

Panos Theodorou

# Husserl and Heidegger on Reduction, Primordially, and the Categorical

Phenomenology Beyond its Original  
Divide

# Contributions To Phenomenology

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Panos Theodorou

# Husserl and Heidegger on Reduction, Primordially, and the Categorical

Phenomenology Beyond its Original Divide

 Springer

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*To my son Nikolas*



ἀναγνώρισις δέ, ὡσπερ καὶ τοῦνομα σημαίνει, ἐξ ἀγνοίας εἰς γνῶσιν μεταβολή [...]. εἶδη δὲ ἀναγνωρίσεως, πρώτη μὲν ἢ [...] διὰ τῶν σημείων [...] δεύτεραι δὲ αἱ πεποιημέναι [...] ἢ τρίτη διὰ μνήμης, τῷ αἰσθέσθαι τι ἰδόντα [...] τετάρτη δὲ ἢ ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ [...] πασῶν δὲ βελτίστη ἀναγνώρισις ἢ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Recognition, then, as the very name signifies, is a transition from ignorance to knowledge [...]. And the kinds of recognition are, first, [...] the one via signs, [...] second, that which is merely set up [...], third, the one by means of memory, when one has a feeling upon perceiving something [...], fourth, the one achieved through inference [...]. Best of all, however, is the recognition that is accomplished on the basis of *the things themselves*. (Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1452a29-30, 1454b19-1455a17; trnsl. mine; emphasis added).





# Preface

Back in 2000, during the defense of my Ph.D. thesis, a Husserlian phenomenological elucidation of thought experiments in Physics, my mentor in Phenomenology, Giorgos Xiropaidis (a young doctor of von Hermann's when he started teaching us in Athens, Greece, in the mid-1990s and now a professor at the University of Fine Arts in the same city), asked me perhaps the most provocative question of that session: "Since in our seminars," he said, "we had the opportunity to see that Heidegger in fact unleashed a devastating critique against Husserl's Phenomenology, what made you decide, after all, to pursue research into Husserl's thought, and to use its terms?" My immediate and somewhat playful response of the moment was that my stance was the result of secret reading outside the seminars. It was indeed true that the enchantment that Husserl's texts exerted upon me in the course of my studies was somehow stronger than the impact of Heidegger's indeed rather tough critique.

From the point of view of my complementary philosophy-of-science classes with my *Doktorvater* Aristides Baltas (now emeritus professor at the National Technical University of Athens, Greece), and more particularly through the spectacles that Kuhn offered us in his *Structure*, my first answer might also have been my final reply to that tricky question. Selecting your first and primary philosophical hero and his or her philosophy is not such a different affair to what scientists face when they begin their work within one or another scientific paradigm. There is always some kind of evidence, which is not at all ultimately decisive but is just enough to convince you that the promises of this philosophy are much more interesting than those of some others.

Since that time, however, I have managed to reexamine my overall relation to the philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger. After the first formation of my paradigmatic stance, as it were, the "normal-scientific" research resulted in the accumulation of further evidence in favor of my initial decision. Nevertheless, as happens in such cases, this research also brought to the surface some serious intraparadigmatic anomalies. Heidegger can indeed serve as a valuable touchstone for an overall estimation of Husserl's and Phenomenology's accomplishments. This, however, does not make Heidegger the absolute measure of everything. Recalcitrant problems in the philosophies of both Husserl and Heidegger, like the ones we are here to

discuss, may be annoying for all of us who choose to study them. Nonetheless, they also contribute to the deepening of our understanding of the possibilities and the limitations of the specific philosophical paradigm, and of philosophy as such. Thus, I think that I am now in a position to offer a much fuller account of how I see the ideas of Husserl and Heidegger, the enigmatic relationship between them, and the prospect of some kind of combination of the two in developing a new phenomenological perspective that overcomes Phenomenology's original divide.

# Acknowledgments

Throughout the years when I was, in one way or another, working on the project that became this book, various people contributed indirectly or immediately to its preparation and completion. I would like to thank Tassos Filippides, the first person to have shown me that the history and philosophy of science could be a way to give my university student years the complementary meaning I was searching for; Aristides Baltas, for being the archetype of what an academic engagé might be and for his open-mindedness in having fully supported my efforts to read Husserl from the point of view of the philosophy of science; Giorgos Xiropaidis, for his ability to interest me in the complex issues surrounding the relation between the philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger; Costas Pagondiotis and Mathieu Marion, who were the first people to coerce me into articulating fragments of arguments in defense of Husserl's *Phenomenology* in the face of Heidegger's and Derrida's criticisms; Burt Hopkins, who honors me with his lasting friendship and his various kind and bighearted ways of assisting my research; Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan, who generously provided me with valuable textual material from their earlier unpublished work on the *Britannica Artikel* manuscripts; Nicolas de Warren, for his decisive encouragement during the first steps I took when writing and compiling this book and for his assistance together with Dermot Moran as coeditors of the series *Contributions to Phenomenology*; the two anonymous referees of the original manuscript, who helped me very much with their questions and suggestions; Anita van der Linden, of Springer publishers, for her continuous and stimulating interest during her queries about the progress of the work on this book; and Elvire Verbraak, who for some time successfully stood in for her.

Separately, I would like to express my deep thanks to my late friend Joseph J. Kockelmans, whose kindness and openheartedness I will never forget.

I also thank my undergraduate and graduate students, for the gentleness and stimulation they have amply offered me all over these years at the University of Patras, University of Crete, and Greek Open University, especially in the various undergraduate and postgraduate classes on *Phenomenology*, Husserl, and Heidegger, where the unexpectedly always eager audience was a constant inspiration for my work. I also thank Simon Summers, for his meticulous work on my original

manuscript, by which he managed to help me present the theses and ideas developed in this book in a linguistically correct and clearer way. Of course, the responsibility for any remaining difficulties, unclarities, errors, or other shortcomings is mine.

My deepest thanks go to my late father Nikolaos Theodorou and my mother Aikaterini Theodorou, who showed me the constant and excessive tolerance of which I was so much in need during my study and research years. I cannot really say how much I owe to my wife Fotini Vassiliou, the strongest support to me for the last 20 years, for her being the person she is and for her help during our long conversations about Husserl's Phenomenology. Finally, I wholeheartedly thank my son Nikolas, for the meaning and happiness he has given to my life and for his understanding when I was not available as much as we would both have liked.

Atsipopoulo  
January 10, 2015

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## First Appearance/Origin of the Chapters\*

Chapter 2: “The Phenomenological Reductions in Husserl’s Phenomenology” has a loose thematic affinity with a paper bearing a similar title, which was first published, in Greek, in the Greek Journal *Deucalion* 19 (2001), 27–60. The present chapter is a thoroughly revised and extended form of what was presented there.

Chapter 3: “Heidegger and the Phenomenological Reductions in Husserl” is loosely based on a homonymous paper that was first published, in Greek, in the Greek Journal *Deucalion* 17 (1999), 277–308. The present chapter is an almost totally new text.

Chapter 4: “Perception and ‘Action’: On the Praxial Structure of Intentional Consciousness,” was first published in *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 5 (2006), 303–320. The text published here is a thoroughly reworked version of that paper. The core argument remains essentially the same, and is only refined and considerably extended with totally new sub-topics.

Chapter 5: “Perceptual and Scientific Thing: On Husserl’s Analysis of ‘Nature-Thing’ in *Ideas* II,” is a reprint from its first appearance in *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* 5 (2005), 165–187. Only minor stylistic changes have been made.

Chapter 6: “Primordial Givenness in Husserl and Heidegger,” appears for the first time here.

Chapter 7: “The Question of ‘Categoriality’ in Husserl’s Analysis of Perception and Heidegger’s View of It,” appears for the first time here.

Chapter 8: “Husserl’s Doctrine of ‘Categorial Intuition’ and Heidegger’s *Seinsfrage*,” appears for the first time here.

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\*Deep thanks go to the editors and publishers of the Journals, where material of some of the chapters of this book first appeared, for their kindness and friendly gesture to allow me to use it here.

Chapter 9: “The Phenomenology of Anxiety and of Nothing: Ontology and Logic in Heidegger,” was first published in Greek in the Greek Journal *Ypomnima* 5 (2006), 33–69, and is here presented in a slightly modified version.

Chapter 10: “Hence and Thence Phenomenology’s Borderline,” appears here for the first time.

# Index of Abbreviations\*

	<b>Aristotle</b>
<i>NE</i>	<i>Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics</i> (translated, with an Interpretive Essay, Notes, and Glossary by Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins), Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2011.
	<b>Husserl</b>
<i>APAS</i>	<i>Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis</i> (translated by Antony J. Steinbock), Collected Works, Vol. 9, Dordrecht, Boston London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001/ <i>Hua XI: Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten, 1918–1926</i> (edited by M. Fleischer), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.
<i>CM</i>	<i>Cartesian Meditations</i> (translated by Dorion Cairns), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960/ <i>Hua I: Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge</i> (edited by Stephan Strasser), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973.
<i>Crisis</i>	<i>The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction to Phenomenology</i> (translated by David Carr), Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970/ <i>Hua VI: Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie</i> (edited by Walter Biemel), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976.
<i>Draft</i>	<i>Introduction to the “Logical Investigations”</i> : A Draft of a Preface to the <i>Logical Investigations (1913)</i> (translated by Philip J. Bossert and Curtis H. Peters), Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1975/ <i>“Entwurf einer ‘Vorrede’ zu den Logischen Untersuchungen”</i> (edited by Eugen Fink), <i>Tijdschrift voor Filosofie</i> 1 (1939), 106–33 and 319–39.

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\*When the references and citations are given in the form x/y, the first number corresponds to the English translation, and the second to the original German texts, as indicated in the following clarifications. Occasionally, I also use the familiar “Hua” and “GA” symbolism.



<i>EJ</i>	<i>Experience and Judgment</i> (translated by James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks), Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973/ <i>EU: Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik</i> (edited by Ludwig Landgrebe), Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1985.
<i>EW</i>	<i>Early Writings in Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics</i> (edited and translated by Dallas Willard), <i>Collected Works: Vol. 5</i> . Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994.
<i>FI</i>	“Fichte’s ideal of humanity [Three Lectures],” (translated by James Hart), <i>Husserl Studies</i> 12 (1995), 111–133/ <i>Hua XXV: Aufsätze und Vorträge 1911–1921, Mit ergänzenden Texten</i> (edited by Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986, 267–293.
<i>FTL</i>	<i>Formal and Transcendental Logic</i> (translated by Dorion Cairns), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969/ <i>Hua XVII: Formale und transzendente Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft</i> (edited by Paul Janssen), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974.
<i>Hua Mat VIII</i>	<i>Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929–1934). Die C-Manuskripte</i> (edited by Dieter Lohmar), New York: Springer, 2006.
<i>Hua XXXIV</i>	<i>Zur phänomenologischen Reduktion, Texte aus dem Nachlass (1926–1935)</i> (edited by Sebastian Luft), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002.
<i>Idea</i>	<i>The Idea of Phenomenology</i> (translated by William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966/ <i>Husserliana II: Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Fünf Vorlesungen</i> (edited by Walter Biemel), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973.
<i>Ideas I</i>	<i>Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology</i> (translated by Fred Kersten), <i>Collected Works: Volume 2</i> , The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982/ <i>Hua III.1: Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie</i> (1. Halbband: Text der 1.-3. Auflage—Nachdruck) (edited by Karl Schuhmann), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977.
<i>Ideas II</i>	<i>Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution</i> (translated by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer), The Hague: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989/ <i>Hua IV: Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution</i> (edited by M. Biemel), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952.
<i>Ideas III</i>	<i>Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Third Book: Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences</i> (translated by Ted E. Klein and William E. Pohl), <i>Collected Works: Volume 1</i> , The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980/ <i>Hua V: Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Drittes Buch: Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften</i> (edited by Marly Biemel), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971.

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<i>LI</i>	<i>Logical Investigations</i> (translated by John N. Findlay), New York: Humanities Press, 1970/ <i>Logische Untersuchungen (Erster Band: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik; Zweiter Band: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, I. Teil)</i> , Halle a.d.S.: Max Niemeyer, <sup>2</sup> 1913, ( <i>Zweiter Band: Elemente einer phänomenologischen Aufklärung der Erkenntnis. II. Teil</i> ), Halle a.d.S.: Max Niemeyer, <sup>2</sup> 1921.
<i>PITC</i>	<i>On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917)</i> (translated by John B. Brough), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991/ <i>Hua X: Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893–1917)</i> (edited by Rudolf Boehm), Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.
<i>PP</i>	<i>Phenomenological Psychology: Lectures from the Summer Semester 1925</i> (translated by John Scanlon), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977/ <i>Hua IX: Phänomenologische Psychologie: Vorlesungen Sommersemester, 1925</i> (edited by Walter Biemel), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968.
<i>PTP</i>	<i>Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931): The Encyclopaedia Britannica Article, the Amsterdam Lectures, ‘Phenomenology and Anthropology,’ and Husserl’s Marginal Notes in Being and Time and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics</i> (edited and translated by Thomas Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer), Collected Works: Volume 6, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997/ <i>Hua IX: Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester. 1925</i> (edited by Walter Biemel), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968.
<b>Heidegger</b>	
<i>BPP</i>	<i>Basic Problems of Phenomenology</i> (translated by Albert Hofstadter), Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982/ <i>GA 24: Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie</i> (edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann), Farnfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975.
<i>BT</i>	<i>Being and Time</i> (translated by Joan Stambaugh), <sup>1</sup> Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996/ <i>Sein und Zeit</i> , Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1967.
<i>CP</i>	<i>Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)</i> (translated by Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu), Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012 / <i>GA 65: Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)</i> , Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1963–38.
<i>FS</i>	<i>Four Seminars</i> (translated by Andrew Mitchell and Francois Raffoul), Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003/ <i>Vier Seminare: Le Thor 1966, 1968, 1969—Zährinegn 1973</i> (edited by Curd Ochwad), Farnfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977.
<i>GA 1</i>	<i>Frühe Schriften: 1912–16</i> (edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann), Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978.
<i>GA 26</i>	<i>Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz</i> (edited by Klaus Held), Farnfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978.
<i>KPM</i>	<i>Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics</i> (translated by Richard Taft), Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.

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<sup>1</sup>When, at some places, I make use of John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York, Harper & Row, 1962) translation, it is indicated with an “[MR].”

<i>N I</i>	<i>The Will to Power as Art</i> (edited and translated by David F. Krell), New York: Harper & Row, 1979/ <i>Nietzsche, Erster Band</i> , Pfullingen: Verlag Gunther Neske, 1961.
<i>N II</i>	<i>The Eternal Recurrence of the Same</i> (edited and translated by David F. Krell), New York: Harper & Row, 1984/ <i>Nietzsche, Erster Band</i> , Pfullingen: Verlag Gunther Neske, 1961.
<i>OHF</i>	<i>Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity</i> (translated by John van Buren), Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999/ <i>GA 63: Ontologie: Hermeneutik der Faktizität</i> (edited by Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns), Frankfurt am Mein: Klostermann, 1988.
<i>P</i>	<i>Pathmarks</i> (edited and translated by William McNeill), Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998 / <i>GA 9: Wegmarken</i> (edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann), Frankfurt am Mein: Klostermann, 1976.
<i>PHCT</i>	<i>Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time</i> (translated by Theodore Kisiel), Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985/ <i>GA 20: Prolegomena zur Geschite des Zeitbegriffs</i> (edited by Petra Jaeger), Frankfurt am Mein: Klostermann, 1979.
<i>TB</i>	<i>On Time and Being</i> (translated by Joan Stambaugh), New York: Harper & Row, 1972/ <i>GA 14: Zur Sache des Denkens</i> (edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann), Frankfurt am Mein: Klostermann, 2007.
<i>TDP</i>	<i>Toward the Definition of Philosophy</i> (translated by Ted Sadler), New York and London: Athlone Press 2000/ <i>GA 56/57: Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie</i> (edited by Bernd Heimbüchel), Frankfurt am Mein: Klostermann, 1987.
<i>WCT</i>	<i>What Is Called Thinking?</i> (translated by Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray), New York, Harper & Row, 1968/ <i>GA 8: Was heisst Denken?</i> (edited by Paola-Ludovika Coriando), Frankfurt am Mein: Klostermann, 2002.
<i>WM</i>	“Was ist Metaphysik?” contained, with Heidegger’s “Introduction” and “Postscript” to this work, in <i>P</i> (see above).
	<b>Kant</b>
<i>CPR</i>	<i>Critique of Pure Reason</i> (translated and edited by P. Guyer and Allen W. Wood), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998.
	<b>Scheler</b>
<i>FE</i>	<i>Formalism in Ethics and Material Ethics of Values</i> (translated by Manfred Frings), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973/ <i>Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik</i> , Halle a.d.S.: Franke Verlag, 1954.

**Part I**  
**Introduction**

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

Now we need to make explicit the debate between Husserl and Heidegger which in fact never took place but which is nevertheless to the point. It is one of the burning, unresolved issues of present-day philosophy. (J. Patočka 1998, 109)

[T]he whole of *Sein und Zeit* springs from an indication given by Husserl and amounts to no more than an explicit account of the ‘*natürlicher Weltbegriff*’ or the ‘*Lebenswelt*’ which Husserl, towards the end of his life, identified as the central theme of Phenomenology. (M. Merleau-Ponty 1962, vii)

### 1.1 The Issues

At the end of the 1960s, Patočka claimed that the philosophical relation and dispute between Husserl and Heidegger was a burning issue in the phenomenological thinking of the day; a challenging problem, demanding a great effort to achieve a deeper understanding of Phenomenology. At the same time, Merleau-Ponty was proposing that Husserl had done all the work, and that Heidegger had basically followed his teacher’s indications, contributing novel aspects and layers to the phenomenological way of philosophizing. I believe that even today, almost five decades after these estimations, the issues remain unresolved and are of perhaps even more burning importance.

The decades that have passed have provided us with some more hints, but these have not yet satiated our need to penetrate into the depths of the difficulties surrounding the philosophical relation between Husserl and Heidegger. The character and fate of phenomenological philosophy, as well as its place in the present philosophical milieu, depend crucially on the way we understand the complexities that connect the thinking of these two great philosophers. We still need to clarify what happened during the period between the publication of Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* (1900–1901) and the appearance of Heidegger’s *Being and Time* (1927), and the parting of the ways that followed almost immediately

after the latter succeeded the former in the chair of philosophy at Freiburg, in 1928. What Phenomenology was and can be, and whether this philosophy can in some form stand powerfully next to other philosophies, *vis-à-vis* the philosophical problems of the past and, more importantly, the critical problems of the present historical situation, are questions that can be answered once we have deepened our understanding of this issue.

On the one hand, on the standard post-war Heideggerian understanding of these issues, Husserl was the founder of Phenomenology, but he could not handle the full potential of what he discovered, committing one fatal philosophical error after another. In the end, he actually even managed to self-cancel himself as a philosopher, and his thinking as Phenomenology (as Heidegger wrote to Löwith on February 20, 1923). It was only Heidegger, the story goes, who first achieved the reconstruction of a Phenomenology that was totally faithful to its motto—“*zu den Sachen selbst!*”—and, later, its completion and overcoming, toward the sole post-metaphysical form of philosophizing: the thinking of Being as such. On the other hand, the standard Husserlian response to this is that Heidegger did not do justice to almost any of Husserl’s delicate and substantial contributions to philosophy, and that he was brutally unfair to his teacher only in order to promote himself as the sole legitimate spokesman of the hidden potential of his mentor’s new philosophy. Heidegger, then, in a sense, didn’t discover anything original, but ruminated upon Husserl’s original discoveries and turned them into superficially unrecognizable sophistications, if not mere sophistries. As can be seen from the notes he wrote in the margins of his copy of *Being and Time*, Husserl himself arrived at this diagnosis. On p. 62 he writes that “What is said here is my own doctrine” and on p. 324 he protests: “What complicated formalities and unclarities, simply so as not to make use of ‘intentionality’!”<sup>1</sup>

In both of these accounts, though, the common tacit assessment is that, at bottom, with regard to really substantial matters, Husserl and Heidegger were, remained, and can only be considered foreign to each other’s thought. From the outset until the end of their philosophical lives, Husserl and Heidegger took essentially different roads and looked at things from completely different perspectives, if not from totally opposing points of view.

In the present volume, I undertake the task of contributing to the solution and overcoming of certain key issues concerning the philosophical relationship and dispute between Husserl and Heidegger. This is not done with the mere scholarly intent of restoring some reliable points of contact between the philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger, although special care is taken to develop a new reading of some of their most central and important works. Nor is my aim to show that one of these philosophers is fully justified and the other totally wrong; this stance would contribute to the continuation (and possibly the intensification) of the intra-phenomenological civil quarrel between Husserlians and Heideggerians. On the contrary, my aim is to try to dig deeper than these two received views regarding both the relation between

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<sup>1</sup>See *PTP*, 310, 382.

Husserl and Heidegger and the nature of their specific Phenomenologies. Again, the purpose is neither a simple comparison of their views, nor the mere tracing and elucidation of known and unknown threads of influence. Rather, my first objective is to see how the ground can be prepared for a kind of mutual understanding between the two immediately interested parties. The point will be that we can neither dismiss out of hand anyone's contribution to Phenomenology, nor can we overestimate that contribution and accept claims to exclusivity in the fate of Phenomenology's capacity to address problems. Rather, it is in some kind of collaborative conception of the views of Husserl and Heidegger, and in a suitable combination of their analyses, that we can hope to carry out such a task. To show this is the second objective.

In the chapters of this book, we will see how it is possible to address some of the most crucial questions regarding the philosophical connection between these two thinkers. In order to do this, we will need to penetrate into important and crucial details in some of their fundamental teachings. The surface orientation of the approach takes its starting point in Husserl's Phenomenology, and moves toward addressing issues raised by Heidegger and his followers. More particularly, we will examine whether, and in what sense, the former can be sustained under the attacks of the latter. Beneath that surface, however, we will also have the opportunity to see the extent and the depth of Heidegger's indebtedness to Husserl's discoveries, to understand its meaning, and to tacitly explore the possibilities of establishing retrospective communication and mutual completion. That is, the present work attempts an exploration of a certain acceptable osmosis between the philosophies of the two founding fathers of Phenomenology. Hopefully, this endeavor will prepare the ground for future phenomenological investigations, and the results presented in this volume will make possible a new round of approaches to the escalating problems of the present: value-constitution and value-experience, ethics, politics, and even economics and art. In order for this latter task to be undertaken and meaningfully followed, however, this book also explores some self-imposed limitations of the high phenomenological aspirations of the two protagonists under discussion. The accordingly moderated combined view, then, lays the ground for (and the promise of) fruitful forthcoming phenomenological work on the real problems of the present.

Before the advent of that bloomy phenomenological future, however, it is necessary to take a closer look at the contents comprising the aforementioned preparation, which will be painstaking, pedestrian, systematic and critical. After the present short Introduction, the analyses through which the reader will hopefully come to participate in this itinerary can be divided in three further separate but interconnected Parts. Each of these explores major problem areas.

## 1.2 The Parts

Firstly, there is the problem of the phenomenological method. After the publication of his path-breaking work, the *Logical Investigations* (1900–01), Husserl turned progressively from the eidetic-descriptive to the transcendental stance of *Ideas*

I (1913). The key to this turn is the method he adopted circa 1905–07, which he called “phenomenological reduction.” Heidegger, as is well known, disagreed with this change in the character of phenomenological thinking and researching. His point was that in the application of this method, Phenomenology becomes alienated from the core of its very essence; it destroys the phenomenon of intentionality, one of the three most original discoveries of the *LI* (the other two being the doctrine of categorial intuition and the new sense of the a priori). In Part II, which comprises Chaps. 2 and 3, I investigate the meaning of Husserl’s method of phenomenological reduction, I clarify the different meanings of the psychological and the transcendental phenomenological reductions, and I criticize, as either inadequate or confused, the relevant interpretations of Heidegger’s and of many others in the literature.

Secondly, there is the problem regarding primordial givenness. Time and again, Heidegger accuses Husserl for having framed Phenomenology within the sphere of theoretical intentionality. Heidegger claims that Husserl, working under the spell of traditional theoretical metaphysics and scientism, thought that at the threshold level of intentionality we experience the entities about which Geometry and Physics speak and, moreover, that we experience them as predicatively constituted. On the contrary, Heidegger maintained, Phenomenology should not theorize from the point of view of a theoretical subject-object epistemological dichotomy and a subject-predicate metaphysics, but should rather describe our being-in-the-world. In this world, we are primordially immersed in our various intentional practical dealings in which we confront equipment as pre-predicatively constituted beings. These claims are widespread in the relevant literature. In Part III, which comprises Chaps. 4, 5, and 6, I take up Heidegger’s views on these matters and examine what Husserl actually thought with regard to the character of our threshold intentional consciousness and its correlates, i.e., the make-up of perceptual consciousness and of the nature-thing (*Naturding*), and what he thought, precisely, with regard to the givenness-priority of nature-thing and equipment (or, more generally, of cultural beings or value objects).

Thirdly, there is the issue of the actual meaning of the influence Husserl exerted upon Heidegger’s thought and development. It is widely known that, as Heidegger admitted, Husserl’s doctrine of categorial intuition played a decisive role in the formation and development of his phenomenological understanding and treatment of the *Seinsfrage*—at least until *BT*. The question, however, remains: what exactly did Heidegger mean by the acknowledgement of this influence? In Part IV, which comprises Chaps. 8 and 9, I examine the meaning that “categorial intuition” has in Husserl’s thought, and I try to decipher what an accessible Heideggerian teaching regarding Being as phenomenon might look like. I also explore how these two clues might help us to make sense of Heidegger’s notorious analyses regarding the puzzling relation between Nothing and Logic, as well as Nothing and Being.

Finally, in Part V, which contains only the closing chapter of this book, I attempt to deal with the issue of the inherent limits of Phenomenology. Firstly, I explore what appears to clearly belong within the area of a fully legitimate phenomenological elucidation. It is there said that thematics like Husserl’s hyletic



data and the transcendental monad, and Heidegger's all-inclusive Dasein and its mysterious relation to Being as such, in fact tend to move beyond the limit of 'objective' phenomenologizable phenomena. Secondly, I consider, in broad contour, what can be thought of as an acceptable yet critical way of talking about what thus surpasses the strict phenomenological domain.

The development of the systematic examination of the respective issues follows a line which starts from exclusively Husserlian thematics (Chap. 2) and ends with exclusively Heideggerian thematics (Chap. 9), in order to allow both to be seen from a unitary perspective (Chap. 10). In the intermediate Chaps. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8) a progressive change of perspective takes place, through which the reader is called upon to trace an inner dynamic that brings us from the founder of Phenomenology to his (avowedly) most eligible spokesman and successor. Ultimately, then, a considerable part of the internal relation and disagreements between Husserl and Heidegger will hopefully have come to the fore.

Right now, though, let us take a closer look at the chapters in which these issues are raised and treated.

### 1.3 The Chapters

In Chap. 2, my starting point is the fact that Husserl's philosophical thinking did not follow a linear route. On the contrary, the changes in terminology and perspective, the transformation of the methodology, etc., cause not only confusion for the reader, but deep despair, even for the most sympathetic scholar of Husserl's texts. Indeed, "Husserl was a great analyst, but he wasn't that great at synthesis and systematization." (Ingarden 1968, 151; trns. mine). Phenomenological philosophy is characterized by the peculiarity under which its analyses are conducted. Briefly, Husserl's analyses are conducted under the status that 'the' method of phenomenological reduction secures. The phenomenological reduction, despite what is generally assumed in the vast bulk of the literature, is *not* a single and unitary method. In actual fact, Husserl used a multitude of phenomenological reductions. Of these, besides the notorious eidetic phenomenological reduction, the psychological-phenomenological and the transcendental-phenomenological reductions are the most important. Confusion between the latter two arises because Husserl did not himself realize the duality of his founding methodological stance until the 1920s. At that time, Husserl clearly sees that the psychological phenomenological reduction leads to a phenomenological a priori science (Pure Phenomenological Psychology), whereas the transcendental phenomenological reduction leads to a phenomenological philosophy (Transcendental Phenomenology).

Contrary to existing interpretations, I propose that the transcendental reduction, in particular, does not transfer us either to the inner life of a self-enclosed consciousness that has lost access to the transcendent world, nor to a world of concepts accessible only in a reflective stance. Rather, the transcendental phenomenological stance is the phenomenologically elucidated normal course of our straightforward

intentional experience, purged of the dogmatic and naïve belief in the realistic independence of the world. This world and its objectivities are then experienced through the knowledge that they are the intentional constitutive achievement of our transcendental consciousness. In the *Ideas I*, however, we find epistemologically transcendental analyses mixed up with ontologically transcendental analyses, conducted from a mundane transcendental stance (consciousness as part of reality). Later on, then, the first two kinds of analysis are distinguished, and the mundane perspective is abandoned in favor of the monadological one.

Chapter 3 is especially devoted to deciphering the way in which Heidegger understood Husserl's phenomenological, "or"—for him—transcendental reduction. On the basis of this understanding, he refused to follow Husserl in his transcendental turn, and directed harsh critical remarks against Transcendental Phenomenology and its method. Husserl, though, claimed that "Heidegger has not conceived totally the meaning of phenomenological reduction" (letter to R. Ingarden, from December 26, 1927). Thus, in this chapter I examine Heidegger's departures from Husserl's Phenomenology until 1927, the date when Husserl formulated the cited estimation, which is also the moment that marks the end of their philosophical and personal relationship. I then present the way in which Heidegger (in relevant scattered remarks) reconstructed Husserl's Phenomenology, its method, its duties, and its physiognomy, as well as his criticism with reference to them in the 1925 lecture course published under the title of the *Prolegomena in the History of the Concept of Time* (GA 20). By way of conclusion, we are led to see that Heidegger did not understand the difference between the phenomenological psychological analyses of the *Logical Investigations* and the transcendental phenomenological analyses first presented in the *Ideas I* and further developed in Husserl's later works, such as the latter's versions of the "Britannica Article." This means that Heidegger's charge against Husserl, namely that after the launching of the transcendental phenomenological reduction his Phenomenology is left with a Cartesian consciousness, is considerably misguided.

In Chap. 4, we see that Husserl progressively took to referring to the whole sphere of the life of intentional acts in terms of *praxis*. Perception, imagination, judgement, scientific consciousness, etc., are all seen as practices. A seemingly self-evident interpretive possibility here is to say that intentionality is praxial, because even perception is not completely free from empty intending moments that demand fulfilment, and all fulfilment is attained by means of basically bodily activities that enable us acquire the relevant sensory contents. This approach, though, is one-sided and insufficient. I argue that perception and intentionality in general is praxial because in all of its constituting syntheses consciousness is, or becomes, organized as a 'practice-structure.' Intentional consciousness, that is, organizes its contents according to the rules that the *noetic senses* prescribe, in order to achieve the accomplishment of evident or true givenness of its noematic correlates.

Heidegger treats Husserlian perception as being a cognitive relation between an isolated theoretical subject and an isolated scrutinized object. However, Husserl never (in fact or in principle) understood perception in these terms. For him, perception is a kind of praxis or, seen otherwise, a specific mode of intentional

consciousness, which is of a praxial nature through and through. After the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl progressively realized that from the point of view of his Transcendental Phenomenology, intentional consciousness is a time-field of multifarious constituting syntheses. Any intentional synthesis, though, which may not necessarily be only of a volitional active character but also of a *passive* one, can be approached in terms of a praxial structure: there is a *telos* (truth), the means (*hyle* in the broadest sense), and a plan for achieving the *telos* (the *sense* of the noeses and the noemata). Under certain strict conditions, this is a clue that may present Husserlian constitution, especially that of the passive character, as standing in promising contiguity to Heidegger's treatment of intentional primordial constitution. Hopefully, this can supply the phenomenological tradition with new dimensions of exegetical power, applicable to the treatment of problems ranging from epistemology and philosophy of science to the theory of values and ethics.

The subject matter of Chap. 5 is an issue that has given rise to another specific disagreement in the context of the wider dispute between Husserl and Heidegger. There, I deal with the issue of the 'identity' of what is notoriously known in Husserl as *Naturding* (nature-thing), especially as it appears in his *Ideas II*. Heidegger reproached Husserl, claiming that the latter takes perceptual things as primordial intentional givens, which he moreover identifies with the nature-things as they are understood in the natural sciences. This supposedly happens because, in the *Ideas II*, part I, we are seemingly guided to understand that these analyses (a) are about the constitution of the beings belonging to the ontological region "material nature," (b) start with the nature-things as thematized in the natural sciences, and (c) we find out that, in their course, nature-things are nothing different than the perceptual things that are constituted in the terms of *res extensa* and *res materialis*. For Husserl, that is, we primordially experience perceptual things that from the start are constituted according to the subject-predicate-structure, and with predicates that are identical with the exact properties about which Geometry and Physics talk.

Contrary to other existing lines of interpretation, I try to show that the analyses in the aforementioned part of that work concern the constitution of the ontological region "material nature," starting from the pre-theoretical perceptual thing in order, of course, to provide the ground for the higher-level analyses concerning their theoretical natural-scientific thematization. It then turns out that by "nature-thing" we must basically understand the pre-theoretical and pre-thematic perceptual thing in its internal layers of *res extensa* and *res materialis*. In Husserl, however, and especially in the text under examination, these terms do not have the meaning that modern philosophy (e.g., Descartes) attributes to them.

Chapter 6 extends this question regarding the relation between perception and categoriality as understood in Husserl and Heidegger. At a certain point of his *Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time*, Heidegger remarks that according to Husserl's analysis, perception is permeated by categorial elements. Husserl claimed that there are two types of categorial acts: acts of linguistic-predicative synthesis and acts of ideation. We know that he also argued both *against* the predicative syntheticity of perceptual objects and *for* the presupposition of an *eidos* (or sense) for their possibility. Does, then, Heidegger argue that, in Husserl's

*actual* analyses, perception is—after all—treated as a predicative act or/and that the presupposition of the *eidōs* is neglected? What I try to elucidate is the meaning of this categoriality and the issue of whether (and in what sense) Husserl's theory of perception presupposes it.

In this chapter, we will see that Heidegger's reconstruction of Husserl's Phenomenology suffers from at least one serious misunderstanding (that even perception is predicatively structured), and two non-recoverable contradictions. Firstly, he recognizes that, in Husserl, there is also a concept of truth for monothetic acts, but does not in fact admit that there are monothetic acts. Secondly, he allows for the thesis that perceptual objects are also constituted in terms of their adumbrations, but maintains that their inner structure is only that of a subject-and-predicate relation. If these factors are combined with his downplaying of Husserl's analysis of inner time-consciousness, then we realize that Heidegger's reading may indeed lead to a withdrawal of philosophical interest in these key Husserlian ideas toward a latent adjusted appropriation, upon which Heidegger himself actually (and unfortunately) built his philosophical edifice.

In Chap. 7, the issue is that of the specific meaning and content of primordially and of primordial givens in Husserl and Heidegger. The latter claims that the former makes the mistake of regarding the givenness of beings characterised by the mode of being of *Vorhandenheit* as primordial. Heidegger himself thinks that it is *Zuhandenheit* (i.e., tool-givenness) that comes first, whereas for Husserl this comes second. In Heidegger, *Vorhandenheit* means the way of givenness pertaining to the theoretical consciousness of attentive perception that presents us with isolated nature-things, judgementally constituted by means of scientific predicates. Heidegger connects this mode of being or givenness with Husserl's conception of perceptual intentionality.

Now, there are Husserl scholars who accept Heidegger's reading of the primordially hierarchy in Husserl and argue for it. I claim both that Heidegger's critique is inaccurate and uninformed, and that the just mentioned scholars follow the wrong route. Husserl claimed neither that perceptual givenness constitutes a phenomenologically self-standing mode of being-givenness, nor that perceptual objectivities are constituted in a theoretical way. If we want to understand what is at stake in this 'debate,' we need a clearer idea about the subject matter of intentional founding relations. Given Heidegger's account of the way in which we move from *Zuhandenheit* to *Vorhandenheit*, it seems that Heidegger thought that what Husserl had in mind was a secondary reverse genetic founding of equipmentality upon nature-thingness. I argue that this is not exactly the case. Husserl never thought there to be a primordial intentional state in which we are conscious of something like a mere perceptually experienced nature-thing without any other accompanying noematic layer. Nature-things, Husserl himself claims in *Ideas II*, are in fact the result of a certain peculiar abstraction. Moreover, the texts make it clear that, according to Husserl's own thinking, in our straightforward everyday living we are primordially conscious not of mere nature-things but of equipment and cultural things in general. The chapter examines and elucidates the meaning of all this in extensive detail.

Chapter 8 deals with the meaning of Heidegger's own admission that his conception and pursuit of the *Seinsfrage*, at least until the period of *BT*, was deeply indebted to Husserl's teaching regarding categorial intuition. All the available textual evidence, then, make clear that Heidegger considered the doctrine of *categorial intuition*, developed in Husserl's 6th *LI*, as of the most decisive influence upon his own thought (with the doctrines of *intentionality* and the *phenomenological apriori* following closely). Now, what is the precise impact of this influence? How might the Husserlian doctrine have helped Heidegger shape the way in which he treated the sole concern of his entire philosophical career, the question of Being?

In this chapter, I try to articulate some thoughts regarding this special issue by taking into serious consideration the directions given by Heidegger himself. I sum up what Husserl's doctrine of the categorial intuition consists in, and I critically examine some of the key ideas offered by scholars. I then direct my attention to several points in Heidegger's mature work (*BT*), which give us a good picture of the way that Heidegger tried to approach the issue and meaning of Being. On the basis of all this, I finally attempt to articulate how we could deepen our understanding of the issue of this enigmatic influence.

The task of Chap. 9 is to offer a kind of exemplary application of the understanding achieved in Chap. 8. The occasion I focus on is Heidegger's enigmatic double move in his "What is Metaphysics?", where on the one hand he equates Being with Nothing (*Nichts*), and, on the other hand, he claims that Logic's possibility depends on Nothing, since logical negation presupposes the noning (*nichten*) of this Nothing. Through the elucidation of these claims, we see Heidegger's deep dependence upon the phenomenological possibilities that were opened up by his assimilation of Husserl's categorial intuition at work. Of course, the phenomenology of Nothing is not as clear as we would like it to have been. There are, however, some (more or less clearly traceable) possible readings. In these, however, we see Heidegger approaching Being and Nothing as objective structures of the world, not as subjectively formed projections. In addition, Nothing is explicitly said to appear not in our understanding but in the extreme thymotic state of anxiety. To this extent, Nothing is not exactly some understandingly available sense, but only the way that the possibility and impossibility of such senses (significances or Beings) matter for our finite existence, as they 'resonate' with our *Befindlichkeit* and are thus disclosed to us in anxiety. This analysis nonetheless also makes us realize that this effort of Heidegger's to offer a completion of his program for a Fundamental Ontology, via a phenomenology of Nothing, represents his last and unsuccessful limit-attempt to retain his life-long *Seinsfrage* within the context of a specifically phenomenological research.

With this last remark, we move to the content and purpose of Chap. 10. Heidegger insisted that all our phenomenological analyses must be carried out in a way that guarantees the impossibility of paramorphoses having a methodologically intervening subjectivity as their origin. We need only let the phenomena show themselves from themselves. On the other hand, Husserl claimed that a philosophy that rejects the phenomenological reduction is no better than an appeal to some oracle in which a

God reveals himself or herself only to the chosen one.<sup>2</sup> Despite these precautions, it seems that Phenomenology does in fact face certain limitations that neither Husserl nor Heidegger explicitly or soberly admitted. There are subject matters in both Husserl and Heidegger that claim more than they can appeal to, according to the letter and spirit of Phenomenology's principle. For instance, Husserl's hyletic data and Heidegger's Nothing are as such prescribed in a way that cancels any acceptable pretention to their phenomenologizability. If Phenomenology does not pay attention to the issue regarding the necessity of *criticism*, of a self-awareness of self-imposed limits in its pretensions to knowledge, to experience, and to intuitability, then it seems that it lets itself count as the next step in the development of absolutist German Idealism. An answer is then suggested concerning what remains of a genuinely phenomenological research program, and how Phenomenology should move forward when it encounters such limitations.

## 1.4 The Further Aimings

Having summarized the scope and content of this book, I must now say a word regarding the further purposes that it was above said to serve. Alongside its systematic intention, there is also the backdrop of an effort to bring together the first elements of a renewed phenomenological approach. I would like to call this new approach *Normalized Phenomenology*. By this I mean that in Phenomenology as a philosophical movement, we should be interested in the ideas, rather than in the persons who introduce them. Working in a philosophical movement means accepting and developing the potential of a kind of research, not tightly-cemented dogmas. Husserl certainly had this in mind—as did Heidegger (if we are to suitably understand his *Gesamtausgabe* motto “*Wege nicht Werke*”). History, however, shows that sometimes the epigones become more papal than the pope. The sense of responsibility and indebtedness we feel toward such major philosophical figures usually makes interpreters rigid and unwilling to admit systematic weaknesses or flaws in the work of their heroes, or perhaps unwilling to discuss the possibility of developing modified versions of their work. The original disputes between the protagonists of the past thus become inner dogmatic divisions that destroy the spirit of the *wunderbaren Anfänge* and make the worshipping of the letter begin. The question then becomes “who is right?” History has shown that this is the most spiritless and, at the same time, the most deceptive question.

Phenomenology as a philosophical movement comprises a distinct way of philosophizing with a vast potential for research possibilities. It is a horizon of genuine discoveries that remains open. In order for this to be fully realized, however, it is necessary to bring together whatever special trends, styles, jargons, and views can be saved from an analysis that will try to settle serious issues that continue to haunt the

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<sup>2</sup>See *Hua* VI, 192.

phenomenological tradition and its most distinguished representatives; first of all, Husserl and Heidegger; then Husserl and Scheler, Scheler and Heidegger, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, Scheler and Arendt, Arendt and Heidegger, Husserl and Gadamer, Gadamer and Arendt, and so on. It is my conviction that Normalized Phenomenology can be constituted as modular teaching, comprised of suitably selected and modified parts of the personal philosophies of key phenomenologists—parts that can indeed be put together after a persistent criticism of both a historical and systematic nature.

In what concerns my narrower current interests, the perspective just suggested is that of realizing the prospect of a core phenomenological research program, made up of a selective and critical fusion of Husserl's phenomenological methodology and his basic discoveries (plus his extended views and analyses on the primordial givenness related to perceptual intentionality), Heidegger's phenomenology of Being as sense founded upon the time horizon of the finite human life, and Scheler's analyses concerning the intricacies of our emotive intentional life and the praxial placing of the person in some cosmos. This initial central core should of course allow, under certain qualifications, for an additional (but also tentative and open) surrounding halo condensing the necessary complementary metaphysics of the social, cultural, and praxial world-whole within which human beings spend their lives unfolding possibilities and strivings. Arendt's aspirations in anti-authoritarian political thinking and a part of Jonas' philosophy of life belong here, for instance.

The traditional dichotomies and hostilities between the different voices in phenomenological thinking have up to now isolated all these possibilities, and have contributed to the estimation of Phenomenology as dealing in cryptic jargons that have meaning only as elements in the history of philosophy. For example, Husserlian Phenomenology has remained basically trapped within the thematics of epistemology; only recently have we seen an effort to renew the agenda, through contributions to the philosophy of emotions and Ethics. Some others have even tried to show that Husserl can be read as a tacit cognitivist epistemologist. I think we can close some old polemics between the disputants representing different phenomenological trends and lift the excommunication acts on (and from) all sides—these have hurt the image and the real potential for development that Phenomenology had and still has. We can proceed toward another phase in Phenomenology's history. In it, a collaborative attitude among researchers and representatives of all of these trends can join forces, trace the edges along which these trends can themselves be interlocked, and see how a unified genre can address the pressing challenges of the present and the future.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>From this point of view, we may reconsider the views presented by Moran (2000b) and Crowell (2002b). Moran in particular is of the opinion that Phenomenology is not actually a research program with its own characteristic research methodology and defining tenets, but that it is rather just a set of people historically related among themselves (2000b, xiv, 3, 21, 189). Husserl and Heidegger are thus just related founding figures who, in the end, came to serious disagreements that are not bridgeable from any possible phenomenological viewpoint (2000b, 90, 188, 198, 208, 260). Moran, however, cannot avoid the implication that, since he is giving an account of Phenomenology, there must be a unifying characteristic behind all the persons belonging to this

It is in Phenomenology as a phenomenological movement, not in any of its separate doctrines, that we have any hope and chance for a positive contribution to the still burning issues in human affairs, both in science and in praxis. Otherwise, our scholarship will continue to remain immersed in the deepest possible erudition without at the same time managing to overcome the partiality of authorities in favor of Phenomenology's own prospects as a philosophical methodology that can indeed deal with *the things themselves* in the aforementioned issues. The present and future of our situation call for open-mindedness and synergy, not dogmatic attachment to the doctrines of some master or other. It is not the doctrines of the one individual, but the mutual creative thinking of the many that may have some future in philosophy's overall fate.

I hope that the work being presented here offers some building blocks for such a preparatory effort, and for the future larger architectonics of a unified phenomenological arsenal.

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kind of philosophizing. Nevertheless, no unambiguous direction is offered. At best, something like a "family resemblances" story could be distilled from his approach. From the point of view of a Normalized Phenomenology, there is the hope that something more positive is possible. The reader can follow the traces left within the chapters of the present book, and reflect on them when we reach Chap. 10.



## **Part II**

# **Method and Possibilities of Phenomenology**

It is difficult; the most difficult thing in philosophy generally is the phenomenological reduction—to understand it in depth and to exercise it properly. (E. Husserl: letter to R. Ingarden, November 23, 1931; transl. mine).

## Chapter 2

# The Phenomenological Reductions in Husserl's Phenomenology

The Delphic motto, "Know thyself!" has gained a new signification. Positive science is a science lost in the world. I must lose the world by epoché, in order to regain it by a universal self-examination. (E. Husserl: *CM*, 157/183)

### 2.1 Introduction

The evolution of Husserl's thought did not follow a linear route. Time and again, crucial changes were taking place in its course. The content of fundamental concepts was shifting; successive discoveries of new thematics were happening; incessant expansions of the ever-under-rework teachings to new fields of application were being developed. The evaluation of Husserl's work in its entirety becomes, thus, an extremely difficult task. The huge bulk of the writings, the multifariousness of their thematics, and the successive reforms and shifts in it make the understanding of even the overall plan wherein the intermediate findings fall very difficult. One thing, though, is certain. In order to overcome all these obstacles to approaching Husserl's work, we must first deepen our understanding of his method, the phenomenological method of philosophizing. Whatever is said in Husserl's Phenomenology makes sense and has its value only to the extent that it is a result of 'the' phenomenological reduction.

The idea that phenomenological philosophy is possible only on the basis of a phenomenological reduction occurs for the first time in 1905, in the so-called "*Seefelder Blätter*," and publicly in 1907 with the *Idea of Phenomenology*. According to Husserl's own personal estimation of the situation, from 1913, his understanding of the reduction did not become clear until 1908.<sup>1</sup> Until the end of

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<sup>1</sup>See his "Draft," 59-60/338.

his life, however, Husserl was in fact talking about a multitude of reductions, which, since they are used in Phenomenology, can all be considered “phenomenological.” Moreover, even though Husserl does not explicitly talk in all cases about this or that reduction, he in fact constantly *presupposes* one. What makes things even harder is that even before 1905, when he was not yet using the term “reduction,” he had already silently put into play some version of phenomenological reduction.

Most commentators have got used to taking it for granted that the possibility of entering the stance from which Husserlian phenomenological philosophizing is possible depends on adopting “the” phenomenological reduction, meaning by this the method that places us in the attitude of Transcendental Phenomenology. That is, in the relevant scholarship, Husserl's great distinction between *psychological-phenomenological* and *transcendental-phenomenological* reduction is lightheartedly rejected.<sup>2</sup> To be sure, in the *Ideas I* (1913), the first systematic work presenting Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl himself refers undifferentiatedly to one “phenomenological” reduction. However, as one can see in Schuhmann's second edition of that work in the *Husserliana* series, and more specifically in the second volume of that edition (*Hua* III.2), Husserl subsequently critically reviewed his personal copies of the *Ideas I*. He, then, complemented his references to “the” phenomenological reduction, making clear that this is actually a double method.<sup>3</sup> We see there that he in fact splits the seemingly one, fundamental phenomenological reduction of the original *Ideas I* (1913) into two: the psychological-phenomenological and the transcendental-phenomenological reductions.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Among the rare exceptions of commentators who explicitly make this distinction, we must include, e.g., Diemer (1965), Kockelmans (1972, 1987, 1994), and Crowell (1990). We also find explicit mention of the distinction in e.g., in Scanlon (1972) and Sokolowski (2000); the latter, however, refers to them only in order to claim that, in the end, the distinction is merely terminological. And it is still a fact that even in the more recent works, see, e.g., Alweiss 2003, Luft 2004a, b, 2012, no full justice has yet been done to the core of our concerns here. As I see it, the foundation for the correct reading of this distinction was first set out by Fink in his famous “Die phänomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen Kritik,” (*Kant-Studien*, 1933; here 1970) (authorized by Husserl himself), and later on by De Boer in his unjustifiably forgotten work (1966; here 1978). These latter works also function as the starting point for the view that is going to be developed in this and the following chapter. As will become apparent, though, there are considerable folds in their stories with regard to which I will differentiate myself.

<sup>3</sup>Especially the *marginalia* and the enthetic pages found in the so-called “D copy” (1929) had the task of highlighting, within the *Ideas I*, a contrast between a latent Phenomenological Psychology and an explicit Transcendental Phenomenology. See also the editor's (Schuhmann's) Introduction in this second edition of the *Ideas I* (and especially *Hua* III.1, lii-liii). See also note 45 below.

<sup>4</sup>The difficulty everybody faces with the thematic and method of ‘the’ reduction is clearly explained by the editor of the latest (2002) *Husserliana* volume (XXXIV) on this issue: “One will not find one definitive systematic exposition of the reduction in Husserl's oeuvre. Part of the confusion this method causes to this day lies in the fact that Husserl never (to his dismay) produced a comprehensive and completely satisfying account of his central methodological tenet.” (Luft 2012, 244). On the other widely known reduction, the *eidetic* one, which is itself another *crux interpretum* and is also connected to the very possibility of phenomenological philosophical analyses, see here §2.6.1.

More generally, in the 1920s, Husserl realized that, accordingly, the phenomenological analyses themselves also have this dual aspect. He found out that the psychological reduction leads to a phenomenological *science*, whereas the transcendental reduction leads to a phenomenological *philosophy*.<sup>5</sup> Thus, Phenomenology can be developing either as Phenomenological Psychology or as Transcendental Phenomenology.<sup>6</sup> For many years and in a vast extension of research manuscripts,<sup>7</sup> Husserl repeatedly tried to make clear not only the distinction between these two Phenomenologies, but also the special conditions under which they can be realized.

Each of these two Phenomenologies can be carried out from the point of view of an analogous attitude, and we arrive at these attitudes via the corresponding preparative abstinings ( $\epsilon\pi\omicron\chi\alpha\acute{\iota}$ ) and accompanying reductions (the Greek term he would have used is  $\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\alpha\acute{\iota}$ ). Both Phenomenologies are possible only through an abstention or a withholding of ourselves *from* something and an accompanying reduction *to* something else. Husserl, however, does not always distinguish these two partial moves as separate constituents of the phenomenological reductions, and, usually, he does not explicitly treat them separately. What is certain is that the analyses of Phenomenological Psychology are made from the point of view of the psychological-phenomenological attitude, which is reached via the psychological-phenomenological epoché ( $\epsilon\pi\omicron\chi\eta$ ) and reduction. In contrast, the analyses of Transcendental Phenomenology are conducted from the point of view of the transcendental-phenomenological attitude, which is reached via the transcendental-phenomenological epoché and reduction. But what do these attitudes actually signify? What do they consist in?

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<sup>5</sup>See below, especially §2.7.

<sup>6</sup>I do not, of course, mean that with this realization Husserl undertakes the task of constructing from scratch two separate new Phenomenologies. What happened was rather a regressive self-interpretation of his course. In order to refer only to his post 1900 works (and until 1929), a number of steps had intervened: the *Logical Investigations* (1900–01), his personal and professional crisis of 1905–06, the painful integration of the transcendental turn of 1907, the essay “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” for the journal *Logos* (1910–11), the *Ideas* I (1913), and countless pages of research manuscripts on the phenomenological method. All that work demanded a classification and an overall look, through which Husserl could make clear,—firstly to himself—the route of a multifarious work, extending along many years.

<sup>7</sup>Rudolf Boehm, editor of Husserl’s *First Philosophy* (1923–24), the second part of which bears the subtitle “Theory of the Phenomenological Reduction” (*Hua* VIII), informs us that the manuscripts dealing with the theme of phenomenological reduction reach the amazing number of 8.000 pages, 4.500 of which are dedicated to the special problem regarding the “ways” leading to Transcendental Phenomenology (*Hua* VIII, xli n. 2). Some more such research manuscripts have meanwhile been edited and published also in the more recent *Hua* XXXIV.

## 2.2 Outline of Husserl's Development: Transcendence, "Natural Attitude," and the Phenomenological Stance

The traditional dipole "internal-external" was recognizing the "external" world as transcendent, in comparison to the immanence of the knowing subjectivity. The world of objects is thus confronted as a universe of self-existing beings that transcends the enclosedness of the bearer of the experiences and of knowledge. Two independent spheres of reality are thus acknowledged, which enter into contact only from time to time, and wholly accidentally.<sup>8</sup> On the one side, we supposedly have the "external" reality and, on the other, the "internal" reality. What is considered as experience and knowledge is the successful incoming and recognition of sensory contents to some suitable sentient 'chamber': psyche, nous, soul, mind, intellect, cogito, tabula rasa, consciousness, etc. In some way, the problem of knowledge must find its solution on the basis of a kind of awareness regarding the contents in the soul, mind, consciousness, etc., which should correspond to, refer to, represent, etc., the external source.

Brentano, Husserl's teacher, had also accepted this basic epistemological idea, and used it in his analyses under the title of *intentionality* (*Intentionalität*).<sup>9</sup> Brentano reformulated the epistemological problem in a form which is nowadays known as "Brentano's problem": how does the possession of some content, immanent in our soul, guarantee our cognitive relation to outer reality, which itself transcends our immanence and is totally different from this content?

Husserl was, of course, well aware of his teacher's efforts to solve this particular problem.<sup>10</sup> In his 5th LI, he moreover argued extensively in order to show the failure of the enterprise to bridge the immanent psychic with some transcending and self-existent real realm. The Brentanian intentional contents that reside in an

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<sup>8</sup>For these expressions, see *Ideas* I, 111/105 (in all the following, references to the English translations are followed by mention of the corresponding original text, which can be seen in the List of Abbreviations).

<sup>9</sup>The Scholastics used the term *intentio* as a translation of Aristotle's terminological expression "form, without the matter." According to the latter, our soul takes on or receives the *form* of the outer objects, without, of course, taking in itself also their matter ("To have a sensation is to receive the species [or form] of what is sensed, albeit without its matter [*Ἡ μὲν αἰσθησις ἐστὶ τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἀνευ τῆς ὕλης*];" *De Anima*, 424a17-19; trnsl. mine). This "form without the matter" is contained in the sensory organs, or in the intellect or mind, not as something having *extensio*, but only as something characterized by *intensio* or *intentio* (both writings were in use). This, then, is what characterizes mental phenomena: they contain within themselves *intensions* or *intentions* (somehow as their objects or referents). Of course, this first realization has since led to a host of accounts and problems in epistemology and in ethics (theory of action).

<sup>10</sup>The issue regarding the difference in the ways Husserl and Brentano understood the notion of intentionality is very complex, and would demand a separate treatment. The reader, however, may consult *LI*, 557ff/370ff.; see also (Mohanty 1970, 101, 104; Mohanty 2008, 43; Moran 2000a, 40; Moran 1996, 6; Spiegelberg 1976, 120–1; De Boer 1978, 6ff.; McAlister 1976, 151–9; Vassiliou 2013).

immanent psychic sphere should be "related" to the "external" things themselves. Nevertheless, what exactly could the texture of this "relation" be? In the end, Brentano couldn't find either an adequate analysis for the ontology of the necessary correspondence or reference, or a satisfactory answer to the possibility of misrepresentation.

In the *Logical Investigations (LI)* Husserl offered his own path-breaking understanding of the notion of intentionality. In experience and knowledge we do not just possess some mere contents within the immanent stream of our consciousness' living experiences (*Erlebnisse*). What happens is the following. First of all, the things are offered to us sensorially via their perspectival sides or adumbrations (*Abschattungen*). These can indeed be said to become immanent contents registered in our receptivity. They can thus be found as *psychically real (reell)* contents in the stream of our immanent living experiences. Experience and knowledge of the things, however, mean something more and something different. I experience or I have knowledge of a thing when there is an *appearance (Erscheinung)* or a manifestation of it as a phenomenon in—or, better, to—my consciousness. But this appearing of phenomena is not identical to the mere having of contents that are lived-through as *reell* recordings in the stream of living experiences. Intentionality is not any more exhausted in this having of *representational* contents 'from' an outer opaque object in the immanence of the cognizing subject. This crucial term should henceforth mean the conscious happening of the manifest appearing of the very beings of the world as phenomena for my consciousness, which, however, lie *beyond* the stream of its living experiences. Instead of the mere possession of immanent contents that 'correspond' to otherwise untraceable external objects, Husserl now talks about an intentional *interpretation (intentionale Deutung)* or intentional apprehension (*intentionale Apprehension*) that animates (*beseelt*) these *immanently real (reell)* contents of the perceptual adumbrations of the things. It is precisely this interpretation of the immanently lived-through contents which leads to the conscious appearance of the very things in their evident manifestation for me, firstly (i.e., at the lowest level) as whole perceptual beings that are simply sensorially experienced.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>In the following brief passages we come across some characteristic descriptions reflecting the general way in which Husserl treated the traditional epistemological issue. "[C]onsciousness ([intentional] experiences) and real beings are anything but coordinate kinds of beings which dwell peaceably side by side and occasionally become 'related to' or 'connected with' one another." (*Ideas I*, 111/105; transl. sl. md.). "[E]xperience is not an opening through which a world, existing prior to all experience, shines into a room of consciousness; it is not a mere taking of something alien to consciousness into consciousness." (*FTL*, 132/239). Also, "Neither the world nor any other existent of any conceivable sort comes 'from outdoors' (θύραθεν) into my ego, my life of consciousness" (*FTL*, 250/257). Later in this chapter, we will see that, especially for the purposes of these introductory remarks, the fact that we have cited passages from both the pre-transcendental and the transcendental period of Husserl's Phenomenology is not an insuperable problem. On Husserl's understanding of intentionality in terms of animating interpretation and appearing, see *LI*, 355/129, 356/129, 537/349, 565–7/381–3, 591–2/418–9, 607–8/439–441, 610/443, 630/470, 637/478, 733–4/82–3, 741–2/91–3; especially 199/194,

In the Husserlian account of intentionality, consciousness manages, thus, to 'extend' itself beyond the Heraclitian flux of living experiences and to reach the beings themselves as *in-person* appearing in the world. With this move, Husserl solves—by actually cutting it like a Gordian knot—what is known as the “problem of epistemological transcendence.” What consciousness experiences or knows has now been put, definitively, beyond consciousness' immanence. Consciousness experiences and knows the transcendently appearing beings in the world; not its immanent ideas, representations, or contents of whatever sort.<sup>12</sup>

But haven't we just said that only transcendence toward beings as *phenomena* is gained? What about the relation of the phenomena with what is traditionally recognized as *self-subsisting* reality, as *realistic* actuality (*reale Wirklichkeit*), or even as 'thing in-itself'?

In the *LI*, Husserl did indeed basically restrict himself to the examination of the appearance and structure of the phenomena. He felt content enough with the examination of intentional acts and their transcendently appearing *intentional* contents (objects). There, instead of engaging in an effort to solve the problem regarding the relation between the phenomena and the supposedly independent, realistic things 'in-themselves,' he circumvented the problem of the latter's existence and meaning of Being.<sup>13</sup> In this way, however, the problem we may call the “problem of ontological transcendence” remained unsolved.

In the *LI*, Husserl did not force himself to speak about anything lying beyond or underneath, as it were, the phenomena manifesting themselves in the sphere of our intentional experiences or, better, in the sphere of transcendent appearances.

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309/74, 310/76, 339/109, 568/385, 607/439, where the term *Deutung* (but also *Interpretation*) is used and also suggested as synonymous with *Auffassung* and even *Verstehen*; *The Idea*, 56–7/71–2; *Hua X*, 117; *PTP*, 179/137–8. For a possible limitation of the validity and scope of this content-interpretation schema of intentional constitution, as it has been thematized in the Husserlian scholarship, see §10.4 n. 12.

<sup>12</sup>It is especially questionable that Heidegger, who, in his *Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time*, devotes plenty of pages to introducing his students and readers to the three fundamental concepts of Husserlian Phenomenology (intentionality, categorial intuition, and the new conception of the a priori), does not present Husserlian intentionality in the terms presented above. On the contrary, he normally insists in talking about it in the rather Brentanian terms of directedness (*sich richten aus*), reference (*Bezug, Verweisung*), and relation (*Beziehung*) of immanent contents with their transcendent 'counterparts.' Thus, Heidegger scholars, as well as Husserl scholars who have been influenced by Heidegger's reading of Husserl, talk about intentionality qua *appearance* and *manifestation* of beings in the world with reference only to Heideggerian intentionality. This, however, is a mistake. On these issues, much more will be said in Chaps. 5, 6, and 7. With regard to the here mentioned “world,” see note 42 below.

<sup>13</sup>To be sure, the real story is much more complicated. In the first edition of the 5<sup>th</sup> LI, §7, Husserl actually attempts a Brentanian unjustified claim that Physics actually accesses the real object behind the appearances; that the thing in its (realistic) reality is the object of investigation for the science of Physics—not of Phenomenology. In the second edition (1913) this section was excised. The reasons for this can be found, e.g., in his *Ideas I*, §52, and their basis will be understood in what follows; see also §§3.5 and 3.6. Regarding my use of “Being” in the context of Husserl's Phenomenology, see note 20 below.

With regard to whatever could concern the supposedly transcendent 'cause' of the phenomena in that sphere, Husserl was rendering obliquely responsible the natural sciences (especially Physics).<sup>14</sup> In the *LI*, Phenomenology had not yet substantially freed itself from the traditional dualism between the psychical and the physically-real, and was not suggesting any solution to the problem of ontological transcendence (traditionally understood). For this reason, the analyses there are restricted to the sphere of the intentional psychic and its intentional, transcendentally—with regard to the stream of living experiences (and its *reell* contents)—appearing phenomena.<sup>15</sup> That Phenomenology does not raise any ontological pretensions (traditionally understood).

As Husserl admitted in 1906, at the culmination of his professional and personal crisis,<sup>16</sup> what he had already achieved wasn't worthy of the name "Philosophy." Whereas his target was a universal critique of Reason in general, what he had achieved was only a reluctant Eidetic-Descriptive Psychology of perceptual and categorial acts together with their phenomena in the corresponding intuitions. In order to fulfill the remaining, desired work, Husserl needed to find a successful solution to the problem of ontological transcendence. And for this, the coherently followed self-restriction of his Phenomenology until that time had to be overcome. He had to find a way to expand Phenomenology beyond the intentional and transcendent, to be sure, but also merely appearing objects. Necessarily, the route toward the philosophical completion of Phenomenology was passing through a critique of traditional ontology. In other words, what Husserl needed to do was to find a new way to solve the problem of the supposed chasm between the psychical (broadly understood now, i.e., together with the appearing phenomena) and the *realistically* understood being(s).

This problem kept Husserl busy during a course of five lectures (SS 1907), which are well known from their publication in volume II of the *Husserliana* series, under the title *The Idea of Phenomenology*. There, we have the ripening and deepening of his self-awareness with regard to the already-at-work, tacit methodological presuppositions of his pre-transcendental Phenomenology. We have also a first exposition of basic ideas connected with his transcendental turn; ideas that were going to take a more systematically elaborated form in the *Ideas I* (1913). In the *Idea*, Husserl remarks that we live our everyday lives with the background

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<sup>14</sup>See previous note.

<sup>15</sup>It is important to remember that already in his "Intentional Objects" (1894–95) and more systematically in *The Idea of Phenomenology* (1907), Husserl explicitly distinguished between two senses of the expression "in consciousness" or "in the sphere of the psychic." The first refers to the *reel* or descriptive contents that are lived-through within the immanent time-stream of living consciousness. This is the sense of "contained within." The second refers to the intentional objectivities transcendentally appearing with respect to the just mentioned stream. This is the sense of "being given to consciousness," of "consciousness' being aware of what appears to it," or of "consciously appearing within the sphere of the transcendent phenomena." See also the last part of §2.5 below and Chap. 4 note 8.

<sup>16</sup>See, e.g., Spiegelberg 1994, 82–3.



supposition that, out there, there is an ontologically independent, realistic world. Husserl now calls the stance from which we live such a transcendently naïve life the “natural attitude” (*natürliche Einstellung*).

[“Natural attitude” is that] in which everyday life as a whole as well as the positive sciences operate. In it <in the natural attitude> the world is for us the self-evidently existing universe of realities [*Realitäten*] which are continuously before us in unquestioned givenness [*Vorhandenheit*]. So this is the general field of our practical and theoretical activities. (*PTP*, 168/288)<sup>17</sup>

The natural attitude appears as the legitimacy-source of common-sense ontology, as the sum of beliefs that for a long period of time justified dualism and created the unbridgeable gap between consciousness and reality in itself.<sup>18</sup> An autonomously or absolutely self-existing “outer” world is supposed to affect (immediately or mediately) our perception and to become represented in our mind, to be given to the subject, to be contained in our consciousness, etc., in the maximum possible fidelity and referentiality. For the psychological and the empirical ego, which are definable within the context of the natural attitude, the world is already there as absolutely self-existent. From the natural attitude, the world with its beings<sup>19</sup> as a reality in itself, as ‘something’ realistically standing “out there,” is independent of the subjectivity to which it just becomes manifest, to which it just becomes known as a phenomenon (itself, however, remaining always something ‘more substantial’ than its phenomenal appearance).

This fundamental but also generally implicit universal presupposition of the ontological independence is thematized in §30 of the *Ideas* I, and is called “the general thesis” or “the general positing” (*Generalthesis*). The term “thesis” comes from the Greek infinitive *thetein* (θέτειν), meaning to place, situate, or posit something. As Husserl makes clear, the general positing, which defines the essence of the natural attitude, is not a propositionally articulated belief, but a universal

<sup>17</sup>See also *The Idea of Phenomenology*, 13/17; *Ideas* I, §§30–31, 39, 39, 62.

<sup>18</sup>The “natural attitude” (*natürliche Einstellung*) must not be confused with either the “naturalistic” (*naturalistisch*) or the “physicalistic” (*physikalisch*) attitude (as they appear, e.g., in the *Ideas* II). In Phenomenology, the naturalistic attitude simply means taking into account only pre-scientific, a-personal or a-spiritual nature (inanimate extended matter in time, and animate beings). Generally, it may also mean to accept as existent only the objects of the natural sciences. The physicalistic attitude is the attitude from which the ontology accepted by Physics, in particular, is recognized as the sole ontological ground. The problem in this latter case is not how the two separate ontological spheres, *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, are bridged, but how we should treat intentional phenomena on the basis of physicalistic terms (e.g., reductively, eliminatively, etc.). Normally, the “natural attitude” should not be confused with what is ‘natural’ from the *phenomenological* attitude (psychological or transcendental)—there are cases, however, in which Husserl’s ‘official’ use of the term may be confused with the latter use. Moreover, the naturalistic attitude may not only be a methodological or metaphysical stance within the natural attitude, but also a methodological (not a metaphysical) stance within the phenomenological attitude (psychological or transcendental). Even though the same can be applied to the physicalistic attitude, the latter standardly has the meaning of a metaphysical stance within the natural attitude.

<sup>19</sup>On the references here to a “world,” and not merely to beings or to their sum, see note 42 below.

form of sense-giving (*Sinngebung*) in our intentional relatedness with the world. The general positing is the self-evident filter, as it were, through which we run our everyday lives and grasp the various epistemological and ontological problems regarding our relatedness to the world. In the end, the fact that the world appears to our consciousness is taken, by our natural attitude, as an additional and secondary event, which has no ontological but only epistemological significance.

