to theorize the cultural economy of the city include historical perspectives, exemplified by Peter Hall (1998) in which culture is accorded a central place in the storylines of cities at their peak moments of ascendancy from the classical era to the end of the twentieth century, and Timothy

Brook and Hy V. Luong's *Culture and Economy: the shaping of capitalism in eastern Asia* (1997), within which the influence of local and national cultures in the emergence of particular forms of capitalism in the east Asian realm are explicated. The hierarchy of artists, artisans and apprenticeships operating within complex workshop systems was crucial to the development of the cities of the Italian Renaissance, together with the patronage of wealthy individuals and families. Artisanal workers were also important in the development of proto-industrial manufactories in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, notably in textiles, furniture, and the production of coachworks. Design was crucial to the rapid development of manufacturing in advanced economies in the nineteenth century, recognized in major expositions in Paris and London which celebrated synergy between the arts and industry, most notably the London 1851 exposition on the theme of 'The Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of all Nations'. Institutional expressions of interdependency between industry and the arts took the form of industrial design associations in the latter half of the nineteenth century in Germany, Britain, and other nations.

Innovation in the arts and design was a central feature of influential cultural movements and their imprints on the form and landscapes of the city, exemplified by the art deco and beaux-arts periods in Paris especially, but with important examples in London, Lille, and Brussels, among other cities, and then in Berlin as center of Expressionism in the interwar period. These movements represented at one level episodes of stylistic innovation in the history of the arts and design, but they also permeated the material cultures of architecture, urban design, and social identity in cities and societies. The social reproduction of cities and space (Knox 1987) became an important function of architects and other design professionals but also involved a broader social milieu of clients, civic leaders, and members of the public.

The introduction of mass-production methods from the 1920s onward, initially in automobile manufacturing and then in a wider consumer product range, arguably served to constrain the creative design impulse—sacrificed to achieve scale economies and profit margins in capitalist economies. Fordism as production régime among advanced economies enjoyed essentially a half-century of dominance, and had begun to run its course by the 1970s and 1980s, especially in the USA and in Britain. The collapse of basic industry in these states owed something to internal characteristics and processes, including disinvestment, obsolescence, and, in the UK especially, poor industrial relations (Massey and Meegan

1980). But there was a broader arena of change, as underscored in Frõbel, Heinrichs, and Kreye's original thesis (1980) of a 'New International Division of Labor' (NIDL), within which advanced economies specialized in advanced services industries and labor, observed in the rapid expansion of office economies within the Central Business District (CBD), and in which increasingly mass-production capacity was relocated to East and Southeast Asia, where labor costs in basic production were lower than in the 'West' by orders of magnitude. The rapid expansion of manufacturing in East and Southeast Asia was influenced both by this emergent spatial division of labor as well as the influence of Japan's accelerated industrialization program: the 'lead goose' in Akamatsu's 'flying geese' model of development widely emulated within the broader region.

Industrial Restructuring, Post-Fordism, and Flexible Specialization: Culture and Creativity

Factory systems organized around stable labor divisions and extended production runs characteristic of advanced economies gave way from the 1970s onward to an era of deep labor-shedding associated with Post-Fordism and more specifically to an emergent production régime of flexible specialization, within which advanced design capacity, inter-industry networks, and flexible production systems shaped new social, spatial, and technical divisions of labor. The most successful manufacturing economies, exemplified by the advanced production sectors of Germany, the Italian triangolo industriale bounded by Torino, Milano, and Genova, Paris and the Ile-de-France, and the southern California and Seattle—Puget Sound regions, which, while different in terms of scale, product lines, and corporate structure, were shaped by advanced industrial design as well as complementary services such as advertising, marketing, and branding (Storper and Salais 1997). Advanced design capacity served to enhance product appeal in consumer markets, as well as generating production efficiencies (Power and Scott 2004). Some traditional manufacturing economies, notably that of Britain, suffered an extended industrial decline, with only a residual base of high-value niche-level industries such as racing cars, aerospace, and biomedical engineering remaining viable into the present century, as well as mostly small-scale artisanal production in the areas of garments, food, and beverages. As a legacy effect, however, the large tracts of obsolescent industrial land in cities such as Manchester, Leeds, and especially London have provided extensive spaces for culture-led regeneration over the past two

decades, facilitating new forms of industrial restructuring, upgrading, and succession (Hutton 2004, 2006).

This radical restructuring of production economies, infused with innovations in design, style, and branding around the turn of the twentieth century, included the emergence of a putative 'new economy' underpinned by synergies of creativity and technology, including the signature (if episodic) wave of 'dot.coms' that recolonized the 'redundant and marginalized spaces' (Turok 2015) of post-industrial cities. These technology-inflected innovations in production systems produced at one level redevelopment energy into the post-industrial city, while at another level placed pressure on low-margin enterprises and low-income communities (Novy and Colomb 2013; Shaw 2005, 2013), with the South of Market Area (SOMA) in San Francisco being a well-known case (Solnit and Schwartzenberg 2000). The rise of the creative impulse as a central feature of industrial innovation and urban development stimulated serious scholarly inquiry, exemplified by Ash Amin and Stephen Graham's acknowledgement of culture in the evolution of the fin-de-siècle 'multiplex city' (Amin and Graham 1997), and Peter Hall's influential essay on 'creative cities and economic development' (Hall 2000).

The dot.com crash of 2000 and apparently inchoate quality of the 'post' post-industrial city served to obfuscate the theoretical contours of the urban economy for a time. Responses included Michael Dear and Stephen Flusty's imaginative if somewhat whimsical essay on 'Postmodern Urbanism' in the Annals of the Association of American Geographers (1999) within which a reading of the workings (and excesses) of 'Keno capitalism' produced apparently chaotic landscapes of activity throughout the metropolis, or at least in the Los Angeles case, and Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin's (2001) thoughtful attempt to depict the spatial 'splintering' effects of the emergent city of advanced production technologies and digital communications.

But Richard Florida's *The Rise of the Creative Class* (2002) produced a galvanizing (and polarizing) effect on the theoretical discourse on the urban economy. Taken on its own terms, Florida's exaltation of a large and rapidly growing 'creative class' suggested to positivist urbanists a new golden age of culture-led urban growth and community regeneration, shaped by an occupational structure comprising several strata of professionals and artisans, and a lead role for a contingent of 'super-creatives' in such fields as music, film, digital communications, architecture, and urban design. According to the creative class script the cultural (and city-making) influence of these cohorts

would largely supplant the more mundane business services workers who made up the bulk of the 'new middle class' which had followed and largely replaced the old corporate élite of the twentieth-century industrial city, and would at the same time energize the imaginaries and social milieux of the communities, neighborhoods, and housing markets of the metropolis.

Further, for many civic officials, business associations and community agencies the creative class and the cultural economy offered a perhaps unique opportunity for aligning the values of the 'convivial city' with those of fostering a more robust economic trajectory—a solution, it seemed, to the post-industrial malaise of many cities. A more troublesome feature of the discourse is that the cultural economy and its creative workforce is by no means distributed evenly throughout national urban systems but, rather, is highly concentrated within apex global cities like New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, London, Paris, and Tokyo, and in smaller, specialized cultural places like Nashville, San Antonio, Modena, Arles, and Kyoto. The answer to this conundrum, according to one reading of the creative class formula, was for city governments and their affiliates to 'incentivise' their urban areas as a means of attracting the 'creatives': a cohort thought to be uniquely attuned to locational attributes of quality schools, urban amenities, hip neighborhoods, and recreational opportunities. Moreover, these values were part and parcel of a parallel storyline which positioned urban centers of the new century not as shopworn sites of production, but rather as altogether more exuberant 'consumer cities', as proclaimed notably by Harvard economist Edward Glaeser (see for example Glaeser et al. 2001; Glaeser 2011).

Contours of the Cultural Economy Theoretical Terrain: Critiques and Reformations

Over the past decade and a half, a critical literature on the cultural economy of the city has served both to repudiate key assumptions and prescriptive features of the creative class construct, with Jamie Peck's stringent critique ('Struggling with the Creative Class', 2005) an influential example, and more importantly to advance lively ideas toward more robust theory and progressive possibilities of cultural governance and policy. Ann Markusen (2006), for instance, endorsed Florida's emphasis on occupations as a particularly fruitful line of analysis in the production of new theory and policies for the cultural economy, but was sharply critical of what she saw as a failure to draw distinctions between important sub-categories

within broad occupational groups. Other contributions include a renewed emphasis on the positionality of artists, on the centrality of production to an understanding of the growth dynamics of the cultural economy, on the saliency of agency and institutions, on the crucial role of 'space' and the built environment as the territorial basis for cultural development, and on the more heterodox field of creativity and its inherent contradictions and subjectivities. I draw on a selection of work in these fields to suggest the outline of a more compelling theoretical proposition (or propositions), emphasizing production and labor relations and including an acknowledgement of the political economy of cultural programming.

Allen Scott's proposal for an ascendant 'cognitive-cultural economy' as descriptor of an emergent industrial régime among advanced economies follows his extended lineage of scholarship on production, shaped in large part by the synergies (and dislocations) of culture, science, and technology. Like Florida (and Daniel Bell in his seminal treatment of *The Coming of Postindustrial Society* [1973]), Scott constructs his model around a framework of occupational divisions. But rather than presenting an ebullient forecast of creative workers performing satisfying work in cities and communities shaped largely around their preferences, there is a more critical acknowledgement of hierarchy and inequality generated by new divisions of labor among advanced societies, which calls into serious question the assumptions of wholly positive synergy inherent in a conflation of cultural industries and labor formation within the creative cities script.

Scott's model of divisions of labor within the cognitive-cultural economy comprises two major tiers, each encompassing multiple subdivisions. Within an 'upper tier' we find managers, professionals, business and financial analysts, scientific researchers, technicians, skilled crafts workers, artists, and designers. A closer look at these categories reveals a managerial cohort, which controls production systems, and a complementary cohort of 'skilled analysts and other professionals' (67), largely following the structure of the 'new middle class' of the post-industrial era (Ley 1996; Hamnett 2003). Then there is a third contingent of workers in the scientific field, which corresponds roughly to Bell's dominant social class described in his seminal sociological forecast of 1973, and then a fourth aggregate whose members perform as 'intermediaries' within the increasingly intimate networks of production and consumption among advanced economies.

A fifth cohort of workers within Scott's cognitive-cultural economy model comprises a key element of creative labor, endowed with 'well-honed

artistic and intellectual sensibilities', principally engaged in the production of goods imbued with high levels of symbolic content, and operating in realms 'where such matters as fashion, meaning, entertainment value, look, and feel, are decisive factors in shaping consumers' choices about the products they buy' (Scott 2008: 67).

But the artists, designers, and other creatives, together with the managerial, professional, scientific, and technical workers who make up the 'upper tier' of the cognitive-cultural economy, comprise privileged strata of the cognitive-cultural economy, in stark contrast to the generally low remuneration, insecurity of tenure, and parlous working conditions experienced by the very numerous 'lower tier' segment of the binary world of labor Scott describes. Representatives of this unfavored aggregate include workers in such fields as retail and personal services, janitorial and custodial work, housecleaning, and childcare. As a further elaboration of the bifurcation of the labor market, there is a widening gap in terms of incomes, benefits, and career prospects between workers in the upper- and lower-tiers of the emergent economy and labor force of the twenty-first-century metropolis, which Scott attributes both to mimicry of alleged 'best practice' in cultural planning and more generally to the neo-liberal turn in governance and politics.

Stefan Krätke extends the general line of Scott's critique of the creative class script by delineating more stringently the role of specific occupations in processes of innovation and creativity, while offering original theoretical insights on the dynamics of urban-regional development in his monograph on *The Creative Capital of Cities: interactive knowledge creation and the urbanization economies of innovation* (Wiley-Blackwell 2011). Krätke's analysis and retheorization includes a sober deconstruction of class and occupation, and a rejection of the idea that the substantial numbers of professionals in finance, property, and consulting are on balance complementary to the creative impulse of artists and designers. Rather, he asserts that these business professionals for the most part 'represent a "dealer class" in a finance-dominated and increasingly speculative model of capitalist development' (2011: 42), and recalls Schumpeter's argument that only a small fraction of entrepreneurs and managers 'can be described as "creative"; the vast majority are instead mere imitators of familiar routines, business models and product configurations' (2011: 44).

Krätke advocates for a deeper consideration of critical factors of innovation and creativity, grounded in the workings and interactions of capital, networks, institutions, and social factors, together with the specificities of

place which shape the trajectories of urban economies among advanced capitalist societies. Agglomeration is accorded a central role in the development of urban economies, comprising 'localization economies' (in the form of intra-industrial externalities within local-regional clusters of firms at the level of specific industries); and 'urbanization economies' (in the form of positive externalities associated with the diversity of industries and firms situated within particular cities and urban territories) (2011: 93). Krätke insists, however, that these 'factors' are not abstract economic constructs which shape economic development in cities and regions, but rather are nested within capitalist ideologies and régimes of capital accumulation, and thus he endorses a stringent political economy viewpoint in assessing both causality and outcomes.

Five Analytic Fields of the Cultural Economy of the City

The discourse on culture, creativity, and the city continues to expand, forming a substantial feature of the broader urban studies literatures in geography, sociology, anthropology, planning, political science, and media studies among others, and reframing the narratives of critical urban studies. This section concludes with a summary description of a model of the 'analytical fields' of the cultural economy prepared by Andy Pratt and me, in which we attempt to synthesize some of the diversity of scholarship (and complexity of development tendencies) in the field. First, the cultural economy and creative employment have been increasingly inserted within discourses of global cities, following a period during which 'the creative economy was absent about debates about global cities' (Pratt and Hutton 2013: 5), in the face of a consistent privileging of banking, finance, and corporate control. Over the last decade or so, however, culture has been accorded an important place within the global city discourse, exemplified by Peter Hall's inclusion of culture and creativity within the 'polycentric global city' (Hall 2006).

A second element of the cultural cities discourse encompasses the complex development narratives of the cultural-historic city, including examples such as Beijing, Hanoi, Malacca, Rome, Florence, Dresden, and Paris. These cities differ greatly in terms of scale and histories, and in many cases have been subverted by experiences of colonialism and other practices of exploitation and erasure. In each case, there are instructive complements and contradictions between the socially constructed values of culture and the contemporary appropriation of historic cultural capital by state agencies and market actors.

As a further elucidation, culture can be experienced for its intrinsic values and material qualities but is increasingly deployed instrumentally by the state in the quest for enhanced competitive advantage, and in particular as a 'hook' for foreign direct investment (FDI). A useful starting point is Paul Knox's observation of the value of place 'as a unique product differentiator' (2012: 91), and its deployment as resource, both for attracting high-value creative talent and enterprise and more exigently for propulsive firms in lead industries such as biotechnology, medical sciences, and pharmaceuticals. This practice can lead to cultural dissonance, in setting up contestation among groups committed to preserving the authenticity of culture for intrinsic purposes values, on the one hand, and on the other, state and corporate agencies anxious to (selectively) appropriate cultural 'assets' for marketing and promotional purposes, as Marguerite van den Berg has demonstrated (2015) in the Rio de Janeiro case.

The value of culture in social regeneration represents a fourth analytic field of urban studies and community development studies. There is certainly a profusion of programs and practices associated with culture in social development. But common to most progressive models is both recognition of cultural relayering and a need to give voice to indigenous cultures in post-colonial societies, and, relatedly, a commitment to inclusiveness in globalizing cities. Just as one particular example, Eleanora Pasotti has described a particular innovation, within which the mayor of Bogatá encouraged cultural inclusiveness as an instrument of a more progressive political model and civic culture within the varied social spaces and landscapes of the capital (Pasotti: 'Brecht in Bogotá: how cultural policy transformed a clientilist political culture' [2013]) For this analytic field we suggest that cultural planning is used as a 'means to a better city, not an end in itself' (Pratt and Hutton 2013: 91).

A final category within our depiction of five analytic fields of the cultural economy concerns the use of culture as industrial policy. Scholarly appreciations of the centrality of culture to urban-regional development and to national economies has (selectively, at least) informed the construction of industrial policies and programs. These have been important features of development policy among the mature economies of the European Union and are now increasingly part of the policy repertoire of states within the 'growth economies' of East Asia (Daniels et al. 2012).

Each of these five categories situated within our 'analytical fields' of the cultural economy of the city suggests the importance of culture and creativity to urban development and necessarily to urban studies. And

here I affirm that research on the contribution of culture and creativity to urban development must also account systematically for the many aspects of inequality which derive from the rise of culture as an increasingly mainstream element of the urban-regional economy.

Cultural Work, Urban Labor Markets, and Inequality

Here I set out a frame for addressing key labor aspects of the cultural economy of the city, acknowledging contributions of culture and creativity to the city expressed in enterprise formation, employment opportunities, and local regeneration, but underscoring more problematic features. I start with more general tendencies of production systems and urban labor markets, employment formation under neo-liberalism, which forms the larger context for understanding inequality in creative work. This is important, first as creative enterprise now comprises a significant element of the economy at large among advanced societies, in terms of industries, institutions, and production networks, and second the scale of cultural employment within many cities is large enough to influence the overall tendency toward greater inequality within labor markets. Following this preliminary discussion I then discuss inequality as it pertains more specifically to the cultural economy labor force.

There is a substantial literature addressing the many forms of inequality within the labor force of advanced economies following the introduction of neo-liberal programs in the 1980s, including policies to restrict the membership and collective bargaining power of workers, recurrent government confrontation with unions in both the private and public sectors, and support for the market sector players in their attempts to drive down the price of labor (Peck and Theodore 2015). The introduction of flexible specialization as production modality among advanced economies has facilitated the paring down of the permanent workforce in many industries, with companies deploying labor for certain specialized tasks and production runs over finite periods. Pervasive outsourcing has become part and parcel of these modalities, with companies engaged in a relentless search for cheaper labor, initially for lower-skill workers capable of performing standardized tasks, but increasingly involving more skilled labor as the employment base of developing economies in China and the Global South experiences upgrading. Taken together, these tendencies produce downward pressure on wages for all but the most skilled and

essential workers, and increasing precariousness for many others (Gill and Pratt 2008).

Structures and Systems of Cultural Labor

For many, cultural work is a satisfying and rewarding experience. Creative enterprise offers rich opportunities for self-expression, identity formation, and productive and satisfying employment. As Ho observes, cultural work comprises a lively and important domain of the overall urban labor market, 'where personalities define products, or the interpersonal influences play a significant role in the work process, and a way of life represents an integral part of the production process' (Ho 2009: 1187).

But the cultural economy also generates inequality. The cultural labor comprises a relatively small number of well-remunerated, élite creatives at the top and a large base of mostly younger workers at the base, reflecting the occupational structure of cultural activity. As K.C. Ho observes, 'there is a rather wide base of artists at the production end; their diverse efforts are at the entry level of the creative economy and therefore can be seen as the efforts of a creative proletariat' (Ho 2009: 1188). The cultural labor force represents a large element of the persistent informalism which characterizes the economies of both 'advanced' and 'transitional' cities (Williams 2015).

High-status creatives and professionals are to an extent at least price-setters, with examples being élite architects, visual artists, and musical performers who benefit from affluent markets attuned to the signification value of cultural products, while the large majority of younger cultural workers are price-takers for the most part. Supply conditions also play into the inequality issue, as the large number of younger entrants to many cultural fields tends to suppress prices for labor. Indeed many younger creatives work gratis to gain experience, add useful entries for their CVs, or demonstrate talents and skills to prospective employers.

Contingent Labor and Precarity in the Cultural Economy of the City

Many cultural industries figure prominently in the growth of contingent work, shaped in part by an increase in outsourcing, and thus contributing to precarious labor formation. At the higher end of the cultural work scale and enterprise structure, notably in the advertising and branding

industries, creative work is undertaken not solely within the firm, but rather within what Gernot Grabher (2001) describes as fluid 'project ecologies', in which teams drawn from multiple companies and freelancers are assembled to undertake specific assignments—an observation derived from interviews conducted in London and Munich. Relatedly urban development planning and project management is typically undertaken by teams, with specialists drawn from the creative professions such as architecture, urban design, landscape architecture, civil engineering, and digital communications (Hesmondalgh and Baker 2013). This collaborative work among creative professionals may be undertaken in situ, although increasingly communications such as Skype and Facetime are used to avoid the high cost of assembling team members in one specific place for the duration of the project.

Increasingly cultural industry firms are able to commission labor for specific tasks offshore, even at the higher-skill levels of work. Glen Norcliffe and Oliver Rendace (2003) have described the transition of work on comic book production from the 1930s to the 1980s, within which specialized creation/production tasks were undertaken in-house, notably in New York and Los Angeles, to a post-Fordist model of 'neo-artisanal' production utilizing spatially disparate workers supplying work by digital transmission to a senior editor. More recently Elliot Siemiatycki, Trevor Barnes and I (2015) have studied video game producers in Vancouver who increasingly source drawings from Chinese artists, with overall quality achieved from these offshore producers close to what could be generated locally, but at a fraction of the cost.

Production–Consumption Relations and Structures of Inequality in the Cultural Economy

A further dimension of inequality is associated with the nature of production–consumption relations in the cultural economy. In an era of post-Fordism, within which the semblance of balance between affluent consumers and production workers making at least a living wage has been sundered by rollbacks in bargaining power and earnings, there is a widening gap between those producing and consuming culture (Gill and Pratt 2008). The garment and fashion industries represent a particularly telling case, with production in all but the haute couture range increasingly situated in low-wage settings, where working conditions are poor, exploitation of workers rife, and safety provisions rudimentary and routinely compromised.

There are complex gender as well as class issues at play (see McDowell 2015 for an insightful historical perspective), as Angela McRobbie has observed in the women's fashion sector, which favors affluent consumers over (mostly) poorly paid labor with few benefits or protections. In an influential essay ('Bridging the Gap: feminism, fashion and consumption' 1997) McRobbie explicates what she terms the 'social relations of consumption' by interrogating 'how different groups of women, from different class and ethnic backgrounds, actually experience this thing called consumption' (1997: 73). She acknowledges that there are to be sure positive socio-cultural relations, as in the intergenerational transfer of skills 'handed down' from mothers to daughters, as disclosed in her panels of interviews. But she concludes that the exclusion from consumption 'can be a profoundly politicizing process which forces young people to confront the meaning of class, gender and ethnicity in their own homes, neighbourhoods, schools and shopping centres' (1997: 82).

Culture and Creativity in the 'New' New International Division of Labor

As the 1970s and 1980s were characterized by a new international division of production labor, favoring a shift of Fordist manufacturing capacity and labor to the growth economies of East Asia, the past two decades have seen the growth of a new international division of services labor, including call centers in India among other examples. Increasingly, too, there is a 'new international division of cultural labor', within which quite sophisticated artwork and design tasks can be sourced within areas of relatively low wages, as the example of artwork for video game firms demonstrates. This tendency offers to be sure opportunity for these creative workers in developing/transitional regions and may contribute to the economies of their communities and regions, but places additional pressures on suppliers of creative work within cities and labor markets of the (so-called) developed world.

'Extensification' and the Overflow of Cultural Work

The demands of creative work and cultural markets often promote the 'extensification' or overspill of cultural labor from the 'normal quotidian' of the workplace to home, especially disadvantaging women who continue to bear greater domestic responsibilities than their partners.

Helen Jarvis and Andy Pratt have studied the overflow of work among new media professionals and workers in the case of San Francisco, one of the principal bastions of the cultural economy in the US. Drawing on work that examines tendencies in the service sector and in creative work more specifically, Jarvis and Pratt identified three themes which contribute to work overflow: (1) longer hours of work; (2) the growing number of women in full-time work; and (3) the 'normalization' of dual-earner structures within households. An important aspect of gender inequality is represented by the fact that even as women have closed the gap with men in terms of hours worked, they continue to support 'the majority of the social reproduction burden' (Jarvis and Pratt 2006: 333).

Space, Culture, and Inequality in the City

Inequality in the cultural economy is shaped both by the nature of creative work as well as larger labor market tendencies, and is exacerbated by the qualities of space in the city. More specifically, processes of capital relayering, social upgrading, and industrial succession each represents key aspects of change which tend to be associated with 'space and place' in the revalorizing city. The cultural economy figures prominently in successive rounds of upgrading and displacement, from the role of artists as 'pioneer gentrifiers' in the post-industrial city (Ley 2003), and more recently the incursion of professional creative firms in the city, to the displacements ensuing from a movement of creative IT firms to the revalorized spaces of the city. An appreciation of these outcomes, together with an understanding of the dislocative effects of systems of cultural activity in place, can usefully inform new theoretical enterprise in locating the positionality of culture and creativity in the city.

Elements of the cultural economy can be located across disparate zones and spaces of the city. New industries and start-ups combining synergies of creativity, technology, and entrepreneurship can be found within the office complex of the CBD and CBD fringe, in some cases reoccupying premises vacated by mainstream business service firms (Hutton 2008 [2010]). Important cultural institutions such as galleries, museums, and higher education tend to be concentrated within the city proper, although suburban areas are increasingly preferred venues for new institutional initiatives, reflecting in part recognition of cultural practices and innovation 'in place'. There are also significant—albeit chronically understudied—numbers of creative workers, institutions, and enterprises within

suburban (and indeed exurban) spaces, including visual artists, musicians, and performers of various kinds, as Brian Hracs (2009) has demonstrated in his case study of Indie musician cultures and practices in Scarborough, in the Greater Toronto region. Advances in digital communications and production systems have also enabled the (co)production, marketing, and distribution of a growing range of cultural products over distance.

But the cultural economy of the city is highly concentrated within the post-industrial inner city, owing to a complex range of factors including agglomeration economies, qualities of space and the built environment, institutional factors, social density, and legacies which include rich (and contested) resources of 'memory and meaning' for many artists and other creatives (Crinson 2005). These represent potent and durable factors of attraction and affinity which are nonetheless subject to re-formation as circumstances change, shaped by market, institutional, and social factors. There is a particularly rich literature on the emergence of culture and creativity as lead trajectory of redevelopment within the inner city, including monographs on important case studies [see Michael Indergaard (2004) for 'Silicon Alley' in Mid-Manhattan, and Richard Lloyd for Wicker Park in Chicago (2006)], case studies in edited books (e.g. Bell and Jayne 2004); collections of cases for edited special journal issues (Hutton 2009 in *Urban Studies*); treatments of interdependency between the inner city and creative work and enterprise (Drake 2003, Helbrecht 2004; Hutton 2008/2010); and influential articles on important case studies in journals [see for example Pier Luigi Sacco and Giorgio Tavano Blessi on the Bicocca project in Milan (2009); Pedro Costa on the saliency of the inner city as 'creative milieu' in Lisbon (2010); Andy Pratt (2009) and Andrew Harris (2012) on cultural industries in the important Hoxton and Shoreditch experiences; and Maria d'Ovidio and Marc Pradel's comparison of progressive fashion co-ops in Barcelona and Milan (2013)].

Although there is then a well-established (and well-documented) research literature on the affinity of creative enterprise and cultural work for the inner city, there are at the same time more problematic aspects to acknowledge, including both pervasive and contingent effects of dislocation and inequality. Sharon Zukin, notably, has contributed to the narrative of inequality associated with culture and the inner city (Arthurs 2013), including both the conflicts of community-based culture and the dislocations and distortions produced by market players and the state, in *The Cultures of Cities* (1995), and more specifically the gentrification tendencies of adaptive re-use within the aestheticized spaces of the inner city

in her path-breaking treatment of *Loft Living* (1989). As Zukin recounts, property market players have been adroit in capturing the cultural value of heritage inner city landscapes and buildings, revalorizing spaces of the city, and injecting a robust price inflation trajectory which in turn shape upgrading and displacement.

Upgrading tendencies associated with the growth of the cultural economy in the city encompasses both social and industrial dimensions. At the broader urban system scale, Bradley Bereitschaft (2014) has studied the effects of 'creative-cultural districts' (CCDs) in the USA over the period 2000–2010. He finds that CCDs have succeeded in attracting 'high-skill, high-wage creative-knowledge workers' at levels significantly higher than their respective metropolitan areas as a whole, in effect creating enclaves of prosperity and consumption within the spaces of the city. But this upgrading tendency also generates overspill pressure on land prices, indirectly producing social dislocation in the city. And recently Heeyeun Yoon and Elizabeth Currid-Halkett (2014) have described the varying fortunes of cultural enterprise in West Chelsea, New York, in which more recent firms have exhibited greater 'survival rates' than earlier ones, implying another form of upgrading and industrial gentrification.

John Paul Catungal, Deborah Leslie, and Yvonne Hii (2009) have identified displacement associated with cultural industry development in the Toronto case at three scales: at the level of the city, the neighborhood, and the precinct itself. Their study site is Liberty Village, a brownfield district on the western margins of the downtown that has transitioned from site of manufacturing and other heavy industry, to a mixed-space of design industries, new media, film, television, and advertising. As in Zukin's account of the experience in Manhattan, property market agencies and actors have successfully co-opted the latent heritage values of Liberty Village in an aggressive marketing campaign featuring adaptive re-use of obsolescent industrial buildings for upscale lofts. There is an important institutional vehicle for promoting property interests, in the form of the Liberty Village Business Improvement Area (LVBIA), whose activities include lobbying for infrastructural improvements, rebranding, and marketing, arguably at the expense of the original community of artists, whose market power and access to capital is appreciably lesser than that of the LVBIA. Further, the de facto displacement of artists from their original habitat within Liberty Village has a corollary effect, in the overspill inflation of property values in the adjacent working-class community of Parkdale, underscoring the wider arena of displacement associated with the cultural economy trajectory in the city.

Conclusion: Cultural Labor, Creative Work, and Inequality

For this chapter I have tried to set out the contours of the cultural economy of the city, informed by efforts undertaken in this century to offer new conceptual architecture for the purposes of theory-building, as a means of working toward a greater understanding of the many facets of inequality produced by industrial innovation and restructuring. At the broadest level inequality within systems of creative work is part and parcel of the dislocations produced by neo-liberalism. Inequality in the cultural economy of the city is associated in the first instance with the particular profile of creative employment and labor: a pyramidal structure quite different from the segmented office workforce (executives, managers and professionals, technical and clerical workers) of the 'services' or 'postindustrial' city of the last century. But there are also many complex and subtle forms of inequality, associated with class, gender, race, ethnicity, and demographic factors.

Among the difficulties of theory, and more especially accounting for the influence of culture in the city, are the more complex structures and fluid spatiality of contemporary cities. The centerpieces of the city of the Chicago School comprised extensive industrial districts of manufacturing and ancillary warehousing and distribution, and a social corollary of working-class communities generally proximate to zones of production and warehousing. The collapse of the industrial city commencing in the 1970s was certainly accompanied by a visceral debate over political economy, including the destructive role of neo-liberal agendas at national government levels. But for theoretical purposes there was at least a quite discernible binary construction of space: the CBD and its high-rise office complex and stratified labor force as the dominant growth site, and fields of disinvestment, massive labor-shedding, and dislocations within industrial areas of the metropolis.

In contrast, the cultural economy is located within central areas of the city (major museums, galleries, and the like) and is strongly represented within the old inner city industrial zone; but creative work also infiltrates a far more diverse array of spaces, production systems, and social domains (including households). The insidious gentrification processes of the 1970s and 1980s, associated with occupational restructuring and class reformation and with pressures of the rent-gap within the revalorized spaces of the city (Lees et al. 2008), have been supplanted by new experi-

ences of globalization and capital relayering (Harvey 2001), including the wealth of transnational élites in residential areas of cities such as London, San Francisco, and Sydney (Butler and Lees 2006), and the emergence of global techno/cultural corporations such as Microsoft, Apple, Google, and Facebook.

The tenure of creative enterprise and work in the (post)industrial spaces of globalizing cities is also recurrently subverted by 'industrial gentrification' and insistent upgrading and dislocation. Cultural production, coproduction, marketing, and transmission are also especially susceptible to outsourcing, to digital transmission, and to e-retailing, further complicating the landscapes (and theory) of the cultural economy, and placing new pressures on the systems of creative work, as well as generating social dislocation and cultural dissonance (Knox 2010). These systemic fault lines into question the facile assumptions underpinning the conflation of 'creative cities' and the cultural economy of the city. The research presented here discloses deep and varied experiences of inequality and dislocation as well as synergy. What is needed now for both theory building and more progressive policy interventions is a commitment to rigorous and imaginative comparative study, linking the cultural economy and 'creative cities' to larger processes of growth and change, including institutional factors (Storper 2013), to issues of governance and neoliberalism (Romein and Trip 2013; Theodore and Peck 2015), to policy mimicry associated with the search for 'best practice' in the face of persistent localism and contingency (Prince 2010), and to the varied cultural experiences of globalization and transnationalism (Appadurai 1996; Smith 2001; Shortell 2014).

Bibliography

Amin, Ash, and Stephen Graham. 1997. The Ordinary City. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 22: 411–429.

Amin, Ash, and Nigel Thrift (ed). 2004. *The Blackwell Cultural Economy Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Appadurai, Arjun. 1996. *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Arthurs, Kerry E. 2013. *Creative Cities, Creative Spaces, and Urban Policy: The Impact of Regulations on Artist-Run Centres and Independent Art Spaces in Vancouver, British Columbia*. Unpub. MA Thesis, Centre for Human Settlements, School of Community & Regional Planning, University of British Columbia: Vancouver.

Bell, Daniel. 1973. *The Coming of Postindustrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting*. New York: Basic Books.

Bell, Daniel, and Mark Jayne. 2004. *City of Quarters: Urban Villages in the Contemporary City*. Aldershot, UK: Asgate.

Bereitschaft, Bradley. 2014. Neighbourhood Change Among Creative-Cultural Districts in Mid-Size U.S. Metropoloitan Areas, 2000-2010. *Regional Studies, Regional Science* 1: 158–183.

Brook, Timothy, and Hy V. Luong (ed). 1997. *Culture and Economy: The Shaping of Capitalism in East Asia*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Butler, Tim, and Loretta Lees. 2006. Supergentrification in Barnsbury, London: Globalization and Gentrifying Global Elites at the Neighbourhood Level. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 31: 467–487.

Catungal, John P., Deborah Leslie, and Yvonne Hii. 2009. Geographies of Displacement in the Creative City: The Case of Liberty Village, Toronto. *Urban Studies* 46: 1095–1114.

Costa, Pedro. 2010. Creative Milieus and Urban Governance: A Typology Based on Ten Case Studies in Lisbon, Barcelona and São Paulo. Paper Presented to the 16th Annual Conference on Cultural Economics, Copenhagen 9–12 June.

Crinson, Mark (ed). 2005. *Urban Memory: History and Amnesia in the Modern City*. Abingdon (Oxon): Routledge.

D'Ovidio, Marianna, and Marc Pradel. 2013. Social Innovation and Institutionalisation in the Cognitive-Cultural Economy: Two Contrasting Experiences from Southern Europe. *Cities* 33: 69–76.

Daniels, Peter W., K.C. Ho, and Thomas A. Hutton (ed). 2012. *New Economic Spaces in Asian Cities: From Industrial Restructuring to the Cultural Turn*. Abingdon (Oxon): Routledge.

Dear, Michael, and Steven Flusty. 1999. Postmodern Urbanism. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 88: 50–72.

Drake, Graham. 2003. 'This Place Gives Me Space': Place and Creativity in the Creative Industries. *Geoforum* 34: 511–524.

Florida, Richard. 2002. *The Rise of the Creative Class: And How Its Transforming Work, Leisure, Community and Everyday Life*. New York: Basic Books.

Fröbel, Folker, Jürgen Heinrichs, and Otto Kreye. 1980. *The New International Division of Labour*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gill, Rosalind, and Andy C. Pratt. 2008. Precarity and Cultural Work: In the Social Factory? Immaterial Labour, Precariousness and Cultural Work. *Theory, Culture & Society* 25: 1–30.

Glaeser, Edward. 2011. *Triumph of the City: How Our Greatest Invention Makes Us Richer, Smarter, Happier and Healthier*. New York: Penguin.

Glaeser, Edward L., Jed Kolko, and Albert Saiz. 2001. Consumer City. *Journal of Economic Geography* 1: 27–50.

Goto, Kazuko. 2012. Craft and Creativity: New Economic Spaces in Kyoto. In *New Economic Spaces in Asian Cities: From Industrial Restructuring to the Cultural Turn*, ed. Peter W. Daniels, K.C. Ho, and Thomas A. Hutton, 87–101. Abingdon (Oxon): Routledge.

Grabher, G. 2001. 'Ecologies of Creativity: the Village, the Group, and the Heterarchic Organisation of the British Advertising Industry', *Environment and Planning A*: 33: 351–374.

Graham, Steven, and Simon Marvin. 2001. *Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructures, Technological Mobilities, and the Urban Condition*. London: Routledge.

Greater London Authority (GLA). 2012. *World Cities Cultural Report*. London: GLA and the Office of the Mayor.

Grodach, Carl, and Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris. 2007. Cultural Development Strategies and Urban Revitalization: A Survey of U.S. Cities. *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 13: 349–370.

Grodach, Carl, and Daniel Silver (ed). 2013. *The Politics of Urban Cultural Planning*. Abingdon (Oxon): Routledge.

Hall, Peter G. 1998. *Cities in Civilisation*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

———. 2000. Creative Cities and Economic Development. *Urban Studies* 37: 639–651.

———. 2006. *The Polycentric City*, PowerPoint Presentation. London: The Bartlett School, University College London.

Hamnett, Chris. 2003. *Unequal City: London in the Global Arena*. London: Routledge.

Harris, Andrew. 2012. Art and Gentrification: Pursuing the Urban Pastoral in Hoxton, London. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 37: 226–241.

Harvey, David. 2001. *Spaces of Capital: Toward a Critical Geography*. London: Routledge.

Helbrecht, Ilse. 2004. Bare Geographies in Knowledge Societies-Creative Cities as Text and Art: Two Eyes, One Vision. *Built Environment* 30: 191–200.

Hesmondalgh, David. 2007. *The Cultural Industries*. London: Sage.

Hesmondalgh, David, and Sarah Baker. 2013. *Creative Labour: Media Work in Three Industries*. Abingdon (Oxon): Routledge.

Ho, Kong Chong 2009. The Neighbourhood in the Creative Economy: Policy, Practice and Space in Singapore. *Urban Studies* 46: 1187–1202.

Hracs, Brian. 2009. Beyond Bohemia: Geographies of Everyday Creativity for Musicians in Toronto. In *Spaces of Vernacular Creativity: Rethinking the Cultural Economy*, ed. Tim Edensor, Deborah Leslie, Steve Millington, and Norma Rantisi, 75–88. London: Routledge.

Hutton, Thomas A. 2000. Reconstructed Production Landscapes in the Postmodern City: Applied Design and Creative Services in the Metropolitan Core. *Urban Geography* 21: 285–317.

———. 2004. The New Economy of the Inner City. *Cities* 21: 89–108.

———. 2006. Spatiality, Built Form and Creative Industry Development in the Inner City. *Environment and Planning A* 38: 1819–1841.

———. 2009. Editor for special theme issue of *Urban Studies*: 'Trajectories of the New Economy', 46, Numbers 5 & 6.

———. 2010 (2008). *The New Economy of the Inner City: Restructuring, Regeneration and Dislocation in the Twenty-First-Century City*. London: Routledge.
———. 2015. *Cities and the Cultural Economy*. Abingdon (Oxon): Routledge Critical Introductions to Urbanism and the City.
Indergaard, Michael. 2004. *Silicon Alley: The Rise and Fall of a New Media District*. London: Routledge.
Jarvis, Helen, and Andy C. Pratt. 2006. Bringing It All Back Home: The Extensification and 'Overflowing' of Work. The Case of San Francisco's New Media Households. *Geoforum* 37: 331–339.
Kim, Won Bae, Mike Douglass, Sang Chuel Choe, and Kong Chong Ho (ed). 1997. *Culture and the City in East Asia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Knox, Paul. 1987. The Social Reproduction of the Built Environment: Archiects, Architecture and the Post-modern City. *Progress in Human Geography* 11: 354–377.
———. 2010. *Cities and Design*. London: Routledge Critical Introductions to Urbanism and the City.
———. 2012. *Palimpsests: Biographies of 50 City Districts*. Basel: Birkhauser Verlag.
Krätke, Stefan. 2011. *The Creative Capital of Cities. Interactive Knowledge Creation and the Urbanization Economies of Innovation*. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Lees, Loretta, Tom Slater, and Elvin Wyly. 2008. *Gentrification*. London: Routledge.
Ley, David F. 1996. *The New Middle Class and the Remaking of the Central City*. Oxford: Geographical and Environmental Studies, OUP.
———. 2003. Artists, Aestheticization and the Field of Gentrification. *Urban Studies* 40: 2527–2544.
Lloyd, Richard. 2006. *Neo-Bohemia: Art and Commerce in the Postindustrial City*. New York: Routledge.
Markusen, Ann. 2006. Urban Development and the Politics of a Creative Class: Evidence from a Study of Artists. *Environment and Planning A* 38: 1921–1940.
Massey, Doreen, and Richard Meegan. 1980. Industrial Restructuring Versus the Cities. In *The Inner City: Employment and Industry*, ed. Alan Evans, and David Eversley. London: Heinemann.
McDowell, Linda. 2015. The Lives of Others: Body Work, the Production of Difference, and Labor Geographies. *Economic Geography* 91: 1–23.
Mckenzie, Murray, and Thomas Hutton. 2015. Culture-Led Regeneration in the Post-industrial Built Environment: Complements and Contradictions in Victory Square, Vancouver. *Journal of Urban Design* 20: 8–27.
McRobbie, Angela. 1997. Bridging the Gap: Feminism, Fashion and Consumption. *Feminist Studies* 55: 73–89.
Miles, Malcolm. 2007. *Cities and Culture*. Abingdon (Oxon): Routledge Introductions to Urbanism and the City.

Norcliffe, Glen, and Olivero Rendace. 2003. New Geographies of Comic Book Production in North America: The New Artisan, Distancing, and the Periodic Social Economy. *Economic Geography* 79: 241–263.

Novy, Johannes, and Claire Colomb. 2013. Struggling for the Right to the (Creative) City in Berlin and Hamburg: New Urban Society, New 'Spaces of Hope'? *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 37: 1816–1838.

Pasotti, Eleonora. 2013. Brecht in Bogatá: How Cultural Policy Transformed a Clientalist Political Culture. In *The Politics of Urban Cultural Policy*, ed. Carl Grodach, and Daniel Silver. Abingdon (Oxon): Routledge.

Peck, Jamie. 2005. Struggling with the Creative Class. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 29: 750–770.

Peck, Jamie, and Nick Theodore. 2015. *Fast Policy: Experimental Statecraft at the Threshold of Neoliberalism*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Power, Dominic, and Allen J. Scott (ed). 2004. *Cultural Industries and the Production of Culture*. London: Routledge.

Pratt, Andy C. 1997. The Cultural Industries Production System: A Case Study of Employment Change in Britain. *Environment and Planning A* 29: 1953–1974.

———. 2009. Urban Regeneration: From the Arts 'Feel Good' Factor to the Cultural Economy: a Case Study of Hoxton, London. *Urban Studies* 46: 1041–1062.

———. 2014. *The Cultural Dimension*. London: Government Office for Science, Department of Business, Industry and Skills.

Pratt, Andy C., and Thomas A. Hutton. 2013. Reconceptualising the Relationship Between the Cultural Economy and the City. *Cities* 33: 86–95.

Prince, Russel. 2010. Policy Transfer as Policy Assemblage: Making Policy for the Creative Industries in New Zealand. *Environment and Planning A* 42: 169–186.

Romein, Arie, and Jan Jacob Trip. 2013. Notes of Discord: Urban Cultural Policy in the Confrontational City. In *The Politics of Urban Cultural Policy*, ed. Carl Grodach, and Daniel Silver, 54–68. Abingdon (Oxon): Routledge.

Sacco, Pierluigi L., and Giorgio Tavano Blessi. 2009. The Social Viability of Culture-Led Urban Transformation Processes: Evidence from the Bicocca District, Milan. *Urban Studies* 46: 1115–1136.

Scott, Allen J. 1997. The Cultural Economy of the City. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 21: 323–339.

———. 2000. *The Cultural Economy of Cities*. London: Sage.

———. 2008. *Social Economy of the Metropolis: Cognitive-Cultural Capitalism and the Global Resurgence of Cities*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Shaw, Kate. 2005. The Place of Alternative Culture and the Politics of its Protection in Berlin, Amsterdam and Melbourne. *Planning Theory and Practice* 6: 151–170.

———. 2013. Independent Creative Subcultures and Why They Matter. *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 19: 333–352.
Shortell, Timothy. 2014. *Everyday Globalization: A Spatial Semiotics of Immigrant Neighbourhoods in Brooklyn and Paris*. Abingdon (Oxon): Routledge Studies in Human Geography.
Siemiatycki, Elliot, Trevor Barnes, and Thomas Hutton. 2015. Trouble in Paradise: Vancouver's Second Life in the New Economy. *Urban Geography* 37: 183–201.
Smith, Michael P. 2001. *Transnational Urbanism: Locating Globalization*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Solnit, Rebecca, and Susan Schwartzenberg. 2000. *Hollow City: The Siege of San Francisco and the Crisis of American Urbanism*. London: Verso.
Storper, Michael. 2013. *The Keys to the City: How Economics, Institutions, Social Interaction, and Politics Shape Development*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Storper, Michael, and Robert Salais. 1997. *Worlds of Production: The Action Frameworks of the Economy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Surborg, Björn. 2006. Advanced Services, the New Economy and the Built Environment in Hanoi. *Cities* 23: 239–249.
Turner, Sarah. 2006. Hanoi's Ancient Quarter: 'Traditional Traders' in a Rapidly Transforming City. *Urban Studies* 46: 1203–1221.
Turok, Ivan. 2015. Redundant and Marginalized Spaces. In *Cities and Economic Change*, ed. Ronan Paddison, and Tom Hutton, 74–93. London: Sage.
Van den Berg, Marguerite. 2015. Imagineering the City. In *Cities and Economic Change*, ed. Ronan Paddison, and Tom Hutton, 162–177. London: Sage.
Williams, Colin C. 2015. Informal Economies. In *Cities and Economic Change*, ed. Ronan Paddison, and Tom Hutton, 108–124. London: Sage.
Yoon, Heeyeun, and Elizabeth Currid-Halkett. 2014. Industrial Gentrification in West Chelsea, New York: Who Survived and Who Did Not? Empirical Evidence from Discrete-Time Survival Analysis. *Urban Studies* 52: 20–49.
Zhong, Sheng. 2011. By Nature or Nurture: The Formation of New Economic Spaces in Shanghai. *Asian Geographer* 28: 33–49.
———. 2012a. New Economy Space, New Social Relations: M50 and Shanghai's New Art World in the Making. In *New Economic Spaces in Asian Cities: From Industrial Restructuring to the Cultural Turn*, ed. Peter W. Daniels, K.C. Ho, and Thomas A. Hutton, 166–183. Abingdon (Oxon): Routledge.
———. 2012b. Production, Creative Firms and Urban Space in Shanghai. *Culture Unbound* 4: 169–191.
Zukin, Sharon. 1989 (1982). *Loft Living: Culture and Capital in Urban Change*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
———. 1995. *The Cultures of Cities*. Oxford: Blackwell.

CHAPTER 3

Urban Inequality: Approaches and Narratives

Ferenc Gyuris

Introduction

Urban inequality belongs to the most popular and striking issues in current urban studies. This interest is fueled, first, by an array of remarkable social challenges over the last decades, such as increasing neighborhood segregation, a relative lack of housing projects for less affluent social groups and intensifying debates around the privatization of urban public spaces, all characteristic to the current neoliberal age. Second, the 2008 global crisis opened the way for considerable criticism on economic and social policies hallmarking the turn of the millennia at the global scale, as well as their underlying moral concept. The academia is no exception as is indicated by the seminal works of Joseph Stiglitz (2012) and Thomas Piketty (2014) in economics and Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett (2009) in life sciences, all having exerted strong impact on the political and public discourses as well,[1] on the challenges posed by increasing social disparity. Third, given that inequality is present in all human societies, it constitutes one of the most fundamental moral issues, about which virtually every human being has some experience and from which many suffer from.

[1] For an in-depth analysis of the impact of Wilkinson's and Pickett's book on the political discourse on social disparities see Gyuris (2014).

F. Gyuris (✉)
Department of Regional Science, Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE), Budapest, Hungary

U. Gerhard et al. (eds.), *Inequalities in Creative Cities*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95115-4_3

Inequality is, however, an essentially contested concept with many conflicting approaches and narratives. Furthermore, it has manifold political overtones and constitutes a notion around which a very vivid political discourse is going on. In both academic and political debates it serves as a forceful rhetoric weapon in the hands of actors following very different, even antagonistic interests, who try to permanently interpret or re-interpret the term in order to keep it fitting to various political agendas. Given the insoluble link between power and knowledge as well as politics and science, all these politically loaded debates have an imprint on academic discussions around inequality, which are, in return, also not free from the motivation of shaping the surrounding political discourse itself. This is not only a challenge for all academics tackling inequality, but, I believe, a possibility, too, to achieve a better and more sophisticated understanding of the manifold and necessarily situated meanings the term has. Hence, this chapter as well as the entire volume consciously and decidedly address the concept of inequality as a highly political one, where taking 'a view from nowhere and everywhere' (Bourdieu 2004, 116) is impossible and the traditional positivistic scholarly attitude of imitating a 'God's view' is more about misusing the credit of science, quite often in service of naturalizing problems (cf. Gleeson 2014), rather than seeking a 'neutral' and 'universally valid' interpretation.

For these reasons, the aim of this chapter is to reveal the complexity of urban inequalities through presenting the manifold ways it has been conceptualized and interpreted in related discourses, and to identify what creative city research can benefit from mobilizing these concepts. The chapter starts with the complex normative meanings of inequality, while underscoring its necessarily politicized nature, the main features of the political discourse emerging around it and the consequences of the latter for academic studies on disparities. In relation to this, I focus on how the situatedness of the researcher might influence the way he/she is dealing with disparities, and how this impact can be recorded and made transparent for the public. Thereafter I scrutinize what the 'urban' means in urban inequality and what conceptual and analytical issues should be considered correspondingly, including the challenges of operationalizing inequality in urban contexts. Finally, I present a historical overview of how the research on urban inequality has undergone considerable shifts in sense of approaches and narratives until having arrived at the contemporary debates on creative cities. During these steps, it is also my goal to identify major issues of debate that have utmost relevance for a more complex

understanding of urban inequality in the creative city, as well as some conceptual cavities, which might be best filled by analytical results derived from empirical case studies in creative cities.

Inequality: A Normative Issue with Contested Grammars

On a basic level, interpreting inequality requires a brief reference to the general roots of unequal social relations which, yet in various forms, exist in each society (Avelino and Rotmans 2009). These result not simply from attempts of certain individual actors to gain mastery over others, but from the very way society is organized. Dominance and differential evaluation are strongly interlinked with the division of labor in complex societies, and the resulting need to coordinate complex systems (Berreman 2001). Complex societies are common not only in having these features, however, but also in institutionalizing *specific* forms of asymmetric power structures and disparities. The maintenance of these is thus served by a multitude of institutional means, which include the legal system, law enforcement organizations and institutionalized economic interest groups as well as institutions of spiritual life (Assmann 2000) and education (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990; Bourdieu 1998), and even mass media, which as actors of the 'memory industry' (Meusburger 2011) play a crucial role in indoctrinating people to accepting the ruling order, including inequalities.

Inequality is, however, not just a phenomenon existing 'out there', but a highly normative concept, as is reflected by the intensive use of the term injustice in corresponding academic literature since the 1970s (Marston 2010), around which a broad and lively *political* discourse exists. In Foucaldian sense, this discourse is not only, in many cases maybe not even first, about understanding how and why disparities emerge and exert a major impact on our everyday lives. Instead, one of its main actual functions is that it serves as a discursive arena where political views can be expressed and made visible, both in the broader sense of politics as debating over social issues and in the much narrower sense of making arguments, and mobilizing actors, for or against concrete political projects. Moreover, beyond that this political discourse 'translate[s] struggles or systems of domination' (Foucault 1981, 53) in order to manifest or hide desires and aspirations, it becomes itself a precious object in political struggles, 'the object of desire … by which there is struggle', and 'which is to be seized' (ibid. 52–53).

It is actually a common feature of public discourses in general to offer opportunity for individuals to develop and express their individual identities as well as belonging to groups (Taylor 1994). Therefore, actors pursuing political goals can take advantage of discourses as means of convincing and mobilizing people and shaping political power relations. The discourse about urban inequality has an especially big potential for fulfilling a number of requirements which the literature in political science tendentiously regards as features of political discourses that are especially efficient in transferring political stances and mobilizing people. It focuses on an issue that concerns basic justice and thus has both definite political relevance and obvious importance for everyday life routines and practices of a huge number of people (cf. Rawls 1997). It tackles openly controversial questions, which are most efficient in raising the interests of people and motivating them to join and express their views (cf. Lazarsfeld 1939). This is because such questions discursively create conflicts, which, due to what Collins (1988) calls the positive functions of conflicts, help social groups to better feel their borders, strengthen their identity and motivate them to seek others with compatible views to find new allies.

Furthermore, given the explicitly claimed emancipatory attempts behind most contributions to the urban disparity discourse, it has the promise of democratic deliberation for many actors that usually have less or nearly insignificant influence on political decisions, offering them a public, non-tyrannical and politically equal discourse (Conover et al. 2002). This means that, unlike a number of highly exclusionary political discourses do, it seems to provide open access for diverse actors (Bohman 1996; Rawls 1997), or in other words, the possibility that they can freely express their preferences, so that the discussion cannot be 'coerced illegitimately' (Conover et al. 2002, 24; cf. Bohman 1996; Dahl 1989), and that they can feel they have relatively equal, or at least not immensely unequal, opportunities to influence the deliberation (Bohman 1996; Knight and Johnson 1997). In other words, the discourse on urban inequality looks like actively helping relatively powerless actors getting closer to the theoretical, and practically never achievable, condition of an 'ideal speech situation' a lá Habermas (1990).

A result of these is that academic contributions to the urban disparity discourse not simply concern a highly political issue, but automatically become politicized, since their meaning for the participants is positional and gained in the discourse itself according to how participants interpret them relative to so-far expressed views and their underlying political positions.

In my view scholars shall take this into consideration and try to formulate their statements correspondingly, accepting the necessarily political overtones those will gain in the discourse. This might be again not just a challenge but also a useful motivation for academic workers to consciously integrate *the political* in their related studies and statements. Furthermore, it is an efficient mean to reveal and emphasize the problematic nature of neo-positivist and neo-naturalist approaches and their underlying technoscientific ideology, which would easily result in naturalizing serious social problems by presenting their reasons, even if these could be avoided through realistic alternatives, as law-like regularities and 'objective' necessities (Gleeson 2014), and decisions driven by particular interests as 'rational' (Flyvbjerg 1998).

Realizing and accepting the political nature of the discourse on urban inequality, however, can also result in political intentions becoming dominant over the analytical, interpretative and explanatory potential that could be a major contribution of scholarly work to the discourse. This can open the way in academic research for specific 'grammars' of urban injustice, specific modes of reasoning as well as a particular language (MacLeod and McFarlane 2014), that utilizes highly emotive metaphors and rhetoric and hyperboles. A remarkable critique from an increasing number of scholars in the field is the widespread application of 'punitive and revanchist grammars' (ibid., 861), and what DeVerteuil et al. (2009) and DeVerteuil (2012) call the 'punitive trope' in contemporary literature on the topic. The issue goes far beyond that of individually different preferences of language use and ends up in many cases that hyperbolic grammars 'actively prevent us from seeing and examining' (MacLeod and McFarlane 2014, 862), for example, through overseeing or hiding well-functioning urban examples of the supportive and their relational connection to the punitive (DeVerteuil 2012). The widespread and regular use of harsh and much pessimistic vocabularies, for which, as Judd (2005) wittily underscores, urban scholars might increasingly look like 'end-times prophets', bear other problems, too. Putting equal sign between otherwise clearly not uncontestable means of 'zero tolerance' on the one hand and 'social cleansing' on the other hand (e.g. Smith 2001a), or, for instance, the asymmetric use of tear gas by the police against politically weak social groups and the mass physical destruction of human beings, is not simply tasteless to those indeed having lost relatives and friends in social cleansings in dark periods of human history, but gradually erodes the positive social impact of scholarly works about the obviously important

problem of urban inequality if readers increasingly feel that such works are hyperbolic and therefore seem to cry wolf.

I admit that harsh grammars and reductive slogans might be very efficient in helping various social groups to articulate struggle and form alliances (MacLeod and McFarlane 2014, 867), since they provide 'overarching political imaginaries to weave disparate struggles together' (Uitermark and Nicholls 2013). As a striking moral question emerges, however, to what extent the end shall justify the means, and who, how and on what basis has the right to decide that certain struggles of certain actors *rightly* rely on reductive concepts and interpretations of a complex world, while others do not. Similarly, the construction of the notion of 'the people', contrasted to a 'ruling elite', as a stable point of reference and self-justification indisputably proves very useful in maintaining political alliances (cf. Iveson 2013). This is also exemplified by the widespread and politically efficient use of likewise reductive and even hyperbolic claims of some urban protest movements, such as the slogan 'We are the 99 percent' of the Occupy Wall Street movement (Sharlet 2011; We Are The 99 Percent n.d.), implying that beyond the one percent constituted by a superrich business elite the whole remaining, and presumably very heterogeneous, ninety-nine percent is represented by the movement. Yet the question remains open under what circumstances and in what sense could such a vocabulary and argumentation better be justified than the, in my view absolutely rightly, criticized attempts of neoliberal urban policymakers to present projects actually in favor of specific political and business groups as 'public interest' (Sandercock 1998). In other words, how the threat of, in Slater's (2012) apt formulation, 'decision-based evidence-making', and unnecessary exaggerations, so widespread in arguments for a number of neoliberal urban projects, can be avoided in academic work, too, without turning away the attention from the complex and indeed much important social *problems* that are present in contemporary cities, and to possible cures for them.

Handling inequality and injustice as highly political and necessarily politicized categories also has the benefit for academic work to shed light to the crucial need of taking into consideration the perspectives of those concerned by disparity in order to gain a more sophisticated understanding of the concept, and one with more practical relevance. Of special importance is to go beyond the leading post-World War II concepts of disparity, both social liberal (Rawls 1971) and libertarian (Nozick 1974), in most capitalist countries in the Western Bloc, especially in Western Europe, which, in

line with then dominating notions of the welfare state, considered inequality and social injustice as matters of *distribution*, basically economic distribution. Therefore, attempts to promote a more egalitarian society had 'redistributive social justice' on their agenda (Sandercock 1975). Works with an explicitly spatial focus were no exception as it was also reflected by David Smith's (1973) much-quoted question 'Who gets what, where and how?', soon becoming a central issue for the newly emerging disciplinary field of welfare geographies (Smith et al. 2010).

