




NEW
GEOGRAPHIES
OF EUROPE

Edited by
ROBERT NADLER, ZOLTÁN KOVÁCS,
BIRGIT GLORIUS AND THILO LANG

RETURN MIGRATION AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE

Mobility Against the Stream



New Geographies of Europe

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Robert Nadler • Zoltán Kovács • Birgit Glorius • Thilo Lang
Editors

Return Migration and Regional Development in Europe

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Editors

Robert Nadler
Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography
Leipzig, Germany

Birgit Glorius
Chemnitz University of Technology
Chemnitz, Germany

Zoltán Kovács
University of Szeged
Szeged, Hungary
and Hungarian Academy of Sciences,
Budapest, Hungary

Thilo Lang
Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography
Leipzig, Germany

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Foreword: Beyond Ordinary Paradoxes

When investigating the conditions and factors shaping migrants' motivations to return to their countries of origin, return migrants' social and economic conditions and their patterns of reintegration, researchers often mention the paucity, if not a complete lack, of systematic data on return migrants' numbers and flows. When official statistical data are available—which is seldom the case—their scope turns out to be extremely limited from an analytical point of view. Stating that data are scanty has become very common. However, behind this basic (if not commonplace) statement there is something quite extraordinary and paradoxical.

Never before has so much policy attention been paid to return. Since the mid-1990s, governments and international institutions have adopted an array of provisions aimed at making migrants' return 'sustainable'; at addressing 'the link between return and development'; and at 'assisting' return migrants with 'reintegration packages'. There is no need to mention here the terms, classifications and categories of thought that have been invented by policy-makers from all countries of migration, or their expertise in addressing what has been referred to as 'the return of third-country nationals'. That return is presented rhetorically and superficially as being either 'voluntary' or 'forced', we have all learned in the past twenty years. It is, however, necessary to pinpoint a glaring paradox between growing policy attention to return (as defined in political terms) and the continuing lack of systematic statistical data—the latter

is essential to gain a sense of the implications of the former for return migrants' conditions. Oddly enough, the root of this paradox lies perhaps in the materialisation of two additional paradoxes.

The first refers to a contradiction that has accompanied the development and evolution of so-called 'return policies'. Whereas Western destination countries have discussed and defended extensively the need for 'return policies', the opinions of non-Western countries of origin have been largely disregarded or they have simply been faced by a *fait accompli* after decisions have been taken. It was only after the framework had been made irreversible that non-Western countries were mobilised in migration talks, at both bilateral and multilateral levels, with a view to implementing 'partnerships'. Admittedly, policies and implementing provisions had to be fine-tuned 'in full partnership with third countries', but basic principles and intents, whether explicit or not, were already, and powerfully, being shaped by objectives responding to Western priorities. This is not the place to explain how such priorities, driven by security concerns aimed at controlling the mobility of populations, began to be diffused both regionally and globally. More intensively when state actors, despite their contrasting interests, agreed to cooperate in the framework of the "international agenda on migration management" 15 years ago. Political scientists and International Relations scholars, especially those interested in policy transfer studies, have already addressed this issue. Far from establishing a solid consensus, however, this agenda only set out basic principles and priorities aimed at reifying the managerial centrality of state actors and their law-enforcement agencies. The reference to the managerial centrality of state actors is important in understanding the way that the issue of return has been addressed in political terms. A manager ensures that things are done, and operability is the key concern. In this light, return has simply been viewed as the act of leaving a national territory to return to the migrant's original country, and what occurs beyond the border of the former has typically been ignored. It is true that project-based reintegration programmes have been implemented since the mid-2000s with a view 'to supporting the contribution of return migrants to development'; however, the rationale for these programmes was to make sure that people remained in their countries of origin, or at least out of the territory of their former destination countries. Against this backdrop,

establishing mechanisms aimed at monitoring independently the human social and economic consequences of these policies in the long term has never been an objective, let alone the organised collection of statistical data capable of providing a systematic picture of the social and economic conditions prevailing in the country of origin.

The second paradox is closely linked to the first. The above-mentioned policy developments, including the *fait accompli*, have generated powerful epistemic conditions in which research on return migration has gradually been embedded. This has taken place *as if* academic research carried out on return migration had to be reinvented in order to enhance its 'policy relevance'. In other words, not only have non-Western countries found themselves facing a *fait accompli*, but this has also applied to researchers across various disciplines. Instead of exploiting a vast and rich academic corpus on return migrants' motivations and patterns of reintegration, dating back to the 1960s, the ground was cleared, as it were, before the expertise was mobilised by governmental and intergovernmental agencies to develop policy-relevant research outputs on 'voluntary and forced return', 'the nexus between reintegration of voluntary return' and, last but not least, the 'sustainability of return'. A form of land clearance was a prerequisite to uprooting large segments of academic research on return migrants with a view to paradigmatically equating return with the end of returnees' migratory cycles, if not with expulsion or deportation. The state-led international agenda for migration management, which was adopted at the Berne Initiative in 2001, provided for the cross-fertilisation of this paradox among policy-makers practitioners and the public at large. The paradox became ordinarily and routinely accepted.

Admittedly, we have become accustomed to paradoxes at a time when certainties, necessary evils and predominant schemes of understanding have become part and parcel of both policy discourses and global migration talks. Moreover, when paradoxes are routinely accepted they create a kind of rationality and turn what is questionable and illogical into something thinkable and ordinary.

Has the possibility of overcoming this situation become hopeless if we are confronted with routinely accepted paradoxes and predominant schemes of understanding applied to return migration? Given the strength of such paradigms, how relevant are the fundamental works car-

ried out by Nermin Abadan-Unat, Roger Böhning, Frank Bovenkerk, Francesco Cerase, George Gmelch, Russell King, Daniel Kubat, Rosemarie Rogers and Czarina Wilpert—to name but a few important scholars who decades ago contributed to the lively academic debates on return *and* returnees before these topics became as excessively politicised in the West as they are today? Beyond their inherent diversity, their works and heuristic devices continue to be instrumental in acknowledging the profound changes in the usage of the word ‘return’, both academically and politically, and in realising that major research interests, across various disciplines, revolved around how return migrants affected, and were affected by, the social, economic, cultural and political context in their countries of origin as well as their former countries of destination. The ‘politics of return’ (which is how they were termed), when they existed, were analysed by focusing on whether and how return migrants chose to respond to them, not on their operability or so-called effectiveness. In other words, return migrants’ individuality—defined as individual *persons* having motivations, aspirations, resources, and projects like any other human being—was a major research subject.

Today, laying emphasis on the individuality of return migrants may be viewed as an eccentric endeavour when one considers the powerful paradigms that have been conducive to the predominant state-centred approach to migration matters, including return migration. However, this book, co-edited by Robert Nadler, Zoltán Kovács, Birgit Glorius and Thilo Lang shows that this emphasis is still possible, both empirically and analytically, as well as being necessary. Based on rich ethnographic and empirical sources aimed at overcoming the paucity of available statistical data, this volume focuses primarily on the return and patterns of reintegration of European migrants within Europe, but also includes chapters addressing the return conditions of non-EU nationals to countries located in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Turkey. Moreover, by drawing on conceptual tools, the authors have analysed returnees’ patterns of social and occupational reintegration, the factors shaping the portability of their skills acquired abroad, their range of propensities to set up business concerns back to their homeland and to become transnational, and last but not least, the complexity of their sense of belonging.

The originality of this book lies in it being a collected series of articles, which as a whole invite readers to expand their thinking and avoid the pitfall of disciplinary dogmatism. This is perhaps a key aspect when reading the chapters that set out to address, in a comparative manner, the interplay between returnees' agency and opportunity structures. Yet the comparative approach, which cuts across various parts of the book, brings about something else. Regardless of the place of return, whether it is located in the West or not, factors (in the broadest sense) and conditions (in both countries of destination and of origin) that motivate return as well as migrants' readiness to return remain basic components in the analysis of the plurality of their patterns of reintegration. In sum, the true problem is not to prove that return constitutes a stage in a migratory cycle, which is self-evident for many people. It is, rather, to explain to policy-makers that the individuality of return migrants, as defined above, will continue to determine the validity and utility of public policies in the field of return and reintegration. The findings contained in this edited book provide ample evidence of the need for a new reflection beyond ordinary paradoxes.

Jean-Pierre Cassarino
Institut de Recherche sur le Maghreb
Contemporain (IRMC), Tunis, Tunisia

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Notes on the Contributors

Elīna Apsīte-Beriņa holds a Ph.D. degree in Human Geography. Currently, she is a Researcher at the University of Latvia in Riga, Latvia. Her thesis was devoted to researching Latvian migrants to the United Kingdom, during which she created and used internet surveys as a tool for data gathering. This method was also used for several other EU countries. In her work she uses an approach of mixed methods and focuses on migrant group research, migrant motives and strategies.

Brikena Balli is a full-time Lecturer in the Sociology Department at the University of Tirana, Albania. She holds a Ph.D. from Michigan State University, Michigan, USA. Her research work focuses on immigration and its intersections with ethnicity, nationality, religion, social class and gender, seen through the prism of the application of field methods.

Māris Bērziņš is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Migration and Urban Studies (CMUS) in Department of Geography, University of Tartu, Estonia. His research and expertise focuses on migration, residential mobility and urban change, with his main research interests revolving around migrant groups, return migration, suburbanisation, residential segregation and neighbourhood change. His experience includes carrying out extensive surveys and working with census databases.

Lajos Boros holds a Ph.D. in Human Geography from the University of Szeged, Hungary. Currently, he is a Lecturer in the Department of Economic

and Social Geography at the University of Szeged. His research focuses on urban social geography, migration, and environmental and social justice.

Alexander Bürgin is Assistant Professor of Political Sciences and Head of the European Union Research and Application Centre at Izmir University of Economics, Turkey. He previously worked for a campaign by the Federal Government of Germany aiming at the better integration of citizens with a background of migration. His research interests focus on European Union studies.

Jean-Pierre Cassarino is at the Institut de Recherche sur le Maghreb Contemporain (IRMC, Tunis, Tunisia). Previously, he was part-time professor at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute (EUI, Florence, Italy).

Alexander Danzer is Professor of Economics at Catholic University Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, Germany. He is a research fellow at the Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration at UCL London and at the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA, Bonn, Germany). He gained Diplomas in Economics and in Social Geography from the University of Munich, Germany, and a Ph.D. in Economics from Royal Holloway College, University of London, UK, in 2010. His main area of interest is applied labour economics and development economics, with a special focus on labour supply and migration.

Barbara Dietz is an Associate Researcher at the Institute for East and Southeast European Studies, Regensburg, and a Research Fellow at the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA, Bonn, Germany). Her research focuses on migration in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, migration policy, and on the economic and social integration of immigrants from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in Germany and the EU.

Defne Erzene-Bürgin is Assistant Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at Izmir University, Turkey. Previously, she worked at the German Parliament as an expert on Turkey–EU relations, migration and integration with German society. Her research interests are in the areas of gender, migration, Turkey–EU relations, agricultural policies and rural sociology.

Birgit Glorius has been a Junior Professor in the European Studies Department at Chemnitz University of Technology, Germany, since 2013. She gained her

Ph.D. in Human Geography from the Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Germany, in 2007 and works in the field of Social Geography with a special focus on migration, integration, identity and lifecourse.

Izabela Grabowska is a Professor at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Warsaw, Poland. She is also a Senior Fellow and International Research Coordinator at the Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw. She holds a Ph.D. in Economics and Habilitation in Sociology. She has been the national expert for Poland at the European Mobility Laboratory of the European Commission and ESCO (European Skill, Competences and Occupations classification). She is a member of the Migration and Polish Diaspora Research Committee of the Polish Academy of Sciences, and is also the co-leader of Research and Action. Youth in Centre. Her research interests focus on migration and labour markets, occupational careers, school-to-work transitions, social remittances and the transfer of skills.

Gábor Hegedűs is a Lecturer in the Department of Economic and Social Geography at the University of Szeged, Hungary, where he gained his Ph.D. in Human Geography in 2011. His research interests involve return migration, urban geography, gated communities and electoral geography in Hungary and East Central Europe.

Caroline Hornstein Tomić is Senior Research Associate at the Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar in Zagreb, Croatia, and a Lecturer/Assistant Professor at the Chair for Anthropology, Zagreb University. She holds an MA in Cultural Anthropology and a doctorate in Sociology from Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Her research focuses on migration and related policies, interethnic relations and identity politics, social stratification and state-building processes in South and Central Eastern Europe. She currently co-leads a project on 'Remigrations and Transformations in Post-socialist European Regions'.

Katrin Klein-Hitpaß is a Senior Lecturer in Economic Geography at the Department of Geography, Bonn University, Germany, and holds a Ph.D. from Osnabrück University, Germany. In her thesis she investigates the impact of high-skilled returning migrants on knowledge-based regional development in Poland. Her research interests focus on economic geography, urban and regional development, migration and development, as well as on governance and the politics of housing markets.

Nilay Kılınç is studying at the School of Hospitality and Tourism Studies at the University of Surrey, working towards a Ph.D. on the relationship between return migration and tourism development in Turkey. Prior to this, she gained an MA in European Studies at Lund University, Sweden, and worked as a research intern at the Malmö Institute for Migration, Malmö University Sweden.

Russell King is Professor of Geography at the University of Sussex, and Visiting Professor of Migration Studies at Malmö University, Sweden. His research interests encompass most forms of migration, in particular with regard to Europe and the Mediterranean region. From 2000 to 2013 he was the Editor of the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. His latest book, authored jointly with Anastasia Christou, is entitled *Counter-Diaspora: The Greek Second Generation Returns 'Home'* (Harvard University Press 2014).

Zoltán Kovács is a Research Professor at the Geographic Research Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS-GSI) and Professor in Human Geography at the University of Szeged, Hungary. His scientific spectrum covers urban geography and political geography with a special emphasis on Hungary and East Central Europe. He heads a research group within the institute specialising in research related to urban and regional development.

Zaiga Krišjāne is Professor of Human Geography and Head of the Department of Human Geography at the University of Latvia, Riga, Latvia. Her scientific interests lie in population geography, migration and urban development. She is highly experienced in working in international teams and has supervised many local and international research projects.

Thilo Lang is Head of the Department for Regional Geography of Europe and Coordinator of the research area 'The Production of Space: Polarisation and Peripheralisation' at the Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography in Leipzig (IfL), Germany. He holds a Ph.D. in Human Geography from the University of Potsdam, Germany. His research focuses on peripheralisation as a multi-level process, innovation outside conurbations, regional change, transnational comparative urban and regional studies, shrinking cities, and regeneration in Central and Eastern Europe, Northern England and Eastern Germany. In 2012 he received the RSA Routledge Award for his research. He was the Project Coordinator of the EU project 'Re-Turn: Regions Benefitting from Returning Migrants'.

Svetlana Milutinovic is an Independent Researcher working on various aspects of migration in Central and Southeast Europe. As a sociologist and social anthropologist (MA from Central European University, Budapest, Hungary) with a background in Sinology (BA from University of Belgrade, Serbia), she is interested in exploring the movement of people and concepts between East and West, paying special attention to the assemblages of alternative modernities shaped by transnational entrepreneurs.

Robert Nadler is a Researcher at the Department for Regional Geography of Europe at the Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography in Leipzig, Germany. He holds a Ph.D. in Urban and Local European Studies from the University of Milano-Bicocca, Italy. He has completed several research projects on cultural and creative industries, regional development, migration theories, multi-locality and economic geography in the Leipzig region, Eastern Saxony and Central Germany. He was the Project Manager of the EU project 'Re-Turn: Regions Benefitting from Returning Migrants'.

Rhona Ní Chearbhaill holds a Ph.D. degree from St. Patrick's College, Dublin. Her thesis was an ethnographical and literary study exploring the linguistic and cultural challenges faced by returning migrants in the Irish-speaking region of Connemara in Ireland. She was awarded a Fulbright Scholarship in 2012 and was a Visiting Lecturer at Lehman College, CUNY, New York. She now lectures part-time with the National University of Ireland, Galway.

Tanja Pavlov Pavlov holds a Ph.D. in Social Psychology and is a Director of the Centre for Migration, a research and advocacy unit of Group 484, a non-governmental organisation engaged in the field of migration in Serbia. She has conducted a large amount of research and written or/and edited several books about migration. Her research interests include links between migration and development, specifically the social inclusion of forced migrants in a community, the migration of highly qualified people, and transnational entrepreneurship.

Jelena Predojevic-Despic is a Research Associate at the Demographic Research Centre of the Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, Serbia. Her expertise includes the links between migration, demographics, the labour market and human capital processes, particularly in South-East Europe. Her current research focuses on the migration of skills, transnational entrepreneurship and the factors influencing talent attraction back to the country of origin.

Ludger Pries holds the Chair for Sociology at Ruhr University Bochum, Germany. He taught and did research in Brazil, Mexico, Spain and the USA. Main fields of research are the Sociology of Organisations, Work and Labour Regulation, migration in international comparison, transnationalisation, transnational migration, and processes of social incorporation. He is or was a member of editorial boards of five scientific journals and is Deputy President of the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (SVR). Recent books include *Cross-Border Staff Mobility: A Comparative Study of Profit and Non-Profit Organisations* (Palgrave 2014), *Shifting Boundaries of Belonging and New Migration Dynamics in Europe and China* (Palgrave 2013) and *Cross-Border Migrant Organisations in Comparative Perspective* (Palgrave 2012).

Sarah Scholl Schneider is Assistant Professor for Cultural Anthropology/European Ethnology, Department for Film, Theatre and Cultural Studies at Johannes Gutenberg University, Mainz Germany. She holds a Ph.D. in Comparative Cultural Sciences and an MA in Political Sciences from the University of Regensburg, Germany. Her research interests include the study of (re)migration, co-ethnic return visits, 'Heimat', elites, and the changes in post-socialist societies in Central Europe. She currently co-leads a project on remigrations and transformations in post-socialist European regions.

Christine von Blanckenburg is a Senior Researcher and Head of the 'Civil Society' unit at the Nexus Institute for Cooperation Management and Interdisciplinary Research, Berlin, Germany. The Nexus Institute has been engaged in research projects on return migration to East Germany since 2005.

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1

Introduction: Mobility Against the Stream? New Concepts, Methodological Approaches and Regional Perspectives on Return Migration in Europe

Thilo Lang, Birgit Glorius, Robert Nadler,
and Zoltán Kovács

And then later, when they finally arrived in London, they would probably separate with barely a word or a look, walk out into a rainy morning, each alone and beginning a new life. And Lev thought how all of this was odd but necessary and already told him things about the world he was travelling to, a world in which he would break his back working—if only that work could be found.

T. Lang (✉)

Regional Geography of Europe, Leibniz-Institut für Länderkunde, Leipzig, Germany

B. Glorius

Institute for European Studies, TU Chemnitz, Chemnitz, Germany

R. Nadler

Regional Geography of Europe, Leibniz-Institut für Länderkunde, Leipzig, Germany

Z. Kovács

Department of Economic and Social Geography, University of Szeged, Szeged, and Institute of Geography, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary

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He would hold himself apart from other people, find corners and shadows in which to sit and smoke, demonstrate that he didn't need to belong, that his heart remained in his own country.

From *The Road Home* by Rose Tremain 2008, pp. 1–2

In *The Road Home*, the reader can accompany the fictive character of Lev, an Eastern European migrant heading to the UK to find a job and support his family back home. Having just left his home country, he is already thinking about his return. English novelist Rose Tremain tells a story, typical of the migration patterns within Europe since the mid-2000s. The Eastern enlargement of the EU and the creation of a common European labour market induced significant migration flows from the post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) to high-income countries, mainly in Western and Northern Europe. Consequently, many regions throughout CEE have been experiencing large-scale emigration of labour, whereas many regions in the 'old' Europe have benefited from the arrival of skilled labour. This imbalance in labour migration has raised new concerns about social, economic and territorial cohesion throughout the EU.

These concerns were the starting point for the project 'Re-Turn: Regions Benefitting from Returning Migrants'. Because of the increasing relevance of return migration to CEE countries and a lack of comparative studies, this project explored for the first time current flows of return migration in a comparative way, including eight CEE countries. Within the frame of the project, scientific partners organised an international scientific workshop on the topic 'Return Migration and Regional Development in Central and Eastern Europe', which took place on 7–8 November 2013 in Budapest. This workshop brought together leading scholars in this field. The present book is a result of the scientific discussion during this workshop. Many of the contributors to this book participated in the workshop, while other contributors joined the discussion and this book project at a later stage. However, all share the observation that current policy debates and migration research in Europe focus more on the emigration of Europeans and immigration towards Europe from other world regions, while return migration of fellow nationals remains an under-researched subject in the European context.

With this book, we aim to enrich the debate on the changing migration patterns in Europe based on up-to-date theoretical and empirical work in the field of return migration. We do not employ the term ‘return’ as a normative concept, but rather use it to describe the direction of a move. Return moves are as definite or indefinite as departures, yet they may have another meaning for the migrants and may therefore deliver different outcomes.

Our focus on return migration within the European Union and from EU member states to neighbouring countries (e.g. Turkey or Serbia) is motivated by changing mobility patterns in the context of European integration, with an intensification of mobility fuelled by the opening of labour markets, and freedom of residence throughout the European Union. In this specific and poorly regarded context, differences in economic prosperity and wealth are less pronounced than between Europe and Africa or Asia. However, the ongoing transformation processes in the post-socialist countries, combined with the global financial crisis and its economic effects, makes this region an excellent case to study actual mobility processes in conjunction with economic and societal transformations, and in their dependence on earlier migration processes. Furthermore, the book will enrich the debate on the migration-development nexus by presenting findings on the role of return migration for regional development, not only at the macro level, but also by analysing individual behavioural patterns that reveal the substantial weight of identity construction, family biographies and subjectivity in the perception and evaluation of the social and economic environment and development opportunities.

This chapter serves as an overall introduction to the book. First, we provide a short overview of existing knowledge and unanswered questions in the context of European return migration by highlighting theoretical and empirical aspects. Following this, individual chapters of the volume will be introduced, pinpointing their position within the general framework of the book. Our collection had to remain selective—as in other edited volumes. We believe that the strength of this book lies in the joint discussion of the presented conceptual and methodological findings from different case studies. It is an anthology of state-of-the-art research on return migration in Europe, but this selection cannot cover

all European regions in detail. The featured chapters represent a focus on post-socialist countries, which—since 1989—have provided strong migration flows and changed migration patterns in Europe. In addition, we have included case studies from Turkey and Ireland, because they add valuable insights for the study of our topic.

1.1 Significance of Return Migration in Europe

Migration of skilled labour from East to West has had a complex history in Europe since the Iron Curtain was dismantled in 1989. First, it was from the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) that the mass emigration of qualified labour took place. According to migration statistics, Eastern Germany has lost more than 2 million people since the German reunification in 1989/90 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2013). These emigrants moved mainly to Western Germany, but also to Switzerland, Austria and other Western European and Scandinavian countries. Later, the exodus from Eastern Germany was followed by migration from other post-socialist countries (e.g. Poland, the post-Yugoslav States). Yet emigration from these countries remained limited throughout the 1990s as a result of remaining administrative restrictions. However, since the first EU enlargement towards the East in 2004, many regions in the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia have witnessed the large-scale emigration of young, and skilled, people. In particular, peripheral rural regions have suffered from the ‘brain drain’ process, whereas large urban agglomerations—mainly capital city regions such as Prague, Bratislava and Budapest—gained internal migration surpluses (European Union 2012). Between 2003 and 2007, it is estimated that about 2.2 million ‘Eastern Europeans’ moved to Western European countries to find a better life and better-paid work (Smoliner et al. 2013). With the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, East-West migration intensified as wage levels in these countries had been significantly lower than in the other reforming countries. As a result of the financial crisis of 2008 and the termination of (normally 5-year) employment restrictions, migration from the Eastern part of

Europe to the West became even more pronounced after 2010. Since the latest EU enlargement in 2013, its labour market also attracts many Croatian migrants.

This large-scale emigration from post-socialist countries—and in particular from CEE—often resulted in a lack of skilled labour in the sending regions. The age-selective outflow has accelerated demographic ageing processes in the regions that have been worst affected. Businesses located in these regions are increasingly struggling to replace retiring workers with young and skilled people (Nadler et al. 2014). This shortage of labour does not affect all regions and all economic sectors in a similar way. Still, it has consequences for the economic prosperity and competitiveness of many—in particular rural and old industrial—regions in Central and Eastern Europe. Many national and regional governments have, in the meantime, realised that long-term economic goals are seriously threatened by the shortage of skilled labour. Several governments have started to adopt retention and/or re-attraction initiatives (Kovács et al. 2013), which, however, are largely unknown to the emigrants, as recent empirical studies show (Lang et al. 2014, p. 37).

This kind of emigration and brain drain should not be considered a permanent process. According to an OECD study (OECD 2008), 20–50 % of emigrants leave their host region within 5 years of their arrival, many of them heading back home. In fact, emigrants often leave their home countries with the intention of returning, making emigration merely a temporary stage in their lives (Vertovec 2008). Surveys have revealed that 63 % of all emigrants consider returning home, and that most actual returnees succeeded in going back to their home regions (78 % of all returnees) (Lang et al. 2014, p. 19). Indeed, a substantial number of those who left their Central and Eastern European home regions seem to have been returning in recent years. The proximity to friends and family, the attachment to their homeland, its cultural and/or natural environment, decreasing wage differences and improved job opportunities often draw former emigrants back home (Lang et al. 2014; Zaiceva and Zimmermann 2012). Thus return migration is not merely a marginal phenomenon. It is shaping European migration patterns increasingly. Nevertheless, we can still experience a gap of knowledge regarding the more recent phenomena of return migration within Europe, and

specifically in the post-socialist countries, as return migration so far has mainly been studied in the specific context of return from industrialised countries in Europe or North America to less-developed countries in Latin America, Africa or Asia (Smoliner et al. 2013; Kovács et al. 2013). For our approach of highlighting phenomena linked to return migration within Europe, the issues described in the following paragraphs need to be taken into consideration.

1.2 Scarcity of Data on Return Migration

One of the main problems in studying return migration is the lack of reliable data. Return migration cannot be measured directly as registry systems in most EU countries do not allow for an observation of individual migration biographies, including return movements to a point of departure. One possible way to estimate the weight of return migration is to analyse the social composition of incoming migrants. While this estimation might contain measurement errors (e.g. being blind to immigrants having acquired citizenship abroad through birth or naturalisation and coming to the country for the first time), it is still the most appropriate instrument for looking at return migration numbers in a comparative way. Most of the EU countries publish data on the numbers of international immigrants, differentiated into nationals and aliens. As Fig. 1.1 shows, the EU enlargement towards countries in Eastern Europe intensified a post-socialist East-West-East migration pattern. In the 2000s, in particular East-West emigration from Poland to Germany and the UK, as well as from Romania to Spain, Italy and Germany, account for a large proportion of these migration flows. At the same time, it is interesting to see how emigration from the Eastern countries to the Western ones is often accompanied by major backflows of fellow nationals to their countries of origin. Large numbers of Polish migrants moved from Germany, the UK and Ireland back to Poland. Romania witnessed an inflow of Romanians from Germany and Spain. Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Slovakian and Hungarian migrants also returned from temporary stays in Germany. West-East return migration has thus become part of the major migration pattern in Europe.




Fig. 1.1 Main flows of European migration from and into new EU member states, 2002–11

According to EUROSTAT (2015), in 2013 the number of returning migrants to Romania was 138,923, and 131,431 Poles returned to Poland; 18,975 Lithuanians went back home, while 17,718 Hungarians resettled in Hungary. A smaller number represents the Czech Republic, where 5326 Czechs returned home. In Latvia, 4774 returns were observed; 4682 Bulgarians returned to their country; 2674 Slovaks moved back to Slovakia; and 2472 Estonians moved back home. Finally, some 2250 Slovenians returned to Slovenia. These figures cover return migration in the EU's new member states. At the same time, Western European countries experience significant inflows of fellow nationals: 83,229 Germans moved back to Germany. Also, the UK and France have large numbers of incoming nationals (76,136 and 115,402, respectively). In Italy, the number equals 28,433 return migrants, and in Austria 9237 returnees moved back to the country. If measured as immigration of fellow citizens, return migration sums up to 3.4 million within the EU28 in 2013 (EUROSTAT 2015).

Using EU Labour Force Survey data from 2005 to 2008, and EUROSTAT data from 2009, Smoliner et al. (2013) found that the percentage of nationals compared to non-nationals immigrating to Central Europe varied considerably between countries: in Poland, 75 % of cross-border immigration was composed of Polish returning migrants. In other countries, the percentage was smaller: 29 % for the Czech Republic, 23 % for Germany, 10 % for Slovenia and 8 % for Hungary, Italy and the Slovak Republic, respectively.

This overall migration pattern indicates that return migration affects CEE countries very differently. Even within the Visegrád Countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia), which are considered to be to some degree homogeneous, there are robust differences with divergent migration flows and socio-economic outcomes. Researchers are also confronted by a lack of appropriate data that allows for deeper analysis, which is viable not only relating to larger samples, but also for a greater comparable set of countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, relatively few empirical findings exist on labour market behaviour and integration of returning migrants (Smoliner et al. 2013, p. 11).

1.3 Theoretical Frameworks of Return Migration

The study of return migration is challenged by the fact that theoretical approaches in migration research were developed initially to explain primary migratory movements. Thus their explanatory value for processes and effects of return migration needs to be reflected critically, taking into account the history of the development of migration theory. Early approaches of migration research focused mainly on the macro level and considered a variety of factors that might influence migration decisions, such as Ravenstein's Laws of Migration (1885/1889) or push-pull approaches (Lee 1966). Research on return migration and its main triggers gained impetus from the middle of the 1970s, mainly because of the spread of the modern 'guest worker' phenomenon (Glaser and Habers 1974; Gmelch 1980; Cassarino 2004; Van Houte and Davids 2008). Since then, several theoretical approaches have been developed regarding return migration and its impact on the country of origin. Neoclassical approaches focus on migration in the context of economic development processes and emphasise the economic logic of migratory decisions, at both macro and micro levels (Sjaastad 1962; Harris and Todaro 1970; Piore 1979; Stark 1991). Structuralist approaches expand the research perspective to a greater number of explanatory variables. They focus on structural elements that are framing migratory decisions, such as the political, economic, demographic or social situations in both origin and possible destination countries (Mabogunje 1970; Gmelch 1980; Kritz and Zlotnik 1992).

While these theories focus on the initial causes of migration, other approaches such as the network theory or the theory of cumulative causation address the questions of how and why migration processes are sustained despite changing conditions (Massey 1990; Gurak and Caces 1992; Massey et al. 1993; Faist 1997). The transnational approach in migration research brought an important shift in the focus of observation, by stressing the significance of transnational social spaces for further mobility decisions, but also for general orientation in life (Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Portes 1997). Those transnational social spaces develop in the

context of migratory movements and they constitute an important reference point for the socio-spatial orientation and identity development of migrants (Pries 2008).

If we apply existing migration theories to the explanation of return migration, we have to consider several constraints that are arising from the different logic of return migration processes as compared to primary migration processes. Ravenstein's (1885/1889) laws of migration are an exception, as they already consider return migration, which is modelled as counterflow developing in the context of primary migration. Also, the regional perspective can be of value, as Ravenstein's laws state that return migration will more likely be directed to urban rather than rural regions in the country of origin. This early approach can serve as heuristic approach rather than as an extended explanatory frame.

Applying neoclassical theories to the research of return migration, we have to vary the central assumption of migration decisions being the result of economic cost-benefit calculations, which means that the return to an economically weaker country would be considered as an individual failure to reach one's original migratory goals (Constant and Massey 2002). Nevertheless, economic rationality can also be applied to return migration processes if we differentiate and adapt some of the explanatory factors, as, for example, income variances, the structure of consumer prices in the countries concerned or the opportunity to apply individual cultural capital in a profitable way. Considering those aspects, low-skilled migrants may have a higher probability of returning from target countries with high income variance, as their relative income is comparatively low, whereas highly skilled migrants might be more motivated to return from countries with lower income variance (Borjas and Bratsberg 1996). Furthermore, structural changes in the labour market of the country of origin can create incentives for return migration; for example, if a shortage of labour leads to an increase in wage levels, or if economic development in the home country increases the probability of applying any skills acquired abroad. These aspects have been found to be strongly relevant for the early transformation period in Central and Eastern Europe (Williams and Baláž 2005). Another example for economic rationality in return decisions is the consideration of consumer prices in both countries, of origin and destination. Particularly

after retirement from paid work, it might be rational to return to a home country that has lower consumer prices, where the acquired pension offers more opportunities for consumption than if the individual stayed in the destination country.

Applying the new economics of migration (Stark 1991) to the research into return migration, we can focus on the impact of remittances and on the assumption that migration decisions are made at the household level. Within this perspective, returnees can be considered as target-oriented migrants returning once the targeted income goal is reached (Constant and Massey 2002). Conceptualising migration decisions as household decisions has not only proved to be viable when considering economic aspects, but also in the context of an extended life cycle concept. Thus, return migration could be encouraged by the ageing process of household members that means adaptations to the transnational household constellation (Yang 2006).

Also, structuralist approaches (Mabogunje 1970; Kritz and Zlotnik 1992) carry a high explanatory potential for return migration processes; for example, if changing labour market conditions are considered. Economic crisis and declining labour demand in destination countries can trigger return migration movements, and multiple connections between source and destination countries on the economic, political or social level can further increase return migration flows. Structuralist approaches can also help to clarify the role of institutional support or the influence of social media for the structuration of return migration.

Social network theories and transnational approaches focusing on the maintenance of migratory processes are also relevant for return migration (Gurak and Caces 1992; Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Massey et al. 1993; Faist 1997). Applying social network theory to return migration, the aspect of embeddedness in transnational social networks will be a crucial factor for successful reintegration. Additionally, institutionalised networks can play an important role, as they can contribute significantly to overcoming any bureaucratic problems that might emerge in the context of return migration; for example, considering labour market integration, housing or schooling. From another angle, the Cultural Identity Model (CIM) brought psychological and cultural perspectives into the explanation of return migration processes (Sussman 2002). According to this

strand of explanations, cultural identity and its transition substantially influence cultural adaptation and return experience.

Considering the history of migration research, there has always been special attention paid towards economic and labour-market-related migration processes, supported by rational choice approaches. Only recently has migration theory started to consider the impact of social networks and transnational livelihoods on migratory movements and decision-making processes. This book draws upon this more recent strand of research. We conceptualise return migration not only as an economic endeavour, but also as a socio-cultural process driven by a mix of economic, social and cultural motives. Return migration decisions in this respect cannot be seen as purely rational individual decisions, but increasingly as socially constituted decisions within a household, family and wider cultural context, or even as structurally inscribed *modus operandi*. Further, acknowledging the circularity and complexity of migration in a European context, return migration should not be seen as the end of a bi-directional process, but rather as an episode in a long-term migration biography. This implies that further episodes might follow.

1.4 The Nexus Between Return Migration and Regional Development

The impact of return migration on the countries of return is of special interest for Central and Eastern Europe. Considering the high selectivity of primary emigration regarding age and educational level, returning migrants represent a human resource to counter current demographic challenges and the lack of skilled labour. Returning migrants are usually younger than the resident population; their educational level is higher than that of non-migrants; and they tend to maintain connections with their home countries while abroad, which makes their integration easier on return compared to that of foreign immigrants. As Smoliner et al. (2013, p. 39) pointed out: ‘Returnees are old enough to have mobilised various resources, but they are still young enough to pursue their goals and use their capital to foster knowledge-based development in the origin country.’

Nevertheless, data stemming from the Re-Turn project shows that there are problems related to return, even though the experienced return for most of the migrants was much easier than expected (see Figs 1.2 and 1.3 and Lang et al. 2014, pp. 35ff.). Returning migrants are often affected by irregular work conditions (e.g. part-time jobs), and are more often unemployed than non-migrants. Furthermore, there are contradictory findings, if the foreign work experience pays off in financial terms. Some studies remark that there is a sort of income premium (e.g. Martin and Radu 2012) and enhanced career opportunities (Vavrečková and Baštyř 2009); others have found that this is not the case (Grabowska-Lusińska 2010; Co et al. 2000). As such, it remains unclear why some returning migrants succeed while others have difficulties.

Furthermore, studies giving an insight into ‘income premia’ of returnees, effects of qualifications and human capital (obtained through the experience of migration) as well as self-employment are not producing reliable findings that could be transferred to other countries and related to the different kinds of returnees (concerning qualifications, education, age and gender). Besides this, most data sets do not allow for the drawing of conclusions on the region of return to which remigration is directed. For example, when Smoliner et al. (2013) analysed Labour Force Survey data according to the country of return, there was no possibility of verifying whether the return region was identical to the region of emigration within




Fig. 1.2 Expected (potential returnees) versus experienced (returnees) difficulty of return. *Source:* Re-Turn data ($n = 1585$). Questions: ‘For potential returnees: how easy do you expect the return to be? For returnees: how easy was it for you to return to [home country]?’




Fig. 1.3 Experienced barriers of returnees (those who experienced the return as being very difficult or difficult). *Source:* Re-Turn data ($n = 153$). Question: 'Which factors made the return difficult?'

the home country. Martin and Radu (2012) stress the importance of regional ties related to networks, peer pressure and local interactions as migrants cluster in specific regions in the country of emigration and in their home country after return. However, they do not provide reliable empirical evidence (Martin and Radu 2012, p. 120). Finally, there is a lack of empirical findings paying attention to gender and a viable framework to measure regional economic effects and impacts on regional development.

1.5 New Theoretical, Methodological and Regional Perspectives Linked to Return Migration in Europe: Contributions of the Book

With this book, we aim to introduce new theoretical, conceptual, methodological and regional perspectives linked to return migration in Europe, and we shall explore research questions that gained in importance during the course of profound political, economic and societal changes in recent decades. Linking to the overall development of migration and return

migration in Europe after 1989/90 and contextualising it within the systemic changes towards post-industrial, deregulated and increasingly globally integrated economies throughout Europe, we aim to prepare the ground for the introduction of new research questions that are connected directly to new theoretical approaches in migration studies. Those approaches and questions address the micro-level of migration decisions in order to enhance an understanding of mobility processes in a post-modern 'risk society' (Beck 1986). Therefore this book is divided into four parts following this introduction:

1. Conceptual approaches towards return migration in Europe;
2. Researching return migration: research methods, implementation and results;
3. New regional perspectives and research questions on return migration in Europe; and
4. Policy recommendations and conclusions.

Return migration was for a long time considered to be a specific, and final, step in an individual's migration biography. However, recent debates among migration scholars have begun to challenge this understanding. Part I of this book focuses on these emerging conceptual debates. In Chap. 2, Ludger Pries critically reflects on the assumed finality of return migration. Based on a review of empirical studies on return migration, he suggests conceptualising return migration as part of a migration career, which rather follows a circular pattern. In the light of this conceptual finding, he comments on current migration policy. In Chap. 3, Katrin Klein-Hitpaß picks up the discussion on the migration-development nexus, which often overlooks return migration. She argues for a conceptualisation of returning migrants as knowledge brokers, and analyses the specific role of returning migrants for processes of innovation in home regions. In Chap. 4, Izabela Grabowska challenges the traditional understanding of returning migrants as bearers of financial and human capital. Based on empirical evidence from Poland, she links life-course studies to the research on return migration. Looking at the occupational trajectories of returning migrants, she argues for a new perspective on migration,

combining models of opportunity structures and agency. In Chap. 5, Jelena Predojevic-Despic, Tanja Pavlov, Svetlana Milutinovic and Brikena Balli also add to the debate on the nexus between returning migrants and the regional development of home regions by having a look at the specific practices of returning Albanians and Serbians in terms of transnational entrepreneurship.

Part II of the book deals with methodological challenges and their implications for empirical research. One of the major problems for further research on return migration is that return migration is poorly recorded by official migration registers, making register-based quantitative studies almost impossible. Most countries only collect data on immigration without recording proper information about former places of residence in the home countries. As an alternative, return migration can be explored by using data that originally was not designed for the study of remigration and thus does not provide all the information necessary to understand the field (for example, European and national labour force surveys, or socio-economic panels). Based on four empirical papers, this Part II will introduce possible data sources for return migration studies and how these can be explored for innovative research. The individual contributions address research questions that call for research designs based on original empirical study. They provide an overview of methodological challenges and possible solutions that are currently applied in return migration studies.. In Chap. 6, Alexander M. Danzer and Barbara Dietz report on their quantitative study based on a comparative cross-country survey with more than 2,000 respondents. In Chap. 7, Robert Nadler introduces an innovative quantitative approach, which consists of first-time analysis of official data from the Federal Employment Agency in Germany. This chapter encourages the further investigation of existing data sets for their utility regarding return migration studies. In Chap. 8, Russell King and Nilay Kılınç provide an example of a qualitative approach using in-depth interviews in the case of returnees from Germany to Turkey. Especially when it comes to understanding processes and motives, a qualitative approach is preferable to a quantitative one, all the more so when sensitive issues are addressed, such as the construction of identity, intergenerational

relationships or gender issues in the context of migration. In Chap. 9, Rhona Ní Chearbhaill broadens the scope to cover interdisciplinary research, combining literature studies with migration research. Using an ethnographic method, she studied Irish returnees through qualitative interviews and validates the results with narratives gathered from Irish novels.

Part III of the book deals with new regional perspectives of return migration in Europe. Important research topics in this context are the durability of emigration and return, and the embeddedness of (re) migration decisions in life-cycle considerations and in extended family contexts. Furthermore, the question of reintegration is raised, as reintegration processes in our regional scope often contain the adaptation to a transformed, unknown societal and institutional context, which is constituted by the modernisation gap between host and home countries, and by the post-socialist situation found in many countries of return. In Chap. 10, Zaiga Krišjāne, Elīna Apsīte-Beriņa and Māris Bērziņš present findings on return migration to Latvia, concentrating on the circularity of movements from and to the country. They describe and explain the heterogeneity of migrant groups and the motives of their mobility decisions. In Chap. 11, Birgit Glorius focuses on the return intentions of international students in Germany, a new target group of German policy-makers in the light of current shortages of skilled labour. Glorius changes the perspective on return migration to that of the host country of migrants. In Chap. 12, Christine von Blanckenburg takes a closer look at returning entrepreneurs and their family-based commemorative cultures in the context of the German reunification process, bringing in the household perspective. In Chap. 13, Alexander Bürgin and Defne Erzene-Bürgin present evidence on the migration motives and trajectories of returning second-generation migrants from Germany to Turkey. They oppose the hypothesis of a 'return of failure' (Cerase 1974) and instead stress the significance of family decisions and lifestyle considerations for return migration. In Chap. 14, Caroline Hornstein Tomić and Sarah Scholl-Schneider address the challenges of reintegration to a transformation environment and explore the processes of negotiation and adaptation of return migrants at home after their return.

In Part IV of the book, we conclude with a view on current policy initiatives to support return migration to Central and Eastern European regions, and with a general summary and outlook based on the individual contributions to the book. Reviewing (national) policies in Europe designed to stimulate return migration, Lajos Boros and Gábor Hegedűs conclude in Chap. 15 that in contrast to the lack of reintegration strategies in most of the source countries at the turn of the millennium, Central and Eastern European countries now aim to help with the reintegration of their returnees. However, to date there has been no significant collaboration between sending and receiving countries, which, however, could be very useful for fostering return migration. This deficiency can be seen as a sign of tension between the interests of the sending and receiving countries. Finally, in our concluding Chap. 16, we bring together the theoretical debates, the methodological discussions and the empirical results portrayed in this book. The aim is to provide a comprehensive understanding of the current state of research on return migration in Europe. By doing so, this chapter—and, we hope, this book as a whole—tells a story that so far has been poorly covered, as return migration is studied mainly through the aspect of returnees from Europe to other continents, and as within Europe, the focus is more on the impacts of emigration or on international immigration. Concentrating on recent return flows and their effects, we attempt to trace one important aspect of a new European mobility regime, bridging the normative divide between East and West, which may not only increase European transnationalism, but can also enforce social and economic cohesion.

Acknowledgements The Re-Turn project aimed at pushing the topic of return migration on to the political agenda, providing an account of the extent of return migration and the competences and needs of returning migrants as well as the concrete measures to promote remigration as a source to foster knowledge development in home regions. Re-Turn's objective was to identify, advance and implement measures to capitalise on returning migrants and thus enhance human capital and return migrants' entrepreneurial abilities in participating regions. The introduction draws partly on the results of collaborative work with Aline Hämmerling, Stefan Haunstein, Anika Schmidt, Jan Keil (Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography, Leipzig, Germany); Stefanie Smoliner (Centre for Social Innovation, Vienna, Austria); Lajos Boros, Gábor Hegedűs,

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Part I

Conceptual Approaches Towards Return Migration in Europe

2

Circular Migration as (New) Strategy in Migration Policy? Lessons from Historical and Sociological Migration Research

Ludger Pries

In the context of economic, cultural, social and political globalisation as well as unbalanced economic and demographic development, migration is of increasing importance in almost all parts of the world. There seems to exist a worldwide iron law that people must try to improve their situation and living conditions—if necessary by moving from one place to another. In 2013, some 232 million people lived in a country other than that of their birth. Additionally, 740 million internal migrants have been estimated by the International Organization for Migration (UN 2013; UNDP 2009, pp. 1ff.). Only China has more than 200 million internal migrants, which is equivalent to the total amount of international migration. In China (as a result of the so-called *hukou* system), but also in other large countries and the continents of the world, internal migration could lead to a fundamental shift in climatic and living conditions as well as in civic and social status and rights (Jijiao 2013). Because of this, *internal* migration within countries could be as important as, or even more important than, some forms of *international* migration. For example,

L. Pries (✉)

Department of Social Science, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Bochum, Germany

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a move from the Netherlands to Germany or from Italy to Switzerland, say, where cultural, linguistic, climatic and social differences might be minor compared to a situation of internal migration from Tibet to Shanghai.

Europe is not at the margin but in the very centre of such migration dynamics. This can be explained by various factors. One is the demolition of the Iron Curtain between Western and Eastern Europe. Another is the worldwide exceptional system of free mobility in the European Union (EU). A third driving force is the demographic challenge of ageing populations in many European countries and the EU as a whole. Finally, there is a significant gap between (Western) Europe and other regions of the world concerning economic wealth and welfare, public security and quality of life. All these factors fuel the migration dynamics into and within the EU. Germany is a platform at the very centre of these European migration dynamics.

After the implosion of real socialism in Eastern Europe, millions of migrants from the former Soviet bloc went West. During the 1990s, the flow into Germany and the outflow from the country of people with non-German nationality varied each year, in each case by between half a million and more than a million. The stock of immigrants coming from other European countries during this period increased by almost two million (Statistisches Bundesamt 2012). Almost a fifth of the population living in Germany in 2013 were immigrants or first generation children of at least one immigrant. Out of these 15.9 million people with a migration background, some 11.1 million originated from Europe, and half of the latter had come from Eastern European countries (BAMF 2015, pp. 194ff.).

In public discourse and scientific research there arose some fears, critiques and hypotheses about who had benefited the most from these migration processes since 1991. Some alarmist statements argue that mainly unqualified people migrate into and within the EU, towards those countries with high welfare standards. In Germany there are passionate debates about an alleged ‘immigration into the welfare system’ or a so-called *poverty migration*. Such debates intensified when, from 1 January 2014 onwards, all citizens from Bulgaria and Romania (and not only the highly qualified academics from these countries who had already had free mobility since 2007) were allowed to move to Germany to seek work.

There are also hypotheses regarding the reverse situation, that it was mainly the highly educated people who migrated; for example, from the Eastern European countries to the West (for Bulgaria and Romania, see SVR 2013, p. 103). There is a larger scientific and political debate about *brain drain* or *brain gain* centred around the question of whether (or under which conditions) migration alleviates or accentuates the welfare gap between poor and rich countries (for a general debate on this topic, see Özden 2006; De Haas 2012; Portes 2012). As Germany experienced a net outmigration at the end of the 2000s, there were even debates about a brain drain from Germany towards Switzerland and Austria (Brücker 2010). Another group of arguments focus on the observation that migration flows are multidirectional. There is not only outmigration from poorer countries of the European periphery towards wealthy or economically prosperous regions (such as Germany), but also a significant amount of so-called return migration. Such tendencies could be observed in the case of Polish migration to the United Kingdom after the financial crisis of 2007 (Zaiceva and Zimmermann 2012), but also for return migration of Russians who first moved to Germany during the 1990s (Pohl 2008, pp. 103ff., 123).

There is no space in this chapter to analyse all aspects of these empirical tendencies, queries and hypotheses, many of which are treated in more detail in other chapters of this book. The main emphasis in the following sections is twofold. First, the normative aspects and the cyclical character of these debates on migration policies, in particular the current discourses in the EU that often treat circular migration as ‘the new Pandora’s box’ without having a closer look at the history of migration policies in Europe, will be analysed in a more conceptual way in the next section. Then, in the following section the historical experiences of ‘guestworker’ migration policies in Europe, in particular in Germany, will be discussed in order to extract lessons to be learned for future migration policies in the field of circular migration. Finally, in light of more recent debates around transnationalisation and the differentiation of concepts of international migration, ranging from simple, unidirectional singular immigration—outmigration events to complex multidirectional repeated transnational network mobility, some general conclusions for our understanding of the

dynamics and the different patterns of international migration will be drawn.¹

2.1 Circular Migration: The New Pandora's Box?

As sketched elsewhere and treated in more detail in other chapters of this book, migration patterns are not restricted to the classic mode of one-point singular and definitive emigration/immigration in the sense of leaving one national container society and integrating definitely into another national container society (Pries 2001). They are neither limited to simple return migration in the sense of traditional concepts of guestworkers or temporary migrant programmes. Multiple and multi-directional mobility patterns have been observed, mainly within the EU, but also in other contexts (for intra-EU migration, see Pries 2015; for Germany—Turkey, see Pusch 2013; for Mexico—USA, see Pries 2004). In this context, mainly in migration policies, the concept of *circular migration* has attracted much attention since the new century. Combining the needs of the migrants themselves, of the countries of their arrival and of the countries of origin, this idea appeared very suitable for combining the necessity of generating income according to varying household needs, of labour market shortages in the countries of the North and West, and of fostering development in the countries of the South and East or the periphery. Circular migration was in vogue in the corresponding discourses.

After having noted that, for many countries of the South, migrants' remittance payments to their home country largely exceeded the amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI) and of official development aid, many politicians as well as scientists turned to considering how migration dynamics could be better exploited for development purposes. Also, many EU member states receiving labour migrants, such as Germany, feel they lack highly qualified workers and employees and are thus very

¹I very much appreciate the comments and suggestions of the two anonymous reviewers; all remaining errors are my responsibility.

open to programmes of circular migration and mobility partnerships with countries that do not have job opportunities for their skilled and highly qualified workers. The EU and many of its member states developed special action programmes in the area of so-called circular migration (as with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia).² On the other hand, many sending countries are interested in negotiating specific contracts for temporal migration or mobility partnerships.

Concerning migration policies, it seems that everyone would be happy with circular migration. The migrants themselves do not have to emigrate definitely and for ever, but just visit for some years. They would gain new knowledge and experiences, and return home with money and projects to develop their income, and thereby also that of their country of origin. The latter would profit from direct economic remittances as well as from social and cultural remittances in the sense of the new capabilities and attitudes of their migrant citizens. The countries of arrival would benefit from having a trained labour force, and invest in additional training and partnership programmes that could be considered as a form of development aid. And the receiving countries would not have to be concerned with all the complex questions arising from unconditional and indefinite immigration, such as family unification, cultural adaptation or integration programmes.

Having a closer look at what is happening at the European level, many migration policy initiatives can be found that reflect exactly the main considerations presented so far. Very important among these initiatives are the 'Policy Plan on Legal Migration' of 2005 and the Communication COM (2005), p. 248) entitled 'On circular migration and mobility partnerships between the European Union and third countries'. This general framework of the EU for circular migration was then concretised in the 'Stockholm Programme' of 2009, which dealt in particular with remittances, migrant diasporas and circular migration. The latter programme also proposed to develop directives at EU level on (1) conditions of entry and residence of highly skilled workers; (2) conditions of entry and residence of seasonal workers (which in fact was presented in July 2010);

² See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/eastern-partnership/mobility-partnerships-visa-facilitation-and-readmission-agreements/index_en.htm.

(3) procedures regulating entry, temporary stay and residence of so-called intra-corporate transferees (employees of companies being sent from dependencies in one country to another); and (4) on the conditions of entry and residence of remunerated trainees.³

In a similar vein, there arose a number of initiatives at the level of independent EU member states focusing on circular migration and mobility partnerships being inspired basically by the arguments mentioned above. For example, in 2010, the Netherlands negotiated a pilot project with South Africa and Indonesia called Blue Bird, which includes allowing 160 qualified people to move to the Netherlands for a maximum of 2 years. The project was not carried out to the end, but finished early in May 2011. Portugal signed a contract with Ukraine in 2003, but only a maximum of 50 people were allowed to come from Ukraine for a 6-month stay to work in construction, agriculture and restaurant service in Portugal. Then there was an evaluation by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) as to whether this was useful for the country and for the people involved.⁴ France signed a contract with Mauritius to bring in 150 highly qualified people for a maximum of 5 years, and for a maximum period of 30 months, 500 skilled workers, to work in France. Spain had similar agreements with Colombia, Morocco and Romania; in Cataluña, the organisation Fundació Agricultors Solidaris (FAS) was founded as a branch of a union aimed at connecting home and host communities and managing the flow of circular migrants between the countries involved. The United Kingdom developed a seasonal agricultural workers' scheme between 1996 and 2004, and then on to 2008, allowing first 5,500, then 25,000 and ultimately 16,250 agricultural workers to migrate and work for a maximum of 6 months in the UK. The return rate of these seasonal workers was over 90 %.⁵ All these examples show that there is actually

³ See <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0248:FIN:EN:PDF>; <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0379:FIN:EN:PDF>; <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0378:FIN:EN:PDF>.

⁴ See http://www.ces.uc.pt/myces/UserFiles/livros/627_21a-1.PORTUGAL_National_Report_Circular_Migration_FINAL_Version_6_Jan_2011.pdf.

⁵ The Seasonal Agricultural Workers' Scheme (SAWS) is a quota system through which individuals (mainly students) from outside the European Economic Area (EEA) are recruited by 'designated operators' for agricultural work for a maximum of 6 months in each year. In recent years, SAWS workers have come mainly from Central and Eastern Europe, including from new member states.

not only a discourse in the E U, but also mechanisms and specific programmes at the level of the EU and of individual member states to promote the idea of circular migration.

Based on the ‘Policy Plan on Legal Migration’ and the Communication COM (2005), p. 669) (Commission of the European Communities 2005) the different national programmes of circular migration active in the year 2002 could be traced according to the total number of work-permit holders, the number of professionals with work permits, the total employment in the corresponding country, and the ratio of work-permit holders to total employment (see Table 2.1). This overview demonstrates that at the beginning of the past decade a large number of countries had in place certain kinds of explicit circular migration initiatives and pilot programmes. But, on the other hand, Table 2.1 also reveals that only a very small number of migrants were included in these programmes. The total of circular migrant workers for selected EU member states given in Table 2.1 sums up to almost half a million, estimates for the then overall EU 25 increasing to 630,000 circular migrants (see Table 2.1). This stock of migrants with limited work permits represents almost half the size of the overall annual net migration flows of EU 25, which is estimated at slightly more than one million (European Commission 2011, p. 49). Almost four-fifths of the temporary work permit holders in 2002 were concentrated in the four countries of Germany, the UK, Italy and Spain. Compared to an overall population with a foreign background living in the EU 27 of almost 45.5 million (Lanzieri 2011, p. 34), the number of work-permit holders is quite low.

Even more questionable is, how many of the half million migrants included in this group could actually be considered as circular migrants in the sense of specific programmes of ‘mobility partnerships’ or ‘circular migration’ in the strict sense of triple-win approaches. The numbers presented above concerning such programmes in the Netherlands, Portugal, France, Spain and the UK, as well as the numbers known for Germany

Accordingly, the EU enlargement was followed by a reduction in the SAWS quota (Guild and Napley 2006: 1012). These provisions are still valid for Bulgaria and Romania (see Martin 2007). As Bulgaria and Romania entered the EU in 2007, according to the specific transition rules of each EU member state free labour mobility for these countries came into effect on 1 January 2014 at the latest.

Table 2.1 Estimated annual inflows of work-permit holders in selected EU countries

Country	All WP ^a -holders	WP ^a -professionals	TE ^b 2002	WPH/TE ^b in %	Comments
DK	1,600	500	2,741,000	0.06	2003. Professionals relate to occupations requiring special skills that are in demand
DE	165,000	3,300	36,275,000	0.45	2003. Figures relate to non-EU persons arriving in Germany. The total includes multiple entries, the vast majority of whom are unskilled. Professional category relates only to 'Green Card' scheme for IT specialists
ES	65,000	—	16,241,000	0.40	Approximate net estimate for 2002/2003 for the rise in the numbers in the SI system (excluding EU nationals)
FR	31,200	12,400	23,885,000	0.13	Professionals covers the inflows of those with Autorisations Provisoire de Travail (APTs) and qualified 'travailleurs permanents' in 2003

Table 2.1 (continued)

Country	All WP ^a -holders	WP ^a -professionals	TE ^b 2002	WPH/TE ^b in %	Comments
IE	16,100	2,000	1,750,000	0.92	2003 data. Professionals include WP holders with occupations defined as in ISCO88 and the highly skilled on Working Visas. New member states (EU 10) are excluded
IT	78,800	500	21,757,000	0.36	Visas issued to non-EU nationals in 2003 for self-employment and contract work. Professional figure is a reserved quota for highly skilled workers
LV	2800	—	987,000	0.28	2002
LT	500	160	1,421,000	0.04	2003
HU	40,300	3,800	3,868,000	1.04	No. of non-EU workers holding valid WPs as at 31/12/03. Professionals have a college or university education
NL	38,000	10,900	8,176,000	0.46	2003
PL	5600	1,700	13,820,000	0.04	Estimated new permits (i.e. excl. renewals) for non-EU persons in 2002. Professionals are those classed as experts + consultants

(continued)

Table 2.1 (continued)

Country	All WP ^a -holders	WP ^a -professionals	TE ^b 2002	WPH/TE ^b in %	Comments
SK	1000	—	2,111,000	0.05	Total non-EU inflow for 2002
FI	13,100	1,700	2,406,000	0.54	2003. Covers non-EU WP holders
SE	6700	4,300	4,348,000	0.15	2002. Covers non-EU WP holders
UK	89,200	15,800	28,338,000	0.31	2003 data. Persons who entered the UK from abroad on WPs in 2003. Excludes renewals and first permissions for those already resident in the UK. Professions defined as in ISCO 88. Includes a small number of EU 10 citizens.
Total	554,900	57,060	168,124,000	0.33	Based on listed country information, does not include all EU countries
EU25	633,200 (estimate)	74,300 (estimate)	191,841,000	0.33	

Source: Commission of the European Communities 2005: p. 27

^aWP = work permits

^bTE = total employment

(see below) suggest a total of less than 100,000 migrants being covered by special projects where aspects of ‘migration and development’ or ‘mobility partnership’ are included. Taking the criteria of highly skilled migrants, only around 74,300 migrants out of an estimated total of 633,200 work-permit holders were considered to be professionals (see Table 2.1).

Despite these reduced numbers of migrants fitting into specific programmes of the ‘new’ circular migration discourse, it must be stated that, mainly since the start of the 2000s there have been substantial initiatives

and approaches to generate win—win situations for both countries of origin and countries of arrival, and for the migrants themselves. Such new circular migration strategies are also on the agenda in Germany. One illustrative example is the pilot project ‘Triple Win Migration’ developed by the Centre for International Migration and Development (CIM), a German development agency specialising in organising human mobility. CIM developed this pilot project of triple-win migration in 2011 for 20 qualified care workers from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania, 20 so-called MINT⁶ academics from Vietnam and Indonesia, and 20 welding operators to come to Germany. So this programme includes both academic professionals and skilled workers.

There was a strict time limit to how long these highly qualified migrants could stay in Germany, and a guarantee that they would return to their countries of origin when this limit was reached. According to the programme, if they did not return, this would be considered a brain drain, and there would be no strong development impact on the country of origin. There were preparation courses in the German language, for example, and an intercultural training course for these 60 people. Mentors were assigned to these migrants during their stay in Germany. Towards the end of their stay there were preparation courses for returning to their country of origin and invitations to develop businesses in their country of origin. In addition, there was investment in developing an information system regarding the labour market in the sending countries, arguing that if there was good information provided about opportunities in the labour market of the sending countries, then people would be more willing to return. According to the project, German employers will benefit by compensating for a lack of experts, will develop international networks, will be able to transfer know-how, and can arrange institutional co-operation with people in the countries of origin. The partner countries will benefit from the transfer of knowledge, academic and economic co-operation will be developed, vocational training will be better and so

⁶According to its wording in German, MINT refers to ‘mathematics, engineering, natural sciences and technical professions’.

on. The migrants themselves will benefit from training, new experiences and the possibility of a second ‘round’ of circular migration.⁷

Summarising, circular migration seems to be a hot topic in migration-policy-related public programmes and declarations, at both European and national levels (De Haas 2010, pp. 230ff.). Viewed from a scientific standpoint, some questions arise regarding the empirical and actual basis for such migration policies, and of the specific factors that could actually lead to a triple win–win situation. Is the idea of circular migration that new? What lessons could be learned from the European guestworker programmes that were so prominent during the 1960s and up to the oil crisis of 1973? Which aspects and criteria have to be taken into account in order to reach a triple win of circular migration projects (i.e. for the countries of origin, the countries of arrival and the migrants themselves)?

2.2 Lessons from History: Guestworker Programmes in Europe and Around

The term *guestworker* (*Gastarbeiter*) was used in Germany and in other European countries to characterise the referred persons as labour migrants who were ‘invited’ to work for a limited period of years as circular migrants. The term is irritating, because ‘guests’ are not obliged to leave—the spirit behind the corresponding guestworker policy was much influenced by an exclusively utilitarian attitude of both the sending and receiving states towards the migrants, who were not seen primarily as citizens but as a labour force.⁸ In more recent discourses on circular migration and triple win situations, the migrants themselves are—at least in theory and talk—approached as human beings with rights who

⁷ See ‘Brief presentation CIM, Project ‘Triple Win Migration’, Brigitte Schmiege (ZAV/BA)/Dominik Ziller (GIZ), 21–22 March 2012, WAPES-Workshop/Bonn; http://www.integplan.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Fachtagung2011/Material/CIM.ppt and Schneider and Parusel 2011, pp. 16–18.