Transcendental Phenomenology, then, raises the pretension of bringing to light all the concealed conditions for the possibility of the *existence* of a world *for us*. It demands to be in the position to describe the structure of its givenness (*Gegebenheit*), but also to clarify the meaning of its Being (*Seinssinn*).<sup>20</sup> For the philosophy under discussion, these conditions of possibility are connected with the concealed intentional *accomplishments* (*Leistungen*) of the life of transcendental consciousness. Under certain conditions,<sup>21</sup> the examination of the structure of givenness shows that the meaning and validity of the Being of the world with its beings (in sensory experience, in praxis, in theory, and in the evaluative stances of all kinds) are the result of the intentional, *constituting functions* of consciousness' transcendental life. Transcendental Phenomenology's solution to the problem of ontological transcendence is bold and simple. It in fact discovers that *there is no such problem at all!* The distinction between a psychic sphere of living experiences, of intentional interpretations and of appearances, on the one hand, and of an ontologically independent "external" reality in itself, on the other hand, was nothing but an interpretative prejudice of the ontology that permeates the natural attitude. It is only from the point of view of that latter attitude that such a problem arises.

According to the new point of view established with the passing to the Transcendental Phenomenology, the very world and its beings in their fullest actuality are nothing but the ontological, *intentional correlate* (*Korrelat*) of a corresponding intentional comportment, within which everything gets constituted according to its whatever Being.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup>By the terms "Being" and "meaning of Being" I do not mean to usurp any Heideggerian thematic and inelegantly transplant it into the Husserlian corpus. Husserl himself uses the terms many times (especially in the *Ideas I*) and he generally means by them, respectively, that "something is" (that it is a being) and "what we mean when we say that something is." The capital letter in "Being" just shows here that we should not read it as the infinitive of the copulative "is," but as the infinitive of the so-called existential "is" (but still in a neutral way that has not yet decided in favour of either metaphysical realism or before-handness or presence-at-handness in the Heideggerian sense, respectively, of *Zuhandenheit* and *Vorhandenheit*—nor, for that matter, of any other sense). The psychological-phenomenological and the transcendental-phenomenological meanings of Being will be further clarified in what follows.

<sup>21</sup>See also the following sections, especially §2.4.

<sup>22</sup>This, however, as Husserl self-consciously remarks, does not mean a Berkeleian idealism; reality is not reduced to an idea of the psychic sphere (*Ideas I*, 129ff./120ff., 241–2/230). Husserl also calls Berkeley's idealism "subjective idealism," "psychological idealism," "psychomonism," (*Ideas III*, 63/74) and even "immanent idealism" (*immanenter Idealismus*) (*Crisis*, 231/234; *CM*, §40–41). We will see below what kind of idealism it is.

Of essential necessity (in the Apriori of the unconditioned eidetic universality) to every 'truly existing' being [*wahrhaft seienden*] there corresponds the idea of a possible consciousness in which the object itself is [constituted or, accordingly,] seized upon originally and therefore in a perfectly adequate way. Conversely, if this possibility is guaranteed, then eo ipso the being truly exists [*ist < . . . > wahrhaft seiend*]. (*Ideas* I, 341/329)

From now on, between transcendently understood phenomena and actuality itself (not "in-itself" any more) there is no chasm. The world, together with all its ontological categories and all its modes, according to which it is given to us as existent on the level of the phenomena, is the intentional correlate of this or that conscious actness or actionality (but not necessarily activeness), the at-each-time full *noema* (*Noema*) of a *noesis* (*Noesis*) which constitutes it accordingly.<sup>23</sup>

It is in this sense that, from within the new attitude, Husserl thinks that he also solves the problem of (traditional) ontological transcendence, thus upgrading Phenomenology from the level of an Intentional (to be sure) Psychology to that of a Transcendental Ontology, as a complete Ontology of everything. Phenomenology now is meant to speak not just about the world and its beings as appearances, but also about them as complete beings (in a sense to be further specified in the following).

In order to be consistent, though, Husserl had to make clear the *method* he had followed in order to arrive at the attitude from which these problems were solved (or rather dissolved). If he wasn't to make his method clear, then all the propositions of Phenomenology would be simply devaluated as—one more—purely speculative system of thought.

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<sup>23</sup>In Husserl scholarship, and especially in the so-called "Fregean" or "West-Coast Interpretation," it is a typical mistake to equate *Sinn* with *Noema*. Husserl constantly uses the terminological expression "*noematischer Sinn*" together, of course, with the corresponding "*noetischer Sinn*." This distinction and these expressions make it necessary (not only terminologically but also substantially, as will become evident) to keep *Sinn* apart from *Noema* (and *Noesis*). More specifically, *Sinn* should be understood as the system of the specifications regulating the constitution of an intentional object or state of affairs (*Sachverhalt*)—more generally: of an objectivity (*Objektivität* or *Gegenständlichkeit*). On the one hand, these specifications are first set in our empty aimings (at the limit, already in perception; but most clearly in signitive intentions connected with our thinking or talking about an objectivity). On the other hand, these specifications are at work on the side of intuitional givenness, when the objectivity happens to be capable of being given or it is actually being given in intuition. In such a case, what was at first only emptily intended in a *Noesis* now intuitionally appears as a *Noema*. The empty prescriptions (*Sinn*) that were first set in the empty *Noesis* have now taken within themselves their 'material,' which proved capable of being structured (constituted) according to these prescriptions, and indeed appears as a whole (prescriptions and 'material') in fullness as the correlate *Noema*. See also below, and Chaps. 4 and 5.

## 2.3 Psychological-Phenomenological and Transcendental-Phenomenological Reduction

We said that in the *Logical Investigations* Husserl merely circumvented the problem of the relation between the phenomena manifesting themselves in the psychic sphere with that which—from the natural attitude—is understood as self-subsistent reality. This move was made possible by means of a methodological move that Husserl himself subsequently called “psychological-phenomenological reduction.” This methodological move, which was already regulating the analyses of the *LI* without, however, any explicit mention of it in that work,<sup>24</sup> releases or leaves outside-the-game what, from the natural attitude, was presumed as realistic within or behind the appearing phenomena. The analyses, there, put into brackets the very (realistically understood) actuality—as it is made intelligible from the point of view of the natural attitude and its general positing—without touching upon it. This reduction offers us the possibility of *abstaining from the issue regarding the realistic existence or not* of the appearing thing and of restraining ourselves methodologically to whatever appears as a phenomenon. The happening of the appearing, i.e., the ‘shining forth’ of that which appears in what it is, the intentional recognition of a thing in consciousness, can thus be treated within the limits of the psychological sphere<sup>25</sup> as the sphere of intentional acts and their transcendently appearing intentional objects (as appearances). In this—still epistemologically—orientated Phenomenology, the legitimate propositions are articulated only with reference to whatever is intentionally (i.e., in the manner of intentionally appearing) ‘included’ in this sphere.

The psychological-phenomenological reduction, that is, methodologically transfers the phenomenologist from the realistically understood (in the natural attitude), intentionally appearing, transcendent thing to its intentional-psychological phenomenon or, rather, to it as *only* intentionally appearing phenomenon. In this sense, this move opens up the region of the intentional-psychologically pure consciousness and of the ‘therein’ appearing transcendent phenomena. It discloses the purely intentional-psychological field of (intentional) experiences and their transcendent intentional phenomena (purely and simply). Put otherwise, it high-

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<sup>24</sup>At the time of the *Crisis* (1936) and in a section dedicated to the “difficulties of the psychic ‘abstraction,’” Husserl retrospectively recognizes that, even though in his *Logical Investigations* he “was already pulled into the epoché, so to speak, [...] it was not until four years after concluding [that work, the *LI*, i.e., in 1905] [...] that I arrived at an explicit but even then imperfect self-consciousness of its method” (*Crisis*, 243/246). Husserl was progressively becoming more and more self-conscious with regard to the non-linear way in which his thought was maturing: “For me, the passing from the first articulation of important theories to their complete intelligibility is always a great step. It takes a lot of time before the various thought-itineraries become friends with one another” (Ingarden 1968, 151; transl. mine). This non-linearity in the development of Husserl’s thought creates, of course, a host of problems in our understanding of his philosophy. Nevertheless, we must always take it into consideration.

<sup>25</sup>See note 15 above, and the last part of §2.5 below.

lights the field of the intentional, *psychologically* pure acts and their intentionally appearing intentional objectivities. The mathesis that is thereby inaugurated is called “Phenomenological Psychology” (in the *LI: Eidetic-Descriptive Phenomenological Psychology*).<sup>26</sup>

However, even if Phenomenological Psychology demarcated a new region of problems that had to be further analyzed, it remained *transcendentally naïve*. Its interests are restricted to the unity of the intentional acts, to the unity of the appearing objectivities and of their parts, and to their intentional relatedness (later: “correlation”). The transcendental naiveté of Phenomenological Psychology consists in this: whereas it focuses on the intentionally appearing and its constitution, it essentially keeps silently presupposing other realities, e.g., the supposed self-subsistent reality behind the perceptually appearing objects. Whatever appears in the sphere of the psychologically pure experiences was still considered simply as phenomenon of *another* realistic being, with reference to which the phenomenological psychologist merely *suppresses* his thoughts and their possible expression. This methodological self-restriction to the phenomena in the sphere of the (intentionally) purely psychic does not solve the problem of the transcendence to the very realistic—whatever this might be—but only demands that the phenomenologist *remains mute* with regard to it. The latter places the supposed independent reality in brackets, in the sense that it does away with the obligation to form and to express any thought or judgment about it. From this point of view, then, Phenomenological Psychology still moves *within* the bounds of the *positivity* that characterizes the natural attitude.

There is at least one additional problem. Phenomenological Psychology, to be sure, abolishes the analysis of the cognitive states (broadly speaking) in terms of a mere having of sensory contents. It establishes the basic conditions for a Gestalt Psychology<sup>27</sup> and confronts all intentional acts in terms of *interpretation* and *evident* appearing. Despite the fact that it transforms traditional epistemology, though, Phenomenological or Pure Psychology cannot express itself substantially on the issue of the relation between the appearing and the (supposed) realistic reality somehow ‘supporting’ or ‘underpinning’ this appearing of the phenomena. The psychological-phenomenological reduction leads Phenomenology to the intentional-psychic field of experiences, to the psychic ego and its psychologically-phenomenologically meant intentional appearances (in the sense of intentional “immanence”).<sup>28</sup> From the psychological-phenomenological point of view, the appearance of the beings as phenomena happens, of course, above and beyond

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<sup>26</sup>See also below §2.7 and Chap. 3, §3.4.1 note 16.

<sup>27</sup>It is Ehrenfels (1859–1932), also a student of Brentano's, who is considered the pioneer of this Psychology. Nevertheless, Spiegelberg considers it as a case of simultaneous discovery (Spiegelberg 1994, 133). Husserl, for his part, claims exclusive priority in the discovery of the basic notions of Gestalt Psychology (*LI*, 480/282). Heidegger too accredits this discovery to Husserl (*PHCT*, 66).

<sup>28</sup>See above note 15, the last part of §2.5 below, and §4.7.2 note 29.

the stream of living experiences. These experiences, however, are still defined with implicit reference to (and dependence on) an ultimately substantial body, in some psycho-physical connection with it. Husserl recognizes this with clarity in a retrospective, indirect, and self-critical reconstruction dating from 1927.

Even Pure Psychology in the phenomenological sense, thematically delimited by the psychological-phenomenological reduction, still is and always will be a positive science: it has the world as its pre-given ground [*Boden*].<sup>29</sup> The pure psyches and communities of psyches [that it treats] are psyches that belong to bodies-in-nature that are presupposed but also simply left out of consideration. Like every positive science, this Pure [Phenomenological-] Psychology is itself transcendently problematic. (*PTP*, 96/248–9); trnsl. sl. md.)

In sum, even though the traditional problem regarding the relation between the intentionally psychic is set aside and left unthematized, the physical-realistic still retains a latent overall legitimacy.

What Husserl realizes in *The Idea* (1907) and systematizes in the *Ideas I* (1913) is that there might be also an ‘ontological’ dependence of the world on the consciousness that experiences it. Furthermore, this dependence is now recognized as a problem falling within the jurisdiction of general phenomenological problematics. It is recognized that the world does not only *appear* to consciousness, but it also *is*, what it fully is, *for* a consciousness and *thanks* to a consciousness. This time, moreover, talk of consciousness changes, and Husserl begins to refer to a *transcendental* consciousness.<sup>30</sup> These latter transcendental phenomenological findings are made possible in the attitude that is opened up by the transcendental-phenomenological reduction.

In Phenomenological Psychology, whatever concerned the realistically existent within or behind the phenomenon<sup>31</sup> was—at least at first—naively relegated to the natural sciences and, especially, to Physics. Now, however, it becomes clear that

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<sup>29</sup>Initially the text read: “[...] as ground that is understood in realistic positivity or as realistically posited [*Boden der realen Positivität*]” (*Hua IX*, 596). According to Husserl, the science of Phenomenological or Pure or Rational Psychology is, in some way, a relatively easily accessible mathesis, which can function as a propaedeutic step toward the heights of the philosophical—or, perhaps, scientifically-philosophical—Transcendental Phenomenology. Phenomenological Psychology, however, is a science, and since like all the other sciences, it is built and developed on the basis of the ontological prejudices of the natural attitude, it is a *positive* mathesis that remains in need of transcendental clarification and grounding, as regards the meaning and the truth of its propositions. See also what follows here.

<sup>30</sup>With the move of the transcendental reduction, a doubling of the ego seems to arise. On the one side, we speak about a psychological ego. On the other side, a transcendental ego is now introduced. Husserl, however, immediately remarks that this is only a seeming doubling. Without entering here into the specific issues of the Husserlian egology (in the original eidetic phenomenological-psychological *LI*, Husserl does not even acknowledge something like an ego), it suffices at present to say that the psychological ego is the ego as seen from the point of view of the psychological reduction, whereas the transcendental ego is the ego as seen from the point of view of the transcendental reduction. See also §2.7 below.

<sup>31</sup>In Husserl’s descriptions of the natural attitude, there is no clear distinction between a general thesis positing the known *empirical reality* as independently existing (self-subsisting) and another positing some unknown *metaphysical reality* as existing in itself. *Both* may be meant in Husserl’s

these sciences too want to control a truth that is possible only on the basis of a very specific cognitive attitude, the natural-scientific one, the meaning and the presuppositions of which have not yet been clarified. This means that these sciences themselves, instead of being allowed to unquestionably raise the pretension to found all other knowledge, appear to be critically exposed to the need for a clarification of the conditions for their own possibility. On pain of *transcendental circularity*, as Husserl claims,<sup>32</sup> the natural sciences can no longer be blindly and uninterpellatedly trusted to offer the ultimate foundation for what is, and for what we know.

Given, though, that even the supposedly ultimate authority of the supposedly realistic has now been eclipsed, we realize that there is a need for a *da capo* examination of the problem regarding the real, and of transcendence in general. As already raised in the *Ideas I*, Husserl suggests that this problem applies only to the context of a very specific stance, i.e., to the natural attitude, and its general thesis or positing. Thus, in order to look at the problem anew, we have to convert our attitude into something new, in order to lift the impasses and paradoxes to which the general positing regulating the natural attitude leads us.

The whole pre-discovered world posited in the natural attitude, actually found in experience and taken with perfect "freedom from theories" as it is actually experienced, as it clearly shows itself in the concatenations of experience, is now without validity for us; without being tested and also without being contested, it shall be parenthesized. In like manner all theories and sciences which relate to this world, no matter how well they may be grounded positivistically or otherwise, shall meet the same fate. (*Ideas I*, 62/66)

The Phenomenological Psychology of the *LI* shows that the *appearing* of the world is the result of an internally cohering unity of living experiences, intentionally associated among themselves in various ways. Now, in the *Ideas I*, it is realized that the idea about another, self-subsistent reality, an actuality that is understood realistically, is a radically unprovable prejudice of the natural attitude. Phenomenology's motto "*zu den Sachen selbst!*" ought to be re-adjusted to the new findings, to become more radical. Phenomenology must continue to remain focused on whatever is intuitionally given beyond any speculation, without, however, limiting itself to just the structure of the phenomena and without accepting phenomenologically unfounded prejudices.

The discovery of the general positing that accompanies the natural attitude and its annihilation by the transcendental-phenomenological reduction allows exactly for the meeting of all these requirements.

No longer is only the dependence of the *appearance* of the world on an internally coherent context of conscious living experiences considered unquestionable. Its *ontological* dependence on the structure of intentional living experiences is now

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treatment of the ontology of the natural attitude. It seems to me, though, that the second alternative makes better sense and is better justified as a problem. For more, see note 36 below.

<sup>32</sup>See *PTP*, 129ff/274ff, 170ff/290ff.



proved equally unquestionable.<sup>33</sup> Every phenomenological unity, which from the point of view of the psychological ego just *appears*, is now also actually discovered as *being* (in this or that way) due to the immanent syntheses or intentionally constituting acts of a transcendental ego. Whatever was previously reluctantly recognized as just a phenomenon of some realistically posited dimension now gets upgraded into the full-fledged—and only thusly being—being: it is self-given in its entire actuality, though disentangled this time from any additional positing (as subsisting in itself). From Transcendental Phenomenology's point of view, no other reality in itself can be legitimately posited beyond this transcendently constituted being.

The chasm between psychologically meant phenomenon and realistically interpreted being is no longer just overlooked or methodologically circumvented; it is directly abolished—without losing anything crucial at all.

[From that epistemological point of view, then,] nothing is lost when [realistic] existence is put between brackets. But from an ontological standpoint, there is indeed a loss of extra-mental reality. [...] [With the transcendental reduction, however,] only a certain interpretation is disconnected [i.e., the one owed to the general positing and dictated by the natural attitude]. Nothing is really lost. Insight into the relative mode of being of the thing *eo ipso* means an awareness of the absoluteness of [transcendental] consciousness. (De Boer 1978, 430)<sup>34</sup>

After the transcendental reduction, every intentional objectivity appears in what it is as a *noema* (*Noema*), i.e., as a transcendent intentional *correlate constituted* in a corresponding *noesis* (*Noesis*) of transcendental consciousness.<sup>35</sup> If the totality of scientific knowledge that is produced in the positivity of the natural attitude is put between brackets, and if the same is done with the general positing that regulates the natural attitude as a whole, then nothing in itself can be sought, behind or within<sup>36</sup> the supposedly 'mere' phenomena. Whatever is given in the one or the

<sup>33</sup>See also below, with regard to the role of the so-called "world-annihilation experiment" (§2.4). See also note 42.

<sup>34</sup>See Fink's equally clear statement that "the transcendental 'noema' is the world itself [...] this being itself" (1970, 124), i.e., the actual world with its beings in their actuality understood as intentional correlate of transcendental consciousness.

<sup>35</sup>Cf. also Diemer 1965, 21ff., 84ff., where, on the one hand, the transcendental reduction comes close to the idea found in De Boer's passage just above, whereas the analyses concerning the Noema present it as the residue of what was here described as psychological-phenomenological reduction. The bracketing of a realistic *being* (or of the realistic 'substratum' of a being) must be kept clearly apart from the realistic *interpretation* of a being. For Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology, it is only the latter that may also lead to posit something like the former.

<sup>36</sup>In the psychological reduction, metaphysical reality can just stay in *suspension*, waiting, as it were, for the possibility of a kind of scientific-realist theoretical insight or theoretical-hypothetical interpretation of its constitution. In the transcendental reduction, metaphysical reality as well as empirical reality is definitely deprived of the meaning "existing in itself;" an ontological meaning like this is no longer legitimate. There is no sense of speaking about a metaphysical reality in itself, and an empirical reality is intentionally constituted in its complete being. There could, however, be some kind of higher-order theoretical hypothesis positing some 'metaphysically



other degree of evidence and with the intuitionality appertaining to this or that intentional comportment or act, i.e., whatever is given in a noesis-noema intentional correlation (*Korrelation*), is fully *actual*. Actuality is a 'category' appertaining to the in-person or 'bodily' (*leibhaftig*) givenness of a transcendent correlate—with the pre-predicative givenness of the things in simple sensory experience being most primordial. Realistic actuality or simply reality, on the other hand, is a 'category' owed to the general positing of the natural attitude, and is a side-effect of the way in which natural- or nature-things are given.<sup>37</sup> What is apprehended as phenomenologically transcendent is also considered as ontologically independent—or if not that (because of its subjective 'phenomenality'), then something in it or behind it, an unknown substratum, is thusly conceived and projected. Characteristic, at least of Husserl's intentions on how to deal with the issue under discussion, is the following passage from the manuscript B IV 6 (1908).

[I]t would not be acceptable for someone to say "there is only absolute [i.e., transcendental] consciousness" as if he or she wanted to say "every other being [Sein] is just something that merely appears [*nur ein scheinbares*], an unreal semblance [*unwirklicher Schein*], a fiction." This would, of course, have been *fundamentally false*. The nature-objects [in simple perception] are self-evidently true objects; their Being [*Sein*] is true Being; nature is actuality [*Wirklichkeit*] in the genuine and full sense [of the term]. It is fundamentally false to ascribe to this Being a measure different than that which this category demands and, thus, to somehow discredit it [i.e., nature], because it is "constituted" within [transcendental] consciousness; because it has its roots in [transcendental] consciousness. (*Hua XXXVI*, 70-1; transl. mine)

Later, in his *FTL* (1929), Husserl remarks:

The true is now the *actually existent* [*wirklich Seiende*] or the *truly existent* [*wahrhaft Seiende*], as the correlate of the evidence that gives something in its very self [*Korrelat des selbstgebenden Evidenz*]. Naturally, the actual [*das Wirkliche*] in the sense of the *real* [or of the *realistic*] [*des Realen*] is merely a particular case [or interpretation] under this broadest [...] sense of actuality. (*FTL*, 127/133; transl. sl. md.)

The *ontological* Transcendental Phenomenology thus came to decisively complement the epistemologically oriented *LI* (and especially the 6<sup>th</sup> *LI*). Psychological-phenomenological epoché from the judgments regarding the existence or non-existence of the "external" world, under which the analyses of the *LI* are conducted, had to be abandoned, in order for Phenomenology to attain the undertaking of its responsibilities vis-à-vis all kinds of Being and all kinds of beings. Hence, what one

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real' dimension in order to explain the appearances (phenomena). To the extent that such an explanation is successful, it might be said that there is also a higher-order experience with some kind and degree of evidence (even a mediate one) that this is how things 'at bottom' are. This theoretically posited and theoretically experienced reality, however, should now also be understood as being transcendently constituted as an interpretation of what appears as experiential being. On this issue, which lies at the frontiers of the debate between scientific realism and constructive empiricism, see also Chap. 10 and Theodorou 2010b, 2012b.

<sup>37</sup>On the problem and meaning of the constitution of the nature-thing or natural thing (*Naturding*) in transcendental consciousness, see Chap. 5.

reads in the *Ideas* I is a reply with regard to the transcendental conditions that make possible, for the first time, something (this or that) to *be*, i.e., the conditions securing that there *is* something (rather than nothing). Only at this point does Phenomenology become the universal Ontology that Husserl explicitly required it to be.

## 2.4 With Regard to the “World-Annihilation Experiment”

By the year 1936, Husserl had become fully aware of the general criticism that with the transcendental reduction “we are losing the world,” that the phenomenological residuum of the transcendental reduction is nil (sheer nothing).<sup>38</sup> If this were true, it would, of course, mean that at the most systematic moment of his phenomenological philosophizing, Husserl had abandoned or at least overlooked and forgotten the very fundament of his thought, i.e., the very inaugural idea of phenomenological *intentionality*.

In order to appreciate this point more clearly, an additional word must be added at this point with regard to Husserl’s transcendental turn. Admittedly, the situation described in the previous section already presents great complexity. We cannot, however, avoid a necessary supplement. Husserl’s turn to transcendental phenomenologizing, from 1905 to 1907 up to its systematic published presentation in 1913, does not only introduce the method of transcendental *reduction*. It also signals another major change. Instead of the *eidetic* intentional constitution of the original *LI*, transcendental intentional *constitution* now takes the lead. This change will be further clarified in §2.7, and particularly in §2.7.2. This much, nonetheless, can be told in advance. In the *LI*, intentional constitution means the mechanism according to which “some supra-psychic *eidos* gets instantiated in the psychic acts and lets us experience the corresponding particular objects.” Transcendental intentional constitution, though, means rule-guided syntheses of hyletic data. In accordance with what we saw earlier, both intentional constitutions of corresponding transcendent objectities have the character of *interpretation*: the first of the *reell* sensory contents of consciousness, the second of the equally *reell* hyletic data or, simply, hyle (*Hyle*, ὕλη).

In §49 of the *Ideas* I, Husserl explains his analyses regarding the meaning of the transcendental reduction by appeal to the philosophical thought-experiment that attempts the so-called “world-annihilation experiment” (*Versuch der Weltvernichtung*)—a philosophical thought experiment to be sure. There, he claims that with this experiment it is shown that even if transcendental intentional constitution (e.g., that of the perceptual world and its beings) fails, we can still say that, in a sense,

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<sup>38</sup>See, e.g., *Crisis*, 154–5/157–8; also *Hua* VIII, 164.

transcendental consciousness 'exists.' In this sense, Husserl proclaims the *absolute* existence or Being of consciousness, in comparison with the *dependent* existence or Being of the world and its beings.<sup>39</sup>

In this way, however, the false impression may be created that the aim of transcendental reduction is the successful carrying out of that world-annihilation experiment, so that, after it, we remain with the absolute transcendental consciousness. Nevertheless, the world-annihilation experiment *is not* the transcendental reduction. And the experiment's conclusion, that it is possible to imagine the annihilation of the world with transcendental consciousness remaining at the same time intact (hence, as absolute), does not describe the total result of transcendental reduction.

When Husserl claims that after the world-annihilation experiment, someone can say that absolute consciousness remains as residuum, what he means is that what remains is a field of immanent possibilities of time-syntheses, which, under certain conditions, could result in the constitution of intentional correlations in which we could find ourselves in the conscious givenness of corresponding, appearing, transcendent beings in their world. The dimension of that field of possibilities for intentional syntheses is also called "functioning intentionality" (*fungierende Intentionalität*) or functioning consciousness,<sup>40</sup> a field of time-syntheses where the hyletic data contained in the stream of living experiences get synthesized in rule-governed ways that let us experience transcendentally appearing intentional objects. As we know, for Husserl, these syntheses are at bottom anonymous, passive, and pre-predicative. Upon them, actively thematizing, predicative, idealizing, etc., syntheses are founded. Within its possible excessiveness, the world-annihilation experiment wants only to bring to the surface the concealed (actual or potential) intentional accomplishments (*Leistungen*) that keep us *always* in the context of a conscious intentional correlation, in which we have always already somehow encountered beings in a world-horizon.

Transcendental reduction is the lifting of the general positing, i.e., the definite cessation of the absolutizing transcendent apprehension of the world (*absolutierende Weltapperzeption*), of the prejudice of the natural attitude according to which the "external" transcendent world (or a substratum of it) is also considered as absolute (absolutely or realistically existing). The transcendental re-interpretation of the status of the world opens us up to an experience in which the world is apprehended and given as constituted in intentional correlations. And the lifting of the general positing does not annihilate the world, but leaves us with the world 'inside' consciousness or, to put it strictly phenomenologically (avoiding traditional

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<sup>39</sup>This concept of "absoluteness," in Husserl, has an ontological rather than a mere epistemological sense; it is used in order to determine not that which contains certainties, but that whose existence does not depend on something else. On the persuasiveness of the world-annihilation experiment and on the absoluteness of transcendental consciousness, see also §2.7 in this chapter, and Chap. 10.

<sup>40</sup>See, e.g., *CM*, 48/85, 54/90, 64/99; *Crisis*, 112–3/114–6, 182ff/185ff.

terminology), with consciousness out there in the world.<sup>41</sup> The world-annihilation experiment is a helpful clarification; it plays the role of the ‘pathological’ case, which offers us the possibility of seeing, for the first time, the unexamined presuppositions of the normal case. The idea is that, if transcendental consciousness was malfunctioning, no world with objects would appear, but instead only partial fragments of unavailable appropriate wholes, or even nothing at all. Hence, the effectual appearing actual beings in the actual world are the achievement of the intentionally, harmoniously synthesizing, transcendental consciousness.

In Transcendental Phenomenology, instead of aiming at the annihilation of the world or at our withdrawal and encaging of ourselves within a self-enclosed sphere (a traditionally immanent consciousness), what is attempted is the persuasive entrenchment of the possibility of intentional transcendence. It is now shown that, in the end, intentionality concerns, constitutes, and controls the whole actual world in its Being and with its beings. With the transcendental turn, Husserl, instead of remaining caught in the happening of the appearing of the world and its beings as enjoying the status of unexamined ‘reality,’ shows a way of re-claiming and regaining the world and its beings in their *ontological completeness*.<sup>42</sup> With the help of the world-annihilation experiment, the transcendental reduction, instead of being a stepping back toward the intentional immanence of the constituting functions, is proved to be a ‘marching’ ahead toward the world and its beings in a full-fledged ontological ‘robustness,’ by means of an enhancement of the meaning of intentionality. Ricoeur, for instance, has a similarly positive view of the world-annihilation experiment.

The possibility that the world does not exist is not the possibility that perception is a dream, or a picture, but that the variety of adumbrations does not come to a unity at all and is radically discordant. It is the harmony of the adumbrations of things that is contingent. This is absolutely new in relation to Descartes and does not contradict the principle of intentionality, since what would be discordant is a series of intentionalities. (Ricoeur 1996, 103)

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<sup>41</sup>On this, see note 15 above here (transcribing the relevant points into the present transcendental milieu); also here, §2.6.

<sup>42</sup>“I must lose the world by epoché, in order to regain it by a universal self-examination.” (CM, 157/183). Especially with the notion of the *world*, an important point showing that Husserl had a good understanding of it qua horizon of givenness of beings that inhabit it, according to its form or essence (worldliness), is *Ideas* I, §§27–30. There, Husserl describes the phenomenology of the givenness of the world in the natural attitude. However, since the reduction basically transforms the meaning of Being of the world and of what is given in it, without annihilating or losing it itself in any worrying sense, what is said there holds—*mutatis mutandis*—equally well for the reduced world. Fink especially has particularly emphasized not just the equiprimordiality of the (regional and specific) forms of beings and the world-form, but—probably under the influence of Heidegger—the absolute priority of the world-form as something ‘co-extensive’ with the constituting possibilities of the absolute transcendental consciousness. See Fink [1970], 140–1, 110–1, 135ff., and especially 137–8. See also Chap. 3, note 33.

This ascertains that transcendental reduction does not lead us to nil, to the empty nothing. On the contrary, as we saw above, it leads us to the world and its beings, qua transcendental phenomenon and, moreover, as an actuality that has been freed from the absolutizing apprehension imposed by the natural attitude. That the world-annihilation experiment does not contradict the principle of intentionality means that transcendental subjectivity does not in any way lose its intentional relatedness with the world itself (*not* “in itself”).

Transcendental Phenomenology is not a speculative theory that is built under the condition of the absolute zero, which the possible absence of the world would amount to. Its claims and its arguments do not presuppose our transference to an empty immanent ‘space’ from which the world itself would be totally absent, just because, as someone may think, it (the world) would contaminate the purity of absolute consciousness with factic contingencies. The only thing that Husserl demands is to be able to intuitionally, i.e., phenomenologically and not merely discursively-speculatively, show that the world and its beings, qua unitary phenomena, are indeed unities appearing in their actuality to our experience, within which our theoretical and praxial comportments are developed. They appear and *are* there for us in their actuality and with whatever givenness because, at bottom, the adumbrations of the things get unified in concordant unities, on the basis of the functioning intentional syntheses.<sup>43</sup> This means that, at bottom, the harmonic unification of adumbrations and things—or, more generally, of partial contents in the concordances of the corresponding appearing wholes—is something that *may* or may *not* happen. Consciousness, however, as the possibility of all this, does not depend on what appears in such a way as actual intentional correlate.

This is exactly the point which the world-annihilation experiment brings to our attention. Indeed, Husserl shows by it that the fact that there is world and beings in it is the result of intentional constitutions. If the functioning consciousness were not achieving harmonic, unitary syntheses, then we would not experience anything; nothing could appear and be there for us. Hence, when the transcendental issue is posed in such terms, i.e., in terms regarding the relative priority of consciousness or of ‘Being,’ it becomes—in a phenomenological, non-speculative way—totally clear that consciousness precedes ‘Being’ or, in order to be more faithful to the meaning of the world-annihilation experiment, consciousness and ‘Being’ are *equiprimordial*. Even in its non-harmonious and phenomenologically unsuccessful intentional functionings, consciousness passively and anonymously strives and struggles, as it were, for meaningfulness and truthfulness, for intelligible and appearing correlates, i.e., for beings in a world.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>43</sup>On these processes, see Chaps. 4 and 5.

<sup>44</sup>On this, see also Chap. 4 and Theodorou 2010b.

## 2.5 Transcendental Reduction as Widening and as Radicalization of the Psychological Reduction

In the *Ideas I*, the first systematic exposition of Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl had not yet made explicit the distinction between the psychological and transcendental reduction. In actual fact, he used similar and sometimes identical expressions in order to refer to methodological moves and functions belonging to either of the two. This rendered extremely difficult any possible attempt to coherently understand the phenomenological method and point of view. Even during the early and mid-1920s, Husserl did not have a fully crystalized way of presenting the distinction between the psychological and the transcendental phenomenological reduction. In one way or another and to one degree or another, he was continually tormented by unclarities and ambivalences. The situation seems to become clearer only during the final years of that decade.<sup>45</sup>

Both of the reductions under discussion here are “phenomenological.” Both contain the first step of a phenomenological epoché. Both contain the move of putting something out of play. Both deactivate or interrupt (*ausschalten*) something, etc. However, these moves have different meanings, different scopes, different presuppositions, a different range, etc. An example of how problematic it remained—even for the Husserl of the late 1920s—to express the subtle but serious difference between the psychological and the transcendental reduction, is to be found in the public “*Amsterdam Vorträge*,” a text written as late as 1928.<sup>46</sup>

The phenomenological-psychological reduction is for him [for the phenomenological psychologist] a method of limiting the real psychic [*das real Seelische*] and, above all, the intentional life to its proper essence [*Eigenwesentliches*], by putting out of play [*Außer-spiel-setzen*] or leaving out of account [*Außer-Rechnung-stellen*] the transcendent positings at work in this life. (*PTP*, 246/340); trnsl. md.)

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<sup>45</sup>More specifically, in the publications of the *Ideas I*, which appeared when Husserl was still alive, the distinction between the two reductions under discussion wasn't explicit. Only in the 1925 and 1929 *marginalia* on his personal copies of that work does Husserl seem to come closer to a clearer distinction of the one “phenomenological” reduction into a phenomenological-psychological and a phenomenological transcendental reduction. Biemel's *Husserliana* publication of Husserl's *Ideas I* (*Hua III*) incorporated some of these *marginalia* in a rather unsuccessful and confusing way. It was Schuhmann's *Husserliana* re-publication of the original *Ideas I* (*Hua III.1*), together with a separate volume containing Husserl's *marginalia* and supplemental manuscripts (*Hua III.2*), that prepared the ground for a better re-interpretation of “the” phenomenological reduction. In addition, the texts that are immediately or mediately related with the notorious “*Britannica Article*” project make this complicated issue much clearer (see what follows). For the restoration of the complete picture on the issue discussed here, the reader should, nonetheless, be patient until the closing of §2.7 of the present chapter.

<sup>46</sup>This can be also seen in the strictly relevant research manuscripts from that period, now contained in *Hua XXXIV*, 3–5, 110ff, 119–20, but also from later ones, *ibid.*, 132ff, 148ff, 394ff.

One page later, attempting once again to define *transcendental* reduction, Husserl uses almost identical forms of expression.

The transcendental epoché, the radical putting-out-of-play [*radikale Außerspielsetzung*] of every activation whatsoever of the validity of the “[out]-there-being-world” [*daseiende Welt*] is accomplished through an act of will in such a way that it is “once and for all.” (PTP, 247/341; transl. md.)

In the second case, the process by which the “[out]-there-being-world” is left out of play is radical. In the first case it amounts to the interruption of every transcendent positing and the limitation of the psychic to its proper essence. In the second, we are not concerned with a simple interruption, but with the de-activation of the validity of an [out]-there-being-world, which leads us back to the roots of transcendental positing. This new ground deletion of the causes of the prejudice regarding a world that exists independently, ‘out there,’ brings about the definite abandonment of the specific (realistic) ontological interpretation of the appearing world.

From all the above until the present point, it becomes clear that transcendental reduction signals the *expansion* of Phenomenology's purview and the *radicalization* of its analyses. With the transcendental reduction, Phenomenology is transformed from Pure Psychology to Universal Ontology.<sup>47</sup> Instead of restricting itself to just the appearances of psychic acts and their objects, it expands its jurisdiction to the full actuality of the intentional correlates of all kinds and levels. Through the transcendental reduction, we also reach the depths of the structures of the time-fields of absolute consciousness that are responsible for the constitution of all the kinds of actual objectivities and objectivities.<sup>48</sup>

Reduction of the natural world to the absolute of consciousness [i.e., transcendental reduction] yields *factual* concatenations of consciousness' living experiences of every kind with distinctive ruled orders in which a *morphologically* [i.e., not necessarily, already exact-scientifically] *ordered* [actual] world in the sphere of empirical intuition becomes [even after and during this reduction] constituted [*sich konstituieren*] as their empirical [intentionally appearing] correlate. (*Ideas* I, 134/124)

The consciousness in which the world is constituted in this sense is the transcendently pure consciousness. Husserl calls this consciousness “absolute” since, instead of being dependent *on some being*, it is itself the ground upon

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<sup>47</sup>As Husserl had wanted his Phenomenology to be (see the fourth part of *Ideas* I).

<sup>48</sup>See also *EJ*, 49–50/48–9, where this double-duality of the transcendental reduction in particular is described on the basis of the discovery of the lifeworld: transcendental reduction leads, on the one hand, to the primordial, pre-predicatively given lifeworld and, on the other hand, to the constituting transcendental subjectivity. The same double-duality is described also in many other passages in the *Crisis*. Levinas nicely condenses the meaning of the transcendental reduction as follows: “[Transcendental] phenomenological reduction is a *purification of the concrete life* [*of intentional consciousness*] *from any naturalistic interpretation regarding its existence*, but also the awareness of the fact that the origination of Being is accomplished in the concrete life of [intentional] consciousness” (Levinas 1973, 93; transl. md.). Nowhere do we find something like an exclusive entrapment in a self-enclosed immanence that has lost its intentional relatedness to a world and its beings. For more on the latter, see §2.7 and Chap. 3.

which the totality of beings depends.<sup>49</sup> The expansion and the radicalization that transcendental reduction offers to the jurisdiction of Phenomenology are also accompanied by a simultaneous new sense-giving projected upon both the contents of the concepts “reality” and “consciousness.” *Transcendentally* pure consciousness is not identical with the *psychologically* pure consciousness, which still presupposes the ontology of the natural attitude. Transcendental consciousness is the field of the transcendental, intentional, synthesizing functions, within which the very ontological validity (*Geltung*) of the at-each-time appearing objectivity, belonging to this or that ontological region (*Region*) or constitution-level (*Konstitutionsstufe*) is, for the first time, established.

Transcendental Phenomenology undertakes the task of experiencing and putting into words the intentional noetic-noematic correlations of all sorts, in which the various objective unities of this or that kind of transcendence and Being are constituted. From now on, the term “world” may mean the thingly transcendence (the sensorially experienceable world) as well as the world of numbers, of the geometrical figures, but also any other region of beings with which we can find ourselves in an intentional relatedness in corresponding intentional acts. The beings of every region acquire their Being-meaning within the at-each-time proper horizon of co-givenness (region, world) disclosed in the corresponding experiences. In this way, every transcendently constituted region of beings entertains its own proper meaning of Being, which originates in transcendental subjectivity and appertains to the corresponding way of correlative givenness.

In Transcendental Phenomenology, the term “intentionality” now names the accomplishing correlations (*leistende Korrelationen*) in which beings of various types of Being are constituted and appear in corresponding intentional comportments. For example, intentionally living in a perceptual correlation means that we are already out in the world, that the *actual* beings of the known experiential world appear to us and *are* for us. The known things are given to us with their familiar ‘phenomenology’ (three-dimensionally, intuitable from this or that particular perspective, with colors, shapes, being close or afar, up or down, on our right or left, accessible if we move toward them, graspable, etc.). Analogous remarks hold for the beings that belong to other ontological regions and appear as such in the appropriate for them intentional acts. Moreover, no being can anymore be comprehended as standing beyond its truthful actuality. Truthfully appearing beings are, in each case, *as real as it can get*. Their very ‘substantiality,’ so to speak, is contained in their appearing and is constituted in transcendental consciousness.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>49</sup>On the problematic meaning of this, however, see also §2.7 below.

<sup>50</sup>See also Chaps. 4 and 5.



Nevertheless, in order to describe the intentional correlations discovered by the transcendental reduction, Husserl also uses a seemingly paradoxical phraseology. Instead of saying that consciousness is correlatively out there in the world 'meeting' with the very beings, he prefers the transcendently equivalent expression that the world is correlatively 'within' consciousness. This phrasing creates, of course, considerable difficulties, which are, however, not irresolvable. Since the absolutizing positing of the natural attitude has been lifted or stricken-through, experience, knowledge, praxis, valuation and their corresponding intentionally existing objectivities are now understood from the point of view of transcendental correlations. The expression "transcendental intentional correlation" does not mean an accidental engagement between a self-accessible consciousness and a mutely posited inaccessible reality in itself, resulting in the intentional opening up of the world and its beings qua psychologically-phenomenologically meant transcendent phenomena. Rather, it names the happening of the constitution and givenness of *actual* objectivities of all kinds of Being, in corresponding synthesizing functions of the "absolute" field of transcendental consciousness. On this basis, all Being is 'within' transcendental consciousness as a self-overcoming, self-extending, self-transcending field of constitution, resulting in the truthful appearance of intentional correlates in their whatever actuality.<sup>51</sup>

As has already been said, it is for this reason that Phenomenology achieves its upgrading from an Eidetic-Descriptive Psychology to a complete Universal Ontology. With the transcendental reduction, it reaches the field of possibilities that establish the intentional correlations and yield Being to the corresponding correlates of all kinds in their proper world-horizons. In this perspective, the world is no longer an existent in itself, which somehow makes its entrance in a camera-like self-enclosed consciousness, and nor is our access to it limited to just knowing the phenomenologically-psychologically meant—transcendent, to be sure—phenomena. Whatever the meaning and validity of the Being of these phenomena may be, it is also meaning and validity constituted in transcendental consciousness.

Husserl's Phenomenology thus undertakes the infinite task of describing the multifarious, inter-layered noeses-noemata correlations, i.e., of the world in its broadest sense; and both statically and also, eventually, genetically. Thus, we will be able to render intelligible to ourselves the specific sense and validity of every 'reality' and of all truth and knowledge that is to be evidently accepted about it.

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<sup>51</sup>With these, however, not everything has been yet explained. We will come to this issue, i.e., to the idea that transcendental consciousness is an absolute all-inclusive sphere of intentional time-syntheses in §2.7 below.

## 2.6 Further Refinement of the Transcendental Reduction and Its Residue

### 2.6.1 *Transcendental Reduction and Eidetic Reduction*

#### 2.6.1.1 A Preamble on Phenomenological Eidetics

After the examination of the problem of reduction and the elucidation of the fundamental traits of the psychological-phenomenological and the transcendental-phenomenological reductions, let's now turn for a while to a different problem. Even in the *Idea*, we basically come across three reductions: the psychological, the eidetic, and the transcendental. The first two are the methods that Husserl had already silently employed in his *LI* (1900–1901), where the psychological was implicitly and the eidetic almost explicitly present. From this point of view, even if in the *Idea* the term “reduction” shows up, whatever genuine turn occurs in that work is not related with either the psychological or the eidetic reduction. Of course, in the *Idea*, Husserl comes to a better retrospective understanding of the methods he had already set to work in the *LI*.<sup>52</sup> There, the new element is the transcendental reduction, but this is present only with imperfect clarity (as we will see later in the present subsection and in §2.7). This, however, means that the eidetic reduction, which leads us from the particulars to their species (εἶδη), is neither introduced there for the first time, and nor does its application amount, by itself, to either the psychological or the transcendental reduction.

The eidetic reduction brings us from the experience of particulars to the experience (intuition) of their universal essence. The process by which this happens is called “free imaginative variation” or simply “eidetic reduction.” In order to reach the intuition of an eidos or essence of a particular, we take an actual or imaginary particular specimen, we freely vary its aspects or characteristics or parts, and through this process we acquire, in parallel, the intuition of the species, the particular, or the essence that is valid for it. For example, and in order to take one of the simplest and least problematic cases, by varying the lengths of the sides of a triangle, as well as the magnitude of its angles, we come to grasp the eidos “triangle” in the sense of what is essential to any triangle. This is why we can also speak here about achieving an intuition of essences (*Wesensschau*). Of course, it is an open question whether there is something like the essence of everything, e.g., of consciousness, of perception, of space, of movement in space, of a whale or platypus, or of man and of other empirical particulars, like gold or the color red, etc., and whether our grasping of an essence is infallible, etc. It appears that there are various possibilities and restrictions with regard to all of these.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>52</sup>On this, see also De Boer (1978), 305ff.

<sup>53</sup>See, for instance, a condensed account in Theodorou 2012b, note 18. Cf. Sowa's—Fregean and Popperian or, more generally, empiricist-analytic, I would say—lemmata “Eidos” and “Eidetics and its methodology” (Sowa 2010a, 2011), where, e.g., the difference between the analysis of phe-

Before anything else, care must be taken with regard to the following. Although the Husserl of the *LI* sounded as if he considered the *eidos* as a Platonic Idea, he does not actually subscribe to such realism with regard to universals. Husserl is explicit that he does not hypostatize the species either metaphysically or psychologically (see second *LI*, §7). In addition, even though the terminological expression “free variation” as indicating the method for reaching the *eidos* or essence does not appear in the second *LI*, which is dedicated to the “Ideal Unity of the Species,” it actually appears repeatedly in the third *LI* (§§5, 23), which deals with the “Phenomenological Apriori.” In the third *LI*, Husserl shows the steps that lead us to the discovery of essential truths and safeguards the soundness of the talk about species. This means that the *LI* contain the first teaching concerning the method of eidetic reduction and eidetic seeing, based on the method of free variation. In his later writings, i.e., *Ideas I*, *FTL* and *EJ*, Husserl becomes aware of the complexity and limitations involved in that basic teaching.<sup>54</sup> Finally, *eidos* should not be understood according to the following confused suggestions. The *eidos* is not some representative member of its extension. The species is not some of its actual or potential specimens. The species of the triangle is not another triangle and the species “red” is not some shade of red. Hume’s empiricism falsely maintained the contrary. (This, after all, may also have been Socrates’ enigmatic point, when he asked “what is bravery?” and his interlocutors replied in vain by mentioning examples of brave men. Of course, Phenomenology, and especially Transcendental Phenomenology, does not espouse Plato’s or Aristotle’s solutions *tout court*.) The species “triangle” is not the fused sum of the actual and/or possible multifariously differentiated triangles, as Locke tried to show, simply because there cannot be any such thing. Nor is *eidos* the open collection of the diversified specimens that are

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nomena and the analysis of concepts, as well as the difference between the (accepted) contingency of *inductive generalization* and the (at least claimed) necessity of *essential universalization*, is not taken into consideration; a fact that creates considerable disorientation (in particular, e.g., 2011, 258–9). For more on the just mentioned difference, which has tantalized philosophy (the status of philosophical research and the possibility of philosophical knowledge) since at least the time of Ockham, see Chap. 3, §3.3. The introduction here of the difference under discussion is my way of approaching the problem that Heffernan (2013, 2014) and Hopkins (2007, 2014) have with the situation regarding the meaning, place, and function of essence or *eidos* in the context of Husserlian Phenomenology, as presented by Husserl interpreters such as Zahavi (2003), Sowa (2010b), and Beyer (2013). See also Hopkins 2011, where parts of the history of philosophy like Plato’s and Aristotle’s theories of universals and Husserl’s eidetic Phenomenology are examined together in a rather elucidatory way. Moreover, even though the distinction between meaning species and intuitional species (see, e.g., the Introduction to the second *LI*) is generally ignored, despite its great importance for understanding the method and aim of Husserl’s Phenomenology, will only be hinted at here. The analysis that follows focuses basically on the *intuitional eidos* or species. Its relevance and importance, however, shows up later in §8.8.1.

<sup>54</sup>See also the beginning of §2.4 and §2.7.2. In his later writings, Husserl also distinguishes between various kinds of evidence in the givenness or intuition of essences, as well as various kinds and levels of essences. There is also some disagreement with regard to the actuality and weightiness of the difference between essence (*Wesen*) and *eidos* (*Eidos*) or species (*Spezies*). For our purposes, the terms will be taken as equivalent.

empirically discoverable or that come imaginatively to the fore in the process of free variation. The issue is what we presuppose, in order to be able to even start collecting such specimens.

Let us press on a little more with our latter example. The phenomenologist or, more originally, the phenomenologically working geometer who wants to know, in eidetic intuition, what a triangle is, freely varies in his or her imagination given actual or imaginative specimens of triangles and constantly asks himself or herself whether the ever new variant of the original accidental specimen is still recognizable as a triangle or not. The condition that enables us to decide the matter is the *intuitional* eidos “triangle.” And, in eidetic variation, we in fact become intuitionally aware of the thusly discoverable limits of the horizon within which this condition ‘moves’ and—in appropriate cases, like the triangle, also—‘gets crystalized,’ as it were. The elements comprising what is thusly crystalized within the aforementioned limits are also what I should normally *emptily conceive of* when I think the concept “triangle” or when I talk about triangles, etc. Eidetic variation indeed creates a potentially limitless series of actually incompatible variational specimens (themselves belonging to subordinate species “isosceles,” “orthogonal,” “scalene,” etc.) as candidates recognizable by the superordinate eidos. Putting aside the difficulty that this infinite series of varying specimens could only at the limit be held in unity within some ‘eidetic’ intuition, it should not in any case be considered that the disjunctive unity of the members of this series is equal to the eidos. Only the *condition thanks to which* this disjunction can in principle be held in a sound unity is to be considered as the intuitional eidos. What is crucial for our grasping the eidos is the pinpointing of the ‘aspect’ or the ‘affinity’ from the point of view of which the series of incompatibles is recognized as relevant and unifiable in this series. And in the eidetic variation, we become intuitionally and explorably aware (even if in many cases in a ‘negative’ way) of the eidos as a complex criterion for deciding the relevance and unifiability of such otherwise incompatible variants. Husserl teaches that while the eidetic variation and its ‘negative’ exploration progress, we become aware not so much of the particulars comprising the series of the variational specimens (which may be open-ended), but of the *a priori* or, better, *necessary condition* on the basis of which these explored and potential members of the series are held together. Generally speaking, the ‘elements’ making up this condition are equal to the eidos as peculiar, intuitionally surveyable, identical and ideal unity. The latter is then the *point of view* from which all the specimens, empirically available and imaginatively constructible, are indeed recognizable as specimens belonging together in what they are.

In the transcendental phenomenological constitutive perspective, of course, the species have become the necessary, a priori presupposed *rules* of intentional synthesis. What in the Phenomenology of eidetic constitution was a particular belonging to an eidos (meaning-aiming or intuitional-fulfilling) is now what is noetically aimed at as such, by the noetic sense, in the empty intentional acts of thinking, and intuitionally recognized as such (by the noematic sense) in the corresponding noematic fulfilment.

### 2.6.1.2 Eidetic Reduction Must Be Carefully Distinguished from the Transcendental Reduction

Having said this, we now come to our narrower issue. We should not think, as Taminiaux (1989) does, that Husserl, unable to reach the realistic world with its appearing *particulars* and faced with the danger of being left with only the Heraclitian flow of the non-appearing *reell* sensory contents, abruptly introduces “the” (transcendental) phenomenological reduction and switches to Phenomenology as Eidetic Analysis in order to finally save the intentional appearance of at least *universal* objects (the species of the transcendentally appearing, particular objects and the species of the intentional acts).<sup>55</sup> For Taminiaux, after Husserl realized that the realistic transcendent world is unreachable, he presents to himself the task of explaining the fact that we have knowledge, that we cognize, i.e., that we intentionally experience objectivities that transcend the immanence of our consciousness with its mere *reell* contents (representations, impressions, sensations). And he supposedly does this by means of the methodology he now introduces, i.e., by “the” (transcendental) phenomenological reduction. Taminiaux thus suggests that this ‘emancipation’ of our consciousness, from its immanently carried *reel* contents, happens only at the level of its reaching the ideal *species*. In this way, he seems to suppose, the transcendental turn enables Husserl to finally entrench his new interpretation of intentionality and offer an account of how consciousness manages to overcome its virtually chaotic *reell* immanence and direct itself toward transcendentally (with respect to the flow of *reell* contents) appearing, intentional objectivities, i.e., for him, the universal species.

Something like this, however, would not constitute a solution (nor even a renewed stance) to the double problem of transcendence, i.e., to the problem of bridging “the inner with the outer” and “the psychic with the realistic.” For, indeed, Husserl thinks that with ‘the’ reduction—the transcendental reduction—he gives an answer to the problem of how, e.g., perception manages to find its object and not a mere *Schein* of it, for instance *this actual tree* over there.

In the perception of an external thing, just that thing, let us say a house standing before our eyes, is said to be perceived. The house is a transcendent thing, and forfeits its existence [*verhält der Existenz*] after the [transcendental] phenomenological reduction. The house-appearance, this *cogitatio*, emerging and disappearing in the stream of consciousness, is given as actually evident [*wirklich evident*]. [...] [I]s it not [...] evident that a[n] [actual] house appears in the house-phenomenon, and that it is just on this count that we call it a perception of a house? And what appears is not only a house in general [a species], but just exactly this [actual particular] house, determined in such and such a way and appearing in that determination. (*Idea*, 57/72)<sup>56</sup>

<sup>55</sup>See Taminiaux 1989, 59, 62, 66–7; also 2004, 15–6, 20–3. Cf., however, also Taminiaux 2004, 30f.

<sup>56</sup>Similar remarks are found, e.g., in *CM*, 32–3/71. Caution is needed, of course, due to the fact that in the *Idea*, Husserl does not fully and clearly control the method of transcendental reduction. What he seeks to achieve, however, is sometimes there too.

This means that perception is neither imagination, nor dream, nor hallucination, nor illusion, nor experience of species. Phenomenology, i.e., Transcendental Phenomenology too, changes nothing as regards this. Transcendental reduction of perception lets us, of course, again perceive, albeit in a new ontological interpretation of its correlates and in a new interpretation of the constituting functions of perceptual consciousness. It lets perception surface as a direct intentionality, responsible for the special appearance of actual intentional objects that are not self-subsistent, but constituted in this particular intentional possibility of transcendental consciousness. Transcendental reduction of perception presents us with perception in its most ultimate primordially, before the realistic interpretation has been imposed upon its correlates by the general positing regulating the natural attitude. But this does not mean that the transcendently reduced beings are not ‘real’ (actual) or even that they are less ‘real’ (actual).

[For Transcendental Phenomenology,] the things are [...] constituted in these [intentional] acts, and come to be given in such acts. It is only as so constituted that they display themselves as what they are [*als das, was sie sind*] [—not merely “appear to be”]. (*Idea*, 57/72)

That is, after the effectuation of the transcendental reduction, we realize that in transcendental consciousness, the very actual things and objectivities are constituted, “as that which they are,” neither as *mere* phenomena nor as already universal species.

At least with reference to the direct ‘out-going’ acts, transcendental reduction does not amount to—either immanent or transcending—transcendence toward the species. On the other hand, the expansion of the legitimate scope of Phenomenology, through the activation of the transcendental reduction so as to also include Being, does not lead to the recognition only of the existence of the ideally being species. The discovery of the species is not the exclusive task either of the *Idea* or of any other psychological-phenomenological or transcendental-phenomenological work.<sup>57</sup> On the contrary, in both Psychological Phenomenology and Transcendental Phenomenology, eidetic reduction comes as the separate, *second* step in the methodology of the phenomenological work of elucidating the phenomena. Once Phenomenology has, with the application of the epoché and the reduction, discovered its field of research, it then moves toward the unveiling of the *necessary structures* involved in the accomplishments of intentional correlations. This research is done only with the employment of the *eidetic* reduction. As we will see in the

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<sup>57</sup>To be sure, as De Boer has so profoundly observed, Husserl’s presentation of the transcendental reduction in the *Idea* still retains a “psychological flavour,” (1978, 305 n. 1, 309). The same can be maintained, though, even with reference to Husserl’s “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” (1911); it is not totally clear there whether Husserl presents us with the science of Eidetic Phenomenological Psychology or with the philosophy of Transcendental Phenomenology. The meaning of this remark, though, will be decisively clarified later, in §2.7. As I have already said, I think that the situation becomes progressively clear to Husserl only during the late 1920s, especially on the occasion of the challenge that the “*Britannica* Article” (1927) in so many ways represented for him. But even in his “Amsterdam Lectures” (1928) the issue somehow always remains in suspension.

next chapter (§3.3), Phenomenology is not research aiming at inductive, accidental generalizations over particulars. It is always in search of the set of the necessary transcendental a priori structures making possible the multilayered intentional correlations, i.e., eidetically put, it is a search for the corresponding eide or essences. For example, once a perceptual intentional correlation is psychologically or transcendently secured and stabilized, the phenomenologist may then proceed by subjecting the poles of this correlation to an *eidetic variation* and examine essential dependencies, e.g., those concerning the perceptual act and its inner folds, or the appearing thing and its adumbrations, or the color and the surfaces, etc. As we already saw, the intuitional—*not discursive*—proof and experience of these discoverable necessary dependencies form, then, in each case, the totality of a unitary species (here: “perception”). This work may then be suitably extended to the many levels of givenness and to the many directions and ramifications of founding dependencies, e.g., between perception and imagination, or perception and judgment, etc.

### **2.6.2 Transcendental Reduction Does Not Present Us with Non-actual Particulars in Reflection**

Let us now examine another point. Drummond (1990) generally follows the so-called “transcendental” or “East-Coast” interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy, with which I have much in common. Contrary to the so-called “Fregean” or “West-Coast” interpretation of Husserl’s Phenomenology, he rightly maintains that noemata are not abstract beings that supposedly mediate between consciousness and realistic things. Following Sokolowski, however, he does not make the distinction employed here between psychological- and transcendental-phenomenological reductions. Thus, he suggests that in the phenomenological “or” transcendental reduction, the general positing of the natural attitude is lifted, in the sense that we no longer adopt a definite position with regard to the real existence or not of the outer thing, whereas we simultaneously turn *reflectively* to the very acts. Moreover, he concludes that if one were to exclude the very reflective act, transcendental reduction amounts to what Husserl in the *Ideas* I called “neutralizing modification” (*neutralisierende Modification*).<sup>58</sup>

In many respects, this reading comes close to the one presented in the foregoing sections. However, neutralizing modification is a process different from both the psychological- and the transcendental-phenomenological reductions. In Phenomenology, the neutralizing modification basically gains its sense only after the transcendental reduction, which has lifted the general positing and has opened up, for us, the things and all sorts of objectivities as actual—appropriately understood in every case—noemata, constituted in transcendental consciousness. As an additional

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<sup>58</sup>See Drummond 1990, §§9–10.

move, with the effectuation of the neutralizing modification upon such correlative noemata, we are left with such noemata destitute of their pertaining *doxic theses* (actuality, doubt, supposition, etc.), much like the way in which the purely imaginary objects are given to us in the first place.<sup>59</sup>

At first sight, neutralizing modification may also look similar to the psychological reduction. It is not identical to that either, however. We saw that after the psychological reduction, we are left with the thing just appearing (as transcendent mere phenomenon) in the psychological sphere of experience. In this, the thing appears only as a phenomenon, but also as a phenomenon of its supposed realistic status (of its own or of its background underpinning it, as it were). The realistic dimension keeps underlying there, behind or underneath, so to speak, the psychologically, simply appearing thing. In the attitude of the psychological phenomenological reduction, we simply do not engage in any definite position-taking with reference to it. Neutralizing modification, on the other hand, applies, e.g., to a correlative actual noema and definitely subtracts, as it were, from it all its actuality (or other possible doxicalities). It does not apply to a thing that, from the standpoint of the natural attitude, is seen as something realistic (or as underpinned by something realistic) in order to abstract from it *that* specific ontological status.<sup>60</sup> That is, it is not neutralizing modification that sets us free from the prejudice of the natural attitude after all.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>59</sup>Thus, see Drummond's sincere and honest aporia, when he refers to the comment "No!" that Husserl wrote in the margin of one of his personal copies of the *Ideas* I, next to the point where the original text was connecting neutralizing reduction with the reduction "[about] which we have earlier spoken so much," i.e., basically with the transcendental reduction in that work (see Drummond 1990, 53, 58 n. 10).

<sup>60</sup>For Drummond, the natural attitude is the attitude in which we have the experience of *actualities* directly presented in our intentional acts (1990, §§9-10 and, especially, 50, 84, 115, 118). Phenomenological reduction (thus unspecified) supposedly transfers the phenomenologist from the natural attitude to the philosophical-phenomenological attitude. This becomes possible because the reduction releases the phenomenologist from accepting the actuality of the appearing objectivities and gives him or her the possibility and the right to turn the gaze, directing it now upon the very act in which the thing appears (instead of living in the direct intentionality that is turned upon the appearing thing). This combination of reduction and reflection is seen as a methodological move that gives us the thing not as actual—as Drummond thinks they are given in the natural attitude—but as some *abstract, non-actual* constituent of intentional consciousness. See Drummond 1990, 52, 58 n. 9. The same holds for Sokolowski (1984, 1987, 2000, especially 47ff., 57ff.). Husserl, however, even in 1933, was trying to free Transcendental Phenomenology from the misinterpretation that the transcendental reduction was some "‘abstraction’ from the concrete world-life [Weltleben]" (*Hua* XXXIV, xlv).

<sup>61</sup>At a certain point, Drummond himself remarks that "The neutrality-modification, in fact, does not necessarily involve a departure from the natural attitude" (1990, 52). For him, however, this happens only because the neutrality modification, understood now just as a first step of doubt, does not on its own amount to "the [full] performance of the phenomenological reduction, [but] it is merely the precondition for any kind of reflection" (ibid.). For Drummond and Sokolowski "the" reduction must be completed with the philosophical reflection that has the specific character of being phenomenological; a character that consists in turning our concern from the object to its



### 2.6.3 *Transcendental Reduction Does Not Leave Us with Senses or Meanings*

It has also been suggested that transcendental reduction leaves us with residues that are nothing but senses or meanings of intentional objectivities. For example, Gutting (1971) explicitly and clearly reports that “the” (one and unspecified) phenomenological reduction does not annihilate the world but that something is saved after it, while the transcendental consciousness at which we arrive is not the Cartesian ego, a small part in the overall reality, but “when we have the absolute consciousness we have everything” (1971, 211; also 207–216). However, if we do not make any distinction between the psychological- and the transcendental-phenomenological reduction, certain consequences follow, even if we say something very reasonable and straight like the latter (we will come back to this in §2.7). Gutting supposes that in the (transcendental) reduction “[w]e do not [...] find objects as real [...] components of consciousness [...] but [...] as non-real, intentional components of consciousness—i.e., as *meanings*” (ibid., 214; emphasis added).<sup>62</sup>

The same holds, among others, for Crowell (1990).<sup>63</sup> Despite the fact that he rightly draws the distinction between psychological and transcendental reduction, he characterizes only the first of these as phenomenological, which he equates with a reflective turn upon the being-lived of the lived-through in the context of the natural attitude.<sup>64</sup> He then equates transcendental reduction with an abstraction of the Being—qua being-there or being-before-hand (*Vorhandenheit*)—from mundane beings. He also suggests that after the transcendental reduction, we seem to be left with mundane beings, i.e., for him, with the transcendental ego and the beings with which it is intentionally—to be sure—related; beings, however, from which *any* sense of existence is abstracted away.<sup>65</sup> For Crowell, then, and especially with reference to the ‘object’ side of that intentional relation, this means that we are left with only *meanings* of beings. For him, that is, Husserl’s analyses, made possible

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abstracted *meaning* or *sense*, qua way of *our being conscious of* the object (see also the following §2.6.3). The reader can also consult the relevant lemmas in the more recent Drummond 2007.

<sup>62</sup>As we already saw transiently in the previous note, for Sokolowski and Drummond, “the” phenomenological reduction leads us, reflectively, to an intentional act, with our interest being directed upon the neutralized—from the point of view of “actuality” (vaguely understood)—intentional objectivity that the act was previously aiming at in its direct mode. In order to arrive at the residua of the full reduction, i.e., at the intentional objects as senses or meanings, they suggest that we have to make a further move, i.e., transfer ourselves to the *logical* attitude. The latter consists in a combination of neutralization applied to the intentional *objectivity* and to the act that is aiming at it, plus reflection upon the so-modified objectivity (but no longer also upon the *act* in which the latter appears). The logical attitude, then, presents us with corresponding meanings. See Drummond 1990, 51, 54, 58 n. 11. Consult also the relevant lemmas in Drummond 2007.

<sup>63</sup>See Crowell 1990, 504, 508.

<sup>64</sup>See ibid., 503ff.

<sup>65</sup>See ibid., 514–5. On the partial truth of this view see, however, also §2.7 in the present chapter.

after the transcendental reduction, are actually “analyses of meanings,” analyses with only epistemological and no ontological significance.<sup>66</sup>

From the point of view defended in this chapter, though, the transcendently reduced beings, i.e., the *noemata* (as *residua* of the transcendental reduction), have not lost anything of their fundamental actuality. The sole change is that from now on we phenomenologically realize that the characteristic “independent self-existence” no longer belongs to the meaning of their Being (to what it means that they *are*). These very *actual things* appear to us as intuitional phenomena and are apprehended by us as constituted in intentional correlations. Only in this way can Husserl maintain that in the transcendental reduction, while in a sense we ‘eliminate’ the world, in the end *we do not lose anything at all* (this is after all the striking peculiarity of the transcendental reduction).<sup>67</sup> The strangeness (*Fremdartigkeit*) of transcendental reduction, to which Husserl refers,<sup>68</sup> consists exactly in this provocative claim; and the world does not disappear only in case we do not see its residue either as an abstractum in reflection or as a meaning.

Phenomenological research will, of course, proceed further by means of the eidetic reduction, whose purpose is to elucidate those necessary structures of consciousness that made the corresponding intentional correlation possible in the first place.

#### 2.6.4 *Phenomenological Reduction and Methodological Solipsism*

We can now refer briefly also to another interesting connection, which, if properly understood, may be of great help in building bridges for a mutual understanding between the analytic and the phenomenological philosophical traditions. Husserl’s ‘phenomenological’ reduction has also been understood in terms of Carnap’s

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<sup>66</sup>See *ibid.*, 507–8, 515. See also Mohanty 1985, ch. 13 and, especially, pp. 192, 202. The view that Phenomenology is the “analysis of meanings” is quite widespread among Husserlians, especially among those who show particular interest in establishing communicative channels with analytic philosophers. A stance like the latter is praiseworthy; and would have been fruitful if it enjoyed mutual trust and esteem. Be that as it may, Husserl himself opposed his interpreters who saw his Phenomenology as a mere analysis of meanings (see, e.g., “Draft” §10). Phenomenology is *intuitional* research into the essential structures of *phenomena* (in correlation to the empty meanings or—in case of pre-linguistic intentionality—senses by which they were or are being aimed at); it is not any usual discursive analysis of meanings. And what is most curious, for Phenomenology, even the empty aiming meanings (and senses) are seen as phenomena to be analysed or rather—as it generally pertains to phenomena—*elucidated* in evidence.

<sup>67</sup>See *Ideas* I, §88.