In this conceptual framework the main matter of debate was what forms of inequality can be tolerated as 'just', and which inequality shall be regarded as 'unjust'. In fact, postwar Western Bloc approaches to the issue were basically common in *problematizing* certain forms of inequality in a Foucaldian sense (Foucault 1994), thus, at least implicitly, referring to its opposite, *equality*, as the desirable condition. Conflicting approaches, however, amalgamated around two different concepts of equality. The first, more socialist-oriented one came out from the assumption that all human beings are equal, and interpreted equality as equity, a condition where an equal distribution of resources is guaranteed, in terms of both equalizing inherited inequalities of property, wealth, etc., and assuring that redistribution prevents the emergence of new disparities. The second concept, rather reflecting libertarian views, was based on the supposition that individual abilities as well as honors are different, and argued for equality in judgment, thus, that equal merit has to end up in equal reward, what was claimed in light of the basic premises to necessarily result in unequal distribution (Gyuris 2014).

Although these two strands concerning distribution are still pretty much in game while thinking about inequality, after the 1980s and Young's (1990) influential volume 'Justice and the Politics of Difference' inequality and injustice were increasingly seen as an issue of *recognition* instead of (or besides) distribution, in sense of recognizing the manifold actors concerned, the heterogeneity of their social positions and the variance of their individual and group perspectives. In the words of Fincher and Iveson (2012), this opened the perspective to other, conventionally overseen 'axes of difference', and underscored that justice is not an abstract condition scholars, planners or decision-makers can define from a 'view from nowhere' (Nagel 1986) perspective, but one inherently inseparable from the experience and preferences of individuals and social groups that are perpetually facing and living various forms of privilege and oppression. This conceptual shift opened the floor for equity and justice regarded less

as outcomes than a process, where a main point for urban scholars and especially planners is not to 'prescribe justice in terms of specified outcomes' (Fincher and Iveson 2012, 234), but to enable the *inclusion* of different people and perspectives.

The increased interest in including different approaches also reveals that the possible normative interpretations of inequality are strongly context-dependent and are often influenced as much by what various actors consider their self-interest as by universal moral concepts. A speaking example for this is that of the potholes for Morrill (2001). As he underscores, potholes can be found in virtually all urban landscapes, yet their density in low-income level districts is usually higher. This is predominantly perceived by poverty area residents as unjust 'since they pay taxes too', so 'the potholes on their streets should have no lower priority than the potholes on the streets of the rich' (ibid. 14789). Residents in richer districts, however, might find just that since they pay more taxes (which they can easily interpret as greater contribution to the welfare of the entire society), they expect that local governments put more emphasis on keeping roads in their districts in good condition. Disparity is thus a situated and relational issue, and not one of pure morality, but one of interests and power, too. A better understanding of inequality in creative cities is thus only conceivable through identifying the various interest groups affected by creative city development, the opportunities and constraints they face, the impact of creative development on their regular micro-level practices, and their capacity to articulate their interests inside the creative city discourse.

Bringing recognition and inclusion to the centerpiece of conceptualizing inequality and injustice also opened new perspectives to local notions of justice operating 'on the ground', which are neither necessarily derived or derivable from abstract philosophical ones, nor are they fully elaborated in theoretical sense, but are sediments of actual local experiences gained in specific urban realities and asymmetric power relations. Such 'shared intuitions of justice' (Barnett 2011) turned scholarly attention to emotional geographies of justice and ethics of care (McDowell 2004; Lawson 2007), while increasingly detaching them from prescribed categories that are derived from philosophical reasoning. Though opening new perspectives on investigating and understanding inequality, this attitude let little space for interpreting empirically found social problems through the lens of an ex ante defined value system, and even for making normative judgments on them, which now seemed for many an essentialist and therefore quite problematic project (Olson and Sayer 2009). With regard to these trends, I

agree with Fincher and Iveson (2012) in the need that we still do not retreat from prescribed norms, given that empirical results are simply impossible to analyze and interpret if this is not done relative to a coordinate system of normative values. However, I share their opinion inasmuch a sophisticated understanding of actually existing inequality and injustice in the urban space requires a 'more tentative and suggestive rather than dogmatic and final' (ibid. 237) involvement of the norms initially set and accepted. In fact, the entire volume reflects these considerations, while discussing inequality as an openly political issue, which is interpreted here not only as an issue of contribution but also that of inclusion in sense of consideration and participation, taking into account the importance of both predefined normative coordinate systems based on general philosophical and moral worldviews as well as actual local intuitions on the ground.

Studying Urban Inequality and the Researcher-Dependence of Results

As underscored, since inequality is to a large extent a matter of power, forming a statement about it automatically means entering a political discourse and unavoidably provides ammunition to certain political interest groups and against other ones. This is why a researcher who is trying to understand inequalities in a given context can hardly make any statement without becoming to some extent political. By the same token, views justifying even aggressive political interests can easily be packaged in the wrapping paper of 'inequality research' and 'scientific findings'. This gives them a remarkable legitimate authority (Blass 2000), which science has gained by its 'long-running expansionist policy' (Wunder 2008, 7) since the Enlightenment, and especially thanks to the scientific boom of the twentieth century, which was brought by mass media 'right into the living room of ordinary people' (Stenmark 2008, 111). For these reasons, the researcher has to calculate with the unintended political meaning of his/her results, and if his/her point is to express political views about the issue, the fact of this conscious political act should be recorded in the scientific work instead of presenting such views, even implicitly, as 'objective truth' (which, however, does not happen in many cases).

Independent from the political meaning research findings about inequality gain in the discourse after being expressed, the study of disparities itself is shaped by the researcher's own situatedness. This is because scientific work never takes place in a sealed container, but in a complex

social, political, economic, etc., context. Each context makes certain issues more visible than others, offers research, finance and career opportunities or social reputation for researchers focusing on certain issues, while constraining those who are willing to deal with other topics, and establishes emotional links of the researcher with local actors, institutional structures, places, and even competing ideologies. For example, it was a result of local specificities of urban growth, institutional settings, academic and cultural traditions, etc., that the concentric zone model (Park et al. 1925), fitting well the urban realities in Chicago but actually contradicting a number of other ones, was formulated by Chicago school urban sociologists, or the concept of 'postmodern urbanism' by Los Angeles School urbanists Dear and Flusty (1998) (Dear 2002; Gieryn 2006) working in the realities of a very fragmented and heterogeneous urban setting of Los Angeles.

The researching agent has social as well as physical attributes (e.g. gender, age, race, language, religion, sexual orientation, occupation, income level, living with or without special needs), which also influence his/her situation in the given context. These factors have a certain impact on which issues one finds interesting and relevant, which research questions one formulates and which not, which methods one uses and how one interprets research findings (Livingstone 2003; Meusburger 2009).

Even for studying urban inequality, the implication of the researcher's situatedness and his/her underlying political notions have strong implication on how the issue is conceptualized, analyzed and interpreted. This situatedness can never be got rid of, and I find crucial that not even scholars try to convince themselves and their audience about the misleading claim of standing 'outside'. What seems crucial and especially valuable is rather that we make ourselves and our public aware of the manifold factors shaping our way of seeing inequality. This goes on the one hand to this chapter, where I am certainly motivated by the post-Communist East Central European social, economic and political context I am from, and the very complex and multilayered experience most people in this region have on the normative notion of equality and its controversial political uses. My personal point is, first, to step beyond the false and hypocritical egalitarian claims of the former Communist regimes, which in practice masked extreme forms of inequality, especially in sense of political power and the right of participation. And, second, to break with the often cynical and arrogant neoliberal views soon becoming much widespread in the post-Communist period, which, implying former Soviet Bloc countries rather like a 'laboratory' for a top-down driven radical economic

shift (Bockman and Eyal 2002), went in their deregulatory attempts far beyond both the moderate-left and moderate-right consensus of the day in most 'Western' European countries, and tended to remarkably naturalize disparity in general, and specifically, the actual and often much contestable ways of reproducing pre-transition inequalities as well as creating new ones during and after the transition (cf. Herrschel 2007).

The attempt to find a bottom line between these extremes provides in my view a strong argument for comparative analyses, where different case studies are carried out through the lens of different individuals taking different perspectives. This is one of the main goals this volume sets for itself in order to enable a more sophisticated, complex and realistic understanding of inequality in the creative cities in particular, and of urban inequality (or even inequality without *any* adjective) in general.

What Is the 'Urban' in Urban Inequality?

While social inequality *per definitionem* refers to socially engendered disparities, which are produced and shaped by the agency of social actors as well as social structures, terms like spatial and urban inequality might be misleading insofar they suggest it is 'space' or the 'city' itself producing inequalities as agent on its own right. The threat of such an interpretation is real, as it is exemplified by the dominant role of the notion of spatial science in early Cold War scientific discourses, which posed space as an impersonal agent that is superior to the humans, and shapes sociospatial phenomena and spatial disparities along its own laws lying outside the radius of human agency. Contrary to this approach, which attracted firm criticism from the late 1960s onwards especially for what Marxist geographies commonly coin as 'spatial fetishism' (Harvey 1982), in this book we consider spatial disparities as the geographical projection of social disparities, and space not as an actor on its own right but as a meaningful analytical framework to grasp certain crucial aspects of social disparities, the sophisticated conceptualization and explanation of which requires spatially focused theoretical approaches and methodologies, which then also contribute to a better understanding of social disparities themselves.

Speaking more specifically about urban inequality, it raises further fundamental questions given the manifold meanings of the 'urban'. In its most conventional form, the adjective refers to 'the city' as a(n) (often predefined) spatial unit in which disparities are scrutinized. This methodologically territorialist approach has its roots in the medieval European

concept of the city as a compact morphological unit surrounded by fortified walls and a legal entity providing privileges for its inhabitants, and in the Westphalian order after 1648, which opened the floor for an overly territorialized notion of states and state-spaces (Agnew 1994; Sassen 2013; also cf. Weber 1921). Thinking about the city as a unit with exact administrative boundaries or as a monocentric agglomeration, without a doubt, fits well the reality of the classic industrial city (cf. Lewis 2008), and is still widespread in the practice of national and international statistical offices presenting figures on the amount and relative share of 'urban population', such as the United Nations' (n.d.) World Urbanization Prospects and the World Development Indicators of the World Bank (n.d.). These datasets imply a clear dividing line between 'the city' and the rural rest, and motivate sentences, maybe more contestable than painstaking, reporting about the world reaching a 'momentous milestone' in 2008 due to 'for the first time in history, more than half its human population … living in urban areas' (UNFPA 2007, 1). Yet, cities are frequently overbounded or underbounded in the sense that administrative borders clearly mismatch functional as well as morphological realities (Hall et al. 2006), which undermines an accurate interpretation of statistics gathered on solely administrative basis. Moreover, the last few decades witnessed the emergence of a new urban-regional space-economy, with incorporating both urban and peri-urban spaces, often forming polycentric metropolitan regions or 'polyopolises' (Hall and Pain 2006) (e.g. the Pearl River Delta in China), 'megaregions' (Harrison and Hoyler 2015) and even supra-state configurations, like Europe's 'Blue Banana' (Brunet 2002) ranging from Mid-England to Northern Italy (Hutton 2015). In these cases, delineating the 'urban' is a difficult and multifaceted task, often without a single 'good' solution.

Further challenges are posed by breaking with the idea about the 'space of places' in favor of the 'space of flows' (Castells 1996), thus, conceptualizing cities not as predefined spatial units made up by urban built spaces, but nods in global networks and flows, or intersections between dense local interactions and non-local connections. In this framework, touching at the multi-scalar nature of urbanization (Brenner 2013), urban inequality will be only one constituting part of a densely woven network of global inequalities, which might follow different dynamics at different scales (Smith 2008). Hence, a seeming decrease of urban inequality in certain cities, delineated anyhow, might only be a concomitant of radically increasing disparity at other scales (or in other, remote cities). Likewise,

deepening inequality in an urban center might reflect instead of the emergence of brand new disparities that inequality having existed outside for long now gets absorbed into the city (e.g. through massive immigration), what can result for instance in what Abu-Lughod (1999) calls the co-presence of the 'First' and 'Third' Worlds in leading global urban centers.

The term 'urban' gains another alternative meaning if one takes the approach of classic urban geography that defines city as a settlement providing urban functions for its own population as well as inhabitants of nearby locations. 'Urban' becomes here a more comprehensive category than the 'city', and rather refers to people having access to and benefitting from urban functions and urbanization in broader sense. On somewhat similar concepts is based Lefebvre's (2003 [1970]) way of predicting 'the complete urbanization of society' (ibid. 7), thus, interpreting urbanism as a *condition* becoming global. Taking this approach, an increasing number of scholars argue that the current epoch is that of 'planetary urbanization' (Merrifield 2013) or 'urbanization of the global rural', in which traditional dichotomies of the urban and rural lose their relevance since there is no outside anymore (Brenner 2014), just variegated sociospatial patterns and developmental pathways of urbanization (Brenner and Schmid 2015). In this conceptual framework the most crucial issue with regard to inequality might be the sorts of disparity produced by planetary urbanization, not only in large concentrations of population or settlements administratively categorized as cities, but all over the globe, including such remote areas like the Arctic (Dybbroe et al. 2010; Nordic Council of Ministers 2011).

These issues are worthy of being considered with regard to inequality in creative cities as well. First, much of the literature on creative cities is infiltrated by methodological territorialism inasmuch the actual case studies are defined simply as the spaces within administrative boundaries. This approach might have many practical benefits, including a clear identification and delineation of our geographical focus as well as an easy adoption of official statistics. Yet, for many cities claimed to be creative, even mid-sized ones in terms of population, administrative boundaries might considerably differ from any borders separating morphological zones with higher and lower spatial density of urban functions, 'creative workplaces', 'creative residents', 'creative spaces', etc. Moreover, creative cities are often located in urban regions with large extension, where the features making the city creative might become meaningful and effective only embedded in a broader urban hinterland, the negligence of which might massively distort the results of our analysis. This is

especially important if, for example, a large share of the locally employed labor force (both in the 'creative class' and low-wage occupations) actually lives outside the city (such as in creative centers of the Silicon Valley), or when the hinterland of the city providing raw material, energy and other resources as well as embracing traffic routes might be of the size of millions of square kilometers (such as for Singapore). The above considerations argue for a much more conscious and comprehensive contextualization of the cities which come under scrutiny.

How Can Inequality Be Operationalized in Urban Contexts?

As we have underscored, inequality is always a result of asymmetric power relations meaning the uneven command of individuals as well as social groups over resources, material and non-material. Resources are manifold, however, and most people have differing levels of command over various sorts of resources. This is well reflected by Bourdieu's concept about the forms of capital (1986) and the social space (1998), where social positions are determined by economic, cultural and social capital. In this interpretation, artists, for example, may have much cultural capital, but little economic capital. For industrialists, the combination might be just the opposite. Furthermore, contrary to this rather simplistic concept there is a broad set of 'capitals' one can define (including human, mental, monetary, artifactual, natural, to use the categories of Avelino and Rotmans 2009). And the social position of a given individual or group, and even the overall volume of inequality, might be different along various capitals. It can happen, of course, that certain actors, the 'power elites' (Mills 1956) can intensively mobilize a wide range of resources at the same time. Yet, this only goes for a very narrow stratum of society. Thus, if the aim is to reveal inequalities within the entire society, the researcher has to decide on which aspect of disparity to focus and which indicators to select.

In high-income level countries with a long history of capitalism, for instance, indicators of formal income and employment have belonged to the most typical and widely used ones in inequality research at least since the mid-twentieth century. These might well be informative for former North American and West European cities with their Fordist economies, where most people relied on wages and salaries and these came from formal and relatively stable workplaces in the 'white economy'. In many

cases, however, one can hardly gain reliable information of these sorts due to a high level of informality, which is not only characteristic to most urban centers in the Global South (for some examples see Perlman 2010 for favelas in Brazil; Baumgartner and Rothfuss on Cachoeira, Brazil, in this volume; Simone 2004 for Africa; and Leaf 1996 for Indonesia), but increasingly present in 'Western' cities, too (Hutton 2015), partly due to the important role of informality in the creative economy and in sectors serving the 'creative class' (Florida 2002) (in both the Global North and South, see Wilson and Keil 2008; Lobato 2010).

Moreover, some forms of disparities that only exert a negative impact on the opportunities of some specific social groups easily remain invisible. An example for this is uneven physical accessibility in the urban built environment, which might speak much more about disparity between residents with and without disabilities or in different age than uneven income or employment conditions (Chouinard et al. 2010; Rosso et al. 2011). Yet, many similar language, race, nationality or gender-specific indicators are considered only in analyses focusing exactly on these specific social groups.

A strong and one-sided focus on secondary statistics, still widespread in, for example, the literature on urban economics, increases especially the chance of such a blindness, given that many categories in official statistical databases are still based on concepts rather fitting the social and economic realities of the Cold War period, including very Fordist notions of work, employment, economic structure or even creativity and innovation (Hoelscher and Schubert 2015), which seem to lose much in relevance in twenty-first century urban contexts. This does not contradict that secondary statistics and quantitative analysis can play a useful part in investigating the creative city and its inequality (see Hoelscher 2012), but suggests a careful and less conventional use of secondary statistics, while underscoring the utmost importance of ethnographic and anthropological research, in general as well as for case studies in the current volume.

Research on Urban Inequality: Shifting Approaches and Narratives

Actual urban conditions have always been changing from time to time and from place to place, and so has the way social asymmetries were conceptualized, analyzed and explained. The first boom of an in-depth scientific

investigation of urban disparities began in the early nineteenth century. It was propelled on the one hand by the Industrial Revolution and the massive inflow of rural population to the cities, and the resulting emergence of new and much visible forms of inequality in urban settings. On the other hand, it was enabled by the existence of comprehensive statistical data thanks to improved administration in nation states of the Enlightened absolutism, especially in the Francophone world (Meusburger 1998), as well as the new approach of social physics, aimed at identifying regularities of society on the basis of mass statistical analysis (Quetelet 1835), and the invention of thematic mapping.

Studies were strongly influenced by *zeitgeist* and embedded in the dominant discourse of the day, deriving the most diverse social problems from the lack of literacy, enlightened morality and 'civilization'. Therefore, they were focusing mainly on 'moral statistics' like illiteracy, crime, various forms of claimed-to-be 'social deviations' (e.g. suicide) in order to reveal a hypothesized link between these factors and poverty, and to identify 'hot spots' of social deprivation (Meusburger 1998). Investigations mainly concentrated on national and regional level data, but studies at the urban scale also appeared. The French hygienist Alexandre Parent du Châtelet (1836) made on the basis of lengthy investigations, and firmly embedded in the hygienic and highly genderized approach of the day (Harrington 2010), an in-depth analysis of prostitution and crime in Paris, including district-level inequalities. Such works had as their basis the conviction of the day that poverty and, thus, social inequality, which were both problematized, were results of the 'immoral' lives of many. In other words, most contemporaries took the 'individualistic hypothesis' (Mingione 1996) and, since their results mirrored *statistical* correlation between the indicators selected, they made those deprived responsible for the problem. Yet, in the meantime they justified national efforts to promote education in the most deprived areas and criminalize certain forms of individual behavior especially frequent in specific districts, from which they expected to help people (even if by force) to find and adopt 'moral' ways of life. This attempt was otherwise fully in accordance with hard interests of the nation states to control their population and create obedient citizens (Meusburger 1998).

Similar notions propelled corresponding studies in Britain, and, somewhat later, the 'social survey movement' in North America (Gyuris 2014), as is exemplified by the most comprehensive such investigation organized by Charles Booth (1902–1903). Booth as a politically conservative, wealthy ship owner wanted to react to, and to refuse through 'objective,

scientific investigation', the 'incendiary' claims of the Marxist Social Democrats in London about one quarter of the city's working class living in 'dire poverty' (Zimbalist 1977, 74). His project finally became an analysis of 120,000 households on the basis of recording a wide array of indicators and mobilizing then radically new conceptual considerations such as involving women in the group of twenty experts who were responsible for preparing and evaluating the research, even if it was far from achieving a balanced gender ratio (3:1 in favor of men) (Bales 1996).

These analyses had important merits in their time, not only by producing a monument of empirical data, but, especially in the case of Booth, also by raising public interest in the issue. Moreover, these studies had a certain capacity of shaping the political discourse on inequality in general and urban inequality in particular, and changing the mind of their very constructors, such as for Booth, who in light of his findings on an unexpectedly high level of poverty became a main supporter of social reforms (e.g. universal old age pension) (London School of Economics & Political Science n.d.).

Although similar social surveys in the USA and Canada, despite all their political biases and contestable analytical approaches, gave new and long-lasting impetus to American sociology and political science (Bulmer 2001), most new surveys rather neglected the spatial while dealing with the social. The only major exception was the Chicago school of urban sociology, which produced the well-known concepts of Park et al. (1925), Hoyt (1939) and Harris and Ullman (1945), containing a model-like representation of urban inequality. In the meantime, in the emerging domain of urban geography the most attention was paid to the functional structure of cities (e.g. De Geer 1923; Bobek 1927; James 1933). This new tradition contributed much in the coming decades to a better understanding of urban functional differences. Yet, mostly it did not focus directly on inequality as normative question, and did not problematize its existence but considered it 'as given'.

During the mid-nineteenth century and the heyday of 'moral statistics', the Marxist tradition emerged as a new approach with firm interests in inequality. In the first decades, this interest was much more social than spatial. In most of their fundamental works Marx and Engels did not put much emphasis on the spatial content, and if they did, then often in the form of less structured or, at least seemingly, even conflicting claims (see Gyuris 2014). Hence, in their very critical analyses of social relations of the day they provided many ideas spatial (and urban) disparity research can

much benefit from. The most important one of these might well be the approach interpreting disparities as *structural* outcomes of certain 'modes of production', turning attention to a decisive factor over which many individuals in their lives do not have mastery, but from which they suffer.

Since the main issue was social inequality, it might be no wonder that a coherent conceptual framework for studying *spatial* aspects did not emerge. Furthermore, the spatial remarks of Marx and Engels mirrored a binary view and much more interest in inequality at higher scales between the country and towns, or 'barbarian', 'semi-barbarian' and 'civilised' [sic!] countries (Marx and Engels 1998 [1848], 14), and less at the local scale, e.g. within the city. (The most remarkable exception from this might well be Engels's *The Condition of the Working-Class in England in 1844*.) The focus on higher scales was even more characteristic to other early Marxists, such as Rosa Luxemburg (2003 [1913]) with her global focus or Vladimir Lenin (1964a, b) putting the most attention on international and interregional inequalities. Thus, the role of Marxist and Marxist-Leninist approaches in studying urban inequality was considerably smaller during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries than it has been in the capitalist world since the 1970s. (In the Soviet Bloc, which claimed itself to have achieved a socially as well as spatially equal society, inequality research became a forbidden field, and the limited number of works gradually beginning to appear around the 1970s utilized, at least implicitly, positivistic Western concepts instead of creating a unique theoretical framework.)

Geopolitical interests proved similarly crucial in a relative negligence of the urban scale in theoretical discussions in the capitalist world after World War II. The gradual decline of European colonial empires and the resulting mass liberation of nations in Africa and Asia made spatial disparities highly important an issue for US decision-makers. For American geopolitics, to convince the elite of these newly established countries to become allies of the USA instead of the Soviet Union was now a major objective. Hence, American politics and Cold War science had to explain with much convincing power why adopting a US styled political, social and economic model was the (only) efficient solution to prevailing problems (Saunders 1999), including the disparity between 'poor' and 'rich' countries, and to identify how the desired convergence could actually be granted in practice. Meanwhile, the issue of regional inequality attracted much attention due to massive economic disparities coinciding in newly liberated countries with interregional as well as international political

tensions as a painful outcome of the artificial boundaries set before by the colonizers (Pounds 1963).

Urban inequality, however, posing no threat on geopolitical relations and lacking the potential of fueling international territorial conflicts, had little relevance in this scope. Therefore, although empirical studies about urban inequality were not missing in the coming period, their main underlying approaches were still those inherited from earlier decades. Novel theoretical concepts of inequality mushrooming over the 1950s and 1960s (e.g. Myrdal 1957; Hirschman 1958; Williamson 1965; Friedmann 1966), however, had a practically exclusive focus on international and interregional issues. Besides these mainstream initiatives of the Global North, dependency theories emerging in the Global South (for a detailed overview see Blomström and Hettne 1984), which also paid great attention to inequality, were similarly concentrating on the global and national scales to identify the reason for the gap between what they called 'underdeveloped' and 'developed' countries.

In urban inequality research, a new shift came in the capitalist world at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s. Political movements in and after 1968 exerted strong criticism on some crucial features of the prevailing system, including strong interlinks of the political, economic, military and academic elites. These were claimed to be a direct reason for massive involvement in military conflicts (e.g. the Vietnam War) and imposing developmentalist projects on 'underdeveloped' countries, an extreme level of Fordist mass production with individuals merely handled as faceless workforce, a remarkable negligence of social deprivation in rich countries, and the justification of all these by high representatives of the academy (Smith 2001b; Gould and Strohmayer 2004). A result of these in geographical thinking was the emergence of Marxist geographies, hallmarked by the works of David Harvey. In these he combined a firm problematization of inequality with a focus on the local scale, namely on urban issues such as gentrification, ghetto formation and urban poverty, and with explicit activism in favor of a political change expected to cure these problems (Harvey 1972, 1973).

Harvey's approach was novel in adopting and updating the Marxist concept about structural reasons, those of exploitation, for urban inequality. Instead of describing spatial patterns the positivistic approaches had intensively investigated during the decades before, he argued for concentrating on underlying social conflicts and power asymmetries. This interpretation gained an even more solid theoretical basis by the Harveyian

concept of the circuits of capital (Harvey 1978) and the spatio-temporal fixes (Harvey 2003) of capitalism managing its own crises at the cost of 'uneven geographical development' (Harvey 1982), and remarkable conceptual contributions by other neo-Marxist thinkers (Smith 1982). As a result, this approach has developed to a major analytical framework of urban inequality. Furthermore, due to the aim of this approach to identify mechanisms prevailing at all scales, and intensive works on conceptualizing geographical scales and scalar processes and politics (Smith 2008; Swyngedouw 1997a, b), urban inequality was now investigated not in itself, but as embedded in, and inseparable from, dynamics at the national and global scales.

Other approaches emerging over the last decades, which are common in being critical to positivism while having debates with each other, too, have also produced many new ideas influencing urban inequality research. Feminist approaches have revealed on the one hand how a genderized approach of the researcher influences the forms of disparities becoming visible, e.g. by concentrating not only on traditionally male activities (for example, investigating 'social reproduction' instead of those of economic production; Dickson and Jones 2006), or denying automatically adopting patriarchal value systems and their way of defining 'normality' as well as 'equality' and 'inequality' (Walby 1990). On the other hand, recognizing the heterogeneity of urban society along the difference between female and male can give insight into striking disparities (e.g. inequality in wages, employment or career paths) not existing between certain districts of the city, for example, but between the genders (see Massey 1994; McDowell 1997; Hanson and Pratt 1995). Furthermore, the feminist approach, with bringing the notion of body inside the discourse, opened the way for studying body spaces and inequalities harming those ill, impaired, or disabled (Buttler and Parr 1999). Another outcome was criticism emerging about the Eurocentricity and heteronormativity, resulting from patriarchal views, in traditional scientific analyses. This critique threw light on the role of race and sexual orientation in social issues and their investigation (Dickson and Jones 2006).

Besides, urban disparity research has benefitted much from the behavioral approach already emerging in the 1960s, aimed at revealing how the urban environment influences individual decision (e.g. about mobility or consumption) through cognitive processes (Golledge 2006) and thus contributing to an analysis between the urban disparities of both. Humanistic stances have pointed at the individuals acting as purposeful

agents (Entrikin and Tepple 2006), an idea with relevance even in the current world, although being usually neglected by structuralists due to their efforts to keep themselves remote from a nineteenth-century-fashioned 'individualistic hypothesis'. Furthermore, given that one can hardly investigate these forms of inequality using conventional statistics and macro-data, these approaches have propelled a much more widespread use of methods such as surveys, interviews, focus groups, participating observations, drawing mental maps, etc., in inequality research. Due to social changes, the proportion of researchers not belonging to high and high-middle class Western (mostly Anglophone) white males also began to increase, which enabled manifold ways of seeing on the side of the researching agents.

The existence of many approaches resulted in different interpretations of how inequality can be or should be problematized. The Marxist tradition, for instance, has a firm socialist interpretation about the 'unjust' forms of inequality, compared to which it problematizes or de-problematizes actual urban conditions. Yet, many researchers, especially those arguing against 'grand theories' (Massey 1991), refuse this 'totalizing Marxism' (Morris 1992, 275) with its 'totalizing visions of society' (Deutsche 1991, 7), and underscore that scientific analyses have to be open to different but coexisting criteria of problematization. Some also stress that one cannot speak about 'justice' and 'injustice' without exactly specifying what is considered unjust for whom and from which perspective. Moreover, for them, injustice is not a matter of pure distribution. Thus, whether the researcher regards inequality as problem should not be simply a function of its level, but by whether those affected by disparity themselves find it unjust or not, and whether they are taken into consideration and allowed to participate in decisions leading to this inequality (Young 1990; Fraser 2000; Schlosberg 2004). Postmodern approaches tend even to attribute equal relevance to the view of every individual. By this, they justify on the one hand the analysis of urban inequality along multiple aspects. In the meantime, however, they evoke strong criticism especially from Marxist authors for their 'unlimited relativism', attributing the same validity to each interpretation, including those absolutely deproblematizing prevailing disparities, irrespective of their form and level (Pacione 2005).

Beyond the birth of these non-positivistic approaches, the last decades witnessed the emergence of a neoliberal regime, which defined as its main goal to promote economic growth. Given the economic problems of the late-Fordist economy during the oil crises as well as increasing challenges

of the Communist Bloc and, as a result, a decreasing belief in state regulation in the capitalist world, the US and UK leaderships made great efforts in the 1980s to transform their economies along the principles of privatization, deregulation and liberalization (Ward and England 2007). These attempts soon became a global fashion, even in countries of the former Soviet Bloc after the collapse of command economies. This shift soon resulted in remarkable polarization in terms of many economic indicators, in social as well as geographical sense, at virtually all scales (Harvey 2005).

Cities are no exceptions. With decreasing state regulation and increasing market volatility, urban centers are in fierce competition to attract as many investments as possible. This process is also propelled by that the desire for growth is a (or even the only) common point in otherwise rather conflicting interests of a wide range of urban elite groups, what leads to the formation of growth coalitions and handling the city as a 'growth machine', while advertising growth as common interest of the entire urban society (Logan and Molotch 1987; Jonas and Wilson 1999). Moreover, due to an increasing competition at higher scales, a strong rivalry is emerging between regions and countries, too, which tend to put their faith in the 'triumph of the city' (Glaeser 2011) and regard major cities with state-of-the-art economic production (e.g. knowledge economy) as growth machines for the whole region and country (for this 'urban turn' in European spatial policy, see van Winden 2010). For these reasons, actors at both local and higher scales have a drive for promoting urban growth, even if it results in increasing inequality both within the city and between cities and their countryside. In the last years, the economic crisis and fiscal constraints have just strengthened this tendency.

In fact, scientific works compatible with the neoliberal notion in their underlying ideology have broken with problematizing disparity (at any scale), which they regard normal along the claim that all cannot win. As Cheshire and Malecki (2004, 261) point out, in works of this sort 'equity is not the issue'. This is well reflected by the language, tendentiously speaking about 'winners' and 'losers' as quasi naturally existing categories (as a remarkable example in neoclassical convergence analysis see Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004), implicitly justifying the existence and permanent reproduction of both. Under such circumstances, cities become highly adaptive to policies promising easy and fast success, resulting in an extreme mobility of neoliberal policies (Peck 2009; Peck and Theodore 2010). A striking example is the global career of Florida's (2002, 2004) concept about the creative class and the resulting 'rise of the new 'creative' imper-

ative' (Rantisi et al. 2006, 1789) in urban policies, accompanied by the 'viral spread of creative city policies' (Peck 2009) over the entire globe.

These policies in particular, and the dynamics in the urban space in the neoliberal phase in general, do not only result in a remarkable restructuring in twenty-first-century cities (Hutton 2010) and their entire region (Hutton 2015), they also create new forms of inequality in the urban space, even if the neoliberal discourse tends to neglect this fact (Peck 2005; Wilson and Keil 2008). As a reaction, urban inequality research pays great attention to outcomes of 'urban privatism' (Peck 1995), especially the privatization of the urban commons (Blomley 2008; Foster 2011; Harvey 2012) such as public spaces (MacLeod 2011) or water supply (Bakker 2003; Harvey 2008; Swyngedouw 2005, 2009). The forms of governance enabling the emergence of these disparities in today's 'post-democratic city' (MacLeod 2011), and the techniques aimed at keeping them under control, e.g. through criminalization and severe punishment of certain activities and behaviors (Wacquant 2008) ('governing through crime' in the words of Simon 2007), also have a central position in current research agendas, just as the forms of opposition. In the meantime, several works underscore that the sorts of inequality prevailing in earlier decades have not disappeared, but are similarly present in neoliberal and even post-crisis cities (for examples in a feminist approach see McDowell 2010; McDowell and Dyson 2011). References to the ongoing need to recognize the manifold competing views about inequality (e.g. 'the multiple geographies of commons', Blomley 2008, 320) in the contemporary city are likewise present.

Even for creative cities, which are in the focus of this volume, there is an increasing literature on that the often expected link between the creative 'turn' and the emerging 'creative class' on the one hand, and the much envisioned economic growth benefitting all on the other hand, is doubtful (Pratt 2008; Krätke 2010), and that 'creativity strategies have been crafted to co-exist' with social problems such as segregation and poverty, 'not to solve them' (Peck 2007, 10). Several authors underscore that cultural cities are facing increasing income inequality (Donegan and Lowe 2008; Peck 2005), where what Florida calls the 'supercreative core' of urban society (Dreher 2002) rather tends to function as a 'new knowledge aristocracy' (Shearmur 2007). Meanwhile, due to exclusionary working practices and jobs with restricted access (Allen and Hollingworth 2013) and an increasingly precarious labor market, the economic trickle-down implied by harshly optimistic works does not take place automatically by

market processes, only if a complex set of explicit mechanisms, which creative city policies commonly neglect, are established and consciously sustained (Colomb 2011). Instead, we can witness a growing share of what Wilson and Keil (2008) call 'the real creative class', mostly formed by excluded and impoverished people reliant on much 'creative' survival strategies to make a living. Besides, contrary to the tolerance and cultural openness advertised by Florida, social exclusion (Pratt 2011) is actually intensifying, even in sense of gender and race (Catungal and Leslie 2009; Leslie and Catungal 2012).

Conclusion

Urban inequality is in the focal point of contemporary urban studies due to remarkable changes in the urban space in the neoliberal age, the consequences of the 2008 global crisis, and for constituting one of the most fundamental moral issues virtually everyone has experience with. Yet, inequality is an essentially contested and highly political concept. For the same token, the discourse on disparity is a highly political one, the contributions to which, even academic ones, necessarily get politicized and gain their meaning in light of the political struggles taking place in and by the discourse. Therefore, in this chapter as well as in the entire volume we argue for integrating the political in our research, which means a conscious break with the naturalizing attitude of positivistic approaches. Meanwhile, we are also in favor of avoiding the widespread use of hyperboles and remarkable reductions in order to gain as much as possible a sophisticated understanding of urban inequalities in the creative city, and clearly identifying why they in our view constitute social *problems*, what mechanisms are behind them and what strategies can help avoid further polarization.

Inequality can be interpreted not only as an issue of distribution, but also one of consideration and participation, where paying attention to the actual local experiences and the intuitive ways of interpreting inequality is of utmost importance. We take this point, but we still consider it necessary to have some predefined sets of norms and values, which as coordinate systems can be used to make normative statements. Regarding that studying urban inequality is a project necessarily influenced by the embeddedness of the researcher himself/herself, we also argue for making our normative positionalities transparent.

For what is specifically 'urban' in urban inequality, an opening up of the 'black box' of the urban seems indispensable in light of the new global

urban trends. These gradually overwrite our conventional concepts about the urban as delineated spatial unit and substitute them with ones on new urban forms. They turn our attention from the 'spaces of places' to the 'spaces of flows' and underscore the embeddedness of the urban scale in a densely woven network of various scales inseparable from each other. They also underscore the importance of increasingly scrutinizing the urban as a *condition*, which is becoming planetary, and reaches well beyond the area of large agglomerations of people and the economy, even in sense of where they are generating inequality.

Finally, in light of the mushrooming of approaches in urban studies, which all touch upon issues we can take a closer look at and utilize methods we can use efficiently, in the volume we consciously avoid a dogmatic attitude and are willing to incorporate as much as possible from the theoretical, analytical and explanatory potential of these various ways of seeing. This also means that, while admitting the still unquestionable importance of 'traditional', and fundamentally economic and distribution-oriented aspects of inequality such as income or employment and the ongoing meaningfulness of taking into consideration secondary statistics as well, we want to go well beyond these and open up our project for less conventional aspects, and intensively apply anthropological and ethnographical methods in the case studies. After underscoring that different approaches are also different in whether they problematize or rather naturalize inequality, we consciously take the former approach. In each chapter we will imply inequality to be a phenomenon that becomes definitely harmful for society if not kept between certain limits and will strive to identify viable and realistic strategies of avoiding extreme polarization in the actual urban contexts. We also recognize that the literature on inequality in the creative city has predominantly focused up to the date on global metropolitan centers instead of 'ordinary cities' (Robinson 2006). Their case studies have mostly come from the Anglophone world, while the experience of other parts of the Global North or of the Global South was greatly neglected. Moreover, they applied grammars and conceptual frameworks easily losing their relevance if confronted with urban contexts in cities of other population scale or in other locations. That is why in the actual volume attention is paid to dealing with case studies from much different contexts and, beyond painstakingly analyzing them one by one, also taking a global comparative approach, with the hope of providing a more sophisticated and complex analysis of urban inequality in the creative city.

Acknowledgement This book chapter has been supported by the National Research, Development and Innovation Office – NKFIH under grant number PD 121127. The title of the grant is 'New spatial disparities after the global crisis'.

Bibliography

Abu-Lughod, Janet Lippman. 1999. *New York, Chicago, Los Angeles: America's Global Cities.* Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Agnew, John. 1994. The territorial trap: the geographical assumptions of international relations theory. *Review of International Political Economy* 1(1): 53–80.

Allen, Kim, and Sumi Hollingworth. 2013. 'Sticky subjects' or 'cosmopolitan creatives'? Social class, place and urban young people's aspirations for work in the knowledge economy. *Urban Studies* 50: 499–517.

Assmann, Jan. 2000. *Herrschaft und Heil. Politische Theologie in Altägypten, Israel und Europa [Rule and Salvation. Political Theology in Ancient Egypt, Israel and Europe].* München: Hanser.

Avelino, Flor, and Jan Rotmans. 2009. Power in transition. An interdisciplinary framework to study power in relation to structural change. *European Journal of Social Theory* 12: 543–569.

Bakker, Karen. 2003. *An Uncooperative Commodity: Privatizing Water in England and Wales.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bales, Kevin. 1996. Lives and labours in the emergence of organised social research, 1886-1907. *Journal of Historical Sociology* 9: 113–138.

Barnett, Clive. 2011. Geography and ethics: justice unbound. *Progress in Human Geography* 35: 246–255.

Barro, Robert J., and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. 2004. *Economic Growth*, 2 edn. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Berreman, Gerald D. 2001. Inequality: comparative aspects. In *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, ed. Neil J. Smelser, and Paul B. Baltes, 7377–7382. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Blass, Thomas (ed). 2000. *Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm.* Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Blomley, Nicholas. 2008. Enclosure, common right and the property of the poor. *Social Legal Studies* 17: 311–331.

Blomström, Magnus, and Björn Hettne. 1984. *Development Theory in Transition. The Dependency Debate and Beyond: Third World Responses.* London: Zed Books.

Bobek, Hans. 1927. Grundfragen der Stadtgeographie [Basic questions of urban geography]. *Geographischer Anzeiger* 28: 213–224.

Bockman, Johanna, and Gil Eyal. 2002. Eastern Europe as a laboratory for economic knowledge: The transnational roots of neoliberalism. *American Journal of Sociology* 108: 310–352.

Bohman, James. 1996. *Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity and Democracy*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Booth, Charles. 1902–1903. *Life and Labour of the People in London*, 3 edn. Seventeen volumes. Macmillan: London.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1986. The forms of capital. In *Handbook of Theory of Research for the Sociology of Education*, ed. J.G. Richardson, 241–258. New York: Greenwood (Translated by R. Nice).

———. 1998. *Practical Reason. On the Theory of Action*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

———. 2004. *Science of Science and Reflexivity*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press (Translated by R. Nice).

Bourdieu, Pierre, and Jean-Claude Passeron. 1990. *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*. London: SAGE (Translated from the French by R. Nice).

Brenner, Neil. 2013. Theses on urbanization. *Public Culture* 25: 85–114.

———. 2014. Introduction: urban theory without an outside. In *Implosions/Explosions. Towards a Study of Planetary Urbanization*, ed. N. Brenner, 14–35. Berlin: Jovis.

Brenner, Neil, and Christian Schmid. 2015. Towards a new epistemology of the urban? *City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action* 19: 151–182.

Brunet, Roger. 2002. Lignes de force de l'espace européen [Lines of force of the European space]. *Mappemonde* 66: 14–19.

Bulmer, Martin. 2001. History of social survey. In *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, ed. Neil J. Smelser, and Paul B. Baltes, 14469–14473. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Buttler, Ruth, and Hester Parr (ed). 1999. *Mind and Body Spaces: Geographies of Illness, Impairment and Disability*. London: Routledge.

Castells, Manuel. 1996. *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture Vol. 1. The Rise of Network Society*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Catungal, John Paul, and Deborah Leslie. 2009. Contesting the creative city: race, nation, multiculturalism. *Geoforum* 40: 701–704.

Cheshire, Paul C., and Edward J. Malecki. 2004. Growth, development, and innovation: a look backward and forward. *Papers in Regional Science* 83: 249–267.

Chouinard, Vera, Edward Hall, and Robert Wilton (ed). 2010. *Towards Enabling Geographies: 'Disabled' Bodies and Minds in Society and Space*. Farnham: Ashgate.

Collins, Randall. 1988. *Theoretical Sociology*. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Colomb, Claire. 2011. Culture *in* the city, culture *for* the city? The political construction of the trickle-down in cultural regeneration strategies in Roubaix, France. *TPR: Town Planning Review* 82: 77–98.

Conover, Pamela Johnston, Donald D. Searing, and Ivor M. Crewe. 2002. The deliberative potential of political discussion. *British Journal of Political Science* 32: 21–62.

Dahl, Robert A. 1989. *Democracy and Its Critics*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Dear, Michael. 2002. Los Angeles and the Chicago School: invitation to a debate. *City & Community* 1: 5–32.

Dear, Michael, and Steven Flusty. 1998. Postmodern urbanism. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 88: 50–72.

De Geer, Sten. 1923. Greater Stockholm: a geographical interpretation. *Geographical Review* 13: 497–506.

Deutsche, Rosalyn. 1991. Boys town. *Environment and Planning D* 9: 5–30.

DeVerteuil, Geoffrey. 2012. Does the punitive need the supportive? A sympathetic critique of current grammars of urban injustice. *Antipode* 46: 874–893.

DeVerteuil, Geoffrey, Jon May, and Jürgen von Mahs. 2009. Complexity not collapse: recasting the geographies of homelessness in a 'punitive' age. *Progress in Human Geography* 33: 646–666.

Dickson, Deborah P., and John Paul Jones III. 2006. Feminist geographies of difference, relation, and construction. In *Approaches to Human Geography*, ed. Stuart Aitken, and Gill Valentine, 42–56. London: SAGE.

Donegan, Mary, and Nichola Lowe. 2008. Inequality in the creative city: is there still a place for 'old-fashioned' institutions? *Economic Development Quarterly* 22: 46–62.

Dreher, Christopher. (2002). Be creative—or die. *Salon*, 7 June. http://www.salon.com/2002/06/06/florida_22/. Accessed on April 14, 2016.

Dybbroe, Susanne, Jens Dahl, and Ludger Müller-Wille. 2010. Dynamics of Arctic urbanization. *Acta Borealia: A Nordic Journal of Circumpolar Societies* 27: 120–124.

Entrikin, J. Nicholas, and John H. Tepple. 2006. Humanism and democratic place-making. In *Approaches to Human Geography*, ed. Stuart Aitken, and Gill Valentine, 30–41. London: SAGE.

Fincher, Ruth, and Kurt Iveson. 2012. Justice and injustice in the city. *Geographical Research* 50: 231–241.

Florida, Richard. 2002. *The Rise of the Creative Class: And How It's Transforming Work, Leisure, Community and Everyday Life*. New York: Basic Books.

———. 2004. *Cities and the Creative Class*. New York: Routledge.

Flyvbjerg, Bent. 1998. *Rationality and Power: Democracy in Practice*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Foster, Sheila R. 2011. Collective action and the urban commons. *Notre Dam Law Review* 87: 57–133.

Foucault, Michel. 1981. The order of discourse (inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, given 2 December 1970). In *Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader*, ed. Robert Young, 51–78. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

———. 1994. *Dits et écrits: 1954–1988. Vol. 4., 1980–1988 [Said and Written: 1954–1988]*. Paris: Gallimard.

Fraser, Nancy. 2000. Rethinking recognition. *New Left Review* 3: 107–120.

Friedmann, John. 1966. *Regional Development Policy: A Case Study of Venezuela*. London: MIT Press.

Gieryn, Thomas F. 2006. City as truth-spot: laboratories and field-sites in urban studies. *Social Studies of Science* 36: 5–38.

Glaeser, Edward. 2011. *Triumph of the City: How Our Greatest Invention Makes Us Richer, Smarter, Greener, Healthier, and Happier*. New York: Penguin.

Gleeson, Brendan. 2014. *The Urban Condition*. New York: Routledge.

Golledge, Reginald G. 2006. Philosophical bases of behavioral research in geography. In *Approaches to Human Geography*, ed. Stuart Aitken, and Gill Valentine, 75–85. London: SAGE.

Gould, Peter, and Ulf Strohmayer. 2004. Geographical visions: the evolution of human geographic thought in the twentieth century. In *Human Geography: A History for the 21st Century*, ed. Georges Benko, and Ulf Strohmayer, 1–24. London: Arnold.

Gyuris, Ferenc. 2014. *The Political Discourse of Spatial Disparities: Geographical Inequalities Between Science and Propaganda*. Cham: Springer.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1990. *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Hall, Peter, and Kathy Pain. 2006. From metropolis to polyopolis. In *The Polycentric Metropolis: Learning from Mega-City Regions in Europe*, ed. Peter Hall, and Kathy Pain, 3–16. London: Earthscan.

Hall, Peter, Kathy Pain, and Nick Green. 2006. Anatomy of the polycentric metropolis: eight mega-city regions in overview. In *The Polycentric Metropolis: Learning from Mega-City Regions in Europe*, ed. Peter Hall, and Kathy Pain, 19–52. London: Earthscan.

Hanson, Susan, and Geraldine Pratt. 1995. *Gender, Work, and Space*. New York: Routledge.

Harrington, Carol. 2010. *Politicization of Sexual Violence: From Abolitionism to Peacekeeping*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

Harris, Chauncy D., and Edward L. Ullman. 1945. The nature of cities. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 242: 7–17.

Harrison, John, and Michael Hoyler. 2015. Megaregions: foundations, frailties, futures. In *Megaregions: Globalization's New Urban Form?* ed. John Harrison, and Michael Hoyler, 1–28. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Harvey, David. 1972. Revolutionary and counter revolutionary theory in geography and the problem of ghetto formation. *Antipode* 4: 1–13.
———. 1973. *Social Justice and the City*. London/Baltimore, MD: Edward Arnold/Johns Hopkins University Press.
———. 1978. The urban process under capitalism: a framework for analysis. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 2: 101–131.
———. 1982. *The Limits to Capital*, 1 edn. Oxford/Chicago, IL: Blackwell/University of Chicago Press.
———. 2003. *The New Imperialism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
———. 2005. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
———. 2008. The right to the city. *New Left Review* 53: 23–40.
———. 2012. *Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution*. New York: Verso.
Herrschel, Tassilo (ed). 2007. *Global Geographies of Post-Socialist Transition. Geographies, Societies, Policies. London*. New York: Routledge.
Hirschman, Albert O. 1958. *The Strategy of Economic Development*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Hoelscher, Michael. 2012. Indicator suites. In *Cities, Cultural Policy and Governance*, ed. Helmut Anheier, and Yudhishthir Raj Isar, 353–442. London: SAGE.
Hoelscher, Michael, and Julia Schubert. 2015. Potential and problems of existing creativity and innovation indices. *Creativity Research Journal* 27: 1–15.
Hoyt, Homer. 1939. *The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighborhoods in American Cities*. Washington, DC: Federal Housing Administration.
Hutton, Thomas A. 2010. *The New Economy of the Inner City: Restructuring, Regeneration and Dislocation in the Twenty-First Century Metropolis*. New York: Routledge.
———. 2015. Epilogue: economic change, globalising cities and the new urban order. In *Cities and Economic Change: Restructuring and Dislocation in the Global Metropolis*, ed. Ronan Paddison, and Thomas A. Hutton, 231–246. London: SAGE.
Iveson, Kurt. 2013. Building a city for 'the people': the politics of alliance-building in the Sydney Green Ban Movement. *Antipode* 46: 992–1013.
James, Preston E. 1933. Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. *Geographical Review* 23: 271–298.
Jonas, Andrew E.G., and David Wilson. 1999. The city as a growth machine: critical reflections two decades later. In *The Urban Growth Machine: Critical Perspectives Two Decades Later*, ed. Andrew E.G. Jonas, and David Wilson, 3–18. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Judd, Dennis R. 2005. Everything is always going to hell: urban scholars as end-times prophets. *Urban Affairs Review* 41: 119–131.

Knight, Jack, and James Johnson. 1997. What sort of equality does deliberative democracy require? In *Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics*, ed. James Bohman, and William Rehg, 279–320. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Krätke, Stefan. 2010. 'Creative cities' and the rise of the dealer class: a critique of Richard Florida's approach to urban theory. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 34: 835–853.

Lawson, Victoria. 2007. Geographies of care and responsibility. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 97: 1–11.

Lazarsfeld, Paul F. 1939. The change of opinion during a political discussion. *Journal of Applied Psychology* 23: 131–147.

Leaf, Michael. 1996. Building the road for the BMW: culture, vision, and the extended metropolitan region of Jakarta. *Environment and Planning A* 28: 1617–1635.

Lefebvre, Henri. 2003 [1970]. *The Urban Revolution*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. 1964a. Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism. In *V. I. Lenin. Collected Works. Volume 22. December 1915–July 1916*, ed. George Hanna, 185–304. Moscow: Progress Publishers (Translated by Yuri Sdobnikov).

———. (1964b). The development of capitalism in Russia. The process of the formation of a home market for large-scale industry. In *V. I. Lenin. Collected Works. Volume 3*, 21–607. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

Leslie, Deborah, and John Paul Catungal. 2012. Social justice and the creative city: Class, gender and racial inequalities. *Geography Compass* 6: 111–122.

Lewis, Robert. 2008. *Chicago Made: Factory Networks in the Industrial Metropolis*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Livingstone, David N. 2003. *Putting Science in Its Place: Geographies of Scientific Knowledge*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Lobato, Ramon. 2010. Creative industries and informal economies: lessons from Nollywood. *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 13: 337–354.

Logan, John R., and Harvey L. Molotch. 1987. *Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

London School of Economics & Political Science. n.d. *Charles Booth (1840–1916)—A Biography (Charles Booth Online Archive)*. Retrieved September 02, 2014, from http://booth.lse.ac.uk/static/a/2.html.

Luxemburg, Rosa. 2003 [1913]. *The Accumulation of Capital*. London: Routledge (Translated by A. Schwarzschild. With a new introduction by T. Kowalik).

MacLeod, Gordon. 2011. Urban politics reconsidered: growth machine to post-democratic city? *Urban Studies* 48: 2629–2660.

MacLeod, Gordon, and Colin McFarlane. 2014. Introduction: grammars of urban injustice. *Antipode* 46: 857–873.

Marston, Sallie A. 2010. Introduction: Geographies of social justice. In *The SAGE Handbook of Social Geographies*, ed. Susan J. Smith, Rachel Pain, Sallie A. Marston, and John Paul Jones III, 411–418. London: SAGE.

Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. 1998 [1848]. *The Communist Manifesto*. London: ElecBook.

Massey, Doreen. 1991. Flexible sexism. *Environment and Planning D* 9: 31–57.

———. 1994. *Space, Place, and Gender*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

McDowell, Linda. 1997. *Capital Culture: Gender at Work in the City*. Oxford: Blackwell.

———. 2004. Work, workfare, work/life balance and an ethic of care. *Progress in Human Geography* 28: 145–163.

———. 2010. Capital culture revisited: sex, testosterone and the city. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 34: 652–658.

McDowell, Linda, and Jane Dyson. 2011. The other side of the knowledge economy: 'reproductive' employment and affective labours in Oxford. *Environment and Planning A* 43: 2186–2201.

Merrifield, Andy. 2013. The urban question under planetary urbanization. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 37: 909–922.

Meusburger, Peter. 1998. *Bildungsgeographie. Wissen und Ausbildung in der räumlichen Dimension [Geography of Education. Knowledge and Education in the Spatial Dimension]*. Heidelberg: Spektrum.

———. 2009. Milieus of creativity: the role of places, environments, and spatial contexts. In *Knowledge and Space: Vol. 2. Milieus of Creativity. An Interdisciplinary Approach to Spatiality of Creativity*, ed. Peter Meusburger, Joachim Funke, and Edgar Wunder, 97–153. Dordrecht: Springer.

———. 2011. Knowledge, cultural memory, and politics. In *Knowledge and Space: Vol. 4. Cultural Memories. The Geographical Point of View*, ed. Peter Meusburger, Michael Heffernan, and Edgar Wunder, 51–69. Dordrecht: Springer.

Mills, C. Wright. 1956. *The Power Elite*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Mingione, Enzo. 1996. Urban poverty in the advanced industrial world: concepts, analysis and debates. In *Urban Poverty and the Underclass. A Reader*, ed. Enzo Mingione, 3–40. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Morrill, Richard. 2001. Spatial equity. In *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, ed. Neil J. Smelser, and Paul B. Baltes, 14789–14792. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Morris, Meaghan. 1992. The man in the mirror: David Harvey's 'condition' of postmodernity. *Theory, Culture & Society* 9: 253–279.

Myrdal, Gunnar. 1957. *Rich Lands and Poor. The Road to World Prosperity*. New York: Harper and Brothers.

Nagel, Thomas. 1986. *The View from Nowhere*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nordic Council of Ministers. (2011). *Megatrends*. Copenhagen. http://norden.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:702166/FULLTEXT01.pdf. Accessed on April 12, 2016.

Nozick, Richard. 1974. *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Olson, Elizabeth, and Andrew Sayer. 2009. Radical geography and its critical standpoints: embracing the normative. *Antipode* 41: 180–198.

Pacione, Michael. 2005. *Urban Geography: A Global Perspective*, 2 edn. London: Routledge.

Parent du Châtelet, Alexandre Jean-Baptiste. 1836. *De la prostitution dans la ville de Paris, considérée sous le rapport de l'hygiène publique, de la morale et de l'administration: ouvrage appuyé de documens statistiques puisés dans les archives de la Préfecture de police [Prostitution in the City of Paris, Considered with Respect to Public Health, Morals, and Administration: Work Supported by Statistical Documents Drawn from the Archives of the Prefecture of Police]*. Two volumes. Paris: Jean-Baptiste Baillière.

Park, Robert E., Ernest W. Burgess, and Roderick D. McKenzie. 1925. *The City*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Peck, Jamie. 1995. Moving and shaking: business elites, state localism and urban privatism. *Progress in Human Geography* 19: 16–46.

———. 2005. Struggling with the creative class. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 29: 740–770.

———. 2007. The creativity fix. *Fronesis* 24: 1–24.

———. 2009. The cult of urban creativity. In *Leviathan Undone? Towards a Political Economy of Scale*, ed. Roger Keil, and Rianne Mahon, 159–176. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

Peck, Jamie, and Nik Theodore. 2010. Mobilizing policy: models, methods, and mutations. *Geoforum* 41: 169–174.

Perlman, Janice. 2010. *Favela: Four Decades of Living on the Edge in Rio de Janeiro*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Piketty, Thomas. 2014. *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Pounds, Norman J.G. 1963. *Political Geography*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Pratt, Andy C. 2008. Creative cities: the cultural industries and the creative class. *Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography* 90: 107–117.

———. 2011. The cultural contradictions of the creative city. *City, Culture and Society* 2: 123–130.

Quetelet, Adolphe. 1835. *Sur l'homme et le développement de ses facultés, ou essai de physique sociale [A Treatise on Man and the Development of His Faculties, or a Test of Social Physics]*. Two volumes. Paris: Bachelier.

Rantisi, Norma M., Deborah Leslie, and Susan Christopherson. 2006. Placing the creative economy: scale, politics, and the material. *Environment and Planning A* 38: 1789–1797.

Rawls, John. 1971. *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

———. 1997. The idea of public reason. In *Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics*, ed. James Bohman, and William Rehg, 131–144. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Robinson, Jennifer. 2006. *Ordinary Cities: Between Modernity and Development*. London: Routledge.

Rosso, Andrea L., Amy H. Auchincloss, and Yvonne L. Michael. 2011. The urban built environment and mobility in older adults: a comprehensive review. *Journal of Aging Research*. doi:10.4061/2011/816106.

Sandercock, Leonie. 1975. *Cities for Sale: Property, Politics, and Urban Planning in Australia*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

———. 1998. *Towards Cosmopolis: Planning for Multicultural Cities*. Chichester: Wiley.

Sassen, Saskia. 2013. When territory deborders territoriality. *Territory, Politics, Governance* 1: 21–45.