⁸ For the long history of guestworker programmes and corresponding bilateral treaties since the 1920s in Europe, see Rass 2010; for the continuity of a similar thinking during the NS-regime see Oltmer 2012 and Pries 2014; for the specific guestworker system after the Second World War in Germany and Europe, see Oltmer et al. 2012.

also should profit from migration (see above). The basic idea of a guest-worker being seen as a kind of circular migrant seems both fascinating and simple (Fijalkowski 1993, pp. 106ff.). But historical evidence underlines that it is a very complex endeavour. The simple and seductive assumption of a triple-win between countries of origin, countries of arrival and migrants underestimates the complexity of collective actors involved and the consequences of the very fact that the topic of *circular migration always deals with a lot of 'moving targets'*; i.e. it is related to longer periods of time—in which actors normally change their goals, strategies and behaviour.

2.2.1 The Volatility of Migration Policies and Conditions: The German Case

This is true for the micro-level of migrants and their families as well as for employers and companies. All guestworker related research indicates that the great majority of migrants themselves actually plan to stay only for a few years and then to return home. But then, during their stays abroad, many of them reconsider their plans, extend their stay, invite other family members to come and define new migration goals and time periods. This is due to substantially new experiences at work, in housing, concerning culture or gender roles, or related to public security. Even if the migrants themselves do not change their plans, the members of their families and households (partners, children, parents and so on) might change their minds, their educational aspirations, or have problems with their health. The same is true for employers. Concerning the German guestworker programme, the first groups to criticize the principle of the migrants' rotation every 2–3 years were employer associations. According to their arguments, training migrants in work and language skills would be in vain if they would then rotate in short terms of a few years. The shorter the periods of circular migration, the more difficult it would be for workers and employers to take advantage of the circle. The longer the periods of circular migration, the higher the probability that the migration circle will 'get out of control' (see Münz et al. 1997, pp. 40ff.; Herbert 1986, p. 202; Luft 2009, pp. 59ff.).

The aspect of moving targets and changing constellations also refers to the macro-level of state policies and politics. In many countries of Europe, as well as all over the world, migration issues represent a highly contested terrain. Therefore changes in governments and corresponding political approaches could challenge the continuity of circular migration programmes. The history of German immigration law (*Zuwanderungsgesetz, ZuwandG*) of 2005 illustrates how volatile the political framing of migration policy can be. Based on a proposal of the then Minister of Home Affairs, Otto Schily, from July 2001 the law was discussed and finally approved by the parliament (*Bundestag*) on 1 March 2002. On 22 March 2002 the Council of the Constituent States (*Bundesrat*) approved the law. As a result of formal failures in the voting (that were claimed by Federal States), the Federal Constitutional Court declared the law to be invalid. In January 2003, the parliament passes the law again, but without any changes. Because of changed power relations within the Council of the Constituent States (after elections in some Federal States) the law was rejected by this body. A working group had to rework the law, which was subsequently passed by the parliament and the Council of the Constituent States in July 2004 and finally came into effect on 1 January 2005.⁹

Though this example was an extreme case of political contests and juridical—formal failures, similar disputes and conflicts have been observed in the case of many topics such as those related to highly qualified immigrants from third countries, or the system of residential permits and citizenship rights of immigrants. The volatility of crucial regulations concerning circular migration could be observed in an important question: under which conditions are highly qualified third nationals allowed to work in Germany? Based on the immigration law of 2005, the law on residence, work and integration (*Aufenthaltsgesetz*) of 2008 laid down that highly qualified immigrants from third countries could live and work in Germany when they could prove they had a job offer with a minimum annual income. In 2008 this limit was defined as €64,800, but this was reduced substantially to €34,000 in 2012. Obviously, such

⁹ See <http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zuwanderungsgesetz#Chronologie>. Interestingly, this law on immigration did not mention or foresee any possibilities of or projects involving circular migration; see Schneider and Parusel 2011, p. 21.

legal framing at the macro level could change the incentive structures for circular migration strongly.

Similar changes and volatility in the setting of circular migration can be observed in almost all countries. According to the orientations and preferences of the political parties in power, the conditions for circular migration vary—even when no basic change in the law might happen, but at the administrative level of executive rules as shown in the aforementioned example. In the Netherlands in 2010 the government initiated the so-called Blue Birds programme to foster the immigration of highly qualified people. This programme was stopped prematurely in June 2011 because of a lack of political support after a change among the ruling parties (SVR 2011, pp. 9ff.; for the volatility of migration politics in the Netherlands in general, see Doornik 2013).

Basic shifts in countries of migrants' departure could also enhance or challenge the conditions of circular migration programmes. Many of the Kurdish migrants who left their country in the context of the German–Turkish guestworker agreement considered their return to Turkey in terms of a substantial improvement of minority rights in that country. So their criteria of circular migration was much different from those of other guestworkers from Turkey—return was coupled directly to the conditions in the country of origin. For example, after the military coup in 1980 in Turkey, many thousands (Skubusch 2000, pp. 105, 112) of Turkish citizens left their country as family members of former guestworkers from Turkey. This began a new period of what at that moment might have been considered by many migrants as circular migration in the sense of a limited stay in Germany. Again, the signal for return was as a result of changes in the country of origin. In general, fundamental changes towards stable and efficient banking systems, reliable governmental policies and the rule of law for all citizens are documented as being crucial for making return migration happen (see e.g. Khadria 2007 and Aneesh 2006 for IT migrants between India and the USA; De Haas 2007 for shifts in the Kingdom of Morocco; Avci and Kirisci 2007 and Jamin 1999 for the—mostly failed—investment strategies of the Turkish state; and Plewa 2012 for Moroccan migrants in Spain).

In sum, the dynamics of migrants' life strategies as well as the shifts in governmental policies and in the legal—institutional infrastructure of

countries of origin and of arrival challenge to the long-term accountability of programmes of circular migration. The same holds for economic cycles and other factors. Does this mean that public policy and political programmes of circular migration make no difference? There is sufficient evidence that policy and politics matter, as will be shown in the next section.

2.2.2 Lessons to Be Learned from Europe and Other Regions

There are many examples showing that a clear and stable institutional framework and public policy in the country of origin are crucial for generating double or triple gains by circular migration. Rass (2012) compares the guestworker programmes of Greece and Spain (for Spain, see also Kreienbrink 2012). In the case of Greece, weak control prevails and there is very little active management of migration by the state. The European flow of migration from Greece was completely concentrated on Germany (about 85 % of all Greek migrants during that period), leading to a situation at the beginning of the 1970s where 11.5 % of the Greek population was living in Germany. From 1960 to 1973, almost 615,400 Greek migrants to Germany were registered, with half of them returning to Greece during the same period. Because of a lack of control in the country of origin an overflowing pool of Greek migrants developed in Germany, leading to stronger selection activities by Germany in Greece (which is represented, for example, in a 40 % rejection rate of applicants). The power relationship between Greece and Germany on migration issues is clearly biased towards the country of arrival, Germany. Greece is the weaker party and has almost no negotiation power.

In the case of Spain, there was strong control and management of migration flows by the authoritarian Spanish state under the Franco regime. Already by 1956 the Franco regime had elaborated an emigration law and founded the 'Instituto Español de Emigración' (Spanish Emigration Institute) representing strong state control. From 1960 to 1969 some 444,100 Spanish migrants to Germany were registered. In 1974, some 272,700 of these were still living in Germany. A similar number of

migrants (about 426,100) went to France, and others also migrated to Belgium, the Netherlands and other countries. Summarising, in the case of Spain there was strong control and management of migration by the state; and migration flows were diversified over many European countries. A well organised—authoritarian—state and the Migration Institute applied criteria of sector, unemployment rates by regions, and skill level to maintain qualified labour in Spain and hinder regional or sectoral imbalances in the country of origin. The crucial role of an explicit and active migration policy in the countries of origin is well documented in the literature (Muñoz Sánchez 2010; Hunn 2011, pp. 13ff.).

Regarding the circular migration case of Turkey—Germany, Avci and Kirisci (2007) conclude that, for the sending country, remittances developed to be a substantial source for development and currency balance. In the first phase, unemployment was reduced, while in a later period returning migrants were a substantial resource for innovative economic activities and even political modernisation. Germany as the receiving country won with the supply of relatively cheap manual labour and could induce the return of some migrants after the oil crisis of 1972/73. The migrants themselves were able to buy land and/or to build houses in their countries of origin and maintain strong ties and identities there, as well as to invest in economic activities when returning. Crucial conditions for these positive effects of circular migration were (a) strong and well defined state policies in both countries; (b) active migrant organisations; and (c) a certain rejection of migrants who were aiming to settle in Germany ('Germany is not a country of immigrants'). Besides these positive effects of circular migration policies, the case also reveals that migration dynamics have their own momentum, which sometimes goes directly against political intentions. An example of 'unintended consequences of intentional action' was the fact that after the end of the guestworker circulation between Germany and Turkey in 1973 many guestworkers actually returned, but, on the other hand, hundreds of thousands—more than intended—stayed.

For Indian circular migration with the USA and the Gulf States, Khadria (2007) found that in general there were several triple-win gains under completely contrasting conditions (high skilled liberal circular migration with the USA, low-skilled restricted migration with the Gulf

States) and that circular migration also could induce subsequent migration from other regions or countries to replace the losses of labour in the sending country (for example, migration inflow to the Indian state of Kerala from other Indian states and Nepal or Burma). Khadria (2007, p. 101) underlines the proactive and regulating role of the Indian state: 'there are various other pro-active programmes that are in the pipeline of the MOIA [Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs], including benchmarking of the best practices of other progressive sending countries like the Philippines and Sri Lanka ... Of all the government measures and programmes in India, Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI)— dual citizenship—is an important landmark in redefining the contours of a migration policy in the new millennium. This measure seems to be relevant mainly to the highly skilled migrants to the developed countries. A second measure, that Indian citizens abroad would have the right to exercise their votes from abroad, is primarily meant for the Indian workers in the Gulf—those who send large remittances back home but can never hope to become naturalised citizens of those countries because of restrictive regimes there.'

For the Moroccan circular migration experiences with Europe and the Gulf States, De Haas (2007, p. 168) found: 'The Moroccan case has shown that policies to increase remittances through formal channels or to stimulate investments can only be successful if they coincide with general macro-economic stability and a banking infrastructure.' De Haas shows how the objectives of the Moroccan government to keep remittance flows high and to strengthen relations with overseas migrants in Europe induced changes in state politics towards democratisation. He also underlines the limits of state control of migration: 'Although the receiving states in Europe and the Gulf have insisted that migration was temporary, even the authoritarian Gulf States have not been able to prevent long-term settlement and substantial undocumented immigration. Paradoxically, restrictive immigration policies in Europe have even pushed people into permanent settlement to a certain extent' (De Haas 2007). Based on the North African experiences De Haas (2007, p. 169) stresses the links between economic and political changes in the countries of origin as preconditions and possible effects of circular migration with triple-win outcomes: 'genuine market integration combined

with domestic political and economic reform might in the longer term indeed lead to sustained economic growth and the transformation of North African countries into labour importers. If that were the case, economic development and democratization is also likely to incite migrants to invest and return, and thereby further reinforce these positive trends.’

What applies to the countries of origin also holds for the countries of arrival, which by their nature are often more highly developed than the sending countries. It appears at first that the countries of arrival would be able to define or dictate many conditions for circular migration as a result of the unbalanced power relations in the migration systems. But on a closer view, politics, policies and the politics of migration management could be organised in a competitive, contradictory or even paralysing way among the different public authorities, and corporate and collective actors. In most cases of countries of migrants’ arrival there are contradictory competences within the public authorities. Germany is a good example (Luft 2009). Until 1965, the ‘policy towards foreigners’ (*Ausländerpolitik*)—this was the official term for treating migration issues—was dominated by the executive authorities. But even at this level there has always been a certain amount of competition between the Minister of Home Affairs, the Minister of Work and Social Welfare, the Minister of the Economy and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The first guestworker agreement after the Second World War was signed with Italy in 1955. From the German side, in the main the agreement was not negotiated because of problems of labour shortage. Italy had many problems with unemployment, and already by 1951 had signed guestworker treaties with France, Luxembourg and Belgium, all member countries of the European Economic Community (EEC). The German Chancellor Adenauer announced a guestworker treaty with Italy mainly for reasons of external policy. So this first agreement was largely a political treaty, because Germany was seeking reintegration with the international community after its isolation after the Second World War. The German Minister of the Economy (not the Minister of Home Affairs or of Foreign Affairs!) went to Italy and more or less spontaneously promised a guestworker immigration programme for Italians (Knortz 2008; Mattes 2005, p. 29). As Luft (2009, ppp. 36ff.) underlines, until the 1970s the legislative power, the parliament, was virtually excluded from

defining migration policies. Particularly during the 1960s, but also in the following decades in Germany, the management of migration was a highly contested terrain of competing competences between executive and legislative forces, ministries and political parties (Luft 2009, pp. 41ff., 55, 88; Schönwälder 2001, pp. 304ff.). In sum, when dealing with circular migration, its opportunities and limitations, a look back at history and international experience reveals the complexity of the topic. Some general conclusions could be drawn.

2.3 From Circular Migration to Transnational Mobility

Based on the international literature on guestworker programmes and circular migration, some general findings can be drawn (see also Miller and Martin 1982, pp. 103ff.; De Haas 2010). The first conclusion is that corresponding political initiatives to foster certain kinds of migration flows could have a tangible impact and leverage at the beginning. Through this, such programmes could—in a figurative sense—sow the first seeds of international migration. But, and this the second lesson to be learned, once such a migration process gains its own momentum, the ‘genie is let out of the bottle’ and state policies and politics are only one of the manifold influential factors in the field. The third conclusion is that the major effect of trying to ‘put the genie back in the bottle’ at a later point in time (such as the stopping of immigration during the period of ‘oil crisis’ in the 1970s) was that many guestworkers actually stayed and brought in more family members, such as from Turkey, to Germany. In spite of ‘closing the door’ the stoppage of the guestworker policy actually prevented the return of many guestworkers and encouraged the immigration of family members (Berlinghoff 2012; Motte 1999). A further general observation refers to the often uncoordinated and contradictory initiatives of different collective actors and state agencies such as ministries or different political parties and governments. Neither guestworker programmes nor circular migration initiatives are planned as homogeneous, harmonious and well-designed action programmes, but rather are ‘moving targets’ in a jungle of changing interests and coalitions. Concerning the guestworker

programme in Germany, Dohse (1985, p. 177) summarises: 'Actually it is significant that there was no such basic decision but a process of single decisions, relocation of problems and segmented management, in which the long-term implications of each singular step were not reflected and seemed neglectable, but which cumulated to a structure that facilitated the import of millions of foreign workers.'

The lessons from history lead to critical questions concerning the future policies and politics of circular migration. First: what if migrants do not return? Circular migration and the argument of a triple-win scenario include the assumption that people will work 2, 3 or 4 years in another country, and then go back to their homeland. Did, for example, the Turkish guestworkers return home from Germany, France or the Netherlands? If there was no considerable return migration, then the brain drain argument would arise: as in the context of circular migration, receiving countries are interested mainly in skilled and qualified labour, such flows would result in a net loss of qualified people for the sending countries if there was not a high percentage of return migration.

A second question is: what if remittances diminish? In other words, what if the amount of money that migrants send back to their countries of origin reduces? Since the start of the 2000s, remittance flows from receiving to sending countries have increased significantly. With the triple-win argument, it is assumed that remittance flows are very high because circular migrants are thinking about and preparing for their return, and consequently they will not invest in the receiving countries but rather in their regions of origin. From empirical studies it is well known that the longer the stay abroad, the more probable it is that remittance flows will slow down. The argument that in the context of circular migration there would be a continuous economic flow of remittances to the sending countries has to be questioned carefully.

There is a third, and very important, query: what if the interests and power of the sending and receiving countries are very unbalanced? The general case is that migration flows go from poorer to richer countries. There are always power relations between countries of origin and countries of arrival. The triple-win model assumes that there is a more or less equal relationship between the countries, and that circular migration programmes could be negotiated between state actors 'on an equal footing'.

But in reality the bargaining power of receiving states such as Germany, and of huge companies searching for migrant labour, is much higher than that of poorer countries such as Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria or the Philippines, to name a few examples. There is no equal power distribution between the collective and corporative actors who are negotiating migration flows and conditions.

A fourth question relates to diverging, or even opposing, interests between circular migrants and the companies that want to recruit them. The companies may be interested in having access to cheap labour for several years, but may not be interested in training people or investing in their education. Why should a company have invest in training and adapting workers for specific tasks and then send them back to their countries of origin some years later? And why should a circular migrant have a high commitment to a job, knowing that this is just for a limited time period and that he or she has to return to the home country?

Finally, a fifth question refers to the margins of control of individual behaviour of migrants by corporate actors such as states and companies and their corresponding norms and programmes. Migration flows are not the same as turning on and off a water tap. Individual decisions to migrate could be influenced by selective incentives of states (like labour market access or the general political climate towards immigrants). But in the end it is the migrants themselves who take the decisions, almost always in the broader context of households and families. Sometimes social actions have exactly the opposite consequences from those that were intended. Robert K. Merton (1936) elaborated the sociological law of ‘unintended consequences of intentional actions’: even when doing something with a completely explicit intention, there will always be some unintended consequences. By their very nature, migration processes are not fully controllable, not predictable, and not manageable.

All this leads to the final conclusion that our understanding of migration processes has to be extended and differentiated. The classic type of permanent emigration/immigration and the classic type of a singular guestworker stay and then permanent return migration to the region of origin still might be very important and for some migration processes these are the still-dominant patterns of migration. But other types of migration, that perhaps were negligible in the past, are of increasing

significance. This is true mainly for transnational migration or transmigration (Pries 2004, 2006; for China and India, see Saxenian 2005) as a recurrent and multidirectional cross-border mobility of people that is part of their life course and life strategy. Transnational migration networks and transnational social spaces are, on the one hand, an outcome of various kinds of international migration, and, on the other, increase the probability and accountability of a second, third or further trip across borders. Inside the EU there are many examples of such recurrent and multidirectional transnational mobility. Therefore the conceptual models of cross-border migration and mobility need to be developed further.

For centuries, cross-border labour migration has taken place in the forms of regular seasonal migration and long-term emigration, in which cases the boundaries between voluntary and involuntary migration, as well as between economically, religiously, politically or ethnically determined migration, are fluid. Thus, for example, because of massive persecution in France during the seventeenth century, hundreds of thousands of Huguenots went to certain German kingdoms and cities and settled there permanently. Conversely, at the invitation of the Russian tsars in the eighteenth century, hundreds of thousands of German migrants settled as university graduates and skilled workers in large Russian cities and as farmers in the Volga basin. In contrast, the German peat cutters from Lower Saxony had to cover much shorter distances as they were hired out for several months seasonally to work in the Netherlands. In a similar fashion, brick makers (also called ‘travelling brick makers’) from Lippe in North Rhine-Westphalia left their village homes in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries during specific times of year to earn income, in addition to their subsistence farming, in dynamic growth regions such as, for example, the Ruhr Area.

Alongside these forms of a rather settled way of life,¹⁰ cross-border labour migration has existed since historical times in the sense of a permanent movement from place to place. This includes itinerant tradesmen with no fixed place abode, seamen and sailors or construction workers such as

¹⁰As settled in the sense of *permanently settled*, a way of life is denoted in which a clearly identifiable bond exists with a residence as the (local, regional and/or national) spatial point of reference for daily social practice and the symbolic ascription of self and other.

those who worked on large religious structures, i.e. cathedrals (for all these forms of migration, see, for example, Bade 2000; Wimmer, Andreas/Glick-Schiller, Nina, 2002). But while geographic worker mobility over relatively large distances and relatively long periods of time has determined the life-worlds of very specific, numerically limited population groups for centuries, it was from this basis that, through the dual processes of nation-state construction and the expansion of industrial capitalism, modern international labour migration has developed. Its analysis was framed by what is called *methodological nationalism*. It could be defined as 'the assumption that the nation/the state/the society is the natural social and political form of the modern world' (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002, p. 302). In line with this assumption, national societies have boundaries that are defined naturally by geographic-territorial boundaries controlled by nation-states. This concept of methodological nationalism forged the understanding of international migration movements in the social sciences. Determined by the nation-state paradigm, international migration was explained primarily in mainstream research by reference to the emigration/immigration paradigm. In this approach, only the types of definite emigrants/immigrants and of temporary (guestworker) migrants are relevant.

Because of this, transnational migration phenomena either remained unacknowledged or were interpreted as a transitory marginal occurrence on the path to immigration and integration within a national society. The change in methodological perspective to transnationalisation research in the 1990s has since redirected the focus on to transnational migration phenomena. Transnational migrants (or transmigrants) ideal-typically could be described as those people who do not explicitly or ultimately define themselves either as immigrants (to a new country of arrival) or as return migrants (to their country of origin) but who situate themselves in between or above the social spaces of national container societies. They normally develop an ambiguous mixture of inclusion and participation but also of maintaining socio-cultural differences with the countries of origin and of arrival. These span their everyday lives, their plans for the future, their social networks of important people, their modes and fashions of dressing or feeding, or cultural consumption across the boundaries of the nation states of which they are a part. According to personal circumstances, economic or political cycles, life trajectory and

social network needs they can change their spatial nexus, because they are rooted pluri-locally in several places and cultural frames.¹¹

Based on an extended and differentiated approach of international migration and mobility, developing adequate criteria for polity, policy and politics should not focus exclusively or primarily on permanent immigration or on singular work stays with permanent return migration. The broad scope of different patterns of international migration and mobility has to be taken into account. In the twenty-first century's context of global technologies of transportation and communication, transmigration and transnational mobility are on the way. Strategies of international migration and of looking at ways to connect migration and development have to take into account the 100-year-long historical experiences of circular migration programmes. And they must also be based on the increasingly important phenomenon of transnationalising of social spaces and blurring the borders between migration and mobility.

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¹¹ See Adick et al. 2014 for transnational mobility in profit and non-profit organisations; Pries and Sezgin 2012 for transnational migrant organisations; Pries 2011 and Palenga 2014 for transnational migrant family networks; Faist et al. 2013.

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3

Return Migrants as Knowledge Brokers and Institutional Innovators: New Theoretical Conceptualisations and the Example of Poland

Katrin Klein-Hitpaß

The impact of high-skilled return migrants on the economic development of various regions has been paid increasing scientific attention in recent years. This is no surprise, as knowledge is most important for the economic competitiveness and innovative capacity of nations, regions and firms, and hence competition for the most talented people develops. But until now research in migration studies often has not differentiated between various kinds of knowledge and their respective influence on innovation processes and economic development—topics that have been discussed thoroughly in economic geography in recent years (Ibert 2007; Balland et al. 2015). Yet the role of migration for knowledge transfer has only played a minor role in economic geography to date. Taking into account the pivotal role of knowledge for innovation and economic growth, as well as the rising importance of international migration processes it is perhaps surprising that knowledge transfer via international migration has up to now been widely neglected in geographical and migration research (Williams 2009).

K. Klein-Hitpaß (✉)

Department of Geography, Bonn University, Bonn, Germany

Following from this, it is the aim of this chapter to develop a theoretical conceptualisation for analysing the role of high-skilled return migrants for knowledge transfer and institutional change by integrating migration approaches with a regional development and institutional perspective. Doing so, high-skilled return migrants are understood as potential knowledge brokers, who act as ‘knowledge carriers’ by transferring their embodied knowledge to a new regional context. In addition, high-skilled return migrants also provide linkages to institutions and key actors abroad, and hence may open up sources for continuous knowledge transfer. Further, the role of return migrants as institutional innovators is discussed, as migrants transfer different institutional backgrounds and new institutional knowledge into the contexts to which they are migrating.

This theoretical framework will then be applied to the case study of high-skilled return migrants in post-socialist Poland. The major research question is: to what degree can high-skilled return migrants in Poland be regarded as innovators who transfer and apply new knowledge and initiate institutional changes in various contexts. Taking into account the specific context conditions, particularly in the early years of the transformation process, it is argued that the potential role of return migrants as agents of change has altered over time. Broadening the view on today’s return migration processes, the chapter comes to the conclusion that—as a result of structural changes in migration processes—return migrants’ influence on regional economic development today can be questioned.

3.1 Return Migration and Knowledge-Based Economic Development: Theoretical Considerations

The availability of high-skilled labour is of increasing importance for the economic performance of firms, regions and nations, and therefore the migration processes of the highly-skilled become more important for economic and political actors (OECD 2002; Salt 1997). In general, migration of high-skilled labour has different effects on sending and

receiving regions. In migration theories, the link between migration and knowledge transfer has long been discussed using the terms *brain drain* and *brain gain* (Hunger 2003; OECD 2002; Salt 1997). In this perspective, migration of the highly-skilled was generally discussed as the gain or loss of cultural capital.¹

In general, the underlying assumption that *brain gain*, or the immigration of high-skilled migrants, is beneficial per se for the economic development of the receiving regions is widely accepted, albeit it misses one important point: positive economic effects can only be expected if the migrants have the possibility of working according to their qualifications and are able to put their cultural capital into effect (Koser and Salt 1997). Accordingly, the assumption that outmigration of the highly-skilled has solely negative effects for sending regions neglects first the possibilities that lie in a transnational transfer of resources via social networks,² and second the possibility of returning. This *return option* (see especially Meyer and Brown 1999) encompasses the hope that returning high-skilled migrants will not only bring back the cultural capital that was lost with their outmigration (*brain regain*), but also bring new knowledge and competences acquired while abroad (*brain circulation*; see especially Hunger 2003).

But as cultural capital also includes ways of thinking and behaviour patterns as well as knowledge about rule systems valid in different contexts, high-skilled return migrants are well positioned to initiate institutional change in receiving regions. This aspect has not received much attention in the debate about return migration so far. The work of Saxenian (2006) and Hsu and Saxenian (2000) on South Asian return migrants provided empirical evidence that high-skilled migrants are potentially able to modify the institutional context to which they are migrating, but a comprehensive theoretical conceptualisation is still missing.

¹ According to Bourdieu (1983), cultural capital can appear in three forms: first, as embodied cultural capital, which involves knowledge and competences, ways of thinking and behaviour pattern as well as norms and values. Second, as objectified cultural capital, comprising explicit or material objects, such as books or scientific instruments. The third form of cultural capital, institutionalized cultural capital, consists of institutional recognition, most often in the form of academic credentials or qualifications, of the cultural capital held by an individual.

² See especially the discussion on transnational social spaces (Faist 2008; Glick Schiller et al. 1997; Pries 1996) and the co-development approach by Nyberg-Sørensen et al. (2002).

Currently, the process of return migration of the high-skilled has gained scientific and political attention, reflected by a growing amount of empirical work on that issue (see, among others, Black and King 2004; de Haas et al. 2015; Glorius 2013; Giffins et al. 2015; Klagge and Klein-Hitpaß 2010; Klein-Hitpaß 2011a, 2011b, 2013; Saxenian 2006). The research results show that return migrants’ impact on knowledge-based development is dependent, first, on the individual cultural and financial resources they transfer. Second, intermediate factors such as social capital, regional context and institutional support structures affect the migrants’ possibilities of making efficient use of their individual resources and hence their role as investors and innovators (cf. Fig. 3.1).

While the transfer of financial capital via return migration processes, and in particular its productive investment, is important for evaluating the overall impact of high-skilled return migration on economic development, sections that follow, the chapter focuses solely on the return migrants’ role in knowledge transfer and institutional change. By concentrating on these two aspects, the chapter seeks to provide an input to close the existing research gap regarding knowledge transfer and institutional change via return migration of the highly skilled.




Fig. 3.1 The impact of high-skilled return migrants on regional development—an analytical framework. *Source:* Klein-Hitpaß (2011a), p. 20

3.1.1 Knowledge Transfer via Migration Processes and Types of Knowledge

In times of globalisation the access to and generation of new knowledge is a prerequisite for the competitive capacity of nations, regions and firms. In particular, current debates in economic geography point to the importance of new, external knowledge for stimulating economic growth (Bathelt et al. 2004; Fitjar and Huber 2014).

In general, high-skilled return migrants can foster knowledge transfer in two ways: first, as knowledge carriers via their physical mobility—in general a very efficient way to transfer incorporated or embodied knowledge (Agrawal et al. 2006; Boschma et al. 2009; Bunnell and Coe 2001; Coe and Bunnell 2003). Second, they can initiate knowledge transfer via their access to external knowledge pools by developing and using social networks to contact people in the sending regions (Bunnell and Coe 2001; Fromhold-Eisebith 2002; Müller and Sternberg 2006). The relevance of external contacts for knowledge transfer and competitiveness has been discussed at length in economic geography. As a source of new knowledge, these so-called *pipelines* put the actor in a position to choose between different technical or organisational problem-solving schemes that go beyond those available in their regional context (Asheim and Isaksen 2002; Bathelt et al. 2004; Fitjar and Huber 2014; Grabher 2006; Malecki 2000). Furthermore, regions in which actors are involved in complex networks, both regional and national, are comparatively open to new ideas and opinions. Thus, the risk of a *lock-in*, i.e. the consolidation and incrustation of given structures, is reduced (Bathelt and Glückler 2005; Grabher 1993; Maskell and Malmberg 2007). In sum, return migrants have access to external knowledge pools, and transfer this external knowledge either by their own physical mobility (migrants as *knowledgeable individuals*) or via their external social contacts (*pipelines*).

But different kinds of knowledge vary in their importance for knowledge-based regional development and regarding their modes of transfer. In the following, three types of knowledge are differentiated: (1) technical knowledge; (2) management skills; and (3) communication skills (Klein-Hitpaß 2011a, cf. Fig. 3.2). Technical knowledge, which is similar to Bourdieu's idea of objectified cultural capital (Bourdieu 1983),




Fig. 3.2 Types of knowledge and their implications for innovation processes. *Source:* Klein-Hitpaß (2011a), p. 32

is in general rather explicit in character and can therefore easily be codified and processed systematically, stored and transferred (Polanyi 1967). In general, technical knowledge is an essential precondition for technical innovations.

The implementation of technical knowledge often depends on the two other types of knowledge: management skills comprise operational and strategic competences; for example, in the field of business or personnel management, while communication skills refer to foreign language skills, intercultural competences, flexibility and openness to change (Klein-Hitpaß 2011a). Management and communication skills sum up to organisational knowledge, which is in general more implicit in character than technical knowledge. Implicit or tacit knowledge in Polanyi's sense is normally more difficult to transfer as it is structurally embedded in people, organisations or even regions. For adopting, using and further developing this type of knowledge, direct interaction with the knowledge carrier is necessary (Bathelt et al. 2004; Gertler 2003; Howells 2002; Polanyi 1967). Successful transfer and implementation of organisational

knowledge can lead to organisational innovation, such as the implementation of innovative management procedures or strategic adjustments. Organisational innovations have gained in relative importance for the innovative capacity of firms and regions in recent years. They are crucial for the adaptation to rapid changes in the current economy (Strambach 2004) and thus are especially important for transformation economies such as Poland.

3.1.2 Overcoming Distances and Uncertainty in Knowledge Transfer: The Role of Migrants as Boundary Spanners and Trust Intermediaries

For the successful transfer of organisational knowledge, different types of distance have to be overcome. In particular, the importance of physical or spatial distance has been discussed in different geographical concepts and approaches (among others, Industrial Districts, Learning Regions and Creative Milieus). In these concepts it is widely accepted that spatial proximity is conducive in particular for tacit knowledge transfer as it leads to (1) lower communication costs; (2) a growing likelihood of coincidental meetings; and (3) a growing likelihood of personal relationships among actors. In addition to spatial distance, Boschma (2005) identifies four additional kinds of distance, namely organisational, cognitive, social and institutional distance. All these distances do influence knowledge transfer, but according to Gertler (2003), institutional distance among actors is the most influential. It refers to 'shared norms, conventions, values, expectations and routines arising from commonly experienced frameworks of institutions' (Gertler 2003, pp. 91ff.).

To transfer knowledge between different institutional contexts, the mutual understanding and acceptance of the different rule systems involved is essential (Bathelt 2005; Berndt 1999; Klagge and Klein-Hitpaß 2010). In this regard, the individual ability of actors to communicate effectively in different institutional contexts or to facilitate a mutual understanding of heterogeneous norms, values and rule systems are of special importance. These 'boundary spanners' are often "*people who have lived and worked in different cultural contexts and are able to*

understand the different expectations and patterns of behavior and clarify them between actors” (Bathelt 2005, pp. 211). Because of their migratory experience, migrants in general and returning migrants in particular are well situated to act as boundary spanners with regard to knowledge transfer (Klein-Hitpaß 2011a).

Furthermore, knowledge is an immaterial economic good and its worth is difficult to estimate. Therefore, knowledge acquisition is very insecure for the partners involved, leading to the specific role of trust as a mechanism to reduce uncertainty in knowledge transfer (Bathelt and Glückler 2012; Gambetta 2001). Trust is understood in general as an assumption regarding the future behaviour of others. Previous interactions and experiences between co-operating partners provide important indications with which to estimate the future behaviour of the trustee. But there always remains a risk that the co-operation partner will not act according to the estimations made beforehand (Bachmann 2001; Gambetta 2001; Glückler and Armbrüster 2003; Offe 2001).

According to Fukuyama (1995), type and degree of trust differ between societies, and based on the distinction between personal and institutional trust he distinguishes between low-trust and high-trust societies. Personal trust is shown to individuals and is developed in close, long-term relationships, based on common objectives, interests and expectations, while institutional trust is placed on the reliability of formal (for example, finance system, law) and informal (for example, codes of conduct, norms) institutions (Bachmann 2001; Burchell and Wilkinson 1997; Klein-Hitpaß et al. 2006; Simmel 1958). Following Simmel, institutional trust becomes more important in modern, highly complex societies, whereas personal trust is more complementary. In contexts characterised by a low degree of institutional trust—i.e. low-trust societies—the importance of personal trust increases. According to Fukuyama (1995), all transformation economies display the characteristics of low-trust societies, as in these contexts the institutional system is subject to profound changes and therefore institutional trust is not well developed (Bachmann 2001; Klein-Hitpaß 2006, 2011a).

To sum up, for knowledge transfer in low-trust contexts, personal trust between co-operating individuals is very important. But the development of personal trust is a long and time-consuming process, influenced by different factors: common experience, physical proximity and the

possibilities for face-to-face contacts as well institutional distance among partners (Bachmann 2001; Gössling 2004). Trust-building processes can be supported by so-called trust intermediaries or ‘*third party referrals*’ (see Uzzi 1996, p. 679): In these cases, partner A, the trust intermediary, expresses his or her personal approval of partner B to partner C and vice versa. By doing so, s/he enables partners B and C to co-operate based on personal trust without the necessity of engaging in a time-consuming process to develop personal trust with all parties involved (Glückler 2001; Glückler and Armbrüster 2003).

Following this line of thought, return migrants can play a special role in the transfer of knowledge and other resources in low-trust contexts: (1) Having lived in at least one other country, return migrants are likely to already have established trusting relationships with individuals abroad; (2) Migrants might show a higher ability to develop trusting relationships with individuals living abroad, based on their own experiences with different institutional contexts; and (3) Migrants are well positioned to act as trust intermediaries between partners unknown to each other. It can be concluded that either by providing or developing trustful relationships to actors abroad or in their role as trust intermediaries, return migrants are potentially able to foster knowledge transfer from external sources (Klagge and Klein-Hitpaß 2010; Klein-Hitpaß 2011a).

3.1.3 The Role of Regional Context Conditions for Successful Knowledge Transfer

To what extent knowledge transferred by return migrants is implemented successfully into and benefits economic development depends on the context of the receiving region. To begin with, regional economic conditions—in particular economic structure and dynamics, business environment, the labour market—are important. Furthermore, the regional context entails its *absorptive capacity*, i.e. the ability of regional actors to access, assimilate and apply externally generated knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). The absorptive capacity of a given region depends largely on the regional knowledge pool. If incoming external knowledge is too different from the present knowledge pool, regional actors face

difficulties in assessing the value of the new knowledge and are likely to disregard it as being too specific to be useful (Bathelt et al. 2004; Bastian 2006; Klagge and Klein-Hitpaß 2010).

(Return) migrants are able to increase the absorptive capacity of regions for three reasons: (1) As knowledge carriers, migrants bring their own (incorporated) knowledge to the region and thereby enhance the quality, and especially the diversity, of the existing knowledge base; (2) Migrants extend the number of social relations to actors abroad, through which they have access to new knowledge from external sources (*pipelines*); and (3) For the successful integration of new external knowledge into the existing regional knowledge pool, a translation or adaptation of the new knowledge is necessary. In particular, returning migrants are familiar with the new knowledge source and act as a boundary spanner in the sense that they are able to bring external knowledge in a form that is understood by regional actors (Klagge and Klein-Hitpaß 2010; Klein-Hitpaß 2011a).

3.1.4 Migrants as Institutional Innovators

Transferring and implementing new knowledge does not only change the regional knowledge pool, but it also alters institutional arrangements. Following North (1992), institutions are understood as the rules of the game. Informal institutions are not formalised but generally accepted codes of conduct, norms and values. Laws, regulations and other formalised rules and ways of behaving are formal institutions. Furthermore, it is understood that formal and informal institutions alike do influence the actions of individuals but do not fully determine them—an important notion for analysing the role of return migrants in institutional change, as it opens up the possibility that individuals are able to change the rules of the game in accordance with their interests and resources (Boschma and Franken 2009; Dacin et al. 2002; Djelic and Quack 2003; Fligstein 2001).

New institutions develop, 'when new organized actors with sufficient resources (institutional entrepreneurs) see in them an opportunity to realize interests that they value highly' (DiMaggio 1988, 14). Whether an individual actor can succeed in changing the institutions to meet his or her own interests depends on the actor's resources and intentions

(Campbell 2004; DiMaggio 1988). The innovative capacity of the institutional entrepreneur is highly influenced by the given institutional context as it prescribes which innovative rules are regarded as legitimate or are not realisable because of the constraining regulatory dimension of institutions. Therefore, it is essential for the institutional entrepreneur's success that s/he adjusts the innovative rules to match the institutional context in operation (Campbell 2004).

To initiate institutional change, a social position between different institutional arrangements is helpful, as the relevant person interacts directly with individuals in different contexts and gains additional knowledge about different institutional rule systems (Campbell 2004; Djelic and Quack 2003; Kraatz and Moore 2002). Existing institutions can be called into question, first, by cross-border mobility of actors and the resulting experience that known and familiar institutions are not valid and are partly contradictory to those in other contexts. Second, by the long-term migration of an individual actor to a new institutional context that differs substantially from the previous one. In both cases, old, incumbent rules are challenged by new ones (Djelic and Quack 2003). As return migrants have lived and worked in different institutional environments they are well positioned to act as institutional entrepreneurs and stimulate institutional change.

3.2 A Case Study of Poland

The role of migrants as knowledge brokers and institutional innovators is affected significantly by the regional context to which they are migrating. In Poland, this context is shaped by the transformation from a socialist planned economy to a democratic market economy. This transformation is at least partly a precondition for the return of Poles living abroad, and opens up windows of opportunity for the transfer and use of return migrants' individual resources.

Polish return migrants have by and large lived and worked in Western market economies, where they have gained technical and organisational knowledge, have made social contacts and become familiar with the respective institutional arrangements. Based on this experience and

against the background of the analytical framework it is hypothesised that Polish return migrants are well situated (1) to act as knowledge brokers and transfer technical and organisational knowledge to Poland; and (2) to initiate institutional change in their role as institutional innovators. By doing so, return migrants are able to contribute to the Polish transformation process from a planned to a market economy.

These hypotheses are explored by looking at high-skilled return migrants in Warsaw and Poznań. Both case study regions show relatively dynamic economic development and a significant number of high-skilled return migrants. The empirical analysis is first based on the analysis of secondary statistics on high-skilled migration processes to Poland, and second on 47 qualitative interviews conducted with high-skilled return migrants in Warsaw (36) and Poznań (11). A high-skilled return migrant is defined as a person in possession of, or with a legitimate claim to, Polish citizenship, who has lived abroad for at least 12 months before returning to Poland and is educated to the level of a university degree. In addition, only those return migrants were considered who are economically active, i.e. those who are employed or looking for employment. To reflect the interview results with return migrants, 20 expert interviews with representatives of national and regional institutions dealing with economic development or migration issues in Poland were conducted.

3.3 Empirical Results


3.3.1 High-Skilled Return Migration to Poland after 1989/90: An Overview

Return migration to Poland gained momentum after 1989/90, when a significant number of often high-skilled Poles living abroad started to return to their country of origin: in the years from 1990 to 2002, almost 70,000 return migrants went back to Poland (Klagge and Klein-Hitpaß 2010; Klein-Hitpaß 2011a, 2011b). About a quarter of these return migrants left Poland again before 2002. These so-called re-emigrants were on average less well-educated than those who continued to live in Poland in 2002. In total, a third of 40,791 return migrants aged more

than 13 living in Poland in 2002 are in possession of a university degree (12,223; 30 %). In comparison, only 15 % of the adult population is in this sense seen as highly skilled (Fihel et al. 2006; Klein-Hitpaß 2011b).

The following details refer to the group of high-skilled return migrants living in Poland in 2002: the majority of this group is between 20 and 59 years old (90 %), employed (75.3 %) and working mainly in the service sector. About 80 % were born in Poland, about a fifth (22.1 %) are in possession of two or more citizenships. Before their return, most high-skilled return migrants lived in the USA, Germany and the UK (see Fig. 3.3; Fihel et al. 2006; Klein-Hitpaß 2011b).

Those return migrants who have continued to stay in Poland after their return are concentrated in urban areas and economic centres of Poland. The Voivodship Mazowieckie (Mazovia Province) including the capital city of Warsaw is the major destination for return migrants: in 2002, more than a fifth of all return migrants and more than a third of all



* Respondents with missing data not included

Fig. 3.3 Main countries of previous residence of return migrants to Poland, 2002 (in %)*. Source: Klein-Hitpaß (2013), p. 241

high-skilled return migrants lived in this region after returning to Poland (cf. Fig. 3.4; Fihel et al. 2006; Klein-Hitpaß 2011b, 2013).

In general, the socio-demographic characteristics of the 47 return migrants interviewed are similar to the structure of the high-skilled return migrants covered in the Population Census of 2002. The majority of the interviewed return migrants are between 30 and 49 years old and about half of them were born in Poland. The interviewees returned in the years from 1989 to 2007, most of them before 2000. All interviewed return migrants had lived in a highly-developed Western country, with the UK ranking first, followed by the USA and Germany. Regarding their types of employment back in Poland, it is striking that more than half of them work in foreign-owned companies or in subsidiaries in formalised international networks (27), whereas only six work in Polish-owned companies. Another eight have founded their own firms (with employees) and six are self-employed (without employees). Interestingly, none of the interviewed high-skilled return migrants works in the public sector (Klagge and Klein-Hitpaß 2010; Klein-Hitpaß 2011a).




Fig. 3.4 Regional selectivity of return migrants and high-skilled return migrants living in Poland in 2002. *Source:* Klein-Hitpaß (2011b), p. Abb. bitte vergrößern

3.3.2 Polish Return Migrants as Knowledge Brokers in Poland and Their Role in the Transformation Process

The interview results give evidence that, via high-skilled return migration, new knowledge is transferred to Polish regions. This knowledge transfer is initiated mainly by return migrants acting as knowledge carriers and to a far lesser extent via pipelines. Either way, high-skilled return migrants transfer both technical and organisational knowledge, but respect of the two knowledge types has changed over time: the transfer of technical knowledge was especially appreciated at the beginning of the 1990s, when there was a big demand for knowledge, especially in the field of marketing, sales and public relations, i.e. in company divisions playing a minor or totally different role in socialist planned economies. As the Polish education system and technical standards in Poland improved over the following years, the demand for technical knowledge decreased (cf. Fig. 3.5).




Fig. 3.5 Knowledge transfer via return migration and its relevance for the transformation process. *Source:* Klein-Hitpaß (2011a), p. 164

Still relevant is the transfer of organisational knowledge initiated by high-skilled return migrants, especially presentation skills and the return migrants' abilities to conduct negotiations with foreign business partners and to communicate efficiently and on equal terms with high-ranking partners in different contexts:

At this time the Polish people used to have a lot of complexes, they were not truly effective in dealing with an international environment with foreign people ... For me it was a very big advantage. I could arrange things that for others were problems not possible to be solved. I could handle them easily. (spj5)

Polish return migrants also transfer management skills, especially knowledge in the fields of entrepreneurship, organisational structures and human resource strategies as well as project management. Entrepreneurial knowledge was scanty in Poland at the beginning of the 1990s because, during socialism, private initiatives to found a company were not well received by Polish officials. Therefore high-skilled return migrants were well-positioned to use their technical knowledge but especially their entrepreneurial knowledge, either for the foundation of subsidiaries of foreign companies in Poland or for starting their own companies, especially in business-related services. In addition, return migrants implemented their management skills in existing, generally foreign, companies. In doing so, return migrants aimed to introduce leaner, more efficient and target-oriented organisation structures and work procedures to their working environment, and to improve communication structures and quality standards. Especially important for them was a turning away from strict hierarchies and a move towards team-orientated organisation structures.

I introduced a completely different management style. The Polish management style is command and control and it always has been. Very hierarchical. The boss says, you do this and the employee does it without questioning. And when it doesn't work the employee says: 'Well, I did what you told me to do.' So I have worked really hard on introducing a system whereby the responsibility for decisions and actions goes as low down the organisation as possible, obviously within reason. (owg1)

High-skilled Polish return migrants also help to reduce in particular institutional distances and uncertainties in knowledge transfer. They act as boundary spanners and support knowledge transfer: Leerzeichen (1) Between foreign and Polish companies

[I]t meant that ... I could understand their [foreign investors'] perspective and their information needs and could also sort of guess what some of the issues would be in how things are different in Poland ... So having someone who could explain those differences was very important to investors. (twr1)

(2) They also broker within a company between foreign management and the Polish workforce

The ability [to be] not just bilingual but bicultural. So to be accepted by the Polish workforce as a Pole rather than some here-today, gone-tomorrow expat manager who could not speak a word of Polish and didn't understand the local conditions, the way that people lived, the way that people thought. And on the other hand to be accepted by the boss as an international executive who has got experience working in the West and knows the realities of business in the West. (mwd1)

Their ability to interact with Polish and foreign business partners alike makes Polish return migrants key actors in the process of the increasing internationalisation of the Polish economy. In the 1990s, their role as boundary spanners was primarily important for the co-operation of foreign and Polish business partners within Poland. Today, Polish companies make increasing use of the special competences of return migrants for their economic activities abroad.

Furthermore, and at the beginning of the transformation process, return migrants' ability to develop trusting relationships with foreign business partners and to act as trust intermediaries in a low-trust context was important, especially for foreign business partners as they felt insecure in the Polish business environment and the formal institutions were changing constantly. Therefore, foreign business partners felt more at ease with return migrants, who understood their institutional background and way of thinking. Although this ability has lost in importance as a result of the advancing integration of Poland into the global economy,

return migrants continue to act as intermediaries between foreign and Polish actors:

Still a lot of international companies don't fully trust Polish people totally 100 per cent. ... They prefer people who have the experience of both worlds; who can communicate to them from two sides, from the Polish side and from the western side. (dps1)

3.3.3 The Role of High-Skilled Return Migrants for Institutional Change in Post-Socialist Poland

With the successful implementation of their organisational knowledge, return migrants do not only change work procedures and organisational structures, but also introduce institutional changes in the contexts to which they are returning. Based on their experience in different institutional contexts, return migrants often have a different level of expectation regarding the functionality of rule systems, and question the institutions they are confronted with after their return. If the different rules are not according to their expectations, some return migrants try to change the given institutions or establish new ones:

[R]eturn migrants do have a different level of expectation, they have a different level of experience, and slowly they sort of pull everybody else up according to that level. They make demands upon the rest of the city or the society that slowly those demands will be met. (PL_9)

The results suggest that return migrants act as institutional entrepreneurs based largely on their direct experience in different institutional context and much less because of their social positioning between different institutional arrangements. They transfer their embodied knowledge about different rule systems to the new context and try to change the incumbent rules already in place. But return migrants are only able to initiate institutional change if they possess the resources necessary to do so. Communication skills and a powerful position are preconditions for return migrants to succeed in shaping the given institutional context to which they are migrating.

Most of the institutional changes introduced by interviewed return migrants were within their organisation or in the direct environment of the organisation. Here, they improved the communication and co-operation structures within the organisation and with outside partners, implemented quality standards, and made efforts to increase the commitment to oral and written agreements. Furthermore, they influenced the working habits and motivation of their indigenous Polish colleagues, especially with regard to solution-orientated attitudes, self-reliance, a sense of responsibility and their ability to give and receive criticism:

If I see that there is a way of improving things or if something doesn't make sense I will argue my point ... But with Polish lawyers, well, if a notary says to them, for example, a document is not acceptable, some Polish lawyers will say: 'Okay, we will have to change it.' ... So, I wouldn't accept ... that this document is invalid. I would just phone them up and say: 'Look, I think you're wrong.' ... And eventually, some of the notaries came round ... So it was little things like that, which I just didn't understand. They were just, you know, foreign to me. So, eventually, you know, I think we were introducing those things. (mwm1)

But beside the numerous examples of institutional change initiated by return migrants, the interview results also led to the conclusion that the institutional differences between Poland and the Western economies have decreased significantly in recent years:

Yes, ... there are still some differences but of course there are so many Poles that are trained now in Western, you know common Western practice, it is becoming much much harder to identify what those differences are. (bs1)

3.4 Summary and Conclusion

As Poland has been the destination for a rising number of return migrants since the beginning of the 1990s, the question about their influence on economic development in Polish regions is highly relevant. By focusing on high-skilled return migrants who moved to Poland at the beginning of the 1990s, the changing influence of Polish return migrants on the

transformation context can be analysed. The proposed theoretical conceptualisation, linking migration research with knowledge transfer and institutional changes, was not only helpful in structuring the empirical research but also to make a contribution to the theoretical debate.

The empirical results show that, acting as knowledge carriers, returning migrants transfer embodied knowledge to Poland, but their relationships with people outside Poland (pipelines) were not important for a continued knowledge transfer. This result questions the sustainability of knowledge transfer via return migration processes, as returning migrants, once back in Poland, do not necessarily contribute to the acquisition of new knowledge from external sources in the long term. Nevertheless, they might still act as boundary spanners and help to support the exchange of knowledge between partners from different institutional arrangements. This competence is employed on two levels: first, between Polish and foreign business partners; and second, within a company between foreign management and Polish workforce. On both levels the interviewed return migrants were able to act as trust intermediaries and to foster a trusting collaboration between the actors involved. In this role, Polish high-skilled return migrants supported the ongoing internationalisation process of the Polish economy, especially in the early years of the transformation process. Yet this unique position is also important today, especially in the context of fostering the internationalisation strategies of Polish companies.

Parallel to the changing role of high-skilled return migrants in falsch getrennt transfer within the transformation process, the importance of different kinds of knowledge transferred by return migrants has also altered: whereas at the beginning of the 1990s there was a great need for new technical and organisational knowledge to meet the challenges of the transformation process, the demand for external technical knowledge decreased over time. The transfer of organisational knowledge by return migration is, however, still relevant, especially for implementing various institutional innovations. By transferring organisational knowledge in particular to Polish regions, high-skilled return migrants initiated institutional change and in doing so supported the transformation of the Polish economic system from a socialist planned economy to a democratic market economy.

To sum up, the empirical results show that high-skilled return migrants bring new knowledge and institutional changes to a given regional context and by doing so are able to contribute to a knowledge-based regional development. This contribution is more important in regions with an obsolete or inadequate knowledge base and with institutional arrangements inappropriate to meet present and future challenges—a situation to be found in Polish regions in the 1990s and 2000s. As the economic situation in Poland has improved over the years the former unique role of high-skilled return migrants has changed. Furthermore, I would argue that access to new organisational knowledge is essential for every region in Europe and elsewhere to avoid structural lock-in and to foster knowledge-based economic development.

While return migration to Poland was exceptional in socialist times and still scarce until the country's accession to the EU, nowadays it has become a mass phenomenon, as high numbers of young Poles in particular move abroad and return later (Anacka and Fihel 2012). But compared to the Poles returning to Poland before EU accession, this group is younger, less well educated and moves back primarily to rural areas in Eastern Poland. Furthermore, they often work at levels below their qualifications while abroad and therefore suffer from cultural devaluation (Klein-Hitpaß 2011b; see also Chap. 4 in this book). These changes question the possible contribution in recent years of Polish return migrants to a knowledge-based development in the regions to which they are returning.

However, currently, Polish officials regard return migration to Poland as being beneficial for the Polish economy because returning migrants might help to reduce a shortage of skilled labour, transfer financial resources and knowledge, and show a different level of expectation regarding the design and functioning of given institutions. Therefore, different political measures are discussed and put in place to persuade Poles living abroad to return to their home country, among other things giving assistance by searching for jobs abroad as well as in Poland, and by integrating return migrants' children into the Polish education system. Yet while it is very unlikely that Polish return migrants will ever again have the unique social position they had at the beginning of the transformation process, it can still be expected that they will bring new knowledge and experience from

abroad to the regions to which they are returning. If they actually do make important contributions to knowledge-based development is highly dependent on, first, their opportunities for knowledge acquisition and learning while abroad; and second, on possibilities of implementing this knowledge and introducing institutional changes for the benefit of the region's economic development.

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4

Migration in Working Lives: Looking Back after Return; a Structure and Agency Approach

Izabela Grabowska

In the first decade of the new millennium, circular and temporary labour migration trends reached a climax in Europe, as an increasing number of migrants began to engage in more fluid forms of mobility (Castles et al. 2014; Engbersen et al. 2013.). The European Union (EU) offered numerous new job opportunities and enhanced migrants' abilities to engage in temporary circulation, particularly following its enlargement to include Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, in 2004 and 2007 (Glorius et al. 2013). Fassmann et al. (2014) calculated that, by 2011, almost 5 million citizens from CEE countries were living in the 'old EU'. Furthermore, 2011 Polish census data revealed that over two million Poles resided abroad for at least 3 months (Goździak 2014, p. 1).

The removal of institutional barriers to employment in EU labour markets in 2004 has created new opportunities within the occupational lives of individuals who are able to take advantage of geographical mobility. In this chapter, returning Polish migrants are used as a test case group,

I. Grabowska (✉)

University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland

given their apparently extensive use of the new opportunity structures allowing unrestricted movement in the EU for work and other purposes.

This massive migration was accompanied by significant reverse flows of return migrants who are difficult to trace. The Central Statistical Office in Poland estimated that throughout the period 2002–2011 nearly 300,000 people returned to Poland, and 57 % (172,000) did so in 2008–2011 (CSO 2013). There were many more returns after shorter periods spent abroad (<12 months) but this aspect was not touched on in the Census. Homesickness was the paramount reason for return of long-term migrants from Poland (85,000). For another 35,000, the end of a work contract was declared to be a key reason for return. Ten thousand said that they would like to set up their own business and therefore returned to Poland. For the first time, Census 2011 asked people about their work abroad in relation to their qualifications. Nearly one third said that they worked at a level below their qualifications while abroad, and 44 % said they worked abroad according to their qualifications. Nearly 'one in two with tertiary level education said they worked abroad at a level below their formal qualifications (CSO 2013).

This chapter focuses on migrants' personal perspectives in the context of structural settings while addressing the theoretical question of how the interplay of opportunity structure (Merton 1996) and agency can explain the meanings of migration to life course occupational trajectories. Occupational trajectories (careers) are understood here as an integrated sequence of both jobs and labour market statuses: employment, unemployment and inactivity (Grabowska-Lusińska 2012).

The chapter is arranged as follows. The first section provides an overview of the basic concepts employed in this analysis, including agency within opportunity structure with life course and migration approaches. The second section explains how the opportunity structure for constructing occupational careers operates in Poland during periods of social and political transition, and discusses four distinct career models within the social structure: those of labourers and of business people who have inspired the presented analysis. The third section elaborates the methods and data used for the purposes of this analysis, including 150 structured exploratory interviews and 18 biographical interviews. The fourth section explores how the typology of meanings of

migration in the occupational lives of people was developed and provides an in-depth explanation of four templates of migration meanings. Conceptual, methodological and empirical summaries are presented in the chapter's conclusion.

4.1 Conceptual Framework: *Agency Within Opportunity Structure* in Life Course and Migration Approaches

In order to understand a dynamic interplay of *structure* and *agency* in a migration context, the life course approach (Elder 2009) needs to be considered (Wingens 2011). However, exchanges between life course and migration studies are still limited (Wingens 2011). Thomas and Znaniecki (1918–1920), in *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, basically applied the life course approach when studying comprehensively the transnational trajectories of Polish families. They aimed to explain social changes from the perspectives of changing values and attitudes, through looking at the confrontations of individual peasants with the receiving, usually urban, developed, foreign societies. However, this approach has not been used very much up to now.

In the context of this chapter, *opportunity structure* is derived from Merton's (1996) understanding of it as a framework for the mutual influence of structural context and assigned socio-demographic characteristics of individuals and individual actions, in which: (1) changing opportunities constitute objective conditions, as understood through individual actors; (2) individuals have opportunities or else face obstacles to access prospects of various kinds related to their position in the labour market; and (3) these opportunities locate individuals according to their class, gender, race, ethnicity, age and/or religion (Merton 1996, p. 154). This theoretical framework facilitates a differentiation of social choices: either conscious and intentional, or unconscious and spontaneous. The opportunity structure also sets up limits, however: it includes conditions that can facilitate or constrain individual actions. Opportunity structure may relate to one of the understandings of structure itself as clarified by

Porpora (1989). He proposed four ways to discuss the nature of social structure as such. The first relates to patterns of aggregate social behaviour that are stable over time. The second refers to the law-like regularities that govern the behaviour of social facts, which constitute social structure itself. The third refers to systems of human relationships among social positions and relates to an understanding of social structure as a set of opportunity structures (Merton 1996) that can be applied to the macro-social (large systems such as bureaucracies, the state, labour markets) as well to the micro-social (relationships between individuals) means of individual social conditioning. The fourth approach focuses on the collective rules and resources that structure behaviours. It brings opportunity structure into the structure and agency discourse, which may facilitate an understanding of meanings of migration in people's occupational lives.

The concept of agency is introduced here in order to explain the complexities of human behaviours as well as the process of constructing meanings in occupational life. Emirbayer and Mische (1998) elaborated a complex understanding of the concept of agency, including both the structural context and, crucially, the temporal nature of human experience. Including the temporal dimension makes possible an analysis of actors' own agencies in future, present and past contexts, and takes into account these actions' temporal attributes. To explain the substance of agency, the authors introduced a core trio of characteristics, including: (1) the repetition of actions; (2) the creation of actions (innovative actions); (3) the praxis of actions and their evaluation. This evaluation is achievable via a social ability to position oneself in a structural context termed 'reflexivity' by Archer (2003). In the context of migration, the three components of agency help to explain in detail not only the meanings of migration within occupational lives, but also the opportunity structure in which they were constructed. It is claimed that agency has become one of the crucial concepts of the life course approach (Wingens 2011) because individuals in high-risk societies are responsible for 'a life of their own' (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002) and create more or less self-monitored courses of occupational trajectories. Migration space seems to be a good litmus test for these contemporary actions and developments. Individuals suddenly become 'actors, jugglers, stage managers of their own biogra-

phies and identities' (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002, p. 23). Not everyone, however, is able to perform their biographies.

The interplay of structure and agency has already been applied to migration studies (most recently, for example, Morawska 2001; Bakewell 2010; Erel 2015). Morawska (2001) treats migration as a structuration process (in Giddens's understanding), using a test case of Polish migration to Western Europe to highlight the agency of migrants in reproducing and eventually changing the underlying structure. Morawska, however, acknowledges that agency is tempered by micro- and macro-structural conditions, which relate alternately to the structure of labour markets, migration polices and the reception of migrants in a receiving country. She focuses in particular detail on the opportunity structures in Western Europe after the collapse of communist rule. The realities of Western European labour markets are intermingled, according to Morawska, with clear economic discrepancies between sending and receiving labour markets (such as wages) as well as among migrants' respective understandings of them. Morawska argues that the interplay of structure and agency ultimately brought about the increase in migration from Poland in the 1990s.

Bakewell (2010) argues that the interplay of structure and agency has the potential to be applied more widely, explaining migration as a natural force in social change. Bakewell observes the critical realism of Archer's (1995, 2003) morphogenetic cycle, which combines structure and agency into one process in order to explain migration and social change, as well as, specifically, the theory of migration systems. Bakewell notes that the starting point for critical realists' research is for the 'object' to be investigated (in this chapter, the concept of combined structure and agency as applied to the occupational lives of migrants).

Erel (2015), in her study on intersectionality of migrant capital, argues that biographical methods in migration studies can provide an understanding of the interaction of structure and agency as they portray links between events, meanings, actions and practices. In her study, with the help of the structure and agency paradigm, she deconstructed a notion of ethnicity and ethnic community in a non-bounded way, but also intra-gender differentiations of capital accumulation. She also showed the dynamic nature of producing, mobilising and accumulating capital.

She proved that life stories constitute social reality, which is otherwise impossible to grasp.

This chapter brings another dimension to the discourse on structure and agency in migration studies. It takes into consideration the role of the Mertonian opportunity structures outlined above and combines this with three simplified components of migrant agency as discussed by Emirbayer and Mische (1998): repetitive actions, innovative actions and the evaluation of practices.

Research on occupational trajectories with a focus on the meanings of migration generated by individuals opens new avenues of interpretation of the structure and agency paradigm. In migration studies, the meanings of migration to occupational lives (Mincer and Ofek 1982; Helgertz 2008) have already been the subject of analysis. Specifically, three types of meanings were discussed: (1) Disruption (Helgertz 2008), which relates to occupational degradation and difficulties in achieving promotion in the host country; (2) Restoration (Mincer and Ofek 1982), which describe the process of career disruption in the country of origin, the subsequent devaluation of qualifications—for example, as a result of the restructuring of a sector of an economy or enterprise and, ultimately reclaiming the value of one's qualifications in a host country; and (3) Continuation (Mincer and Ofek 1982), which is related to the continuity of a range of types of employment gained in a migrant's country of origin and/or receiving country.

4.2 Work Lives Under System Transition in Poland

System transformation opened up Poland to a variety of new phenomena and trends in the contemporary world and Polish society has absorbed many of the social conditions that are characteristic of capitalist countries seen from the outside, while at the same time retaining some elements of a country still transitioning between early and mature capitalism. This has caused the contemporary Polish labour market to become something of an amalgamation of a range of occupational cultures.

As a result, Poland must still deal with: (1) Adapting ingrained labour market habits from its previous system; (2) Labour market behaviours

orientated towards largely materialistic and consumerist targets typical of the early 1990s; (3) But also contemporary, global labour market settings connected to behaviours related to occupational changeability, occupational life without borders, life-long and life-wide learning combined with various social roles in the life trajectory (for example, roles of employee, parent, partner and so on).