<sup>68</sup>See *PTP*, 252/295.

methodological solipsism, i.e., the methodological stance from which one is supposed to be able to construct the world on the basis of one's own auto-psychological states (the immediate data of experience).<sup>69</sup>

Barry Smith and David W. Smith, however, make this association without any further qualification (see the Introduction to their 1995). Fodor brought back to the foreground the research-strategy that Carnap called "methodological solipsism" (Fodor 1980, 63–73), which the latter himself too explicitly associated with Husserl's method of "phenomenological reduction" (not further specified).<sup>70</sup> According to the generally current view regarding 'the' phenomenological reduction, Smith and Smith see only one reduction, which they identify with the epoché, that is, with the methodological move by which "[w]e [...] 'bracket,' or abstain from positing the existence of the natural world around us" (1995, 11), without any further specification. Again, following the generally accepted view, they think that after this move we are introduced to a philosophy that has found shelter in a "'pure' consciousness," identified with the phenomenological "transcendental ego" (ibid., 10–11). Paradoxically, they also think that, even after this move, a phenomenological ontology remains. The paradox grows bigger when one discovers that, in their interpretation, this phenomenological ontology is generally sought for in the pre-transcendental Phenomenology of the *Prolegomena* (1900) and of the phenomenological mereology of the third LI (1901), without any mention of the *Ideas I* (1913) and the subsequent transcendental works of Husserl, where the latter effectuated the ontological maturation of the transcendently naïve appeals to beings (particular and universal) that one encounters in the *LI*. What they generally conclude is that, in the end, ontology in Husserl's Phenomenology (without any other specification) is nothing but Formal Ontology, which studies only objects in general, properties in general, relations and relata in general, etc. (ibid., 27f.).

Nevertheless, only under specific conditions, which have to do with the interpretation of Husserl's conception of intentionality, can this move be associated with the "methodological solipsism" that Carnap introduced. More specifically, I would dare say that Carnap's methodological solipsism, together with his principle of tolerance, could at best be compared to Husserl's *psychological*-phenomenological reduction.<sup>71</sup> But, again, we must always bear two things in mind. Firstly, it is not at

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<sup>69</sup>See Carnap (1967), 101ff.

<sup>70</sup>See Smith and Smith 1995, 10, 42 n. 13. See also Dreyfus 1982, 3, 15–17.

<sup>71</sup>See especially his very important Carnap 1950. Surprisingly, let me add here, Quine's more radical pragmatist response to Carnap could, I think, be read as parallel to what was here reconstructed as the ontological point of view, enabled by Husserl's transcendental phenomenological reduction. Under certain conditions that have to do with questions of primordiality with reference to language learning over pre-linguistic perception (and vice versa), Quine's view (1951) can be read in this way. We read there that from a strictly epistemological point of view, i.e., based on what is given to the mere senses, we can say that, e.g., the ontological claims of nuclear Physics are not superior to these of ancient Greek mythology, etc. That is, to put it simply, from within the corresponding experiential frameworks, protons in the nuclear laboratory are understood as no more real than goddess Athena in her interventions during the Trojan battles. To put it more phenomenologically,

all clear how or whether Carnap disengages from the traditional representationalist epistemology that lies far behind Husserl's intentional-phenomenological solution to the problem of transcendence. Secondly, Carnap attempted a logical-judgmental construction of the world, whereas Husserl started from an elucidation of the happening of the primordial, pre-linguistic, passive constitution of the appearing world and its beings.<sup>72</sup> Linguistic cognition demanded a second and higher founded level of analysis that would explain the function of thematization and the formation of the corresponding higher-level correlative experience.<sup>73</sup>

Lastly, let me make a remark in connection with the view of Smith and Smith regarding the possibility and character of the ontology that we are left with after the transcendental reduction. We have to be careful to distinguish when, in *Phenomenology*, the expressions "something" (*etwas*) and "in general" (*überhaupt*) are used with a *formal-general* meaning and with a *material-general* (or *regional*) meaning and, for that matter, when they are used in connection, correspondingly, with a priori analytic or a priori synthetic truths. Otherwise, we are left with a distorted and, in the end, erroneous picture of *Phenomenology*. Formal Ontology offers us only analytic truths, whereas Husserl is quite confident and persistent in stating that Transcendental Phenomenology is a goldmine of a priori synthetic discoveries regarding our intentional correlations with actual beings in their ontological regions.

## 2.7 Transcendental Reduction: Elucidating the Remaining Adytum

### 2.7.1 *Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology: Sciences or Philosophies?*

First of all, let us turn our attention to a closely related puzzle left for us by Husserl. In his lecture course of the SS of 1912, Husserl had presented his idea about a science with the name "Rational Psychology," which could and should found—the already developed at that time—Empirical Psychology. In a sense, this founding Psychological *science* ought to be *Phenomenology*. But *Phenomenology* had been conceived as science even before 1912. More concretely, it can be argued that even in his "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science" (1910–1911), Husserl speaks precisely about such a Rational or Phenomenological Psychology qua *science*, and not

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what I experience as real (read: actual) depends in each case on the level of intentional functionings (primordial or founded) and on the internal consistency of the intentional constitutions, based on the ways consciousness interprets its relevant *reell* contents. See also the references in the next note.

<sup>72</sup>Regarding Husserl's interesting influence on Carnap's philosophical thinking, see also the important Haddock 2008, especially 50ff.

<sup>73</sup>On this, more will be said in Chaps. 5, 6, and 7. See also Theodorou 2010b.

about a Phenomenology qua *philosophy*, i.e., about Transcendental Phenomenology. Moreover, from the point of view of his lecture course “Phenomenological Psychology” (1925), Husserl himself explicitly recognizes, retrospectively, the *Logical Investigations* (1900–1901) as Descriptive Psychology or (better) as Intentional or Eidetic Psychology, i.e., again, as a science.<sup>74</sup> To my knowledge, this tension with regard to whether Phenomenology, in one or the other of its versions, i.e., as Phenomenological Psychology or as Transcendental Phenomenology, is science or philosophy (founding or not) is not clearly solved in Husserl's work. Even at the end of the 1920s, in the fourth and final version of the “*Britannica* Article” (1927), we read the following.

The term “Phenomenology” designates two things: a new kind of descriptive method which made a breakthrough in *philosophy* at the turn of the century, and an a priori *science* derived from it; a science which is intended to supply the basic instrument (*Organon*) for a rigorously scientific philosophy and in its consequent application, to make possible a methodical reform of all the sciences. Together with this philosophical Phenomenology, but not yet separated from it, however, there also came into being a new psychological discipline parallel to it in method and content: the a priori Pure or “Phenomenological” Psychology, which raises the reformational claim to being the basic methodological foundation on which alone a scientifically rigorous empirical Psychology can be established. An outline of this Psychological Phenomenology, standing nearer to our natural thinking, is well suited to serve as a preliminary step that will lead up to an understanding of philosophical Phenomenology. (*PTP*, 159/277–8; emphases added)

At times, Husserl also calls Phenomenological Psychology “First Philosophy.”<sup>75</sup> The same oscillation is observable even later, e.g., in §52 of the *Crisis* (1936). In sum, I suggest that we should rather conclude that Transcendental Phenomenology is philosophy, and that Phenomenological Psychology is science. Of course, serious problems may still remain in suspension. For example, consider the following (consult the last cited passage).

- (i) How will Phenomenology (as science) function as organon for the announced scientific philosophy?
- (ii) What is the identity of this “scientific philosophy”?
- (iii) What kind of science, after all, is the so-called “Pure Psychology”?
- (iv) What kind of relation does it have with Phenomenology as philosophy?
- (v) What kind of reformation will the latter bring about to the rest of the sciences?
- (vi) If Phenomenological or Pure Psychology, as science, leads to a scientific philosophy that will reform the sciences, then how can this scientific philosophy also reform its presupposition (Phenomenology as science)?

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<sup>74</sup>To be sure, Husserl had already recognized that work as (Eidetic) Descriptive Psychology, i.e., as science, from the time of its first publication. See 5th *LI* of the 2nd ed., §16 first note. See also, however, the “Draft” (1913), §11.

<sup>75</sup>See *Hua* IX, 267.

This problematic situation is unavoidably reflected also in the meager but important bibliography on the issue.<sup>76</sup> I hope that the foregoing sections can at least set the basis for a clearer background against which it will be tenable to overcome these difficulties.

As a beginning, it would suffice to say that a priori or Pure Phenomenological Psychology is conducted under the methodological constraints posed by the psychological-phenomenological reduction, and it contains necessary eidetic analyses of the intentional acts (aiming or fulfilling) and of their founding interdependencies. As such, it can comprise the pure or a priori epistemological part of Psychology as an empirical discipline, providing the latter with its appertaining object domain of research. The latter science can only have its objects available for empirical-experimental research when it has a clear pre-empirical, i.e., a priori or pure, recognition of these very objects in their essential constitution. Empirical research on the objects of an empirical science may proceed through “trial and error,” but sheer empirical trial and error is not the way by which this science came to have these objects available for research. This is the old Aristotelian and Kantian view of philosophy of science. To stay here only with Kant, the view says that the possibility of Physics as empirical science is founded upon a Pure Physics, an a priori discipline that contains the pure or metaphysical (a priori synthetic) principles of Physics. Generally speaking, these principles are general metaphysical and special metaphysical ones. In the case of Physics, principles of the first kind include causality, preservation of matter and energy, etc., whereas the three well-known Newtonian principles (action and reaction, inertia, and inertial mass as the fraction of force over the rate of velocity change) comprise the special metaphysics of Physics as empirical science.<sup>77</sup> Interestingly, the spirit of this fundamental approach is also the core of the corresponding ideas that Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s philosophies of science unknowingly re-introduced into discussion at the beginnings of the second half of the twentieth century.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>76</sup>I have in mind, for instance, Crowell 1990, and 2002a.

<sup>77</sup>From this point of view only, this a priori laying-of-the-ground for the building of the specifically empirical research of a science may also be considered as the *philosophical* or metaphysical part of this science. In this part, the a priori philosophical work constitutes the object domain even of an empirical science, i.e., it forms the metaphysics of the object that the empirical research will investigate further. Otherwise, empirical research would be blind, stumbling accidentally, as it were, one time on this and another on that being, without having any clue about how to avoid, e.g., mixing cases that resemble each other only superficially (not essentially). Additional information is given in Chap. 3, n. 18, of the present book. In my Ph.D. thesis, after the development of an interpretation of the ground tenets in Husserl’s *Phenomenology*, I defended the view that the above philosophical preparation of the object domain of Physics as an empirical science is being accomplished in what is known as scientific “thought experiments” (see Theodorou 2000). Some points concerning this fundamental idea, presented in connection with the possibility and meaning of science’s historicization, can be found in Theodorou 2010b.

<sup>78</sup>An important remark must be made at this point. Until now, we have been seeing Phenomenological Psychology as a Pure or Philosophical Psychology, functioning as a founding mathesis for any empirical psychological research. We have also been saying that Phenomenological Psychology

Beyond this function of Phenomenology as a priori establishment of the research field of any empirical Psychology, it could of course also play the role of first philosophy or 'Fundamental Ontology.' It would elucidate the process of constitution and the corresponding meaning of Being of the beings belonging to *every* ontological region. This would be the task of Transcendental Phenomenology in particular. Nevertheless, this method and the attitude it effectuates are anything but easily accessible and plain. Thus, taking into consideration the fact that Transcendental Phenomenology was conceived as a widening and deepening of Phenomenological Psychology, Husserl coined the idea that Phenomenological Psychology, being closer to our natural attitude intuitions, may work as an easy propaedeutic mathesis for the far more difficult entrance to the transcendental phenomenological stance and view. During the last years of the 1920s and in the 1930s, Husserl was confident that this study-schedule would work and do the whole job. For example, this stance can be easily traced in the "Britannica Article" body of manuscripts, as well as in the third part of the *Crisis* manuscripts, published in the *Husserliana* series.

### 2.7.2 *One Step Forward Two Steps Back: Mundane and Monadological Transcendental Phenomenology*

The above, however, were not the only difficulties that tortured Husserl throughout his life-long endeavor to consolidate Phenomenology into a fully intelligible and rigorous method of a priori research. As already mentioned above, in the early 1920s Husserl realized that Phenomenological Psychology actually develops from the point of view of some *remaining* power of the natural attitude.<sup>79</sup> Psychological-phenomenological reduction had not actually eliminated the power of the natural attitude. It had certainly put the outer-psychic, physical realistic out of play, but had forgotten to do the same with some other presuppositions or prejudices of that attitude.

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has a merely epistemological value and function. These two ideas, however, do not exhaust the character of Phenomenological Psychology and thus may, in their partiality, create a problem of consistency. In order to arrive at a clearer view we must also say this: in its founding function, Phenomenological Psychology at the same time fixes and posits its *own* subject matter, the psyche or the psychic phenomena, in their essential make up, and then proceeds to a host of additional a priori researches regarding further details, interconnections, etc., of these phenomena. It thus provides empirical psychological research—in our day this could be the so-called *Cognitive Science*—with the possibility to further know what it tries to experiment with, in the empirical-natural research of what it is trying to locate, etc. In this, i.e., in fixing and positing the psychic in its essential constitution, Phenomenological Psychology acts *metaphysically*. Once this sole metaphysical move is made, it immediately turns to *epistemological* issues. More on the issue of Phenomenology as science and as philosophy will be said in Chap. 3 of this book, especially with regard to how Heidegger understood it.

<sup>79</sup>See also, e.g., *Hua* IX, 240-4.



Firstly, Husserl came to see that the psychologically-phenomenologically reduced Eidetic Psychological Phenomenology of the—thusly now read—*Logical Investigations* had no right to have posited a sphere of *eidetic realities* beyond the phenomenologically accessible intentional acts and intentionally appearing objectities. Eidetic seeing, already discovered in the *LI*, secured that, in the intentional constitution and experience of particular objectities appearing to the intentional acts, a *universal* factor interferes and determines what is significantly aimed at or experienced. Phenomenological eidetic seeing could ascertain that this universal is experienceable and phenomenologically intuitable in categorial acts of ideation; it wasn't a mere conceptual fiction, a mere empty speculation. In that work, however, although Husserl did not actually substantiate the universal, either psychologically or metaphysically (the universal as such wasn't either a part of the particular acts or a denizen of a Platonically heavenly or supra-heavenly reality),<sup>80</sup> there was a problematic conception of it that somehow allowed it to be independently 'outside' or 'beyond' the act itself and its particular intentional objects. The species that become instantiated in the particular acts were *universa supra rem*, not themselves constituted in the intentional acts and yet necessarily presupposed for the latter. This is what standardly made the readers of the *LI* think that Husserl was there a Platonic realist with regard to species.

In his maturing after the publication of the *LI*, though, Husserl thought that the scheme of intentional constitution used in that work and its presupposition of that peculiar eidetic realm were only quasi-phenomenologically sustainable. The universal rule (*Materie*) conditioning—with its 'instantiation' in the aiming and fulfilling acts—the intentional constitution of transcendent objectities could not itself be simply presupposed as an unconstituted, independent, quasi-reality. Thus, with the early transcendental turn of 1907, Husserl abandoned the "eidosis (*Materie*)/instantiation scheme" of intentional constitution, which was in use in the eidetic psychological *LI* (1901). The constituting rule that is activated in the constituting acts is no longer seen as the universal *Materie* instantiated in them. Husserl now basically discovers and uncovers the rule-following *inner functionality* of constituting intentional acts.

The first transcendental reduction (1905–1907 until circa early 1920s), then, was a supplement to the psychological reduction that was already 'unconsciously' active in the eidetic *LI* (and only later thematized as such). And the methodological task of that transcendental reduction was to phenomenologically uncover what was genuinely taking place in the constituting acts of our intentional consciousness and, of course, what sense of Being this constitution was capable of assigning to the constituted objectities. Presumably under the influence of the transcendentalist Natorp, Husserl testifies that consciousness is a time-field of constituting *functionings*. The factor dictating the functioning process was not *Materie* qua eidetic reality instantiated in these acts, but the *rule* guiding the *synthesizing* character of consciousness' intentional functionings. This rule was generally called

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<sup>80</sup>See §2.6.1 above.



*sense (Sinn)*—or meaning (*Bedeutung*) in the specific case of linguistic acts—and, since there are two kinds of acts, acts that merely aim and acts that intuitionally fulfill these aimings, there are *two* senses: aiming senses and fulfilling senses. Husserl called the first “*noetic senses*” (*noetische Sinnen*) and the latter “*noematic senses*” (*noematische Sinnen*). The first prescriptively determine the objectivity that is emptily aimed at. The second—which, let me add here, is in all likelihood better understandable along the lines of the Kantian “*schema*”—sketch the lay out of the objectivity that intuitionally appears.

In addition to this, as previously discussed, Husserl had made the bold move of transforming Phenomenology from epistemology to ontology. In brief, again, instead of being content with the phenomenological certification that intentional objectivities appear just as transcendently self-manifesting correlates (with respect to the immanence of the stream of the *reell* contents of consciousness), he now claims that there are no realistic counterparts or underpinnings of such phenomena. Intentional objectivities are not ‘mere phenomena’ with respect to some other really real dimension behind or within the latter. Intentional objectivities qua appearing phenomena are of course constituted basically as senses; they are somehow senses. Nevertheless, *as such*, they are *as real as it gets* in each case; e.g., in perception, the perceptual objects are as real as we experience them to be. There are no realistic beings, but the appearing phenomena are indeed *fully actual* and are characterized by the normal ‘phenomenology’ that we know in each case.

Secondly, Phenomenological Psychology is a mathesis working under the simply deactivated ontological prejudice of the natural attitude. As such, it itself suffers not only from the limitation we have seen, but also from an additional one applied this time to its own self. Intentional consciousness qua totality of psychologically psychic acts is itself a mere phenomenon that hovers over some unthematized but supposed realistic substratum. In Phenomenological Psychology, the connection that Husserl calls “*psycho-physical*” simply remains in suspension. The psychological psyche or the psychic intentional consciousness can, with its acts, be examined as a mere phenomenon. Transcendental Phenomenology will then be the philosophy that undertakes the task of resolving the latter’s abeyance too and every other problem concerning the meaning of Being for everything, i.e., also for consciousness as subject matter of Phenomenological Psychology. The view from which such a thing can be attempted is the one established by the transcendental reduction, as described in the foregoing sections. Of course, the one who attempts to perform it should be the above thematized, subject-side residuum of the latter reduction: the subject as transcendental consciousness. How this is expected to be done and whether this can be done at all will be seen in the remaining subsections.

These two basic points form at least a great part of the ground upon which Husserl’s *first* transcendental turn takes place. This move informs texts like the *Idea*, “*Philosophy as a Rigorous Science*,” and even *Ideas I*. During the 1920s, though, Husserl progressively came to realize that this first transcendental turn had forgotten to make an issue of the *locus and status of the intentionally synthesizing transcendental consciousness itself*. After the analysis of the meaning

of transcendental reduction in §§2.2, 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 of the present chapter, we will now see that this story is further analyzable in at least two internal and generally opaque sub-stories.

With the first transcendental reduction, Husserl progressed by making the presuppositions of intentional constitution phenomenologically more appropriate. He had now made Phenomenology more sophisticated and mature to the degree that everything seemed to fall in the right place; everything appeared to be intact. Still, something else was wrong in that version of Transcendental Phenomenology.

In the “*Britannica* Article” manuscripts and, more particularly, in the second half of the second version of this work, but more clearly in the fourth version, which were both written by Husserl himself (mostly as a reply to Heidegger’s remarks and questions in the margins of the first version of the “Article”), the problem is articulated as follows. When we abandon the natural attitude, says Husserl, we realize that the world is and is what it is for our consciousness. Its Being and sense are Being and sense constituted in the intentional acts of our transcendental consciousness. This, however, soon leads to a serious problem.

Once the world in this full all-embracing universality has been related back to the subjectivity of consciousness, in whose living consciousness it makes its [transcendent] appearance precisely as “the world” in the sense it has now, then its whole mode of being acquires a dimension of *unintelligibility* [*Unverständlichkeit*]. [...] [H]ow it [consciousness], so to say, manages *in its immanence* that something which manifests itself can present itself as something [taken to be] *existing in itself*, and not only as something [merely] meant but as something *authenticated in concordant experience* [as true and actual]. [...] *Unintelligibility* is felt as a particularly telling affront to our very mode of being <as human beings>. For, obviously, we are the ones (individually and in community) in whose conscious life-process the [transcendentally] real [*reale*] [sic] world, which is present for us as such, gains sense and acceptance. *As human creatures, however, we ourselves are supposed to belong to the world.* When we start with the sense of the world <*weltlichen Sinn*> given with our mundane existing, we are thus again referred back to ourselves and our conscious life-process as that wherein for us this sense is first formed. (*PTP*, 168–9/288–9; emphases added)

And if this is a somehow careful attempt on Husserl’s part at a consolidation and clearing of the problem, here is how he described the situation regarding unintelligibility (*Unverständlichkeit*) in the second draft of the “Article” that Heidegger had read and questioned in puzzlement. On the one hand, since Phenomenology realizes that whatever *is* (in any sense of the word “is”) and is what it is only for a consciousness that constituted it in rule-governed synthesizing acts, the transcendental stance makes unintelligible (*unverständlich*) any posited reality in itself, e.g., the physically realistic, the world of numbers and of propositions in themselves, the sphere of eidetic realities in general, etc. (*PTP* 125/271). On the other hand, since Pure or Phenomenological Psychology still moves on the ground of positivity, it remains transcendently naïve. This then produces a severe difficulty.

Despite their purity, all pure psychic [transcendentally appearing] phenomena have the ontological sense of worldly real facts, even when they are treated eidetically as possible

facts of a world which is posited as general possibility but which, for that very reason, is also *unintelligible* from a transcendental point of view. For the psychologist, who as psychologist remains in positivity, the systematic psychological-phenomenological reduction, with its epoché regarding the existing world, is merely a means for [subsequently] reducing the human and animal psyche to its own pure and proper essence, all of this against the background of the world that, as far as the psychologist is concerned, remains continually in being and constantly valid. (*PTP*, 127–8/272–3; emphasis added).

It was these latter descriptions of his old teacher's new insights that alerted Heidegger and forced him to thematize, in the relevant epistle we have, his absolutely understandable confusion and irritation with this dark issue of the "*unintelligibility*":

The first thing in the presentation of the transcendental problem is to clarify what the "unintelligibility" of entities means.

- (i) In what respect are entities intelligible? i.e., what higher claim of intelligibility is possible and necessary?
- (ii) By a return to what is this intelligibility achieved?
- (iii) What is the meaning of the absolute ego as distinct from the pure psychic?
- (iv) What is the mode of being of this absolute ego—in what sense is it the same as the ever factual "I"; in what sense is it not the same?
- (v) What is the character of the positing in which the absolute ego is something posited? To what extent is there no positivity (positedness) here?
- (vi) The all-inclusiveness of the transcendental problem. (*PTP* 139/602)

Here is how we should make sense of the problem that the mature Husserl discovered within the perspective of his first Transcendental Phenomenology. Having in mind the two points presented earlier in this subsection, i.e., that every worldly being, in its whatever actuality, is constituted in intentional consciousness, we stumble upon this challenging puzzle. How can consciousness—be it either the one constituting according to the eidós-instantiation schema of the *LI* or the transcendental synthesizing one of the *Ideas I*—as a part of the actual world, next to the 'extended *res*,' constitute both that latter and itself? Or, to put it otherwise (and solely in transcendental-synthesizing terms), if everything that is in the world has been or becomes constituted by transcendental consciousness, then how can this consciousness be a being within the overall world sphere? Who or what constituted it? Such a transcendental consciousness should be at the same time constituting (by its 'definition') and constituted (as one being within the sphere of beings). But *this does not make any sense*. This is something totally *unintelligible*.<sup>81</sup> It presents us

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<sup>81</sup>See also *Hua* XXXIV, 481–6; *Hua* VI, §§52–54. Fink, in fact, bases his whole presentation of Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology exclusively on this (later) idea of an *unintelligibility* as arising in the context of the transcendental reduction (1970, 101, which is, however, developed in 114ff.). In the end, this is a problem regarding the phenomenologically justified content of a Phenomenological Egology, a problem with which Fink was deeply acquainted, and with which he had already struggled in his collaboration with Husserl for the so-called "Sixth Cartesian Meditation"; an effort that would solve the impasses that had blocked Husserl's further development of the Phenomenological Egology contained in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation (1929). Here, a more transparent story is being presented. We will come back to the importance of this

with the enigma or paradox concerning human subjectivity: “being a subject for the world and at the same time being an object in the world” (*Crisis*, §53).

If Transcendental Phenomenology wants to become a true First Philosophy, then it must abandon even the last remaining bit of naiveté (of ‘unconsciously’ relying on self-understandable presuppositions). It must manage to really free itself from *all* traces belonging to the natural attitude. This means that it must find a way of elucidating the transcendently synthesizing consciousness (to restrict ourselves here to this) in a way that no longer reads it as a *part* of the actual world or, seen otherwise, in a way that endows it with *sound* absoluteness. That is, a full-fledged and non-speculative Transcendental Phenomenology worthy of its name must realize that the transcendental consciousness discovered up to this point, in the context of its developing transcendental methodology, is in fact a *mundane* reality. It is a psychological-phenomenological psyche clumsily disguised as an absolute transcendental consciousness. As such, it cannot have any place within a complete Transcendental Phenomenology that sees all worldly actual beings as constituted in a rightly understood, transcendently synthesizing consciousness. The hitherto adopted perspective of understanding transcendental consciousness needs to be abandoned.

In some way, an intelligible transcendental consciousness must be a horizon that somehow ‘encloses’ both the rest of the actual world *and* its mundane (psychological or naïve transcendental) self. Husserl then thought that, grasped in its fully appropriate sense, only a *genuinely* absolute consciousness, one cast in terms of *monadology*, seems to be the most suitable context for accommodating these later transcendental phenomenological perplexities.

### 2.7.3 *Traces of the Developing Change*

Husserl’s relevant inspiration toward this turn seems to have been Fichte, whose all-constituting “I” had supported Husserl’s transcendental journey already (probably around 1915 if not 1913),<sup>82</sup> and Leibniz. It seems that in all likelihood, the first intimately relevant connection with Leibniz’s thought must have happened already, before 1910. In the early 1920s, Leibniz and monadology had been a systematically constant concern in Husserl’s writings and publications.<sup>83</sup> Absolute transcendental consciousness is now conceived as an all-inclusive monad, qua complete stage upon

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“unintelligibility” and to its connection with the quarrel between Husserl and Heidegger in Chap. 3, §3.10.

<sup>82</sup>On this, see Kern 1964, 35–7, 292, 297; also Hart 1995.

<sup>83</sup>See Schuhmann’s *Husserl-Chronik* (1977). For more details on Husserl’s adoption of basic Leibnizean schemes of thought, from “Philosophy as Rigorous Science” to his research manuscripts of 1937, see (Cristin 1990; Mertens 2000; MacDonald 2007). On the difficulties and the impasse that this mature, monadological, transcendental turn signals, see also Chap. 10, §10.4.

which the drama is played of the totally whole, transcendently reduced *actual world*, as we experience it in lower- and higher-order intentionalities. Monadologically absolute consciousness, that is, constitutes not only the world transcendently appearing to us, but also the worldly consciousness qua *mundane* psyche either in its eidetically or in its transcendently functioning intentional constituting. In the monadologically absolute transcendental consciousness, the whole range and ranks of intentional *correlations* is constituted.

In the *Crisis*, the *CM*, and the “*Britannica* Article,” Husserl indeed clearly maintains that, in the end, the psychological ego or the mundanely understood, early transcendental ego, is only the *self-objectification* (*Selbstobjektivierung*) of the ultimate, always already functioning, anonymous (*letztfungierende anonyme*), fully monadological transcendental subjectivity.<sup>84</sup> In other words, when the anonymous transcendental subjectivity understands itself naively, it actually objectifies itself as a mundane psyche (eidetically or synthesizingly constituting). It apprehends itself as a tiny *edge* in the world, left over from the positivity of the hardly eradicable natural attitude.<sup>85</sup>

It must have been clear by now, then, that *mundane* transcendental consciousness, i.e., transcendental consciousness after the first conception of the transcendental turn (e.g., that about which Husserl still speaks in the *Ideas* I), can be both epistemologically successful (and thus find its proper place in an appropriately modified Phenomenological Psychology) and ontologically unsuccessful (and find its proper place in a pre-monadological Transcendental Phenomenology). The latter unsuccessfulness, that is, can be lifted if we do not take the transcendently synthesizing consciousness to also constitute objectivities in their Being (thus leading to the “unintelligibility”), i.e., in case we approach it with only a phenomenologically-psychologically limited epistemological interest. From the point of view of Husserl's later realizations, the merely epistemological Transcendental Phenomenology, i.e., a Phenomenological Psychology that has adopted the constituting model of the *Ideas* I, appears to be free from the defect of the aforementioned unintelligibility.<sup>86</sup> This, of course, once again makes clear that there are in fact two kinds of Phenomenological Psychology, the Eidetic one of the *LI* and the Synthetic or Transcendentally-Functioning one of the

<sup>84</sup>See also Fink 1970, 133ff., 139f.

<sup>85</sup>See *Hua* VI, 115, 116, 156, 183, 186, 190; *Hua* IX, 274, 294; *Hua* I, 130, 136f, 157, 159, 168, 207 comment to 59.15, 208 comment to 60.33; *Hua* VII, 73; *Hua* XVII, 222f., 243. We will come back to the problems related with this possible conception of transcendental consciousness in Chaps. 3 and 10.

<sup>86</sup>To be sure, as must have already appeared, a ‘milder’ version of “unintelligibility” could be projected in the context of a Phenomenological Psychology referring to an intentional consciousness qua (mundane) psyche, which is intentionally constituting either according to the eidetic constituting model of the *LI* (*Materief* instance in the act) or according to that of the *Ideas* I (time field of ‘transcendental’ syntheses). I mean by this the—either way suspended—psycho-physical connection: whence the *reell* contents and whereupon the constituting functions? See also Chap. 10.

first transcendental period, which we can refer to as “mundane Transcendental Phenomenology.” Otherwise put, from the point of view of the Monadological or Radical Transcendental Phenomenology, Mundane Transcendental Phenomenology can in fact be seen as another valid version of Phenomenological Psychology (the version that understands intentional constitution in terms of syntheses).<sup>87</sup>

Only with difficulty can the course of the just delineated change in Husserl’s maturation be unambiguously traced in the course of his thought. To my knowledge, there is no perfectly clear self-criticism about this on Husserl’s part. It seems, though, that some self-reflection or criticism after the publication of the *Ideas* I and before 1920 must have made Husserl realize the difficulty. From Fink (1970), though, we learn that in fact a criticism of this sort, actually stemming from the Neokantian camp, was launched against Husserl as late as 1930 and 1932.<sup>88</sup> It seems that in the Neokantian tradition, the issue of the ontological status of the transcendently constituting consciousness had always been at the center of their concerns. For example, in his *Allgemeine Psychologie* (1912), Natorp, with whom Husserl retained a close personal contact, starting at least from the time of the *LI*, had made a special effort to argue against the possibility that absolute constituting consciousness is in time, like all the rest of its objects.<sup>89</sup> Husserl studied this work thoroughly, together with Natorp’s essay “*Philosophie und Psychologie*” (1913), in 1918.<sup>90</sup> Thus, in all likelihood, Natorp, who was a key figure in Husserl’s abandonment of the ‘Platonist’ perspective (eidetic intentional constitution) as found in the *LI*, also played some role in Husserl’s further maturation and in his move from the mundane Transcendental Phenomenology of the *Ideas* I to the later radical, fully monadological Transcendental Phenomenology of the years following the early 1920s.

In this connection, it is also remarkable that there is a striking analogy in the two stages of Husserl’s maturation after the *LI*. This can be vividly displayed in the aporias that led to these two steps and to the developments following them. In the overcoming of the *LI*, the crucial question is: how could we presuppose self-standing realities like the species, when Phenomenology should be presuppositionless research into the origin of all objectivities and of all fundamental concepts? In the overcoming of the *Ideas* I, the crucial question is: how could we presuppose that after the transcendental reduction we are left with a consciousness seen as a mere worldly region or corner, when Transcendental Phenomenology should be an analysis regarding the constitution of all kinds of beings?

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<sup>87</sup>Naturally, this dimension of Husserl’s itinerary sheds a new light on the first round of elucidations and distinctions that were made above, in §§2.2–6.

<sup>88</sup>See Fink 1970, 74ff, 145 n. 1, and especially, 92ff, 96f.

<sup>89</sup>On Natorp’s influence upon Husserl after the publication of the *Ideas* I, see also Kern 1964, §31 and, especially, 348ff.

<sup>90</sup>See Kern 1964, 350 n. 4.

### 2.7.4 *Beyond Fink's Advocacy of Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology*

Fink, however, builds his advocacy of Husserlian Transcendental Phenomenology along a line of argumentation that, in its development, does not recognize any point at which transcendental consciousness was presented—if not also conceived—in a mundane perspective. That is, Fink retrospectively projects Husserl's mature monadological understanding of transcendental consciousness back on the *Ideas I* and the relevant works after 1905 (or 1907).<sup>91</sup> As I see it, though, this is a retrospective retouch that serves to hide some annoying abjured figures from the official picture presented to the public. And the additional difficulties in our understanding of Husserl's progress and Phenomenology that this authoritative beautification created cannot be underestimated.

That we have to do with such a retouch and that the situation is very obscure and complicated to a degree that has prevented a full penetration into the adytum of its perplexities and a full reconstruction of a clear view of Husserl's development can also be seen from the following. If we focus on the *Ideas I*, Husserl's supposedly breakthrough transcendental phenomenological work, we come across many phrasings that tempt us to read them as clear statements of a fully monadological conception of transcendental consciousness. I will cite here, in particular, those passages that sound very much like the late 1920s remarks negating an understanding of transcendental consciousness as a small part or a small piece of the whole world.

[In the preceding sections (§§27–50) of the “Fundamental Considerations” in the *Ideas I*, we have] penetrated to the cognition that there is something like the field of pure consciousness, indeed, that there is such a thing which is *not a component part of Nature* [*Bestandstück der Natur*], and is so far from being that, that Nature is possible only as an intentional unity motivated in transcendently pure consciousness by immanent connections. (*Ideas I*, 114–5/107–8; emphasis added)

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<sup>91</sup>A line of reconstruction that is present also in De Boer (1978), cf. also Ricoeur 1967, 14–5, 24ff. To be sure, Fink makes an allusion to the fact that there is something problematic in the presentation of the transcendental reduction in *Ideas I*, but he considers this a matter of “inadequacy,” “inappropriateness,” “equivocality,” or “provisionality” and not of “literally negligence” (1970, 114, 120, 122, 130, 135, 136). A detailed and unprejudiced examination of the matter, however, shows that it is much more complicated. Moreover, as can be seen from Husserl's self-corrections on his personal copies of the *Ideas I* (see *Hua* III.2), we are not dealing with mere mistakes in the presentation of clearly discovered ideas and phenomena, but with an incomplete and problematic conception of that early transcendental phenomenological methodology, which only later gets corrected in another direction. After all, Husserl was struggling to properly cope with the idea of the reductions even as late as 1936 (see his letter to his son Gerhart from February 20, 1936, where he says that only in the *Crisis* had he achieved the first lucid, all-sided, and clear presentation of “the” phenomenological reduction)! With all this, also, I do not mean to claim that Phenomenology can only be done in its monadological transcendental sense, and that we have to accommodate ourselves in its context. See also Chap. 10 in this book.

At first sight, this indeed sounds like an indisputable statement of Husserl's later clear view that transcendental consciousness should not be some part of the whole world, but the all-encompassing, intentionally-transcendentally synthesizing condition for the possibility of this world. As usual, however, appearances are here deceptive. Husserl writes "Nature" not "World." In fact, in the personal so-called "copy D" (1929) of the *Ideas I*, Husserl corrects the phrase "of Nature" so as to read "of the real world!"<sup>92</sup> In the original *Ideas I*, we should not conceive of transcendental consciousness as a part of *Nature*, i.e., of *physical* reality (actuality)—not of the *world* as a whole! From the perspective of the 1920s, however, the fully monadological transcendental consciousness must not be conceived as a part of the *world* as a whole—not of physical reality (even as an alien attachment to it).

That, in the *Ideas I*, Husserl is in confusion with regard to that upon which the transcendental reduction may have its effects—does it apply to Nature, to transcendent 'realities,' or to the totality of the world?—can be seen also at other points. In §33 of the first edition of that work, Husserl writes the following.

What can remain, if the whole world, including ourselves with all our cogitare, is excluded?  
(*Ideas I*, 63/66)

Sometime in the early 1920s, however, in his so-called "copy A" Husserl added this marginal note on this point:

Is the world-all [*Weltall*] not the "all" of whatever exists [*des Seienden überhaupt*]? Is there any sense to ask for that which "remains" [*was "übrig" bleibt*]? As a matter of fact [and from the fully monadological point of view], the expression is objectionable because, having been taken from the world of sensuous reality [read: Nature], it carries with it the thought of doing away with one part of a whole, one part of a real context. [From the fully monadological point of view], [t]he question may, however, *still have a legitimate sense* when stated in the form: What can still be posited as Being [*Sein*] if the world-all, the "all" of reality, remains parenthesized? [The answer should be: what remains is the full monadological consciousness.] (*Ideas I*, 63 n. 3/485; emphasis added)

Perhaps the most convincing evidence is found in the very text of the original edition of the *Ideas I*. On the one hand, Husserl describes the world from the perspective of the natural attitude, including indeed in it the natural world and every human being qua—mundane—human being (be that the one describing the world from the first person perspective or all the other human beings that are given to that person). Moreover, when he prepares us for the introduction to the transcendental epoché and reduction, he explicitly notes that to the meaning of this double process pertains its universality.<sup>93</sup> Thus, the reader may be excused for

<sup>92</sup>See *Ideas I*, 115, n. 46/*Hua* III.2, 500. That, in the 1920s, Husserl corrected the *Ideas I* so as to upgrade them to a fully monadological transcendental level may be seen also from his corrections in §51 and elsewhere. The term "mundane" moreover, appears just once in the *Ideas I* (*Hua* III.1, 109; the English translation has it as "worldly") and refers to a totally *irrelevant* subject matter. In all likelihood, this absence signifies that at that time, Husserl hadn't yet arrived at a clear-cut distinction between the mundane and the fully monadological transcendental (but only to that between the natural and the—unknowably so—mundane transcendental).

<sup>93</sup>This is the story developed in *Ideas I*, §§27–31.



becoming confident that the reconstruction offered by Fink (and Husserl) (1933) and followed by erudite Phenomenology scholars like De Boer 1978, maintaining that already in the *Ideas I* transcendental reduction leaves us with an a-regional,<sup>94</sup> fully monadological transcendental consciousness, is beyond questionability. On the other hand, though, we are immediately caught by surprise.

But with good reason we *limit* the universality of that [transcendental epoché and reduction]. [...] [I]f it were as comprehensible as possible, then no province would be left for [transcendentally] unmodified judgments, to say nothing of a province for science [i.e., Phenomenology as a rigorous science, that would have transcendental consciousness as its proper object "province"]. But our purpose is to discover a new scientific domain [namely, Phenomenology, that will provide us with pure rigorous truths about that which will be left as a *residual ontological province* after the performance of the suitably restricted transcendental reduction, i.e., of the transcendently pure intentional consciousness]. [...] [Therefore] [w]e put out of action the general positing which belongs to the essence of the natural attitude [...] [as especially limited to] *the whole natural world*. (*Ideas I*, 60–1/65; second emphasis added)

In the *Ideas I*, if Phenomenology wants to secure its proper field of research, it must in a way limit the possible universality of the transcendental reduction so as to leave behind, as its residue, transcendental consciousness in the sense of a special region of Being, forgotten in the darkness of some dusty corner of the world.<sup>95</sup> Once again, the latent mundane perspective is panegyrically tracked and uncovered within the constitutional text of Transcendental Phenomenology.

Even though the term "monad" indeed appears sporadically at the time of the "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science" and the *Ideas I*, it does not have its *full* monadological, i.e., a-regional, transcendental sense. In those works, Husserl's conception of the transcendently *functioning* consciousness in terms of monad did not go beyond seeing it as a unity of a *self-enclosed time-field, within which intentional constitution happens* (in passive and active ways).<sup>96</sup> *Self-enclosure* is one characteristic of the monad as unity; a characteristic, nevertheless, that does not yet secure its *non-mundaneity*.<sup>97</sup> The other, and most important characteristic

<sup>94</sup>See Fink 1970, 122; De Boer 1978, 431. See also note 97 below.

<sup>95</sup>Cf., however, Fink 1970, 112.

<sup>96</sup>See *Ideas I*, 193ff./182ff., 283f./273f.

<sup>97</sup>De Boer, mostly following Fink (1933), sees only one mundanity, connected with the *psychological* intentional consciousness of Phenomenological Psychology, the psychological psyche (see De Boer 1978, 168, 175, 245–6, 410). We have seen, however, that mundane may also be the transcendently *functioning* or synthesizing intentional consciousness. Otherwise put, the transcendently functioning, mundane psyche is, properly speaking, nothing else than a (post-eidetic) psychological psyche, the psyche of the Eidetic Phenomenological Psychology that now constitutes otherwise. And this was the case in Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology before the 1920s. De Boer gives us excellent description of the final transcendental reduction and of its outcome: "[What] remains after the transcendental reduction is being itself. It is not the correlate of a mundane consciousness regarded as a region; it is rather the correlate of an *a-regional* consciousness that is the origin of all regions." (1978, 431; emphasis added). He, however, projects this later post-1920 view even back on the *Ideas I*. In the *Ideas I*, though, Husserl still refers to transcendental consciousness as a residuum, as a sphere of Being, and even as a region of Being

of a specifically monadological unity, is *all-inclusiveness*; inclusiveness even of its empirical bodily and psychological, self-objectified version of itself.<sup>98</sup> It is only on this count that the non-mundaneity of the full-fledged, a-regional, monadological, transcendental consciousness has been attained. Before the 1920s, intentional transcendence was effectuated as a transgressing and overcoming of the limits of the abysmal trench surrounding the ‘monad’ as regional self-enclosure, as the entity characterized by “immanent Being.”<sup>99</sup>

From the 1920s point of view, Husserl can see that the epoché and the reduction, understood as “exclusion” of reality, can only mean that transcendental consciousness, which is meant to be left intact after these methodological processes, is left as a mere *residuum*, as a *tiny stretch* or *tiny region* of the previous world-all. And this led to the serious unintelligibility that Husserl explicitly thematized in the “*Britannica* Article.” From the perspective of the fully comprehended monadological transcendental turn, Husserl’s aporetic question in copy A, “What can still be posited as Being [*Sein*] if the world-all, the ‘all’ of reality, remains parenthesized?” (*Ideas* I, 63 n. 3/*Hua* III.2, 485) is fully understandable. Nonetheless, it should have been phrased in a clearer way, so as to move us away from seeing transcendental consciousness as something ‘positive’ standing there (“What can still be posited”), curled down in a corner of the previous world status. We should have been more clearly directed to view it as a total time-like hyper-horizon, within which the happening of the constitution of us qua subjects—having the experience of the actual world and of the founded objectivities—occurs. We are, nonetheless, instructed to ask what remains if we are not to exclude just Nature, but to parenthesize the world in its *totality*. In this case, of course, as the fully monadological Transcendental Phenomenology teaches us, what is left is indeed the *unitary horizon wherein all the functioning and possible intentional correlations take effect* (including the one that I now currently happen to be in, e.g., my currently perceiving that tree over there, or thinking the Pythagorean theorem, together with all my recorded past, my acquired habitualities, and my vaguely projected future in the context of a human community, etc.).

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or generally as some kind of remainder or leftover (see also *Ideas* I, title of the third chapter and §§33, 42, 49, 55, 57, 61, 76). Even at his best, Husserl defines there transcendental consciousness as a *primal region* (*Urregion*) (*Ideas* I, 171/159), i.e., *still* in terms of regions, of a region—and *not* as plainly and simply a-regional field of constitutions as De Boer, echoing Fink (1970, 122), wants it.

<sup>98</sup>It is probably this unnoticed transition that makes De Boer actually *notice* that, at least in the *Idea* (1907), the reduction has a “psychological flavour” (see above note 57). Something analogous, however, must be said even for the “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” (1911), where, in fact, Husserl uses for the first time the term “monad,” and the *Ideas* I (1913). Especially with regard to the view that by “Rigorous Science” Phenomenological Psychology is actually meant, see a further confirmation in *Hua* XXXIV, 4.

<sup>99</sup>See *Ideas* I, 110/104.

Many other corrections and marginal notes from Husserl's personal copies indicate the serious change that his thought underwent in its passing from the *Ideas* I to the way he started reflecting on the issue of transcendental subjectivity in the 1920s.

Naturally, all these back-and-forths with regard to the meaning of the transcendental consciousness as a residuum of the transcendental reduction have their repercussions in the way Husserl conceives of the status of Psychological Phenomenology and Transcendental Phenomenology and the relation between them. And it is no longer a self-evident truth that the progress with regard to the first issue always finds a faithful reflection on the second. In his "*Britannica* Article," Husserl managed to attain a clearer view of how to separate the two 'transcendental' perspectives reconstructed above. Nevertheless, he could not as yet clearly distinguish Science, which, generally speaking, is an a priori or/and a posteriori research of a certain delimited region of beings, from (First) Philosophy, which is not research of such a fraction of what is, but general—even if not necessarily also formal—research into the possibility and constitution of Being and beings of all sorts. Transcendental Phenomenology as First Philosophy (or, let me repeat it, Fundamental Ontology) is not research into the (eidetic or synthesizing) psychic as a region of beings, but into the transcendental syntheses as such or, better, of the intentional correlations as such, i.e., of the field of empty aiming and of intuitively fulfilling time-syntheses.<sup>100</sup> It is only now that Transcendental Phenomenology can properly speak about consciousness' syntheses as happenings in an *a-regional time-field*. And of course, then, this transcendental consciousness is in no way identical with the regional Cartesian ego or the regional psychic consciousness of either the *LI* or the *Ideas* I. Finally, under the conditions here exhibited, Husserl can easily claim that, epistemologically speaking, the analyses of Phenomenological Psychology (Eidetic or Synthetic) can be turned into analyses of Transcendental Phenomenology "word for word" (*Hua* IX, 266, 270). Ontologically, however, the meaning of these words has been drastically and decisively changed; they bear a totally *different sign* (*Hua* IX, 247–8).<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>100</sup>For a moment of relative clarity on this, see, e.g., *Hua* IX, 253.

<sup>101</sup>See also Fink 1970, 119ff., where we can excavate such a distinction between Phenomenological Psychology as a regional science of the mundane psychic and Transcendental Phenomenology as an all-encompassing First Philosophy.

# Chapter 3

## Heidegger and the Phenomenological Reductions in Husserl

With the [sic] phenomenological reduction [Phenomenology] establishes an in principle novel kind of experience, which is not an experience of the world [in the natural attitude], and sets us directly upon the absolute ground, i.e., that of the [fully monadological] 'transcendental subjectivity.' Unfortunately, the 'phenomenological movement' remained blind about this. Almost all the expositions and critical expressions regarding these sides of the reduction are so misleading that I myself can only warn you about them. (E. Husserl: letter to Paul Welch from June 17/21, 1933; transl. mine)

### 3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, we arrived at some important realizations. At least after 1907, Husserl recognized that in the *Phenomenology of the LI* (1901), i.e., in *Eidetic Descriptive or Pure Eidetic Psychology*, elements that were silently presupposed were actually in need of phenomenological clarification and reconsideration. This was also the case with regard to the problematic ontological status of the world, as it is experienced in the natural attitude. In order to overcome this difficulty, Husserl invents the method of transcendental reduction and, on its basis, transforms the *Eidetic Phenomenological Psychology of the LI* into the *Transcendental Phenomenology*, which, in a systematic form, is first expounded in the *Ideas I* (1913). The transcendental reduction is conceived of as a widening and a radicalization in comparison to the possibilities of the psychological reduction that was already at work, albeit silently, in the *LI*.<sup>1</sup> If the psychological reduction leads only to the world as a mere phenomenon, the transcendental achieves something deeper and

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<sup>1</sup>This is evident, e.g., from the way Husserl refers to the *LI*, at least from the perspective of his SS 1925 lectures on *Phenomenological Psychology* (see *Hua IX*, §3); see also Chap. 2, §2.2, 2.3 and 2.5, of the present volume.

more decisive. On the one hand, it offers Phenomenology the means to effectively re-interpret and re-appropriate the question regarding the Being of all intentional objects. On the other hand, it enables Phenomenology to uncover consciousness' deepest time layers of synthesizing functions, where the constitution of whatever actually is happens.

Of course, if Phenomenology is to retain its avowed original novelty, importance, and identity, then phenomenological *intentionality* should be constantly considered as the sound essential mark of consciousness, or of psychic or mental phenomena in general.<sup>2</sup> The transcendental turn should not cancel out intentionality, on pain of Phenomenology's own self-cancellation. According to all the indications Husserl provides for us, this condition seems to be fulfilled, even after that turn. The proof, nonetheless, that all this is actually the case is more easily claimed than it is given and accepted.

Thus, from the moment in his *Ideas* I when Husserl re-defined the whole range of Phenomenology's work, he never stopped refining it, uncovering complications ensuing from the ontological intentional correlation, and overcoming unexpected incomprehensibilities. From the research regarding the role that kinaesthesia plays in the constitution of the meaning and the actuality of the perceptual world—already achieved from the time of the 1907 lecture courses and the *Ideas* II (1912)—up to the genetic ontological analyses on the basis of the pre-given lifeworld, which found their final expression in the texts and manuscripts of the *Crisis* project (1934–1938), he time and again worked painstakingly to shed enough light on all the folds of the issues surrounding transcendental reduction and transcendental constitution.<sup>3</sup>

Despite this, as Husserl repeatedly complained, the meaning of Transcendental Phenomenology was never completely understood by even his closest disciples and collaborators. This is no surprise. As we know, the series of difficulties one must face in the effort to appropriate Husserl's Phenomenology, let alone the passing from the *LI* to the *Ideas* I, are disheartening, if not totally repelling. In Chap. 2, we have already seen and confronted various difficulties in the exposition of the teaching of the reduction, as well as some representative recent misappropriations of the meaning of the transcendental reduction. We have done the same with regard to the specific confusions related to the—notorious—notion of “unintelligibility.” In the present chapter, we will focus on another misappropriation of Husserl's phenomenological method, the one for which Heidegger himself was responsible, and which the Heideggerians continue to follow unquestioningly.

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<sup>2</sup>On the way Husserlian intentionality is understood in this book, see Chap. 2, §§2.2 and 2.3; Chap. 4, §4.7, 4.8, and 4.9; Chap. 5, §5.3 and 5.4; Chap. 6, §6.7.

<sup>3</sup>For more on Husserl's attempted refinements of the details regarding transcendental reduction and its residua, see Chap. 2. In recent times, the unfortunate event of Biemel's critical edition of the *Ideas* I in the *Husserliana* series has contributed to the perpetuation of Husserl's original failure to make himself understood. On this, see Chap. 2, note 45. Here, we will see another reason of the failure.

### 3.2 Husserl's Difficulty in Presenting the Move from the *LI* to Transcendental Phenomenology

In his analyses that followed the *Ideas I*, Husserl desperately tried to guide all those who were still tightly enchained to the enchanting, breakthrough teachings of the *LI* toward the true meaning of Transcendental Phenomenology. In order to do this, he either re-worked older explicatory means or developed new ones. In sum, he used the so-called “three different ways.” More particularly, he used the “Cartesian way,” the way through Phenomenological Psychology and, finally, the way through the sciences and the lifeworld (or “way through ontology”).<sup>4</sup> At the time of his calamitous attempt at a close collaboration with Heidegger, on the occasion of the “*Britannica Article*” project, Husserl had fully developed and used at least the first two of these. In what follows, I will appeal to these in order to explain and assess Husserl's dissatisfaction with the way his transcendental methodology was understood, especially by Heidegger.

In order to do so, though, I must first clarify some crucial points regarding the transition from the *LI* to the Transcendental Phenomenology that was made public in the *Ideas I*. This will enable us to appreciate the general context within which the attempted collaboration between Husserl and Heidegger took place.

As Husserl later remarked, in the *Ideas I* (but also already, somehow, in the *Idea* and later in the *Cartesian Meditations*), he endeavored to make “the” phenomenological reductive method understandable by paralleling and confusedly comparing it with Descartes' method of universal doubt, i.e., by employing the “Cartesian way to transcendental subjectivity” or to Transcendental Phenomenology. He soon realized, though, that the problems with this one-step path to transcendental subjectivity were much greater than the explicative service it provided. In the end, Husserl himself deeply regretted having used this so-called “Cartesian way” to Transcendental Phenomenology.

More particularly, he admitted that this one-step transfer to the transcendental ego had created the wrong impression that the phenomenological transcendental consciousness had the specific sense of the Cartesian *cogito*, and that after the application of the transcendental reduction, consciousness had to be empty of any contents.<sup>5</sup> During the painful process of intellectual maturation, then, Husserl tried to reform and even to replace<sup>6</sup> that one-step monolithic “Cartesian way” with a combined move, consisting precisely in the two known steps of the psychological and the

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<sup>4</sup>See the classic Kern 1977. In its systematic conception, the third way was not made available in any publication before the *FTL* (1929) and, then, in the *Crisis* (1936) and will not be specifically examined here. See, however, Theodorou 2010b.

<sup>5</sup>For this, see *Crisis*, 155/157–8. For what concerns us here the most, i.e., for the adoption of the Cartesian way and its total failure, see also Kern 1977, and especially pp. 130–1.

<sup>6</sup>See also *Hua* III.1, liii; *Hua* VIII, xxxvi n. 5.

transcendental reduction.<sup>7</sup> As we saw in Chap. 2, though, the correct meaning and the precise difference between the psychological and the transcendental reduction are *themselves* issues traceable to the *Ideas I*, and they became clearer in Husserl's own thought progressively, crystallizing only toward the end of the 1920s.

As we can assume, the “Cartesian way” that was employed in the *Ideas I* was actually the ‘natural outcome’ of the fact that Husserl was already, latently or in a self-understandable way, using the psychological reduction in the *Phenomeno*-logy of the *LI*. And the later discovered failure of this “way” made him more conscious of the supposed self-evident meaning of his turn from the *LI* to the *Ideas I*. So, Husserl's move from the “Cartesian way” to the way through Phenomenological Psychology was, in actual fact, a regressive attempt to better explicate what had obscurely appeared in 1913 as a development upon the achievements of 1900–01.

In any case, in the *Ideas I*, the situation was already disastrous on this count. As we saw in the previous chapter (§2.1), Husserl's *marginalia* and research notes (written between 1925 and 1929) on his personal copies of the *Ideas I* alarm us about this state. In 1913, both “the” “phenomenological” ἐποχή (and reduction) and the “transcendental” ἐποχή (and reduction) were presented. In its surprisingly rare appearances, however, the latter was still confusedly understood at the time. Beneath the surface of these methodological moves, though, there were in fact already at least *two* different versions of ἐποχή and reduction silently at play and in interplay. In the original edition of the *Ideas I*, Husserl failed to clearly distinguish the range of jurisdiction and the duties of the phenomenological ‘or’ transcendental reduction from those of the psychological reduction (already mutely in the background of the *LI*). In that work, then, there is an inner tension which runs, mainly, through its third part.<sup>8</sup>

As a whole, though, the circumstances surrounding Husserl's expositions of his itinerary from the *LI* to the *Ideas I* present us with the following situation.

The *LI* concern the species of intentional acts in their structure and their interrelations. Intentionality, in this phase, characterizes the relatedness between the stream of living experiences and the phenomenologically-psychologically meant transcendent phenomena as established in consciousness. The focus of interest is

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<sup>7</sup>This is clear enough in the notorious “*Britannica* Article” (1927) and in the third part of the *Crisis* manuscripts (1935–38) (“The Clarification of the Transcendental Problem and the Related Function of Psychology”). Chapter 2 of the present book was dedicated to the clarification of this issue and its hidden perplexities.

<sup>8</sup>This was made clear in Chap. 2. The meaning of *Ideas I*, §89 offers another occasion. The question there is whether an actual fire can or cannot burn out the tree as noema. Originally, the section had the precarious subtitle “The noema [i.e., the residuum of the transcendental reduction] in the psychological [sic!] sphere.” Expectedly, from the perspective of the D copy (annotated in 1929), Husserl commented with the phrase “The psychological phenomenological reduction,” which indicates that the whole issue should be re-examined by taking into consideration the originally mutely present phenomenological-psychological perspective.

on the mere *phenomena* of the world and its beings as they appear 'within'<sup>9</sup> a psychological sphere of intentional experiences. The supposed sphere of the realistically interpreted 'backing' of these phenomena is put aside and left unexamined. Nevertheless, even if with the psychological reduction the realistic 'subsoil' of the phenomena is not taken into consideration, and even if it is "left out of play," it never ceases to be constantly *presupposed*.

It seems, then, that for the Phenomenological Psychology of the *LI* (and, *mutatis mutandis*, the one unearthenable in the *Ideas I*), there are still two fields of Being. On the one side, there is the field of purely psychical experiences and appearances, where the correlation between intentional acts and intentional transcendently appearing phenomena takes place. On the other side, there is the supposedly self-subsisting but phenomenologically inaccessible realistic field of beings ('behind' or 'under' the phenomena). That is, the purely psychic field of acts with their appearing intentional objects continues to constitute a sphere of Being that stands *next* to (as it were) a simply ignored and supposed realistic counterpart, which 'underpins' it and its phenomena.

On the basis of this latter discussion, then, we can firstly see why and how the more familiar Cartesian point of view, which was also considered a more friendly introduction to the unrecognizably mutated post-*LI* Phenomenology of the *Ideas I*, can make one prone to understanding intentionality as the characteristic of a consciousness *qua res cogitans* 'within' which the mere appearances of the *res extensa* are now contained.<sup>10</sup>

Of course, Husserl had meanwhile also raised the claim that Phenomenology could not remain silent with regard to the supposed realistic dimension of the world and its objects. But the way in which he tried to introduce it to his philosophy appears to have given the things an additional and confusing twist.

As we saw in Chap. 2, in the context of Transcendental Phenomenology, a decisive ontological claim is coined. The phenomena appearing to (but phenomenologically-psychologically also "in") our consciousness are expected to be understood as having the Being of actuality (further specifiable so as to appertain suitably to each kind and level of intentional correlate). From the transcendental-reductive point of view, the common mark of these appearing actual beings is the fact that they are all intentional correlates, constituted in the transcendental consciousness—and, beyond this, nothing. Husserl, then, thought that he had integrated his full possible itinerary as a philosopher, and that he had managed to bring within Phenomenology's range the whole horizon and all the depths of consciousness together with the complete actuality, in all its founding and founded levels of Being.

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<sup>9</sup>This is of course a term exposed to the highest possible potential for misunderstanding. It is responsible for a large number of the confusions surrounding the appropriation of Husserl's philosophy, especially during the period we are now examining. For the proper Husserlian phenomenological meaning of this "within," see Chap. 2, notes 15 and 28.

<sup>10</sup>On the point that Husserl does not understand 'extensionality' in the Cartesian theoretical sense that it has in Geometry, see Chap. 5 and Theodorou 2010b. See also §3.10 below.



But how could something like this be believed or even just followed as a thought when Husserl himself was also teaching two highly problematic things?

On the one hand, the constitution of the appearing beings in their most robust actuality was assigned to a transcendental consciousness like the one disclosed in the *Ideas I*, later discovered to have been simply a *mundane* psyche, i.e., not a fully monadological, transcendental, time-field of intentional syntheses. This, of course, created the problem of the notorious “unintelligibility” discussed in the foregoing chapter.<sup>11</sup>

And, as if this was not enough, the reader of Husserl’s new Transcendental Phenomenology was also called upon to assimilate an additional claim. The aforementioned completion was supposedly arrived at by means of a move called “transcendental reduction,” described as a “bracketing of reality” or as a “putting out of play” of any reality whatsoever, a stepping backwards to the evidence of consciousness. Isn’t it that a guideline like this may indeed be understood as a call for a retreat from any ‘transcendent reality’ back to a consciousness-immanence? Wouldn’t such immanence run the danger of being bereft of any connection to whatever was soundly transcendent? Isn’t it, then, that Husserlian transcendental consciousness becomes at best a traditional representational camera, or at worst a pitch-dark wasteland of total absence?

Through this carelessness, Husserl dealt the final blow to even his most patient reader. Here, of course, Ingarden’s remark that Husserl “was a great analyst, but not as great a synthesizer and systematizer” (1968, 151; trns. mine) finds its most fitting application. Instead of moving his Phenomenology securely ahead, Husserl had unwittingly worked toward its fall into disrepute and desolation. After 1913, all these problems regarding “the” phenomenological “or” transcendental reduction, and thus Phenomenology as such, were to have cumulative negative consequences. As we will see in the following sections, all Husserl’s later efforts to save his Transcendental Phenomenology from fatal misunderstandings arising from the above described complex situation were not enough to undo the damage that had already been done.

To be sure, from the perspective of the late 1920s, when Husserl had indeed achieved greater clarity with regard to his methods and possibilities, Heidegger could have better met the old man’s expectations for help and collaboration. The historical records, however, show unmistakably that Heidegger was neither in the position to help, and nor did he really want to engage in such a project any more.

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<sup>11</sup>I here offer the following brief reminder. “Phenomenological Psychology” refers to epistemological phenomenological analyses conducted after the phenomenological-psychological reduction, and may presuppose either the eidetically constituting intentional psyche of the *LI*, or the mundane transcendently synthesizing psyche of Husserl’s first transcendental turn (1905/1907 until the beginning of the 1920s). In Chap. 2, we also saw that “Transcendental Phenomenology” refers to epistemological and ontological phenomenological analyses conducted after the transcendental-phenomenological reduction, and may presuppose either a mundane or a monadological version of a transcendently synthesizing consciousness—with the mundane leading to incomprehensibilities that are lifted by the monadological. See also §§3.9 and 3.10 in the present chapter.

### 3.3 Husserl's Rejection of Heidegger's Understanding of the Reduction(s)

Let us now move on to the issues that will be our direct concern. Immediately after the completion of the “*Britannica* Article” project (1927) and the effort toward a closer collaboration with Heidegger, Husserl hastens to carry over to his disciple and friend Roman Ingarden a very disappointing as well as alarming discovery. In the relevant letter, of December 26, 1927, we read the following.

The new Encyclopedia article has given me a lot of trouble, chiefly because *once again and in an original way*, I thought through my fundamental [methodological] procedure and carefully arrived at the conclusion that Heidegger, as I now have to believe, *has not understood this procedure nor, consequently, the whole sense of the method of the [sic!] phenomenological reduction*. (cited by Kisiel and Sheehan 2006, 388; trns. sl. md., emphases added)

A thorough examination of the events and the texts connected with the “Article” makes it clear that this statement of Husserl's concerns the meaning of the *transcendental* phenomenological reduction—especially from the perspective of the late 1920s.<sup>12</sup> In the following, we will consider what Husserl might have meant by this crucial remark.<sup>13</sup>

The confusion that Heidegger experiences<sup>14</sup> with regard to the inner itinerary of Phenomenology actually starts from the problem that anyone faces in trying to figure out how the militant anti-psychologism of the *Prolegomena* (1900) coheres

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<sup>12</sup>Let it be noted here that even though the letter was written after the completion of the fourth version of the *Artikel*, where Husserl devoted a special effort to elucidating the distinction between the psychological and the transcendental phenomenological reductions, and this on the occasion of his will to arrive at a mutual understanding with Heidegger on the issue, vis-à-vis the fortunate prospect of an authoritative first-hand presentation of Phenomenology to the English-speaking world, Husserl again refers rather carelessly to “the” phenomenological reduction, with no further specifications. Clues to his problems with Heidegger's understanding of “the” reduction and of his Phenomenology can also be found in Husserl's letter to Pfänder, on January 6, 1931.

<sup>13</sup>It is usually thought that Husserl's statement was a mere expression of his bitterness about Heidegger's abrupt alienation, after his takeover of the chair of philosophy at Freiburg (succeeding Husserl). As I hope will become clear, this view does not exhaust the whole issue, especially in 1927, and Husserl has real reasons for his complaint. Moreover, it is self-understandable that the results of these sections, against the possible misconceptions of Husserl's transcendental reduction, equally concern e.g., Biemel (1977) and all the interpreters following the received Heideggerian criticism of Husserl's reduction(s), such as e.g., the influential Dreyfus (1982, 1991). See also §3.7 below.

<sup>14</sup>It is remarkable that, in his “My Way to Phenomenology” (1963), Heidegger himself explicitly admits that quite often his passing through Husserl's work left him in “perplexity” and “confusion” (see *TB*, 78/97; also Moran and Mooney 2002, 251ff.)—at least, as he says, before he had met Husserl in person. As we already saw in Husserl's letter to Ingarden, though, it was perhaps only Heidegger's impression that this confusion was totally dissolved after he met with the “old man” (some of Husserl's students did indeed refer to him using this expression, e.g., Heidegger in his letter, of May 8, 1923, to Löwith).

with the analyses of living experiences (even if intentional) in the main part of the *LI* (1901). How can an analysis of living experiences be non-psychological (non-*psychologistic*)? Heidegger informs us that he found the answer to this question, regarding the content and meaning of the *LI*, only in 1913, when he studied the *Ideas I*.<sup>15</sup> But this can only be a telling misunderstanding. So, in what sense could Heidegger's reading of "the" phenomenological qua transcendental reduction in the *Ideas I* have determined his understanding of Husserl's Phenomenology, especially its passing from the eidetic-constitutive to the transcendental-constitutive version and from the psychological-reductive to the transcendental-reductive versions?

### 3.4 Heidegger General Background Relation to Husserl's Works

#### 3.4.1 Heidegger's Search for the Meaning of Phenomenology's Anti-Psychologism: Pure and Empirical Psychology

Before anything else, the solution to the problem of compatibility between the anti-psychologistic *Prolegomena* and the analyses in terms of living experiences in the main part of the *LI* exists within the *LI* itself, even if not quite as clearly as we might like. The analyses there in terms of living experiences are not psychologistic—they do not concern psychological occurrences or neuro-psychological processes—in the following three senses. First, the analyses are conducted under the silent application of the psychological reduction, i.e., they abstain from the possible (realistic) physical ground upon which even living experiences may 'lean.' Second, the analyses do not focus on the actual contents of the stream of living experiences (the "Heraclitian flux" of the *reell* contents of consciousness), but are turned toward what Husserl discovered as the "intentional interpretation" of these contents or sense-giving moments of the act (i.e., on the level of full-fledged, i.e., properly *intentional*, living experiences). The contents of the stream are interpretatively unified into the transcendently appearing intentional beings (qua transcendent phenomena) in a way that is normatively conditioned vis-à-vis the truthful appearance (or non-appearance) of the thusly aimed-at correlates. Third, Husserl's aim in the *LI* is not the development of an empirical, inductive Philosophical Psychology, but, as we already saw in Chap. 2, the building of an a priori, Eidetic-Descriptive<sup>16</sup> Philosophical Psychology, i.e., of an Eidetic Phenomenological Psychology. What this means

<sup>15</sup>See *TB*, 76–7/95–6; also Moran and Mooney 2002, 252.

<sup>16</sup>Husserl's subsequent regret about his characterization of the analyses in the *LI* as "descriptive" is well-known. It is not at all uncommon, though, to find (even nowadays) phenomenologists being tortured by this question: how can Phenomenology, e.g., that of the *LI*, be *descriptive* and still claim to have discovered *necessary* laws regarding its subject matter? The answer must be this: Phenomenology describes species (εἶδη), *essences*; essential structures (not particulars in their

is that Phenomenology, even in the *LI*, wasn't offering inductive generalizations regarding observable regularities of psychological occurrences (or even of psychic interpretations), as the natural sciences offer inductive generalizations (when they do only this) about the observable regularities of natural phenomena. Eidetic (or, more generally, Phenomenological) Psychology, is not a search for lawfulness based on either outer perception or "inner perception" qua "introspection" of the particular phenomena and the properties that we happen to encounter as constantly accompanying them and their behavior. The laws discoverable by generalizations based on this kind of observation say only what is usually/constantly observed to happen, and amount to what in philosophy of science are known as *empirical laws*. The latter, then, cannot found *necessary truths* and, if they are contents of a Psychology, they cannot found the normative laws of Logic, Mathematics, and (hopefully) of Axiology and Ethics. Any effort to the contrary leads to the psychologization of these disciplines and the abolition of their core meaning. In the six *LI*, though, Husserl is actually involved in a "reflective" and eidetic search for the necessary laws of intentional phenomena, i.e., of the eidetic truths or of the laws of essence, which we met in Chap. 2, §2.6.1.<sup>17</sup> The "is" that Phenomenological Psychology discovers there, then, is not that of an accidental inductive generalization after an external observation of particulars; it is the "is" of essential necessity. Thus, to put it this way, the eidetic-descriptive (i.e., essential) "is" indeed manages to ground the normative "ought," which is to be found in the so-called "normative matheses," e.g., in Logic, etc. This is the idea of Husserl's achievement in the long arguments of the *Prolegomena* (1900), and it is carefully applied throughout the *LI*.