Saunders, Frances Stonor. 1999. *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War*. London: Granta Books.

Schlosberg, David. 2004. Reconceiving environmental justice: global movements and political theories. *Environmental Politics* 13: 517–540.

Sharlet, Jeff. 2011. Inside Occupy Wall Street. *Rolling Stone Politics*, November 24. http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/occupy-wall-street-welcome-to-the-occupation-20111110. Accessed on July 29, 2014.

Shearmur, Richard. 2007. The new knowledge aristocracy: the creative class, mobility and urban growth. *Work Organisation, Labour & Globalisation* 1: 31–47.

Simon, Jonathan. 2007. *Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Simone, AbdouMaliq. 2004. *For the City Yet to Come: Changing African Life in Four Cities*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Slater, Tom. 2012. The myth of 'Broken Britain': welfare reform and the production of ignorance. *Antipode* 46: 948–969.

Smith, David M. 1973. *The Geography of Social Well-Being in the United States: An Introduction to Territorial Social Indicators*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Smith, Neil. 1982. Gentrification and uneven development. *Economic Geography* 58: 139–155.

———. 2001a. Global social cleansing: postliberal revanchism and the export of zero tolerance. *Social Justice* 28: 68–74.

———. 2001b. Marxism and geography in the Anglophone world. *Geographische Revue* 3: 5–21.

———. 2008. *Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space*. Third Edition, with a New Afterword. Atlanta, GA: University of Georgia Press.

Smith, Susan J., Rachel Pain, Sallie A. Marston, and John Paul Jones III. 2010. Introduction: situating social geographies. In *The SAGE Handbook of Social Geographies*, ed. Susan J. Smith, Rachel Pain, Sallie A. Marston, and John Paul Jones III, 1–39. London: SAGE.

Stenmark, Mikael. 2008. Science and the limits of knowledge. In *Knowledge and Space: Vol. 1. Clashes of Knowledge. Orthodoxies and Heterodoxies in Science and Religion*, ed. Peter Meusburger, Michael Welker, and Edgar Wunder, 111–120. Dordrecht: Springer.

Swyngedouw, Erik. 1997a. Excluding the other: the production of scale and scaled politics. In *Geographies of Economies*, ed. Roger Lee, and Jane Wills, 167–176. London: Edward Arnold.

———. 1997b. Neither global nor local. 'Globalization' and the politics of scale. In *Spaces of Globalization. Reasserting the Power of the Local*, ed. Kevin R. Cox, 137–166. New York: Guilford.

———. 2005. Dispossessing H_2O: the contested terrain of water privatization. *Capitalism, Nature, Socialism* 16: 81–98.

———. 2009. Troubled waters: the political economy of essential public services. In *Water and Sanitation Services: Public Policy and Management*, ed. José Esteban Castro, and Léo Heller, 22–39. London: Zed Books.

Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2012. *The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers Our Future*. London: W. W. Norton & Company.

Taylor, Charles. 1994. The politics of recognition. In *Multiculturalism*, ed. Amy Gutmann, 25–74. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Uitermark, Justus, and Walter Nicholls. 2013. From politicization to policing: the rise and decline of new social movements in Amsterdam and Paris. *Antipode* 46: 970–991.

UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund). 2007. *State of World Population 2007. Unleashing the Potential of Urban Growth*. New York. https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/695_filename_sowp2007_eng.pdf. Accessed on January 24, 2016.

United Nations. n.d. World Urbanization Prospects. http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup. Accessed on January 24, 2016.

van Winden, Willem. 2010. Knowledge and the European city. *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 101: 100–106.

Wacquant, Loïc. 2008. Ordering insecurity: Social polarization and the punitive upsurge. *Radical Philosophy Review* 11: 1–19.

Walby, Sylvia. 1990. *Theorizing Patriarchy*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Ward, Kevin, and Kim England. 2007. Introduction: reading neoliberalization. In *Neoliberalization: States, Networks, Peoples*, ed. Kim England, and Kevin Ward, 1–22. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

We Are The 99 Percent. n.d. We Are The 99 Percent Blog. http://wearethe-99percent.tumblr.com/ Accessed on July 29, 2014.

Weber, Max. 1921. Die Stadt. Eine soziologische Untersuchung [The city. A sociological study]. *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 47: 621–772.

Wilkinson, Richard, and Kate Pickett. 2009. *The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better*. London: Allen Lane.

Williamson, Jeffrey G. 1965. Regional inequality and process of national development: a description of the patterns. *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 13(4/II): 3–84.

Wilson, David, and Roger Keil. 2008. The real creative class. *Social & Cultural Geography* 8: 841–847.

World Bank. n.d. *World Development Indicators*. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. Accessed on January 24, 2016.

Wunder, Edgar. 2008. Introduction to the volume. Clashes of knowledge inside, outside, and at the threshold of science. In *Knowledge and Space: Vol. 1. Clashes of Knowledge. Orthodoxies and Heterodoxies in Science and Religion*, ed. Peter Meusburger, Michael Welker, and Edgar Wunder, 5–9. Dordrecht: Springer.

Young, Iris Marion. 1990. *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Zimbalist, Sidney E. 1977. *Historic Themes and Landmarks in Social Welfare Research*. New York: Harper.

PART II

Different Dimensions of Inequalities in Specific Cities

CHAPTER 4

The Ideal Worker: Inclusion and Exclusion in a Knowledge-based City: The Case of Oxford, UK

Linda McDowell

Introduction

At the heart of the argument about the creative industries and creative cities lies the figure of an idealized worker: mobile, affluent, innovative, talented, tolerant, and cosmopolitan (although not displaced), a figure that Jamie Peck (2012: 462) parodied as a chic portentous hipster, who is usually white, always middle class, secure in his own self-identity (if not always secure in employment terms) and masculine or masculinized. This worker is footloose and fancy free, able to accept portfolio work, willing to travel without worrying about baby-sitting arrangements, and able to cross borders without anxieties about the status of documents or a fear of deportation. This hipster figure is paralleled by a similar figure at the heart of discourses about flexibility, about mobility, the new 'social factory', and about waged work beyond the workplace that have also influenced debates in economic geography over the last three decades or so.

L. McDowell (✉)
School of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford, Oxford, Great Britain

U. Gerhard et al. (eds.), *Inequalities in Creative Cities,*
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95115-4_4

In this chapter I explore the ways in which both the idealized representations and the material composition of the creative industries' labor forces exclude multiple 'Others', including many women, working class men, people of color, and the majority of in-migrants to the UK. In the first part of the chapter, I explore the critiques of arguments about creativity, the rise of knowledge economy, the mobility paradigm, the identification of a 'new' capitalism, and the Italian Operaismo School's predictions. A particularly significant critique is one developed by feminist theorists, building on a long effort to expand the definition of work and to challenge the inherent individualism in most economic theory that portrays the worker as an individual, unburdened by dependents and domestic responsibilities that tie them to specific geographic locales. I then explore the definition and significance of creativity empirically, looking at recent changes in the UK economy as it 'recovers' eight years after the crisis of 2008, in a context of declining public sector spending and rolling back the welfare state. The majority Conservative Government elected in May 2015 continues to accelerate the program of public sector cuts introduced under the previous coalition Government, plans that will have a serious impact in a city such as Oxford where public sector employment is much higher than in the majority of British towns and cities.

In the final part of the chapter, I turn to a case study of Oxford: a city that perhaps above others in Britain, with the exceptions of London and Cambridge, personifies a 'knowledge economy'. In Oxford, 'brain work' is the key activity of many employees. Two universities, a large research-based health sector, and the publishing industry dominate the local labor market. However, the city has 'another side', long inhospitable to the unqualified but aspiring in-migrants from Thomas Hardy's Jude to current asylum seekers, penned up in a camp six miles north of the city. I compare the narrative and rhetorical construction of the city as one of 'dreaming spires' (the towers of medieval buildings that puncture the skyline: see Fig. 4.1) and of creativity and high-status knowledge-based industries dominating its changing economy with a different and less-well publicized story about high house prices, in-migration, and the expansion of insecure and low-waged work, especially for women in 'servicing' jobs, as austerity policies continue to bite.

I conclude by suggesting that the significance of embodiment may unite workers in interactive, and often precarious, employment in both the creative industries and in bottom end work in the service sector, uniting them

Fig. 4.1 The Oxford skyline dreaming spires (photo by author)

across class boundaries, as Guy Standing (2011) suggests in his arguments about the new precariat. However, the lives, nature of work, and its financial rewards, as well the living standards of the different members of this growing group of casualized and insecure workers remain divergent, as the city, like others in the south of the UK, becomes more unequal.

Thinking About Creativity, Knowledge, Mobility, and Affective Labor

In a nod to the aphorism that 'nothing succeeds like success', a set of optimistic rhetorical and theoretical claims about the key basis of successful economic growth and competition by the west in the face of expanding economies elsewhere has established something of a stranglehold on debates in (and beyond) economic geography. Behind these claims—about the significance of knowledge-based industries, about the need for flexibility in both production processes and the use of labor, about the rise of new industries based on affective social relations between empathetic and aware individuals, working in many cases beyond the restrictive boundaries of traditional workplaces—lies a vision of a new idealized worker for the new economy. The worker is intelligent, well educated, mobile and adaptive, able to sell himself (the term is deliberate) on the basis of a portfolio of skills, an individual summed up in Carnoy's (2000: 1) definition of the characteristics of the new economy:

> It is a way of work and a way of life. Its core values are flexibility, innovation and risk. As the new economy becomes the source of wealth creation worldwide, it infuses old industrial cultures with these values. It requires a workforce that is not only well-educated but also ready to change jobs quickly and to take the risks associated with rapid change.

Indeed, so significant is the notion of a flexible mobile individual, able to respond to new trends, to this view of the future that the sociologist John Urry (2000) identified nothing less than a new form of social organization and a new focus for his discipline: the mobility paradigm. In economics and economic geography, a related, but distinct, paradigm grew in significance, captured in the terms the new/knowledge economy and the creative industries paradigm. To a remarkable extent, the claim about the significance of creativity and the creative sector as the basis both for urban expansion and urban renaissance, as well as for national economic prosperity, has its origin in a series of books, papers, public performances, and consultancies by the geographer, Richard Florida. In his collected work, Florida argues that the creative class is variously seen as tolerant, affluent, knowledgeable, cosmopolitan, wired, charitable, younger than average, middle class, white, or sometimes from more diverse ethnicities or backgrounds, with diverse sexualities, elite, and (self) employed. Urban growth, Florida (2002) argued, depends on the existence of this hypermobile creative class, a class based on three Ts—technology, talent, and tolerance. The actual size of the class is open to debate, although its significance resides in its basis in leading-edge industries. However, while Florida suggested in certain cities such as Amsterdam up to a third of all employment may be in creative industries, an Amsterdam city official (quoted in Peck (2012)) suggested that 7 % of the workforce in that city was a more accurate estimate.

Despite such empirical disagreement, claims about the significance of the creative class and its idealized representatives chimed with the dominant political climate in the late twentieth century and the start of the twenty-first century in which a tough individualized neo-liberal set of policies set the frame for deregulation, rolling back the state and the rampant expansion of the financial services sector as the basis for growth in both the USA and Western Europe. With the benefit of hindsight, and the effects of the crisis of 2007–08 that are still being felt in declining wages and living standards, this optimistic rhetoric now looks less appealing. Nevertheless, as I demonstrate in a later section, it retains a hold on economic planning and policy in the UK and elsewhere. However, even before

the sobering reassessment demanded by post-crisis theorizing, several significant criticisms of the creative industries/knowledge economy claims had been aired, to greater and lesser extent. A simple but effective claim was that by Jamie Peck (2012)—that the idealized creative sector worker was exclusive: the urban hipster he parodied. Bolstering this claim was the demand for empirical verification of Florida's claims: how widespread and, more importantly, how significant were these new creative industry workers? While there is no doubt that the skills demanded of workers in the post-industrial, post-Fordist economies of the west in the later twentieth century were different than those of earlier eras, how much had changed, where and with what effects? As du Gay (2004: 147) carefully noted, 'one of the most striking things about much of contemporary theorizing about work and identity is the epochalist terms in which it is framed in which the logic of dichotomization establishes the available terms in advance'.

Kevin Doogan (2009) has marshaled an impressive critique of the empirical gaps in the arguments of theorists who identified new economies, a new capitalism, the rise of affective labor and so forth, producing a series of data that documented the continuing significance of public sector employment, in what used to be referred to, after Castells (1977), as the sphere of collective consumption. Doogan, however, prefers to call this reproductive labor (without a recognition of its feminist heritage: an omission to which I shall return below), those jobs keeping the wheels of the state turning, whether in the health services, educating workers, or maintaining central and local administrations. Here employment is in the main, and especially in lower and less well-paid tiers, in semi-managerial jobs and lower level clerical and administrative tasks, female-dominated. These employees are not the hipsters of Florida's world nor the flexible, mobile, cosmopolitan workers identified by Carnoy and others, but women with domestic responsibilities, whose job tenure, as Doogan also demonstrates, has increased rather than decreased, albeit in a data set that ends before the period of public sector cuts in employment. In my own work on the changing composition of the labor market, along with other feminist theorists, I have argued that the neglect of gender relations has produced theoretical claims that ignore the commodification of tasks and the provision of goods that previously were undertaken and provided in the domestic arena, in the main by individual women for individual men and other household members (McDowell 2009, 2016). This commodification has meant a growing feminization of the bottom end of the labor market, as well as women's rising labor market participation.

Despite these criticisms of some of the central claims of what might be termed 'the transformation theorists', it is clear that the arguments about knowledge, creativity, and affective labor, in which dealing with people rather than things is crucial, have considerable purchase in service-based economies. Two-thirds of British workers are currently employed in the service sector, many of them in interactive forms of work in which both the employee and the purchaser of the service are present. In these forms of work, what matters is the embodied interactions between the provider and the consumer, as a great deal of the work involved is persuasion, what in the devastatingly honest words of a City of London investment banker in mergers and acquisitions whom I once interviewed, includes 'persuading the client that I know better than him, even if I don't' (McDowell 1997: 112). This sort of work, defined by Bauman (1998) as relying on seduction, was defined by feminist theorist Hochschild (1983) as 'emotional labor'. It involves the emotions and embodied attributes of employees—their tone of voice, their stance, their image, size, and height, their appropriateness in the view of both employers and consumers, for the provision of, variously, care, service, advice, or bodily maintenance. More recently influential theorists of the Italian Operaismo school have termed such work of persuasion and seduction, dependent on co-presence, affective labor, based on bonds of intimacy, desire, and emotion. What is significant in this new form of service labor is that it is connected to a growing polarization in the labor market, a two-fold distinction that is also differentially gendered. In Oxford, women, often women born outside the UK, continue to provide the services demanded by the new 'creatives'—staffing the coffee shops, cleaning the offices and laboratories, and caring for their children as they 'network' in the evenings or fly to meetings in Milan or Munich, to book fairs, art markets, museums, and medical conferences.

Castells (2000), in more recent arguments, has identified a dual employment structure in which the ideal knowledge worker is termed a portfolio worker, characterized by the very attributes that Carnoy identified. These workers are found among the ranks of the well-paid, including City employees, the old professions and the senior civil service, and more recently in the expanding high-tech and creative sectors—software designers, artists, academics, film makers, and script writers, this latter group perhaps trading income and security for greater freedom from routine and flexibility in everyday social relations. These are members of Florida's creative class: clustering in key cities, living and working in old warehouses, hanging out in clubs and bars in districts with a bohemian atmosphere.

In an interesting piece of contemporary journalism, Paul Mason (2014: 7), the economics editor of Channel 4 News in the UK, illustrated the widespread appeal of this discourse in his definition of an ideal city:

> It has entire neighborhoods designed around hipster economies. Though currently maligned, hipsters are crucial signifiers of a successful city economy. Their presence shows it is possible to live on your wits even as neoliberalism stagnates. Such neighborhoods typically contain: vintage clothes stores, a micro-brewery, a gay club, burger joints, coffee bars not owned by global chains and workshops for creative microbusinesses.

No nurseries or good schools then. And in an astonishingly insensitive coda, Mason adds 'in ideal form, these areas are home to both hipsters and ethnically diverse poor communities, who refrain from fighting'—to add local color and a touch of grittiness, perhaps, to these locales.

At the other end of the labor market to the urban hipsters and new economy knowledge workers are, indeed, the urban poor, who are often ethnically diverse. For them the service sector offers not flexibility but uncertainty, often employed on casual or temporary contracts, providing the sorts of services the more affluent urban population needs to maintain their daily life and high standards of living. As Sassen (2001) noted some time ago, chic neighborhoods and their residents in London, New York, and Tokyo, also rely on low-paid retail workers, on construction and maintenance workers to aid gentrification, on employees of laundry services, housecleaners, dog walkers, nannies, and baby sitters, staff for bars and cafes, and all the multitude of low-paid employees currently growing in number in cities in the west: what Castells (2000) termed generic workers, interchangeable one with another, and part of the 'precariat' I discussed above. These workers may be insecure, but they are not always interchangeable. Just as in the case of portfolio workers, their embodied social characteristics are also significant, ranking them in a hierarchy of eligibility and acceptability for different types of what I and others have termed 'body work' (Wolkowitz 2006; McDowell 2009) and Hochschild and others 'emotional labor'. By neglecting these employees, analysts of economic change ignore a key element of continuity in the labor market, especially the feminization of low-waged 'servicing' employment and the intersection and co-reliance of both ends of a polarized service economy. The employees of the creative and knowledge industries, which dominate cities such as Oxford—in this case education and publishing as well as

more typical industries such as music, art, software development, etc.—are also often precarious, but not generic. Recruited for their specific skills and often highly educated, employees such as research assistants, lab technicians, linguists, and designers are too often on short-term contracts with little security. In British universities, for example, an astonishingly high percent of employees are on temporary contracts: almost 50 % in Oxford University in 2015, for example. And for many of these employees, soft skills and relying on personal interactions are also key.

This notion of the growing significance of emotional or affective labor in knowledge economies and creative industries is central to the work of the Italian school of 'transformation' theorists. Known as the autonomists or the Operaismo school, influenced by the work of Hardt (1999), Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004), Lazzarato (1996), Virno (2005), and others, their arguments are important as they place immaterial or affective labor (that might include both employment in knowledge and creative industries and servicing labor [what Brush (1996) once aptly termed hi-tech and hi-touch labor]) at the center of their claims of an economic and social transformation. This quote from Hardt and Negri (2004: 108) explains the concept of affective labor:

> Unlike emotions,[1] which are mental phenomena, affects refer equally to body and mind. In fact, affects, such as joy and sadness, reveal the present state of life in the entire organism, expressing a certain state of the body along with a certain mode of thinking. Affective labor, then, is labor that produces or manipulates affects.... One can recognize affective labor, for example, in the work of legal assistants, flight attendants, and fast food workers (service with a smile). One indication of the rising importance of affective labor, at least in the dominant countries, is the tendency for employers to highlight education, attitude, character, and 'prosocial' behavior as the primary skills employees need. A worker with a good attitude and social skills is another way of saying a worker is adept at affective labor.

This is not a new argument—the great sociologist C. Wright Mills (1953) recognized the significance of embodied labor and selling the self in the mid-1950s and Arlie Hochschild's classical text *The Managed Heart*

[1] The distinction between emotions and affect is a subject of debate by geographers who collectively term themselves the nonrepresentational theorists (NRT). However, it is clear from Hochschild's classic work that she includes both mind and body in her definition of emotional labour.

(1983) spelt out the significance of emotional labor 30 years before this argument by Hardt and Negri. The Operaismo or autonomous school's arguments are, however, influential and of particular relevance at present as they point to the new significance of the urban arena rather than traditional, spatially distinctive, workplaces in both economic change and in politics, as well as the importance of creative labor. As McRobbie (2010) noted, in a useful summary of the Operaismo arguments, many young people have become dissatisfied by traditional types and places of work, seeking alternatives where they might 'exercise their brains thereby achieving a kind of autonomous space for critical thought and reflection' and so create 'a disposition towards co-operation and collectivity, qualities which are also required in the new workshops or studios of cognitive capitalism'. As she suggests 'this chimes well with the growth of freelance or precarious self-employment among young people or with new forms of micro-entrepreneurialism associated with the growing cultural and creative and media sectors of advanced capitalism' (pp. 63–64).

However, as McRobbie (2010) also pointed out, this is a particular and optimistic reading of both politics and economic opportunities. In UK, under Thatcherism and Blairism, and Cameron's Conservation/Liberal Democrat Coalition and Conservative majority Governments, the state has pursued a form of heavy-handed biopolitics to discredit trade unionism, class-based activism and feminist politics, and left politics more generally, in order to scapegoat the unemployed, and undo universal forms of welfare provision. A rhetorical claim of 'making work pay' lies behind benefit cuts and indeed, although youth unemployment has remained higher than overall unemployment levels (at 13 % compared to 5 % in 2016), overall levels of unemployment have declined since 2008 and never reached the level experienced in previous recessions. The key rise, however, has been in self-employment, regarded widely by left wing critics as a sign of desperation rather than the flowering of freelance creative employment beyond the bounds of the workplace. In the UK, 40 % of new jobs created since 2010 are a result of the shift to self-employment. It seems clear that many of the self-employed have not made a political or life style choice, but rather one dominated by desperation and lack of employment in the formal sector. The financial crisis, the recession, low economic growth since 2008, high youth unemployment, and public sector cuts seriously challenge the arguments of the Italian school, although the optimism of the claims is seductive and, indeed, should not be ignored. These claims have their origins in some of the post-1960s critique of materialism

and of the alienation, lack of freedom and artificiality of modern urban life among social critics such as Adorno (1991) (and see Boltanski and Chiapello 2005), given expression in many cities by artistic and bohemian movements, which surely are a cause for celebration rather than regret.

What is also useful to take from the Operaismo School is their recognition of the transfer of many of the tasks of production out of the workplace and into the hands of both producers and consumers. They explore the ways in which free or cut price content is utilized in, for example, social media and reality TV, and the rise of services such as uber and airbnb, transferring control into the hands of consumers. However, here too the liberating possibilities of such transfers are often outweighed by their cooption by large-scale capitalism companies. As Andrew Ross (2009: 22) noted 'the burden of productive wage labor is increasingly transferred to users or consumers—outsourced as it were to what Italian autonomists refer to as the "social factory" at large' but in ways that transfer the costs to consumers. This is an evident trend in both basic services such as grocery shopping and in public services such as libraries. And in both the case of the creative industries and the retail sector, it is the corporate majors that usually end up profiting and consumers losing despite the illusion of greater 'choice'. In this cold new world of austerity, it might be expected that the hipster discourse, as Mason suggested, has been discredited and new forms of economic policy emerged to meet new circumstances. Before addressing this possibility, I turn to a brief outline of the definition of creative industries by UK policy makers and an assessment of their significance.

The Creative Sector in the UK: Size and Composition

Perhaps it is not surprising that multiple definitions of the creative industries co-exist. According to Peck (2012), the UK Government's definition of 'cultural industries' comprises 11 sectors: advertising; architecture; art and antique markets; crafts; design; designer fashion; film, video and photography; software and electronic publishing; music and visual and performing arts; publishing; and television and radio. However, in a mapping document for the Department of Culture, Media and Sport in 1998, 13 industries were identified: film, TV and radio, publishing, music, performing arts, arts and antiques, crafts, video and computer games, architecture, design, fashion, software and computer services, and advertising. The

United Nations, by contrast, defines four sectors: cultural heritage (traditional cultural expressions and cultural sites); arts (visual and performing arts); media (publishing and print media, audiovisuals); and functional creation (design, new media, and creative services). It seems clear that this is a rather diverse collection of industries, in size and potential for growth as well as for the basis of national economic policy. Indeed, there has always been a lack of clarity in policy documents at both European and British levels about where the main growth potential is and was—in several documents information and communications technology (ICTs), rather than the more creative industries, are identified as crucial.

It is clear that computing and high-tech industries are rather different from traditional cultural industries. Furthermore the issue of how to transform 'culture', which is typically seen as a public good, into a marketable commodity, is sometimes avoided, although from the late 1980s onwards in Britain the significance of 'culture', especially museums and other artistic events and installation began to be seen as a key part of local economic development, especially in the regeneration strategies of declining towns and cities in the industrial parts of the UK. The arts sector began to develop arguments about managerial efficiency and economic benefits in terms not only of direct employment but also the spending generated by tourism. Myerscough (1988), for example, developed a model for measuring the multiplier effect of spending on the arts, including not only direct employment but also visitors' spending on attendance, transport and meals, etc. Investment in new cultural facilities was linked to other developments of new leisure, retail, and office facilities, leading to a discourse about the establishment of what became known as 'new cultural quarters' which would be a central part of a culture-led urban renaissance in cities as varied as Manchester, Newcastle, London, Birmingham, and numerous smaller towns and cities including Oxford, not of course a declining industrial city (Bell and Jayne 2004; Landry 2000; Montgomery 2005; Roodhouse 2006a, b). Indeed, from the late 1990s onwards in Britain, the creative industries were identified as a key engine of national growth.

The policy rhetoric was at most its extended and ambitious in the first Blair Government (1997–2002) when investment in cultural and creative industries was presumed variously to 'further diversity, access, relevance, civic pride, community engagement and social inclusion as well as improve public health, race relations, urban blight, special education, welfare to work programs and, not least, economic development'—all listed in short book written by Chris Smith (1998), the first Minister at the Department

of Culture, Media and Sport. The size of the cultural economy in terms of output in 2007 was estimated at 7.3 % of the economy (Ross 2009: 28), and employing 1.8 million people, about same size as financial services at that date. By 2013, the Confederation of British Industries (2014) suggested 6 % of output with a workforce of 2 million, focusing on increases in employment in the media and music industries, video gaming, fashion and publishing. With the possible exception of fashion, however, these industries, especially at the top end, remain dominated by men (Gill 2002; Christopherson 2008) and a largely middle class arena, where the ability to undertake unpaid work experience as an intern is a key mode of access to employment. Patterns of informal hiring are widespread. Combined with the concentration of much of the creative sector in London and the South East, as well as the adverse effects of gentrification in certain areas (Evans and Shaw 2004), these forms of contract have exacerbated inequality, both between regions and within cities (Oakley 2006).

What is surprising about the debates about creative cities, quarters, and industries is their relative lack of attention to questions about the effects of these industries on other parts of the labor market, or indeed on the conditions of everyday life, as Britain becomes a dominantly service-based economy. While flexibility and creativity are emphasized either as non-gendered attributes or as appropriate for women combining employment with domestic tasks, the reality of both labor market change in recent years and women's care for dependents are seldom interrogated empirically. The vast expansion of employment for women in the post-Fordist years has been in low-paid jobs, mainly in care, the retail sector, and clerical labor and these jobs have been almost entirely taken by women with children. Indeed Oxford economists, Connolly and Gregory (2007), have estimated that between 1970 and 2000, 'women have made up the entire net expansion of the UK workforce over this period' (p. 144).

As I have argued at length elsewhere (McDowell 2009), those arguments about the transformation of the labor market, whether about the creative industries, the knowledge economy, or a new capitalism, ignore changes in women's participation and the location of their workplaces that challenge the key claims. Thus, for example, the significance of waged work for women has increased and not declined; and many women have always worked beyond the walls of workplaces in the social factory, be this other women's homes or in casualized work in small workshops. As women move into employment, new class divisions have opened up, challenging older claims about gender (McDowell 2009); middle class women

increasingly work full time, where increasingly they purchase the consumer goods and services necessary to maintain their workplace performance and appearance in interactive occupations as well as the semblance of domestic service at home. Thus industries including clothes, leisure, home furnishing, and new retail services, including cooked and chilled food, are all expanding, often employing lower-skilled and less-well-paid women. These women (and men) are often trapped in low-paid and precarious forms of employment (Standing 2011), in occupations where ethnicity increasingly intersects with class and gender to construct new divisions of labor (McDowell 2013; Wills et al. 2010). As I argued earlier, a new polarized labor market, in which low-paid, low-skilled, and insecure work, is the lot of growing numbers of people, rather than the satisfying, creative, and portfolio work that dominates academic and policy discourse. As I now explore, in Oxford, a city with a reputation for knowledge and creativity, the majority of its workforce are not part of the creative class and are excluded from both high-paid employment and increasingly the services that form part of a 'good city'—decent housing, conviviality, and leisure opportunities—as wages shrink and living costs rise inexorably.

Oxford as a Creative City or the Significance of Knowledge

Oxford is a city that looms large in the British, and perhaps global, imagination. In literature, film, and in the retrospective recollections of generations of students, it is the city of soft sandstone medieval buildings, of punting on the river on long summer afternoons, as well as a city dominated by the cultivation of the mind and the education of the young. In the rhetoric of the city marketeers it is also now a modern, forward looking knowledge-based city, in which the immaterial exchange of ideas—whether in the university, the publishing houses, or the high-tech medical laboratories—dominates the economy. What both these representations of the city neglect is the extremely high cost of living in the city. In 2016 Oxford was identified as the fourth most expensive place to live in the UK after London, Cambridge, and Brighton (see Movehub.com and Fig. 4.2). It also has significant transport problems, as according to the 2011 Census, of the 100,000 people who had their main job in Oxford, 46,000 lived outside the city, commuting in often on a daily basis. There is also growing income inequality, evident ethnic exclusion, and, more recently,



Fig. 4.2 Housing affordability in Oxford neighborhoods, 2014. Source: https://www.oxford.gov.uk/download/downloads/id/998/housing_affordability_in_oxford_neighbourhoods_december_2014.pdf

cases of child abuse, prostitution, and violence. Little of this touches the representations that dominate literary images of the city, although poverty and exclusion find their way into policy documents. It is also a conservative city, where half the population is represented by a Conservative Member of Parliament, and a long-established elitist hierarchy dominates Oxford University (and the country, as numerous Prime Ministers were educated in the city). Despite its cosmopolitan atmosphere, with street cafes, art venues, and a visible minority population, especially among graduate students, Oxford is not quite the funky, libertine place of Florida's or Mason's imagination. The rhetoric of cultural quarters and a creative class has, however, not left entirely Oxford untouched. Oxford University is, for example, currently erecting new buildings on an inner urban site once occupied by the hospital under the banner of The Radcliffe Cultural Quarter or ROQ. However, this re-designation and rebuilding is marked

by iconic buildings, designed by global architects and built by international construction firms rather than gentrified workshops or forms of self-build that might be conjured up by the term cultural quarter.

Oxford is, however, indisputably, a city in which knowledge and creativity matter. Its economy is based on the sale of ideas: in the public sector through its educational institutions and its large, research-based health sector and in the private sector through its significant publishing industry. It also has a small but important workforce in the car industry, in the BMW Mini plant. The public sector is considerably larger than in most cities and 40 % of all employees work in education, health, and public administration (see Table 4.1).

While universities are not explicitly included as part of the creative industries, publishing is, as is employment in the heritage industry, in museums, cinemas, music venues, and tourism, which is a growing part of Oxford's economy and position as a high status destination for tourists. For example, 9.3 million tourists visit the city each year. The majority of employees in the tourism industry, however, are neither well-paid nor freewheelin' independent spirits, but in the main poorly paid and often casual employees, many of whom wish to work longer hours on permanent contracts. Florida's own definition of the creative class, however, as O'Connor (2010) noted, is not entirely satisfactory as he conflates 'creative' occupations with a wider group of urban professionals, including lawyers, scientists, and employees in other businesses. It might therefore be reasonable to include Oxford's academic workforce as part of its creative class. It is also evident, however, that many of the professionals identified by Florida, and including academics, are attracted to parts of cities that are already gentrified rather than the gritty boho districts mentioned by Mason (and see Healy 2002; Markusen 2006; Montgomery 2005; Peck 2005). Typically such areas, once gentrified, become exclusively middle class and too expensive for artists and other craft workers. Jericho in Oxford, where Jude the Obscure wandered in distress, which was once a quarter dominated by working class houses occupied by workers who unloaded coal form barges on the nearby canal, is a classic example. These small terraced houses built for the industrial working class or in some streets for college 'servants' were once a disreputable area where drugs and prostitution were not unknown into the 1960s. In the new millennium, estate agents advertise houses in Jericho now as 'close to the restaurants, bars and cinemas of this lively area' but are also just as likely to mention open space and private schools in the

Table 4.1 Employment statistics, Oxford, South East and Great Britain, 2015

	Oxford (numbers)	*Oxford (%)*	*South East (%)*	*Great Britain (%)*
Employment by occupation (Jan 2015–Dec 2015)[a]				
Soc 2010 major group 1–3	59,400	64.4	49.2	44.4
1. Managers, directors, and senior officials	5,200	5.6	12.1	10.4
2. Professional occupations	41,100	44.6	21.7	19.8
3. Associate professional and technical	13,100	14.2	15.2	14.1
Soc 2010 major group 4–5	15,700	17.0	20.9	21.4
4. Administrative and secretarial	9,800	10.6	11.0	10.7
5. Skilled trades occupations	5,900	6.4	9.8	10.6
Soc 2010 major group 6–7	10,400	11.3	15.8	16.9
6. Caring, leisure, and other service occupations	7,600	8.3	8.7	9.2
7. Sales and customer service occs	#	#	7.0	7.7
Soc 2010 major group 8–9	6,700	7.3	14.1	17.2
8. Process plant and machine operatives	#	#	5.0	6.3
9. Elementary occupations	#	#	9.1	10.8
Employee jobs (2014)[b]				
Total employee jobs	113,900	–	–	–
Full-time	76,500	67.1	67.8	68.3
Part-time	37,400	32.9	32.2	31.7
Employee jobs by industry				
Primary services (A–B: agriculture and mining)	–	–	0.2	0.4
Energy and water (D–E)	–	–	1.1	1.1
Manufacturing (C)	4,100	3.6	6.2	8.5
Construction (F)	6,100	5.4	4.8	4.5
Services (G–S)	103,300	90.7	87.6	85.6
Wholesale and retail, including motor trades (G)	11,300	9.9	17.0	15.9
Transport storage (H)	2,600	2.3	4.6	4.5
Accommodation and food services (I)	7,700	6.8	7.4	7.1
Information and communication (J)	6,200	5.5	5.8	4.1
Financial and other business services (K–N)	18,000	15.8	22.5	22.2
Public admin, education, and health (O–Q)	54,400	47.8	25.6	27.4

(*continued*)

Table 4.1 (continued)

Employee jobs (2014)[b]				
Other services (R–S)	3,100	2.7	4.8	4.4

[a]Source: ONS annual population survey; #: Sample size too small for reliable estimate (see definitions); Notes: Numbers and % are for those of 16+, % is a proportion of all persons in employment

[b]Source: ONS business register and employment survey, https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/reports/lmp/la/1946157324/report.aspx?town=oxford; –: Data unavailable; Notes: % is a proportion of total employee jobs, Employee jobs excludes self-employed, government-supported trainees and HM Forces, Data excludes farm-based agriculture

locality. Average prices for a Victorian three bed-roomed terraced house in this area approached £1 million, or even more, in 2016, out of reach of most hipsters, and temporary university staff, and nowadays even professors on good salaries and permanent contracts. The new ROQ quarter mentioned earlier includes an iconic new building for the Blavatnik School of Government (see Fig. 4.3), and the headquarters of Oxford University Press is also part of the locality, facing each other across the main street that runs through Jericho. Their employees, publishers, academics, and administrators may work in Jericho, enjoying the pubs, cafes, and other venues, but few of them are able to live there too, and often face long journeys to work from out-lying villages.

A search of the key documents relating to economic development in Oxford reveals the relative insignificance of the creative industries. Instead the key focus is on the significance of knowledge in the city as part of the key aim of 'building a world class city for everyone' (Oxford Core Strategy 2026 adopted in 2011) where 'the need to maintain competitiveness in challenges of the global market' (para 8.1.2; no page numbers) is the driving force of policy. The majority of the discussion about the economy, headed 'strengthening prosperity', is concerned with policies to facilitate the continued growth in three main sectors: the universities and hospitals; retail; and sustainable tourism. The only mention of cultural activities is a desire to increase participation, outlined in two sections of the document—one on promoting social well-being and a second section on cultural and community development. Here it is stated that 'culture has an intrinsic value to communities and visitors, bringing people together in shared experience, strengthening community bonds

Fig. 4.3 The old and new in Jericho_Church (now a bar) and the Blavatnik School of Government, on the fringes of the Radcliffe Cultural Quarter (photo by author)

and making a major contribution to the quality of life. A thriving cultural sector can also deliver substantial economic benefits, particularly to tourism' (para 6.3.1) and 'Facilities that add diversity to the cultural scene, including music and theatre venues and cultural employment opportunities, will be encouraged in appropriate locations throughout Oxford' (para 6.3.4). Thus, the encouragement of the creative sector is seen as an additional way to enhance tourism rather than as a key economic strategy in its own right. The employment that is closer to the heart of the Oxford policy makers is the higher education sector and forms of high-tech manufacturing including the BMW Mini plant in Cowley where each car is customized and pre-purchased before it is built.

The Other Side of Oxford

What is neglected in the stories of Oxford as a creative city or the city of dreaming spires, where crime is presented as the backdrop to an enviable existence among beautiful ancient buildings in television dramas such as *Morse* and *Lewis*, is the poor living standards and insecure working lives

of many of the individuals and households who live on or below average incomes. These people include not only many of the precarious employees in service sector jobs, catering, cleaning, and waiting on the mobile population of tourists that flood the city each year but also the mobile population of something like 40,000 students living in Oxford during term for three or so years. This large student population adds to the surface feeling of the city as 'funky', as student incomes support cafes, bars, clubs, and artistic venues that construct a visible sense of the city as 'creative' and 'alternative'.

For permanent residents living in parts of the city that are increasingly dominated either by 24/7 leisure services or by student residences (both purpose-built and converted houses) noise, litter, parking, and general inconvenience are the cost of an economy dominated by tourism and educational provision.[2] It is not only visitors and students who need 'servicing', however. The knowledge and creative sectors in the city provide employment opportunities for many of the highly educated women who live in the city. Indeed, dual household incomes are now an essential element in access to owner occupied housing in the city. One of the consequences of the high and rising rates of well-paid employment for middle class women has been the growing commodification of goods and services previously provided in the home through social relations of affection. Numerous individual women, for example, used to cook, clean, do childcare, and look after, love, and care for the other members of their household without a cash payment. Increasingly though meals are taken outside the home or cooked and chilled dinners replace 'proper' cooking from scratch; leisure is also purchased, and children cared for in commercial or state-funded nurseries or their own homes by nannies and childminders, homes that are often kept clean by burgeoning services such as *Molly Maids* whose pink vans are a frequent sight on Oxford streets. Although the commodification of former domestically provided services is a common phenomenon in the UK, it takes a geographically specific form. In cities such as Oxford, where women's employment rates are among the highest in the country, often in reasonably well-paid jobs and increasing average household incomes among the middle class, the demand for new forms of 'servicing' is high. The women, and it is usually women, who

[2] For additional points on the topic of 'studentification' see Chap. 6 by Gerhard and Hoelscher.

undertake for wages the same tasks that used to be the basis of free domestic labor, are typically from a different class than their employers and often different national origins. Thus working class women, many from ethnic minority groups, now perform part of the reproductive labors that are central to supporting creative or knowledge-based economies. This form of commodified domestic labor, however, albeit affective, has been ignored by many theorists and even if not ignored, as Angela McRobbie (2010, 75) noted they have left 'little space for anything like a case study or even references to . .. the actual experiences of working lives'. In this section therefore, I provide a brief illustrative case study of women's waged reproductive work in Oxford, based on a previous research project I undertook with Jane Dyson (McDowell and Dyson 2011) where we interviewed 20 non-British born women about their working lives. These women have precarious lives, like many of the employees of Oxford's main formal sector organizations, but in other respects they differ from them, not only in income and living standards but also in where they live in the city. Oxford is one of the most class segregated cities in the UK, in a geography where middle class housing is separated from working class districts by the river and the ring road.

All of the women whom we interviewed had complex working histories, often changing employers on a frequent basis or holding multiple jobs at the same time. This reflects the growing uncertainty and precarity of the labor market at the bottom end (Goos and Manning 2007; McDowell et al 2009; Vosko 2001) but also insecurity in those female-dominated industries that are part of the creative sector. Their lives were, perhaps, not so different from women working in fashion (Larner and Molloy 2009) or modeling (Wissinger 2007, 2009), where insecurity is rife, although status, working conditions, and income tend to be better in the creative sector. The women in Oxford had a range of jobs, often concurrently. Flutra, from Kosovo for example, described her employment trajectory after arriving in England in 2008. 'I worked in factory, jam factory for three months but I had no papers there so I stopped.' Cleaning private houses became her only option until she had the right to remain in the UK. She was then able to take a child-minding course and become a registered minder. Even then, however, low-paid caring and servicing employment was all that was open to Flutra. At the time we talked to her, Flutra was managing by patching together a number of part-time jobs: 'I started childminding for three days and now I do nanny and I do waiter as well'. Other women, some of them with vocational qualifications or

higher educational certificates were also employed in caring roles, several of them looking after elderly local residents in care homes, where wages are notoriously poor, and some found the intimate care of others' bodies demeaning. As Faheema, a woman of Pakistani origins who grew up in Kuwait noted 'I was so embarrassed to tell them (friends) that I am working in a nursing home so that's why I kept it a secret. . . . Because in our culture it is not nice to work in an elderly people home because we have to provide personal care and everything which is not allowed to do so'.

Despite the dominance of service sector employment, as I noted earlier, Oxford still has a significant manufacturing sector as BMW assembles the Mini in its Cowley plant on the south eastern periphery of the city. However, despite a core workforce with relatively secure employment contracts and reasonable wages, BMW increasingly relies on a periphery of short-term contract workers, recruited during boom times but laid off during periods of low demand. Here too, as for women doing reproductive labor, insecurity is a common feature of working life. The Cowley plant, during its previous ownership by the British Motor Corporation, Leyland, the Rover Group, and British Aerospace between 1959 and 2000, has always relied on migrant labor, initially from Wales and Scotland, later from the Caribbean (Hayter and Harvey 1993) but more recently from the newer EU member countries, particularly from Poland. Oxford's 'minority' population, which includes British-born black, Asian and minority ethic (BAME) people, as well as non-British born in-migrants in 2011, is 22 % of all residents, a figure that is higher than the England and Wales average of 13 %. There are also a further 14 % of the population who were identified in the national census as white but non-British. Both these figures may include students as the census period may fall into term time, but even if it does not, graduate students are likely to be resident in the city. The largest non-white groups are of Pakistani, Indian, Black African, and 'other' Asian and Chinese ethnic heritage, while the non-British white population includes Irish and Polish men and women and other in-migrants from the EU, as well as considerable numbers of North Americans, Australians, and New Zealanders. As is typical in the UK, both recent in-migrants and people of color are over-represented among the low paid in Oxford and those who are permanent residents working in low-wage employment are more likely to live in areas that are more likely to have higher concentrations of poverty and deprivation than elsewhere in the city, including some of the eastern suburbs. Here there are concentrations of residents with low skills and low incomes. In the area of the city known as Blackbird Leys

for example, 46 % of people have no educational qualifications at all. This area is also one that suffers from higher levels of crime than elsewhere in the city, although there are also problems of homelessness and rough sleeping in the city center and elsewhere. A study of youth crime on the outer estates in British cities by Beatrix Campbell (1993) several decades ago perhaps surprised readers by the inclusion of this Oxford estate, which continues to suffer from low level crimes such as vandalism and taking and driving cars without consent. Its children, educated in the local schools, also have lower levels of attainment than the children in state schools elsewhere in the city. Indeed, in the city as a whole, state schools underperform compared to the large private school sector in Oxford. Here, in a wonderful illustration of the intersection of privilege and creative success, a local private school called the Dragon School, with a famously good drama department hit the national press as it had educated both the stars of *The Night Manager*, a 2016 TV adaptation of a novel by John Le Carre: Hugh Laurie and Tom Hiddleston, as well as Emily Watson, one of the stars of the Harry Potter films. In an attempt to bring media glamour to the university, one of the Colleges, headed by a former editor of a national newspaper, *The Guardian*, has recruited Emma Watson as a temporary fellow of his College, attempting to unite creativity and scholarship, but leading to complaints of intrusion from both the press and students, anxious to gaze on a 'star' in their library.

A far more serious set of criminal activities was uncovered in Oxford in 2013, as Oxford joined the infamous list of cities where child sexual grooming, rape, and exploitation of vulnerable, underage, and usually white girls were found to be rife, and not taken seriously by the police, across a decade. A police investigation, launched in 2011 and labeled Operation Bullfinch, uncovered a network of serious sexual crimes enacted against as many of 373 victims; the majority were vulnerable under-age young girls aged between 11 and 15, but also including 50 boys, who had been subjected to grooming, pied with drugs and drink, raped, and trafficked. In 2013, seven men were convicted on 50 counts of offences including rape and arranging or facilitating prostitution. During the hearings it became apparent that a culture of denial, or perhaps ignorance, had existed in the city that allowed this exploitation to proceed unhindered for more than 10 years. A set of cultural assumptions that saw young teenagers having sex with adult men as consensual was facilitated because the young women's behavior was regarded as promiscuous and difficult and that the girls were sexually precocious. In the inquiry that followed the

convictions the police and social services were criticized for failing to see the links between grooming and violent control, as well as for their pessimism about ever bringing a successful case as many of the girls involved were too traumatized to give evidence. However, seven men were convicted and more positively, Oxfordshire has established a dedicated team of 20 detectives to investigate suspected child sexual exploitation in the city and the county.

Conclusions

It is difficult to imagine a greater contrast to the poverty and squalid exploitation of vulnerable girls made visible in the Bullfinch case and the images of Oxford as a city where privileged youths study and play among beautiful buildings and gracious lawns of the university. However, even for students, the city has a dark side as many live for part of their years in the city in expensive and often poorly maintained properties in the private rented sector in the same low-income suburbs as many of the permanent but less affluent residents. Oxford is now one of the most expensive cities in Britain in which to live, with serious implications for both its economic future and social inequality. The sorts of small businesses—artists' studios, craft workshops, cafes and bookshops, spatially concentrated in organic and vibrant cultural quarters—that are part of the idealized image of the creative sector, will find it challenging to get a toehold in Oxford's competitive and expensive property market.

Oxford may be a knowledge-based economy par excellence with its focus on education, research, medicine, and publishing, but whether it fits the conventional model of a city dominated by the creative industries is debatable. Large highly regulated organizations dominate the economically expanding sectors, in which conformity rather than unconventional hipster attitudes are typical, although innovation is highly valued. Oxford is, for example, now a rival to Cambridge in the size and significance of scientific commercial spin-offs. At the same time as high status, and often well paid, jobs in these parts of the knowledge economy are expanding, there is also rising employment in Oxford in the other end of the service sector, in shops, cafes, pubs, clubs, as well as a wide range of personal services, from nannies to personal trainers. The city was to a large extent relatively untouched by the 2007–08 financial crisis and rates of unemployment remained below the national

average. However, these 'servicing' jobs are not only poorly paid and insecure but also depend on a set of bodily attributes, including ethnicity, appearance, and accent, that rank potential employees in a hierarchy of eligibility for the available positions. Here there are both parallels and differences between the two ends of the service sector. In terms of which idealized bodies are appropriate for which sorts of jobs, although as the feminist philosopher Iris Young (1990) suggested, dominant norms continue to advantage slim, white, heterosexual, middle class men at the top end of the status hierarchy, and even at the bottom, may benefit the same group, although in those jobs that involve caring, the associations between femininity, empathy, and care of the body as 'natural' attributes may disadvantage men. Florida may have been correct in paying attention to embodiment but the masculine hipster he placed center stage is not necessarily the ideal worker in a city like Oxford, where the don, the medic, the care worker, and the barista each embodies a particular and different embodied version of an ideal employee. Between the ascetic, cerebral figure of the don (now of course as likely to be a young mother harassed by the conflicting demands of 'life' and 'work') and the new migrant, often visible by virtue of skin color or accent, but less visible as he or she cleans the streets and offices of the city, is an intermediate figure. This is the public sector employee, often female, working in clerical or middle rank managerial positions and now under threat of redundancy at worst, or pay freezes and reduced hours at best, as the austerity policies being rolled out by an increasingly right wing Conservative Government deplete locally provided services. These are the new workers of the new knowledge economy, marked by gender, class, and national origins, where rhetorical claims about the social and economic benefits of the creative industries are challenged by new patterns of difference and division in a hard unequal world.

In this harder world since 2015, the Conservative Government's economic policy discussion has shifted from a focus on the creative industries to rhetorical claims about the 'march of the makers' (manufacturers) and a wish to create a 'northern power house' (Cox and Raikes 2015) to harness growth in a trans-Pennine region stretching from Liverpool in the west to Sheffield/Leeds in the east, and including Newcastle in the north. However, the infrastructure and other investment that is needed is not (yet) forthcoming and at the same time manufacturing output continues to decline in the UK. In October 2015, Tata, Caparo, and SSI withdrew investment from the steel industry

in Redcar, Scunthorpe, and Motherwell, involving several thousand redundancies. For the men faced with unemployment in these northern towns, employment in the creative industries is an unlikely savior, nor is their involvement likely as consumers in a sector that increasingly demands a financial contribution for participation.

Bibliography

Adorno, Theodor. 1991. *The culture industry: selected essays on mass culture*. London: Routledge.

Bauman, Zygmunt. 1998. *Work, consumerism and the new poor*. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Bell, David, and Mark Jayne (ed). 2004. *City of quarters: urban villages in the contemporary city*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Boltanski, Luc, and Eve Chiapello. 2005. *The new spirit of capitalism* . Verso: London. Trans. By Gregory Elliott

Brush, Lisa. 1996. Gender, work, who cares? Production, reproduction, deindustrialization and business as usual. *Signs* 46: 429–454.

Campbell, Beatrix. 1993. *Goliath: Britain's dangerous places*. London: Methuen.

Carnoy, Martin. 2000. *Sustaining the new economy: work, family and community in the information age*. New York: Harvard University Press.

Castells, Manuel. 1977. *The urban question*. London: Edward Arnold.

———. 2000. Materials for an exploratory theory of the network society. *British Journal of Sociology* 51: 5–22.

CBI. 2014. *The creative industries: a growth strategy for the UK's creative industries*. Available from www.cbi.org.uk/business-issues/creative-industries.

Christopherson, Susan. 2008. Beyond the self-expressive creative worker. *Theory, Culture and Society* 25(7–8): 73–95.

Connolly, Sara, and Mary Gregory. 2007. Women and work since 1970. In *Work and pay in 20th century Britain*, ed. Nicholas Crafts, Ian Gazeley, and Andrew Newell, 142–177. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cox, Ed, and Luke Raikes. 2015. *The state of the north 2015: four tests for the northern powerhouse*. London: IPPR.

Doogan, Kevin. 2009. *New capitalism? The transformation of work*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Du Gay, Paul. 2004. The tyranny of the epochal and work identity. In *Identity in the age of the new economy*, ed. Torben Jensen, and Ann Weststenholz, 147–158. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Evans, Graeme, and Phyllida Shaw. 2004. *The contribution of culture to regeneration in the UK: a review of the evidence: a report to the Department of Culture, Media and Sport*. London: London Metropolitan University.

Florida, Richard. 2002. *The rise of the creative class: and how it's transforming work, leisure, community and everyday life*. New York: Basic Books.
Gill, Rosalind. 2002. Cool, creative and egalitarian? Exploring gender in project-based new media work. *Information, Communication and Society* 5(1): 70–89.
Goos, Maarten, and Alan Manning. 2007. Lousy and lovely jobs: the rising polarisation of work in Britain. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 7: 49–62.
Hardt, Michael. 1999. Affective labour. *Boundary* 2: 89–112.
Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. 2000. *Empire*. Boston: Harvard University Press.
———. 2004. *Multitude: war and democracy in the age of empire*. New York: Penguin Press.
Hayter, Teresa, and David Harvey (ed). 1993. *The factory and the city: the story of the Cowley automobile workers in Oxford*. London: Mansell.
Healy, Kieran. 2002. What's new for culture in the new economy? *Journal of Arts Management Law and Society* 32(2): 86–103.
Hochschild, Arlie R. 1983. *The managed heart*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Landry, Charles. 2000. *The creative city: a toolkit for urban innovators*. London: Earthscan.
Larner, Wendy, and Molley Molloy. 2009. Globalisation, the 'new' economy and working women: theorising from the New Zealand designer fashion industry. *Feminist Theory* 10: 35–59.
Lazzarato, Maurizio. 1996. Immaterial labour. In *Radical thought in Italy*, ed. Michael Hardt, and Paolo Virno, 133–151. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Markusen, Ann. 2006. Urban development and the politics of a creative class: evidence from a study of artists. *Environment and Planning A* 38(10): 1921–1940.
Mason, Paul. 2014. What makes a perfect city? *G2, The Guardian*, 25 August, p. 7.
McDowell, Linda. 1997. *Capital culture: gender at work in the city*. Oxford: Blackwell.
———. 2009. *Working bodies: interactive service employment and workplace identities*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
———. 2013. *Working lives: gender, migration and employment in Britain*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
———. 2016. *Migrant women's voices: talking about life and work in Britain, 1945–2012*. London: Bloomsbury.
McDowell, Linda, and Jane Dyson. 2011. The other side of the knowledge economy: 'reproductive' employment and affective labours in Oxford. *Environment and Planning A* 43(9): 2186–2201.
McRobbie, Angela. 2010. Reflections on feminism, immaterial labour and the Post-Fordist regime. *New Formations* 70: 60–76.

Montgomery, John. 2005. Beware 'the creative class'. Creativity and wealth creation revisited. *Local Economy* 20: 337–343.

Myerscough, John. 1988. *The economic importance of the arts in Britain*. London: Policy Studies Institute.

O'Connor, Justin. 2010. *The cultural and creative industries: a literature review*, Creativity, cultural and education series, 2 edn. Newcastle Upon Tyne: CCE.

Oakley, Kate. 2006. Include us out—economic development and social policy in the creative industries. *Cultural Trends* 15(4): 255–273.

Peck, Jamie. 2005. Struggling with the creative class. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 29: 740–770.

———. 2012. Recreative city: Amsterdam, vehicular ideas and the adaptive spaces of creativity policy. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 36(3): 462–485.

Roodhouse, Simon. 2006a. *Cultural quarters: principles and practice*. London: Intellect.

———. 2006b. The creative industries: definitions, quantification and practice. In *Cultural industries: the British experience in international perspective*, ed. Christiane Eisenberg, Rita Gerlach, and Christian Handke, 13–32. Berlin: Humboldt University.

Ross, Andrew. 2009. *Nice work if you can get it: life and labor in precarious times*. New York: New York University Press.

Sassen, Saskia. 2001. *The global city*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Smith, Chris. 1998. *Creative Britain*. London: Faber and Faber.

Standing, Guy. 2011. *The precariat: the new dangerous class*. London: Bloomsbury.

Urry, John. 2000. *Sociology beyond societies: mobilities for the twenty-first century*. London: Routledge.

Virno, Paolo. 2005. *The grammar of the multitude*. New York: Semiotexte.

Vosko, Leah. 2001. *Precarious work*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Wills, Jane, Kavita Datta, Yara Evans, Joanna Herbert, Jon May, and Cathy McIlwaine. 2010. *Global cities at work: new migrant divisions of labour*. London: Pluto.

Wissinger, Elizabeth. 2007. Modelling a way of life: immaterial and affective labour in the fashion modelling industry. *Ephemera* 7: 250–269.

———. 2009. Modelling consumption. *Journal of Consumer Culture* 9: 273–295.

Wolkowitz, Carol. 2006. *Bodies at work*. London: Sage.

Wright Mills, Charles. 1953. *White collar work: the American middle classes*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Young, Iris, M. 1990. *Justice and the politics of difference*. Princeton University Press, Princeton.

CHAPTER 5

Making Creative Cities in the Global West: The New Polarization and Ghettoization in Cleveland, USA, and Glasgow, UK

David Wilson

Introduction

Today "ordinary" cities of the global west experience a feverish redevelopment drive to "creativize" (Gerhard 2014; Giband 2014). Like their larger brethren, growth machines here strive to cultivate a creative city that refines a previous (pre 2005) "go-entrepreneurial" city surge. From Cleveland to Glasgow, a city rehabilitation ethos is in the air as growth machines more deeply push to add edgy-cultural artists, high-tech professionals, downtown spaces of high culture, bold high-tech zones, and gentrification rows. A refined rhetoric of "city need to re-entrepreneurialize" which features new appeals and fears propels this drive. A new technical vocabulary has emerged in these cities—smart growth, sustainable cities, green cities, urban innovators, creative re-birth—that privileges an enticingly packaged, market-rooted development agenda (Jonas 2015). What this will deliver, in pronouncement, is something long overdue: a heavy dose of "livability" that everyone purportedly clamors for.

D. Wilson (✉)
Geography and Geographic Information Science Department,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL, USA

U. Gerhard et al. (eds.), *Inequalities in Creative Cities*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95115-4_5

This chapter deepens our understanding of this emerging drive. I chronicle that beneath this redevelopment's pomp and hyperbole, this creativity obsession now forges a more polarizing and punishing city than previously believed. I argue that at the core of this, the creative redevelopment anchors in a new relationalness whose two parts afflict many. First, its making of "robust creativity space," led by the crowning glory of building glittery downtowns and gentrification rows, deeply interconnects with the city's supposed biggest scourges, ghettos, and slums.[1] Downtown redevelopment, spearheaded by glitzy, trophy spaces, relies upon something crucial to it: creating and sustaining the city's worst conditions for human living. Second, this city entrepreneurial project roots in an elaborate fear-speak, the city's supposed ensnarement by a city-threatening globalization that offers an afflicting "slow-burn haunt" for all to absorb. This fear-speak motors this new redeveloping as the elaborate, haunting rationale to grasp the essence of this downtown restructuring.

The first new relationalness involves the new city restructuring simultaneity attracting and purging populations and land-uses at central redevelopment sites (downtowns, nearby neighborhoods). Producing "global attraction space" is now never straightforward. On the attraction side of things, new "creatives" and economically propulsive land uses are sought and cultivated. On the purging side of things, poor racialized bodies and "ghetto" land-uses are actively repulsed and driven to invisibilized locations in the city ("ghettos"). This relationalness, now more pronounced than before, results from growth machine's now intense desires to visually erase any semblance of the marginalized from central creative sites that leads to both unprecedented concentrations of city resources in some areas and massive purges of otherness to other zones. As I suggest, in a time of heightened sensitivity to the visual and iconographic, when selling images of creativity is deemed as crucial to the go-global city project as actually making space, the marginalized become further problematized as presences. They become banished from what these machines so strongly desire: visualizable, impressionistic space that can convey imaginings of downtown creativity and lush international aesthetics.