In their research on the occupational lives of workers and businessmen/women (which are thought of as opposites within the organisational hierarchy in Poland) during the considerable social changes that followed the fall of communism in 1989, Domecka and Mrozowicki (2008, 2010) argued that the hidden effects of system transition are detectable through the lenses of occupational careers, especially when understood as interconnected phenomena bound by changing institutional rules and adjusted by individual strategies of action (see Mach 1998). During Poland's period of transition, Domecka and Mrozowicki (2008, 2010) identified four templates of typical occupational career trajectories: 'anchor', 'patchwork', 'construction' and 'dead end', which together have inspired the topic being considered in this chapter.

The *anchor* pattern comprises actions rooted in a previous political system that are still present today. It is a status quo career type, within which all previous practices and actions are sustained, usually within distinct institutional frames. Being anchored could be a life necessity.

The *patchwork* pattern can be described as a collection of ill-fitting, incoherent elements. It suggests an acceptance of existing conditions with only limited ability to change them. This pattern is generally related to a chaotic social life, often characterised by non-intentional actions.

The *construction* type of career is built via intentional actions, which are planned and usually extend beyond the current job and/or position. This type of career is accompanied by ambition, risk-seeking behaviour, innovation and advancement aspirations.

A *dead end* career (Domecka and Mrozowicki 2010) is characterised by behaviours that stem from a lack of mobility within the labour market, circumstances with only weak (if any) prospects for advancement, constant and deepening career degradation, and an overall lack of opportunities in a given area.

4.3 Data

In this chapter, a number of qualitative data sources were consulted. The first includes findings from a 2010 study that made use of structured, in-depth interviews about migrants' occupational histories, which was of an exploratory nature. Its fieldwork consisted of 75 interviews conducted in Warsaw and 75 in Nysa (Opolskie District) with migrants who had returned to Poland. This was a mapping exercise which helped to draft the reconstructed types of meanings of migration to work lives of people. The main body of research contained 18 biographical interviews on the occupational life stories of migrants with varied socio-demographic backgrounds (for details of respondents' profiles, see Appendix 4.1). In each case, migrants were selected in a strategic way to obtain the widest range of socio-demographic characteristics, including migratory experiences.

4.3.1 Findings: Meanings of Migration in Occupational Lives

This section does not attempt to present a typology of migrants (for that, see Engbersen et al. 2013) but rather seeks to construct a typology of the meanings of migration in occupational life. In the course of the qualitative data analysis, which consisted largely of in-depth interviews on the subject of respondents' occupational lives, two dimensions of migration meanings were developed.

The first of these dimensions portrayed in Fig. 4.1 relates to the objective trajectory of a career. It was conceptualised as a continuum between stable and changeable careers, where stability means being fixed in the same socio-occupational category and conditions of the labour market, while changeability is characterised by shifts between occupational categories and labour market statuses (employment, unemployment, inactivity). This conceptualisation was inspired by Lipset and Bendix (1959), who stressed that changeability and stability have different meanings from and consequences for occupational life.




Fig. 4.1 Typology of meanings of migration in occupational lives (see also Grabowska 2016).

The second dimension in Fig. 4.1 relates to the subjective aspects of a given career and is described as a continuum with two discrete ends: one end being a planned career that can otherwise be thought of as an autonomous, individual project, and the other marked by gradual conditioning, which means ‘going with the flow’ at one extreme and acting after planning at the other (Domecka and Mrozowicki 2010). This dimension was, in turn, inspired by Archer (2010); Domecka and Mrozowicki (2008, 2010), according to whom a subjective approach to external conditions demonstrates the agency of individuals, which can also be understood as an opportunity for self-reflection.

Superimposing, in a fashion, these two dimensions lead to the creation of a typology of meanings of migration in occupational lives (Fig. 4.1). It can be depicted using four graphic concepts: ‘fixative’, ‘incident’, ‘exploration’ and ‘project’ (Grabowska-Lusińska 2012; also Grabowska 2016).

4.3.1.1 ‘Fixative’

The first reconstructed type of meaning of migration in occupational life (see Fig. 4.1) emerges as a result of merging work/life stability with the

acceptance of local structural conditions. Stability generally means remaining in the same socio-occupational category throughout one's entire professional life, usually in one organisation and with the same employer, while local structural conditions, at times, limit innovative professional activities. 'Fixative' can be understood as 'being fixed', sedentary in one place despite otherwise being spatially mobile. 'Fixing' (stabilising, glueing to one place) one's occupational situation in Poland is made possible by two types of capital: social and cultural (Bourdieu 1986). The first is related to social networks a particular person has in either his/her workplace or household in Poland. It is most often used to find flexible replacements in the workplace and in looking after children when migration takes place. Cultural capital generally means experience and professional practice, or deep, accumulated knowledge regarding the functioning of institutions or a branch of industry. In these cases, migration does not alter the pace of an individual's occupational career; it is most often a carefully planned gap, a short-lived suspension in social space, serving mainly to improve the household budget. The type of work undertaken during migration is usually unrelated to an individual's formal qualifications or earlier job experiences.

Migration also provides a specific type of compensation for low-paid work in Poland, usually in accordance with previously-secured qualifications. This generally applies to nurses, teachers, lower-level administration clerks and so on. In the cases of multiple migrations—for example, those that are cyclically repetitive during holidays or during unpaid annual leave—two parallel occupational worlds emerge: one rooted in Poland and the other abroad.

So, after the internship, it was 2002. The first of January 2002 in a community centre in X. I worked there until 2005 and during my time there I started to go abroad. Specifically, during holidays. It was seasonal work in agriculture. Specifically, in a vineyard. There were a few periods: in February, two weeks; later, two weeks in May; and in July in agreement with my bosses I left on an unpaid leave. The major factor behind that decision was low pay. And that is why I decided to go. ... Getting better pay, exactly ... No [job] wasn't part of any professional life plan. I wasn't thinking that it was going to give me any experience, or that I would get any qualifications thanks to it. It was only serving a monetary function ...) I mean, I like working in administration, office work. And this was kind of

my goal. It kind of worked out, that in the office, working with people having a position. (From Olgierd's occupational history, lower-level clerk in local administration, age 31, experienced seasonal migration to Germany and Austria; worked mainly in agriculture; migration were between the regular work duties in the municipality in small town in Poland—X during holidays or periods of unpaid leave; for more, see Appendix 4.1)

I worked abroad because of economic necessity. My teacher's salary did not fulfil my family needs (3 children) and the need to finish the construction of my house ... While abroad I did numerous different jobs and they weren't linked in any way. Most commonly, I carried out building/decorating jobs, they were better paid. In the early years, in Braunschweig, these were jobs on farms (hard), but later I got a job in construction and since then I've tried to get work in that sector for two reasons: I already knew something about it, and the work was interesting and well paid. I could work with my friends; I wasn't alone, which was important for me since I do not speak German very well. (From Roman's occupational history, teacher in a gymnasium, 50 years old, for eight years, during summer school holidays, Roman went abroad for seasonal work, mainly in construction; for more, see Appendix 4.1)

Migrants usually explain their ability to preserve a given employment situation in Poland in terms of their attachment to the workplace and their colleagues, a need to balance family and professional duties, and general satisfaction—all of which are often the result of a self-imposed limitation on aspirations, and which can explain low occupational mobility in promotions (Domecka and Mrozowicki 2010).

This occupational root or core that is linked to migration is not merely passive endurance (Domecka and Mrozowicki 2010) in a social space, though it may seem so at first glance. In modern times (Giddens 1990), where the future seems to be unknown and fluid, being rooted demands great effort and skill. Moreover, a model characterised by a sense of stability and security is almost inherently associated with risk (Beck 1992). Strong life or family roots in Poland can cause people to overlook the opportunities that underlie the introduction of potentially beneficial changes to occupational life. Often, when migrants seek to gain some amount of control over their occupational lives, and when employers facilitate 'top-up

by working abroad' positions, they, perhaps predictably, try to work much harder and be even more loyal to their employers in both places (Baker and Aldrich 1996). In these scenarios, a specific social contract emerges between migrants and both their Polish and foreign employers. If a Polish employer agrees to a scenario of unpaid leave or other professional suspension, migrating workers are ready to make at least some concessions. On the other hand, migrants can act in a non-compromising way towards an employer who allows his employees to migrate cyclically: they frequently look for stable, Polish, low-paying employers who would accept these practices while agreeing to provide some degree of job security. For the agreement to work in cases of employment overseas, an employer needs to know that the employee in question can be reliably available, even if only periodically and for a specific amount of time. This type of agreement is often readily accepted by employers who offer seasonal work (Fihel and Grabowska-Lusińska 2014).

In a 'fixative' model, then, migration can happen incidentally or else evolve into an exploration of opportunities abroad on the migrant's return to Poland. As a consequence, this practice often leads down a specific occupational path or initiates the development of a parallel career abroad. The 'fixative' model, as it relates to the meaning of migration, also applies equally to well-educated individuals, including those who are rooted in international companies or corporations in a particular country and who are sent abroad for short periods of time. This sort of placement abroad may not actually change anything in the evolution of a career path in the country of origin.

4.3.1.2 'Incident'

The second reconstructed template of meaning of migration in occupational careers (see Fig. 4.1) is marked by chance, coincidence or accident. This meaning is more conditional than intentionally planned, and is characterised by a certain disorder of social reality in which an individual exists. There is a far greater possibility of chance, coincidence and accidental occurrence here than there is in scenarios that are logically planned, if limited by a mixture of an individual's structural and personal conditions.

‘Incident’ can be understood as an instrumental meaning of migration in individuals’ occupational lives, built of loosely bound episodic elements that lack a pattern in a given career path, and with migration being only one of them. ‘Incident’ can also be the result of system transition, the product of a sense of loss in social space on the one hand, and, on the other, a defensive action, a passive act of accepting ‘what life brings’.

In this model, migrants construct for themselves a particular disorder, treating the random character of their migration as an integral and unavoidable component of a new social and economic reality. That is, these actions are purely responsive, in reaction to current affairs, and are usually taken without any judgement. Deeply internalised, structural limitations are often interpreted as personal failures. As a result, an individual finds it very difficult to plan and/or design any novel occupational paths. Occupational life is limited to day-to-day functioning, while an eventual need for development and self-realisation is shifted to other spheres—for example, lifestyle.

We can say that. And there was the issue that I couldn’t find any other satisfying job for more decent money. How long? Over six months after graduation, or more. I left for England in March 2006. It was the beginning of March. No, I was going there and only ... I was going with friends to stay with another friend. We had only that place to sleep guaranteed. And nothing else. We arrived [in the UK], and the next day we went to a job agency—one, another. And in the meantime there was no work, meaning there were no offers, actually. And after two weeks they offered us a job and we went for the interview; they checked our knowledge of English, in the sense that they checked if we could understand what they were saying. And we got the job. In a sausage factory. (From Lucjan’s occupational history, engineer, age 32, experienced post-accession migration to the UK, worked in factories and in distribution, his first job was abroad and after returning to his place of departure—Cracow—he got a job as a client adviser in big window company; for more, see Appendix 4.1)

When I arrived ... in what year I came to Ireland ... in 2006. So I began ... at first I worked in a factory. I went there, kind [of] to see my friends, I mean I knew that this is to work too ... to see friends, I took a sabbatical. ... No tourism. I completed [the] first year, had a scholarship and all.

But I went to Ireland [and] I stayed, did not come back after my sabbatical since I took it for a year to earn a little and to have something for myself simply ... [Then] Packing, putting stickers on. ... In the beginning [in the shop] was great. First few months were just brilliant. I worked from Monday to Friday, sometimes Saturday and also on Sunday. I didn't mind, since this wasn't every Sunday. I was working full time, so had enough money to splash a bit. This is when I met Rafal, since he worked there in X. He was the manager, I worked in the kitchen. Everyone was happy, that the sandwiches are nice, I was better in English than the friend through which I had this job ... I mean she didn't get it for me, I still had to go through an interview. So it was all OK. And then it all went wrong. They began to be picky, reduce hours, asking to work more weekends. I went part-time. So then I went to seek social benefit. I knew everything then. This was kind of subsidy of your salary so to speak. (From Daria's occupational history, 25 years old, from a small town—Krosno, she has changed jobs in Ireland five times, and three times enrolled on various university programmes and courses; she went back with her partner to the small town of Pionki in central Poland, where she was unemployed on the time of the research.)

In the 'incident' category, migrants seem deliberately to bypass reflexivity on their working lives. Work almost exclusively serves consumerist targets and, especially for young people, is also linked to a particular lifestyle.

It is only once subjective limitations are overcome, and some form of resistance is developed against a constant state of being destabilised by external events (or simply opting to 'go with the flow'), that it becomes possible to move on to an 'exploration' model—and even, after some biographical work (Domecka and Mrozowicki 2010), to a 'project' model. This is contingent, however, on the condition that agency won't develop into rather passive, routine actions—a set of concerted acts stemming from an individual's logical decisions.

4.3.1.3 'Exploration'

The third type of meaning of migration in occupational life explored in this analysis (see Fig. 4.1) is characterised by exploration, searching, investigation, discovery and testing one's own qualifications and knowledge—these may be formal, gained from educational institutions, or else informal and

practical, gained from work experience or non-academic life practices. This type of meaning of migration in an individual's occupational life involves the accumulation and conversion of capital (that is, applying it in different ways or fields). As a consequence, individuals make independent decisions about changing their line of work, and seek out new professional experiences. Individuals do not all explore their respective occupational spaces in identical ways, however. They may do so in a relatively superficial way, or else in a more reflexive, deeper manner.

Deepened exploration can also lead to the appreciation of manual, physical jobs and labour market informal learning, contrasted, however, with aspirations for further formal postgraduate education, often not realised abroad. These educational aspirations and work abroad below the level of the migrant's formal education often lead to long-lasting exploratory, searching behaviours as a reaction to a general failure in the education—labour market nexus.

Exactly ... I thought that I did that already. I think, that now I know in which direction I want to go, because ... if I get this job, even if it doesn't work out in the shop where I would like to work, because I know that in a short time I would be unhappy there ... I think so ... I mean I don't know, I'm thinking ... I think that it was satisfying, for at least some time, to be a manager. For sure not. If I have to I'll start from that. But when I have funds to realise my potential, I'm sure I will decide to ... or to study postgrad, or some kind of course ... Each of these [jobs abroad] gave me something. These physical jobs taught me that some level of education, self-knowledge and at least a will to develop is very important to achieve something in life. If you let it hang loose, do not educate yourself, do not work on yourself, it is a catastrophe. (From Lucja's occupational history, philosopher, age 33, experienced long-term post-accession migration to Ireland, started with a very basic position in a supermarket and ended as a floating manager of a global supermarket chain. After returning to Poland she explored her opportunities, including further postgraduate education, started working as a manager in a shop of a global clothing company, where she introduced her managerial skills from abroad; for more, see Appendix 4.1)

In the process of exploration, which becomes, in a sense, life exploration, people engage in reflexivity and discuss structural conditions while

comparing different contexts: that is, their country of origin versus their country of current settlement.

I'm glad I've been there. There is an awful lot of cultural variety and, on the other hand, after spending time here I'm glad that this doesn't exist in Poland. I miss what is in London, but I think that here it wouldn't work. I'm saying that ... it is difficult here ... if I hadn't gone abroad I would be saying that everything is fine, that there is nothing wrong. But I was there, I figured out that our society is still totally blocked. Seemingly we got into the EU, we are cool, but that is not the case. I suspect that it comes from the fact that people in Poland are still overwhelmed by everyday life and the work they do. So they cannot be happy. And over there, I was going out and I saw joy on people's faces. Here you cannot see that. (From Grzegorz's occupational history, machine operator, age 34, experienced two migrations to the UK each of which lasting more than a year; worked in the UK as a construction worker and then set up own interior decoration/construction business, returned to his place of departure—Radom—and set up his own non-registered business, enrolled into the internal security and administration programme at private graduate school, after which he applied for a professional position in the army; for more, see Appendix 4.1)

Expanded exploration can also serve as a tool for self-evaluation (though not necessarily of one's own actions) in a migration situation.

Perhaps I got to value myself more now. Because over there I felt appreciated for the work I did. Here, beforehand, I had this fear, this anxiety that I worked for someone and did a job, but he won't like it and will not pay me, or something. And there, there was no such thing. When I said that all was done, I was certain that it was, and held my head high because I knew that everything was all right and I deserved the pay. And in Poland people often tried to turn it around ... now in Poland I am able to, if I can't agree with the client, just pack my things, say thank you, walk out and part normally, just close the door and that's it. I wouldn't do that before out of fear of losing the job or that I would not find new ones. (From Grzegorz's occupational history, machine operator, age 34)

Migrant narratives, especially these individuals with long-term experience of working abroad post-accession, apply exploring behaviours

because of the opportunity structure in which they find themselves. This also brings constraints connected to the glass-ceiling syndrome, which means an inability to move up through the ranks because of external nuanced conditions.

Talking about my career self-satisfaction, you asked what it means to me ... it means that I can climb higher [in life]. And this is not about money, not about being a piece of a puzzle, etc. Yes, yes. But, for example, in Ireland I couldn't do that any more. I was so frustrated, because at some point, especially during the recession, I knew that even if my English was perfect, even if I was a good manager, which I knew I was, it is—at some stage—like hitting the ceiling, which I couldn't break, because they would not let me ... go any higher. Return, I'm sorry. Because I knew that I wouldn't get very far. Even if I had finished university, etc. Simply, no. You know yourself how things are there. Well, unfortunately, Ireland is a small country. Everyone knows each other. They get each other jobs, etc. And now certainly they are unlikely to help foreigners. They are unhappy, anyway ... You know, I witnessed some acts of aggression, where the Irish finished work and were angry that they don't have jobs while foreigners are arriving, working and earning. This was also a reason for me to leave, because that is not pleasant. (From Lucja's occupational history, philosopher, age 33; for more, see Appendix 4.1)

To sum up, in the exploration model, drifting behaviours combined with educational aspirations often lead to rather passive reflexivity on working life and its occupational improvement. For people following this model, it is very difficult to compel self-thematisation of their modern biographies (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002). They realise that modern working life is condemned to constant activity, but their activity is often fractured. They want to follow the modern guideline of a 'do-it-yourself' working life but are often stuck in exploring various activities at the same time. It is difficult for them to conduct 'elective biographies' and these run into 'risk biographies' (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002), especially if the drifting process lasts too long. They know that a life of one's own is an experimental life, which means searching, trial and error behaviours, and exploration. It is clear, however, that it still allows the individual to begin to design and construct an occupational plan for the future.

4.3.1.4 'Project'

The fourth type of meaning of migration in an individual's occupational life (see Fig. 4.1) relates to a situation in which migration is planned, becomes an integral part of an existing occupational path and serves as a reflexive space for learning.

I think that when you try to reach a goal, all failures contribute to your strength; so all my experience—where I started, or where I was just before going on this internship abroad—all this lead to where I am at the moment. (From Maria's occupational history, 25 years old, from a small town near Warsaw. Her migration experience was gradual: first, she moved to Warsaw, working in various administrations and then she decided to apply for an Erasmus scholarship to Portugal and then prepared and planned a 12-month internship in a real estate company in Belgium; after her return to Poland she began working in a multinational real estate company in the centre of Warsaw)

The idea of a project implies construction, building, coherent and direct action geared towards a particular end, which in this case is the individual's occupational life or a part thereof. This type of project is positioned on an accumulation and conversion of capital (Bourdieu 1986) and characterised by openness to change and a readiness to take risks, including those stemming from international migration. They 'are compelled to make themselves the centre of their own life plans and conduct ... in other words people demand the right to develop their own perspective of life and to be able to act upon it' (Beck 1992, p. 92), and migration can act, in this context, as 'an empowerment' in the working life.

I have rather good memories, but unfortunately I have a feeling that some sort of a glass ceiling was there. Yes. I think that, yes. I got, at the end of my work there, a permanent job offer for very good money. Not with them but at a 'sister' company which had just started to develop and was supposed to look after independent film production. I resigned, because I didn't want [it] ... I knew in that very moment, that I wanted to deal with films as products, not to collaborate in their production. So the film production wasn't exactly what I wanted to do. I realised that there are other opportunities in that area and I resigned, I explained my reasons ... I thanked

them, giving family matters as [my] reason for leaving. They were really surprised and shocked, that you can go back to Eastern Europe where you are from, and not pursue a career in media in London. Well, but that was my decision and I was always happy about it. So, I came back. (From Pola's occupational history, film specialist, age 33, graduated from the University of Warsaw in social sciences, migrated to the UK post-2004 EU enlargement and stayed there for a few years. Her first work abroad was as a pub toilet cleaner, then a petrol station worker, then she decided to apply for a university programme that suited her interests, namely film promotion. After graduation she worked for a British film promotion company, then returned to Poland and got a job at the national film institute)

The project model does not need to be conducted only by well-educated people, but also by those who have clear plans and ideas for their working life, i.e. the sequence of jobs and moves (internal and international) as craftspeople, qualified labourers and so on (Grabowska-Lusińska 2012).

In general, in its ideal form, the 'project' type is characterised by an almost constant effort to make subsequent occupational events, including migration, consistent with previous and upcoming decisions so that they combine to construct a coherent career. In this model, according to Archer (2003), action, agency, actors' self-control and their perception that 'migration must be under control' is clear.

4.4 Summary: Meanings of Migration to Working Lives and Agency Triad

This analysis describes how each reconstructed template of the meanings of migration in occupational life can relate to respective levels of agency (Emirbayer and Mische 1998). 'Fixative' and 'incident' types show routine repetition of actions 'here' or 'there' without touching on other components of agency such as innovative and evaluation actions. 'Exploration' and 'project' show that people take risks and undertake innovative actions in their occupational lives, but not everyone is able to evaluate the actions undertaken and build on them for further career stages, which is why some people get stuck in the exploration phase of their career.

This analysis has shown that occupational activities are not realised uniformly as a result of individual agency (see Fig. 4.2). They depend on coexisting factors: a willingness to migrate, and reflexivity. That is therefore why not everyone is able to exit the ‘incidental’ or ‘fixative’ models of occupational paths, or to achieve the ‘exploration’ or ‘project’ models, which allow individuals to attain various forms of professional career.

The matrix seen in Fig. 4.2 shows the position of each quoted individual in this analysis, their life course occupational trajectories in relation to the different components of the agency triad (Emirbayer and Mische 1998), and meanings ascribed to migrations during the course of their working life. It is clear that up to the time of the study not all occupational trajectories were able to capture all the components of the agency triad.

To sum up, the detailed analysis of biographies has shown that not everyone is able to realise all the components of the agency triad, which creates different patterns of life course occupational trajectories, with migration as a part of them. It depends on coexisting factors of opportunity structure (such as the free movement of labour in the EU, labour market supply—demand structures), occupational plans, situational conditions (for example, the workplaces the migrants are in), their attachments to the sending and receiving countries (linked lives), and the stage of their life course. Not everyone is therefore able to exit the ‘incidental’ or ‘fixative’ model of occupational path or to accomplish successfully the ‘exploration’ or ‘project’ model. These findings are consistent with the principles of life course mentioned at the beginning of this chapter (Elder 1991).

Meaning of migration to life course occupational trajectories	Agency triad (Emirbayer and Mische 1998)			
		Repetition of actions	Creation of action (innovations)	Praxis of actions and their evaluations
	Fixative	e.g. Olgierd, Roman →		
	Incident	e.g. Daria,	Lucjan →	
	Exploration		e.g. Lucja, Grzegorz	→
	Project			e.g. Maria, Pola →

Fig. 4.2 Matrix of agency triads and meanings of migration in life course occupational trajectories (see also Grabowska 2016).

4.5 Discussion

While exploring the reasons for differentiated meanings of migration in occupational life, it is worth revisiting Swidler's (1986) position, which considers individuals' actions in both stable and uncertain periods. During stable times, as after Poland's accession to the EU, individuals realised their plans in repetitive, sequenced ways, almost trouble-free, fulfilling to some extent their cultural competences and following their own courses of action. However, in uncertain times—for example, during system transformation—two types of individual scenarios emerge: (1) individuals faced with uncertainty and limited knowledge about 'new' opportunities look to traditionalism, familiarity and stability; and (2) others react to established conditions, do not give in passively, and choose instead to engage in new, forward-looking activities; they step outside the traditional framework.

Post-accession migration looked at from the perspective of individual biographies, enhances the process of individualisation of late modernity (Beck 1992). Migration may help to create Beck's 'do-it-yourself', 'elective' biography, which was described here as 'exploration' and 'project' where people are able to realise all components of agency, going far beyond the routinisation of their actions. They need to bring new actions into their lives and are able to evaluate them and apply the outcomes of these assessments. Migration can also bring risks and breaks in biographies when people routinise their migratory actions and submit non-reflexively to the external conditions or act as incidental job-hoppers.

There is a big difference, however, in the realisation of a biography where there are opportunity structures connected to the institutional resources such as human rights, freedom of movement and work, and a welfare state to cope with the constraints and contradictions of modern biographies. People struggle with their working lives in a world that is still difficult to grasp. With unlimited mobility they are pushed into 'global biographies' with 'place polygamy' (Beck 1992). This means that their lives are no longer sedentary or tied to particular place. They are spent in a range of places, often transnational, where the sense of definitive return lost its sense and validity because there were ongoing departures and returns.

Appendix 4.1 Respondents' profiles and reconstructed meanings of migration to their life course occupational trajectories

No. and name	Gender	Age at time of IDI	Marital status and children	Origin/ place of leaving at the time of IDI	Formal profession/practised profession	No. of migrations/ duration/ places	No. of jobs in occupational trajectory/ year of first job	Reconstructed meaning of migration to life course occupational trajectory
1/R/M/ Adrian	M	24	Bachelor/0	Warsaw/ Pruszkow	Management & marketing specialist/own business—shop	2/?/UK	7/?	Incident → exploration
2/A/K Barbara	F	38	Married/1	Radom/ Radom	Chef, lower clerk economist, finances and accounting/ internal designer and decorator	2/Germany/ 2001– 2004/1992	10/?	Exploration → construction
3/M/M Cyril	M	40	Married/1	Radom/ Nowy Targ	Plumber, repairman/ machine operator	1/Ireland/ 2002–2005	4/1994	Construction
4/K/K Daria	F	25	Partnership/0	Krosno/ Pionki	No degree/ unemployed	1/Ireland/ 2004–2011	3/?	Incident
5/R/M Emil	M	33	Divorced/2	Pionki/ Pionki	IT specialist/IT specialist	1/Ireland	?/2000	Incident

No. and name	Gender	Age at time of IDI	Marital status and children	Origin/ place of leaving at the time of IDI	Formal profession/ practised profession	No. of migrations/ duration/ places	No. of jobs in occupational trajectory/ year of first job	Reconstructed meaning of migration to life course occupational trajectory
6/E/K Felicja	F	28	Single/1	Warsaw/ Warsaw	English philologist/ family business	1/Ireland/ 2004–2008	7/2004	Exploration
7/P/M Grzegorz	M	34	Married/1	Radom/ Radom	Vocational mechanic, high school, started Bachelor programme on internal security/ professional army soldier	2/Uk/2.5 and 1.5 years	?/2001	Exploration
8/I/K Halina	F	38	Married/2	Warsaw/ Warsaw	PhD in social planning/ specialist in the labour ministry	1/Ireland/ 2000–2010	?/1998	Construction
9/M/M Igor	M	42	Married/2	Warsaw/ Warsaw	Transport and logistic engineer	1/Ireland/ 2000–2010	?/1998	Incident → exploration

(continued)

Appendix 4.1 (continued)

10/L/M Jeremi	M	-	-	Warsaw/ Warsaw	-	-	-	Incident
11/N/K Katarzyna	F	25	Single/0	Warsaw/ Rzeszow	-	1/Cyprus/3 months	9/2004	Incident
12/L/M Lucjan	M	33	Bachelor	Cracow/ Cracow	Engineer, machine construction/ customer adviser	1/UK	?/2005	Exploration
13/A/K Lucja	K	33	In partnership	Radom/ Ryki	Philosopher/ sales manager	1/Ireland/ 2006-2012	5/2005	Exploration
14/K/K Maria	K	27	Single	Warsaw/ countryside	Administrative officer/real estate specialist	2/Portugal, Belgium/12 months, 6 months	2/2007	Construction
15/M/K Natalia	K	32	Single	Warsaw/ Warsaw	Financial specialist/ real estate manager	3/Australia, UK, UK/12 years, 3 years, 6 months	?	Exploration → construction
16/JG/M Olgierd	M	31	Married/1	Kamiennik/ Kamiennik	Municipality clerk/ municipality clerk	?/2010	4/Austria, Germany/ seasonal	Fixative
17/M/K Pola	F	33	Single	Warsaw/ Warsaw	Sociologist/ film promoter	?/2001	1/UK/3 years	Construction
18/N/M Roman	M	50	Married/3	Otmuchow/ Otmuchow	Teacher/teacher and builder	2	6/Germany, The Netherlands/ seasonal	Fixative

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5

Transnational Entrepreneurs in the Western Balkans: A Comparative Study of Serbian and Albanian Migrants and Returnees

Jelena Predojevic-Despic, Tanja Pavlov,
Svetlana Milutinovic, and Brikena Balli

Transnational entrepreneurship (TE) is becoming a leading economic activity worldwide, particularly in the area of high technology. A growing number of studies are attempting to address this type of migration, whether in the form of immigrant entrepreneurship or the entrepreneurship of returnees in their homeland. Serbia and Albania have experienced a significant emigration among their highly skilled population. TE is an emerging trend in both countries, but apart from sporadic studies on foreign remittances, there has been no research carried out on transnational economic activities and transnational entrepreneurship among immigrants or returnees.

J. Predojevic-Despic (✉)

Institute of Social Sciences, Kraljice Natalije 45, Belgrade, Serbia

T. Pavlov • S. Milutinovic

Center for Migration, Group 484, Belgrade, Serbia

B. Balli

Faculty of Social Sciences, Sociology Department, Tirana University, Tirane,
Albania

The aim of this pilot study¹ was (a) to cast light on a new phenomenon in the region of the Western Balkans and reveal transnational entrepreneurial business activities of transnational migrants and returnees who conducted business in/with Serbia and Albania, while maintaining close business relationships with foreign countries; (b) to investigate the forms and characteristics of economic activity among these returnees in the two countries, respectively, and to examine micro, meso and macro factors motivating and affecting them—in line with Bourdieu's (1977) concepts of habitus, field and social capital; and (c) to discuss comparatively the research findings from these two countries. We applied a qualitative methodology, given that transnational entrepreneurs were not statistically visible or recognised by any quantitative data in these two countries.

5.1 Theoretical Framework: Transnational Entrepreneurship

An increasing number of scholars from various academic disciplines are attempting to address this emerging economic and social practice. According to Drori et al. (2009, p. 1001), the process of TE involves those 'entrepreneurial activities that are carried out in a cross-national context, and initiated by actors who are embedded in at least two different social and economic arenas', and TE is a rapidly growing aspect of international business expansion. Saxenian (2002, 2005) highlights the crucial role played by foreign-born (mainly Asian), US-educated engineers and managers in entrepreneurship and technological innovation in their countries of origin. The survey study by Portes et al. (2002) of Salvadorean, Colombian and Dominican immigrant groups in the USA reveals that transnational entrepreneurs (TEs) represent a large proportion, often the majority, of the self-employed people among immigrant communities. Others explore various forms of TEs' activities (Landolt et al. 1999;

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Zhou 2004; Itzigsohn et al. 1999) or look at socio-cultural factors underlying these activities (Urbano et al. 2011).

For this research, we drew upon Terjesen and Elam's (2009) work on TEs, exploring their internationalisation strategies through the lens of Bourdieu's (1977) theory of practice. Following Drori et al.'s (2009) theoretical framework, they show how distinctive mindsets and resource sets—economic, social, symbolic, capital—uniquely position TEs to pursue international markets and meet the navigational requirements of multiple institutional settings within a particular field of economic activity. Therefore we used Bourdieu's concepts of habitus, field and capital to explain the processes of foundation and perpetuation of TE among Serbian and Albanian returning migrants. Habitus refers to habituated and transposable dispositions that guide our thoughts and actions in a particular field, referred to colloquially as worldviews (Terjesen and Elam 2009) consisting of experiences, perceptions and norms. Field, as interpreted by Drori et al. (2006), refers to institutional structures in the macro-environment. Field describes social structures in which an action takes place, while forms of capital—economic, social, cultural and symbolic—define the position from which the actors react (Bourdieu 1993). While Bourdieu did not study migrants, subsequent applications of his theory to the study of migration has provided definitions of various forms of capital: economic capital referring to financial and other material resources that have direct economic value; social capital referring to relationships or networks that make connections; cultural capital referring to education and learned experiences; and symbolic capital the legitimacy and credibility owned by migrants (Terjesen and Elam 2009).

Combining these Bourdieu's concepts helps us to link micro-level processes with macro-level structures (Swartz 2008). We argue that Serbian and Albanian transnational migrant entrepreneurs rely on diverse sets of resources (economic, social and cultural) to navigate the fields, i.e. multiple institutional legal and regulatory environments, when they conduct their business. For this study, we drew upon social capital, which implied the ability of individuals to manage scarce resources on the basis of belonging to networks or broader social structures (Portes 1995). TEs, through the interaction of human capital and specific knowledge and skills, establish networks and have the potential to expand their business in transnational space.

Along these lines, we based our research on the definition of transnational entrepreneurship as a practice, i.e. 'the pursuit of new business activities shaped by the dual and complementary set of habitus and field which structure entrepreneurial activity' (Drori et al. 2010, p. 4). Entrepreneurship of Serbian and Albanian transnational migrants and returnees can thus be understood as a practice or action strategy in which decisions are based on an individual's response to his/her context, given that person's habitus and capital resources, as determinants of his/her social position in the field of action.

5.2 Methodology

Our research employed a qualitative method. The instrument used was semi-structured, face-to-face interview, which is a flexible way of asking people directly about what is going on and has the potential of providing rich and highly illuminating material (Robson 1993, p. 229). This method was only applicable in these two countries because of the lack of quantitative data relevant to the research questions and novelty of the phenomenon not recognised by the official statistics.

Operationally, we defined transnational migrants and returnees as the citizens of Serbia and Albania who had worked or studied abroad for more than a year, then returned and established businesses in their countries of origin or extended business operations already being run abroad. The success of their business depended on regular contacts with foreign countries.

We should point out that entrepreneurs were discovered and selected through our own private and professional networks, from private acquaintances to university alumni groups, business incubators and state institutions. All entrepreneurs contacted were initial informants, meaning that we did not use a 'snowball' method to reach respondents through their own networks. The reason for this was related to the scarcity of returnees who were embedded, or whose businesses were embedded dually in transnational social space. Fifteen respondents were interviewed in each country. The interviews were conducted in various cities in Serbia and Albania and lasted between 40 minutes and about 2 hours. All the names of the respondents remained anonymous.

5.3 Country Case: Serbia

The socio-demographic characteristics of interviewed Serbian TEs were heterogeneous: thirteen of the respondents held university degrees—three had received master's degrees, one had a doctorate, and two others had a high school diploma. Thirteen of the respondents were men and two were women. Seven out of these fifteen respondents were in their thirties, five in their forties, two in their fifties and one in his sixties. Ten were married and had children, four were single, and one was divorced. Ten entrepreneurs lived in Belgrade, and the rest in other towns in Serbia, mainly in local administrative centres. There were also those who lived in the transnational space between two or more countries (Serbia—Slovenia—Germany, Serbia—Hungary).

They went abroad at different points in their lives—seven of them were between the ages of 16 and 25, while the rest were aged 26 to 31. Fourteen of the respondents returned to Serbia after 2005, but one returned in 1997. Seven of the study participants returned from the USA and two from Germany, while the other six came back from France, the UK, Finland, Italy, Canada and Australia. Seven of the entrepreneurs had dual citizenship. Most of the respondents stated that their initial business capital came from their personal savings, or financial assistance of friends and family (the so-called 'angel investors'). Only one took out a loan in the USA to launch his business, while another one secured financial assistance from the government of Serbia (Pavlov et al. 2013).

As for the sector of their activity, nine of the companies provided services and five were production-orientated firms. Of the first group, four companies were concentrated in the ICT sector, one provided financial consultancy, another provided a dental service, two others dealt in petroleum products, and another sold household appliances. The production companies produced small aircraft, foodstuffs, energy, objects of art and furniture, medical software and one produced software for ICT purposes. The companies were small in size, employing between one and 38 persons, mainly Serbian nationals. Ten of the companies had their head offices in Serbia; one entrepreneur had a company in Serbia and another in Hungary. Three other firms were based abroad, and two of them had their branch offices in Belgrade. All the companies that provided IT ser-

vices did so exclusively to foreign markets that included Australia, the USA, Canada, the EU, and the former Soviet countries.

At a micro level, we discovered several reasons why our respondents returned to Serbia. Some of them, or their partners, were unable to obtain a legal status in the country of destination. Others worked in a virtual space and it made no difference where they were living physically, therefore they opted for the country where they were surrounded by their family, relatives and close friends. Others wanted to develop or expand their business in Serbia, where labour is cheap. Several of the respondents cited family reasons for their return, such as bringing up and educating their children in their home country, or caring for their parents. They usually returned after assessing the circumstances in Serbia as being favourable, as well as having conceived a plan to start a business activity. Some had already launched their business from abroad.

The conducted interviews show three different paths of Serbian transnational migrants and/or returnees towards entrepreneurship, thus revealing the meso-level forms of combining micro-level processes with macro-level structures. The first path is that of migrants who were born abroad or went to study there. They developed their entrepreneurial spirit in the course of their education process. The second path was developed by those who completed their university studies and had jobs in Serbia, but decided to go abroad to get away from the difficult political and economic situation. The third path was developed by migrants who left the country driven by poverty.

These paths were developed along different transnational network structures, offering different opportunities in a given context, as well as different orientations and strategies (Cassarino 2004; Predojevic-Despic 2009). In the process, this complex web of social networks enabled the negotiation between human and social capital and institutional structure. Based on the findings from the interviews, we found several kinds of these networks that the TEs employed:

- Networks arising from professional connections, which helped our informants in the process of developing their businesses. Most of the interviewees stated that they 'got the business deals from abroad', implying that they maintained business networks both through connections with professional associations and via informal communication with current and former colleagues.

- Networks of clients/customers that helped TEs to overcome the obstacles they were facing, given the lack of mutual connections, or the lack of connections to the government structures that were necessary for successful business operations in Serbia.
- Networks of innovation that helped them with regard to the creation and exploitation of opportunities in different countries. These networks usually involve professionals from different disciplines as consultants and idea developers. One such innovative team had developed a very productive co-operation through which they constructed ‘a new plane absolutely made in Serbia’ by ‘working day and night, commitment, experience, persistence’ and costing ‘six times less money than would be needed in the Western European countries’.

Macro factors on both sides of transnational social space are also very important in developing and sustaining a transnational business. Our respondents highlighted the difficulties as well as the opportunities they encountered in their transnational business undertaking. They, for example, emphasised two macro factors with regard to destination countries—good business conditions and/or difficult conditions for the regulation of the legal status of immigrants. On the other hand, as much as business operations in Serbia have their flaws (a weak legal system, long and costly customs procedures, a poor business environment), they also have many positive aspects. Serbia offers opportunities related to competitiveness in both quality and price. Compared to developed Western countries, starting and doing business in Serbia requires fewer financial resources. There is an educated and professional, but cheaper, labour force compared to Western countries (for example, in the ICT sector). Through developing such far-reaching and competitive transnational business operations, especially in ICTs, the interviewed entrepreneurs used opportunities and overcame obstacles by simultaneous involvement in two or more social environments.

5.4 Country Case: Albania

Socio-demographic characteristics of Albanian interviewees were also diverse. As far as their educational level is concerned With regard to their educational level, nine of the participants held university degrees; three

had received master's degrees, and three others had a high school diploma. Six of the nine respondents were women. Three of the respondents were in their fifties, two in their thirties, one in the late twenties, and the rest were in their forties. One of the respondents was single and the rest were married and had children.

The time of migration varied. Two left Albania in 1990, six in 1991, one in 1992, and another in 1994. Two of the participants left in 1997, two others left in 1999, and another in 2006. The length of stay abroad ranged from 17 months to about 15 years. Seven of the participants lived and worked in Greece, one was a migrant in Greece and Germany; two lived and worked in Italy, one in the UK, one in Turkey, one in Romania, while two others lived and worked in North America. All but one immigrant, stated that their most common source of financial capital to start their business was their personal savings from their migrant's work. Some, however, said that money from family also supplemented their initial financial sources.

The entrepreneurs hailed from Korca, a town in the south-east near Greece; Tirana, Durres, and from two other towns in south-west Albania. As for the sectors of activity, their businesses concentrated on production (food, garment and shoe), sale (medical and beauty products), services and a non-profit enterprise. Most of the companies were small in size, employing up to about 10 people. Three of them, however, were larger in size in terms of their workforce. These included the food production and distribution company, and two of the companies that specialised in production for export (garments and shoes). The first of these employed about 60 workers, while the other two employed around 100 and 250 workers, respectively. Almost all of the companies were based in Albania. Four of them had partnerships with companies abroad.

As for their micro-level frameworks, all but one of the entrepreneurs in this study said they returned because they wanted to start a business. One came for family reasons. When asked why they started their business, respondents cited various reasons. These included the desire to own their own business, be independent economically, economic need, to start something new, in particular in a free market economy, having access to local markets, as well as the desire to take risks. Moreover, for most of

them, the idea of starting a business was born out of their working experience in the receiving countries.

Respondents' stories revealed the awareness of their habitus and the impact that their migration experiences had on them. Working and living in other countries gave immigrants a different worldview, a different mindset which they transposed to their own countries in order to embark on their entrepreneurial journeys.

Regardless of the types of business, transnational social capital in the form of border-crossing networks underlay returnees' business activities in all of their stages. Similar to the case of Serbian transnational entrepreneurs, we found several types of transnational networks:

- Networks arising from professional connections. Immigrants in the sample emphasised the importance of border-spanning networks in establishing and conducting their businesses, allowing them to buy the products or equipment they need to run them.
- Formal/informal networks for recruiting a workforce. A common concern cited by several informants was a total lack of technical experts in Albania to maintain and repair machinery and other equipment used in their business. In view of these circumstances, returnees resorted to bringing technical experts from abroad, mainly from the places with which they maintained regular business relations.

Respondents varied as to how they went about hiring workers in their companies in Albania. For one owner, the informal channels were the dominant form. He mainly hired his relatives for the various positions in the firm. Another used a different way of hiring: first, he advertised the open positions on local TV and then interviewed those who applied. The ones who were hired went through a trial period. If they met his expectations, they continued to work there.

The legal and regulatory environment is extremely important for the operations of transnational entrepreneurs (Saxenian 2002, 2005). One of the challenges they faced had to do with the fact that Albania lacked the legal and regulatory framework for accommodating the TEs, especially migration-related TEs in the country. The government has put in its agenda the synergy between migration and development, but there

are no consistent measures in place to implement such a synergy. Not surprisingly, when asked about the difficulties they faced running their business, all the interviewees emphasised that the institutional, as well as political, climate in Albania was not very conducive to running a business.

In spite of the difficulties, our respondents, driven by their entrepreneurial spirit, were determined to move on. As they pointed out, as ‘bad’ as ‘things’ were in Albania, it still offered many opportunities for business, given it was an unexplored market. One just had to think big: ‘have big ideas’. Additionally, TEs, by their very nature, were embedded in both receiving and sending countries. They knew the language, customs and ‘ways of doing things’ in their host society as well as in Albania. In this way, they were well positioned to navigate both environments. One of the respondents said that in order to move his business forward in Albania, he would do things that he would never do in Italy, implying the extent to which they tried to navigate even the most difficult of the terrain.

5.5 Comparison: Albanian and Serbian Transnational Entrepreneurs

The socio-demographic characteristics of Serbian and Albanian transnational entrepreneurs who participated in the study revealed heterogeneous groups. Most of the respondents were males in their thirties to late forties/early fifties. The entrepreneurs were highly educated: most of them held bachelor degrees, some held master’s degrees, while a few had only high school diplomas. Most of them were married with children. In both countries, the majority of returnees lived in the capitals and large cities, where most business activities took place.

However, there were differences between the Serbian and Albanian transnational entrepreneurs on several dimensions. These differences were mainly a result of the entrepreneurs’ different economic, political and social context when they emigrated. With regard to the time of migration, for example, several Serbian entrepreneurs began their migration journey in the 1970s, and the rest of entrepreneurs reported doing

so in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. This was not the case with Albanian migrants, though. The earliest reported year of migration was 1990, as Albanians were not allowed to leave the country before that date. Serbia, on the other hand, had a longer history of labour migration, which started in the second half of the 1960s. Moreover, during the 1980s Serbia offered a possibility—though limited—of private entrepreneurship, while Albania's economy was highly centralised until the collapse of the authoritarian government.

Destination countries of previous migration waves also influenced the destinations of participants in the study. For example, most of the Albanian transnational entrepreneurs stated that they lived and worked in Greece and Italy, countries with the largest numbers of Albanian migrants. Unlike Albanians, however, about half of the Serbs, mainly highly educated, had chosen the UK and the USA as their destination countries. The rest had worked and lived in other countries such as France, Germany, Austria and Switzerland, all countries with a large concentration of Serbian migrants (Predojevic-Despic and Penev 2012). These structural differences had also shaped business process and structure. For example, in the case of Serbia, many transnational entrepreneurs started their business abroad and then transferred it to Serbia, which was not the case with Albanian entrepreneurs.

Transnational companies were also heterogeneous, just like the transnational entrepreneurs. They were concentrated in diverse sectors. In the case of Serbia, the highest percentage of the surveyed entrepreneurs started their business in the field of information and communication technologies. It should be emphasised that their small enterprises in this sector were quite competitive in the foreign markets, where they innovated and sold products as diversified as banking software or software for detecting early skin cancer. Other sectors included trade, financial activities, construction, education, mining and processing of building materials, manufacturing, electricity, gas and water supply, real estate, lease and rent, health and social care, other social and personal service activities, agriculture, the production of small aircraft, furniture design, and the manufacture and sale of art works. In the case of Albania, the interviewees' businesses were mainly concentrated on food production and distribution, export-based garment and shoe production, online

service provision, sales of products for dental laboratories, aesthetic and beauty salons, auto repair service, not for profit social enterprise, tourism agency, health and social care, manufacturing, consulting, project, and transportation and storage.

The sizes of the businesses varied. In the case of Serbia, they were usually small-sized enterprises employing up to 30 people. Most of the Albanian firms were micro-enterprises, while three were medium-sized enterprises. The initial source of funding for business start-ups in both countries was personal savings, followed by loans from friends and family, and, at a much lower percentage, joint ventures with investors.

Regarding the composition of the workforce, most of the Serbian TEs employed highly educated workers. The majority had university degrees or MA/Ph.D. diplomas. In the case of Albania, however, the results were more mixed: the overwhelming majority of the workforce in the production companies, or services, had a high school diploma, while a few had only primary education. The more specialised services employed workers with university and postgraduate degrees. Moreover, in both cases, the interviewed TEs expressed a strong preference for hiring people with migration experience because of the work ethics and professional attitudes, as well as their knowledge of foreign languages.

Different socio-political conditions of social development in Serbia and Albania, especially during the communist regimes and in the 1990s and 2000s, shaped different paths towards entrepreneurship in these two countries. Among the most important factors were different attitudes among state representatives towards foreign influence and the possibilities of maintaining connections with family members and acquaintances abroad, different state policies towards migration and consequently emigration trends over time, as well as the entrepreneurship climate in these countries. In line with these factors, the majority of Serbian interviewees started their businesses in Serbia before emigration, or developed their ideas in the course of their education process abroad, or even started their entrepreneurial career in the destination country and then transferred the business to Serbia for further development, either in Serbia or in other countries in the region of the Western Balkans. Only one person went back to Serbia to become an entrepreneur without previous experience in the field. The situation was rather different for Albanian entrepreneurs.

The interviewed Albanians could be divided into two groups: the first group consisted of those who worked for a company abroad and upon return to Albania started and operated the export-based business of the same company. The second group consisted of returnees who started a business in Albania similar to the ones they had worked in during their stay abroad.

Despite the listed differences, there was a striking similarity between the two migrant groups *vis-à-vis* their perception of the advantages and disadvantages of doing business in the home and host countries. Both groups of TEs recognised the structure of opportunities in their home countries. They said that operating costs were lower, and the ‘degree of friendships and relationships relevant to business’ was higher in Albania/Serbia. However, the disadvantages of doing business in Albania/Serbia were still clear in relation to doing business in destination countries. They all agreed that the following characteristics were lower or worse compared to those of the destination countries: availability of capital to start a business and run business operations, speed of professional growth, professional recognition and acknowledgment of the society, size and strength of healthy competition, and state support. They also emphasized similar obstacles to doing business—corruption and complicated administrative procedures were in first place in both countries, followed by unfair competition (working in a grey economy and thus reducing the cost of services), and political or economic instability.

Being positioned uniquely between the home and (former) destination countries, transnational entrepreneurs functioned simultaneously as parts of different networks, which helped them to manage the dual challenge of gaining legitimacy both globally and locally, securing resources and pursuing opportunities. This research identified several types of networks among our respondents in both countries: the first type consisted of networks developing from professional connections. Among these, the most appreciated were the informal professional networks with colleagues, but also networks of professional associations or alumni organisations. Both the Albanian and Serbian cases pointed to the fact that border-spanning networks were very important (in the Albanian case, they were seen as being vital) for the survival of the business. Through these types of networks, they found high-quality labour, and developed their business operations, advertised, created their image and closed business deals. Networks

of clients and customers, whose importance was emphasised by a couple of interviewed entrepreneurs in Serbia, can also be put into the group of the networks of professional connections. These networks were important for coping with uncertainty, acquired legitimacy and offset the absence of formal institutional support. In addition, networks of innovation were also identified in the Serbian case. Established and maintained with the aim of creating and developing new and original products that could aid entry to the international market, these kinds of networks involved numerous people with different skills and qualifications. For example, in Serbia, the product that had come into existence from this kind of network was an original aircraft recorded in the relevant EU registers.

Finally, in addition to ensuring their own business profits, with almost no support from their governments, the transnational economic activities of these migrant groups may form an important resource for the development of the Serbian and Albanian economies. Moreover, by bringing in the entrepreneurial spirit and values of legalism and meritocracy they contribute to the creation of a good business climate in both Serbia and Albania.

5.6 Conclusion

This pilot study revealed a new social phenomenon in the two Western Balkan countries—TEs and transnational forms of economic activity among Serbian and Albanian migrant returnees. It explored their motives, as well as micro, meso and macro factors affecting their transnational business practices. TEs who participated in our study demonstrated that this migrant group were able to connect the countries of origin and destination in the transnational space with its social and human capital. Through transnational business operations, entrepreneurs used the opportunities and overcame obstacles by maximizing material and non-material profits. The simultaneous involvement in two or more social environments allowed them to maintain key global relations that enhanced their ability to maximize the resource base creatively and efficiently (Drori et al. 2010).

Their migration experience devised over a specific habitus, along with the use of resources embodied as cultural, social and economic capital,

affected their coping within an insufficiently regulated business environment and the development of services and products that were competitive in the market. This comparative analysis attempted to determine commonalities and divergences between the two entrepreneurial migrant groups, who came from different socio-political backgrounds but faced similar barriers to their entrepreneurship.

This study represents a step towards a better understanding of the TEs in the Balkan region. While this research offers important information in developing these insights, it is necessary to point out that the research results are valid only for these particular cases and cannot be generalised. The observed similarities and differences among the migrants of these two countries should be viewed as the opening of a new research field rather than a robust generalisation.

More longitudinal and quantitative studies are required to better understand the complex entrepreneurial dynamics of transnational migrants and returnees in the region, with a special focus on social capital features. Gaining deeper insights into complex transnational entrepreneurs' social networks through which they negotiate the placement of their goods and services in the international market would be important. This is vital because the innovation of their business operations does not only come directly from the activities of transnational businesses as such, but also from the very fact that they are transnational and rely on networks spanning borders.

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Part II

Researching Return Migration: Research Methods, Implementation and Results

6

Temporary Labour Migration from Eastern Europe: The Role of Human Capital Investment and Migration Agencies

Alexander M. Danzer and Barbara Dietz

The enlargements of the European Union (EU) in 2004 and 2007 established a new frontier in Eastern Europe, turning a number of post-Soviet Union countries into neighbours of the EU. Encouraged by economic opportunities abroad and by the greater freedom of movement, labour migration from post-Soviet states increased, whether it was from those countries bordering the enlarged EU directly (Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus) or those very close to its borders (Armenia, Georgia). While Russia is an important migration destination for people from this region, migration flows to the EU and other Western countries are increasing (IOM 2005; Mansoor and Quillin 2006). Because immigration and labour permits are restricted in most destinations, migrants from post-Soviet countries often move only temporarily and work in casual jobs.

A.M. Danzer (✉)

WFI, KU Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, Ingolstadt, Germany

B. Dietz

Department of Economics, Institute for East and Southeast European Studies,
Regensburg, Germany

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Since 2009, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have participated in the Eastern Partnership (EP) of the EU. This project was launched to support political and economic reforms in the region and to promote a closer co-operation with EU countries. While the EU's migration policy towards its Eastern Partners emphasises border control and the fight against illegal immigration, it also promotes legal labour migration activities and visa liberalisation. This is particularly relevant since the EU aims to attract high-skilled immigrants (Kahanec and Zimmermann 2011).

Among Eastern Partnership countries, Moldova experienced the highest emigration of temporary labour in recent decades, while the outflow from Armenia, Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia was comparatively moderate. In line with expectations from the economic migration literature on transition countries, women are less likely to migrate than men (Görlich and Trebesch 2008; Vadean and Piracha 2010). Somewhat unusual in international comparison are the relatively high proportions of older migrants and a significantly negative effect of university education on migration decisions (Danzer and Dietz 2014). Russia attracts the majority of temporary migrants from the Eastern EU border region and provides an extended labour market for those who are less educated or unemployed. Individuals with a better education and foreign language skills move towards the EU and overseas destinations (Danzer and Dietz 2014). Nevertheless, the higher education and skills of temporary migrants from Eastern Europe often fail to pay off, as schooling and experiences obtained in these countries are not easily transferable. In many cases, migrants are channelled into low-skilled occupations and are thus not able to make use of their talents, particularly in the West (Mansoor and Quillin 2006).

A growing body of literature deals with immigrants' investment into skill transferability and its earnings effects after migrating to a foreign country (Chiswick et al. 2005; Chiswick and Miller 2009; Duleep 2007). In the framework of this concept, immigrants tend to earn wages that are below those of natives directly after immigration but converge with natives' wages as the destination-country-specific human capital and work experience of the immigrants improve (Chiswick and Miller 2009). Recently, attention has been shifting towards the practice of migrants investing in

human capital before migration (for example, in language acquisition and vocational training) to ease their access to the foreign labour market.¹ Such *ex ante* investment into skill transferability directs migrants towards countries that reward these resources (Danzer and Dietz 2014).

In the migration destination choice, all kinds of networks exert a strong pull effect, as network relations reduce the costs and risks of movements (Massey et al. 1998). The empirical literature finds strong support for the relevance of ‘family, friends and neighbours’ networks in migration movements. Munshi (2003), for example, shows that migrants with better network relations are more likely to be employed and have better chances of working in higher paid jobs. Recent studies find that networks extend beyond ‘family, friends and neighbours’ and often include recruiters, consultants and other agents who support the movement of people and ease their access to foreign labour markets (Castles 2007; Krissman 2005).

This chapter explores the destination choice and migration duration of temporary labour migrants from five EU Partnership countries: Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. We study explicitly whether activities undertaken before moving abroad influence the selection of destination countries and the duration of temporary movements. Two particular measures are analysed in detail: the assistance by migration agencies and the pre-migration investment in destination-country-specific human capital. We argue that both activities support migrants to success in the foreign labour market. While migration agencies contribute predominantly to overcoming migration barriers, reducing moving costs and assisting in finding work, pre-migration investment in human capital strengthens the transferability of education and skills and helps to gain access to labour markets that offer greater returns. It can be expected that labour migrants who aim at high-wage countries have a greater probability of investing in human capital before moving. Once in the destination country, migrants who took advantage of migration agencies and/or invested to improve their skills before moving might stay longer, as

¹Chiswick and Miller (2009) support this hypothesis, as they found a tendency among labour immigrants in the USA to move into higher skill levels after arrival than was indicated by their level of schooling. An argument in this context is that these people, when planning to migrate, invested in the country-specific human capital of the receiving economy.

they have a strong incentive to realise the returns on their pre-migration expenses. In the light of the new migration opportunities that became available in EU partnership countries, the identification of policy implications for sending and receiving countries are highly relevant. While sending countries might enjoy labour market and skill improvements, detrimental effects relate to demographic and social costs. Receiving countries, particularly the EU, need policy concepts that attract skilled migrants and support the transferability of their skills.

The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: The first section describes migration experiences in the East EU border region, while the second introduces the survey data and the methodology employed. The analysis of migrants' destination choices and migration duration are reported in the third and fourth sections, respectively. The fifth section concludes with policy implications for both sending and receiving countries.

6.1 Between Russia and the West: Migration Experiences in the EU's Eastern Border Region

All post-Soviet countries in the East EU border region experienced common economic and social transition challenges after becoming independent in 1991. This resulted in job losses, increasing social inequality, growing poverty, a breakdown of social security systems, and market failures. Nevertheless, despite having a shared Soviet institutional heritage,² the economic and political development paths of these countries were diverse (EBRD 2007). In the mid-2000s, the time period of our empirical analysis, the economic and political systems of Belarus were closely intertwined with Russia through the Eurasian Economic Community, and its relations with the EU were tense. Armenia's key economic sectors were controlled by Russian investors, but the country also received support from economic and political initiatives originating in the EU. Moldova

²This includes the widespread use of the Russian language, though all the countries in the region replaced the former official language of Russian with their own national languages.

tried to balance the influences of Russia and the EU, whereas Georgia saw Russia as the chief threat to its security and territorial integrity, and intended to integrate with the West. Ukraine entertained economic and political relations with Russia and the EU, whereby economic interrelations with Russia were stronger in the eastern than in the western part of the country.

After independence, most post-Soviet states abolished the emigration barriers that had long prevented the free movement of people. Initially, this triggered the return of ethnic minority populations to their ethno-national homelands, most of them located within the former USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). Since the end of the 1990s, migration flows in the region have become economically motivated, and diversifying with respect to destinations. While Russia is the preferred destination for labour migrants, the numbers of people leaving for the EU and other countries grew (Chudinovskikh 2012; Mansoor and Quillin 2006). In many cases, recent labour migrants move temporarily and often do not have work permits in the destination country (Chudinovskikh 2012; León-Ledesma and Piracha 2004; Mansoor and Quillin 2006). Because of serious under- and misreporting in official statistics these new migration trends are difficult to quantify (Mkrtchyan 2012). Official data assess the total emigration from Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine as being below 100,000 persons per year in the early 2000s, while (rough) estimates suggest numbers of between 3.5 and 4.2 million (Ivakhnyuk 2006).

Since the mid-2000s, temporary labour migration in the East EU border region can be understood against the background of its geographical location and its economic situation. A comparison of GDP per capita in Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia and Georgia with corresponding income data in Russia and in the EU reveals substantial differences in living standards. On average, Russia is three times richer than these post-Soviet countries, and the EU-27 is on average five times better off.³ While Russia is comparatively close in terms of geographical, institu-

³ GDP per capita data relate to 2005 (World Bank, World Development Indicators, available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>; accessed 7 May 2015). It has to be considered that economic disparities within the countries of the EU are huge.

tional and cultural distance, and does not require any entry permit, the bureaucratic, information and travel costs of entering the EU and other Western countries are considerably higher for temporary labour migrants from post-Soviet countries in the East EU border region.

6.2 Survey Data and Methodology

This chapter makes use of a unique cross-country survey conducted in early 2006 with comparable survey methodology across five EU Partnership countries: Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Using a multi-stage random sample, 400 households were selected in each country and interviewed using identical questionnaires (Wallace and Vincent 2007).⁴ The survey covers information on 2000 respondents (household representatives) who were between 16 and 65 years of age. The data include individual socio-demographic characteristics of respondents (gender, age, ethnicity, education) as well as information on their households (household wealth, settlement types, number of children and elderly members of the household). In this survey, temporary migrants are respondents who went abroad at least once for work reasons for a minimum of four successive weeks between May 2004 and 2006, but returned to their country of origin after their last trip.⁵ The strength of the survey is the inclusion of unregistered migrants, as respondents were interviewed independently of the ways in which they crossed the border and found work in the receiving country. Furthermore, the survey captures the efforts of respondents to improve their chances of a successful migration into foreign labour markets. Two measures were addressed explicitly: the assistance of migration agencies before moving or planning to move, and pre-migration investment in the destination country's specific human capital requirements. To identify 'assistance by migration agencies', respondents were asked if they had 'registered with agencies providing jobs abroad' and/or 'addressed experts holding emigration

⁴The survey was financed by an EU INTAS project (INTAS Ref. No.: 04-79-7165). For more details on survey implementation, see Wallace and Vincent (2007).

⁵Note that almost all the migrants from the Eastern EU border region moved only temporarily at that time (León-Ledesma and Piracha 2004; Mansoor and Quillin 2006).

consultations' before moving or planning to move. In the case of 'pre-migration human capital investment' respondents were required to give a positive answer to the question if they had 'learnt a foreign language' and/or 'improved their qualifications' to prepare for migration (independently of whether they migrated later or not).⁶ The survey data also included information on transnational network relations of respondents at the time of the survey. Because the survey does not reveal whether these relations were already established before the period of temporary migration, this information was not used in the analysis.⁷

In the two-year observation period, 8.2 % of the respondents in our sample had worked abroad temporarily. Females, university graduates, younger (18–25 years old) and older people (over 56 years) were less likely to have participated in temporary labour migration compared to males, people between 26 and 35 years of age, and people with a secondary or lower education. Members of the titular ethnicity were more engaged in temporary migration than ethnic minorities, indicating that work-related migration is no longer supported by ethnic motivation. Moldova stands out as the country with the highest incidence of temporary labour migration (13.5 %), followed by Ukraine (11.8 %), Belarus (10.8 %), Armenia (3.3 %), and Georgia (1.7 %). Among temporary migrants, 14.6 % had taken steps to improve their chances to migrate successfully into foreign labour markets (see more details in Danzer and Dietz 2015): 3.7 % relied on the assistance of migration agencies, and 14.0 % invested in the improvement of their human capital. Interestingly, women are twice as likely as men to have invested in their human capital before leaving their home country. The gender gap in the use of migration agencies is even larger: while only 1.1 % of men said they used such a service, women were five times more likely to do so. Since female migrants tended to be better educated than male movers, these figures seem to reflect gender specific occupational differences in labour demand rather than the human capital catch-up of women.