Moreover, it is clear—and this can be found also in Husserl's lecture course on "Phenomenological Psychology" and in the versions of the "*Britannica* Article"—that epistemologically, the eidetic should precede the empirical, in the specific sense that the first constitutes a priori the field of the objectivities that can then be recognized by the second as its own proper research area. In Husserl's terminology, Pure Phenomenological Psychology *founds* Empirical Psychology. In Kant's terminology, Pure Phenomenological Psychology would amount to the necessary special *Metaphysics* for Empirical Psychology as a posteriori, inductive research.<sup>18</sup>

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accidental make up and behavior). Thus, it is Eidetic-Descriptive. What, from this perspective "is," is *necessarily* so.

<sup>17</sup>On all this, see also *LI* 5, §§5, 13, 27; *LI* 6, §44; Appendix to the *LI*, §§2–4; *Ideas* I, §§41, 46, 75–78. See also McDonnell 2012.

<sup>18</sup>Let me, however, mention a critical difference here. In his Preface of the *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft* (1786), Kant states that in a mathesis there is as much science as the Mathematics that can be found in it; which means that, for him, *no* science of the psychic is possible. From the point of view of Kant's philosophy of science, exactitude is co-extensive with the mathematical and, since no Mathematics of the psychic is possible, no science is possible for it either. Thus, for him, Psychology was destined to be a mere "historical," i.e., merely narrative discipline, not capable of even mere metaphysically ungrounded, (exact) inductive generalizations. Husserl agrees that there is no Mathematics of the psychic (see *Ideas* III, 38/43–4; *Ideas* I, §72).

Be that as it may, in the *Ideas I* (1913), Husserl had already moved far away from the *LI*, persuaded that he had found the road to overcoming the narrowness of their merely epistemological scope (i.e., their restriction to the eidetically constituting psychological psyche and its merely appearing intentional objects) and their methodological naiveté (abstention from any question regarding the realistic Being irrespectively of particular regions). In his work of 1913, Husserl was no longer answering a problem regarding the inner consistency in the *LI*, which had already been done in a magisterial way in the earlier work. In the *Ideas I*, Husserl thought that he had finally discovered the road to transforming Phenomenology from Pure (Eidetic) Psychology or phenomenologico-psychological epistemology into a complete ontology, having the right to talk positively about Being and actual existence.<sup>19</sup>

### 3.4.2 *Heidegger's Search for the Meaning of Husserl's Transcendental Reduction*

Let us now pass to our central concern. As a whole, in his criticisms of Husserl, Heidegger basically takes into consideration the former's publications starting from the *LI* and ending with the *Ideas I*, with an intermediate stop at the "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science" (1911). In Chap. 2, and briefly here (§3.2), we saw what the character of Husserl's analyses in the *LI* was. The question then is: could Heidegger have found in the "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science" any substantial clues for a proper understanding of Husserl's transcendental reduction?

In that latter essay, Husserl explicitly announces a rigorous science of the purely psychic, which is distinguished from Empirical Psychology qua inductive, a posteriori, experimental research of the possibly accompanying neuro-biological occurrences. In the "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science" too, then, Phenomenology is basically research into the essential morphology or structure of intentional living experiences, of their interrelations, and of the transcendent phenomena appearing

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However, his eidetic phenomenological analyses are introduced as a way of arriving at *rigorous* (*streng*) concepts of even *inexact*, non-mathematical and non-mathematizable, i.e., *morphological* essences, like "living experience," "perception," "memory," etc. On this ground, Husserl, who generally follows Kantian guidelines in the philosophy of science, moves further than Kant and suggests the possibility of a Phenomenological Psychology as a *rigorous science*. On the basis of this, then, Heidegger correctly remarks that, as a model for a priori research, Phenomenology should not at all be considered as less *streng* (rigorous) than Mathematics; on the contrary, *exact* Mathematics should just be considered as *enger* (narrower) than such a novel form of science (see the closing of §32 in *BT*).

<sup>19</sup>Of course, we should remember that this was done in the special way we have seen, i.e., in the way of a mundane Transcendental Phenomenology, which, in the end, could be either an unintelligible ontology (an unintelligibility that was overcomable, to Husserl's mind of the late 1920's, by the monadologization of transcendental consciousness) or an intelligible 'Synthetic' (no longer Eidetic) Phenomenological Psychology.

in them, without actually dealing with the question regarding their possible realistic 'backing.'<sup>20</sup>

As we realize from the above, and from the "*Britannica* Article,"<sup>21</sup> before the *Ideas* I, Heidegger faced a Phenomenology qua (Pure or A Priori) Eidetic Phenomenological Psychology (next to any empirical Psychology). And, as we saw earlier, he was able to do so only by way of forcing himself to project the spirit of the 'less enigmatic' *Ideas* I back upon the 'enigmatic' *LI*. It would not be an exaggeration, then, to claim that Heidegger in fact always remains attached to—if not trapped within—the charm and mystery of the *LI*, especially his "beloved" sixth *LI*. He does, however, also appeal to the *Ideas* I as a work that brings with it a kind of clarification of the *LI*, but he thinks (as we will see later in this chapter) this is done at the cost of some unfaithfulness to Phenomenology's original spirit.<sup>22</sup>

In what sense, then, could the *Ideas* I (with the announcement of the turn to Transcendental Phenomenology by means of "the" phenomenological qua transcendental reduction) have shaped Heidegger's negative estimation of Husserl's transcendental turn and of its effect on the spirit of original Phenomenology?

As we saw, Heidegger's above-mentioned autobiographical note does, on the one hand, register the positive contribution of the *Ideas* I to his overall understanding of Husserl's original Phenomenology. As he says, only in the *Ideas* I did Heidegger realize that "'Pure Phenomenology' is the 'grounding science' of philosophy that is now marked by Phenomenology." (*TB*, 77/96; trns. md.). On the other hand, the *Ideas* I also had a negative impact, and he writes that in that work, "However, the 'subjectivity' of the knowing, acting and valuing subject [. . .] consciously and decidedly moved into the [Cartesian] tradition of modern philosophy" (ibid.). The *Ideas* I, moreover, by understanding this subjectivity as transcendental, show that "Phenomenology retained 'experiences of consciousness' as its thematic realm, but now in the systematically planned and secured investigation of the [synthesizing] structure of acts of experience, together with the investigation of the objects *lived-through in those acts* with regard to their objectivity [*der in den Akten erlebten Gegenstände hinsichtlich ihrer Gegenständlichkeit*]" (ibid.; trns. md.).

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<sup>20</sup>In Chap. 2 (note 57 and §2.7.1) we saw that, even though the *Idea* and the "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science" belong to the period after Husserl's first transcendental turn (1905–1907), they retain a "psychological flavour," as De Boer has put it. Especially with respect to the transcendental ambitions of the *Idea* (and this both in terms of the ontological scope and the form of intentional constitution), the *Logos* essay amounts to a regressive programmatic restatement of an agenda silently residing within the *LI*. Husserl seizes the opportunity of a self-presentation in the Kantian journal, and tries to show how Eidetic Phenomenology could benefit those projects in Empirical Psychological research that were at that time being clumsily developed. See also the references in the previous note.

<sup>21</sup>On this, see *Hua* IX, 257; *GA* 20, 137.

<sup>22</sup>See also Moran and Mooney 2002, 251ff.

Now, what might all this mean? Is it right that Husserl's transcendental consciousness is a Cartesian *cogito*? Are the transcendently reduced intentional objects mere lived-through contents? Have the intentionally transcendent world and its objects been annihilated?

### 3.5 Heidegger's Palpable Confusion With Regard to the Reduction(s)

One of the sub-sections of the first half of the second version of the "Britannica Article"—half of which was written by Heidegger, after Husserl's invitation to do so—has the title "(a) The phenomenological-psychological reduction" (*Hua* IX, 260). (Biemel, editor of the *Hua* IX volume, where this article appears, notes that this "-psychological" was added by Heidegger only to the B1 copy of that version—probably after discussion with Husserl.) In one of his notes in his translation of that version of the article, Sheehan makes the following correlation (which, nevertheless, remains totally unexploited): "In 1925,"<sup>23</sup> he tells us, "Heidegger called this reduction 'the first stage within the process of the phenomenological reductions' <note the plural> and referred to it as 'the so-called *transcendental* reduction'" (*PTP*, 113; emphasis added).<sup>24</sup> As we will see in what follows, this rather paradoxical remark of Sheehan's is correct only from the point of view of the way in which Heidegger himself understood the concept of "the" reduction. Instead of thematizing the fundamental problem behind the two reductions, the psychological and the transcendental, Sheehan merely reports that the reduction mentioned by Heidegger in his half-finished version of the article as "psychological-" was *also* called by him "transcendental." Moreover, Sheehan brings to the reader's attention the plural ("reductions") in Heidegger's text from 1925, so as to stress the fact that, from his own (Sheehan's) point of view, Heidegger shouldn't have written "reductions," since, as it is supposedly shown from the perspective of the "Article," there aren't "reductions," but only one phenomenological reduction, which may be called either "psychological" *or* "transcendental." Unfortunately, it seems that it is Heidegger who should be blamed for misguiding Sheehan in how to understand Husserl's ideas regarding the phenomenological method. I will try to explain this a bit further.

When Heidegger, in his 1925 lecture course (*PHCT*), says that the reduction he was presenting was the "first stage in the process of the phenomenological reductions," what he means is of course not that he was also about to introduce his students to the transcendental reduction as the "second" reduction. Indeed,

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<sup>23</sup>Here, and in all other cases, the acutangular brackets are by the original editor or translator. Sheehan refers to Heidegger's 1925 lecture course "Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time" (*PHCT*).

<sup>24</sup>Heidegger's phrases cited here in this passage are, of course, from Heidegger's lecture course "Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time" (*PHCT*, 100/137).



Heidegger there presented as “first” what he called *transcendental* reduction (which was generally understood as ‘the’ phenomenological reduction). However, the aforementioned plural is totally justified, since as the immediate context of the passage explicitly shows,<sup>25</sup> after that first phenomenological reduction, Heidegger wanted to introduce his students to the *eidetic* reduction (which is, of course, as phenomenological as both the psychological and the transcendental ones are). But is the transcendental reduction of which Heidegger spoke in 1925 identical to the *psychological* one, according to the terminology he had to use in the 1927 “Article”? Of course not! And, in fact, the whole “*Britannica* Article” project marked the final breakdown of Husserl’s philosophical relation with Heidegger, because they didn’t manage to move beyond this level of speaking at cross-purposes.

Heidegger’s understanding of Husserl’s phenomenological methodology remained problematic and, in the end, this made any possibility of communication impossible. We can see this from Heidegger’s most systematic presentation of Husserl’s Phenomenology in his *PHCT* (1925). More specifically, it is worth examining more closely what Heidegger, Phenomenology’s “*Wunderkind*,” has to say with regard to the “first phenomenological” ‘or’ “transcendental” reduction, as a method of getting access to some “pure” consciousness as the field of Phenomenology’s investigation. (All the passages are from *PHCT*.)

[T]he aim is to discover a new scientific domain. This new region is called the region of pure lived experiences, of *pure consciousness with its pure correlates*, the region of the *pure ego*. This region is a new domain of objects. (95–6/131). [...] [T]his wholeness of the stream of experience, as a self-contained totality, excludes everything, that is, every real [*reale*] object, beginning with the entire material world [*materielle Welt*]. Over against the region of lived experiences, the material world is alien, other. (97/133). [...] [C]onsciousness [...] is [...] in reality [*realiter*] one with the [real] nature in the concretion of every factual living being (man); but at the same time consciousness is also separated from it by an absolute gulf. [...] Now this separation into two spheres of being is remarkable precisely because the sphere of immanence, the sphere of lived experience, establishes the possibility within which the transcendental world, separated from it by a gulf, can become objective at all. [...] How is the drawing out and highlighting of consciousness as an *independent region* of lived experiences, as an independent region of being, still possible? (98/134; emphasis added) [...] [The answer is that] in *reflexion* I am directed toward a particular experience [...] such as that of perceiving a thing, I am thematically focused upon the perception *and not upon the perceived*. [...] This way of considering the act and its object is *not a transcendent apprehension of the thing* itself. I [...] do not ‘go along with’ the concrete perception [...] but [I live] in the attitude of the immanent reflective apprehension of perceiving the chair, not in the thesis<sup>26</sup> [*Thesis*] of the material world, but in [the reflexion on] perception and [...] its object *as it is there in the act*. This ‘not going along with’ the thesis of the material world *and of every transcendent world* is called *ἐποχή*, refraining. [...] This bracketing [...] has [...] the sense of making the Being-character [*Seinscharakter*] of the entity present [...] of making the entity present in regard to its Being. (99/135–6; emphases added) [...] I thus envisage the acts and their objects in terms of *how they are presumed* [*im Wie ihres Vermeintseins*] in the acts. This securing of the sphere of acts [in the way just explicated] [...] is called *reduction*. [...] This is the first stage within the process of

<sup>25</sup>See *PHCT*, 100/137.

<sup>26</sup>Read: positing.



phenomenological reductions [...] [the] so-called *transcendental reduction*; the reduced field is [...] that of *my stream of consciousness*. (99–100/136–7; emphases added) [...] [This] pure consciousness is the field which Descartes glimpsed under the heading of *res cogitans*. (101/139)

How could Husserl's philosophy have hoped for any better fate, if his avowed spokesman, his most authoritative representative (according to Husserl's own attestation), was teaching it along the fundamental lines presented above?

Phenomenology (without further specifications) returns reflectively, by a backward and inward move, to a regional pure (without further specifications) consciousness or pure (without further specifications at first) *ego*, which is a self-enclosed unity of streaming lived experiences,<sup>27</sup> with no connection any more with the real world *itself*, qua transcendently appearing actuality. This is supposedly the result of our “not going along with” the positing of the realistically real world (in the context of the pre-phenomenological natural attitude), a stance that Heidegger equates with the turn of our gaze from the perceptual thing to the perceiving, or to the perceivedness of the thing. In the latter, we no longer have the transcendently appearing, actual thing, but the thing in the how of its appearance, or in its Being-character, or in its being-meant, or in terms of its constituting factor, or, we may add (following Husserl's analyses in the *LI* and in the first publication of the *Ideas I*) in its *sense (Sinn)*—understood, at best, as the universal factor prescribing the form of an empty aiming that struggles to be established rather than as something particular. The reduction that is responsible for this new stance is equated by Heidegger with the “so-called transcendental reduction,” which leads us also to a pure consciousness that is, now, no other than Descartes' *res cogitans*, the isolated immanent world-edge of the thinking reality next to the sphere of extended reality that is, moreover, stricken through by “universal doubt.” When, in the *Crisis*, Husserl made the bitter remark we saw him making earlier (§3.2) regarding his “Cartesian way,” he was absolutely right (but also a bit delayed).

In the “*Britannica Article*” (1927), Heidegger has not really moved beyond this horizon. And when, next to that first phenomenological reduction which is “the so-called transcendental reduction,” he has to add that there is a second novel reduction, different from the “second” of 1925 (i.e., different from the eidetic), he realizes that he is facing a very painful situation. Heidegger hadn't followed the evolution of Husserl's thought toward the deepening of his self-understanding regarding the transcendental-phenomenological methodology, especially the latter's ripening after the first publication of the *Ideas I* and during the 1920s.<sup>28</sup> It is only because of this

<sup>27</sup>From this point of view, Phenomenology's analyses do not concern the purely psychological, transcendently appearing *phenomena* of objects, but objects that in an unspecified—if not paradoxical—sense are “lived-through in those acts [der in den Akten erlebten Gegenstände]” in some vague “regard to their objectivity [hinsichtlich ihrer Gegenständlichkeit]” (*TB*, 77/96; trnsl. md.). To use a Nietzschean expression here: *incipit tragoedia!*

<sup>28</sup>As we saw in Chap. 2, Husserl comes to a deeper understanding of the transcendental-phenomenological methodology and to a fully intelligible and truly ontological understanding of Transcendental Phenomenology only after the late 1920s. Then, moreover, as we can conclude on

that, in 1927, Heidegger seems to have been caught in an unexpected throttling clinch by Husserl. For how should he treat the first phenomenological reduction of his first part of the second version of the *Britannica* article (which, in the B1 copy of his manuscript, was marked as “psychological”) if in 1925 he considered the “first” phenomenological reduction to be the “so-called” transcendental reduction? A real mess indeed!

In what follows, we will encounter additional evidence that will help us overcome these fatal misunderstandings, which continue to leave Phenomenology internally divided and unbearably introvertive.

## 3.6 The *Residua* of the Phenomenological Reductions in Heidegger and Husserl

### 3.6.1 Heidegger’s Faulty Understanding and his Final Stance

As becomes clear from Heidegger’s relevant references in 1925 and 1927,<sup>29</sup> he essentially never updated his connection with Husserl’s developing thought after his study of the *Ideas* I (1913). Thus, Heidegger’s knowledge of an explicit phenomenological reduction concerned the generally “phenomenological” (or vaguely, “transcendental,”) reduction that Husserl used for his analyses in the *Ideas* I. That generally phenomenological reduction can be “first” only with regard to the eidetic reduction. From 1901 until 1927, then, Heidegger was, in “confusion,” trying to assimilate Husserl’s Phenomenology on at least these three counts.

- (a) He somehow managed to solve his open problems with the consistency of the *LI* by searching the content of the *Ideas* I.
- (b) He unsuccessfully tried to understand Husserl’s *transcendental* turn as it was expressed, basically, in the *Ideas* I.
- (c) He unsuccessfully tried to make sense—especially in 1927—of the newly appearing to him “phenomenological *psychological*” reduction, in relation to the phenomenological transcendental reduction.

The confusion, of course, was not totally unjustified. As we have seen, Husserl himself admitted that the one-step transition to Transcendental Phenomenology,

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the basis of what was said in Chap. 2 and up to this point in the present chapter, epistemological transcendentalism (Synthetic Phenomenological Psychology) is distinguished from the really ontological transcendentalism of either the unintelligible mundane or the intelligible monadological sort. (The intelligibility of the latter is recognized from Husserl’s own point of view and should not be a kind of unquestionable orthodoxy for all Phenomenology. On this, see also Chap. 10.) Cf. also the present account of this section and the relevant analyses of §3.4.1 above here, along with Crowell 2002a.

<sup>29</sup>See *PHCT*, 121–2/167–8; Heidegger’s letter of October 22, 1927 to Husserl (*Hua* IX, 600).

via the monolithic “Cartesian way,” was responsible for much confusion among his readers and students, regarding the meaning and scope of that version of phenomenological philosophizing. And what we saw in the previous chapter with regard to the development of Husserl’s thought on phenomenological methodology also provides ample reasons for such confusion.

Facing all these difficulties, Heidegger seems to have understood transcendental reduction in a way determined by the situation that was sketched earlier, in §3.2. In the *LI*, Heidegger’s favorite and—in many respects the most acceptable—phenomenological work of Husserl’s, it becomes clear at some point that Phenomenology does not examine the real (realistic) thing, but only the intentionally appearing thing.<sup>30</sup> This, of course, means that a certain restriction is already presupposed in Phenomenology’s methodology. In the *Ideas I*, however, Heidegger is caught by an unpleasant, so to speak, surprise: he reads that Phenomenology must now perform a phenomenological ‘or’ – still confusedly – ‘transcendental’ epoché and reduction, in which we put into brackets the world, and that, by means of a process called “experiment of world-annihilation” (*Weltvernichtung*), we can prove that, whereas the transcendent world is *annihilatable*, transcendental consciousness will always remain *intact* as an “absolute” sphere of Being.

Bearing in mind Heidegger’s itinerary in Phenomenology, it seems reasonable to conclude that, for him, the Transcendental Phenomenology announced and developed in the *Ideas I* demands the application of a method that instructs us to erase or annihilate even the faded remains of the transcendent world, still allowed in the *LI*, in order to retreat and to find final refuge in a desolate consciousness that has lost any foothold in the transcendent world. In Heidegger’s eyes, then, Husserl’s Phenomenology absolutely betrays itself. In its transcendental rendering, Phenomenology seems to totally strike-through the transcendently appearing world and its beings, in order to lead us back to an empty consciousness deprived of its original characteristic mark, its very *intentionality*! At best, it is left with its immanent *cogitationes* (mere *reell* living experiences, mere aimings, mere possibilities of intentional aiming and intentional correlation) much like what happens with Descartes’ *cogito*. Thus, transcendental reduction’s residuum, i.e., transcendental consciousness, may be thought to remain, after all, practically empty. If the transcendental reduction is an anxious bugle for retreat to safety and to familiarity, to our most intimate ownness, then not only the realistic reality is abandoned but also the transcendent phenomena that were left still intact in the *LI*.

The notorious world-annihilation experiment makes all this even more persuasive. After its involvement in the project of the transcendental turn, the impression that the transcendental-phenomenological methodology wants from us the abolition

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<sup>30</sup>On this, see also Chap. 2, note 12. From the perspective of the ontological *Ideas I*, Husserl, of course, changed his mind and abandoned the basically Brentanian idea that was present in the first edition of the *LI*. Phenomenology precedes Physics and any other empirical science of any kind of reality and shows that all Being is Being constituted in transcendental consciousness (see *Ideas I*, §52).

of the transcendent world and our backward turn into an actually empty consciousness can be easily formed. When one lacks a clear distinction between psychological and transcendental reduction, Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology, and psychologically and transcendentally pure consciousness, then transcendental consciousness in the *Ideas I* is thought to be the poor remnant and faint shadow of the intentional consciousness introduced in the *LI*. It becomes a worldless self-enclosed region of sterile stirring of ineffective attempts at syntheses upon ‘raw material’ of a disappearing (or in any case inscrutable and enigmatic) origin. This would indeed then mean that Transcendental Phenomenology blatantly betrays and deserts the grounding arch-principle of Phenomenology: the idea of intentionality and intentional transcendence to an appearing world with beings.

In Heidegger’s relevant lecture courses of 1925 and 1927, we can trace a certain wavering in the way he presents intentionality in Husserl’s Phenomenology. On a charitable approach, this can be explained on the basis of the problem regarding the understanding of the latter’s systematic transition from the *LI* to the *Ideas I*.<sup>31</sup> In the *PHCT* (1925), Husserlian intentionality is presented positively, as an overcoming of the corresponding traditional concept that Brentano had inherited from the Scholastics (*PHCT*, §§4.e-5). Husserlian intentionality secures continuous contact with the world, thus solving the traditional epistemological problem of bridging ‘mind and reality.’ In the *BPP* (1927), the misunderstandings of the concept of intentionality which Heidegger attacks are: (a) that which considers intentionality as a *relation*, and (b) that according to which intentionality makes possible a transcendence toward the world, in the sense of a move starting from an *inwardness* in order to arrive at an *outwardness* (*BPP*, §9). Neither of these two cases can refer to Husserl and, especially with regard to the second, Heidegger remarks that it refers to the *non-phenomenological* philosophies. In *Being and Time* (1927), however, the stance reconstructed above takes full shape. It is clear that Heidegger’s allusion there, that a *reductive* effort to free ourselves from *all* presuppositions would leave us with a “worldless ego,” (*BT*, 190–1/205–6) has as its addressee none other than Husserl.

### 3.6.2 *Husserl’s Actual Intentions With the World-Annihilation*

Nonetheless, as we know from the second chapter of this book, this picture is erroneous. Transcendental reduction simply wants to bring to light that which previously lay hidden: the ultimate time-structures upon which the intentional correlation between conscious, rule-governed, synthesizing acts and transcendentally appearing, actual object-unities happens. In this sense, transcendental reduction

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<sup>31</sup>And not, say, on that of an inner struggle between Heidegger’s documented frenzy to surpass Husserl and his expression of a deep awareness of his great debt to him.

does not lead us to a cabinet-like consciousness experiencing nothing, but to the very always-already-established intentional correlations, where actuality itself, in all its kinds of Being, gets constituted.

The experiment of the world-annihilation, so crucial after all for a proper understanding of the transcendental turn in Husserl's Phenomenology, indeed leaves us facing the limit-experience of a sheer self-enclosed emptiness. But this is done only in order to draw our attention to the ceaselessly functioning transcendental consciousness, within which the givenness of the world (with its beings) in its Being is, in the end, accomplished in internally harmonious, intentional syntheses. The realistic conception of the world (and its beings) is, then, proved to be the result of a naïve, erroneous absolutizing interpretation of this appearing world.

The thought experiment of world-annihilation, which intervenes in the process of transcendental reduction, does not signal a further and more radical retreat in immanence than that of the psychological reduction. It does not mean that consciousness, after having first just suspended the question regarding the reality of the transcendent world (in the psychological reduction), now refuses even to acknowledge this transcendently appearing world, in order to be awkwardly led to the elimination of its own very intentionality and, thus, of its essential make-up. Contrary to the widespread view, with the transcendental epoché and reduction, Husserl wants to make consciousness' 'ties' with the transcendent world in its actuality as manifest and robust as is phenomenologically possible—'ties,' which, in this special meaning, were at first simply left out of play.<sup>32</sup>

The [transcendental] epoché in respect to all *natural* [*natürlichen*] human life-interests *appears to be* a turning-away [*Abwendung*] from them (which is, by the way, one of the most common misunderstandings of the transcendental epoché). But *if it were meant in this way, there would be no transcendental inquiry*. How could we take perception and the perceived, memory and the remembered, the objective and every sort of verification [*Bewährung*] of the objective, including art, science, and philosophy, as transcendental theme without living through these sorts of things as examples and indeed with <their> self-evidence [regarding their original transcendent appearance and their transcendental-phenomenologically re-interpreted natural reality, i.e., actuality]? (*Crisis*, 176/179–80; emphases added)

After the transcendental reduction, the world remains solidly connected with the field and the constituting possibilities of transcendental consciousness, with the transcendental time-field, where the world is constituted in its sense (*Sinn*), validity (*Geltung*), and Being (*Sein*). Within this attitude, the world or, perhaps more accu-

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<sup>32</sup>Cf. Moran 2005, 241. Regarding the world-annihilation thought experiment, see *Ideas* I, §§31, 49–50; see also the explanations offered here in Chap. 2, §2.4. On the relation between epoché and reduction and their combined function, see Chap. 2, §2.1, 2.3. In the Husserlian bibliography, the thesis that with the transcendental reduction Phenomenology re-gains the whole world in its Being was stressed for the first time by Fink in 1933 (1970). On this, see also Merleau-Ponty's relevant remark that reduction (here read: world annihilation experiment) "steps back to watch the forms of transcendence fly up like sparks from a fire; it slackens the intentional threads which attach us to the world and thus brings them to our notice" (Merleau-Ponty 1962, xv).

rately, the beings of this or that specific worldliness,<sup>33</sup> appear as transcendently constituted transcendent correlates. They appear, that is, as *noemata*—i.e., first of all as the things experienced in the “threshold intentionality” of simple sensory perception and, ascending up to the acts of higher order, as the objectivities aimed at in them (and perhaps also intuitively given) as founded upon perception in this or that way. The world no longer appears in the context of the ontological interpretation (understanding) dictated by the positivity and the general positing (*Generalthesis*) of the natural attitude. It now appears as intentionally constituted in the one or the other intentional correlation, but also in its—whatever each time—full Being.<sup>34</sup>

If, then, transcendental reduction is expected to do something ‘more’ than the psychological reduction, this more is the showing of the inevitability of the ontological dependence of the *actual* world and its beings on the field of transcendental syntheses. Transcendental reduction is Husserl’s way of solving this question too, by showing that there is no gap separating the appearing, actual thing from its absolutized apprehension, projected somehow within or behind the appearing thing. For Transcendental Phenomenology (either mundane or monadological), what is gives itself (and what can be can give itself) in some intentional correlation according to the “phenomenological principle of all principles.”<sup>35</sup> The sphere of realistic beings and its distance from the appearing phenomena are now seen as mythological speculations established on the basis of the general positing that characterizes the ontologically naïve natural attitude.

Transcendental reduction does not extend the spirit of the psychological reduction in a linear manner. Transcendental reduction is not a retreat and a loss, as, in a sense, is the case with the psychological one. The whole itinerary, of the natural attitude to that of the Phenomenological Psychology and from it to the attitude of Transcendental Phenomenology, is not exactly a march of devastation and loss. We do not follow a course leading us from the self-subsisting thing to its psychological (but still transcendent) phenomenon and then to the destruction of even that phenomenon. The residue of the transcendental reduction is hence not the intentionally null, a regional self-enclosed ego with ineffective meanings and van-

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<sup>33</sup>The term “worldliness” (*Weltlichkeit*) appears in Husserl’s writings before 1929 (the time at which he thoroughly studied Heidegger’s published works) and even before 1927. See, e.g., *Hua* IV, 369; *Hua* XXXV, 289; *Hua* IX, 274, 613; *Hua* XXXIV, 253, 265, 288–9; *Hua* I, 125, 129. See also Theodorou 2010b. Its meaning there, sometimes gesturing toward “mundaneity” (on the use of this term here, see Chap. 2, §2.7, and below here §3.9) and at other times toward “character of the world-horizon within which the corresponding beings appear,” does not prohibit the use just suggested in the main text (which is connected of course with the second meaning of the current explication and with Heidegger’s use). See also Chap. 2, note 42.

<sup>34</sup>“Whatever” in a double sense: (a) noetically, in whatever noesis (*Noesis*), from the point of view of the act’s *character* (if the being is aimed at or appears to us in perception, imagination, memory, etc.) and from the point of view of the act’s *order* (if it is aimed at or appears to us in simple perception, mythological interpretation, this or that theoretical thematization, etc.), and (b) culturally or historically. On this point, see also Theodorou 2010b. For the use of “Being” in connection with Husserl’s Phenomenology, see Chap. 2, note 20.

<sup>35</sup>See *Ideas* I, §24. We will come to this fundamental point later, in Chap. 10.

ishing ‘raw material,’ as Heidegger generally thought in 1927. Indeed, as we saw in Chap. 2, and this is important (despite its defects), even the mundane transcendental consciousness retains its *full* intentional capacity (despite the “unintelligibility”). And this is further supported by the next step in the maturation of the transcendental reduction, which leads from mundane to fully monadological consciousness. Thus, in his part of the second version of the “*Britannica* Article” Husserl wrote:

As transcendental phenomenologist, what I have now is not my ego as a [psychologically-phenomenological or even mundane transcendental] psyche—for the very meaning of the word ‘psyche’ [in this sense] presupposes an actual or possible world [as a sphere of *res* next to that of such a psyche]—but as a [monadologically] transcendently pure ego. (*PTP*, 129/274)

Heidegger, however, having missed the inner developments of Husserl’s methodology, misunderstood this description of the transcendental residuum. In a marginal note, he asks Husserl:

Does not a world-as-such belong to the essence of the pure [transcendental] ego? Cf. our conversation in Todtnauberg < April, 1926 > about “being-in-the-world” (*Being and Time* §12, §69) and its essential difference from presence-at-hand “within” such a world. (*PTP*, 129/274 n. 1)

Here, the dialogue between Husserl and Heidegger has reached the apex of talking at cross-purposes! Phenomenology’s internal maturation collapses. The roads of development have been separated.

### 3.7 The Standard Heideggerian Reception of the Transcendental Reduction

In the standard Heideggerian critique of Husserl’s Phenomenology, no real care is taken to consider the original causes that led to the misunderstandings about which Husserl so often complains. For instance, Seeburger (1975) suggests that Heidegger’s problem with Husserl does not so much have to do with “the” phenomenological reduction, since Heidegger too (in order to overcome the priority or rather current factum of *Vorhandenheit*) must somehow find a way to get out of this particular concretization of Being-in-the-world characterizing the presently entrenched historical situation of humanity. Heidegger’s problem with regard to Husserl’s Phenomenology consists rather in that, as Heidegger himself says, Husserl supposedly makes the following mistake.

[Husserl] confuses Being with beings, insofar as he clings to the assumption that the structures of Being (*Sein*) must be grounded in some being (*Seiendes*). [. . .] [He] attempts to ground all structures of meaning and Being (*Sein*) in transcendental subjectivity, which remains, after all, *a being* (*ein Seiendes*). (Seeburger 1975, 200)<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>36</sup>Similar views are maintained by Bernet (1990, 144–5, 147), Morrison (1978, 54), and Schacht (1972, 304–5).



After Husserl's subsequent tracing of the unintelligibility problem, and his adoption of the monadological problematic, this line of criticism no longer holds. A monad is not one being among the other mundane beings of the world in its totality, and it does not constitute actual ('real') beings while sharing with them the same mode of Being. Husserl's transcendental monad is, rather, an a-regional, horzonal, time-field of syntheses, within which all mundanity gets constituted in a genetic-historical fashion. It is the very a priori, universal, non-ontic condition for the possibility of rule-guided intentional constitution of all beings in their particular Being or proper worldliness; a condition for even the possibility of its self-objectification as mundane psyche.

Taminiaux (1989) reads the situation in an analogous way. His reading is explicitly<sup>37</sup> based on the line drawn by Heidegger in 1925, already mentioned above. Firstly, without having distinguished between psychological, eidetic, and transcendental phenomenological reductions, Taminiaux treats Empirical and Phenomenological (Pure) Psychology as indistinguishable, and reads Transcendental Phenomenology merely as an eidetic-descriptive mathesis, referring exclusively to—psychologically-phenomenologically understood, in the end—phenomena, which has no right to discuss Being. For him, transcendently reduced constitution means, basically, arrival at *essences*, not re-appropriation of ontic existence or of the meaning of Being. In straightforward intentional correlation, transcendental consciousness does not confer existence to its correlates; it only *lets them appear* or *be given* as 'mere' phenomena.<sup>38</sup> In what, then, do the *LI* differ from the later transcendental phenomenological works? Certainly not in that in the *LI* we allegedly exclusively find analyses having in view only the living experiences, the *cogitationes*, but not also the transcendently appearing intentional objectivities, the *cogitata*—as Taminiaux seems to think.<sup>39</sup> How could Husserl otherwise repeatedly claim, e.g., in the "*Britannica* Article," that all the psychological-phenomenological reductions can, by a simple change of sign, be turned "word for word" into transcendental phenomenological reductions and vice versa?

Secondly, Taminiaux's difficulty in distinguishing between psychological and transcendental phenomenological reduction also leads him to the impression that the transcendental subject in Husserl is necessarily forced to have the same Being as that of a physical transcendence and, more specifically, as seen from the pre-transcendental point of view, i.e., the natural standpoint. For Taminiaux, the distinction between nature and mind that Husserl supposedly attempts to introduce in his *Idea of Phenomenology* (1907) leads us back to Descartes' metaphysical

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<sup>37</sup>See Taminiaux 1989, 67ff.

<sup>38</sup>See Taminiaux 1989, 66. Also: "The 'reduction' [...] is designed first of all to defend pure immanence against any contamination by transcendence." (Taminiaux 1991, 12–3; more generally, 12ff).

<sup>39</sup>That something like this is clearly excluded may also be seen from Husserl's explicit references in subsequent works and marginal notes, e.g. in *Hua* III.1, 296 and 296 n. 1, 217–8, 203 n. 1. See also below in the main text.



dualism of *res extensa* and *res cogitans* (without any further specifications).<sup>40</sup> Taminiaux lets us see here that, being in complete agreement with Heidegger's misinterpretation of Husserl, the transcendental ego is for the latter, and from beginning to end, a mere mundane entity. For Husserl, though, the monadological transcendental ego is, in the end, purged of any of the residual positivity that escaped the transcendental reduction up to the 1920s; it is not a sphere of intra-worldly Being, next and parallel to *res extensa*.

When no care is taken with the distinction we made earlier, one is left with a general and vague idea about "the" phenomenological reduction, which in an uncontrollable way allegedly puts into brackets "existence" or the "real existents."<sup>41</sup> As expected, this has its consequences. Thus, despite the fact that, e.g., Maloney accepts the priority of the ontological question among the motives that led Husserl to the transcendental reduction, he thinks that at the critical moment, Husserl deprives transcendental consciousness of its intentionality, thus rendering it *worldless*.<sup>42</sup> And this, as the same maintains, is because after placing the world between brackets, the "transcendentality" of the Husserlian consciousness consists in "transcending *the world*," i.e., it consists in its being-outside it and without it. On the contrary, he continues, only the Heideggerian *Dasein* manages to be "transcendence *to the world*" and thus to remain faithful to the spirit of Phenomenology.<sup>43</sup>

Crowell is one of the few phenomenologists who clearly refer to the specifically *psychologically* pure ego as amounting to a *mundane* entity.<sup>44</sup> He, however, thinks that Husserl locates both the psychological *and* the transcendental ego (without further specification) within mundanity, attributing to the first the mode of Being "present at hand" (*Vorhandenheit*) and arriving at the second by simply "abstracting" this meaning of Being from the first. Thus, despite the fact that Crowell recognizes that Husserl discovered a "non-formal transcendental field [that] allows him to speak of 'transcendental facts'" (1990, 508), he ultimately suggests that for both Husserl and Heidegger, "the 'transcendental' [must] be a field of evidence

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<sup>40</sup>See Taminiaux 1989, 71; 1991, 35.

<sup>41</sup>Maloney 1986, 16. Biemel also thinks that the transition to transcendental and constituting (indeed) Phenomenology is accomplished when "the Being of the world" has undergone an epoché (*Hua IX*, xxiv), without any further specifications. He then maintains that Phenomenological Psychology is effectuated within the natural attitude, but without elucidating any of the details that we were here trying to deal with. See also Biemel (1977).

<sup>42</sup>Maloney 1986, 15. Under certain conditions, which we will discuss further below, we must not oversee Crowell's positive remark that Husserl uses the term "world" in two different ways: (a) "to mean 'the totality of objects,' i.e., in the sense of something 'present at hand' (if not as a whole) for the theorizing (and pre-theoretical) subject," (Crowell 1990, 512), and (b) "as a non-objective 'horizon' of all positing" (*ibid.*, 513). For him, it is only from the point of view of the way (a) prescribes that "the transcendental ego *must*, as reduced, be worldless" (*ibid.*, 513; emphasis added). The preceding analyses of this chapter, however, hopefully complement this reading. See also Theodorou 2010b.

<sup>43</sup>See Maloney 1986, 16.

<sup>44</sup>See Crowell 1990, 506, 512.

embedded within mundaneity” (1990, 509), but with a difference in what concerns the meaning of Being of “the transcendental” and of “mundaneity.” This view, however, comes as a result of the fact that, on the latter’s approach, there is no absolutely clear view of, on the one hand, the substantial relation among *natural attitude*, mundaneity, and psychological ego in Husserl<sup>45</sup> and, on the other hand, the precise meaning of the sort of—at least claimed—liberation from mundaneity and the existence appertaining to it as it was effectuated by the *transcendental reduction*, especially its late 1920s understanding. In short, it is not correct to suppose that Husserl recognizes just one kind of Being among the mundane beings and that, due to this, transcendental reduction forces him to be left with only beings without Being, i.e., only with *meanings*.<sup>46</sup> For Husserl, mundaneity characterizes beings that, *although constituted* in intentional correlations, are naively considered—tacitly or thematically—as self-subsisting beings in themselves (realistic entities). This is the result of the general positing conditioning the natural attitude. Transcendental reduction frees us from precisely this general positing. It leaves us, though, with the beings in this or that appropriate mode of *actual* Being, e.g., with perceptual beings in their usual perceptual actuality, but now as clearly marked by the meaning “intentionally constituted in transcendental consciousness” (*no matter yet* if transcendental consciousness is taken in its mundane or in its monadological status). Probably because of the fact that Crowell understands the relation between the psychological and transcendental ego in the way he does, ultimately he lets Heidegger’s problematic presentation of the issue (seen in §3.8 the citation from *PTP*, 109/257), go unnoticed.<sup>47</sup>

Moreover, on the basis of this, he also thinks that transcendental reduction signals “a departure from all questions of ontology” and, thus, “the question of the ‘existence’ (= worldly [read: mundane] existence) of such a subject can no longer have *any* meaning” (Crowell 1990, 515), since, as it is meant there, with the transcendental reduction, *even* the meaning of Being as “presen[ce] at hand” was subtracted. That is, for Crowell, the transcendental subject is the psychic ego that transcendental reduction further transformed into mere meaning.

Nevertheless, according to the reading presented in Chap. 2 and here, none of the latter readings really succeeds in reaching the core of Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology; much less to threaten the consistency (only this concerns us here) between its methodology and its systematic pretensions, as well as its claimed research field.

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<sup>45</sup>On this, see Crowell 1990, 513–4.

<sup>46</sup>For the latter equation, see Crowell 1990, 507–8, 515. See also Chap. 2 §2.6.3 of the book at hand.

<sup>47</sup>See Crowell 1990, 510. Despite the differences in our approaches, I must say that, to my knowledge, Crowell’s writings are the most sensitive and apposite analyses of the relationship between Husserl and Heidegger (especially those concerning the “Article” incident).

### 3.8 Heidegger's 1927 Fallacious Apprehension of Phenomenological Psychology and of Its Place Within Phenomenology and Philosophy

Even in 1927, then, Heidegger does not seem to have a clear view of the developments in Husserl's thinking. He is still deeply puzzled with regard to both the ultimate methodological presuppositions of the *LI* and the meaning of the transition from that work to the *Ideas I* and subsequent advances. "What is the meaning of the absolute [transcendental] ego, as distinct from the pure psychic [ego]?" (*PTP*, 139/602), he asks Husserl, in eloquent puzzlement, in a letter of October 22, 1927. And while still confused with regard to this difference, he built his own Phenomenology together with a harsh, multi-fronted, and yet asymptotic criticism of Husserl's specifically transcendental Phenomenology.

In the first part of the second version of the "*Britannica Article*," i.e., in the part of the article that Heidegger wrote fully on his own (after Husserl asked him to do so), Heidegger tries to crystallize the way he had understood the standing architectonics and future plan of his teacher's Phenomenology. In particular, the awkwardness of the manner in which Heidegger had understood the relation between Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology is vividly displayed in some critical points of his manuscript. Consider the following.

Nonetheless, fundamental reflection on the object and method of a *Pure Psychology* can let us see precisely that such a Psychology is fundamentally unable to secure the foundations for *philosophy as a science*. For Psychology itself, as a *positive science*, is the investigation of a determinate region of entities and thus, for its part, requires a foundation. (*PTP*, 109/257)

Philosophy as a science is a mathesis that needs foundation. Pure Psychology is a positive science that cannot found philosophy as science. Pure Psychology itself needs a foundation—probably in Philosophy as a science.

Phenomenological Psychology is here called "positive science" and it is as such that it does not suffice to form the founding basis for philosophy as science. But what does "positive science" mean here? And what would the necessary foundation for a phenomenological philosophy as science look like? That is, we can assume, what kind of foundation would we need for Phenomenology as First Philosophy or, which is here for Heidegger the same, for Transcendental Phenomenology as First Philosophy or, for that matter, for Phenomenology as Science of the Sciences or Fundamental Ontology?<sup>48</sup> Here, too, Heidegger appears desperately perplexed.

Firstly, the following must be said in this context. Calling Pure or Phenomenological Psychology—either in its eidetic or in its mundane 'transcendental'<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>48</sup>On the prehistory of this understanding of Phenomenology on the part of Heidegger, i.e., as Science of the Sciences or, after all, as *Fundamental Ontology*, i.e., as project for an a priori intuitional elucidation of the meaning-qua-phenomenon of Being as such, see Theodorou 2010a. See also here Chaps. 8, 9, and 10.

<sup>49</sup>On the meaning of this 'transcendental,' see notes 8, 11, 18, 19, and 28 above.

version—a positive science is not necessarily a sound animadversion for Husserl's plans with it.<sup>50</sup> Husserl himself had done this already in his first version of the article. As we saw in Chap. 2, in the 1920s, Husserl realized that the Eidetic Phenomenological Psychology is actually developed from the point of view of *some remaining power* of the natural attitude. Latently in use in the *LI*, the psychological-phenomenological reduction had not actually eliminated the full power of the natural attitude. Psychological-phenomenological reduction still silently left intact or kept “posited” the realistic world behind both the physical and the psychic.<sup>51</sup>

Besides this, the fact that Pure or Phenomenological Psychology is expected to fix the metaphysics of the subject matter of any empirical psychological research means that it determines the essence of the psychic as one of the actualities in the world, as a *specific region* of Being. This is another sense of what “positive” may mean in the last citation.

Be that as it may, though, Phenomenological Psychology as such was never conceived by Husserl as First Philosophy or as a *foundational* level of Transcendental Phenomenology as First Philosophy. As we saw above, in §3.4.1, Husserl had conceived of it only as the a priori foundation of Empirical Psychology (and, later, as mere propaedeutic for the Transcendental Phenomenology).

We must now try to examine more closely whether and how Husserl managed to overcome the restrictions imposed to Phenomenological Psychology (from the fact that it itself is a ‘positive science’) and reach the level of Phenomenology as an intelligible Transcendental Phenomenology and, thus, of phenomenologically sound First Philosophy.

Before turning directly to this task, let us first see how Heidegger understands the matter, and how this seriously affects the way he presents Husserl's Phenomenology. The lines below follow immediately the last cited passage (*PTP*, 109/257).

The return to consciousness, which every philosophy seeks with varying <degrees of>certitude and clarity, extends itself back to [*erstreckt sich <...>über<...>zurück*] the region of the *pure psychic*, into the field of pure subjectivity. Because *the Being of everything* that can be experienced by the subject in various ways, i.e., [the Being of] *the transcendent* in the broadest sense, *is constituted in this pure subjectivity*, pure subjectivity

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<sup>50</sup>Considering Phenomenological (or Pure) Psychology as a positive science can, of course, *become* problematic, if this positivity were to be understood along the lines of the positivity of the natural sciences, i.e., as implying reliance on empirical data that are to be inductively processed. However, the adjective “Pure” normally protects from some such misunderstanding. On Heidegger's side, we preclude of course any reading of Phenomenological or Pure Psychology as science, which would understand it as an empirical (inductive) endeavour in need of another regional metaphysical founding of its subject matter or object-domain; i.e., it cannot be the case that Heidegger sees Pure Psychology in a manner analogous to Classical Physics, which—as positive empirical inductive science and for the constitution of its object domain—is in need of the special metaphysics that Kant recognized (and Phenomenology should also recognize) basically in Newton's three principles. For more on this, see Chap. 2, especially §2.7.1 and note 77; also §3.4.1 in the present chapter.

<sup>51</sup>We saw that this was done also by the transcendently *constituting* consciousness of the *Ideas I*, i.e., with the mundane transcendental consciousness in its epistemological synthesizing version.

is called *transcendental subjectivity*. Pure Psychology as a positive science of consciousness points back to [*weist zurück in*] the transcendental science of pure subjectivity [i.e., to Transcendental Phenomenology as supposed science (of all sciences)]. (*PTP*, 109/257; trnsl. md.; emphases added<sup>52</sup>)

On the one hand, we notice that here, in 1927, Heidegger considers treating consciousness as constituting everything transcendent in its Being. However, this does not restrain him from also thinking that all this is lost after Husserl's reductive move. On the other hand, the serious *distortion* that arises here cannot escape our attention. Until this passage and, more generally, throughout the first part of the second version of the "*Britannica Article*" (the part that he wrote), Heidegger examines the possibilities and the problems arising with regard to Pure Psychology as "positive" science. It is this Psychology which is there presented as the supposedly *sole* phenomenological way for *traditional* philosophy's sought-for return to consciousness, to conscious subjectivity. And now it is as if all these are suddenly forgotten. It is forgotten that for Husserl too, this Pure Psychology or Phenomenological Psychology is, *mutatis mutandis*, nothing but a "positive" science, with all the implied weaknesses and restrictions that something like this imposes upon it. In manifest violence, now in 1927, Heidegger seems to repress and conceal the consequences of his calling Pure Psychology's field of research "pure psychic subjectivity." Abruptly and inconsistently, he confusingly projects onto the Husserl of 1927 the idea that *this—psychologically-phenomenologically*, of course—pure subjectivity, the one with which Pure Psychology as a "positive" science deals, *constitutes the Being* of the transcendent correlates of all sorts of intentional acts.

We are already appropriately prepared to understand that this is a serious misreading of the 1927 Husserl. It is as if Heidegger's reading wants to point back, from the direction of his own worries, to the problem of "unintelligibility."<sup>53</sup> However, from the point of view of his own agenda, Husserl has already confronted, dealt with, and solved this problem.

### 3.9 Husserl's Ultimate Conception of Transcendental Consciousness

Phenomenological Psychology strictly understood (either in its eidetic or in its synthetic version) is conducted under the auspices of the psychological-phenomenological reduction. And this means that—to a certain degree, not only in Husserl's clearer thought of the 1920s—it *cannot* by itself amount to a transcendental consciousness that constitutes its intentional correlates in their

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<sup>52</sup>The terms "transcendent" and "transcendental" are emphasised in the original text.

<sup>53</sup>We should recall that this "unintelligibility" was the subject matter discussed in Chap. 2, §2.7.

Being. It is from this later perspective that, in his *Cartesian Meditations* (1929), Husserl warns us with regard to the content of his mature views on the ego.

[I]t must by no means be accepted as a matter of course that allegedly with our apodictic pure [transcendental] ego we have rescued a little tag-end of the world [*ein kleines Endchen der Welt*] as the sole unquestionable part [...] of the world. [...] Unfortunately, these prejudices were at work when Descartes introduced the apparently insignificant but actually fateful change whereby the ego becomes a *substantia cogitans*, a separate human *mens sive animus*. (CM, 24/63)

We also find an analogous warning in another work of the same period, *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1929), where we read that transcendental intentional subjectivity is not disclosed with a turn toward the Cartesian *cogito*, the mere “I think” (*Hua* XVII, 48). All this, of course, applies—as an implicit self-criticism—to Husserl’s own earlier rendering of the transcendental consciousness in the *Ideas* I, which was still presented along the lines of Cartesian doubt. Even when, in 1921, Husserl writes that “*das Residuum der phänomenologischen Reduktion*” is “*was bleibt undurchstreichbar als reines ego und sein cogito, gewinne ich mich als Monade*” (*Hua* XIV, 52), he does not seem to have escaped from the dangerous attraction of the Cartesian way. The same holds for another passage from 1922 (*Hua* XIV, 264.4–11). It says that, after the transcendental reduction to my solitary life, I am left with “my monad behind its solitary shutter [*Blende*].” The editor of the volume informs us that Husserl “later” struck-through this point and criticized it with the comment “naïve” in the margin of the manuscript. And, again in 1921, Husserl writes as if his transcendental monad were a Cartesian ego, a being that retains its subsistence even when everything *else* in the world has been annihilated. “*Jede Monade ist in ihrem Dasein nicht abhängig von der anderen, sie bliebe auch bestehen, und das Ich bliebe dieses Ich, wenn die Welt als Natur aufhörte zu existieren, und es hätte dieses Ich auch gewesen sein können, wenn in ihm Natur sich nie konstituiert hätte und hätte konstituieren können. So hat Leibniz recht, wenn er sagt, die Monade entspreche dem Cartesianischen strengen Substanzbegriff: wofern in ihm nur gesagt wäre, dass selbständig ein Wesen dann ist.*” (*Hua* XIII, 233).<sup>54</sup>

Two points in another direction seem to be the following. In 1920 Husserl remarks that “*Fingiere ich eine Genesis, in der ich noch keine Anderen habe, so gewinne ich Körper und meinen Leib, letzteren in einem schon ziemlich vollen Sinn, aber doch nicht ganz, denn was jetzt die Hauptsache ist: Die konkrete Einheit meiner Subjektivität mit dem in ihr schon Konstituierten (Körper, Leib) kann sich nicht als Einheit in einer Apperzeption konstituieren: Meine Monade ist das Milieu für alle Apperzeptionen und noch nicht Seele.*” (*Hua* XIII, 461 n. 2). In its context, this remark means that the monad as residuum of the transcendental reduction is

<sup>54</sup>Cf. Marion’s remark in note 61 below. See also *Hua* XIV, 295 n. 1, a text from 1922, where, as an alternative definition of the transcendental subject as monad, Husserl self-understandably refers us to Spinoza’s definition of “substance” (from *Ethica*, part I, def. 3) in which we read that substance is “*id, cuius conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei, à quo formari debeat* [that, the conception of which does not need the conception of other realities that would have to form it]” (trnsl. mine).

not actually a mere object like any other object which is constituted precisely in such a monad. And again, in the first volume of the published lecture course on “First Philosophy,” (1923–24) Husserl explicitly states that the *Cartesian* “pure ego is nothing different than the pure *psychic* [ . . . ] [;] a small piece [*Stückchen*] of the objective world” (*Hua* VII, 73; emphasis added)—but this doesn’t hold anymore for the monadologically transcendental, pure ego.<sup>55</sup>

As Husserl’s still problematic and unsatisfactory—even to his own eyes—expositions in the *Britannica* manuscripts show, it is true that all this was not analytically clear, even to him, prior to the late 1920s. On this count, Heidegger’s puzzlement and confusion were of course understandable, albeit not unconditionally acceptable. Moreover, it is also probable that Husserl becomes for the first time *fully* aware of the problem of the *Unverständlichkeit* after his discussions with Heidegger during his visit to Husserl’s house in 1927. For example, to my knowledge, there is no relevant mention of the critical term (“unintelligibility”) before his version of the second part of the second version of the article. Nonetheless, it does appear afterwards in relatively clear connection with the problem of the reduction and the status of the reminding ego or consciousness, e.g., in the manuscripts from 1932–35 collected in *Hua* XXXIV.

Pure Psychology, as Heidegger explicitly recognizes in the first citation of §3.8, rests upon a basis that does not suffice to render it the First Philosophy that would unpresupposedly found the whole range of the particular sciences. The fact that it itself presupposes one regional part of the world, with a particular meaning of being and an unexamined realistic positing, cannot let it as such found (or ground) the sciences that would like to explore other regions (their reality) of the world and shows that all of them are in need of a *more* fundamental grounding. To ignore this is precisely one version of the *transcendental circularity* upon which Husserl blames the whole modern philosophical tradition.<sup>56</sup> From his most developed standing, he blames it for trying to produce the world from one of its sub-regions, from the cogito, mind, Kantian transcendental ego, etc., as if the world were not already presupposed in this very same move, and as if it were possible that a being of the—essentially—same ontological order with that of the world (*res*) constitute the world and its very self, too, as part of this world.

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<sup>55</sup>See also *Hua* XVII, 235, where we read again that the Cartesian ego is a small piece or a tiny edge of the world. Cf. Diemer 1965, 26, 21, where the psychological reduction is related to the Cartesian method that leads us to a supposedly certain tiny edge of the world; and Levinas (1973, 143 f), where the psychological consciousness is indeed distinguished from the transcendental or absolute one, and only the second is described as truly and fully constituting, whereas the first is presented as basically constituted. Phenomenological Psychology does not have in view the intentional life of consciousness qua “source” or “origin” of Being, but qua one of its regions (Levinas 1973, 145). From our perspective, we must add that what Diemer and Levinas remark about psychological consciousness holds equally well of *mundane transcendental* consciousness.

<sup>56</sup>See, e.g., *Hua* IX, 264ff, 273, 290, 298.



To be sure, there is an indication that at some point Heidegger comes to understand and accept Husserl's mature transcendental position. In the second part of the second version of the "Article," which Husserl wrote in order to complement Heidegger's first part (that was ending in the aporias we saw earlier), he ascertained that "Once one has systematically disclosed, in <Pure Psychology>, the realm of the pure psychic, one thereby already possesses, implicitly and even materially, the content of the parallel transcendental sphere, and all that is needed is the doctrine that is capable of *merely reinterpreting* [the pure psychological sphere] rather than supplementing it <by adding something on to it> [i.e., 'the' transcendental reduction]." (*PTP*, 134/277; emphasis added). This is another articulation of Husserl's "change of sign" idea. Heidegger, though, asks in the margin (still confusing the tasks and range of the psychological and the transcendental): "But on the contrary, isn't this '*reinterpretation*' really only a '*supplementing*' application <or: utilization> of the transcendental problematic that you find incompletely <worked out> in Pure Psychology, such that when the psychical comes on the scene as a self-transcending <entity>, from that moment on, everything positive is rendered transcendently problematic—everything: both the psychical itself and the entities (world) constituted *in it*." (*PTP*, 134/277 n. 1). In the last phrase, we find repeated the thesis previously encountered in the second citation of the current section. Note here, too, the thesis that the world is a being (like all the other beings) that Heidegger projects on Husserl. Discussion and other communication on this matter, though, apparently led Heidegger to another position. Thus, in the letter to Husserl of October 22, 1927, he finally acknowledges this: "We are in agreement on the fact that entities in the sense of what you call 'world' cannot be explained in their transcendental constitution by returning to an entity of the same mode of being." (*PTP*, 138/610). To my knowledge, however, after this sign of mutual understanding, no other positive stance is detected on the part of Heidegger.

Husserl, in any case, had already moved beyond Heidegger's late realization of the real problem in 1927. The difficult experience, though, makes him eager to seek the opportunity to make himself clear once more. In his "*Nachwort*" (1931), Husserl expresses himself in this way. "'Transcendental I' is an old term given a *new* sense; [ . . . ] [it should be now understood as] the [most] primordial locus [*Urstätte*] of all meaning-giving and validation of Being." (*Ideas* II, 406/139; emphasis added). From the properly intelligible perspective of the monadological Transcendental Phenomenology, this means that the truly a-regional monadological transcendental consciousness constitutes even the being that, from the natural attitude, is recognized as psychologically-phenomenologically pure consciousness (psyche), an edge of a particular sense of being ('*res cogitans*') within the totality of the world ('*res*').<sup>57</sup>

It is only because of such confusions between the tasks and the limits of the psychological and the (mundane and monadological) transcendental reduction that Heidegger can reproach Husserl that transcendental subjectivity is suppos-

<sup>57</sup>See also Chap. 2, §2.7.2 and 2.7.3, and notes 8, 11, 18, 19, 28 above in the present chapter.



edly simply one more intra-worldly being-before-hand (*etwas Vorhandenes*). Only because of this can he reproach Husserl, in his course *PHCT* (1925), for allegedly not posing any question with regard to the meaning of Being of transcendental consciousness, etc.<sup>58</sup> On this basis, we can also explain the theses and the interpretations of the standard Heideggerian criticism that the transcendental consciousness about which Husserl speaks is an isolated region of Being, whose meaning of Being is the same as that of the beings that it constitutes; that it is found next to them and that it is essentially worldless.<sup>59</sup>

### 3.10 Absolute Transcendental Consciousness and *Dasein*'s Absoluteness

We are now familiar with Husserl's perspective of the late 1920's, marked by the clear and correct distinction between the psychological and the (mundane and monadological) transcendental reduction and between psychologically and transcendently (mundanely and monadologically) pure consciousness. It is only on this basis that we are also able to retrospectively assess the meaning of the passage from *Ideas* I, where Husserl—provocatively indeed, but, still, as another Koestlerian sleepwalker—claimed the *absoluteness* of transcendental consciousness.

[C]onsciousness considered in its "purity" must be held to be a self-contained complex of being, a complex of absolute Being *into which nothing can penetrate and out of which nothing can slip*, to which nothing is spatio-temporally external and which cannot be affected by any physical thing and cannot exercise causation upon any physical thing<sup>60</sup>—being presupposed that causality has the normal sense of causality pertaining to Nature as a relationship of dependence between *realities* [*Realitäten*]. (*Ideas* I, 112/105; emphases added)

This passage offers itself to two different possible readings.

From the *premature transcendental stance* of the *Ideas* I, it means that this transcendental consciousness is a self-enclosed sphere of Being; but a *sphere* of

<sup>58</sup>See *PHCT*, §10–13. See also Chap. 4, §4.10 and especially §4.10.2, of the present book.

<sup>59</sup>Characteristic are the comments of, e.g., Bernet 1990, 144–5; and Maloney 1986, 16, 18–9. See also Dreyfus 1991, 177, 248. We will come back to these issues in the section that follows. On the meaning of consciousness' independence from the beings in the world as sown by the world-annihilation thought experiment, see also Marion 1998, 82–3.

<sup>60</sup>In his copy D (1929), Husserl adds: "not by any being prior to it conceived as absolute" (*Ideas* I, 112 n. 28/499); there is no other absolute being before it. Retrospectively seen, from the pre-monadological transcendental perspective of 1913, 'absolute' transcendental consciousness is absolute in the sense of a remaining edge of the world in its totality; it is absolute as a *residuum* within the totality of world. This absolute "edge" is, in 1913, seen as synthesizingly-constitutively producing the rest of the actual world as dependent on that absolute consciousness. From the perspective of the late 1920s, this idea is recognized as an "unintelligibility" (see Chap. 2, §2.7.2 and 2.7.3). The specifications of a monadological absoluteness were of course set on track, albeit still naively.

Being. “Absolute” here means “*independent* from any *other* reality”<sup>61</sup> or “independent region of Being.” Next to this sphere, another appears—supposedly in its reality (actuality)—as intentionally constituted in the transcendently functioning (synthesizing) subjectivity. And this “self-enclosure” means that the consciousness under discussion is in no need of anything external, e.g., incoming stimuli, in order for it to constitute or even to exist. And yet this constituting consciousness is still conceived literally as a residue, as something left over or saved after the thought experiment that has annihilated the transcendently appearing world in its ‘reality.’ This consciousness is thus tacitly seen as a tiny edge of the world, which remains intact after the destruction of the (rest of the) world. Indeed, this consciousness *was given* the task of constituting the whole world in its Being. This is a task that, as mature reflection discloses, is not intelligibly attainable by such a consciousness. In fact, it then manifests itself as nothing more than a transcendently *functioning* (synthesizing), psychologically-phenomenologically cognizing pure consciousness.

From the now *mature, monadological, transcendental-phenomenological attitude*, inescapability and impenetrability do not define an “edge” within the naturally interpreted world, which “edge” remains uncontaminated from every transcendent “reality.”<sup>62</sup> Inescapability and impenetrability cannot, in the end, concern some hermetically self-enclosed partial locus of the total world that does not contain anything and cannot take anything within itself, being thus equal to an empty punctual locus. From the genuine monadological transcendental perspective, Husserl arrives at the adequate meaning of that passage. Nothing can penetrate to this absolute consciousness, because the world in its totality is already found ‘within’ it<sup>63</sup>; and nothing can escape from it, because there is no ‘place’ outside it to go. The totality of the world with its various regions and sub-regions of beings in their corresponding Being are co-extensive, so to speak, with the horizon of the monadologically absolute consciousness. “Absolute” now means “most fundamental,

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<sup>61</sup>Marion’s reading of Husserl’s transcendental reduction in the *Ideas* I attempts to insulate Husserl from such a reading. He brings to our attention the fact that in copying Descartes’ description of the status of consciousness, i.e., the idea that consciousness “*nulla alia re indigeat ad existendum*” (“it does not need any other *res* in order for it to exist”) Husserl purposely omits the word “*alia*” (“other”) (Marion 1998, 82). This, for him, is clear evidence that in the *Ideas* I, Husserl did not consider consciousness as a region of *res*, that is, as what we have up to this point considered as “mundane psyche.” Despite the incontestable philological acuteness of Marion’s point, I will only briefly remind us here of Husserl’s own later admission of the “intelligibility” issue.

<sup>62</sup>A psychologically-phenomenologically pure consciousness (either the eidetically or the epistemologically-transcendently constituting one) does not run such a ‘danger’ of being thus ‘contaminated.’ Otherwise put, this danger is not *conceivable* in the context of Phenomenological Psychology. In the latter, consciousness is purified from any reality; it is intentionally related only with mere (transcendently appearing) phenomena. Note, however, that, as the last line of the latter cited passage allows, a mundanely Being-constituting transcendental consciousness would indeed have been in such danger, since in Transcendental Phenomenology we thematize the world not as just a phenomenon but in its “reality”—even if not in the positive perspective of the natural attitude, but as actuality in the most robust sense possible.

<sup>63</sup>Consult also Chap. 2, note 11, 15.

a-regional ground of all Being,” which is also “source of all Being” that can be constituted within it throughout history. The Husserlian genuinely monadological transcendental consciousness *is* the world; in its geneticality or generativity, it is the actual world in its experienced becoming historicity.

As he was totally aware of the problems regarding intentionality, Being, and appearance, problems that he considered alien to Husserl’s thought and insolvable within its context, Heidegger tries to outline another route for Phenomenology. But did he have any really radical alternative to offer, in place of Husserl’s fully monadological transcendental subjectivity? The answer is “yes and no.” Right now, we will address the “no” answer. In Chap. 10 we will also consider the “yes” answer, and assess it separately.

Surprisingly enough, Husserl’s fundamental idea of mature transcendental problematics is not actually foreign to Heidegger’s *own* thinking. In his summer lecture-course of 1927, the “Basic Problems of Phenomenology,” he referred to his alternative conception of consciousness, i.e., to *Dasein*, using (almost verbatim) the words we saw Husserl using to describe his monadological transcendental consciousness (see passage on p. 96)!

When Kant talks about a relation of the thing to the cognitive faculty, it now turns out that this way of speaking and the kind of inquiry that arises from it are full of confusion. [...] For the *Dasein* there is no outside, for which reason it is also absurd to talk about an inside. (*BPP*, 66/93; emphases added)

Even though he only rarely (and even then only mediately),<sup>64</sup> poses the question of the ‘first material’ for *Dasein*’s constitution of reality, Heidegger himself offered a surprisingly over-idealist solution. *Dasein* or, better, the *Da* of the *Dasein*—or *Dasein* in its *Da*—‘is’ the world in its historical unfolding of the realities we discover and confront. Monadological transcendental consciousness is not an empty box standing over there in one corner of the world. It is totally all-inclusive, in the sense that everything in its actuality is or happens ‘within’ the compass of the ultimate time-field of consciousness, which ‘co-extents’ as the ultimate ground of the openness of the horizon, where the world happens (is and becomes in history). It is only because of this that Husserl can say that with the transcendental reduction we do not intent to lose anything, but, on the contrary, that we attempt to gain Being in its totality. It is only then that the full meaning of intentionality has been unfolded. And it is because of this that, if the following passage from *BT* is understood as a tacit criticism of modern philosophy, then, contrary to Heidegger’s intentions, this criticism cannot be legitimately applied to (the generally transcendental) Husserl.

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<sup>64</sup>I have already referred to Husserl’s problem regarding the origin of the *reell* contents of hyle in Husserl’s monadological transcendental consciousness in Chap. 2, §2.4. Heidegger does not seem to pose this question for his *Dasein*. Heideggerians, though, are strongly interested in it. I have in mind Dreyfus 2001, and Dreyfus and Spinoza 1999, who defend a “robust” scientific realist view with regard to the status of the traditional in-itself in Heidegger’s context. In Chap. 10 of the present book, we will come back to these issues in the founding fathers of Phenomenology and try to estimate the situation.

In directing itself towards [...] and in grasping something, *Dasein* does not first go [say] outside of the inner space in which it is initially encapsulated, but, rather, in its primary kind of Being, it is always already “outside” together with some being encountered in the world already discovered. (*BT*, 58/62)

In his *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger in fact openly relates his conception of the *Dasein* in its *Da*, as intentional openness to (or of) the world, with Leibniz’s monad, placing the relevant view on its proper basis.<sup>65</sup>

In his criticism of Husserl, Heidegger actually repeats Leibniz’s critique against Descartes’ *cogito* and the dualism between *res cogitans* and *res extensa*. This may show that either Heidegger was a more perceptive reader of Leibniz, or that Husserl had considered the monad’s unceasing, uncancelable, seamless, transcendental intentional relatedness with the world as most self-understandable.

We see that this exploration of the way in which Heidegger understood the meaning, function, and consequences of the transcendental reduction is particularly revelatory. There could still be room to find the ground for collaboration and development.

Unfortunately, and despite his admission in the aforementioned letter to Husserl (from October 22, 1927), Heidegger refuses to see this evident possibility of reading Husserl’s (at least) advanced Phenomenology of consciousness, and stubbornly struggles to retain all the positive credentials of his analysis of the *Dasein*. We cannot help also examining this latter possibility, since even decades later, in his *Zähringen* seminar (1973), his estimation of the situation inexplicably persists.