In the second new relationalness, growth machines elaborately serve up the concept new global times as the central frame to understand this

[1] Ghettos are now widely seen as existing in cities across the global west, including Northern Europe, Southern Europe, and Canada. Answers to this question have followed Ceri Peach's (1996) provocative question early on "does Britain have ghettos?" While the precise emergence and intensity of deprivation in these areas has been the subject of debate, I believe that their presences have now been definitively demonstrated.

redevelopment's importance. New global times, established as a lurking city enemy, is richly communicated as the current force that must be unequivocally confronted by public policy. The result is the offer of an "emergency time" that comes to haunt the public consciousness. "Emergency time" invokes the immediate need to provide a downtown creativity fix: re-making city cores is the supposed antidote to an attacking globalization. In the rhetoric, there can be no other way, globalization stands poised to eviscerate the city and must be confronted now by this pressing downtown fix. A seized comprehension (the notion globalization in the public consciousness) is now used and fully plundered for political gain by these growth machines. The notion globalization, of course, has been substantively on the scene since the 1980s, and has been widely understood by references to new global times (Short and Kim 1999). Yet today, I suggest, this reference has been deepened, subtly altered, and made jarring. In the process, a once "sleepy abstraction" (Singh 2005) has become an emotively charged, more frightening referent.

My discussion draws on the recent redevelopment experiences of two mid-sized, "ordinary" cities in the global west, Cleveland and Glasgow. I study these two cities because of their highly publicized and widely recognized struggles to move from industrial to post-industrial to creative-entrepreneurial places. In both, I chronicle the rise and effects of a 1980s entrepreneurial redevelopment (Harvey's (1989) stage of the entrepreneurial city) and the recent (post-2008) shift to hyper-entrepreneurial creative redevelopment. Cleveland and Glasgow, we learn, now experience a major creative re-making of physical and social fabrics that is driven by and constituted through these new relations. A redevelopment follows—driven by a dizzying and frightening offer of globalization—that deeply sediments and replenishes ghettos and socio-spatial exclusion in the cities to deepen something now widely identified: the creation of separate cities within a city. Throughout, the global trope is a prominent invoking that sears common thought with a slow-burn haunt. I conclude that Cleveland's and Glasgow's growth machines, with deep historic ties to the creation of ghettos and socio-spatial exclusion, continue to aggressively cultivate these.

The Cleveland Case

Cleveland's recent redevelopment tale begins with its growth machine boldly moving into Harvey's "entrepreneurial redevelopment" under Frank Jackson's mayoralty in 2005. After decades of spotty and ineffectual

downtown redevelopment, Jackson trotted out a bold city vision: to renew the downtown and nearby neighborhoods and forge a more competitive city. Jackson's rhetoric, clear and straightforward, drew on the recent successes of nearby Chicago and its redevelopment guru mayor, Richard Daley II. Stealing a page from Daley, Jackson called for a new economic and cultural day in Cleveland. To Jackson, Cleveland's new redevelopment would pivot around energizing the Lake Erie waterfront. This once bustling port area had been lagging for decades under the weight of a 25-year disinvestment and decline (Warf and Holly 1997). This vision caught the fancy of Cleveland's powerful civic group Cleveland Club, a coalition of prominent businesses, politicians, and community leaders (Howard et al. 2010).

To forge this coalition Jackson jumped on an opportunity structure: prevailing neoliberal sensibilities in 1980s America and Cleveland (Koval et al. 2006). The city had recently turned to the right in its policy agenda, favoring a city revitalization that emphasized increased privatization, re-entrepreneurializing the business climate, and targeting government resources to attract new businesses (Howard et al. 2010). A once staunch democratic city that had historically privileged a politics of redistribution re-oriented its government focus. Jackson struck out aggressively to work through this new reality and became, arguably, America's leading pragmatic mayor. Assuming the mantle of the new courageous neoliberalcrat, he promised to reverse the fortunes of his city through popular neoliberal beliefs. Returning Cleveland to its former glory, it seemed, would require a working through of this reality that Jackson unapologetically labeled as innovative.

A rash of small successes soon followed. A rehabilitated park (Rivergate), an upscaled retail and commercial set of blocks, and a kayak and dragon boat public loading area with restaurants and shopping were initial "core area" developments. Soon to follow were significantly larger projects: the Rock and Roll's renovation and re-configuring (built in 1983), a major upgrading of Playhouse Square, and the constructing of a swath of new downtown hotels. The process escalated from there and Cleveland soon moved more staunchly into a "creative-entrepreneurial" redevelopment stage. Jackson and the city governance began to tap the growing creative city mantra sweeping America (see Florida 2005, 2006) and hyped the need to create a regional powerhouse city that would center around nurturing creative people, creative industries, and creative sensibilities. Yet, today, this is not simply one more city governance having gone more

deeply neoliberal and creative-entrepreneurial, there is immense place specificity in this governance's operations, as this section shows.

Offers of the new Cleveland proved resonant, particularly with them being underpinned by a powerful trope: declarations of a new city-ensnaring, hyper-competitive reality. In bold proclamation, Cleveland was "extrematized" as a once proud and confident city which had recently become economically de-stabilized with a potential for a dramatic economic hemorrhaging. Cleveland, in Planner B. Lee's (2013a, b) words, "has been stuck in an uncertain place for quite a while … after 2005 or so a new economic reality increasingly hung over Cleveland ... globalization … a new reality ... that seemed entrenched and difficult to fix." Supporting this, in parallel assertion, Cleveland also became annunciated as a place of becoming, said to be a historically resilient locale that, one more time, had to act courageously to subsist (Wilson 2004, 2007). Yet it supposedly had in place the rudiments that could enable Cleveland to successfully navigate the new global competition: still vibrant cultural institutions, diverse neighborhoods, a gritty determinism. City survival now supposedly needed a key ingredient: re-entrepreneurialization. The supposed need was to "out-businissize" other places and illuminate an entrepreneurially spirited, pro-business city.

Other wrinkles brought into this narrative added resonance. Following a national trend, Jackson and governance voices subtly changed the sense of what globalization is. Its basic content, previously identified as a blunt, transparently place engulfing force, became a more subtle, shadowy presence. Thus, globalization in Cleveland became a furtive force of periodic penetrations, evanescent physicalities, uneven morphologic impacts, in short, a more mysterious and scarier force. Thus, globalization, in City Councilperson R. Roe's (2009) terms, "moves," "hits and runs," "is ominously out there," and "strikes but always keeps us guessing…." This globalization is now not only alive-and-well and biting, it is also painstakingly elusive, intangible, and ambiguous. It has purportedly moved to the city's center, but continues under a cloak of mystery and furtiveness. This change in globalization's content is meaningful. With this replacement, a once calculable, brute globalization becomes something much more haunting: a murky, difficult-to-discern and predict globalization. Here is a political trope par excellence. A once engulfing totality, in a refined stroke, becomes something more sinister, a moving, unpredictable attacker of districts and areas.

In this context, public and private resources—government subsidies, planner expertise, private investment—now blatantly concentrate to deepen and re-fortify the downtown transformation. Today there is seemingly no other option. All was recently in view when Frank Jackson hosted a boat tour aboard the Goodtime III along Lake Erie to highlight and sell his new downtown (Atassi 2014). Cleveland's Chief of Regional Development Edward Rybka and Cleveland Metroparks CEO Brian Zimmerman narrated the cruise to more than 150 passengers, entitled "Back to the Future: Cleveland, The Waterfront Tour Part II." Unveiled for all on the excursion was the blueprint for Cleveland's plans to aggressively revitalize its face.

The tour began in North Coast Harbor, near the site of the first phase of development. Initially, new restaurants, boutiques, and posh hotels were identified. Jackson also richly narrated new projects along the waterfront that will provide about 1000 apartments, 80,000 square feet of commercial office space, and 40,000 square feet of retail and restaurant space on 21 acres of lakefront property. As Jackson touted, the City Council has been a central enabling agency, recently passing legislation authorizing these next steps in the lakefront plan. Moreover, a central infrastructural investment, a $20 million pedestrian bridge (all but completed), was identified which will soon connect downtown, Mall C, and the Cleveland Convention Center to the lake. Finally, guests caught a view of a completed office tower, hotel, and restaurants that make up the first phase of the Flats East Bank project. "This is all about the connectivity of Cleveland to its major asset, which is water," Jackson (in Atassi 2014) said. "It's about how do we develop our waterfront in a way that maintains its public nature … is still accessible to the public, but also creates the economic vitality that we need to move Cleveland to the next stage."

In the Shadows: Ghettos and Exclusion

But in the shadows of the downtown restructuring, this redeveloping has an underside that is scarcely publicized: it regenerates and repopulates poor African-American communities. Routinized real-estate actions on the ground drive the process. At the core of this, Cleveland's 2011 revised zoning ordinance promotes tall, high density development and "creative" tenants downtown, and expels "lesser" housing and associated kinds of tenants here. In response, dense tower and medium-dense midrises flock to key sections of the East 4th Street District and Civic Center

District. A seemingly innocuous ordinance this way speaks volumes about who are the desired, civic contributory subjects in the current Cleveland and who are not. At the same time, the city's use of tax increment financing (TIF) downtown, spearheaded by Shaker Square and Lee Harvard Shopping projects, has begun to power gentrification in and around the core and displace ascribed riff-raff to elsewhere. In these areas, TIF funnels tax revenues extracted from these districts back into these zones. Land is often quickly valorized, and districts made hot for new investment. These TIFS, advertised as value-free redevelopment tools, also speak to who is to occupy the downtown and who is not to.

At the same time, the completed I.M. Pei-designed Rock and Roll Hall of Fame & Museum, Great Lakes Science Center and First Energy Stadium, home of the Cleveland Browns, sit side-by-side along Lake Erie as anything but innocent projects. Beneath the pomp, redevelopment has expelled an estimated 55 businesses, 500 units of affordable housing, and two large and vibrant youth activity spaces into the deepest crevices of Cleveland's segregated mosaic. An estimated 70 percent of these displaced stores and 80 percent of the displaced population ended up on the impoverished East Side (Lee 2014). And the banishing from the site continues. Crucial to this, the area (North Coast Harbor) is now the epicenter of a new city policing tactic, Protect Civic Cleveland. This 2012 initiative identifies and repels supposedly problematic people "to prevent street blockage and obstruction problems that youth and vagrants can create, and minimizes possibilities for street crime" (Police Officer K. Lewin 2014). The area is to be "core clean and sellable to tourists and visitors, not a place for kids and the like to randomly hang out" (Lewin 2014).

Intensifying this deepened embrace-purge redevelopment is the city's ongoing demolition of high-rise public housing. Under this program, inaugurated in the early 2000s, the city promotes land valorization in and around the downtown by destroying public housing and privatizing this land. This initiative has played to central emotions: shock at stark human destructiveness, concern for eclipsed community, and extraordinary rage against a purportedly failed government program. It has rendered this housing "… a government failed monstrosity ... that has destroyed people [its inhabitants] and neighborhoods" (Lee 2014). In this context, destruction of the near-downtown and downtown's Big 2 projects—Lakeview Terrace and Cedar Central—has been swift and decisive. It has removed more than 1200 blacks from homes, with less than 400 units of affordable housing provided (through set asides and Hope VI). The result: land has been

seized for redevelopment and hundreds of people have been thrown into the vagaries of the private housing market and disappeared into the city's segregated residential mosaic. Not surprisingly, the slowly gentrifying outer downtown area has experienced significant upper income growth and expansion. This area went from 29 percent white in 2000 to 75.4 percent white in 2010, making it one of Ohio's fastest gentrifying areas.

This simultaneity of accept and purge actions assumes a dulled normalcy in Cleveland. Sanctioning this normalcy, prominent planning documents—Cleveland 2020, Cleveland Downtown Lakefront Plan—and bold pronouncements from leading figures—Mayor Frank Jackson, City Counsel President Kevin Kelley—suggest the unfolding of purely technical acts. Supposedly unleashed is something objective and value-free: growth. If a class of people (economic elites, the creatives) are favored in redevelopment policy, as it is occasionally acknowledged, this class favoritism is cast as purely superficial. In presentation, these populations, upon capture and retention, will toil tirelessly to generate economic and social benefits that will spin out to help everyone and the entire city. As Cleveland Planner E. Adams (2013) noted, "our [City] policy identifies the engines of city growth, the technically endowed and the educated, but this is deliberate ... to follow our future leaders ... and have them lead us down a path to success that we need in Cleveland today … this is the core of our current vision … it's simple pragmatics at work."

To be clear, the underbelly of this downtown build-up that produces socio-racial segregation and exclusion, is to be complete and total. The racialized poor are not to be visualized and thought about at these strategic high-culture locations. As the drive to create the new creative ecology advances, visualness is privileged: the poor are now no longer just bodies to be controlled and managed (their activity spaces) as supposed polluters of land values, they are the ocular problematic that can ruin bourgeois imaginings of urban downtown vitality and aesthetics. The poor, particularly the racialized (black and Latino) poor, are not to be here for anything—for strolls, visits, passes through. Any of these could damage the delicate, ever-shifting cognition of what the Flats, the North Coast Harbor, the Nine Twelve District are. This redevelopment, in the process, redefines the very character of marginality and Otherness in Cleveland. Visual bodies, skin color, mode of comportment when out of place and out of space are codified as the new sinister threat to Cleveland's economic viability.

In this context, isolating and entrapping the visually blighting subject intensifies in three of the city's most impoverished black ghettos: Hough,

Glenville, and Kinsman. To one local resident we talked to, who told us that statistics in these communities frequently lie, more than 60 percent of households live below the poverty level. “Look around,” he said, “this is a stash-house for the poor ... so few get out of here ... the poor and hopeless are everywhere …” With this stashing and retaining, these three neighborhoods today have infant mortality rates above 18 per 1000, a figure that rivals El Salvador’s 19 per 1000 and Peru’s 20 per 1000 (World Fact Book 2012). On 79th Street in Hough, only 11 minutes from Cleveland’s vibrant downtown, almost every storefront is boarded up, a vivid testimonial to the concentrated entrapping of poverty in the area. In Glenville, beggars and the homeless multiply across its main thoroughfare, Martin Luther King Drive, in a desperate fight to survive. Kinsman, one of the 15 poorest urban neighborhoods in America in 2010, had more than one in four of its residential parcels tax delinquent in 2011 compared to the city’s less than one in nine.

Enhanced entrapment and marginalization of these people show in another way: by the increased economic failure of social service providers in these neighborhoods. Today, many of these providers have contracted or disappeared entirely as they ineffectually negotiate a debilitating reality of disproportionate poverty and marginalization. In Cleveland’s East Side, many charitable and non-profit organizations after 2010 have closed. Others have been forced into desperate debt. For example, the area’s YMCA closed in 2011, Merge Annunciation Church shuttered in 2014, and Epiphany Church closed its doors in 2014. All are victims of the dire practical and financial realities of subsisting in Cleveland’s three poorest areas. Agencies forced into debt have also become commonplace in these areas. As head M. Kay (2014a) of Epiphany noted to me, “the diocese and the area have run out of money, energy, and steam. there is no one in this community who has the resources to help the organization out ... it’s just desperately poor around here.” To Kay (2014b), “ we can’t keep the doors open any more, it’s just too tough, simply unrealistic …”

Such neighborhoods have subsequently become tougher places to live. In Hough, a women I talked to describes her everyday as worse than before and an ongoing struggle to hold down work, be safe, and make ends meet. “Hey, things are more difficult here than ever before.” The neighborhood is down, really down, and where can I work for decent money? ... I work a couple of jobs, they’re tiring and tough, just off Euclid. It’s hard making the second one in time, I’ve gotta get from one to the other every day ... But I have no choice, it’s either work or starve ….”

Another women I talked to, living in Glenville, reiterates the theme of hardship and declining community times. She said: "this area has become more depressed … more people hurting, the kids don't have much to do … [also] my job is s____y ... I am barely paid, certainly not enough to meet my needs." Her three-year stint in this job, at a local supermarket, "is just a dead-end for me … the place caters to local, poor folk, so it's no surprise that they can't really pay me much."

The Glasgow Case

Current Glasgow also has a distinctive history that has structured its current drive to go creative. The governance decades ago promoted Glasgow as the industrial hub that built more than 20 percent of the world's ships. More recently, the governance began to dabble in entrepreneurial redevelopment. Most recently, there has been another change: a tentatively mobilized globalization and culturally driven redevelopment has given way to a more robust and aggressive global offering and creative city assertion. By the early 2000s, the governance mantra became something new: "be creative or die." The dominant frame: Glasgow is in a high-stakes war for talent that could only be won by developing a distinctive "people climate" valued by creatives. In the process, the governance now professes a heightened sensitivity to visualness to create its new "creative city ecology." As City Planner A. Neale (2014) noted about the city anchor, City Centre: "it is to be a symbol and panorama of what Glasgow is rapidly becoming ... a bold and important glimpse onto how entirely creative and sparkling this city could be…."

An early marker for Glasgow initially going down this entrepreneurial road was the business community's deeply symbolic overhaul of the City Chambers building in 1982 on George Square. Cheered on by Lord Provost Michael Kelly, black paint, soot, and pollution from decades of industrial build-up were theatrically and performatively removed (daily TV reportage spotlighted the removal). The building was retrofitted with postmodern frills that staked out a new growth image for all to absorb. Glasgow in symbolism had entered the post-industrial age. Paralleling this, public discourse steadily erased the city's historic connection with dirt and gritty industrialization. Most poignant was Glasgow's first international large-scale marketing campaign, "Glasgow's Miles Better" initiative (Helms 2009). Set in motion was not merely the now refined metaphor of the ugly duckling turned beautiful white swan, but also the denial of a persistently

gritty past of industrial grime, grinding poverty, and gaping uneven development (Booth and Boyle 1993; Boyle 1999).

Since 2010, this city entrepreneurializing has subtly changed and deepened. Now Scotland's largest city advertises and re-builds itself as a financial, commercial, and tourist hub that anchors in a notion of creative upgrading. Its political governance and business community follows a familiar recipe: they speak continuously of a new hyper inter-city competition in global times that makes Glasgow easily discardable as a place for investment and business. In proclamation, Glasgow has morphed from a once confident, stable economic center to an increasingly open-ended, unstable economic venue with a potential for a dramatic economic eclipse. The city, like Cleveland, is said to stare at an uncertain economic future as a kind of accumulation disorder and uncertainty hangs over it. Yet Glasgow is also invoked in another equally expedient way, as historically resourceful and ever evolving that, one more time, must act ingenuously to survive. As the Glasgow Economic Forum noted, "Glasgow is increasingly subject to global competition. To be successful, Glasgow has to compete for international flows of investment and talent. Glasgow has a strong tradition of internationalism that dates from the city's transformation to a major trading and then industrial centre."

Glasgow's growth machine, like Cleveland's, decisively deepens the offer of the global menace by substantively changing globalization's most basic content (what this is). Whether elaborately contrived or not, this machine now follows a pattern increasingly evident in many global west cities (Wilson 2014), increasingly offering a furtive globalization of poignant penetrations, uneven city-wide outcomes, and seamless impacts. Globalization in Glasgow, to city planner L. McQuade (2014), "moves into the city in a destructive path," "runs roughshod over our neighborhoods and areas and moves out," "viciously encircles the city," and "is out there as something that is difficult to detect." This globalization is seemingly ever present but is also concealed, avoids concerted gazes, and is shadowy. It now purportedly shapes the character of Glasgow, but does so under a veil of elusiveness and cover. This change in globalization's content is profound. A once calculable, blunt globalization, now, becomes something much more haunting: a murky, difficult-to-discern, and difficult-to-predict globalization. One more time, a powerful political trope surfaces. A once engulfing totality, in a refined stroke, becomes something more sinister, a moving, unpredictable attacker of districts and areas.

In this setting government money, planner actions, and private investment re-make the city's socio-physical ecology that centers on re-working Glasgow's City Centre. This site is advertised as appealing to the desires and sensibilities of Scotland's and Europe's creatives: providing new cultural offerings, specialized technical and creative jobs, and new conspicuous leisure opportunities. Use of a potent and resonant language of innovation—"newness," "pioneering," "daring," "entrepreneurialism," "cultural chic"—obfuscates a familiar cocktail of state subsidy, place promotion, and local boosterism that forcefully drives the restructuring. In this setting, a creative class aesthetic now pervades the downtown: designer shops, trendy restaurants, music clubs, coffee shops, and cafes have mushroomed along Buchanan Street. Large-scale flagship regeneration projects have also flourished. The Scottish Development Agency has invested more than 1.2 million pounds to re-make Celtic Park and establish support retail and commercial establishments in its nearby blocks. At the same time, a sparkling new corridor, the International Financial Services District (IFSD), has been created to attract new financial companies to the city. The IFSD, a joint partnership led by Scottish Enterprise and Glasgow City Council, has created almost two million square feet of new Grade 'A' office accommodation in the City Centre (Clyde Waterfront 2007).

But the drive's crowning jewel is the upscaling of the Clyde Waterfront. Scottish Enterprise and the Scottish government have invested more than 3.5 billion pounds in this massive project (Clyde Waterfront 2008). "London has its docklands, Baltimore has its harbor, Amsterdam has its canals," Glasgow Planner A. McGintie (2014) noted to me, "Glasgow has found ... at long last ... its meal ticket into the future, its city-synergizing water body." As in Cleveland, the market is deemed important but by itself inadequate for such an anchor initiative's success. Aesthetic-cultural repertoires are identified as a key market-transcendent element which must be cultivated for the competitive good of the project and the city.

Currently, this 20-kilometer stretch, running east-west from Glasgow Green in the heart of Glasgow, has more than 200 projects completed or under way. Today, three additional partners join the drive: Glasgow City Council, Renfrewshire Council, and West Dunbartonshire Council. Between 2003 and 2014, the coalition added 73,000 square meters of commercial floor space, 73,000 square meters of retail accommodation, 250,00 square meters of new office accommodation, and more than 10,000 new residential units. The most significant project, Braehead, on the south side of the river at Renfrew, is anchored by a large shop-

ping center. Braehead, it is said, will lead the way to "re-birthing" a long neglected water front (see Clyde Waterfront 2014). Glasgow's Digital Media Quarter at Pacific Quay, a prominent shoreline development, is now home to the headquarters of BBC Scotland, with three major studio spaces, including "Studio A," the largest television studio outside London. This is proclaimed as clear evidence of the rise of Glasgow as a soon-to-be dominant telecommunications center in Europe. By the time of the massive project's completion, expected to be circa 2018, total investment is expected to exceed 5.5 billion pounds (Clyde Waterfront 2008).

In the Shadows of Glasgow's City Centre

But in the shadows of the City Centre and waterfront build-up, poor communities have become more profound receptacles for the marginalized and impoverished. The core of the connection again: to build one (a sparkling physical and visual City Centre of 23 square blocks) the other (deprived areas that blanket East and North Glasgow) must be activated as zones to ensnare and warehouse. All occurs in the unbroken flow of City Centre real-estate and planning operations. Stigmatized people, mainly unemployed workers and immigrants as the anointed ocular trash in the new big build-up, are decisively cordoned off as potential blighting influences on the downtown and new play spaces for the "creatives" and city elites. But of note, while taken-for-grantedness moves much of these acts along, there is, among some of the most central drivers of the new redevelopment, clear recognition of this connection between the disparate spaces. Thus, to people like Scottish mega-developer Tom Hunter (see Garland 2012) and real-estate shaker and mover Sam Bacile (see Adams 2012), a kind of people—how they appear and what they are held to symbolize—cannot be allowed to transgress what Glasgow must now build, decent neighborhoods and civically important culture and play spaces. At risk is a downtown's supposed growing stability, a stepped-up tourist economy, and the drive to make an increasingly competitive Glasgow.

A litany of institutional actions on the ground feverishly replenishes opulent regeneration districts and re-functionalizes their supportive human-warehouse zones. Glasgow's recently revised zoning ordinance, tailored to attract new housing development to the core, is ruthlessly efficient, enabling tall, high density development and a kind of city resident to occupy City Centre while consigning the building of affordable housing and its kind of resident (now treated as visually blighting) to elsewhere.

Glasgow housing activist M. McLean (2014) calls this ordinance "the building block of our most visible dilemma today—uneven development and socio-spatial segregation in current Glasgow." Throughout, realty companies operating in the city are notorious for steering the poor to "their own areas." A handful of dominant Realty companies, flagrantly fortressing City Centre from "a poor invasion," are termed by local activist M. McLean (2014) "the modern day slum makers" and "segregation creators of Glasgow." "Under the guise of niceness … simple technical matters that are supposedly harmless," "is a pronounced discriminatory tool that does the bidding of Glasgow's elite" (McLean 2014).

At the same time, a dominant project, infrastructural construction for the 2014 Commonwealth Games, expands opulent regeneration districts and further segregates the poor. Central here has been the building of a new velodrome, sports arena, and a 1500-home Athlete's Village in East Glasgow (concentrated in the Dalmarnock neighborhood). Glasgow 2014 LTD, a coalition of local business interests, assumed responsibility for delivering the 11-day event, with funds provided by Glasgow City Council and the Scottish Government (International Network for Urban Research and Action 2014). In the process, an estimated 120 local businesses, 500 units of affordable housing, and numerous local retail ribbons have been pushed out under this class colonizing (Glasgow Planner T. O'Leary 2014). Most of these scattered people, stores, and housing have reappeared in the strikingly poor and segregated East and North Ends (O'Leary 2014). The city and Glasgow 2014, to date, have not acknowledged any displacement from this restructuring and speak only about a redevelopment that improves Glasgow physically, aesthetically, and competitively.

In this context, one central dumping ground for the growth machine's downtown-blighting poor has been Glasgow's isolated tower blocks. Their origins lie in the city's rapid industrial and demographic expansion and the emergence of a 1950s housing crisis. Twenty-nine "Comprehensive Redevelopment Areas" were identified and peripheral social housing estates developed. By 1979, Glasgow had more than 300 tower blocks, the highest density in the UK. The infamous Red Road Flats, a line of eleven 43-story buildings on the East Side, was the tallest reinforced concrete structures in Europe (they are now torn down). Glasgow's tower blocks do not seem to lend themselves to reinvention as "brutalist chic" (unlike London), and some have been leveled. Yet, recent years have seen an accelerated targeting of "the blighting poor" here. Thus, since

2000, the UK Government's Asylum Seeker Dispersal Policy has led to the housing of more than 4000 refugees and asylum seekers here, most of them from the Middle East and Africa (International Network for Urban Research and Action 2014). Managing these populations, to local activist T. Rule (2014), "have been important to the City; these populations needed to be among themselves and, in a zone of comfort, to find their way in a new society."

One more time, in a seamy side to a downtown build-up, segregating and excluding the marginalized poor is to be complete and total. This population now is to be kept away from municipally crucial but fragile symbolic zones in the city. With the stepped-up drive to manufacture the new creative ecology, Glasgow's poor are no longer simply bodies for assiduous controlling and managing (their activity spaces), but are the ocular problematic that can contaminate the new images of City Centre creativity and global aesthetics. Thus, the poor, in all their everyday actions (walks, visits, passes through), are to be starkly denied access here. At issue is the delicate, ever-shifting cognition of what Braehead, the increasingly swanky Buchanon Street, and the like are. As in Cleveland, this new supposed imperative re-makes the very character of local marginality and Otherness. The drive to manufacture the new city ecology, in its connections and reach-outs, now re-functionalizes these ghettos as hyper-stigmatized store houses for the visually blighted and blighting.

The proof of the cultivated neglect lies strewn across current Glasgow. Today, the ten most deprived wards in Scotland lie in Glasgow as isolated, distanced-from-downtown areas (BBC News 2004). The city is currently home to 17 of the 20 poorest areas nation-wide (BBC News 2004). The two most deprived wards, Barlanark and Ruchill, entrap a population that has more than 90 percent of adults obtaining welfare. These wards, life expectancies at 55 and 56 years, are lower than what is found in Baghdad. With this intensity of isolation and deprivation, Glasgow has the lowest life expectancy of any city in the UK. In this context, Glasgow struggles with unemployment and the real bane of these areas, underemployment (unemployment alone rose from 7 percent in 2008 to 11.7 percent in 2012) (Vinter 2014). "Glasgow," to Westgap CEO Paul McLaughlin (in Vinter 2014), "seems to be doing a pretty good job cosmetically, it looks improved, but for the less visible outside the city centre… [who] don't have the pound in their pocket …[all is bleak … they cannot] participate in the things that are being brought into the city."

Paul Swinney, author of a 2014 report which rated Glasgow as the city with the highest level of inequality in Britain, identifies the current city as "almost two-speed." Glasgow, to Swinney, is two worlds that seldom touch: the new sparkling city centre and the disinvested, peripheralized corners. Posts, blogs, and everyday street conversations attest to this perception. One blogger named Scottslass recently noted: "Some parts of the Glasgow area are like a different country to the rest of Scotland." Another, Dizzybint, comments: "can't talk for all cities as never been to many, but in some places [of Glasgow] begging with babies on the ground is commonplace …." Moreover, on Glasgow's streets, I talked with a middle-age man who casually referenced the Barlanark and Ruchill wards as "dank places … they're disgusting, most people drink and do drugs ... I have never seen it so bad and it's never been so insufferable." Glasgow's downtown, it seems, may be undergoing a glittery build-up, but at the expense of these peripheralized areas that now soak up the people who are not to be seen and identified in the new City Centre.

Such areas, not surprisingly, have become tougher places to live. In Cranhill, on Glasgow's East Side, a marginally employed man I talked to depicted himself as being trapped in a blighted and despairing terrain. "Today," he notes, "it's just incredibly frustrating, the area is shot to hell, and there doesn't seem to be any way to get out." "I feel locked into this area," he said, "life is just complicated … it's been that way for awhile." Another man I talked to, in the East Side's Parkhead neighborhood, also chronicles a current reality of hardship and declining areal times. He said: "Parkhead is barely a sane area … it's a mess, these blocks warehouse the down and out … drugs and drug users line the streets … they line up outside the churches, the buildings … this neighborhood has gotten worse, let me tell you …." "No one is gettin outta here [Parkhead] alive," he said to me, "it's just the way it is now… don't let any politician tell you otherwise." Currently, this man supports himself by working irregularly washing dishes and sweeping floors at a local pub.

Finally, I would be remiss if I failed to identify the stark indifference to this segregating and marginalizing that currently exists among too many. Shockingly, these cultivated ghettos and slums are now blatantly mobilized as objects of amusement for the middle- and upper-middle class. Most conspicuously, with the Commonwealth Games in Glasgow in July 2014, the city used these zones to generate upper-class spectacle and titillation. Thus, the city blew up the Red Road Flats, a flagrantly desolate housing project, as part of its opening ceremony. The symbolism was eerie: to showcase the city's new competitive future, demolishing its low

income blocks became celebrative spectacle. "We are going to wow the world, with the demolition of the Red Road flats set to play a starring role," noted Glasgow City Council Head Gordon Matheson (in Smith 2014). Built in the 1960s, the eight 30-story buildings were the tallest housing in Europe at the time, their height symbolizing the optimism invested in them, but which soon evaporated as they fell into disrepair. Giddy organizers in 2014 gleefully described the plans to demolish them as the largest tear-down ever in Europe. The whole dynamite show lasted just 15 seconds, and was broadcast on a giant TV screen inside the opening ceremony's stadium. Residents living around the demolition zone were temporarily evacuated. As compensation, they received free tickets to watch the opening ceremony at venues across the city.

Discussion and Conclusion

The ongoing craze of creative redevelopment across cities of the global west, I suggest, deepens the affliction of the poor and the marginalized. This redevelopment deepens with a vengeance something initially identified by urbanists in the 1980s: class biased city re-making. The new reality: growth machines strive to manufacture an audaciously competitive city, centered on up-scaling downtowns, that exacerbates the city's supposed biggest scourges, ghettos and slums. At the core of this is a frenzy at redevelopment sites to relentlessly accept, purge, embrace, renounce, entice, and repulse. All of these are to be done starkly and decisively. Ghettos, once storing and isolating the poor to truncate activity spaces, now also function to invisibilize poor people. These poor are not to be seen by tourists, creatives, and the bourgeoisie, they are to be buried in the shadows, tucked away from zones of symbolic vibrancy. If the public is to see them, they are to be in their own proper spaces. As downtowns become a space of visual and experiential intensity, the poor are to get out of the way and meld into oblivion.

This cutting reality recasts the very character of marginality in these cities. A new modality and taint of marginalization have emerged. The poor and marginalized are now more deeply urban outcasts, their simple presence in visual fields at strategic sites deemed unacceptable and a threat to city health and viability. In dominant stroke, poor bodies are to be out of sight, out of mind. Marginality, more deeply than before, is ascribed to the visual, what people are seen to represent. Appear poor, and the proper place for you in the city is in the caverns of the urban's forgotten spaces. Appear creative, and your proper place is neighborhoods and zones

that are boldly illuminated and heralded. The new marginality, ignoring plight and circumstance, identifies beings that are supposed contaminants of pristine, sellable entrepreneurial space.

At a superficial level, of course, these findings should not surprise us. We should expect nothing less from restless, neoliberal growth machines in search of new redevelopment opportunities. Yet, there is much here that is surprising. Now these ghettos and patterns of segregation do not merely deepen, they are being systematically re-made. A new uneven development is being grafted on top of an existing one, as the engines of bureaucratic enterprise provide an existing uneven development a new discursive taint and a new socio-physical layer. A political project's connections and interdependences now re-weave these ghettos as something new: hyper-stigmatized store houses for the culturally blighted and visually blighting. "A people" and their communities are rendered symbols of an ocular trash which re-makes these zone's functionality and content. The new go creative redevelopment bolsters the age-old functional logic of the ghetto and segregation as mechanisms to isolate and warehouse the poor (established decades ago). But now ghettos and segregation are being asked to do more, to entrap and bury into oblivion the people who must supposedly be banished from the bourgeois gaze for the city's good.

An additional surprise has been redevelopment's changed mission. Suddenly, in cities like Cleveland and Glasgow, re-entrepreneurializing the city has become more complex. Thus, the drive to creativize these cities is not merely about fabricating an ideal spatial form, and it may not even be its principal aim. It is also about manufacturing a city of sight and meaning that communicates across the globe an effervescent creativity and internationalism. Indeed, Kern (2010) and Smith (2011) have identified the dramatic "visual turn" in redevelopment that now marks so many global west cities. Creative city making becomes as much a discursive project as a material producing, with its center the drive to cultivate appearances and impressions that can trigger anticipated patterns of human decision-making (where investors will invest, where educational elites will live, where business people will locate new plants and businesses). To be sure, previous phases of redevelopment in the west have centered discursiveness as important (in the age-old quest to valorize land, create cities of bourgeois comfort, and salvage urban economies). But current city growth machines—from Cleveland to Glasgow—obsess with the cultivation of images and impressions. Here is David Harvey's (2013) "new symbolic anxiety in planning" that now relentlessly drives current redevelopment in these cities. Where it will end up, no one at the moment knows for sure.

Bibliography

Adams, Guy. 2012. *Profile: Sam Bacile—The Middle-Aged Real-Estate Developer Behind the Controversial 'The Innocence of Muslims' Film*. Available from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/profile-sam-bacile-the-middle-aged-real-estate-developer-behind-the-controversial-the-innocence-of-8130843.html.

Adams, E. 2013. *Discussion with Planner*. Cleveland: City of Cleveland.

Atassi, Leila. 2014. *Cleveland Mayor Frank Jackson Touts Lakefront Development Plan on Goodtime III*. Available from http://www.cleveland.com/cityhall/index.ssf/2014/09/cleveland_mayor_frank_jackson_38.html

BBC News. 2004. *Scotland's Poorest Place Located*. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/3805031.stm

Booth, Paul, and Robin Boyle. 1993. *Cultural Policy and Urban Regeneration: The West European Experience*. Manchester: Manchester University.

Boyle, Mark. 1999. Growth Machines and Propaganda Projects: a Review of Readings of the Role of Civic Boosterism in the Politics of Local Economic Development. In *The Urban Growth Machine: Critical Perspectives Two Decades Later*, ed. Andrew E.G. Jonas, and David Wilson, 55–70. New York: SUNY Press.

Clyde Waterfront. 2007. *Economic Review Shows IFSD Booming*. Available from http://www.clydewaterfront.com/our-journey/news-archi7/economic-review-shows-ifsd-booming

Clyde Waterfront Committee. 2008. *Clyde Waterfront Regeneration*. Available from http://www.clydewaterfront.com/home.aspx

Florida, Richard. 2005. *Cities and the Creative Class*. New York: Psychology Press.

———. 2006. The Flight of the Creative Class: The New Global Competition for Talent. *Liberal Education* 92(3): 22–29.

Garland, John. 2012. *Benefits Capital of Britain: The Glasgow Neighbourhood Where Nine Out of Ten People Are on Welfare*. Available from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2143850/Glasgow-neighbourhood-9-10-adults--welfare-crowned-benefits-capital-Britain.html#ixzz34ux9fdpn.

Gerhard, Ulrike. 2014. Knowledge and Cities: A Creative Symbiosis. In *Lecture Delivered at the Making Creative Cities: Conflicts, Contradictions, Possibilities Conference, Urbana-Champaign, IL, September*.

Giband, David. 2014. Constructing the Unequal/Creative City By Its Pieces: Residential Strategy and Neighborhood Fabric in Montpellier (France). In *Lecture Delivered at the Making Creative Cities: Conflicts, Contradictions, Possibilities Conference, Urbana-Champaign, IL, September*.

Harvey, David. 1989. The Roots of Geographical Change: 1973 to the Present. *Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography* 71: 3–1.

———. 2005. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University.
———. 2013. Rebel Cities: The Current Outlook. In *Millercom Lecture, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 13 May*.
Howard, Ted, Lillian Kuri, and India Lee. 2010. The Evergreen Cooperative Initiative of Cleveland, Ohio: Writing the Next Chapter for Anchor-Based Redevelopment Initiatives. In *White Paper Prepared for the Neighborhood Funders Group Annual Conference, Minneapolis, MN*.
International Network for Urban Research and Action. 2014. *Glasgow, Scotland*. Unpublished technical report, available from author.
Jonas, Andrew. 2015. Beyond the Urban Sustainability Fix: Looking for New Spaces and Discourses of Sustainability in the City. In *The Politics of the Urban Sustainability Concept*, ed. David Wilson, 117–135. Champaign: Common Ground.
Kay, M. 2014a. *Discussion with Planner*, City of Cleveland, 9 September, Cleveland.
———. 2014b. *Discussion with Planner*, City of Cleveland, 13 September, Cleveland.
Kern, Leslie. 2010. Selling the 'Scary City': Gendering Freedom, Fear and Condominium Development in the Neoliberal City. *Social & Cultural Geography* 11(3): 209–230.
Koval, John P. 2006. *The New Chicago: A Social and Cultural Analysis*. Philadelphia: Temple University.
Lee, B. 2013a. Discussion with Planner, City of Cleveland, 12 September, Cleveland.
———. 2013b. Discussion with Planner, City of Cleveland, 8 July.
Lewin, K. 2014. Discussion with Police Officer, City of Cleveland, 11 October, Cleveland.
McGintie, L. 2014. Discussion with Planner, City of Glasgow, 6 June.
McLean, B. 2014. Discussion with Local Activist, City of Glasgow, 7 June.
McQuade, L. 2014. Discussion with Planner, City of Glasgow, 6 July.
Neale, L. 2014. Discussion with Planner, City of Glasgow, 5 July.
O'Leary. 2014. Discussion with Planner, City of Glasgow, 8 June.
Peach, Ceri. 1996. Does Britain Have Ghettos? *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 21(1): 216–235.
Roe, R. 2009. Discussion with Planner, City of Cleveland, 5 August.
Rule, B. 2014. Discussion with local activist, City of Glasgow, 9 June.
Short, John, and Y. Kim. 1999. *Globalization and Cities*. New York: Wiley.
Singh, Kavaljit. 2005. *Globalization*. New York: Wiley.
Smith, Neil. 2011. The City and the Global. In *Millercom Lecture, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 9 November*.
Vinter, Hanna. 2014. *Tourism Replaces Shipbuilding as Glasgow's Economic Engine*. Available from http://skift.com/2014/02/26/tourism-replaces-shipbuilding-as-glasgows-economic-engine/

Warf, Barney, and Brian Holly. 1997. The Rise and Fall and Rise of Cleveland. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 551: 208–221.
Wilson, David. 2004. Toward a Contingent Urban Neoliberalism. *Urban Geography* 25: 771–783.
———. 2007. *Cities and Race: America's New Black Ghetto*. London: Routledge.
———. 2014. *New Discursive Times and Redevelopment in Chicago*. Unpublished manuscript, available from author.
World Fact Book. 2012. *World Facts and Figures, Technical*. Document, available from organization.

CHAPTER 6

Knowledge Makes Cities: Education and Knowledge in Recent Urban Development. The Case of Heidelberg, Germany

Ulrike Gerhard and Michael Hoelscher

Introduction

One of the few unambiguously perceived trends of modern societies is the growing importance of knowledge, often described as the emergence of a knowledge society or knowledge economy. In this transition from an industrial to a knowledge society (Stehr 2001), the economic emphasis is shifting from the factors of production (work, capital, and resources) to the service sector in which knowledge has become a commodity in itself (Wilke 1998; Powell and Snellman 2004).

This development has made education one of the central assets for employment and economic growth, with major importance for distributing

U. Gerhard (✉)
Geography Department, Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany

M. Hoelscher
Higher Education and Science Management Department, Speyer University, Speyer, Germany

U. Gerhard et al. (eds.), *Inequalities in Creative Cities,*
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95115-4_6

life-chances. While most dimensions discussed in this book (e.g. gender, race) are overwhelmingly seen as humanly endowed traits, educational success is often seen as being achieved through human effort and toil (Parsons et al. 1959). However, research has shown that the granting of educational certificates and the access to higher levels of education by no means follow meritocratic rules, but are highly influenced by social origin (Boudon 1974; Bourdieu and Passeron 1964).

Cities have become the key sites of the transition to a knowledge economy. They are the places where educational facilities are concentrated, knowledge is produced, and where individuals strive to turn their educational merits into economic success and prosperity. Cities increasingly seek to use knowledge-intensive growth as a strategy for sustainable economic urban development (Gerhard and Marquardt 2015; Hristova et al. 2015). Thus, no matter how big or small, how important or peripheral they are, most cities now strive to "go creative", which is associated with high-educated inhabitants, a high standard of living, as well as a more equal distribution of growth. This, at least, is the prevailing image. However, especially in neoliberal times, knowledge-intensive development is used as rhetoric, as a growth strategy sometimes to even implement harsh economic measures.

This chapter aims to analyze the emergence of new social inequalities related to education in cities and how current creative city-policies may influence these. The main objective is to decipher the process of growing inequality through a positive connoted rhetoric like knowledge, sustainability, etc., and thus to deconstruct the myth of the all-encompassing knowledge society. Under the heading of creative city strategies, re-urbanization or knowledge-led growth, many ordinary cities are experiencing a strict urban restructuring, camouflaged by low energy residential developments, sustainability measures, citizen's participation, right-to-the city slogans, etc., which result in a strong commodification of urban space. Developmental policies increasingly dominate redistributive local policies (Navarro and Clark 2012). Accordingly, a survey on international experts shows that a majority of respondents from Latin America, Asia, and Africa think that current urban reforms mainly serve the interests of the rich (UN Habitat 2008: 128 f.). Our main argument is therefore that creative city strategies lead to a growing urban and social polarization by focusing on and supporting the already successful. "The rhetoric of universal social potential accompanying creative city ideas continues to overlook those

unable to participate in this new economy, as well as those who are more actively excluded" (Atkinson and Easthope 2009: 64).

Our case study Heidelberg, a mid-sized town that relies heavily on its university, the oldest one in Germany, is a very good example for analyzing the nexus between creative city strategies, education, and social inequality for different reasons. First of all, it is a rather "ordinary" city in the German south with a considerably high standard of living, low unemployment rates, and assumingly little burden of social problems or inequalities. Thus it is not one of the "usual suspects" for exploring urban inequalities. Second, Heidelberg has a very long history with an established, well-known university, allowing for historical perspectives as well as for an analysis of the impact of the ongoing so-called "Excellence-initiative", an initiative of the federal state government supporting currently 11 German universities with extra money to become world-class institutions. Third, the city is currently and until 2022 running an "Internationale Bauausstellung" (IBA), an international building exhibition that serves as a temporary lab for urban development, under the slogan "knowledge makes cities (Wissen schafft Stadt)". This offers the possibility to analyze the impact of an explicit strategy to promote Heidelberg as a knowledge city nationally and internationally in the process. What makes the German case also interesting is the fact that the correlation between social origin and educational success is very high in the German context, as Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA)-studies comparing elementary school performances on an international scale have revealed (e.g. Duru-Bellat and Suchaut 2005). Here, we find some fundamental issues regarding unequal development in German cities in the context of the knowledge society that we would like to discuss. The chapter's first part discusses the interplay of education and cities in the knowledge society in general and with a special focus on social inequalities. In a second step, the example of Heidelberg is introduced, followed by a presentation, in a third step, of empirical evidence on educational inequalities in this city. One important point of the empirical analysis will be the co-clustering of living spaces and workplaces of highly educated individuals, educational institutions, and other aspects of living conditions. The chapter closes with some conclusions on the specificity of the urban inequality discourse in the context of the knowledge society and an outlook, delineating some more general hypotheses that might be used for further comparative analyses.

Knowledge, Education, and the Creative City

Knowledge has always been an important term, not only in the so-called knowledge society (see for example Böhme and Stehr 1986). Throughout the last two decades, however, one can observe the increasing significance of knowledge as a constituting asset of societal development. In the transition from an industrial to a knowledge society, economic emphasis has shifted from cultivating the factors of production to choreographing the service sector in which knowledge has become a commodity in itself (Wilke 1998). Experience and skills have become traded goods; their production is a quintessential object of economic activity. In this sense, our society has materialized into a post-industrial society that has replaced the industrial society of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Bell 1973; UNESCO 2005).

However, the mainstream discourse on the knowledge society, even more so on the knowledge *economy*, is focusing on a very specific kind of knowledge. Most authors limit themselves to a rather narrow definition, the rationalised, scientific, and instrumental knowledge, often stemming from formal learning and training [although it might comprise aspects such as the "hidden curriculum" (Jackson 1968)]. Knowledge and human creativity are thereby limited to "human capital" (Becker 1975; critical Brown 2001), leaving out more complex concepts of knowledge with regard to mastering everyday life (e.g. Berger and Luckmann 1966), incorporated/bodily knowledge, situated as well as practical knowledge, or sometimes even craftsmanship.

Cities have become the precise locations of this transition (Knight 1995). They are the places where knowledge-led growth materializes. Here, knowledge is produced and applied—due to the high concentration of people, headquarters, universities, schools, political institutions, and cultural facilities. Knowledge generation is regarded as an interactive process that especially flourishes in highly heterogeneous and diverse urban environments (van Winden 2010: 202). In these "thick" environments (Amin and Thrift 2007), ideas are developed, decisions are made, and strategies are being distributed throughout the periphery. They are the spatial nodes of the global network society where power and knowledge materialize (e.g. Castells 2000). This is why authors such as Friedmann (1986), Sassen (1991), Taylor (2005), and many others developed the concept (or heuristic research approach) of a "global city", relating to certain cities as "command centers of the global economy" (Sassen 1991).

Thus, the role of the city as centers of knowledge production cannot be overestimated.

At the same time, one can describe this trend as a "re-urbanisation" of knowledge (van Winden 2010: 202). In contrast to the 1960s and 1970s, when university campuses and science parks were typically created at "greenfield" suburban locations, cities now provide inner-city space to convert brownfields into attractive learning environments. These are seen as the perfect surroundings for knowledge-generation, while, at the same time, they function as incubators for urban flair and urban atmosphere. So-called knowledge-quarters are developed and introduced in many cities, linking knowledge-based growth directly to urbanity (e.g. Benneworth et al. 2011; Charles 2011). In short, the transformation to a knowledge society is closely related to the urban society; a trend that has been already addressed by Lefebvre (1974) and Castells (1977) in the "urban question" or the "complete urbanization of society" and is now being picked up by concepts such as "planetary urbanization" (Brenner and Schmid 2015; Brenner 2013). Even though one can question the "urbanization of everything" (Roy 2015; Merrifield 2013), the urban aspect of knowledge generation can be truly acknowledged.

Accompanying this transition to a knowledge society has been a profound change of urban labor markets. As many researchers have pointed out, jobs in the service industry are increasingly replacing industrial work. Optimistically, these new workers have been described as the creative class (Florida 2002), less affirmative they have been named portfolio workers (Castells 1989), their work has been described as affective (Hardt and Negri 2000, 2004: service with a smile) or emotional labor, meaning that the personality is involved in the work procedures instead of a standardized, impersonal operation of tasks (see also McDowell in this book and Bröckling 2016). Many cities with reduced manufacturing sectors currently flourish in finances, education, arts, and culture and have developed a high share of workers in the service class, and thus have been named creative cities (Florida 2005; Landry 2000). These cities aim to provide suitable conditions for the development of creativity and knowledge production, trying to attract the loose group of the so-called creative people (Anheier et al. 2012; Hoelscher 2012a).

Within this context, education as the basis for individual and societal knowledge and creativity is probably the single most important factor in the outlined aspects of knowledge-based urban growth, labor-market shifts, and societal outcomes of creative cities: it is important for

the economic competitiveness of cities as a whole, it is important for individual success in the labor market, and it is influencing the capacity of civil society to induce and gain from related societal developments. The term education covers, though, a very broad field: from nurseries over schools to universities, from formal degrees to informal learning in clubs, from narrow human capital as job-related skills to a broad emphatic understanding of education as in the German term "Bildung", etc. It also spreads out over different places and locations: from school yards to university campuses, from public libraries to office buildings, from home offices over co-working spaces to fablabs or makerspaces. And—to extend the list of educational places beyond the institutions of instrumental knowledge formation—it also multiplies in private settings, public squares, spontaneous encounters. The knowledge society as well as the creative city are connected to all of these facets in different ways. For example, there is an ongoing debate on how to improve the quality of nurseries: should they focus on systematic teaching of key skills and competencies such as reading and writing, foreign languages or numeracy, or should they allow free play of children. With regard to informal learning, economists emphasize the importance of informal networks and regional clusters for a region's economic success by transferring tacit knowledge (Bathelt et al. 2004; Howells 2002; Polanyi 1966). And with the explicit distinction between the terms of knowledge economy and knowledge society (Sörlin and Vessuri 2007) it becomes clear that there is much more to education than just an economic aspect, for example cultural heritage issues (Graham 2002; Isar 2012) or the capacity to participate competently in political processes ("citizenship education").

Much of the debate and research focuses on the role of higher education and universities (e.g. Beerkens 2008; Delanty 2001; OECD 2008; Weber and Duderstadt 2006; World Bank 2002), as they combine the two functions of teaching and research, knowledge distribution and knowledge production (Hoelscher 2012b). While measurement of the economic effect of research institutions on regional development has been the undertaking of several economic geographers, economists, and sociologists (e.g. Matthiesen 2004; Mossig 2011; Kunzmann 2009; Lange and Bürkner 2010; D'Este et al. 2013; Nijkamp 2011; Lever 2002), the teaching dimension contributes to regional development for example by providing highly skilled graduates (e.g. Abel and Deitz 2012) as well as opportunities for lifelong learning (Németh 2010). The direct regional effect of the University of Heidelberg, for example, has been calculated

in monetary terms by Glückler et al. (2010). Combining teaching and research, the yearly demand generated by the university via its employees, material expenses, and investments ranges about 1.2 billion euros (of which more than 50 % are spent within the city and the surrounding communities) (ibid.: 106). However, indirect effects through knowledge-spillover, spin-offs, or the overall image of the city are probably even more important. In their quantitative analysis of 287 metropolitan areas, Gabe et al. (2012) highlighted the central role of universities for knowledge-induced urban growth since they enlarge the human capital base of a city. Also van Winden et al. (2007) concluded in their analysis of European cities regarding their transition toward a knowledge-based society that universities and knowledge institutions should be regarded as key (economic) actors for urban growth, thus speaking of a demanded "knowledge turn" in urban politics.

Education and the city are therefore related in reciprocal processes. People with educational degrees move into specific, attractive cities and quarters, shaping and influencing the city make-up. At the same time and within the creative cities-discourse, cities are trying actively to attract these highly educated people and knowledge-intensive firms by developing certain areas with regard to the demands of these groups. This seems to be a win-win-situation for both: The "creative class" is provided with nice urban working- and living-spaces, and the city profits from their economic success.

This vision is definitely tempting. Yet the relation between knowledge, economic success, and urban development is not that straightforward. Despite the fact that the specific spatial social, political, and economic context in which actors or social systems seek to achieve their objectives largely determines whether competence can be parlayed into economic success (see Meusburger 2013), we argue for a more severe circumvention: the creative connection between knowledge and creative city growth leaves out groups already disadvantaged (the less creative and less well-educated). The dominant arguments in favor of the creative city are biased, if not wrong in at least three ways. First, expected benefits from creative city strategies seem often exaggerated. It is not yet clear to what extent creative city strategies really foster economic growth and social improvements (Bontje and Musterd 2009), especially where many such cities compete with each other (Knight 1995). Here the above-cited studies by van Winden et al. (2007) and Gabe et al. (2012) remain astonishingly vague in their conclusions. Additionally, much profit and other gains from creative city politics do not benefit the

whole city, but are privatized or individually appropriated (Van Reenen 1996; Faggio et al. 2007; Storper and Venables 2004; Ponzini and Rossi 2010; Peck 2005; see also Lee and Rodríguez-Pose 2013). Cultural and creative industries are a prominent example. They are often labeled as "winner-take-all"-markets (Frank and Cook 1996), i.e. markets where performance and success are not directly related and therefore only a few stars or products are very successful, while the mass of producers go away empty-handed. More generally, empirical evidence shows that many jobs that are created in the context of creative city policies are low paid or precarious (e.g. part-time jobs, termed contracts, temporary self-employment, etc.).

Second, some protagonists argue that access to the creative class is open for all. Florida (2002), for example, reports about his "famous" janitor turning into an interior designer. However, there are undoubtedly mechanisms of class closure that prevent this: The political initiative of an "educational expansion" during the last decades—meaning that higher education in many European countries should be made available for bigger portions of the population—has (unexpectedly) not led to less social inequality, but only to a devaluing of some education titles by internal differentiation. The rising demand for higher degrees (e.g. a PhD instead of a Master degree) has sometimes been labeled as "diploma disease" by some authors (Dore 1976, 1997; see also Becker and Hadjar 2009; Bourdieu 1979, on the role of education and cultural capital in social reproduction more generally). Also, as already argued above, the focus is on a very narrow aspect of education, namely abstract, rationalized, instrumental, commodified knowledge stemming from formal training, excluding other forms of local, situated, embodied knowledge. And while hopes existed for the creative industries to provide opportunities for minorities and disadvantaged people, Oakley (2012) shows that well-paid jobs in these sectors are confined mainly to the usual suspects. As she shows in London, ethnic minorities as well as women are strongly underrepresented in the labor force: Around 35 % of the cultural and creative work force in London is female, compared to 43 % in the rest of the economy and, while yearly changes are slight, these proportions tend to be worsening. In broadcasting, music, and publishing, for example, the proportion of ethnic minorities was, by 2007, less than half of London's workforce as a whole (ibid., 207). The nature of the cultural labor markets, though, with an over-supply of graduate labor, very small firms, and strong social networks makes direct "equal opportunity" interventions

difficult. Mayer (2008) proved something similar in a study on the high-tech sector in four metropolitan regions in the USA. In this sector of the high creatives, women were confronted with segmentation and segregation patterns that seemed to be stronger than those in the traditional sectors. Thus, policy concerns of access, identity, or education have never disappeared in the creative city; they only have been remade in other guises and with different language.

Third, the demands of the creative class, although they are hidden behind such benevolent terms as sustainability, tolerance, and urbanity, are by no means the demands of the whole society. Due to their privileged access to media and their eminently respectable knowledge supply, this class dominates the overall discourse, but it is questionable whether their claims are shared by all groups. This is especially important in times of shrinking financial resources of cities, when expenditures for many segments of citizens are decreasing. For example, even when money is still spent in the field of culture, it makes a difference whether it is spent on a socio-cultural center in a deprived neighborhood to support inclusion or on a new world-class museum in the city center to polish the city's image.

And, last but not least, there are spatial transformations that are rather ambiguous. While the influx of students and their spending is an important monetary effect, as is labor force improvements, Smith (2004) looks at the negative impacts student housing has on city neighborhoods. They range from the inflation of house prices through incoming students, displacement of former inhabitants in the neighborhoods, to an array of incivilities such as noise nuisances, drinking, and anti-social behavior caused by students. These trends have been identified as the rise of "studentification" (Chatterton 1999; Sage et al. 2012; Smith 2004, 2008; Smith and Hubbard 2014; Steinmüller 2015).

Our thesis is therefore that creative city strategies lead to a frequently hidden growth in urban and social polarization by following the "Matthew effect" (or accumulated advantage; see Merton 1968). The privileged obtain additional support. Educational intensification, as shown above, plays an important role in this process. The hegemony (Gramsci 1992) of a certain understanding of legitimate knowledge parallels the homogenized vision of valuable citizens and employees in the creative city, excluding those with alternative knowledge reservoirs and thereby supporting existing power relations. We will elaborate on this influence in the next section.

The Example: Heidelberg as Creative Knowledge Pearl

> (University) Campus instead of industrial areas, nursery instead of production halls, green parks instead of parking lots: In the cities of the 21st century knowledge has become the socio-economic and socio-cultural fundament of society. (Campus statt Industriegebiet, Kitas statt Produktionshallen, Parks statt Parkplätzen: In den Städten des 21. Jahrhunderts wird Wissen zum sozioökonomischen und soziokulturellen Fundament der Gesellschaft.)

This quote is taken from the homepage of the International Building Exhibition in the city of Heidelberg, Germany, displayed for the opening phase of the exhibition (2013). It elucidates the creative city discourse and places knowledge at the center of urban development, "knowledge makes cities" (Wissen schafft Stadt).[1] The International Building Exhibition is a platform for new urban design ideas in Germany that address recent trends and needs in urban development. It has a long history and started in the German city Darmstadt in 1901. Here, architects joined forces with artists to design the Mathildenhöhe art colony, which focused on the interaction of art and craftsmanship, consciously setting itself off from the mass production of the industrial age. Even today, the colony is recognized as an impressive construction project of the Art Nouveau period. Several other Exhibitions followed, e.g. in Stuttgart 1927 (Weißenhofsiedlung, Le Corbusier: Testimony to "New Building"), Berlin 1957 (The City of Tomorrow), and Hamburg 2013 (Projects for the Future of the Metropolis).