⁶ Because of the widespread Russian language competence in post-Soviet countries, Russian did not count as a foreign language.

⁷ In other words, we cannot rule out that networks developed as a result of migration.

To analyse the choice of migration destinations, we estimate a multinomial probit regression which reports the determinants of either migrating to the enlarged EU, to Russia, or to an overseas destination,⁸ or not to migrate at all. We report the relative marginal effects for different demographic characteristics as well as two possible investment strategies (agency versus human capital). Note that these marginal effects sum to zero across destinations. The model hypothesises that gender, age, marital status, education, assistance by migration agencies, and pre-migration human capital investments have an impact on migration and the selection of destination regions. To explore the determinants of migration duration (measured in months), a negative binomial regression model for over-dispersed count data is used. The migration duration in our sample ranges between zero and 39 months. Explanatory variables are gender, age, marital status, education, the assistance by migration agencies, pre-migration investment in human capital, plus a number of household-related characteristics, such as household size, settlement type and number of children and elderly people in the household. As males and females are expected to differ significantly with respect to the length of stay abroad, the regression model on migration duration was also estimated separately for males and females.

6.3 Destination Patterns of Temporary Migrants

In the following, we investigate how individual characteristics (gender, age, marital status and education) of temporary migrants are related to the choice of destination countries.⁹ Furthermore, we explore the role played by migration agencies and by pre-migration investment in human capital when selecting a particular migration destination. This analysis is

⁸Overseas destinations include: the USA, Canada, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Israel and Japan. We prefer the multinomial probit model as it slightly relaxes the IIA assumption of the logistic model. However, the multinomial logit model produces an identical result.

⁹In this paper, we do not analyse sending country specific differences with respect to socio-demographic characteristics. See Wallace and Vincent (2007) and Danzer and Dietz (2014) for a discussion of these issues.

based on job search and labour migration models (Roy 1951; Sjaastad 1962), which argue that workers move to those destinations where their human capital (minus migration costs) will receive the highest returns. In a foreign labour market, wages depend crucially on the transfer of human capital and on destination-country-specific skills (language competency and job qualifications). Nevertheless, often only low-skilled labour market sectors in receiving economies are open to immigrants.

According to the results of our survey, 74.2 % of temporary migrants from the five EU Partnership countries go to Russia, while 20.4 % move to the EU and 5.4 % head towards overseas destinations. Table 6.1 shows the determinants of destination choices. In our context, the core interest lies in the comparison of the two main destinations for post-Soviet migrants from the EU border region: Russia and the EU. It turns out that gender, age and education exert a strong influence on destination choice. While women are significantly more likely to migrate to EU countries than men, the opposite is the case for Russia. The high demand for labour migrants doing heavy manual work in Russia as compared to the need for household and care services in many EU countries are an explanation for this (see Tishkov et al. 2005).¹⁰ Russia tends to attract older migrants, while for EU countries age has a smaller, but negative, impact. The p of older migrants for Russia certainly reflects traditional Soviet Union ties and Russian language proficiency among older age cohorts in post-Soviet countries. Being married significantly reduces the propensity to move to a European destination, but has a positive impact on going to Russia. This might be connected to Russia's lower geographical distance and greater cultural proximity, making returns easy. Lower education exerts a very strong and positive influence on selecting Russia as the migration destination, while university education plays a discouraging role in the choice of this country. While a similar pattern can be observed for temporary migrants to EU countries, the effect is much smaller. Only in the case of overseas destinations is a university education a supportive factor. These destination choices have to be assessed in the light of a negative selectivity of migrants in general, i.e. the highly educated individuals in our sample

¹⁰According to Tishkov et al. (2005: 27) migrants in Russia work mainly in construction, transport, forestry and trade.

Table 6.1 Multinomial probit regression of migration destination; adults aged 16–65

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent variable (Destination)	Russia	Europe	Overseas	No migration
Migration agencies	0.066*** (0.019)	−0.000 (0.005)	0.005* (0.003)	−0.071*** (0.019)
Human capital investment	−0.009 (0.010)	0.072*** (0.008)	0.025*** (0.005)	−0.088*** (0.013)
Female	−0.069*** (0.008)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.001 (0.001)	0.059*** (0.008)
Age	0.010*** (0.002)	−0.003*** (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	−0.007*** (0.002)
Age squared	−0.015*** (0.003)	0.005*** (0.001)	−0.001 (0.000)	0.011*** (0.003)
Married	0.020*** (0.007)	−0.013*** (0.004)	−0.003** (0.001)	−0.004 (0.008)
Lower education	0.072*** (0.019)	0.016* (0.009)	0.012** (0.006)	−0.100*** (0.021)
University degree	−0.037*** (0.007)	−0.021*** (0.003)	0.002* (0.001)	0.056*** (0.008)
Observations	2000	2000	2000	2000

Notes: McFadden's R-squared 0.075. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Source: INTAS data set; authors' calculations.

are generally the least likely to move abroad because their education does not pay off there (Danzer and Dietz 2014). Thus fears of a brain drain that have occasionally been expressed by sending countries' officials, are not confirmed by the data.

The analysis of supportive activities undertaken by prospective migrants to improve their access to foreign labour markets reveals some important findings. First, individuals who had invested in an agency or in the upgrading of human capital are significantly less likely to stay in the home country, reflecting the fact that investments are only undertaken by individuals with a strong tendency to work abroad. While assistance by migration agencies has a significant and positive impact on moving to Russia, it does not influence the propensity to enter the EU. In contrast,

pre-migration investment in human capital strongly supports the selection of EU or overseas destinations, but does not play a role in choosing Russia. These findings are in line with the results indicated by the demographic characteristics of temporary migrants. Russia attracts the lowest-educated, who expect to profit from comparatively higher wages in this destination, and with relatively low costs of moving. Migration agencies are in this context typically used to arrange foreign travel and jobs. Temporary migrants attracted by EU and overseas destinations can expect higher wages but face higher migration costs and greater human capital requirements to overcome labour market barriers. We find that the comparatively better educated choose these destinations. To overcome some of the human capital loss involved in migration to the EU or to overseas countries, these migrants are inclined to invest in destination-country-specific qualifications before moving. In the choice of destination regions, temporary migrants from the five post-Soviet countries employ different support strategies. While those who go to Russia are more likely to rely on migration agencies, those who go to EU and overseas destinations tend to build up human capital before migrating, to improve the transferability of their human capital.

6.4 Duration of Migration Episodes

Below we investigate migration durations and the factors associated with the length of stay. The average migration episode lasted for 4.5 months, ranging between 3 months (Russia) and 9 months (EU); on average, women were abroad for 4.8 months and hence 0.7 months longer than men. The determinants of migration duration are reported in Table 6.2. Armenians, Georgians and Belarusians stayed away from home for a significantly shorter period than did the Ukrainian comparison group. Older and lower-educated individuals migrated for longer time periods. Household size, small children and elderly members in the household, coming from a rural area, belonging to the titular nationality and living in the capital city have no effect on the duration of migration (coefficients not reported in Table 6.2). Migrants who had used migration agencies or had invested in human capital extended the duration of their

Table 6.2 Negative binomial regressions, full sample; adults aged 16–65

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dependent variable (Duration of migration, months)	Full sample	Male	Female
Migration agencies	1.019** (0.410)	−0.156 (1.191)	1.311*** (0.428)
Human capital investment	1.638*** (0.284)	2.355*** (0.392)	1.269*** (0.314)
Female	−0.043 (0.258)		
Age	0.150** (0.071)	0.125 (0.108)	0.107 (0.096)
Age squared	−0.208** (0.096)	−0.182 (0.145)	−0.148 (0.128)
Lower education	0.924** (0.445)	−0.599 (0.823)	1.481*** (0.528)
University degree	0.112 (0.313)	0.451 (0.420)	−0.025 (0.360)
Belarus	−0.834** (0.352)	−0.803 (0.590)	−1.010** (0.453)
Moldova	−0.102 (0.322)	−0.071 (0.554)	−0.546 (0.411)
Georgia	−2.963*** (0.458)	−3.821*** (0.740)	−2.940*** (0.539)
Armenia	−1.661*** (0.443)	−3.247*** (0.704)	−1.574*** (0.505)
McFadden's R-squared	0.074	0.100	0.066
Observations	2000	730	1270

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions control for ethnicity, settlement type, household size, presence of children, presence of elderly people (all insignificant). * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Source: INTAS data set; authors' calculations.

stay significantly. This result could be explained by individuals' desire to realise the returns for their pre-migration expenses.

Splitting the sample by gender reveals some differences between men and women, for example, with respect to the link between lower education and duration, which is only significant for women. This indicates that low-skilled women who usually work in very low-paid household

services and care have to stay abroad for longer to make their migration worthwhile. An interesting pattern arises for the impact of migration agencies and pre-migration human capital investment on the duration of stays. While pre-migration human capital investment increases the length of stay abroad for males and females, assistance from migration agencies prolongs the migration duration only for women. Potentially, women incurred higher expenses in using migration agencies, which forced them to work abroad for longer to reach the 'break-even' of pre-migration investment.

6.5 Summary and Policy Implications

Temporary migration from the post-Soviet countries that border the enlarged EU has grown since the mid-2000s. While Russia remains the main destination, the EU and overseas destinations are increasingly selected. An analysis of migrants' destination choices shows that gender, age and education play a prominent role. While men, older and lower-educated people prefer Russia, women, younger and better-educated individuals have a stronger preference to move to the EU and overseas destinations. Migration agencies and pre-migration human capital investment exert a strong influence on destination choice: Russia attracts those who were assisted by migration agencies but did not improve their qualifications before moving. In contrast, the assistance of migration agencies plays a minor role in the context of the EU; yet individuals moving to the EU were more likely to invest in their human capital before going abroad. Pre-migration investment in human capital accounts for longer migration stays, while the support of migration agencies is associated with longer migration stays for women. Considering returns to investment, it seems plausible that greater pre-migration expenses are associated with longer stays abroad.

Several policy implications for the countries of origin and destination can be drawn from our analysis. Fears of a brain drain in Eastern EU Partnership countries have not been substantiated in our data. Migrants are in most cases low- or medium-educated; yet many upgrade their

human capital before going abroad in order to access higher-income countries. Such pre-migration investment in human capital may yield a social dividend. Not only will migrants who improve their qualifications earn higher incomes abroad, but their origin countries can benefit from their improved skills after their return. Furthermore, better migration prospects might encourage individuals at home to invest in qualifications and skills (brain gain). Migrants who return from Western countries may also import improved skills and qualifications. The major drawback for sending countries lies in the demographic costs of labour migration and the potential social problems in families. Welfare policy in sending countries has to consider detrimental effects such as the growing numbers of 'social orphans', as already noted in Moldova and Ukraine in recent years (Cantarji and Mincu 2013; Coupé and Vakhitova 2013).

For the EU, two major implications are apparent: many migrants from Eastern Partnership countries invest in their human capital before moving to the EU in order to reap benefits in the labour market. Against this background, permanent immigration and social benefit abuse seem to be subordinate objectives. Nevertheless, the educational backgrounds of temporary migrants entering the EU is comparatively low, even after taking into account any pre-migration human capital investments. While this offers the opportunity to target Eastern European migrants with medium skills for specific occupations that have chronic labour shortages, the far better educated migrants from the same region chose overseas destinations (Danzer and Dietz 2014). Potential reasons for the EU's failure to attract the most highly qualified workers may be the strict visa regulations in the EU, high administrative labour market barriers, the low transferability of qualifications and skills, and the reluctance to accept educational certificates and skills by EU member states. Accordingly, a forward-looking EU migration policy towards Eastern Partnership countries might strengthen screening procedures with respect to the recognition of foreign certificates and qualification profiles, support the efforts of migrants to improve their skills and qualifications before moving, and relax entrance and labour market barriers in accordance with specified qualification criteria.

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7

Measuring Return Migration: The Example of Eastern German Labour Return from Western Germany

Robert Nadler

The study of return migration emerged as a sub-theme of migration studies since the early *Laws of Migration* were formulated by Ernst Georg Ravenstein (1885/1889). In one of his laws, he explicitly formulates that every migration flow generates a respective counter-flow (Ravenstein 1885, p. 199). Ravenstein observed that these counter-flows are smaller than the original ones, but also acknowledged that it is unclear whether these counter-flows are composed of returning migrants or other groups. This issue is still debated today. While we have been studying return migration for decades, we in fact do not know much about the actual numbers and the geographical distribution of return migration flows. As Dumont and Spielvogel (2008, p. 162) comment: ‘While return migration is a major component of migratory flows, our knowledge of it is still fragmentary.’ Here, they refer to the ‘absence of suitable data’. Similarly, Dustmann and Weiss (2007, p. 239) remark: ‘One difficulty

R. Nadler (✉)

Regional Geography of Europe, Leibniz-Institut für Länderkunde,
Leipzig, Germany

with return migration is its measurement. While many countries have registration procedures in place that allow assessment of the number of incoming immigrants, estimation of outflows of immigrants is less straightforward. There are typically no procedures in place that register immigrants who leave a country.' While Dustmann and Weiss refer to the perspective of receiving countries, this problem also affects the sending countries, whose existing procedures are not adapted sufficiently to keep track of return migration. From the home country's perspective, an approach to the measurement of return migration consists in registering the immigration of fellow nationals. Yet this approach might lead to measurement errors, such as the inclusion of first-time immigrants, who were naturalised while they were abroad. Additionally, what is lacking is a standard definition of return, which could help in implementing better registration procedures (Smoliner et al. 2013). Because of these shortcomings, the study of return migration is often limited to small, qualitative case studies or estimations in the frame of broader quantitative studies. As a consequence, it is nearly impossible to find representative studies focusing on regional differentiation at the sub-national level.

Even though information about return migration is limited because there is insufficient data available, scholars so far have concluded that returning migrants display strong potential for their home countries' regional development (Black and Gent 2004; Nicholson 2004; Williams and Baláž 2005; Iara 2006; Cassarino 2008; De Haas 2010; Schmithals 2010). They are thought of as knowledge brokers, enhancing institutional change and bringing in new skills from abroad (Iredale and Guo 2001; Klagge and Klein-Hitpaß 2007; Klein-Hitpaß in this volume). This positive association with regional development opportunities attracted the attention of policy-makers and business representatives in the countries of origin (Kovács et al. 2013; Boros and Hegedűs in this volume). By implementing measures to attract returning migrants, they hope to compensate for the brain drain caused by former periods of emigration. In the European context, mainly the post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe have experienced massive emigration and now lack skilled labour. Additionally, emigration has accelerated demographic change in these regions: rapid ageing and shrinking of the population is a major challenge to these countries.

In this chapter, I present an innovative method for the measurement of return migration. In collaboration with the German Institute for Employment Research (*Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung*), I analysed for the first time the regional distribution of return migration in the specific case of Eastern Germany. Since 1999, the analysed Employment History Dataset has contained the migration biographies of all German workers who are subject to social security contributions, which allows us to observe the return of Eastern German workers to their home region. In the first section below I present a brief description of the migration trends during the post-socialist period in Eastern Germany. In the second section I then introduce the methodology and the dataset used, before presenting in the third section the main findings on the geographical distribution and longitudinal changes of return migration patterns to Eastern Germany. In the fourth section I will draw some conclusions for future research on return migration.

7.1 Migration from/to Eastern Germany

The post-socialist transition path taken by Eastern Germany is an exception within Central and Eastern Europe (Stephan 1999). While neighbouring countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic had to deal with this transition on their own, Eastern Germany was able to rely on massive financial transfers from Western Germany (Dornbusch and Wolf 1992; Lenk and Kuntze 2010). Furthermore, there was no need to develop and implement new institutional structures and legal systems. With reunification, structures and systems from Western Germany were simply reproduced in Eastern Germany (Hall and Ludwig 1994; Carlin 2010). Finally, there are no legal or linguistic barriers to labour mobility between East and West within the country. Yet Germany remains divided economically. Economic structures and labour markets were severely disrupted in Eastern Germany (Postlep 2004), and mass unemployment affected large parts of the Eastern German population throughout the 1990s (Hunt 2004). Even today, long-term unemployment remains an issue in many Eastern German regions. Such historical specificities engendered a massive movement of people between a restructuring Eastern and

a prosperous Western Germany (Friedrich and Schultz 2007). In this context, heavy emigration and long-term negative migration balances have led to a rapid decline of the Eastern German population. As a result, interest in stabilising population figures through political intervention has increased in recent years, notably following opportunities generated by return migration.

Analysing statistical data on migration in Germany (see Table 7.1) it is obvious that Eastern Germany has lost population massively through emigration towards Western Germany ever since the Berlin Wall fell. In the aftermath of the reunification, in the year 1991 alone, about 230,000 people moved towards Western Germany, accounting for 1.6 % of the resident population of the Eastern German *Länder* by that time. During this first

Table 7.1 Emigration from and immigration to Eastern Germany (excluding Berlin), 1990–2011

Year	Emigration from Eastern Germany to Western Germany	Immigration from Western Germany to Eastern Germany	Migration balance
1990	46,268	8,898	-37,370
1991	229,210	63,800	-165,410
1992	175,868	89,781	-86,087
1993	142,952	87,373	-55,579
1994	129,935	95,441	-34,494
1995	129,948	98,056	-31,892
1996	125,546	100,617	-24,929
1997	124,885	96,683	-28,202
1998	136,067	89,802	-46,265
1999	148,648	90,514	-58,134
2000	168,167	92,216	-75,951
2001	191,979	94,414	-97,565
2002	176,703	95,876	-80,827
2003	155,387	97,035	-58,352
2004	146,352	94,677	-51,675
2005	137,188	88,212	-48,976
2006	135,979	81,835	-54,144
2007	138,133	83,328	-54,805
2008	136,544	85,536	-51,008
2009	120,461	88,142	-32,319
2010	110,956	87,377	-23,579
2011	113,465	91,879	-21,586

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 1992–1996, 2009, 2013; own calculations.

peak of emigration, it was mainly families and adult individuals who had left, seeking a better life in Western Germany (Heiland 2004). Throughout the 1990s, emigration from Eastern to Western Germany decreased, while immigration from Western to Eastern Germany increased up to 1996. By that time, many Western German managers and professionals had settled in Eastern Germany. They contributed towards replacing the socialist elite and to building up the organisational structure necessary to integrate Eastern Germany into the capitalist regime (see Dyck 1997).

In the early 2000s, there was another peak of emigration from Eastern to Western Germany, which was accompanied by a decrease in immigration from Western Germany. In the year 2001, roughly 190,000 people moved from Eastern to Western Germany (1.4 % of the resident population). This second peak of emigration can be linked to two factors. First, the strong birth cohorts born around 1980 graduated from schools and a large number of them moved to Western Germany for professional training or study purposes (Melzer 2011). Second, the restructuring process of the Eastern German economy is continuing, including struggles to establish a competitive service sector. This has caused mass unemployment and the subsequent emigration of young and skilled labour (Heiland 2004; Kröhnert 2010).

After this last peak of emigration, the numbers of emigrants gradually decreased again to little more than 100,000 per year in 2010/11. At the same time, immigration from Western to Eastern Germany increased slightly. The overall migration balance is still negative for Eastern Germany, but it has recovered significantly after the two emigration peaks in 1991 and 2001.

However, the main problem Eastern German regions are facing is the uneven recovery of regional migration balances. Urban agglomerations such as Leipzig, Dresden or Potsdam are able to attract young people from all over Germany and even have positive migration balances, benefiting from their attractiveness as university cities. In contrast, rural regions remain affected by severe migration-related population decline. Along with low fertility rates and rapid ageing, these sustained migration outflows constrain the rural employers' supply of young and skilled workers, a problem that is much discussed in current debates on demographic change in Eastern Germany (Arent and Nagl 2010).

The great question is how Eastern German rural regions can attract new (young) inhabitants to help to maintain the social vitality of communities and the economic prosperity of local businesses. The presented migration patterns within Germany lead to the assumption that rural Eastern Germany is less attractive to young Germans than flourishing cities with a vibrant cultural scene, educational offers and decent job opportunities. At the same time, international immigrants also favour large urban agglomerations (with high social diversity) and prosperous regions.

Who would potentially be willing to move to rural Eastern Germany to reduce the negative outcomes of demographic change? Here, policy-makers, regional planners and public officers in Eastern Germany have been counting on (potentially) returning Eastern Germans to tackle the problem (Schultz 2004). This target group has attracted the attention of decision-makers since the mid-2000s (Dienel et al. 2006). A great variety of policy initiatives have begun to develop measures in order to re-attract Eastern Germans back from Western Germany (Thüsing 2012; Schiemenz 2011). However, these initiatives are based on poor empirical knowledge about the target groups. Up to the present time, it is unclear how return migration flows are developing, and which regions in Eastern Germany can actually benefit from return migration. Furthermore, communication on return initiatives is insufficient because knowledge about potential host regions in Western Germany is limited. Detailed knowledge about host regions would be necessary to better address potential return migrants and stimulate return migration flows.

7.2 Innovating in the Study of Return Migration

The main problem in return migration studies is that scientific knowledge about returning migrants is scarce because they are not 'visible' in official registers. In Germany, migration flows are registered based on migrants' declarations of their main or secondary residence. The procedure implies that only the former place of residence is registered on arrival in a new municipality, but other previous places of residence are not included.

Hence, it is impossible to track personal migration paths among such registers.

Recent attempts to analyse regional phenomena of return migration were based on case studies involving small samples, which cannot be considered to represent the population of Eastern German return migrants. Furthermore, socio-economic information characterising the population of return migrants is simply unavailable. Most studies dealing with return migration rely on survey data (examples for international case studies: Jauhiainen 2009; Stockdale 2006; Von Reichert et al. 2011; for case studies in Eastern Germany: Jain and Schmithals 2009; Matuschewski 2010; Scheffel 2012). The advantage of such data is that it provides very detailed information about the interviewees. However, since this enterprise is very time- and resource-consuming, the data is often limited to a specific geographic area and/or derived from a restricted number of observations. As such, generalisation to the situation of other regions is impossible.

Another approach consists in making use of representative population surveys (such as the European Labour Force Survey or Germany's Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); see Smoliner et al. 2013). In these surveys, migration biographies can be reconstructed, allowing for the identification of return migrants. However, these datasets cannot be used to study regional differentiations characterising return migration flows, because the size of these samples is considerably reduced when limiting the analysis to return migrants. At first glance, the GSOEP fulfils relevant criteria for the study of return migration: it is a survey with comprehensive personal and household information and its samples are large. Some studies about return migration to Eastern Germany were actually conducted based on GSOEP data (Beck 2004; Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln 2009). Yet, while the definition of a returnee in these studies is quite broad—it includes everybody migrating from Eastern to Western Germany and then going back to Eastern Germany (including Berlin)—the number of observations made is rather small.

At this point, I want to introduce the Employment History Data (*Beschäftigtenhistorik—BeH*) of the Institute for Employment Research (*Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung—IAB*) as an innovative solution to the problem of data availability (see FDZ 2015). This data set is based on the administrative register of the German Federal Employment

Agency (*Bundesagentur für Arbeit*). *BeH* data has already been used to analyse labour mobility (Buch et al. 2011; Arntz et al. 2011; Lehmer and Ludsteck 2011), but to my knowledge it had not yet been used for studies on return migration. The Institute for Employment Research generates the *BeH* dataset from social security notifications sent by employers in Germany. It contains individual information on all the employees in Germany subject to social security contributions. Hence, *BeH* data, while containing less information about the observed individuals than survey data and being restricted to employees only, best fits the requirements for a representative study on return migration flows.

From a spatial sciences' perspective, *BeH* data is interesting because it contains information regarding the registered individuals' former and current places of employment and, since 1999, also the places of residence. Thanks to this information, individual migration biographies can be reconstructed. Since the *BeH* dataset contains information on all employees subject to social security contributions, the number of cases to be observed is high. This allows for greater representativity and enables us to both analyse disparities among regions and establish connections between sources and destinations of return migration flows. As such, the *BeH* dataset represents a valuable source of information for all questions related to territorial planning.

However, there is another side to the coin. A general problem pertains to the limitation of the observation to employees subject to social security contributions. This group accounts for about 30 million people, representing roughly 56 % of the working age population. Yet it is impossible to draw conclusions on the pool of people who are not employed according to the same scheme (for example, state officers, soldiers, those who are self-employed). Furthermore, younger generations (before their first employment) and retired people are excluded from the observations. The observation is also restricted to employees working in Germany. Thus the *BeH* data is blind to cross-border commuters; that is, people living in Germany but working abroad. Finally, employees who are temporarily unemployed or under-employed on limited contracts, are not subject to social security contributions. Therefore the *BeH* dataset contains registration gaps, including a lack of information on geographic variables for the respective periods of non-standard employment.

To conclude, the *BeH* dataset is an appropriate and valuable tool for the observation of labour mobility within Germany, but it does not allow for a comprehensive coverage of the total population's mobility. On a practical note, the use of the dataset is also limited by the fact that because of the existence of data security and protection safeguards, data cannot be processed outside the *IAB*'s facilities. As a result, data analyses are only made possible through collaboration with *IAB* research groups.

7.3 Results: How Many Eastern Germans Return? And Where Do They Go?

In collaboration with my colleague Mirko Wesling at *IAB* Saxony, I analysed the *BeH* dataset, focusing on the specific case of return migration of Eastern German workers from the Western German labour market (Nadler and Wesling 2013). We used data from 2012, which includes information on residential mobility for the years 1999–2010. Residential mobility was observed at the NUTS-3 level (German *Landkreise/kreisfreie Städte*). Eastern German workers were defined as those whose first employment after reunification (since 1992, when registration started)—corresponding to their first federal social security registration—had been observed in Eastern Germany. By definition, 'emigrating' Eastern German workers had relocated their place of residence at least once since 1999 from Eastern to Western Germany. 'Returning' Eastern German workers had moved back to their last NUTS-3 region of residence in Eastern Germany since 2000. We then calculated emigration rates based on the relationship between the emigrating workers and the non-mobile ones; correspondingly, return rates indicate the share of returning workers among the total emigrant workers' population.

We differentiated two 5-year periods in order to expose dynamics in return flows across time. Period one counted all returns that occurred in the years 2000–2005; period two referred to returns that occurred between 2006 and 2010. Comparing the two periods, we found that return rates increased in 71 out of 76 counties. The average return rate to Eastern German counties was 5.8 % in 2000–2005, and increased to 8.5 % in 2006–2010. At the same time, the average emigration rate from

Eastern German counties decreased from 2.5 % to 1.5 %. As such, the increase in return rates does not necessarily imply an absolute increase in the number of return migrants in each of the observed regions. When the volume of emigrants shrank more rapidly than the volume of return migrants, this also led to an increase in return rates. Still, it is interesting to note that return rates have increased in nearly all regions.

While a general trend of increased return of Eastern German workers to their Eastern German home regions can be established, not all counties have benefited in the same way. Return rates are higher in those regions located in proximity to Western German *Länder*, such as counties in Thuringia and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, where return rates between 2006 and 2010 exceeded 11 %. The Thuringian county of Eichsfeld recorded a return rate high of 18.6 %. In contrast, counties surrounding the Berlin capital region neither experienced strong emigration to nor strong return migration from Western German regions as workers here tend to commute to Berlin's labour market. Return rates of <5 % were observed only for the city of Frankfurt/Oder on the German-Polish border (representing the minimum value of 3.6 %) and for the city of Jena. Also, other large cities (*kreisfreie Städte*) in Eastern Germany such as Suhl, Gera, Cottbus, Schwerin, Halle/Saale, Rostock or Magdeburg benefit very little from return migration as they exhibit return rates of below 7 %. Furthermore, these cities have comparably strong emigration rates.

At first glance, these findings seem counter-intuitive. Migration studies have demonstrated that large cities are hubs for major migration flows. They are the ties of migration networks. As such, they are characterised by strong volumes of both inflow and outflow (Sassen 1991; Favell 2008; Saunders 2011). However, our data shows that this is not the case for return migration flows in Eastern German cities. Here, emigration rates are higher than in rural regions, but the inflow of return migrants is smaller than in rural regions. When applying the BBSR (2013) structural typology of regions, we can see that 72 % of returning Eastern Germans moved back to a rural region, while only 61 % of all incoming internal and international migrants chose rural destinations.

A second curiosity arises here. Intuitively, it seems unlikely for return rates to be higher in those regions that are located close to Western German labour markets. Our empirical data show that emigration occurs

less often from these regions, most probably because workers there have the (spatial) opportunity to commute to the Western German labour markets. As such, one would expect that those few who made the final decision to emigrate were strongly determined to do so. If the decision to move to Western Germany was purely job-motivated, commuting to Western Germany would also have been an option—something that was not feasible for Eastern Germans residing in more peripheral locations—for example, those living along the German-Polish border.

Table 7.2 shows the average return rates when grouping Eastern German counties into quartiles according to their return rate in the period 2006–2010. Obviously, counties of the first quartile also exhibited the highest return rates in the previous period between 2000 and 2005. They also experienced stronger increases in return rates between the two periods and attract more long-term returnees who emigrated between 2000 and 2005 and returned between 2006 and 2010.

Considering the composition of those regions displaying the highest return rates in the latter period, it is striking that return rates growing the most rapidly are often found in regions that had average or below-average return rates in the early period (2001–2005). These regions are located further from Western Germany; namely, Southern Saxony-Anhalt, Northern Saxony-Anhalt and Brandenburg, Central and Eastern Thuringia, and Saxony. Furthermore, one can see that large cities in Eastern Germany exhibit lower return rates for both observation periods; and that their return rates did not increase as fast as those of rural regions (with large cities being represented mainly in the 4th quartile).

As mentioned above, another advantage of the *BeH* dataset is that it allows us to link the origin to the destination regions of (return)

Table 7.2 Return rates in longitudinal perspective, 2006–2010

	Average return rate 2000–2005 in %	Average return rate 2006–2010 in %	Average increase in percentage points	Average return rate (long term) in %
1st quartile	7.9	11.2	3.3	4.0
2nd quartile	6.5	9.1	2.6	3.5
3rd quartile	5.9	8.1	2.2	3.1
4th quartile	4.2	6.1	1.9	2.4

Source: IAB *Beschäftigtenhistorik* 2012; author's own calculations

migration flows. To improve overall readability, we enlarged the definition of returning migrants for Fig. 7.1, counting returns of emigrants to their respective *Bundesland*. We also expanded the observation period to cover the full decade of 2000–2010. In total, about 16,200 Eastern German workers returned to their *Länder*. This corresponds to 9.7 % of all emigrant workers (this time also including returnees who moved to a different county within the same *Land*). Obviously, return flows are stronger between geographically proximate *Bundesländer* in Eastern and Western Germany. Major flows of return migration were observed between Bavaria and neighbouring Thuringia and Saxony. Saxony-Anhalt received the largest return flow from neighbouring Lower Saxony. Similarly, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania’s main return flow originated from neighbouring Schleswig-Holstein.




Fig. 7.1 Main flows of return migration to Eastern Germany




Fig. 7.1 Continued

As the *BeH* dataset contains information on the place of work, we also analysed the numbers of return migrants still working in Western Germany after having moved back to Eastern Germany. In fact, these commuters account for more than a third among all returning migrants in most of the counties along the former inner-German border, where the return rates were also higher. In contrast, counties distant from Western Germany (around Berlin and along the Polish-German border) are characterised by both lower return rates and lower numbers of commuters. In the latter case, less than a quarter of return migrants commute to Western German labour markets. These differences highlight that geographical proximity to Western Germany can be a conducive precondition for return migration towards Eastern Germany, because return migrants can avoid the difficulties in finding appropriate employment in a struggling Eastern German economy by commuting to more attractive jobs in Western Germany. In the light of this finding, I would argue that return migration is only adding a limited part of the supply of young, skilled workers to the Eastern German economy, which is lacking labour. At the same time, current return flows can have a positive impact regarding the challenges associated with demographic change, because these return migrants represent new consumers (of vacant buildings, private services, public infrastructures and so on) and—as we observed among employees—they are not dependent on social benefits.

7.4 Conclusion

This chapter introduced an innovative approach to the study of return migration, which relied on the usage of an administrative dataset. Central findings included the observation that return migration of Eastern German workers from Western to Eastern Germany increased between 2000 and 2010. We discovered that return flows are not equally distributed spatially. Differences in the regional distribution of return migration partly can be explained by the geographical proximity to Western German labour markets, with many returning Eastern German workers moving back to live in Eastern Germany while continuing to work in Western Germany. As such, return migration can be considered an

important driver of commuting practices, encouraging the emergence of new mobility patterns. An open question addressing the specific case of inner-German return migration remains: How is it that large cities have such low return rates?

As well as the observation of return migration, this data set could prove useful for all spatially-related research questions seeking to study reverse-orientated flows of people; for example, such as the processes of reurbanisation (Brake and Herfert 2012), and counter-urbanisation and the return to rural areas (Paniagua 2002; Phillips 2005; Schmid 2005; Jentsch and Simard 2009). Furthermore, such types of data sets can be used to study multilocality and commuting (Weichhart 2015), and could generate new findings regarding mobility-related spatial partnerships between regions (Dienel 2009). The limitation of the dataset obviously pertains to its focus solely on inner-German movements. However, the presentation of this pilot study could promote the value of such types of databases in general. I hope that researchers dealing with other countries might feel motivated to look for similar data sets in other countries, which might provide comprehensive information on migration biographies.

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8

The Counter-Diasporic Migration of Turkish-Germans to Turkey: Gendered Narratives of Home and Belonging

Russell King and Nilay Kılınc

Among the many migration and return migration waves that ebb and flow across and in and out of Europe, there is one type of movement that is often masked by the lack of available statistics. We nominate the term *counter-diasporic migration* to connote the movement of diasporic peoples back to their homelands: normally, such ‘returning’ migrants are the descendants of the original migrants, given that the meaning of diaspora invokes a historical scattering of a population. That dispersion can be produced either by a traumatic event, such as violent ethnic or religious persecution, or it can be a voluntary or semi-voluntary phenomenon—for example, shaped by the demands of national or global capital for certain kinds of labour. The latter mechanism is what created the large-scale post-Second World War migration from Turkey to Europe, especially to (West)

R. King (✉)

Department of Geography, School of Global Studies, University of Sussex,
Brighton, UK

N. Kılınc

School of Hospitality and Tourism Management, University of Surrey,
Guildford, UK

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Germany, which has resulted in Turkish migrants and their descendants becoming the largest migrant/diaspora population in Europe.

Despite the considerable heterogeneity of the Turkish-origin population in Germany, we see them as a *labour diaspora*, following Cohen's (2008, p. 61) designation of this diasporic type as a large-scale migration in search of work which results in long-term settlement abroad combined with 'strong retention of group ties, a connection to the homeland ... and significant social exclusion'. These diasporic conditions prevail among the first-generation Turkish labour migrants in Germany, whose senses of 'home' and 'belonging' are more fixed compared to the attachments of their children—the second generation. Therefore, while we can use the term 'return' for the first generation's resettlement back in their homeland, it is problematic to use the same word for the second generation, since they are relocating to a country in which they were not born and raised, and their understanding of 'home' can become blurred.

In this chapter, we focus on the paradoxical nature of 'return' in the case of second-generation Turkish men and women born in Germany. Our epistemology follows Brubaker and Cooper (2000) in challenging 'identity' as a static, possessive property. Instead, we see identities as 'points of temporary attachment to the subject positions which discursive practices construct for us' (Hall 2000, p. 20). We explore the second generation's identity negotiations in the social spaces of the multilocal diaspora—such as family, work, school and neighbourhood. Some of these social spaces are highly gendered, others less so. Our key premise is that the second generation's gendered identities are constantly being renegotiated when incorporated within the cultural representations of different 'translocal' time-space settings (Anthias 2002).

While migration is now widely recognised as being a fundamentally gendered phenomenon (Kofman et al. 2000; Mahler and Pessar 2006; Silvey 2004), not much has been achieved in exploring return migration as gendered, and even less with regard to second-generation counter-diasporic migration (but see Christou and King 2011). Taking the Turkish-German case, we demonstrate that gender organises and structures migration to a degree that men and women have different levels of individual agency in shaping their decisions and mechanisms to return. The second generation's complicated relationship to 'home' and 'belonging' can be traced in their

gendered selves. They have been exposed to an accumulated history of gender-role norms and practices: the views of their parents as first-generation Turkish migrants; their 'German' upbringing in both their schooling and neighbourhood; and their encounters with the more gender-unequal society in Turkey in their childhood visits and when they relocate there.

By focusing on these shifting, gendered landscapes of norms, roles and practices in different diasporic and counter-diasporic translocations, our key research questions are the following. First and foremost: how are the perceptions and experiences of counter-diasporic migration gendered? Second, what types of 'return' migration take place (i.e. forced or voluntary), and what (gendered and generational) circumstances affect these? Third, what are the second generation's evolving understandings of home and belonging, and how do these affect their counter-diasporic journey? Throughout our analysis of answers to these questions, we draw on Mahler and Pessar's (2001) theoretical framing of *gendered geographies of power*, which we explain below.

The research design was built on semi-structured life-history narratives and carried out in 2012 with a non-random sample of 35 second-generation 'returnees', 26 of whom were interviewed in Istanbul, and the remainder in small towns and villages along the Black Sea coast. Istanbul was chosen as the main area of fieldwork because of the assumption that such a major metropolis would be an attractive destination for the second generation. Access to potential participants was by snowballing out from multiple entry points. The ages of the interviewees ranged from 23 to 51, and three-fifths of them were women, who were generally more responsive to being interviewed. Subject to their informed consent, the narratives were recorded, and subsequently translated and transcribed. Names and work and study places were anonymised.¹ Thematic analysis of the transcribed material was used to identify recurrent themes and patterns, enabling an analytical framework in which we could merge data-driven and theory-driven approaches to analysis and interpretation (Braun and Clarke 2006, p. 79).

The chapter unfolds as follows: First, we outline some essential background information on Turkish migration to Germany. Then we provide an overview of the main theoretical perspectives introduced above, namely 'home', 'belonging' and 'return' incorporated within 'gendered

¹ For further details on research methods, see King and Kilinç (2013, pp. 11–12).

geographies of power'. Our empirical findings are then presented under three chronological stages of counter-diaspora: childhood and socialisation in Germany; narrative themes of the actual 'return'; and the challenges, satisfactions and disappointments of life in Turkey.

8.1 The Turkish-German Case

The migration of Turks to Germany was the hallmark of the wider phenomenon of European post-Second World War labour migration, and of the transformation of the migrants from temporary labourers—'guestworkers'—into settled migrant communities (Castles et al. 1984). Turkish migrants were recruited mainly for factory work, filling the shop-floor jobs that German workers were reluctant to do. Most of the early migrant workers were men, who were given temporary contracts and housed in hostels. However, some women were also recruited, mainly to work in light industries such as electrical goods and textiles/clothing, and the number of migrant women in the workforce increased when family reunions were allowed during the later 1960s (Abadan-Unat 1976; Akgündüz 2008).

It is vital to appreciate that an important change in the socio-educational status and geographical origins of the Turkish migrants occurred over the period between 1961, when the first labour recruitment agreement was signed, and 1973, when the oil crisis caused recruitment to be halted, since this change affects how we interpret the results of our own research. In the first few years of recruitment, the migrants were mainly men in their twenties and thirties who were relatively skilled and educated compared to the average in Turkey at that time. They came mainly from Istanbul and other more developed, urbanised parts of the country. Subsequently, between the mid-1960s and 1973, the scale of migration increased and its geographical origins widened to include mainly rural areas, with the result that average educational levels of the migrants dropped markedly. According to data from the German Federal Statistics Office, 1.36 million Turkish citizens migrated to Germany for work purposes during 1961–73 (Rittersberger-Tiliç et al. 2013, p. 88). However, given the rotational nature of guestworker migration, the 'stock' of Turkish workers present in Germany at the end of this period

(around 605,000) was less than half of the total migrant entries (Abadan-Unat 2011, p. 14). Nevertheless, by 1973 Turkish migrants had become the largest foreign group in Germany, and Germany was seen as by far the principal destination for Turkish migration.

After the 'recruitment stop' in 1973, family reunions and marriage migration were the only legal means through which the growth of the Turkish population in Germany could be sustained. No new workers were recruited, apart from, of course, the many joining spouses who sought and found work, mainly in low-status manufacturing and service jobs. At this time, and despite the economic downturn triggered by the oil crisis, return migration to Turkey was an option rejected by most of the Turkish migrants in Germany, largely because the Turkish economy remained in a backward state. The rapid demographic evolution of the Turkish-origin population in Germany at this crucial juncture can be seen by comparing age and gender data across the period from 1974 to 1985: the proportion of women increased from 35.7 % to 42.3 %, and of children and young people under the age of 21 (more or less the second generation) grew from 29.6 % to 45.6 % of the total.²

Increasing political tension in Turkey, culminating in the 1980 military coup, led to a new migration, this time of political dissidents who were accepted as refugees in Germany and other European countries. Most of these refugee-migrants were educated and came from urban rather than rural locales. Migration continued through and beyond the 1980s, either via the asylum route (corresponding later to Kurds fleeing conflict in south-eastern Turkey) or clandestinely, typically travellers arriving on visitor visas and then overstaying. Since 2000, there has been a continuous decline in Turkish migration to Germany and elsewhere, largely because of strong economic development in Turkey and the fluctuating prospect of EU membership (Rittersberger-Tiliç et al. 2013, p. 91). According to the same authors (2013, p. 90), 2.5 million people of Turkish origin live in Germany today, 40 % of whom were born in the country. The Turkish-national population in Germany stands at 1.7 million, reflecting large-scale naturalisations of former Turkish citizens facilitated by recent German legislation.

² Data extracted from *Statistisches Jahrbuch* (1974–1985).

Return migration has been an ever-present feature of Turkish migration to Germany. According to Gitmez (1983), 190,000 returned in the wake of the first oil crisis and recession (1974–1977) and another 200,000 between 1978 and 1983 (second oil crisis). Then, mainly as a result of the ‘return incentive’ scheme operated by the German government, there were 310,000 returnees between the end of 1983 and 1985—these migrants were paid a bonus of approximately €5000 to relocate to Turkey (Ayhan et al. 2000). Recent data on return migration are compromised by the nationality issue. According to Rittersberger-Tiliç et al. (2013, pp. 90–92) and Pusch and Splitt (2013, p. 140), the return flow of Turkish citizens from Germany declined from an annual average of 44,000 during the 1990s to 35,000 during 2000–11. But these figures exclude returnees of Turkish origin who have German citizenship as well as those who engage in circular migration behaviour.

8.2 Gendered Perspectives on Homeland and Counter-Diasporic Migration

Here we develop the earlier introductory remarks about gendering the process of counter-diaspora and its many associated questions. What degree of agency does an individual have in shaping her or his decision and mechanism of relocation? Does the ‘return’ of the second generation have any similarity to the migration of the first generation, wholly or primarily motivated by the search for employment and a better income? Or, as one might expect from a priori reasoning, is it more an individual-scale search for ‘home’ and ‘belonging’? To probe more deeply, what provokes ‘homeland orientation’? Is it purely an emotional search for ancestral roots and a ‘place’ in the homeland where one can, indeed, feel ‘at home’ (see Christou 2006)? Does it reflect a strong sense of inward-looking ‘Turkishness’ nurtured in a strong ‘Turkish’ upbringing within the ethnic enclaves of German industrial cities? Or is it related more to a failure to fit into German society, blocked by barriers of racism and discrimination that have resulted in alienation and exclusion? Above all, and crucially for the originality of this contribution, how are the perceptions and experiences of counter-diaspora *gendered*?

While almost no attention has been paid to the Turkish-German case of counter-diaspora, there has been a recent and growing literature on second-generation ‘return’ to other European countries, especially Greece (Christou 2006; Christou and King 2006, 2011, 2014; King and Christou 2010), but also Cyprus (Teerling 2011, 2014), southern Italy (Wessendorf 2007, 2013) and Portugal (Sardinha 2011). We scan this literature to yield some more robust conceptual insights into how the ‘homeland orientation’ of the second generation can be understood, especially as a gendered phenomenon. Subsequently, in our empirical sections, we will see to what extent the Turkish-German case upholds these understandings.

Undoubtedly, the second-generation returnees are grappling with their identity—the ‘who they are’ in the ‘where they are’ (Christou 2006, p. 207). This couplet hints both at the *fluidity* of identity—it is entwined with life-stage and movement across space and cultures—and at its *placed-based* nature—for example, displaced from, or emplaced within, a site that might be considered as ‘home’. Among the multiple attempts to define the meaning of home, we find that of Rapport and Dawson (1998, p. 9) the simplest yet very insightful: Home ‘is where one best knows oneself’; where one feels one ‘belongs’. But in the migration context of the second generation who ‘return’, the notion of ‘home’ assumes huge ambivalence and complexity. For such migrants, there may indeed be a ‘homing desire’ to seek a ‘home’ in the ‘ethnic homeland’. But having once moved there, they may discover that the ancestral homeland is ‘stranger’ and ‘less homely’ than they thought it would be (see Tsuda 2003). Their affective gaze may be turned back to their birth country, which is reappraised as their true homeland. Or, over time, the disillusionment with the ancestral homeland may fade and the pragmatic necessities of surviving there may heal or at least attenuate the earlier disappointment. All these issues are, at this stage, conjectural; but, as we shall see, they resonate to various extents with our data.

In contradistinction to the complexity and elusiveness of the notion of identity, ‘belonging’—our preferred operational concept—is somewhat easier to define: it signifies an affective link to a group (marked on the basis of nationality, ethnicity or some other shared characteristic) and/or to a place (a country, region, city and so on) which might be construed

as 'home'. Hedetoft (2002) nicely exposes this relational duality of home and belonging in the following passage, but then goes straight on to problematise what appears to be a rational definitive statement with the challenge brought to bear by situations of migration and diaspora.

'Belonging' is a concrete, innocent, almost pristine notion closely interwoven with and imbricated in the notion of 'home' ... Our home is where we belong, territorially and culturally, where 'our own' country is, where our family, friends and acquaintances reside, where we have our roots, and where we long to return to when we are elsewhere in the world ... 'Home' and 'belonging', thus conceived, carry affective rather than cognitive meaning; the indicative and simplistic statement above, 'home is where we belong', really means 'home is where we feel we belong'.

...

But what happens if where we feel we belong (our 'cultural' or 'ethnic' home) does not match objective descriptions of membership (our 'political' or 'civic' home), because 'belonging' separates into its two constituent parts: 'being' in one place, and 'longing' for another?

This last question has powerful resonance for the situation of many (but not all, as we shall see) participants in our research, and for other second-generation returnees and transnationalists whose identificatory belonging is split between where they *are* and where they *want to be*, or where they *think* they want to be.

Mahler and Pessar (2001) have argued persuasively that, as migrants move through the various stages of the migration process, including return migration, they are subjected to '*gendered geographies of power*'. For example, various institutions ranging from the state to the family orchestrate migration along gender lines: the West German government's recruitment of male guestworkers for heavy factory work; the gendered rules on family reunion; or the way, within Turkish (migrant) families, that patriarchal mentalities treat boys and girls, men and women, differently. Moreover, these structures are fluid and open to possibilities of contestation and negotiation. Our empirical evidence, presented shortly, will trace through these gendered transitions across transnational space for the Turkish-German case.

The standard view of how gender empowerment interacts with migration is illustrated well in Hondagneu-Sotelo's (1994) book, *Gendered Transitions*, where she argued that the USA acts as a 'gender equaliser' for Mexican migrant women. For Turkish migrants in Germany, it might be hypothesised that a similar process operates; living in a more gender-egalitarian society and with access to paid work, Turkish-origin women gain a somewhat greater say in family life and a degree of economic independence. On the other hand, when first-generation return migration takes place, the 'pseudo-emancipation' of migrant women is exposed, as there is, to some extent, a return to the status quo ante, especially if the return is to a traditional village setting (Abadan-Unat 1977). For second-generation returnees, the situation is made more complex by their embodiment of multi-layered geographies and generational histories of gender relations, as noted earlier. Let us now follow our participants on their journeys through the shifting gendered landscape of norms, expectations, roles and practices in the different spatial settings of diaspora and counter-diaspora.

8.3 Childhood and Early Life: A German or a Turkish Upbringing?

The first moment in the second generation's counter-diasporic trajectory concerns their upbringing within a Turkish diasporic setting in Germany. It corresponds, in the interview narrative, to the opening questions in the interview regarding the participants' parents' backgrounds in Turkey and migration to Germany, and the circumstances surrounding their own upbringing in a German city or industrial town. Behind our analysis of these narratives on family background and early socialisation are two linked hypotheses outlined earlier. First, we suggested that the likelihood of return for the second generation would be greater if their upbringing was within a distinctively 'Turkish' family and neighbourhood; and second, more or less the same hypothesis but stated from a different angle, return will be more likely in cases where the second generation has failed to integrate and faces racism and discrimination. Framing this

dual question is the wider discourse of the family's relationship to Turkish culture and the issue of return to the 'homeland'. The second generation is inculcated with what Vertovec (1997) calls a 'diaspora consciousness' by virtue of them being surrounded by these 'family narratives', which are about the distinctiveness of Turkish culture and identity, and, in most cases, also about the desire to return 'home'. Sometimes this return aspiration is indeed fulfilled, in which case the 'family return' also brings the second generation back to Turkey: the particular circumstances of this type of return are dealt with later. But in other cases, this return orientation of the first generation remains little more than a 'dream': talked about, but never actioned. Rather, in these cases, it may be the second generation that returns and fulfils the dream of the parents. This is clearly exemplified in the following interview extract from Nurten (female, age 38, Istanbul).³

Oh, my parents always intended to go back! The plan was to buy a house and resettle in Istanbul ... But they bought a house in Germany, their kids grew up, got educated, and they never managed to come back [to Turkey] ... Now they don't even mention returning! They are happy in Germany. My older brother is married to a German woman, a lawyer ... and they are about to have their first child, and my younger brother is a dentist in Germany ... And I am living in Istanbul!

This quote gives several clues to the character of the first generation's migration and settlement in Germany, and to the evolving class position of the second generation—namely, upwardly mobile. But to interpret fully the significance of these perspectives, we have to scroll back to the diversified character of the Turkish migration to Germany. Our participants' parents had originated mainly from Istanbul, and had either been part of the first stage of guestworker migration (early 1960s), drawn from predominantly skilled and educated migrants (educated to at least secondary level), or were from the 1980s wave of politically motivated migrants—again, drawn disproportionately from Istanbul and well-educated. Even though most of these first-generation migrants, especially

³ After each participant, basic demographic information is given: gender (M/F) and age (years). All interviews were in Istanbul unless stated otherwise.

the earlier ones, did ‘guestworker’ manual jobs (there was no other type of work on offer to migrant workers in Germany at this time), they nevertheless retained a more ‘urban’ outlook. Not surprisingly, this was passed on to their children, who in the main did well at school and evolved into the Turkish-German middle class—note how Nurten’s two brothers had attained that status. Nurten herself had been trained in Germany as a pharmacist, but since her relocation to Turkey to get married to a cousin, her husband had not allowed her to work—a clear case of return migration leading to ‘gender disempowerment’. We pick up other aspects of Nurten’s story later.

Given their parents’ origins, not as poorly educated rural Turks but as urbanites from Istanbul, the majority of our sample of participants did not find themselves in the ‘Turkish ghettos’. Most grew up in predominantly ‘German’ suburbs of big cities or in small towns where there were few other Turkish migrants, at least at the time of their parents’ migration. One of our older participants, Oktay (M51), stresses the depth of his family roots in Istanbul, and how his father’s migration to Bremen in 1963 was ‘no big deal’.

My whole family is from Istanbul. My family has been living in Istanbul for about 140 years. I mean here [Istanbul] is our village [laughing]. So my father ... he decided to migrate to Germany ... My parents never mentioned having any difficulties in Germany, because they are from Istanbul ... Also, Bremen is such a small place compared to Istanbul ... We did not have a hard time in Germany at all. If we had gone to Bremen from a small village, and you know in those days many villages in Turkey did not even have electricity; well, then, Bremen would have been such a new world. But we are from Istanbul, and Bremen was not a big deal for us.

Time and again, participants stressed that there were few, if any, other Turks in the schools they attended because they did not grow up in ethnic-Turkish neighbourhoods. There were occasional mentions of racist comments received within the school setting, but there appeared to be no causal link between this early casual racism and the decision to ‘return’ to Turkey. Again reflecting their parents’ socio-geographical origins and aspirational status, most of our respondents had not been channelled

into the lower-status vocational secondary schools, the *Hauptschule* and the *Realschule*, as had the great majority of the Turkish-German second generation (Rittersberger-Tiliç et al. 2013: 122–124), but had attended the academically oriented *Gymnasium*. This more ‘open’ and upwardly mobile upbringing, while still preserving core elements of Turkish culture, such as food, language and (but not always) religion, also created a more egalitarian environment in which the second-generation girls could express their gendered identities and personal ambitions more freely.

Here is a typical quote to illustrate the latter point, this time from Eda (F23), the youngest participant, who was born and brought up in Munich and had recently returned to Turkey to pursue a career as a make-up artist in films and the media.

I was mainly with Germans while growing up ... I had many German friends. There were a few Turkish kids I knew, but I wasn't really close to them ... I wasn't raised with strict rules, I was able to do everything that the German kids did. For instance, there was a mountaineering club at the school and I was one of the active members. My mother never said to me: ‘You're a girl, you can't do that’.

Note here how Eda refers to her mother as the dominant force in her family, subverting the patriarchal tradition of family decision-making that is characteristic of most Turkish and Turkish-German families.

A few interviewees mentioned that their mothers were the first to migrate to Germany, again challenging the standard view of Turkish migration as male-led. Like the men, most first-generation women worked in factories, where they socialised with both Germans and other guestworker nationalities (mainly Italians, Greeks and Yugoslavs). The following quote is a good illustration of how the second generation with family roots in Istanbul perceives the evolution of the Turkish immigrant presence in Germany, by recalling the migration stories of their parents.

My mother went to Germany by herself. She only told her family after she had moved ... She worked in a factory where only women were recruited. The flat she lived in was provided by the factory.

...

She did not have any adaptation problems. She went to Germany from Istanbul, and she comes from a good family ... In the first years of the guestworker agreement, people were mostly coming from big cities like Istanbul and they did not have any problems integrating. The problem was the people who followed later, they came from rural areas, and they had big families ... They created their own communities where they strongly preserved their traditions. They did not integrate ... instead they created ghettos. Their children became confused, they felt 'in-between'; these kids had different lives inside the home and outside. (Erdem, M45)

The final element of the second generation's upbringing concerns their summer holidays in Turkey. All the interviewee narratives pointed to these as key annual moments in their diasporic life in Germany. Their parents saved money throughout the year to afford these visits. For the second generation, these holidays symbolised hot, sunny weather, the seaside, Turkish food and family hospitality—and long car rides to the homeland. The participants' stories of these homecoming holiday visits resonate with other studies (King et al. 2011a, b; Vathi and King 2011), which emphasise both the sheer enjoyment of these holiday times, and their symbolic link to the homeland, planting the seeds of an idea about a more permanent relocation. These were opportunities for childhood and teenage comparisons of what Turkey and Germany had to offer. The results were often intriguingly mixed, as the following clip from the interview with Lamia (F36) reveals, especially in relation to her exploration of gendered identities in these transnational spaces.

Before each trip, the excitement grew in me; we were going to our land, to where we belonged! But when we were in Istanbul, I was missing home—Germany! And yet, even though we had the best of everything in Germany, I would be admiring the stuff in Turkey. For example, the crappy ice cream made by the local grocery in Istanbul was so valuable to me! My aunt's daughter Selin was my idol. When I met her, I would scan her clothes, hairstyle and behaviour closely so I could imitate her. She represented how a Turkish girl should look like for me. In Germany young people mostly wear sporty stuff. But the girls around my age in Turkey were so fancy! ... Once Selin told me, 'I am going to show you something, you won't believe your eyes!' She took me to a shopping mall ... we got on the escalator and

she started to scream ‘Isn’t this amazing?’ Her excitement was that it was the first escalator in Turkey. I have never been so disappointed in my life—we already had escalators everywhere in Germany. In spite of this, I liked everything in Turkey. I liked its backwardness, I liked that it had nothing! [laughing]. Turkey wasn’t really developed in those years, but for me it was still the best place.

Lamia’s reflections on ‘home’ and ‘belonging’ through these early teenage memories, as well as other narrative extracts that we have presented, show that the second generation has been constantly renegotiating their diasporic and gendered identities in different diaspora and family spaces. The next sections describe how the second generation accessed their imagined homeland and how they reflect on the realities that they encountered there.

8.4 Narrating the Return

The interview accounts point to three types of return:

- Involuntary return actioned through a *family decision*. On the whole, this was narrated as a traumatic event, since it involved teenagers being brought to Turkey against their wishes.
- Return related to *marriage*, usually to a non-migrant spouse from Turkey. In particular, the women involved in this type had to adapt their lifestyles after their return.
- Return as a search for *self-realisation and belonging*. This is the most ‘voluntary’ of the return types: the second generation seeks its true ‘Turkish’ identity in the imagined homeland.

We now examine each in turn, paying special attention to the intersections between gender, the return process and questions of belonging, as well as cross-referencing our findings with some of the other case studies cited earlier.

Many *whole-family returns* took place in or soon after 1983, in response to the financial incentive offered by the German government to return-

ees. Participants who were brought back by their parents at this time were usually in their mid- or late-teenage years; at the time of their interview in 2012 they were in their forties. They were upset by the family return decision, in which they had no say. They described how it was nearly always the father who took this decision, which was imposed on other family members. The teenagers were deeply affected by having to leave all their friends behind in Germany, and impacted equally negatively by the abrupt change in the school system and language of education. They switched from a liberal, pupil-centred, critical style of learning with good educational and leisure facilities to an authoritarian regime based on rote learning in overcrowded classrooms. While the male returnees who came back as teenagers also experienced the relocation as a shock, the situation was generally made more difficult for girls because of the more restrictive gender environment in Turkey. A typical case is Pinar (F44), who was brought back to Turkey in 1983, aged 16.

My father decided to return; it was a surprise for me and also my siblings ... After he retired, he just decided one day that he wanted to live in Turkey. That was a very tough time for me; I wasn't prepared for this ... I didn't want to leave my friends behind, I didn't want to be taken away from my social environment in Germany. My older sister and brother immediately rebelled against the idea of returning. They had both started to work in Germany and didn't want to ruin their careers. So they stayed on. I was too young, and had to move. I cried every day for a year. I became depressed, I wasn't able to enjoy anything. I was constantly dreaming of a way to get back to Germany. I didn't have any friends in the beginning ... So the first year was horrible. After that, I started getting used to living in Istanbul ... I slowly made some friends at the high school and in time I worried less about having to live here.

Family return was the most common mechanism of return among our sample, accounting for almost half of the interviewees' returns. Compared to other, broadly similar, studies of second-generation 'return'—for example, in Greece (King and Christou 2010; Christou and King 2014), Cyprus (Teerling 2014), southern Italy (Wessendorf 2013) and Portugal (Sardinha 2011)—we find a much greater emphasis on family return.

We feel that this difference is ‘real’ though we cannot rule out that part of it is an artifice of our sampling method.

Less common, but sometimes equally challenging for the individuals concerned, was the *marriage route* to return, which mainly affected women, who had to make fundamental adjustments as a consequence of moving to a country with different gendered norms about ‘acceptable’ behaviour. The gendering of ‘marriage return’ is also well-documented in the Greek case, where it is nearly always the woman who is in some way obliged to relocate to Greece, especially if her husband’s parents are there (Christou and King 2014, pp. 152–154). Earlier we noted the case of Nurten (F38), who was trained as a pharmacist in Germany, but on relocating to Turkey was not allowed to work by her Turkish husband. As a result, Nurten had to renegotiate both her gendered and her diasporic identity because of her more egalitarian upbringing and professional training in Germany, both of which had to be ‘sacrificed’.

The idea was that I would return and get married here. In the beginning it was difficult. I wasn’t able to express myself fully [in Turkish] ... I would say something and people would misunderstand me, especially my husband’s family ... My husband doesn’t allow me to work here. He said, ‘You can’t do it here ... Turkey is not like Germany ... people would take advantage of you.’ I really wanted to experience a working life here, but I can’t [...] I think that, even though I now feel closer to the Turkish culture, I still feel that I am very different from people here ... I was born and raised in Germany ... I think differently ... in terms of parenting ... and many other things.

If Nurten has had challenges adapting to married life in Istanbul, how much more difficult it must be for women who returned to rural Turkey. Ahu (F35, Devrek) has returned to her parents’ village near the Black Sea. She is now divorced and raises her son on her own—a situation which is not unusual in Germany, but rare, and viewed negatively, in Devrek.

I don’t like this place, people here are very narrow-minded ... they talk, they constantly talk. Because I am divorced, because of my clothes, my behaviour ... If you are a woman in Turkey, you have to be strong, you have to be clever, and you have to be careful.

The third mechanism for return is embodied in a search for some kind of *self-realisation and belonging*, a homeland orientation very prominent in studies of Greek return migration (Christou 2006; Christou and King 2014). Our Turkish-German participants generally projected the return as an autonomous decision, either as something planned over a period of years, perhaps built on favourable experiences accumulated during holiday visits, or as something that developed more spontaneously, with the return seen as an ‘adventure’. Some used the educational route, coming first as an Erasmus scholarship student to get a ‘taste’ of living in Turkey, and then coming back later for work or further study (see Sardinha 2011, p. 238 on Portuguese-French second-generation students doing the same in Portugal). There are also several cases in our interview data where the second generation at first felt disillusioned, but over time found that, after all, they ‘belonged’ in Turkey. Earlier we heard the story of Pınar (F43) who initially reacted so badly at her forced return as a teenager that she ‘cried every day for a year’. Later in her narrative, the story is rather different:

Finally, after living here, experiencing more, becoming more fluent in Turkish ... I could feel that I was happy to be living here. But it took me a long time to discover such feelings, to feel that, after all, Turkey is better than Germany; to feel that, in the end, Turkey is my motherland.⁴

8.5 Life After Return: Contentment or Disappointment?

The previous section on ‘narrating the return’ gave us some preliminary insights into the variable and ambiguous nature of the participants’ post-return experiences. We now take this discussion about the third stage of the return process a little further by drawing up a kind of balance-sheet of the positive and negative outcomes. It needs to be stressed, however,

⁴In an interesting gendering of different versions of the ‘homeland’, it was common to refer to Turkey as the *motherland* (the source of family roots, culture, homeliness and so on) and Germany as the *fatherland* (the place of birth and early life, the source of material satisfaction and so on).

that this discussion of ‘pluses’ and ‘minuses’ as perceived, experienced and narrated by interviewees is not a rigid categorisation. Importantly, situations changed over time, as we saw in the testimony of Pınar (and many others too), and the same interviewee may express happiness and disillusionment in the same interview, even in the same sentence. In what follows, we separate out two scales of analysis: that referring to Turkish society as a whole; and those aspects of the post-return life experience that are more place-specific, especially with regard to Istanbul, where most of the interviews were carried out.