With Husserl, the sphere of [traditional] consciousness is not challenged, much less shattered. [...] One cannot, in fact, shatter it as long as one starts from the *ego cogito*; for it is the basic constitution of the *ego cogito* (just as with the monad in Leibniz) to have no windows from which something could either enter or exit. In this way, the *ego cogito* is an enclosed space. The idea of ‘exiting’ [*herauszukommen*] this enclosed space is itself contradictory. This is why one needs to start from something other than the *ego cogito* [i.e., with *Dasein*]. [...] [Only then can one say that] When I look at the inkwell [...] I take it itself into view, the inkwell itself. (*FS*, 70/121)

We have managed to see, though, that starting from the Cartesian consciousness does not necessarily lead to a self-enclosed and inescapable immanence (even though Husserl became aware of this danger and took appropriate measures only in the late 1920s). Husserlian intentionality accounts for the fact that in my simple experience I am aware of the inkwell itself; I do not only lived-through some *reell* immanent sensory contents, or only have an immanent representation of it. (On what is simple experience in Husserl and in Heidegger, however, we will have much more to say in Chaps. 4, 5, 6, and 7.)

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<sup>65</sup>See *BPP*, 174-5/247-8 300-1/425-6. On Fink’s own attempt to adopt Heidegger’s *Lichtung* back to the Heraclitian-Leibnizean apparently relevant or even parallel notion of “fulguration,” see Cristin 1998, 26–8.

### 3.11 Husserl's Final Estimation Regarding the Reception and Fate of his Work

We can now see how justified Husserl's worries and complaints regarding the quality of the assimilation of his work were. Some of his writings after 1927 vividly reflect what he believed about the way in which his readers (and, most importantly, closer students who benefited from his work the most) approached his efforts to build a coherent phenomenological methodology.

[In some cases] one thinks that knows already too much [about Transcendental Phenomenology]. [...] At best, someone has read my writings or, something which is more common, has been guided by my students. [...] In this way, he orientates himself in accordance with the interpretations and criticisms of Scheler, Heidegger and others and frees himself from the very difficult indeed study of my own writings. To my continuous protestations there is one answer: the old man has become stubborn and continues to move with obstinacy along the lines of thought he once introduced, unamenable to any refuting criticism. (*Hua* VI, 439; trnsl. mine)

When crucial points in Husserl's thought-itinerary have been misunderstood, disregarded, concealed, and, in the end, totally forgotten, it seems natural to accuse Husserl of Cartesianism, loss of intentionality (with the move of "the" phenomenological reduction), regress to a 'punctual' or hermetically self-enclosed worldless consciousness, an ontology of "presence at hand," a view of the world as a mere aggregation of entities, overlooking the historicity characterizing our understanding of the Being of entities, Platonism, psychologism, anthropologism, representationalism, ignorance of the possibility of founding Being (both of the entities and of the transcendental subjectivity) on time, and of many more lethal phenomenological and philosophical sins. In these two Chaps. (2 and 3), we have seen that some of these 'sins' were not committed by Husserl at all, and that others were understood and rectified in time by him. In the chapters of Part III, we will see something analogous for the rest of these.

It seems necessary to understand Husserl, but mostly Phenomenology itself, anew; at least for the reason of restoring historical and philosophical accuracy with regard to the details of the founder's work and its development over time. The standard Heideggerian critique does not do justice to Husserl's accomplishments, because it does not pay proper attention to these details, taking for granted the rightfulness of Heidegger's authority over against the very word and spirit of his teacher's philosophy. As we will see in the chapters that follow, though, it is impossible to learn about Husserl's foundational phenomenological guide-lines by studying Heidegger's *Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time* (1925), or *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (1927), or his *Being and Time* (1927), etc. If we do not blindly trust Heidegger's—indisputable—greatness and his reading of Husserl, another picture forms. Of course, again, this cannot mean that we necessarily take Husserl's Phenomenology as a holy doctrine. It may only mean that if we want to see Phenomenology as a philosophical research line that is worth studying, and not merely as a chapter in the "history of ideas," we should take care

to restore its 'internal stories' in a way that may allow us one day to consolidate its *normalized core*: the fundamental co- and inter-operating ideas that may work as the ferment for a future substantial theory applicable in a wide variety of old and new problems. In a project such as this, the clearing of the ground of Husserl's Phenomenology has priority. Recognition, then, of Heidegger's (and Scheler's) extreme importance must follow. Otherwise, Phenomenology will be condemned to remain in the state of internal division and self-canceling hostility that Husserl described in his "*Nachwort*" (1931).

I would only like to say expressly that I cannot acknowledge any kind of justification to the objections that have been advanced by those quarters ["the counter-trends of the present"]: e.g., my intellectualism, the miring of my methodic procedure in abstract one-sidedness, my failure, in general and in principle, to touch upon original-concrete, practical-active subjectivity, and my skirting of the so-called problems of "Existence" as well as the metaphysical problems. These objections are all based on misunderstandings and ultimately, on the fact that my Phenomenology is interpreted back to a level, the overcoming of which is precisely its whole sense. In other words, they are based on the fact that what is in principle the novelty of the [transcendental] "phenomenological reduction" has not been understood, and consequently neither has the ascent from mundane subjectivity (from man) to "transcendental" subjectivity. So it is my critics who have remained mired—in an anthropology, whether empirical or a priori, which, according to my theory, does not at all secure the specifically philosophical ground. And to take this anthropology for philosophy is equivalent to a relapse into a "transcendental anthropologism" or "psychologism." (*Ideas II*, 407/140)

In those circles where the phenomenological [transcendental] reduction is dispensed with as a philosophical irrelevant oddity—whereby, of course, the whole sense of my work and of my Phenomenology is obliterated—what is left is only an a priori *Psychology*. (*Ideas II*, 421/155; trns. sl. md.; emphasis added)

From the point of view achieved here in Chaps. 2 and 3, the meaning, truth, and importance of Husserl's latter remarks have hopefully become clearer. I also hope that this first round of explications regarding the issue of phenomenological methodology opens up the perspective that will be further advanced in the chapters to follow.

However, let me say here that what we have seen up to this point helps us see that under certain widely known conditions, which will be repeated in the chapters to follow, Husserl's and Heidegger's Phenomenologies are not so foreign to each other as we have become used to thinking. As even in Husserl's Phenomenology, the "change of a sign" suffices to create the differences we have been discussing in these two Chaps. (2 and 3), so the discovery of other changeable signs can offer us the possibility of tracing the seam along which Husserl's and Heidegger's Phenomenologies run parallel (or even meet), and to some extent also overlap as chapters of the same philosophical school. Once we have cleared up the points of misunderstanding and actual and sound disagreement, we can see these Phenomenologies as more closely associated than we may have otherwise expected.

Thus, through such an exploration, we could have, of course, the first elements for a new and more sober reconstruction of the philosophical dispute developed not only between Heidegger and Husserl, but also between the two camps among

their spiritual descendants. But, at the same time, something more will become possible. We will be able to locate with greater accuracy (and evaluate on a more correct and concrete basis) the nodal points around which the whole nexus of Husserl's and Heidegger's Phenomenologies can be interconnected in a new, more 'economical,' more coherent, and more practical, if you like, "research program" in Phenomenology. In Part III, we will extend this examination to other (substantial this time) key-points in the dispute between Husserl and Heidegger. Hopefully, in the end, we will have managed to overcome the sterility of this dispute, and we will have prepared the ground for freeing still hidden potentials within Phenomenology. Thus, phenomenological philosophizing will have the opportunity to prepare itself for more daring and self-confident engagements with the real problems that still haunt humanity and its condition.

## Part III

# Key Husserlian Teachings and Heidegger's View

Looking back from this vantage to the *Logical Investigations*, I am now convinced that Husserl was never a philosopher, not even for one second in his life. He becomes ever more ludicrous. (Heidegger: letter of February 20, 1923 to Karl Löwith; cited in *PTP*, 17)

Much as the study of the great thinkers of the past had influenced me, I still saw all around me only undeveloped, ambiguously iridescent problems and deep-delving but unclear theories. Weary of the confusions and fearing lest I sink into the ocean of endless criticism, I felt myself compelled to push the history of philosophy aside and, for the sake of philosophical self-preservation, to risk the attempt of starting someplace on my own and to look for problems which were immediately accessible—be they ever so modest and considered of little importance—from which I could perhaps eventually work my way up step by step. (Husserl: *Draft*, 16–7)



## Chapter 4

# Perception and ‘Action’: On the Praxial Structure of Intentional Consciousness

*Questioner:* Well if you chose to make Doing the Be-all and End-all of human life, why do you not make meaning to consist simply in doing? [ . . . ]

*Pragmaticist:* [ . . . ] It must be admitted, in the first place, that if pragmatism really made Doing to be the Be-all and the End-all of life, that would be its death. For to say that we live for the mere sake of action, as action, regardless of the thought it carries out [read: that carries it out], would be to say that there is no such thing as rational purport. (C. S. Peirce, *Philosophical Writings of Peirce*, New York: Dover Publications, Inc. 1995, 262–3)

What is actual is not the external action but an internality in which the individual cancels the possibility and identifies himself with what is thought, in order to exist in it. This is action. (S. Kierkegaard: *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009, 284)

### 4.1 Introduction

At some point of his career, Husserl started adopting a new terminology to refer to what were previously known as “intentional acts” or “intentional living experiences.” He now speaks about “intentional *practices*” in general. Every unfolding of consciousness’ intentional possibilities may now be understood as some kind of “*Praxis*.” Even the intentionality characterizing simple perceptual consciousness is now seen as a practice, a perceptual practice (*Wahrnehmungspraxis*).<sup>1</sup> The intentionality of the acts of predicative thematization is now seen as another kind of practice (*Handeln*).<sup>2</sup> The special acts of consciousness by means of which we do theoretical and scientific work are also collectively called “theoretical praxis”

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<sup>1</sup>See *Hua* XVII, 437–446, and esp. 445.

<sup>2</sup>See *Hua* XVII, §63.

(*theoretische Praxis*).<sup>3</sup> The question is: what does this mean and what does this change signify? It is only recently that some sporadic interest in this aspect of Husserlian scholarship has begun to arise.<sup>4</sup>

The whole issue, however, is important not only in the strict context of Husserlian scholarship. It also relates to recent trends in cognitive science and the philosophy of perception. During the last two decades or so, there has been growing interest in the connection between perception (or knowledge of the external world in general) and the human capacity for actions or practices of different sorts. I think that this encounter between Husserl's philosophy of intentional consciousness, especially as praxial, and current Anglo-American trends in epistemology—cognitivist and non-cognitivist—will soon become more substantial and more fruitful for all.<sup>5</sup>

Meanwhile, though, we must first make clear the fundamentals of the relevant issues in Husserl's *Phenomenology*. Thus, I begin by delineating and criticizing a first possible reading found in the existing (and still meager) literature concerning what we may call Husserl's "praxial turn" (§§4.2, 4.3, and 4.4). I then proceed by examining a second possible understanding of this turn (§4.5). Next, I prepare and develop my positive account of how we should understand this matter (§§4.6, 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9). In §4.10, I discuss two key issues that will be brought up in the systematic sections of this chapter. I refer to some important paralipomena regarding the notion of *Streben* (§4.10.1) and the question concerning time as the common texture of the ultimate fields upon which intentional constitution occurs, according to Husserl and Heidegger (§4.10.2). Finally, in §4.11, I recapitulate the solution offered, and touch upon some further possibilities concerning current worries in the literature regarding intentionality and the possibility of its naturalization.

In this chapter, I will focus mostly on the fundamental case of perceptual intentionality. Although the conclusions at which I will arrive are easily applicable to the sphere of judgmental and theoretical praxis, a detailed elucidation of these latter intentionalities would require separate treatment.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>See *Hua* VI, 113. In the *Crisis*, we read that, in the lifeworld, our whole life unfolds and develops in terms of praxis (*Crisis*, 50–51/51). The beginning of this turn, which to my knowledge never resulted in definite and systematic teaching, has not yet been accurately traced. It seems, however, to have taken place circa the early 1920s. See also §4.10.1 of the present chapter.

<sup>4</sup>See Saito 1991; Lee 2000; Moran 2000a.

<sup>5</sup>With this, I do not yet mean to take sides on the issue of, e.g., whether Husserl's *Phenomenology* can be read as a chapter of cognitive science, as quite a few phenomenologists want to argue (Dreyfus 1982; Petitot et al. 1999). Even though what will be said here may suffice as an indication for my views on the matter, a lot more must of course be added, in order to make this indication more substantial and persuasive. See also §4.11 and notes 11, 19 below.

<sup>6</sup>On the way theoretical intentionality works in terms of praxis, see Theodorou 2010b. Meanwhile, I have also presented the first findings of how the reading offered here could be applied to the phenomenological understanding of the emotions as intentional acts, and as intentional experiences of values. See Theodorou 2012a; 2014a, b.

## 4.2 “Praxial” in the Sense of the Doing that Brings in Fulfilling *Reell* Contents

Why is it important that Husserl refers to intentional consciousness in terms of praxis? After all, isn't it Husserl himself who, from the time of his *Logical Investigations* (*LI*) (1900–01), already speaks of intentional experiences as *acts*, as having an act-character?

Even though Husserl does indeed refer to intentional experiences in terms of acts in the *LI*, he in fact refuses in that work to conceive of the term “act” in the usual sense—as we may explicate it—of a “setting in motion,” “drive or incite to deeds,” “activity,” “doing,” etc.

In talking of [intentional] acts [...] *all thought of activity* [*Betätigung*] *must be rigidly excluded.* (*LI*, 563/379)

In a footnote, Husserl points out that he, like Natorp in his *Einleitung in die Psychologie* (1888), objects to “fully serious talk about ‘mental activities,’ ‘activities of consciousness’ or ‘activities of the ego.’” And he continues with this remark (citing Natorp’s original point almost verbatim).

[C]onsciousness only *appears* as a doing [*Tun*], and its subject as a doer [*Täter*], because it [consciousness] is often or always *accompanied by conation* [*Streben*].” We too reject the “mythology of activities [*Tätigkeiten*]”: we define “acts” as intentional experiences [*intentionale Erlebnisse*], not as mental activities [*psychische Betätigungen*]. (*LI*, 563 n. 2/379 n. 1.; emphases added)

But if consciousness is often (or, better, always) accompanied by *Streben* or “conation,”<sup>7</sup> then why we should not think of intentionality in terms of an activity or doing?

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<sup>7</sup>In its everyday usage, the German term generally has the meaning “*mit großer Energie versuchen etwas zu erreichen*” or “*sich in Richtung auf ein Ziel bewegen und sich dabei von nichts ablenken lassen*” or even “*fleißig lernen*” in the sense of *büffeln* (see, e.g., the online *The Free Dictionary*). Analogously, the English term has the general meaning “the aspect of mental processes or behaviour directed toward action or change and including impulse, desire, volition, and striving” or “the aspect of mental life having to do with purposive behaviour, including desiring, resolving, and striving” (*ibid.*). In philosophy, the German term is used with the meaning “*selbsttätige, eigeninitiative Bewegung auf ein Ziel hin*” or “*menschliches Bemühen*,” characterized by “*die Momente der Spontaneität, Aktivität (energeia) und Finalität*,” whereas to it the “*wesentlichen rein menschlichen Merkmale der Reflexion und der Reflexivität*” characteristically belong (see the *UTB Online-Wörterbuch Philosophie*). Husserl uses the term under discussion many times in the *LI* with the precise meanings cited here, see, e.g., “*Streben nach Erkenntnis*,” (*Prolegomena*, 31) translated by Findlay as “efforts after knowledge” and “*Ziel möglichen Strebens*” (*LU* II.1, 102), translated by Findlay as “end of possible endeavour”. This meaning is also accordingly modified in its composite forms of *Anstreben*, *Bestreben*, etc. The same holds for Husserl’s implicit understanding of the term in the immediate context of the two passages cited here. In §4.3 below, more will be said concerning this issue. Later, in §4.10.1, we will re-examine the situation regarding the meaning of the almost occult term (*Streben*).

Husserl admits that "intention" may indeed have the meaning of an at-first empty *aiming-at* or *striving-for* that demands fulfillment at a secondary stage, which can be obtained via some activity (of the sensory systems, of the limbs, etc.) that would bring in the relevant fulfilling material (*reell* contents). Nevertheless, as he makes clear in the immediate context of the above cited passages, this is just a "narrow" sense of intentionality. This narrow sense fits only "theoretical or practical" intentionality,<sup>8</sup> i.e., the intentionality "of the judging or the desiring sort," as opposed to perceptual intentionality, imagination, etc.<sup>9</sup> That is, in the case of theory, intentionality may have the meaning of an at-first-completely-empty intending to achieve this or that, or of having the intention to bring about this or that, etc. Similarly, in practical intentionality, I may desire or plan to achieve this result, and then engage in the activity that will realize it. This meaning, however, does not fit the cases of intentionality pertaining to perception, imagination, etc. The reason is that in these latter cases, we do not have an empty aiming-at that achieves a subsequent fulfilled relation or 'reference'<sup>10</sup> to this or that object of perception. Neither do we aim at *doing* several things in order to reach the goal of consciously having that perceptual or imaginary object, etc. This is so because perception and imagination are cases of fulfilling or, otherwise put, of always already *fulfilled* intentions.

But, what exactly does this mean? In what sense do the always already fulfilled intentionalities of perception and imagination preclude us from thinking their 'actional' character in terms of activity?

Here, someone may seem justified in supposing that if perception is a fulfilling intentionality, this must mean that in perception there are no empty intendings moments demanding fulfillment; i.e., he or she may think that *all* fulfilling contents are already accumulated and available. Thus, given that this accumulation is dependent on our sensory organs and, e.g., on their orientation and re-orientation toward the surrounding reality, perception seems to be in no need of further activity on the part of our sensory-bodily system that would bring in any 'missing' fulfilling contents. This understanding, then, seems to suggest that this must have been what made Husserl (in the *LI*) deny that all intentionality is praxial.

The proponent of this reading may then pursue the following train of thought. If we are to explore Husserl's analyses of intentionality *carefully*, the above distinction

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<sup>8</sup>Note that in the English translation, this "or practical [*oder praktisches*]" (of the original) is missing. I also remind the reader, at this point, that "*reell*" contents in Husserl can be all the kinds of sensory materials, e.g., tone sensations, patches of colours, visual *gestalts*, e.g., whole sides of three-dimensional things or adumbrations (*Abschattungen*) of them, etc., as contained or lived-through within the stream of living experiences. All these contents are "psychically contained" in our living experiences, they have a "psychic reality"; they are not real as, e.g., a marble in a box, but just *reell*; they enjoy a 'lighter' status of reality. For more on this pattern of Husserl's thought, and for my reading of it, see below §§4.6–4.9.

<sup>9</sup>See *LI*, 563/379, 617/453.

<sup>10</sup>I will use this conventional terminology up to §4.6; then, for reasons that will have been explained, I will change it.

between empty aiming and intuitional fulfilment must be rejected. It may be the case that in his *LI*, Husserl of course distinguishes between the following two notions of “intentionality”: (1) A “narrow” concept of intentionality (theoretical or practical aiming), understandable in the sense of an at first completely empty aiming-at which demands subsequent fulfillment by means of an action or practice that will bring in fulfilling *reell* contents or actual objects (at first unavailable); (2) a wide concept of intention (perception, imagination, etc.), understandable as always already fulfilled and in no need of further fulfillment by some activity. But the *actual* teachings in the *LI*, and in Husserl’s later writings, show that this distinction is untenable. Even in fulfilling or fulfilled intentions like perception, we may speak of a necessary set-in activity or practice. The reason for this is that as Husserl himself shows already in, e.g., the 6th *LI*, it seems possible to see the “wide intention” of perception as always consisting in three other sub-intentions: (i) the one referring to the now actually given adumbration (*Abschattung*) of the object perceived, (ii) the one holding a reference to the adumbration I saw just before, and (iii) the one anticipating a reference to the prospective adumbration to become actually given. Thus, the objector may continue, even in the *LI*, there is no—even fulfilling—intention that is *completely* clear of empty aiming intentions that are still in need of fulfillment. This fulfillment can be accomplished only via *practices*, qua movements or activities understood as “habitual activity molded by mechanical repetition,” “kinesthetic activities,” e.g., of the eyes, “unconscious bodily movement connected with drives and instincts,” “activity accompanied by reasoning,” etc.<sup>11</sup>

Since this can be found even in the *LI*, perception and—in the end—all intentionality in general should be acknowledged as praxial. All intentionality (not only in the “narrow” sense) is inextricably bound up with *activity*, in the sense of a *doing* qua actual moving or transposition-in-space of limbs, sensory organs, and the body in general. Hence, all intentionality is praxial, because in all of its forms, intentionality has the meaning of an aiming at the acquisition of contents, which becomes satisfied due to various activities of the subject’s body and/or its parts.

From this point of view, the Husserl of the *LI* appears inconsistent in refusing to acknowledge that we can think of all intentionality as praxial, i.e., in terms of activity or action. In his actual analyses, though, he prepares the ground for letting us understand that intentionality is through and through praxial. Supposedly, Husserl surpasses the problem of inconsistency in the *LI* only later, when he realizes more deeply that even in fulfilling intentionalities, like perception, there are always latent partial empty intendings that can be fulfilled via some bodily activity. This is why, then, we later find Husserl considering all intentionality as praxial.

This way of understanding Husserl’s praxial turn depends on two crucial points.

- (A) Intentionality and intentional fulfillment is essentially a matter of accumulating sensory contents (hyletic data) that are at first emptily aimed at, and which, once contained in consciousness, somehow ‘refer’ to the intentional object.

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<sup>11</sup>For this line of interpretation and argument, see Lee 2000 (from which the latter quotations are taken). With regard to the understanding of “activity,” see especially pp. 55–7; see also Lotz 2007.

- (B) The only sense of “praxis” especially relevant for understanding all intentionality (as understood by Husserl after his praxial turn) is that of a bodily ‘mechanics,’ of the moving connected with our bodies and/or its parts, via which the accumulation of sensory contents gets realized.

I hope to show that, strictly speaking, these presuppositions are *neither sufficient nor necessary* for understanding Husserl’s characterization of all intentionality in terms of praxis. As a first step, in the next section we will see that by rejecting activity as a possible means for understanding intentionality in the *LI*, Husserl was rejecting at least three different senses of this notion, none of which was that of bodily activity as a possible means of intentional fulfillment. More generally, we will see that intentionality is something more than simply various actual bodily activities that accumulate *reell* contents and supply intentional aiming with increasing fulfillment.

### 4.3 The Senses of Act or Activity Rejected by Husserl in *LI*

On the one hand, Husserl eventually came to consider all intentionality in terms of praxis. On the other, in his *LI*, he already acknowledges that perceptual fulfillment is connected with some bodily activity or doing. And yet, he there rejects any essential connection between talk of intentional acts and talk of activity. Is Husserl inconsistent? Right away, I will try to show that bodily activity, in the sense already delineated in §4.2, is not the activity Husserl explicitly rejects in the examined context of his *LI*.

Husserl may be rejecting the essential connection between intentionality and activity yet leaving open the possibility of some connection between intentionality and bodily activity. Of course, later on we will examine whether this suspension of the latter issue can be developed into a positive stance toward the possibility of understanding Husserl’s documented praxial turn in terms of such an activity.

Close analysis shows that in the passages of the *LI* discussed in §4.2 above, there are three things that Husserl rejects under the heading of “activity.”

First, Husserl rejects the conception of acts of consciousness in terms of a commonsensical understanding of “activity.” He rejects the view that “act” may have the sense of machinery involving ‘gears’ or functional parts of some sort, which take in some material and form or transform it into what the whole apparatus can make or produce as result. In other words, Husserl wants to say (with Natort) that conscious constitution of intentional objectities and objectivities does not have the character of real doings, in the sense of some work produced in a physical or mental factory-like settlement (e.g., homunculi) working on some devices.

Second, in his *LI* Husserl, (to some extent with Natort), rejects the assumption best understood by the appeal to an existing ‘egoical’ *substance* that pulls the strings behind the curtains of the scene of consciousness. In the first edition of the *LI*, Husserl totally opposes the idea that our consciousness is a scene of a drama

of intentional appearances of transcendent objects, which is, in a sense, dictated by an independent and hidden absolute intelligence, working deliberately in the background. In the *LI*, Husserl negates the idea that beyond the total flow of my intentional experiences, there is an “I” activating and organizing immanent parts and contents leading me to produce the ‘deeds’ (intentional objects) of which I am directly conscious. This I-‘doer,’ a ‘back-door’ authority of planning and doing, a super-intelligence beyond the coherent totality of my intentional experiences, which sets our (psycho-physiological) parts and contents in motion and makes us have the experiences we have, is clearly rejected.<sup>12</sup>

To be sure, Natorp does not really discard the idea that conscious acts cohere into a unity thanks to the Kantian principle of the “I think.” What he discards is the possible but Kantianly misguided assumption that this “I” accomplishes its thinking in a way similar to that of our planning and accomplishing our deeds in the world.

The third thing Husserl rejects in the passages under consideration is the conception of intentional acts as aimings and doings, for the direct reason that not all intentional acts are literal aimings and doings. Perception, for instance, is not an act because it actively puts forward aims to be achieved only later, at a secondary stage. It is only in a *passive*<sup>13</sup> state of our consciousness that perception is what it is, ‘does’ what it ‘does,’ functions in the way it functions, and ‘gets’ its intentionally constituted and evidentially appearing objects. What is here rejected is the possibility that all intentional acts are like theoretical or practical acts, i.e., aimings and doings that *deliberately and actively* posit their sought-for contents or objects—not the possibility that the later acquisition of these contents or objects comes via appropriate bodily activity. Intentional experiences, like perception, belong to the passive state of consciousness in which objects are always already ‘just there’ (in a

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<sup>12</sup>Husserl cites Natorp’s phrase that consciousness only *appears* as a doing: “*weil Bewußtsein oft oder immer von Streben begleitet ist*” (*LU* II.1, 379 n. 1). Findlay’s translation of the German “*Streben*” as “conation” (“because consciousness is often or always accompanied by conation”) may be taken as reflecting such an understanding. The term *Streben* originates from the Proto-Germanic *strīdō* (“combat, strife”) as transferred into the Old High German *strīt* (“quarrel”) and *strītan* (“to fight”), whereas conation originates from the Latin *conari* (“to try”) or *conor* (“to endeavor”). This translation allows for the connection between striving and a *deliberate* planning that may stem from an authority-like, egoic intelligence. That is, it may indeed make us think that talk of intentional acts means that consciousness or intentionality is the result of a deliberating and intelligent willing (*conatus*), which at first plans independently in veiled isolation and, then, at a secondary phase, takes action by setting us in bodily motion or action, etc. It is interesting, of course, that in the *LI* Husserl admits such an understanding of theoretical intentionality (in terms of a *Streben*), but still refuses (in the first edition of that work) to acknowledge a ‘transcendental’ I of a sort. (See also the third point following immediately in the main text.) However, for still further perplexities regarding the meaning of “*Streben*,” see also §4.10.1.

<sup>13</sup>Of course, here, “passive” is understood in the proper phenomenological sense, i.e., not as a mere receiving of representations on the tain of a mirror-like mind, but in accordance with the meaning of intentional constitution. The latter will be further explained in the subsequent sections.

manner that is further explicated in §§4.8 and 4.9 below).<sup>14</sup> It is extremely doubtful that Husserl, with Natorp, actually rejects this sense of act. In the Husserlian context, perception is conscious constituting but is also passive. In the Kantian context, perception as objective experience is determined by a deliberate "I."<sup>15</sup>

It is possible to think that at the time of the first publication of the *LI* (1901), in the here examined passages Husserl also silently rejected a fourth possibility of understanding intentional acts as activities. I mean the sense of activity connected with intentional constitution as a mode of "syntheses." But this possibility cannot be sustained. On the one hand, this would have been a mistake on Husserl's part, if the pre-transcendental Husserl really wanted to follow the Kantian Natorp in rejecting any possible connection between "conscious acts" and fully serious talk about "activities." In addition, even the eidetic constitutive model of the *LI*, i.e., 'instantiation' of the universal *Materie* in a living experience, is not without its 'motility.' On the other hand, Husserl retains the remark that "intentional act" should remain disentangled from any connection with "activities of consciousness," "activities of the ego," or "mental activities" even in the second edition (1913) of his *LI* (see the reference in the note mentioned in §4.2). But, at that time, he had already adopted the Kantian-like talk of transcendental intentional constitution in terms of *syntheses*, which *has* an unmistakable sense of "mental activity" or of "mental functioning" of a certain sort. Later, in §4.9, we will see how important this is.

#### **4.4 Perception Is Always Already Fulfilled, but Never Absolutely so (Without This Signifying Some Essential Insufficiency)**

Husserl expressed his refusal to let us conceive of all intentionality in terms of an intending in the "narrow" sense and, thus in terms of "activities" (see the citations from *LI* in §4.2). The case of the non-theoretical act of perception (and imagination) appears to stand as an obstacle to this. We saw that one view is that Husserl's negation is based on his impermanent and careless assumption that perception is always already fulfilled, meaning that it is in no need of a bodily activity that will bring in necessary complementary sensory material. According to the same view, Husserl actually knows that even perception, which is already fulfilled, is in fact *not totally* or absolutely fulfilled, i.e., it is in need of always further fulfillment. Thus, when Husserl fully realizes this, he goes on to accept the praxiality of *all* intentionality, in the sense that all intentionality is activity-laden.

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<sup>14</sup>For further vindication of all three senses of act and activity rejected by Husserl with regard to perception, see also, e.g., *Ideas* II, 23/21, 21/19.

<sup>15</sup>See, however, also the second rejected sense of activity; moreover §§4.8 and 4.10.1.



Meanwhile, we also saw three substantial reasons for Husserl's refusal to accept that all intentionality involves activity. The remaining question, then, is whether the just thematized in-principle insatiability of perception's intentional fulfillment could have—ever, under any circumstances—been an additional reason for this refusal. That is, we at the same time wonder whether the overt and fully aware acknowledgement of perception's essential non-absolute fulfillability could in any case be a substantial reason for recognizing the praxial nature of all intentionality.

By refusing in the *LI* (at the point under discussion) to understand intentionality in terms of activities, Husserl is not exactly forgetful of the fact that there are intentional experiences (perception), which, although already fulfilled, are always in need of bodily activity that brings in *additional* fulfilling contents. A forgetfulness of this sort could have never been the reason for refusing, in the *LI*, to consider intentionality in general as an activity. The reason is that perception, which, although always already fulfilled, is also never completely fulfilled, i.e., is always in need of further fulfilling contents that could be supplied by a bodily activity, but *without* this amounting to an essential deficiency for it. Thus, no matter whether Husserl momentarily forgot perception's imperfect fulfillability, or whether he again becomes fully aware of it, this changes nothing in his—at least pre-1920s—view that intentionality is not essentially an activity (*Tätigkeit*). I will try to explain this more clearly.

That perception as a concrete or full-fledged intentional act is always already fulfilled simply means that it always already has 'related us with' or has let us experience an appearing perceptual object. Perception is always already fulfilled, just in the sense that in it, and in the manner proper to it, we always already intentionally 'refer' to or—phenomenologically put—experience a transcendentally appearing intentional object. And from Husserl's writings, we indeed know that even a *glance* (*Blick*), as part of an enduring perceptual act, should as such count as—and indeed is—a concrete perceptual act. For instance, in the first edition of the *LI*, we come across this remark.

[W]e perceive an external thing. That the object does not offer all its parts and sides to perception is [...] irrelevant [...]. For perception is essentially the presumptive apprehension of some object, not its adequate intuition. *Perception itself* [...] *naturally falls* [...] *beyond the glance* [*Blick*] [...]; somehow similarly to what is the case with the ungrasped and yet appearing aspects of a perceived external thing [which] are not themselves falling within [the glance of] perception. [...] [In all these cases, though, the corresponding things are] said to be perceived, and perceived they indeed are, and in full, 'bodily' presence [*in der Weise leibhafter Selbstgegenwart bewußt*]. (*LI*, 551/362–3; emphases added)

And of course, we have the emblematic statement in §47 of the sixth *LI*.

In sense-perception, the 'external' thing appears '*in one blow*,' *as soon as our glance falls upon it*. The manner in which it makes the thing appear present is straightforward. (*LI*, 788/147; emphases added)<sup>16</sup>

<sup>16</sup>"*In der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung erscheint uns das 'äußere' Ding in Einem Schlage, sowie unser Blick darauf fällt. . . .*" See also *LI*, §47 as a whole, but also, e.g., *PP*, 133/174; *EJ*, 252/301. This

We find many references in Husserl's work which assure us that even a momentary 'receptive' glance of a perception (as the enduring act it is) counts as a proper perceptual experience. Perception, that is, is an intentional aiming that is always already fulfilled, even at the most 'transitory' moments of its possible duration. Even in its most elusive or limit instants, i.e., when it contains just one adumbrative phase of a perceptual thing, perception is what it is without being connected with a bodily activity that brings in additional fulfilling contents (with respect to that which is already contained in it). This means that perception is correlated with its proper intentional object, the transcendent perceptual thing, even before or apart from any bodily activity subsequently set in motion. That is, Husserl can exclude *actual* bodily activity from being the crucial factor that should determine our understanding of intentionality in general in terms of praxis.<sup>17</sup>

Perception as the intentional act it is, moreover, is an intentional act *par excellence* and, from Husserl's later perspective, must count as praxial in nature even in momentary 'receptive' glances. This means that when Husserl comes to consider all intentionality, i.e., even perception, as praxial in nature, this is not due to a regained awareness regarding the imperfect fulfilling character of perception. Thus, the reason for acknowledging the praxial nature of perception, and hence of all intentionality, should not depend on the recognition of perception's inherent 'pragmatic' need for further fulfillment. And, importantly, this is already an early realization of his Phenomenology in the first edition of the *LI*.

#### 4.5 'Praxial' in the Sense of a Handling Pervading All Givenness

Before moving any further, another possible explanation of Husserl's praxial turn based specifically on the example of perception is worth-examining here.<sup>18</sup>

Let me first offer some preliminaries. When the intending of an act is fulfilled in some appropriate way, we may say, in phenomenological terms, that the very thing (*die Sache*) that is now given in this fulfillment is being given with *evidence*. According to standard views, something is evident when it is itself given exactly *in the way it was intended* in the relevant act. In evidential givenness, we live in the consciousness of the *self-having* of the given objectivity. And we may say that, even when I see a real thing, the thing fills the perception *bodily or in person*, even though I see it only from one of its aspects.

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latter articulation of the sixth LI in particular did not escape the attention of Heidegger. See his way of putting it in *PHTC*, 60 f. Later on, in §4.7, we will return to this topic with a renewed interest.

<sup>17</sup>See also note 23 and §4.7 below.

<sup>18</sup>This section is a totally new addition to the original manuscript published in *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*.

Now, the alternative view on the matter examined here may go like this. Husserl usually focuses on perceptions and acts of judgment, but he never held that all forms of fulfillment were of such a (supposedly) purely *cognitive* kind. Some fulfillments are achieved in emotions or in *actions*, and are accomplished through bodily engagement.

The so-called “praxial” dimension or “practical” nature of intentionality may appear, then, to be once again connected with fulfillments achievable by means of actions performed by the bodily constitution of a human subject. Perception is seen as a praxis, on the basis that in the fulfilling moments of its (at first, we may suppose) empty intendings, several actions of the perceiver’s body are necessarily presupposed. Nevertheless, according to this alternative view, the meaning of this presupposition differs considerably.

In contrast with the previous conception of the body’s way of engaging in the fulfilling of perceptual intentions, this time its engagement may be conceived as being more substantial. The idea here is that when I *see*, e.g., a cup, I also immediately see it as pickable-up, as liftable by its handle, etc. This is a meaning-intention whose fulfilling condition is that I can actually move toward the cup, extend my hand in its direction, and finally pick it up, hold it, bring it to my lips, etc. The cup is perceived, but perceived with a horizon, as it were, of an open set of “I-can” possibilities, related to my own bodily capacities for activity. Thus, bodily action in this new sense may be taken into account among the conditions that are essential for having something like “perception.”<sup>19</sup>

As we will see in Chap. 6, the hidden source behind such an approach may lie in Heidegger’s objections to Husserl’s account of intentionality, and especially to his account of *primordial* intentionality. For Heidegger, the primordial intentional constitution and appearance of a worldly being is not understood primarily as the sensory-perceptual bodily or in person givenness of a perceptual thing, which is achieved by means of sensory fulfillment of at-first empty purely cognitive (even if not already judgmental) intentions of the character “(passive) perception.” For him, it is instead understood in terms of an ‘action’ that apprehends the being (and thus constitutes and lets it appear as what it primordially is) within a wider context of concerns that have to take a course toward some final οὐ ἔνεκα (*Worum-willen*).<sup>20</sup> For instance, such a primordial constitution lets us experience something as a hammer on the basis of our having been immersed in a practical coping with this being as ready-to-hand, in the wider context of a total work (*Werk*) that is meant to be accomplished, e.g., my constructing a fence that will protect my home-bred animals that sustain me and my family in life. On the contrary, as the standard

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<sup>19</sup>An argument along these lines may be found, e.g., in Moran 2000a. It is an approach that can be found in the work of thinkers who—at least as regards this particular issue—draw either directly from Heidegger’s work or from ideas related to it. See, e.g., also Føllesdal 1979, 2000, and Arp 1996.

<sup>20</sup>It is essential here to compare this basic schema of Heidegger’s approach with what we will find out later, in §§4.8 and 4.9. On this, see also §4.10.1 below and Chap. 6.

Heideggerian criticism has it, in Husserl a cognitive and theoretical conception of intentional constitution prevails, which speaks about a primordial givenness of perceptual beings as present-at-hand, i.e., as merely there-standing external objects, being reflected in a mirror-like mind.<sup>21</sup>

A compromising view, then, such as the one suggested by Moran (2000a), may go like this: perhaps Husserl does really say that cognitive and theoretical intentionalities are more primordial than the practical one, but we know that in the end, he somehow intermingled his analyses of perception with those related to practical engagement. Husserl characterizes the world of things given as *vorhanden*, as just there standing in an enduring presence, but he expressly allows that we may *also* be concerned with things in their *uses*. Thus, the thing that actually appears, e.g., in perception, is always already laden with such usefulness or practical meaning. Husserl, after all, offers us cases in which we apprehend things basically as means of nutrition, as use-objects (heating materials, axes, hammers, books, etc.), as means for the satisfaction of needs, etc.<sup>22</sup>

This represents the second alternative approach to the problem examined in the present chapter. It seems that it is not the case that perception is *restricted* to a mere ("theoretical") encounter of the occurrent, the present-at-hand, in a complete abstention from the practical. On the contrary, perception as an encounter with the occurrent must be seen as considerably intertwined with the (equally fulfillable) meaning-levels of the useful and the *practical*. In this last sense, it may be thought that *praxis inheres in perception* and, thus, that perception is indeed 'contaminated' through and through by the paraxial, or that it is *praxially-laden*, or simply that perception is, after all, praxial in nature. One may, then, go even further and claim that this model of perceptual intentionality qua praxis could be suitably extended and applied to other spheres of intentional consciousness. For instance, even the scientifically theoretical intentionality, e.g., of a physicist who forms empty thought-intentions that delineate and also actually seek, in appropriate laboratory handlings, the discovery of, say, the Higgs boson, could be treated accordingly. From this point of view, then, *all* intentionality could be considered as praxial in the sense just presented.

Here, I will keep my distance from this possible approach concerning the elucidation of the praxial character of perception (and of intentionality in general). The reason is simpler, and I will present it straightforwardly. Given the remark offered at the beginning of this section, perception should not be said to be praxial in this sense. The reason is that the practice examined here does not contribute to the constitution of the *perceptual thing as such*. It does not contribute to the constitution

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<sup>21</sup>I must make clear that I do not agree with the Heideggerian claim that, in Husserl, perception is (at least in its basics) a *theoretical* (*interest-guided, predicative, scientific*) affair. For a detailed consideration of this standard Heideggerian reading of Husserl's *Phenomenology*, see Chap. 5. The results of the present chapter, as well as those of Chaps. 5, will then be used for a more global treatment of the issue regarding primordial givenness in Husserl and Heidegger (Chap. 6).

<sup>22</sup>See the references in the three previous notes.

of the *proper perceptibles* (ἀντιληπτά ἴδια)—in accordance to the Aristotelian proper sensibles (αἰσθητά ἴδια). That is, the kind of practice just discussed does not contribute to the constitution of the purely and simply sensory-perceptual thing, i.e., to the perceptual in the sense of *Dingphantom* and *res materialis*, as developed in, e.g., *Ideas II*. This will be explicated in Chap. 5 of the present book.

It is evident that the first approach examined earlier to the praxial in perception and intentionality does not fall prey to this Heideggerian deviation from Husserl's Phenomenology of perception or, for that matter, of intentional experiences in general. As we will see in Chap. 6, the praxis examined in the present section contributes to the constitution of founded and *higher-level* noematic layers (that are not yet necessarily theoretical). Such practices are separate (although founded) full-fledged intentional acts that end up with *their own* proper (but also internally structured) intentional correlates: the useful thing, the tool, the nutritious thing, etc. Thus, an approach such as the one examined in the present section does not serve to elucidate the mystery of the praxial nature of *perception* in the strict sense, nor that of all the other kinds of intentionality.

## 4.6 Imagination as Fulfilling Intentional Experience

The approach presented in §4.2 above suggested that Husserl's praxial turn took place when he fully realized that there is no intentional act completely free of empty aimings that would require the performance of some bodily activities or doings for its fulfillment. Nevertheless, I hope to have shown that there are reasons to believe that this approach creates problems for our understanding of perception in the Husserlian framework. We will completely surpass these problems by means of the new approach offered in §§4.7, 4.8, and 4.9. In order to prepare ourselves for this, however, we will now examine the case of imagination. We will see that since imagination is just another intentional act, it too must be treated as praxial, despite its own peculiarities.

If we were to literally follow the approach examined in §4.2, then imagination, which has as its objects beings not able to be given actually (i.e., imagination is an act for which there is no actual accumulation of fulfilling *reell* contents) should never be considered, after Husserl's praxial turn, in terms of praxis and thus as a kind of intentional consciousness.<sup>23</sup> But Husserl not only comes to consider all imagination as praxial in nature, but, as we saw, in the *LI* he referred to it as one of

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<sup>23</sup>One may possibly object that imagination, e.g. of an elf, is praxial because it relates to a bodily activity that is set or could be set in motion seeking—even in vain—relevant fulfilling contents. It could also be claimed that perhaps imagination, like a perceptual glance, is not connected with *actual* bodily activity, but it could be shown that both relate to remembered or potential bodily activity connected with the accumulation of fulfilling contents. In §§4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 below, I will show that neither actual nor potential bodily activity is the reason that led Husserl to consider all intentionality in terms of praxis.

the reasons prohibiting our understanding of intentional acts in terms of activities. This seems to further strengthen the conclusion of the previous section. What makes a conscious act intentional is not the possibility of its being connected with some actual bodily activity that brings in fulfilling contents.

That, for Husserl, intentional life may be considered as praxis not with respect to an actual outward limbs-and-tools-involving activity is shown more clearly in passages like the following.

[T]he practical consideration [*Besinnung*]<sup>24</sup> is an inner practice [*Handeln*] and, when it succeeds [*gelingend*],<sup>25</sup> it results in an inner work-morpheme [*Werkgebilde*]. (*Hua VIII*, 205). [...] [This inner practice has the status of a] thought-like anticipation, a plan qua fore-having [*eine Vor-habe*] of the process of the outer practice and of its end. (*ibid.*, 206). [...] [In addition, the afore-mentioned anticipation takes place in imagination and] imagination would be equal to 'actuality' ['*Wirklichkeit*'] [just] when it is stable and vivid enough—[and] when the whole affair concerns merely me individually. (*ibid.*, 208)<sup>26</sup>

That is, in sum, even the inner imaginative planning of a future work, of an outer practice (*äußeren Handeln*), is to be considered as having a praxial structure.

It is for this reason that Husserl is justifiably in the position to claim that at least in some extreme cases of intentional life, like that of an original artist, the *genuine intentional* achievement is mental (*geistig*). And this is so because, in such cases, we can claim the following.

The plan or projection [*Entwurf*] in *inner doing* [*Tun*] [...] would [in her or his case] already be the work itself. (*ibid.*, 208; emphases added)

Here, consciousness' genuine intentional achievement does not necessarily lie in the actual (outer) bringing about of an externalization of the artist's 'idea' (such as a painting on a canvas, a written poem, a bronze or steel sculpture, etc.).

[The imagining consciousness consists] in the inner considering [*besinnlichen*] and inner self-completing [*sich vollendenden*] achievement. All real [*reale*] externality is *irrelevant* and only a means for the objective exposition [of the 'idea']. (*ibid.*, 209; emphasis added)

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<sup>24</sup>In the sense of the fore-meaning (*Vormeinung*), of a plan or projection (*Entwurf*), that anticipates the secondary actual setting of ourselves at the realization of this or that work; see *Hua VIII*, 206–207 (the present translations from that work are mine).

<sup>25</sup>In a sense, this is what will be further explicated in §§4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 below.

<sup>26</sup>This talk of imagination should not, however, be taken to mean that intentional praxis as such is restricted to the mere having of the 'inner image' by which imagination may happen to merely *accompany* consciousness. If this were the case, then intersubjective communication (agreement or disagreement) on matters related to *just planned* actions would be difficult and accidental if not totally impossible. This idea is included in Husserl's own criticism of traditional representationalism. Husserl places the crucial weight not so much on the side of the (subjective) image given in imagination, with the evidence pertaining to this act, but on the side of the *sense* (or meaning) and its function in the overall intention. (For example, see *Hua VIII*, 205ff and especially 206.) These remarks should suffice here to assure the reader that Husserl had always escaped the pitfalls of semantic psychologism. For additional explications regarding the meaning of this connection between imagination (but also between all intentional acts) and *sense*, see §§4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 below; see also Chap. 2, §§2.2, 2.3, and 2.4.

For present purposes, this may suffice. It seems that imagination, which as one of the intentional possibilities, must also be considered as having a praxial nature—and in the just quoted text, it is indeed called a ‘doing’—and is not praxial because of some actual (outer) activity and doing (turning one’s glance, walking, extending of hands, handling of instruments, and the like) connected with its fulfillment. That possibility is here out of the question. Imagination is a kind of intentional life that is praxial *in its structure*; not because it involves empty intentions that are subsequently fulfilled on the basis of bodily activity. This makes even the intentional act of imaginative ‘inner planning’ of a future actual outer work or practice *itself* a practice, and itself praxial in nature. The inner essence, as it were, of imagination in general, of this inner planning or projection or fore-having of an outer activity or object, *suffices* in order to characterize it as an intentional act of a praxial nature.

## 4.7 Intermediate Considerations

### 4.7.1 A Possible Objection to the Conclusion of §§4.4 and 4.6

Perceptual *further* fulfillment has ceased being of any interest for us here. What has become interesting is the possibility of fulfillment as such, or what prescribes the possibility of appearance. And momentary perception is always already fulfilled (to one or another degree of fullness). Perception being always already passively fulfilled means that it is always relatively fulfilled, even in a momentary phase toward its possible continuous development. But what does it mean for perception to be fulfilled at a momentary phase? It means to be an intentional experience of a perceptual object by way of *living through even* just one *reel* content (‘corresponding,’ e.g., to an adumbration of that perceptual thing) that is immanently contained within the stream of living experiences. And in this, no reference to some actual bodily doing has been made. A similar conclusion was also reached in §4.6, with regard to the ultimate limit case of the imagination.

A possible objection may arise, here, however. Absence of actual bodily activity should not necessarily also mean absence of an (even passively motivated) past remembered, or future anticipated, *potential* bodily activity. Perception (and, accordingly, imagination) may indeed always already offer us, even in its fragmentary instants, its intentional objects without any actual bodily activity, because its retention in the living present (or, accordingly, memory) always already supplies it with the relevant ‘retained’ (or ‘re-presented’) sensory contents that were *in fact* acquired by actual bodily activity. Thus, we may still suspect that when Husserl started referring to all intentionality in terms of praxis, he did so as a result of recognizing that even in its momentary phases, perception is fulfilled only because it presupposes some past or potential bodily activity that has already brought in (or will bring in) the relevant fulfilling *reell* contents.



In the following subsection, we will see that intentionality does not depend essentially on the acquisition, the containment, or the living-through (in some *narrow* sense to be explained below) of the *reell* contents that participate in what fulfillment is. Someone may indeed have *reell* contents and yet *not* have an intentional experience proper. And *if* bodily activity is only the means for acquiring these contents, it turns out that bodily activity as such is not that on which intentionality depends.

### 4.7.2 *Having Reell Contents and Being Intentionally Conscious of Appearing Transcendent Objectivities*

We may now turn our attention to point (A) above, in §4.2. This point depends heavily on what we mean by “intentionality” in Husserl’s *Phenomenology*. Of course, the issue is tremendously complicated and, as we saw in Chaps. 2 and 3, it seems to have undergone considerable changes throughout Husserl’s career. Here, I will summarize the rough idea, in a manner that cuts through variations in the meaning of “intentional constitution” in Husserl’s different periods and works (see Chap. 2, §§2.2, 2.3, and 2.7.2).

In the literature, it is customary to refer to the three moments (i)–(iii) articulated in §4.2 as three *intentions* or three *intentionalities*, or even as *concrete* intentions or intentionalities. This way of speaking is misleading. It is also constitutive of the already presented way of understanding Husserl’s conception of intentionality in terms of praxis. Intentionality is the mark of conscious experiences in the *proper* sense, i.e., of a complete act, and not of its possible separate constituent moments—e.g., of its separate temporal phases. Some notable exceptions appear, perhaps, in the *Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness (Hua X)*, where we come across overstatements with regard to the latter.<sup>27</sup> Normally, characterizations like those under discussion here are forbidden in Husserl’s *Phenomenology* (or are not used without further contextual explications). Confusion on these points obscures the differences between the Brentanian and the Husserlian intentionalities, and blocks the proper understanding of full-fledged phenomenological intentionality in terms of praxis. Let us see why.

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<sup>27</sup>Sokolowski (1964) bases a good deal of his understanding of Husserlian intentionality and of intentional constitution on an over-emphasised focus on this use of “intentionality.” If the so-called “partial intentions” of retention and protention around the current living present of internal time consciousness are to be considered as baring genuine intentionality, then their immediate lived-through *reell* contents (hyle) should also be regarded as ‘transcendently referring.’ Such a development would, of course, result in the collapse of the specifically anti-Brentanian and anti-representational potential of Husserl’s phenomenological intentionality. This also relates to the notorious problem regarding the validity and scope of Husserl’s fundamental content-apprehension, matter-form, or content-interpretation schema of intentionality. We will return to this in Chap. 10, n. 12.



Time and again, it is said that as a result of his criticism of Brentano's conception of intentionality, Husserl gave intentionality the meaning of 'referring to something objective'; intentional consciousness 'refers' to something objective. More specifically, intentional consciousness is then supposed to be an at-first empty aiming that subsequently gets fulfilled whenever consciousness acquires some corresponding *reell* content (e.g., in the case of perception, offered gestalt sides of the object). Then we say that our consciousness 'refers' intentionally to a perceptual object. But does this conception of Husserlian intentionality mean a referring of our consciousness in the sense of a *mere having* of some sensory content—qua, say, 'representation' of a facet of transcendent objects—within the stream of living experiences? Does this mean a labeling-like referring of our consciousness, via such immanent contents, to transcendent objects? Or, to examine another possibility, does this mean some mediate referring to *facets* or *parts* of transcendent objects?<sup>28</sup>

As the result of Husserl's radical criticism—for the first time in the fifth LI—of Brentano's use of "intentionality," this concept *cannot* have, in *Phenomenology*, the meaning of such a merely representational 'referring' to something 'objective' in any of the above senses. In Brentano, intentionality was already understood as a tending toward an object (*Richtung auf ein Objekt*) or toward something objective, albeit immanent (*immanente Gegenständlichkeit*), as we read in the famous and oft-quoted passage from his *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (i.e., at least before his "immanence crisis").<sup>29</sup> Thus, to speak about Husserlian intentionality in the above simplified and (so to say) traditional way, without any further clarifications, is of little help in developing a suitable understanding of the matter and, in the end, is totally wrong-headed.<sup>30</sup>

As I understand it, in the *LI*, intentionality means the *appearance* of a *transcendent* being in its horizon of *co-appearance*—"transcendent" with respect to the immanence of the flow of *Erlebnisse*, or living experiences in the narrow<sup>31</sup>

<sup>28</sup>In posing these last questions in the present context, I have in mind Lee 2000 and Sokolowski 1964.

<sup>29</sup>In the Brentanian conception of intentionality, consciousness is directed or refers either directly to a content of this last kind or, in his thought after 1905, it is conjectured—in a confused way—to *correspond* or *refer*, in some mysterious and in fact non-testable way, to a real transcendent thing via such a content. Brentano seems to have remained ambivalent with regard to the question of whether the genuine object of our consciousness is the immanent content or an inaccessible realistic transcendent something 'corresponding' to this content. On the meaning of Husserl's critique of Brentano's intentionality, see e.g., De Boer 1978, 45ff; and Vassiliou 2013.

<sup>30</sup>Such an understanding, by the way, seems to be the basis of the assimilation of intentionality in Anglo-American circles, informed by the basically Brentanian Chisholm, e.g., Wilfred Sellars, Fodor, etc. Unfortunately, the same can be said about the circles acquainted with intentionality under the influence of phenomenologists like Føllesdal and Dreyfus, especially when they interpret or present Husserl's intentionality. The understanding under discussion can also be found in, e.g., Searle.

<sup>31</sup>Note that this last use of "narrow" that is going to be used here is not the same as Husserl's use in the citation from *LI*, referred to in §4.2.

sense. It means the evidence of the meaningful having of an appearing transcendent being, within a background of co-givenness. According to Husserlian intentionality, whatever is for a consciousness appears or manifests itself as something transcendent, in relation to the immanence of the stream of living experiences and its *reell* contents that are interpretatively lived-through. In short, these are the characteristics that seem to me to come closest to the Husserlian conception of intentionality: (a) interpretative intentional animation (*Beseelung*), (b) appearance, and (c) transcendence. Appearance is contrasted to non-appearance, to a mere having of an inert, non-intentionally-animated sensory content in the immanence of the stream of living experiences (in the narrow sense). In this way, Husserl gains something more. It is right to think that acts like perception are considered as full-fledged intentional experiences or acts, whereas sensation per se should *not* be considered in this same way.

We can now examine whether it is adequate to draw the distinction between intentional perception and non-intentional sensation in terms of referring and non-referring, respectively, to something objective. If the *differentia specifica* between them is sought in such terms, an ambiguity ensues, since there is a sense in which sensations may also be said to 'refer.' If we are to use Husserl's example of the fifth *LI*, the pain I have in my left foot 'refers,' in some sense, to my foot; I consciously feel the pain and locate it at this or that point in, e.g., my left foot, etc. But this does *not* make my pain an intentional experience in the pregnant sense of the term. In my sensation of that pain, neither the pain itself, nor my foot or that specific part of my foot, is there for my consciousness in the sense of appearing perceived objectivities in a world. Something analogous holds even for the visual *sensation* I have of a house, or of any other external object. In perceptual sensations of this object here and now, an *Abschattung* of it is contained as a *reell* part of the "living present" in the stream of my living experiences (in the narrow sense). And, from some point of view, this contained gestalt of the house-over-there may be said to 'refer' to this very house—especially if the contained *reell* gestalt is taken as intentionally "animated," i.e., meaningfully interpreted in the perceptual act as being a part of the whole possible horizon of other such gestalts 'belonging' to the same house. The sensation as a mere (*bloß*) having of the *Abschattung*, 'refers' to the house over there: it is a sensation 'of' this or that side of the house (or 'of' that house in a still looser sense). This sensed side is a side 'of' the perceived house. Nevertheless, the mere perceptual sensation (with its *reell* content) is not yet equal to an appearing of the intentional object "house" itself, in the proper sense sketched above. Even if that content is taken as animated (*beseelt*), what makes it intentional is not some 'referring' of it (from its *reell* immanence) to the corresponding side of the house, but its being-a-dependent-part of the house itself, qua transcendently appearing object of perception.

Phenomenology of perception in the proper sense, i.e., as a concrete intentional experience, shows that whereas we entertain an actually given partial side of a thing, we have the consciousness of the whole *thing* qua an appearing, transcendent, objective, identical, horizontal-unity of fused dependent moments.

[The perceptual thing] is the intentional unity, the identically-and-unitarily [*identisch-einheitlich*] thing being consciously experienced in the continuously ordered flow [*kontinuierlich geregelten Abfluß*] of perceptual multiplicities, which interpenetrate into one another [*ineinander übergelenden*]. (*Ideas* I, 88/85; trns. mine)

In Husserl, intentionality names this peculiar happening exactly: e.g., in perception, while we are actually living-through (in the narrow sense) sensed, descriptive and *reell* contents (sides, *Abschattungen*), we live (in the broad or phenomenologically proper sense) in the conscious experience of a phenomenologically and transcendently *appearing* thing as totality (even though not as ideally or absolutely fulfilled).

Thus, if we stay just at the level of an unspecified ‘reference’ as the essential characteristic of Husserlian intentionality, even in his *LI*, intentionality is loosely said to characterize not only perception proper (full intentional experiences), but isolated sensations too (in a non-full or narrow sense of intentional experiences). But if we understand intentionality in the triple sense I previously sketched as the characteristics (a)–(c), then, just as Husserl wanted it, *separate(d) sensations* are safely excluded from the sphere of the phenomenologically intentional.

In a word, intentionality is a matter of achieving experience of transcendently appearing whole objects, not a matter of just having—or even being mediately directed to—dependent (either immanent or transcendent) parts of objects that ‘refer’ to them as their ‘representations.’ Thus, we realize that intentionality isn’t a matter of accumulating more and more sensory contents that may additively ‘refer’ all the more fully—in a merely quantitative sense after all—to such objects. Hence, if we want to see what could justify an account of intentionality in terms of praxis, we must first of all (and always) take care that we are indeed dealing with *genuine* phenomenological intentionality. This means that something more has to be considered than the mere having of additive bundles of separate partial ‘intentions,’ which are fulfilled by our fetching relevant corresponding sensory contents via bodily activity or doing.

## 4.8 On the Structure of Perception as Intentional Act

When one speaks of praxis and practices, an association with action of some kind takes place. But Husserl speaks in terms of praxis even with regard to passive intentional living-experiences like perception, and even with regard to its momentary phases and glancing mode. Even when perception entertains just one adumbration of its intentional thing, it is an intentional act in which we experience its correlative thing as a whole.

Now, the fact that (passive) perception is intentional, even in these ‘receptive’ glances or transitory phases, does not mean that it is intentional due to its mere *having* of the corresponding adumbration in these limit cases. In §4.7.2, we saw that intentionality is not just a matter of containing ‘referring’ *reel* contents, but is rather a matter of having an experience of transcendently appearing things. Thus, something more is needed in order to understand why a perceptual moment becomes

and is intentional. The uncovering of this missing 'internal' (see §§4.4 and 4.6) element or factor will lead us to understand in what sense even 'non-active'—from the point of view of bodily motility and doing—gazing is praxial in nature.

Perceptual-praxis (*Wahrnehmungspraxis*) is guided by an ideal. Ideally, it aims at a fulfillment that should culminate in an all-sided self-presence of the perceptual thing. But this does not mean that in order to have a perception (as we know it), the ideal itself and as such has to be realized. It is a phenomenological truth that perception cannot—but, in a sense, also should not—realize the appearing (and being) of an actually all-sidedly given thing.<sup>32</sup> In all intentionality, the relevant noetic sense (*noetischer Sinn*) serves as a guide for the intentional constitution of perception's correlative noematic objectivity (the actual perceptual thing).<sup>33</sup> In perception, the relevant perceptual sense (*Wahrnehmungssinn*) serves as a guide for the constitution of the perceptual object, as an appearing, unitary, spatially limited horizon with an inner correlatively unifying principle (against the backdrop, of course, of an outer horizon of co-givenness). This thing as an appearing unitary horizon has its completed and uncompleted fulfilment phases. The thing itself is never a horizon that consists of only actually offered adumbrations of the thing. It neither consists in all the up-to-a-certain-point actualized adumbrations. The appearing thing is an open-ended unitary horizon of such actual and potential adumbrations, which is 'defined' on the basis of a particular ideal of inner- and outer- inter-correlatedness dictated by the relevant perceptual sense. This is what appears: the thing thusly constituted; not the ideal intentional correlate.

*Wahrnehmungssinn*, perceptual sense (not perceptual noema),<sup>34</sup> is a very peculiar and rather fragile concept; this is because its intentional correlate, the perceptual

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<sup>32</sup>This, of course, does *not* amount to a defect of perception. Such an ideal givenness is impossible in perception—even for God, as Husserl famously puts it, e.g., in his *Ideas I* (§43). We may speak here of a 'situational'-relative completeness of fulfilment. No omni-intuitional givenness of a perceptual thing is possible. It is because Derrida thought the contrary, in his *Speech and Phenomena* that, feeling betrayed by Husserl's deconstructed textual evidence, he cried out: 'there is no perception!' This reading of Husserl's *Phenomenology* and of the phenomenology of perception (but also of the phenomenology of meaning and expression) may have made phenomenologists more self-aware in their philosophy. No Husserlian and no phenomenologist, though, really balk at such acute but off-the-point criticisms.

<sup>33</sup>Although this terminology pertains to the transcendental-phenomenological point of view and its synthetic constitutive analyses of the *Ideas I* and beyond, the general spirit of this treatment applies *mutatis mutandis* also to the phenomenological-psychological point of view and the eidetic constitutive analyses of the *LI*. Of course, via this phrase (and what will be said in the next section), we are referred back to the serious and rather complicated issues of the meaning of the phenomenological reduction(s) and of the relation between sense and noema in Husserl's *Phenomenology*. Let this issue be considered settled here, with the analyses contained in Chaps. 2 and 3 of this book. With regard to the specific connection between sense and noema and, more particularly, between noetic sense and fulfilled noema, see also below, and Chap. 5.

<sup>34</sup>“[T]he sense is not a concrete entity [or being (*Wesen*)] in the total composition of the noema, but a sort of abstract form [*Form*] inherent in the noema.” (*Ideas I*, 316/273). To be sure, this description concerns the specifically *noematic* sense. For our present purposes, we will consider that, in perception, the noetic and the noematic senses are one and the same thing. This explains the peculiar character of the perceptual correlation (perceptual noesis and perceptual noema).

noema, is an always already *fulfilled* perceptual sense. On that level, in perception, from the point of view of its intending *sense* alone, something has appeared but has yet not appeared. The difficulty consists in that the perceptual intending sense ‘exists’ only within the context of a currently operative concrete perception, which is, as such, always already fulfilled (to one or another degree of fullness). In perception, the perceptual sense does not ‘exist’ somehow separately in advance, waiting in purely empty antecedence, as it were, before its actual perceptual modality. In the operative perception, the perceptual sense is as just-*set-into-action* or, better, as having been *always already* set into action in a current perceptual act. It is on the basis of this that an *Abschattung* has been intentionally animated or, better, *interpreted* (apprehended or understood) and been consciously held as the actually offered facet of the overall perceived object that appears transcendently.

In perception, then, the always already fulfilled perceptual sense has always already appeared and been recognized qua correlative noema, i.e., as a concrete perceptual thing (if we also take into consideration the in-each-case relevant factic *reell* hyle). No purely neutral phase antecedes: there is no previous merely empty intending after which, at a secondary phase, we go seeking *reell* contents in order to fulfill it. In perception, that is, we do not see because we want to see, and nor do we see whatever we want to see.<sup>35</sup> Now, this must be added.

[In the] perceptual sense [...] there are directives [*Anweisungen*], unfulfilled anticipatory and retrospective indicatory interpretations [*Vordeutungen und Zurückdeutungen*] which we only have to follow up. [...] All the different *directions of determination* [*Bestimmungsrichtungen*] which lie in the thing-meaning [*im Dingvermeinten*] as such are thereby traced in advance [...] [as its] essential interweaving [*Wesensverflechtungen*]. (*Ideas* II, 38/35)<sup>36</sup>

In every moment of perceiving, the perceived is what it is in its mode of appearance [as] a system of *referential implications* [*system von Verweisen*] with an appearance-core upon which these have their hold [*Anhlat*]. And, in these referential implications [*Verweisen*], it calls out to us, as it were: “There is still more to see here, *turn me* so you can see *all my sides*, let your gaze *run through* me, *draw closer* to me, *open me up*, *divide me up*; keep on looking me *over* and *over* again, turning me to see all sides.” (*APAS*, 41/5; trnsl. md.; emphases added)

The fact is that the perceptual sense has always already taken or accepted within itself some material (*reell* content), which is perceptually interpreted on the basis of the instructions that the perceptual sense itself gives. This is why the perceptual thing has always already appeared as fulfilled sense or, which is the same, as a transcendent correlative noema or, otherwise put, as a correlative noema, fulfilled in accordance with what the perceptual sense *prescribes*. An *Abschattung* has always already been placed interpretively within the horizon that the sense sets up, or opens up for it. It is because of all this that perceptual sense is so difficult to distinguish from its correlative noema. This is a very subtle distinction, which is only rarely

<sup>35</sup>See also §4.6 above.

<sup>36</sup>See also *FTL* §§3–4; *Ideas* I, 295/286.

described by Husserl himself. We can find one such reference in a manuscript (dated between 1918 and 1921).

[In the intuition of perception] the sense [...] is *always 'full'* ['voller'], covered over, as it were, by the fullness of intuition, it is fulfilled [*erfüllter*] sense. In what is intuitional [*Im Anschaulichen*] we cannot somehow isolate two constituents, the sense and the fullness, and place them one over against the other. (*Hua* XI, 363; transl. mine, emphasis added)

In perception, once again, there is no purely empty intending, waiting 'there' blindly for its—subsequently only possible—fulfillment and the appearing of its intended object. An organizational directive has always already '*taken action*' by *itself* (the proper sense of 'passivity' here), and an actual correlate has always already appeared. What already appears on the basis of the instruction that the perceptual sense is, i.e., the noema qua fulfilled—and also possibly doxically interpreted (as actual, realistic, etc.)—sense, i.e., the concrete particular perceptual object in each case, has already been pre-delineated by this sense (given the hyle).

In sum, then, the perceptual sense is the very *rule for an interpretation*<sup>37</sup> or intentional constitution which is applied to *reell* contents, e.g., even on a single available adumbration of a perceptual thing—an adumbration which, as such, and in isolation, *does not appear* at all.<sup>38</sup> In this application, the sense suitably organizes one or more *reell* contents within the horizon of other such contents, and 'projects' them transcendentally, in their thusly constituted totality, which appears as the overall perceptual thing (with the phenomenology of the evidence appertaining to perception; nothing more, nothing less). Here, we have the quintessence of intentionality. This is why perception was always considered by Husserl as being intentional *par excellence*, even in the momentary 'receptive' single transitory phases of its possible duration, and in its mere glancing mode.

The account just developed will now be extended to help us understand not only what makes perception praxial, but also what makes all intentionality praxial.

#### 4.9 Intentionality as a Rule-Guided Process Aiming at the Telos of Evidence or Truth

We are now ready to see how the conception of intentionality as a mere 'referring-to,' presented above in §4.2, determines a fatal approach to the meaning of the praxial nature of intentionality. In that analysis of intentionality, the emphasis lay on the mere having of *reell* contents, which somehow 'refer,' or on a mysterious referring of our consciousness to sides of an external object. It does not lay in the constituting happening of the transcendent appearing (or conscious or

<sup>37</sup>See *Ideas* I, 118/111, 344/333, 343/332, 357/347, 358/346; *Ideas* II, 91/86, 29/33. See also *Hua* XI, 5.

<sup>38</sup>On this, see *Hua* X, 116–7; *PP*, 137–8/179.

phenomenological or intuitional having) of correlative objectivities in their worlds. That conception of intentionality leads to the conclusion that all intentionality is praxial just because there is no 'pure' fulfillment, i.e., because there are no intentional acts that do not demand the fulfillment of corresponding partial empty moments of intention in order to 'refer.' But the mere acquisition and having of contents that 'refer,' gained by means of bodily activities, blur and finally conceal the tremendous constituting happening of the intuitional appearing of intentional correlates. One then understands the praxiality of intentional acts in terms of the 'mechanics' through which the accumulation of *reel* contents (each of which refers to some corresponding part of the perceptual thing) is achieved. What really has to be accounted for as intentional praxis, though, is what makes possible the very evident intuitional appearing of the perceptual thing (something present, in its premature way, already in *LI*). And this is a factor that is functional even at the level of the passive, momentary, perceptual glance.