One of the most important reasons for Heidelberg to become home of the latest IBA in Germany are the large brownfield sites that currently become available to city planning due to the pullback of the US Army in Germany. Many German cities are currently "requited" with expansive urban spaces—often quite centrally located within the city—that have been used by the US Army and are now given back to the German federal government and/or the city. Apart from the costly need for redevelopment these areas provide great opportunities for cities to gain additional land in the dense inner cities. Other conversion sites include industrial

[1] The German phrase is a pun, as "Wissenschaft" also means "Science". In German, therefore, the phrase has the double meaning of "Knowledge makes the city" and "Science-City". This has provoked a discussion to what extent the focus of the IBA has to be broadened to "education" and "knowledge" more generally. The IBA has recently changed the English translation into "Knowledge | Based | Urbanism".

brownfields or former railway tracks that offer additional space in cities for redevelopment. In Heidelberg, these sites are developed in close relation to knowledge-related development. Student housing has been immediately implemented, making use of residential units of the US Army, and new knowledge quarters have been modeled. The most prominent one is the so-called Bahnstadt, a new "knowledge quarter of the city" that is located in close distance to the main railway station. It is currently one of the largest zero-energy housing areas in Europe. A new bridge across the river is to connect the quarter to the University Campus, and pilot projects like "multigenerational living" or "learning houses" are being promoted. New learning environments (such as multi-purpose and multi-scale library buildings, innovative pedagogical centers, multi-use learning environments, etc.) are envisioned to serve as the new hubs of the neighborhood (see http://www.iba.heidelberg.de/english/).[2]

The IBA shall facilitate these processes and develop ideas on the use of these opportunities. Its slogan "knowledge makes cities" illustrates the widespread appeal of the knowledge discourse on the definition of an ideal, successful city: no smoking chimneys, no industrial labor or blue-collar work, but playful children, studious adults, a creative work ethos encircled by green parks that are open to all. Urban development is staged as a sustainable, class-less, and people-friendly process—if only knowledge is the main factor of development. A rhetoric of growth paraphrases knowledge as a productive and clean impetus for the urban and goes very well with the above-mentioned knowledge turn in urban policy. And it applies to the city of Heidelberg very well. Consequently, Heidelberg claims to be the first IBA that did not start with a "problem" (e.g. housing in Berlin; run-down brownfield areas around the haven in Hamburg, etc.), but with a chance or "opportunity" (the centrally located conversion areas).[3]

Heidelberg is a mid-sized city (around 150,000 inhabitants) with a long history as a university town (since 1386) and a strong research sector. Following Kunzmann's typology (2004) of universities and cities,

[2] With the increase in migrants' figures in 2015 in Germany, Heidelberg became the central initial reception facility for the whole federal state of Baden-Württemberg. The facility is located in one of the mentioned conversion areas, Patrick Henry Village. It is too early to decide how the social reality of the new migrants in Heidelberg will counteract with the mantra of a knowledge city, that is, how the integration of the migrants succeeds.

[3] In a captious interpretation, this special situation in itself follows an inherent neoliberal growth logic: Not looking at problems and working on them, but to support already existing strengths, hoping that there will be spill-over-effects also for existing weaknesses.

Heidelberg can be classified as a traditional, small university town whose university is embedded in a traditional milieu closely connected to urban history and development. The most recent Heidelberg survey (Stadt Heidelberg 2016) also illustrated this: the majority of the citizens were positively connected to the university, arguing that the city profits from its university and the research institutions. In van Winden's and others' (2007) typology of city knowledge industries, Heidelberg can be named a "knowledge pearl". Knowledge pearls are defined as "smaller cities with a high score on virtually all foundations [knowledge base, industry structure, quality of life, diversity, accessibility, social equity], that are located very near a big agglomeration, with a good performance record" (ibid.: 540). Overall, 18,000 people are employed by the University of Heidelberg; and it enrolls about 30,000 students. Several further institutions add to the research sector as well: public research centers such as the European Molecular Biology Laboratory (EMBL), "Europe's flagship laboratory for the life sciences" (their own website) with more than 800 personnel, the German Cancer Research Centre (DKFZ), four Max-Planck-Institutes, and several small public and or private colleges.

Moreover, the area's employment market compared to other German cities shows specific characteristics closely related to knowledge industries. The biggest industry sector is health: every fifth employee in Heidelberg belongs to it. Large sections of this sector are part of the university since it entails a very strong medical program including several hospitals and clinics. If one compares this share to the German average of 7 %, the health sector is respectably higher represented. Further important sectors are universities and higher education (4 % without the clinics compared to 0.9 % in Germany), research and development (4 % compared to 1.9 %) and cultural institutions (6 % compared to 3.8 % in Germany) (Glückler et al. 2010: 106; Eurostat n.d.).

The focus on creative knowledge industries is furthermore revealed in a strong public cultural sector. Investments per capita into cultural events by public organizations rank third compared to all other German cities (295 euros per capita, totaling to a sum of 42.5 million euros) (Glückler et al. 2010: 157).[4] The attractiveness of Heidelberg as an international tourist destination (castle, old city center, image of a romantic town, etc.) plays a major role here. Heidelberg contains 18 museums that account for 12,000

[4] However, public subsidies to cultural institutions (138 euro per capita) are well below what would be expected in Germany for a city of Heidelberg's size.

museum visitors per 1000 inhabitants. This is by far the highest number compared to other German cities. The same holds true for theater visits (ibid.). Thus, one can see the strong economic potential of the cultural and creative industries: the image of a romantic city is strongly connected to its history as a university town where famous writers and thinkers—ranging from von Eichendorff, Anna Seghers, Ernst Bloch, Martin Heidegger to Max Weber, Hannah Ahrendt, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Robert Park—have lived, taught, and studied. Tourists want to experience such a prestigious atmosphere and are thus attracted by a strong cultural sector (see also Freytag 2010).

This strength in education, research, and culture, of course, is reflected in a high share of creative workers in the city. Following Florida's generous definition of the creative class (counting employees in creative occupations), 62 % of all Heidelberg employees or 46,800 people work in such industries (Glückler et al. 2010: 159). Compared to Germany, this is a considerable larger share, where "only" 49 % of all employees can be counted as creative people. Out of the 46,800 persons, 26 % work in highly creative occupations, compared to 16 % in Germany overall (Glückler et al. 2010: 100). Especially certain occupational sectors account for the high share of creative people: 67 % of all employees in the health sector, 87 % in universities and higher educational institutions, 86 % in research and development in science (Glückler et al. 2010: 106). The single most important sector of the creative economy (looking at the sectoral approach with 11 subsectors) is book publishing (one-third of the creative professionals) and software, especially games (Glückler et al. 2010: 75). Consequently, Heidelberg applied to become member of UNESCO's "Creative Cities Network: City of Literature", and was accepted in late 2014.

Also, further demographic variables indicate an above-average appearance as a "creative city". If we take Hoelscher's (2012c) six dimensions of a creative city (multiculturalism, religious heterogeneity, young population, low unemployment, high educational level, and large service sector), Heidelberg differs from many German but also other university towns discussed in this book: The share of migrants is 30.5 %, notably higher than in Groningen (22 %), Oxford (28.5 %), Montpellier (12.6 %), and especially Germany as a whole (19 %).[5] Its population is respectably younger

[5] Data for the different cities are taken from the respective statistical offices: Heidelberg: Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg 2015; Groningen: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 2014; Oxford: Office for National Statistics 2011 Census; Montpellier: Institut

than the national average (27 % of the inhabitants are in the age group of 25–39 years compared to 18 % in Germany), very similar, though, to the other university towns: 25 % in Groningen, 25 % in Oxford, and 34 % in Montpellier. Also, the proportion of inhabitants with a university degree is respectably higher: it doubles that of the German average (32 % vs. 15 %), however it cannot compete with Groningen (74 %) or Oxford (43 %).

Heidelberg therefore makes the "perfect place" for a knowledge city. And its self-image is well mirrored in what van Winden et al. (2007: 542) concluded in his study: "These cities do not have serious problems of social exclusion, although there often is a cultural gap between the academic community and the rest of the population".

In the next part, however, we would like to look behind the "growth story". Who is involved in the transformation process toward knowledge-society? Who can benefit, and, even more important, who is excluded from the growth path? And also, considering some hindrances of growth, how dynamic, sustainable, and creative is the creative city really?

New and Old Inequalities in Heidelberg

For a first picture, the spatial patterns of socio-economic indicators in Heidelberg on a neighborhood scale are analyzed. These indicators are studied in relation to educational aspects within the city. Then, power relations of IBA-actors will be discussed in order to understand who is involved in the knowledge turn of urban politics. Following from this, we ask as a form of conclusion how dynamic the creative city really is considering a high imbalance of creative city growth.

As mentioned before, Heidelberg as a city ranks very high economically compared to many other cities in Germany (unemployment and poverty rates are among the lowest in Germany, whereas income and especially house prices are very high). The distribution of income and growth, however, is quite uneven throughout the city. If we look at the neighborhood scale (Stadtteilebene) we can distinguish 15 neighborhoods with a total population between 17,800 (Handschuhsheim) and 2,200 in the newest neighborhood Bahnstadt (numbers for 2014, Amt für Stadtentwicklung und Statistik 2014).

national de la statistique et des études économiques 2010, 2015; Debrecem: Központi Statisztikai Hivatal Népszámlálás 2011. We are well aware of the ambivalences to compare international data or statistics. These numbers just serve as one way to discuss different regional contexts.

With regard to the creative city discourse, two economic sectors are deemed especially important: universities/knowledge institutions and the cultural and creative economy. The university institutions are mainly spread over three locations: the old city center ("Altstadt", mainly humanities in historic university buildings), Neuenheim (the science campus, including most clinics, in the Neuenheimer Feld, introduced in the late 1960s/1970s and continuously expanding), and the "new" Campus Bergheim, a brownfield conversion of the last ten years (see also the following maps). The significance of creative economy firms in the city show an equally strong spatial pattern (see Fig. 6.1): most firms are concentrated in central neighborhoods close to the city center and the university buildings in Neuenheim and Bergheim. Only very few creative industries can be found



Fig. 6.1 Creative industry in Heidelberg



Fig. 6.2 Unemployment rates in Heidelberg by neighbourhood

in the southeastern (Boxberg, Emmertsgrund, Kirchheim) and western (Pfaffengrund, Kirchheim) neighborhoods.

If we compare these patterns to the spatial occurrence of unemployment, we find an almost reverse picture (see Fig. 6.2): Unemployment rates are highest in the southern and western parts of the city (close to 20 %), and lowest in the central and northern/eastern neighborhoods (less than 4 %). One exemption is Bergheim, a quite mixed neighborhood that is currently undergoing gentrification processes from east to west, following the conversion of former clinics into buildings for teaching and research, bringing much more people, especially students, into the area (Bumiller 2015). Overall, 60 % of all welfare-recipients in the city live in just five neighborhoods (Bergheim, Kirchheim, Rohrbach, Emmertsgrund, and Boxberg), even though their population share is only



Fig. 6.3 Rent index zones in Heidelberg

35 % (Stadt Heidelberg 2011: 61). The distribution of certain age groups also reveals an interesting picture. While the age group of 18–29 years is highest in the neighborhoods where university buildings are present, the fragmented spread of the "young-employed" (age 30–44 years old) is even more pronounced: all central neighborhoods rank high, with decreasing numbers toward the periphery.

One can also identify a concise pattern of housing prices and rents throughout the urban landscape. While Heidelberg ranks sixth among all German cities regarding rents,[6] the picture is somewhat uneven throughout the city (see Fig. 6.3). Most expensive are again the "creative" neighborhoods in the north as well as the center, where average

[6] Compared to the average income, Heidelberg exhibits even the fourth highest rents of all German cities (see Immoscout, accessed 23 May 2016).

rents per square meter, controlled for the standard of the flat/house, are more than 30 % higher than those in the least expensive neighborhoods in the south (Emmertsgrund and Boxberg) (Stadt Heidelberg 2013a). Overall, affordable housing is one of the key problems that impinges upon the standard of living in Heidelberg (Stadt Heidelberg 2013b). No matter how content the creative professionals are with their location, their strongest criticism is rents and shortage of affordable housing.[7] Even though already Florida described high housing prices as a common trait for creative cities, the fact of high rents in "ordinary" cities such as Heidelberg—that are not competing on a global scale such as Munich, Berlin, or Hamburg—is an increasingly disturbing factor for the equality of life in these cities.

We now turn to more explicit aspects of education. Also here strong discrepancies are detectible between the neighborhoods (Fig. 6.4). College or university degrees are held by 51 % of the employees in Neuenheim, 43 % in the Weststadt, and 40 % in the central city. On the other end of the spectrum are Pfaffengrund (12 %), Boxberg (9 %), and Emmertgsrund (8 %). The same old divide between north and south/west. If we look at residences of university professors, the picture again is highly fragmented (see Fig. 6.5). Most live in close vicinity to the university, that is, the central neighborhoods. Since they do not necessarily belong to the highest income groups in a city, there is also a considerable tendency toward suburbanization: Out of 351 professors, 146 live in the city, 96 in the outskirts, and 109 are commuters from other cities (Source: Universität Heidelberg 2015). Along with this residential pattern of academic households goes the educational success of the children (see Fig. 6.6). Data analysis shows that elementary schools in those "professorial neighborhoods" display much higher proportions of kids going to the best high schools in town (in Germany called Gymnasium).[8] The Mönchhofschule in Neuenheim, for example,

[7] While building affordable housing is envisaged for some of the conversion areas in the future, the near-to-city-center-area Bahnstadt was explicitly built without social housing.

[8] German pupils are in general sorted into one of three different school-types after grade 4 (aged around 10): The most basic one is the "Hauptschule", offering another five years of schooling. The next one is the "Realschule", offering six years of schooling (up to grade 10), and the most demanding school is the "Gymnasium", offering nine years of additional schooling and ending with the "Abitur", which is still the normal prerequisite for studying. While the figure has grown during the last few years, overall still only around 50 % of pupils get the "Abitur" (37 % in the year 2000).



Fig. 6.4 Highest educational degree for employed people by place of residence

sent all but two pupils to the Gymnasium in 2014, Heiligenbergschule in Handschuhsheim all but five, and the Landhausschule all but seven pupils. This is in clear contrast to the more southern, less prestige neighborhoods: From the Waldparkschule in Boxberg hardly any child reaches the entrance level for the highest educational schools, in the elementary school in Emmertsgrund only 15 % of the students achieve this. Thus, knowledge and education is almost "inherited" by youth. It is—especially



Fig. 6.5 Residency of university professors at Heidelberg University

in the German educational system with an early selection of students—a socio-cultural good given to the academically privileged households. Their well-off children do not only benefit from their families, but also from their peers as well as generally more supportive educational institutions (e.g. often better teachers, less conflicts in the classroom, additional equipment sponsored by the parents, etc.).

Interesting is also the distribution of student households as a share of the overall neighborhood population. Students belong to the lower income groups, they are, however, mostly temporary residents with high educational aims and a reasonable prospectus of higher income in the



Fig. 6.6 School transfers from elementary to secondary schools in Heidelberg by school districts

future. So their locations are strongly oriented toward the university as well as to the supply of student residences within the city, resulting in a high concentration of students in the central neighborhoods but also in some selected locations in the south.

In sum, we uncover a highly uneven picture of knowledge-related prosperity in Heidelberg. The city as a whole profits from universities and other creative industries as it attracts creative workers to come, settle, study, and

work in Heidelberg. This growth, however, benefits only selected fractions of the population. It produces highly segmented neighborhoods that even show signs of polarization when university buildings enter certain neighborhoods. This division is not new, already Meusburger (1997) stated strong inner-city discrepancies regarding the educational behavior of high-educated and less-educated households. These discrepancies, however, seem to deepen in the course of the increasing orientation toward knowledge-induced urban growth. People with lower educational degrees, elderly employees with discontinuous work CVs, young people at the beginning of their potential career, certain groups of migrants with limited language skills[9] and—especially—their related children are left behind. The risk of these groups to belong to poor households is about 15.2 %, two times as high as for the average population. Not surprisingly, they are peripherally located to the romantic, consumer-oriented downtown and the surrounding gentrified academic neighborhoods and are socially and spatially excluded from the success story of the Heidelberg knowledge pearl. This exclusion might not be as visible as in other contexts or cities—they do not suffer deprivation from hunger or citizen rights, they do not dispense with basic consumer goods and public welfare, and they do not suffer obvious discrimination. However, their marginalization is more subtle: they do not get access to certain professions, social circles, cultural or educational institutions, and, especially, certain neighborhoods. They are trapped in marginal surroundings and cannot participate in the knowledge boom because they do not find access, almost from the beginning of their childhood (see educational system) or the moment of expulsion (e.g. from the job market). Thus, their social mobility is extremely low. This social imbalance is strengthened by the factor of employment/unemployment: While the overall picture in Heidelberg improved between 2010 and 2013 (from 6.2 % unemployment rate in 2010 to 5.3 % in 2013 and even 4.4 % in 2015), the figures for people being older than 55 years and for those being unemployed for more than a year has increased, and migrants had the lowest relative decrease (Stadt Heidelberg 2015: 15).

[9] The composition of migrants in Heidelberg was quite specific, as a huge share of them has moved to the city either as student or as member of the university. For example, two-thirds of Heidelberg's migrant population had at least an ICSED-level-3-qualification, granting them direct access to higher education (Stadt Heidelberg 2009: 11). This figure refers to the situation before the huge increase in migrants in 2015, though. The new migrants have much less favorable educational backgrounds. See footnote 2.

Such an uneven picture of access to education throughout the city leads to a strong polarization process that excludes the already disadvantaged citizens from the ongoing and appraised knowledge turn. This unevenness is also expressed by the power relations in urban development, exemplified in the course of the international building exhibition IBA. While the IBA explicitly started with the aim to connect citizens and quarters to support a sustainable city development, it will probably not be able to remove the trenches. Its slogan of "knowledge makes cities" addresses only certain population groups, and the question is to what extent it will be able to integrate different actors and stakeholders into the process. Research on international building exhibitions identifies four ideal phases (see BBSR 2011: 52). Heidelberg has already passed the pre-IBA phase, in which the idea is developed and important city officials are taken on board. Currently Heidelberg is in the second, called starting-phase, where the creation of broader networks is one of the essential tasks (see BBSR 2011: 48). A social network analysis of the central actors during this phase was undertaken to shed light on the power relations in the urban development process. Data on connections between actors and on their attitudes and expectations toward the IBA process were collected via three waves of snowball-sampling. As starting points for the snowball-sampling important actors during the pre-IBA-phase were identified through a document analysis of central publications (see, for example, Stadt Heidelberg 2012). While our study probably does not include all members of the IBA-network, the snowball-sampling technique is seen as the best approach to approximate the full network when no definite list exists (e.g. Maiolo and Johnson 1992; for details on the study see Hoelscher et al. 2014). Figure 6.7 shows the central network with people having more than one contact within the network. The size of the nodes shows the importance (degree centrality) of actors.

The picture reveals a dense inner network, containing mainly representatives of the city administration (olive nodes) or politicians (dark blue), the IBA GmbH (black), architecture (pink), and from different science-organizations, mainly the University of Heidelberg (light blue) as well as two people from the cultural sector (green). Ordinary individual citizens, representatives of the economy (white), and especially civil society actors (medium blue and grey) are in most cases only loosely connected to the central network and are therefore placed at the periphery. This becomes even more obvious when the intensity of contacts is taken into account. With a threshold of meeting at least once a week, we



Fig. 6.7 Network of actors in the early IBA stage

find the so-called cliques with single-sector actors from science, architecture, and the administration, as well as overarching actor-cliques from administration and IBA GmbH, from administration, IBA GmbH and city politics, and from architecture and the cultural sector.

What becomes apparent is that mainly professionals that are linked to the IBA through their occupations are involved in the inner steering network. Existing power relations along traditional hierarchical lines are therefore perpetuated, and new forms of inclusive governance and partnership have not yet developed. Neither civil society (e.g. foundations or citizen groups) nor the economy is well included. Lacking until now are especially enthusiastic or even charismatic central figures that would be able to broaden the basis of IBA activists and guarantee the sustainability of the connections between different societal groups that have undoubtedly been established by the IBA. Interpreting these power relations also sheds some light on class figurations in the knowledge society: While in the industrial age the bourgeoisie earned their income and status from industry and corporate companies, the recent Heidelberg bourgeoisie is mostly dependent on the state (as civil servants) and spin-offs from the academic field. They basically form the so-called creative class—with little social heterogeneity or diversity. It is a rather broad, stable, and saturated academic class majority with an allocation of power already for decades that is ruling and governing the city. Since the majority of population is living very well from that there is only little urge for change—and thus very little opportunities for outsiders or non-members of that class. As the network analysis illustrates, Heidelberg is an almost exclusive place for a saturated middle class majority where entrance for others is extremely restricted.

Conclusion

> I break ranks and I am a dancer and I am a singer and I am an all-around artist; I write, I paint, I take pictures, I blossom from all pores. I am an old warrior but I do not fight for any army of this world. I fight for the inexpressible.

This quote from Ombo, one homeless male adult (age is hard to guess) in Heidelberg, whom we interviewed one afternoon in 2009, describes the life-worlds of the *other* people, the *non-creatives*, being excluded from the trope of the knowledge society. Or are they the ones being

creative? He describes himself as a writer. He cannot rely on the social network of the creative milieu, of course, that is generally regarded as important for knowledge generating processes. Being a writer (as he says), he is not part of the "UNESCO Creative City of Literature" that Heidelberg is so proud of. Due to the narrow, rather instrumental definition of knowledge in current society, Ombo's poetry is not valorized, it is not regarded as "valuable knowledge", and it certainly does not count for creative city-making.

As we show in this chapter, knowledge is the central reference to deconstruct the overall growth story of creative cities. On the one hand, it fosters growth from which—especially in the knowledge society—many people profit considerably. On the other hand, it increases inequality in cities by exacerbating polarization and marginalization. In the "phantasm" of the knowledge society, education-afar households—as they are called in official German language—experience increasing disconnection from the growth path. They are, via house prices, studentification, and knowledge-oriented development displaced from the knowledge city, especially the most affluent city neighborhoods. Police increasingly control the public central squares to keep them "flourishing" for tourists and creative workers, they remove benches to dismount sleeping opportunities.[10]

Heidelberg, Germany, was a very useful case study to analyze the ambivalent relation between knowledge and urban growth due to its long history as a university town where the significance of valorized academic knowledge is very high. Being a "knowledge pearl" is even commodified as a global tourist attraction that fascinates tourists from all over the world (e.g. the famous Philosophers' Walk). Furthermore, it is a city with remarkable studentification processes that—especially in the course of the knowledge turn in urban politics—influences the urban live-world of the city already for decades and thus perpetuates an even higher urban inequality.

From a comparative perspective—which this book is all about—it might surprise some that an affluent city like Heidelberg, in which ethnic conflicts and severe impoverishment play a minor role compared to large cities especially in North America, experiences such steady inequalities. The meaning of being deprived, however, varies strongly between the researched countries. In Germany, the strong rhetoric of knowledge-induced growth for the benefit of all gains an increasingly

[10] This has been one of the most pressing issues of a homeless gathering in a shelter, interviewed during field-work in Heidelberg.

bitter tone when education and knowledge as the number one entrance fees are not accessible for all. And while education as a seemingly achieved trait legitimizes this inequality, it is—as the case study has shown—strongly inherited in social class, educational and ethnic background of the family as well as one's location within the city. Ascribed traits are therefore still influential for social inequalities, though this relation is masked behind a pretended equality of chance. With the early segmentation of pupils in the German education system, these differences are implemented at a very early stage, producing steady inequalities that are even enforced through the knowledge turn. And educational opportunities are inscribed in the urban fabric along these social inequalities. Although the mayor of Heidelberg has now officially launched an initiative for affordable housing (Stadt Heidelberg n.d.), it is still unclear whether this is little more than a rhetorical manoeuver. Especially in the new "science quarter" Bahnstadt rents are well above the city's average—and they continue to rise. Residents whose rents are paid by government subsidies ("Hartz IV") are therefore prohibited by law to move there.

Overall, we observe that the so-called diversity of the creative city and the tolerance of the creative class[11] are rather limited, and thus contrary to Lefebvre's understanding of a heterogeneous urban condition with regard to lived space and practices. This limitation is also mirrored in creative city-strategies' narrow understanding of education and knowledge, thereby (re-)producing old and new inequalities, which are nevertheless masked behind an "equal opportunities" argument.

Thus, in going creative, also well-off cities experience increasing inequalities. Classic segregation patterns may be fading; new criteria, though, most prominently education, produce new patterns that only at their very surface are less contested than race, class, or also gender. Even more, they are highly intertwined with these criteria: While in industrial societies the clearly defined working class was impoverished and discriminated in the social hierarchy, in the so-called knowledge society those thresholds are not that clear: Deprived inhabitants are highly over-represented among immigrant people. However, those migrants involved with university (professors, guest lecturers, international students) well belong to the creative academic class. Children in households without high-school or college degrees hardly ever gain

[11] Florida (2002: 79) admits himself that "while the creative class favors openness and diversity, to some degree it is a diversity of elites, limited to highly educated, creative people".

the same chances to climb up the social ladder since school success is highly dependent on the educational level of the parents. The situation gets even worse when those households do not speak German fluently. Single mothers with children count as the poorest households in many German cities, again affected by a school system that counts on the intensive support of parents. Last but not least, the booming real estate market especially in knowledge pearl cities such as Heidelberg prevents social as well as spatial mobility because it is highly segmented and over-priced.

In this respect the focus on the creative city, and the knowledge society more generally, does not hold its promise of increasingly egalitarian opportunities, but gives legitimacy to the perpetuation of former inequalities. The creative and ecologically sustainable city with splendid cultural facilities of international reputation is again dominated by white middle-class men and, increasingly, women (see also Chap. 4). These inequalities are concentrated away from the co-location of creative jobs, good schools, and high-rent-areas. And the respective city quarters are further developed due to creative city policies that try to make these areas even more attractive for the well-established creative class (while spending on social projects for the less privileged and for socio-cultural projects is cut).[12] In this way creative city strategies once again contribute to the cementation of social inequalities, may it be deliberately by following a neoliberal credo, may it be unconsciously by overemphasizing the importance of the cultural and creative industries for their own sake.

Bibliography

Abel, Jaison R., and Richard Deitz. 2012. Do colleges and universities increase their region's human capital? *Journal of Economic Geography* 12(3): 667–691.

Amin, Ash, and Nigel Thrift. 2007. Cultural-economy and cities. *Progress in Human Geography* 31(2): 143–161.

Anheier, Helmut K., Yudhishthir R. Isar, and Michael Hoelscher (ed). 2012. *Cities, Cultural Policy and Governance*, *Cultures and Globalization Series*. London: SAGE.

[12] Some figures: Overall basic institutional funding for socio-cultural centers in Germany decreased between 2011 and 2013 from 51.8 to 45.3 million euros; and public funding per visitor is 6.54 euros for socio-cultural centers, but 109.54 euros for the more high-brow public theatres (Bundesvereinigung Soziokultureller Zentren 2013).

Atkinson, Rowland, and Hazel Easthope. 2009. The consequences of the creative class: the pursuit of creativity strategies in Australia's cities. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 33(1): 64–79.

Bathelt, Harald, Anders Malmberg, and Peter Maskell. 2004. Clusters and knowledge: local buzz, global pipelines and the process of knowledge creation. *Progress in Human Geography* 28(1): 31–56.

Becker, Gary S. 1975. *Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education*, 2nd edn. New York: Columbia University Press.

Becker, Rolf, and Andreas Hadjar. 2009. *Expected and Unexpected Consequences of the Educational Expansion in Europe and the US. Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Findings in Comparative Perspective*. Bern: Haupt.

Beerkens, Eric. 2008. University policies for the knowledge society: global standardization, local reinvention. *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology* 7(1): 15–36.

Bell, Daniel. 1973. *The Coming of Post-industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting*. New York: Basic Books.

Benneworth, Paul, et al. 2011. The 'science city' as a system coupler in fragmented strategic urban environments? *Built Environment* 37(3): 317–335.

Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann. 1966. *The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.

Böhme, Gernot, and Nico Stehr (ed). 1986. *The Knowledge Society: The Growing Impact of Scientific Knowledge on Social Relations*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Bontje, Marco, and Sako Musterd. 2009. Creative industries, creative class and competitiveness: expert opinions critically appraised. *Geoforum* 40(5): 843–852.

Boudon, Raymond. 1974. *Education, Opportunity, and Social Inequality: Changing Prospects in Western Society*. New York: Wiley.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1979. *La distinction. Critique sociale du jugement*. Paris: Les Ed. de Minuit.

Bourdieu, Pierre, and Jean-Claude Passeron. 1964. *Les héritiers : les étudiants et la culture*. Paris: Les Ed. de Minuit.

Brenner, Neil (ed). 2013. *Implosions/Explosions: Towards a Study of Planetary Urbanization*. Berlin: Jovis.

Brenner, Neil, and Christian Schmid. 2015. Towards a new epistemology of the urban? *CITY* 19(2/3): 51–182.

Bröckling, Ulrich. 2016. *The Entrepreneurial Self*. London: SAGE.

Brown, Phillip. 2001. Skill formation in the twenty-first century. In *High Skills. Globalization, Competitiveness, and Skill-Formation*, ed. Phillip Brown, Andy Green, and Hugh Lauder, 1–55. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bumiller, Daniel. 2015. *Urbane Ungleichheiten. Eine kleinräumige Sozialraumanalyse am Beispiel Heidelberg-Bergheim*. Unpublished thesis.

Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung (BBSR). 2011. *Die Zukunft internationaler Bauausstellungen: Internationale Fallstudien und ein*

Monitoringkonzept. Berlin: Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung. Available from http://www.bbsr.bund.de/BBSR/DE/Veroeffentlichungen/BMVBS/WP/2011/heft74_DL.pdf;jsessionid=51C282C11D2CD102666C7FE08A281310.live2051?__blob=publicationFile&v=2.

Bundesvereinigung Soziokultureller Zentren e.V. 2013. *Soziokulturelle Zentren in Zahlen*. Berlin. Available from http://www.soziokultur.de/bsz/sites/default/files/file/flipviewer/Statistik2013_WEB/Statistik2013_opf_files/pdfs/Statistik2013__.pdf.

Castells, Manuel. 1977. *The Urban Question*. London: Edward Arnold.

———. 1989. *The Informational City: Information Technology, Economic Restructuring, and the Urban-Regional Process*. Oxford: Blackwell.

———. 2000. *The Rise of the Network Society*, 2nd edn. Malden: Blackwell.

Charles, David. 2011. The role of universities in building knowledge cities in Australia. *Built Environment* 37(3): 281–298.

Chatterton, Paul. 1999. University students and city centres—the formation of exclusive geographies, the case of Bristol, UK. *Geoforum* 30(2): 117–133.

D'Este, Pablo, Frederick Guy, and Simona Iammarino. 2013. Shaping the formation of university-industry research collaborations: what type of proximity does really matter? *Journal of Economic Geography* 13(4): 537–558.

Delanty, Gerard. 2001. *Challenging Knowledge: The University in the Knowledge Society*. London: Open University Press.

Dore, Ronald. 1976. *The Diploma Disease: Education, Qualification and Development*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

———. 1997. Reflections on the diploma disease twenty years later. *Assessment in Education: Principles, Policy & Practice* 4(1): 189–207.

Duru-Bellat, Marie, and Bruno Suchaut. 2005. Organisation and context, efficiency and equity of educational systems: what PISA tells us. *European Educational Research Journal* 4(3): 181–194.

Eurostat. n.d.. R & D personnel. Available from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/R_%26_D_personnel.

Faggio, Giulia, et al. 2007. The evolution of inequality in productivity and wages: panel data evidence. *CEP Discussion Paper 821*.

Florida, Richard. 2002. *The Rise of the Creative Class. And How It's Transforming Work, Leisure, Communitiy and Everyday Life*. New York: Basic Books.

———. 2005. *Cities and the Creative Class*. New York: Routledge.

Frank, Robert, and Philip J. Cook. 1996. *The Winner-Take-All Society: Why the Few at the Top Get So Much More Than the Rest of Us*. New York: Penguin Books.

Freytag, Tim. 2010. Being a tourist in Heidelberg: exploring visitor activities and spatial mobility in the city. *Rivista Geografica Italiana* 117(2): 379–389.

Friedmann, John. 1986. The world city hypothesis. *Development and Change* 17: 69–83.

Gabe, Todd, Jaison Abel, Adrienne Ross, and Kevin Stolarick. 2012. "Knowledge in cities." *Urban Studies* 46 (6):1179-1200.

Gerhard, Ulrike, and Editha Marquardt. 2015. The Greener, the happier? Urban sustainability in the knowledge city: Policies, programs and practices in the German context. In *The Politics of Urban and Regional Sustainability. Appraising the Concept and Process*, ed. David Wilson, 65–86. Champaign, IL: Common Grounds Publishing.

Glückler, Johannes, Martina Ries, and Heiko Schmid. 2010. *Kreative Ökonomie in Heidelberg. Perspektiven schöpferischer Arbeit in der Stadt Heidelberg.*

Graham, Brian. 2002. Heritage as knowledge: Capital or culture? *Urban Studies* 39(5/6): 1003–1017.

Gramsci, Antonio. 1992–2007. In *Prison notebooks*, ed. Joseph A. Buttigieg, and Antonio Callari. New York: Columbia University Press.

Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. 2000. *Empire*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

———. 2004. *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*. New York: Penguin Press.

Hoelscher, Michael. 2012a. Creativity and innovation. In *Encyclopedia of Global Studies*, ed. Helmut K. Anheier, and Mark Juergensmeyer, 306–310. London: SAGE.

———. 2012b. Universities and higher learning. In *Encyclopedia of Global Studies*, ed. Helmut K. Anheier, and Mark Juergensmeyer, 1713–1718. London: SAGE.

———. 2012c. Indicator suites—describing and comparing culture in cities globally. In *Cities, Cultural Policy and Governance*, ed. Helmut K. Anheier, Yudhishthir R. Isar, and Michael Hoelscher, 353–442. London: SAGE.

Hoelscher, Michael, Georg Mildenberger, Andreas Putlitz, Annika Müller, and Michael Weiler. 2014. *Das Netzwerk der Internationalen Bauausstellung Heidelberg. Bericht der Pilotstudie*. Heidelberg: Centrum für Soziale Innovationen der Universität Heidelberg (unpublished report to the city of Heidelberg).

Howells, Jeremy R.L. 2002. Tacit knowledge, innovation and economic geography. *Urban Studies* 39(5/6): 871–884.

Hristova, Svetlana, Milena Dragicevic Sesic, and Nancy Duxbury (ed). 2015. *Culture and Sustainability in European Cities. Imagining Europolis*. London: Routledge.

Immoscout. 2016. Available from http://www.immobilienscout24.de/immobilienbewertung/ratgeber/mietpreise-und-kaufpreise/wohnkostenanteil-grossstaedte.html

Isar, Yudhishthir R. 2012. "Heritage." In *The Encyclopedia of Global Studies*, edited by Helmut K. Anheier and Mark Juergensmeyer. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

Jackson, Philip W. 1968. *Life in Classrooms*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Knight, Richard V. 1995. Knowledge-based development: policy and planning implications for cities. *Urban Studies* 32(2): 225–260.

Kunzmann, Klaus. 2004. Wissensstädte: Neue Aufgaben für die Stadtpolitik. In *Stadtregion und Wissen. Analysen und Plädoyers für eine wissensbasierte Stadtpolitik*, ed. Ulf Matthiessen. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

———. 2009. Planning and new labour: a view from abroad. *Planning Practice & Research* 24(1): 139–144.

Landry, Charles. 2000. *The Creative City : A Toolkit for Urban Innovators*. London: Earthscan.

Lange, Bastian, and Hans-Jochaim Bürkner. 2010. Wertschöpfung in der Kreativwirtschaft. Der Fall der elektronischen Klubmusik. *Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsgeographie* 54(1): 46–68.

Lee, Neil, and Andrés Rodríguez-Pose. 2013. Innovation and spatial inequality in Europe and USA. *Journal of Economic Geography* 13(1): 1–22.

Lefebvre, Henri. 1974. *The Production of Space*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Lever, William F. 2002. Correlating the knowledge-base of cities with economic growth. *Urban Studies* 39(5/6): 859–870.

Maiolo, John R., and Jeffrey Johnson. 1992. Determining and utilizing communication networks in marine fisheries: a management tool. *Proceedings of the Gulf and Caribbean Fisheries Institute* 41: 274–296.

Matthiesen, Ulf (ed). 2004. *Stadtregion und Wissen : Analysen und Plädoyers für eine wissensbasierte Stadtpolitik*. Wiesbaden: VS Verl. für Sozialwiss.

Mayer, Heike. 2008. Segmentation and segregation patterns of women-owned high-tech firms in four metropolitan regions in the United States. *Regional Studies* 42(10): 1357–1383.

Merrifield, Andy. 2013. *The Politics of Encounter: Urban Theory and Protest Under Planetary Urbanization*. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.

Merton, Robert K. 1968. The Matthew effect in science. *Science* 159(3810): 56–63.

Meusburger, Peter. 1997. Grundstrukturen und Leitmotive der Stadtgeographie von Heidelberg. In *Heidelberg—Stadt und Universität*, ed. Universität Heidelberg, Heidelberg, 115–155.

———. 2013. Relations between knowledge and economic development: some methodological considerations. In *Knowledge and the Economy. Knowledge and Space* 5, ed. by Peter Meusburger, Johannes Glückler and Martina el Meskioui, 15-42. Dordrecht: Springer.

Mossig, Ivo. 2011. Regional employment growth in the cultural and creative industries in Germany 2003-2008. *European Planning Studies* 19(6): 957.

Navarro, Clemente J., and Terry N. Clark. 2012. Cultural policy in European cities. *European Societies* 14(5): 636–659.

Németh, Balàzs. 2010. The accelerating roles of higher education in regions through the European Lifelong Learning Initiative. *European Journal of Education* 45(3): 451–465.

Nijkamp, Peter. 2011. *Innovation, Growth and Competitiveness : Dynamic Regions in the Knowledge-Based World Economy*. Berlin: Springer.

Oakley, Kate. 2012. Rich but divided... the politics of cultural policy in London. In *Cities, Cultural Policy and Governance*, ed. Helmut K. Anheier, Yudhishthir R. Isar, and Michael Hoelscher, 204–211. London: SAGE.

OECD. 2008. *Tertiary Education for the Knowledge Society*. Available from http://www.oecd.org/education/skills-beyond-school/tertiaryeducationfortheknowledgesocietyvolume1specialfeaturesgovernancefundingquality-volume2specialfeaturesequityinnovationlabourmarketinternationalisation.htm

Parsons, Talcott, Edward A. Shils, and Edward C. Tolman (ed). 1959. *Toward a General Theory of Action*, 4 edn. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Peck, Jamie. 2005. Struggling with the creative class. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 29(7): 740–770.

Polanyi, Michael. 1966. *The Tacit Dimension*. London: Routledge.

Ponzini, Davide, and Ugo Rossi. 2010. Becoming a creative city: the entrepreneurial mayor, network politics and the promise of an urban renaissance. *Urban Studies* 47(5): 1037–1057.

Powell, Walter W., and Kaisa Snellman. 2004. The knowledge economy. *Annual Review of Sociology* 30: 199–220.

Roy, Ananya. 2015. What is urban about critical urban theory. *Lecture Delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Association of Geographers, Chicago*.

Sage, Joanna, Darren Smith, and Phil Hubbard. 2012. The diverse geographies of studentification: living alongside people not like us. *Housing Studies* 27(8): 1057–1078.

Sassen, Saskia. 1991. *The Global City. New York, London, Tokyo*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Smith, Darren. 2004. 'Studentification': the gentrification factory? In *The New Urban Colonialism: Gentrification in a Global Context*, ed. R. Atkinson, and G. Bridge, 72–89. London: Routledge.

———. 2008. The politics of studentification and '(un)balanced' urban populations: Lessons for gentrification and sustainable communities? *Urban Studies* 45(12): 2541–2564.

Smith, Darren, and Phil Hubbard. 2014. The segregation of educated youth and dynamic geographies of studentification. *Area* 46(1): 92–100.

Sörlin, Sverker, and Hebe Vessuri (ed). 2007. *Knowledge Society vs. Knowledge Economy: Knowledge, Power, and Politics*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Stadt Heidelberg. 2009. *Heidelberger Migrantenstudie 2008. Schriften zur Stadtentwicklung*. Heidelberg: Amt für Stadtentwicklung und Statistik Available from http://www.heidelberg.de/site/Heidelberg_ROOT/get/documents_

E468669412/heidelberg/PB5Documents/pdf/12_pdf_HeidelbergerMigrantenstudie_2008.pdf.

———. 2011. *Bericht zur Sozialen Lage in Heidelberg*. Heidelberg: Amt für Stadtentwicklung und Statistik Available from http://www.heidelberg.de.

———. 2012. *Memorandum: Perspektiven der Europäischen Stadt in der Wissensgesellschaft. Internationale Bauausstellung Heidelberg*. Available from http://www.heidelberg.de/site/Heidelberg_ROOT/get/documents/heidelberg/PB5Documents/pdf/61_pdf_IBA_Wissenschafftstadt_Memorandum.pdf

———. 2013a. *Mietspiegel 2013. Heidelberg: Amt für Stadtentwicklung und Statistik*. Available from http://www.heidelberg.de/hd,Lde/HD/Leben/Mietspiegel.html.

———. 2013b. *Wohnraumbedarfsanalyse Heidelberg 2030. Schriften zur Stadtentwicklung*. Heidelberg: Amt für Stadtentwicklung und Statistik Retrieved 28 May 2015 from http://www.heidelberg.de/site/Heidelberg_ROOT/get/documents_E-999837103/heidelberg/Objektdatenbank/12/PDF/12_pdf_WohnraumbedarfsanalyseHD2030.pdf.

———. 2014. *Bevölkerung 2014. Entwicklung und räumliche Verteilung der Einwohner im Stadtgebiet* (Statistische Kurzmitteilungen). Heidelberg: Amt für Stadtentwicklung und Statistik. Available from http://www.heidelberg.de.

———. 2015. Heidelberger Nachhaltigkeitsbericht 2014. Schriften zur Stadtentwicklung. Available from http://www.heidelberg.de/site/Heidelberg_ROOT/get/documents_E-1463535727/heidelberg/Objektdatenbank/12/PDF/12_pdf_Nachhaltigkeitsbericht%202014.pdf

———. no year. *OB Würzner initiiert Bündnis für Wohnen*. Available from http://www.heidelberg.de/hd,Lde/HD/Leben/OB+Wuerzner+initiiert+Buendnis+fuer+Wohnen.html.

———. 2016. Heidelberg-Studie 2015. Leben und Mediennutzung. Heidelberg: Amt für Stadtentwicklung und Statistik.

Stehr, Nico. 2001. *Wissen und Wirtschaften: die gesellschaftlichen Grundlagen der modernen Ökonomie*. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main.

Steinmüller, Bastian. 2015. *Studentische Urbanität. Art und Auswirkungen der Prägung urbanen Raumes durch Studierende—Eine vergleichende Fallstudie in den Universitätsstädten Heidelberg und Montpellier*. Unpublished Masterthesis, University of Heidelberg.

Storper, Michael, and Anthony J. Venables. 2004. Buzz: face-to-face contact and the urban economy. *Journal of Economic Geography* 4: 351–370.

Taylor, Peter J. 2005. Leading world cities: empirical evaluations of urban nodes in multiple networks. *Urban Studies* 42(9): 1593–1608.

UN Habitat. 2008. *State of the World's Cities 2010/2011. Bridging the Urban Divide*. London: Earthscan.

UNESCO. 2005. *Towards Knowledge Societies*. Paris: UNESCO Publishing.

Van Reenen, John. 1996. The creation and capture of rents: wages and innovation in a panel of U.K. companies. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 111: 195–226.

Van Winden, Willem. 2010. Knowledge and the European city. *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 110(1): 101–106.

Van Winden, Willem, Leo van den Berg, and Peter Pol. 2007. European cities in the knowledge economy: towards a typology. *Urban Studies* 44(3): 525–549.

Weber, Luc E., and James J Duderstadt. 2006. Universities and Business: Partnering for the Knowledge Society. London: Economica.

Wilke, Helmut. 1998. Organisierte Wissensarbeit. *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 27(3): 161–177.

World Bank. 2002. *Constructing Knowledge Societies: New Challenges for Tertiary Education*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

CHAPTER 7

"Creative Urbanism" in the French South: Constructing the (Unequal) Creative City in Montpellier

David Giband

In Europe and North America, the "creative city" has become a dominant figure of the contemporary restructuring of the capitalistic urban order. Creativity is the watchword for today's urban policies as well as a rhetorical instrument in the reshaping of urban social spaces (Boudreau et al. 2009). Recently, the European Union has propagated an approach that emphasizes the role that creativity plays in fostering economic competitiveness (Bodirisky 2012).[1] This vision of creativity, as a booster for competitiveness, is followed by specific social representations in public policies (such as social mix, cultural diversity) that conform to neoliberal values and priorities. In France, the diffusion of such "creative" social norms meets with major restructurings of urban and social policies devoted to

[1] Council of Europe and CEC 2008.

D. Giband (✉)
Department for Actors, Resources and Territories in Development, Université Perpignan, Perpignan, France

U. Gerhard et al. (eds.), *Inequalities in Creative Cities*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95115-4_7

poor neighborhoods and social housing and with state rescaling (Le Galès and Vézinat 2015) that threatens current social order.

Montpellier, a southern French city, is a significant example of an early adaptation strategy of urban agendas to neo-liberal incentives and to capitalist flexibility in the production of creative urban spaces. Involved since the 1970s in a creative city project, Montpellier reveals recent changes in "creative entrepreneurial urbanism" and how this type of urbanism now uses "new" social norms, conforming to neo-liberal goals and values, to legitimatize the production of social inequalities. These "new" social norms, such as "social mix", "sustainability", and "cultural diversity", compatible with the creative city imaginary, are not only alibis for the local acceptance of social restructurings (like gentrification). They are also a critical component and instrument of a broader process of the privatization of urban space. This process depends on a cognitive-cultural capitalism (Scott 2014), a pro-growth coalition associating national, local, public, and private actors. It also relies on the implementation of a performative urbanism which reverses social values used in the transformation of poor neighborhoods.

This chapter proposes, on the one hand, to contextualize the unequal dimension of the creative city process in Montpellier in its historical and ideological perspective under the auspice of a "political imaginary". This term refers to a complex matrix made of an entrepreneurial urbanism, collaborative urban planning, social divide, and an electoral strategy under the auspices of a local cognitive-cultural capitalism. On the other hand, it aims to understand how today urban strategies and transformations along new tramway lines and the urbanization of new neighborhoods devoted to knowledge workers and creative classes are institutionalized types of urban fragmentation, reinforcing existing social inequalities and creating new ones. We will then discuss how these ambiguous modes of iterative urbanization reinforce social and ethnic boundaries and enhance social exclusion in ways that are far from the inclusive social mix discourses of creative city promoters and despite citizens growing protests.

Going Creative: Creative City as a Performative Entrepreneurial Urbanism

Over the last two decades, French cities have faced major changes following both neoliberal restructuring and public incentives to adopt entrepreneurial agendas. Among these strategies, creative city policy plays a central role. Since the early 2000s, the French state has propagated an approach

to urban creativity that pulls together support for cultural and knowledge industries with social mix strategies used in urban policies, drawing the picture of an intercultural and social balanced creative city model. These changes are part of a broader neo-liberal restructuring and rescaling of French urban governance (Brenner, Neil and Theodore, N., 2002; Le Galès and Vézinat 2015) in which, under decentralization processes, French cities moved from local government to local governance and from managerial urbanism to entrepreneurial urbanism.

Neoliberal Injunctions and Local Incentives

These expectations take place in a nexus of political and institutional reforms. Since 1980, an unfinished process of decentralization has changed the political condition of urban planning and development. The switch from a traditionally centralized and bureaucratic urbanism, controlled by the national state, to a more local and decentralized way of governance, giving more power to local authorities, has followed a shift from a Keynesian urban economic regulation to an unregulated one. On this neoliberal path, cities and metropolitan authorities gained power and opened urbanism to public/private partnerships. This shift to an entrepreneurial urbanism not only results from national injunctions for cities to be creative and attractive. It has also to be understood—as Hackworth (2006) noted—as an institutionally regulated disciplining strategy in which urban localities must fit with global and national creative incentives and goals. Devolution of powers to local authorities has nurtured the privatization of urban public services (water supply, public transportation network lines, etc.), and local public/private partnerships in many fields (higher education, research, culture, city planning, environment, energy supply, etc.). The transformation of the urban economy and the political environment answered to national injunctions for cities to be more attractive and more global. Among the experimental strategies, the "creative city strategy" monopolized urban agendas nationwide (Vivant 2009). Such a strategy strongly relies on the implementation of an urban economy based on the knowledge and creativity sectors. Following international trends, it favors the interdependent development of higher education, public and private research, arts and crafts sectors, and new sustainable technologies (Vivant 2009). Since 2000, many national incentives have succeeded one and another, each encouraging local authorities to fit with creative city and new urban labels: *smart city, knowledge city, Ecocity,*

creative city, and so on. In the context of decentralization, national incentives promote the development of a locally based knowledge capitalism (universities, high tech companies, arts and crafts firms), able to foster creative growth and to embrace policies favoring the beautification of historic downtowns, social mix, sustainability, and urban smart technologies. French cities' creative turn takes a similar path to other European countries. Following a pro-growth strategy, urban planning focuses on the aestheticization of urban spaces and the implementation of large cultural amenities in order to ease the settlement of the creative classes and knowledge workers. The subordination of creativity to the primacy of competitiveness is linked to local authorities' narrow vision of creativity as a knowledge-based economy. The recent and rapid rise in the adoption of creative urban agendas (in Lyons, Saint Etienne, Paris, Lille, Montpellier, Bordeaux, etc.) has been subject to academic criticisms (Hollard and Saez 2012). As Peck (2005) suggests, such urban agendas have spread not because of their efficiency but mostly because "they can be mapped onto existing strategies and because they conform" to pro-growth strategies (Peck 2005, 766). They do not change power structures and "they accessorize neoliberal urbanism in a manner befitting cultural tropes of competitive cosmopolitanism" (Boren and Young 2013, 1801).

The Creative City and the Making of Social Norms

Our main hypothesis is that in this entrepreneurial shift in urban policies, social and inequality issues are not only de-prioritized as a consequence of neo-liberal urban agendas but are a strategic part of an ideological construction of the creative city. Besides spatial and architectural ideological idioms (promoting knowledge workers, crafts industries, fancy urban spaces), social issues—such as social and cultural mixing—are a strategic component of the ideological construction of the creative city. In the creative city, social mix is a key discourse hiding policies that exclude the poor and the working classes. Indeed, the creative turn deeply relies in France on the alibi of social mix and cosmopolitan values easing social acceptance of the creative city and promotes representations of "still socially friendly" urban policies (Giband 2011). As the keystone of nearly all public urban policies, social mixing is replaced under the auspices of a racially neutralized diversity. Neoliberal restructuring promotes cosmopolitan values and images of creativity and cultural diversity regardless of the racial composition of the French urban society, which is already culturally

diverse (Wacquant 2006). Beyond virtuous policies aiming to promote more livable and socially mixed cities, a process of sociospatial exclusion occurs. This strategy is part of a vast dismantling of disadvantaged neighborhoods, both in downtown and in the "banlieue" according to real estate and policing goals (Deboulet and Lelevrier 2014). In city centers the objective is to make room for upper and creative classes according to urban renewal programs focusing on the redevelopment of historic neighborhoods. The creative turn is also coincidental with neoliberal attacks on social housing and peripheral poor neighborhoods (Epstein 2010). In many cities, creative classes and knowledge workers are targeted as the main clientele for downtown renewal operations but also in former social housing neighborhoods at the periphery of French cities, now demolished. It leads to the displacement of poor households and lower classes. In this ideological construction of the creative city as a "social mix" model, attention has to be drawn to "the importance of discourses, imaginations, narrative and representations in the performance of entrepreneurial urbanism" (Ward 2003, 117). The social mix argument is thus used in order to ease the settlement of the creative classes and knowledge workers according to the representations of a neoliberal cultural diversity that eludes the cultural reality of French urban society.

Montpellier "the Gifted"[2], Archetype of the Unequal Creative City

(Auto-) celebrated as the most creative French city, Montpellier occupies a specific place in the landscape of creative cities in Europe. This medium sized southern French city can be depicted as a Sunbelt city in which growth has been mainly fueled since the 1970s by domestic and European migrations and by the growth of knowledge industries (Volle et al. 2010). On the European creative scene, Montpellier is of particular interest. The early shift to entrepreneurial urban strategies—following a creative city agenda—dates from the late 1970s and illustrates the importance of a local form of cognitive-cultural capitalism in the making of the creative city and in the deepening of social inequalities (Giband 2016).

[2] Slogan first used in 1984 for an advertising campaign in the national newspaper *Le Monde*.

Creative City or Cognitive-Cultural Capitalism?

The creative city process relies here on an early political project that since the 1970s aims to attract knowledge workers and industries into a livable creative environment (Fig. 7.1). This strategy focuses on "new urban elites" whose representation in the city population has constantly grown with little attention paid to long-term residents facing social and economic difficulties (whom a significant part of them has an immigration background from North and West Africa). Whereas Montpellier shows itself as the most creative French city, the creative sector only counts for 2.1 percent of the active population (23 percent for the knowledge industry).

« Montpellier the gifted, cradle of the future ». City slogan in national newspaper Le Monde, 1985.

« The Sunny french Tech Attitude », Tramwayline 4.

« The sexiest tramway in Europe ! » in New York Times web edition, January 2nd, 2012.

Fig. 7.1 Creative city representations and imaginary, youth and tramway lines

As many creative cities, Montpellier is still far from meeting the economic and employment goals in the cultural sector and depicts the building of a creative landscape in a city dominated by knowledge economy and unemployment (14.3 percent in 2014 compared to 10.1 percent for the country). The apparent weakness of the creative industry has to be put in perspective with the existence of a larger sector of cognitive-cultural capitalist jobs (Scott 2014). The development of the creative city in Montpellier strongly depends on the growth of a version of cognitive-cultural capitalism (Scott 2014) supported by the French state (in a strategy of decentralizing research facilities) and municipal authorities. From 1980s to present, this local cognitive-cultural capitalism has benefited from decentralization of Parisian research and scientific facilities (public and private) and by an active cultural municipal policy welcoming performing arts companies, arts and crafts industries and building numerous cultural facilities. As Scott recently noticed "Creativity is an extraordinarily difficult word whose meaning is bedeviled by its presumed connection with exalted states of mind, and notably with the 'mysterious' workings of artistic and scientific genius (…) we are now entering a period marked by a distinctive third wave of urbanization based on cognitive-cultural capitalism" (2014, 4). In this new urban capitalist development, high-level cognitive and cultural skills are increasing. In the case of Montpellier, this development encompasses both private and public knowledge industries, the art and craft sectors (small companies), and the cultural industry itself (performing art and theatre companies, street art companies, etc.).

A Paradoxical City

The first city in the country for attracting knowledge workers, and ranked second for its growth rate (1.6 percent a year), Montpellier is also the sixth poorest city and the poorest among cities above 200,000 inhabitants. For the last 40 years, the population of the metropolitan area has multiplied three-fold, reaching 406,100 inhabitants in 2013. Behind the success story of a non-stop growing city there is a more complex pattern.

On the one hand, the demographic growth rate is 2.5 times higher than the average national metropolitan growth. This non-stop demographic growth has been fueled by migrations and the attractiveness of a Sunbelt city promoting quality of life and knowledge industries. Since 1965 and the establishment of an IBM plant, computer and science industries have grown, employing now about 34,000 people while the city consolidated

its position as a major European university and public research center. From the 1970s until the late 2000s, supported by state decisions and local incentives, private and public research institutions have settled in the city mainly in computer (IBM, Dell, Bull), pharmaceutical (Sanofi), and agro-food industries (Kraft Jacobs), as public research institutions were growing (CIRAD, CNRS, BRGM). Each year, 6000 newcomers settle in town; among them 3400 are executives, professionals, researchers, and university employees. With many academic institutions and research centers, the city's population includes about 100,000 students (29 percent of the city population[3]), offering the picture of a dynamic "youth city".

On the other hand, 25 percent of the city population lives under the poverty line and half of the households live with a yearly average income below 17,500 euros (Fig. 7.2). Growth favoring high skill professionals leaves few opportunities for unskilled workers in a region without a strong industrial base. Apart from Paris, Montpellier is the French city where the income gaps are greatest among the 10 percent richest and the 10 percent poorest. Geographical dispersal of incomes is higher than in other similar cities. Wealthiest households are concentrated in the peripheral neighborhoods and suburbs, mainly in the northern part of the city where new residential units have been built close to university and research facilities (*Aiguelongue, quartier Hôpitaux-facultés*) and along new tramway lines (*Richter, Odysseum*). Low-income households mainly live in some of the old and deprived downtown neighborhoods (*Ecusson, Pas de Loup*) and in large social housing projects in the west part of the city (*Mosson, Petit Bard*).

The tightened housing market is strongly segmented according to socio-economic patterns. About half of new housing units produced are aimed at new comers and can be divided in two categories. Condominiums in new neighborhoods (north part and along tramway lines) serve a wealthy population, while large numbers of suburban individual houses were built for the middle classes. With an average housing cost of 4000 euros per square meter,[4] housing is a major social issue and a vector of residential segregation in the city. In the last two decades, social housing and affordable housing production has collapsed due to private speculation and public choices, dramatically reducing residential choices for low-income households.

[3] It is 14 percent for cities with similar characteristics.

[4] The national average housing cost is about 2500 euros per square meter.