Some of what follows reproduces popular stereotypes about Germans/Germany and Turks/Turkey. We acknowledge this, but these were the national framings conveyed consistently in the narratives, seemingly based on actual, or rather reported, lived experiences. Of course, we do not discount the possibility that the stereotypes were exaggerated or instrumentalised by the participants to justify their decision to move or to take a particular stance on an issue.

Many participants waxed lyrical about the ‘special’ features of the Turkish way of life: the general atmosphere of warmth and friendliness; the strength of family, and of kinship and neighbourhood support; and the tradition of hospitality and generosity. One interviewee drew an explicit contrast between the outcome of a hypothetical situation where you call on someone and find they are eating: the German would be embarrassed and say something like ‘I’m sorry, I can’t see you now as we are eating our meal’, whereas the Turkish response would be ‘Ah, come in, sit down, join us, you must have something to eat.’ Or, another scenario: in a restaurant, Germans would divide the bill and each pay their share, whereas a Turk would insist on paying for everyone.

In contrast to their previous lives in ‘boring’ Germany, many participants stressed the attractions of living in a large, lively, cosmopolitan metropolis by the sea. In the words of Eda (F23),

I love Istanbul and Izmir [where she also worked after relocating to Turkey] because they are cities of the sea. In Munich [where she was born and lived until the age of 21], there is no sea. The weather here is much nicer than the German weather. Now I live in Taksim, in the middle of the city. It’s such a lively place, you see all types of people, so colourful! Don’t get me

wrong: Munich is a beautiful city too. But Istanbul is better. Even just for the view of the Bosphorus, I would spend my whole life in Istanbul.

Against those who said Istanbul was an exciting, vibrant city in which to live were others who bemoaned the chaos and insecurity of the place, and pined for the quiet, orderly safety of German towns. Nilgün (F50) had spent her childhood and early life in two medium-sized towns in southern Germany; she moved to Turkey in 2000 after divorcing her Turkish-German husband.

I liked these small towns, life there is very organised and safe, perfect to raise children ... perhaps that's why my parents weren't restrictive at all. They trusted me and they trusted the environment ... My life in Germany was so nice.

Nilgün had moved to Istanbul to 'distance' herself and her daughter from her ex-husband. Appreciative of the escape route that her parental homeland offered her, she was nevertheless all too aware of the challenges of living, and making a living, there—especially for a single mother. Like other second-generation women, she was oppressed by the 'macho' culture of aggressive behaviour, often illustrated by reference to chaotic traffic and driving conditions in the city.

For the majority of participants, the need to work and earn a living was paramount, though there was a minority, including those with children or who were studying at university, who were not seeking work, at least for the present. We also remember Nurten, whose desire to work was denied by her husband's veto. For the rest, a major part of the post-return narratives was taken up by describing the difficulties of accessing paid work, and accounts of the working conditions that, inevitably, were compared with those in Germany. Many of these stories about access to the labour market, and the nature of working life, were highly gendered in the sense that the strongest critiques came from women, who, more than men, bore the brunt of workplace abuse and discrimination, and had less power to react in a meaningful way. Interview narratives were full of remarks about the 'corrupt system' of getting jobs in Turkey; of someone getting a job because 'he is the nephew of the boss's wife' or some other

form of nepotism or personal favouritism. Here is a typical experience related by Nurten, whom we have quoted extensively in this chapter.

In Turkey you can only get a job if you have a network, or if you bribe the right people. If your father knows the right man. It is horrible.

...

I find it hard to deal with the bureaucracy in Turkey. Once I received an official letter through the post—it was something for my father and I had to go to the Internal Revenue Office to collect a document for him. The official there didn't try to understand me, he didn't want to help. He only wanted me to bribe him ... but I couldn't ever do that!

From Nurten's quote we get a powerful insight into the gender-power dynamics encountered in the employment sphere in Turkey: it is the *men* who are being rude, who are looking for a bribe, who control the levers of power in the job stakes—'if your *father* knows the right *man*', and so on. Within the workplace setting, we find many accounts of a lack of 'professional' standards, informal and exploitative practices (especially against younger female workers) and time-shirking scams. These stories are abundant in both the private and state sectors. Here is a typical example, from Selin (F29), who works in administration at one of Istanbul's many universities.

In terms of work discipline, the Germans are way ahead. Turks are too easy-going, they have a relaxed attitude towards work ... A German will draw up a schedule and then do parts of the job from morning till evening. A Turk on the other hand will immediately start getting help from friends and finding short-cuts to finish the job earlier with the minimum of effort. Turks always look for the easy way round and they are very cunning; sometimes to the level of scamming.

The final question to be dealt with concerns feelings of 'identity' and 'belonging' expressed by second-generation returnees. How do they classify themselves in terms of their relationship to other social and ethnic reference groups? Following Rapport and Dawson (1998), where do they feel they truly belong, and where is home? We did not pose direct questions to our interviewees about their 'identity' or where they

thought of themselves as ‘belonging’, for reasons that have been spelt out in some of the critical literature on these themes—namely the mistaken belief that people have a ready-made story to tell about who they are, or think they are (Anthias 2002; Teerling 2011). We preferred to let these subtle issues emerge organically in the narratives and conversations, thereby setting ourselves the challenging task of analysing, via the double hermeneutic filter, *our* understanding of *their* understanding of their (trans)national social positioning and belonging. If this sounds rather complex, the narrative confluences are actually rather clear, and can be distilled into three main constructions of home and belonging. The first, and simplest, is the ‘*roots narrative*’ (see Wessendorf 2007): the feeling that the ‘homing journey’ to the ‘imagined homeland’ is indeed a journey ‘home’ to where they ‘properly belong’. This may start out either as a homing instinct, where the image of the homeland is fulfilled (or at least the disappointments are not so fundamental as to challenge the overall sense of satisfaction at having made the return); or it may emerge over the longer term, perhaps after one or two decades of living in Turkey/Istanbul, so that the ‘German part’ is eventually forgotten. Nilgün, the divorcee who relocated to Istanbul with her then 6-year-old daughter in 2000, was an example of a participant who took some time to ‘settle’:

I was happy with my life in Germany, but if you ask me now where I would prefer to live for the rest of my life, I would say Turkey because it’s more lively, the people are warmer, I feel better here.

The second construction is more one of *non-belonging* and reflects a more or less permanent state of *existential displacement*, of feeling that one’s true home hardly exists any more, or cannot be found; it exists neither ‘here’ nor ‘there’. It is perfectly expressed in this summing up from Didem (F24): ‘It’s a cliché but it’s true: you’re a foreigner in Germany and an *Almanca* in Turkey. You don’t belong in either place. That’s how I feel.’ The double sense of non-belonging does not push them to a second return, however, this time to Germany, because they have become estranged from there too, and in any case a move away may not be legally possible if they have Turkish citizenship.

The third construction of 'identity' and 'belonging' relies more on articulations of '*Othering*' rather than of membership of a particular group or allegiance to a place. The result is that the participants see themselves either as unique individuals, or as a group defined by their own specific diasporic history and subsequent counter-diasporic migration. One fairly typical example of this struggle to 'identify an identity' is the extensive musing on this topic by Levent (M29), who 'returned' to Istanbul from Düsseldorf one year prior to the interview and who now works in an architect's office, having graduated in that profession from a university in Germany. Here are a few extracts from his interview.

Turkish culture was dominant in our home in Germany. Even though I was lucky that I was part of a family with a modern outlook, I still thought it was hard to balance home life with life outside home. It makes you schizophrenic. I had two worlds and I was familiar with both ... Then, when I was 15–16, I started feeling more comfortable with the German culture. When my parents divorced—I was around 14—we didn't have the happy Turkish family life anymore ... and the Turkish world faded away. There was only German culture for me from that point on. Because every successful, decent person I knew was German and I wanted to follow the German way; I thought that it was better.

...

Nowadays, it's hard for me to define my identity, but as I get older I feel the need to be sure about what I am. Now I am thinking, I am not a child of one country, not of Turkey, not of Germany; I am a world citizen. I am not able to see myself as German, or Turkish; I am just saying that I am a human being ... First I was Turkish, I spoke Turkish when I was with my family; then with school I became German; and after moving here I had to remember Turkish again; and in the end I realised I am none of these identities. Or let's say I am all and none at the same time. Actually, I am more than this: I am embracing all cultures and therefore I am a world citizen.

Levent traces his shifting identificatory trajectory: first as Turkish in the home sphere in Germany; then as German through school, especially after his parents' separation; and then as Turkish again after the move to Turkey. But this constant shifting had, in aggregate, dislocated him

from *both* the Turkish and German identities; thus he saw himself as a ‘human being’, a ‘world citizen’, and only those who shared his particular counter-diasporic life trajectory could understand ‘who he was’.

8.6 Conclusion

This chapter has explored second-generation Turkish-Germans’ lives in their (counter-)diasporic spaces in Germany and Turkey and has analysed their gendered constructions of home and belonging in the light of their memories of childhood and early life in Germany, and their subsequent ‘return’ to Turkey. Personal narratives were the main source of data, providing direct and often well-articulated insights from the participants’ accounts of their mobile lives. The main narratives of return were three-fold: return as a family decision and event, return through marriage, and return as self-realisation.

Compared to other studies of second-generation ‘return’, the Turkish-German case has uncovered a higher proportion of cases where ‘whole-family’ return has brought back teenagers, often against their will. While we acknowledge that this could reflect a bias in our sampling method, we believe this difference to be ‘real’. We make this affirmation because one of the authors of this chapter also carried out a large-scale study of the ‘return’ of second-generation Greek-Americans and Greek-Germans to Greece, based on a similar methodology (Christou and King 2014), and here ‘teenager’ return *en famille* was far less evident. What this latter study did find, especially for the Greek-German case, was a historical trend for some first-generation parents to send their children to Greece to be cared for by grandparents or other relatives so that both parents could work full-time and thus maximise their earning potential. It was planned that such children would then rejoin their parents in Germany at a later age and finish their schooling, but then be drawn back to Greece once more when they were able to make an independent decision (King et al. 2011a). The Greek-German case also found a significant number of ‘returnees’ who relocated to Greece, typically around the age of 19, to

go to university (including some who had spent part of their childhood in Greece). Hence we can observe some parallels, but also some differences, between the dynamics of second-generation return from Germany to Turkey and Greece.

Throughout our analysis, the gender perspective has assumed major importance. Based on the very different gender norms of Turkish versus German society, women returnees often struggled to renegotiate their gendered identity and well-being. In particular on returning to Turkey, they had to adapt to more rigid gender roles and expectations, though some found space to contest these and thereby make their contribution to reworking established 'gendered geographies of power' (Mahler and Pessar 2001). This resonates with similar gender-related challenges faced by Italian-Swiss second-generation women relocating to small-town southern Italy (Wessendorf 2007, 2013, pp. 124–129), and Greek-American and Greek-German second-generation women returning to Athens and elsewhere in Greece where they are faced with a similar male-dominated society characterised by aggressive male behaviour (Christou and King 2011, 2014, pp. 218–222).

What is perhaps most interesting conceptually about this study on second-generation 'return' is the way that the 'reverseness' of this process enables fixed and static notions of home and belonging to be blurred and problematised. Second-generation 'returnees' are 'subversive' migrants in that they challenge fundamentally the boundaries between 'here and there', 'origin' and 'destination' country, and 'indigenesness versus foreignness' that pervade both everyday perceptions of migrants and the academic study of migration. Similarly, the standardised concepts of return migration and generation begin to lose their meaning. So, how to define and analyse the 'return' of second-generation 'returnees' to Germany? Or what to call the Turkish-born children of our second-generation participants? These are questions for future research.

We also need to acknowledge that the post-return phase of a counter-diaspora is itself dynamic: people change *through* return, and also *after* return, with respect to their evolving conceptualisations of home, belonging and life satisfaction. And not for the first time, when forced to generalise from our findings, we arrive at a somewhat counter-intuitive outcome: those who were traumatised by their teenage years return are

now more or less happily settled in their Turkish/Istanbul homeland; whereas those whose return was voluntary, in search of self-fulfilment or marital contentment, are those whose lives are most blighted by elements of frustration and disappointment.

Let us round off this chapter by giving some succinct answers to the many questions raised earlier. The participants' *degree of agency* in their return decision depends entirely on the circumstances of their return. Those who returned as teenagers as part of a family return had little or no say in their relocation, which was effectively a 'forced' migration for them. For the rest, the migration was much more voluntary, although perhaps constrained by spousal or family pressure in the case of marriage migrants. Second, the *motivations* for return were rarely economic—unlike the migration of the first generation, who went as labour migrants to Germany. Nevertheless, the requirement to find employment was an important part of the second generation's resettlement process, and many found jobs where their language skills—in Turkish, German and English (learned at school in Germany)—were instrumental. Thus, building also on their generally high levels of education, many returnees worked as teachers and translators, or in businesses connected to travel, tourism, trade and marketing.

One of the most interesting findings, again counter-intuitive at first sight, was that returnees were not the most inwardly 'Turkish' or the least integrated of the Turkish-German second-generation population in Germany. *In fact, the reverse is the case.* Those who return (at least those who go and settle in Istanbul) seem to be a distinct sub-set of the Turkish-German second-generation—those who experienced a fairly full integration into the German education system and society at large, and who thus brought to Turkey a more solid endowment of human and intercultural capital. This reflects in turn their parents' social and geographical origins as coming from Istanbul and better educated than the mass of labour migrants who originated from rural Turkey. This means that Istanbul is a special case—and points up the need for further research into second-generation return in other Turkish regions, especially in rural and small-town settings, in order to bring out the spatial differentiation in the return migration process and its regional impact.

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9

'You'll Have to Start Learning Irish Now': Irish Return Migration and the Return of the Second Generation to the Connemara Gaeltacht Region

Rhona Ní Chearbhaill

The experience of displacement as the result of emigration has been a dominant feature of Irish life for many generations. While migration from Ireland was traditionally viewed as being permanent, and statistics pertaining to returnees have been scant until recent years, literary and folkloric evidence attest to the presence of returnees in most regions of the country even before the turn of the twentieth century (Schrier 1997/1955; see Fitzgerald 2005). Emigration remained a constant feature of Irish life for much of the twentieth century until an unprecedented return flow occurred in the 1970s and again in the 1990s and early 2000s as a result of rapid economic growth. The experiences and challenges faced by these returnees has been the focus of an increasing body of academic literature. The aim of this chapter is to review that literature and contextualise my own research on the cultural and linguistic challenges faced by second-generation return migrants to the Irish-speaking Gaeltacht region of Connemara. My discussion regarding this group of returnees contributes to ongoing research on the subject of Irish

R. Ní Chearbhaill (✉)
An Cheathrú Rua, Co. na Gaillimhe

return migration and highlights the attempts of second-generation return migrants to resolve any identity conflict resulting from their response to heritage language loss and acculturation post-return.

9.1 Setting the Context: A Review of the Literature

Available evidence marks the 1970s as the first significant period of net immigration in the Irish state since its foundation in 1922 (Delaney 2002: 6). The high level of emigration previously experienced by the country was temporarily reversed largely as a result of the return of Irish emigrants who had left the country in the inter-war and post-Second World War period (Delaney 2002: 6). The significant level of return migration in Ireland during the 1970s was the basis of two studies (namely, Gmelch 1983, see 1986, Gmelch and Gmelch 1995; and McGrath 1991). The majority of migrants resettled along the western seaboard and the counties in the north-west; that is, the regions that had suffered the highest rates of emigration. It was in these counties that George Gmelch surveyed the readjustment challenges faced by returnees. Data for the study were gathered principally through a questionnaire survey ($N = 606$) and open-ended interviews carried out over the summers of 1977 and 1978. The average period spent abroad was 17 years. Gmelch (1983: 50) found that the returnees' motivations for return were strongly influenced by 'a strong emotional attachment and identification with the homeland' and most migrants had maintained regular contact with family and friends through letters, telephone calls and holiday visits (1983, p. 51). Julie DaVanzo (1976, p. 15), in her study of the differences between return migration and migration to an area that is new to a person, has suggested that 'the psychic costs of a return move should be lower than a non-return' because of migrants' familiarity with the potential destination. Gmelch's study, however, reveals a different picture, and the majority of the study's participants felt they were distinct from those who had stayed behind. Despite their homecoming decision being strongly motivated by the pull factors of the origin country, the respondents faced a range of readjustment challenges on return. Many were dissatisfied with

the community's social life. The returnees frequently mentioned having had difficulty in re-establishing relationships with local people, including former neighbours and friends. Gmelch (1983: 53) also found return to be generally more desirable to men, who often had to persuade their wives to return to Ireland. Women viewed Ireland as a safe place to rear children, they were more likely to return to their husband's home village, which meant they did not reap the benefits of being near their own kin (1983, p. 53). These gender differences are further explored in a study by Gmelch and Sharon Bohn Gmelch (1995) where the readjustment experiences of Irish women are compared to female returnees in communities in Newfoundland and Barbados. For women who had become accustomed to an urban lifestyle, the return to a rural setting was sometimes deemed unattractive to them (1983, p. 53). Indeed, return migration for the majority was essentially an urban-to-rural movement, and some of Gmelch's respondents were disappointed with their discovery 'that Ireland is no longer the traditional, close-knit, folk society of memory' (1986, p. 162).

Geographer Fiona McGrath's (1991) research was conducted nearly 10 years after Gmelch's study but also sought to throw light on the return phenomenon of the 1970s. Her research, based on 142 interviews with returnees in Achill Island in the west of Ireland in 1988, explores the socio-economic and cultural impacts of the return movement to the island. Despite being inspired by what she calls the 'decade of return' in the 1970s, McGrath is eager to point out the complexity and transitory nature of the movement to and from the island, and she contextualises her findings accordingly. The marriage pattern of the returnees in McGrath's study echoed that of Gmelch's research, and while 70 % of her respondents had married abroad, two-thirds had married people from the island 'reinforcing the notion of Achill emigrants remaining in close-knit communities when abroad' (McGrath 1991, p. 59). McGrath claims the circumstances surrounding the decision to return are far more complex than the motivations for the original emigration decision and, like the respondents in Gmelch's study, most return decisions were motivated by non-economic factors. Overall, many return migrants claimed to be happy with their return decision, yet McGrath found disillusionment to be rife among respondents. Despite an attempt to explore the cultural

impact of the return phenomenon, McGrath does not refer to the possible language challenges faced by returnees returning to this island, which contains a large Irish-speaking district.

The high numbers of returns in the 1970s were a relatively brief phenomenon, however, as significant levels of unemployment and emigration resumed in the 1980s. Over 70,000 migrants are estimated to have left in 1989 alone (Ní Laoire 2008, p. 196). While many travelled to Britain, the traditional emigrant destination of the USA regained its attraction for a new generation of Irish migrants; and many entered the country illegally (Corcoran 1993). This 'new wave' of Irish emigration was no longer mainly of rural origin, and many Irish cities also experienced net outmigration during this period (Mac Laughlin 1994, p. 50). The skills and educational background of the 1980s emigrant cohort had also changed from that of their predecessors, and contained a significant number of migrants with secondary and tertiary-level education (Delaney 2002, p. 19). Jim Mac Laughlin (1994, p. 75) claims, however, that this 'new wave' of Irish emigration still saw young Irish migrants following traditional migratory routes and occupying 'the traditional job ghettos of the Irish immigrant'. The emigration in the 1980s and early 1990s, Mac Laughlin argued, did not merit categorisation 'as a fundamentally new development' (1994, p. 2; see Gmelch and Gmelch 1995), claiming the country was still functioning as 'an emigrant nursery' as late as 1994. After that, Ireland entered a period of exponential economic growth, known as 'The Celtic Tiger', which lasted into the early 2000s. This period spurred unprecedented growth in immigration (Powell 2002, p. 431) and Ireland became a primary destination for citizens of new entrant countries into the enlarged European Union, such as Poland and the Baltic states. Ireland's new arrivals were accompanied by previous generations of Irish migrants returning to live in Ireland, with over 240,000 former emigrants returning between 1991 and 2006 (Ní Laoire 2008, p. 196). While the economic upturn enabled the return of previous Irish migrants, a number of important studies inspired by this movement emphasise their non-economic reasons for return. Richard Jones (2003), echoing earlier studies, found that motivation for return is often driven by cultural and familial attachments to the home country (p. 153). Jones examined the correspondence between return migration

and multinational investment in Ireland at county level during the Celtic Tiger period. Rates of return were higher in this period in Dublin, the midlands and the west. Despite some migrants returning to Irish counties where jobs in multinational corporations and various other employment opportunities were available, Jones's research revealed that many returned to their place of birth, particularly in the west. Jones interviewed returnees in County Mayo to further investigate the reasons directly related to the homecoming decision. Many had become disenchanted with life in the host country, and their primary reasons for return often related to family, cultural and 'quality of life' (Jones 2003, p. 164). Some expressed disappointment over the slow pace of life and the growing materialism in Irish society, echoing findings in previous and subsequent studies (Gmelch 1986; McGrath 1991; Corcoran 2002; Ralph 2009).

Mary Corcoran (2002) interviewed 23 returnees who had left Ireland in the 1980s and returned in the 1990s, and explored their self-identification and 'reinvention of the self' in the Celtic Tiger period. The economic boom had facilitated their return, similar to the returnees interviewed earlier by Gmelch and McGrath. Corcoran (2002, p. 189) found their motivation to return was influenced heavily by a 'quest for anchorage' and a desire for a better quality of life. The participants in Corcoran's research, however, were deeply disappointed on their return, to discover that Ireland had become a 'fragmented and deeply individualized society' (2002, p. 176) during their absence. Corcoran's interviews also explored the migrants' motivation for leaving, self-identification and adjustment problems. She claims all of the participants in her study felt the experience of emigration had enhanced their lives and provided them with an opportunity to develop their personal and professional potential (2002, p. 185). In turn, when cultural and familial needs could not be met in the ethnic community within the host society, many among the professional élite returned home and entered what Corcoran calls 'a process of reinvention' (2002, p. 181). That is, disenchanted with their migrant lifestyle, many returnees chose a different career path on their return. When in the host country, many migrants viewed Ireland as a better place to raise their children, a place where people had more time, were more sociable and friendly, and where there was a slower pace of life (2002, p. 190). Corcoran points out that the slow pace of life that

caused readjustment challenges for most of the returnees interviewed by Gmelch and McGrath is yearned for by those migrants disillusioned with the individualised global cities in which they lived. On returning, however, Corcoran's participants bemoaned the transformation of the social landscape and the appearance of a new self-interest among former friends and neighbours (see Gmelch 1986; McGrath 1991). Paradoxically, the economic boom that enabled the return of many migrants in their 'quest for anchorage' (Corcoran 2002, p. 189) is presented as the very force that has accelerated a growing individualism in contemporary Irish society, making it reminiscent of the host society that the return migrants were attempting to leave behind.

Much of Caitríona Ní Laoire's research on Irish return migration in the same period involves an analysis of life narratives gathered as part of the all-island collaborative project *Narratives of Migration and Return* (Ní Laoire 2007). This research project grew from a recognition of the need for in-depth research on return migration to Ireland, particularly given the dearth of existing research on the subject. The project was conducted by an interdisciplinary team of researchers based in the Department of Geography (University College Cork), the Centre for Migration Studies (Omagh), the School of History, Queen's University Belfast, and the Department of Sociology (University of Limerick) in an attempt to explore the divergent and shared contexts of migration in Ireland. The project produced an oral archive of 92 return migrant life narratives, providing a valuable insight into contemporary Irish society and culture. Focusing mainly on the 1980s cohort of emigrants who returned during the economic upturn, geographer Ní Laoire draws attention to the complexity of rural return migration processes in recent years (2007). Return migration for the majority of the participants in her research, and indeed in many studies of Irish return migration to date, is essentially an urban-to-rural movement. Returnees' narratives, she claims, regularly reproduce perceptions of a 'rural idyll' and create unrealistic expectations that are often founded on childhood memories and holiday return visits (2007, p. 342). Subsequent research by Ní Laoire found the decision to return to Ireland coincided with life-course transitions, and returnees' narratives often also 'construct Ireland in terms which cohere with the image of Ireland as a type of safe haven, a place apart from the pressures of

their modern lifestyles, and a place where they could connect with family and friendship networks' (2008, p. 207). Despite the homecoming fulfilling the dream of returning to a rural home, return migrants' accounts of the homecoming experience in Ní Laoire's research reiterates many of the readjustment problems experienced by returnees in other studies. Acute frustration and disenchantment result when the expectations and the realities of return come into conflict, and the return migrants' identification of themselves as both incomers and locals creates an identity conflict. More recent research by Ní Laoire (2011a) sheds light on the cultural and social challenges faced by children and young people in the context of Irish return migration. Motivation for the return decision is often narrated in terms of what is best for the migrants' children, yet few studies have attempted to explore the children's own experience of migration. Ní Laoire's research therefore provides valuable insights into the return migration experiences of children and young people in an Irish context (2011a).

Geographer David Ralph's (2009) contribution to the literature focuses on migrants who returned from the USA during the Celtic Tiger period. According to Ralph, 'return migration is an obvious instance of the continued attachments to home that persist among contemporary migrants' (2009, p. 185). His analysis of intensive interviews with return migrants who emigrated from Ireland in the 1980s aims to explore the imaginary and actual geographies of the place they call 'home', and the meaning returnees give to this 'home', as well as their sense of belonging to the homeland (2009, p. 186). Despite 'home' being central to migrant and return migrant experiences, he claims it is an ambiguous concept and one that is altered in the homecoming process. In turn, the return experience itself is, he asserts: 'a Janus-faced experience that cannot easily be mapped onto traditional cartographies of belonging' (2009, p. 184). Despite a government campaign at the height of economic growth to entice migrants to return to Ireland and fill gaps in the labour market, the return migrants in Ralph's research saw their return as a personal journey and not as a patriotic one (2009, p. 191). Despite Ireland being presented in the recruitment campaign as 'an indelible place, the reservoir of a mystical culture and inimitable way of life, with its romantic, undulating landscapes' (Ralph 2009, p. 188), the migrants in his research

returned to a society that no longer viewed the home as a sanctuary. In fact, the acquisition of a house or houses was considered to be a development of personal wealth in this period (2009, p. 189). Some of the return migrants interviewed by Ralph were therefore disappointed by the changes in their home communities, and by the challenges they faced during the return process. Despite this, many returnees claimed they had found a refuge 'at home' and the return had fulfilled their social and cultural needs, something the ethnic society in the USA had failed to do. They associated their home with family and with community, supporting the findings of Jones's and Corcoran's studies (Ralph 2009, p. 190).

9.2 Second-generation Return to the Connemara Gaeltacht Region

Scattered along the western seaboard of Ireland lie many of the Gaeltacht or Irish-speaking districts, those recognised by the government as areas where the Irish language is the predominant one spoken. Historically, these areas have suffered from mass migration, one of the many reasons blamed for a serious language decline within their communities, particularly in the period following the Second World War. Little research has been carried out to consider the specific cultural and linguistic challenges faced by the Gaeltacht migrant or return migrant despite consistently high rates of outmigration from Irish-speaking districts. Indeed, return migration is often mentioned in socio-linguistic studies as a central cause of language shift in the Gaeltacht community (Ó Tuathaigh 2008; Ó Tuairisg 2000; Ó Riagáin 1997). My own experience of returning to the Connemara Gaeltacht, the largest of the Irish-speaking districts, from London in 1991 when I was 9 years of age meant that I was acutely aware of the presence of returnees within the community. This essay explores the migratory experience of second-generation returnees to this Irish-speaking community, using a qualitative ethnographic research approach. Return migration for the purpose of this study is defined as the return to a place that is considered 'home' whether cultural or physical. Drawing on key migration concepts of home, displacement and acculturation, my research focused on interviews ($N = 22$) with return migrants living in

the Connemara Gaeltacht region. The literature review in the first part of this chapter provides a suitable context for a discussion of the ethnographic basis of my research on Gaeltacht return migration. Part of the ethnographic aspect of my research was informed by a series of in-depth semi-structured interviews with five second-generation return migrants. The aim of this research approach was to allow returnees to narrate their stories in their own voices in their natural setting. The returnees in this study grew up in large British cities, returned to the region as adults and are currently living in the Connemara Gaeltacht community. Despite a major language shift in most Gaeltacht regions in recent years, the Irish language still plays an important role in the formation of identity in the Connemara Gaeltacht. The second-generation returnees' experiences of language after relocating to Connemara, and the acculturation challenges they were faced with as a result of this phenomenon is explored here.

Gaeltacht migrants who left their homes in the post-war period possessed an identity as part of an Irish-speaking community within an overarching identity as a member of the Irish diaspora. They were Irish migrants in the eyes of the host society, but were often viewed as Gaeltacht migrants within the Irish community as a whole. Various studies on identity have placed significant emphasis on the role of language in identity construction. Lily Wong Fillmore (1996, p. 435) recognises language as being inseparable from cultural identity, 'since it is the means by which members of communities communicate with one another, and how individuals establish that they are, in fact, members of the same cultural community'. Many of the emigrants who left the Irish-speaking area of Connemara in the post-war period and who were interviewed as part of my research spoke only Irish when they left home. However, the majority of native speakers who emigrated did not transmit the language to their children.

Return migration to the ancestral home is an aspect of the second-generation migrant experience that has been understudied. The literature available to us on the second generation within the Irish diaspora, for example, is predominantly concerned with their assimilation and integration into the host society (Hickman et al. 2001). The first port of call is to address the ambiguity surrounding the concept of second-generation return migration. Recent scholarship has attempted to explain this elusive

movement. Anastasia Christou and Russell King (2008, p. 1) have developed the concept of ‘counter-diasporic migration’ to describe ‘the process whereby the second generation relocates to the ancestral homeland—the birthplace of their parents’. Susanne Wessendorf (2007) uses the term ‘roots migration’ in her research on returns among second-generation Italians in Switzerland. While the return of the second generation is often viewed as a retreat to an idealised homeland associated with childhood visits, the second generation’s homecoming decision has a cultural value and is very often a response by some members of the diaspora to their sense of belonging to another place. Teerling, Christou and King (2010: 2) have justified the use of the term ‘return’ when discussing the second generation since it is claimed: ‘the affective connection to what is often regarded as the “home country” may be very strong, so that the “return” has ontological meaning even if it contravenes the logic of migration statistics’. Therefore, while technically this group cannot return to a place from which they did not originally come, the transnational activities the second generation participated in as both children and adults inform their sense of identity and belonging. This, in turn, facilitates their return as adults and justifies the homecoming decision. When I began to research the return phenomenon to the Gaeltacht region of Connemara I did not at first intend to include second-generation returnees. My initial fieldwork, however, revealed this group to be central to the region’s migratory experience. It became clear to me that any study concerned with return migration to the Gaeltacht region must include an exploration of this group’s readjustment challenges, and specifically those related to their cultural and linguistic role in the Irish-speaking community.

As mentioned previously, all of the second-generation returnees in my study were raised in major British cities. They relocated to Connemara between the ages of 20 and 40 years. They all described themselves as Irish, or as London-Irish, Manchester-Irish and so on. The major city they grew up in affirms their continuous negotiation between ‘home’ and ‘host country’. Despite having at least one Irish-speaking parent, all interviewees were raised using English. The decision for native Irish-speakers from the Connemara Gaeltacht to speak English to their children was also common among the first-generation returnees interviewed as part of my research. While the Irish language was not central to the construction of

their Irish identity, most had participated in Irish cultural events, attended Irish dancing lessons and were involved with Irish associations during their childhood. The participants' narratives attested to the strong transnational links maintained with their home by the ethnic community in the host country. These activities, along with holiday visits, fostered a homecoming desire among the second generation. Russell King and Anastasia Christou (2008, p. 14), however, claim that information based on family narratives and short-term visits possessed by second-generation returnees prior to resettlement, based on family narratives and short-term visits, are 'likely to present a less-than-accurate portrayal of the homeland'. All the returnees had visited Connemara frequently as children and later as adults. These visits, however, had not prepared them for the reality of the resettlement experience in a Gaeltacht region. Jane, who returned to Connemara in 1996 and is now in her forties, describes her experience of language and culture shock:

So we moved here, we got married here and kind of, we were a bit romantic about the place at the time. And coming back on holidays... used to come here as a child actually. Every summer the car would be packed up, the house would be rented out and it would be sheep business for six weeks. And we were in the village for six weeks ... and we were spoken to in English all the time, so when I moved here in '96, got a huge shock about the language because I was completely ignorant, completely oblivious that it was so important. It took a while for that to sink in, but we're still here ... When we moved the people were still speaking English to us and then we started to get, 'Oh, you'll have to start learning Irish now'.

Interestingly, Jane remembers her father speaking Irish with other men from Connemara in the Irish Club near their home in England.

My dad wouldn't ever teach it to us, wouldn't speak it to us, even when we asked him, I remember asking him at one point, 'No. No need for it and that's that'. Still now, even when I'm trying with the language, he won't, it's not natural for him to speak it to me.

Gaeltacht-born parents' decision not to transmit their mother tongue to their children resulted in feelings of cultural loss and regret for certain

respondents such as Patrick, who relocated to the Connemara Gaeltacht region in 1998 in his early twenties. Now in his forties, he recalls how his parents would speak Irish among themselves and with other Gaeltacht emigrants, while speaking only English to himself and his brothers.

Oh yeah, what happens with Connemara people is that they speak to each other in Irish but they don't speak to you, they turn around and speak to you in English and that's why we never learnt it. Mum left here with no English so she saw no reason to teach us Irish, no earthly reason and I really regret that, as much as I try, I can never get my head around it, the [English] accent doesn't lend itself to the Irish.

Despite having declined drastically as a community language in recent decades (Ó Giollagáin et al. 2007), Gearóid Denvir claims the Irish language is the significant feature of identity and the common link between members of the Connemara Gaeltacht community (1997, p. 310). It is in this context that identity conflict, or what Aneta Pavlenko and Adrian Blackledge (2003) call 'negotiation of identity' occurs. New members of a community must often prove they have the skills and values required to assimilate (Block 2009, p. 25) and those who wish to participate fully in a community and in the culture of that community must have what Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1984) has termed 'cultural capital'. Visits home had created a romantic notion of rural life among second-generation returnees and motivated a desire to return to what they had perceived as their 'home'. Their return was often narrated in terms of a better place to raise their children (see Ní Laoire 2008, p. 196; Corcoran 2002, p. 190) but their inability to speak Irish created challenges for some returnees. Caroline relocated to Connemara with her children in 1998 when she was in her twenties, where she expected they would receive similar language support from the educational system as was available to children with little English in Britain. This, she claims, was not the case and it became a major source of frustration for her as a parent. Despite attending Irish language classes, she experienced a persistent sense of helplessness when she was unable to help her son with his homework.

He used to come home and say 'Mum, can you help me with this' and I had no clue and I said 'I can't do this'. To a mum who always, always helped

him with his homework, I'd always done everything with them, I was as frustrated as he was frustrated.

Returnees were often directly confronted with the challenges of language immersion and often felt marginalised as a result. It is clear from Caroline's narrative, however, that she was determined to confront the linguistic challenges of the Connemara Gaeltacht to help her children assimilate in the school context.

I used to give them all the readers [local school] and they'd put them on a tape for me and I would sit at home all day listening to 'Tá Lúlú ag rith. Tá Micí ag spraoi (Lúlú is running, Micí is playing)' and when he'd come home I'd be able to say 'Tá Lúlú ag rith. Tá Micí ag spraoi. Tá Lúlú agus Micí ag rith agus ag spraoi', and I just hoped that the teacher wouldn't change the reader without letting me know! I was just one page ahead of them all the time, four different readers. I made no attempt to go to work for maybe 2 years until I knew they were settled in. I was at the school at 9 o'clock and I was at the school at 3 and I'd know when they were coming out if it was a tough day for them or if they could bear it.

Marion relocated to Connemara in 2008 in her thirties, and her inability to help her child with his Irish language schoolwork motivated her to learn the language as well: 'When I came here first there were no classes available and I thought "Oh, my God, what am I going to do?" Patrick was coming home with homework and I wasn't able to help him so I wanted to do classes'. Despite the challenges faced by adult returnees in language acquisition, it is not hard to find evidence of their positive attitudes towards the Irish language, which in turn is linked to identity. All of the participants interviewed speak Irish or are trying to learn it, and are committed to raising their children bilingually. Significantly, James Cameron and Richard Lalonde's (1994) study of first- and second-generation Italian-Canadians has 'shown that ethnic-language maintenance is important for second- and later generation immigrants, but not for the first generation' (Vedder and Horenczyk 2006, p. 426). Despite being motivated initially by a desire to help her child with his homework, Marion has persevered with the learning of the language, and now recognises its importance within the community. She claims there is a different way of communicating through Irish.

I love the language, just the music, the sound of it. I love listening to people speaking. People say things, especially the old people, I laugh, there's a way [of communicating] in the Irish language that isn't there in English and I love that. I just wanted to understand that and even now people say things and I think "Oh, there's something there" and I want to understand that.

Tom returned in 1987 in his twenties and his decision to move to Connemara was influenced significantly by an interest in his language heritage. He was aware that not only was his mother a native speaker but also her family and generations before her were. He did not want to be the one to break that cultural chain. He subsequently acquired proficiency in Irish and became active in the promotion of the language in his community. Both Tom and Marion displayed feelings of pride in their ability to speak Irish with their parents, who also subsequently decided to return to Connemara. Language acquisition in the Gaeltacht community aids the second generation's acculturation but also develops their sense of self in that community. This affirms Paul Vedder's and Gabriel Horenczyk's (2006, p. 426) assertion that 'language is instrumental to satisfying basic needs for bonding and security and, as such, also impacts a person's identity development'. Caroline hasn't succeeded in becoming completely fluent yet, but she is happy that her Irish-speaking children have managed to reconnect their ancestors' cultural chain.

There were four fluent Irish speakers, Jim's mother and father and my mother and father, my mother is the only one alive but she's fluent, then there was myself and Jim, not fluent Irish speakers, now there's another four, you know. There's four fluent Irish speakers in this house now.

Language acquisition is strongly linked, however, to issues of culture with H. Douglas Brown going so far as to claim: 'Becoming a bilingual is a way of life. Every bone and fiber of your being is affected in some way as you struggle to reach beyond the confines of your first language and into a new language, a new culture, a new way of thinking, feeling and acting' (1980, p. 1; see Block 2009). Interestingly, Tom, who is now a fluent speaker, claimed he felt he would be a 'stranger' in the community

for the rest of his life because he wasn't born and raised there. Proficiency in the Irish language in some cases, it seems, is not sufficient to create a complete sense of belonging to the Gaeltacht community.

9.3 Conclusion

The considerable body of academic literature that exists on the subject of return migration to Ireland provides in-depth accounts of migrants' experiences of return and readjustment in their 'home' communities. A review of the literature also serves to highlight the dearth of research on the migratory experiences of members of the Gaeltacht community. Few research projects, either, have attempted to explore the return of the second generation to Ireland. My study of second-generation migrants to the Connemara Gaeltacht region describes, from an insider's perspective, the cultural and linguistic challenges faced by members of this community. Returnees' narratives highlight the intersection between language and cultural identity, an important insight, considering language shift in the region has been linked, among other factors, to returnees (Ó Tuathaigh 2008; Nic Eoin 2011; Ó Tuairisg 2000). Central to the experience of the Gaeltacht second-generation returnee, therefore, is his/her attitude to language and its practice on return. Some participants interviewed described feeling marginalised on their return to what they had perceived as their ancestral homeland. The concept of home may, it could be argued, be more connected to the returnees' sense of identity than the language when the decision to return is first made. Many participants, in fact, stated place and familial networks as the primary reason for return. What is clear, however, is that significant attempts have been made by second-generation returnees to resolve this identity conflict by committing themselves and their families to bilingualism. Linguistic identification or affiliation for many of the second-generation returnees may be a means of acculturation and coping with the challenges of dislocation on return to Connemara. This study therefore gives a perspective on the linguistic challenges faced by return migrants, and one we must consider for a complete representation of return migration to Ireland. The Connemara Gaeltacht may experience immigration as a result of return

migration in the years ahead. As current migrants participate in transnational activities that continue to tie them to home, it is important to acknowledge language as a form of cultural capital that would facilitate acculturation on returning to an Irish-speaking community.

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Part III

**New Regional Perspectives
and Research Questions on Return
Migration in Europe**

10

Circularity Within the EU: The Return Intentions of Latvian Migrants

Zaiga Krisjane, Elina Apsite-Berina, and Maris Berzins

Recently, much attention has been paid in the literature to circular migration because of its perceived potential to reduce permanent migration and to promote development. This is probably a result of a perfect combination of interests benefiting not only sending and receiving countries, but also the migrants themselves (Vertovec 2007; Adepoju et al. 2010; Castles and Ozkul 2014). Circularity allows migrants to gain experience and acquire skills, and to apply them on returning to their countries of origin, thereby contributing to development (Cassarino 2004; de Haas 2010, 2012), transforming brain drain into brain gain, and at the same time contributing to their positive effects on labour markets in both the sending and the receiving countries (Stark et al. 1997; Dustmann et al. 2011). In addition, circular migration shares many features with transnationalism as migrants engage in back-and-forth movement between

Z. Krisjane (✉) • E. Apsite-Berina • M. Berzins
Department of Geography, University of Latvia, Riga, Latvia

two or more countries to sustain their economic, cultural or political interests and activities (Portes et al. 1999; Vertovec 2009). Contemporary migration patterns in Europe show an increase in, and diversification of, international migrant flows as a result of differences in wealth levels, the removal of restrictions on the free movement of labour, reduced transportation and communication costs, the expansion of formal and informal labour recruitment networks, and initiatives by governments and employers to recruit labour into specific economic sectors (Hooghe et al. 2008; King 2012). The emergence of a new migration system in Europe is followed by a number of concepts to describe a more diverse reality—incomplete migration (Okolski 2012), lasting temporariness (Grzymala-Kazłowska 2005), mobility (Wallace 2002; Sheller and Urry 2006), free movers (Favell 2008), liquid migration (Engbersen et al. 2010; Glorius et al. 2013) and multiple migrations (Ciobanu 2015). Return and circular migration are becoming increasingly important in post-enlargement Europe, and Eastern European migrants are most likely to engage in this temporary circular and transnational mobility (Favell 2008; Martin and Radu 2012).

Within this context, Latvia has experienced an intensive migration turnover and substantial population shifts in its recent history. Since 1991, and in particular after joining the EU in 2004, high rates of emigration have characterised the migration system in Latvia. Government statistics indicate a loss, caused by net emigration, of more than 400,000 people over the period since 1991, resulting in a substantial decline in the overall population. The UK, Germany, Ireland and the Scandinavian countries (particularly Norway and Sweden) have been the principal destinations for Latvian migrants within the EU since the late 1990s. The most recent wave of emigration is associated with the global economic crisis that exploded on to the scene in 2008 (Hazans 2013; Krisjane et al. 2013). Previous studies in Latvia have focused on migration flows and the characteristics of migrants before and after Latvia's accession to the EU (Eglite and Krisjane 2009; Hazans and Philips 2009), but more recent studies highlight the effects of the economic downturn on the patterns and composition of migrant flows and on the behaviour of migrants (Krisjane et al. 2013; Hazans 2013; McCollum et al. 2013). In addition, labour emigration and the economic downturn pose a

significant challenge to the demographic situation in Latvia, since the country is facing a significant drop in fertility rates and an overall ageing of the population. Given the deteriorating demographic situation, the possible return of emigrants can be seen as crucial for the sustainable development of Latvian society. However, the return migration of Latvians over the period of time covered by our study was modest and reflected poorly in the statistics. Nevertheless, we present an empirical investigation of return intentions and examine the characteristics of both potential returnees and stayers abroad, as well as repeat and first-time migrants. The research questions we address in this chapter are whether there are distinctive compositional variations in the propensities to return or to stay abroad, depending on the migration behaviour, and whether these differences are distinguishable by gender, age, family type, socio-economic status and migration attributes. Considering the connections between return and circular migration, personal characteristics also shape identity-construction processes—such as a sense of belonging and feelings of homesickness or alienation—and can affect both return plans and transnational practices or the interplay between the two.

As already demonstrated by the Latvian example above, an important difficulty with the study of return and circular migration is the measurement of these flows (Dustmann and Weiss 2007; Skeldon 2012). While many countries have registration procedures in place that allow an assessment of the numbers of incoming migrants, there are no procedures in place that register immigrants who leave a country or who move repeatedly. Similarly, many circular migrants do not register, and are therefore overlooked in studies based on official population statistics. We therefore used an internet survey of Latvian immigrants in the top destination countries as the primary data source in our research. Our study thus explores, on the one hand, the significance of external processes influencing intra-EU migratory patterns by contextual description and migrant-group identification under specific conditions; on the other hand, research favours the global accessibility of information and technologies while creating transnational spaces and identifying nationals abroad.

More specifically, the focus of this chapter is on the return intentions of Latvian immigrants living abroad. Research on the return intention

reveals that the latter is more important than the relationship with the actual return-migration decision-making, in that return intentions reflect migrants' attitudes to the migration experience as a whole, and may have the potential to affect both integration processes and transnational practices. However, it should be noted that the relationship between stated intentions and actual behaviour is sometimes subject to critical evaluation (Manski 1990; Constant and Massey 2002). Nevertheless, in the migration literature it is widely acknowledged that the intention to move is the primary determinant of migration behaviour, and the forces that trigger intentions are the same as those that actually make people move (Hughes and McCormick 1985; De Jong 2000). Despite the fact that evidence on international migration intentions is scarce, intentions are good predictors of future behaviour (Waldorf 1995; van Dalen and Henkens 2012).

The outline of this chapter is as follows. We begin with a short and selective review of the literature on the nexus between return and circular migration. The second section introduces context-related patterns of contemporary emigration from Latvia, including recent patterns and dynamics of return migration to the country. The dataset and methods used in the analyses are described in the third section. The fourth section outlines the empirical results based on logistic regression analysis and the chapter ends with some concluding remarks and a discussion of how intentions to return interact with migration behaviour and the previous experience of Latvian immigrants.

10.1 The Nexus Between Return and Circular Migration

In this section, for the sake of completeness, we summarise briefly some essential points from the literature on the nexus between return and circular migration. The recent growth in migration has been accompanied by an increasing diversity of migration forms. Consequently, the diverse forms of mobility have replaced permanent migration in an age of mass migration and hypermobility (Hatton and Williamson 1998; Favell et al. 2007). Migration in general is usually characterised not by a simple movement from one place to another, but by a complex sequence of move-

ments forwards, backwards and onwards (Skeldon 2012) which take place in migration systems that connect countries and regions (Fawcett 1989). According to the human-capital model, migrants may return by drawing on the relative weights attached to earnings related to the skills acquired abroad and the costs of living in different places (Dustmann and Weiss 2007; Dustmann et al. 2011). Beyond these economic considerations, return migration is also informed by concerns about security, the education of children, health reasons, cultural detachment and social inclusion (Cassarino 2004), and migrants' feelings of homesickness or alienation (Gmelch 1980). Within this framework, return migration may not be the end of the migration sequence but rather a precursor of repeated, chain, onward and circular migration (Cassarino 2004; King 2012). Circular migrants engage in a regular and repetitive series of outward and return movements between an origin country and a destination (or destinations). Thus the idea of circular migration provides a more accurate sense of the experience of the majority of those who moved, as many migrations nowadays are temporary (Adda et al. 2006; Skeldon 2012). In an era of transnationalism, the terms 'return migration', 'temporary migration' and 'circular migration' overlap, and the boundaries between them are sometimes blurred (Carling and Erdal 2014). Return visits to the country of origin, or circulation, is perceived as a transnational practice which, in numerous ways, interacts with possible return migration (Burrell 2009; King et al. 2013; Lulle 2014). Transnational migrants are active agents who use circular migration to benefit from the economic and potential situation in both the countries of origin and of destination (Portes 2000; Vertovec 2004; Faist 2008). In addition, circular flows are also intended to encourage development, both for the origin and destination countries of migrants and for the migrants themselves (de Haas 2012; Skeldon 2014). Circular migration, seen from this point of view, seems to be a win—win—win scenario. In addition, circular moves are almost always economically motivated rather than for family reunification or some other primarily non-economic reason (Newland 2009). Contemporary studies on migrant networks and transnationalism have emphasised that technical advances have enabled migrants to build and maintain social fields that link together their countries of origin and destination via cheaper and faster transportation, the internet, mobile

phones and satellite television, as well as through institutional frames and informal channels for remitting money and goods (Larsen et al. 2006). This has expanded the scope for migrants to foster multiple belongings, to develop ‘double identities’, to hold dual citizenship, to travel back and forth, to work and to do business simultaneously in distant places (Cassarino 2004; Vertovec 2004, 2009; de Haas 2005). Similarly, some recent studies reveal an increase in transnational practices and behaviour among Latvian migrants (Findlay et al. 2013; Krisjane et al. 2013; Kerevica 2014; King and Lulle 2015).

10.2 The Context of Emigration from Latvia

Latvia, despite its small population of only two million, represents an interesting case in migration research. The country has experienced an intensive migration turnover and substantial population shifts in its recent history. Soviet occupation in Latvia started with large-scale immigration, mainly from Russia, a flow that remained high throughout the 1980s. This immigration was part of a deliberate political and ideological agenda to disperse a predominately Russian-speaking workforce through ‘organised channels’ of migration to other republics in the Soviet Union (Kulu and Tammaru 2003; Gentile and Tammaru 2006; Eglite 2009; Lindemann 2009). Since the removal of the Iron Curtain in 1989 and the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, Latvia, along with other Eastern European countries, became a country of emigration. Eastern European countries witnessed the removal of migration barriers and the phenomenon of mass East—West European migration started (Okolski 2004; Mansoor and Quillin 2006). In Latvia, after four decades of continuous immigration, net migration since 1991 has been consistently negative (see Table 10.1). The dissolution of the Soviet Union triggered a massive wave of mainly Russian-speakers’ return migration to their ethnic homelands in the 1990s (Heleniak 2004; Eglite 2009). Westward emigration at that time was modest and intensified only in the 2000s. Since 2004, migration flows between Latvia and Western Europe are part of the much wider mobility of citizens from accession countries that have recently joined the European Union (EU).

Table 10.1 Long-term migration trends to and from Latvia

	Immigration	Emigration	Net migration
1951–1960	639,880	–459,832	180,048
1961–1970	476,934	–335,872	141,062
1971–1980	548,643	–428,235	120,408
1981–1990	506,576	–423,953	82,623
1991–2003	64,002	–287,097	–223,095
2004–2013	71,520	–253,231	–181,711

Source: Statistical database of the Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia

The eastward enlargement of the EU had a substantial effect on the increase of migration outflows from Latvia, although migration patterns and the intensity of flows have been quite diverse since the mid-2000s. First, in 2004, only the UK, Ireland and Sweden opened their labour markets to the accession countries. Gradually, other established member states also opened their labour markets, the last being Germany and Austria in 2011 (Engbersen et al. 2013). This resulted in a great inflow of migrants from Latvia to the UK, Ireland, Germany and some Scandinavian countries. Second, the global economic crisis that occurred in 2008 had an impact on the patterns and composition of migrant outflows and on the behaviour of Latvian migrants. Following the country's accession to the EU, Latvia experienced rapid economic growth, which caused emigration rates to drop slightly (Fig. 10.1). However, the Latvian economy faced a notable decrease in employment, wages and gross domestic product (GDP) because of the financial crisis of 2007–09, and the most recent wave of emigration is associated with the subsequent economic recession (Smith and Swain 2010; Hazans 2013; Krisjane et al. 2013; McCollum et al. 2013). According to official statistics, this crisis migration from Latvia peaked in 2009–11 (see Fig. 10.1). Since 2012, Latvia has been seen as one of the most successful countries in overcoming the economic crisis (Aslund and Dombrovskis 2011). However, on the social side and despite the economic recovery, the situation remains unfavourable: the purchasing power of employees has been reduced, unemployment rates are decreasing only slowly, and emigration is still higher than during the EU post-accession years.

The return migration of Latvian nationals since the mid-2000s has been modest; the increase observed in recent years is, instead, the result of




Fig. 10.1 Recent international migration trends in Latvia. *Source:* Statistical database of the Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia. *Note:* *including non-citizens of Latvia.

statistical recalculations after the most recent census in 2011. The negative decision to return-migrate observed among recent emigrants may pose certain risks for the growth potential and sustainability of social security in the Baltic States (Hazans 2012). Moreover, there is strong evidence that emigration is continuing and that the number of Latvian migrants abroad has grown in recent years. According to official statistics of the top host countries, there has been an increase in Latvian immigrants in all countries apart from Ireland (Fig. 10.2).

During the economic crisis, Ireland was hit by high unemployment and the number of Latvian migrants decreased slightly. Most recently, Latvian emigration has become more orientated towards the UK, Germany and Norway. In much the same way, Sweden was expecting large numbers of immigrants from the Baltic States and Poland; however, the actual figures did not reach the expected level (Drinkwater et al. 2009; Olofsson and Malmberg 2011; Apsite et al. 2012). To conclude, emigration flows from Latvia since the mid-2000s have been fairly responsive to the changes in legal and economic conditions both at home and in the host countries. However, the main destinations remained relatively stable over the period.




Fig. 10.2 The stock of Latvian immigrants—top five host countries. *Source:* Eurostat database; OECD statistics.

10.3 Data and Methods

10.3.1 Data and Sample Description

The empirical analyses presented in this study are based on data collected from an online internet survey of Latvian nationals living in the five destination countries with the largest numbers of Latvian migrants. This data-gathering method was used because the available data on return migration in general are weak, being concentrated on the analysis and explanation of emigration processes. Specialised surveys are normally required in order to generate the information necessary to trace return movements or intentions and the population characteristics behind them. In addition, the use of internet-based survey tools is an increasingly common research approach in Migration Studies and enables the collection of a large quantity of primary data, especially over geographically dispersed areas (Oiarzabal and Reips 2012; Reips and Buffardi 2012; McCollum and Apsite-Berina 2015).

The survey was conducted in 2012, with the questionnaire being posted individually on a locally popular online social network website—www.frype.com (www.draugiem.lv in Latvian)—a widely recognised and highly popular communication channel among Latvians; together with the survey, it was selected repeatedly and the data gathered thus proved to be extremely valuable, as shown in a previous research study (McCollum and Apsite-Berina 2015). For the purpose of studying return intentions, these data are unique not only in terms of migrant characteristics, but also because they provide an insight into peoples' migration behaviour. The questionnaire contained 40 questions on respondents' demographic characteristics, socio-economic status, emigration motives and livelihood particulars. The participants in our study were given a full description of the aims and objectives of the survey and various ethical guarantees.

The research population consisted of 2,565 Latvian immigrants, among whom 1,117 were resident in the UK, 618 lived in Ireland and 426 in Germany, while 404 respondents were surveyed in Sweden and Norway together. The respondents were aged between 16 and 73 years, though most were younger than 30. Where possible we correlated our respondents in the UK so that the sample corresponded with the general age composition of A8/Latvian migrants in the UK at that time (Gillingham 2010; McCollum and Apsite-Berina 2015). Overall, 1,036 males and 1,529 females participated in the questionnaire survey. However, in the present study we focus on four distinct migrant groups, identified in line with the overall research objectives. The survey data allowed the simultaneous collection of pre-migration data on return intentions and post-migration data on the actual migration behaviour and previous experiences (Fig. 10.3).

Our data distinguish certain groups of people who are in favour of returning to Latvia, and those who are not. Their intention to return from the selected destination countries show quite similar results among Latvian immigrants. When asked if the respondents were considering a return to Latvia within the next 5 years, the majority—ranging from 74 % in the UK to 81 % in Germany—claimed that they would not choose this option. The highest numbers of people willing to return was found among Latvians living in the UK. As regards the migration experience itself, the results were not so obvious, and we found more pronounced differences between the destination countries. Of all the




Fig. 10.3 Surveyed immigrants according to the research objectives (%). Source: Authors’ own survey.

respondents, 64 % had a previous migratory experience, thus ensuring the stability of migration outflows. The context of economic conditions, uncertainty and unemployment in Latvia plays an important role in the ongoing process of emigration, still reeling from the effects of the recent economic recession. The majority (57 %) of respondents participating in the survey moved to their particular host country during the recent economic crisis between 2009 and 2011; all other years were represented by less than 7 %.

10.3.2 Methodology

Binary logistic regression models were applied for the analysis, including the following variables: gender, age, education, children abroad, partner abroad, information channels, migrant group, occupation in Latvia, occupation abroad, region of emigration in Latvia, period of emigration, reason for emigration (work-related, quality of life, private, adventure/student), and repeat migration experience. This enabled us to analyse the compositional differences between the various groups of emigrants from Latvia, particularly with our specific interest in their return intentions and previous experience of migration. The regression equation is formalised as follows:

$$\log \frac{p(Y_i = 1)}{p(Y_i = 0)} = \alpha + \sum_{k=1}^K \beta_k X_{ik} \tag{1}$$

Where $p(Y_i=1)$ is the probability that an individual $i=1, \dots, I$ falls into the category of ‘potential returnee’ in Model 1 and ‘repeat migrant’ in Model 2; $p(Y_i=0)$ is the probability that an individual $i=1, \dots, I$ corresponds to ‘stayer abroad’ in Model 1, and ‘first-time migrant’ in Model 2; α is a constant, X_{ik} is the value of variable k for individual i ; and β_k is a parameter describing the impact of variable k , with K variables.

10.4 Who Intends to Return?

10.4.1 Descriptive Patterns

Table 10.2 shows the characteristics of potential returnees and individuals wishing to remain abroad, as derived from the online survey data. The analysis disaggregates the sample according to whether the migrants are willing to return to Latvia within the next five years or if they prefer to remain in one of the countries of residence in this period of reference. It is possible to draw some conclusions regarding the typical characteristics of recent emigrants from Latvia. Overall, 67 % of our respondents do not plan to return to Latvia in the next five years and have not made any concrete plans. The main discouragement for them is the uncertain economic and social situation in Latvia and an insufficient number of employment positions to enable them to earn an income and cover their monthly commitments. Thus improvements in the Latvian economy could stimulate partial increases in return migration. Integration in the host country varies greatly, depending on the migrant’s characteristics. Labour migrants arriving alone in the host country often do not use any integration strategies and their social network is limited to other migrants, whether from Latvia or from other countries. Around 60 % of all respondents have friends and relatives with experience of migration, who act as a main source of information, and help the migrant to pursue his or her international move. These informal networks for Latvian migrants thus play a very important role in both migration and return-migration behaviours. However, in reality, high unemployment, an unappealing set of economic circumstances and reintegration difficulties in the

Table 10.2 Compositional differences between potential returnees and stayers abroad in the research population (%)

	Variable	Potential returnees	Stayers abroad	Total
Gender	Female	52.2	61.8	59.6
	Male	47.8	38.2	40.4
Age group	16–25 years	44.7	35.1	37.3
	26–45 years	44.7	54.6	52.4
	46+ years	10.6	10.3	10.3
Marital status	Married, in cohabitation	52.2	54.0	53.6
	Single	47.8	46.0	46.4
Family type	No children <18 years	67.6	58.8	60.8
	Children <18 years	32.4	41.2	39.2
Level of education	Primary	13.8	15.6	15.2
	Secondary	41.8	37.2	38.2
	Secondary vocational	30.8	33.2	32.7
	University	13.4	13.9	13.8
Occupation in host country	Student	6.2	9.0	8.4
	Inactive	11.5	14.1	13.5
	Unemployed	4.8	4.1	4.2
	Low-skilled	39.2	30.3	32.4
	High-skilled	25.0	24.1	24.3
Period of emigration	Professional/manager	13.7	18.4	17.2
	Pre-crisis, 2004–2007	23.5	34.4	31.9
Migration experience	Crisis, 2008–2012	76.5	65.6	68.1
	First-time migrant	42.3	34.3	36.1
Reason for emigration	Repeat migrant	57.7	65.7	63.9
	Family-related	23.6	27.7	26.7
	Other	76.4	72.3	73.3
	Work-related	55.8	55.8	55.8
	Other	44.2	44.2	44.2
	Credit, mortgage payments	36.6	37.0	36.9
	Other	63.4	63.0	63.1
	Missing perspectives	35.1	44.1	42.1
	Other	64.9	55.9	57.9
	Adventure–/study-related	21.6	17.6	18.5
Other	78.4	82.4	81.5	
Host country	Germany	14.2	17.3	16.6
	UK	48.8	42.0	43.5
	Ireland	22.8	24.5	24.1
	Sweden and Norway	14.2	16.2	15.8
		<i>N</i> = 584	<i>N</i> = 1,981	<i>N</i> = 2,565

Source: Own calculations.

origin country have kept many potential return migrants from actually going back.

Regarding the emigrants' return plans, those who wish to return—compared to those who have decided not to return—belong to the so-called 'crisis migrants' group. This term indicates the length of time the migrants have spent abroad and their experiences in the host country(ies). Respondents who left Latvia in the pre-crisis period are less likely to return than are recent 'crisis migrants'. The prolonged stay helped them to settle in and, as in other cases, the probability of the migrants returning has decreased over time (Massey and Espinosa 1997). Similar results were found in research with Lithuanian migrants—"The longer they stay abroad, the more likely Lithuanian emigrants are to establish roots in the host-country" (Thaut 2009, p. 210) and thus do not return. Those changing their place of residency intend 'to settle abroad' (Pinger 2010) and do not want to return to the origin country.

More detailed analysis of possible returnees and stayers abroad indicates that emigrants can be categorised into diverse groups regarding their previous migration experience, their reasons for emigration and how much they have been influenced by the current economic conditions in the country of origin when going through the decision-making process and choosing the most attractive destination. Our analysis distinguishes only certain groups of people who are in favour of returning to Latvia, however, thus setting the preconditions that could change the migrants' future plans. The current context of economic instability, uncertainty and unemployment pose great challenges for crisis migrants to face.