### 4.9.1 *Intentionality as Hermeneutic Praxial Achievement*

Of course, Husserl always understood intentional life as a kind of *achieving* (*leistend*) life. But this achieving is not one of physical doing, e.g., for the accumulation of more sensory contents. The achievement Husserl's Phenomenology (but also Phenomenology at large) is talking about is *intentionality* itself. It is the achievement of *evidence* or *truth* and of the corresponding 'reaching out' of consciousness (not of the five senses), which aims at making actual the self-presence and self-giveness of the relevant (in each case) intentional correlate (being). This is an achievement the outcome of which is demanded or aimed at by sentient life as such, and in general. Intentionality is not a physical *striving* (*Streben*) for more and more descriptive or sensory contents. It is a 'psychic' aiming at the evidence of appearing intentional beings in their co-appearing worlds. In the case of perception, this striving can be accomplished fully passively, with even just one effortlessly given side of a perceptual object.

We can now put the matter this way. As we saw in §4.7, perception can be accounted for in terms of an aiming at evident appearing of its correlative intentional objects, which, for the attainment of this *end*, organizes some *means* (available contents) according to a plan or *rule* (sense).<sup>39</sup>

In fact, when talk is made of praxis and practices in philosophy, what is most commonly meant is a physical or external activity of some kind—some sort of doing. This, however, is not the most interesting sense of practice or praxis. A fuller explication and settlement of the problem goes far beyond the scope of the present book. For the moment, though, let the remark suffice that what I consider as the really philosophically interesting sense of praxis, especially in the context of the

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<sup>39</sup>See also *Ideas* I, 357–8/346–7, 348/337; *Ideas* II, 29/33, 38/35, 91/86.

“philosophy of praxis,” is not that of a mere external acting or doing. And this is irrespective of whether it is motivated by an “I will” that is inspired by its respect for a rational ideal (e.g., the categorical imperative) or is merely a succumbing to an irrational passion (the desire). I take it that the praxial nature of intentionality in Husserl lies deeper than such a simple notion of action and, in the end, can be paralleled with the most interesting meaning of praxis developed by Aristotle.

The weakest possible version of the latter is sufficient for our current discussion. Three elements will determine this basic reading. For Aristotle, *phronesis* (φρόνησις) is one of the five fundamental ways in which the psyche experiences the truthful givenness (ἀληθεύειν) of beings or of beings in their truth (ἀλήθεια). *Phronesis* is the specific virtue or perfect functional state of the psyche, when it is engaged in praxis, i.e., when it is engaged in meaningfully responding to given factic circumstances in the actual world. *Phronesis*, then, can be considered as the most fundamental virtue presupposed in all the rest of the comportmental virtues, and in the corresponding ways in which the psyche experiences truth.<sup>40</sup> In sum, and quite neutrally put, what is meant is that praxis is a certain process that aims at the end of the truthful givenness of beings, which is accomplishable on the basis of a strategy concerning the suitable and intentionally effective organization of actually or potentially available means. To enter a practice is to engage in a procedure aiming at the task of the truthful givenness of a being by effectively organizing given means according to a ‘schedule’ or ‘plan.’ This might make us suppose that talk of praxis always also has the meaning of a *deliberate* planning and/or of an *active* organization of some means for the realization of the end. In Aristotle, however, there is no self-evident account suggesting that all the aimings of the psyche are motivated by a free-willing egoical pole in the psyche. And we also saw that, in Husserl, perceptual intentionality also exhibits such a structure in a passive but at the same time fully conscious way.

The idea here is that the aforementioned (active or passive) sense of praxis can help us understand the praxiality of intentional consciousness in Husserl’s terms. *Intentional life is praxial in the sense that it aims at the constitution and evident or truthful appearing of its intentional correlates, which is achievable in a synthesizing function determined by certain rules of synthesis.*

All of this answers the questions posed in previous sections. Consciousness as a whole should be considered as praxis because it is a mode of life of actual (and possible) syntheses, which organizes, unifies, and merges its multifarious given *reell*

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<sup>40</sup>All of these are famously developed in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, essentially Book 6, and especially 1139b18–20, and 1140a27–b34, and are a subject of fundamental importance for Heidegger’s *Phenomenology*, in his lecture course on Plato’s *Sophist*. I first suggested this fertilization of Husserl’s praxial understanding of intentionality with Aristotle’s basic elements of praxis in Theodorou 2006, Chap. 1. To my knowledge, the only relevant hint toward such a possible connection between Husserl’s mature understanding of intentionality and Aristotle’s thematics of *energeia* is Hart (although he speaks there rather of *entelecheia*) (see his 1995, 150–1). On an additional element of the fundamental importance that Heidegger attributes to these Aristotelian thematics, see also §4.10.1 below here, and Chap. 8, §8.8.1.



contents in ways that may lead to (or let us into) experiences of truthfully given correlative objectivities. Consciousness is of a praxis-structure in the sense that it suitably ‘deploys’ strategies or appropriately synthesizes its actual (and possible) contents in ways that are effective in achieving evident givenness of intentional correlative objectivities. It constitutes in ways that bring about and establish *truth in the sense of “being.”*<sup>41</sup> This, its actual or even potential *evidence-effectiveness*, the realization of the end of evidence or truth (or being) by applying senses qua rules of syntheses upon available and anticipated means, is what renders intentional consciousness a *praxis*. And it is understandable that at least a glimpse of all this must have occurred to Husserl after the maturation of his turn to transcendental consciousness, and to the explicitly synthetic mode of intentional constitution.

From the Husserlian point of view, then, the praxial character of all intentionality, far from depending on some physical activity, lies in its being a ruled process achieving the telos of evident truth (or being). This is the result of a continuous process of *self-regulative interpretative* syntheses of evidence-striving conscious life. It is a truth-seeking process, with the general form of a *hermeneutic*, a self-adapting zigzag move from the part to the whole and from the whole to the part, i.e., from the given to the sense and from the sense to the given. If we are to put intentionality in terms of appearing, and no longer in terms of mere ‘referring,’ my emphasis is not on the possible factic *means* that are employed in arriving at the proper telos, but on the *rule-guided evidence-aiming* or *evidence-seeking* functionality of conscious life itself.

## 4.9.2 Praxial Intentionality and Teleology

Now, this is also why, both statically and genetically, Husserl repeatedly considers consciousness as a *teleological* structure.

[Transcendental] Phenomenology therefore actually encompasses the whole natural world and all of the ideal worlds which it excludes: Phenomenology encompasses them as the ‘world sense’ by virtue of the sets of eidetic laws connecting any object-sense and noema whatever with the closed system of noeses, and specifically by virtue of the eidetic concatenations of rational positing the correlate of which is the ‘actual object’ which, thus, on its side, always exhibits the index for the whole determined system of *teleologically unifying fashionings of consciousness*. (*Ideas* I, 347–8/337; emphasis added)

Consciousness is an incessant process of becoming as an incessant process of constituting objectivities in an incessant progressus of graduated levels. It is a never ending *history*. And history is a graduating process of constituting higher and higher formations of sense through which prevails an immanent *teleology*. And belonging to all sense is a truth and a norm of truth. (*APAS*, 270/218–9; emphases added)

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<sup>41</sup>On the extremely important, but downplayed—especially by Heidegger, who really presupposes them—four senses of “truth” in Husserl’s *LI*, and especially on the most important of them, the sense of truth as being (or being as truth), see *LI* 6, §§38–39. This Husserlian notion of truth will preoccupy us again in Chap. 7, §7.7.

Two things must be noted at this point. Firstly, even if the static and genetic teleologies appear at first sight to be different, they are in fact the same, as concerns the ultimate principle that guides them, which is none other than the seeking of evidence or truth. To put it this way, static teleology brings about the truth of what is at one time available (either as *reell* content or as appearing objectivity). This truth, however, poses new issues of 'untruth,' which are genetically-teleologically sought to be interpretatively elucidated according to new sense-bestowal, in a new truth (evidence), etc.

Secondly, Husserl appears to have a somewhat unstable understanding of this intentional-constitutive teleology. Undoubtedly, he usually abstains from a clear disavowal of deterministic teleology. For instance, Husserl unrestrainedly praises Fichte's optimistic, necessary teleology of intelligent, progressive, historical creation of a world-order within which moral humanity in its perfection can be possible. In his later views regarding transcendental Phenomenology, he also places it (clearly whiggishly) in the historical development of philosophical thinking.<sup>42</sup> At other (rarer) times, though, he appears to espouse a non-deterministic view of teleology. This can be seen, e.g., in his refusal of the possibility of a mathematics of consciousness' intentional life,<sup>43</sup> or in the transitory remark of the "*Britannica* Article" to the effect that both the teleologies (static and genetic) are understood "in the sense of tendencies" (*PP*, 177/299).

The larger picture would have Husserl preferring the hyper-rational deterministic teleology of progress and perfection. Unconditional persistence in such teleology, though, would be not so much Phenomenology as wishful thinking. In a non-dogmatic Phenomenology, I think it is clear that what is at one time lived-through or evidently experienced cannot sufficiently determine what will correspondingly appear, or what can be genetically implicated. Teleological tendencies are open to truth, but also to error; to coherence, but also to conflict. Otherwise, perceptual illusions and historical tragedies, for instance, wouldn't exist, or they should be interpreted in the context of a basically chiliastic Christian or Hegelian view of history, alá "cunning of reason."<sup>44</sup> Despair is understandable; especially in times of crisis. The same holds for reactions, whether optimistic or pessimistic. Phenomenology, however, should not degenerate to the status of either a philosophical comforter or a nihilistic preacher. Errors are errors, and evils are evils. No hoorays, no cries. No nihilism, no cynicism either, of course. Nonetheless, we will discuss these issues further in Chap. 10.

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<sup>42</sup>See, e.g., *Hua* XXV, 275–7; *Hua* XV, 406, 610; *Hua* VI, 503. See also Hart 1995 and Strasser 1979.

<sup>43</sup>See *Ideas* I, 161/149, 165/153–4. There is also the estimation that his understanding of the monad is sometimes free from such determinism. "In [...] die Leibnizsche Welt [...] der prästabilierten Harmonie, [...] findet Husserl keinerlei Spur eines Determinismus oder Dogmatismus." (Cristin 1990, 164).

<sup>44</sup>Thus, I fully comply with Strasser's critically reserved stance toward Husserl's hyper-idealist reading of history's meaning and course (Strasser 1979, and especially 329–30).

### 4.9.3 Praxial Intentionality and ‘Embodied’ Consciousness

Having said all of this, I clearly do not want to underestimate the role of the body in phenomenological intentionality, existence, and praxis. Firstly, no actualization of evidence would be possible if the factic or accidental (after all) presuppositions for this, i.e., the *reell* contents, were absolutely lacking; and, *in our case*, it seems that such sensory contents are available only as bodily recordings. Secondly, the body in its possible motility and activity supplies the senses with further and further *reell* contents both for the actual reaching of the goal of evidence and/or of its supplementary enhancement.<sup>45</sup> Thirdly, intentionally interpreted or animated sensory contents are always already projectively located and re-located, etc., distributed throughout primordial spatial arrays or maps (as it were), and determined by the specific make-up of our lived bodies.

What makes intentional consciousness ‘embodied,’ then, in a sense that is significant from the Husserlian and phenomenological point of view, is not the physical side of the human ‘psychophysical’ unity. We should rather try to *re-interpret* the embodied character of the Husserlian transcendental consciousness in the following way: “Embodiment,” in the here relevant sense, should take on a considerably different meaning than that which relates to the material substrate and physical motility of our selves. More specifically, at bottom, “embodied” will be the determination of a kind of intentional constitution; the kind of constitution in which the rules of syntheses apply to material originating in our senses, schematically pre-ordered in accordance to sensory-motor and kinesthetic places and orientations.

The first step toward such a new reading was made in Chap. 2, at those points where the meaning of intentional constitution as transcendental synthesis was presented. The fully internally consistent version of this teaching was connected, in particular, with the monadological sense of transcendental intentional constitution. Nevertheless, for reasons that will become more explicit in Chap. 10, a suitably moderated transcendental constitution, one that may be ‘less consistent’ but at the same time more faithful to the phenomena, can help us reconstruct the spirit of embodiment in what concerns the character of intentional consciousness, especially in the context of perceptual intentionality. An approach of this sort will be presented in Chap. 5, where the issue will be the constitution of what is called natural thing or nature-thing (*Naturding*).

Nevertheless, if we were to speak here about the ‘bodily’ or ‘embodied’ dimension of intentionality in only the above terms, intentional consciousness could be considered as praxial even if it were absolutely ‘dis-embodied,’ and even if it were completely un-related, as it were, to such an actual body. This is so because intentionality is simply the *most ultimate a priori condition for the truth- or being-*

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<sup>45</sup>I say this regardless of what relevant restrictions and exclusions transcendental reduction might impose here. Of course, I refer to the problem regarding the transcendental theory of constitution poses in our understanding of the source of the *reell* contents. For more on this, the reader should wait until Chap. 10, Sect. 10.4.

*accomplishing interpretative wholification or holopoiesis* of all these lived-through sensory contents into the form of recognizable and meaningful correlative beings. We must, however, observe that this condition for intentional truth- or being-holopoiesis would be totally inert if nothing made possible this (mysterious indeed) “seeking” behind it. The “seeking,” now brought to the surface, can of course be considered as the fourth and possibly deepest dimension of intentionality’s embodiment. The very possibility of there being something like a *seeking* appears to presuppose and to only have meaning on the basis of a *suitable* material carrier. This would be a host capable precisely of giving rise to or letting emerge something like this seeking. What is meant at this point will, hopefully, become clearer in the following two sections.

## 4.10 Intentionality, *Streben*, and Time

Having reached this critical point, two additional topics must be immediately addressed, albeit briefly. Then, the issue set in suspension in the closing words of the previous section will be further cemented with some relevant remarks, in §4.11 (especially note 57).<sup>46</sup>

### 4.10.1 Intentionality and *Streben*

In the foregoing §§4.2 and 4.3, we saw that—at least before the 1920s—Husserl agreed with Natorp that in our understanding of the acts of consciousness, we must refrain from falling prey to the “mythology of the activities.” In his *Einleitung*, Natorp objects to the idea that conscious acts (*Akte*) are a *Tätigkeit*, an activity or an enterprise of some kind in which the subject engages itself. This is so despite the fact that in many cases, if not always, consciousness is seen to be accompanied by conation or striving (*Streben*). It seems certain that in the passage Husserl cites (see §4.2 above), Natorp has in mind Fichte’s metaphysics of consciousness and the “I.” Indeed, a few pages prior to the passage under discussion, Natorp refers critically to Fichte’s egology.

In order to elaborate his solution to the alleged problem of inconsistency in Kant’s system of critical rationalism, i.e., the ‘chasm’ between the spontaneous transcendental “I” and the unknowable thing in itself, Fichte developed the idea that the essence of the transcendently apprehending “I” is the—by now—notorious “*Streben!*” In making this move, Fichte was actually building on still anterior notions of an active “I.” To refer only to its modern conception, Descartes had

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<sup>46</sup>This section was not contained in the manuscript of this chapter as published in *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*.

suggested that in our brain there is the infamous *conatus*, which is basically the capacity of our material part for motility. Spinoza and Leibniz, who each in his own way tried to lift the Cartesian dualism of a thinking *res* and a movable extended *res*, offered their approaches to this mysterious *conatus* (*tendentia*) as a suitably sublimated principle of motility. Goethe liked the idea very much, and raised this *conatus*, translated now as *Streben*, to the status of the ultimate essence of humans.<sup>47</sup> To be a human being means to be always already engaged in a striving, in an endeavour. This is what essentially differentiates humans from the rest of inanimate and animate beings in nature. At the crucial point, Fichte uses this idea anew. Transcendental consciousness or, more specifically, the transcendental conscious “I” is actually a doer. That this “I” is a doer means that it is activity, the activity that consists in positing its very self. The “I” is the activity that posits itself.<sup>48</sup> Fichte calls this “*Streben*,” and even uses the term “*Tathandlung*” synonymously. Paradoxically through—and to a certain degree inconsistently), Fichte presents this “I” as not positing only its own self, the “I,” but also the non-I. The “I,” then, is a transcendental activity that posits everything and anything that can be posited.

Isn't it, then, that the transcendental phenomenological egology, with its scheme of an all-constituting “I,” which does not assume in any way an in-itself reality, could actually adopt Fichte's way? Couldn't intentionality be approached in terms of this Fichtean *Streben*? Husserl appears to toy with this possibility. Indeed, he discussed the possibility in positive terms. I think we can soundly suppose that one important source of Husserl's understanding of intentionality in terms of *Praxis* or *Handlung* was his renewed study of Fichte's philosophy during the turn from the 1910s to the 1920s.<sup>49</sup>

The subject is thoroughly, and nothing else than, what acts [*Handelnder*]. And whatever the subject has in its presence, as substrate of action [*Handelns*], as object of its activity [*Betätigung*], that must be something immanent in it, something already enacted [*Erhandeltes*]. Therefore there coincides being a subject and being one who acts [*handelnd*]; but also being-an-object-for-the-subject and being a product of acting [*Handlungsprodukt*]. Prior to the acting [*Handeln*], when we go to the origin, there lies nothing. The beginning, when we think, so to speak, of the history of the subject, is not a fact [*Tatsache*] but an “action” [*Tathandlung*]. (*FI*, 117/275)

<sup>47</sup>In his *Faust*, we come across these three ideas. Proteus to the homunculus: “*Nur strebe nicht nach höheren Orden, / Denn bist du erst ein Mensch geworden, / Dann ist es völlig aus mit dir.*” (8330–3). The Emperor, however, has already remarked: “*Es irrt der Mensch so lang er strebt.*” (317). The latter makes Angel's later assurance all the more important for our understanding of the culture that Goethe nourished: “*Wer immer strebend sich bemüht, / Den können wir erlösen.*” (11936–7).

<sup>48</sup>For Husserl's adventurous relation with Fichte, see Kern 1964, 35–7, 292, 297; see also Hart 1995. Husserl's studies of Leibniz's work during the turn to the 1920s and the latter's similar concerns with the *conatus qua tendentia* probably also contributed to Husserl's “praxial turn.”

<sup>49</sup>Husserl's Fichte lectures from 1917 (and 1918) represent something of a landmark in his turn to a publicly confessed and admitted admiration for and trust in German Idealism's fundamental guidelines and potential.

A few pages later, Husserl continues the praise of Fichte's more mature post-1800 conception of the "I" and of life as a whole, and becomes more eloquent.

All life is striving, is drive for satisfaction [*Alles Leben ist Streben, ist Trieb nach Befriedigung*]. (ibid., 125)

In §4.3, after having rejected the possibility of understanding intentional actionality in terms of physical activity, we saw Husserl rejecting three different points of view from which conscious acts could be understood as activities (*Tätigkeiten*). This Fichtean notion was not any of these in particular. Nonetheless, it is somehow their common denominator and their arch-ground. Thus, to the extent that the later Husserl begins to flirt with the idea of a transcendental "I" that is and intentionally constitutes as *Streben*, he is actually caught in a tragic irony. He has come full circle, unknowingly meeting and adopting the view that his earlier self had rejected: the possibility of seeing all intentional acts as activity in the sense of conation or striving!

Be that as it may, even if Husserl is found to have unconsciously returned to an understanding of intentionality's praxiality as a *striving*, he still has to avoid talk of a "mythological" activity. What a non-mythological sense of activity would look like is a question about which Husserl does not seem to have any clear idea. Husserl does not develop a specific theory for his praxial turn. It might be said that, in a sense, the approach developed above in §§4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 stands as a more concrete interpretation of Husserl's vague understanding of intentionality as praxis. More specifically, it can be argued that the sense of intentional praxiality developed here is also the most suitable and fertile rendering of what Husserl was sleepwalkingly dealing with silently since the LI and explicitly after the 1920s.<sup>50</sup>

It is my contention, though, that an analogous train of thought must have led Husserl's most trusted spokesman, Heidegger, to his treatment of intentionality as the essence of humans. For the time being let me only remind that as it is generally accepted the Aristotelian praxis played a decisive role in his understanding of intentional constitution and transcendence on the part of *Dasein*. This brings us to the second point I want to make in this Section.

### 4.10.2 *Intentionality and Time*

The second point relates to the issue regarding the thematic of time in Husserl and Heidegger. The common and bilaterally prejudiced opinion is that the rendering

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<sup>50</sup>By no means can the issue regarding the thematic of intentionality and *Streben* be considered as exhausted and closed on the basis of what I present in this subsection. A fuller development must, however, be postponed until another occasion, when intentionality will be investigated in the context of emotive-valuing and willing phenomena. Until then, a further glimpse is offered in Theodorou 2012a, 2014b.

of this thematic in Husserl and Heidegger results in teachings that are completely foreign to one another and that, in the end, are quite incompatible.

We can immediately state that, as it turns out from relevant observations in Chaps. 2, 3, and 4 of this book, both Heidegger and Husserl consider time as the ultimate ground of meanings or senses qua ‘forms’ of intentionality. In the chapters that follow, we will indeed see how central it is, in both Husserl’s and Heidegger’s Phenomenologies, that *sense (Sinn)*, as a rule for the intentional constitution of beings in the world, is actually a function in primordial pre-objective time. Transcendental consciousness and the *Da* of *Dasein* will then surface as sharing an ultimate ground in time. A more developed account of Husserl’s notion of sense as a rule of intentional constitution will be given in Chaps. 5, 6 and 7. In Chaps. 8 and 9, where the passing from Husserl’s to Heidegger’s Phenomenology will take its full shape, this discussion will be integrated.

Next, we must say this. If, in his *Dekonstruktion* of traditional metaphysics, Heidegger finds something positive to say (already in §6 of *BT*, but also in his *Kantbuch*) about Kant’s theory of schematism as the temporalization of the *a priori* categories, qua forms of transcendental constitution of experiential objects, then his near silence with regard to his teacher and “fatherly friend” Husserl is certainly questionable. For Husserl no longer moves along the naïve spatial understanding of time as a succession of points occupying directly neighboring but independent places along a spatial axis. Rather, Husserl understands time as a field of continuous and self-folding and unfolding processes of syntheses of corresponding contents. It is only then that time can be referred to as the ultimate ground of all intentionality and of all the sense-guided syntheses that constitute both ontic and ontological transcendence.

It is certain, though, that there is at least one important difference in Husserl’s and Heidegger’s approaches to time. It lies in the *scale*, so to speak, on which they consider time. Heidegger refused to enter into a perspective allowing something like a field of time-syntheses pertaining to a really phenomenological primordial sensory perception (an immanent *micro-time*). He declared this scale of analysis “theoretical”<sup>51</sup> and insisted upon building another, genuinely phenomenological, perspective. From this point of view, only the time pertaining to the whole life-span of human everyday existence in the world (a transcendent *macro-time*) can be accepted as a primordial phenomenon. For him, that is, only this time scale is considered as susceptible to genuine or legitimate phenomenological access and givenness.

Of course, this is also connected with his somehow dogmatic understanding of the *objectivity* of the source of meanings or the source of constitutive apriories. This is outside the modern psychic immanence of a subject (generally considered); it is the transcendent form or Being-structure of the historically self-becoming world in which we are (exist).<sup>52</sup> Thus, he was led to abandon any significant talk of

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<sup>51</sup>We will deal with the meaning of this accusation in Chaps. 5, 6, and 7.

<sup>52</sup>We will have the opportunity to deal with this point about ‘objectivity’ at length in Chaps. 8, 9, and 10. To be sure, Heidegger discovers that beyond the intra-worldly time (*Zeitlichkeit*), in the



a transcendently constituting subjective 'immanence,' such as the one we have become acquainted with in our talk about intentionality and constitution in Husserl's *Phenomenology*.<sup>53</sup>

For phenomenologists, the standard question at this point is: who was right, Husserl or Heidegger? Personally I refuse to take sides in this biased quarrel. Given our analyses in Chap. 3, §3.10, Heidegger's indiscriminate rejection of all transcendental 'immanent' subjectivity, i.e., also of Husserl's mature monadological transcendental subjectivity, becomes a new and very real question. A transcendental immanence like that in the later Husserl would have permitted Heidegger to develop a totally different *Phenomenology*, exploiting deeper and further potentialities of his teacher's original thinking. Later Husserl's transcendental subjectivity and Heidegger's *Dasein* in its *Da* share not only a time basis, but also a monadological character—their co-extensivity, as it were, with the whole horizon of the world. Thus, hypothetically speaking, the possibility arises here of a *Phenomenology* that would accept a monadological consciousness with a *dual equiprimordial*, pre-objective time fundament: the one where simply perceptual objects are constituted, and the other where the beings of our everyday dealings are constituted upon the former.<sup>54</sup> Such a move could lift Heidegger's failure to integrate transcendental meanings, qua rules of *cognitive*—broadly meant—intentional syntheses. It would thus allow for a larger picture, within which this lower or micro-level intentionality could be fruitfully connected with meanings related to the human ontological condition that interested him, but also with the specifically ethico-political *praxial* organization of human life, which interests us more (I guess).<sup>55</sup>

From the perspective opened up here, it seems that the unification of the two phenomenological time perspectives, to the degree that it has been shown

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context of which a finite human motility unfolds its intentional possibilities, he was in need of a still greater time-scale: that which pertains to the motility of Being as such (*Temporalität*). It is problematic, however, whether he could phenomenologize this latter time dimension (see here Chaps. 9 and 10).

<sup>53</sup>His well-known talk about hearing Being's call, of *conscience*, or even of guilt and remorse, line up with his reversal of Augustine's theology and ethics in the guise of his ontology of human existence in a cosmos happening according to Being's own *λόγος* (whatever this might mean—see Chaps. 9 and 10). Through this talk, however, Heidegger actually loses sight of humans as intentionally experiencing a world already populated by beings that foundingly antecede the existential projection of various life-plans; beings that are substantial in commensurance to the human sensory, bodily-kinesthetic, and perceptual, intentional synthesizing capacities. We will say more about this in Chap. 6.

<sup>54</sup>For a more concrete treatment of this possibility, see Chap. 5 and especially Chap. 6. As it will turn out, though, in Chap. 10, *Phenomenology* is not actually forced to follow this supposedly phenomenologically super-consistent philosophical anthropology of the a-regional monad.

<sup>55</sup>Husserl is notorious for his ultimate failure to develop a fully intentional phenomenological theory of ethico-political praxis in the lifeworld. His analyses regarding emotive intentionality and motivation for action didn't flourish in the way his analyses regarding perception and judgment flourished. For Husserl's failure in the field of the phenomenology of emotive intentionality and of value experience, see Theodorou 2012a.



to be plausible and further workable, must be seriously attempted in future phenomenological work.<sup>56</sup>

## 4.11 Concluding Remarks and Further Issues

In §§4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 above, we saw that we could have intentional experiences without depending on either an actual or a potential external bodily activity. The latter is a *non-sufficient* condition for intentionality. In §§4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 we saw that we could have such an activity and yet not have an intentional experience. Bodily activity is not a *necessary* condition for intentionality. What makes the whole range of intentionality praxial is not a bodily activity that accumulates *reel* contents, but the fact that in all of its expressions and forms, intentional consciousness is or becomes organized in the form of sense-guided syntheses seeking and/or achieving the evidential givenness of intended correlates that truly appear (and are what they are).

Now, have we arrived, with this, at a final word with regard to intentionality qua praxis? Of course not. More must be said with regard to the praxial syntheses themselves. At one level, we must ask: what kind of syntheses are these, in which the appearance of entities in their worlds is achieved? To what degree can an analysis of the praxiality of intentional consciousness run parallel to the full conception of praxis, in Aristotle, and in contradistinction to his account of theory (episteme)? What might the consequences be of such a possibility as regards our deeper understanding of intentionality? At another level, we may pose another series of questions. Are these praxial syntheses simulatable or even actually implementable in a real material system (e.g., in an electromechanical device, like a robot)? This is the great question regarding the possibility or impossibility of *naturalizing* Phenomenology and, in particular, of naturalizing intentionality.

For the time being, I only want to make explicit this necessary remark. Before one starts tackling the intricate question of naturalizing intentionality, in particular, it is necessary to unfold facets of the very phenomenon one wants to naturalize: intentional consciousness as a *praxial-teleological* structure in the sense I have presented here.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>56</sup>On this feature of Husserl's and Heidegger's perspectives on time, see also Chap. 8, §8.8.3.

<sup>57</sup>An interesting set of papers on this subject has appeared during the last 15 years or so, by philosophers like H. Dreyfus, R. McIntyre, B. Preston, D. Münch, J. Mensch, and others. These works concern the issue of whether Husserlian intentional consciousness is representational and/or computational, i.e., cognitivist. In an early and still unpublished presentation at the N.T.U.A., sometime around 1999 (the year that Petitot et al. 1999 appeared), I examined some of these pro-naturalization theses. I argued that no merely electromechanical system can realize intentional syntheses and, thus, intentionality. Only living organisms can develop such functions (and the teleological-striving character of intentionality corroborates this). Today, having since studied Scheler's later phenomenological philosophical anthropology, Jonas' thoughts on life, and some of Varela's and Thompson's views on the matter, I find no reason to modify this view.

## Chapter 5

# Perceptual and Scientific Thing: On Husserl's Analysis of "Nature-Thing" in *Ideas II*

*Dasein's* specific spatiality must be grounded in temporality." (M. Heidegger: *BT*, 418[MR]/367) "Only on the basis of its ecstatico-horizonal temporality is it possible for *Dasein* to break into space. (Ibid., 421/369)

The attempt in *Being and Time*, section 70, to derive human spatiality from temporality is untenable. (M. Heidegger: *TB*, 23/29)

### 5.1 Introduction

*Ideas II* has been the source of several issues in the broader phenomenological literature. Some of these issues focus on the particular aims of that work and its place within the system of transcendental constitutive and genetic Phenomenology. Others are concerned with its significance in the development of Husserl's thought on the possibility and direction of a phenomenological philosophy of natural science (still under discussion), along with a systematic phenomenological grounding of the human sciences. Furthermore, the manuscript of *Ideas II* seems to have contributed to the formation of Heidegger's views on the nature and status of Husserl's Phenomenology and of Phenomenology in general. Thus, an examination of the actual meaning of the analyses in *Ideas II* would contribute significantly to the understanding of a variety of important issues in phenomenological philosophy.

Husserl's so-called "transcendental turn" between 1905 and 1907 represents the beginning of the path to *Ideas II*. From 1907 onwards, Husserl attempted a clear and systematic development of his ideas on the *transcendental constitution of intentional beings in their—whatever—actuality*. This is a task he undertook in the *Ideas I*, in which he expounds the general core of the new discoveries that allowed him to go beyond the analyses of the *Logical Investigations*. Having established

transcendental subjectivity as the ultimate ground where “the Mothers” accomplish their constitutive work, Husserl became convinced that he had discovered the source from which *all Being (Sein)* arises.

What was supposedly left for Phenomenology was the task of discovering all the rules governing the Being-originating functionings of the intentionally constituting transcendental consciousness. The constitutions of all beings that belong to the different regions and levels of Being could, moreover, enter into a hierarchy of founding dependences. This was, of course, an ambitious task. In fact, it was an *infinite* task, whose chances of being realized depended exclusively on a co-operative philosophical project, which would start with the specialized works of Husserl’s followers and former students.

Husserl wrote the *Ideas II* with the aim of offering an application guide to the core ideas behind his transcendental constitutive Phenomenology to specific problem areas. In the concluding sections of *Ideas I* (§§149–153) he states that his purpose was to show what transcendental constitution means, and how Being originates in its three basic regions (*Seinsregionen*): inanimate nature, living beings or animate nature, and spirit or culturality.

In *Ideas II*, *inanimate nature* is presented as comprising the most basic region and as the fundament for the constitution of all the other ontological regions (or regions of Being or Being-regions). But, in Part I of that work (the English translation reads “Section One”), we find Husserl providing an analysis of the constitution of *nature-thing (Naturding)*.<sup>1</sup> What is Husserl’s conception of nature-things there? How do they relate to inanimate beings in general? How do they relate to the things that are supposed to be given in simple visual perception or in simple sense or sensory experience? Are they the accomplishment of a predicative or of a pre-predicative intentionality? Are they the subject matter of natural science, and in what sense—and, if not, why? The text of the *Ideas II* generates puzzlement and confusion, much of which is reproduced in the relevant literature.

Before proceeding any further, I would like to note at this early point that what follows in this chapter may be understood as the positive continuation of what, in my Theodorou 2004, was only the negatively indicated impasse in Kuhn’s analysis of the way scientists move from one paradigmatic experience to another. Despite opinions, Kuhn is very clear that there is no neutral experienceable ground among such shifts. Husserl’s analyses of perception, analyzed here at length, show that there is a common phenomenological ground and what it is like. (The way Husserl’s and Kuhn’s theories can be combined is shown in Theodorou 2010b).

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<sup>1</sup>Some commentators use the translation “physical thing” and, correspondingly, “physical nature.” I avoid these terms because, in the long run, as I hope will become clear, they may lead to confusion. Another acceptable translation would have been “natural thing” or “thing of nature.” As a rule, in modern philosophy this term stands for the beings that belong to nature, e.g., a rock or a tree, as opposed to civilization, e.g., a hammer, a table, or a book. Husserl uncritically adopts this approach, and soon finds himself caught up in problems. In this chapter, we will silently abstain from this difference, and focus only on the actual analyses of the *Ideas II*, Part I. The aforementioned crucial phenomenological difference will be thematized as such in Chap. 6.

## 5.2 Overview of the Problem and Its Reflection in the Relevant Literature

In *Ideas II* Part I, we are led to expect that Husserl will provide us with analyses of the intentional constitution of the most ultimate ontological region, that of inanimate nature. He begins by informing us that these analyses presuppose a “theoretical attitude” and, further, that it is in fact under such an attitude that we come to experience nature-things. Nature-things are then (as we shall see further in the next section) characterized as *objects of natural science*. Husserl then starts his constitutive analyses, which we suppose concern these “nature-things.” Yet, in the process, we discover that these analyses refer to *sensory-things*, that is, to *perceptual things*, which are said to be constituted as essentially *extensional* and *material* beings.

How are we to understand all of this? How do nature-things relate to inanimate beings? And, most crucially, does Husserl in fact believe that the extensional and material things of perception are identical with nature-things, i.e., the beings *presented* (as discussed above) as the objects of scientific-theoretic consciousness? Would it then be true to say that Husserl’s systematic constitutive analyses of the primordial regions start at a level that is already too high—that of scientific theoretical intentionality? But is it not also true that Husserl considered perceptual intentionality to be the most primordial intentionality, and already pre-scientific, pre-theoretical, and, indeed, pre-predicative? Did Husserl, after all, discover a primordial intentionality of the latter kind only much later than the *Ideas II*?

Landgrebe, for instance, who was the (second) editor of the manuscripts of that work, claims that in the *Ideas II* Husserl began from the givenness of the *physicalistically objectified thing*.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, he maintains that in that work, Husserl held that the “*judgmentally positing* attitude” is the model for intentional consciousness. According to Landgrebe, in *Ideas II* “positing” means *predicatively* and *theoretically* thematizing. Hence, according to this reading, Husserl loses the chance to begin his constitutive analyses from a pre-predicative, pre-objectifying, and pretheoretical availability of the world in a kinesthetic and embodied consciousness. Thus, Landgrebe adds, Husserl introduces his idea of primordial (*pre-regional* according to Landgrebe) givenness only when he explicitly introduces the concept of the lifeworld, toward the end of the 1920s. For Landgrebe, it is only at this late point that Husserl conceived the idea that nature is something more fundamental than what is physico-mathematically objectified. It is also at this point, according to

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<sup>2</sup>Landgrebe 1981a. In a relevant translator’s endnote in that paper, McKenna explains Landgrebe’s view approvingly, claiming that the analyses of the first part of the *Ideas II* are conducted from the point of view of the “naturalistic” attitude. This attitude, McKenna adds, correlates us with the region of the objects of natural science (i.e., mostly Physics together with naturalistic Psychology) (ibid., 150). Cf. note 1 above.

Landgrebe, that Husserl abandoned the thematic of regional ontologies, which on Landgrebe's reading were spheres of correlate-objectivities constituted for the first time in the corresponding *theoretical* conscious experiences.<sup>3</sup>

Landgrebe, however, is not the only one of Husserl's students and commentators to offer such a reading. And, as is clear from Heidegger's direct and indirect attacks on Husserl throughout, e.g., *Being and Time* and *Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time*,<sup>4</sup> it was probably Heidegger who paved the way for this understanding. Today, based upon the secondary literature on Heidegger's criticism of Husserl,<sup>5</sup> we can assume that this reading has become something of a 'received view,' at least with respect to understanding the Husserl of *Ideas II*. Nevertheless, this view has also influenced some contemporary Husserlians. Some of those who directly address that text, or who deal with the dispute between Husserl and Heidegger, accept this reading as one that indeed corresponds to Husserl's views, and even defend it as being phenomenologically proper or more in keeping with Husserl's thought.<sup>6</sup>

Given this, I hope that the present chapter will contribute to a better understanding of Husserl's project, especially to a better understanding of his *Ideas II* and its significance for both the internal history of the phenomenological movement and the possibility for a phenomenological philosophy of perception and of science. In the following sections, my aim will be to elucidate the perplexing and confusing analyses in Part I of the *Ideas II*.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Thus, Landgrebe locates a contradistinction (as opposed to the complementary and explicative relation I seek) between *Ideas I, II*, and *Crisis*. See Landgrebe *ibid.*, 148–9; also Landgrebe 1981b, and especially 153–4, 160. In what follows, we also come across some more similar recent readings.

<sup>4</sup>See, for example, the context of *Being and Time*, §§3, 15; *Prolegomena to The History of The Concept of Time*, §5 and p. 168; but also *Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, §19. In fact, Landgrebe's account is strikingly similar to Heidegger's, especially with respect to the latter's explicit early accounts of the nature-thing. See also Dreyfus 1991, Chaps. 4 and 6 and especially pp. 61, 71, 74, 80–1, 115, 120–1.

<sup>5</sup>In relation to our immediate concerns here, see e.g., Soffer 1999 and Overgaard 2003 (especially pp. 161–3, where the nature-thing of *Ideas II* is presented as the—direct or proper—object of natural science). This reading of *Ideas II*, however, can also be found in the Husserlian secondary literature that deals not so much with the dispute between Husserl and Heidegger, but just with the *Ideas II*. See, for example, Bernet et al. 1993, Chap. 9. It should also be noted here that the intimate connection between the perceptual thing and the scientific thing creates a series of paradoxes that run through some of the essays that specifically set out to decipher the text of *Ideas II*. See, for example, Melle 1996, Soffer 1999.

<sup>6</sup>On this issue, see the corresponding references in the previous and subsequent notes.

<sup>7</sup>The fact that the text as we know it is the result of successive editorial works by Edith Stein and Ludwig Landgrebe, neither of which seems to have satisfied Husserl (see Husserl's remark from *Hua IV*, 403, cited in § 5.9 below), is probably an additional factor among those that have caused this puzzlement and confusion. However, this factor cannot be taken into account here *per se*.

### 5.3 Nature-Things and the Question of the Most Primordial Intentionality

In *Ideas II*, Husserl starts his analysis with a study of the constitution of nature-things (or nature-objects). In the very first pages (§1) of that work, he remarks that although in our everyday life we confront value-objects of various kinds, natural science abstracts from these, and takes as its object mere nature-objects. He explicitly states that the nature-object “[...] is the correlate of the idea of natural science [Physics]” (3/1–2).<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, in §11 we read that the subject matter of his analyses is nature as a correlate of the *theoretical, interest-motivated intentionality pertaining to modern natural science* (Physics) and that this nature comprises “mere things.” In the same context we also read that in the theoretical attitude of natural science, we abstract or abstain from all non-cognitive values, practical interests and the like, i.e., we no longer experience houses, tables, works of art, or tools, as is the case in ordinary life. We are thereby left only with appearing beings, recognized as mere nature-things, mere material things, or mere spatio-temporal bodies.<sup>9</sup>

Given that nature-objects are subsumed under the title of analyses concerning the constitution of inanimate nature, qua most basic region of Being, does this mean that the *ultimate* fundament that underpins the phenomenological givenness of cultural or value-objects is a natural *scientific* reality? If we were to read the excerpt above from the perspective of modern philosophy’s long tradition, it would be tempting to think that Husserl belonged firmly to that tradition. The combined effect of the program announced in *Ideas II*, and claims such as the one just cited, make it seem that for Husserl—as for Kant, for example—a mathematically and physicalistically described nature comprises the sphere of our most primordial experience. This understanding, it seems, may be further strengthened by appeal to the expectations Husserl creates in his Introduction to the *Ideas I*.

In the *Second Book* [i.e., in *Ideas II*] we shall then treat in detail [...] the difficult relationships of Phenomenology [...] to the physical sciences of Nature. (*Ideas I*, xxi/7)

None of this should confuse the reader, however. It is true that in *Ideas II* (and in other places in Husserl’s work) we come across analyses in which it is claimed that “nature-”objects and “natural” scientific reality in general are indeed products of some *theoretical* consciousness. But, in Husserl, this does not entail

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<sup>8</sup>References to the *Ideas II* will be given in this simplified form. The first number refers to the English translation and the second to *Hua IV*. Also, when there is no other specification, the symbolism “§x” refers to the same work.

<sup>9</sup>The details of the story behind the attitudes mentioned in *Ideas II* are too complex to be examined here. What is necessary to understanding the problem dealt with in this chapter, though, is silently provided. What is most crucial is the ambiguity of the term “theoretical” as it appears in Husserl’s manuscripts under discussion. In section 4 below, this ambiguity is dissolved. See also Chap. 2, n.18.

that theoretical consciousness in general is the most primordial, or that “nature-thing” names the *direct* intentional correlate of the natural-scientific theoretical consciousness. In what follows, I will show that in *Ideas II*, nature-things are described from a phenomenologically legitimate ‘theoretical’ attitude that does not, however, necessarily adopt the verdicts of natural scientific theories about what is ‘mere nature.’ Confusion arises because, in *Ideas II* Part I, Husserl discusses the constitution of nature-things alongside the question of the *origin* out of which natural science obtains its own *immediate* (or direct) objects. This parallel treatment of the constitutive problems in the sphere of natural science and of the founding ground from which natural science draws (‘abstracts’) its proper objects produces ambiguities that need to be dissolved. Below, I attempt to untangle Husserl’s confusingly intermingled references as they appear in a number of specific places in his *Ideas II*.

#### 5.4 ‘Theoretical’ Consciousness and Pre-giving Acts

In *Ideas II*, we read that natural science is the product of theoretical consciousness, and that theoretical acts are those in which we explicitly perform the positing of a subject to which predicates are attributed. This process amounts to an attentive focus on our part, i.e., to an *objectifying* grasping in an *active sense* (§3). However, Husserl also says that these theoretical acts constitute their objects by thematizing objectivities *already given in pre-theoretical acts*. These are pre-giving acts, whereas there are also *ultimate* pre-giving acts with their corresponding intentional correlates (§4). For example, it is one thing to be sense-experientially conscious of this apple, simply, but a completely different thing to be attentively (in a narrow sense) conscious of it in the active performance of a judgmental thematization that is at play in saying “the apple is red” or, more specifically (taking into consideration natural-scientific predicates), “this apple is a material thing with a mass of 0.2 Kg,” and so on (see §3). Ultimate pre-giving intentional correlations are ultimate *passive* correlations that have nothing to do with logico-categorical formations (§4). Predicatively thematizing acts in general, and theoretical-scientific acts in particular, belong to a spontaneously active intentionality (although they may *be considered* as—secondarily—passive, when they are turned into founding strata for even higher-order intentional acts).<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>The closing passages of §4 also create the impression that we can either pass to the theoretical attitude or that we already live in that attitude and that, from this point of view, theoretical consciousness appears to be our *ultimate* intentional possibility. This impression, however, is *false*, since two pages earlier Husserl speaks of a quite different kind of intentionality as the *lowest* level of consciousness (11/9)—we will come to this shortly. What Husserl wants to say in §4 is that *any* kind of founded intentionality, i.e., including the natural-scientifically theoretical one, can function as a foundation for other kinds of intentionality. The same context makes it clear that something *analogous* to this founding of theoretical upon pre-theoretical correlations also holds for evaluative intentionality in general (see 9–10/8). Yet Husserl’s example is not very clear, and the

That it is mere things (*bloße Sachen*), mere *sense objects* (*Sinnesgegenstände*) or *sense-things* (*Sinnendinge*) (or sensory things or things of the senses) that are the *primal* or *foundationally ultimate* constitutive objects is made explicit only in §8 of the work under discussion. Husserl then embarks upon an extensive analysis concerning the constitution of these things: the sense-things. And this appears in the part of *Ideas II* that has, as its theme, the constitution of nature-things. From this, we are led to understand—at least initially—that foundationally ultimate beings are not nature-things, i.e., the things that supposedly stand as the objects of theoretical natural science, but the just mentioned “sense-things.” Nevertheless, for some reason, which *prima facie* remains unclear, the analyses concerning sense-things appear in the context of passages concerning nature-things.

What are “sense-things” anyway? They are the things that are given and which appear in simple sensory experience.

If we would touch on the thing itself, then it is required of us, [...] not to be content with vague traditional locutions and traditional philosophical preconceptions [...]. [W]e have to go back [...] to the consciousness in which things are given to us originally [...], [i.e., the situation calls] not simply for a mere perception [...] [;] it is necessary to ‘follow up’ the perceptually meant in a perceiving and experiencing [...] [in a] *series of perceptions* [...] in which the perceived object is one and the same. (37/34, emphasis added)

But does this analysis of sense-things, lodged in the context of analyses concerning the constitution of nature-things qua (supposedly) objects of natural science (see above, § 5.2), make any real difference? Does perception deal with beings that are totally different to the avowed objects of scientific consciousness?

At first, a sense-thing is described as essentially nothing more than a *spatial body*—albeit filled with the extended qualitative sense-filling. At that level, we simply have a thing qua spatial phantom, a schema (figure) of a thing endowed with sensuous qualities, a corporeal shape with some sensuous filling extending over its entire surface.<sup>11</sup> Here, we may speak of a thing as mere extension fulfilled with sense qualities. What is given at this level does not support anything like *substantiality* or *materiality*. Things get constituted as *res materialis* at a different level (more on this below).

Thus, the part of *Ideas II* that deals with the constitution of nature-things as the alleged objects of natural science, and at the point where we would expect more information on the make-up of these beings, we come across the so-called “sense-things.” These are initially described as extended and then as *material* beings that

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reader should resist the idea that what *ultimately* founds a value object in general is a nature-object qua *scientific* theoretical correlate. Despite appearances, moreover, value-objects are not theoretical objects (11/9), as the single quotation marks he uses (*‘theoretische’*) in the first appearance of this equation of value with the theoretical suggest (*Hua IV*, 9–10); these quotation marks are missing in the English translation. Chapter 6 of the present book is totally devoted to making clear—vis-à-vis Heidegger’s relevant accusations—what Husserl actually thinks with regard to the order of givenness and the founding relation between the perceptual thing and the various cultural strata of the beings we straightforwardly experience in our everyday life in the world.

<sup>11</sup>See 40/37, 42/39.



are, moreover, characterized as ultimate in the order of founding. This complicates things. It seems to make the digression from the analysis of the constitution of nature-things qua objects of natural science toward sense-things superficial, if not utterly useless. If the truly ultimate founding things are essentially nothing more than extension and matter, then why should we think of these as being different from the objects of mathematical Physics?

## 5.5 The Constitution of *res Extensa*

We read that “it was not without reason” (31/28) that Descartes designated *extensio* as the essential attribute of material thinghood—as distinguished from animal thinghood. Material nature occupies a place within world-space, is characterized by corporeal extension, and can change location in space. Animal nature (or animal thinghood) is a complex composed of a lower stratum of material nature, *extensio*, and an upper stratum of a fundamentally different essence.

In describing the sphere of the non-thinking *res*, Descartes had in mind a conception of the extensionality or spatiality of beings, rooted in a Euclidean conception of space and a physicalistic conception of matter and substantiality. Spatial descriptions, there, begin with scientifically geometric (Euclidean) terms. The lines determining the boundaries of things in space, surfaces and volumes, but also the very conception of space as such, was already defined in the Geometry of the time. In other words, this kind of conception of the spatiality of *res extensa* is already theoretical. In fact, this spatial conception of things results from the scientific-theoretic *idealization* present in the context of Euclidean Geometry, which means that the metaphysics of space in the Cartesian conception of *res extensa* is already scientific. This is also the case with materiality and temporality within the same conception.

Does this mean that on Husserl’s analysis, sense-thinghood is already formed in Descartes’ sense? Is it the case that Cartesian *extensio*, one of the mathematically defined primary qualities, is after all at play in Husserl’s conception of the constitution of the primordial kind of beings?

To believe this would be to ignore Husserl’s well-known claim that he uses old terminology with a new meaning. What we should bear in mind is that in *Ideas II*, whenever the subject matter of the phenomenological investigations concerning constitution is the theoretically constituted nature of the natural sciences, this investigation always necessarily brings us back to *more fundamental* levels of constitution. At these levels, we are not dealing with the theoretically constituted sphere of intentional beings, but with objects that are first constituted in passive perceptual intentionality.

It is a mistake to project Descartes’ conception of extension onto Husserl’s descriptions in *Ideas II*, and this does not need to be recognized from the point of view of an anachronistic interpretation of Husserl’s intentions in his *Ideas II*, in the light of his subsequent analyses in, e.g., the *Crisis*. In *Ideas II*, there are traces (see below) of a merely perceptual-spatial—i.e., not yet lifeworldly cultural—

constitution and givenness of things, which clearly *precedes* (in a transcendental and historical-genetic sense) its scientific-geometric ‘counterparts.’ At that level, i.e., at the level of the pre-giving and sensuous intentional life correlated with an actual (*wirklich*) world-and-its-beings, spatiality does not already have a geometrized texture in some special scientific sense. There, theoretically idealized universals are not yet ‘in touch’ with our consciousness. The rules that guide the relevant constitution do not correspond to scientific-geometrical apriories. There, lines are more or less straight, more or less circular, surfaces are more or less flat or curved, and so on.

The crucial point here is that the existence of a world with things that have, for instance, a shape, three dimensions, and are located in space, does not—on its own—necessarily force Phenomenology to consider all these characteristics from the point of view of a scientific-theoretical Geometry. As Husserl would later say, at this level one can speak only of “morphological” characters, apriories and concepts. Thus, a phenomenological analysis of the primordial givenness of beings in a world that regards them as ‘*res extensa*’ is not ipso facto an analysis that starts—prematurely—at the theoretical level, from a scientific-theoretical consciousness.

According to direct evidence from *Ideas* II Part I, Descartes simply “had his reasons” for attributing *theoretical-geometrical* extension as the essential feature of natural thinghood examined in terms of sense-thinghood. However, as Husserl adds a few lines later, *we* should speak of extension “*rightly* understood” (31/29, emphasis added). Extension determinations, i.e., magnitude, form, figure, etc., are the extension determinations of the science of Geometry (theoretical geometrical consciousness) only “*ideally* speaking” (33/30, emphasis added). As Husserl has already claimed in the *Ideas* I, space, i.e., the space in which we find appearing things as correlates of simple perception, is *not* yet the space of Euclidian Geometry.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>*Ideas* I, 84/82, 85/83. In examining the relative priority between readiness-to-hand (*Zuhandenheit*) and presence-at-hand (*Vorhandenheit*), Heidegger treats the latter as the givenness of beings in mere perception (in the Husserlian sense), which has resulted in the theoretical modification of our primordial intentionality (which for him offers us the experience of ready-to-hand beings). Heidegger identifies this theoreticity in the givenness of beings qua mere (perceptual) objects with their being given in terms of the Cartesian *res extensa* (with regard to this, see Heidegger’s marginal note 98.a in his *Hütte* copy of *SZ*, where Heidegger explicitly connects Cartesian *res extensa* with the Husserlian ultimate ontological region!). Soffer writes that in Heidegger: “it is not clear what the path is from readiness-to-hand to presence-at-hand, or in what way the broken hammer is the static condition for *res extensa*” (Soffer 1999, 389), i.e., for the hammer’s being “a material body in the Cartesian sense [...] satisfying the characteristic isolation of the present-at-hand” (*ibid.*, 382). Soffer, however, accepts the view that Husserl indeed considered readiness-to-hand or culturality as founded upon a *theoretically* constituted more primordial level, upon a presence-at-hand or perceivedness of nature-thinghood characterized also as *res extensa*. She then asks, rhetorically: “Is not *res extensa* for Husserl the result of a mathematical idealization and logical subtraction [...]?” (*ibid.*, 383). Thus, in their effort to defend Husserl against Heidegger’s criticism that he has over-theoreticized intentionality, there are Husserlians who accept Heidegger’s reading of Husserl, i.e., of Husserlian *res extensa* in already scientific-idealized terms, and try to defend this view as phenomenologically correct. Here I follow a different path, which will culminate in Chaps. 6 and 7.

According to Mohanty, Husserl had always been familiar with the thematic of *idealization*, i.e., the step that brings us from pre-scientific—albeit, for the first, also thematic—consciousness to scientific consciousness, which attracted Husserl’s attention more intensely from his Freiburg period (1916–1928) onwards. “That the scientific was an idealization of the pre-scientific is to be found [also] in the early writings on space and Geometry.”<sup>13</sup> There is also irrefutable evidence for this in the *LI*.

Plainly the essential forms of all intuitive data are not in principle to be brought under “exact” or “ideal” notions, such as we have in Mathematics. The spatial shape of the perceived tree as such, taken precisely as a “moment” found in the relevant percept’s intentional object, is no geometric shape, no ideal or exact shape in the sense of exact Geometry [. . .]. “[I]nexact” essences [. . .] may not be confused with the “exact” essences which are ideas in the Kantian sense, and which [. . .] arise through a peculiar “idealization.” The descriptive concepts of all pure description, i.e., of description adapted to intuition immediately and with truth and so for all phenomenological description, differ in principle from those which dominate objective science. (*LI*, 450–1/245)

Clearly, already before *Ideas II*, by spatiality and extensionality Husserl did not self-understandably mean a scientific-theoretic geometricality. The distinction is also sufficiently clear in *Ideas II*. Either subjectively oriented (directionally differentiated) space or intersubjectively objective space, together with all appearing spatial forms, “*admit of idealization [lassen eine Idealisierung zu]*” (emphasis added), in which they are “to be grasped in geometrical purity and determined exactly” (88/83).<sup>14</sup> More specifically, in *Ideas II* we read that it is our living body, with its potential for motion and its system of kinesthesias, which is somehow responsible for the construction of the primordial spatial world.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>13</sup>Mohanty 1995, especially p. 64; see also pp. 57–8, 76 endnote 34.

<sup>14</sup>On the difference between pre-scientific and scientific space in *Ideas II*, see also 92/87. It is true that at a certain point, Husserl (or at least the manuscript we have) does not hesitate in subsuming extensionality under what are known as “primary qualities” and to contrast them with what are known as “secondary qualities” or “real qualities” (for more on the meaning of this expression, see below) that fill the spatial body (33-4/30-1). In the same context, we also find extension raised to the level of the essential form for *all real determinations*, or to the essential form of existence for “material or physical (*physisch*)” being *in general* (35/32). In this context, we are given the impression that extensionality and materiality are indeed presented from the exclusive physico-mathematical point of view. This way of putting things is admittedly confusing (for similar cases that concern materiality, see also below). However, a careful reading of “or” in “material or physical” enables us to retain a non-scientific meaning for “material” and, accordingly, for extensionality.

<sup>15</sup>See 62/57. For those who know that Merleau-Ponty spent quite some time studying Husserl’s manuscripts that led to *Ideas II*, it comes as no surprise to find Merleau-Ponty developing this idea further in his *Phenomenology of Perception*. On this issue, though, see also Chap. 4 of the present book, especially §§ 4.5 and 4.9.

Thus, although we have seen that the first part of *Ideas II* (dedicated to constitutional analyses of inanimate nature) deals with the constitution of nature-things qua the alleged objects of natural science, we have also seen that the actual analyses concern the constitution of sense-things qua *foundingly ultimate* intentional beings. Then, we established that sense-things should first be considered as *res extensa*. Nevertheless, we also discovered that these constitutive analyses do not primarily refer to a scientific spatiality (although they can be transformed in a way that allows them to acquire such a character). We will now see how something similar applies to the case of the constitution of *res materialis*.

## 5.6 The Constitution of *res Materialis*

How is materiality—the ‘*res*’ of *res extensa*—constituted? This is the concern of §§15–17. According to these sections, “material (extended) thing” is to be found by means of an eidetic variation that starts from a perceived thing, e.g., from this table here. The spatial body, fulfilled with extended qualitative filling, is not yet a thing in the usual sense of a materially real thing. This is simply an ‘airy’ phantom thing, a visual-tactile shape with the corresponding sensuous filling. It is the phantom thing’s *motion*, qua its change in place (*Ortsveränderung*) and its *interaction* with other such phantoms and with me that constitutes the robust or substantial actuality of that thing, i.e., the *res* of *res extensa*. The materiality of the perceptual phantom is constituted in its exerting and undergoing impacts and pressures, pulls and resistances—not exclusively felt in terms of mere visual perception (which is also always there), but also by means of “exerting the muscles,” “bracing oneself against,” etc. (42/39).

Yet, as was also the case with *res extensa*, and despite appearances, materiality at this level is not yet the materiality of physical science. Here, we do not have a metaphysical analysis of matter in the Kantian sense of the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. Rather, Husserl’s Phenomenology is a ‘renewal’ and radicalization of transcendental philosophy, since it discovers a level of experience that is neither the traditional empiricist one nor yet the natural scientific one. It uncovers and legitimizes a meaningful and truthful level of givenness of the world, which is indeed conscious (truthfully or evidently appearing), but also pre-theoretical. It brings to the fore a whole stratum of life that functions as a necessary condition for the possibility of other strata of life, among which the scientific-theoretical is just one. The latter perhaps allows greater effectivity in some crucial endeavors of human life, but it is not more truthful or more real than the most primordial one.

Of course, Husserl once again seizes the opportunity to complicate matters. This time, he indeed speaks of a distinction between *geometrical* and *mechanical* movement (42/39) in which materiality is constituted. It becomes clear from the context, however, that he is not really referring to the *sciences* of Geometry and Mechanics. He only wants to draw a distinction between a non-‘dynamic’ or non-‘substantive’ movement (perhaps of isolated or non-interacting *Abschattungen*

or phantom-things) and its ‘dynamic’ or ‘substantive’ counterpart, in which real interaction qua “causal conditioning” (*kausalen Bedingtheit*) (43/40) is taken into account.

The examples we find in this context are perhaps another source of confusion for the reader. In exhibiting the materiality of the thing by way of its “dependence on circumstances” (§15c), Husserl takes as his example a steel spring that, once struck, starts oscillating by going through a certain succession of states of relative change in place and shape. This means that the spring has the real property of elasticity. In other words, as Husserl again explains, as soon as a certain “impetus” (*ibid.*) is given, there is a corresponding deviation from the state of rest and a resulting mode of oscillation.

Does this “elasticity,” though, correspond to some scientifically objective stratum of the intentional objects—one whose description belongs specifically to Physics—and if not, why? We read, for instance, about a phenomenon in which a steel spring, impetus, and oscillation are involved. Is this not proof that we are in the realm of Physics? Here again, one might have reasons for thinking that Husserl is addressing the constitution of natural scientific objectivities and phenomena.

This *would* have been the case if, in the above description, we were really dealing with a specifically natural scientific concept of (causal) processes and circumstances. A spring is a spring, elasticity is a mode of the overall givenness of a thing that is subject to certain changes of form; a hit is a hit (in the English translation, the scientifically biased “impetus” translates Husserl’s somewhat ambiguous *Anstoß*). There is nothing specifically scientific in the description. In the closely connected text of the so-called *Ideas* III, we also read that the “merely material thing” “[a]s an intuitively given articulation of experiential reality [. . .] precedes all thinking, and specifically all scientific theorizing thinking,” and that all thinking concerning the empirical (*Erfahrungsdenken*) draws (*schöpft*) its “ultimate legitimizing basis from experience only by ‘adjusting’ itself to it [*sich nach ihr ‘richtet’*]” (*Ideas* III, 1/1, emphasis added). At another point of this interesting text, we also read that “to the extent that there is consciousness of something real [in simple pre-thematic and pre-scientific experience], there is also consciousness of causality—but completely unclear [at first] and *able to be brought out and prepared and determined conceptually* only by means of [a subsequent natural-scientific] theoretical experience-analysis and investigation” (*ibid.*, 4/4; emphasis added). Schütz comments on this issue by claiming that “it has to be emphasized that the material thing and its causalities [at least] *thus described* are not the thing and its causalities in terms of the natural sciences, but the thing as it is constituted in the sensorial perception of an experiencing subject” (Schütz 1966, 19; emphasis added).<sup>16</sup>

<sup>16</sup>As we shall see below, it is a rare fortune to find such accurate and clear—albeit transient and overlooked—statements on this issue. In the overwhelming majority of the relevant literature, this causality is already and exclusively conceived in the scientific terms of Physics. For example, Melle talks of causality and the constitution of “physical nature” exclusively in terms of the “exact” “calculative” laws of natural science (Melle 1996; especially pp. 20, 23). (See also note

How, then, are we to understand all this? The first part of the *Ideas II* is supposed to concern the constitution of the beings of the ontological region of “inanimate nature.” The analyses were about nature-things, which were presented as being intimately related with the objects of science. We then read that ultimately founding beings are called “sense-things.” Sense-things were said to be essentially *res extensa* and, on another level and in a broader sense, also *res materialis*. This, then, may admittedly tempt one into thinking that, according to Husserl, the most primordial stratum of intentional being is that described by Geometry and Physics. We managed to discern, however, that talk of extensionality and materiality always had a double sense for Husserl: a pre-scientific and a scientific one.

Thus, we must now answer the following question. In what sense can analyses concerning the constitution of the extensionality and materiality of pre-scientific sense-things take place in the part of the *Ideas II*, whose main theme, appears to be the constitution of inanimate nature in terms of nature-things, qua alleged objects of natural science?

Before attempting to answer this question, however, we will first examine another fold of the character pertaining to the intentionality that is responsible for the constitution of pre-scientific and, more specifically, of mere sensuous thinghood.

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35 below.) Something similar holds for Soffer (1999). Soffer locates a certain “ambiguity” in the meaning of the naturalistic attitude (from which the analyses examined up to now have supposedly been conducted), which produces a corresponding ambiguity in the meaning of causality. The first ambiguity concerns the issue of whether naturalistic nature allows us within a sensible intuitable nature or, on the other hand, transposes us into a logico-mathematical un-intuitable nature. The second ambiguity concerns the issue of whether causality applies to the sensible, inexact, and secondary properties of material bodies, or to imperceptible and idealized bodies with their exact primary qualities. But, for Soffer, causality in the second sense is characterized by (merely) “far more” rigorous law-like connections and (merely) “more” exact predictability (ibid., 39–40). In the end, Soffer simply contrasts physical causality with *psychic motivation*, and describes the former as having to do with interactions between material bodies seen from the naturalistic point of view, which “conceives of material nature as a *subject-irrelative ‘in itself,’* [i.e., from the point of view of natural science]” (ibid., 40, emphasis added; also 44). As I see it, however, these sections of the *Ideas II* do not contain an irreparable accidental “ambiguity” in favour of the “naturalistic attitude” or, in the end, of the self-evident domination of the scientific point of view. They only introduce *two systematically different materialities*, distinguished by Husserl himself (albeit not clearly). Ricoeur also sees Husserl’s phenomenological abstention from culturality (plus animality) in the first sections of *Ideas II* as the *scientific-theoretical objectivating attitude* (Ricoeur 1967, 40–1, 46). Due to this, Ricoeur thinks that the constitution of nature in *Ideas II* already means a constitution of a *scientific nature*. From this point of view, Ricoeur equates naturalistic and scientific-theoretical objectivating attitudes, even though he correctly differentiates the first from the natural attitude (cf. ibid., 37). This is why he seems convinced that, contrary to what an existential phenomenologist like Merleau-Ponty would expect, “[i]n *Ideas II* there is no question of finding a type of worldly presence [...] [other than] the objective relations of the intellectual and scientific level whose significations would be projected by the unfolding of my corporeal powers” (ibid., 43). In the main part of this chapter, I put forward a different understanding of this issue; one standing closer to the expectations of Merleau-Ponty.

## 5.7 The Constitution in Terms of Substrate and Properties

Some readers may, at this point, be engaging in the following train of thought. It may be the case that Husserl actually considers the constitution of nature-thing in terms of simple perceptual things, and he may also consider the latter as capable of being given on a pre-theoretical level of experience. Husserl, however, speaks about *properties* of these things. Is it the case that, in Husserl, our perceptual experience of a thing, like the spring discussed above, is formed by means of predicating elasticity upon some merely logical or metaphysically material substratum? Or, alternatively, is it the case that elasticity co-constitutes our merely experienced spring, in the manner of a property attributed to it qua subject of a categorical judgment?<sup>17</sup>

We read about the spring and its elasticity in the context of a section in which Husserl is in the process of analyzing how the various strata of a thing qua *res extensa* and *res materialis* are formed. *Res extensa* is supposed to be the intentional correlate of mere perceptual experience (basically visual and tactual). The extensional strata of the spring, together with its corresponding sense-filling, are constituted on the basis of constitutive rules pertaining to (visual and tactual) perceptual intentionality, i.e., by the appropriate folds of perceptual sense. Its materiality is constituted on the basis of changes that do not relate to the actually offered sides of the thing and their sensory contents, but on the basis, firstly, of certain changes of place after collisions with other such things or, secondly, of certain other changes of shape.

Husserl does indeed claim that during changes of the thing-schema (as in the case of the oscillating spring) or changes of place occupied by a given constant thing-schema, the thing is grasped (*erfaßt wird*) in an “objectifying” way as having the “property” of elasticity (45/42). In the same way, during changes in illumination, the filling color of a given thing-schema is constituted as the “objective” color “property” (*ibid.*). Husserl in fact calls this process a “realizing apprehension” (*realisierende Auffassung*), and we read that it amounts to a constituting of “the real thing as *substrate* of real properties” (46/43).<sup>18</sup> Does not all of this mean that, in Husserl, our primordial experience of an identical thing depends upon syntheses by which properties, and especially objective ones, are predicated of a mere formless subject?

Nothing of the sort necessarily happens here. There are neither subject-and-predicate syntheses nor scientific-objective properties in the constitution of real things qua ultimate intentional correlates. It is the known *pre*-predicative syntheses that hold together actual and potential *Abschattungen* of the thing in an intentional appearing unity that are responsible for perceptual *res extensa*. Changes of place

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<sup>17</sup>For a Heideggerian reading that attributes to Husserl the view that the—supposedly wrongly primordialized—perceptual being, which corresponds to the Heideggerian present-at-hand or occurrent (*vorhand*) being, is constituted according to the scheme of substance-with-properties, see, e.g., Dreyfus 1991, 46, 61, 71.

<sup>18</sup>See also, e.g., 80/75.

of things qua *res extensa*, after collisions with other such things or after changes of form, constitute them qua *res materialis*. All these are happenings that occur in our perceptual field and involve ‘holistically’ or horizontally (un-explicitatedly) experienced things. There is nothing resembling a predication in this process, and no subjectivation or predication has mediated in the constitution of the experienced thing in the sense of the most primordial intentional correlate.<sup>19</sup> No process of thematizing substratization, such as that described in detail in *Experience and Judgment*, may be said to have already taken place. All that happens up to this point is that, under the variation of circumstances we have described, we apperceive the identical thing as something transcendent with regard to our possible immanent *reell* contents that ‘correspond’ to it, i.e., with regard to our stream of living experiences and their *reell* contents. What gets constituted at this level is not a mere formless (logical or metaphysical) pole waiting for its experiential clothing, as it were, to come via a predication of properties. As we already know from the 5th and 6th Logical Investigations, even in being grasped (*erfaßt*), this thing appears as a unified ‘self-enclosed’ horizon (on the background of an outer horizon), as a holistic unity of elements or characters that could only subsequently be actively isolated as specific predicable *properties* of a subject.<sup>20</sup>

Moreover, it is in this vein that color (or some other ‘property’) is said to be ‘objective’ at the level of the simple experiential givenness of the thing as *res extensa* and as *res materialis*. In speaking about the constitution of the thing in terms of “objective properties,” Husserl does not mean that we are dealing with a perception that is already scientific-predicative.<sup>21</sup> He explicitly distinguishes between two senses of “objective”: (a) the thing-like unity presenting itself to us under ‘normal’ conditions, and (b) the identical content of qualities that can be worked out and become logico-mathematically fixed: i.e., the physicalistically conceived thing. We could add that sense (a) can be subdivided into (i) solipsistic and (ii) intersubjective. It seems that sense (b) cannot be divided in the same way, since it is always understood as the outcome of a demand for intersubjective objectivity.<sup>22</sup> Here, in the

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<sup>19</sup>For the distinction between experiential pre-predicative thing and the predicative determination of such a thing in *Ideas II*, see 87/82.