Fig. 7.2 Income inequalities in the city of Montpellier, 2012

Replacing the (Unequal) Creative City in Its Historical and Political Perspective

The creative city is part of a process starting in the 1960s with the development of computer industry and formalized in the late 1970s with the implementation of an entrepreneurial agenda and a pro-growth coalition targeting knowledge workers and creative classes. This process can be divided into three specific periods as below (Table 7.1):

Table 7.1 The three-stage creative city in Montpellier

	The pioneer city (1977–1983)	*The gifted city (1983–2009)*	*The unlimited metropolis (2009–…)*
References	Livable city Solidarity-based city	Knowledge economy	Global city Creative classes
Political imaginary	Knowledge city	Creative city Knowledge city Youth city	Smart city Creative city Ecocity
Place of culture	Network of neighborhoods cultural facilities Popular culture	Large cultural facilities International events Arts and crafts sector	Cultural technologies Street theatre Creative urban landscapes
Actors	Public actors Computer and science industries Public research	Local realtors Academics, knowledge workers Business executives	National realtors "New urban" Public/private partnerships
Capitalism	Cognitive-cultural capitalism		
Urban planning	Cohesive urbanism	Fragmented urbanism	Narrative urbanism
Electoral base	Low-income and new comers, left base electorate	New urban elites Nouvelle bourgeoisie ("bobo")	New urban elites Nouvelle bourgeoisie ("bobo")
Inequality developed	Traditional	Unequal access to housing Social inequalities	Tramway lines as a booster of social divide Unequal access to pre-school facilities and childcare facilities Gender and ethnic inequalities

From a Solidarity-Based to an Unequal Creative City

Under the auspices of mayor Georges Frêche (1977–2004), the city implemented a model of urban growth based on the development of a knowledge economy, a strong cultural policy, a collaborative planning with local and national real estate developers, and a sophisticated urbanism.

The creative city strategy was designed in 1977 when a newly elected left-wing coalition decided that a strong cultural policy would be the

keystone of a larger strategy of "territorial distinction" in the urban global competition (Négrier 1993). This assumption defined the first stage of a strategy of a creative city understood as a "livable and solidarity-based city". From 1977 to 1983 (Table 7.1), the city developed a neighborhood cultural policy focusing on the building of cultural facilities across the city following the national model of the "Maisons pour tous (cultural houses for all)": cultural centers opened to local and regional artistic creations.[5] This strategy sets a dense network of neighborhood cultural facilities conceived in a perspective of social cohesion and mixing.

The 1983 municipal election signaled a profound change in this cultural policy and a shift in the creative city process. The place of culture in the political municipal agenda grew and became a strategic tool for urban and economic growth as the political coalition broke down and new managerial classes became a strategic part of the left-wing coalition. Building of large cultural facilities (Opera-Comédie, Museum Fabre, School of fine arts, a convention center, a national center for dramatic arts) monopolized public attention and subsidies. The building of international cultural facilities, the multiplication of cultural events accompanied a change of scale in the urban governance. The cultural policy moved from the municipal political scene to the new metropolitan political arena. Favoring metropolitan governance, this scalar change enabled links between cultural policy and the metropolitan strategy while the local cognitive–cultural capitalism became a visible actor on the local scene and a stimulus into the pro-growth coalition (Négrier 1993). Participation of the private sector in cultural funding was growing to finance large cultural facilities, and culture was placed at the heart of Montpellier's communication strategy in order to attract and satisfy the new management and intellectual classes (Nay 1994).

Mayor Frêche organized a specific urban agenda (popularized as "Montpellier the gifted") based on the growth of a cognitive-cultural capitalism, a strong cultural policy, a collaborative planning with real estate developers, and a sophisticated urbanism. It relied on the setting of two different kinds of systems of references and public actions: a political imaginary of a non-stop creative city and a fragmented urbanization process.

[5] "Maisons pour tous" are multipurpose institutions offering cultural, social, sports, and leisure services to adjacent neighborhoods.

Entrepreneurial Rationality and "Creative Bossism"

The creative city relies on two embedded processes: a political imaginary and a narrative urbanism. These two processes are part of a double strategy consisting in fostering private investments (a pro-growth strategy) and a strategy of "proclamation" using modern communicative tools to promote images of a creative city. This strategy has been set with the election of mayor George Frêche in 1977. He called upon the private sector for specific investments in urban growth. He also used marketing techniques and a "new entrepreneurial rationality" in the urban planning process and developed a bossism type of urban governance. This bossism relies on a traditional political patronage and on a new entrepreneurial rationality (Ponzini and Rossi 2010). This specific type of bossism can be described as "creative bossism". Behind the irony suggested, this type of personalized governance can be understood as a "creative bossism" in the sense that its intentions and goals only focus the building of a "gifted city", a pioneer in the creative city process. Close ties with community associations authorized the political control of the electoral base and helped to ease social acceptance of entrepreneurial and social shifts. This creative bossism adds together two legitimacies: a political one and an entrepreneurial one.

The creative city narrative sells itself under the political imaginary of the "gifted city" catchword. It clearly presents the creative city as a "ville produit": a "product city".[6] Under this marketing strategy, the city of Montpellier is designed as a trademark ("the gifted city") that needs to be promoted, marketed, and sold. This strategy of commodification is presented as necessary for urban growth and to reach social goals such as reducing unemployment, encouraging economic growth, and modernizing cultural facilities. This marketing strategy fuels a political imaginary, representing the creative city as a malleable space essential to adapt to capital flexibility, and to respond to economic and cultural challenges. It involves the building of new neighborhoods and cultural facilities (Antigone neighborhood, Opéra-Comédie, Le Corum, Parc du Millénaire). Star-architects were entrusted with flagship operations, such as Ricardo Bofill for the new neighborhood of Antigone in 1983. A narrative urbanism has been set following a "creative city script" (Beck 2005) closely associating cultural, architectural, and urban creativity.[7] This script tells the story of a creative

[6] City as a product.

[7] "Montpellier, the city where architects never sleep".

city using urban transformations as strategic idioms to seduce newcomers (university lecturers, researchers, managers), to adapt itself to new capitalist conditions, while easing social acceptation by local residents based on the rhetoric of social integration and cultural mixing.

Over the last three decades, the idea of a creative city—both as a political imaginary and a narrative urbanism—has become a powerful toolkit from which politicians and policy makers have largely drawn in their attempts at reconciling a strategy of urban revitalization and economic growth with social acceptance of social shifts.

Making It Unequal: Creative Urbanism and Tramway Lines

The creative city planning process encompasses in Montpellier two large urban projects: the "neighborhood fabric" and the implementation of a tramway network. With implicit references to public consultation and local democracy, these projects set the scene for a fragmented urbanization. In this local entrepreneurial urbanism, these two projects are the keystone of a flexible mode of urban development, seen by private investors and city officials as the most efficient way to answer capital needs of urban flexibility and to build new spaces for knowledge and creative workers.

The Neighborhood Fabric Strategy: Land Control and Social Divide in a "Bobo City"

The neighborhood fabric strategy consists of urbanizing new peripheral neighborhoods in isolated sectors according to land opportunities and later to revitalize some strategic parts of downtown.

In this neighborhood fabric strategy, two neighborhoods located in the city center were recently designed as specific targets to attract newcomers and foster cultural activities: Nord-Écusson and Cité Gély. Nord-Écusson, part of the historic district, hosts an important population with an immigration background (North African, Turkish), living in poor housing conditions (slum and unhealthy housings). Cité Gély is a small social housing complex, mainly gipsy populated, at the edge of the city center (Fig. 7.2). These neighborhoods are part of a national urban renewal program. The purpose is to revitalize neglected neighborhoods and fight social exclusion. In both neighborhoods, discourses and rhetoric are used to mobilize an argument referring to social and cultural mixing, to the redesign of

public spaces and urban heritage. Behind these virtuous objectives, there is a neutralizing rhetoric that aims to introduce a specific form of social mixing. Indeed, whereas current national social mixing policies seek to introduce social housing and low income households into middle class neighborhoods, here the purpose is the opposite: to facilitate the residence of middle and upper classes in poor and deprived central neighborhoods and replace social housing by private investments. This diversion of current social mixing policies is presented as a virtuous goal, necessary to fight blight and slums and to revitalize public spaces and the historic heritage. A number of public actions accompany this urban renewal plan. The remodeling of many public spaces is an important element. It is the starting point for further public and private residential investments. It is also a strategic part of the new cultural and communication policy that tends to develop street theatre activities and art professions ("Opération des métiers d'arts"), concentrating arts and crafts activities in the historic district. The new residential production is provided by a public private partnership in Nord Écusson that promotes small housing units to house young professionals and students, and so forcing large families to move away. In Cité Gélys, demolition of blighted social housings precedes a program of housing mixing that reduces the share of social housing and introduces new private residential units for "new urbanites" in a former public housing complex.

Besides discourses and urban policies favoring social mixing, low-income households and families with an immigration background are socially and spatially relegated. Gipsy Roma groups from Cité Gély have been dispersed in peripheral neighborhoods while other residents of Nord Ecusson (mainly with an immigration background) were partly relocated in *La Paillade* and other social housing complexes. This socio-spatial relegation coincides with the implementation of public housing policies at two different scales. According to national urban renewal projects since 2003, low-income populations have been dispersed from public housing projects and neglected neighborhoods, thus leaving place for social reconfigurations. At the local scale, this national policy meets the goals and objectives of a creative city that aims to transform the heart of the city into a "bobo city",[8] understood as a mix of professionals, students, and people working in the arts and crafts sector.

[8] "Bourgeois Bohème" (Marchal and Stébe 2014; Brooks, 2001).

Such urban and housing policies have seriously distorted the meaning of social mixing policies and have generated tensions and contests. Many neighborhood groups contest the vast rebuilding of the city. They caricature promoters and city officials as "les saigneurs de la ville" (a joke with landlords and bleeders) and are reclaiming in some neighborhoods more social justice: "justice pour le Petit Bard" for instance.[9] Residents' associations and also the Green Party (environmentalists) strongly contest public policies favoring a cognitive-cultural capitalism which helps to turbocharge the gentrification process and exacerbate the exclusion of low-income families underwriting the takeover of downtown neighborhoods by new urban elites. As in big cities, the creative city process induces gentrification in downtown neighborhoods accompanied by steady displacement of original low-income populations. But unlike in such big cities, the process seems to be uncompleted in Montpellier. It has not yet produced real and clearly gentrified neighborhoods. Unlike other European cities confronted with such dynamics, here inner city residential areas are not fully dominated by creative classes. University lecturers, knowledge workers and art professionals are still characterized by dispersed residential strategies in peripheral new neighborhoods or suburbs. The settlement of new urban elites with some specific demographic profiles like young professional families, same sex households, etc., seems to be very marginal in these central revitalized neighborhoods. However, the rent gap is widening and accelerating patterns of socio-spatial segmentation at the micro level with pockets of poverty surrounded by non-contiguous gentrified areas according to public private residential investments.

Tramway Lines: Creativity and Inequalities on the Tracks

The quest for creative classes coincides with the production of new images in architecture and urban design (Fig. 7.2). In Montpellier the tramway lines play such a role (Hamman and Blanc 2010). These images reflect an urban creative ideology and also express the unequal character of urban patterns of development. The implementation of a tramway network basically answers two goals: to connect new urban sectors to downtown facilities and peripheral business, university, and research clusters, and to encourage the building of new neighborhoods. In the political discourse, the implementation of a new network of tramway lines in the

[9] http://mib34.com/

city is depicted under social goals. It is presented as a tool fostering urban mobility for students and disadvantaged households living in peripheral neighborhoods (mainly *La Paillade* at the end of line 3) and as a powerful symbol for social mixing, aiming to reconnect deprived neighborhoods to the rest of the city. But the implementation of the tramway networks is much more ambiguous.

The settlement of a network of tramway lines at the turn of the 2000s actually matches with a new communicative strategy picturing the image of a non-stop creative city, connecting new elite neighborhoods to downtown cultural facilities and peripheral economic and research clusters. The two first tramway lines were designed as marketing tools for creative and managerial classes. This "spectacular urban parade" promotes images of a creative city by connecting cultural facilities (Le Corum, Opéra-Comédie, Odysseum) and new neighborhoods (Port-Marianne, University city) using references to social mix goals and to objectives of social inclusion (tramway as a social connector) and local democracy (many fora have been organized during the planning phase of the tramway lines). Tramway lines bear powerful symbols of the creative city—postmodernity, social connection, artistic design, and technologies (slogan of a "sunny French tech attitude", Fig. 7.2)—and permit an understanding of the spatial production of social inequalities in Montpellier. Such a network, resulting from an iterative urbanism, produces segmented spaces with high communicative values according to a place branding strategy. Tramway lines are presented by the local political imaginary as an assurance of technical (sustainable electric tramway cars), cultural (streetcars have been designed by famous artists and a couturier), and social innovations (improving social cohesion and mixing). Streetcar design for lines 1 and 2 has been given to famous urban designers (Garouste and Bonetti), lines 3 and 4 to Christian Lacroix (French couturier) while line 1 tramway stations were dotted with works of modern art by contemporary international artists (Ludger Gerde, Alain Jacquet, Allan Mc Collum, Sharkis, Chen Zhen). Such artistic initiatives gained international attention; *The New York Times* recently designated it "the sexiest tramway in Europe" (see Fig. 7.2).

Behind the production of new images of the creative city built on social objectives, the development of tramway lines generates different kinds of inequalities. First, along the new tramway lines, the cultural and urban revitalization policies comprised a wide range of measures, artistic initiatives, cultural partnerships, and coalitions, but none of these have been linked to social cohesion and inclusion objectives of the urban renewal

plan. In the new urbanized sectors (like Richter, Pas de Loup), social objectives are limited to a vague promise of reserving a part of the new residential units to social housings. If the promises vary from 16 percent to 29 percent, real estate promoters rarely produce more than 9 percent. Most of the time, rents of these new social housing units are expensive, seriously deterring low-income families and dramatically reinforcing unequal access to the housing market. Students and employees of the universities and research institutions occupy a large part of this newly produced social housing. The tramway is also clearly associated with the increase in housing prices and real estate speculation. According to the local association of realtors, tramway lines increase house rents by 50 percent when connecting a new neighborhood. This rent gap is the first basis of Montpellier's social inequalities (Fig. 7.2). In existing neighborhoods, the coming of a tramway line precipitated a social shift with the rapid influx of artists, university lecturers, and students; in some neighborhoods such as Nord-Écusson or Louis Blanc rents have doubled. In this tight residential market, low-income families, especially those with an immigration background, are less likely to access an affordable housing in the newly connected neighborhoods to tramway. They are over-concentrated in neighborhoods poorly connected to the public transportation system, reinforcing the spatial mismatch between low-income residential areas and job locations. And even in *La Paillade*, the biggest social housing site of the city, at the end of tramway line 1, the connection to the tramway network coincided with a de-densification plan aiming to demolish old and unhealthy social housing complexes and now replaced by new mixed and sustainable neighborhoods for middle and upper class residents. Whereas it has been presented as a major goal accompanying the building of tramway lines, social mixing, and a larger access to urban mobility appear to be rhetorical palliatives rather than effective social policies.

Second, many neighborhoods, not or un-connected to tramway lines, are now concentrations of poverty and social exclusion, both in the city and in the suburbs. In the suburbs, Le Lunellois is an example of a low- and middle-income suburban community excluded from the tramway network where social difficulties are growing fast (unemployment, school failure and drop out, etc.). This kind of suburban neighborhood is now hosting a growing proportion of poor households displaced by new construction or by urban renewal programs. But, unlike previous programs launched in the 1980s or 1990s (relocating displaced households in a small number of neighborhood where social programs were initiated to accompany these

relocations), today displacements are more geographically dispersed in the city peripheries and in the first ring suburbs, lacking social programs to ease these removals. In 2014, the Green Party denounced the layout of tramlines 4 and 5 as particularly unfair, avoiding connecting working-class districts to the network and drawing a dual city: one smart, connected, creative, and visible, and the other one unconnected, "socially disabled," and taking the form of a more invisible part of the city, spatially dispersed, and socially weakened. The logics of "connection" also depend on a range of factors such as political and electoral motives (toward suburban municipalities with the Montpellier bossism system), and land opportunities.

Gender and Ethnic Inequalities

The establishment of an efficient public transportation network around tramway lines not only determines residential and job growth location but also seriously impacts on the location of pre-school and educational facilities. According to the deployment of the tramway network, a new geography of preschool and educational facilities has emerged favoring new neighborhoods. Whereas new neighborhoods built along tramway lines house about 25 percent of children under six, they account for 60 percent of kindergartens and preschool facilities. These inequalities have rapidly risen between low-income neighborhoods (50 percent of children under six and only 35 percent of preschool facilities and kindergartens) and newcomer locations. Single-families headed by women are the most disadvantaged in accessing such facilities that are a critical component of social well-being and access to work. Indeed, 11 percent of Montpellier families are single-female families, mainly residents of poor neighborhoods, for whom a regular, daily, and easy childcare arrangement is a necessary condition for keeping (or looking for) a job. Investigations in *La Paillade* have shown that women from North African and African origins headed a majority of such single-families. These kind of gender and ethnic inequalities existed in Montpellier prior to tramway lines, but they add together in a context in which they are maintained and exacerbated by creative city-led urban development policies (transportation, residential, and childcare local policies). Moreover, a distinction can be made in terms of the quality of childcare arrangements and educational programs delivered. In wealthy and connected neighborhoods, a large majority of kindergartens and childcare facilities offer pre-school programs and daily childcare arrangements with qualified employees. In contrast, in poor and

unconnected neighborhoods, public or community nurseries without daily arrangements and offering very limited pre-school and educational programs are over represented. Recent studies have underlined the importance of pre-school programs in a successful schooling and education. In a context of rapid population growth, arguments set out by municipal authorities underline the importance to assist and take advantage of the growth where it happens: namely new neighborhoods and the historic district. Such a policy disadvantages low-income peripheral neighborhoods where population growth is weak leading the municipality, in some cases, to close municipal childcare facilities and to re-open them in more dynamic neighborhoods. The issue is also a matter of social and spatial justice. In March 2015, a group of women from *La Paillade* asked for more social justice and for more social mixing in schools. They contested the new school district limits that exclude these families from quality schools and send children to schools without social and cultural mixing.

Conclusion: An Unachieved, Pervasive, and Complex Unequal Process

Like neoliberalism, the creative city policies implemented in Montpellier are complex and sometimes contradictory processes in which local contexts and the balance of power are of some great importance (Brenner and Theodore 2002). In Montpellier, social and spatial inequalities are embedded in global forces (adoption of a neoliberal urban agenda, public private partnerships, global social trends) and in a local concrete context that shapes its character and specificities. The new division of labor favoring a cognitive-cultural capitalism has been projected out into local urban space where it happens "in a form of pervasive but never fully accomplished division of neighborhoods" (Scott 2014, 4). It leads to a re-stratification of local urban society and to significant readjustments in the social geography of neighborhoods under the auspice of a spatially and socially fragmented urban development pattern. This complex and unachieved fragmented pattern is based on unequal access to residential opportunities, urban mobility, and public facilities and is very modestly counter-balanced by social mixing policies. Creative city processes produce socio-spatial complexity in which social, ethnic, gender, and spatial boundaries and inequalities multiply. This socio-spatial complexity is developing following an iterative and irregular scheme taking unclear

and diffuse forms of inequalities according to the implementation of the creative city political imaginary, rhetoric, and public/private urban development.

In this southern "sunny creative city", the lower classes appear as politically marginalized social groups. Local protests, like in *La Paillade*, are spatially and politically contained by public consultation procedures and other techniques of social mediation following policing goals, while political contests of creative city urban developments into the municipal scene (the Green Party denouncing tramway lines as a foster for gentrification), are presented as old-fashioned, unrealistic and narrow-minded. These social and spatial inequalities are clearly embedded in an urban regime of flexibility and adaptability to the local cognitive-cultural capital requests, to an intensified competition, and to what Peck (2005) calls a "creative city script" which contains wishful thinking, political imaginary, leadership style, and regressive social policies under the auspice of increasing public well-being. Such policies emphasize social, racial, and spatial cleavages, easing the implementation of a social sustainable order compatible to neoliberal requests but perhaps sowing the seeds of urban discontent.

Bibliography

Bodirisky, Katarina. 2012. Culture for competitiveness: valuing diversity in EU-Europe and the 'creative city' of Berlin. *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 18(4): 455–473.

Boreen, Thomas, Young Craig. 2013. Getting creative with the 'creative city'? Towards new perspective on creativity in urban policy. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 37(3): 1799–1815.

Boudreau, Julie-Anne, R. Keil, and D. Young. 2009. Changing Toronto: governing urban neoliberalism. Toronto: UTP.

Brenner, Neil, and N. Theodore. 2002. Cities and the geographies of 'actually existing neoliberalism'. *Antipode* 34(3): 349–379.

Brooks, David. 2001. *Bobo in paradise: The new upper class and how they get there*. Simon & Schulter, New York.

Deboulet, Agnes and Lelevrier, Christine, 2014, *Rénovations urbaines en Europe*. Presses Universitaires de Rennes. Rennes.

Giband, David. 2011. *Les villes de la diversité. Territoires du vivre ensemble*. Paris: Anthropos/Economica, Coll. Géographie 150 p.

———. 2016. Ecocity: the case of Montpellier. In *Adventures in urban sustainable development: theoretical interventions and notes from the field*, ed. T. Freytag, S. Mossner, and R. Krueger. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (forthcoming).

Hackorth, Jason. 2006. 'Neoliberalism, contingency and urban policy: the case of social housing in Ontario'. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 30(3): 510–517.

Hamman, Paul, and C. Blanc. 2010. Les négociations dans les projets urbains de tramway. Regards croisés sur les projets strasbourgeois et montpelliérains. In *Des rails pour tisser des liens ? Les tramways à l'épreuve de la négociation dans les projets urbains*, ed. P. Hamman. Paris: Research Report.

Hamman, Paul, and C. Blanc. 2010. Les négociations dans les projets urbains de tramway. Regards croisés sur les projets strasbourgeois et montpelliérains. In *Des rails pour tisser des liens ? Les tramways à l'épreuve de la négociation dans les projets urbains*, ed. P. Hamman. Paris: Research Report.

Hollard, Michel, and Guy Saez. 2012. *Les nouveaux enjeux des politiques culturelles. Dynamiques européennes*, 23–71. Paris: La Découverte.

Le Galès, Patrick, and N. Vézinat. 2015. *L'État recompose*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Nay, Olivier. 1994. Les enjeux symboliques du développement local : l'exemple de la politique de communication de Montpellier. *Politique et management public* 12(4): 57–69.

Négrier, Emmanuel. 1993. Montpellier: international competition and community access. In *Cultural policy and urban regeneration*, ed. François Bianchini, and M. Parkinson, 135–154. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

———. 2008. La culture projet métropolitain? Le cas de Montpellier. In *Intercommunalités, le temps de la culture*, ed. E. Négrier, P. Teille, J. Préau, and A. Faure. Grenoble: Observatoire des politiques culturelles.

Peck, Jamie., 2005. Struggling with the creative class. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 29 (4): 740–770

Ponzini, Davide, and C. Rossi. 2010. Becoming a creative city: the entrepreneurial mayor, network and policy and the promise of an urban renaissance. *Urban Studies* 47(5): 1037–1055.

PrisVivant, Elsa. 2009. Qu'est-ce que la ville créative ?, Presses universitaires de France, Paris.

Scott, Allen J. 2014. Beyond the creative city: cognitive–cultural capitalism and the new urbanism. *Regional Studies* 48(4): 565–578.

Volle, Jean-Paul, Viala, Laurent, Négrier Emmanuel, Crozat, Dominique. 2010, *Montpellier, la ville inventée*. Parenthèses Editions. Paris.

Wacquant, Loic. 2006. *Parias urbains: Ghetto, banlieues, Etat*. La Découverte.

Ward, Kevin. 2003. Entrepreneurial urbanism, state restructuring and civilizing East Manchester. *Royal Geographical Society* 35(2): 116–127.

CHAPTER 8

Entering a Knowledge Pearl in Times of Creative Cities Policy and Strategy. The Case of Groningen, Netherlands

Justin Beaumont and Zemiattin Yildiz

Introduction

In this chapter we critically examine the notion of the creative cities paradigm in terms of socio-spatial inequalities, with reference to the knowledge pearl of Groningen in the northern region of The Netherlands.

On Wednesday, 21 January 2015, the newspaper of the University of Groningen (RUG) announced that the university, together with the Hanze University of Applied Science (Hanze), the municipality, and the provincial government, would invest 14–17 million euro in the coming years "to transform the campus (*de Zernike Campus*) from a grey, liminal zone to a lively Silicon Valley". This transformation would consist mainly of the construction of more green spaces and walking corridors to connect both sides of the Campus. New space will be made for small retail outlets, catering businesses, enterprises, and potentially an international student

J. Beaumont (✉) • Z. Yildiz
Faculty of Spatial Sciences, University of Groningen,
Groningen, The Netherlands

U. Gerhard et al. (eds.), *Inequalities in Creative Cities*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95115-4_8

dormitory. The vision is to bring together students and business in order to facilitate more cooperation in the knowledge economy.

Although the budget remains modest, this investment is striking for several reasons. First, the municipality has until now warded off small retail, catering, and housing in this part of the city to focus on the inner-city as the center of its leisure economy. Second, the overriding assumption is that improving the physical outlook and spearheading some cafés and related services on campus could foster synergies between knowledge institutions and the private sector. Third, despite the associated optimism and hyperbole, the comparison with Silicon Valley reveals the level of ambition in the rationale behind this public investment.[1]

In another part of the city, adjacent to the historic city-center, we find the former CiBoGa terrain.[2] This city area was fallow for some 15–20 years, plagued by soil contamination, for which local policy-makers only recently have found a new albeit temporary purpose. Today the area is home to the *Open Lab Ebbinge* (OLE), a project that mainly provides a testing ground (*proeftuin* or Lab) for temporary area development, and creative urban use in the form of events, dwellings, exhibitions, work ateliers, and so on. The aim of the project is "to develop a deprived urban area into a dynamic creative zone, where knowledge, innovation, culture and creativity meet and mutually reinforce" [....] "further developing the profile of Groningen as a creative city, tackling the problem of unoccupied commercial buildings in the *Ebbingekwartier* and stimulating the local business climate".[3]

We do not argue that these developments can be subjected to an overarching, all-encompassing (urban) development logic (Du Gay 2004; cf. McDowell 2017). Neither do we imply that they are entirely subject to or "complicit" with neoliberalism (Peck 2005). However, we argue that these developments center on a new ambition of cities: to proliferate as a regional center of urban economic development in a post-industrial, competitive, urban environment through the installment of creativity policies, strategies and developments. While these developments provide striking examples, they are only the tip of the iceberg (in Groningen and elsewhere). As such creativity policy now occupies a prominent place in urban

[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *(Ci)rcus), (Bo)dem en (Gas)terrain* (CiBoGa), see: www.woneninhetebbingekwartier.nl/. Accessed 6 December 2015.

[3] See: www.openlabebbinge.nl/english-project-description/. Accessed 6 December 2015.

interventions and therefore becomes an important subject for the people who inhabit cities and especially in terms of the differential access to benefits of these changes and the spatial dimensions of those inequalities.

Against the back-drop of recent approaches to [urban] inequality (see section "Our Approach to Inequalities"), the next two sections discuss and compare two conflicting strands of (spatial) urban theory. In particular, we draw on key concepts in critical urban theory (CUT) as pioneered by David Harvey and Henri Lefebvre and on the concept of "policy mobility" rooted in a tradition of assemblage-inspired readings of urban space. "The section a Knowledge Pearl in Times of Creative Cities" offers a detailed description of creativity-cum-knowledge policy, strategy, and development in Groningen in the face of socio-spatial disparities. We make reference to two illustrative examples: (1) creative re-development of the former CiBoGa area; and (2) Groningen's aspiration as a 'City of Talent'. Finally, we conclude with implications for local strategies to reduce socio-spatial disparities in the face of a growing dependence on creative city development and point to implications for further research.

Criticisms of the Creative Cities Paradigm

The notion of creativity has become an almost normalized and popularized trend in policy-making over the last decade. This process has occurred in particular at the level of the city and region (McCann 2004), as well as within local economic development policy (Donegan and Lowe 2008). Of particular relevance—although first pioneered by Landry (2000)—is Richard Florida's *The Rise of the Creative Class* (2002), where he argues that in the US economy a new class of workers has emerged. This new class, which he calls the creative class, has, for a large part, replaced traditional industrial jobs and consequently radically changed the role of place in spatial (urban) economic development. Instead of workers following jobs, now jobs follow highly mobile, creative workers (see Florida 2005). These workers, in turn, are attracted to urban centers that offer a specific range of amenities and an economically and culturally attractive environment. As Donegan and Lowe (2008) point out, economic prosperity of cities and regions therefore is no longer seen as dependent on "traditional economic development strategies—such as industrial recruitment, export promotion, or workforce development—but rather on its success in attracting and retaining creative talent" (p. 46). We wish to emphasize, however, that there already existed profound bifurcations regarding the

use of Florida's logic both in theory and practice. Some cities are already past his conception of the creative class (e.g. Amsterdam as already "post-Florida", see Peck 2012), but still aim to foster further economic growth through similar policy reforms and development strategies.

In academic circles too the creative cities paradigm has been the subject of long-standing debates over the concepts of creativity, culture, and knowledge vis-a-vis urban development. The creative cities paradigm could be simplified as follows: while the concept "creative industries" represents a particular economic sector (or perhaps capital) that is to be "mapped" and promoted, and the "creative class" a specific group of workers (labor) that cities and regions aim to attract in a bid for increased competitive edge, we might say that the term creative city refers to the bringing together of the former two in a(n) (often predefined) spatial (urban) unit (see Prince 2012: 322–3). In this sense, the latter term of creative city designates creativity policy in its most spatial dimension.

In terms of spatial (urban) planning and governance the creative city hypothesis leads to the question how should local and regional actors act upon this paradigm. How can these actors operationalize the creative cities idea in their city (see Peck 2005)? We refer to the following features:

1. Fostering creatives (talent), industries and synergies;
2. Cool, sexy, edgy, and surprising parts of the city, where municipalities plan for leisure, tourism, and redevelopment;
3. Mainly anti-government in ethos (see McCann 2004; Donegan and Lowe 2008) and where government assumes a more facilitating role, creating more room for creative solutions (see Gerhard 2017);
4. City competitiveness based on numerous creative city rankings, with an emphasis on urban networks and hierarchies;
5. Favoring short-term solutions and planning processes, not just short term as in temporary projects like *OpenLab Ebbinge* in Groningen but in terms of governance style (link to debates on Foucauldian governmentality), internationalization and the knowledge economy;
6. For municipal governments these factors mean that there are new industries to bolster involving specific groups of workers and certain types of neighborhood; sprucing up the appearance of the city becomes a cornerstone in policy documents, where an entrepreneurial, libertarian preference for "trickle down" prevails.

The rationale behind the academic discourse, as well as the implications for practice, has been rather over-blown, opportunistic and populist in tone. One could say that the creative cities paradigm has to a large measure served the purposes of a particular group of policy-makers, politicians and other urban elites, with little in the way of benefits for ordinary, low-income people in working-class and deprived neighborhoods. The discourse has attracted a range of criticisms on both the Left and the Right of the political spectrum (see Peck 2005).

One important critique concerns the contested size of the alleged creative class and the actual amount of creative industries in any given city (see Peck 2012; Gerhard 2017; McDowell 2017). Another important critique concerns the problem of causality (Peck 2005): "Street-level cultural innovation and conspicuous consumption may just as easily be consequences of economic growth, rather than causes of it" (p. 755). That policy-makers will never be certain whether the creative city policy will really bear fruit is another point of concern. In effect, some even wonder whether we are really looking at something special or new at all (see Gerhard 2017).

Despite these objections, as Bontje and Lawton (2013) note, the furor over creative city policy has raced ahead of careful conceptualization and empirical engagement. The result is a free-wheeling policy with poor referencing to existing research and academic debates on the side of policy-makers, while ensuring much disagreement among scholars about the true virtues and benefits of creative cities themselves.

The most virulent critique now emerging concerns relations between the creative cities paradigm and inequality. In particular:

1. An idealized conception of the creative worker, rooted in uncertainties, instabilities and flexibility working practices and arrangements;
2. Focus on a dealer class and real economy, therefore the creative city concerns a deeply stratified and unequal sector in itself (see McDowell 2017);
3. Tendency to instrumentalize and commodify culture;
4. Complement and aggravate neoliberal politics and governance with the associated cleavages and grievances for less advantaged groups;
5. Discourse bypasses and circumvents debates on inequality; the discourse re-packages rather than changes policy (Peck 2012).

Our Approach to Inequalities

Interpreting inequality has always been a particularly contested topic, both in modern and pre-modern societies. The recent publication of Thomas Piketty's *Capital in the Twenty-First Century* (2014a), where he demonstrates that inequalities (in terms of income and wealth) have increased dramatically since the 1980s, almost mirroring the unequal distributions during the early 19th century (see also Piketty 2014b), has renewed relevance of the topic as well as the urgency to address and mitigate their consequences.

Simultaneously, inequality remains a politically sensitive and scientifically challenging topic, subject to manifold ideologies, concepts, and narratives. The lines between its analytical and normative features, and by extension between science and politics, seem to blur significantly. Apart from opposing interpretations of the term inequality (respectively in terms of merits and rewards, and in terms of human beings as equals)—let alone, the term equity, referring to respective starting positions of individuals and social groups—there are a series of "modalities of inequality" (i.e. their legal, economic, political, social, and physical "dimensions") and "cleavages" (social class, stratification, gender, ethnicity, etc.) along which inequalities persist. In addition, expressions, concepts, and explanations of inequalities diverge substantially. For example, (social) inequality has been conceptualized in terms of "differences among people in their command over social and economic resources" (Osberg 2001: 7371); in terms of distribution of resources and (human, social, creative) capitals (referring to Rawls and Bourdieu); in terms of production and consumption referring to Marxian approaches; and even in terms of "recognition" of rights and desires of different individuals and social groups (Honneth 1995, 2003, 2007).

Accordingly, the vocabularies and grammars deployed to address and conceptualize the issue also differ a great deal (MacLeod and McFarlane 2014). Moreover, and paramount to the potential solutions, we may wish to advance in order to prevent further entrenchment of inequalities, the construction and availability of (new) tools—concepts, equipment, statistics, measuring instruments, and, not the least, money—to investigate inequality are crucial elements for how both academics and "others" are able to investigate and interpret the issue, and, in extension, to (de-) problematize it.

Two sets of distinctions characterize our interest in the purported relations between creative cities and inequalities. First, whether a particular form of inequality is a unique feature or consequence of creative city

policy and strategy or whether they affect existing disparities. We attempt to identify direct relationships between the creative cities paradigm and inequalities. Second, we are interested in how the discourse on creative cities not only amplifies but also potentially offers chances to reduce, growing socio-spatial inequalities under conditions of global neoliberal urbanism.

Since the logic supporting the creative cities idea is embedded in a distinct spatial (urban) paradigm, we are especially interested in inequalities in an urban context. This interest is ignited by concepts of urban space that conceive of capitalist urbanization as a process of 'un-equalization'. Take note that several empirical analyses have already identified correlations between urbanization and inequality, demonstrating that respective rates of wealth and/or income are exceptionally higher in metropolitan areas as compared to the national level (see Fiscal Policy Institute 2010; Glaeser et al. 2011). More direct concerns over the relation between creative cities and inequality have been expressed by Donegan and Lowe (2008) and Peck (2005). Even Florida himself has anticipated and hence reviewed this relation (see CityLab website; c.f. Peck 2005). What matters for us about creative cities and socio-spatial disparities is not merely how the ideas, concepts, and policies of creative industries or creative class engender new forms of socio-spatial disparities or how they may aggravate and/or obscure any existing disparities, but what role (the concept of) the city—or more accurately, the *urban*—plays in this regard.

We now draw upon two interpretations of urban space that both generate and inspire better understanding of three issues: (1) the relation between urban space and inequality, and by extension between creative cities and inequality; (2) how creative city policy and strategy circulates and mutates and as such becomes seemingly ubiquitous; and (3) respective claims over the relation between urban knowledges of concepts of the city and creative cities, on the one hand, and urban practices—urban and creative governance, policy, strategy, developments)—on the other.

Critical Urban Theory

One fundamental insight of Lefebvre was to distinguish between the city, on the one hand, and the urban and urbanization, on the other, which opens up understanding both in the relationship between creative cities and inequalities, but also provides initial insights in what enables creative city policy to acquire a sense of "everywhereness". The former merely constitutes a "thought object" or a "virtual object", and hence cannot be

treated as "category of analysis", but only as a "category of practice" (see Wachsmuth 2014; c.f. Lefebvre (2003 [1970]: 57)). Recently Neil Brenner (2013) has taken up this lead to counter contemporary hegemonic urban knowledge(s) inherited from the Chicago School. He demonstrates how debates on urbanization by international institutions, such as the World Bank (2009), European Commission (2010), and the United Nations (2008), on which much of growth and cluster theories (e.g. Porter 1998), and also creative city theory and policy hinge and rely, suggest we are currently witnessing an "urban age" because more than 50 % of the world population lives in urban areas (see also Merrifield 2013; Brenner and Schmid 2014). However, Brenner and Schmid (2014) argue that "[w]hile urban age discourse is usually put forward as a set of empirical claims regarding demographic and social trends, the latter are premised upon an underlying theoretical and cartographic framework whose core assumptions, once excavated and scrutinized, are deeply problematic" (p. 744). In this vein, the term city, and by extension the methodological territorialist definition of urban space, becomes perceived as scientific urban ideologies, which *both* obscure *and* sustain "the contradictory socio-spatial relations of capitalism (commodification, capital circulation, capital accumulation, and associated forms of political regulation and contestation) [which are] are at once *territorialized* (embedded within concrete contexts and thus fragmented) and *generalized* (extended across place, territory, and scale and thus universalized)" (Brenner 2013: 95: *emphasis added*).

The suggestion is that data accumulation, analysis, and cartographic representations associated with these urban knowledges obscure policy debates related to urban poverty, public health, and environmental degradation and ecological issues. This obscuring can be extended to include policy debates and interventions related to labor markets, housing, education, transportation, development, and energy provision, which all impose confusing and misleading understandings of the multi-scalar processes of urbanization (Brenner 2013; Brenner and Schmid 2014). Today, such knowledge of urban space is being disseminated and naturalized at all spatial scales and among powerful actors and institutions, as for example to facilitate creative city policy transfers. We could therefore say that creative city policy and strategy—through the definition of city, especially the separation of urban and rural—is sustained along these territories, which, as demonstrated, are thus problematic in the first place, while simultaneously facilitating their legitimacy. In this respect the creative city paradigm is

both embedded in a broader processes of global, neoliberal spatial (urban) restructuring *and* as an enforcement of this regime.

The second insight derives from the claim of Lefebvre that urbanization, superseding industrialization and exceeding the traditional conceptual boundaries of the city, has become a generalized condition on a world scale (Lefebvre 2003 [1970]). This generalization does not hold that the entire planet will be covered by densely, concentrated agglomerations (traditionally labeled as cities, and now as urban space, e.g. urban age thesis). Instead it is to designate, as Soja and Kanai (2007) explain, that "the major features of urbanism as a way of life—from the play of market forces and the effects of administrative regulations, to popular cultural practices and practical geopolitics—are becoming ubiquitous" (p. 62). We could see creative city policy as a significant expression of these popular cultural practices. These practices are embedded in recent processes of geopolitical and political economic restructuring of spatial policy that promotes development especially by centering on regional and urban spaces. For example, almost 30 years ago David Harvey (1989) already anticipated the emergence neoliberal, entrepreneurial, urban strategies where, along with the decline of the industrial sector and growth of service-based industries, cities are forced to adjust their policies to a competitive urban landscape and to adopt strategies for urban and regional profit at the expense of existing (or renewing and creating new) redistributive schemes, thus preparing the "urban tissue" for the next spatial fix.

Peck (2005) has already dismissed creative city policy as an extension of "urban entrepreneurialism" and "consumption-oriented place promotion" (p. 761). To Peck, cities and regions are increasingly bound to compete for talent and businesses in the creative-cum-knowledge sector, while structurally relinquishing responsibilities for those excluded. The problem that remains, however, is that at the same time local policy-makers desperately deploy such strategies without any reasonable certainty that they will bear the fruits of their investments.

Returning to the notion of ideology, we can begin to see that the discourse on creative cities does not only thrive on an idealized conception of the creative worker (see Castells 1977 [1972]; Peck 2005; McDowell 2017), but by implication an idealized conception of the good city (see Gerhard 2017). Such conceptions of the city leave unattended spaces both of the unequal divisions of labor and of uneven-development of capital, in which these practices are embedded.

A third fundamental insight Lefebvre added to our conceptual repertoire is to understand urbanization as a historical process that "contains two dialectally intertwined moments": *implosion* and *explosion* (Brenner 2013: 94). On the one hand, urbanization is characterized by concentration, centralization, agglomeration of infrastructures, capital, labor, and interactions ("implosion"). However, while forgotten and largely neglected within conventional urban studies, on the other hand, urbanization is simultaneously characterized by "explosion": "urban transformations, materialized in densely tangled circuits of labor, commodities, cultural forms, energy, raw materials, and nutrients—simultaneously *radiate outward from the immediate zone of agglomeration* and *implode back into it* as the urbanization process unfolds" (Brenner 2013: 103: *emphasis added*). As such, we can understand creative city policy and strategy as inextricably bounded through a vast web of social and physical infrastructures (extended urbanization) that not only connect the dots, traditionally labeled as cities, but which themselves play a constitutive role in the production of intra- and inter-urban spaces.

The crux of the dialectical process of implosion/explosion is that while the morphology of concentrated urbanization appears as straightforward (defined by concentration, density, and agglomeration) the morphology of extended urbanization is uneven, variable and context specific (Brenner 2013). While (global) processes of urbanization, including dominant urban policies and strategies, such as creativity policy, may seem to conform to a more general (global) urban logic, manifestations of these processes, policies, and strategies, on the ground, variegate along local, domestic contexts. Accordingly, for a policy or policy idea to acquire a sense of "everywhereness", it needs not only a *vehicle* that grants it *mobility* (to *travel*), but also a means to *adapt* to the particular local context of destination (to be *adopted*). Here Peck (2012) has argued creativity policy to be a "vehicular policy idea"—i.e. a policy idea that "is constructed for travel" and "formulated with purposive ambiguity/ mutability (rather than as a fixed template), so as to move swiftly and smoothly between policymaking sites, and to lubricate new (or rebadged) initiatives in distant locales" (p. 480).

Policy Mobility

Against these critical observations on the circulation and adaptation of urban (creativity) policy (Peck and Theodore 2010; Peck 2011; McCann and Ward 2011), it is worthwhile to consider another perspective on the movement of creative city policy: assemblage-inspired readings in human

geography and urban studies (see McFarlane 2011a, b for an overview of urbanism; see Anderson and McFarlane 2011 for overview in human geography). From this body of work we see an emerging literature on "policy mobilities", which "explores the apparent movement of particular policy programmes from one place to another" (Prince 2014a: 191). Russell Prince's discussion of policy mobility in the case of creative city policy offers a more nuanced account of this movement by deepening our understanding of how these policies travel from regional centers to their respective recipients, and as such why they are capable of acquiring "a sense of everywhereness" (Prince 2012, 2014a). By "looking through" taken-for-granted spatial constructs such as the city, the nation-state, the continent, and so on, and describing the boundaries, continuities, and discontinuities that give shape to their construction, Prince provides a way to think differently of the relation between policy and city (see Prince 2012: 320).

One important aspect of policies that helps explain how, or better, what makes, policies *move* is their topology, or more accurately: their topologies. Prince (2014a) contrasts the notion of "policy topology" with the notion of "policy topography". The notion of topology, which derives from science and technology studies (STS) and actor-network-theory (ANT) conceptions of space, opposes the Euclidean spatial conception of topography: "[c]ontrary to Euclidean geometry, which assumed that space was in fact an absolute extrinsic dimension in which entities were circulating and in which their position and transformations could be calculated and measured [...] [t]opological forms do not move and circulate within space, they do not occur in space, they are not contained in space (e.g. like a bed would be in a bedroom), but rather constantly generate and modify their dimensions" (Lecomte 2013: 475). The notion of topology problematizes the notion of topography as the latter presents a container-like image of space as to indicate *what* happens *where—in* space—while the former stresses that space does not exist independently of any other entities but instead is made up by these entities themselves: no entities, no space. As Law and Mol (2001) explain, an analysis of spatial topologies "helps to undermine the essentialism of Euclidean space, but also hints at the way in which Euclidean space is produced" (p. 612).

The notion of policy topology suggests that we abandon questions concerning how global (or local) a policy is, but instead affirm that "the topographical connections through which policy can be seen to travel are wrapped up with multiple topological relations that shape that policy's movement" (Prince 2014a: 194). Instead of perceiving the policies as circulating *on* space, policy topologies inform us about how the "circuits" of

policy create multiple spaces itself. As such describing policy topologies can inform us both why certain policies seem to be everywhere topographically, as how they are to be contested or altered (re-scribed). Drawing on STS and ANT literatures on social topologies (notably Law and Mol 2001; Mol and Law 1994), Prince discusses four typologies of creativity policy: regional, network, fluid, and fire.

"Regional topologies are composed of bounded areas that do not overlap [...] [but] can, however, be nested at different scales, and so contained within larger regions" (Prince 2014a: 194). Examples of such regions range from the neighborhood and the urban to the continental and the global. Importantly, on the one hand, they "inscribe boundaries between different regions at each of these scales, and they are often reproduced through the construction of administrative jurisdictions that are coterminous with the region [...] [but, on the other, they] are also reproduced through the collapse of variation within boundaries and its reconstruction *between* regions" (*ibid*: 195: *emphasis in original*). Certain forms of economic activity can be observed regionally (e.g. at the level of the urban) but not within these regions. Policies, such as those for creative cities, do not necessarily need to produce new topologies but often utilize existing ones.

In order to actually compare regions we need a second typology: the network typology. "Network topologies can cut across regional boundaries, but are, paradoxically, central to their reproduction" (Mol and Law 1994) (*ibid*). To compare the (presence of) creative industries or class along different regions requires the reproduction of a similar measurement technique in all these different regions. In this way places from all over the world "come together" on a "level space of comparison" (*ibid*). Indices and table charts, applied by Florida, represent such a space.

Similar to the regional topologies, network topologies do not necessarily require the construction of new networks (Prince 2014a). Just like how creative policies make use of existing regions, their measurement often relies on existing statistics, picking out the variables that are regarded or deemed most important and, if necessary, gather new ones. As Prince points out, "the 'new' topological spaces of creativity policy are never entirely new. They build on and transform existing topological relations, with their existing policy channels, to produce a policy geography that is distinctive, and yet emerges out of prevailing configurations" (*ibid*: 196). It is in this way that we can begin to grasp how creative city policies can simultaneously be *perceived* as authentic and as simply complementary to existing urban trends like neoliberalism.

A third topology, fluid space, provides more clarity on the latter tendency of policies. Fluid spaces are similar to networks in that they traverse boundaries, but are contrary to the network topology which is based on similarity between different points cutting through (e.g. by means of reproducing similar measurement methods), and they also allow a certain degree of variation between them (Mol and Law 1994; Prince 2012, 2014a). The fluid spaces of creative city policies are mobile due to *a lack of clear boundaries*, *ability to mix*, *robustness*, and *interrelations with regional and network spaces* (see Prince 2014a: 321). Creative policies appear to be less bounded, more mixable and changeable and as a consequence become more "open to interpretation and manipulation" (Prince 2014a).

According to Prince (2014a) "a key element of the topologies of creativity policy is their technical aspect" (p. 194). "Creativity policy, almost without fail, consists of attempts to measure the nature and size of something considered relevant to creativity. This quantitative dimension is central to the topologies of policy that are present here, particularly in relation to regions and networks" (Prince 2014a: 198–9). However, at the same time, this technical element of topologies transforms the creative city into a universal category. In effect, policy is "stripped off" from "the context of their initial conception", which renders a certain global validity based on alleged scientific measurement and delimitation and makes their transferability conceivable and possible.

A Knowledge Pearl in Times of Creative Cities

The city of Groningen in the northern region of The Netherlands provides a compelling case of "hidden inequalities" and the politics of urban development in the face of the creative cities discourse in what could be termed a "knowledge pearl" city (see van Winden et al. 2007) (Fig. 8.1).

A geographically delimited area of Groningen now referred to as the *Ebbingekwartierterrain* (or just *Ebbingekwartier*) has been the focus of several creativity inspired redevelopment initiatives as early as 1987. While clearly dependent on the particular notion or understanding of "creativity", the burning conceptual issues are: (1) redevelopment of old industrial, "brownfield" areas, creative space, housing and gentrification effects; (2) inequalities and differential benefits (social and economic[4]) by socioeconomic class and

[4]The tension between social and/or economic return was discussed during our Let's Gro event #087: *Politics, inequalities and the creative city*, which took place Friday 21 November



Fig. 8.1 Map of Groningen

creative/ non-creative groups; and (3) lasting effects of temporary uses in terms of net effects and emergence of new areas.

What we show in the context of Groningen is a (re-)development agenda that had led to a number of largely state financed activities increasingly brought under the label of "creativity". Due to high levels of state subsidization the creative city agenda in Groningen can be viewed as a form of redistribution in a city where employment in the public sector and reliance on essential public services including welfare is pronounced. Redistribution within the public sector is now being commodified and revalorized as creative, cultural and "business" entrepreneurialism. Diverse social groups have access to these developments and their benefits differentially, sharpening existing inequalities and forging new cleavages.

To understand the significance of the Ebbingekwartier one needs to place it in historical and spatial context. The Ebbingekwartier can be seen as the successor of the former Circus-, Boden- en Gasterrain (CiBoGa), an urban development project in the Hortusbuurt on the eastern edge of the Groningen inner city that has long been used for purposes other than housing. In 1854 a gasworks was built at the Boterdiep which later led to the pollution problems that needed dealing with; the ground had to be dug deeply when redevelopment commenced. Although the gasworks has long since been closed, the chimney is still visible today. It was at this location that the *Groningse Wereldtentoonstelling* (Groningen World Expo) took place in 1903 to showcase industry and art. The whole area is now ripe for residential development. In the interim, the site now referred to as the *Ebbingekwartier* serves as a creative space and cultural breeding ground under the auspices of the EU-funded, public–private partnership: *Open Lab Ebbinge.*

The *Ebbingekwartier*, referred to as the *creatieve stasdwijk Groningen* (creative urban neighborhood in Groningen), has since 2005 become a focus of diverse "creative" projects that benefit from the central location in the city and the availability of space. There are ample opportunities for creative and cultural entrepreneurs and innovative retailers that reflect changing consumer preferences and tastes in the wider context of Groningen-style gentrification. A core element would appear to be a growing emphasis on service, a personal approach and an atmosphere of reified artisan or craft consumerism in keeping with general cultural trends. Several premises are available for cultural and creative entrepreneurs to set up shop in the area.

2014 at Het Concerthuis in the centre of Groningen. Let's Gro was an inspiration festival, organized in collaboration with Municipality Groningen and University of Groningen.

Open Lab Ebbinge (OLE) is located within the boundaries of the *Ebbingekwartier* and is a unique and internationally relevant example of innovative, temporary city building where a "brownfield" site within the city is transformed into a hub of cultural innovation and business creativity.[5] Through public–private partnership, a one hectare, once contaminated site in close proximity to Groningen's center was developed into a "micro-city". The "micro-city" (2010–15), abandoned since the late 1980s, housed diverse cultural and entertainment activities as well as innovative and trendy service provision. The project aims to augment the area as a cultural and creative hotspot, one for innovative entrepreneurs and educational institutes to develop new products and services. Largely financed through EU subsidies, the OLE brings together a wide array of public and private stakeholders in an experimental development process in the use and re-use of buildings that are sustainable and movable/nomadic. In this way the project is an innovative engagement with unused inner city sites and paves the way for innovate and creative cultural entrepreneurs.

What emerges from this creative redevelopment is a clear demarcation, or social stratification, between creative and non-creative groups. Creativity can be beneficial to some groups; these people are the creative elite and progressive entrepreneurs, in other words, well-educated people most of the time.[6] De-regulated zones such as the *Ebbingekwartier* and also the *Wolkenfabriek* (on the former *Suikerunie-terrain*) reflect government support for the creative class. The government expects highly unrealistic trickle-down. The belief is that supporting growth in creative activities benefits a growing number of entrepreneurs and tourists, and more tourists and more creativity lead to job and income growth and in turn to higher tax revenues, which will purportedly spread to the poor and lower educated. The creative redevelopment process can be seen as a form of gentrification in focusing on attracting creative industries, individuals, and groups to the inner city.

The *Ebbingekwartier* has become a place for the young art/design/IT class, largely but not exclusively students and those pejoratively known as "hipsters" in a peculiarly Groningen form. Other groups tend to be

[5] See: www.openlabebbinge.nl/. Accessed 7 December 2015.

[6] Frank Menger a politically active resident of Groningen stated during the Let's event #87 (see footnote #4) that the perception of the *Ebbingekwartier* is divided: on the one hand it is recognizable, but on another level some people are simply unaware of it. Demonstrable positive effects, however, are thin on the ground at the moment.

onlookers from the sidelines, merely visitors and spectators who take little part in the developments. So elderly people and the lower educated, for example, are not those intended to benefit from the activities in the *Ebbingekwartier*. Mostly students, but a particular or special brand of students, are attracted as a result of the incubator activities in the area. It is far less attractive for the "stadjers" (people who come from and live in the city) and Groningen's low-income residents.

City of Talent

In Florida's work the creative class also consists of those labor segments working in knowledge institutions (mainly public sector jobs), such as universities, higher education institutes, research and development (R&D), and medical centers. This coming together is relevant in the Groningen case. Conceptualization of the "creative knowledge city" (Bontje et al. 2011; van Geenhuizen and Nijkamp 2012) voices the merging of debates concerning creative industries and creative cities with concepts on knowledge and innovation.

Groningen is a medium sized city with approximately 190,000 residents and is the capital of Groningen Province. Spatially and economically the city and region are relatively peripheral and were hit less severely by the economic recession in 2008 than other cities and regions in the Netherlands. It is home to the second oldest university in the country after Leiden, the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen (RuG), dating back to 1614, and located mainly in the inner-city and on the Zernike Campus on the edge of the city, and a higher education facility (Hanzehogeschool) located on the same campus. Together both knowledge institutions account for well over 45,000 students,[7] which amounts to roughly over a quarter of the metropolitan region's population. Nationally Groningen has always been perceived as a student city (*studentenstad*). With the University Medical Centre Groningen (UMCG) located on the edge of the inner-city, the health sector is strongly represented.

Overall, Groningen's economy relies strongly on knowledge institutions and the attraction of students (hence the public sector). Dutch spatial economists Raspe and van Oort (2007) distinguish between three dimensions of the knowledge economy—R&D, innovation, and knowledge workers—which in spatial/topographical terms rarely overlap.

[7] The number of students in Groningen is over 50,000 and the figure for residents is in the region of 200,000 (see: http://groningen.buurtmonitor.nl/. Accessed 6 December 2015).

Groningen's knowledge sector is mainly represented by knowledge workers rather than R&D and innovation, which are more prominently represented in other cities and regions.

Two city-regional trends further inform local and regional policy with regard to the knowledge economy: a brain-drain at the scale of the city-region and the state. It reflects migration from the surrounding region to the city of Groningen, and again from the city to other regions in the Netherlands (mainly the Randstad) and a vast population decline in the region (mainly in the east of the province). While migration of graduates to other parts in the Netherlands is partly inevitable due to a lack of jobs, and the share of highly educated workers as a share of the total workforce in Groningen is already exceptionally high (47.8 %) (Manshanden 2009), for cities and regions in the Netherlands, and certainly for the municipality of Groningen, a recurring question is how it may use the excess of graduates for its own labor and housing markets.

The municipality of Groningen has developed certain policies for the knowledge sector, combined with creativity-inspired developments in the city. One of these policies is (Groningen as) "City of Talent", which is in line with principles of the Agreement of Groningen (*Akkoord van Groningen*). This is an accord between the municipality, University of Groningen and the Hanzehogeschool to jointly invest 1.5 billion euro in local innovation and knowledge infrastructures (Provincie Groningen 2007). This agreement prioritizes three elements: (1) marketing (*profilering*) where space is created for Groningen to be "… a creative city", to proliferate through a "multi-layered campaign strategy" (*ibid*: 5); (2) "cross-pollination" (*kruisbestuiving*), where Groningen facilitates interaction between firms, institutions and talent and provides the necessary infrastructure to help innovative start-ups, which in turn will exploit opportunities that offer further research and technological development; and (3) source points (*bronpunten*) where the municipality offers physical space for creative use and entrepreneurship (*ibid*: 5–6).

Related policies concern "internationalization". Here the city, as regional center of the three northern provinces, attempts to construct ties with northeast Europe while trying to strengthen existing ties with partner cities. Having recently acquired the status of a top-100 University, the University of Groningen and the municipality are keen to attract more international students and staff to the city, the impacts of which are already starting to show. For example, the number of international students at the university has increased by almost 50 % between 2010 and 2013, rising to

over 3300. Never have the residents of Groningen experienced the presence of so many international students. A proposed branch campus, to be located in Shandong province, China in 2017, is another example of the University's internationalization strategy.[8]

The arguments supporting these policy objectives and developments are scattered and inconsistent. This fragmentation reflects a diversity of sometimes conflicting and disparate reasons among local departments. Various government departments deploy different definitions of the creative sector. For example, the department of Culture, Education and Sport puts the number of the creative class in Groningen at 30 % while (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (in Dutch)) Central Agency for Statistics (CBS) puts it at 4 %. Another municipal representative puts the figure at 9 % to include the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector (see CBS 2012, 2014a, b).

The creative sector is understood as a promising, yet uncertain, sector, for regional economies in terms of employment, production, and value-addition. However, the creative sector also has an assumed indirect effect. Creative activities develop cultural amenities that in turn may attract people and firms (Poort and Marlet 2005). Highly skilled (knowledge) workers but also talent (students) prefer to locate in those places with high access to cultural amenities as these contribute to the attractiveness of the city (*ibid*). Marlet et al. (2012) therefore suggest the positive migration rate in the municipality of Groningen can for a significant part be attributed to Groningen's relatively large cultural sector. For example, on the Cultural Index of Dutch Cities developed by Marlet et al. (*ibid*) Groningen is the second city after Amsterdam.