Table 10.3 shows an interesting aspect regarding female migrants, who appear to display a smaller propensity to return than do male migrants. This highlights the so-called feminisation of migration (Castles and Miller 2009) and reflects the increasingly large proportion of labour-migrant flows constituted by women, who are mainly single in the case of potential returnees, and family breadwinners in the case of stayers (Morakvasic 2002; Kofman 2003). The age distribution shows that potential returnees are younger (aged 16–25) and rarely have children, but those wishing to stay abroad for at least another five years are aged between 26 and 45 years old and have a higher propensity for moving with children under 18 years of age. Figures on education levels show that people with

Table 10.3 Results of binary logistic regression with a dependent variable: potential returnee (1), stayer abroad (0)

Variable	Exp (B)	Sig.
Gender (ref: female)		
Male	0.518	***
Age group (ref: 26–45 years)		
16–25 years	0.404	***
46+ years	0.336	**
Marital status (ref: married, cohabiting)		
Single	-0.124	
Family type (ref: no children under 18 years)		
Children under 18 years	0.218	*
Level of education (ref: primary)		
Secondary	0.419	***
Vocational secondary	0.265	*
University	0.425	***
Occupation in host country (ref: low-skilled)		
Student	-0.654	***
Inactive	-0.211	
Unemployed	-0.040	
High-skilled	-0.163	*
Professional/manager	-0.663	***
Period of emigration (ref: pre-crisis, 2004–2007)		
Crisis, 2008–2012	0.456	***
Migration experience (ref: first time)		
Repeat	-0.303	***
Reason for emigration from Latvia		
Family-related (ref: other)	-0.190	
Work-related (ref: other)	-0.205	**
Credit, mortgage payments (ref: other)	-0.069	
Missing perspectives (ref: other)	-0.502	***
Adventure-/study-related (ref: other)	0.187	
Host country (ref: Sweden and Norway)		
Germany	-0.049	
UK	0.243	*
Ireland	0.046	
Constant	-1.378	

Source: Own calculations.

Notes: * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

a primary and a subsequent vocational education are more likely to be stayers, whereas the group of potential returnees comprises mainly peo-

ple with a secondary education. Those occupied in low-skilled positions have far higher intentions to return than have students, the inactive or migrants employed as professionals or managers. Crisis-period migrants (emigrating from Latvia between 2008 and 2012) are more likely to return than are 'pre-crisis migrants' (who emigrated between 2004 and 2007). First-time migrants have fewer intentions to return than do repeat migrants. Interestingly, economic or unemployment-related reasons for emigration are less important in terms of return intentions. Individuals emigrating for family reasons and 'a lack of future prospects' in Latvia are more likely to stay abroad. On the other hand, the adventure-seeking group and students are among potential returnees. Finally, migrants surveyed in the UK show a higher probability of return than respondents in all other countries.

10.4.2 Regression Analysis

The binary regression output displayed in Table 10.3 shows that potential returnees are more likely to be male in the age groups 16–25 and 46+ years than migrants aged 26–45 years of age. They tend to have children who are under 18 years of age.

Migrants who have secondary-, vocational secondary and university-level education compared to just a primary education have a higher propensity to return. Evidence from research by Pungas et al. (2012) on Estonian return migration found that education level was not related to a tendency to return. However, in the case of migrants from Latvia, occupational groups of students, the highly skilled and professionals compared to low-skilled in the host country are less likely to return. The propensity to return is higher among recent 'crisis migrants' compared to those who migrated pre-crisis. Interestingly, migrants with previous migratory experience compared to those without such experience display a lower likelihood of returning within the following five years. This could be explained by the absence of attractive pull factors, related to the worsening of economic conditions since the crisis, which also pushed a certain number of crisis-period migrants to return, albeit reluctantly. When all the main destination countries are tested for migrants' propensity to return, only those in the UK showed a higher probability of being re-attracted by Latvia.

For those who had already returned to Latvia, the return decision was based on their personal experiences and generally private and emotional feelings. The Latvian culture and nature, and the feeling of being among fellow Latvians, all played a crucial role when migrants made their return decision; however, the economic perspectives and ambiguity about the conditions in Latvia may prevent migrants from returning in the near future (Apsite-Berina 2013). After the actual return, several reintegration issues have to be faced, such as reintegration into the education system for children, finding employment, housing and social security.

The output from the binary logistic regression model (see Table 10.4) analysing the migratory experience reveals that potential returnees are more likely to be ‘first-time migrants’, a finding in line with previous research dealing with the interrelationship between settling in the country of residency and the time spent abroad. Previous studies confirm that returning home during a period of crisis can have further implications. Individuals with previous work experience abroad display a higher propensity to re-migrate to the same country, or to another European country, thus empowering potential repeat and circular migration in an enlarged Europe (Zaiceva and Zimmermann 2012).

This is further confirmed by the ‘period of emigration’ variable, which states that people emigrating from Latvia in the period between 2008 and 2012 have a higher probability of being ‘first-time migrants’. However, accession migrants show previous migration experience. In line with this, migrants whose motivation to migrate is work-related compared to other motives display a higher likelihood of a previous migration experience. However, a lack of future prospects at the time of the migration created a new category of migrants—mainly caused by the worsening economic conditions in Latvia. People previously contributing to the European migratory system were older—specifically aged over 46 years—compared to the younger age group (26–45) who are part of the more recent migratory system and tend to have no children under the age of 18 years. Individuals with a university education compared to those with only a primary education display a higher propensity to be first-time migrants, which can, again, be associated with the economic crisis. High-skilled workers and professionals in the host country tend to have previous migration experience. Finally, there are several differences between the destination countries. Migrants to

Table 10.4 Results of binary logistic regression with a dependent variable: repeat migrants (1), first-time migrants (0)

Variable	Exp (B)	Sig.
Gender (ref: female)		
Male	0.110	
Age group (ref: 26–45 years)		
16–25 years	0.026	
46+ years	0.370	**
Marital status (ref: married, cohabiting)		
Single	0.002	
Family type (ref: no children under 18 years)		
Children under 18 years	-0.166	*
Level of education (ref: primary)		
Secondary	0.071	
Vocational secondary	0.066	
University	-0.319	*
Occupation in host country (ref: low-skilled)		
Student	-0.037	
Inactive	-0.111	
Unemployed	-0.198	
High-skilled	0.276	**
Professional/manager	0.301	*
Period of emigration (ref: pre-crisis, 2004–2007)		
Crisis, 2008–2012	-1.251	***
Intention to return (ref: no)		
Yes	-0.296	***
Reason for emigration from Latvia		
Family-related (ref: other)	-0.107	
Work-related (ref: other)	0.178	**
Credit, mortgage payments (ref: other)	-0.127	
Missing perspective (ref: other)	-0.178	**
Adventure-/study-related (ref: other)	-0.183	
Host country (ref: Sweden and Norway)		
Germany	0.756	***
UK	0.255	*
Ireland	-0.764	***
Constant	-1.378	

Source: Own calculations.

Notes: * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Germany and the UK compared to those to Sweden and Norway generally have previous migration experience, but migrants to Ireland com-

pared to Sweden and Norway had a higher propensity to be first-time migrants. In the case of Germany, the migratory regime for immigrants from Latvia changed on 1 May 2011 and thus attracted more new, first-time migrants to the country.

10.5 Conclusions

Most recent studies on international migration show that, following the first migration and in the context of political, institutional and socio-economic changes, migrants are likely to move again. This chapter has demonstrated that migration patterns among Latvians have been changing. Our study investigated the individual characteristics and compositional variations linked to the return intentions of Latvian immigrants living abroad. Our assumption here is that the decision to migrate is a well-thought-out and planned action. Therefore, the return intentions would be closely related to the actual migration behaviour. However, uncertainty and changing circumstances can easily alter an individual's previous decision. Nevertheless, return intentions based on individual-level characteristics can provide valuable insights into the ongoing discussion about East–West migration in Europe, which has focused mainly on the socio-economic dimension. As our analysis was based on a representative sample of Latvian immigrants in the top receiving countries, we focused on the compositional context in the desire to return to Latvia, and on differences among migrant groups based on their migration behaviours. We wanted to find out how the migrant composition contributed to shaping return-migration intentions and depended on previous migration behaviour. Latvian immigrants in the selected destination countries are far from being a homogeneous group, but the dominant emigration reason was related to common economic push factors from Latvia and the desire to gain international experience. The methodological approach adopted in this article was via social media, which are widely used by the modern migrant; this allowed researchers to communicate with the migrants directly (Reips and Buffardi 2012). A popular Latvian social media network was used to draw out valuable data relating to the characteristics of Latvian migrants resident in the top destination countries in Europe. As Latvia was one of the countries hit by the 'Great Recession'

of the late 2000s, the intensity of the expected return migration could be delayed (Zaiceva and Zimmermann 2012). The findings of the regression analysis can be summarised as follows. First, we found higher odds of return intentions among males, the young, the elderly, families with children and people with a higher educational level. The most common among prospective returnees were migrants who left Latvia during the economic recession. Second, students and highly skilled migrants had fewer intentions to consider returning. Third, respondents whose migration behaviours corresponded with circular migration were less inclined to return. This finding could be related directly to the fact that return among Latvian immigrants is seen as likely to be permanent. At the same time, the results also point to increasing evidence of repeat-migration behaviours among Latvians. These migrants benefit from their stays abroad, but do not always see an opportunity to return to their country of origin, especially at a time of economic recession. Moreover, we found that those who went abroad, as with low-skilled workers during a period of economic recession, displayed a higher propensity to return—which could be influenced by general economic improvements and a rise in the social attractiveness of the country of origin. Finally, we end by recognising that further work is required in order to provide a better understanding of the multiple roles that migration, and the migrants themselves, play in the EU internal space and countries of source and destination.

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11

Stay, Return or Move On? Mobility Decisions of International Students in Germany

Birgit Glorius

All over Europe there are significant signs of demographic decline and labour market shortages. The migration of a highly qualified individual is, therefore, an important instrument to secure technological and economic development. Source and destination countries compete for highly qualified migrants, and implement various programmes with the aim of attracting foreigners or motivating and supporting the return of country nationals.

Within this contextual framework, migrants have to make mobility decisions, matching their knowledge of labour markets and quality of life in various countries with individual expectations, plans and dreams. But how do they actually make their decision concerning future mobility steps? Do they compare options and constraints actively on a rational basis? How do they perceive the legal and institutional possibilities offered by the states in question? How important is rationality against emotional aspects of decision-making? And how do they consider further mobility steps in the light of their own biography, which not only concerns their individual careers, but also possible effects on spouses and other family members?

B. Glorius (✉)

Institute for European Studies, TU Chemnitz, Chemnitz, Germany

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The paper aims to explore the decision-making process of highly qualified migrants, tackling the questions raised above. It draws on a case study at the University of Halle/Germany carried out in 2008 and 2009, with 31 narrative interviews with primary degree, Ph.D. and Post-doctorate students. The paper is organised into four sections: following the introduction, it briefly discusses theoretical approaches to migration, retention and return in the first section. The second section provides background information on Germany as a receiving country of international students. The third section presents and discusses the main findings, based on the research questions formulated above, while the fourth section draws general conclusions and identifies open research questions.

11.1 How Do Consecutive Mobility Decisions Come About?

Student mobility has been researched widely in recent decades, mainly exploring the return–development nexus from a neoclassical research perspective (see Fromhold-Eisebith 2002; Hunger 2000; Saxenian and Hsu 2001). Another body of studies addresses the value of studying abroad for the returning individual; for example, ERASMUS students (Teichler and Janson 2007) but also on returnees from Central and Eastern European countries who worked or studied in Western European countries (Klein-Hitpaß 2011; Wolfeil 2012). In particular, the case of Polish graduates returning from Germany has been explored thoroughly; for example, by Wolfeil (2012). Regarding the probability of either the retention or return of highly qualified migrants and graduates, the existing research literature suggests the following assumptions: return is influenced positively by the existence of social capital in the country of origin, while social capital in the target country fosters a permanent stay (Gibson and McKenzie 2009). Retention is more likely the higher the educational degree, and is linked to the length of the migratory stay, meaning that those who completed degree studies in the target country are more likely to stay than those who only spent one or two terms as exchange students (Gibson and McKenzie 2009; Chiu and Hou 2007; Soon 2008). But retention is also more likely in certain fields of study, such as humanities, engineering and

medical science, thus linking individual profiles and migratory decisions to structural factors such as labour market needs in both the target country and in the country of origin. Wolfeil (2012) shows that the chance to apply one's knowledge acquired abroad depends on various factors, such as position of the country in the modernisation process and the degree and field of study of the migrant, but also on social capital that could serve as a door-opener for a successful labour market entry.

Regarding the question of return migration from the individual migrants' perspectives, we have to consider not only rational and strategic arguments such as the labour market situation and career opportunities, but also personal factors such as quality of life or personal relationships in the countries concerned, which can foster return as well as retention. Also, the legal framework for a further migratory stay plays a part in the decision-making process, combined with the migrants' level of knowledge of those legal procedures.

A factor rarely considered in migration theory is the impact of irrationality on migrants' decisions. This may result from asymmetric or selective information available to migrants, or from emotionality connected with the decision-making process. Behavioural approaches in human geography stress the significance of the selectivity of perceptions and individual patterns of information processing, resulting in selective and subjective decision-making processes (Weichhart 2008, pp. 137ff.). Drawing on results from psychological research, we are aware of the importance of instinctive decisions, particularly if the decision in question is very complex or if it is perceived to have the potential to have a very profound impact on later life (Kahnemann 2011; Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Thus individual mobility decisions might thwart rational thinking, and rational or neoclassic explanatory approaches.

11.2 Germany as the Receiving Country for Foreign Students

Germany is an important receiving country for international students, hosting about 10% of all internationally mobile students worldwide. In 2014, there were around 219,000 international students studying at

German universities. Most of them (about 100,000) were enrolled in first degree studies, roughly 78,000 had enrolled for a second degree, and about 24,000 were enrolled on a Ph.D. programme (DAAD and DZHW 2015).¹ In 2014, the largest numbers of educational foreigners at German universities originated from China (around 28,300), followed by the Russian Federation (around 11,100), and India, Austria and Bulgaria (between about 6,700 and 9,300 students from each).

While students from European Union (EU) member states may have a rather smooth start regarding formal issues, non-EU students need to apply for study programmes and student visas prior to moving to Germany. On arrival in the country, they have to register with the local foreign office by confirming that they can secure their income by own means.² Residence permits are issued for the purpose of study, usually for a duration of two years with a yearly extension until the aim of the stay (the graduation) is fulfilled.

An important hurdle for international first-degree students to tackle is the university entry certificate for Germany (*Abitur*) and a German-language certificate. To obtain those certificates, many international first degree students have to pass two semesters of preparatory classes in specific colleges (*Landesstudienkolleg*) before being enrolled for degree studies.

Until very recently, third-country nationals were obliged to leave the country after graduation, as labour market integration had not been foreseen by the German administration. In recent years, however, facing demographic decline and significant shortages in highly qualified personnel, especially in innovative branches such as information technology or biotechnology, German politics changed immigration policy in favour of highly qualified foreigners, aiming at the recruitment of international graduates from German universities. The New German Immigration Act of 2004 (put into practice after 1 January 2005) foresees a one-year residence permit for third-country nationals in order to search for a job

¹ However, these numbers and percentages do not give a precise picture, as quite frequently exchange students are documented as first-level students even if they had already been enrolled at a university in their country of origin (see the methodological remarks on www.wissenschaft-weltoffen.de).

² Which requires a bank account containing the sum of at least €8,040 for the first year.

within one year of graduating from a German university (§16, Abs. 4 *AufenthG*). After signing an employment contract, third-country graduates are eligible for a long-term residence permit (BMI and BAMF 2008).

11.3 The Case of International Students at the Martin Luther University in Halle, Germany

The Martin Luther University (MLU) in Halle is the largest university of the East German Federal State of Saxonia-Anhalt. The MLU takes part in the internationalisation process of German universities and attracts rising numbers of foreign students and Ph.D. candidates; for example, by introducing Master's and Ph.D. programmes taught in English language or by specific recruitment programmes among graduates from German Language Schools³ abroad. Around 1,600 international students enrolled at the MLU in the year the study was carried out. The MLU has a good reputation in study programmes of the natural sciences, such as biology, chemistry, physics or pharmacy. Ph.D. programmes are not only offered by the university itself, but also by numerous research institutions established in the past, forming a scientific cluster of natural and earth sciences.⁴

11.3.1 Survey Methodology

In the years 2008 and 2009, I undertook in-depth interviews with 31 international students and Ph.D. candidates at MLU, covering a wide range of issues around their migration biographies. The first respon-

³ Graduates from International German Language Schools received their high school education predominantly in the German language, thus being well prepared for attending university programmes in Germany. Quite frequently, they are accepted without additional preparatory courses, as they hold university entry certificates which are equivalent to the German *Abitur* as well as a German language certificate. Thus they are a major focus group aiming to increase the number of international students in Germany (DAAD 2008).

⁴ Among others, the associated institutes for Polymer-Science, Agrochemistry, Dermatopharmacy, Technical Biochemistry, the Max Planck Institutes for Enzymology and for Microstructural Physics, or the Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research.

Table 11.1 Basic characteristics of the interviewees

Aspect	Number of cases
Status	19 first degree students, 12 Ph.D./Post-Doc
Field of study	Language and Cultural Studies and Sports: 8; Law, Economics and Social Sciences: 9; Mathematics and Natural Sciences: 11; Engineering: 3
Age	22 years and younger: 9; 23–26 years: 9; 27 years and older: 13
Gender	15 Male; 16 Female
Family status	25 Single; 6 Married, of which 2 with child/ren
Country of origin	Asia: 8; Africa/Arabia: 4; Western Europe: 2; Central and South Eastern Europe: 8; Russia: 4; USA: 1; South and Middle America: 4

Source: Own survey

dents were recruited with the initial help of the university's international office, in German language classes and in social programmes for international Ph.D. students. Further interviewees were found by the snowball method. The interviews were carried out in German and English, taped and transcribed.⁵ Analysis was made step-by-step, first doing sequential analysis and thematic coding of each individual interview, followed by a thematic cross-sample analysis.

Table 11.1 shows the basic biographical characteristics of the interviewees. Regarding gender, field of study and region of origin of the interviewees, the sample largely corresponds with the total of international students at MLU in the year of the survey. In the presentation of my data, I will concentrate on migrants' perceptions and strategies regarding further mobility steps, analysing the arguments for starting a career in Germany versus returning to the country of origin or leaving for another country.

11.3.2 Should I Stay or Should I Go? Substantiating Future Mobility Perspectives

The prognosis of future mobility steps is a constrained field of research, on both a macro and a micro scale. While on a macro scale problems

⁵ For this chapter, German quotes have been translated into English by the author. The quotes that were originally done in English have been retained as recorded, including any grammar mistakes made by the non-native speakers.

derive from the construction of indicators serving as prognostic tools, on a micro scale we are confronted by considerations on future decisions, which might change over time or might not be carried out, for several reasons. For the following analysis, I will leave aside this issue of possible non-realisation. The analysis is based on the current self-assessment of the interviewees, and examines the arguments the interviewees use to substantiate their current opinions. Using future mobility perspectives as a structuring variable, I could differentiate five types of further migration strategies (Table 11.2). I will describe these types and reproduce their main lines of argumentation in the following paragraphs.

The first type characterises migrants who are pursuing a transnational lifestyle, which could mean that they stay in Germany, return to their home country, or move on to a third country. Those considerations are largely determined by career considerations, focusing on the quality of accessible jobs rather than on the country where those jobs are located.

I think I probably will go back to China or go to another country to continue my research. (GradM2, China)

I think I cannot find, I can work in Germany but not for a long time because my own experience, my own knowledge is petroleum engineering ... so I prefer to go to a country or back to Iran to find a job or study petroleum engineering, but I don't know. (GradF6, Iran)

Table 11.2 Typology of future migration strategies

Type	Main characteristics and arguments
Transnational lifestyle	International (academic) career; specifics of field of work; transnational family considerations
Career orientated return	Gain experience and fuel career back home; return as expatriate of international/German company
Stay constrained	'Forced' return; homesickness
Return constrained	Unfavourable living situation and job opportunities at home; transferability of cultural capital; acculturation of spouse
Stay for good	Living conditions; job opportunities; transnational cultural capital as additional asset

Source: Own survey

What is peculiar to this type is that all of the answers display a high degree of uncertainty towards the future career and migration path. Given that the young scientists are in an early stage of a two- or three-year contract and their future career will be highly dependent on the outcome and quality of their current research, and given the project-bound and rather short-term appointments in international research projects, we can easily understand this attitude. One variation within the transnational lifestyle type are transnational families, who are not solely concentrated on career issues, but who are making their choice in the light of two different socialisations and thus different perceptions of where the best place will be to establish a family life. The following quote displays the inner negotiation process of a student from the USA who is married to a German.

Possible that we stay here. But actually we want to move back to the U.S. in four, five years ... None of us has feelings attached to a specific place. She doesn't need to stay in Germany, and I don't feel like returning to the place I was born either. In Germany, there is nothing that holds us. Maybe we move to Canada ... The health system in Germany is better, and also the education. But college seems to be better in the U.S. But you pay a lot of money for it ... We don't know where we'll actually end up. If we return to the U.S., it is not out of question that we re-emigrate to Germany one day. (StudM6, USA)

The second type consists of interviewees who perceive their education in Germany, combined with some initial work experience abroad, as an important asset to fuel their career back home. These interviewees perceive living conditions in their home countries to be somewhat preferable, and also display a strong rootedness and explicitly state family and social networks in their home country as a reason for returning. A common strategic vision is to transfer both knowledge and life quality from the German context into the home country. This could be achieved by being employed by a German or international company and being sent back to the country of origin as an 'expatriate', thus being eligible for a much higher income than if one was employed in the home country. Those strategies are based strongly on the assumption that the cultural capital from both home and abroad will be the entry ticket to a suitable position.

I think after I finished my Ph.D. project, if it's possible, if I have the opportunity, I could stay in Germany for two or three or five years and work here ... with this experience I could find a very good job in China. (GradM1, China)

I will study two more years, then I will gain some experience and then return home. There you can earn more, with the German education, you can earn more. (StudM4, Vietnam)

After graduation I want to apply for some company in Germany or in Europe basically. I think here or in Norway ... The money there [in Norway] is just crazy. What I want to do is work there for like a year or something and then I want them to send me back to Thailand, so I can base there, but still got the payment in *Kronen*. (StudM5, Thailand)

A third type of student described various other forces (cultural, social) drawing them back home, so a long-term stay in Germany was not seriously considered. In the cases in my sample, it was strong homesickness that structured this perception, or framing factors such as the regulations of a home country's scholarship that foresaw a return of the person who was financed to go abroad to study.

Two years after my scholarship has finished I have to return to my home country. Otherwise I have to pay back the scholarship [grant]. (GradM4, Serbia)

It would be good for me [to stay after graduation], but I feel so much as a stranger in Germany. Only since I am in Germany I have understood the meaning of words such as 'home' or 'mother'. (StudF4, Russia)

The fourth type, which was a rather large group, consists of people who displayed strong constraints against a return, even though they felt a strong sense of home and an initial wish to return. What was holding them back were the unfavourable living conditions at home, which are even more important when compared to their situation in Germany.

I would be happy to get back and work in Ethiopia, but I don't know, after three years, it might be Western countries, and ... I might prefer in an area where it is paid well. (GradM3, Ethiopia)

I think I would stay here, because when I visit home, I always hear those stories about social security. Poland really has a lot of problems. There is a lot of work, but the people just earn too little. (GradF1, Poland)

Another strong motive is the perception that the cultural capital gained abroad will not be transferable to the home country's labour market, or that the social capital built up in the home country will have vanished during the stay abroad. Especially when a labour market is strongly controlled by social contacts or specific systems knowledge, an absence over several years can alienate the (prospective) returnee from those conditions.

The question is: how do I get along if I never studied my subject in Portuguese language? ... It's possible that people first choose one who has studied within the country, who has this basic knowledge how the system works ... I think I really have no big knowledge about how things work in Brazil, but I think this will play a role, how you build up a system, organisational things like tax, marketing, that's indeed another culture. (StudM1, Brazil)

It's not the case that I don't want to return to my home country, but ... within four, five years, your country may change a lot, and also the people. Possible that you return and you find another country than that which you have left. (StudM9, Ecuador)

Again, there is a further consideration in the case of binational couples, as a return of one partner will mean the emigration of the other, thus there is an additional set of considerations that needs to be taken into account in the course of a familial decision.

If I get a good job with good payment at home ... But I think I must be able to earn for the two of us. Because for my wife it will be difficult, she cannot speak Arabic yet, it's difficult for her. I think she still needs time for socialisation. (StudM2, Morocco)

The last type in my sample consists of interviewees who display a very strong desire to stay in Germany and substantiate this attitude mainly with the favourable living conditions and positive experiences they have had so far. Interestingly, this type consists only of first degree students. In contrast to the postgraduates, they have not yet taken a step into the labour market. Therefore one can assume that their knowledge about their prospects of employment in general is not yet well developed. However, in their statements, career opportunities are an important precondition

for staying. They also make comments with respect to their cultural 'otherness' and its effect on labour market access, but again there is too little experience to evaluate this aspect seriously.

I think I like to stay in Germany. I am planning to go to Berlin and work in the theatre or cinema business. (StudF8, Italy)

And after graduation, I actually want to stay in Germany. Even though I know that I have no chance without a master degree. And with my headscarf even less. (StudF6, Egypt)

After graduation I think this won't be a problem. There are many big firms who ... on the basis of foreign knowledge ... they expand to Russia. (StudM7, Russia)

The typology shows the results of individual risk assessments, taking into account migrants' own life goals in terms of career, income, family and quality of life. It appeared that risk assessment is made on the basis of perceived living conditions, opportunities and constraints rather than on the basis of a wide range of objective information. It became clear that the process of risk assessment is carried out from a transnational perspective. When planning future mobility decisions, the interviewees compare their experiences at the current location with the situation in their country of origin and possible further migration targets. Regarding the possibility of attracting international students for a long-term stay in Germany, the next section will look more deeply at the subjectivity of perceptions and assessments of living conditions and formal frameworks as a component of stay decisions.

11.3.3 Why Not Stay? Assessment of Germany as Host Country

Considerations about consecutive migratory steps were found to begin with general considerations about career opportunities, the living situation and social obligations both at home and abroad. The evaluation of Germany as a possible long-term host country only appeared as a secondary consideration. While the decision to come to Germany was driven mainly by secondary information, the interviewees now can apply their

Table 11.3 Assessment of Germany as a host country

Positive assessment	Negative assessment
<i>Culture and quality of life:</i> Cultural attractions; historical landscapes, quality of life, security	<i>Mentality:</i> Cool and not outgoing mentality, difficult to get into contact, impolite in everyday situations
<i>Research and technology:</i> Research infrastructure, economic strength, research spirit, work attitude	<i>Diversity:</i> Lacking openness towards foreigners, no immigration history, rather homogeneous society

Source: Own survey

own experiences to assess living and working in Germany. It turned out that several perceptions existing prior to the stay proved to be true, but other experiences were rather surprising to the interviewees (see Table 11.3). The outstanding position of Germany as a high technology country with an excellent research and development infrastructure—a perception that was already in place prior to the stay—turned out to be true, and the actual research landscape even exceeded expectations. But also the rich culture and history of Germany and the local quality of life was assessed positively and evaluated as a pull factor to attract qualified migrants, with a preference for short-term stays, as the following quote puts it.

So I think Germany should be ... give [giving] people more knowledge, or let people know more about Germany's culture and history ... Yeah, I think that would be another thing to attract people to ... yes, to do some research short stay in Germany. (GradM2, China)

Many respondents clearly differentiated between short-term and long-term migratory stays. For a short-term stay, they appreciate the convenience of the research landscape that exists in Halle as well as the acceptable living situation and positively assessed culture. However, for a long-term stay, some negatively perceived aspects of daily life gain importance. A number of interviewees mentioned their difficulties with the German language. Though this is negligible in their (English-speaking) academic surroundings, it creates a huge barrier towards social integration in everyday life.

My big problem is the language. I mean I cannot go to the shops to buy, for example, to find the furniture, I need help from other persons that can speak German. I haven't enough time to go to the [language] class but this is my major, my most important problem I think. (GradF6, Iran)

Apart from the difficulties of coping with daily life without a good command of the German language, the mentality of the German people was perceived as unfriendly and not outgoing, and mentioned as negative factor.

A striking difference was found with regard to the ethnicity of migrants and their experiences of alienation and discrimination in Germany. Europeans were more at ease with their surroundings in Halle than non-Europeans, and among the latter, those who could be identified as alien by their physical appearance (Asian, Arabic, African) felt more alienated in Germany than did other non-Europeans. For them, the USA represents a multicultural society, thus being a more preferable place than Germany.⁶ However, while some of the respondents concerned already lived in the USA, others relied on stories from friends or perceptions drawn from the media and movies.

Germany ... eh ... is not an immigrant country, so you cannot stay here longer, or settle down, it's not really possible or, I mean, quite difficult ... I mean, its OK for short time, but for long time, I think it's too ... not open enough. (GradM2, China)

Everybody [in Ethiopia] wants to go to USA, and not to Europe or to any other place ... Because people think that the payment is much, much better in the USA, and the freedom to ... to live, and the other things are believed to be better ... because there are many, many different ethnic groups and different nationalities in the Unites States and I guess that's why they want to go there—diversity. (GradM3, Ethiopia)

⁶It must be considered that Halle is not representative of the whole of Germany regarding diversity. Located in the ethnically very homogeneous east of Germany with only 4.3 % of the population being of foreign nationality in 2012, experiences of foreigners in Halle will not be comparable to more diverse places such as Frankfurt-am-Main or Cologne with a share of 24.5 % and 17.0 % of foreign population, respectively.

An important factor for future mobility decisions is the legal frame for a further stay and the level of information about legal regulations. The interviewees displayed a high degree of uncertainty regarding their legal possibilities for a long-term stay, stemming from misinformation about regulations concerning duration of stay and further legal possibilities (extension of visa, work permit, eligibility for social benefits and so on). Instead, general ideas about German immigration law play an important part in assessing the students' own situation, sometimes leading to false assumptions being made. A good example is the case of GradF1 from Poland, who moved to Germany with a student visa prior to Poland's accession to the EU. With that accession in 2004, Polish residents initially had freedom of residence in Germany, but excluding the freedom to work or eligibility for social benefits for a transitional period. When GradF1 graduated at MLU, she was not aware of her legal situation at all and feared having to leave the country, even though she had planned to stay to study for Ph.D.: 'I had such a panic towards the end of my studies ... What if they tell me in the foreign office, or the labour office: "Goodbye, now you have to go back to Poland!"' (GradF1). She finally went to the foreign office and discovered that yet another (relatively new) paragraph applied to her: as a student from a new EU member state who had stayed in Germany more than 7 years, she had access to the labour market and was fully eligible for social benefits.

Another interviewee drew on his prior international experience to address his problems with German immigration law. He takes the USA as an example of a country with clear immigration regulations, and makes connections between the regulatory system and the general attitude towards immigrants: 'In the U.S. you don't have to stay longer to get this Green Card, if you are skilled, you can apply for the Green Card. The U.S. government will review your criteria and will say: "O.K. you are highly skilled, it will help U.S. to be a better country, so they will stay." ... I mean, it's kind of easy to tell, you have to consider, you know, potentially he will contribute to the country, he will pay the tax, he won't be a burden for the social system. You want somebody to stay here to contribute. There has to be criteria.' (GradM2, China).

Summing up all these observations, I found a clear difference in migrants' assessments of their own perceptions and experiences depending

on the targeted length of the migratory stay. While factual arguments such as research infrastructure, cultural heritage or natural conditions mainly support the short-term perspective, major obstacles regarding a long-term stay were difficulties with the German language and the effect of ethnic homogeneity on the individual. Also, assessments of the legal possibilities for a long-term stay were made on the basis of selective information and biased interpretation.

11.4 Generalisation of Findings and Conclusion

The results from the case study on international students and researchers at the MLU Halle displayed a variety of individual biographies and perceptions, yet, as a result of qualitative analysis, a number of generalisations can be drawn that refer to my main research questions and hypotheses raised above.

The first research hypothesis assumed that the decision-making process has both rational and emotional elements, and that there are subjective perceptions and information asymmetries that shape migration decisions. The interpretation revealed that migratory decisions are negotiated using elements of rationality, subjectivity and emotionality. However, the weight that was given to either component varied according to the general life goals and priorities that the individual had regarding an academic career versus family life or economic success. Concerning future migratory decisions, including the decision to stay in Germany, there was found to be a high level of selectivity regarding the acquisition and evaluation of information on legal options for a long-term stay. It became clear that the institutional framework played an important part in both past and future migratory decisions, but that it was not just the legal framework alone that presented a problem but rather perceptions of it, based on selective knowledge and previous experiences with public institutions at the place of arrival. The assessment of the institutional framework was made using a transnational frame of reference which integrates (again selective) knowledge and perceptions on the situation at home, at the actual place of residence and in possible third countries.

My second research hypothesis argued that consecutive mobility decisions are influenced by prior migratory experiences and their individual evaluation. It transpired that most of my interviewees were still undecided concerning further migratory decisions. Their positions as students or junior researchers gave them a good opportunity to test out living abroad, gathering important experiences and social and cultural capital, but also enabling them to test how they are able to cope with emotional aspects such as alienation and homesickness. These experiences will shape decisions later in life, and we can hypothesise that they will lead to a higher level of transnationality, whether migrants return to their home country, stay in Germany or move on.

In the evaluation of the prior migration decision and the actual living conditions, all of the interviewees seemed to stress the positive aspects in order to make sense of their previous decision. But regarding a possible long-term stay, the arguments were weighted in a different manner than for a time-limited one. Among those arguments, lacking language proficiency seemed to be the biggest obstacle as it hindered social integration in everyday life. Another important argument was the perception of Germany as lacking diversity and openness towards foreigners, which was obviously constructed against the background of experiences with other, more diverse, countries.

The typology of return decisions showed five different strands of decision-making around the options of whether to stay, to return or to move on. While some of these factors concern general orientations in life (security and life quality versus career orientation) which can be influenced very little from outside, two other factors seem to be relevant, especially in the context of return migration: the institutional framework of the individual migration project and its perception on the one hand, and the existence of social capital in the home country versus social capital in other countries on the other. Both factors were important elements of the future migration considerations of the interviewees. The institutional framework regarding a possible long-term stay and labour market access in the destination country was sometimes perceived as a push factor from the destination country back home (or onwards), while an unreliable labour market and career structures in the home country to some degree

deterred possible returnees. For state administration and institutions interested in the retention or return of highly skilled graduates, transparency of the legal pathways, migration or integration marketing and active aid for prospective stayers or returnees are possible ways to increase the numbers of stayers or returnees, respectively.

Second, the amount of social capital in the destination and home countries was a crucial factor when considering a successful stay or return. In particular for primary degree students, it was difficult to assess whether their social capital would ensure a good entry into the home or destination country's labour market, as the students had so far no opportunities to build up relevant social capital. For destination countries, this aspect could be improved by increasing internship and job opportunities for international students, to enable them to establish links into the local, regional or national labour market during their educational stay. On the other hand, for home countries, it is important to be aware of these factors from the perspective of citizens studying abroad, and they could be advised to build up supportive structures to bridge this gap in order to ensure a successful return and labour market integration.

However, home as well as destination countries have to be aware that they are only two stakeholders in a global race for talent, and that the structural frame they can offer is only one aspect among many others that are considered in the course of complex biographical decisions such as the decision of whether to stay, to return or to move on after graduation.

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12

History, Memory and Remigration: Familial Cultures of Memory as a Background to the Return of Entrepreneurs to East Germany

Christine von Blanckenburg

The migratory processes in East Germany can be characterised by two great waves of exodus: after the World War II and after the reunification in 1990. According to estimates, around a fifth of the population left the country between the end of the Second World War and 1961 when the wall was built. Among those who turned their backs on the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in this first phase of migration were an estimated 36,000 entrepreneurs and their families (Hefele 1998). Entrepreneurs' decisions to migrate were very closely related to the sequestration and expropriation of their businesses. A climax of persecution was reached in 1953 and accordingly the biggest part of the migration of the entrepreneurs was also concluded up to this year. Many saw no further chances for themselves or their companies in a socialist state, where they would be victimised and criminalised (Hefele 1998; Hennecke 2008).

Half a century after their grandparents left their businesses behind, to build up a new, unthreatened existence in the West, relatives of the

C. von Blanckenburg (✉)

Department of Civil Society, Nexus Institute for Co-operation Management and Interdisciplinary Research, Berlin, Germany

generation of their grandchildren began to head back to the East at the beginning of the 1990s and in most cases re-established businesses modelled on those their families formerly owned. In this chapter, using biographical interviews as a basis we will work out in which way familial cultures of memory influenced the decision to return.

In many respects this chapter enters territory that has not been very well researched up to now. While much has been published on return migration to East Germany, the issue of remigration to East Germany across generations has not been approached apart from by two publications (Schellhorn and Mark 2012; Von Blanckenburg et al. 2014). Contemporary representations of the collective memory of the refugees and those displaced from their homes in the lost eastern territories can in this case only be connected in a provisional way, as they highlight a level of personal memory, but aim above all at the political instrumentalisation of memory (Demshuk 2012; Lotz 2007). Those who fled from the Soviet occupied territories as well as from the GDR have not experienced such a politicisation of their memories. According to the Reunification Clause, part of the preamble of the German constitution, they are not considered to be displaced persons. Without the respective expellee associations, the possibility of organised exchange would be much more marginal. Through the format of private, transgenerational disclosure of memory, however, as detailed below, no difference can be seen between those displaced and refugees of the GDR.

Migration research forms a further scientific framework for this study on the role of familial memory for the remigration of grandchildren from companies located in the new federal states. The economic science explanation perspectives of failure or success are followed in the structural approach to remigration theory. In the typology of Cerase (1974) there is no reference to social or emotional motives for migration. It was not until almost 10 years later that these were addressed in Unger's (1983) model of 'Family remigration', which deals only with return migration in response to family emergencies in the home country. In Cassarino's (2004) theory, social networks in both the country of migration and in the homeland and their roles in the *preparedness* to return are analysed; however, the emotional aspects of social relationships have not been explored. These are worked out with more sophistication later in a later qualitative study on return migration to East Germany by Diemel et al. Empirical research on return

migration between the West and East of Germany shows that economic motives lag behind motives of social or even emotional connection (Dienel et al. 2005; Brecht 1995). Lang and Nadler (2014) supplement the classical remigration typology of Cerase with the ‘emotional and social type of return’ in their study on ‘Return Migration to Central and Eastern Europe’.

This chapter about entrepreneurs whose return migration is a result of family tradition adds knowledge regarding the emotional and social types of return. The horizon which until now was restricted to individuals, their framework conditions, social networks and motives is extended, in so far as remigration is presented in an overall generational context produced by a familial communicative memory.

The investigation therefore also refers back to memory studies, which, with sociological, historical, artistic and literary, psychological and cultural studies approaches to the emergence of collective memories, explore the meaning, forms and effect of a cultural memory. The starting point for analytical concepts of memory studies began with Maurice Halbwachs (1925), who already by the 1920s had developed the theory of the social conditionality of individual remembrance, forms and functions of memory moulded between generations as well as the extension of the term *memoire collective* to the area of cultural tradition and traditional education (Halbwachs 1939). Jan and Aleida Assmann (1988, 1992 and 1999) built on this to introduce in theory two frameworks for collective memory. Communicative memory is formed in a social group, such as in a family, for example. It is informal, lacks shape and is characterised by a wandering time frame of 3–4 generations, which is typical for one family. Cultural memory, on the other hand, is characterised by a high level of form, manifests itself in traditional productions, objects and media representations, and aims to achieve collective identity building and political legitimisation. Cultural identity is related closely to cultural memory. This overarching binding nature is interpreted in Pierre Nora’s *Lieux de memoire* (1984–1992) in the sense of real or imagined places where traditional, national identity is celebrated and can be experienced. In response to this unreflective and nation-focused understanding of cultural memory, the topos of the diversity of cultures of remembrance has been gaining in popularity in multicultural societies for some years (Glynn and Kleis 2012). In Germany, the discourse is conducted in particular with regard

to the remembrance of the Holocaust, which increasingly manifests a disturbing deviant cultural memory of immigrants in Germany (Wetzel 2008). Here are overlaps with research on migration, such as when the collective memory of immigrant groups possesses other content to the national narrative of the successful integration of migrants into society (Lentz 2010). The interest in the interface between memory studies and migration research focuses primarily on the relationship of differing cultural memories in the formation of hybrid identities and the integration into the host countries of migration. The function of a collective memory as an emotional attachment in the context of origin, which is effective as a motive for return migration, has, however, not yet been investigated.

12.1 The Sample

Interview material used in this chapter was collected in a study commissioned by the representatives of the new federal states of Germany. The interviews were conducted as semi-open, narrative, life-history interviews following the method of Schütze (1983). Specifically, this means that the subject of the interview becomes an entire life history and the interviewee can speak as freely as they wish according to their own criteria of relevance. This is done in the first part of the interview, a long, uninterrupted sequence of biographical narrative. In the second part, the interviewer can ask comprehension questions, or even try to fill any gaps in the CV. Only in a third part of the interview, questions asked are directly relevant to the particular research interest of the interviewer, which means that the influence of the preconceptions and background knowledge of the interviewers on the results is largely avoided by this method. The interviewees are free to speak in the narrative of their biography, which at the same time represents a construction of their own identity (Leh 2010).

From this material, five interviews were conducted with entrepreneurs whose grandparents, or in one case, father, were active as entrepreneurs in East Germany and between 1945 and 1953 fled the occupied Soviet territories or the GDR. The interviewees were born and raised in the West, with one exception. They settled in the mid-1990s, at the ages of 28–51 in the new federal states. Three of the interviewees rejoined the

entrepreneurial family tradition back in its original home, one settled near his parents' business premises, and in only one case was there no relationship between the interviewee and the location of their new business—it was the interviewee's husband's family's place of origin.

12.2 Case Study 1

Life History

Our female interviewee was born in a northern German city in 1960. Her parents were both aristocrats from the East. She grew up in the countryside, where her father provided for his family with a small agriculture-related business.

Later, the family moved into the city, where our interview partner completed her high school studies, and she subsequently moved to Tübingen to continue her studies. In 1991 she married her current husband, who is also of the aristocracy. She returned to the East German provinces with him and moved into a manor house very close to the ancestral seat of her family. She placed herself very consciously back in the family tradition that had been largely conveyed by her mother, who told her much about her own childhood on the estate. The interviewee admits that this way of life is 'totally anachronistic', but it is also exactly what she desires.

Biographical Narrative

The biographical narrative of our interviewee does not take the form of spontaneous narration, but is a firmly entrenched remembrance. On the day before the interview, the interviewee wrote down the description of her life for the family. She began her life story with the biography of her mother. Their aristocratic background is widely recounted through referencing life on their estate on multiple occasions. The material memory of the estate where her mother was raised is very important, as retrieving these pieces of memory was very dangerous for her mother, who, after fleeing in 1945, still returned repeatedly over the border to her homeland.

After the first 13 lines about her mother, she then details the background of her father and discusses the war briefly, his imprisonment in the war and the death of his first wife in 1952. The section on her parents concluded with information about the marriage of her parents in 1955. Their connection was through a friend of her father, who was a captive with him in the war. The father is significantly older than the mother.

According to her daughter, the happiest time of her mother's life was after the war, before she got married. During these years, she travelled the wider world and through her professional training was independent and self-sufficient.

In the third section of their biographical narrative the interviewee reported in detail (23 lines) her own childhood in the countryside, from being involved in the family business, which meant having her own responsibilities but also brought a small income and the experience of being important and useful. In the biographical narrative she rated her own childhood as a 'pure and ideal world'. She moves away from this when asked questions, where she reports more of the underlying tensions that arose mainly as a result of the hard-pressed material conditions. The negative assessment of the economic situation of the family in the infancy of the interviewee can be explained by the loss of status of the family in comparison to the pre-war situation but also in comparison to West German aristocratic circles.

She describes her father's late appointment as a pastor. Their private life at that time remains strangely pale in comparison to the fortunes of her parents, as life events are mentioned only briefly. Her own biography regains momentum with her marriage, and in particular the move to a peripheral region of eastern Germany. It appears adventurous and in some ways even logical to her to move into a manor house. At the end of the biographical narrative, the interviewee reports widely on her early experiences with entrepreneurial independence—presumably described in relation to the project topic of the establishment of a business, as detailed in the request for an interview.

However, quite soon, being without employment herself became a problem. The interviewee tried out different entrepreneurial ideas with moderate success, more in the field of handcrafted self-production, until she established a successful operation emerging from a clever business idea. This is where the biographical narrative ends.

Familial Culture of Memory

The interviewee referred to an intensive familial culture of memory. The most important content of familial memory—life on the estate and the escape—were conveyed in multiple ways. Narratives cover a broad spectrum. Discussions about escaping and the way of living on the estate were conducted mainly at the lunch table. Despite this communicative situation, the familial memory could not be continued equally by all members, and changed to become orientated towards present requirements, as her grandmother and father picked up the family tradition of written recording and put their memories of war and escape on to paper. These memories were not only written down but also read aloud to the children multiple times. These individual memories probably had a binding character for family members. Further important elements of memory are images, in this case tapestries at the manor houses that once belonged to the family, objects that were saved, such as a demitasse cup, personal effects, such as the mother's correspondence, which is still kept in a safe place, tied up carefully by the daughter, or a recipe book that the cook of the estate wrote by hand in Sütterlin. And, of course, subsequently the culinary realisation of good times at home with dishes such as 'Silesian heaven' (!) or another sumptuous meal, 'a dish with 16 eggs and wobble' and in a present with food shortages, this becomes a culinary symbol in the account of using margarine instead of butter (Hage 2010).

In communicative memory, the friends of the parents are also included. There is a special network of noble families from the East connected by marriage. Loss links them all, and when they get together a piece of home is realised by their gathering, and in the dishes they eat. Their bond with each other, which lives on mainly through large family gatherings such as confirmations, is not only positively remembered by the interviewee in the sense of Demshuk's (2012) 'human home', but also as a negative limitation to this group as a result of their loss of status. The family lived, in comparison to the manor houses where tapestries adorned the walls, cramped in a single-family home. Their income was adequate, but far from enough to forge a connection with the West German nobility circles or entrepreneurial families.

Familial Culture of Memory and the Decision to Remigrate

The central function of familial memory, which is formed in intergenerational exchange, is the construction of identity. Memory is not a reflection on the past, but rather a reconstruction of the past, which is geared to the needs of the family in the present (Erl 2005). This interviewee spoke very vividly of this development of family identity. Her mother's descriptions of harmonious life on the estate and the ubiquity of material memory had such a strong influence on her that, as a young girl, she 'devoured' memoirs of escape. She wanted to know 'Why am I the way that I am?' She perceives herself and the cultural identity of her family as being different from their environment: 'Why do we live so differently from the rest of my classmates, with a tapestry on the wall. Or why do we eat from porcelain so different from everyone else's? Or why there are certain customs, and why is this structure, why are these conventions so important?'

The fact that the examination of their own family identity takes place through the adoption of historiographical literature shows how the communicatively formed family memory is embedded in the overarching narrative of flight and pursuit, which belongs to the cultural heritage, and is set out in writing and reshaped to a large extent. However, cultural memory in this case refers not to the nation, but to the nobility, for whom their arrival in the West in particular meant a huge loss of status. The interviewee also recounts this.

For the identity of the family in the West, it was very important to confront the often laborious existence as a small-business owner with a positive memory of the past—to maintain a good picture of themselves as a family. As a result, the motif of the home is superimposed with the motif of aristocratic life. This is expressed in the interviewee's reference to the decision to return. Home for her is 'a very important issue', but the region to which she moved was her husband's home location. She herself knew 'hardly where it was', but she went with him because of local ties, and finds it 'actually quite natural' to move into a manor house, 'because the idea of a manor house' was 'simply in [her] blood through the stories [her] mother told'. The return to the East was determined mainly by the family traditions of her husband. However, the interviewee

also accepted an unconscious 'order' of the familial culture of remembrance (Hoffmann 2010) in which they tried to return to a lost world. She experienced confrontation with the real conditions in the present as a great disappointment. The sheltered life on the family's estate, which her mother had described again and again, could not be revived. In this context, first a revision of the family memory and an adaptation to the needs of the present was carried out by expressing the opinion that even on the estate described by her mother perhaps not everything was as simple and harmonious as narrated.

12.3 Case Study 2

Life History

The female interviewee was born in West Berlin in 1966 as the youngest of three sisters. She came from a watchmaking and goldsmithing family and after her secondary school education she also completed training to become a watchmaker. The family have owned a house with a watchmaking shop on the ground floor in a small town near Berlin since 1879; this was returned to them in 1991. With the restitution of the family property, the interviewee and her former husband were given the chance to have their own large apartment and to become self-employed. In 1994 they both moved to the small town in Brandenburg, and in 1997 opened a watch and jewellery store in the old business premises, in its fifth generation.

Since 2003 the interviewee had run the shop alone, after separating from her husband. She is now in a new relationship and has a 10-year-old daughter.

Biographical Narrative

The interviewee began her biographical narrative by labelling her position as a latecomer compared to her two older sisters in the order of their birth, and then in the second section of the biographical narrative she

talked about her father and grandfather, who were from the location near Berlin where she now lives. The family tradition of watchmaking was also introduced into her narrative here.

The interviewee then detailed her time at school, her vocational training to become a watchmaker, and the first steps in her career. Shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, her father showed his family his former home, the house where he grew up and in which the family business should have continued. He submitted a request to retransfer the house to him. The comments on fixed points of the life of the interviewee—moving house in 1994, opening the business in 1997, and the birth of her first daughter and the separation from her first husband in 2013, scarcely went beyond what had already been established in her life history. With 34 lines, or not quite 8 minutes to read through, the biographical narrative is extremely concise.

Only when the interviewee was questioned was the migration of her family defined more clearly. The father, who was unable to complete his watchmaking training in Glashütte, worked as an apprentice from the end of the 1940s and then as an assistant in West Berlin, and he also moved there shortly afterwards. Her grandparents settled in the West in 1952—according to family memory, to avoid imminent arrest—and moved first to Dortmund. They attempted self-employment there but were not very successful. At the beginning of the 1970s they moved to Berlin, into an apartment very close to their parents' business.

Also, when asked, the interviewee admitted that her 'not so insanely interesting life' entered a decidedly dynamic phase with the recovery of the family property in 1991, as she became self-sufficient a long time before her older sisters and became more established in both work and her private life. Above all, she experienced the transformation of the economy and society in the East at first hand. She viewed herself as a child of reunification, reflected on her own biography as an interesting one, as she knew about borders and by moving to the East lived through the changes. She can explain all of this to younger people, who 'listen excitedly'. Above all, she can describe the irritation of West Berliners at the East-German-dominated conditions and even hostilities. She was able to settle in her new place of residence through a West German and West Berlin circle of friends, who also moved to the area.

She did not associate the biographical turning point of settling back into the traditional family location of a small town in Brandenburg with a feeling of returning home. First, in retrospect, she summarised that it was more about the 'returning as a belated generation', and that over time the town had 'become home'.

Familial Culture of Memory and the Decision to Remigrate

The familial culture of memory is not particularly pronounced, and above all is related to the professional tradition of watchmaking and goldsmithing. This spans three generations, back to the grandfather. The interviewee could not describe the time before, only providing a consolidated narrative, that a son of a watchmaking family from Lausitz moved to Brandenburg, acquired a house in 1879 and opened a watchmaking business. The memory of her father completing his watchmaking training in the celebrated watchmaking location of Glashütte is significant for the family. According to her memories, her parents always wanted the sisters to become watchmakers, as the tradition would be stronger if all three were involved in the industry.

Personal memories were ascertained from the grandparents' maid: the interviewees father and his younger brothers lived an easy life and messed around a lot. The parents rarely told any stories about themselves that lay outside details of their careers. Therefore, there is only a weakly determinable communicative memory in the family. This also includes a certain heroisation of the grandfather; he was imprisoned by the Nazis as he had not forced a Jewish tenant of his to leave. In 1952, he was once more threatened with being arrested, this time through the authorities of the GDR.

In 1991, at the age of 63, the interviewee's father showed his daughters places from his childhood and their family's and began to share memories from his past. The daughter explained the behaviour of her father and the extensive lack of communication on the history of the family through his experiences of war. As in the first case study, the interviewee referred to literature on the topic, to arrive at a historical psychological classification

where there are major gaps in family memory: 'I once read a book: *We the Children of the Children of War* ... where ... it was described, why ... my generation ... is so tense and cold hearted. And a book *The Lost Generation*. This was about the generation of my parents, so those children which grew up or were born during the war. Since this I understand my father and also my mother better ... both of these books were really life changing to me.'

Material memory determines the family memory of its origins in the Brandenburg town. Significantly, in this family, in which the tradition of watchmaking seems to be much more important than their private life, a clock is the focus. It hung on the façade of the residential and commercial building. The father dismantled this clock after the grandparents fled and smuggled it on the S-Bahn (the local rapid-transit railway) to West Berlin. There it was kept in the basement and only brought out later by the interviewee and restored when she opened the shop again. The importance of this clock to familial memory became clear when the interviewee stated that her father, on the occasion of the 'initiation', gave a public speech, and an article about it appeared in the local press.

In case study 2, because of the relative absence of a familial culture of remembrance, no link between familial memory and return migration is evident.

12.4 Case Study 3

Life History

The male interviewee was born as the youngest of four siblings in an industrial town in the centre of Germany in 1943. His great-grandfather founded a company there in 1883, which very quickly grew into a large operation. The family moved to the West shortly after the end of the war, to where the interviewee's father had bought a farm in the countryside of Berchtesgaden in 1937. This is where the interviewee grew up. Later, he attended boarding school and after compulsory military service he studied Business Administration. He first entered the family business at the beginning of the 1970s, which his father had refounded in the south

of Germany and it expanded once more into a large operation. In 1994 the interviewee closed the business in the south and relocated production to central Germany.

Since he has not succeeded in establishing satisfactory social contacts in the new location, the interviewee is planning to return to Bavaria at the end of his career.

Biographical Narrative

The interviewee's biographical narrative was extremely brief and limited with the exception of the story of escape, the most important stages of his training, and his history with the company. Fleeing to the West was told in relatively greater detail. Large parts of central Germany were first occupied by the Americans in April 1945. Before they retreated to their final occupation zones in Hesse and Bavaria, and the Russians invaded (Möller 2014), the family left their home and moved to the farmhouse in Berchtesgaden. Even when questioned, the interviewee did not elaborate very much on this skeleton of a life history. Only the first visit to the GDR, which he made with his sister shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall in order to see his town of birth and his father's plant, as well as combining this with visiting his successor, was explained in more detail.

Familial Culture of Memory and the Decision to Remigrate

The familial culture of memory concentrates on one hand on the story of a business and on the other on the story of their flight. The material tradition of the company's history is represented by a large-scale image in the background, present even during the interview. In this image one can see one of two plants, together with a factory villa. The great-grandfather of the interviewee founded a company in 1883 that very quickly grew into a large operation. With perceptible pride, the great-grandson reported that the family exported to 50 countries, and at the World Exhibition in Paris in 1900 won a gold medal for their models. By 1945, the company had

doubled in size again. In the West in 1950 the father started small once more, but built the new operation into a large company with around 500 employees within a decade.

The second topic of the familial culture of memory, escaping from the Russians, affected the interviewee deeply, but as a small child he had no real memory of this of his own. His father was remembered as one who, because he was a businessman, would under Russian occupation certainly have at least been given a prison sentence, if he had not been shot. This life-threatening situation was avoided by the family, who had been warned by the Americans, by fleeing to the West. The protective father, looking ahead, had bought a farm before the war, which saved the family from having to live in a refugee camp. Many sections in the interview corresponded with this very present content of familial culture of memory, in which the respondent expressed his political opinion. He saw a pernicious communist influence everywhere, and this culminated in these statements: 'I would never recommend any young person to found a business'; 'As an entrepreneur you are only a scapegoat'; and 'It's sad when I have to say this, but Germany is heading in a political direction led by those from whom we fled'.

The communicative memory of the family cannot be located in the biographical interview. This is also possibly because there was little opportunity for communication among the family. Even during the interviewee's primary school years, his father founded a new operation 200 km away from the family home. At 10 years old the interviewee went to boarding school and only saw his family during the holidays.

The interviewee categorically excludes family tradition as a possible motivation for return migration for himself. According to him, the East German past played no part in his family, and the moving of the plant close to his father's he explains as just a chance occurrence. But he would not rule out such a link for others with which he already sees a readiness to the return due to family traditions. In his view, the Treuhand (agency established by the government to privatize East German enterprises) has squandered opportunities for economic reconstruction by the return migration of entrepreneurs. If the Treuhand had better treated the old owners, many would have gone again to the east and would have founded enterprises. 'There a lot would have changed', he sums up, 'with the heaps of money they had'.

12.5 Case Study 4

Life History

The parents of the interviewee moved to the West in 1950, and as the son of a businessman and the daughter of doctor they saw no chance for development in the newly founded GDR. From Germany they moved to Sweden, where the interviewee's father established a company in 1953. Our interviewee was born four years later. At 22 he took over his father's trade business and increased its income substantially over a short period of time. At the start of the new millennium he sold the business and dissolved the last connection to the country of his birth, where in 1995 his first marriage had fallen apart.

The woodwork factory that once belonged to the interviewees great-grandfather had become over the years part of a furniture combine. After it had been retransferred to him in 1992 he reconstructed the factory. During the first three years of ownership he was commuting between Sweden and Germany. Since 1995 he has been based at the location of production and started a family there a few years ago.

Biographical Narrative

'I live here and I am the ninth generation to do so', is how the interviewee began his life story. He expressed the fact of spatial continuity, the connection to the region of origin of his family, and integration into the entrepreneurial family tradition. His biographical narrative has five sections: the escape of his parents and the emigration to Sweden; the history of the family business; the interviewee's personal relationship with his grandmother and, respectively, the connection to the home of his parents; and finally his return and his own entrepreneurial activity in the traditional family location.

First, the interviewee explained why, despite such continuity, he is a returnee, during which explanation he addresses briefly his parents' escape in 1950, their migration to Sweden and his father setting up the business in their chosen location. Additionally, he noted that he

bought his father's Swedish company in 1978. This part of the biographical narrative comprised only seven lines. It was followed by a comparatively extensive (11 lines) and lively story of the businessmen in the family—beginning with the great-great-grandfather. He was presented as a 'tradesman, as they are in the books'—i.e. his ancestor was characterised as someone who recognised early opportunities resulting from processes of change in the period of urbanisation in the nineteenth century, and seized them consistently. He was progressive and down to earth at the same time. He was followed by the interviewee's great-grandfather, who took over the company in 1899, expanded it and managed it until 1953.

Here, the third very brief portion of the biographical narrative, with only four lines, began, describing 'Action Rose' and the end of the family business in the GDR. 'Action Rose', in February 1953, expropriated over 440 hotels and restaurants as well as more than 160 other private companies in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. The owners were arrested on flimsy grounds, given prison sentences and their assets confiscated (Lingnau and Stippekoehl 2003). The great-grandfather of the interviewee also shared this fate. After serving his prison sentence he lived for some years with his daughter, who still lived in 'A'. In the fourth section of the narrative, comprising around eight sentences, the interviewee discussed his relationship with his grandmother, who lived in 'A' until her death in 1989. He visited her several times a year from 1972 onwards. When questioned later he described in more detail how close he was to his grandmother. By far the largest part of the biographical narrative is his account of his development of a business idea for his own East German firm, and the respective corporate development, to which he devotes more than 56 lines.

The interviewee was not telling his story for the first time, and he makes this clear himself; for example, when he says 'like I always say'. The biographical narrative is not spontaneous, but it is at least in part a form of self-expression developed over a longer period. The interviewee emphasises his familial connection with the region as an entrepreneur. However, by no means does he want to appear as bound by family traditions, but rather as a rationally acting entrepreneur who, through his

personal relationship with his grandmother had gained sympathy for the region. This is how the interviewee styled himself in the fifth section of his biographical narrative, following the example of his great-great-grandfather, the company's founder. Like him, the interviewee developed a business idea, building on what already existed and based on good local knowledge of the demand in East Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall. He thus led the company into a new field of business and a new spatial dimension. Like his great-grandfather, whom he says he built up the business 'for the region [!] to one of largest companies', he summed up his own entrepreneurial activity in addition to the opportunity to make a profit, as also something he runs for the benefit of the region.

Familial Culture of Memory and the Decision to Remigrate

The respondent depicted a relatively undeveloped familial culture of memory. It related significantly to the company or entrepreneurial ancestors of whom a private episode was also anchored in the family memory: the death of the founder of the company as a result of a fall from a penny-farthing bicycle. There were also material memories of the company's history: a carefully-preserved old cash book, a banner with the motto 'Unity is Strength', a journeyman's piece belonging to his father, who had been a cooper—these artefacts are preserved and have also been integrated consciously into company communications. They present the message that it is both a family company and a traditional one, while other elements of corporate communications emphasise its modernity.

The pursuit of private enterprise in the GDR plays an obvious role in the familial culture of memory, but the explanations remained wooden and lacking in emotion. The parents as members of the bourgeois elite (doctor's daughter, factory owner's grandson) saw themselves as being threatened by political developments. Specific events were not described in more detail, only that one could foresee the political development

at that time. The escape of the interviewee's parents in 1950 is remembered as a path to freedom. In which direction political development was steered was something the great-grandfather experienced with 'Action Rose' in 1953. One of the recurring narratives of family memory seems to be that he had his 80th birthday in prison, but the description is never more than a few blunt words. Nevertheless, the fear of communism is characterised in the family history. The father did not trust travelling to the GDR for 30 years as he was afraid of being arrested as a fugitive. The son was more courageous. As a Swedish citizen, he travelled regularly from 1972 onwards to East Germany to visit his grandmother. However, she was afraid of reprisals and she feared that he was, for example, openly critical about the state in his opinions expressed in conversation at a pub. The interviewee built on the experience of generations before him when making clear that he preferred to remain Swedish, though he felt like a German, as for him this is was a reassurance in the event that the communists return.

The familial culture of memory that concentrated on the fear of the socialist state offered no direct point of contact for return migration to East Germany, in particular since the interviewee also had to overcome a language barrier. He used the phenomenon reported by many migrants to explain that you only really arrive when you dream in the foreign (in this case, German) language. The attachment to place is not discussed overtly, but belongs to the family memory. Nine generations of the family have resided here. The great-grandfather worked for the region. He and his daughter continued to live in their original location after the terrible experiences of arrest, imprisonment and expropriation, and because of their ages they most certainly could have left safely. The interviewee joined this tradition by basing his company here. He dismissed an interpretation that, in decisions on return migration, a type of family obligation also plays a part. He insisted that for purely economic reasons a rational decision had been made. He admits that the decision he made to move to 'A' was easy for him, because over the years visiting his grandmother he had developed a very positive image of the region, 'the nice times with her' shaped his 'experiences of the people and the region'.

12.6 Case Study 5

Life History

The grandparents of the interviewee, hotel owners on the Baltic coast, were arrested in 1953 during Action Rose and had their property expropriated. His parents then moved to the West. The interviewee was born in 1957. His father had been a serving member of the German armed forces, so he grew up in various locations. He decided finally to settle in the west of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). There, together with his wife, he became successfully self-employed with the spin-off of a company in 1987. After the hotel was retransferred to his father at the beginning of the 1990s, it was at first unclear whether it would be renovated and taken over by the family. In this case the interviewee decided on a radical new beginning in 1994. Together with his wife, he bought the hotel from his father, renovated it extensively and opened for business two years later. The couple have two daughters. The elder child was close to finishing high school when her parents moved east. She stayed in the West, whereas her younger sister grew up on the Baltic coast, and calls it home.