<sup>20</sup>See also, e.g., *Ideas I*, §37.

<sup>21</sup>Soffer (1999), however, completes her rhetorical question (see note 12 above) in the following way: “Is not *res extensa* for Husserl the result of a mathematical idealization and logical subtraction, so that it can never be present [as Heidegger thinks of *vorhanden* beings] in the way of a physical body in the lifeworld?” (ibid., 383). In this context, she also equates *res extensa* with an object existing (scientifically-objectively) “in itself” (e.g., 384). On the basis of these two points, she is then led to ask whether it would be correct to say that *Vorhandenheit* lacks its very first (Heideggerian) characteristic, i.e., that something *vorhanden* is “being looked at” (ibid., 384). Thus, she suggests, what appears primordialially in the lifeworld may not, after all, be an *idealized* physical body, as Husserl supposedly claimed in *Ideas II*, but it is still a *theoretically thematized physical body*, i.e., a subject with *not-yet-idealized* physical properties predicated of it.

<sup>22</sup>With regard to these points, see 82/78, 87/82, and 75ff/70ff. These differences in the meaning of “objectivity” and, *mutatis mutandis*, of “in-itself-ness,” seem to escape the notice of commentators on *Ideas II*. See, for example, Melle and Ricoeur (ibid.). As a result, the truth of nature in simple



context of the passage we are examining, it is clear that we are dealing with sense (a). Thus, by “objective properties,” Husserl means that under the circumstances described, color gets apprehended as the color “had by the *thing* no matter whether it is in sunlight or in dim daylight, [etc.]” (45/42, Husserl’s emphasis). It is in the same sense that this objective color is also characterized as “real” (46/43), i.e., as something *holistically co-constituting* the reality of the thing or *belonging to the internal horizontal unity* of the thing appearing transcendentally as actually existing.<sup>23</sup>

Up to §15d, Husserl’s analyses mostly concern the problem of the constitution of the different strata of a thing, in the sense of a primordial intentional correlate. The pre-scientific phantom-thing and the pre-scientific material thing are strata of the unitary internal horizon of this perceptually experienced sense-thing. No process of thematic substratization (subjectivation) has thus far taken place. So, experiential *strata* have to be carefully distinguished from the judgmental *substrata*. More specifically, experiential strata—or *absolute* substrata, as Husserl also calls them<sup>24</sup>—have to be distinguished from thematically *subjectivated* substrata. Again, experientially constituted *substance*, qua the unchanged real content of the identical simply experienced thing (qua *res extensa* and *res materialis*), should be carefully distinguished from the judgmental *substrates* (subjects).

For example, in my simple perceptual experience of this apple, the apple appears as an identical internal horizontal unity, against a background of co-appearing perceptual objects (external horizontal unity). It is also within my intentional possibilities to grasp it and hold it in isolation from its background, as it were. Its identical, substantial, internal horizontal unity is then an absolute substratum.

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perception falls into oblivion, or gets conflated with the truth of nature in its possible (idealizing or non-idealizing) thematizations—in favor of the latter. Incidentally, Ricoeur recognizes only type-(b) objectivity, at least in *Ideas* II, which is the reason why he equates “worldly [true] presence” with (exclusively) *scientific* intersubjective intentionality (see, *ibid.*, 49–51).

<sup>23</sup>Of course, here too the available text of *Ideas* II does not make things easier. There, we read that when we are left with mere (nature-)things, we are also left with their mere *logical* characters (18/16). What might this mean? Does it mean that our mere sense perception has as its correlate a logical substratum clothed, as it were, with its attributed sense predicates? This would not make sense. It can only mean that these characters are “unnoticed” (*Hua* IV, 16) or unexplicated, in the sense that subsequent thematic acts can grasp them and turn them into predicates (while subsequent theoretic acts may turn them into idealized predicates) of suitably understood subjects. That is, “logical characters” seems to mean “predic-able characters.” (See also next note). The picture of the relation and relative intentional dependence holding among the thing of simple perception, the predicatively constituted thing, the thing of science, the lifeworldly appearing thing, and that which Husserl calls “the determinable X” suggested by Landgrebe, Melle, Soffer (among others) creates a number of interpretative and phenomenological paradoxes. But the examination of this issue would take us beyond the context of the present discussion. See, however, Theodorou 2010b.

<sup>24</sup>*EJ*, 134/152-3, 206/242-3; see also *Hua* XVII, 57. It is unfortunate that Schütz, speaking of substrate and properties in the above context (see note 16), does not make use of this distinction. Concerning this, we read, e.g., in the “*Textkritische Anmerkungen*” of *Ideas* II: “*Wir unterscheiden das Erfahrungsdenken, das [sprachlich-diskursive] Denken, das aus Erfahrungen seine Rechtsgründe schöpft, und die Erfahrungen selbst*” (*Hua* IV, 403). Judgmental and simply experiential objects have totally different ‘inner’ articulations.

Now, within this holistic unity of the appearing apple, I can subsequently explicate (*explizieren*)—in a not yet necessarily isolating way—its various strata and folds (extentionality, materiality, figure, sensory characters, etc.). This does not mean that I have already turned the originally appearing apple into a *judgmental* substrate (subject) upon which I predicate thusly gained and isolated properties from an interest-motivated point of view. For instance, I can subsequently discover the original apple as a such-and-such (e.g., in the categorial experience of a “this apple is red”) and thus cover (conceal) all its other original horizontal folds. These, however, are all distinct intentional modifications. Primordially, no grasping, explication or predication has taken place.

## 5.8 Mere Experiential Thing Versus Scientific Thing

Primordially, then, we can have the experience of a real thing as a holistic unity retaining a relatively stable identity throughout various changing circumstances. (From this point of view, we can refer to the thing as a *res temporalis*.) To know a real thing at this level, we read, means “to know its behavior in the nexus [*Zusammenhang*] of its causalities” (48/45) (in the sense described above). This, we understand, is how real things become constituted at the most fundamental level, that of simple experience. This does not presuppose the mediation of something like a thematizing or, more specifically, a natural-scientific theoretical interest.

Natural science, however, is indeed closely connected with the ‘properties’ co-constituting the material thing throughout its behavior under changing circumstances, and more particularly under circumstances called “nexus of causalities.” Here is an intriguing and provocative statement:

*To pursue [nachgehen] these nexuses and to determine the real properties in scientific thinking, on the basis of progressive experience, that is the task of Physics (in a broad sense), which, led in this way from the most immediate unities in the hierarchical sequence of experiences and of what is primordially manifest in these experiences, goes on to ever higher unities. (48–9/45, emphases added)*

Does this mean that the foregoing analyses presented here are wrong? Does this mean that there is a scientific gathering of properties and that, consequently, the constitution of the ultimately real thing is the original, direct business, and result of the work of Physics? If we were to come across the cited sentence without having clarified §§1–15d, we would be tempted to answer this questions in the affirmative. The interpretation given above, however, makes it clear that it is not Physics or any theoretical or thematizing interest in general that constitutes the real (actual) thing in the first place. Physics, of course, sets as its task to *further* “pursue” and to arrive at an exact quantitative determination of experientially ‘objectivated’ real properties. But it does nothing more than this. Physics is *not* the achievement of an intentional consciousness that gathers these ‘properties’ for the first time in the constitution of the ultimately real thing. The further determinative pursuit of the ‘properties’

in question results—if fulfillingly successful—in the constitution of the relevant *higher* order objectivities (the “ever higher unities” mentioned in the excerpt above) that comprise the theme of Physics in the most (and only) proper sense.<sup>25</sup> This appears intentionally in the corresponding suitable *category intuition pertaining to the natural-scientific consciousness*.<sup>26</sup> But these objectivities are of a different (i.e. higher) order than that to which the primordial simply experiential real things belong.

It comes as no surprise, however, that in §16 matters are once again complicated. There, Husserl mentions “weight” as an example of a real property, and the movement of a body “toward one of the earth’s poles” as a relevant context of change. During this change, we read, “its weight changes continuously” (49/46). Actually, in the way we apperceive a material thing in mere sense experience, the *unexplicated* (and non-idealized) ‘property’ “weight” plays a role. In our *passive* experience of a real thing, its weight forms part of its reality (though not necessarily already in connection to any specifically theoretical interpretation of it). In this passive apperception, however, it seems impossible to detect something like a change of weight during the sort of change of place described just above. It seems that such talk of change and its detection demands a scientific, thematizing-theoretic interest in this property (“gravitational weight as depending on the geographical latitude”). It demands a certain objectivation, not in the sense of acquiring the consciousness of a property belonging to a transcendently appearing thing, but in the special sense of “having turned it into a thematic object of theoretical-scientific investigations.” Property-isolating abstraction, idealization, exact measurement, and predicative consciousness all belong to a thing at this level. The further pursuit and exact quantitative determination of the experientially ‘objectivated’ real property must have already taken place in order for this accomplishment to occur. In short, at this point of the *Ideas* II, we find ourselves dealing with an unfortunate example.

The same is true of the details of the example of the oscillating spring, as considered anew on pages 50–1/47. The changes considered there (a series of different impacts, heating that turns the spring “red hot,” etc.) point toward a thematizing and perhaps scientific-theoretical interest in the property of elasticity. These examples, however, show that the passage from the pre-thematizing constitution of a real thing to the thematizing and scientific theoretical constitution of its possible higher-level reality appears to be *practically*—but *not* phenomenologically—continuous. I believe that Husserl is clearly conscious of this.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> “[T]he constitution of real properties can *also* be accomplished at higher levels. This means that hierarchical formations are possible, according to which still higher unities make themselves primordially manifest in unities of primordial manifestation [*Einheiten der Beurkundung*] and, eventually, become determined with the help of [pre-scientific, at first, and scientific, eventually] thinking grounded in experience.” (50/46, transl. sl. md., emphases added).

<sup>26</sup> With regard to this, Husserl uses also the hybrid expression “theoretical experiencing” (*theoretisches Erfahren*) in his so-called *Ideas* III (2/2). See also Theodorou 2010b.

<sup>27</sup> See for example the closing sentence of §16 (passage from 56/52–3 cited below in footnote 28).

## 5.9 The Character of Husserl's Analyses of Nature-Thinghood in *Ideas* II: Nature-Thing in Perception and Science

A thing, Husserl writes, *is* what it is only in relation to its behavior under different circumstances (*Umstände*) (see 51/47)—as was the case above. In addition, changes of circumstance may sometimes be “motivated” in a specific sense, as when I deliberately bring the thing, with its identical unchanged optical character, under different illuminations or series of illuminations (see 51/48), in order to experience it in a richer way. Nevertheless, a thing is the *total enduring unity* of continuous, changing, interrupted or even cancelled ‘properties’ (*res temporalis*).

[T]he duration of the being of the thing, with respect to any property, [may] disperse itself into segments. But the overriding unity of the thing is still there [. . .] In the duration of a thing ever new properties or changes of a property emerge [. . .]. [Y]et a unity of reality traverses the totality of changes. (52/48–9)

It is from this perspective that Husserl addresses the issue of the constitution of nature-thinghood in the first section of *Ideas* II. There, he is not particularly interested in making explicit distinctions between the different levels of constitution. Rather, he merely wants to show in what sense one and the same inanimate or, generally, simply material thing may gather—within itself or even upon itself, but always within its self-same unitary internal horizon—a host of many different elements that co-constitute it as the thing it is. This starts from shape (inexactly or exactly-idealizingly understood) and ends with its various real-causal properties (also inexactly or exactly-idealizingly understood) throughout an open duration of time.<sup>28</sup> Husserl also makes clear that the sphere of the mere sensory experiential intuition of a thing is not really connected with the fully rigorous idea of reality. In this sphere, we deal only with a reality “contained in the very formation of unity given in the [relevant] apprehension” (52/49) of the self-same, mere sensory experiential thing. In other words, this sense of identity, unity, and reality (or thinghood [*Dingheit*] or substance)<sup>29</sup> has to be kept distinct from its scientific counterpart.

It was [only] the new science of nature which first grasped this idea of a *strict* identity in the *absolutely determined* and unequivocal dependencies of causality (an idea that has to be

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<sup>28</sup>“What it is that we have described is *the thing* constituted in the continuous-unitary manifold of the sense *intuitions* of an experiencing ego or in the *manifold of ‘sense-things’* of various levels: multiplicities of schematic unities, of real states and real unities on various levels” (60/55). But, “The preceding suffices for an understanding of the *universal [algemeinen] type of the constitutive thing-construction* in the sphere of intuition [in general], in its remarkable stratification which, as can be seen after all, is only a sort of continuation of an other, though analogous, stratification, one in which the sensuous schema, the lowest level of the formation of unity now considered by us, is already constituted, for its part, as a unity” (56/52–3).

<sup>29</sup>For this triple equation, see 58/54. Instead of substance in general, Husserl prefers the expression *substantial reality*, which he distinguishes from *extensive substance* or *strict materiality*.

set off from any empirical [non-scientific or original<sup>30</sup>] apprehension) and which developed the demands implied in this idea, demands which determine essentially the course of the scientific research into nature. (52/49)

But none of this means that science is in a privileged position over our actual sensory experience in announcing truths with regard to what things are. In fact, in *Ideas II*, there are arguments to the contrary. On the one hand, “perception is not an experience which provides a full report about the thing” (54/50). On the other, “we would have a right to reject [the *idealiter* possible and scientifically suggested idea of] a self-modification that has no [causal] grounds. But, again, actual [perceptual] experience can raise a protest against such claims” (56/52). In addition, science may tell us that things are constructed out of molecules and atoms. But, first, this is “already pre-delineated as a possibility in the [simply perceptually] intuited thing, at any rate in the way in which a thing is possible as a thing-aggregate with [internal, not necessarily already scientifically understood] causal connections” (54/50) and, second, “where is precisely this constructing [out of parts?]; *that* is the problem” (ibid.). That is, scientific ideas seem to be possible only as specific thematizing and idealizing modifications of what we are already and independently confronted with at the level of simple sensory-experiential reality. Scientific ideas appear to be pre-delineated as possibilities that depend on the things simply perceptually intuited. (As we saw in Chap. 3, of course, the possibilities of such genetic pre-delineations should not be necessarily understood deterministically, but also in the sense of “tendencies.”) Moreover, this does not mean that the latter suffice to *unequivocally* determine the sense and content of the former. The perceptually intuited things *underdetermine*, as it were, our scientific theories about them, since, as Husserl puts it in that context, there is always more than one a priori possibility here. For example, one may still abandon the idea of a discontinuous filling of space and work on the idea of a continuous one.<sup>31</sup>

Here is how Husserl passes explicitly to the examination of the possibility of determining the real thing from a logico-mathematical point of view. First, he supposes that we have grounds for accepting the Being of the world and of its beings as we experience them in simple experience. This experience, however, supplies us with beings and, in particular, with real things that are given to us as being the same, with a stock of lasting properties, but also as on each occasion relative to the contingencies of the obtaining circumstances (lighting, the condition of our sense organs, etc.).<sup>32</sup> Second, he believes that on the basis of this accepted Being

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<sup>30</sup>*Ursprünglichen Dingauffassung*. See a few lines below the cited passage.

<sup>31</sup>See 54/51. This, for instance, was Aristotle’s or Kant’s conception of matter.

<sup>32</sup>This relativity allows us a consciousness of a self-same object even under a multiplicity of changing circumstances. The identity of an intentional thing here is an open horizon of variable properties. I have, for example, the consciousness of the same table whether I see it in the light of a bright day or in the shade of my room, whether it has four legs, as it did yesterday, or three legs, as it does now that I have sawn off one, or whether I experience its color or lose the ability to do so after an accident (which might have left only my sense of touch intact), and so on. Here, we may speak of an objective identity in the sense of (a) (see § 5.7 of the present chapter). We can even speak of

of the world and of its beings, we can and must pursue the possibility of attributing qualities to them, e.g., *geometrical* ones, which are of a different kind and play a different role as compared to sensuous qualities. This possibility, Husserl remarks, came to be expressed at the beginning of the modern age as a distinction between primary and secondary qualities.

[O]nce the “sense-thing” is itself constituted, and so is the, founded upon it, real-causal thing at the level of genuine experience, [i.e.,] sense experience, then a new constitution of a higher level results in regard to the relativity of this “thing” [ . . . ] It is this relativity which demands the constitution of the *physicalistic thing* manifesting itself [*sich bekundenden*] in the intuitively given thing [ . . . ]. The geometrical determinations pertain to the physicalistic object itself; what is geometrical belongs to *physicalistic nature in itself*. But this is not true of the sensuous qualities, which thoroughly belong in the sphere of the *appearing* [*erscheinenden*] nature. (82/77; last two emphases added)

With this statement, it becomes clear that the tension in *Ideas II* Part I is lifted within the text itself. Here, we get a delayed answer to the question that has haunted the text from its very first pages: how can a nature-thing be the object of natural science and at the same time be explained in a context that contains analyses of simple perceptual constitution? Here, we finally get a somewhat clear statement that the *direct* or immediate object of natural science is not exactly the *natural-thing* (natural thing) but the *physicalistic* thing. (Accordingly, we ought to say that the attitude from which natural science is carried out is not the naturalistic in general, but the physicalistic in particular).

This elucidation, together with the parallel untimely announcement on the first pages of *Ideas II* that the analyses are undertaken from the point of view of the ‘theoretical’ attitude, perhaps explain the following marginal note of Husserl’s (apparently applying to the whole first chapter of the *Ideas II*): “*Schlecht zusammengestellte und schlecht ausgearbeitet Manuskripte, eigentlich überhaupt nicht ausgearbeitet. Dieses Kapitel muß völlig neu ausgearbeitet werden.*” (*Hua IV*, 403). By the latter words, Husserl is probably expressing his dissatisfaction with the editorial work of his assistants, which seems, retrospectively, to have caused so much confusion to the readers of *Ideas II*.

From the first pages we read that it is “the nature-object [ . . . ] [that which] is the correlate of the idea of natural science [Physics]” (3/1–2).<sup>33</sup> In the passage examined above in the present section (82/77), we read that the thing as constituted on the basis of specifically scientific (physico-mathematical) properties must be

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a ‘fuzzy’ identity. Husserl claims that such an identical thing is a *phenomenologically* appearing something (see for example *Ideas II*, 74/86), i.e., not an empty logical something. By contrast, the objective identity of the *physicalistic* thing (which I discuss in the main text below) is a logico-mathematical one, a strict non-horizonal identity, in which the thing is determined by exactly measured, finite, and stable properties. For example, a physical body is either a mere dimensionless something with a specific mass, or a mere something with a specific mass distribution; electrons are mere somethings with a specific mass and charge, etc. This is sense (b) of “objective” (see § 5.7 above).

<sup>33</sup>See also 294/281.

understood as a “physicalistic thing.”<sup>34</sup> As such, this thing has nothing to do with the real thing that is constituted in simple experience. We now have a totally different terminology, replacing the descriptions of the constitution and givenness in earlier paragraphs, which, for example, included talk of springs, impacts, oscillations, and heat. Here we have mathematically “continuously or discretely filled space,” physico-mathematically conceived “states of motion” that are also called “energy forms,” matter determined via “certain groups of differential equations” and via “certain fundamental laws of Physics,” “temperature,” “waves in the ether,” etc.<sup>35</sup> The context has undergone a dramatic change. What is interesting here is that—with respect to this physicalistic thinghood or reality—“there are no sense qualities [...] no qualities whatever” (89/84). The purely physicalistic thing is constructed “in *thought*” (92/86–7); here, its constitution is not “aesthetic” (*sinnlich*) at all. The path toward the constitution of a scientific objectivity (qua intersubjectivity) passes

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<sup>34</sup>For this see also 288–9/302.

<sup>35</sup>For these descriptions, see 89–90/84–5. Melle, to be sure, recognizes a “physical [sic] nature in a double sense: as a concrete nature of sensuous experience and as abstract, mathematically determinable physicalistic nature” (ibid., 21). He also notes that by the process of *Abbau*, we can go beneath all culturality to an abstract “undetermined” and “unknown” world of “pure experience” that can be called “mere nature” (ibid., 25). The fact, however, that he talks only about natural-scientific nature in terms of “objectivity” and “truth” (ibid., 19–21, 26–7) does not suffice to establish an unambiguous answer to the question of Husserl’s views on primordially and phenomenologically *true* ultimate intentional correlations. Melle, moreover, does not say that Husserl’s talk of *res extensa*, *res materialis*, and *res temporalis* applies equally well, albeit in radically different senses, to both “mere appearances” of “sensuous experience” (cf. ibid., 21) and to physicalistically objective true nature (cf. ibid., 20). Spatial-material-temporal nature is, thus, exclusively offered to exact, calculative, causal-inductive science (ibid., 24; cf. also 34). See also note 16 here. Thus, the constitution and identity of this “mere appearance” becomes a real mystery. What seems to escape the universal claim of the scientific-naturalistic world-view is the lifeworld qua world, in which we exclusively unfold our every “sensuous experience” mentioned above—Melle’s sole pre-scientific “rootedness in nature” or “stratum of nature” for everything spiritual—seems to be *nothing more* than the mere “sensitivity” of the living body, which is “correlated” with nothing more than mere “sensations” (see ibid., 29). But, from this point of view, there is *no world of transcendentally appearing beings* before science, the mode of consciousness that supposedly builds actively upon these mere sensations. In the end, it turns out that this understanding provides the colonizing appetite of natural science the whole stratum upon which values, aims, concerns, etc., are to be founded and found. (See also the close of note 5 above.) Ricoeur, in order to account for the co-presence and partial overlap in *Ideas II* of analyses concerning the perceptual constitution of things and analyses concerning the scientifically objective thing, claims that Husserl is in fact interested in elucidating scientific knowledge, but gets involved in analyses of perceptual constitution instead of staying exclusively close to the analyses of scientific constitution. For Ricoeur, this is so because “science *does not* present *absolutely new* problems in relation to the perceptual constitution of things” (ibid., 44; emphases added) and the latter seem more convenient. We have seen, however, that a large number of *essential* differences lie between these two kinds of intentional constitution (but also between mere sense experience and pre-scientific thematization), and that this co-presence is otherwise explained from a totally different perspective.

through aesthetic properties that have now been transformed and replaced by their *idealizingly exact* ‘counterparts.’<sup>36</sup>

## 5.10 Summary and Conclusion

In *Ideas* II Part I, Husserl is engaged in analyses that concern the intentional constitution of the beings that belong to the ontological region “inanimate nature.” These analyses start from nature-things that are characterized as objects of natural science. But, as these constitutive analyses unfold, we realize that they refer to sense-things, i.e. to perceptual things. Perceptual things are said to represent the most fundamental level of being-constitution, while they are at the same time presented as essentially extensional and material beings. We have seen that a closer reading of the text shows that Husserl does not in fact hold that the extensional and material things of perception are identical with the direct or proper objects of scientific theoretic consciousness, which are specifically called “physicalistic things.”

If we take into account the architectonic of *Ideas* II Part I, and the particular contexts of the analyses as we have presented them here, “nature-thing” should be naturally equated with the pre-scientific and pre-thematic mere sense-experiential thing; namely, with the being of the most primordial level of intentional givenness. Thus, that nature-thinghood is the object of natural science does not mean that natural scientific experience has as its direct and proper object something like a “nature-thing.” Rather, it means that the object proper to natural science (Physics), i.e., the *physicalistic* thing, is a special active modification of that nature-thing, which functions as ‘source’ or ‘inspiration’ for it. The object proper to natural science is mathematically constituted extensionality and materiality, which is the categorial objectivity constituted via the scientific abstraction and idealization of specific moments of the primordially given nature-thing. The physicalistic thing is a higher-level intentional correlate, which presupposes “nature-thing” as its most ultimate intentional fundament. Now, all these kinds of beings comprise different transcendently- and historically-genetically internal possible *levels* of constitution within the ontological sphere or region of “inanimate nature.” “Inanimate nature,” correspondingly, is the characterization of a region of Being that has “nature-thing” as its most ultimate (but already ‘thick’) level, and “physicalistic thing” as its upper (relatively recent and again quite ‘thick’) sedimented level.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>36</sup>A full treatment of the constitution of physicalistic being and of the meaning of its givenness and its existence, however, demands an extensive separate treatment. This is in part undertaken in my Ph.D. dissertation, Theodorou 2000. See also Theodorou 2010b.

<sup>37</sup>I would like to thank Fotini Vassiliou for discussing with me the structure and content of *Ideas* II and the relation of *Ding und Raum* to *Ideas* II. I have benefited greatly from these discussions, and from her incisive comments on the final version of this chapter. I would also like to thank Elisabeth Behnke for her useful comments on an early form of the manuscript.



# Chapter 6

## Primordial Givenness in Husserl and Heidegger

[E]very great thinker always *thinks* one more jump more originally than he directly *speaks* [*denkt immer um einen Sprung ursprünglicher, als er unmittelbar spricht*]. Our interpretation must therefore try to say what is unsaid by him. (M. Heidegger: *N I*, 134/158)

### 6.1 Introduction

In his *Ideas I* (1913), with his thought experiment of world-annihilation, Husserl becomes persuaded that the beings of which we are conscious do not simply lie ‘out there’ in themselves, enjoying an independent (realistic) existence. Our experience of beings in a world, qua total horizon of beings, is the achievement of our intentional consciousness, which unfolds its overall constitutive possibilities. It is because of this that in our everyday meaningful comportments, we are always intentionally correlated with what is “*Vorhanden*”<sup>1</sup> for us.

In what we know as *Ideas II*, Husserl sought to offer concrete analyses of such intentional constitutions. He distinguished three fundamental spheres of intentional objectivities: inanimate material nature, animate or psychic nature, and spirit or culturality. These constitute, as Husserl puts it, three different *regions* of Being, comprising beings that are meaningfully given in the three corresponding kinds of intentional correlation. Thus, he divided the problem of intentional constitution into three corresponding sub-problems. Now, according to Husserl’s *Phenomenology*, some intentional interdependence holds between these three regions of Being. In the way the matter was approached in Chap. 5 of the present book, the region of inanimate material nature, which comprises the nature-things (*Naturdinge*), is presented as being the most fundamental. The constitution of animate-psychic

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<sup>1</sup>On the meaning of this term as used by Husserl (at least in his *Ideas I*), see below.

nature is, in its turn, thought of as presupposing inanimate nature-thinghood as its intentional foundation. Spirit and culturality, finally, presupposes the first and, somehow, the second region.

It is generally thought that Husserl was of the view that, for us, primordial consciousness is the perceptual experience of nature-things; simple sensory perceptual things. That is, on the lowest level of our conscious life, we are intentionally correlated with simple perceptually appearing things. Our experience of cultural beings or, more broadly speaking, things of value (goods) like tools, books, etc., is intentionally derivative and founded upon the former.

In his *Being and Time* (1927), Heidegger, who had already been influenced by Husserl's discussion of the aforementioned ontological regions, claimed that primordially, intentional experience presents us with a world where equipment and other beings like us appear. Moreover, the givenness of beings as nature-things, or simply as sensory perceptual beings, is the result of a theoretical construction.<sup>2</sup> In what I would like to call "standard" or "received" Heideggerian criticism of Husserl's Phenomenology, it is held that Husserl starts his analysis at a high level of theoretical intentionality.<sup>3</sup> What Husserl takes as primordial intentionality, the story goes, is an experience that is possible only as attentive-observational and thematic givenness of beings; nature-things can appear only in 'elaborate' derivative experience of such a kind. In addition, in this judgmental constitution of nature-things, the properties attributed to them appear to belong to science. This thesis, Heidegger maintains, makes Phenomenology unfaithful to its very dictum that calls us to remain close "to the things themselves." If Phenomenology were to stay close to how things indeed are, it would discover that primordially, we are not correlated with theoretically constituted *vorhanden* nature-things, but with *zuhanden* equipment of different kinds. Positing nature-things or perceptual things as the ultimate fundament of intentional givenness moves us away from the original sense of Phenomenology and accepts phenomenologically unjustified prejudices.<sup>4</sup>

But is this widespread reading of Husserl and the corresponding criticism on the part of Heidegger and the Heideggerians correct? I think that if we want to get to the heart of the matter, the following more specific questions must be

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<sup>2</sup>For more on the meaning of the expression "theoretical construction," see below. As we will see in Chap. 7, Heidegger also says that talk (but not givenness) of simply sensory things can refer also to the merely lived-through sensory contents in real relations. In this case, they are the result of a merely speculative theoretical abstraction.

<sup>3</sup>This is, of course, the view already rejected in its fundamentals in Chap. 5 (see also Chap. 7). However, this recapitulation is necessary for the purposes of the present chapter.

<sup>4</sup>For this line of Heidegger's reading of Husserl, see, e.g., the former's criticism of Descartes' "cognitivism," "theoreticism," and "scientism" (*BT*, §§19–21; also §§13–14), which, as Heidegger himself confessed (see note 8 below), applies also—if not first and primarily—to Husserl's Phenomenology. For this widespread reading of Husserl on the part of the Heideggerians (but also on the part of some Husserlians), see Dreyfus (1991, §§6.I, 6.III), its most influential and fiery proponent. Dreyfus explicitly presents Heidegger's criticisms of Descartes as valid criticisms against Husserl. See, however, Chap. 5 of the present book, and especially §5.5.

posed. Does Husserl really make Phenomenology enter the speculative-theoretic mode when it discovers nature-things and considers them as threshold intentional beings? Does he conceive of the givenness of perceptual nature-things in terms that are already ‘theoretical’? What does Husserl really think when he says that Phenomenology testifies to the primordially of the givenness of perceptual nature-things? By “founded upon nature-thingness,” does Husserl mean that there is a straightforward kind of conscious life, within which nature-things are separately given as such? Here, I will deal only with the last two questions, since the whole of Chap. 5 dealt (and part of Chap. 7 will deal) specifically with the first two. Nevertheless, with regard to the first two questions, there remains one unresolved issue, to be dealt with in §6.2 below.

Moving on from the findings of Chap. 5, in this chapter I will maintain that there are additional reasons for seeing the just-mentioned and now habitual reading of Husserl as both one-sided and seriously flawed. In addition, I will try to offer the necessary context for a precise understanding of Husserl’s actual view with regard to the relation between nature-thingness and equipmentality or, more generally, between spirituality and culturality. Only then will we be able to see whether Husserl’s view falls short of anything.<sup>5</sup>

At this early stage, before proceeding to our analyses, two things must be noted. Firstly, for our purposes, Husserl’s notion of ‘spirituality’ and culturality (comprising things of value or simply goods) has been rendered as a concept almost parallel to Heidegger’s *Zuhandenheit* or equipmentality. Of course, this parallelism is far from obvious, but we assume it here in order to establish a dialogue. A simple way to clarify this and continue our discussion is as follows. Although Heidegger would accept that *Zuhandenheit* is indeed the most original level of ‘spirituality’ and culturality, seen as the defining characteristics of human beings, Husserl would be willing to acknowledge *Zuhandenheit*, i.e., some kind of ‘spirituality’ and perhaps even a lower culturality, as an elementary level of an intentional life that could pertain also to animals (at least to primates, e.g., Wolfgang Köhler’s chimpanzees,

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<sup>5</sup>Before moving any further in the tasks just set, I would like to refer to three other answers to the Heideggerian-Dreyfusian challenge: Føllesdal 1979, 2000; Arp 1996; and Soffer 1999. Føllesdal endeavored to challenge the view that Husserl was guilty of charges addressed against him by Heidegger, and by Dreyfus’ reading of the latter. At first, he focused on Husserl’s manuscripts dating from 1917 to 1918, while in his 2000 he referred also to Husserl’s *Ideas* II (1912). Nevertheless, as I read this particular dispute, I think that, *mutatis mutandis*, I have to side with Dreyfus (see, e.g., the latter’s 1991, 48ff.; and 2000, 334ff.) and say that Føllesdal’s efforts do not succeed in being as focused and conclusive as would be required. At best, they establish that in his Phenomenology, Husserl was able to simply accommodate—from his own point of view and without inner conflict—the thematic of the praxis and praxial constitution of intentional correlates. (See also note 35 below.) Analogously, Arp tries to show that Husserl did not fall victim to the view that there is only one kind of consciousness, “theoretical thematizing consciousness,” since his Phenomenology could easily account for our every-day coping with beings around us in a non-thematic modality of consciousness (cf., e.g., Arp 1996, 162). Generally, these responses fall short of systematically confronting the questions posed above here. For my view on Soffer’s—more relevant to our issues here—answers, see §§6.6, 6.7, 6.8, and 6.9 below and note 22.

Japan's macaques, or Congo's bonobos). Spirituality and culturality, that is, are used here in a loose sense, to refer also to the minimal kind of intentionality that is higher than the merely sensory-perceptual one.

Secondly, in the present chapter, our main concern is to establish the ground for a satisfactory understanding of the phenomenology regarding the intentional constitution and givenness of what Husserl calls "spiritual" and "cultural" objects (things of value), and of what Heidegger understands as beings primordially appearing to humans specifically as humans, i.e., understood as the supposedly sole living beings that are capable of understanding Being. This means that, at least on this first level of the approach, we will not differentiate among elementary forms of equipment (in their evolution from stone-age to the present), food, shelter, etc., and sophisticated artifacts and goods like works of art, money, books, microscopes, X-ray plates, etc. To the degree that it is possible, however, we will abstain from dealing with complex goods and with more elusive values like "good" and "evil" or with "beautiful" and "sublime." What will be said in this chapter, though, can be considered as preparation for a phenomenological theory regarding the constitution of value-beings or goods *in general*.

## 6.2 *Vorhandenheit* and Theoreticity in the Appropriate Husserlian Context

Before anything else, let us solve this issue: how does Heidegger use the terms "*vorhanden*" and "theoretical," and what does Husserl mean by them?

In examining the relative priority between *Zuhandenheit* and *Vorhandenheit* or, otherwise put, between equipmentality and mere objecthood, Heidegger treats the latter as a "theoretical" givenness of beings. The key characteristics of *Vorhandenheit* seem to be the following:

- (i) the "there-being" of the given for a detached, attentively observing, camera-like subject,<sup>6</sup>
- (ii) abstraction of the corresponding co-given and co-determining context of (variously but mostly practically) relevant beings,<sup>7</sup>
- (iii) judgmental constitution, in terms of predicated theoretic-scientific properties.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>In Chap. 5, we had the opportunity to see that this first fundamental character of *Vorhandenheit* does not apply to Husserl's analyses, even regarding the constitution of the perceptually appearing nature-thing.

<sup>7</sup>To see why this is not the case with Husserl's views regarding the appearing and givenness of intentional correlates, even in the case of the perceptual things, see Chaps. 5 and 7, and Theodorou 2010b.

<sup>8</sup>In Heidegger's work, this 'theoreticity' in the *vorhanden*-like givenness of beings qua mere objects is in fact immediately connected with their being given also in terms of the Cartesian—geometric and natural-scientific—*res extensa*. Covertly in the main text of *SZ*, but explicitly in the

In short, *zuhanden* entities are not just standing there, isolated, and under a thematic-scientific inspective sight, whereas *vorhanden* entities are. The non-isolatedness of equipment may be understood as meaning that these beings are contextual, referentially related to an overall set of other entities of the same Being (worldliness), and caught up in the overall nexus of Dasein's projects and concerns.

In Phenomenology, then, one appears to be forced to think the problem of primordially exclusively in these pre-designed terms: either equipmentality or theoretic givenness (of this sort) can be thought of as being primordial. Heidegger chooses equipmentality and attributes the contrary view to Husserl. The question, however, is whether Husserl starts his analyses from the givenness of *vorhanden* beings in the Heideggerian sense of this term.

It is true that for the most part, Husserl presents us with analyses of perceptual intentionality, rather than of with analyses of other intentionalities related to what are generally understood as practices. As we saw in Chap. 5, moreover, it can therefore appear tempting to understand Husserl's descriptions of perception, e.g., in *Ideas* II, and his mention of colors, figures, and other characteristics of perceptual beings in terms of properties, scientifically meant cause-effect relations, etc., as referring to beings given in *attentive, examining, thematizing observation*. This would of course make us believe that for Husserl, the most primordial way of the being of human beings is the *theoretical* one—which Heidegger identifies with the secondary and, according to him, founded constitution of *Vorhandenheit*.

What Husserl seems to have meant by the term “*Vorhanden*,” though, is something different. For example, in the *Ideas* I, §27, it has the sense of a neutral intentional availability-for-someone, or the status of a being that can be generally confronted in the world and that can be evidentially given to some intentional act. That is, it refers to the meaningful givenness in general of beings, constituted in intentional consciousness.<sup>9</sup> Thus, it does not refer exclusively to perception or to an interested or attentive observing, and it does not mean an isolated particular givenness of something constituted judgmentally on the basis of some properties.

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*marginalia* to his *Hütte* copy, Heidegger accuses Husserl of presupposing the reversed order of Being, and of wrongly positing such a *res extensa* as the most primordial intentional givenness. With regard to both these points, see Heidegger's *Hütte* note *a*, on page 98 of *SZ*. See also *SZ*, 61–2, 95, 361; and *GA20*, 165 (for the pre-*BT* history of these points, see Overgaard 2003). In his 1919 *Kriegsnotsemester*, Heidegger lets his students understand that Husserl's phenomenological description is theoretical in character to the extent that it objectifies, isolates, de-worlds, and conceptualizes (if with the latter an abstraction and subsumption under logical generalities is meant) (see *TDP*, 85). See also Chaps. 5 and 7 of the present work.

<sup>9</sup>See, for example, *Hua* III.1, 58, 59–60. On this, I agree with Soffer; the term at stake is used in the most liberal way in Husserl's writings (see Soffer 1999, 379–393, and especially 382). See also §6.4 below.

It is also true, however, that in his *Ideas II*, Husserl himself tells us that his analyses concerning the givenness of nature-things as given in simple sensory-experience<sup>10</sup> are conducted from a *theoretical* point of view (e.g., *Ideas II*, §§3, 11, 49.e). In Chap. 5, though, we saw that this attitude is confused. The confusion arises due to the corresponding ambiguity in the meaning of the term “nature-thing” in *Ideas II*. A careful examination of its use suffices to clarify that in the relevant contexts, “theoreticity” has *two* different meanings. First, it indeed means the attitude from which interested examination and natural science is done, i.e., the attitude in which we, as specifically interested spectators, are conscious of nature-things that are judgmentally constituted by means of (non-scientific or scientific) predicates.<sup>11</sup> Second, it means the attitude from which we, for the purpose of a phenomenological description, manage to isolate the givenness of nature-things as appearing to mere sense experience, freed from any kind of non-sensory noematic folds or sediments, i.e., basically of spirituality and culturality (values, etc.).<sup>12</sup> This second sense of “theoreticity” in *Ideas II* is phenomenologically fully legitimate and harmless for the *Sachen*. It does not result in the constitution of a distorted version of *die Sache selbst* that would destroy our original subject-matter.<sup>13</sup> It thus provides us with the possibility to a proper and thorough elucidation of the original founding presupposition of equipment and of culturality in general, i.e., of perceptual natural-thingness, as distinct from the givenness of the intentionally founded layers. For instance, a variety of this phenomenologically legitimate ‘theoreticity’ is the one that enables us to elucidate the givenness of, e.g., perceptual things via their *Abschattungen*, etc.; another one is the above hinted at of “de-sedimentation.”<sup>14</sup>

This confused use of the notion of theoreticity in *Ideas II* seems to offer some degree of explanation for Heidegger’s one-sided understanding of the phenomenological legitimacy and the total phenomenological structure of givenness in Husserl’s philosophy. Thus, it also constitutes part of the reason for Heidegger’s polemic against the latter,<sup>15</sup> the rightness of which has since been simply taken for granted.

Given all of this, when I refer to the problem of primordially in what follows, the reader should take care not to confuse the Heideggerian with the Husserlian sense of *Vorhandenheit*—the second may also include original perceptual givenness of

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<sup>10</sup>On the meaning of “simple perception” and “simple sensory objectivation” it is interesting to compare what is said here in Chap. 5 (see also Chap. 7, and Theodorou 2010b) with Mulligan 1995, 173, 183, 188, and Mooney 2010, esp. pp. 25ff, 40ff.

<sup>11</sup>See, for example, *Ideas II*, 5/3–4.

<sup>12</sup>See, for example, *Ideas II*, 27/25.

<sup>13</sup>On this, see also Chaps. 3 and 5 in the present book.

<sup>14</sup>For example, in his *Beilage* 40 to the important (for our purposes here) §37 of the *Ideas I* (see *Hua* III.2, 595), Husserl also uses the term ‘theoreticity’ in quotation marks, in order to give it this second meaning.

<sup>15</sup>See also Chaps. 2 and 5.

mere nature-things (in the sense discussed in Chap. 5). As we will very soon see, the danger of such confusion does not apply only to *Vorhandenheit*.

## 6.3 Concerning the Character of Intentional Foundedness

### 6.3.1 Moments, Pieces, Foundedness

In order to examine the consistency and inner possibility of Heidegger's own claim (and his reproach against Husserl) with regard to the primordially of *Zuhandenheit* over *Vorhandenheit*, and the nature of secondariness and foundedness of *Vorhandenheit*, we must have a clear sense of the phenomenological relations of intentional foundedness. Thus, our analyses demand that we enter in some detail into the mereological and stratificatory constitution of intentional beings.

First of all, let us recall Husserl's definitions of independent and dependent parts, introduced in his discussion of mereology in the third LI.

We have independent contents wherever the elements of a presentational complex (complex of contents) *by their very nature permit their separated presentation* [*getrent vorgestellt werden können*]; we have dependent contents wherever this is not the case. (LI, 439/230)

And here is what Husserl means by the "separation" of something that can thus be separately presented.

Isolability [by separation] [*Lostrennbarkeit*] [of a content or part of a whole] means only that, in a presentation [*Vorstellung*], we can keep this content constant, despite boundless variation—variation that is free, though not excluded by a law rooted in the content's essence—of the contents associated with it, and, in general, given with it [in the whole under discussion]. This means that it [i.e., the isolable content or part of the whole] is unaffected by the elimination of any given arrangement of co-present contents whatsoever. (LI, 443/235; transl. sl. md.)

We may call these independent and separately presentable contents or parts of a whole "pieces" (*Stücke*), and those that are dependent and not separately presentable "moments" (*Momente*). Given this, we may now say also the following.

[A piece] would be what it is even if everything outside it were annihilated. If we form a presentation of it, we are not necessarily referred to something else, included in which, or attached to which, or associated with which, it has being, or on whose mercy it depends, as it were, for its existence. (LI, 445/238)

On the other hand, "a non-independent object [i.e., a moment of a whole] can only be what it is (i.e. what it is in virtue of its essential properties) in a more comprehensive whole" (LI, 453/249). Now, if a part is—by essential, objective necessity—not independent, then we say that it is in need of a *foundation* (*Fundierung*) or that it is, after all, *founded* upon other parts.

If a law of essence means that an *A* cannot as such exist except in a more comprehensive unity which connects it with an *M*, we say that an *A* *as such requires foundation by an M* or *also that an A as such needs to be supplemented by an M*. (LI, 463/261)

The general mereological principle, i.e., the law defining what is involved (and how it is involved) in the establishment of this foundation, now reads as follows.

*The only true unifying factors, we may roundly say, are relations of 'foundation.'* The unity [of the parts into the whole and of the whole itself] [...] is in consequence brought about by 'foundation.' (LI, 478/279)<sup>16</sup>

This unity, Husserl explains, is not a *real* predicate. Surprisingly, though, at first he calls it a "*categorical* predicate" (LI, 478/280), like linguistic conjunction, disjunction, predicative "is," etc. Later, however, he corrects his terminology by maintaining that we have wholes whenever we have foundation, a relation that depends on essential necessities relative to the *nature* of the founding parts. To this extent, i.e., to the extent that the formation of a whole depends on the "nature," i.e., on the 'material' content of the founding parts, he suggests that "material form" (*materiale Form*) should be a more proper expression for the founding relation, qua form of unification.<sup>17</sup> For our purposes, "structural character" would have been a more neutral and general expression for this non-real founding moment that unifies the involved parts into a whole. We must bear all of this in mind in what follows.

### 6.3.2 *Static and Genetic Phenomenological Perspectives*

We now turn to the distinction between static and genetic perspectives of phenomenological analysis. Static analysis begins with an elucidation of the constitution of a given intentional correlate (noema), from the point of view of the descriptive givens or folds available in one or the other isolated level of the full noema. In perception, for instance, static phenomenological analysis is a description of what intentional interconnections 'take place' when actual and potential adumbrate-gestalts (*Abschattungen*) of a thing are unified in the appearance of this thing as a perceptually intentional object, etc., (according to what was said in Chaps. 4 and 5). A static analysis of intentional constitution does not take into consideration any temporal or "intentional implication"<sup>18</sup> relations of the factors involved. To this extent, an analysis of this kind is synchronic, or rather, achronic. No question arises

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<sup>16</sup>Important portions of the exciting but also complicated story behind Husserl's development of this particular aspect of his mereology, from the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* to the *LI*, can be found in Vassiliou 2010.

<sup>17</sup>Husserl explicitly deals with the problem: "But did we not say in the previous section that unity (and we were talking specifically of a unity based on foundation) was a categorical predicate?" And the explanation he gives is that "the Idea of a whole is based on the idea of 'Founding,' and the latter Idea upon the Idea of a Pure Law [...]. [A] law [however] is not [a] thing-like [entity], not therefore perceptible—and [...] to this extent the notion of a Founded Whole is a categorical notion. But the *content* of the law governing each such whole is determined by the material specificity of the 'founding' contents and consequently of the 'founded' types of content" (LI, 481/284).

<sup>18</sup>We will return to the notion of "intentional implication" below.



here as to whether e.g., some adumbrations are (or are not) prior to some other such moments in the order of actual intentional availability, etc.

Nevertheless, even here, there is a conceivable but also *limit* case of phenomenological<sup>19</sup> mereological priority—normally, the traditional, strictly logical priority is not applicable here. We can call this a “static priority” relation (no matter how paradoxical the expression may sound), corresponding to the relevant foundation relations. Under it, we can classify the relation between the as such non-appearing moments<sup>20</sup> and the appearing whole of the intentional object itself. Exemplarily in perception, some *reell* content is recorded and lived-through and ‘then’ the intentional interpretation of it arises as our consciousness’ response. In Chap. 4, we saw that perception is always already fulfilled and that we cannot actually discern in time the having of the *reell* content and the intentional achievement. Mereologically and foundationally, though, these two are distinct moments in the intentional life of perception. In this case, “static priority” may only mean the relation of dependence between, e.g., merely given lived-through moments and their intuitionally appearing correlates. Statically, the phenomenologically dependent *reell* moments are mereologically prior to the phenomenologically independent appearing object, of which such moments are parts.

Genetic analysis takes into consideration time and implication relations between proper phenomenological objectivities, the first of which *appears independently* and *as such*, qua genetically founding stratum. The genetically secondary intentional objectivity is, then, another intentional correlate that also appears *as such*, albeit as founded upon its founding presupposition, and which may subsequently also work as the founding stratum for a still newer and higher founded stratum, etc. The thusly founding strata are always prior in time; the founded posterior. The founding strata must be autonomous phenomenological givens—ranging from absoluteness to the mediation of a first level, a second level, etc.—and as such. They can thus also work as the occasion for the constitution of the founded strata. For example, in order to thematize appearing redness or being-red as such, the red color on some red patch or an appearing perceptual object, e.g., an apple, must have been given. This means that in the end, the aforementioned apple must itself have already appeared with autonomy and as such. In an analogous case, in order to measure the length of a rod, the rod itself and as such must have already appeared, etc. By the “as such” (it itself as it is), I refer to the Husserlian notion of ‘in-person’ or ‘bodily’ givenness, i.e., to that which is not in any way mediately given, e.g., via empty aiming, symbol, image, etc. For instance, “the apple we directly experience” or “the

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<sup>19</sup>It is *quasi*-phenomenological, to be sure, as it will become more evident later.

<sup>20</sup>Thus, *descriptive*, and *not* intentional proper—see also, e.g., note 1 in §16 of the 2nd edition of the fifth *LI*. It is not these moments that appear as objects, but only the *object as totality* having these moments as its parts.

rod we directly experience,” are these themselves that now appear to me. As we will see below, however, the specific narrow identity of that which we “directly experience” is questionable.

In §§6.7 and 6.8, we will also examine the distinction between *passive* and *active* genesis. We will see what this means in Husserl’s Phenomenology, and we will examine what Husserl could have claimed with regard to the foundedness of equipmentality from the point of view of this latter distinction.

## 6.4 Determining the Actual Meaning of Heidegger’s Stance

Our specific question with regard to Heidegger’s stance toward our primordially priority issue should be twofold. On the one hand, we want to know what exactly Heidegger means when he rejects the—traditional metaphysical and (supposedly)—Husserlian view that perceptual givenness is more primordial than *Zuhandenheit* (culturality) and that the second is founded upon the first. Does he think that Husserl means a static or a genetic priority of the first with regard to the second? This is far from clear in his analyses. On the other hand, we need to know how he himself understands the primacy of *Zuhandenheit* and the foundedness of *Vorhandenheit*. The answer to this second question must be postponed until §6.10.

With regard to our first question, it seems that Heidegger believes Husserl treated *Vorhandenheit* as genetically founding *Zuhandenheit*. That is, Heidegger seems to think that according to Husserl, in our everyday, straightforward intentionality, we primordially experience full-fledged perceptual objects upon which *Zuhandenheit* is subsequently founded. Of course, bearing in mind our analyses from Chap. 5, as well as the foregoing §6.2, when Heidegger attributes this view to Husserl, he can only mean that the latter maintains it with regard to judgmentally constituted perceptual things. That is, Husserl supposedly argues that, at first, judgmentally constituted purely perceptual things appear in autonomy and as such, e.g., “the apple is red,” “this is an apple,” etc., qua mere or nude (as it were) nature-things (*Naturdinge*). Subsequently, another kind of intentionality is activated, which results in the constitution of higher noematic layers, genetically founded upon that perceptual thing, so as to allow us to now experience a new, stratified noema, e.g., an edible nutritious fruit, a tool, or some other spiritual or cultural being. More precisely, according to the criticism, Husserl makes the mistake of thinking that what is ontologically primordial is a region comprising beings that are understood as perceptual things, constituted separately in a judgmental way, and in terms of geometrical extensionality and natural scientific materiality, e.g., as “this apple is a sphere weighing 0.25 kg, emitting red light at the wavelength of 760 nm,” etc.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup>Heidegger does not even distinguish, as does Husserl, between thematization in terms of pre-scientific concepts and thematization in terms of idealized geometrical and natural-scientific concepts. See for example *SZ*, 361–3 (where he identifies thematization of *vorhanden* beings

From a genetic point of view, then, we secondarily constitute equipmental objectivities as founded upon such perceptual-theoretical objectivities.

We have already seen that Heidegger projects onto Husserl a theory of perceptual intentionality that is clearly wrong. In this chapter, we will also see that Heidegger's interpretation of what Husserl actually teaches with regard to the relation between perception and culturality, e.g., what in Heidegger is the *equipmentality*, is not justified. In what follows, I will defend the view that although Husserl may not have been as clear as he should have been on these matters, we can distil from his writings a view that is phenomenologically more adequate and more reasonable than Heidegger's own.<sup>22</sup>

Of course, Heidegger's magisterial phenomenology of equipmentality retains its power, in terms of the way he elucidates the status and ultimate meaning of this specific layer of the overall make-up of the corresponding beings. Since Husserl does not have a clear elaborate theory of the constitution of these value levels of the beings we confront or handle in our lifeworld, Heidegger's analyses are valuable. From the normalized phenomenological point of view, pre-announced in Chap. 1 of the present book, we could claim that only a careful merging of these—separate and seemingly conflicting—thematics can restore the desired phenomenological adequacy to the very things themselves.

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and scientific projection); see also Husserl's marginal remarks to *SZ*, 362 (in *PTP*, 265, 398–9). According to Heidegger, once we happen to abandon our equipment-engaged comportments, we are thrown into a theoretical life understood in terms of attentive observation, general predicative thematization, and scientific properties. We rejected this reading of Husserl's teachings in Chap. 5. For another possible understanding of sensory experience by Heidegger, see also Chap. 7, §7.3.

<sup>22</sup>Soffer (1999) also thinks that Heidegger understands the relative founding relation between *Zuhandenheit* and *Vorhandenheit* (or vice versa) genetically. More specifically, she writes that by the priority of *Zuhandenheit* over *Vorhandenheit*, Heidegger must have meant a "genetic" priority. Something like a hammer must already have a place within mature *Dasein's* practical projects and concerns, if such a *Dasein* is ever to "bother [...] itself with a hammer in the first place [...] [or] to involve itself with anything" (1999, 390). If I understand these allusions in the relevant two or three phrases correctly (cf. *ibid.*, 389–90), I think that the terminologically loose "bothering" and "involve" have there the sense of examining carefully, of observing attentively, of scrutinising theoretically, of persistently thematizing, and so on. Now, in the end, Soffer *reverses* the order of priority, maintaining that contrary to Heidegger, in Husserl there is a *genetic* priority of the *theoretical* being-givenness. She claims: "[T]heoretical activity including thematic study and investigation of cause-effect relations precedes readiness-to-hand [*Zuhandenheit*] *in time*" (*ibid.*, 389). Therefore, according to this approach, we first happen to experience theoretically constituted intentional beings in perception, and it is only subsequently *in time* that we may have something like a tool-givenness and tool-experience of beings. As it will turn out, there are good reasons for disagreeing with this reading of Husserl.

## 6.5 Equipment Cannot Be the Result of Active, Thematizing Genesis

First of all, Heidegger actually claims that Husserl in fact reversed the genuine order of primordially. Heidegger, who supposedly posits the right order of the primordially-hierarchy, thinks that *Vorhandenheit* is the result of a theoretical judgmental stance that takes into account scientific-objective properties. If we take the claim to reversed order literally, what we should first examine is the following question: could Husserl have meant that equipmentality is constituted secondarily due to a theoretical judgmental stance that takes into account some relevant properties?<sup>23</sup> Note that as we will see in Chap. 7, this stance should have been founded upon some kind of Husserlian perceptual experience, which is for Heidegger theoretically (judgmentally) constituting. The alternative of a perception in terms of hypothetically abstractive, non-appearing lived-through sensory content (Chap. 7, §§7.3.1, 7.3.4, n. 14), is here excluded, because we are now concerned with an active genetic foundedness upon intentional objects.

In this section, we will see that Husserl could not have meant that equipmentality (or, more generally, culturality) can be constituted for the first time in such an active, thematizing *genetic* sense, upon natural-thingness. More particularly, Husserl could not have claimed that equipmentality is constituted by means of a predicative attribution of suitable properties upon the perceptual being—either in the way Heidegger understands the latter in Husserl, or in the way suggested earlier in Chaps. 4 and 5 (and to be seen in Chap. 7).

But let us examine the situation. The working hypothesis formulated a few lines above may be strengthened from the fact that Husserl presented linguistic intentionality and its recognized peculiar discovering-and-covering function and effect as the key-model for understanding genetic intentional *implication (Implikation)*.<sup>24</sup> Thus, if Heidegger accuses Husserl of thinking (wrongly) that equipmentality is genetically founded upon (an already theoretically constituted) nature-thingness, it

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<sup>23</sup>Dreyfus, for example, takes this claim about a reversed order literally. Referring to Descartes, Plato, and Husserl, he opposes the understanding of tool constitution in exactly these terms, i.e., in terms of extra relevant *properties* that the—supposedly primordial and autonomous—substance-like, object-basis of these tools has (Dreyfus 1991, 46–7, 65–6, 115–6).

<sup>24</sup>I refer to Husserl's use of this term in *EJ*, 124/140, 376–7/457–8; *Crisis*, 52/52; *CM*, 46ff/83ff, 51/88, 64/98, 85/118; also *Hua* I, 190. To my knowledge, it is only Fink who has tried to give us something like a definition of the core idea: "Implication [*Implikation*] means a 'being-beyond' [*Übersein*'] of the ego, which is itself nothing other than a constant, primally, streaming constituting, a constituting of various levels of universes of beings ('worlds'), to each of which actual and habitual validities of Being [*Seinsgeltung*] belong, in modes of horizontality pertaining to each of them; modes of horizontality, which get harmoniously individualized in the actuality of the [ego's] fulfilling accomplishments; for example, we refer to the validation of the 'spatiotemporal' universes by corrections in modes of modalization." (Fink 1995, 170; transl. md.). It doesn't go, however, beyond what is already presupposed in the present chapter.

seems reasonable to suppose that he would also accuse the latter of thinking that the equipmental noematic layers should be constituted in a theoretical-predicative way.

There is another reason for reading Heidegger's reproach in this way. In concluding the closely relevant (for our purposes here) §37 of the *Ideas* I, Husserl writes that connected with valuing intentionality, in which we are conscious of value-objects (among which equipment is, for him, included), is an interesting consciousness-possibility. Here is what Husserl means by this.

[I mean the intentionality pertaining to acts] by which their full intentional objects become heeded and, in this sense, [these] "*objectivated*" ["*vorgestellten*"] objects [...] are then, for their part, capable of serving as substrates for explications, relations, *conceptual apprehensions, and predications*. [In addition, it is] [t]hanks to this *objectivation* [...] [that] we confront [...] *values and practical objects of every sort*: [...] streets with street-lights, dwellings, furniture, works of art, books, tools, and so forth. (*Ideas* I, 7–8/77; second and fourth emphases added)

Having mentioned the intentional stances of explicating, relating, conceptually apprehending and predicating, the mention of this last "objectivation" can easily give the impression that the objectivating intentionality, thanks to which we confront "works of art, books, tools, and so forth," is exactly that of explicating, predicating, etc. Since these all belong to the category of thematizing (isolating-predicative) intentionality in the pregnant sense, wouldn't we be right to think that according to a supposedly Husserlian analysis, we first have tools because of a *theoretical-predicative* constitution of the sort "this is a hammer," i.e., a substance 'surrounded' by all the physical properties that make it suitable for hammering, etc.<sup>25</sup> (For the moment, we will leave the issue of Husserl's positive suggestion in the above cited passage open—we will come back to this in §6.6 below—and focus on just what he could *not* have said there.) In fact, this is also suggested by Heidegger's text in *BT*.

When we speak of material thinghood [...] we have tacitly posited a kind of Being: the constant occurrence of things [qua Cartesian *res extensa* and *res materialis*] [...] [Thus,] subsequently endowing [these] entities with value-predicates [...] [as a traditional view would suggest] cannot tell us anything at all new about the Being of [equipment]. (*BT* [MR], 132/99)

In the context of Husserl's *Phenomenology*, though, predicative acts 'take in' themselves what is intentionally *already* given in pre-linguistic constitution—at first in the simply perceived nature-thing. On this basis, and by means of a dieresis and a synthesis,<sup>26</sup> these acts *actively* re-organize the elements of its unitary—but possibly multi-dimensional—internal horizon of appearance, leaving us in a new kind of experience (categorical intuition related to acts of synthesis). In this new experience, we intuit the originally and intentionally given objectivity from the 'point of view' or through the 'filter,' so to say, of the selected predicate(s).<sup>27</sup> From

<sup>25</sup>See the references in notes 22 and 28.

<sup>26</sup>See e.g., *Ideas* I, 319ff/307ff; *EJ*, 209/246, and e.g., Sokolowski 1971, 336.

<sup>27</sup>On the phenomenology of experiencing higher-level intentional objectivities on the basis of the primordially, simply perceived thing, see also Theodorou 2010b.

then on, it is possible to turn to the newly constituted objectivity and access it on the level of its newly established formation (although in a relatively ‘transparent’ way, which easily allows us see its underlying original fundament). This means that the foundational basis of a predicatively constituted objectivity must have already appeared as the phenomenological content of the total pre-predicative givenness of the corresponding being. Accordingly, only on this presupposition *would* a thematizing act predicatively constitute something like a tool. This means that tool-givenness cannot be predicatively constituted upon the fundament of the inner or outer horizon of a *perceptual* thing, since *nowhere* in it can we find as predic-able something like the Heideggerian *um-zu*, an appropriateness for this or that practical end, or even some *usefulness* (as value or otherwise), etc., i.e., factors constituting equipmentality in general.<sup>28</sup> Speaking generally, non-sensory noematic layers like value cannot be found within the strict horizons related to a sense-experientially given nature-thing (in either Heidegger’s or in Husserl’s sense, as interpreted in Chaps. 4, 5 (and later in 7).

And yet, nature-things are indeed simultaneously meant, in Husserl, as the fundament for value-things. How is this possible? For the moment, we can claim only that spirituality, culturality, or values in general (or equipmentality in particular) must have a non-sensory intentional origin; an origin, moreover, that does not give them to us primordially in a predicative fashion. Whence do they arise, then? How are they offered to us in the total unities of value-objects on top, as it were, of mere nature-things? The first question will be treated here only allusively, whereas the second will occupy us in the following sections.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>28</sup>In Dreyfus’ relevant references to the issue, the vagueness of this point cannot escape our attention (see, e.g., 1991, 46–7). Cf. also Overgaard’s unreserved acceptance of Heidegger’s criticism of Husserl’s account of equipmental objects, which is reported to have already been launched in Heidegger’s *OHF* (GA 63, 68ff). Husserl is there read along the lines presented here, i.e., as maintaining the view that equipment is predicatively constituted upon the substrate of a naturally scientifically constituted nature-thing (2003, 161).

<sup>29</sup>Whatever we say with regard to value-constitution and value-thing givenness in connection with their intentional founding upon mere nature-thingness applies equally well to equipment and its dependence upon nature-things. In a sense, I am here trying to elucidate the ontological meaning of the Husserlian conception of ‘investment’ of nature-things with values (an idea not foreign to the neo-Kantian camp). Heidegger explicitly expresses his complaints with regard to the notion of ‘value’ and ‘value-investment,’ and strongly denies engaging in such an approach (see *BT*, 96–7/68, 132/99). This rejection, though, unavoidably leads to a severe aporia with regard to the origin of the *vorhanden* discovered after the famous ‘broken hammer effect’ (see §6.7 below). For my part, I hope to show the fertility of an analysis in such terms (in terms of values) here, and to bring to light a mode of foundedness other than those usually mentioned in this connection. This is, of course, only a first step toward a normalized-phenomenological account of the constitution of value-beings. See also Theodorou 2012a, 2014b.

## 6.6 Husserl's Actual View Regarding Our Experience of Cultural Beings

It may sound strange to many, but Heidegger was certainly not the first in Phenomenology to have claimed—supposedly against Husserl—that nature-things or perceptual things (in any sense of the term examined in Chaps. 4 and 5) are not what we are primordially presented with in the course of our straightforward everyday life.<sup>30</sup> In his *Formalism in Ethics* (1913), we read Scheler maintaining the following.

Goods are not somehow founded upon the [natural] things [*sind nich etwa fundiert auf die Dinge*], in the sense that, if something is to be able to be a good, it has first to be a [natural] thing. Rather, the good exhibits [*stellt . . . dar*] a “thing-like” [“dinghafte”] unity of value-qualities or value-affairs, which is founded upon a determinate ground-value [*Grundwert*]. [Thus, t]he [latter] *thinglikeness* is present [*gegenwärtig*] in the good; not, though, “the” [natural] thing. (*FE* 20/43; tr. mod.)<sup>31</sup>

Thus, there are two known sources that promote—supposedly against Husserl—the primacy or primordially of the cultural or value beings and the derivativeness or foundedness of the perceptually appearing nature-things. Do they do justice of the latter's actual view on these matters? Yes or no? In what sense?

From this point onwards, our talk about perception and perceptual things in Husserl will follow the sense of these terms established in the foregoing chapters of the present book. Given this, we can now see what Husserl really thinks with regard to what is given to us in straightforward, everyday experience, and in what sense. I think that there is enough evidence in Husserl's writings to show that he didn't in any way believe that in this case we experience mere, nude perceptual things, and that tool-giveness comes only in a subsequent, secondary constitution and giveness. This evidence can be found prior to the time when Husserl could somehow have been influenced by Heidegger's or Scheler's thoughts via discussions, or through reading their works and criticisms (i.e., between 1913 and 1929). More specifically, I think it is clear that for Husserl, in a concrete straightforward everyday experience, we are first of all directly related with nothing else but *cultural* entities.

<sup>30</sup>On his thesis, see, e.g., *BT*, 56ff/60ff, 67/71, 91f/98f.

<sup>31</sup>Also, “[t]he *value-nuance* [*Wertnuance*] of an object (whether the latter be remembered, anticipated, represented, or perceived) [ . . . ] [is] the *most primal* factor [*das Primärste*] that [ . . . ] [comes] upon us from it, and it is as if the value of the whole [*des Ganzen*], of which this object is a member or part, constitutes a ‘medium,’ as it were, in which, for the first time, the object fully develops its imagerial content [*Bildinhalt*] or its (conceptual) meaning. Its value precedes it [*schreitet ihm voran*]; it is the first ‘messenger’ of its particular nature.” (*FE* 18/40–1; tr. mod.). See also *ibid.*, 19/42, 157/159. Of course, Scheler talks about things of value, i.e., of goods, whereas, at least in 1927, Heidegger has abandoned any talk about values as relevant to the ontologically important constitution of beings like the primordially given equipment (instruments, tools, etc.). A first account regarding Heidegger's reasons for this can be found in Theodorou 2014a.



In Husserl's unpublished *Ideas II* (1912), a work that Heidegger also studied (1925) before completing his *Being and Time* (1927), we find an astoundingly clear statement.

In ordinary life [*gewöhnlichen Leben*], we have nothing whatever to do with nature-objects [*Naturobjekten*]. What we [straightforwardly] take as things are pictures, statues, gardens, houses, tables, clothes, tools [*Werkzeuge*], etc. These are all *value-objects* of various kinds, *use-objects*, *practical objects*. They are not objects which can be found [in mere sensory-experience or even as—theoretically thematized] in natural science. (*Ideas II*, 29/27; emphases added)

This statement alone may not be decisive in resolving the matter of whether by “nature-objects” Husserl meant either whatever natural science treats as its proper object, or, alternatively, what is first given in simple sensory perception and founds natural-scientific objects.<sup>32</sup> It unambiguously suffices, though, to decide the matter of whether Husserl thought that in ordinary everyday life it is nature-things that are directly and solely given to us or not. Thus, to put it in a traditional way (and with some degree of terminological reservation), Husserl is clear that in the *ordo cognoscendi* it is indubitable that we primordially confront and experience cultural things, not simple perceptual nature-things.

Nevertheless, these value- or use-objects, etc., are not given in a simple way without any internal stratification structure. Culturality does not float freely in the air, as it were; it does not stand alone, but is possible only as founded upon something else.

[In straightforward pre-thematic everyday life] there constantly appear to us, prior to all thinking [scientific or even pre-scientific], spatio-temporal objectivities in immediate ‘intuitability’ *charged* [*behaftet*]<sup>33</sup> with certain characters of value and practice. (*ibid.*, 27/25; emphases added)

That is, the cultural beings that directly or immediately appear in our straightforward everyday experience are unities comprised of an underlying pre-theoretical and pre-cultural spatio-temporal soil that bears, as it were, the corresponding value-characters upon itself. This soil is, of course, the simply perceptually experienced nature-thing. It is the most primordially available intentional being; it is the being that is given before any other possible intentional meaning-layer, and is the being that can only make possible the givenness of any other intentional objectivity as founded upon it. We can then say that in the *ordo essendi*—or rather, here, *ordo fundamenti*—what is primordially given is the simply perceptual nature-thing, as the founding soil for the constitution of the cultural noematic layer and the givenness of the overall cultural being.

<sup>32</sup>In Chap. 5, it was shown that there is a non-scientifically-laden meaning of the expression ‘nature-thing’ in *Ideas II*, and that the latter basically signifies a simply sensorially perceived thing.