The attracted students, especially once they have graduated, offer an opportunity to provide an impulse for a stagnating housing market by increasing local demand (Venhorst et al. 2011). Furthermore, they can positively affect local (and regional) employment through consumption, which could even be increased if they establish start-ups or when their presence results in the establishment of new or the expansion of existing companies (*ibid*). The highly educated and knowledge workers are considered to contribute to a liveable city climate. As such, the mantra

[8] The RUG is the first Dutch university to open a branch campus in China. A collaborative effort with the China Agricultural University, Beijing, means the establishment of a presence on campus in the city of Yantai. See: www.rug.nl/about-us/internationalization/branch-campus-yantai?lang=en. Accessed 7 December 2015.

of Florida—jobs following people—is very much present in the academic arguments borrowed to support Groningen's creativity and knowledge policy. Most policy documents focus on the introduction to Florida's thesis. Interestingly, since creativity is often conceptualized as a "flywheel" (Rutten et al. 2011), able to perform different functions, knowledge and creativity here are often merged and work in tandem. In a parody of Florida's suggestions, Groningen's strategy assumes a reasonable opportunity for artists to facilitate innovative activities from the knowledge sector. The strongest argument for these policies, especially when it comes to the contribution to the overall population of the municipality (and the region) appears to be that the presumed trickle-down effects the knowledge and creative sectors will occur.

While the tone of these policies and physical interventions is celebratory and dreamy—"Groningen is ahead in innovation and entrepreneurship"[9]—we believe it to be essentially a façade. Groningen seriously lacks contemporary innovation, R&D, or left-over manufacturing to foster further economic growth. For example, previous developments of industrial parks in the municipality have embarrassingly misfired. The local economy largely depends on public sector jobs and funds. In fact, the whole region is economically marginal—e.g. *Langman Akkoord* supporting the three northern provinces in terms of employment, labor participation and to reduce the uneven spatial distribution of welfare (see Raspe and van Oort 2007). For Groningen (both the region and the city), then, sustaining the cultural amenities and knowledge activities it houses while trying to increase the value added of these sectors seems the only viable option at stake.

The question remains whether Groningen is really doing something new, or is simply repackaging policy (Peck 2005, 2012). Are problems such as socio-spatial disparities in the city and region solved or at least addressed, or are they bypassed and relegated to the background? Does the city and region really believe it can do something about these problems? These questions remain unanswered or are at least problematic. Another problem concerns the relation between city and region (Lefebvre's dialectic of urbanization). As Venhorst et al. (2011) demonstrate with an increasing concentration of highly educated people in cities the surrounding regions witness a brain drain: "the city wins, the region loses".

[9] See: www.cityoftalent.nl/en. Accessed 7 December 2015.

Conclusion

We have critically examined the notion of the creative cities paradigm in terms of socio-spatial inequalities, with reference to the Ebbingekwartier and City of Talent developments in the knowledge pearl of Groningen in the northern region of The Netherlands.

Several crucial points of discussion arise from our investigation of the Groningen case. *The notion of (in-)visibility is centrally important with respect to socio-spatial inequalities.* In a more simplistic sense (in)visibility alludes to the difficulty involved in elucidating direct, "factual" linkages between creativity, knowledge, urban strategy and development, and inequality. Certainly, different social groups do not benefit equally from these developments—especially their re-distributive "materials"—or conversely, even find themselves excluded from these developments. This exclusion could stem from access, age, education, or financial resources, spending power and money. The proliferation of creativity-inspired developments at the level of the urban dovetails with, and enforces, an organizational transformation that prioritizes the provision of soft, short-term infrastructures at the expense of responsible, inclusive, and long-term investments. The mobilization of public and private actors in joint task forces has increased the potential of the local and regional leisure economy and consolidated Groningen as a regional recreational hub. Here Talent is "put to work" more as a potential consumer than a potential productive asset in the local economy. Moreover, the rationale for certain developments (e.g. RUG campus) serves as a Trojan horse for further real estate development and valorization (e.g. University Campus). Developments tend to create local and regional excess of high, as a consequence, also low-skilled labor.

Creativity and knowledge are applied in tandem, preparing Groningen for the next "spatial fix" Importantly, the developments in Groningen focus more in terms of consumption than production, which we consider an unwelcome message in face of the large portion of jobless in the city, but also the northern and especially eastern part of the province (Oost-Groningen). These parts of the region do not take part in the creative festivities and instead require mobilization of their productive force.

Adaptations of the creative city paradigm in Groningen thrive on an idealized conception of the "good city" At the level of discourse, creativity is deployed to promote anti-government, libertarian life-styles, labor-contracts and arrangements, short-term development, strategy, policy, and

governance. The result is a prevalence of economic determinism expanded to and developed further (a) at the level planning and decision-making and (b) cultural and knowledge sectors. Planners do away with long-term planning in favor of short-term developments and incremental, facilitative management. An emphasis is placed on "attraction" of talent, but in extension of tourism, international students and business that implicitly waves away concern for socio-spatial disparities and further relegates *concerns* over inequalities to the background. Within the new creative spaces that are brought about little room is afforded for contestation of the policy mainstream and for the engagement with possible radical alternatives. In symbolic terms, developments are in abundance but are rather cosmetic and lack substance. While the developments add symbolic value it is questionable how far they are able to create new jobs for the harder to reach members of society.

While CUT offers many insights for engaging with the relationship between creative cities and inequalities profound limitations exist The creative cities paradigm gets perceived as a feel-good complement and lubrication mechanism of a neoliberal urban policy regime. Consequently, there is little new or distinctive about it. The proliferation and popularity of creative cities policy gets conceived as a symptom rather than a cause of the prevailing urban policy condition. We can discern little about how the policy actually travels or how it gets adopted in various localities, other than that it simply utilizes existing urban policy constructs. The creative city becomes conceived as an idealized construct in which inequalities are "hidden". While critics of the creative city paradigm are keen to deconstruct the creativity thesis—e.g. by noting that it is in fact poorly defined—at the same time it is still granted much explanatory power in terms of engendering and sustaining the more fundamental sources of injustice, albeit confined to the level of urban and (urban) policy discourse.

The notion of "policy topologies" gathers more credence against these limitations Thus, creativity policy can be viewed more as a tool for inventarization than creation. Regional and network typologies allow the mobility of existing measurement techniques, not the creation of new productive devices at the local level. Rather than being "powerless", totally subjected to a global urban regime as the overall pessimistic critical urban readings suggest, localities like Groningen are not simply passive receivers of creativity policy and strategy. Instead all localities together contribute to the production of such an inventarization. All sorts of actants—human and non-human, from persons to organizations, institutions and technological artifacts (creativity metrics, charts, statistics, concepts, empirical

research, and of course policy documents themselves)—are entangled in this process. One problem is that in the process of scientific advice and policy formulation the practice—the technical aspect of policy topologies (see Prince 2014a, b)—is rendered invisible.

Creative city policy in Groningen is not really that creative While creative city policy remains embedded in an urban (neoliberal) regime depending on urban knowledges, we discover that not much is really new. Developments are more about copying, repackaging, and trying to get funds. Raspe and van Oort (2007) support this position, questioning regional and local policies of creative industries and the developments of "x-valleys". They argue that copying best practices from other regions is often not a good strategy. Given the low value-added of the creative sector and its (partial) dependence on government funding, Groningen's economy is unlikely to improve a great deal by these investments. Furthermore, by copying "best practices" Groningen may risk losing its uniqueness, becoming simply an isomorphic node in the global network of urban hierarchies.

We have to ask about the relation between inequalities or trickle-down logic adopted by certain actors and involved parties Rather than addressing inequalities in Groningen as a matter of fact, we should put the issue of socio-spatial disparities and inequalities as a matter of central concern. To us, inequalities are not simply something that is out there only for the "smart" scientists to observe from afar, but something which requires sustained attention and care. In particular we think that it is the right time, post-Florida, to focus on new relations between neo-bohemian political dissent among creatives to create space for radical alternatives that do not overly rely on commoditized cultural and re-distributive assets and false market promises. Instead we should aim to mobilize actors and creative materials in which new assemblages are created between creativity policy channels and those excluded.

There are implications for further research that arise What we find so compelling about the Groningen case and this volume as a whole is that the creative cities paradigm has clearly invoked a triple-whammy: (1) new cleavages, inequalities, and injustices have been generated; (2) alternative forms of creative and artistic expression including political engagement have been overlooked and sidelined, and (3) the tide is slowly beginning to turn as Florida-style "creatives" have now more or less had their day. Clearly, more critical forms of engagement on the ascendency. An example of the latter would be more progressive types of urban regeneration hitherto excluded or outside mainstream creative city policy regimes. We suggest that new

research should focus theoretically and empirically on new forms of creative expression, for example dissent activism among destitute neo-bohemian creatives, their forms of governance, politics and engagement, and, most importantly, how participants deal explicitly with a social and spatial justice vision or agenda.

Bibliography

Anderson, Ben, and Colin McFarlane. 2011. Assemblage and geography. *Area* 43(2): 124–127.

Bontje, Marco, and Philip Lawton. 2013. Mobile policy and shifting contexts: city-regional competitivenes strategies in Amsterdam and Dublin. *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 104(4): 397–409.

Bontje, Marco, Sako Musterd, and Peter Pelzer (ed). 2011. *Inventive city-regions: path dependence and creative knowledge strategies*. Farnham: Ashgate.

Brenner, Neil. 2013. Theses on urbanization. *Public Culture* 25(1): 85–114.

Brenner, Neil, and Christian Schmid. 2014. The "urban age" in question. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 38(3): 731–755.

Castells, Manuel. 1977 [1972]. *The urban question: a Marxist approach* . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Trans. Alan Sheridan.

CBS. 2012. *Monitor Topsectoren: uitkomsten eerste meting*. Den Haag/Heerlen: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. Available from http://www.cbs.nl/NR/rdonlyres/FA8F2205-3054-41D9-A206%20BC9D13F7ECBF/0/monitorentopsectorenresultatenweb.pdf.

———. 2014a. *Monitor Topsectoren 2014: uitkomsten 2010, 2011 en 2012*. Den Haag/Heerlen: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. Available from www.cbs.nl/NR/rdonlyres/017E1C21-8A11-4397-AEAD-5750EEA7A65B/0/2014_mtoprpub.pdf.

———. 2014b. *Monitor Topsectoren 2014: methodebeschrijving en tabellenset*. Den Haag/Heerlen: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. Available from http://www.cbs.nl/NR/rdonlyres/C2C31530-4BA4-428C-8947-71AACFD5E92C/0/2014_mtsmpub.pdf.

Donegan, Mary, and Nichola Lowe. 2008. Inequality in the creative city: is there still a place for "old-fashioned" institutions? *Economic Development Quarterly* 22(1): 46–62.

Du Gay, Paul. 2004. Self-service: retail, shopping and personhood. *Consumption, Markets and Culture* 7(2): 149–163.

European Commission. 2010. *Investing in Europe's future: fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.

Fiscal Policy Institute (FPI). 2010. *Grow together or pull further apart? Income concentration trends in New York*. December 13, 2010, New York City, NY. Available from www.fiscalpolicy.org/FPI_GrowTogetherOrPullFurtherApart_20101213.pdf.

Florida, Richard. 2002. *The rise of the creative class: and how it's transforming work, leisure, community, and everyday life*. New York: Basic Books.

———. 2005. *The flight of the creative class: the new global competition for talent*. New York: HarperBusiness.

Geenhuizen, van Marina, and Peter Nijkamp (ed). 2012. *Creative knowledge cities: myths, visions and realities*. Cheltenham: Edgar Elgar.

Gerhard, Ulrike, and Michael Hoelscher. 2017. Knowledge makes cities: education and knowledge in recent urban development. the case of Heidelberg, Germany. In *Inequalities in creative cities: issues, approaches, comparisons*, ed. U. Gerhard, M. Hoelscher, and D. Wilson. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Glaeser, Edward L., Mattew Resseger, and Kristina Tobio. 2011. Urban inequality. In *Justice for all: promoting social equity in public administration*, ed. Norman Johnson, and James H. Svara, 76–99. New York: M.E. Sharpe.

Harvey, David. 1989. From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: the transformation of governance in late capitalism. *Geografiska Annaler* 71B: 3–17.

Honneth, Axel. 1995 [1992]. *The struggle for recognition: the moral grammar of social conflicts*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

———. 2003. *Redistribution or Recognition?: a political-philosophical exchange* . London: Verso. Co-authored with Nancy Fraser.

———. 2007. *Reification: a recognition-theoretical view*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Landry, Charles. 2000. *The creative city: a toolkit for urban innovators*. London: Earthscan.

Law, John, and Annemarie Mol. 2001. Situating technoscience: an inquiry into spatialities. *Environment and Planning D: Society & Space* 19(5): 609–621.

Lecomte, Jeremy. 2013. Beyond indefinite extension: about Bruno Latour and urban space. *Social Anthropology/ Anthropologie Sociale* 21(4): 462–478.

Lefebvre, Henri. 2003 [1970]. *The urban revolution* . Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Trans. Robert Bononno.

MacLeod, Gordon, and Colin McFarlane. 2014. Grammars of urban injustice. *Antipode* 46(4): 857–873.

Manshanden, Walter J.J. 2009. *Kennis als Economische Motor: onderzoek naar het ruimtelijk-economisch effect van hoger onderwijs, TNO-rapport*. Delft: TNO.

Marlet, Gerard, Roderik Ponds, and Clemens van Woerkens. 2012. *De Cultuurkaart van Nederland, Methodologische Verantwoording*. Utrecht: Atlas voor Gemeenten.

McCann, Eugene J. 2004. 'Best places': interurban competition, quality of life and popular media discourse. *Urban Studies* 41: 1909–1929.

McCann, Eugene J., and Kevin Ward. 2011. *Mobile urbanism: city policymaking in the global age*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

McDowell, Linda. 2017. The ideal worker: inclusion and exclusion in a knowledge-based city: the case of Oxford, UK. In *Inequalities in creative cities: issues, approaches, comparisons*, ed. U. Gerhard, M. Hoelscher, and D. Wilson. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

McFarlane, Colin. 2011a. Assemblage and critical urbanism. *City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action* 15(2): 204–224.

———. 2011b. On context. *City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action* 15(3–4): 375–388.

Merrifield, Andie. 2013. The urban question under planetary urbanization. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 37(3): 909–922.

Mol, Annemarie, and John Law. 1994. Regions, networks and fluids—anaemia and social topology. *Social Studies of Science* 24(4): 641–671.

Osberg, Lars. 2001. Inequality. In *International encyclopedia of the social & behavioral sciences*, ed. Neil J. Smelser, and Paul B. Baltes, 7371–7377. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Peck, Jamie. 2005. Struggling with the creative class. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 29: 740–770.

———. 2011. Geographies of policy: from transfer-diffusion to mobility-mutation. *Progress in Human Geography* 35(6): 773–797.

———. 2012. Recreative city: Amsterdam, vehicular ideas and the adaptive spaces of creativity policy. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 36(3): 462–485.

Peck, Jamie, and Nick Theodore. 2010. Mobilizing policy: models, methods, and mutations. *Geoforum* 41(2): 169–174.

Piketty, Thomas. 2014a. *Capital in the twenty-first century*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

———. 2014b. Capital in the twenty-first century: a multidimensional approach to the history of capital and social classes. *The British Journal of Sociology* 65(4): 738–747.

Poort, Joost, and Gerard Marlet. 2005. Omvang en belang van de creatieve productie in Nederland. In *Cultuur en Creativiteit naar Waarde Geschat*, ed. Gerard Marlet, and Joost Poort, 3–26. Amsterdam: Stichting Atlas voor Gemeenten.

Porter, Michael. 1998. Clusters and the new economics of competition. *Harvard Business Review* 76: 77–91.

Prince, Russell. 2012. Metaphors of policy mobility: fluid spaces of "creativity" policy. *Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography* 94(4): 317–331.

———. 2014a. Topologies of mobile policy: neoliberalism and creativity. In *Engaging Geographies: landscapes, lifecourses and mobilities*, ed. Michael Roche,

Juliana Mansvelt, Russell Prince, and Aisling Gallagher, 191–206. Newcastle-Upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

———. 2014b. Calculative cultural expertise? Consultants and politics in the UK cultural sector. *Sociology* 48(4): 747–762.

Provincie Groningen. 2007. *Dwarskijken Groningen als Creatieve Stad: het provinciale beleid 2005-2008*. Groningen: Pronvincie Groningen.

Raspe, Otto, and Frank van Oort. 2007. *Ruimtelijkeconomisch Beleid in de Kenniseconomie*. Den Haag: Ruimtelijk Planbureau.

Rutten, Paul, Gerard Marlet, and Frank van Oort. 2011. *Creatieve Industrie als Vliegwiel: onderzoek in opdracht van Creative Cities Amsterdam Area*. Haarlem: Paul Rutten Onderzoek.

Soja, Edward, and Miguel Kanai. 2007. The urbanization of the world. In *The endless city: the urban age project by the London School of Economics and Deutsche Bank's Alfred Herrhausen Society*, ed. Ricky Burdett, and Deyan Sudjic, 54–69. New York: Phaidon.

UN-Habitat. 2008. *State of the world's cities 2010/2011: bridging the urban divide*. Nairobi: United Nations Human Settlements Programme.

Venhorst, Viktor, Arjen Edzes, Lourens Broersma, and Jouke van Dijk. 2011. *Brain drain of brain gain? hoger opgeleiden in grote steden in Nederland*. Den Haag: Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, Faculteit Ruimtelijke Wetenschappen.

Wachsmuth, David. 2014. City as ideology: reconciling the explosion of the city form with the tenacity of the city concept. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 31: 75–90.

Winden, van Willem, Leo van den Berg, and Peter Pol. 2007. European cities in the knowledge economy: towards a typology. *Urban Studies* 44(3): 525–549.

World Bank. 2009. *World development report 2009: reshaping economic geography*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

PART III

Beyond the Global North

CHAPTER 9

Creative Inequality in the Mid-sized University City. Socio-spatial Reflections on the Brazilian Rural–Urban Interface: The Case of Cachoeira

Wendel Henrique Baumgartner and Eberhard Rothfuß

Introduction

The United Nations 'World Population Prospects' (2014) states that, '*[o]verall, nearly half of the world's 3.9 billion urban dwellers reside in relatively small settlements with fewer than 500,000 inhabitants, while only around one in eight live in the 28 Megacities […]. Many of the fastest growing cities in the world are relatively small urban settlements*'. However, in the academic world, few studies have been carried out on these cities (Lubell 1984; Rondinelli 1983; Satterthwaite and Hardoy 1986). A mere 12.5 % of the world urban population is currently living in Megacities (UN 2014) all the while that a focus on megacities and the metropolis dominates current debates and themes.

W.H. Baumgartner
Departamento de Geografia, Universidade Federal da Bahia, Salvador, Brasil

E. Rothfuß (✉)
Geographical Institute, University of Bayreuth, Bayreuth, Germany

U. Gerhard et al. (eds.), *Inequalities in Creative Cities*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95115-4_9

The goal in this chapter is to add conceptual visibility to the '*ordinary city*' (see Robinson 2006) in the Global South, which can be small or medium-sized[1] and whose size counts for the largest number of cities around the world.[2]

We agree with Roy (2005) that the most significant transformations of the twenty-first century are taking place in cities of the Global South. However, these (small and medium-sized) cities are important in a double sense: They are the interface(s) of several process, structures, functions and forms. They are dialectically spaces of resilience and resistance as well as spaces of cooptation and transformation. They are not just 'one thing', i.e. they are not urban or rural, they constitute the interface, and due to their spatial size, have inhabitants that share the same spaces and get (frequently) connected through face-to-face interactions. The interface aspect sheds light on the transformations of the cities because it connects the conceptual friction between different processes or spaces.

Florida's (2004) creativity paradigm has been widely adopted across diverse kinds of cities (Landry 2000). This creativity 'package' divides the social world into creative people and non-creative people (see Peck 2005, 2007). Privileged is one conception of a creative economy, culture and way-of-life, which dualistically separates the rural (frozen and crystalized, traditional, non-creative, conservative, full of prejudices, non-diverse) from the urban ((post-)modern, transformative, free of prejudices, 'multicultural', the melting pot). Produced for common consumption is a dualistic and exclusionary world. Those that think and act 'creatively' are entrepreneurial, working toward enhancing place competitive advancement, and accepting and adaptive to private-market principles as a way to govern people and grow cities. Any thoughts and acts outside of this narrow casting is deem non-creative and civically problematic.

We discuss the paradigm of creativity through the lens of spaces at the rural–urban interface, where medium-sized cities have an important

[1] For the UN (2014), considering the population, the global standards to define an urban settlement as small or medium are less than 500.000 and less than 5 million inhabitants, respectively. However, we must consider that these numbers do not represent some urban networks. In Brazil a small city has less than 50.000 and the medium-sized city less than 500.000 inhabitants. In Germany small cities range between 20.000 and 50.000 inhabitants, medium-sized cities between 50.000 and 100.000.

[2] But small and medium-sized cities are neglected in a two-fold manner by the academic world because of their size and also the fact that they are ordinary and 'fancy-less'. Furthermore, most small- and medium-sized cities are located in the Global South, in the periphery and in the semi-periphery of the capitalist world system (Wallerstein 1979, pp. 95ff.).

place. As we chronicle, when the creativity package is adopted in one of these places, social inequalities become legitimized through this concept. To explain and illustrate our ideas, we focus on Brazil, one of the most unequal[3] societies in the world. However, aspects of Brazilian inequalities can be observed in other countries with the same late capitalistic integration and uneven urbanization in the Global South. The same selective modernity observed in Brazil can be seen in other places, where modernized (post-)industrial society and 'traditional communities' (e.g. indigenous tribes or rural settlements) co-exist. The images of the Brazilian middle class going to the modern and international supermarket with their domestic sub-employer to carry bags or the new launched car having been washed at the streets by 'street washers' are common around the world.

In this context, we first interrogate the concept of 'creativity' which has been used for more than one decade in public policy (see Chap. 2) that now embodies hegemonic power and homogenizing ideas about the Global South. Next, we focus on our case studies in Brazil and unearth some prominent inequalities that have emerged, as the creative city growth paradigm has been put in place.[4]

The Creativity Paradigm: A View from Brazil, in the Global South

A comparison between North/South worlds suggests that Brazil is among the most highly inequitable nations in the world. Florida's (2004) creativity index suggests that Brazil ranks 43rd whereas Germany appears on the 10th position with a 0.577 index with Sweden in the number 1 position (0.808) (Table 9.1).

Inside Brazil (where the inequalities North/South is opposite with a rich South and a poor North/Northeast), Florida's creative industries

[3] Further readings about Brazilian Inequalities see: Da Matta, R. Carnivals, Rogues and Heroes: An Interpretation of the Brazilian Dilemma. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991; Freyre, G. The Masters and the Slaves (Casa-Grande & Senzala): A Study in the Development of Brazilian Civilization. Oakland: University of California Press; 2 revised edition, 1987; Ribeiro, D. The Brazilian People: The Formation and Meaning of Brazil. Gainesville: University Press of Florida; 2000, Santos, M.; Silveira, M. L. O Brasil. Território e Sociedade no início do século 21. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2001; Skidmore, T. Brazil: Five Centuries of Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2nd edition, 2009.

[4] After the creativity package has been implemented in policies in the global cities, it is now entering the countryside, transforming the ordinary city into a creative one. It inserts these cities in the globalized urban network through the introduction of new functions, services, business and the production of a creative milieu and will hopefully promote a high position for these cities in the global rankings of creativity.

Table 9.1 Abstracts of the creativity index according to Florida

	Technology index	*Talent index*	*Tolerance index*	*Innovation index*
Germany	0.511	0.468	0.753	136.77
Brazil	0.083	0.128	0.266	0.77

Source: Florida

concentrate in the São Paulo/Rio de Janeiro region, where over 40 % of the Brazilian GDP is produced. This concentration reinforces the uneven economic development in the country.

In these relations between the global urban world and regional spaces, Brazil's cities are nodes and points for reception and transmission of ideas (ideologies). Nevertheless, the connections are unequal, since the power of urbanization is higher and seducing. Of course, there exists resistance in places where 'traditions' are still present, but what these ordinary cities, at the margins of the development machine, can offer to the 'creative urban world' is just an exotic or 'too strange' or even 'too roots'. The idea of roots in places with weak urbanity or rurality linked some cultural/folk fixed aspect—apparently with no movement and deeply connected with the soil—with an opposition with the ideal of cosmopolitan, more connected with the urban metropolis and the 'cosmos' the universe, the free and fluid space, the sky. Therefore, if some cities want to be part of this 'urban creative party', the local/ordinary/roots creativity must be standardized and commodified. The place for exotic, picturesque or vernacular is

- Small in the gourmet house chefs because the tastes can be too different,
- Loud with its music in comparison to the cool lounges around the world,
- Too colorful with its hand-made crafts to the white colored environments,
- Simplistic in its design,
- Starless in architecture,
- Not comprehensible in movies,
- Too rural/regional, so it is not 'desirable' due to the specific 'traditional' milieu.

This does not suggest that there is no tolerance or that there are prejudices, especially if we consider that Brazil is a 'cultural melting pot' and immigrant country. Sometimes, the outsider/ urban creature wants to

change the place, without people living in that place. One characteristic of the rurality is this 'shy' behavior with the 'outsider'. Inequalities are often relations between the global and the local sphere (and in class relation on the national level), with populations in both spaces wary of the other. Even in cases where there is conflict and contradiction, public policies promote urban and regional development in these ordinary places, trying to simulate what has worked elsewhere (in economic terms) around the world. Creative growth becomes implemented by the Brazilian state. In the last decade we can observe an intensified process of implementation of universities in small- and medium-sized cities, in dynamic or stagnated (often peripheral) regions. In the poorer areas, the local knowledge, the cultural practices and the situated creativity are the driving forces of regional and urban development (see Fig. 9.1).

The idea of creative or cultural degrees from a university brings the perspective to legitimate the standardization of the local creativity and



Fig. 9.1 Location of Federal University Campus in Brazil

production of a more 'urban-global' creativity, more easily consumed by the world, through the idea of innovation in '*knowledge societies*' (UNESCO 2005). What is ordinary for the local community can be considered innovative when incorporated in the urban world, after the standardization. The university as a globally recognized institution can connect the place with the urban world. The university creativity, more urban, is easily digested and, on the other hand, the ordinary people produce a 'local' creativity, more rural and less urban. However, since the creativity concept decidedly bears a positive connotation, the ordinary creativity or culture of a small town is used as a *dispositif* in a Foucauldian sense to attract attention. But it is important to highlight that is not the 'folk creativity' that will be successful to reach the world, but the standardized creativity.

Some Theoretical Considerations: Urbanity, Rurality and the Locality Matters

Seeking theoretical ground, we operationalize some thoughts of Henri Lefebvre (1973, 2000). On a global scale it is very important to consider the imposition of an urban global society. The urban space and more specifically, the urban (global) way of life—urbanity—is a universality in tension with a more 'local' or 'ordinary' aspect of the everyday life that we could consider as a 'weak urbanity' or even a *rurality*. This is important because we consider this issue as central to understanding the role of small- and medium-sized cities in the global urban network, since these cities are still situated in a local/regional socio-spatial context, but with connections to the global sphere through processes of urbanization. The metropolitan areas are too far from the rural/regional spaces to influence them in any profound and visible way. Since the age of '*planetary urbanization*' (Brenner and Schmidt 2015) and according to Lefebvre's (2003) dictum of an '*urban revolution*', the urban world has been in constantly 'innovation' and creativity appears as a possibility of economic production. It is important to note that urban society is a product of a capitalist world. In this sense, the urban is inseparable from the deep-seated imprints of economic structures and activities.

Gust-Bardons (2012) makes a crucial contribution to an analysis of the role of geographical proximity in the innovative process that can be transposed to the creative process. She argues against the decline of the geographical proximity, studied by Boschma (2005), where the effect of 'space'

is vitiated by other types of proximity: social, cognitive, organizational, and institutional. We agree that both innovative and creative processes have an intimate relationship with knowledge in terms of formal/institutional/certified knowledge and traditional/experienced/lived knowledge. The certified knowledge and the standardized creativity can be spread around the world and be reproduced anywhere, by following a manual. The lived knowledge, however, base for creativity in a strict sense, can only be learned in a face-to-face relation and for this, geographical proximity and '*locality*' (Korff 2003) matters. Of course, 'this initial creativity' could be appropriated and transformed to be consumed in the global world. However, its 'genetics' is strongly connected with local and regional scales, a situation Florida called learning regions which cannot be seen as isolated islands (Florida 1995, cited in Gust-Bardons 2012). In order to 'survive' these learning regions have to be open to the global scale.

If we consider geographical proximity as an important framework to discuss inequalities associated with the creative economy, we can interrogate how to overcome this spatial constraint. One effective remedy, as often captured in public plans, is to develop a creativity infrastructure associated with a knowledge infrastructure (universities and research institutes). Unfortunately, these plans are often repetitive, with a post-modern conceptualization, the locational models based in the economy of agglomeration, where the concentration of people and institutions could solve the problems. This theoretical frame raises crucial questions when we think about small- and medium-sized cities. For example, quantitative concentrations of people, functions and institutions become smaller compared with the metropolis. Hence, the starting point for a small city in the competition in the globalized urban network will be always a step behind.

In this scenario, public programs seeking to promote the local/regional development should make efforts to solve these two crucial points: increase of quantities—people/capital/institutions—and upgrade of the urban economy based on international trends. Providing for and supporting the construction of infrastructures constitutes a significant and fundamental step to achieving these goals. In our case study (see Chap. 4), one infrastructure to develop in one region/city is to implement a public university campus. The main idea is that the infrastructure will centralize people/knowledge/capital in one place initially and later disseminate to the inner region and connect these places with the globalized world. In the last decade, the Brazilian government promoted

a comprehensive decentralization program of federal public universities toward medium- and small-sized cites. The installation of a public university is a governmental strategy to provide the infrastructure to a territory, as well as to increase urbanity degree of rural or not-modernized ordinary cities (see Baumgartner 2014).

Rurality and Urbanity: A Lefebvrian Perspective

There are different forms to increase the urbanity of ordinary cities, as well as diverse development or resistance gradations of this urban world. The urbanization process has different phases of incorporation and different degrees of urbanity. This range goes from 'absolute' rurality (the rural archetype, or '100 % rural') to 'absolute' urbanity (the urban archetype, or '100 % urban', or the 'promised' Lefebvrian urban society). In between these two extremes, there are several degrees of urbanity and rurality that fulfill the forms, or the cities. For rural cities, the 'industrialization' of agriculture is the most common case in increasing urbanity and the substitution of parts of their rurality. Going beyond the industrialization, the higher education institutions become bearers of a high grade of urbanity, because the knowledge produced as well as the members of the university community are connected with the advanced life styles of the world. Understanding the city's position between rurality and urbanity, or getting closer to the processes and contents that stimulate the city, is academically stimulating, transcending the conventional classificatory schemes of cities. It is important to remember that these contents between the rural and the urban archetypes, manifested in their ruralities and urbanities, overlap and coexist in space, often within the same city.

The characterization of these two archetypes is based in the contribution of Henri Lefebvre (1973) and the two archetypes rurality and urbanity are just theoretical potentialities, but their graduations are visible in space. It is important to stress again that the idea is not to create or to promote a rigid dichotomy in our classification scheme, or a form of double idealization of urban versus rural. In Table 9.2, we present the archetypes of this potential content. In between the two columns is what is important and what is empirically observable. The combinations for the different degrees of urbanity and rurality are fluid and extremely variable. Also, the proper archetype, especially the urban, is in constant change, adding new possibilities of existence in the process of realization of itself.

Table 9.2 The rural and urban archetypes

Contents	*Rural archetype—rurality*	*Urban archetype—urbanity*
Space	Restricted, local, regional	Large, global
Time	Natural, cyclic, slow	Clock time, linear, fast
Social Organization	Organic	Mechanic
Sociability	Family, resonant	Individual, instrumental
Communication	Strong; face-to-face	Weak
Information	Weak	Strong
Technical Density	Low	High
City	Meeting place, commerce, religion, value of use, spontaneity, work	Circulation, services, working place, consumption, programmed appropriation, product

Source: Changed from Baumgartner (2014)

The rural archetype space is strongly characterized by its local aspects. This 'small' space is the result of difficulties in the transport system and vehicles (animal or mechanic traction), traffic routes and an 'attachment' felling to the place. The time is conducted by nature, which governs aspects of production, mainly linked to agricultural production, and the ordinary issues of daily life. The community builds an organic social organization, creating strong links and ties between the community members, who organize themselves for collective survival, mutual aid to cooperate with the issues/difficulties that arise (see Tönnies 1957). In this context, the family is promoting the mediation and the insertion of the individuals in this community.

The rural archetype is also marked by a strong communication component (Santos 1979), as the form of organization generates a need for exchange between group members without the mediation of technical objects. This is because the technique has a low density and most contacts are face-to-face interactions. In this context, the variety of information is small, because the intrinsic interest and identity of the group is related to their own place and their close everyday life (Castello 2010). This does not mean alienation, however. It is just one constraint—given by the lack of technical means—or even no interest in an amount of information that have no direct (and relevant) impact on their every-day life (Rothfuß and Korff 2015).

The city filled by a higher degree of rurality is a space of meeting, sporadic encounters (e.g. fairs, street markets, religious festivals and

church services), as well as for trade and basic bureaucratic or financial activities. However, in a big city we can see fragments or lower rurality especially in older and popular neighborhoods. Studies of global cities and metropolis note that within these distinct geographies, globally connected communities often emerge. Appadurai (1996), for example, shows how closely connected migrant communities emerge. Looking at the peripheral regions of Megacities, McGee notes a situation he refers to as '*Kota-desa*' or urban—rural (McGee 1991). These regions show many features of villages rather than of parts of a metropolis. Several studies of deprived neighborhoods within the metropolis indicate the high degree of social cohesion. In Indonesia one still speaks of Kampung or 'village' in the big cities.

The urban archetype is a capitalistic production and it is defined by a fundamental element: the capital/resources/money available to its realization. The urban space is marked by fluidity and its global extension, even as potentiality. This characteristic of urban space is related to the development of transportation infrastructure and information systems. People who embody the most intense degree of the urban world tend to travel more often and international trips become more frequent. Nevertheless, the degree of communication in the inter-personal contact is weak, and usually mediated by a specific equipment or object, day-by-day more individual, as the personal phone, personal computer, and etcetera. However, due to the high technical density, the volume of information exchanged, transferred or received, is very high. This does not mean that the whole volume is assimilated and has direct links with everyday life or essential aspects of life. The information is produced and transferred instantly, even if this information is less relevant or is outdated in a short period of time. The time in the urban archetype is fast and accelerating and people often have the feeling that it is almost insufficient for the amount of tasks and displacements needed in everyday life (Rosa 2013). The impression is that 24 hours is still insufficient to 'live' one day. Indeed, time is marked by the clock, a time built by the society and not nature, and watches have been conducting much of our everyday life. This mechanical aspect of time is also transferred to the social organization, structured by ephemerons interests of the individual life, based on professional or service delivery relationships.

The individual satisfaction in social relationships is predominant against collective emancipation. Moreover, the individual is the center of sociability in urban archetype. A profession, a job, an address, and credit

capacity mark the real social status as well as define possible living spaces with other individuals in the same income range or position (segregation and fragmentation of urban space). The urbanity is the realm of individuality.

Globalization enhances the rise and differentiation as well as delimitation of culturally self-sustaining communities in the big global cities. Hence, they are fragmenting into spheres of intimacy (Sennett 1977) that leave little space for public life and communication. The centrality of the global city within global and national networks and 'civilizations' implies orthodoxy of cultures and ideologies, especially of those connected to ideas of superiority of those residing in such central spaces and participate in such cultures. As a result, we find a combination of arrogance ('we are more civilized/enlightened simply by being in the center') and ignorance ('we don't need to know what happens elsewhere, as only what happens here is of importance').

In *The Fall of Public Man*, Richard Sennett (1977) criticizes attempts to establish communities of intimacy within the cities. Processes of globalization favor such a growth of intimacy and ghettoization of '*cosmopolitan*' people. The BoBos (Bourgeois Bohemians: The *creative class* in Florida's sense) have their own self-centered condominiums, they go to boutiques and coffee-shops where they are certain of finding other BoBos, etc. The city is, in terms of everyday life of its inhabitants, increasingly fragmented into communities.

The consequence is not the dissolution of the city, but rather the transformation especially of the big and global (creative) cities into collections of villages with different social milieus, quite similar to what we find in remote rural areas inhabited by different ethnic minorities. This means, while global cities turn into agglomerations of communities, small and medium cities become centers of urbanism of an urban society. This leads us to the assumption that especially these small- and medium-sized cities at the rural–urban interface are the transforming spaces of the 'global trope' (Wilson 2007) of the creative paradigm.

Global cities are mainly architectural. The first living in wooden and clay huts, while the others live in duplex houses, high-rises, etc. In contrast, the population in small and medium-sized towns is too limited to allow for the rise of distinct communities (they are 'liminal spaces'; see Fig. 9.2). The inhabitants have to communicate with each other and integrate the different groups as neighbors into their everyday life. Thereby heterogeneity of communication and of relations to persons of diverse life



Fig. 9.2 Rural–urban interface of mid-size cities—localities of innovation and creativity (own source Rothfuß)

styles becomes a main feature. In another terminology one can say that especially in the small cities the weak ties gain in relevance. As noted in Granovetter's (1973) *The Strength of Weak Ties*, it allows the rapid spread of innovations among different groups and cultures. Consequently, the district towns become ever more urban in the sense of urbanism, while the metropolis is paradoxically 'ruralising' (see Fig. 9.2).

Fig. 9.3 Location of Cachoeira in Bahia, Brazil

The Ordinary City of Cachoeira and Its New University

Brazil's Cachoeira[5] was an important place in past centuries due to its central position in the Brazilian colonial/imperial urban system (see Fig. 9.3). However, during the twentieth century the city lost its economic power and became isolated. This isolation froze the city's landscape with a colo-

[5] Cachoeira must be understood with its twin city São Félix. It has 14,098 inhabitants (IBGE, 2015), with 9265 in the urban area and 4833 in the rural area. The population estimative to 2015 (IBGE) indicates 15,091 inhabitants to São Félix and 34,535 inhabitants to Cachoeira. Once the cities have a very integrated socio-spatial structure, we can consider the agglomeration of these two cities a mid-size city in the interface of small and middle-sized cities of the Brazilian urban network in the Northeast of Brazil.

nial architectonic space.[6] The city currently contains 16,387 inhabitants whereas 15,639 live in the rural areas of the municipality (IBGE 2015).

After the colonial period, when Cachoeira was in the middle of the biggest colonial sugar cane and tobacco fields, the city kept its importance with the arrival of an important railway crossing. These economic particularities also explain the monumental colonial architectonic site (Baumgartner 2009). The wealthy economy was ruined during the 1950s when the transport system changed to a road-based system, which did not cross Cachoeira and thus excluded the city from the new transport system. Factories, warehouses and trade centers closed and out-migration increased. The city's central location shifted and poverty swelled. According to UNDP (UNDP/PNUD 2013), the Municipal Human Development Index (HDI-M) for Cachoeira increased from 0.598 (1991) to 0.516 (2000) and to 0.647 in 2010, placing the city among the municipalities with medium human development, occupying the position number 3172, between the 5,565 Brazilian municipalities. Cachoeira's population is constituted by 16.7 % extremely poor and 33.8 % poor to the World Bank definition.

To overcome this economic stagnation, several planning actions to boost economic development followed. Three major actions were supported by the Federal Government. The first was The Monumenta Program (Ministry of Culture), an Italian-based model to rehabilitate the historical center financed with the resources from Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and UNESCO. The second was The Program for Ethnic Tourism (Ministry of Tourism), directly linked to the tourism sector, and designed to attract people around African identities. The third was the installation of the Federal University of Recôncavo da Bahia—UFRB (Ministry of Education).[7]

[6] In addition, Cachoeira is one of the birthplaces of the *Candomblé* (an Afro-Brazilian religion) and has several festivities, which promote this Afro-Brazilian culturalheritage.

[7] Bahia state (almost the same size than France), where Cachoeira is located, has a very good example to understand late creation and the concentration of superior course in the state's capital—Salvador. The first superior course in Brazil was created only in 1808 in Salvador (the first universities just in the decade of the 1930s). In Bahia, in 1946 the University of Bahia (now Federal University of Bahia—UFBA) was created with a campus in Salvador. In 1977, UFBA installed a campus in a countryside city to established courses related with agriculture. After 2005, there were created more Federal Universities: the Federal University of West of Bahia—UFOB, the Federal University of South of Bahia—UFSB, the University for the Afro-Brazilian Lusophony Integration—UNILAB, the Federal

In this context, the UFRB was founded in 2005 to promote urban and economic development based on knowledge and creative growth. Academic courses in history and the social sciences were created as well as courses in museology, journalism, visual arts and films and audiovisual. The development of these latter courses sought to create a creative industry in the city through an idea of bringing the campus to the city. Minister of Culture Gilberto Gil (a famous musician) led the initiative.

Establishing UFRB is the most important public project in the city to date and one with a high impact on the everyday life and urban morphology because of the influx of a new profile of inhabitants—professors, technical and administrative staff and students. In 2014, the university employed 116 professors (50 of them with a PhD) and 35 administrative and technical employees. The campus has approximately 1.511 students.

These professors originated from other cities, states and countries (because of the qualification in specific areas) and have an income 22 times higher than the local population. According to UNDP (2013), the average monthly income of a Cachoeira inhabitant is R$ 368 (114 €) and the salary of a professor holding a Doctorate degree, starting the career, is around R$ 8,000 (2,500 €). This ratio was even worse in 2009, when the difference was 25 times.

The first big impact on the city can be observed in housing. Local residents had to move from their houses, most of them, to rented houses in the city center, to the peripheries, outside the historical area. With the first wave of newcomers in 2006 and 2007, rent for small houses (50 m²) increased from R$ 200.00 to R$ 800.00 (from 87 € to 347 €; or 400 %). Another important impact is the 'modernization' of trade and consumption in the city. Old forms, such as the street market on Wednesdays (Fig. 9.4), where local farmers could sell their products, have been replaced by branded supermarkets (Fig. 9.5). In these supermarkets, where all the products are processed in other cities, local producers and farmers have no access to sell their products, while the local population has no money to buy the more expensive products that replaced them. The 'evolution' of the local market was a predictable development after establishment of the university, since new inhabitants have much more money compared to locals. Also, as urban residents, they have other wishes and ways of shopping. The shift from the 'street market' to supermarket is thus one of the

University of the São Francisco River Valley—UNIVASF and the Federal University of Recôncavo (UFRB). This last one has a campus in Cachoeira.

Fig. 9.4 Street market in the city center: Rurality in town. There, small and local farmers could sale and trade their products, which reached the market using mules or old cars for transportation. The products prices were lower and bargaining was common. Source: Baumgartner, November 2009

most visible aspects in the retreat of rurality and expansion of urbanity after the establishment of the UFRB.

Santos (1979) wrote that people often suffer adaptations, disappearances or reductions of 'traditional' activities with new redevelopment. Santos (1979) further argued that the forces of modernization attack silently from within or outside of the city but very selectively. Production tends to concentrate at certain points of the territory, but consumption responds to dispersion forces and tends to be dispersed and reaches more points.

The installation of a university gave the city the opportunity to create new functions and to 'modernize' others, increasing the intensity of urbanity, mainly to the idea of creative economy and knowledge. The new residents' profile, with high qualifications and more connected to the creative phantasm brings urbanity with them. It is observable in changes in the everyday life of the city, with students' parties and meetings, cof-

Fig. 9.5 Inside the delicatessen: A symbol of urbanity. Also located in the city center, the convenience store is well organized, the products are industrialized, mostly of them from other states or even imported, prices are fixed and people can pay. Source: Baumgartner, November 2009

fee shops, bookstores, symposiums, music and literature festivals. In this direction, there are no connections between these creative courses (with their students and professors) and the local/ordinary people and the city.

A glance at the Film and Audiovisual course of Cachoeira, which is one of the few courses of this type[8] in a medium-sized city and is completely free (it is offered by a Federal Public University), is instructive. It has produced nearly 50 films (short) in digital form every year by its 21 professors and 181 students. Some of these films exhibit local culture, especially the '*Samba de Roda*' and '*Candomble*' or other religious festivities, but have registered limited impact on the media (a short film '*Sambares*' on the platform 'Vimeo' had 268 plays in three years). Curiously, Cachoeira has one movie theater that opened in the year 2014 (in Brazil, only five cit-

[8] Film and Audiovisual Arts Courses by Brazilian's Regions: 10 South; 24 Southeast (SP and RJ); 5 Central West; 12 Northeast; 3 North.

ies with less than 20,000 inhabitants—among 3,842 cities—have a movie theater; the whole state of Bahia has 83 movie screens and 90 % of them are located in Salvador). The presence of the university put Cachoeira in the route of international art festivals, like an international film festival and a literary international fair. Several scientific meetings took place in Cachoeira after the establishment of the university.

In the center of the city the impact of the university can also easily be observed in several areas. The amount of functions, services and commerce has increased. Economic growth is apparent, new businesses opened their doors and economic opportunities emerged. However, the 'development' is bringing other content to the space, i.e. conflicts have been produced. We can observe a fracture in the city with the production of two different spaces: the *local city* and the *University City*. In both spaces, specific aspects of rurality and urbanity, respectively, are present. Can the university transform the city in a completely urban space connected with the creative global economy? Or will it be an illusion?

Concluding Remarks

In the configuration of today's global urban society, the apparent supremacy of the urban over the rural, both in morphology and in daily life, is easily observed. However, in small- and medium-sized cities, where the higher amount of the world population is living, and even in those areas, which are part of the economic globalization process, we observed that there is something beyond the urban society that is anchored neither in the rural 'archaic' nor in the 'traditional'.

We can detect several possibilities to analyze the relations between rural and urban spaces inside this dialectical approach. The fast urbanization spreading in the Global South, like in Brazil, is still incomplete and selective, observed in the morphological sphere of space (forms) as well as in the functions and in everyday life (constituent). The result of this 'unfinished' urbanization processes, especially in the small- and medium-sized cities, still exhibits traces of ruralities. Our research about the relations between ruralities and urbanities took place in university cities located in traditional rural areas as well as in agribusiness.

As chronicled, symbols of a global and advanced urban society in medium-sized cities still retain more organic and close relations with the rural. As interface, spaces coexist in the same city linked to the integration dynamics in global urban networks (like the creative activities supported

and standardized by universities) and places closer to the life of the countryside, or elements that refer to a more rural and local or regional life. Yet the dichotomy or the differentiation of areas between rural and urban spaces does not explain the intensity of the spatial processes and that of the large number of cities.

In our perspective, it is important to stress that the focus on the interface of ruralities and urbanities can deliver interesting insights to understanding and explaining the spatialization and manifestations of the mainstream creativity discourse. Concealing inequalities and fostering the invisibility of the reproduction process of inequality in general became positive with some development and imported concepts bearing positive connotations, such as creativity. Brazil—one of the most unequal nations in the world with a long 'tradition' neglecting and camouflaging inequality—has been represented as a powerful place to implement the creativity paradigm, since creativity (f.i. the *malandro* and the *jeitinho brasilieiro*) was already an important part of the social construction of Brazilian collective identity.

We observe a '*banalization*' and '*instrumental reason*' (Adorno & Horkheimer 2002) guiding the quest for creativity, where partying and good moods become the main reason of a creative vibe lived by the 'creative people' when they live just with and among other 'creative people'. The ideas lead us to a kind of creative segregation where the creatives take predetermined places and spots in the university cities and the 'others', conservatives and 'non-creatives' must be placed somewhere else. It is not our main goal to discuss this spatial segregation as an aspect of unequal creativity, but this can help us recognize that creativity must be practiced in a different way than the segregationist way. The creative vibe should be the realm of freedom for all living in the city. But of course, this seems to be a naive promise.

The chapter has shown that Cachoeira can be considered as a city with a strong and recognized social, historical, cultural and architectonic background. In the last decade, the city transitioned from being a cultural city to a 'creative' one, after the university was established. However, social and economic inequalities became more acute, since the prices of housing and groceries have been rising considerably after the arrival of the creative class. Local people had to move to the periphery of the city in order to survive economically. Only 41 % of young people finished high school and a few (4 % of its population) with more than 25 years have a university degree. The average income is (R$ 368 or US$ 92). In 2010, 28 % of the population had no access to a house toilet with water. Even though the

developments in Cachoeira can be considered positive, inequalities are still prevalent and the 'ordinary' city is increasingly competing with the 'creative city' in a globalized urban network.

Bibliography

Adorno, Theodor W., and Max Horkheimer. 2002. *Dialectic of Enlightenment. Philosophical Fragments*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Appadurai, Arjun. 1996. *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Baumgartner, Wendel H. 2009. A instalação da UFRB, a ação do Programa Monumenta e o turismo étnico na reestruturação urbana e no cotidiano de Cachoeira-BA: Notas preliminares de pesquisa. *Geotextos* 5(1): 89–112.

———. 2014. Small city and new university. Perspectives and conflicts after the establishment of new public Brazilian universities in small cities. In *Proceedings of Colloque Aux frontières de l'urbain. Petites villes du monde: émergence, croissance, rôle économique et social, intégration territoriale, gouvernance*, 759–775. Avignon.

Boschma, Ron A. 2005. Proximity and innovation: A critical assessment. *Regional Studies* 39: 61–74.

Brenner, Neil, and Christian Schmidt. 2015. Towards a new epistemology of the urban? *CITY* 19(2–3): 151–182.

Castello, Lineu. 2010. *Rethinking the Meaning of Place: Conceiving Place in Architecture-Urbanism*. Surrey: Ashgate.

Florida, Richard. 1995. Toward the Learning Region. *Futures* 27: 527–536.

———. 2004. *The Rise of the Creative Class*. New York: Basic Books.

Granovetter, Marc. 1973. The strength of weak ties. *American Journal of Sociology* 78(6): 1360–1380.

Gust-Bardon, Natali I. 2012. The role of geographical proximity in innovation: Do regional and local levels really matter? *Working Papers Firms and Region no. R4:1438–9843*. Karlsruhe: Fraunhofer ISI.

IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatísticas). *Cidades* 2015. Available from http://www.ibge.gov.br/cidadesat/link.php?codmun=290490.

Korff, Rüdiger. 2003. Local enclosures of globalization. The power of locality. *Dialectical Anthropology* 27(1): 1–18.

Landry, Charles. 2000. *The Creative City: A Toolkit for Urban Innovators*. London: Earthscan.

Lefebvre, Henri. 1973. *De lo rural a lo urbano*. Barcelona: Ediciones Peninsula.

———. 2000. *Everyday Life in the Modern World*. New York: Continuum.

———. 2003. *Urban Revolution*. Minneapolis: Minneapolis University Press.

Lubell, H. 1984. Third world urbanization and international assistance. *Urban Studies* 21: 1–13.

McGee, Terry G. 1991. The emergence of desakota regions in Asia: expanding a hypothesis. In *The Extended Metropolis: Settlement Transition in Asia*, ed. Norton S. Ginsburg, Bruce Koppel, and Terry G. McGee, 3–25. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Peck, Jamie. 2005. Struggling with the creative class. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 29(4): 740–770.

———. 2007. *The Creativity Fix*. Available from http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-06-28-peck-en.html

Robinson, Jennifer. 2006. *Ordinary Cities: Between Modernity and Development*. London: Routledge.

Rondinelli, Dennis A. 1983. Towns and small cities in developing countries. *The Geographical Review* 73(4): 379–395.

Rosa, Hartmut. 2013. *Acceleration and Alienation—Towards a Critical Theory of Late-Modern Temporality*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Rothfuß, Eberhard, and Ruediger Korff. 2015. Urban self-organisation in the global south: The everyday life of the poor as a collective resource to enhance the politics of sustainability. In *The Politics of the Urban Sustainability Concept*, ed. David Wilson, 152–166. Champaign: Common Ground Publishing.

Roy, Aananya. 2005. Urban informality: toward an epistemology of planning. *Journal of the American Planning Association* 71(2): 147–158.

Santos, Milton. 1979/2004. *O espaço dividido: os dois circuitos da economia urbana dos países subdesenvolvidos*. São Paulo: Edusp.

Satterthwaite, David, and Jorge Hardoy (ed). 1986. *Small and Intermediate Urban Centres. Their Role in National and Regional Development in the Third World*. London: Hodder & Stroughton.

Sennett, Richard. 1977. *The Fall of Public Man*. London: Penguin Books.

Tönnies, Ferdinand. 1957. *Community and Society*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.

UNDP/PNUD (Programa das Nações Unidas para o Desenvolvimento). 2013. Perfil municipal de Cachoeira/BA. *Atlas do Desenvolvimento Humano no Brasil*. Available from www.atlasbrasil.org.br/2013/perfil/cachoeira_bawww.atlasbrasil.org.br/2013/perfil/cachoeira_ba.

United Nations. (2014). World Urbanization Prospects. The 2014 Revision. Highlights (https://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Publications/Files/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf)UN (United Nations) 2014.

UNESCO. 2005. *Towards Knowledge Societies*. Available from http://www.unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001418/141843e.pdf

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1979. *The Capitalist World-Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wilson, David. 2007. *Cities and Race: America's New Black Ghetto*. London: Routledge.

CHAPTER 10

Regulating Access and Mobility of Single Women in a "World Class"-city: Gender and Inequality in Delhi, India

Christiane Brosius

Introduction

This chapter reflects on the ways in which the concept of the world class city, here Delhi, mirrors and generates gendered spaces as well as discourses. These facilitate and respond to structural inequalities and concern politics of visualisation and materialisation of single middle-class women. The first part of the chapter seeks to highlight how restricted the access to independent residential living is for single upper middle-class women in Delhi. A focus on public space then draws in the spatial dimension of singleness, linking this to contemporary models of urban development, as well as the different qualities and ways in which urban spaces impact on and reflect how (single) women move through and dwell in cities. The second part highlights the

This chapter emerged from a EU-funded research collaboration (HERA Humanities in the European Research Area) entitled "Creating the 'New Asian Woman'—Entanglements of Urban Space, Cultural Encounters and Gendered Identities in Shanghai and Delhi (SINGLE)" (www.hera-single.de).

C. Brosius (✉)
Heidelberg Centre for Transcultural Studies, Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany

U. Gerhard et al. (eds.), *Inequalities in Creative Cities*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95115-4_10

interconnections between women's aspirations and strategies of claiming a right to the city, which includes empowerment through participation in a democratic space still at stake, partly because of the emphasis on neo-liberal economic production. The "world class" city gestures towards consensus on equality and fairplay, it suggests that its citizens have equal access to resources such as knowledge, mobility, and access to well-being according to "global" standards. Moreover, aesthetics, imaginaries, and media narratives of the "world class" city project the woman to be empowered by economic liberalisation. But the two approaches offered in this chapter show that these narratives generate manifold conditions of precarity and inequality when it comes to mobility and access in/to public and domestic contexts.

When glancing over media and academic discussions of India's urban transformation and development visions in the past decade, an interesting rhetorical ecology emerges that seems to differ from discussions led on the topic in Europe and the North America. The majority of debates is centred around "global city" and "world class" city (Brosius 2014; Ghertner 2015), with an emphasis on consumer growth, and mainly related to the so far booming affluent middle classes and opening consumer markets since the large-scale economic liberalisation in the early 1990s. Until now, substantially less attention is placed on "creative cities" and knowledge society, with one exception. A concept that points to this direction is that of the "smart city". It has been chosen by the current Indian government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi and was disseminated with the launch of the "smart cities mission" in 2015. This urban development vision triggers an imaginary related to the development of a new generation of cities based on new technologies (e.g., e-governance), good quality of life, citizen-friendly, and environmentally sustainable.

Under the umbrella of the "world class" city discourse lies a utopian language of prosperity, poverty elimination, and equality. Furthermore, it is based on a rhetoric that alleges a movement out of the rank of "Third world" to that of the "First world". This implies a much intended emancipation, or "up-grading" of India to the rank of wealthy, strong, and confident nations and economies on this globe. Finally, following the American-style model, the country realises its "Indian dream". And cities play a vital role in this. "World class" seems much more suitable for this imaginary than "creative cities". At least in the initial stage.

But interestingly, a socio- and cultural sensitive approach towards "Indian" challenges that urban development is absent except in the critical interventions of urban planners, activists, and intellectuals. And there,

too, we find a discourse that has largely been concerned with developmentalist and modernist concerns with a chaotic, corrupt, backward setting of megacities in the "Third World" (Roy 2009: 77). The "world class" narrative seeks to distance itself from the concern with the megacity by appropriating much of the "global city" discourse. In this unfolding, what is left out is the everyday spatialities and practices of marginalised urban populations in India. Absent from many urban visions is a critical perspective on class, caste, ethnicity and religion, and gender.

This chapter approaches the regulation and access to the world class city in the global south in several steps: first, we explore the concepts available for urban development and urban visions, arguing that this also impacts qualities and strategies of gender exclusion and empowerment. Second, the chapter presents a discussion of housing policies and residential environments for women. Of key interest is the single middle-class woman. Third, and last, the mobility of single women will be touched upon, with a special focus on safety discourses.

Diverse Visions for India's "Creative Cities"

Interestingly, the "creative cities"-discourse is still relatively minor in the otherwise vibrant discussions around India's urban growth and prosperity. Two directions can be mentioned briefly to map the debate. There is the UNESCO Creative Cities network which, in November 2015, declared a list of 47 such cities based on the following categories of creativity: crafts and folk art, design, film, gastronomy, literature, media arts and music. For India, two second-tier cities have been defined as "creative cities": Jaipur in Rajasthan ("Crafts and Folk Art") and Uttar Pradesh's holy city of Varanasi (also known as Benares, for "Music"). This network was launched in 2004 and is by now made up of 116 member cities. The aim is to foster sustainable urban development, social inclusion, and cultural vibrancy. From a look at the creativity categories, it becomes evident that the UNESCO view differs from Richard Florida's notion of "creative classes" to which we turn in a moment. In the focus on culture as enabler of sustainable development, less attention is paid to first-tier cities such as Delhi.[1] The "creative potential" of cities in India is defined differently in

[1] The Martin Prosperity Institute is based at the Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto and has applied the Creativity index to 50 Indian cities, ranking highest the city of Mumbai, followed by Bangalore (Bengaluru) and Delhi. The results are published in the

the next case that focuses prominently on the "creative economy" along criteria coined in the USA but responding to India's urban growth in terms of impacting urban development along the lines of "creative cities". The motor behind this is the US-based Martin Prosperity Institute (MPI), a think-tank whose director is Richard Florida. Under the umbrella of "global economic prosperity", the MPI focuses on cities by highlighting "the importance of place and the development of people's creative potential" (Creative Cities India Report 2014: 2). In 2012, it merged with the Institute of Competitiveness in India and forms the *Prosperity Institute of India* "with the intent to enhance the prosperity and creativity of Asia by sharing knowledge in the 3Ts (technology, tolerance, talent)". Clearly, the MPI sees its role in advising and developing cities on the basis of Florida's Creative Capital Theory, expecting to have their "boot in the door" when it comes to India overtaking China's population living in cities by 2050. As the report further underlines: "It is estimated that by 2030 India's cities could create 70 percent of all new jobs and produce more than 70 percent of the national GDP which would amount for an almost four-fold increase in national per capita income from today (McKinsey Global Institute 2010)" (ibid.: 1). In order to create this surplus value, cities must nurture, attract, and retain a "talented, creative and knowledgeable work force rather than by staying focused on conventional industries" (ibid.). This approach alleges that the "creative model" offers concrete expertise seemingly needed to transform India into an economy based on particular forms of technology and knowledge production.