Biographical Narrative

The interviewee divided his biographical narrative into life before the retransferral of the family property and life afterwards. He first outlines his birth, childhood and career, in 13 lines. At the end of this, the interviewee has reached the peak of his career. He is self-employed, together with his wife, in their home in West Germany. The company from which he founded his own business offers very good conditions, so the couple have a secure and successful future ahead. It was extremely important for the interviewee to have this on record, as he wanted to differentiate himself from the stereotype of those who moved to the East from the West but 'who didn't make it at home'. He was successful in the West but 'then history intervened' and gave his life a new direction. How exactly this happened is described in the second comprehensive

section of his biographical narrative, comprising 21 lines. Here, the conflicts connected to the retransfer of the family property are broached. The first dispute was whether it was appropriate to pay the Treuhand Agency the extra purchase price they were demanding. More significant, and indeed existential, was the second conflict on the question of whether the hotel should be sold after retransfer or taken over by the family. The father felt too old to renovate the hotel, the interviewee's brother, who was the most professionally equipped to take over, did not want to for family reasons, and the interviewee was not really prepared for a new beginning as a hotelier because of his successful, long-term and securely established company in the West. Selling the hotel was not an option for him, in view of his grandmother's suffering under expropriation, which he described in the next 20 lines. In contrast to the interviewee in case study 4, the way in which Operation Rose changed the life of his grandparents is described in detail. From the injustice suffered emerged a responsibility to take on the inheritance. The next section of his biographical narrative, the most extensive with 27 lines, described how great the risk of a new beginning was. The greatest difficulty was in obtaining a loan to carry out the project, to turn the building (which had been converted into an unattractive guesthouse in the GDR) into a hotel which met the standard required by its excellent location. In the next 17 lines of his biographical narrative the interviewee described his introduction to hotel management on opening the hotel in 1996 and moving to the Baltic coast.

The interviewee narrated his story routinely and certainly not for the first time. The narrative of the familial culture of memory in the original location, the familial connection to his place of origin and the humiliating experience of expropriation is combined with the narrative of a beginning in the East, an unstable start as a hotelier and finally—described in more detail when questioned—feeling at home in the old family residence. That was the greatest adventure in the life of the interviewee and therefore took up the largest part of his narrative. The interviewee reflected on the adventurous character of return migration and founding a business, when he ended his biographical narrative with the sentence 'that was indeed an exciting time'.

Familial Culture of Memory and the Decision to Remigrate

'Tears and apple pie': the interviewee narrated his life history, return migration and founding a business under a self-determined heading, which summarises the special communicative context of the familial culture of memory. The family exchange on the central event of expropriation took place almost as if ritualised. On Sunday afternoons the grandmother came to visit and brought apple pie. While drinking coffee there was only one subject for discussion, the lost home and the circumstances of expropriation. More and more tears then flowed. Not, as the interviewee noted, because of material loss, but because of the humiliation and helplessness in the face of state despotism.

Operation Rose is a key event in the family's memory. The grandparents' arrest was described, the reasons for sentencing, and the long wait for rehabilitation. In a few brief sentences the interviewee initiated his explanation of why he felt obliged to take over the family legacy in the East. 'Why I did not want it to be sold?' More important than the events themselves was the suffering of the grandmother, which left a deep impression on him as a child. The interviewee expressed very clearly the obligation that arose from this for him: 'As I said: "You (directed at the father) can't sell it, now that we just got it back. And then my wife and I just said: we want to renovate it.' And then he complements half jokingly 'perhaps someone is looking upon us from heaven.' Even later in the interview he returned to the motives for return migration in the familial culture of memory. He stated that he didn't have free choice with respect to the inheritance. Going against the advice of concerned friends, who recommended a rational consideration of the pros and cons, he argued, 'But when you get back something that was family-owned, my wife and I said: "This is a commitment; we must see it through ... Because of the tears. Because nothing else would have been so sincere to me".'

The interviewee's personal memory of his grandfather and also the grandfather as an object of the familial culture of memory is weaker than the memory of his grandmother. The grandfather was remembered in two short narratives: one concerning the reason for his

arrest—the possession of a hundredweight of sugar and a barrel of salted herrings—and his ‘death caused by a broken heart’. Only after remigration was the rudimentary familial memory of the grandfather supplemented by the stories of the people who still remembered him from there.

The interviewee found himself within a family and corporate tradition dating back to his great-grandmother, and hopes that his daughters or grandchildren will continue this tradition. He finds ‘it is always good when there are such traditions in families’ and there is ‘an image: they built it, they got it back, they continued it and it is passed on like this through the family’.

The hotel, which is a material family memory in itself, is important for the family identity. The interviewee reported that he has also used this to characterise his own background to others regarding the time before the fall of the Berlin Wall. The associated social status was important to him. It was ‘no small operation’, but a fine hotel in a prime location. He is grateful that he can finally prove this past social status now through his ownership.

The decision to remigrate was related to the prestige connected to the importance of property for him, included, however, only after 50 minutes of conversation. The obligation that arose from his grandmother’s suffering was quite a dominant motive, but, he added, ‘I would not have made the switch for a guesthouse or something. I wouldn’t have for a restaurant or for a guesthouse, but I would have gone to my father and said: sell it and make a beautiful life for yourselves. But this hotel has a certain size ... So I would not have become a barman or something’.

12.7 Conclusion

In the case studies presented in this chapter, familial cultures of memory and return migration were connected in widely differing ways (see Table 12.1).

The construction of family memory, which always corresponds to the situation of the family at the time of recollection, is based in nostalgia in

Table 12.1 Familial cultures of memory and return migration

Content of familial memory	Feature of returning
Loss of status	Returning to a better past
Suffering in the past	Order to make amends
Connection to the place of origin	Return because of geographical continuity, partially related to existing social networks
Material memory: property	Return to regain property
Business tradition	Return to a professional identity and continuity of the family

Source: Own production

case study 1. The family compensated for the loss of status they suffered after their escape, through the memory of a more brilliant, fuller and ostensibly better time. Very vibrant and diverse family memories motivated their return to a better past.

In case study 5, the loss of status is addressed as a peripheral motive for return migration, but the suffering of the family is in the foreground. It is made the subject of family narratives about the past and is also directly present through the tears that flow regularly in the communicative situation in which memories are exchanged. This is a direct return migration motive. The grandson takes on a sort of contract for restitution. Such unconsciously mediated contracts extending over generations were first reported in association with the psychological disorders of children and grandchildren of Holocaust survivors (Rieck 1991; Hoffmann 2010). Later, similar phenomena were also reported in association with flight and expulsion (Kossert 2008; Ustorf 2008).

In case studies 4 and 5, attachment to the place of origin is an important part of the familial culture of memory. One interviewee reported how he was entrusted at a young age with family stories, and stories from the home of his grandparents, who lacked faces for him for decades. As part of the family identity, activated once more in the reunification period, it was important that the family belonged to a certain place, had widespread relatives there and an active network. In case study 5, such a network, which one could rejoin after remigration, no longer existed. Here the attachment to home was established through the story of the nine mythical generations who had been resident there. Attachment to the place of origin is known as the primary

reason for return migration, especially for the descendants of noble landowners. The ancestral seat is an important element of the identity of a noble family handed down over generations. Significant losses in living standards are often accepted for the possibility of return. This love of home represents great potential for the peripheral rural regions where the expropriated manors lay, because resettlement is undertaken for purely emotional reasons in places that would otherwise probably not be considered for business start-ups. The business idea is secondary and can be developed only after return migration (Schellhorn and Mark 2012; Von Friesen 2000).

By selecting these samples as a secondary usage of a study on return migration and establishing businesses, a special familial culture of memory can be found in all the case studies, namely the collateral of real estate and business, which until the fall of the Berlin Wall, with the exception of case study 4, where the interviewee was a regular visitor to the GDR, were integrated exclusively through storytelling and artefacts such as photos, engravings and furnishings into the familial culture of memory. The parents of the returning entrepreneurs illustrated in the case studies left East Germany between the end of the Second World War and 1953. The exodus occurred in close temporal association to repressive measures, under which entrepreneurs and their companies suffered in the occupied Soviet zone and the young GDR. A similar link between the subject and the time period is also found in the return migration of the children or grandchildren of these entrepreneurs: the reason for remigration was the recovery of property in the years 1991 and 1992, and they then returned in either 1994 or 1995. After the fall of the Berlin Wall the old properties were finally physically accessible and were inspected closely during trips of remembrance first of all. When the law on regulating unresolved property issues (Gülle 2001) offered three of the case study interviewees the opportunity for return, they applied for the retransfer of the family's inheritance between 1990 and 1992 and considered the possibilities of buying it back and making other investments. After the retransfer/repurchasing had taken place in 1991–1992, returning to the old home of their parents happened rather quickly afterwards, between 1994 and 1995. Since the applications for restitution in the context of business were to a large extent settled by the end of the 1990s, return migration

connected to the acquisition of existing companies is no longer to be expected.

In the culture of memory of entrepreneurial families, the company's tradition is overarching compared to personal memories. These corporate traditions also allow for the extension of communicative memory over three generations. With the exception of the businesswoman with a noble background, who neither established herself in the place of origin of her parents nor with a specific company, all the interviewees emphasised their integration into their company's traditions and described in detail the company and/or their profession. In case studies 3 and 5, they follow the great-grandmother or great-grandfather as the fourth generation, while in case studies 2 and 4 the interviewees represented even a fifth generation. The companies were founded between 1879 and 1891, i.e. at a time of industrialisation and urbanisation in Germany. From the long family history of their companies, a pressure might have developed not to break this tradition. Yet the interviewees did not describe this. They did, however, formulate the expectations of their children and grandchildren they have themselves (in case studies 2, 4 and 5).

In all the case studies motives for return migration were clear, but sometimes more strongly or sometimes more weakly emotionally potent. This aspect is given particular emphasis in case study 1, in which love is seen as encouraging regional development: 'Love is ... a great, great power, and I think that is often just ... underestimated. And also the politicians [who] were involved [in the exclusion of repossession of goods expropriated by the Soviets] back then simply underestimated this love of home and a specific area. And if I imagine it would have been at least partially returned to these entire families, not only the noble, but many middle-class families, then it would again look very different in the new federal states.' This view is confirmed by the representative in the sample who rejects the assumption that the decision to return with his company to the home of his father had been taken at an emotional level. The emotional motives for return migration related to familial culture of remembrance are, with the exception of case study 1, associated with the interviewees' self-presentation as rational and decisive entrepreneurs. Return migration solely on the basis of family history, as in the case of the noble returnee, does not apply to the other entrepreneurs. How high

the level of emotional attachment to the entrepreneurial family tradition and the associated location is, however, even in this rational group, can be gauged by the fact that all three men in the sample were already successful entrepreneurs in the West. Without difficulty, they decided on a radical new beginning in the East. Hefele (1998), who examines the relocation of companies from the Soviet occupied territories/GDR to West Germany, emphasises emotional motives when he reports that some of the successors at the peak of migration operations have defied existing commercial concerns with their business involvement in the East through 'Reunification euphoria'. This euphoria has now disappeared along with the favourable opportunities that were a result of the transformation process (Hinz 1998). In summary, therefore, it can be maintained that return migration and business creation linked to the exodus of entrepreneurs in 1945–1953 and 1961 reached a conclusion before the 2000s. Those who did not return to the East in the 1990s when operations were retransferred and conditions for corporate takeovers in the course of privatisation were relatively affordable, now have no reason to come back. The fact that the grandsons and granddaughters who still have an emotional attachment to those entrepreneurs who fled have now reached an age where a new professional start in founding a business is considered difficult also naturally plays a role.

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13

Why People of Turkish Origin Leave Germany and How They Feel in Turkey: Results of an Online Survey

Alexander Bürgin and Defne Erzene-Bürgin

Concerns over a possible brain drain and a failed integration policy have been raised by the emigration of qualified people of Turkish origin. However, there is very little reliable data available regarding the profile and motivations for this in the German-trained workforce. To explore the relative importance of different migration motivations, we conducted an online survey ($n = 126$). The main finding was that family-related reasons are the most important factor in the emigration to Turkey. In contrast, a negative career outlook and/or discrimination experiences in Germany, highlighted in public discourse, played only a secondary or even a tertiary role. Instead, the emigration motivations of people with and without a migration background are often similar, reflecting increased mobility in a globalised world, a factor confirmed by the fact that a significant number of respondents expressed an intention to return to Germany.

A. Bürgin (✉)

Political Science and International Relations, Izmir University of Economics, Izmir, Turkey

D. Erzene-Bürgin

Political Science and Public Administration, İzmir University, Izmir, Turkey

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There has been an increasing focus on the migration of people of Turkish origin from Germany to Turkey in the public debate regarding the integration of immigrants of Turkish origin, and on the issue of the emigration of qualified people in general. The loss of a qualified workforce educated and trained in Germany triggers negative consequences in an ageing society, which already suffers from a lack of qualified workers in certain professional sectors (Diehl and Dixon 2005; Ette and Sauer 2010). Regarding the reasons for emigration, an unfavourable career outlook, strongly influenced by labour market discrimination and/or experiences of social exclusion are often emphasised in the media (Jacobsen 2009; Sontheimer 2008; Steinvorth 2010) and in scientific discourse (Griese and Sievers 2010; Sezer and Dağlar 2009). It is argued that the young and well-qualified feel discriminated against, and therefore abandon Germany in favour of the promise of successful careers in increasingly prosperous Turkey. Thus the emigration is interpreted as an indication of a mental 'turning away' of this group from the host society and of a 'failure of integration' (Aydin 2012, p. 201).

However, little reliable data are available about the profile and the migration motivations of these German-educated and socialised individuals. Evidence from research on return migration (Constant and Massey 2002; Güngör and Tansel 2008; Kirdar 2009; Razum et al. 2005) has only limited explanatory power, because some of the detected motivations, such as the accumulation of savings or the nostalgia-inspired longing to return home cannot apply to second- and third- generation migrants, as these either came to Germany at a young age, or were born in Germany. Neither group can therefore be considered as 'returning' to their homeland.

First studies indicate that the public focus on the economic and social lack of integration in Germany as the main emigration reason is too narrow. One such finding is from a study conducted by Erlinghagen et al. (2009). While not focused on emigrants of Turkish origin in particular, this study found no correlation of migration with dissatisfaction related to personal life, or standard of living. This was regardless of whether the emigrants had a background of migration or not. The study was based on data from the German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP), a wide-ranging representative longitudinal study that has sampled nearly 11,000 households and more than 20,000 individuals every year since 1984. For the study, migrant participants were identified, and their living conditions in Germany analysed. A study by Tılıç-Rittersberger et al. (2011), retrieved

anecdotal evidence from 21 in-depth interviews, less than half of which were with second- and third-generation migrants. It was found that the better-educated members of this group left Germany for reasons related to education or personal relationships, rather than for economic reasons. Similarly, a study by Pusch and Aydin (2011) found that unfavourable career prospect or discrimination experiences played no part in the decision of 12 highly-qualified German-Turks to move to Turkey.

The aim of this chapter is to contribute to these studies. We conducted an online survey between May 2011 and February 2012 ($n = 126$) to gain some exploratory insights into the reasons why working-age people moved to Turkey. Because the emigration of people of Turkish origin is not registered systematically, a representative study is impossible. Hence we do not claim that this sample is representative; however, our study adds further value to the above-mentioned studies. First, the larger sample allows us to make quantifiable tentative statements about the relative importance of different possible emigration motivations, filtered according to characteristics such as gender and education level. Second, the method of snowball sampling avoids the concentration on particular locations or educational backgrounds.

The main finding for the sample, as noted above, is that family-related reasons are the most important factor in emigration, while a negative career outlook and/or discrimination experiences in Germany played only a secondary or even a tertiary role. Thus the focus of the public debate on economic aspects and failed integration are only minor factors in the emigration phenomenon.

The chapter proceeds as follows: the first section describes the brain drain debate and available data about the migration of people of Turkish origin; the second section outlines possible explanations for the outmigration, and finally, the third section presents the results of the online survey.

13.1 Migration Trends and Demographic Challenge

For the period 2002–06, approximately half of German emigrants were university educated, compared to around a quarter for the total population in Germany. Furthermore, the average age of the emigrants was

31.8 years, around 11 years below the average of the total population (Ette and Sauer 2010). This emigration of qualified workers has caused concern about a possible brain drain (*Financial Times* 2012), in particular against the background of the demographic challenges of an ageing society. German business is already suffering from a shortage of skilled workers. According to a survey of the German Chambers of Industry and Commerce (DIHK 2010), 70 % of the member enterprises indicated problems in recruiting qualified staff. Demographic developments will increase the shortage of specialists, as the working population is expected to fall by 6 % by 2020 (OECD 2007). One of the main reasons is an overall fertility rate of just 1.4 (World Bank 2014). As a consequence, Germany's population, constantly falling since 2003, is expected to decrease from about 82 million at the end of 2008 to approximately 65–70 million in 2060 (Federal Statistical Office 2009, p. 5). This gap cannot be closed by immigration alone. Therefore the OECD recommends a better exploitation of its own specialist potential, and in particular the more efficient integration of those with a migration background who are already resident in Germany (OECD 2007b).

The proportion of the population with a migration background involves large numbers. In 2005, the Federal Office for Statistics and the Regional Offices for Statistics started to collect data on people with an immigrant background; these include the following groups: immigrant foreigners, non-citizens born in Germany, naturalised foreigners, ethnic German repatriates and children with at least one parent who fulfils the specified criteria. Thus those with an immigrant background do not necessarily have the experience of migration themselves (Federal Statistical Office 2007, p. 6). In 2010, almost 16 million people fulfilled at least one of these criteria, some 20 % of the total population, and of these, two-thirds had direct immigration experience. Of all those with a migration background, 55 % are German citizens, and the remaining 45 % do not hold a German passport. Mainly because of the lower birth rate among the ethnic German population, the proportion of those with a migration background is expected to grow. They already represent a substantial proportion of the younger German population, with 27.9 % of under-25-year-olds, and 33.1 % of the under-6-year-olds (Federal Government of Germany 2008, p. 33). People of Turkish origin represent the largest

group (2.485 million); with 39.7 % born in Germany (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 2011, p. 192).

The emigration to Turkey has been relatively constant since the year 2000, ranging between 40,369 in 2000 to 32,172 in 2007, and 36,003 in 2010 (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 2011, p. 134). However, this figure does not reveal the level of education or purpose of migration. According to Turkish statistics, 73,736 people from Germany moved to Turkey in the year 2000 (Aydin 2012, p. 212). The discrepancy between the two figures may be a result of the reluctance of emigrants, especially those with Turkish passports, to register their move with the German authorities, as they feared this might endanger their right to residence in the future.

13.2 Migration Motivations

A detailed overview of migration theory is outside the scope of this chapter (Brettel and Hollifield 1997; Massey et al. 1998). In general, studies on migration motivations distinguish between a variety of economic and non-economic push and pull factors. Neoclassical economic approaches focus on the supply side of migration, and assume that individuals compare the cost and benefits of staying in the country with those of leaving, and then choose the utility-maximising option (Borjas 1989, p. 461). In contrast, the new economics of labour migration perspective argues that migration decisions are made not by isolated individuals, but rather by families or households (Massey et al. 1998, pp. 21–28). Another perspective, the segmented labour market theory, shifts the focus to the demand side, emphasising that migration is influenced by institutional factors such as the migration policy of the receiving country, and the changing organisation of production. Thus the globalisation of the economy has led in particular to the increased mobility of the highly skilled within the internal labour markets of transnational corporations (Koser and Salt 1997, p. 290). In addition, there is increasing worldwide competition to recruit the most talented people (Shachar 2006).

In contrast to this economic perspective, historians, anthropologists, sociologists and geographers emphasise socio-cultural motivations.

Glover et al. (2001) argue that, for the majority, even very large differences in economic returns are insufficient to induce migration. Migration system theory suggests that migratory movements generally arise from the existence of prior links between sending and receiving countries, and the resulting personal networks and cultural affinities (Kritz et al. 1992). In addition, the expansions of boundaries worldwide have led to a trend for increasing mobility that is not directly related to career prospects in the home country. In fact, permanent mobility has become a way of life in a world in which exchange is not only seen in terms of economics, but also in terms of cultural (Sassen 1998) and educational factors (Mahroum 2000, p. 28). These developments have been stimulated both by developments in transportation and the reduction of transportation costs, and by new technologies that facilitate contact with previous home communities (Lowell and Findlay 2001, p. 15). As a consequence, a new body of literature on transnationalism (Basch et al. 1994; Bauböck and Faist 2010; Guarnizo et al. 2003) highlights the issue of the extent to which migration is leading to new permanent linkages between sending and receiving societies. In particular, the greater mobility of those who are highly qualified leads to more frequent bi-directional traffic, and therefore actually represents a benefit rather than a loss for the migrants' country of origin (Favell et al. 2007, p. 18).

An application of these economic and socio-cultural theoretical approaches to the outmigration of individuals of Turkish origin is able to identify a variety of potential motivations for emigration. One possible economic push factor is a pessimistic career outlook, caused by the lower level of career opportunities for migrant groups compared to the majority ethnic group (Massey et al. 1998, pp. 28–34). The poor integration of people with an immigration background is shown by the unemployment rates for non-citizens,¹ which in 2010 was 15.8 %, twice the amount for the total population (7.7 %) (Federal Government of Germany 2011, p. 75). One reason for the disappointing labour market integration is the lower educational level of people with a migration background, caused mainly by language deficits and the often early streaming of students into

¹ So far, the statistics of the *Bundesagentur für Arbeit* only distinguish between non-citizens and Germans, but not between people with and without a migration background.

three levels of secondary education (Entorf and Minoiu 2005). Migrant children are more likely to attend the lowest level of educational establishments, the *Hauptschule*; 40 % of the pupils with foreign passports attend this type of school compared to only 15 % of German pupils (Federal Government of Germany 2008, p. 34). However, even highly-qualified workers of non-German origin have problems integrating into the labour market. In the year 2003/04 the unemployment ratio of university graduates with a migration background in Germany was 12.5 %, nearly three times that of equally well-qualified graduates without such a background (4.4 %) (OECD 2007). This discrepancy cannot only be explained by a lack of social networks (Song 2011), which are important in terms of finding employment, but also, to a greater extent, by workplace discrimination. According to the OECD, second-generation immigrants—that is, those who are native-born with foreign-born parents—appear to have on average a 10 % less chance of finding employment than their counterparts with ethnic German parents. This was measured by field experiments, in which fictitious written applications were sent in response to real job advertisements. Discrimination was measured by comparing the number of invitations to interviews across the group. Results showed that immigrants with exactly the same qualifications and work experience received approximately 30 % fewer invitations to an interview than the general population.

With regard to economic pull factors, the positive economic career prospects in Turkey have been driven by a rate of economic growth higher than the European average. Gross domestic product (GDP) levels more than tripled from USD231 billion to USD736 billion between 2002 and 2010, while GDP per capita similarly experienced a steep rise from USD3,500 to USD10,709 in the same period. The visible improvements in the Turkish economy have also boosted foreign trade; exports reached USD114 billion by the end of 2010, up from USD36 billion in 2002 (Republic of Turkey 2012). As Turkish businesses expand and modernise, highly-skilled, multilingual Turkish-German professionals are welcomed and highly regarded by employers. According to the German Federal Foreign Ministry (2012), there are around 4,000 German firms or German-Turkish joint ventures registered in Turkey. These firms require personnel familiar with both languages and cultures. In addition, Turkey

offers former citizens the so-called Mavi Kart (blue card) which grants almost all citizenship rights apart from voting. The combination of Mavi Kart and German citizenship facilitates a transnational lifestyle, allowing trouble-free commuting between the two countries.

As with economic factors, non-economic factors can also be distinguished in terms of push and pull. As regards the push factors, discrimination in personal life as well as in the workplace may cause a feeling of being unwelcome, and thus lead to alienation. According to Sezer and Dağlar (2009, p. 17), 38 % of Turkish-descent university graduates in Germany would consider migrating to Turkey. Of those prepared to emigrate, 42 % reported not feeling at home in Germany, a reason more common in men than in women. Furthermore, the level of children's alienation from the host society is dependent on that of their parents. However, a survey of emigration intentions cannot predict the de facto emigration (Erlinghagen et al. 2009, p. 664). Past studies of such a prospective design have repeatedly found enthusiasm for emigration; however, the scope of the actual migration did not reflect this (Hahnewinkel 2012).

Part of the non-economic pull factors are social, emotional and psychological themes, such as curiosity about family roots, marriage, moving closer to family members (King and Christou 2010) or the desire to educate children in their own cultural context (Dustmann 2003).

In addition to migration-background-related motivations, other reasons need to be considered, since, regardless of migration background, people may share similar motivations. Economic, cultural and educational exchange worldwide has led to a trend of increasing mobility. Given the general positive correlation between education level and mobility in Germany (Sassen 1998; Mahroum 2000, p. 28), the increasing tendency for people of Turkish origin to emigrate may be merely related to the rise in the level of education among this group. This in turn has two causes: first, demographic change, as those with migration backgrounds are a growing proportion of the population, and second, the partial success of political efforts to improve educational integration, which has reduced the educational level gap in recent years (Federal Government of Germany 2011, p. 38).

13.3 The Online Survey

To disseminate our online survey, we used the method of snowball sampling. The following groups of multipliers were asked to forward the survey link: students on our courses in the spring and fall semesters in 2011; associations or round tables of ‘returnees’ in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir; and researchers into return migration. We provided a detailed personal briefing for students and researchers to ensure that those contacted all held German school certificates. This was done to exclude retired returnees of the first generation and students living in Germany for short periods, who are not the subject of the public discourse about a potential brain drain and failed integration policy. Despite this briefing, we excluded 42 of 128 respondents from further analysis because these people were not fully educated in Germany. Around 200 students were asked to forward the survey link, but only 128 responses were received, which might indicate a difficulty in finding respondents, but also a lack of interest among the students to disseminate the survey or of the contacted people to participate. The remaining 86 respondents, consisting of 35 men and 51 women, were distributed almost equally across the age range 20–50, and across the education categories *Hauptschule* (lowest secondary school), *Realschule/Gesamtschule* (middle secondary school), and the *Gymnasium*, which qualifies for university education. A gender-specific differentiation shows that the women in the sample earned less, with 51 % reporting their income to be below average, in comparison to only 28 % of men. Around half of the respondents were born in Germany, and about a third have German citizenship; 32 left Germany within the previous five years, 12 in the previous 10 years, and 42 have lived for at least 10 years in Turkey. Table 13.1 summarises the profiles of the individual groups (in which *University degree* is a subcategory of the category *Gymnasium*). The figures reveal higher proportions of females (72 %) and German nationals (63 %) among those who were graduates of a *Gymnasium*.

The most common major reasons for leaving Germany (multiple answers were possible) were family reasons/partnership (63 %), a desire for a life change (29 %), and not feeling at home in Germany (28 %). In contrast, economic reasons played a secondary role. Dissatisfaction with

Table 13.1 Profile of emigrants (in %)

	Gender		German citizenship	
	Male	Female	Yes	No
<i>Hauptschule</i> (23)	61	39	4	96
<i>Realschule</i> (31)	39	61	32	68
<i>Gymnasium</i> (32)	28	72	63	38
<i>University degree</i> (13)	31	69	77	23
Total (86)	41	59	36	64

Source: Own survey

career prospects in Germany and attractive career options in Turkey were jointly cited by 16 % as important reasons for leaving Germany. The results show the greater importance of family-related reasons for women (69 %) compared to men (54 %). In contrast, the lack of ‘feeling at home’ was reported more frequently as being important by men (35 %) than by women (25 %). Finally, the responses indicate that, with increasing education levels, family-related reasons lose their importance, and there is a corresponding rise in the importance of attractive career options and a desire for personal change (Table 13.2).

To gain insights into the issue of whether the emigration represents a turning away from Germany, or a turning towards Turkey, the participants were asked to indicate which of the two optional statements reflected more accurately their emigration decision. The answers, given in Table 13.3, reveal a clear trend: for a majority of 73 %, the reasons to move to Turkey (pull factors) were more important than the reasons to leave Germany (push factors).

The secondary role of economic factors or feeling unwelcome in Germany is also supported by the low numbers reporting unsatisfactory career prospects (16 %) and feeling unhappy in Germany (12 %). However, qualification- and gender-related differences appear in the sample: pessimism about career prospects was noticeably greater among the higher qualified, who probably had higher expectations in comparison to the other groups (25 % of those with a *Gymnasium* qualification and 38 % of those with a university degree), and men (23 % in comparison to 12 % of women). With regard to discrimination, 53 % reported at least one personal experience, while 28 % experienced it sometimes or often.

Table 13.2 Emigration motives (multiple answers possible, in %)

	<i>Dissatisfaction with career prospects in Germany</i>	<i>Not felt at home in Germany</i>	<i>Attractive career options in Turkey</i>	<i>Wanted a change in my life</i>	<i>Family-related reasons/ partnership</i>
<i>Hauptschule</i> (23)	4	26	4	13	83
<i>Realschule</i> (31)	23	16	19	19	61
<i>Gymnasium</i> (32)	19	41	22	50	50
<i>University degree</i> (13)	23	46	38	62	38
Women (51)	16	25	14	25	69
Men (35)	17	35	20	34	54
Total (86)	16	28	16	29	63

Source: Own survey

Table 13.3 Relative importance of push and pull factors

Which statement better describes your motivation to leave Germany?

	<i>My motives to leave Germany (push factors) were more important than my motives to go to Turkey (pull factors).</i>	<i>My motives to move to Turkey (pull factors) were more important than my motives to leave Germany (push factors)</i>
<i>Hauptschule</i> (23)	26	74
<i>Realschule</i> (31)	35	65
<i>Gymnasium</i> (32)	19	81
<i>University degree</i> (13)	23	77
Women (51)	16	84
Men (35)	43	57
Total (86)	27	73

Source: Own survey

No difference between the frequency of discrimination suffered by men and women was revealed.

The results also reveal that a significant proportion of the sample keep their ties with Germany. While 13 % of the respondents have already planned their return to Germany, another 20 % have no concrete plans but regard a return as possible, and 5% reported that they regularly commute between Turkey and Germany. Concrete return intentions are

Table 13.4 Professional position (in %)

	Did you improve your professional position due to your move to Turkey?				
	<i>Strongly improved</i>	<i>Slightly improved</i>	<i>More or less the same</i>	<i>Slightly decreased</i>	<i>Strongly decreased</i>
<i>Hauptschule</i>	57	17	22	4	0
<i>Realschule</i>	45	19	23	6	6
<i>Gymnasium</i>	47	25	22	6	0
Women	35	24	29	10	2
Men	69	17	11	0	3
Total	49	21	22	6	2

Source: Own survey

more common among recent emigrants. Furthermore, a majority of the sample is emotionally attached to Germany. While 40 % feel equally at home in both countries, 12 % indicated stronger ties to Germany than to Turkey. More women (55 %) than men (45%) reported feeling at home in Germany.

With regard to the living conditions in Turkey, a broad majority of 70 % indicated improved professional positions since their move to Turkey. However, the responses reveal a gender specific difference: while 69 % of men had greatly improved their professional position, only 35 % of the women did so. A further interesting point was that those with a *Hauptschule* qualification improved their professional situation in larger numbers than those with a higher education degree (Table 13.4).

In contrast to career advancement, the income situation is evaluated less positively, with 55 % reporting an improved income situation. Again, women are lagging behind, with 45 % indicating that they received a higher salary than in Germany, in comparison to 71 % of men. Regarding educational attainment, the income situation has developed the least positively for those with a higher education degree (Table 13.5).

The gender-specific gap is also reflected in overall job satisfaction, which is higher among men than among women. However, the survey does not reveal any gender-specific differences regarding overall life satisfaction in Turkey: it is the same proportion of both genders, as 63 %, considered themselves to be happier in Turkey than in Germany (Table 13.6).

Table 13.5 Income situation in Turkey (in %)

Did you improve your income as a result of your move to Turkey?					
	<i>Strongly improved</i>	<i>Slightly improved</i>	<i>More or less the same</i>	<i>Slightly decreased</i>	<i>Strongly decreased</i>
<i>Hauptschule</i>	43	22	35	0	0
<i>Realschule</i>	48	13	16	13	10
<i>Gymnasium</i>	25	19	25	16	16
Women	27	18	29	14	12
Men	54	17	17	6	6
Total	38	17	24	10	9

Source: Own survey

Table 13.6 Life satisfaction in Turkey (in %)

In general, how happy are you with your life in Turkey?			
	<i>Happier in Turkey than in Germany</i>	<i>More or less the same</i>	<i>Happier in Germany than in Turkey</i>
<i>Hauptschule</i>	74	26	0
<i>Realschule</i>	45	35	19
<i>Gymnasium</i>	72	19	9
Women	63	25	12
Men	63	29	9
Total	63	27	10

Source: Own survey

13.4 Conclusion

The findings indicate the importance of motivations for non-economic migration. In addition, Turkey-related pull factors are much more influential than Germany-related push factors. The most frequently stated reasons for leaving Germany were family reasons/partnership (63 %), followed by a desire for a life change (29 %), and not feeling at home in Germany (28 %). Dissatisfaction with career prospects in Germany, and attractive career options in Turkey were cited as important reasons for leaving Germany by only 16 % for each category. This reveals that the German media discourse, which tends to highlight Germany-related push-factors such as unfavourable career prospects and experiences of

discrimination, neglects two important aspects of the emigration of people of Turkish origin: (1) Increasing numbers, particularly of the well-educated, are attracted to a lifestyle involving working in different countries. For these mobile and cosmopolitan-minded people, self-realisation and a desire to explore new environments take priority over monetary advancement; and (2) A logical extension of this is that the growing number of well-qualified people of Turkish origin is as mobile as their peers of German origin.

Furthermore, the findings suggest that a significant proportion of the emigrants maintain ties with their former home country, leading to new permanent linkages between sending and receiving societies. While around a third were either already planning, or are able to imagine, a return to Germany, 5 % are already commuting between the two countries. These long-distance commuters may make an important contribution to German—Turkish relations. Economically, they can help to establish new business networks, and promote knowledge transfer and investment. As regards the social interaction and integration, they can contribute to a better mutual understanding and a reduction in prejudice. Such migration of the highly qualified is not therefore a simple zero-sum game which corresponds to a brain drain for one country and a brain gain for the other; on the contrary, it has the potential to create substantial benefits for both.

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14

An Easy Game? Experiences of 'Homecoming' in the Post-Socialist Context of Croatia and the Czech Republic

Caroline Hornstein Tomić and Sarah Scholl-Schneider

The obstacles that often accompany remigration, planned and imagined as a 'homecoming', are seldom the topic of investigation in migration studies. Returning is not always an 'easy game'. To explore this aspect of remigration, this chapter intends to focus on narratives of return produced mainly by so-called co-ethnic migrants¹ who moved back to Croatia and

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¹ While ethnicity is not the only criterion for categorising returnees, and remigration is not inevitably attached to co-ethnicity, in the case of the migrants investigated in this study, all were people returning to societies in which 'their own' ethnic group made up the majority of the population and so can be described as co-ethnic (see Beer 2010).

C. Hornstein Tomić (✉)

Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar, Zagreb, Croatia

S. Scholl-Schneider

Kulturanthropologie, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, Mainz, Germany

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the Czech Republic during the past two decades of post-socialist transformation.² The empirical base of the chapter draws on the experiences and struggles accompanying remigration,³ and of arrival and acceptance in the respective society as described by returnees in biographical interviews. Attention is given to everyday social interaction in which alternating expectations and specific patterns of behaviour become apparent, as well as to processes of identification in which self-perception and perceptions of the 'other' confront each other and where 'belonging' is negotiated. These narratives of return also suggest that the concept of return should fundamentally be reconsidered, as should the notions of 'homeland' and 'homecoming' on which it is based. They challenge us to investigate and reflect on remigration as *immigration*, as has previously been suggested in another context.⁴ Since migrants—whether or not co-ethnic—generally bring along other languages, worldviews, values, patterns of behaviour and aesthetic preferences, which they have acquired and assumed elsewhere, co-ethnic transnational migration and remigration encourage processes of cultural diversification. These factors are sometimes involved in the collisions, tensions, conflicts and learning processes that accompany the process of integration, even into a host society imagined as the cultural country of origin. This line of thought leads us to conclude that co-ethnic remigration ultimately contributes to social transformation and cultural diversification in the host societies. This assumption will be explored in the following examples and discussions. We will also examine whether the frictions, dynamics of communication and transfer processes which shape and accompany the integration of returnees, can perhaps advance or trigger social and cultural change, or whether the inertia of habitual actions and prevailing rules of the game, along with the intrinsic

² The study includes narratives by people belonging to the second generation of migrants. Born abroad as the children of emigrants, these migrants cannot essentially be seen as returning but more accurately as co-ethnic, transnational migrants.

³ The interviews with Croatian returnees from Germany, the USA, Canada and Austria were conducted by Caroline Hornstein Tomić between 2010 and 2014. The interviews with returnees to the Czech Republic from Germany, Austria, the USA, Canada, France, the UK and the Netherlands were conducted between 2004 and 2014 by Sarah Scholl-Schneider.

⁴ See the study by Marita Krauss on return from exile to Germany after 1945 (Krauss 2001) as well as the study by Jasna Čapo Žmegač on return to Croatia and neighbouring areas that belonged to the former Yugoslavia (Čapo Žmegač 2010: 227).

behaviour they demand, make it difficult for people who have been away for long periods of time to take part in 'the game' as returnees.⁵

In the context of remigration, the metaphor of the game used by Pierre Bourdieu to analyse the deployment of capital by social actors in various fields of the social world can be seen as a useful thread allowing us to follow and review more systematically the numerous everyday and 'playing' situations in which returnees find themselves. After all, it is predominantly capital gained abroad in its various forms (economic, social and cultural; and not always, but often, also symbolic) that migrants considering return are able to, and wish to, invest, whether to profit themselves or their homeland. Bourdieu explains how such resources effect the staking out of space for action, the exploitation of opportunities that pose themselves within given structures, and ultimately the wielding of influence and power, 'The kinds of capital, like trumps in a game of cards, are powers which define the chances of profit in a given field' (Bourdieu 1985, p. 10). However, potential trumps in the game—for example, advanced knowledge that could, at least when seen from the outside, secure a competitive edge—can sometimes prove to be handicaps in the context of the host society or give rise to misunderstandings. After all, a game depends entirely on the rules accepted by a social group, though usually left unwritten, and on the stakes and the value of specific kinds of capital within a certain context. However, the 'playing fields' of Croatia and the Czech Republic are shaped by different conditions and circumstances of emigration, and hence of remigration, which we described elsewhere in more detail.⁶

⁵ For the case of Croatia, this will on the one hand be traced in the experiences of returnees belonging to the first generation of migrants who left the country either shortly before the collapse of Yugoslavia or soon after, and returned many years later after having established professional careers abroad. Not only were they irritated by problems in post-socialist Croatian society inherited from the socialist era, but also by the changes in standards of behaviour and social norms prompted by the transformations. Members of the second generation of migrants, who may only have come into contact with socialist everyday life during holidays, were unable to recognize breaks or continuities in the same way. Nevertheless, encounters with ways of thinking and behaviour stemming from socialist times were equally described as challenging.

⁶ For the Czech Republic see also: Scholl-Schneider 2011; 2014: 195–209. For Croatia, see also: Rogić and Čizmić 2011: 164–170; Hornstein Tomić and Jurčević 2012: 173–222; Čapo and Jurčević 2014: 15–41; Hornstein Tomić 2014: 109–131; Hornstein Tomić and Pleše 2014: 80–95.

14.1 Approaches to Remigration

Before we let the returnees take the stage and allow an insight into their patterns of action and interpretation, the methodological background, assumptions and limits of this analysis must be clarified. First, it must again be emphasised that some types of migration, such as remigration, evade the grasp of statisticians and demographers, and that observation is best achieved through qualitative research, the analysis of media reports and personal narrative.⁷ Our choice of using qualitative interviews to explore our topic, which we have also supplemented with other sources such as autobiographic texts, must, as with any criticism of statistics, be considered from a perspective that engages critically with the sources. We consider it significant that we conducted research as German scientists in a foreign context—and mainly in a language that was not our mother tongue.⁸ Even without considering the linguistic hazards of such interview situations, it should be borne in mind that we were dealing with dissymmetric interrogative situations that could influence the content of the dialogue. When somebody returns after many years abroad in the West, or as a member of the second generation coming to live in a country permanently for the first time, that can only be ‘played’ according to altered, or in the latter case, mainly unfamiliar rules, he or she may feel closer to the scientist sitting opposite who has had her own experiences with immigration officials or everyday routines—such as a refusal to separate waste—and who may share dismay over behaviour lingering from socialist times, than to their compatriots. A conversation can lead rapidly to ‘complicity’,⁹ as we observed in certain cases. Suddenly, the interviewee began to distance herself/himself from ‘the Croats’ or ‘the Czechs’, stereotyping cultural differences, though she/he was under observation as part of the very society in question. However, comparative scrutiny of

⁷In this connection, see references to the return of members of the second and succeeding generations of former emigrants (King and Christou 2010: 167).

⁸All excerpts from interviews cited here, which were conducted in either Czech or German, were translated into English. We mention in footnotes if any interviews were originally conducted in English.

⁹Complicity can be deployed deliberately and with a specific research strategy in mind. Compare Lucius-Hoehne and Deppermann 2002.

the (scarce) research into post-socialist remigration shows that researchers engaging with this topic have often done so from an outside perspective (compare, for example, Fox 2009; Klein-Hitpaß 2011, Klekowski von Koppenfels 2009; Göler 2011 etc.), or have dealt with return to home countries while living abroad or investigating broader transnational issues (Galasińska 2010; Anghel 2013; Vlase 2013 etc.).¹⁰

The selection of interview partners must also be examined here, since both country samples encompassed mainly highly educated individuals, some of whom were active public figures and so can be described as belonging to an educational elite, as was also reflected in a degree of public exposure and predisposition for public speaking.¹¹ In addition, demographic factors reduced the group further: few returnees from the wave of post-Second World War emigrants are alive today and only a very few were able to talk to us. Of the returnees from the first generation of emigrants featured in our study, most were men, while in the second generation men and women were evenly represented.

We conducted our interviews with a biographical focus and without pursuing a particular theme. This kind of semi-structured dialogue is useful where the aim is to allow the interviewee to set his or her own narrative agenda and avoid directing memories too firmly. The interview transcript includes detailed ethnographic records noting the context of the dialogue, which were essential for the interpretation (particularly for later secondary analysis) and provided an indispensable background for our interpretation. We evaluated our material—collected over many years and generally not analysed here for the first time—in many different ways: as biographical case studies, cross-sections or topical analyses, by applying the 'ideal type' concept to biographical research, and so on.

¹⁰The project 'Remigration and Transformations in Post-socialist European Regions' (www.remigrations.pilar.hr), led by the authors together with Robert Pichler (Graz) is gathering contributions from researchers employing an 'outside' perspective to analyse the dynamics of remigration in specific national and regional contexts (Scholl-Schneider, Pichler, Schmidinger, Bernard). However, it also includes an inside view (Dobruska, Čiubrinskas, Božić, Anghel/Cosciug and to a limited extent Hornstein Tomić, who, while she has been observing events from the 'outside', as a German citizen is also located 'inside' by being permanently resident in Croatia with her family).

¹¹Despite the fact that a number of our interview partners were public figures, not all wanted to be cited with their full names. We, the authors, retain authorised versions of the interviews that can be made available on request, but decided to maintain the anonymity of our interview partners in the framework of this contribution.

However, until now we had not taken a comparative look at this comprehensive material. This is the first time that a thematic analysis of a body of mixed Croatian and Czech sources has been undertaken with a particular set of questions in mind.

In the following text, we undertake an analysis of the interviews by having recourse to Bourdieu's concept of 'the game' discussed in the introduction, and its application to the issue of remigration, as well as inspired by literary texts such as Milan Kundera's novel 'Ignorance' (2002), Catalin D. Florescu's *'Der blinde Masseur'* (2003) as well as 'Zaira' (2008), Aleksandar Hemmon's 'The Lazarus Project' (2008) and Norman Manea's 'The Hooligan's Return' (2004). The analysis will reveal how far post-socialist return has often been more of an 'away match' than a 'home game'.

14.2 Confrontation on the Playing Field

'Perhaps time stood still for you while you were in exile. But they no longer think like you do', someone explains to Josef, the protagonist in Kundera's novel, who returns to the Czech Republic after many years as an émigré in Denmark (Kundera 2002, pp. 143–144). The thinking of those who remained at home has changed, as has their behaviour. What is it that seems strange to the returnee? A lawyer who returned from Canada laughed as she recalled how an official tasked with issuing her with an ID card sought advice from her colleague. She overheard them speaking through the open door, 'There's some auntie here who claims ...'. Unimaginable, she said in retrospect, that an official in Canada would speak about her in that way in her presence. But confrontations like this are more painful when they have concrete consequences, such as in the case of another woman of Czech origin returning from Canada who felt financially exploited by her Czech business partners in the course of the restitution of her parents' property. She had imagined that they would welcome her skills. 'But the opposite was the case. All they wanted from me was my money'. The motif of being exploited or deceived also recurred repeatedly in conversations with returnees to Croatia. A young lawyer who grew up in Germany as the child of

guest workers who had achieved considerable prosperity received a job offer in Croatia soon after starting her career; she recalled how her father tried to build up a business in his home region during the early phase of privatisation, when her parents also decided to move back to Croatia:

My father was directly addressed by some kind of political heavyweights: 'Here, diaspora, you're here, you've got money, come here and invest in your homeland!' That really boosted my dad, who is really just a small boy from the country, and motivated him to stick in a lot of money, which he lost entirely because the whole privatisation thing did not work out ... When I ask him about it today, it's a sore point. He just says, 'That lot, those politicians, cheated me.'

Memories of this kind of experience lead to remigration—particularly to a society in transition—being seen as burdensome. It can't have been an easy game. A Czech journalist who founded a weekly newspaper patterned on German journals, explained that

Remigration is more difficult than emigration. Germany is a functioning structure, you just have to work a bit more and look about, but you drop into a functioning society and if you adapt to it, you are accepted. But contracts there count, your word ... here nothing counts to this very day.

One of the often-cited problems seemed to be a lack of respect for the law and for agreements, but also for public goods and private property. Returnees noticed these kinds of things about the home society, and that gave rise to bitterness. Czech ethnologist Jiří Holý explains a saying used widely in the Czech Republic, 'He who doesn't steal is stealing from his family', by pointing out that a high number of criminal offences related to stealing socialist property were never brought to trial. For example, a considerable proportion of the building material used for private homes is believed to have come from unidentified sources. Czech public toilets were known for having neither hand towels, soap or toilet paper because these items regularly disappeared after having been placed there (Holý 2001, pp. 29–30). The shocked remarks made by some returnees about employ-

ees' attitudes towards responsibility, including responsibility towards property, indicate that such habits have continued. The notion that everything belongs to the state and so to the people, corroborated by the above saying, survived socialism and made first efforts to establish a market system extremely difficult. In particular, people working in the private sector suffered from the concrete effects of the continuity of this attitude in the first few years after their return. 'People simply robbed me ... Of course, they stole a lot from me,' said a publisher. 'When I arrived here and somebody said something to me, I automatically believed him, whereas you shouldn't believe people here at all and if you do believe them, you're stupid.'

The continuity of socialist structures and modes of behaviour was also noted in other professional contexts and evaluated critically as a block to change and a restraint to self-initiative and self-responsibility. A scientist¹² who returned to Croatia after 10 years abroad in Western Europe pointed out, 'this keeps being a problem in Croatian academic institutions still: the hierarchy and the old, unwritten rules are more important than the objective criteria'. He further went on to criticise a recruiting system that largely fails to consider aspects of merit. Instead, at least until recently, social connections and political affiliation were by far the most decisive criteria influencing recruitment. 'So this is this old-style thinking still being dominant here, but this is now changing. I have a feeling that for the first time [in the] last two or three years this has really started to change.' Nevertheless, he concluded, 'We are too much still under the influence of the old socialist days, socialist mindset.' He cited decision-making as an example, 'This is quite drastic here in public institutions like this one. Almost everything is being voted on. You know, we have a meeting of the department, we vote. I have almost no power [as a department head] to, you know, enforce anything. And then we go to the Institute council and then we also vote on everything. You know how this works. It's a way for [retaining] the status quo ... everybody's interest is then somehow preserved and that's ... there is no space for change, you know, what we need, especially in our institutions.'

¹²The interview with him was originally conducted in English.

In the context of employment, returnees also repeatedly pointed out submission to authority as a prominent feature—for example, in ministry departments—as well as the lack of readiness to take on responsibility or to act on one's own initiative. They frequently mentioned experiences with bureaucratic procedures and modes of behaviour within state administration. They stressed inflexible and unyielding structures and procedures, as well as displays of power—as applicants for work, people found themselves in the role of a foreign suppliant required to adapt to routines, or rather to show obeisance and refrain from making special demands. A member of the second generation who moved to Zagreb in her late thirties with the aim of building up a consulting firm, recalled:

I had to visit somewhere 48 times in order to clarify something, 'We do things differently here, you will have to come to terms with that and accept it.' Such obstinacy! And because I came from outside they all think I was born with a silver spoon in my mouth.

Another member of the second generation who made the move to Croatia at the start of his studies remembered the learning processes he went through not only in coming to terms with deficits in linguistic and cultural knowledge—he spoke about 'differences in mentality'—but also as part of practising the types of behaviour suited to the system.

The initial period was tremendously exciting and also very difficult ... Everything came together for me in Zagreb, in that sense it was tremendously exciting. But it was also very difficult because without a Croatian school education, and especially here studying law, which is very much connected to language; it was not easy to find my way around. ... Of course, I had to find my way into society here and with the kind of mentality developed in Germany, you behave differently, think differently, and so it was not easy in the beginning.

Moreover, some returnees were confronted with the old system in a much more personal manner. The expatriate author Jiří Gruša, who in a demonstration of loyalty to his homeland returned the German citizenship he had received in exile and applied for a Czech one as he prepared to become ambassador to Germany, met the very official at his repatriation

who had formerly withdrawn his citizenship (Gruša 2002, pp. 231–232). Others also came up against people who in the past had been responsible for the fate of their country and so indirectly for that of the emigrants now returning. An exiled Czech historian reported that he had neither been able to, nor had wanted to, shake the hand of his predecessor when receiving his keys to the office.

14.3 Playing Alone or as Part of a Team: Social Networks

While the mistrust of returnees who had left the former Czechoslovakia for political reasons towards those who had shown loyalty to the old regime restricted the group of possible new ‘game partners’ in the young Czech state, the group of old ‘playmates’ on the other hand were no longer always around. After years abroad, it appeared that old networks could no longer be reactivated, friendships had faded or suffered from exposure to spying, denunciation and the secret police. In the beginning, returnees often found themselves isolated. Families had been torn apart; the regime had gone so far as to destroy gravestones in order to isolate the ‘national traitors to the people’ and rob them once and for all of their homeland. Returning to a system strongly shaped by closed social networks (compare Roth 2007) was a move that needed to be well planned.

Both Czech and Croatian returnees mentioned clientelistic structures and nepotism as serious shortcomings and identified them as lingering socialist structures. A Czech returnee, for example, complained of repeatedly receiving CVs from acquaintances who thought that she could secure them a job. People openly urged her to ask her husband, a senator, to make the necessary call that would surely lead to employment. Network structures proved to be the biggest challenge for the returnee historian who became the first director of the Institute for Contemporary History in Prague after the political changes. ‘I do you a favour, you do me a favour, one hand washes the other’, is the attitude he faced every day and took time to change. A Croatian returnee from Canada recalled the arduous process of integration into social life and, above all, into professional structures.

In Croatia, I think, everything depends on it ... you really have to know people ..., the right people in the right places. I think it often doesn't matter what you know or what you have done. I've the feeling this is a real disadvantage in Croatia.

Rather than eroding the permanent efficacy of such network structures, transition up to a point reinforced them. A second-generation returnee working as a lawyer emphasised the role of networks and social capital in acquiring clients: 'It is almost impossible for me to acquire a mandate for Croatian cases because they, again, view me with healthy distrust.' It took time to build up networks, she said, pointing out that contacts tended to be generated on the basis of existing ones. She also addressed patriarchal structures: as a woman, proposing a business lunch to a potential male client was often taken the wrong way by the 'big shots' in Zagreb. In addition, her German accent was sometimes an impediment, as was her being more strongly anchored in the German-speaking community.

here I mainly work with Germans and Austrians ... while the Croatians are on the other side ... So my opportunities are limited ... people look for lawyers, they know each other; it does work via recommendations. People look for lawyers who are already established here, and they say that I wouldn't know where to attack.

On the other hand, some returnees of the first generation were able to fall back on existing networks; and this hugely facilitated their reintegration. In the Czech Republic, for example, those people who were expatriated in the 1970s after they had often already achieved a prominent status—albeit as a dissident disdained by the regime—were precisely those who activated old networks they had maintained over the years through secret channels or work with the media such as Radio Free Europe. However, these people remained an exception. As coincidental elites (Srubar 1998, p. 25), they were 'recalled' by the new elites and so were allocated a position on the playing field. Bourdieu categorises such mechanisms of 'mutual acquaintance and recognition' (Bourdieu 1992, p. 63) as social capital. When deployed strategically, this can increase an actor's other

kinds of capital (Bourdieu 1992, p. 64). This process became very obvious here: the economic as well as symbolic capital linked to remigration multiplied where social capital had led to recall to the country and remigration was not only initiated but also greatly facilitated. However, there were also members of the first generation who, in a similar way to second generation returnees, addressed what it meant to lack social capital as outsiders and consequently be blocked from 'playing' in network structures. A scientist who emigrated to the USA shortly before the collapse of Yugoslavia and after almost two decades returned to Croatia, where he today works as a university professor, remembered the moment when his faculty colleagues made it clear that he did not belong:

Basically they co-operated you know, until the moment when I won the project. At the moment I won the project of 4million kuna, they were freaked ... My project was approved but the money on the contract not. Why? Because I was someone outside the system; so they don't allow people outside the system to get the money ... The system is basically built on these personal relationships so that these people can never lose. Everyone can lose, but not these people ... They cannot afford that someone who is coming back, that he actually starts something.

He concluded on a sobering note, 'This tribal mentality controls the success of other people. They will not let anyone have success who should not be successful.' Without being able to bring to light more systematically the differences between types of migrants with respect to networks and inner relationships at this point, it is important to stress here that in both the Croatian and Czech cases, the authorities spared no efforts in making it impossible for political emigrants to maintain contact with the homeland. Passports were confiscated, telephones tapped, letters intercepted. The conduct of emigrants in the diaspora or in exile was frequently kept under observation. Labour migrants and their children, on the other hand, were able not only to stay in touch but also to keep up to date with events in their home countries through social relationships, holiday trips, practices of chain migration and family reunification as well as through unimpeded verbal and written means of communication.

14.4 Rejection of, or Adaptation to, the Rules of Play

Both Croatian and Czech interview partners often remarked that returnees had limited possibilities to influence playing rules and the progression of the 'game' but rather had to adapt. A member of the second generation, already cited above, who came to Croatia to begin his studies, recalled:

The study of law here was mainly based on learning encyclopaedic facts by heart, an approach that was quite unknown to me from Germany. We were always oriented towards thinking critically about written texts and really didn't simply reproduce knowledge very much. We were much more involved ourselves and in somehow finding compromises, some kind of original ways to resolve problems. Here, that was absolutely not the case. Here you were basically a very good student if you knew the footnote on page 345 of the book. This was completely incomprehensible to me on the one hand, on the other I saw it as backward and also consciously opposed it. But that basically didn't help me much. I couldn't change the system.

Furthermore, some spoke about their refusal to accept playing rules that contravened personal principles or beliefs. Such refusals highlighted the reciprocal estrangement of the returnees arriving from the outside to understand people in the home country; for example, when a returnee refused to adapt or make him/herself at home in a game that s/he found disturbing and rejected it. A former chancellor at the presidential office of Václav Havel remembered how, at the beginning of the 1990s when he was on a business trip to a far corner of the country he had so much wanted to revisit, he was looking for a place to eat,

And lo and behold, all of a sudden an inviting pub lit up. We stopped in front of it, someone from the Castle was with me. And we go in and see a sign on the door, 'Gypsies not wanted'. I asked if that was serious, and he said 'Yes'. No thanks—we drove on. I don't go into that kind of place.

Similarly, a former Czech foreign minister was met with incomprehension when, following the practice he had acquired in British exile, he did

not dismiss his predecessor's state secretaries, making him realise how extremely different the political culture in each country was. The fact that he did not create a blank slate and introduce his own staff was interpreted as a weakness.

Feelings of not fitting in were expressed most often in memories of the early days of remigration. Being able to once more (in the case of the first generation) feel part of society may have been possible here and there for those who once emigrated, yet experiences of having been seen as 'foreign' by locals was a recurring theme in all the interviews, with members of both the first and second generations.¹³ The former adviser to the Czech president cited above referred to himself in the interview as an alien, as an 'E.T.' The term 'alien' often came up in the Czech context, along with 'semi-foreigners', 'the estranged' and even 'degenerated' (compare Scholl-Schneider 2011, pp. 47–49). The kinds of refusals described above or the unusual approaches and practices of returnees may have played a role in creating this image. Moreover, criticism of conditions, opposition to routines such as those mentioned above in the context of institutions or in communication with state authorities, highlighted feelings of alienation. The lawyer born and raised in Germany who migrated to Croatia as a member of the second generation, emphasised, 'I never said I was a German. I always had a Croatian passport and always clung a bit to this identity' but also commented with a degree of disillusionment, 'I always said I was Croatian, even when from the Croatian perspective I am a German—here I am always a *švabica*.'¹⁴

How should one behave in order to feel at home and be accepted as belonging? One meaningful strategy was to become involved in the host society, to recognise its playing rules and play by them to an extent that allowed a high degree of adaptation and therefore successful integration and acquisition of the skills needed to take part in the game. The previously cited former law student and current diplomat followed the strate-

¹³ Experiences of being perceived as an alien and coming up against 'strangeness' have frequently been recorded in studies on co-ethnic remigration.

¹⁴ In the Croatian language (as well as in other Slav languages), the term *švabica* is used to denote 'a female from Swabia'. The term has been in use since the colonisation of Slavic lands in the eastern Danube region by the so-called 'Danube-Swabians'. However, in colloquial language it is still in use today to describe a female German in general, and not a German from Swabia in particular.

gic goal of integration through overcoming alienation and difference, not only during his studies and later in his professional career, but also in his social contacts.

I was relatively radical in wanting to establish myself here and I really quite consciously avoided socialising with returnees. I knew a few people and now and then we went out for a coffee or something, we kept each other's spirits up ... So, I didn't want to live in a subculture or something like that, like let's say the Croatians in Germany have always lived in a subculture, or all immigrants, not only the Croatians. Rather, I consciously wanted to be part of Croatian society, so my friends, most of my friends I saw more of, were really Croatians from Croatia.

No game without a strategy: once the playing rules had been observed for a certain time, strategies of adaptation began to emerge depending on the field, and became deployable. Some individuals chose to first observe and analyse the playing field from a distance and so refrained from returning in the early phase of transition to instead come back many years later. This also had practical reasons. The radical changes in the political system, and economic transformation as Czechoslovakia split up into the Czech and Slovak Republics, similar to the War of Independence from 1991–95 and its consequences in Croatia, suggested that it would be wise to wait and see how conditions would stabilise and develop. Moreover, the far-reaching changes sometimes confused the playing rules or even destroyed the playing field entirely, thus generating new rules. Those people who were the most politically¹⁵ highly engaged and motivated were primarily those who returned right at the outset of the democratisation process rather than making first cautious visits as others did. Other often-mentioned strategies consisted of avoiding confrontation, not drawing attention to oneself or making oneself unpopular with well-meant advice, and ultimately keeping silent. This kind of strategy was suggested indirectly to returnees by the general lack of interest in their experiences of

¹⁵In analogy, Krauss reports that in the context of post-war remigration to Germany, return was swifter and more likely in correlation with how politically motivated emigration had been (Krauss 2001: 9).

living abroad among those who had stayed at home. Like Odysseus, they were not asked about their years in exile. A Czech returnee concluded

People here are really full of minority complexes: that they did not have a good life, that they can't do anything, that they don't understand, that they don't know, that you are richer, that you have seen the world. So anything you would say about your life there is an assault on their self-confidence. So I never tried to tell them which countries I've been to, what I did, what kind of social life I had, nobody asked me about it. So like I had kept quiet there about this one [life], here I kept quiet about that one. And then my friends came along, 'We were on holiday, there was a pool and they had a buffet and you could take what you wanted from the buffet.' I said, 'Really?' [laughs] Yes, well what should you say to that? Yes, so keep quiet, quiet, quiet.

In additional comments, her husband made clear in how far keeping silent really was a strategy to avoid rubbing somebody up the wrong way and appearing like a stranger; 'If I had told them at the time what they should do, they would have been offended: "He's from Canada, thinks he knows it all and is telling us here such nonsense"'. Members of the second generation also played down or tried to conceal a possible competitive edge in order to alleviate distrust and avoid rejection. People in the home country suspected that returnees had special knowledge and therefore a competitive advantage. This attitude provided the background for behaviour that distanced or excluded people coming from outside. Such kinds of behaviour recurred in daily working life, whether in a lawyer's firm, or in the academic or the banking sector. Returnees criticised this for impeding procedures, corporate and inner institutional communication, general co-operation and, as a result, a successful working environment. The former adviser to the Czech president went so far as to take a 'break' after several years and withdrew from politics. He justified his retreat and time-out with his being all too aware of how understanding of the events and people in a country of origin steadily declined.

Like I said, I lived in Austria and there I saw *ad oculos* how fast emigrants lose the feeling for what is going on in their country. I was there, whether those were the social democratic emigrants who returned from America

and England and were no longer able to come to terms with life in Austria in the 1950s, or whether they were others. Many knew a lot, but I can only express it in English: 'They didn't understand how their country ticks.'

Here again it is evident how relevant the time factor is. When someone has been away for a long time—in the case of political emigration, this may have been for decades—they tend to develop distorted or inappropriate ideas about the society they left, or even completely lose their relationship to it. In 'The Homecomer', Alfred Schuetz (1945, p. 375) described this as follows,

the home to which he [the homecomer] returns is by no means the home he left or the home which he recalled and longed for during his absence. And, for the same reason, the homecomer is not the same man who left. He is neither the same for himself nor for those who await his return.

The scientist who returned to Croatia from the USA expressed similar feelings.

before America I was here like a fish in the water. So it was pretty much ... I knew everything. I think that America has changed many things in my head, the way I operate. I'm unable to ... I don't think that until the end of my life, I will be able to operate here the way I was used to operate.