There is not enough space here to further detail the eminent dangers of such an approach in terms of inequality and exclusion, e.g., local and global politics of participation and the Right to the city (e.g., Benjamin 2008; Yeoh and Ramdas 2014). Moreover, this chapter can only point towards the fact that this Index ignores vital aspects that make up urban dynamics in Indian cities, such as class and education, caste, ethnicity, and religion, as well as gender. However, the way in which "creativity" and "knowledge" are framed here underlines a dominant discourse that surfaces in the "smart cities vision" of the Indian government, and thus must be considered relevant for future urban development. Delhi has been selected as host of a "smart city" in 2015. The idea proposes a participatory element in allowing citizens of cities across India to "vote" for their

Creative Cities India Report of 2014. URL: http://martinprosperity.org/insight-creative-cities-india/, retrieved on 2.6.2016.

city to be a "smart city". This national competition is seen as a catalyst for the "holistic city rejuvenation programme to enhance physical infrastructure (water, energy, built environment, waste, mobility, and Information and communications technology (ICT)) and social infrastructure (health, education, and recreational facilities)". The smart city "mission is to drive economic growth and improve the quality of life of people by enabling local area development and by harnessing technology, especially technology that leads to Smart outcomes".[2] Yet, as UN Women Deputy Executive Director, Lakshmi Puri, articulated at the Safe Cities Global Stakeholders' Planning Meeting "Safe Cities for Women and Girls—Implementation Essentials": "No city can be smart and sustainable if half of its population is not safe and lives in fear of violence". [3] She further argues that:

> Urban safety is intrinsically linked to the concept of the Right to the City, and encompasses every person's rights to mobility and access social, economic, political, cultural opportunities that the cities offer. Adequate gender-sensitive planning in the provision of services and infrastructure can become an empowerment force that enables the full enjoyment of women to their right to public space, gender equality, and equal access to income, education, health care, justice, and political participation and influence. (see footnote 3)

Puri's voice finds support in other critical remarks on the ways in which the "smart cities" concept ignores structural inequalities based on class, caste, religion and gender, suggesting that this model of urban development might even just shift but further reinforce the exclusionary mechanisms.[4] Such a critical voice is raised against a growing number of protagonists who argue that the smart city approach is the only way through which the "derailing of India's growth" can be avoided.[5]

The globalisation of Indian cities has received scholarly attention with respect to the growth of middle classes, ongoing production of spatial

[2] See http://smartcities.gov.in/writereaddata/What%20is%20Smart%20City.pdf, retrieved on 2 June 2016.

[3] See http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2015/6/lakshmi-puri-safe-cities-statement, retrieved on 2 June 2016.

[4] Kumar, Alok P. & Srijoni Sen, in http://thewire.in/2015/06/01/divided-cities-cannot-be-smart-cities-2878/, retrieved on 2 June 2016.

[5] Alice Charles for the World Economic Forum 2016 https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/04/india-wants-to-create-100-smart-cities-how-can-it-get-there, retrieved on 2 June 2016.

and economic inequality in the context of illegal and semi-legal settlements (Ghertner 2015; Baviskar and Ray 2011), the emergence of new professional landscapes in the light of knowledge society, urbanisation, and the boom of service-based information technology (Nisbett 2010; Upadhya 2013; Radhakrishnan 2011). Less has been published on the relation between gender, middle class, and urbanisation (Donner 2014). Srivastava (2015) has paid attention to the ways in which cities like Delhi are gendered in terms of the regulations and possibilities that manifest spatially and through the flow of global ideas, concepts and capital.[6] Many cities brand themselves as "hubs" of the IT industry. In many instances, they provide particular opportunities to younger and educated single and married women who would, for instance, be counted as members of the "creative classes". In fact, the IT sector has become one of the iconic and most visualised realms of the booming national economy, with women often spearheading the pictorial and narrative landscape of urban and social change. The works have brought to the fore the drastic demographic, social and economic changes India's urban landscape is undergoing, the shifts in social relations and aspirations experienced by the country's booming youth population and the possibilities available to educated middle-class women in this process. Authors like Radhakrishnan (2011) have underlined the restrictions related to symbolic resources and social norms that women experience in particular contexts of work-life-relations in Bangalore while Donner (2014) has discussed changing intergenerational and gendered relations in the light of new ownership patterns and real estate development in Kolkata. A city like Delhi displays aspirations towards promoting gender equality in it capitalist version of "world class". Examples could be the emphasis on the knowledge-based female professional workforce, also for the sector of business process outsourcing (call-centres, retail), and an expanding landscape of higher education and training institutions that also caters to women. But its public and residential fabric demonstrates strategic exclusion and inequality.

[6] Much research on gender in cities of the Global South has focused on lower-class migrant women, e.g., with a focus on the rapid growth of cities in Asia, leading to an increasing demand for informal female labour migration linked to sectors such as care work, the sex industry, industrial labour, or low-paid domestic services (see Yeoh and Ramdas 2014). Jarvis et al. (2009) place gender and inequality centrally, even if gender is not always 'clearly visible'. Chant (2016: 12) highlights research on gender-based violence in slums, challenging gender equality—inequality on the basis of health, employment, education.

A "World Class" City for Single Women?

The imaginary of the "world class" city carries visions of equal mobility and access for middle-class women in the realms of work and consumption. Numbers of single women have increased remarkably since 2000.[7] Anglo magazines and TV-reports pick up stories of single women as a new social type time and again, be it the single mother, the single career-woman, or the single student (Swain & Pillai 2005). Challenges are addressed, but the general attitude is that the city slowly begins to open itself for these unconventional women because of its cosmopolitan nature. The majority of reports on women in the city are still dominated by the safety discourse on sexual violence. The spectrum between "successful power-woman" and "haunted victim" remains problematically silent, particularly with single women, underlining her ongoing stigmatisation, despite her potentially productive value for the "knowledge city".

Cities like Delhi are important arenas for "testing" new gender models, changing family patterns and the unravelling of 'traditional' social contracts as a result of new work opportunities, delayed marriage, divorce, of changing access to (higher) education, growing leisure and consumer society. As a result, one may argue that women are becoming increasingly visible in public, be it through media representations, everyday practices, and enhanced mobilities. Their presence is informed by repertoires of cultural encounter stemming from urban and national histories, globalised media landscapes and aspirations to cosmopolitanism and "world class" status. Yet the resulting subjectivities and everyday realities are of a precarious nature, marked by asymmetrical power relations reflecting opposition to 'westernisation' and associated perceptions of transgressions of normative gendered comportment and spaces such as the domestic and the public.

The 'new' urban woman becomes an emblem of this globality or world-classness aspired to, but ironically, at the risk of her personal autonomy (Lahad 2013; Lau 2010; Oza 2006). The seemingly 'new' Asian woman emerges in glossy lifestyle magazines and films, successful in the new service sectors of media production, IT industries, creative industries,

[7] Twenty-one percent (73 millions) of India's female population is constituted by unmarried, divorced, separated, or widowed women spending power in many cases has attracted attention of businesses. Working power and educational training make this group suitable for new service sectors. There is a 40 % growth of single women between 2001 and 2011 (census data), with women between 20 and 29 years constituting the sharpest rise of 68 percent (Fernandes, Dhar 2015).

claiming visibility in higher education, and pushing moral boundaries of patriarchy and class (Munshi 2001). But she also hits glass ceilings and symbolic boundaries that are entrenched and durable. Critics claim that freedom and autonomy are moral frames providing a "model of social engineering that can regulate individuals and populations towards promoting harmony within the market economy and among capitalist interests in order to effectively control labor power" (Song 2010: 133). In this, women's sexual independence and choice to abstain from the dogma of marriage and reproduction, too, plays a significant, albeit unspoken role. This implies that a single woman can be controlled less, that she can choose her relations and nurture different priorities, that she can redefine her position towards "projects" such as nation-state-building, career, and family. But a second rhetoric also surfaces: that of the woman being less dependent and thus responsible for her own fate and happiness (Song 2010: 133). She is to be held responsible if career or love relations fail (Lahad 2013). Moreover, young educated women are often no longer willing to consider the phase of being unmarried as temporary and allegedly unproductive 'waiting' for the 'natural' and teleological arrival of arranged or arranged-love marriage (Lahad 2012). While the single woman in popular film and visual culture has often been associated with the "westernised" cabaret dancer ('vamp'), the 'lose' urban girl that finally had to succumb to the social norms of marriage or risk being further stigmatised and socially excluded, this stigma is slowly and partially changing in everyday lives of cities like Delhi, Bengaluru, Mumbai, Pune, or Kolkata. More narratives and opportunities for singlehood as pleasure and social competence find entrance into the popular urban imaginary. More women demand a different place in society and in the city.

In a "world class" city like Delhi we can observe very strong dominant discourses on gender-based morality and behaviour, but we can also see that demotic discourses are increasingly possible and surface in a growing set of places and publics. Smitha Radhakrishnan's (2011) work on gender distinction and knowledge workers in the IT-hub Bangalore, South India, shows how important and yet paradoxical the development of the 'creative classes' in India is for this 'urban type'. The IT industry presents an example of the new infrastructures for work and leisure that have both facilitated and responded to the growing presence of the single, 'independent' woman as a social category but, simultaneously, also nurtured very conservative values that support patriarchy even in the light of transnational flexibility. Even if women are represented in the IT world, it is often

still based on a naturalised gender-inequality, and the global appeal of IT industries and lifestyle camouflages the possibility of the office-space as a prison-like cell that mirrors patriarchal control over women's mobility at home.

Leisure infrastructures for 'new' flexible and single women emerged in urban environs like Delhi, offering spaces and activities that expand the narrow social surveillance of family, neighbourhood (Singh 2010), or work: There is, for instance, a growing amount of travel agents in India specialising in holiday packages for single women, with the travel market for them growing circa 600 percent between 2005 and 2012 (Aji 2012). Single clubs (not to be confused with dating forums because sexual relationship is not necessarily intended) have emerged in cities like Mumbai, catering towards professionals and their desire to structure leisure time with peers. The real estate market is coming of age in terms of realising that professional affluent women seek to invest in residential housing and have become a stable factor on the housing market. Besides new 'institutionalised' forms of socialisation, there is a host of new places available for middle-class women aspiring to an independent lifestyle, be it gated communities, shopping malls, restaurants and a vibrant coffee culture, wellness and fitness centres (Srivastava 2012b).

Placemaking as Homemaking

In her analysis of single women's representations in contemporary literature from India, Lisa Lau outlines a fear attributed to residential autonomy of single women. She quotes from a novel on coping with singleness, as a 45-year old woman confronts her siblings with her decision to live on her own. Her siblings respond: "It is improper for a woman to live alone. What will society say? That your family has abandoned you" (discussion of Nair 2002, in Lau 2010: 278). The conversation reflects a stigmatising discourse of singles as failed wives or selfish hedonists by placing the family at the mercy of social gossip for the woman's breaching of normative behaviour.[8] This underlines a striking double-bind between a family's alleged respectability depending on that of its female members.

[8] According to Situmorang (2007), the social pressure on women living alone in Indonesian metropoles is high, and can often only be born if the single is well educated and financially independent.

In Asian cities, the residential infrastructure for singles (both men and women) is still underdeveloped (see Singh 2000, Song 2010). Moreover, the stigmatisation of women seeking their own accommodation, without marital or familial context, is predominantly seen as "abnormal", if not "anti-social" (see Srivastava 2012a, b). The dominant view is conservatively asserting the dependency of a woman on her husband or father. To move out of the biological family context without moving into marital housing is still rare but sought after increasingly by young women seeking refuge in the context of vocational training, work, or higher education. Metropoles spearhead the testing of new residential and social forms of living. Some, such as the "Paying guest" (living in a room as part of the owner's household, often with other women) or the "hostel" (on or near campus, or work-related) are older forms of affordable housing away from the family (Kumar 2012). Independent housing in shape of peer-or couple-based live-ins (flat-sharing) or ownership are recently becoming more in numbers. But in cities like Delhi, these are rarely affordable—and "sociable"—ways of residential home-making for single women. Access to housing is regulated through real estate agents, online portals, word-by-mouth. Within the category of the single woman, it is the freelancer who encounters most restrictions. Journalists, designers, and people working in the media sector rarely have contracts and financial security in hand and are seen as unnecessarily mobile and unstructured in terms of everyday life patterns. Students too are seen as "threatening" bourgeois orders since this is a time when, away from the family, they can experiment with lifestyles. Further stigmatised are unmarried or divorced women or single mothers, or women with boyfriends or in a homosexual relationship. Social norms surface in diverse techniques of subtle or outspoken surveillance and restriction of those "new" social types. Thus, access to an independent apartment may be restricted by landlords or housing associations who often enforce strict rules based on financial, social, ethnic, or religious criteria. Landlords may still consider single women living on their own as "uncultured" and, mainly in paying guest relations, may even impose strict rules on their tenant's mobility (e.g., having guests, going out at night). Especially in the case of women working in call-centres or other offices with night shifts, this could even be a case of rejection. Chennai's IT industry leads to higher rents of flats for single women than for men and families (Venugopal 2012), the same counts for women hostels on or off campus, for instance, in Delhi. In the case of Delhi, landlords too appear reluctant to rent or lease apartments to single women, and if so, often

rent out flats for substantially higher rents (on top of the already inflationary rental costs and scarcity of rental apartments), while loans for single women to purchase homes are still difficult to get, and request certain forms of behaviour (e.g., no male guests overnight, or at all, impose caste-based diets).[9] For urban South Korea, too, Song (2010) observed that spatial autonomy is almost non-existent and that marriage- and family-centred-housing policies prevail, partly to monitor unmarried women's sexual behaviour, and because urban housing is very expensive, limiting gender-based independence to those who have their own, substantial, income, and must be prepared for stigmatisation.

Since 2010, in globalising cities across India, there is a trend for housing space to be re-appropriated to suit independent lifestyles for more affluent young and creative people, ranging from students to interns to professionals. While conventional middle-class neighbourhoods still restrict such new residential forms, the "urban village" especially has become an adequate site of social experiments. Urban villages are pre-urbanisation agglomerations that have been both absorbed by but also sustaining of rapid Master-Plan-urbanisation. Such enclaves were formerly (or still are) inhabited by villagers, who have sold (or rented) their fields and houses to have them converted into residential and business properties in the course of urban growth. They are socially heterogeneous, with special housing patterns and regulations and often affordable rents. Thus, they attract particularly members from the creative classes who aspire to live and work independently, seek particular and often highly mobile social, leisure and work environs nearby. These special habitats are often socially, economically and ethnically much more diverse than surrounding middle-class neighbourhoods, nurturing informal growth and relatively low rents, attracting creative classes, expats and singles as much as illegal migrants and stigmatisations ("criminal"). For the perspective of this chapter, vthe urban village is an "in-between" or "transit-space" (Brosius and Schilbach 2016) that allows for experiments with new lifestyles, and with what many would identify as gateway to the city for such groups that would otherwise be rendered marginal or restricted access. Since a decade or more, many urban villages in South Delhi have become buzzing hubs for the creative classes, have shown openness with respect to social groups and lifestyles that are elsewhere restricted much more. As elsewhere, we also witness strong currents

[9] I thank Lucie Bernroider for this information which comes from her research on young middle class women in South Delhi as part of the HERA-Single project.

of gentrification as a consequence of the "trendy diversification" of these creative contact zones (such is the case in the urban villages of Shahpur Jat or Hauz Khas village; see Tarlo 1996).

Another residential site can be found in middle-class neighbourhoods with a number of not yet modernised bungalows that were built after Independence in 1947. The *barsati* is a particular residential unit in Northern India that has come to serve singles in pursuit of independent lifestyles. This independent unit on top of a bungalow or a two-storyhouse was once the preserve of servants, or a 'transit' room for male bachelors working away from their parental home, a private area with a large roof-terrace, allowing tenants to dry washing, or to enjoy the cool breeze during monsoon. From the 1970s onwards, the *barsati* stood not only for affordable living but also for enabling social "experiments", allowing women to live independently. With economic liberalisation in the 1990s, the habitat of the *barsati* became both gradually gentrified and diversified: it was affordable, compact, and independent from the main house. Artists, journalists, musicians, and increasingly single women would search for those spaces to retain autonomy and yet be emplaced in "respectable" middle-class neighbourhoods (Soofi 2011). The increasing pressure on central residential neighbourhoods through real estate development and affluent status-conscious middle classes since 2000 has led to a quasi-extinction of affordable residential units for the "Generation X": the older generation of houses built after Independence in the 1950s vanishes to make place for multi-storey state-of-the-art apartment buildings that have replaced the barsati by the "penthouse"-cum-affluent tenant.

The upper edge of urban places that may show a higher degree of tolerance vis-à-vis independent women are gated condominiums or gated housing colonies. They are often controlled by residential welfare associations (RWA) or other housing organisations.[10] In cities like Delhi a growing number of single women aspire to buying condominium apartments in gendered peer groups, seeking 24 × 7 "safety" as well as privacy-through-anonymity and a "cosmopolitan" lifestyle (see Srivastava 2012a: 40 and 2012b). However, the security measurements provided by guards, CCTV, and gates often come in tandem with the panoptic and often conservative eye of RWA as panoptic moral communities replacing family or clan. Despite offering privacy they impose rules for social behaviour and can

[10] In 2011, circa 3 percent single women invested in real estate (source: National Real Estate Development Council, see Dhamija and Bagchi 2011).

turn the life in "their little community" into a paternalist panopticon, particularly for single women. That safety measurements in residential and public spaces also cause anticipated threat, is an argument made about neoliberal "world class cities" elsewhere too (see Caldeira 2001, 2014), and underlines the ambivalent role of women's autonomy. This will briefly be explored in the next part, where women's access to and mobility in public space is addressed.

Walking the Street, Claiming Public Space

Using the lens of the right to the city paradigm another way to look at gender inequality in "world class" cities in South Asia is to study how women are enabled—or restricted—to navigate streets, parks or squares. In India, this is overshadowed by a safety discourse that reduces women's mobility to ideas of lack and threat, and that or urban planning to inefficiency and disorder (Datta 2010). Rather than proposing that gender-based urban violence is new, instead, the perspective on the "world class" city as a vital catalyst for knowledge-based economies and investment-friendly habitats has pushed discussions on women's restricted mobility to the fore. The quest of a different public city thus is largely framed through a neoliberal lens, with much emphasis on middle-class publics. This leads to a reductionist vision of women's potentials but also further societal issues related to public commons and democracy in an urban environ. Yet, the concentration on patriarchy and late capitalism as only sources of gender-based restrictions in Asia might also be misleading (space does not allow this to be further elaborated on).

Annah MacKenzie (2015) argues in her work on place-making in future cities (part of UN Habitat-funded Project for Public Spaces), that public space is rarely thought about in neoliberal urban planning, which is largely project-led and stirred by interest in commercial and private profit. In the context of elite aspirations towards Delhi's "world-classness", land must be transformed into capital (Ghertner 2015), while public space becomes "non-profit" and "unproductive". The "threat" or vulnerability of public space as publicly owned land and symbolic value of societal life, open and accessible to all members of a country has become one of the challenges to rapidly urbanising societies. This produces social segregation and inequality and reduces the city to a "milk cow", or an apocalyptic megacity drenched in turmoil. Rarely is public space seen as a motor for democratic action and diversity, as a site of innovative social transformation

and production. Place-making, in this context, is a key consequence of city leaders and citizens alike. This sounds very plausible in a place where both "city leaders" are committed to a diverse and yet inclusive city, and where citizens are attributed with key importance. But to establish such agendas in a city where governments of the past decades have not paid attention to the shaping of a shared notion of public space as public good, and where citizens are often dealt with as vote-banks, along the lines of interest groups based on caste, class, religion, region, this is a difficult task to translate. "The challenge is to include rather than to exclude, to share responsibility and investment, and to encourage new modes of integration and regulation based on public good, not purely private interest. In cities where Placemaking has taken hold", argues the programmatic paper *Placemaking and the Making of Future Cities* (2015), governments step back and leave space for community development organisations, neighbourhood partnerships, "to take the lead in making community change happen" (ibid.: 16). This seems to reflect a perspective on cities in the Global North, where cities have grown over time, rather than booming at rapid speed, such as cities in the Brasil Russia India China South Africa (BRICS) countries; and where socially diverse neighbourhoods have equally developed a history, while the Indian context, for instance, this experiment with social diversity as a concept for urban planning and civil society is impacted by dramatic shifts in politics, society, and economy and accompanied by violence (caste, religion, ethnic). Consequently, solidaric spatial responsibility is difficult to establish. Urban environs in a world class context like Delhi are largely managed by neoliberal and class-based registers: this way, for instance, low-class social groups are strategically excluded or rendered invisible. Moreover, the street and squares are not included in the repertoire of world class Delhi, because they are seen as "mundane" and lacking status.

In the context of Indian cities, another aspect should be considered, that of male claims to dominance over public space and thus mobility of diverse groups. As much as a woman is said not to live on her own, she must prove that her movement through space is productive and ideally, accompanied. Women moving through the city on their own are often considered "disrespectful", should be in male company, following an activity that caters towards "homemaking" or other forms of labour, and stick to mobility during day-time. Pleasure-based "loitering" in public is commonly understood as inadequate for women, walking as flânerie is limited to malls, and otherwise indicating low status. Walking as participa-

tion and expression of place-making is not yet accepted in a city like Delhi. While, in the Northern hemisphere, "walkability" has become a new trend of "global cities", an expression of a democratic mobility for all genders and social classes, arguing that public space and democracy are linked and that streets must be claimed by women as much as men, north Indian cities rank walkability one of the lowest qualities of urban life. Feminist scholars like Phadke et al. (2011) argue that loitering should be a fundamental right of all citizens alike, strengthening participation, equality, and inclusion of minorities and women. While loitering is a concept challenging patriarchal spatialisation practices, but also class-based inequalities, it is also the emphasis of "world class" city policies on "beautification" and "sanitisation" that affects urban visions, and further troubles women's role in cities.

They Discourse of Safety and Public Space

> It is a truism that women in the national capital of Delhi feel unsafe in many public spaces, and at all times of the day and night. Cutting across class, profession, they face continuous and different forms of sexual harassment in crowded as well as secluded places, including public transport, cars, markets, roads, public toilets and parks. School and college students are most vulnerable to harassment, … Unlike men, women experience the city differently and have to devise their own safety strategies to negotiate public spaces during day and night. (Safe Cities Report 2011: XI)

The *Safe Cities Report* funded by the UN in 2010 continues the portray of Delhi,

> as a city of exclusion, poverty clearly emerged as an important axis sharpening this vulnerability. There is an alarming level of 'normalization' of violence which threatens public spaces. The experience of violence and fear of violence at all times of the day and night, and virtually in all kinds of public spaces, underlines the flawed architecture of the city spaces and the gender insensitive attitude of the institutions that govern. … the development of Delhi as a "world class city" has made their lives more insecure (ibid.: 43).

These excerpts have been extracted from one survey on women's safety in the city undertaken by the feminist organisation Jagori in Delhi.[11] Jagori's

[11] See http://www.jagori.org/projects, retrieved on 2 June 2016.

key campaign "SafeDelhi. Make your city safe for women" was founded in 2004 and appeals to "let's reclaim our right to safe public spaces" (Jagori 2011).[12] The agenda points towards a dominant safety discourse that highlights gender-based violence in public against women of all social segments so that their mobility is restricted, threatened and leads to particular gender-based strategies to avoid anticipated violence (Gautam 2014). These strategies can range from self-restriction of women with respect to their dress, their choice of transport, the places visited—or not. One of the key arguments is that despite drastic changes in the city (to become more "modern" and "global"), citizen's concerns and safety have not been sufficiently considered. Some of Jagori's activities point towards the gender inequality that surfaces in the context of leisure and work nightlife, suggesting different strategies of navigating around or even challenging the conditions of inequality (e.g., safety audits, self-defence training).

Public protest is another strategy, a fair amount having been triggered since Delhi's self-branding as "world class" city, and concerned young educated middle-class women claiming their right to the city, centrally critiquing the city's ongoing, or even increasing, patriarchal spatialisation and violence. One point in case is residential spaces such as women's student hostels and the ways in which they shape regimes of control that restrict their access to public space at night. Hostels become agents of a patriarchal morality, often hand in glove with the parents. Many women's hostels in Delhi have issued a curfew that does not permit students to leave the place after 8 pm, and demands a limited amount of request letters if young women want to return to the hostel after that. Protests against this form of mobility restriction have taken place since decades, mostly by feminist organisations. Many addressed similar issues at stake today, for instance, the fact that women's mobility should not be restricted on the basis of a patriarchial safety discourse, more concretely, that the curfew imposed on women at night was a way of imprisonment and keeping them from enjoying equal access to nightlife (outings such as dinners, movies, parties). One of the prominent slogans became "Take back the night". By and large, no drastic consequences were taken in response to these demands and protests. Instead, curfew has been further tightened in the light of Delhi's growing reputation as "rape capital" since 2012. For the first time, in May 2016, following massive protests of students in

[12] See http://www.safedelhi.in/safe_delhi_campaign.html, retrieved on 2 June 2016.

Delhi, the Delhi Commission for Women has issued a notice to universities to bring the unequal treatment of female students in hostels to an end.

Delhi has a history of communalist and gendered violence that precedes economic liberalisation, and a reputation of being "tough" and "aggressive". The narrative of "India Shining" and the "world class city" of Delhi has sidelined socio-economic inequalities, challenges and tensions, sometimes stigmatising them as nuisances (Sharan 2014; e.g., small-scale industries, informal labour, squatter and illegal settlements, migration, population growth from 1.5 million in 1951 to 22.6 in 2011, with the bordering cities of Gurgaon (Haryana), Noida, and Ghaziabad (Uttar Pradesh) growing from 1.5 mio in 1951 to 4 mio in 2011[13]). A city formerly of traders and bureaucrats, underwent massive de-industrialisation in the late 1990s (see Vishwanath and Mehrotra 2007: 1544; relocation of hundreds of thousands of poor industry workers, changing the face of urban labour), and the new millennium, the urban infrastructure was all coined towards the mobility, visibility and productivity of the "world class". Delhi's reputation has been highlighted by Ravi Sundaram: "*A peculiar mix of modernist design, garden city antiurbanism, and progressive centralization of governmental power led subsequent critics to suggest it was a design for a 'heartless city'*" (Sundaram 2012: 170). The reputation of the 'aggressive' city was increased further by the ways in which gender-based sexual violence came to form regular patterns in English-language (and international) news with the sexual attacks on middle-class and foreign women the new millennium. This went as far as calling Delhi the "rape capital" of the world, a stigma that has not only led to many internal debates about women's safety in Delhi but darkened the "glossy side" of the world class city-in-the-making. One recent example is the brutal gang rape of a student in Delhi's colonial center in 2012, where news media and enraged citizens blamed the lack of civil governance and concern for people's safety on the streets of Delhi (Schneider, Titzmann 2015).

The topic of gender-based violence and inequality in cities is not limited to the Global South. But in the context of a country like India, it is of a different quality based on the fast pace at which urbanisation, social and economic change take place—cities are still predominantly male-populated and yet, with economic liberalisation, more women have access to 'male monopolies' (see Chant and McIlwaine 2016: 17). Reads a UN-Habitat

[13] http://www.newgeography.com/content/002545-the-evolving-urban-form-delhi, retrieved on 9 April 2016.

report (UN Habitat 2008: 2–3): "Spatial and organisational aspects of the city affect men and women in different ways. A gender-aware approach to urban development and its management would seek to ensure that both women and men obtain equal access to and control over the resources and opportunities offered by a city" (see also Srivastava 2012a, b). This does not so much concern semi-privatised or privatised spaces (e.g., malls, bars): "while it is generally understood that men's access to public spaces need not be tied to a 'purpose' (that is, carrying out specific tasks), the idea of women loitering in such spaces becomes both incomprehensible and condemnable" (Srivastava 2012a, b: 25; see Phadke et al. 2011). Interestingly, while on the one hand, we can see a lowering of the glass ceiling particular for women from lower classes, and a general rise of gender-based sexual violence we can also see empowerment, confidence, and pleasure in women's growing sense of claiming a right to and in public space, a right that largely identifies with gender equality.

Conclusion

The focus on women's place in Delhi is both an engagement with urban planning and social spatialisation in contemporary India. And paradoxically it is double-tongued, giving birth to both empowerment and inequality. Women are connected to a creative class and a model of the "world class" city that suggests inclusion, acceptance, and equal rights. Yet the various surveys and projects on women's safety in the city make visible the precarious experiences and different forms of restriction and violence against women across social strata. They underline that policies and governance has for too long ignored the precarity of women across social strata, and point to ongoing civic attempts to coin women's participation as a battle for a more just and inclusive city and civil society, while, likewise, pointing out the widening gap of inequalities in and through the neoliberal city. Ironically, thus, the "world class" city facilitates further gender-based difference by sidelining patriarchial fields of power in urban policies and planning and by propagating panoptic surveillance aesthetics (e.g., CCTV, visibility, and order).

To conclude, this chapter proposes that a view on gender, particularly on urban and professional middle-class women and students, allows for a differentiated look at access and mobility in the city. For women generally, the new go-global city means an intensification of inequalities along these two dimensions. Moreover, it argues that for members of the aspiring and affluent middle classes, world class spatialisations open up a realm of spaces

such as shopping malls and leisure facilities, new transport and work infrastructures and residential housing, accompanied by a vibrant real estate market. But structural inequalities are built into this seemingly accessible landscape, and these are largely built on the category of gender. Lastly, even though the discourse of safety has acquired much support in urban planning of public spaces and gender, it has largely reinforced patriarchal politics and continued to exclude and monitor women on the basis of their alleged "biological" inequality and social vulnerability. This restricts their mobility in and access to city resources, and is often exacerbated by class, religion, caste, and regional background. For many women in this new city of India, inequalities persist as normalised and pronounced.

Bibliography

Aji, Sowmya. 2012. Single Indian Women of Today Can Do Without Chivalry. *India Today*, 31.3.2012.

Baviskar, Amita, and Raka Ray (ed). 2011. *Elite and Everyman: The Cultural Politics of the Indian Middle Class*. New Delhi: Routledge.

Benjamin, Solomon. 2008. Occupancy Urbanism: Radicalizing Politics and Economy Beyond Policy and Programs. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 32(3): 719–729.

Brosius, Christiane. 2014/2010. *India's Middle Class. Urban Leisure, Consumption and Prosperity*. New York: Routledge.

Brosius, Christiane, and Tina Schilbach. 2016. "Mind the Gap". Thinking About in-Between Spaces in Delhi and Shanghai, Introduction to the Special Issue Edited with Schilbach. *City, Culture and Society* 7(4): 1–6.

Caldeira, Teresa. 2001. *City of Walls. Crime, Segregation, and Citizenship in São Paulo*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

———. 2014. Gender Is Still the Battleground. In *The Routledge Handbook on Cities of the Global South*, ed. Susan Parnell, and Sophie Oldfield, 413–428. London: Routledge.

Chant, Sylvia, and Cathy McIlwaine. 2016. *Cities, Slums and Gender in the Global South: Towards a Feminised Urban Future*. Oxon: Routledge.

Datta, Bishakya (ed). 2010. *9 Degrees of Justice. New Perspectives on Violence Against Women*. New Delhi: Zubaan.

Dhamija, Anshul, and S. Bagchi. 2011. Single Women in India Are Investing in Real Estate for Stability. *The Economic Times*, 12.11.

Donner, Henrike. 2014. Gender and Property in Neoliberal Middle-Class Kolkata: Of Untold Riches and Unruly Homes. In *Routledge Handbook of Gender in South Asia*, ed. Leela Fernandes, 189–203. New York: Routledge.

Fernandes, Joeanna Rebello, and Shobita Dhar. 2015. All the Single Ladies… 73m & Growing. *Times of India*, 22.11. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/sunday-times/deep-focus/All-the-single-ladies-73m-growing/articleshow/49875130.cms.

Florida, Richard. 2014. "Insight: Creative Cities India". URL: http://martinprosperity.org/2014/02/27/understanding-india-cities/, retrieved on 6 November 2016.

Gautam, Nishtha. 2014. Unlocking the Half a Billion. Why Staying Indoors Is Not the Solution to Women's Safety. *DNA India*, 28.4. http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/standpoint-unlocking-the-half-a-billion-why-staying-indoors-is-not-the-solution-to-women-s-safety-1983043.

Ghertner, D. Asher. 2015. *Rule by Aesthetics. World-Class City Making in Delhi*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Jagori. 2011. *Building Safe and Inclusive Cities for Women. A Practical Guide*. New Delhi: UN-Women, UN-Habitat.

Jarvis, Helen, Jonathan Cloke, and Paula Kantor. 2009. *Cities and Gender*. Oxon: Routledge.

Kumar, Sunalini. 2012. Does Democracy Stop at the Doorstep of the Women's Hostel? Posted on Kafila, 12.3. http://kafila.org/2012/03/24/does-democracy-stop-at-the-doorstep-of-the-womens-hostel-appeal-from-co-ordination-committee-for-womens-hostels-in-delhi-university/, retrieved on 6.9.2014.

Lahad, Kinneret. 2012. Singlehood, Waiting, and the Sociology of Time. *Sociological Forum* 27(1): 163–186.

———. 2013. 'Am I Asking Too Much?' The Selective Single Woman as a New Social Problem. *Women's Studies International Forum* 40: 23–32.

Lau, Lisa. 2010. Literary Representations of the 'New Indian Woman': The Single, Working, Urban, Middle Class Indian Woman Seeking Personal Autonomy. *Journal of South Asian Development* 5(2): 272–292.

MacKenzie, Annah. 2015. *Placemaking and the Future of Cities*. http://www.pps.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Placemaking-and-the-Future-of-Cities.pdf, retrieved on 9.4.2016.

Munshi, Shoma. 2001. *Modern Woman' in Asia. Global Media, Local Meanings*. Surrey: Curzon.

Nisbett, Nicholas. 2010. *Growing Up in the Knowledge Society. Living the IT Dream in Bangalore*. New Delhi: Routledge.

Oza, Rupal. 2006. *The Making of Neoliberal India: Nationalism, Gender, and the Paradoxes of Globalization*. New York: Routledge.

Phadke, Shilpa, Sameera Khan, and Shilpa Ranade. 2011. *Why Loiter?: Women and Risk on Mumbai Streets*. New Delhi: Penguin.

Radhakrishnan, Smitha. 2011. *Appropriately Indian. Gender and Culture in a New Transnational Class*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Roy, Ananya. 2009. Why India Cannot Plan Its Cities. Informality, Insurgence and the Idiom of Urbanization. *Planning Theory* 8(1): 76–87.

Safe Cities Free of Violence Against Women and Girls Initiative. 2011. *Report of the Baseline Survey Delhi 2010*

Schneider, Nadja-Christina, and Fritzi-Marie Titzmann (ed). 2015. *Studying Youth, Media and Gender in Post-Liberalisation India. Focus on and Beyond the 'Delhi Gang Rape'*. Berlin: Frank & Timme.

Sharan, Awadhendra. 2014. *In the City, Out of Place: Nuisance, Pollution and Urban Dwelling in Modern Delhi, c.1850-2000*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press

Singh, Sunny. 2000. *Single in the City: The Independent Woman's Handbook*. New Delhi: Penguin.

Singh, Shweta. 2010. Neighborhood: The 'Outside' Space for Girls in Urban India. *International Journal of Social Welfare* 19: 206–214.

Situmorang, Augustina. 2007. Staying Single in a Married World. *Asian Population Studies* 3(3): 287–304.

Song, Jesook. 2010. 'A Room of One's Own': The Meaning of Spatial Autonomy for Unmarried Women in Neoliberal Korea. *Gender, Place & Culture. A Journal of Feminist Geography* 17(2): 131–149.

Soofi, Mayank A. 2011. City Life—Barsatis, South Delhi. *The Delhi Walla*, 9.5. http://www.thedelhiwalla.com/2011/05/09/city-life-barsatis-south-delhi/, retrieved on 6.9.2014.

Srivastava, Sanjay. 2012a. Masculinity and Its Role in Gender Based Violence in Public Places. In *The Fear That Stalks: Gender Based Violence in Public Spaces*, ed. Sarah Pilot, and Lora Prabhu, 13–50. New Delhi: Zubaan Books.

———. 2012b. "National Identity, Bedrooms, and Kitchens: Gated Communities and New Narratives of Space in India". In *The Global Middle Classes. Theorizing Through Ethnography*. Edited by Rachel Heiman, Carla Freeman, and Mark Liechty. Sante Fe, NM: SAR Press

———. 2015. Entangled Urbanism. Slum, Gated Community and Shopping Mall in Delhi and Gurgaon. Delhi Oxford University Press.

Sundaram, Ravi. 2012. Danger, Media, and the Urban Experience in Delhi. In *Facing Fear. The History of an Emotion in Global Perspective*, 162–182. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Swain, Pushpanjali, and Vijayan Pillai. 2005. Living Arrangements Among Single Mothers in India. *Canadian Studies in Population* 32(1): 53–67.

Tarlo, Emma. 1996. Fashion Fables of an Urban Village. In *Clothing Matters: Dress and Identity in India*, ed. H. Hendrickson. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.

UN Habitat. 2008. *Gender Mainstreaming in Local Authorities. Best Practices*. Kenya. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/member_publications/gender_mainstreaming_in_local_authorities.pdf, retrieved on 16.6.2016.

Upadhya, Carol. 2013. Return of the 'Global Indian': Software Professionals and the Worlding of Bangalore. In *Return: Nationalizing Transnational Mobility in Asia*, ed. Xiang Biao, Brenda Yeah, and Mika Toyota, 141–161. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Venugopal, Vasudha. 2012. "City cold to single women living alone". The Hindu, 8 March.
Vishwanath, Kalpana, and Surabhi T. Mehrotra. 2007. Shall We Go Out? Women's Safety in Public Spaces. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 42(17), 28 April.
Yeoh, Brenda, and Kamalini Ramdas. 2014. The Place of Migrant Women and the Role of Gender in the Cities of Asia. In *The Routledge Handbook on Cities of the Global South*, ed. Susan Parnell, and Sophie Oldfield, 370–384. London: Routledge.

CHAPTER 11

Conclusion

David Wilson, Ulrike Gerhard, and Michael Hoelscher

This book has revealed that with the go-creative drive gripping ordinary cities across the globe, the specter of inequalities and exclusions often deepens. As capital and the state privilege select city locations (downtowns, gentrified neighborhoods) and new populations ("the creative class") for nurturing, a host of other areas (working class quarters, impoverished communities) and populations (semi-skilled workers, unemployed people, the racial poor, immigrants) are neglected. The promise of the creative city therefore is at least ambiguous. In some cases, an increasingly uneven development across the city is currently being exacerbated by the new go-creative restructuring. New patterns of work, state subsidization,

D. Wilson (✉)
Geography and Geographic Information Science Department, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL, USA

U. Gerhard
Geography Department, Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany

M. Hoelscher
Chair Higher Education and Science Management, German University of Administrative Sciences, Speyer, Germany

U. Gerhard et al. (eds.), *Inequalities in Creative Cities*,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95115-4_11

investment targeting, and physical re-making balkanize and fracture cities like Cleveland, Oxford, and Montpellier, and even in our more balanced case studies of Groningen and Heidelberg they create a growing (spatial) divide between classes, races, ethnicities, and genders.

Also revealed is something important to urbanists: the go-creative city movement is fueled by an intricate discourse responsible for all that has been chronicled in this book. The discourse at the moment is powerful and compelling. Here is the motor that drives the creative city re-sculpting process and which needs our undivided attention. This final chapter thus focuses on the complex configuration of this dominant narrative, its form, features, plays, and multi-textured nature. This is an analytic intervention on our part that is deliberately designed to steer academic attention to this extremely important element of the current go-creative restructuring dynamic. As the lynchpin to the whole go-creative political project in these cities, the force that powers this intensification of inequalities, we believe this focus is deserved and important.

A second, though related, aim of this conclusion is to give some hints on how we think that scientific progress can be made with regard to unveiling the negative sides of creative city strategies and its underlying discourse in the future. Before we delve into the intricacies of the creative city discourse, we therefore want to draw some lessons from our own approach and add especially to the advancement of comparative urban research.

The Comparative Perspective

In the most general sense, all scientific knowledge is comparative. Even descriptive terms such as "metropolis" carry with them the notion that they can be distinguished from other phenomena, e.g. ordinary cities. While being aware of the growing literature on comparative urban research especially in Urban Theory (most recently assembled in a theme issue in the International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 40 (1) 2016), our research network focused explicitly on doing comparative urban research by looking at two dimensions of comparisons: different cities on the one hand, and different aspects of inequality on the other. At first sight, the two comparisons possess quite diverse logics. While the cities in focus are seemingly separate and separable units of analysis, the different aspects of inequality are inextricably interconnected. Oxford, Heidelberg, and Cleveland, for example, are unique cases with a specific "Eigenlogik" (Berking and Löw 2008); gender, ethnicity, class, and education, however, are strongly interdependent categories. At second sight, though the picture becomes more complex. Cities are

by no means bounded by singularities, as Ferenc Gyuris already outlined in Chap. 3. Even ordinary cities are part of a growingly international network of different city layers (global cities, regional hubs, etc.); they are, for example, connected via migrants, flows of commodities, and, especially important in the cases at hand, via discourses. This holds true for cities in the Global North, but also—maybe even especially, due to a global, neoliberal competition—for cities in the Global South.

Our comparative approach was not (yet) hypothesis-testing in a strong sense, but much more explorative. We therefore did not stick to a comparative research in the form of a clear "Most Similar Systems Design" or "Most Different Systems Design" (see Kantor and Savitch 2005; Robinson 2010, or for an empirical case study Frank et al. 2014). On the contrary, we combined quite similar cases (e.g. Heidelberg, Oxford, Groningen, and Montpellier as European "knowledge pearls") with cities of different sizes (e.g. Delhi), different continents (Cleveland and Cachoeira), and more or less success in their development strategies (Glasgow). This heterogeneity allows to assess to what extent creative city strategies have spread globally and to what extent they have similar impacts, even in distinctive contexts. As becomes apparent, and is explained in more detail below, we find references to go-creative strategies in all our places, but with quite different foci and outcomes. Also, the go-creative strategy is sometimes more prominent and explicit (e.g. Montpellier), while in other contexts it is tamed behind knowledge discourses (e.g. Groningen, Heidelberg) or described as world-class ambitions (e.g. Delhi). Especially in the less developed countries, we find a stronger focus on general growth strategies, while in the European context with still quite affluent cities (at least comparatively), we find a stronger focus on creativity and culture. One important contribution to the research is also the analysis of the impact of these strategies in not-so-successful places, as much of the literature picks out the visible successes, thereby neglecting "failing cities" as one (and maybe the more numerous) side of the story (e.g. Glasgow or Cleveland).

However, this book is only a first attempt, as each chapter mainly looked at one city at a time (with the exception of Chap. 5). The task is to formulate some more specific research questions based on the results presented here (and also outlined by Tom Hutton in Chap. 2). While we cannot give right to this topic here, three examples could be:

1. Is the stronger focus on creativity and culture in the European cities due to their relative prosperity, or is it the result of specific cultural traditions that are (still) shaping the European city/citizenry?

2. To what extent is focusing solely on creative city strategies risky for ordinary cities, compared to larger metropolises with larger resources and additional fields of activity?
3. How important is the political context for the side effects of cities going creative?

To answer these questions, the current approach has to be extended in two ways. First, additional cities should be added, depending on the specific research question, and second, we need more true juxtapositions of these cities. We hope that we have built some solid ground for such comparisons with the analyses in this book.

With regard to inequality, the aim at the outset of our research network was to illuminate the vicious interplay, of different aspects of inequality and the spatial form this takes. Ethnicity, gender, and social class are traditional dimensions of inequality, as is education. What could be shown is how these traits and their related inequalities are hidden behind an ideological discourse claiming diversity, sustainability, creativity, and equal, virtually unlimited, opportunities. Education plays an important double role in this respect: Its importance has grown significantly in the context of the knowledge society and the creativity discourse, and as it seems to open up an egalitarian way to success (see Chap. 6). However, as Boudon (1974) and Bourdieu and Passeron (1964) have already shown, and as became apparent again in our studies, only certain types of knowledge and education are rewarded, and their accessibility is closely linked to the more traditional dimensions of inequality. For example, as Linda McDowell shows in Chap. 4, embodied knowledge, necessary for certain jobs in the service industry that are low paid though highly specific, is strongly linked to gender. On the other hand, Ulrike Gerhard and Michael Hoelscher claim in Chap. 6 that access to better-paid jobs in the creative core is to a large extent based on formal educational certificates. And, as Justin Beaumont and Zemiattin Yildiz detect in Chap. 8, those inequalities are often hidden behind the claims of the welfare state. Within the city, these different kinds of knowledge have their focal points in certain quarters, with higher social classes, less unemployed, lower shares of migrants, etc., often going along with better educational facilities and higher shares of core creative industries, ergo job opportunities. Also, the built environment of the city follows a narrative urbanism that it is supposed to increase the attractiveness of the city, while, at the same time, it produces new inequalities. This is shown by the new tramway in Montpellier, announced as “the

sexiest tramway in Europe", embodying the "sunny French tech attitude" but providing access only to the more affluent neighborhoods (see David Giband in Chap. 7).

Again, we think that the book contributes to current debates about inequality, but there is still more to do, and Ferenc Gyuris mentions many aspects of potential improvements in Chap. 3 that we did not take care of yet. One important thing would be to have an even closer look at certain types of disadvantages. For example, one should distinguish between different groups of migrants. In Germany, Asian migrants seem to fare better than migrants from other world regions, and Heidelberg has a huge share of highly educated migrants, often working at the university, who are confronted with, on average, less severe difficulties than those faced by most migrants. Another progress would be to take an even closer look at the interlinkages of the different dimensions of inequality and to cross these in a kind of matrix structure with all analyzed cities. For now, the book addresses mainly different cities with regard to different inequalities. Even more ambitious is the view beyond the Western world: what can we learn from looking at cities in the Global North and the Global South? Can a cosmopolitan view improve our understanding of global narrative and discourses (as suggested by Robinson 2011, and Parnell and Robinson 2014)?

As one can see, the used comparative approach has already produced interesting results as well as follow-up questions. We will try to expand our research on this basis in the indicated ways. However, the question is whether there is an overarching result that can be drawn from the different case studies. The next section elaborates on this question by outlining some important conclusions on the creative city discourse that can be drawn from the joint results of the preceding chapters of the book.

Assurances of Narrative Durability

As many researchers have shown, the creativity discourse has gained an overwhelming power in the recent transformation of the cities. But what ensures the durability of this go-creative city vision? It is one thing to offer provocative and enticing scripts of simple villains and victims and to frame this in pervasive offers of fear. It is another thing to successfully "durabilize" this city re-making vision, recognizing of course that this narrative can easily appear foolish, profligate, and punishing of many city residents rather than being innovative and timely. The aforementioned tropes seemingly must be undertaken to provide meaning and substance to this narrative, but they

do not guarantee success. So, what ensures this vision's durability? What strivings are designed to legitimize the state's and capital's offers of this vision vis-à-vis ordinary citizens? What tropes and plays are at work here?

We suggest that this go-creative narrative is deftly aligned with two other discourses—the sustainability and smart growth formations—that provide it with fundamental legitimacy as a fuzzy, fusing convergence of offers. There is something critical to realize here. We believe that this drive to go creative does not occur in isolation, but instead inter-textually appropriates from other city narratives to anchor this offer. For this, a globally isomorphic political rhetoric often uses "root metaphors that are, in turn, woven into convincing imageries of social reality" (Alasuutari and Qadir 2016: 633). In our context, narratives of city restructuring—go-creative city re-making, restructuring for city sustainability, smart city growth—dynamically meld, mesh, integrate, borrow, and move forward as a collective of interconnecting synergistic visions that are barely discernable from one another. This, we believe, results in a unified movement transforming cities along neoliberal pathways supported by a deliberate, deft political strategy as well as by vague hopes and expectations of citizens.

Most importantly, the widely proclaimed urban sustainability vision has dramatically moved across urban landscapes of the Global North and Global South (Wilson 2004, 2015). This vision, melding with offers of "smart growth," "regional planning," and "creative cities," now dots the reality of ordinary cities across the globe—as we have seen just in our few case studies. In discourse, local authorities and planners are closest to their cities and communities and know what they need to ensure economic and social vitality: "sustainability." Sustainability is typically a mix of nature, smart spatial organizing of the city and communities, robustly built physical infrastructure, acute environmental planning, and ideally situated growth foci ("innovation") in one coordinated package, sometimes accompanied by cultural sustainability as well (e.g. Hristova et al. 2015). This vision's linkages and similarities to the go-creative vision are striking and remarkable. What this will deliver, in pronouncement, is something long overdue: a heavy dose of "livability" and sound socio-environmental order that will generate growth (seemingly for all) and suitable qualities of life (seemingly for all) at the same time. The offer is of something enticing: a humane functionality that will make people feel good about themselves and their city, and truly catalyze the economic engine of the city. To be sure, this offer is not only false consciousness, there is a benevolent side to this sustainability narrative, suggesting that cities are to be humane,

person-centered places. But here is the complexity of such narratives that make them murky political configurations.

As early as 2006, more than 1,000 localities from 113 countries were using sustainability initiatives that have undoubtedly grown (Krueger and Gibbs 2007). In more than 75 percent of these cities, sustainability was the central plank in planning initiatives. As Campbell (1996) notes, this sustainability vision has triumphed in the non-stop struggle of "the battle of big public ideas." Offers of sustainability, like "growth," "development," and "economic stimulus," show no signs of abating as Smith's (2011) "new hegemon." It could be said that "we are all sustainabilists now," borrowing from an old adage, and alternative development strategies seem out of step. What must now be done, it seems, is to simply flesh out specifics and details to this vision in particular places that can propel cities and communities down a recuperative economic and social path. The go-creative strategy is one especially attractive version of such a specification, as it combines sustainability with progress, culture and individual self-fulfillment instead of self-restriction.

Short Excursus

At an even deeper level, the similarities between the sustainability and go-creative visions are amazing that enable a seamless borrowing and interconnecting to fuel the integrity of both visions. Like the go-creative vision, the sustainability gaze presses forward using a strategic and deft resource: vagueness. Here urban sustainability is marked as much by its lack of specificity and muddiness as its clarity and clear specifying. As the reality of new global times and the need for actions are declared, there is a keen mixing of ambiguity and specificity that poignantly communicates. Thus, targeted beneficiaries from this sustainable growth are typically "greyed" but in subtle message communicate an assistance to the relatively affluent. Similarly, offers of potential obstructionists to enacting this vision are vague, but in undertone become a mix of lurking villains as well as globalization.

Also, like go-creative re-making, urban sustainability makes an appeal to something important in this politics: "nature." Even though "nature" is used for urban development processes in very different contexts and with a variety of meanings (for a comparison of the use of urban nature in Indian and US American cities, see Brosius and Gerhard 2016), this appeal becomes glorified with aggressive attempts to create it and locate it in the city. This, we believe, is not a simple addition, but rather a kind

of calculated turn. This turn, a keenly discursive one, re-maps the city as a place of attractiveness, viability, and functionality for an ambiguous "public." Upholding the long-standing distinction between the city and country long enough to draw on it, this is collapsed to render them inseparable elements in an idealized city form and city kind of living. Country living and values become a needed essence in the city. Once held up as oppositional to city ways and lifestyles, the obverse of the urban condition and urban ethos, country values now have a crucial place in the city. Here rurality and its companions of contemplation, reflection, and social purity need to be infused into the fabric of the city with its traditional orientations of drive, assertiveness, and freneticism to open up the free spaces needed for creative thinking, thereby producing the ideal entrepreneurial city. Ordinary cities across the globe need these provisions through swaths of functional green spaces, open air retail markets, vest pocket gardens, farmers' markets, and green-clad roofs as crucial development ingredients.

In the final analysis, sustainability "truths" help the go-creative enthusiasts push for outcomes—all of them we can see in our cities. Some of them have been discussed in this book.

Outlook

In our final point we suggest that the creative-city narrative and interventions are anything but a deterministic, done deal. For in ordinary city after ordinary city, we observe, this creative-class re-making is riddled especially by three contradictory drives that need further exploration by analysts. First, many of these actors embody mixed feelings about how a key site in the city—marginal neighborhoods—are to be managed. Tensions arise with recent desires to both commodify this turf (lucrative profitable opportunities frequently exist here and socio-ethnic "gems" can be packaged and brought into displays of city diversity) and demonize it (bolstering these space's race-class warehousing function). Paradox here thus centers on how to intervene in a dialectic of integrating-segregating the marginal that has no easy answer.

Second, these actors offer a paradoxical sense of self as the past and the present collide. Many governances in these cities were for years neutral technical experts whose supposed tool kit of wondrous understandings and techniques ideally situated them to dictate kinds of city re-making. This changed with the dramatic rise of neoliberalism across the globe. Now enabled to toe conservative politics, these governances switched gears and become self-anointed political creatures. Here governances

boldly projected themselves as brash truth tellers who needed to call out and chase away deceptive falsities about city transformation and its impacts. At the moment, many of these governances awkwardly wear this hybrid identity, vacillating between the two. In many ordinary cities at the moment, not surprisingly, these amalgams are increasingly being identified as ambiguous and deceptive formations, not least as neoliberalism is under critique from different sides more generally.

Third, these actors extract power via an instrument that also ironically works to undermine their prowess: built environments. Their built forms are proving to be contested symbolic sites that involve dueling ensembles of signifiers: theirs and those of interpreters. On the one hand, governance actors strive to encase these built forms—sparkling downtown, gentrified row, new cultural district—with progressive cultural and economic meanings. To see such built forms, they assert, is to observe economically propelling forces being unleashed in a new city re-making. On the other hand, we identify resistance groups forming in many of these cities compelled by a creative and reflexive interpretation of created environments. Anything but passive and dulled interpreters of their changing cities, these people deftly seize these built forms and use them as keys to unlock advocacy. In emergent contestations, one group's road to civic salvation is another group's pathway to a hellish future. These forms thus stand to both help and hinder these governances. At the moment, it seems, these actors appear to have no answer for this contradiction except to continue to trudge on and hope for the best.

Not surprisingly, then, the future of this city re-making movement and the ordinary cities that feel their wrath is open and to be determined. As governances toil to "re-creativize" cities and project a sense of an inevitable rise to power, they struggle to maintain this veneer. The world of cities at the moment may be their oyster, but only by convincing many that their policies are progressive and have arose an inevitable outcome. This recognition of governance struggle, we believe, may prove telling. For here are the forces that may usher in a governance transformation that could change everything from the constitution of growth governances to the tools, tactics, and vision that come to dominate the urban arena. Clearly, as this book has chronicled, the drive to deepen this creative redevelopment strategy spawns new inequalities and deepens existing ones. Cities across the globe have become more polarized and fractured. But stay tuned, we advise, for change may be around the corner.

Bibliography

Alasuutari, Pertti, and Ali Qadir. 2016. Imageries of the Social World in Epistemic Governance. *International Sociology* 31(6): 633–652.

Berking, Helmut, and Martina Löw, eds. 2008. *Die Eigenlogik der Städte—Neue Wege für die Stadtforschung*. Frankfurt/Main: Campus.

Boudon, Raymond. 1974. *Education, Opportunity, and Social Inequality: Changing Prospects in Western Society*. New York: Wiley.

Bourdieu, Pierre, and Jean-Claude Passeron. 1964. *Les héritiers: les étudiants et la culture*. Paris: Les Ed. de Minuit.

Brosius, Christiane, and Ulrike Gerhard. 2016. Jenseits von Nord und Süd: Natur in den Städten. *Ruperto Carola* 8: 103–111.

Campbell, S. 1996. Green Cities, Growing Cities, Just Cities? Urban Planning and he Contradictions of Sustainable Development. *Journal of the American Planning Association* 62(3): 296–312.

Frank, Sybille, Petra Gehring, Julika Griem, and Michael Haus, eds. 2014. *Städte unterscheiden lernen. Zur Analyse interurbaner Kontraste: Birmingham, Dortmund, Frankfurt, Glasgow*. Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag.

Hristova, Svetlana, Milena Dragićević Šešić, and Nancy Duxbury, eds. 2015. *Culture and Sustainability in European Cities. Imagining Europolis*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Kantor, Paul, and H.V. Savitch. 2005. How to Study Comparative Urban Development Politics: A Research Note. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 29(1): 135–151.

Krueger, Rob, and David Gibbs (ed). 2007. *The Sustainable Development Paradox: Urban Political Economy in the U.S. and Europe*. New York: Guilford.

Parnell, Susan, and Jennifer Robinson. 2014. (Re)theorizing Cities from the Global South: Looking Beyond Neoliberalism. *Urban Geography* 33(4): 593–617.

Robinson, Jennifer. 2010. Cities in a World of Cities: The Comparative Gesture. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 35(19): 1–23.

Robinson, Jennifer. 2011. 2010 Urban Geography Plenary Lecture—The Travels of Urban Neoliberalism: Taking Stock of the Internationalization of Urban Theory. *Urban Geography* 32(8): 1087–1109.

Smith, Neil. 2011. The City and the Global. Millercom Lecture at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 9 November.

Wilson, David. 2004. Toward a Contingent Urban Neoliberalism. *Urban Geography* 25: 771–783.

——— (ed). 2015. *The Politics of the Urban Sustainability Concept*. Champaign, IL: Common Ground.