Similarly, soon after his return, a Czech émigré remarked on how one assumed another—possibly outsider—perspective in exile. In any case, perspectives changed.

When you live where I lived for those years, I saw things with other eyes in the sense that things that people here accept as natural or that don't particularly annoy, provoke, irritate them—I see them. From rudeness to the incompetence of salespeople, from lack of interest, from the doctor who treats you impersonally, who you see is uninterested—at least he could pretend to be [interested].

Schuetz also acknowledged that the homecomer saw things with different eyes, and found everyday routines, patterns of behaviour or ways of thinking

hard to accept. And it created the urge to change or influence them; just as it happened to many returnees. Once again we turn to Schuetz (1945, p. 375).

To a certain extent, each homcomer has tasted the magic fruit of strangeness, be it sweet or bitter. Even amid the overwhelming longing for home there remains the wish to transplant into the old pattern something of the novel goals, of the newly discovered means to realise them, of the skills and experiences acquired abroad.

14.5 Influencing and Changing the Game

Our interviews reveal numerous examples of minor and major innovations in everyday life, of the transfer of experiences and skills as elucidated by Schuetz into professional structures such as work processes and forms of communication, which returnees frequently refer to with pride. They all ultimately display a diversification of cultural patterns, which accompanies the return of former emigrants or their descendants. The publisher of a Prague-based bulletin for classified advertising, for example, succeeded in establishing new 'playing rules' and achieved results by motivating his employees to improve their performance through higher pay.

Of course, the work pace and our demands were unusual for people who were used to work[ing], or rather not to work[ing], under communism.¹⁶ At the same time, 'Annonce' paid very well, I would say always above average, and that continues to be noticeable until today, but was mostly so in the starting phase. So, people were not that put out because we wanted good work from them and a lot of work, but they were also paid a lot for it.

Processes of learning and adapting were often accompanied by disillusionment and the realisation of the limits of individual potential to bring about change, trigger initiative or introduce knowledge and experience gained 'outside'. This kind of awareness could be painful, especially when

¹⁶ Again, compare Holý (2001: 30) and his description of how the practice of increasing free time by working on private things during work time was widespread in communist Czechoslovakia.

the decision to return was motivated by the hopes and wishes to become actively involved in events and be able to influence processes. The notion of 'being able to help' was a recurring theme in the interviews, such as in the narrative of a Czech journalist who justified her return as follows,

I am of the opinion that it is necessary to educate for democracy and that this is not a short-term process. So we knew that it would be our task to simply help Czechoslovakia along the path to democracy and naturally also to a market economy, but above all to democracy.

The former law student and current diplomat cited several times above, spoke similarly.

The feeling ... developed that you could participate in it, make your contribution—let's say, in quotation marks, 'development aid'. That kind of contribution, so as a Croatian with the background I had then, you could make a bigger contribution in Croatia than as someone in Germany. That was my idea at the time.

However, whether returnees really were successful as 'mediators between cultures' (see Scholl-Schneider 2011), as 'agents of change' or actors in the process of knowledge transfer, remains open to a more thorough investigation that should take a closer look at processes over longer periods as well as consider directly the perspective of locals. The method of conducting qualitative interviews with the actors themselves is limited in scope for offering meaningful analysis—at this point it would be necessary to observe and evaluate their actions using other, additional methods. However, in analysing the interviews it became evident that almost all the returnees, from wherever they came and to whichever generation they belonged, shared a strong eagerness for initiative and a desire to improve—for example, by introducing more efficiency and competitiveness to professional life—in other words, a strong will for change. In both the Czech and the Croatian cases, concrete transfer was accomplished based on 'foreign' examples and patterns learned and tested abroad: for example, the establishment of a child abuse hotline, the founding of an institute or newspaper, the setting up of teams and teamwork based on flattened hierarchies in scientific institutions or in the banking sector. However, it was less the creation of

structures or institutions, but instead returnees often contributed small acts of assistance, comments, ideas, and contacts or inspired thoughts about more democracy (see Scholl-Schneider 2011, esp. pp. 152–253).

The question remains as to whether returnees to the post-socialist ‘playing field’ were successful, whether they were able to win. Were they able to use their resources in a profitable way and gain points through skilful playing moves? Here, it is expedient to differentiate between personal experiences and adaptation to the playing field, and professional moves. While experiences of adaptation, bowing to the rules or even keeping silent were prominent in individual self-assessment, in professional life, successes achieved through particular approaches, methods and ways of thinking seem to have left their mark.

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Part IV

Policy Recommendations and Conclusions

15

European National Policies Aimed at Stimulating Return Migration

Lajos Boros and Gábor Hegedűs

The so-called brain drain is a long-standing phenomenon: the best-known example is the migration of skilled professionals from the countries of the Global South to ones in the Global North. The changes in regimes in 1989–90, plus the liberalisation of borders created an entirely new situation with regard to migration in Central Europe and a new dimension of the migration processes has emerged. The enlargement of the European Union (EU) in 2004 and 2007 and the acceptance of new acts and agreements, such as the free movement of people, re-drew migration patterns within Europe significantly. As a result of systemic changes, and more recently EU accession, the economically active and mobile parts of these societies, in particular the young and well-educated, began to move in large numbers towards Western Europe, especially the economically more prosperous and competitive regions (i.e. core regions) (Drbohlav et al. 2009; Martin & Radu 2011). The destinations of this labour movement also turned gradually towards those countries of the EU that were previously considered peripheral and were to some extent sources than destinations of migration

L. Boros (✉) • G. Hegedűs

Department of Economic and Social Geography, University of Szeged,
Szeged, Hungary

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(for example, Ireland and Spain). These countries were turned into destinations, mainly as a result of the labour flow arriving from the new member states (Kahanec and Zimmermann 2011; Drbohlav et al. 2009).

Given the scale and effect of these processes, political and economic decision-makers are forced to react quickly to slow down, stop or even reverse the outmigration from the new member states. It is almost impossible to define the exact number of emigrants because of the free movement of people principle—but the official statistical data shows a growing number of emigrants from the former socialist countries (Table 15.1). The real number of migrants is certainly higher than these statistics show.

The aim of this paper to present the types of policy answers related to the massive outmigration and to analyse their results and applicability. To this end, we analysed policy documents related to the causes and effects of the migration processes. After a brief presentation of data and methods we present our theoretical framework. Since brain drain is a global phenomenon, some examples of policies outside Europe are presented in the next section. In the fifth section we analyse European policy measures on various scales.

15.1 Data and Methods

The paper is based on the content analysis of international, national and sub-national policy documents (for example, migration strategies, economic strategies, analyses related to development plans, local and regional best practices and so on; see Table 15.2). The documents that were available in English were analysed by the authors. In the case of documents in other languages we used the input from the project partners of the Re-Turn project financed by the EU through the Central Europe programme.

We used a qualitative approach in our research: we identified the aims and tools in each policy document and made comparisons between them to draw up the main groups of measures mentioned. Because of the different national contexts and the heterogeneity of the documents we did not consider the quantitative approach useful (for example, we did not use key words). Given the nature of the analysed documents (i.e. their practical focus) the aims and tools were usually clearly articulated. When

Table 15.1 Emigration from Central and Eastern European countries 2001–2012

Country/year	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Bulgaria							2,958	2,112				16,615
Czech Republic	21,469	32,389	34,226	34,818	24,065	33,463	20,500	51,478	61,782	61,069	55,910	46,106
Estonia	2,175	2,038	3,073	2,927	4,610	5527	4,384	4,406	4,658	5,294	6,214	6,321
Latvia	24,539	15,837	15,647	20,167	17,643	17,019	15,463	27,045	38,208	39,651	30,311	25,163
Lithuania	27,841	16,719	26,283	37,691	57,885	32,390	30,383	25,750	38,500	83,157	53,863	41,100
Hungary	2,591	3,126	3,122	3,820	3,658	4314	4,500	9,591	10,483	13,365	15,100	22,880
Poland	23,368	24,532	20,813	18,877	22,242	46,936	35,480	74,338	229,320	218,126	265,798	275,603
Romania								302,796	246,626	197,985	195,551	170,186
Slovenia	4,811	7,269	5,867	8,269	8,605	13,749	14,943	12,109	18,788	15,937	12,024	14,378
Slovakia	1,011	1,411	4,777	6,525	2,784	3084	3,570	4,857	4,753	4,447	1,863	2,003
Croatia	7488	11,767	6,534	6,812		7692	9,002	7,488			12,699	12,877

Source: Eurostat

Table 15.2 Initiatives analysed in this study

Name of initiative	Spatial focus	Spatial scale	Aim
Youth entrepreneurship project	Ossola, Italy	micro-regional, local	retention
Youth Businessmen Group	Ossola, Italy	micro-regional, local	retention
PFIFF	Saxony-Anhalt, Germany	regional	re-employment
Fachkräftesicherungspakt Sachsen-Anhalt	Saxony-Anhalt, Germany	regional	re-employment
Municipal Retention Policy	Alsómosolád, Hungary	local	retention
Business Angel	Alytus, Lithuania	regional	re-attraction, retention
The Development Strategy for the Opole Voivodeship	Opolskie, Poland	regional	reintegration
Pößneck kommt zurück	Pößneck, Germany	local	re-attraction
MV4you	Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	regional	re-attraction
Boomerang Lausitz	Lausitz, Germany	regional	re-attraction, retention
Revenio	Hartz region, Germany	regional	re-attraction, retention
UFaS/Thüringer Agentur Für Fachkräftegewinnung (ThAFF)	Thuringia, Germany	regional	re-attraction, reintegration
Commissione dei Lucani nel Mondo	Basilicata, Italy	regional	re-attraction, reintegration
Scholarship in Ústecký region	Ústecký region, Czech Republic	regional	retention
Zuhause in Brandenburg	Brandenburg and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Germany	regional	retention, re-attraction
Perspektiven für junge Menschen	Eastern regions, Germany	regional	retention
Verbund Rück- und Zuwanderung	Eastern regions, Germany	regional	retention, re-attraction, reemployment
Sachse komm zurück	Saxony, Germany	regional	re-attraction, reemployment

(continued)

Table 15.2 (continued)

Name of initiative	Spatial focus	Spatial scale	Aim
JUKAM	Saxony-Anhalt, Germany	regional	retention, re-attraction
Slovensko calling	Slovakia	national	reintegration
Marie Curie Actions	European Union	transnational	retention, re-attraction
Solidarity Net Ukraine	Ukraine	national	reintegration
IEFP	Portugal	national	re-attraction, reemployment
Brain Gain Albania	Albania	national	re-attraction, reemployment
Guidance and Counselling for Migrants and Returnees	Slovakia, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Netherlands, Cyprus, Greece	transnational	reemployment, reintegration
Service for Overseas and Repatriated Cypriots	Cyprus	national	re-attraction, reintegration, reemployment
Momentum	Hungary	national	re-attraction, retention
Markusovszky scholarship	Hungary	national	retention
Opening Up Opportunities for Returned Georgian Migrants	Czech Republic/ Georgia	transnational	reintegration, reemployment
Back2BG	Bulgaria	national	re-attraction
Rientro Cervelli	Italy	national	re-attraction
Have you got a PPlan to return?	Poland	national	reintegration, re-attraction
BARKA Foundation	Poland	national	re-attraction, reintegration
OST Scientist Network	Austria	national	resourcing expatriates
German Academic International Network	Germany	national	resourcing expatriates
Wspólnota Polska Association	Poland	national	resourcing expatriates
The State Agency for Bulgarians Abroad	Bulgaria	national	resourcing expatriates
Student contracts in higher education	Hungary	national	retention

(continued)

Table 15.2 (continued)

Name of initiative	Spatial focus	Spatial scale	Aim
Fondo Microcredito Balcani	Italy, Romania	national, transnational	return of migrants
Guidance and Counselling for Migrants and Returnees	Slovakia, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, The Netherlands, Greece	transnational	reintegration
Migration policy of the Slovak Republic— Perspective until the year 2020	Slovakia	national	retention

Source: Own draft

we had difficulties or uncertainties with the categorisation we mentioned it in the analysis. During the categorisation of the policies we relied on the so-called ‘six Rs’ model of Lowell (2002) but other aspects were also considered. As well as the use of the ‘six Rs’ model we did not use pre-defined categories; instead we used the method of emergent coding and the categories were established after the preliminary analysis of the data.

In addition to the initiatives listed in Table 15.2, our analysis also builds on other analyses and evaluations as secondary sources. Moreover, it is important to emphasise that the paper is only based on those documents available in English or were interpreted by the project partners or other researchers. Therefore our analysis cannot be considered as a complete review of European policies. However, we think that the paper identifies the most common directions, aims and tools of the European remigration policies.

The study focuses primarily on national and regional levels but it gives also a brief outlook on European and transnational perspectives.

15.2 Theoretical Background

With regard to analysing remigration policies, we use the following definition of returning migrants in our study: returning migrants are people returning to their country of citizenship after having been international

migrants (whether short-or long-term) in another country and who are intending to stay in their own country for at least a year (UN Statistics Division 1998). We focus generally on policies aimed at voluntary, or largely voluntary, return in our study, and we do not examine the policies/programmes on ways of forced remigration (involving, for example, the return of refugees or asylum seekers to their countries of origin). The issue of circular migration is also related to return migration. Similarly to return migration, the descriptions of circular or cyclical migrants are also used widely and diversely by the special literature. According to Wickramasekara, circular migration is temporary and refers to repeat movements involving more than one migration cycle. In addition, this definition contains the involvement of the same groups of migrants, or repeat migration by the same individuals (Wickramasekara 2011). Circular migration and related policies can be classified under several headings (Agunias 2006; Sopemi 2008; Wickramasekara 2011). Concerning circular migration, however, there are some negative aspects and impacts related to employing circular migration potential, in both European and non-European countries (de Haas 2007a; Wickramasekara 2011). For example, restrictive immigration policies can be real obstacles to realising circular migration, since they can interrupt circular migration patterns and discourage migrants' circular mobility by pushing them into permanent settlement (de Haas 2007a; Ferri and Rainero 2010).

According to the literature, policy responses to migration could be divided into six categories, named the 'six Rs' (Lowell 2002):

1. Return of migrants to their source country—focusing on the permanent return of workers. There are different aims of these policies: for example, benefiting from the new skills gained by migrants during their time of emigration, reversing negative demographic trends, dealing with labour shortages in certain sectors or regions and so on. The social reintegration of returnees is a crucial element of these policies, because without successful reintegration, return can become only temporary and workers may emigrate again.
2. Restriction of international mobility—this policy option is used mainly in less developed countries to protect their domestic labour market and to keep a skilled workforce at home. Because of EU rules this policy strand is only applicable to workers from third world countries.

3. Recruitment of international migrants—attracting workers, in most cases highly skilled labour from abroad. Such policies make immigration easier for skilled workers and often offer incentives to attract them.
4. Reparation for loss of human capital (compensation)—this is only a theoretical migration policy. The idea was developed in the 1970s, claiming that the more developed countries should compensate financially (or in other ways) the less developed countries hit severely by a brain drain (Giannocolo 2005).
5. Resourcing expatriates (diaspora options)—this policy is used mainly in the case of skilled migrants; they can be drawn into initiatives started by governmental or the business sector to help networking, knowledge transfer and so on.
6. Retention—through policies in the education system and through economic development, skilled workers decide voluntarily to stay in the country. The re-employment of workers to prevent their emigration is a crucial tool in these policies, particularly in regions hit by crisis. It is important to emphasise that, in contrast to restrictions, retention policies do not apply administrative constraints to keep workers in the country.

Because of the Single Market rules (for example, free movement of people) policy types in items 2 and 4 (restriction and reparation) cannot be used within the EU. The other four options are all applied to some extent by European governments. This analysis does not cover the policies regarding the recruitment of workers from abroad. Our focus is on policies aiming to re-attract and/or keep the local/national workforce in place, or using migrants as a resource through business, research or educational networks. In some cases, policies have interconnected aims—for example, to foster return migration and to keep the domestic workforce in the country (i.e. retention).

Regarding the target group, three types of policies can be identified, whether focusing on re-migrants, possible re-migrants, or people planning to emigrate (Table 15.3).

Among the above-mentioned classifications of policies it is important to emphasise that the connection between migration and development

is a highly debated issue. De Haas (2007b) distinguishes between so called ‘migration optimists’ and ‘migration pessimists’. The former group emphasises the beneficial effects of developing migration, while the latter often sees migration as a process that jeopardises the catching-up of less-developed regions. Migration often means the loss of skilled workers and thus hinders development. On the other hand, outmigration can ease social problems (for example, unemployment) in the sending countries and can contribute to their development through the growing income via remittances. To tackle the domestic economic and social problems, some countries (for example, Bangladesh, India) even encourage and actively help with outmigration (Castles 2000).

Traditional, largely structuralist approaches are perhaps the most prominent representatives of the migration pessimists’ points of view. They emphasise the negative effects on source economies, claiming that migration has mainly negative effects on the development of source region/country (i.e. Bhagwati and Hamada 1974, Bhagwati and Rodriguez 1975). These evaluations often use cost—benefit analyses highlighting

Table 15.3 Policy options focusing on brain gain and retention—types and features

	Policy in response to return migration (reactive)	Policy stimulating return migration (active)	Policy to retain human capital (proactive)
Target group	Real returnees	Potential returnees	Potential migrants
Rationale	To minimise social tensions and costs related to return migration	To maximise profits related to return migration (through the social, economic, demographic and financial capital of returnees)	To prevent or minimise loss of human capital
Aim	Reintegration of returnees in the society	To induce to return and/or to facilitate the return process	To prevent outmigration of (skilled) workers
Place	Country of origin	Country of stay	Country of origin
Time	After return	Before return and/or at time of return	Before outmigration

Source: Modified, after Kaczmarczyk and Lesińska (2013)

the loss in terms of human resources, the costs of training, missing savings and earnings in the source economies and so on (Castles 2000). These studies claim that outmigration makes it hard, or sometimes impossible, for developing countries to catch up.

Development optimists' points of view of migration see the free movement of the workforce as a natural element of human societies that is essential to development. The 'beneficial brain drain model' focuses on the opportunities created in source economies by migration; migration opportunities motivate people to study, and since not everyone emigrates this raises the average educational level. Furthermore, the widening opportunities attract investments to the source economies (Beine et al. 2001). The social network model emphasises the role of immigrant networks as they create knowledge networks and provide channels for the flows of knowledge, remittances, business investments, power and so on. Therefore, outmigration can also be beneficial for those who stayed 'at home'. At the same time, it is important to notice that the existence of transnational migration networks can increase the probability of outmigration among stayers, since they can gain more information about the target country, and the opportunities it provides; in addition, the family ties between migrants and stayers are also motivational factors for moving abroad (IOM 2010b). The impacts of migration result in different kinds of transfers; this has been summarised by IOM (2010b) in the 3Ts model: the transfer of people, know-how and knowledge, and financial assets are interlinked forms of transfer. All three transfers can have both positive and negative effects.

In the countries of destination, the effects of migration are also a highly debated issue for various social, cultural and economic reasons. It is quite commonly stressed in public opinion or political discussions that immigration hinders economic development in target countries, and contributes to the increase in social tensions (IOM 2010b; United Nations 2013). However, as the findings of an OECD (OECD 2013) study show, immigrants can contribute significantly to economic growth and in some cases even contribute to the narrowing of wage inequalities, and can represent a significant driving force for innovation and entrepreneurship (Ottaviano and Peri 2012).

However, to the traditional migration pessimist, cost—benefit approaches seem to be the most widespread in both public and political discourse, highlighting the loss in human resources, educational costs, quality of life and so on. In other words, from the 3Ts model, mainly the first ‘T’— the transfer of people—is highlighted, while the transfers of financial assets and knowledge are often neglected. This strongly affects the policy answers formulated by national, regional and local authorities.

15.3 Examples of Remigration Policies Outside Europe

The role of policies targeting return migration has been growing globally. The process, called ‘brain gain’ in the literature, has been on the agenda in many countries around the world (UNDP 2007). The reverse ‘brain drain’ of high-skilled engineers and scientists has been of great benefit to China, Taiwan and India, which is well documented in the literature (Sills 2008). Following their example, more and more countries are making efforts to attract back their nationals who are living abroad (for example, Jamaica, the Philippines, Tunisia, Argentina). The migration policies adopted in these countries aimed at stimulating the migrants to remit funds, to bring their skills back, and even to allow them dual citizenship and rights. They may establish systems of information and cultural outreach to expatriate communities, and may also support migrants to seek representation in institutional structures, and in particular in the parliament. They may even offer incentives to stimulate return (special access to specific social services, permission to hold convertible foreign-currency accounts or to earn premium interest rates and so on), as well as reintegration assistance (OECD 2008). Furthermore, national return policies are sometimes based on using the ethnic return phenomena (Tsuda 2010). Furthermore to return migration, some policies aim at the successful use of circular migration (see, for example, Wickramasekara 2011). However, in many countries there is a lack of measures to help the reintegration of returning migrants, which is a crucial element of circular migration (Castles 2000; Ferri and Raneiro 2010). A complete

summary of these provisions would exceed the scope of our study, but some examples can illustrate the variety of approaches.

Successful brain gain strategies may have different levels. The level of their institutionalisation, the scale of economic and legal efforts, as well as their efficiency, can be very different. Political will at the highest level and investment in tertiary education that is reactive to in-country as well as international labour market demand, coupled with a helpful policy/administrative environment and an integrated incentive package are among the key factors that make an effective brain gain initiative possible. China, India, Taiwan, South Africa and Ghana are the front-runners regarding the efficiency of brain gain policies, the scale of instruments, and the level of institutionalisation (UNDP 2007). Partly as a result of return migration, these countries have achieved great success in the modernisation of their national economies.

Despite the relative success in the field of return migration, however, there are several factors that hamper brain gain: for example, in China, corruption and political control; in India, bureaucracy; and in Taiwan, the unbalanced structure of the economy. We can also find remigration policies in the world that have had limited success: for example, Mexico, Colombia and Palestine (UNDP 2007).

15.4 European Remigration Policies

Despite the outmigration of the workforce causing serious problems for many European countries, to date there have been no comprehensive strategies developed to deal with this complex phenomenon. In many cases, the available European and national policy documents identify outmigration as a challenge, but do not offer concrete and comprehensive solutions. In other words, the national development policies of the EU member states either completely disregard or only partially recognise the possible effects of 'brain gain'. This implies that, compared to other parts of the world, European countries have not yet truly explored and discovered the economic potential provided by return migration. This is especially astonishing because the implementation of such policies could be co-financed from the community budget, which would help national governments in launching and financing return initiatives.

One of the reasons behind this situation is that the objectives of different policy-making levels are different, and in some cases also conflicting. On the EU level, the free movement of people is a basic principle granted and protected by several fundamental acts and agreements. However, the possibility of the free flow of people makes outmigration easier, which leads to significant social and economic problems in the less developed regions. At the European level, the free movement of people enhances competitiveness, while at national, regional and local levels it can create serious tensions. The other possible reason behind the lack of efficient and comprehensive policy response is that the causes and consequences related to outmigration can differ greatly by country and region; hence it is difficult to elaborate a single policy ‘formula’ (Zwania-Rößler and Ivanova 2013).

With respect to geographical scales, European, transnational, national and regional/local policies can be identified. While this chapter focuses on national and regional levels, we present the European policy environment and the most important transnational initiatives briefly too.

At the European level, the promotion of single market and European mobility is a basic principle articulated in several policy documents, guidelines and acts beginning with the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of Economic and Monetary Union were all important steps towards a unified labour market. The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 institutionalised the common immigration and asylum policy, but focused exclusively on migration from third countries (Pascouau 2013). The Single Market Act II (EC 2012) highlighted the vision of a true, unified European labour market, which could enhance the competitiveness of Europe. The recent enlargements (in 2004 and 2007) of the EU resulted in the gradual removal of migration barriers and the extension of the Single Market. The Lisbon Treaty specified that the EU should develop a common migration policy (which deals not only with security-related issues but also aims to co-ordinate effectively migration flows to and within the EU)—but so far this has not been manifested. Several analyses highlighted that there is a growing need for skilled migrants, from both EU and third countries (Boeri 2008; EC 2008; Kahanec and Zimmermann 2011).

In the analysis of policy documents we found very few true transnational policies, and only one (Marie Curie) had a full European (and beyond) coverage. A large-scale initiative covering six European countries is 'Guidance and Counselling for Migrants and Returnees'. The project involved partners from six European countries (Yeminee Ltd, Slovakia; Regent's College, the UK; Masaryk Institute of Advanced Studies, the Czech Republic; Stichting Vice Versa, The Netherlands; the Public Employment Service, Cyprus; and Orientum, Greece) and was undertaken between 2009 and 2011. The main objective of the project was to disseminate people's experiences and to collect best practices regarding migrants and returnees. Beyond these initiatives, bilateral agreements were also established between sending and receiving countries (for example, between Austria and Ukraine, and between the Czech Republic and Georgia) to help migrants to return.

It is important to emphasise that, while return migration flows inside the EU do not play a very important role in EU-level migration policies, the EU has many more concrete policies regulating migration flows between EU member and non-EU member 'third countries'. There are some policies that try to prevent the brain drain triggered by the EU on third countries. It means that the EU attempts to co-operate with these countries in a number of ways. In the frame of co-operation mentioned, it is planned that the following main aims are to be fulfilled: helping remigration to third countries, networking based on diasporas, and stimulating circular migration (see for example, Sopemi 2008; EC 2011a, b, 2013). During our desktop research it transpired that co-ordination and synergy between existing national brain gain strategies are also missing. As a conclusion, it can be noted that, compared to the significance of labour outmigration, there are very few transnational initiatives. Without the co-ordination of national and transnational policies the EU is not a *de facto* unified labour market. Therefore, in the future the role of the European level should be significantly strengthened.

On a national level, 'migration', 'labour' and 'youth' policies deal jointly with the questions of retention and re-attraction of workforce. In most cases, the focus of migration policies is on immigration, both legal and illegal, and asylum seekers and the implementation of EU regulations (for

example, the Schengen Borders Code). Outmigration and the retention of the labour force are often mentioned only briefly, highlighting the most important hazards and negative processes (for example, the migration policy of the Slovak Republic, Perspective until the year 2020, adopted in 2011). Interestingly, while the analysed strategies aim to attract skilled labour, they pay much less attention to preserving or re-attracting their country's present and former human resources. Most policy documents put the emphasis on the possible economic and demographic advantages of return migration, whereas the role of social reintegration is emphasised in very few of them. According to their time span, most of the analysed policies are very recent (implemented only after the year 2000) which shows that return migration became a hot issue in Europe only recently.

Regarding the applied methods (for example, re-attraction, reintegration, re-employment, retention) national policies show great variations. Most documents apply more than one method. Generally, re-attraction plays an important role in most policies, but it is emphasised more in those remigration policies that have clear economic objectives and in policies formulated in East Central European countries (for example, Poland, Hungary and Albania). The latter try to overcome the negative consequences of previous migrations generated mainly by income disparities. The role of re-employment is important in labour market interventions (Momentum in Hungary, or Slovensko Calling in Slovakia).

The most common and significant policy instruments applied by the studied countries are the following.

Return policies:

- Grants to re-attract skilled labour—especially R&D personnel. These initiatives target generally very few people (4–10 people per year). The grants are usually co-financed by the EU. Some examples are: *Rientro cervelli* ('Brain buster') in Italy, *Lendület* ('Momentum') in Hungary, or *Slovensko Calling* in Slovakia.
- Information services for possible re-migrants regarding jobs, business opportunities and so on. Some of the sending countries (for example, Poland) have created crisis centres to facilitate information flow and help with re-employment. The 'Have you got a P_Lan to return?' initia-

tive in Poland aims to provide information to make returning as smooth as possible and to help reintegration.

- Helping reintegration and re-employment of re-migrants by recognising skills collected abroad (for example, Romania).
- Assisting the return of migrants who had lost their jobs abroad and become homeless (BARKA Foundation, helping Polish people to return to Poland)
- Strengthening the identity of emigrants to motivate their return (Back2BG in Bulgaria).

Resourcing expatriates:

- Network-building among expatriates—frequently used in scientific (R&D) relations (for example, OST Scientist Network—Austria, German Academic International Network, Germany).
- Lobbying with the participation of expatriates (for example, pro-Polish lobbying) to promote the country abroad.
- Promoting national culture and language abroad (for example, Wspólnota Polska Association of Polish emigrants).
- Creating a database to collect information about students and workers abroad (The State Agency for Bulgarians Abroad).

Retention policies:

- Easing the administrative burdens of starting new enterprises, and organising training for future entrepreneurs. The target groups can be both (possible) re-migrants and workers who have not yet emigrated.
- Most of the countries emphasise the importance of national and regional economic conditions, and from this point of view outmigration and return migration are seen as simply (economic) growth-related issues. From this angle, the priority should be to boost economic growth locally and as a result migration trends would change automatically. This idea strongly affects policy approaches on migration and brain drain, and it is characteristic for countries without significant outmigration.

While EU legislation does not allow for administrative regulations to prevent the free movement of people, there is an example of restriction policy too:

- In 2012, the Hungarian government introduced a new rule for future university students, to slow down the outmigration of skilled labour. According to the new rules, students have to work in Hungary during the 20 years following their graduation for a time period that equals their government-financed university education. If they emigrate, they have to pay back the cost of their education.

The decision whether to return (or stay put) is influenced not only by policies implemented by the sending countries but also by those of the receiving countries. This track of migration policies became more important as a result of the recent crisis (Cerna 2010; Kuptsch 2012). Growing unemployment in target countries drove governments to consider protective measures regarding their labour market. Because of EU legislation, mainly third-country migrants were affected by new restrictions, but other types of initiatives were also begun to lower the numbers of migrants—even those from EU countries. Some examples of this type of policy are:

- ‘Pay-to-go’ programmes to motivate return migration (used by, for example, Spain, Czech Republic). The country of destination offers money to migrants to facilitate their return to the home country. However, according to available data very few people have used this option up to now.
- Campaigns in the sending countries to make outmigration a less attractive option (for example, the UK’s campaign in Romania).
- Microcredit funds for returning migrants (for example, Fondo Microcredito Balcani in Italy, helping Romanian migrants to return, started in 2007) in a co-operation between sending and host countries.

At the same time, some countries continued their (more or less) open migration policies because of labour shortages. For example, Sweden still applies a very liberal migration policy (Awad 2009; IOM 2010a).

On a national level, the fragmented institutional background of migration policies seems to be a problem. There are usually no co-ordinating institutions with a comprehensive authority to manage all the remigration-related tasks. Furthermore, national decision-making processes are not comprehensive and lack of funds is also a significant problem.

According to previous research findings (see, for example, Hilpert and Parkes 2011), general public opinion in both the sending and receiving countries is afraid that the migration, which was planned as a temporary stage in the career of the migrant, would become permanent, and migrants would never return to their home countries.

Despite the information services offered for possible returning migrants, information flow seems to be a weak element of policies. Surveys show that the majority of possible returning migrants have not received any information about their prospects after return. The quality of information flow also affects policy responsiveness: if there are links between migration policy and labour market indicators, decision-makers can react to new challenges (for example, labour shortages in certain sectors or regions) by changing the migration policy (Cerna 2010; Eurofund 2012).

In connection with re-attraction policies, it is worth mentioning that, according to some surveys, some of the returnees distrust their governments. For example, in a comparative research conducted by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofund) several Polish returnees said that re-attraction campaigns showed a false (better) image of the home country. Furthermore, they thought that these campaigns were politically driven and are part of domestic election campaigns (Eurofund 2012). The distrust towards national governments implies that future policies should be more focused at the sub-national level.

Regional and local policies can solve the 'distrust issue' towards national policies and policy-makers, and return and retention policies can also be more efficient. The spatial focus of these initiatives is mainly crisis-ridden regions with significant outward migration, high levels of unemployment and serious structural problems in the local economy. Based on our analysis, re-attraction and retention are the most widely used tools from the above-mentioned 'six Rs' model, with special emphasis on reintegration and re-employment.

By analysing the types of approaches, we can distinguish two major groups of regional and local best practices. The first group (the concentrated approach) focuses only on migration-related and labour market issues (for example, re-attracting people, preventing brain drain, providing information about jobs or business opportunities and so on). The second group (the integrated approach) connects migration issues with a wider range of social and economic processes, urban and regional development, education, information society and so on. Most of the analysed initiatives use the concentrated approach. However, as Castles (2000) points out, migration strategies should not be focusing solely on migration itself—instead they should be linked to other issues as well, from sustainable development to human rights or wider social, economic and environmental goals. Considered in this light, the analysed initiatives have deficiencies.

In most cases, the initiatives do not differentiate their target groups by age. But when they do, the main focus is on young people. Based on their own specific problems, regions use different types of measures to intervene in the migration processes. The main types of interventions are: job creation, place marketing, scholarships and grants, financial aid for returnees, scientific research, recruitment, and the development of public relations.

According to the level of education of the target groups, there are two main approaches: the ‘catch all’ approach does not set educational barriers in the project (for example, a youth entrepreneurship project, Fachkräftesicherungspakt Sachsen-Anhalt; the Municipal Retention Policy, such as Alsómocsolád, Business Angel, Development Strategy for Opole Voivodship and so on), while ‘differentiated’ approaches (for example, the Youth Businessmen Group, PFIFF, New MV4you, Momentum) focus mainly on highly educated, highly skilled labour (but not exclusively: see, for example, Boomerang-Lausitz targets medium-skilled workers.)

Among the more or less successful strategies, those focusing on networking (for example, Germany, Poland) seem to be the most successful and sustainable. Furthermore, the Momentum (Lendület) Programme from Hungary also seems to be a useful tool to re-attract qualified workers. However, it remains to be seen whether its effects are long-standing

Table 15.4 The number and share of native-born re-migrants in some Central and Eastern European countries in 2012

Country	Native-born immigrants	Percentage of native-born people among immigrants
Bulgaria	5,100	36.2
Czech Republic	8,300	24.3
Estonia	900	34.6
Latvia	9,600	72.3
Lithuania	15,600	78.7
Hungary	4,900	14.5
Poland	120,400	55.3
Romania	132,300	79.1
Slovenia	1,900	12.5
Slovakia	800	13.9
Croatia	900	10.3

Source: Eurostat

or the re-attracted workforce emigrates again after the support of the programme ends.

Because of the unreliable statistics it is hard to measure the magnitude of return migration. According to the official statistics, the number of native-born immigrants (i.e. returning migrants) is the highest in Poland and Romania—two countries that also had to deal with the highest number of emigrants (Table 15.4). At the same time, the ratio of native-born people among immigrants is the highest in Latvia, Lithuania and Romania. The number of re-migrants is lower than the number of emigrants, which indicates that the main trends of migration processes did not change significantly. However, without surveys conducted among re-migrants it is impossible to define the most important motive of their re-migration—therefore we cannot measure the success of re-migration policies and initiatives. The above-mentioned figures are almost certainly influenced by the effects of the economic crisis in the target countries (for example, Ireland).

15.5 Conclusion

According to our analysis, relatively few transnational and national policies have been developed to deal with re-attraction and return migration to date. The relative lack of European measures seems to be conspicuous.

To create a real common market, the European level should probably also strengthen its migration policy—as a communication of the European Commission to the European Parliament stressed in 2011 (EC 2011b). But other geographical scales can play a more important part than they do at the present time. For example, because of the lack of confidence in national governments, regional and local policies and initiatives seem to be the more appropriate for dealing with the re-attraction of labour.

However, for the sake of efficient return initiatives, a competent institutional background with a decentralised decision-making system is needed. Because of the relatively short time in existence of the analysed policies it is hard to measure their success but—based on the results of the already implemented policy answers—some conclusions can be drawn. Well-defined aims and target groups seem also to be important factors for success—without them there is a risk that the programmes become too general with no real focus or results. Last, but not least, smooth information flows between different actors are crucial in remigration and reintegration programmes.

Contrary to the lack of reintegration strategies in most of the source countries at the start of the new millennium (Castles 2000), Central European countries aim to help the reintegration of their returnees to society and the job market. However, to date there is no significant co-operation noted between sending and receiving countries that—according to the evaluations of the United Nations Working Group on International Migration (1998)—could be a useful tool for fostering return migration. But this deficiency can be a sign of tension between the interests of the sending and target countries.

Brain drain is and will continue to be one of the most important social problems of many Central and Eastern European countries. Therefore, our expectation is that the number of policy measures will be growing in the near future, and the experiences of the already existing measures will help to formulate more efficient policy actions. However, analysing recent policies, it seems that most of the actors neglect the heterogeneous nature of the connections between migration/remigration and development using a simplifying, naive approach. Therefore, our results are similar to those (for example, de Haas 2007b) which emphasise the ‘swinging’ nature of migration debates, highlighting the switches between overly optimistic and pessimistic views on the topic. That is why the construc-

tion of clear information systems on the relationship between migration and development are needed, as Wise et al. (2010) recommend. These could help to demystify migration and return migration and can also be useful to strengthen the transnational levels of policy formulation—which is lacking according to our analysis, and by previous researches and analyses (for example, Castles 2000; IOM 2010b; EC 2011b).

Current (re)migration policies (in both sending and receiving countries) often reflect a pessimist view on migration and see migrants as a loss for their source economies. Future initiatives could use a more balanced approach and consider the possible benefits of migration as well as using the possibilities of immigrant networks through the policy option of resourcing expatriates.

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16

Conclusions: Current and Future Perspectives on Return Migration and Regional Development in Europe

Robert Nadler, Thilo Lang, Birgit Glorius,
and Zoltán Kovács

This final chapter brings together the theoretical debates, methodological discussions and empirical results portrayed in this book. The aim of the book was to provide a comprehensive understanding of the current state of research on return migration and its nexus with regional development in Europe. This volume tells a story which to date has been poorly told, because return migration is studied mainly from the position of return from Europe to other continents. Furthermore, it enriches the knowledge on specific links between migration and development by reporting on the specific role of returning migrants, broadening the classic focus on financial remittances.

R. Nadler (✉) • T. Lang
Regional Geography of Europe, Institut für Länderkunde, Leipzig, Germany

B. Glorius
Institute for European Studies, TU Chemnitz, Chemnitz, Germany

Z. Kovács
Department of Economic and Social Geography, University of Szeged, Szeged
Institute of Geography, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary

The variety of empirical studies collected in this volume gives an insight into European migrant spaces that so far have rarely been perceived as destinations for migrants. The case studies analysed processes of adaptation to transformative conditions, and how return migrants might be able to influence transformation processes actively by making use of the social capital and habitus they gained during emigration. Here, return decisions are conceptualised as individual negotiation processes in the context of life in a globalised risk society. However, migrants do not appear as *homines oeconomici*, but as actors who are aware of their positions in both society and history. Studying in particular the influence of migration experiences, family biographies and ancestral migration trajectories on return decisions will provide new and important evidence that can take the field of return migration studies forward. In this sense, returning migrants induce flows of ‘mobility against the stream’—in both a geographic as well as an economic perspective.

This is also true for the question of regional development through return migration. In particular, the combination of individual interpretation and action patterns in confrontation with changing social and institutional contexts can improve our understanding as to how successful integration and active participation in regional development processes in the context of return migration is possible. This was also an important goal of this volume. In the following sections, the new insights will be summarised. Then this chapter will link to the previous one by drawing further conclusions for policy-making, and future fields of scientific inquiry will be sketched out.

16.1 Perspectives on Return Migration

16.1.1 Return Migration as a Stage of Transnational and Circular Migration

A joint argument of many individual contributions in this book is that migration flows in Europe have increased, and migration patterns have become more complex, after the latest rounds of EU enlargement and as a result of the financial crisis that began in 2008. This finding was also

stated in other research (see Glorius et al. 2013). Yet the specificity of this book is the insight that not only emigration patterns but also the specific case of return migration patterns, have been affected. A major discussion in academia is circulating around the question of whether return migration is actually a special form of migration, or if it is merely an episode in transnational and circular movements. Carling and Erdal (2014), for example, support the position that it makes sense to differentiate return migration from transnational migration, though both forms are heavily interwoven. According to the findings of their work on the linkages between transnationalism and return migration, return intentions are strongly influenced by transnational life opportunities. Accordingly, return migration cannot be considered as a permanent move. In this line of argumentation, the chapters in this book showed that return migration is indeed to be understood as an episode in migration biographies. The transnational rootedness of today's migrants, together with the increasing institutional support of migratory movements facilitate repeated migratory moves, including future re-migration.

Ludger Pries (Chapter 2 in this volume) showed that migration policies can actually induce new migration flows. However, once these flows begin, it is very hard to control or to stop them again. Historic examples, such as the European guestworker programmes in the aftermath of the Second World War, illustrate the difficulty of having only the intended consequences. Pries argues for a new understanding of circular migration among policy-makers: migration should be understood as a transnational process that does not necessarily come to an end. This perspective includes an understanding of return migration as a temporary stage in a migrant's mobile life.

Still, we believe that there is also a reason to look at the literal aspect of *return* migration, because these migrants do not simply go on to another new place in their migration biography; they go back to where they came from. This includes envisioning the familiar and a feeling of going/coming home. As such, return migration is a very specific episode in a circular migration career. As the contributions in this book show, the return migrants' emotional attachment to destinations in the frame of return is comparatively high, and this emotional attachment itself is one of the constituents for return. Even though feelings of homesickness or

belonging are individual and subjective, and thus difficult to capture or foresee, they have considerable power in the decision-making process and on actual movements in space as well as on the directions of such movements. As such, the link between return migrants and their home regions and home countries is a very tight bond, which has implications for the link between return migration and regional development.

16.1.2 Return Migration and Regional Development in Europe

The results presented in this book showcase that there is an ambivalent relationship between return migration and regional development in Europe. Return migration can have beneficial effects on the development of home countries and regions. This was illustrated by Klein-Hitpaß and by Grabowska (in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively) for the case of Polish returnees. The returnees added to the incorporated transfer of human capital and they engaged in driving institutional change in their home country. Both aspects positively impacted on the economy and society back home. Return migrants also worked as institutional change makers in the case of Czech and Croatian return migration (see Scholl-Schneider and Hornstein Tomić, Chapter 14 in this volume). Given that knowledge is a key resource for regional development in a knowledge economy, Klein-Hitpaß argues that migration studies should be linked much more strongly to economic geography and economics, as migrants are a valuable *explanans* for how knowledge transfer between regions and countries takes place. Next to being carriers of knowledge, return migrants open channels for further knowledge inflow into their home countries by providing contacts through their social networks abroad.

In a similar vein, Predojevic-Despic et al. (chapter 5 in this volume) stress the relevance of transnational social capital for bridging different institutional contexts. Just as Polish returnees, also Albanian and Serbian return migrants worked as boundary spanners, bringing institutional change to their homelands. Yet the focus of Predojevic-Despic et al.'s considerations goes beyond this issue of capital transfer to the homeland. They also pinpoint the transnational and circular aspects. The entrepreneurial

returnees are transnational entrepreneurs. Their business models are often based on linking practices between the home and host countries. By doing so, they integrate regions with few international contacts with the international markets and at the same time extend their own market range.

On the other hand, returning migrants' capacity to facilitate regional development back at home can be limited by structural and contextual factors. As was shown by Nadler in Chapter 7, return migrants in Eastern Germany do return in the sense of relocating to these regions, but they often continue to work in Western Germany. As such, they only help to reduce regional development problems in demographic terms but not in terms of skilled labour, and they do not add fully to the regional value-added. This is related to the fact that labour conditions (for example, wage levels) in their home regions are not competitive. The labour market was also a serious problem for returning migrants' reintegration in the case of second-generation return to Latvia (see Krišjāne et al. in Chapter 10), Croatia and the Czech Republic (Hornstein Tomić and Scholl-Schneider—Chapter 14). The contribution by Glorius in Chapter 11 highlights the central role of labour market constraints in home countries for decision-making processes prior to a possible return. The contributions by Danzer and Dietz (Chapter 6) as well as Bürgin and Erzene-Bürgin (Chapter 13) add the aspect of an increased circular mobility of migrants. As a consequence, return migrants should not only be considered from the perspective of home countries, but should rather be looked at as bridging actors between different countries and regions.

As such, assessing the impact of return migration on regional development in Europe is a more complex endeavour. The evolving circular migration pattern does not follow traditional logics of regional development, still arguing from the perspective of a settled population as an economic and social (re-)production factor. Given that people become more mobile and are less stably bound to individual regions, their value-added in terms of regional development consists increasingly in the links they span towards distant other regions. If opening up the perspective on regional development towards the idea of a 'network society' (Castells 2000), in which distant locales become connected in a space of flows, and have a mutual influence on each other through flows of people, ideas, meanings, goods, capital and so on, then the circular migration patterns

of today's return migrants in Europe can be interpreted as an important value-added, in particular for peripheral regions that lack attractiveness for other migrant groups.

16.1.3 (Return) Migration as an Intergenerational Project

A central finding of this book's contributions is also that return migration should be looked at from an intergenerational perspective. In particular, the contributions from King and Kılınc (Chapter 8), Ní Chearbhaill (Chapter 9) and von Blanckenburg (Chapter 12) highlighted this issue. King and Kılınc have demonstrated that, in the case of second-generation returnees, being born and raised in Germany and moving back to Turkey, the individual and collective negotiation of home and belonging is not merely an issue for the first generation of migrants. The reflexive discourse on identity is transferred from the first generation to the second and is a driving force for intergenerational return. King and Kılınc observed that second-generation Turkish-Germans have less of a fixed concept of home and belonging. Their return migration to Turkey is actually a move into a new country, and they have unclear connotations of home and belonging, which create a kind of 'paradoxical nature of "return"' in this case. The identity of these second-generation returnees is fluid, based on temporary attachments and discursive practices. As such, King and Kılınc prefer to use the term 'counter-diasporic migration' when looking at this phenomenon of second-generation return migration. Their initial thesis that the second generation would have a strong homeland orientation could thus not be validated. For the second generation, home and belonging is simply more complex than for the first generation. Their belonging is separated into 'being' in one place and 'longing' for another one. Also, the importance of family narratives became clear. The narratives that first-generation migrants tell their children breed a growing consciousness on their situatedness in the diaspora and as a consequence a desire for a counter-diasporic move away from this situation.

The role of those family discourses becomes also obvious in the chapter on intergenerational return to East Germany by von Blanckenburg, who

adds to the connection of migration and memory studies. She found that collective memory and familial cultures of telling their own history play a crucial role in intergenerational return. Memory is integrated through storytelling and artefacts such as photographs or furnishings, and family members incorporate and reproduce a collective narrative that could drive return migration. Here, another important link exists between the role of intergenerationality of return migration and regional development. The case of returning business people described by von Blanckenburg illustrates that business development can be stimulated by such non-economic factors as familial cultures of memory.

Finally, Ní Chearbhaill's contribution adds to the emotional aspects that affect the reflections of the second-generation returnees. The ambivalence of feelings of belonging was also stated for second-generation Irish returnees from the UK. Ní Chearbhaill stresses the importance of the linguistic dimension. Returnees of the second generation long for a return to a homeland, but they are often not as good at speaking the home countries' languages as non-migrants, and on returning, this causes a feeling of being excluded. Additionally, returnees often experienced the communities back home as having changed or not being as expected. Hence there is a disillusioning momentum in return migration, when expectations and realities come into conflict. Up to now, this fact has often been overlooked in the study of return migration.

16.1.4 Return Migration as a Gendered Phenomenon

This book also adds to the links between gender and migration studies. Migration is a gendered phenomenon, but little focus is placed on gender issues in return migration studies. King and Kılınc (Chapter 8) show that gender shapes the level of agency in deciding about return and the mechanisms of return. Their findings point to the importance of gendered diasporic identities, which affect social position and satisfaction with life after the return. In reference to Mahler and Pessar's (2001) idea of gendered geographies of power, King and Kılınc speak of 'gendered landscapes of norms, roles and practices in different diasporic and counter-diasporic translocations'. This is reflected in three types, or settings, in

which return migration of second-generation migrants can take place and which affect female and male migrants in different ways. If return takes place in the frame of parents' decisions and was not chosen voluntarily by return migrants, this can be traumatic for both male and female returnees. Another type consists of second-generation return to get married to non-migrants in the home country. This type is represented mainly by women, who must then adapt to circumstances back home, but who may have serious difficulties in doing so. Finally, there is a type of second-generation returnee characterised by the longing for self-actualisation in the home country. In the case of Turkey, this is more difficult for women than for men, as Turkish society is still more traditional in its gender roles than that in Germany, where the second-generation returnees were socialised. As such, female returnees of this type have a greater struggle to make an independent living in the Turkish, male-dominated society, facing, for example, problems in accessing decent positions in the labour market. Gender differences also show up in Ní Chearbhaill's study, where female returnees more often return to the home areas of their partners in their home country, while male returnees frequently return to their own places. This brings a stronger pressure for female returnees to adapt.

16.2 Methodological and Theoretical Reflections

16.2.1 Studying Return Migration: Methodological Remarks

In terms of access to data, the contributions in this book show that studying return migration is anything but easy. The authors confirm general methodological findings from migration research. In line with results from the EU-funded SEEMIG project (Gárdos and Gödri 2014, p. 59), we state that official administrative registers are being improved continuously in their capacity to observe actual migration flows and numbers of migrants. However, their exploitability for migration studies is still limited. Limitations are caused by legal barriers and access restrictions

to these data, by insufficient comparability between countries' registration systems, and by the large variation between different administrative registers regarding the information they hold regarding the same phenomenon.

Adding to such general problems in the use of administrative registers, the official registration of migration processes is rarely suitable for identifying return movements, not to speak of individual migration biographies. Furthermore, for reasons of data protection, data sets are often provided as aggregate data, which do not allow for the answering of many scientific questions focusing on the contextualisation of migration behaviour.

As a consequence, researchers who are interested in the study of return migration have to generate original empirical material. The contributions in this book reflect the large variety of data-generating methods that are suited for an analysis of return migration. Traditional methods of the social sciences, such as quantitative and qualitative interviewing, were used by several authors in this book. However, the contributions also showcase innovative methods, which are not common in migration studies. In particular, the approach of Ní Chearbhaill is promising: by combining interview techniques with the text analysis of fictive books on return migration, she made use of an additional source of information. Novelistic literature allows for an aggregate perspective on return migration and can help to reach a better understanding of the phenomenon. Another promising approach is the collaboration of scientists with the owners of register data, such as was displayed in the case of Nadler. Here, existing register data from Germany's Federal Employment Agency were jointly analysed from the perspective of return migration studies. Finally, also the study of return migrants using traditional methods of interviewing was updated by using ICT. The contributions of Krišjāne et al. as well as Būrgin and Erzene-Būrgin stand as examples for this, showcasing the use of online survey methods that seem to be a promising tool for interviewing mobile population groups (see Nadler et al. 2015). In sum, this means that the study of return migration will continue to be based on original empirical fieldwork, while innovative ways of approaching the topic are broadening the access to relevant information.

16.2.2 Return Migrants in the Global Risk Society

As the individual chapters of this volume have demonstrated, processes of return migration in Europe can also be linked to debates on the global risk society, described by Ulrich Beck (1992). During modernisation, human beings have taken control of natural, external risks by technological fixes. However, these technological fixes and the mastery of nature have caused new—this time human-made—risks that people become aware of during a process of reflection. This reflexive modernisation produces the risk society, which according to Beck (1992), is the follow-up model for the industrial society, and in which security against human-produced risks is becoming a central social endeavour. Risks come into existence through decision-making by human beings and thus ‘the social roots of risks block the “externalisability” of the problem of accountability’ (Beck 1992: 98). Risk management became an issue both for collective and individual actors and is a central constituent of social formation today. From this perspective we can understand return migrants within Europe as reflexive and responsible individuals, who assess risks that they perceive as endangering their opportunities for self-actualisation, their social position and their actual existence. The outcome of this assessment feeds into decision-making processes regarding their emigration and return.

According to William and Baláž (2012), migration can be seen as a phenomenon that is informed by risk. Migrating to a foreign place is a risky undertaking and includes uncertainty; for example, about the experiences that will be encountered abroad. Migration can be considered as a cause of risk, in the sense that in sum it constitutes the outcome of individual actors’ decisions, which can affect societies in host and home countries both positively and negatively. In host countries, social tensions between native and foreign populations can increase, while in home countries negative effects of brain drain, ageing and shrinkage of the population could be reinforced. Finally, migration can also be seen as a coping strategy against risk, because individuals can improve their chances for self-actualisation and resilience to risk. In this sense, return migrants are proactive individuals that affect risk levels at the micro and macro level, but who can hardly be controlled politically.

16.2.3 Returning Migrants as Agents of Change

We have found in this book that return migrants in Europe make their decisions regarding a potential return to their homelands from a position between individual agency and their structural environment. Referring to Giddens' (1984) Structuration Theory, we can understand return migrants as agents of change. Their behaviour is determined by a structure consisting of institutional frameworks (for example, legal regulation of migration and citizenship, access to social benefits), economic conditions and social patterns (for example, value systems affecting the integrative capacity of host societies), which all inform decisions about a (potential) return migration. On the other hand, return migrants change these framing structures by moving back to their homelands, or by re-emigrating after a return. They impact on institutional settings (see Chapter 4 by Grabowska) by transferring and implementing knowledge regarding alternative designs of institutions from abroad. They transfer financial and human capital from one country to another and add to changing economic balances between European countries. And finally, they also change the social value systems by bringing in new perspectives to both their host and home countries. By doing so, return migrants can be understood as agents engaging in a continuous structuration process as described by Giddens. Return migrants act as boundary spanners (see Chapter 3 by Klein-Hitpaß) and add to reshaping the European space by refreshing their—often peripheral—home regions' position in the European territorial system. Furthermore, it became obvious that return migrants do change their home regions consciously. They reflect on and compare their positions within their host and home countries and through this reflection, start to envision necessary changes in their home regions.

16.2.4 Voluntariness and Preparedness in Return Migration

Cassarino's (2004, 2008) great merit for return migration studies consists of his conceptualisations of 'voluntariness' and 'preparedness' as factors influencing the success of return migrants. According to Cassarino, a

return migrant's success back home is influenced positively if return takes place voluntarily and the return was carefully prepared. His considerations originated from empirical research conducted in the context of return migration from highly-developed to less-developed countries. In this context, the legal regulation of migration is strong and migratory movements' voluntariness is limited. Furthermore, the development differences between host and home countries include that institutional settings in host countries differ strongly from home countries' ones. This makes preparation for return essential to exploit the individual types of capital in an efficient way upon return.

The return migration flows we studied in this book took place between more equally developed countries and in the frame of more liberal regulations of migratory movements. In this case, voluntariness is not such a straightforward marker for the success of returnees. As was shown, for example, by King and Kılınc in Chapter 8, those second-generation returnees who went from Germany to Turkey voluntarily, were much more dissatisfied with their life in Turkey than those returning in the frame of traditional expectations by family members (for example, marriage with Turkish partners in Turkey). At this point, we need to reflect critically on the notion of 'success' in the context of return migration. Given the complexity of motives for return migration found in this volume, we should move away from defining a successful return merely in the context of economic success. As we have seen, the (re)gaining of emotional stability by moving closer to family members, or the return to a place where one feels at home, can have a huge impact on life satisfaction as a whole and can thus be defined as a 'successful return' in the migrants' eyes.

16.3 Policy Recommendations

With the opening of the European labour markets, migration within Europe has become very easy, and phases of recession and tight labour markets in some countries can be compensated through migration to countries with better labour market opportunities. However, the long-term problem this causes for the sending regions and countries has not been fully thought through. As a consequence, there is an evident need

for easing the return migration processes for European citizens and for a broader discussion between sending and receiving countries respecting the long-term strategic objectives of both sides.

Even though migration and return migration affect European countries to different degrees, the demographic outlook for European countries reveals future challenges in terms of securing the supply with a young and skilled work force, and as such of maintaining the productivity and competitiveness of the economy. In particular, rural regions in Europe are experiencing demographic problems, while major urban agglomerations are still growing, often nurtured by a positive migration balance. Rural regions in Europe cannot profit from internal and international migration in the same way. For these rural regions, fostering and assisting return migration of their formerly emigrated citizens is a promising approach, as these return migrants have a precise memory of these rural regions. However, as Boros and Hegedűs have demonstrated in Chapter 15 of this volume, comprehensive return migration policy programmes can rarely be found in European home countries. Existing policies deploy to only a small range of measures and their scope could still be broadened.

In addition, various return initiatives are already operating throughout Europe, but the main problem is poor publicity about them (see Lang et al. 2014). We argue that return initiatives need more powerful public relations (PR) and communication strategies to reach their target groups. Migrants who returned successfully should be included in communication strategies of return initiatives.

Second, businesses from home regions have to be included into these return initiatives. Potential return migrants seem to fear problems with labour market re-entrance back at home. As found by several contributors to this book, social factors are dominant in the decision to return. Hence, return migrants—up to a certain tolerance level—accept less optimal working conditions at home compared to their position in their former host country. Yet finding employment back home is a necessary condition for return. At the same time, migrants often reported that the labour market conditions in home regions are considered as a problem for return (see contributions in this volume; also Lang et al. 2014). As such, employers back home have to be included in return initiatives, providing information on their labour needs and vacant positions as well as the pre-

vailing working conditions. These employers also have to be sensitised to the need for a structured re-integration of returning employees. This is important for the fact that rural regions in Central and Eastern Europe are characterised by a high proportion of small and medium-sized enterprises, which have not yet developed professional human resource strategies, but which will be confronted with increasing difficulties in replacing an ageing workforce with young and skilled workers (see Nadler et al. 2014). Including employers in wider regional and national initiatives for dealing with return migration can help them to anticipate these future challenges.

Third, one has to bear in mind that engagement in return initiatives is a form of positive discrimination for returning migrants compared to non-migrants. As such, return initiatives have to be discussed by policy-makers, taking into consideration the general discourses on emigration, immigration and return migration in the respective country. Here, examples from other countries could help to discover arguments for or against the support of a positive discrimination towards return migrants (see differing examples of Maghreb countries). Still, it has to be considered that re-migrants may entertain exaggerated expectations concerning their valued skills and develop a sense of superiority that might hinder the re-adaptation process.

Finally, taking into account the transnational theoretical paradigm, return migration should not be expected as a permanent move but rather as a stage within a migration biography. In our geographical focus of observation, which is the European mobility space, EU programmes and initiatives (such as EURES, Socrates, Leonardo and so on) strongly support labour mobility. As such, regional and national initiatives to support return migration must pay attention to the fact that return migration is increasingly not a permanent decision, and that supranational institutions aim at enhancing an ongoing mobility between countries. A subsequent re-emigration of returned migrants is becoming more and more probable, because labour migration in the EU became easier for the individual migrant and thus became more circular than in the former decades.

To sum up, there is no 'one size fits all' strategy for policy intervention in the field of return migration, as regional situations are different. Yet, based on the findings of this book, the engagement in return initiatives appears as an opportunity for Europe's rural regions to diminish the negative impacts of demographic change.

16.4 Conclusions

This book adds a specific understanding of the links between return migration and regional development to the book series 'New Geographies of Europe'. Migration processes have to be taken into account when seeking to describe current patterns of the (re-)production and re-shaping of European space. The authors from various disciplines and geographical backgrounds collected in this volume showed that returning migrants are active drivers of change—in both their home and host countries. The focus on intergenerational return migration is an example of how path dependencies develop through migration. Migrants, who circulate between European regions, sustain links between these regions, and these links solidify across generations.

By transferring different sorts of capital, migrants add to the existing patterns of territorial development in Europe. These patterns are ambivalent. Migrants increase polarisation and peripheralisation by moving from peripheries to economically prosperous core regions of the EU, where they add to growth. At the same time, by remitting money from core regions to the peripheries, and by returning eventually to their peripheral homelands, they also enhance a more balanced development of European regions. However, this book opens up many new fields of interest for further scientific enquiry into the phenomena associated with return migration. We thus conclude by outlining five fields for future research.

First, we still lack a clear definition of return regarding both the process and the actors. As we can see from several contributions to this volume, return can rarely be perceived as a definite move, but rather as an episode in more complex migration biographies that span several generations. The impact of these intergenerational aspects can ideally be captured by longitudinal studies with concurrent historical references back to earlier generations. The need for those approaches seems to increase, considering the fact that migration processes cause an increase in transnational identities in subsequent generations, who are again more likely to enter into mobility processes, not only physically, but also with their thoughts, imagination, skills and so on, and thus connect different places and spaces.

Second, the concepts of home and belonging have to be reflected in a new way. Second-generation return is an issue that demonstrates the problems related to 'fixed and static notions of home and belonging'. Second-generation returnees do not simply return to a place of origin, but rather to an 'imagined place of home'. This leads us to question how exactly the process of home-making is constituted. Further research could give more insight into home-making as a cognitive process and the translation of the concept of home into performative action that actively transforms a place that is perceived as home. Research of this kind would not only enrich migration studies but could enhance more generally our understanding of home as a socially constituted phenomenon and its impact on processes of 'making geographies'.

Third, we saw the importance of paying attention to gender aspects within return migration. This is because gender inequalities may vary in places of migration and return, and may contribute to the different opportunities and hence the coping strategies of both returning males and females. On the other hand, studies focusing on gender aspects in the context of return migration could also reveal how returning migrants are reacting to gendered roles and opportunities in the country of return, and thus may eventually contribute to the transformation of gender relations in the long run.

Fourth, we see the need for a stronger integration of economic aspects in the context of return migration research. This should not be understood in the context of traditional economic approaches in migration theory that focus on the economic success of migration and thus might conceptualise return migration as migration of failure. Rather, we suggest a focus on the role of return migrants as entrepreneurs and knowledge brokers who might bring an intellectual thrust into the region of return. Research questions in this context may deal with the role of returnees in transnational companies and business startups. How do return migrants transfer their knowledge and skills and make them function within the structural conditions of the country of return? How do they use (transnational) social networks to reach their goals? How might their goals and intentions change over time, as a consequence of a process of re-adaptation to the return country's conditions? And, seen from the other side, how do companies and public institutions change under the influence of returnees?

Our final suggestion for further research reflects on the title of this volume, which addresses return migration as ‘mobility against the (main) stream’. If we focus on the geographical direction of return as a movement from strong economies to transformation economies, ‘mobility against the (main)stream’ would not only include ‘returning migrants’ in words alone, but could be extended to the range of people moving in the same direction, integrating, for example, returnees, emigrants, retirement and amenity migrants, expatriates and so on. Questions we could ask in this context are: How are those people and their material and immaterial possessions connected, and how do they interact with each other on a local and regional scale? Is there sound evidence that mobility against the stream is driven by actors who conceptualise their lives against the general consensus, with a stronger emphasis on self-realisation, familial closeness, emotional attachment to a landscape or the active opposition to pre-cut lifestyles? These notions clearly refer to social theory and the concept of reflexive modernisation, and thus demonstrate the need for embedding our research within the broader context of social theory.

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