<sup>33</sup>It is of course this particular term, “charged” or “invested” (*behaftet sein*, *wertbehaftet*, etc.) that so bothers and irritates Heidegger in the relevant passages of his *BT*, with regard to the question of a phenomenologically adequate way of analysing the constitution of equipment (see §§14–15).



We find similar statements scattered throughout different places in that work, but also in many of Husserl's other writings. Thus, in *Ideas II* Part III, we read that humans, qua full-fledged spiritual beings, do not experience mere nature, a horizon of mere nature-things. Especially in humans, the phenomenological standpoint that has this level of intentional life under its "magnifying glass" (ibid., 192/182) is the "personalistic attitude."

[This is] the attitude we are always in when we live with one another, talk to one another [...] or are related to one another in love and aversion, in disposition and action [*Tat*], [...] when we consider the things surrounding us precisely as our surroundings [*Umgebung*] and not as 'objective'<sup>34</sup> nature. (Ibid., 192/183)

What we are conscious of, while intentionally living on that level of consciousness, is a

surrounding world [*Umwelt*] comprised not of mere [nature]-things but of *use-objects* (clothes, utensils, guns, tools), *works of art* [...] [but also of other persons qua] *members of communities*, members of personal unities of higher order [...] [which] have their moral and juridical regulations, their modes of functioning in collaboration with other communities [...] their regulated changes and their own way of developing or maintaining themselves invariant over time. (Ibid., 191/182; emphases added)

The person "evaluates [*wertet*] the thing, apprehends it *as* beautiful or useful, *as* a garment or *as* a drinking cup, etc." (ibid., 193/184; emphases added—see also §50 of that work). Of course, as we saw just above, all value-strata presuppose, in the order of founding, the ground of what Husserl rather loosely calls "nature-thingness."

It is interesting, though, that Husserl's crucial idea under discussion is also to be found in the *Ideas I*, a published and known work. However, the reading of that text under the spell of the inertial 'standard' (or at least 'common') Heideggerian criticism continues to conceal its meaning. For instance, this reading seems to have determined even Kersten's translation of *Ideas I* (at least of the particular passage cited just below). The two seemingly innocent words "only" and "also" that he adds to the English translation disorientate the reader, and weaken the general consciousness with regard to Husserl's real views. (The first inserted word is explicitly marked by the translator's square brackets—here by indirect quotation, acutangular brackets—and the second is followed by my comment "sic!".) According to Kersten's translation, Husserl writes the following.

[I]n the natural attitude we confront, [...] as members of the natural world, not <only> mere things of nature [*Natursachen*] [you may read also: nature-things (*Naturdinge*)] but also [sic!] values and practical objects of every sort: streets with street lights, dwellings, furniture, works of art, books, tools, and so forth. (*Ideas I*, 78/77)<sup>35</sup>

<sup>34</sup>On the problematic use also of this term in *Ideas II* and the possibility of a serious misinterpretation of the identity and the content of the naturalistic attitude and its correlative region, inanimate nature, see Chap. 5.

<sup>35</sup>Føllesdal (1998) adopts and cites Kersten's translation with no further remarks. This testifies, once again, to a problematic grasp on his part of Husserl's views regarding the issue of the relative

Husserl does *not* in fact write “only” and “also.” Thus, the original text, exactly like its parallel in *Ideas II* (quoted above), clearly states that in straightforward everyday life we do not come across mere scientifically thematized or even simply perceptually constituted nature-things, but that we directly and already come across cultural things and equipment. Moreover, the context makes it clear that by “*Natursachen*,” Husserl does not intend to refer to things in nature in the sense of the usual lifeworldly recognized and praxio-existentially significant beings, e.g., a stone on the river-bank, a high mountain, a blossoming apple tree, a buzzing bee, or a cow grazing on the field. Rather, he intends to refer, at bottom, to things as they are constituted at the threshold level of simple sensory perception, or of simple experience that presents us with beings as *res extensa* and *res materialis* (in the sense of these terms given in Chap. 5; see also §6.7 below). We have natural beings in this sense, i.e., as lifeworldly and praxio-existentially significant beings (the tree, the bee, the stone, etc., ‘we all know’), only when their simply perceptual layer is suitably apprehended by hermeneutically constitutive intentionalities that are different or higher than the simply sensory perceptual ones. It is the latter that turn merely perceptual nature-things to the things of value that we confront in the concrete lifeworld.<sup>36</sup>

Thus, what we have seen Husserl saying *already*, during the years 1912–1913, is that in our straightforward everyday life, πρότερα πρὸς ἡμᾶς (prōtera prōs hēmas) are the cultural beings or equipment, etc. That is, in this kind of intentional life, we *directly* experience cultural beings, tools, etc. The latter are experientially more primordial. Πρότερα τῆ φύσει (prōtera tē phusei), we may carefully and *mutatis mutandis* say, are nature-things, which found the former. That is, nature-things are ontologically or constitutively more primordial.<sup>37</sup> In the next section, I will try to examine the meager textual evidence we have from Husserl on the precise inner connection between nature-thingness and spirituality or culturality. In other words, I will try to clarify the kind of foundedness of cultural beings or of equipment in particular upon nature-thingness, and the corresponding character of the givenness of the overall intentional correlate.

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priority of the cultural and the natural (especially in the latter’s pre-1917 thought). Another point must also be noted here. In this cited passage, Husserl describes what appears to us in the natural attitude, i.e., before our phenomenological reductions. What we saw in Chaps. 2 and 3, however, should make us realize that the phenomenological content of what is described will not change under the reductions (psychological or transcendental).

<sup>36</sup>See also §6.9.4 below. Nevertheless, in this book we will not say anything with regard to the actual identity of these value-constituting intentional acts. On this latter, though, see Theodorou 2014a, b.

<sup>37</sup>For the thesis developed here, see also *Experience and Judgment*, §§12, 65. With this realization, a new reading of Husserl’s views regarding primordially and foundedness becomes possible; a reading completely different from those referred to in notes 5 and 22 above. Especially with reference to Husserl’s general position regarding the praxial nature of intentional constitution, see Chap. 4.

## 6.7 Husserl's View on Passive Genetic Foundedness and Equipmentality

It seems that any approach to the foundedness of thematizing correlations modeled after Husserl's analysis of predication will eventually come across this question (§6.5): how can I direct an activity toward something, an intense investigation, a thematizing-theoretic intentionality with specific questions about it, if I do not *already* have this something in an experience, i.e., as somehow intuitively appearing? As we will see, moreover, this question applies equally well to Heidegger's analysis of the transition from equipmentality to the—according to him—theoretical givenness of perceptual things by the mediation of what we already called “broken-hammer effect” (§6.10). We must, then, ask whether the basic mechanism that leads from the originally passively constituted and appearing perceptual fundament to the spiritual or cultural layers or noema in sum can be accounted for in terms of what Husserl called “passive genesis.”

### 6.7.1 The Case of Passive Genesis

It is indeed the case that equipmentality cannot be the result of a predicative constitution based exclusively on perceptual givenness (of whatever sort). It may be, however, the result of a predicative constitution based on *another* kind of consciousness, one which can offer ‘equipmental’ properties within the internal horizon of a corresponding total objectivity given to that consciousness. If this thought has any relation to our present problem, the following should be immediately clear: if, for Husserl, there is a consciousness founded (somehow) upon perceptual nature-thingness that moreover in some way ‘encapsulates’ equipmental ‘properties’ within the internal horizon of *its* correlative intentional objectivity (noema), then we would *not* need to consider the possibility of a predicative constitution of equipmentality at all.<sup>38</sup> If there is such a consciousness, then this should be exactly the one that we must first turn upon (and not its predicative thematization). Thankfully, Husserl does indeed offer us evidence for this.

Being turned valuingly to a thing [...] the *value*-thing or the value is the *full intentional correlate of the valuing act*. [...] Accordingly, “being turned valuingly to a thing” does not signify already “having the value as object” in the particular sense of the seized-upon [*erfaßten*] object, such as we must have it in order for it to be the object of predication. (*Ideas I*, 76–7/76; trns. sl. md.)

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<sup>38</sup>With this, we touch upon the issue of whether all values are pre-linguistically (pre-predicatively) or linguistically constituted (via predicative thematization). I take it that a Husserlian analysis should claim that values have, *originally*, a pre-linguistic source of constitution. Moreover, some of these first apply to pre-linguistic correlates, whereas others may come only after the establishment of a linguistically constituted lifeworld-layer. *Primordial* tool- or equipment-consciousness must depend on pre-linguistic correlates, i.e., on mere nature-things as constituted in perception (Chaps. 4, 5, 7).

What Husserl says here is that if we are to isolate the value as a property and predicate it of this—subjectivated—value-object, we need to have an already constituted value object (given as such in the appropriate intentional correlation), which is not itself already a thematic-predicative object. What, nevertheless, might this sought-for intentional correlation (consciousness) be, that offers us such a pre-predicative value-thing as founded upon the simple perceptually given nature-thing? In order to pursue this possibility further, and in the spirit of the present intermediate considerations, we need to know what *other* alternative mechanisms Husserl offers for genetic implication. He offers the possibility of a *passive genetic implication*.

First of all, passive genesis appears to be a notion for which Husserl did not himself provide a satisfactorily elucidation. It is standardly intermingled with passive, i.e., non-active, synthesis, but it is also described as connected with instances or moments of active constitution, which have meanwhile been sedimented.

[T]he meditating ego can penetrate into the intentional constituents of experiential phenomena themselves, thing-experiencing phenomena and all others and thus find intentional references leading back to a *history* and accordingly making these phenomena knowable as formations *subsequent* [*Nachgestalten*] to other, essentially *antecedent* formations (even if the latter cannot be related to precisely the same constituted object). There, however, we soon encounter eidetic laws governing a *passive forming of perpetually new syntheses* (a forming that, in part, [a] lies *prior to all activity* and, in part, [b] *takes in all activity* itself); we encounter a *passive genesis* of the manifold apperceptions, as products that persist in a *habituality* [*Habitualität*] relating specifically to them. (*CM*, 79/113; first emphasis in the original)

In Husserl's 'official' exposition of the notion under discussion, passive genesis is a matter of habitual intentional acquisitions, and comprises both passive syntheses, which supply the unexplicated-unthematized holistic noematic correlates with their necessary fundament, and active syntheses, which supply upper thematic-judgmental layers. This treatment produces confusion. We can detect this confusion when, having written above that "we encounter a passive *genesis*," in the very next sentence (of the original) Husserl continues by saying that "Thanks to the *aforsaid* passive *synthesis* [*dieser* passiven *Synthesis*] (into which the performances of active synthesis also enter), the Ego always has an environment of 'objects.'" (*CM*, 79/113; emphases added). The explication placed within parentheses makes the confusion even greater, for a few lines earlier, the same description was used to determine passive "genesis."

What is crucial in Husserl's analysis is the following. Original passive synthesis constitutes in a time that has become *historicized*. Active synthesis, on the contrary, constitutes in a time signaling succession in *history*. That is, active genesis is presented as starting *after* a presupposed event is unfolded (during an interval in the lived-through and not necessarily abstract-scientific objective time), integrated, and marked as having passed. In active genesis, the new spiritual or cultural apperception, e.g., a linguistic thematization or an instituted view or use of something, is activated only after this something (in the simplest case: a perceptual thing) has first been integrated and slipped into 'objective' memory (not in mere retention). Passive genesis, for its part, is presented as the habitually established passive reception and having of (i) possible originally, passively constituted correlates (as in the case

of perceptual passive synthesis) or layers of such correlates, or (ii) temporally anterior active constitutions, accomplished as founded upon correlates that have been originally constituted either passively or actively.<sup>39</sup>

### 6.7.2 *Passive Genesis and Habitual Sedimentation*

What exactly does Husserl think with regard to the alleged “passive genesis” of spiritual or cultural noematic correlates? Here is the concluding part of the story.

[A]ny building of *activity* necessarily presupposes, as the lowest level, a passivity that gives something beforehand; and following this building *we run into constitution by passive genesis* [*Genesis*]. The “ready-made” object that confronts us [*Was < . . . > fertig entgegentritt*] in life as an existent, mere [nature]-thing [*als daseiendes bloßes Ding*] (when we disregard all the “spiritual” or “cultural” characteristics that make it knowable as, for example, a hammer, a table, an aesthetic creation) is given, with the originality of the “it itself,” in the synthesis of a *passive* experience. As such a thing, it is given beforehand to “spiritual” *activities*, which begin with active grasping [and proceed with passive genesis]. (*CM*, 78/112; transl. sl. md.; emphases added)

In the same section of the *CM*, Husserl becomes even more explicit with regard to the process of this building, to the character of its achievements, and to the manner of our experiential access to what has been thusly constituted.

The nature-thing [*Ding*] given beforehand in passive intuition continues to appear in a unitary intuition [ . . . ] it continues to be given beforehand during and in this activity. [ . . . ]

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<sup>39</sup>Understandably, this uncertainty is reproduced in the secondary literature. Moran, for instance, in his efforts to elucidate this issue, writes the following (all the emphases are mine). First of all, “[p]assive genesis must be distinguished from another Husserlian concept, passive synthesis. Passive synthesis refers to the manner in which we experience sense-contents already structured and laid out before us. Thus we encounter formed objects against a horizon of intentions which are already there for us. Our experience is passive and yet it is structured.” (Moran 2000b, 167). This is correct. Moreover, “*genetic* constitution [in general] examines the structuring in a *temporal* manner. Genetic constitution may be active as in practical reasoning where new objects are [actively] constituted by the ego (just as new collectivities are generated in the act of counting.” (ibid.). This is correct too. Now, “Passive genesis [ . . . ] refers to the structuring of objects in *layers sedimented* upon one another. [ . . . ] [In contraposition to the latter actively genetically constituted objects] objects are also [sic] encountered as *already made up*—as cultural objects, for example hammers, tables, works of art, and so on. How is it that we experience [such] things as objects *immediately* and in a *single* grasp?” (ibid.). Moran explains this in the following way. “The passive reception of these objects has its own constitutional *history*, and this is what is covered by the term ‘passive genesis.’” (ibid.). Judging from his latter examples, especially the tables and the works of art, what he means is simply that these are constituted in passive genesis in the sense that they were once actively genetically constituted and are now ‘taken for granted,’ so to speak; they are experienced through habitual sedimentation. Moran goes even further. “Husserl believes that the basis of our experience of objects in *perception* is a process he calls ‘*passive genesis*.’ (ibid.). If this is not mere mistyping (instead of “passive synthesis”), it is simply not correct. Our additional issue here, though, is whether or not cultural things are indeed constituted for the first time in active genesis.

There [...] we soon encounter [...] a passive forming of perpetually new syntheses (a forming that, in part, lies prior to all activity and, in part, takes in all activity itself); we encounter a *passive genesis* of the manifold apperceptions, as products that persist in a *habituality* relating specifically to them. (Ibid., 79–80/112–3)

Husserl maintains that the cultural noemata available via passive genesis are basically cultural objectivities that have been constituted in *active* conscious possibilities. They are built upon perceptual fundaments (that have been originally passively constituted), and through their active constitution they are being constantly transformed into habitual acquisitions. That is, the possibility (i) suggested at the close of the previous section is here silently excluded. The constitution of hammers and of all the cultural beings (cultural noematic layers) appears to be the result of *active* consciousness, founded upon original, passive, perceptual strata, and made available in a passive genesis. According to Husserl, then, it is only on this basis that we, in our straightforward everyday life, directly and at once grasp or experience hammers, equipment, etc.

Here is another rare passage in which Husserl engages in distinctions and references that belong to the strict horizon of our current problems. It comes from his course known as *Natur und Geist* (SS 1919), and it repeats the same story. The founding perceptual thing is presented as already passively given as a self-standing being, whereas the founded spiritual layer is attached to it only later as an accomplishment of active consciousness, which has become a habitual acquisition. The additional clue here is the emphasis on the anterior self-standing, independent givenness of the perceptual fundament.

What we call “mere reality,” “mere nature-object” [*Naturobjekt*] is something *concrete and complete, something self-standing* [*ein Konkretes, ein vollkommen Selbstständiges, etwas*], which even when it [already] bears [—founded upon it—spiritual or cultural] meaning-predicates [*Bedeutungsprädikate*], it can be [or exist] as a concrete, self-standing object even without them. We, then, recognize this: it is very well [or certainly] capable of being (re)presented [*sehr wohl vorstellbar ist*]; that it is a thing, even when it is not provided with [spiritual or cultural] meaning-predicates originating from an *actively accomplishing* subjectivity [*auch ohne daß es je von aktiv leistender Subjektivität mit Bedeutungsprädikaten versehen worden war*]. We also recognize that when an object already bears [spiritual or cultural] meaning-predicates, it might be experienced by some other subject, which does not know a thing about these predicates, as a *concrete and complete* object. Whoever, unlike the anthropologist, does not understand the stone arrowhead as arrowhead sees of course a *concrete* thing, the *mere nature-object, the stone*. (Hua XXXII, 127; transl. mine, emphases added)<sup>40</sup>

Husserl, then, appears to have maintained the following: we originally live in the passively constituting perception pure and simple. We might live in this consciousness for quite a long time and then, for some reason or even merely

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<sup>40</sup>I thank Fotini Vassiliou for bringing this passage to my attention. The reader may notice that this passage from Husserl’s *Natur und Geist* in fact connects the reading of nature-thing offered in Chap. 5 with the reading of primordially in Husserl developed in the present chapter. On Husserl’s view, that spiritual and cultural reality results from active conscious accomplishments which become habitualized as passive acquisitions; see also *Crisis*, 26/23–24; *APS*, 268–9.

accidentally, some motive leads us to a different kind of consciousness, active this time. This new kind of consciousness, which almost immediately acquires the character of passive genesis, offers us beings qua equipment and other cultural beings. And, in case this somehow collapses, e.g., in cross-cultural experience shifts, we are transposed back to the merely perceptual experience until we become accustomed in the experiences of the other culture, etc. Thus, according to Husserl, in straightforward everyday conditions we happen to directly and immediately encounter cultural beings, things of value or goods in general. But this is simply the result of felicitous historical accidents motivating active constitutions that turn into passive geneses and endow us with the sedimented cultural wealth. The higher level sediment may of course collapse; then, we are left once again with the experience of the simply perceptually appearing thing, which had, all the time, been working as the fundament for the possibility and actuality of the cultural noemata.

### 6.7.3 *Passive Genesis and Association*

For the moment, we can set aside the portended difficulties related to the time chasm between the founding and the founded in the constitution of the spiritual and cultural. There still remain, however, the difficulties related to the mode and the quality of the consciousness that is responsible for the constitution of the latter. Passive genesis in the sense examined in the previous subsection does not, however, solve the problem, since it presupposes an active synthesis. And since Husserl does not appear here to have suggested an active synthesis different from that of judgmental thematization, we are driven to a dead-end (§6.5).<sup>41</sup> In this subsection, I will examine whether Husserl has the *additional* apparatus needed to make his account of passive genesis work.

Remaining within Husserl's presentation of passive genesis developed just above (which basically focuses on the habitual sedimentation of anterior active thematizing constitutions), we soon run up against additional difficulties. Already in his *Analyses Concerning Active and Passive Syntheses* (ca. 1920), the possibility of passive genesis is enforced with the "law of association" (*APS*, 119, 114ff) or, more broadly, with "apperception, motivation, affection and association, kinaisthesis" (translator's introduction to *APS*, xxxi). In all their relevant appearances, these apperceptions, motivations, associations, etc., concern in the end nothing more than the constituting functions applied basically upon sensory contents contributing to the formation of the perceptual thing. The same applies to Husserl's extended analyses of the idea of passive genesis at other points in his *Cartesian Meditations* (§38 and especially §39). "For example," Husserl notes, intentional-phenomenological association is found to rule the "sensuous configuration in coexistence and in succession" (*CM*, 80/114).

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<sup>41</sup>Curiously enough, in the *CM*, Husserl talks about active syntheses having in mind "activity of explication, of grasping parts and features" (*CM*, 78). See also the next note.

This, however, creates a serious problem. Affection, apperception, motivation, and association can work in passive perceptual constitution and in fixing connections of available contents and meaning layers. It is controversial, though, whether and in what way this may work in a 'passive genesis' that, according to Husserl, is expected to bring about the experience of hitherto unavailable spiritual or cultural noematic layers. In any case, this associatively backed passive synthesis cannot do anything more than merely regulating the habitual sedimentation of anterior active syntheses (§6.7.2). It seems to me that we do not yet have a phenomenology of the way in which cultural noematic objectivity is constituted via apperceptions, associations, etc., that somehow originate or spring forth from the already constituted and appearing, passively constituted sensory perceptual thing. In fact, this is an impossible task. There may be mechanisms of association working in the *background* of the constitution of equipmentality or of other cultural 'characters.' If this is so, however, the perceptual, passively constituted thing, or even some specific gestalt characters of it, must 'matter' in a new, *non-sensory* constitutive 'milieu' of motivations. It must acquire an *additional* and *different* significance.<sup>42</sup> This is necessary if the perceptual thing or some of its parts or characters are to be apperceived or interpreted as something having this or that (non-sensory) *value* 'character,' e.g., agreeableness, suitability, usefulness, etc. What interests us here is exactly this *new* intentional milieu within which only the perceptual or some of its parts may be found to 'matter' in a way that lets it appear as possible for this or that value 'quality' to be 'invested' on its top. The sensory constitutive nexus of motivations, i.e., the associative nexus within which perceptual truth or perceptual appearance is the intentional telos, is not the proper 'milieu' for the associative interconnections that have the constitution of value-like correlates as their intentional-constitutive telos. And if association is found to play an essential role even in the static constitution or passive syntheses, then to say that it is also the principle of passive genesis does not by itself in any way suffice to clear the ground. Moreover, if association interferes only in the fixation of the aforementioned new significances upon the already available nature-things, what we would really need is an elucidation of the intentional life that was precisely responsible for the constitution of these significances in the first place. In the next section, we will elaborate on this remark.

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<sup>42</sup>Here, we must also refer to Husserl's earlier attempts to show that values, and thus goods, are intentional correlates constituted in emotive acts that must somehow be discovered as being intentional. This specific approach to the problem will not be treated here in detail, however, for at least two reasons. Firstly, it lies outside Husserl's view examined here that spirituality and culturality is the result of associative passive genesis upon active thematizing constitution. Secondly, this approach is itself fraught with difficulties that lead to another Husserlian dead-end. It was, after all, this impasse that prevented the later Husserl from considering emotive constitution of values and goods as a real alternative to the active thematizing constitution examined here. For his failure to develop this view in a consistent, successful way and for the possibility of an alternative fruitful continuation of this phenomenological view, see Theodorou 2012a, 2014a, and b. In what follows, we will refer only allusively (and only to the degree that is necessary) to the emotive constitution of the value layers of goods in general.



## 6.8 Passive Genesis and Foundedness Relation Proper to the Constitution of the Spiritual/Cultural

The rare explicit references that Husserl himself made to the matter under discussion (see the citations in §6.7, especially these from *CM*, 78 and *Hua* XXXII, 127) suggest that we can have a fully autonomous givenness of something like the mere nature-thing (qua simply sensory perceptual thing), upon which some spirituality gets actively constituted *only subsequently*. It may also be the case that in unsuccessful or collapsing attempts at cross-cultural experiences of already established cultural beings, we are presented with this self-standing and enduring appearance of the simply perceptual nature-thing.

Nevertheless, from the basic point of view of Husserl's Phenomenology, and following the indications offered in *Ideas* I, *Ideas* II, and *EJ*, we must suggest another way of putting the matter. Ultimately, nature-things have the status of the *Sehending*, *Tastending*, etc., but as *unexplicated totalities* of such intentional (not *reell*) dimensions. In Husserl's Phenomenology, an "unexplicated" (*unexpliziert*) totality is a unitarily appearing whole, e.g., this perceptual object, that has not yet been internally 'partialized' due to interest-guided attention that has isolated particular contents within this whole.<sup>43</sup> For the first time this appears as an undetermined determinability (*unbestimmte Bestimmbarkeit*), a pre-thematic X in its un-uncovered horizons.<sup>44</sup>

On the basis of several act-possibilities of our embodied Being and of our sensory abilities, our intentional life synthesizes its hyletic data in a way that leaves us with the experience of transcendently appearing perceptual objectivities. These are surely constituted in a synchronic *multidimensional* fashion. Here, *dimensions* of the overall perceptual thing are constituted on the basis of our embodied synthesizing possibilities, and the relevant hyletic data corresponding to the senses: the thing of vision, the thing of touch, the thing of taste, etc. All these thing-*dimensions* converge or, rather, they get superposed, thus making up the unitary-and-identical<sup>45</sup> internal horizon of the perceptually appearing nature-thing as a whole. However, this "phantom" or "schematic" thing, as Husserl also calls it, is not yet the *full* simply perceptual- or nature-thing. In order to arrive at that, further dimensions are needed. These come from the activation of other intentional possibilities toward the things given, in the sense discussed thus far. The dimensions of *materiality* and *temporality* are constituted, in their turn, in our dynamic interactions with the things and in the perceptually accessed interactions among them.

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<sup>43</sup>We must remember that perception, for Husserl, does not mean consciousness of a thematized being; nor does it necessarily mean consciousness of an un-thematized being as simply grasped or *seized-upon* (*erfaßt*) and *isolated* in front of its perceptual outer-horizonal background. This is made explicit, even though not as clearly or in as detailed manner as it should be, e.g., in *Ideas* I and in *CM* (e.g., *Hua* III.1, 96, and §§35, 37; *Hua* I, 75). See also below in the present section.

<sup>44</sup>For this expression, see *Hua* IX, 598 note for p. 257.21.

<sup>45</sup>For this, see *Ideas* I, 88/85.

To our general value-constitutive analyses, we can now add the following. Values are ‘added’<sup>46</sup> as new, *non-sensory* noematic layers to the already sense-experientially constituted and appearing multi-dimensional nature-things. The intentional possibilities of correlation that are responsible for the constitution of these layers have nothing to do with the theoretical observation, examination and predication exercised upon the available content of the nature-thing. Values are ‘added’ to the (pre-theoretically and even pre-thematically and pre-predicatively) perceptually given thing in everyday life by means of intentional possibilities different than those of sensory and sensory-motor ones, but also by means of possibilities *presupposing* the latter. They are established in intentional correlations that are possible due to the fact that we are *not* just a harmonious functional set of sensory organs with the immediate or mediate ability to move that our limbs afford us. We are also beings that have instincts and instinctual responses and feelings about what affects us; we find ourselves in emotive stances, set tasks in our lives, strive after goals, succeed or fail, etc.

In the end, beings available in our everyday lifeworld are complex wholes ‘composed’ of dimensions superposed into the form of objects and historically sedimented layers<sup>47</sup> that are intentionally constituted by us, qua beings with senses and grasping limbs belonging to a body, with the ability for variously motivated motion, instincts, emotions, empathy, and ‘interests’ in the broadest possible sense. The higher-level layers, however, corresponding to our specifically human way of intentionally experiencing, always depend on noematic layers and dimensions that seem to be the correlational achievements of lower-level—not always strictly human—intentional possibilities.

A hammer is nothing pure and simple. There are no beings that are purely and simply *equipmentally* hammers. The same holds with, e.g., paintings, books, etc. For instance, there is no such thing as a *solely artistic* painting, i.e., a being whose concrete constitution is exhaustible in what is given purely in an elevated aesthetic experience. The being-hammer or being-painting in these examples is something founded on their being already sensorially appearing (at a lower layer of their constitution). It is only because these beings are at bottom always already nature-

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<sup>46</sup>For Heidegger’s strong opposition to the idea of an ‘addition’ of a value upon a seized-upon thing, which supposedly concerns Husserl too (e.g., *BT*, 96–7/68, 111–2/80–1, 131–3/98–100), see notes 29, 33 above.

<sup>47</sup>For example, in a multi-dimensional analysis, we may have perceptual nature-thing, e.g., ‘hammers,’ (homonymous with the hammers as actual lifeworldly tools) as visual phantoms, tactile phantoms, as pre-scientifically material things, etc. But in a multi-level analysis, we may have hammers as ‘toys,’ hammers as tools, hammers as broken tools (though not necessarily all at once), as objects of everyday predicative descriptions, hammers as objects of physical-predicate descriptions, hammers as objects of chemistry, hammers as objects of the technology of materials, hammers as specific cultural objects, hammers as commodity, hammers as pop art objects, hammers as themes of criminology, etc. Now all of these, in their open-ended series, continually and holistically constitute what a hammer *genetically* is, as an identical open total horizon (with some of its internal elements accentuated each time).

things (sensorially-intentionally constituted beings) that they can be given, on a different intentional-experiential level, as hammers or paintings. On this general and in-principle position, we can side with Husserl.

[W]ith the new [aiming] noetic moments *new noematic moments* also make their appearance in the correlates. [...] [T]here are [...] novel “*apprehensions*,” and a new sense becomes constituted which is *founded on*, while at the same time embracing, *the noesis underlying it*. The new sense brings in a totally *new dimension* [*Dimension*] [sic!] *of sense*; with it no new determining parts of mere [nature-]“things” are constituted [on the noematic side], but instead *values of things*, value-qualities, or concrete objects with values [*Werte der Sachen, Wertheiten, bzw. konkrete Wertobjektitäten*]: beauty and ugliness, goodness and badness, the use-object, the art work, the machine, the book, the action, the deed, and so forth. (*Ideas I*, 277/267)

Being turned valuingly to a thing involves, to be sure, a seizing-upon [*Erfassung*] the [mere nature-] thing; however, not the *mere* [*bloße*] [nature-]thing, but rather the *value*-thing or the value is the *full intentional correlate of the valuing act*. (*Ideas I*, 76–7/76; transl. sl. md.)

Husserl here describes the composite intentional correlation by which we come to have consciousness of value-objects or of cultural objects in the broad sense. The description, however, concerns these objects only once they are *already established*. Given that we have set aside questions concerning the specific intentional acts that constitute the value layer, the concern that still remains is the following: What is the general way in which this establishment takes place? In what way is the nature-thing presupposed for the possibility of the value layer?

The latter citation says that the possibility of experiencing a value-thing (“being turned valuingly to it”) depends on a seizing of its underlying nature-thing as object. In the same context, Husserl remarks that the common usage of the term “object” automatically considers it as something to which we direct our attention (*Auf-etwas-achten*), our noticing (*bemerken*), our heeding (*beachten*), as something seized upon or grasped (*erfaßt*). To be conscious of an intentional object, however, he continues, and to have it as grasped, etc., is *not* the same thing. For example, with regard to mere things (*Dinge*), and to all objectities that can be presented simply (*schlicht vorstellbaren*), to have them as seized-upon or grasped means to be *actively* intentionally conscious of them, i.e., to be intentionally turned upon them in a (simply) isolating fashion. It is only this active intentional consciousness that entertains them exactly as *grasped* in the proper sense; only this intentional modification has them as “objects” in the simplest proper sense of the term. Thus, it is only our active intentional consciousness that really *objectivates* mere nature-things. This simple objectivating grasping holds a mere thing in isolation. What does this mean in terms of our present problem?

Two possibilities exist. The first says that if we are to constitute (and experience) a higher noematic layer upon the threshold intentional objectivity of the simply perceptually appearing nature-thing, we must already have the latter as an available object (in this latter minimal sense). That is, an active simple grasping of it is presupposed, for the constitution, upon it, of tools and other cultural objects. My apprehending this simply perceptual ‘stone’ as a tool for cracking bones presupposes that I have already actively turned to it as object in the horizon of the

perceptual world. The second says something else. This simple grasping penetrates the higher level noematic layers of the value meanings, and reaches the underlying founding threshold (the simply perceptual nature thing) and holds it in pure isolation as such a (minimal) object. This is something different. Only our experiencing (in the strict sense of the term) presupposes the nature-thing as an underpinning factor. Our grasping this factor as object means only that we can trace it but we cannot necessarily also isolate it as a separately self-standing object.

Nevertheless, given our earlier citations (from *Hua* XXXII, 127, and other relevant sources), we can say that what Husserl actually had in mind was a possibility like the first option. What is presupposed for the constitution and experience of the value-thing is a genuinely objectifyingly modified perceptual experience, in which we are presented with sheer *res extensa* and *res materialis* in actual vertical isolation (isolation from the higher noematic value-layers). Is this possible? Is there any phenomenological examination of the matter that would evidentially certify the view that consciousness of equipment is a possibility arising at some particular point in time, via a process that attentively objectivates a perceptual fundament that has supposedly already appeared as existing on its own in objective time? Isn't it true, rather, that some spirituality or some culturality *has always already invested* the givenness of the perceptually given? But what, ultimately, does this mean?

## 6.9 The Meaning of the One-Sided Dependence of the Cultural Layer on the Simply Perceptual

We have discovered that if we are interested in the question regarding the most primordial kind and content of intentional experience, in the sense—we might say—of the *ordo cognoscendi*, then Husserl and Heidegger are in agreement. They disagree, though, if we pose the question in the sense of the *ordo essendi* or, better, *ordo fundamenti*. We shall now examine what kind of theory Husserl was trying to develop in order to make clear the genesis of spirituality and culturality upon merely perceptual nature-thing-givenness. What we have just begun to realize is that Husserl's way of dealing with this issue is highly problematic. In the present section, then, I will try to develop a *minimal* phenomenological account of what it means that in the *ordo cognoscendi*, simple perceptual nature-thingness is primordially given. This account, then, together with the foregoing analyses presented in the chapter, will help us to disclose, in §6.10, the until now unthematized problem in Heidegger's view that equipmentality is (in the terms developed here) primordial not only in the *ordo cognoscendi* but also in the *ordo essendi* or *ordo fundamenti*.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>48</sup>It is interesting that Scheler, who explicitly also claims in 1913 that in our everyday straightforward life we do not come across objects but across value-beings or goods of various sorts, does not offer a fully satisfactory analysis of the constitution of goods (*FE*, 21–2). More specifically, he remains attached to Husserl's quasi-Platonic (anti-transcendental) account of

### 6.9.1 *The Perceptual Thing Is Independent; the Cultural Dependent*

On the basis of the analyses of the third LI (§3 above), we can now say that the spiritual layer is a dependent part of the whole (appearing, concrete) spiritual being. The spiritual “garment,” as Husserl would have put it at the time of the *Crisis*, constitutes only the uppermost or pre-eminent aspect—a semi-transparent mask, if you like—of the whole being that appears ‘in this guise.’ The perceptual thing is still ‘down there’ supporting this possibility, underpinning the givenness of the upper layer. From this point of view, the case appears to some degree similar to that of the relation between the colored patch and the surface of the patch. The latter appears with the color it appears to have, but it is the underlying extension that makes this possible. More accurately, though, we realize that color and extension depend *mutually* on one another. This was the content of the famous essential and a priori synthetic law regarding our experience or knowledge of colors. What free variation (i.e., the method for arriving at such phenomenological laws) teaches us here is that the specifically spiritual/cultural level *one-sidedly* depends on the underlying perceptual stratum. Within the whole cultural being that appears through its pre-eminent spiritual formation (‘mask’), the perceptual thing is in fact an *independent* piece, whereas the specifically spiritual garment is a *dependent* part. And, remembering Husserl’s view, since the specifically spiritual garment of the whole spiritual being is founded upon the underlying perceptual- or nature-thing, it is this *founding relation*—and not some additional ‘glue’—that unites them into the overall spiritual being.

There is still at least one serious problem that we must face here, though. Given the foregoing analyses, a puzzling question must be explicitly stated: we have said both that the founding perceptual thing is independent, and that it in no way ever appears purely as a separately self-standing nature-thing as such. Seen from a different angle, it appears that even though it is as if we had said that nature-thing and spiritual/cultural thing are foundingly *equiprimordial*, no such thesis is admitted here. Is this a mere confusion?

In every case, we have up to this point unquestionably accepted that in the complete spiritual or cultural noema, the simply perceptual thing is *always already mediated* by the givenness of its spiritual or cultural layer. But why do we then characterize *only* the perceptual thing as foundingly or ontologically primordial? Isn’t it that, by definition, such mereologically independent objects can be presented separately, i.e., as self-standing? Wouldn’t have been wiser then to speak of a mutual dependence or mutual foundedness between the perceptual thing and the spiritual or cultural layer? We will see in a while what must be said here.

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intentional constitution as found in the fifth LI (instantiation of an *eidōs* in a corresponding act). An additional propaedeutic analysis of the extremely tricky problem under discussion here is offered in Theodorou 2012a and b.

Before proceeding any further, let me make this remark. We saw Husserl maintaining the view that values are the result of active syntheses that are habitually retained as passively carried acquisitions (§6.7). Contrary to this approach, I argued that a passive genesis *proper* should be considered responsible for (at least) the most basic value layers of the spiritual and cultural objects (§6.8). This is a view that can be accommodated within Husserl's analyses. Thus, it can be maintained that Husserl's real view is that all sensation affects synthesizing intentionality in a way that motivates it to constitute the horizontal wholes of the appearing perceptual things as *also* containing 'values.' In such a case, two comments would be due. On the one hand, even if this were the case, these 'values,' with which original sensation would have been endowed, should remain strictly limited within the horizon of *sensory* values (agreeable, disagreeable, etc.).<sup>49</sup> A value-layer of a radically different kind, that is, would still be in need of further analyses appealing to different kinds of intentional life. It seems to me that this holds also in the simplest case of the constitution of something as elementary as the nutritious being, etc.<sup>50</sup> On the other hand, a reading of Husserl like the one under discussion in this last paragraph would not solve the issue of the relative founding primordially of the sensory over the valuing. It is to this precise problem that we will now turn.

### 6.9.2 *Passive Co-genesis*

If we want to avoid the difficulties we saw in Husserl's approach to the issue of the constitution of spiritual or cultural correlates, we should proceed in an alternative way, and along the following lines. First of all, it is necessary to introduce a slight modification to the notion of passive genesis, so as to refer to the passive constitution of a noematic layer that is *always already passively* co-constituted *together* with the perceptual fundament. This is passively founded upon the perceptual thing, even though not in any way temporally—let alone historically—subsequent to it. We can call this "passive co-genesis." The corresponding phenomenological analysis should speak of the simply perceptual as an intentional or phenomenologically *proper* (i.e., appearing) 'stratum' (objectivity) that cannot be otherwise than *factually* given in this appearance, but only together with (or having 'on top' of it) the various cultural strata. This view leads us to different paths.

The perceptual things are not separable—in terms of givenness—from the spiritual or cultural noematic layer, albeit not because of their essential nature,

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<sup>49</sup>Cf. Mensch 1998, 223. This problem is dealt with in Theodorou 2014b.

<sup>50</sup>Cf. Mensch 1998, 221ff. But let it be said here that when Husserl explicitly tried to *develop* a more systematic phenomenological elucidation of his first guiding insights (see the unfortunate *Hua* XXVIII), he ended up speaking about value-*properties* that are *predicated* upon substrativated and subjectivated perceptual things. That is, he very soon tried to find refuge into a scenario like the one exhibited here: active (judgmental) synthesis of value-predicates habitually sedimented upon perceptual things. On this, see also Theodorou 2012a and b.

but because of our own accidental make-up! That is, the perceptual is not given separately from the cultural, and this is not due to a law of essence regarding the phenomenology of its intentional appearing, but due to the contingency of our actual concrete organismal construction.<sup>51</sup> If we were merely intentional sensory systems endowed with motility and kinestheses, teleologically coordinated only to perceptual evidence or truth and being, then we would, perhaps, have a limit-experience of fully separate (separate from spirituality or culturality) perceptual objects. The nature of intentionality and of its syntheses, as developed in Chaps. 4 and 5, naturally allows for this possibility. However, we do not happen to be constituted exactly in this way. We are the complex living, sentient, and existentiopraxial beings we are. That is, since we are what we are, we cannot be what we are not (and still be what we are). Naturally, this can be considered an “a posteriori necessity” (to use Kripke’s notion). From this point of view, and in the present context, there appears to be only one a priori necessity, which *one-sidedly* suspends the spiritual or cultural upon the perceptual (but not also the other way round).<sup>52</sup>

Superficially, the experiential priority that spirituality, culturality, and equipmentality have over the ontological priority of the simply perceptual nature-things resembles the special case of the *static* priority (§6.3) attributed to an *Abschattung*, which is lived-through prior to the holistically appearing perceptual thing as a whole. There exists, though, a subtle phenomenological difference between this static priority and the experiential priority drafted above. In the first case, the foundational element can never appear at all, it is phenomenologically inert and intentionally null. An *Abschattung* as such can never separately appear as such. The intentionality of a complete perceptual consciousness is necessary for it to appear as part of the perceptual object. The adumbration is *really* given and lived-through in the living present, but, necessarily, it does not yet appear as a self-standing objectivity. Normally, this does not hold in the case that we are interested in at present, for here the foundational element, i.e., the simply perceived thing, is a transcendently interpreted intentional object; it appears, albeit as *always* covered over in *meditative*

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<sup>51</sup>Of course, in Phenomenology’s correlative analyses, Kant’s dictum that the conditions for the experience of objects are also conditions for the possibility of objects in experience holds equally good. This means that after the initial dramatic tone of these remarks, the analyses that follow have this dictum in mind.

<sup>52</sup>Mensch writes that, contrary to what Heidegger attributes to Husserl, “For Husserl, however, values are not something added on to objects, which are first given as mere things. Insofar as their original givenness is correlated to our instinctive striving, value is co-given with their initial presence.” (Mensch 1998, 232 n. 7). But without introducing distinctions like the ones we introduced here, Mensch brings to our attention, in favour of this reading, a citation from Husserl’s manuscripts, where we read: “*Bloße Empfindungsdaten und in höherer Stufe sinnliche Gegenstände, wie Dinge, die für das Subjekt da sind, aber ‘wertfrei’ da sind, sind Abstraktionen. Es kann nichts geben, was nicht das Gemüt berührt . . .*” (Ms. A VI 26, 42a). Of course, Husserl says here that data of sensation and even perceptual objects cannot but always be given as ‘covered over’ by values (as constituted and experienced in our emotivity). This, however, does not yet make it clear whether this “cannot but” represents an a priori essential necessity or an a posteriori factual ‘necessity.’ Mensch seems to simply opt for the first option. See also the closing of §6.9.1.

*incrustation* by the semi-transparent spiritual or cultural noematic layers. Normally, in our straightforward everyday experience, this perceptual fundament does not appear autonomously and separately as such. It is nonetheless always there, mutely manifest ‘underneath,’ as it were, the directly appearing spiritual or cultural layers of the full noematic correlate.

That said, one may claim that the way the spiritual or cultural noematic layer is founded upon the passively available perceptual thing resembles the way in which a predicative state of affairs is founded upon its proper pre-predicative fundament. In the latter case, we are dealing with a relation between a phenomenologically proper (appearing) objectivity and a higher ‘stratum’ (genetic layer), through which the former is actually given in straightforward experience. Unlike this foundational relation, however, the genesis about which we are speaking here in the context of the—not necessarily already linguistically constituted—spiritual and cultural objects is not primordially active and does not come with any delay in ‘objective’ time (either lived-through or theoretically objectified). Thus, time-difference is the distinctive mark not only between static and active genetic intentional relations, but also between what we have here called “passive co-genesis” and active genesis.

### ***6.9.3 Nature-Thing Givenness Is Value-Mediated Because We Do not Only Cognize***

The mediative givenness dependence of the perceptual on the cultural is not dictated by an a priori law reflecting necessities in the sphere of intuitional correlation. In the third LI, Husserl presents the necessities regarding founding dependencies with reference to the possibilities and necessities of objective representability depending on *essential* laws or on the very *nature* of the contents that are interpreted in intentional consciousness. The ‘dependence’ of the perceptual on the cultural has nothing to do with this kind of dependence. It has to do with the concrete *factuality* of the overall make-up of human beings, not with perceptual noesis and its noematic correlates. It is a mere fact that the make-up of human beings is such that their perceptual intentionality is always already covered-over with layers of cultural intentionality. We are multi-level intentional agents, having a base-level of sensory perceptual intentionality, and some side- or upper-levels of intentional possibilities; these always already dress up, as it were, the base-level intentionality. For example, if we allow ourselves, for a moment, to discuss even lower levels of value-constitution, a human being does not merely *visually see* its possible food, it also experiences it *as food*; this happens not at the sensory level of intentionality, but *instinctually*, i.e., at the level of animality, which is not specifically humanly spiritual or cultural. Similarly, a human being does not merely visually see this stone on the ground, but also experiences it as something upon which it can (or cannot) step in order to pass over the torrent, as something that is (or is not) graspable, throwable (or not) at a wild beast, suitable for smashing bones, etc.



Taking as our starting point Husserl's regional constitutive Phenomenology drafted in the *Ideas II*, we can accept this: we live intentionally as beings in a world, in which other concrete living persons and equipment for our life-needs and plans appear primordially to us as founded upon perceptually given mere nature-things. It is precisely these 'life-needs' and plans that work as the extra-sensory intentional source for some of the noematic value layers at large. Equipmentality is just one among the most original of these.

To the possible objection (which is basically the idea behind both Scheler's and Heidegger's approaches) that the givenness of the perceptual does after all presuppose a praxial engagement in the lifeworld (world or cosmos), i.e., an involvement into what happens to us within the world or, to put it otherwise, a teleological way of being, I refer the reader back to the analysis of the through-and-through teleological structure of intentionality as such in Chap. 4, especially §4.10. There is involvement and mattering, i.e., meaningfulness and intentional teleology, even at the smallest sentient scale of our overall make-up. In addition, no other valuing or meaning-giving act or comportment can be established unless it first finds a primordial perceptual bearer.<sup>53</sup>

#### 6.9.4 *The Case of Psychic Blindnesses*

The reader has perhaps already detected a possibility that, until now, has been left in the margins of the main train of thought. I refer to the possibility that a noematic value layer is constituted not on the full-fledged appearing perceptual nature thing, but on a lower, seemingly pre-intentional level of its givenness. More specifically, care was being taken in many cases to leave room for the possibility that not only the appearing nature-thing, but also some of its parts or characters may function as fundament for the constitution of some value layer. Of course, this does yet tell us whether such parts or characters can function in this way before the happening of the natural-thing's appearance. A phenomenological answer is that the latter may happen, but only on the proviso that we consider the case of a living sentient being that is *capable* of intentional experience. That is, a merely lived-through sensation (of, e.g., sweetness) can function as fundament for the value "agreeable" even without the full-fledged appearance of the sweet candy, but whenever sweetness is sensed by an organism capable of intentional experience. For instance, we could accept that this is the case of newborn children or of patients suffering from a special kind of psychic blindness, known as apperceptive visual agnosia. The way value constitution gets activated in such cases, though, lies beyond the immediate horizon of our concerns here.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>53</sup>See also Theodorou 2014b.

<sup>54</sup>Analyses that develop this point can be found in Theodorou 2014b.

Now, having said this, we realize two interesting things. Firstly, value constitution is founded upon immediate or mediate nature-thing givenness, but is accomplished by intentional noeses that go beyond perception and its perceptual and quasi-logical or logical modifications, e.g., correspondingly, attention, grasping, explication, conceptualization, predication, etc. Secondly, there may be cases of intentional experiences in which the perceptual thing or some of its elements are intentionally experienced in a well-functioning or, correspondingly, in a malfunctioning perception, *without* it also being invested by lifeworldly praxio-existentially significant value layers. One case in which the latter probably happens is another case of psychic blindness, known as associative visual blindness. We are talking here about a pathological case, in which the patient retains some level of his or her perceptual constituting abilities (i.e., the nature-thing as *res extensa* and *res materialis* appears in this or that degree of evidence) but the valuing constituting ability has been generally destroyed or has malfunctioned. So, the patient can avoid nature-thingly given obstacles in the perceptual world ‘Tetris,’ so to speak, but is not conscious of their lifeworldly praxio-existential *significance*, and so does not recognize them as complete lifeworldly beings.

For example, the patient presumably has the experience of the perceptually homonymic ‘table’ as *res extensa* and *res materialis* within the perceptual horizon of other thusly appearing things, etc. His or her perceptual and bodily motivational mechanisms, then, can guide the patient through this ‘Tetris,’ and he or she may indeed move with relative success therein. The complete lifeworldly significant table, though, does not appear. The patient does not recognize the merely perceptual table as the being we have connected with so many different praxio-existentially significant uses and relatednesses. So, the patient—if we are to assume here that he or she is being questioned properly—denies that he or she experiences the table we all *normally* experience. Of course, from the point of view of Phenomenology, the term “visual” in this kind of agnosia appears to be totally wrong.

The question (§§6.7 and 6.8) remains as to whether there is any other *normal* possibility of letting merely perceptual nature-things appear separately.

### **6.9.5 Pure Nature-Thing Givenness Is Phenomenologically Legitimate But Only Limitly Possible**

Speaking here of an experience that has mere sensory perceptual things as its objects would indeed be an “abstraction;” albeit not a *speculative theoretical* abstraction, but a *phenomenologically legitimate* one. Under normal, i.e., non-pathological conditions, it is possible by means of the non-intervening, non-modifying, and non-destructive phenomenological *de-composition* (*Abbau*). It is not a theoretical supposition regarding some non-phenomenal and made-up structures of the overall phenomenon (the whole appearing correlate) and of a surreptitious re-projection of its result back within the structure of the latter. Moreover, this decomposing abstractive presentation of the threshold or base-level objects is not a merely

*conceptual* abstractive possibility, but a properly *intuitional* one, i.e., in the end, a phenomenologically totally legitimate abstractive possibility.

This possibility is also one that, as we saw in Chap. 5, sufficiently differentiates the case of non-Husserlian talk of *res extensa* and *res materialis* from the way Husserl referred to them. It is precisely this wrongly-handled possibility of independently re-presenting to ourselves the perceptual thing exactly at the level of *res extensa* and *res materialis*, and especially in its mathematized Cartesian and Lockean version, that produced the impression that there is some cognizable independent nature in itself. The latter interpretation of this possibility does not meet the standards of phenomenological discovery. From the phenomenological point of view, the thing in itself, the *empiristic* sense data, the physicalistic *stimuli*, and the scientific-realist entities are also illegitimately abstractive and theoretical beings (that is, merely speculative).<sup>55</sup> Unlike the simply perceptual thing, none of these can be given in person and as such, but only as historically valid theoretical interpretations of what is thusly given in person. The green patch, or the adumbration of that thing over there (and, to an even greater extent, the thing at the level of the phenomenological *res extensa* and *res materialis*), are not the product of such phenomenologically illegitimate abstractions. They appear in what they are (and in each case according to the phenomenological "principle of all principles"). The fact nevertheless remains that, in normal cases, the perceptual thing is always already given under the 'guise' or through the 'filter' of some spiritual or cultural noematic layer. This renders our usual phenomenological access to it only limitly possible.

## 6.10 Overcoming Heidegger's Aporia and His Rhetoric Suppress of the *Sache Selbst*

### 6.10.1 Resolving a Persistent Phenomenological Obscurity

Given all the above, it is now time to reverse the situation and pose the question of what a Heideggerian really means when she/he claims that, *primordially*, we find ourselves related not with perceptual things but with equipment or tools. Let us for a moment skip over the question of how we come to find ourselves skillfully or expertly manipulating various equipment,<sup>56</sup> and focus just on a current manipulation of such beings.

We could take Heidegger's own well-trodden example of hammering, but let us lighten the atmosphere, and consider the case of driving a motorcycle on a road that runs across some pleasing spring scenery in the countryside. What, in this case,

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<sup>55</sup>On this, however, see also Chap. 10.

<sup>56</sup>This is the question that Dreyfus' widely discussed idea regarding five stages of skill acquisition has to answer.

does it mean that all these beings are given to us in the seeing of circumspection (*Umsicht*), as Heidegger puts it? What is the complete phenomenology of this kind of givenness of the involved beings? What does it really mean that a being is given in circumspection specifically as a handlebar, break levers, a motorcycle, a road, a countryside horizon, where an auspicious sky touches the ground of the mild low hills out there in the distance or, perhaps, some ominous clouds above threaten to produce a delayed rain shower, etc.? In other words, what does it mean for a being to primordially be for us in an intentional comportment as a handlebar, high-speed road, ominous cloud, etc.? Can there be something that is purely and simply such a being or, more generally, just and only a spiritual or cultural being or equipment? How *are* all these beings, for us? How are all these, constituted in their being, given to us upon our riding the motorcycle, sitting on the saddle, extending our hands toward the handlebar, while the road—among many other beings involved here—extends beneath us and ahead of us? Are all these available solely in the “seeing” of the “in order to,” constitutive of the *Umsicht*, totally *apart* from—i.e., ontologically independently with regard to—any sensory perceptual givenness of a more primordial *res extensa* and a *res materialis* (meant in the fashion of Chap. 5)? And is it that all their sensory reserve in their perceptual articulation becomes, for the first time, constituted and given in the intentionality of visual-seeing, of touching, etc., when we—knock on wood!—have a road accident, i.e., when, *alá* Heidegger, something goes wrong in their anticipated proper service and we turn to them in attentional examining intention? What does it mean that all these qualities in their thingly articulation are first constituted (discovered) in such a situation? Do they all spring forth out of a previous phenomenological-ontological zero and then, all of a sudden, become predicatively gathered together, in order to make up the perceptual thing? Heidegger and the Heideggerians were never clear on this.

Do the foregoing propaedia allow us to maintain that the following is the case? When we unfold our comportment toward the handlebar as handlebar, the road as road, the auspicious sky as auspicious sky, etc., we already have, as phenomenologically given—even without at the same time specifically noticing or grasping it—the relevant intuitionally appearing colours, smoothness or hardness, shapes, magnitudes and distances, solidity, etc., and indeed as incorporated within the underlying simply perceptual nature-object that underpins the being and the givenness of all the former. (“Incorporated,” of course, is meant in the specific structural way that appertains to the perceptual intentional syntheses.) This is not an argument. It is a simple call for phenomenological examination of the things themselves. The handlebar was already silver and black, tinsel and solid, solenoid and bent, approximately as long as the distance between my forwardly extended hands are, etc., and formed in its perceptual structure. The sky was blue and appearing as having a reversed-deep-platter shape, etc. The sky didn’t become blue all of a sudden when I fell off my motorcycle, and the handlebar did not acquire its perceptual structure when I lost it from my hands. (To the contrary, in the latter cases my vision would have turned pitch black, and the solid construction of the things would lose its cogency in a disturbing liquidity.) Of course, all these colors

and shapes, etc., of which we are conscious (in our pre-scientific sense of them) are not there either already or immediately after the accident as predicated properties of subjects.

From the Husserlian perspective, and despite inaccuracies and possible blunders here and there, a phenomenologically more adequate picture has been given. The analysis offered above shows that we may *immediately* experience a handlebar as equipment, but this does not exactly mean that this is also thusly given in ontological-foundational primacy. The equipment "handlebar" is possible only on the homonymic nature-thing 'handlebar.'<sup>57</sup> Only the latter is what can be considered as an ontologically-foundingly primordial given in a full and adequate phenomenological sense. The handlebar is already primordially constituted as a nature-thing, with its pre-theoretical color, hardness, shape, magnitude, solidity, etc., and at the same time—at the level of its upper 'surface,' so to say—as a tool used in order to . . . , etc. Any claim in favor of a pure and simple immediate or direct tool-givenness, basically as an immaterial meaning (*Bedeutsamkeit*) that is not already founded—in the way indicated above—upon primordially given perceptual and indeed 'substantial' strata looks, phenomenologically, to be sheer sleight of hand.<sup>58</sup>

It seems that even Heidegger himself sometimes wanted to escape the unsoundness of the view we are rejecting here, as passages like the following reveal: "an equipmental thing [ . . . ] has been constantly *vorhanden* too" (*BT* [MR], 103/73). In a sense, it was exactly the meaning of this reluctant and puzzled phrase that we have been elucidating all along. In *Being and Time*, moreover, the lack of any account of how this happens, and Heidegger's real aporia (impasse) on this issue is just *concealed* behind the following rhetorical question.

Yet only by reason of something present-at-hand [*Vorhanden*], 'is there' anything ready-to-hand. Does it follow, however, granting this thesis for the nonce, that readiness-to-hand [*Zuhandenheit*] is ontologically founded upon presence-at-hand [*Vorhandenheit*]? (*BT* [MR], 101/71)

We saw that there is some justification for this impasse in the currently available phenomenological literature. The givenness of spiritual or cultural beings is complicated and tricky. Thus, on the one hand, Heidegger wants to answer the question in the negative. On the other, however, he seems to be forced to admit that our theoretical gaze on the broken hammer cannot *ex nihilo* and artificially

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<sup>57</sup>We have already said many things about the nature of this process, but we will come back again in §6.10.2, with something new.

<sup>58</sup>Even later Heidegger still struggles to find an account on the enigmatic dependence of the culturality of a being, e.g., of a hammer or a jug or a work of art, on something that somehow 'materially' supports its possibility and actuality. Two of his later texts are closely related with this problem, "The Origin of the Work of Art" (1935–1936) and "The Thing" (1951). He thematizes there, almost in passing, the problem of the self-standingness or self-supportedness of the cultural objects and introduces the notion of "earth" (in its particular shape formations). To the extent that this idea makes any sense at all, I do not consider it better than Husserl's analysis of the folds of the nature-thing, i.e., pre-theoretical *res extensa* and *res materialis*.

construct or rather *create* that which is then given in the place of the hammer-tool. The broken hammer only brings to the surface what was always appearing and was there ‘within,’ so to say, the hammer-tool, i.e., the ‘hammer’-thing. But even if Heidegger were willing to admit this, the problem would be that, for him, this hammer-thing, appearing now in perception, should then be a being that was judgmentally constituted, with scientific properties, etc.<sup>59</sup>

By now, however, it must be evident that the answer to Heidegger’s question in the latter passage should be a clear “yes!” if we have understood *Vorhandenheit* properly, i.e., according to what we have seen in Chaps. 4, 5 (and will see in Chap. 7). Yes, if we accept the analyses presented in this chapter, for we have seen a different possibility. But again, let the remark here concerning the coming of the perceptual thing to appearance not be understood as maintaining normally an enduring and at will separation of the pure perceptual presence of the underlying *res extensa*, *res materialis*, and *res temporalis* of the hammer. For the non-phenomenologist, such an experience is transient, momentary, and perhaps even unrecognizable as such. Repeated such experiences and phenomenological training, though, permits a more extended and informed estimation of the threshold level of givenness we have described here. Again, this is normally possible only at the limit, and never achievable without the constant accompaniment of the now ‘transparentized’ upper founded cultural noematic layer.

### 6.10.2 *Heidegger’s Ultimate Presupposition Behind His Unsound Thesis*

One last point remains. Heidegger balks at the possibility suggested just above because he seems to understand founding (*Fundierung*) exclusively as an “internal modification” of the mode of Being of the founded, much akin to the case of (logical) grounding (*Begründung*). To begin with, Heidegger describes *Vorhandenheit* as an internal privative modification of *Zuhandenheit*. More generally, his conceptions of the Being-relations (or Being-modifications) observe an analogous pattern. In his mature post-1925 phase, a somehow all-incorporating, source-like totality (Being as such) is primordial, which in its being (unfolded in factual history) undergoes privative or sense-emptying (*sinnentleerende*) internal modifications. Thus, the question Heidegger actually poses in the latter citation from *BT* is this: how could a mode of Being like *Zuhandenheit* be founded on a mode of Being like *Vorhandenheit*? If the historical course of Being disclosures follows a privative ramificatory route, the richer ontological version must antecede. Thus, in Heidegger’s pattern of thought, the ontological foundedness of *Zuhandenheit* on

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<sup>59</sup>For Heidegger’s extremely interesting 1919 attempt to decipher the identity and constitution of what may actually lurk beneath the complete cultural being when we experience the breakdown of its expected serviceability in cross-cultural experience failures (like the one we saw earlier in the citation from Husserl’s *Nature and Spirit*, the similarity of which with the ‘broken hammer effect’ and other analogous cases in *BT* must not escape our notice), see Theodorou 2010a.

*Vorhandenheit* is impossible, since for him, the latter has a privative character in comparison with the former. Thus, he traps himself in the aforementioned aporias.

Speaking generally, what seems to have perplexed things here is the fact that although the perceptual thing normally enjoys *full phenomenality*, it is *always already invested* with cultural layers. The perceptual thing appears to be always dependent on the spiritual/cultural for its experiential givenness. As was already said above, though, the 'dependence' of the perceptual on the cultural is not a clear-cut foundational dependence, like the dependencies concerning the relation between color and extension, *Abschattung* and full perceptual thing, predicative state of affairs and perceptual thing, etc. We can further dissolve the remaining traces of the mystery by introducing another distinction. Let us assume that we consider all of the latter dependencies "internal," meaning by this that as concerns the intentionally interpreted contents, they are in each case all inscribable wholly within the same constellation of intentional life. In internal dependencies, the transition from intentionality to intentionality is a matter of moving through differing intentional interpretations and through differing intentional formings. The process is a matter of 'motility' merely *within* the same life of consciousness, along possibilities conditioned in accordance with the very contents available to it until then. However, if we also recognize an "external" dependence, the transition from intentional life to intentional life now presupposes the introduction of novel contents, which may be caused by the former or not. A new constellation of conscious life is then formed, which may also be accompanied by intentional constitutive formations that pertain only to the new kind of contents. This appears to be the case of the spiritual/cultural dependence upon the perceptual nature-thing. The mediative dependence of the perceptual upon the spiritual/cultural, however, does not belong here. The latter is an actualized factual and non-deterministic external possibility, dependent on the givenness of the former. The former is in no way derivable from the availability of the latter factual availability. From this point of view, we can say that Heidegger neither recognizes external dependencies, nor acknowledges the underivability of the independent from the externally dependent.

The above also shows, of course, that *Zuhandenheit* is not (and cannot be) an internal modification of *Vorhandenheit* (in either Heidegger's or Husserl's sense of the latter). Normally, a Husserlian proper *Vorhandenheit* (*Naturdinglichkeit* as analyzed in Chap. 5) always already offers itself *factually* together with *Zuhandenheit*, with the latter being foundingly dependent on the *actuality* of the former in an external sense. As they are here treated, *Zuhandenheit* is not foundingly dependent on the inner sense of the kind of Being of *Vorhandenheit*. *Naturdinglichkeit* and *Zuhandenheit* are *factually equiprimordial*, even though they are ontologically related in the external, a posteriori necessary way. For Heidegger, this is unintelligible! And, speaking literally, it is indeed *unintelligible*. This is the point. Phenomenology does not proceed with arguments from intelligibility, it does not move intellectually with deductive or dialectical derivations from first meaning principles. So, this unintelligibility is out of the question when things themselves inescapably press their factuality on us.

There is no internal deductive/dialectical or, for Heidegger, internal sense-ontological passing from one mode of Being to the other. For its concrete constituting specifications, each depends on a posteriori ‘materials’ that are actually foreign to each other. Generativity and historicity, then, cannot be the result of a mere inner self-differentiation of an absolute universal principle alone. The mediation of unpredictable materiality and of radical facticity or crude factuality, necessitating and triggering new intentional responses, is necessary for the generation of genetic levels of intentional correlation and of historicity. We will say more about this in Chap. 10.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>60</sup>An early version of the text for this chapter was originally written as a result of a research project of mine, which had the title: “Ontologies and Computationally Utilizable Information: Philosophical Investigation” funded by the Special Research Account, in the context of the 2000–2002 Research Program “Archimedes” of the National Technical University of Athens, Greece.



# Chapter 7

## The Question of ‘Categoriality’ in Husserl’s Analysis of Perception and Heidegger’s View of It

φύσις λέγεται [...] ἡ μορφή καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον [...]. τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν αὐτοῖς κινήσεως ἀρχὴν ἢ μορφήν καὶ τὸ εἶδος, οὐ χωριστὸν ὄν ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ τὸν λόγον.” (Aristotle: *Physics*, 193a28–193b5)

By “nature” of an intuited being we mean [...] its form or species as far as it can be grasped by our capacity for concepts and discourse [...]. The form or species of the beings that have become what they are by means of their own principle of generation, [e.g., the form or species of nature-things] is not something standing somewhere separately from them. Only our capacity for concepts and discourse, then, can—in its way—abstract it away from the pre-given intuited nature-thing. (The rendering is mine)

ὡς δ’ ἔστιν ἡ φύσις, πειρᾶσθαι δεικνύναι γελοῖον· φανερόν γάρ ὅτι τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ἔστιν πολλά. τὸ δὲ δεικνύναι τὰ φανερά διὰ τῶν ἀφανῶν οὐ δυναμένου κρίνειν ἔστι τὸ δι’ αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ δι’ αὐτὸ γνῶριμον (ὅτι δ’ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο πάσχειν, οὐκ ἄδηλον· συλλογίσαιτο γὰρ ἂν τις ἐκ γενετῆς ὦν τυφλὸς περὶ χρωμάτων), ὥστε ἀνάγκη τοῖς τοιοῦτοις περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων εἶναι τὸν λόγον, νοεῖν δὲ μὴδέν.” (Aristotle: *Physics*, 193a5–9)

Of course, it would be ridiculous to try to make manifest that nature exists; it is evident that there are many nature-things. Any effort to make manifest what is evident by what is not evident is the mark of a man who is unable to distinguish what is cognized as such, by itself, from what is not cognized as such, by itself. To be sure, the case that someone may fall victim to such a fallacy is not unprecedented; recall the case of a man who, blind from birth, might very well think and argue about colours. It is therefore necessary that, in such cases, one says various things using concept-names; he or she, however, is not seeing or intuiting anything. (The rendering is mine)

### 7.1 Introduction

In his *Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time* (1925), Heidegger develops what at first sight could be seen as a masterful presentation of the “three fundamental discoveries” of Husserl’s Phenomenology: intentionality, categorial

intuition, and the new conception of the a priori. Nevertheless, closer examination of the text discloses a series of subtle but serious problems. Our interest here will be restricted to Heidegger's presentation of his understanding of Husserl's theory regarding the intentionality of perception and of categorial intuition.

In §6 of that work (48/64), we read that Husserl's discovery of categorial intuition means two things. Firstly, it means that there is an experience of objectities in which we also have a simple apprehension of *categorial* constituents, i.e., of the elements which the tradition, in a "crude" fashion, called "categories" (48/64). Secondly, it means that this apprehension is already present in *every* experience and, as Heidegger explains a few lines later, according to what he has "already suggested" in his preceding analyses of the fundamental discovery of intentionality (in §5), categorial intuition is found even in *every perception* (48/64). Heidegger insists on this claim, and at several points of his presentation (see, e.g., §6.b.β), he repeats the idea that the intentional act of perception is, after all, permeated with categorial elements, with "categorial intuition."

Now, how should we understand this dense and heavy idea? Is it a hidden criticism of Husserl's views on perception, or is it Heidegger's sincere understanding of Husserl's original discovery? The relevant literature seems to take Heidegger's reading as a true depiction of Husserl's theory of categorial intuition. However, as we will see, this reading of the latter theory is far from self-evident, a fact that also casts doubt on the corresponding stance regarding its actual motive. In this chapter, I plan to cast new light on the details of Husserl's theory, and thus also on this fold of the philosophical relation between Husserl and Heidegger. In order to do this, I will first seek to establish the exact and central meaning of the alleged "categoriality" of perception (§§7.2, 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5) as Heidegger sees it, and then examine whether this meaning corresponds to the teaching and spirit of Husserl's *Phenomenology* (§§7.6 and 7.7). I will close the chapter with some reflections regarding the possibility and character of a language that would be most faithful to the phenomena, i.e., the language that would make *Phenomenology* adequate to its subject matter (§7.8).

## 7.2 Heidegger's Analysis of Perception and of Categorial Intuition

The analyses of §6 of the *PHCT* are mostly dedicated to the elucidation of the idea of categorial intuition. In order to accomplish this task, Heidegger has to bring the difference between simple perceptual intuition and categorial intuition to the fore. What is the difference, as Heidegger sees it? The relevant text is both extremely complicated and obscure.

### 7.2.1 *Perceptual Assertions and Perceptions: The Intricate Bond*

On the one hand, we read that all of our intentional acts (or rather, for Heidegger, our “comportments”) are thoroughly permeated by “assertions” (*Aussagen*); “expressivity” (*Ausdrücklichkeit*) conditions their performance. Even our “simplest perceptions and constitutive states” are “interpreted” (*interpretierte sind*) and caught within this expressness. Heidegger puts this in the following emblematic form.

[W]e do not say what we see, but rather the reverse: we see what one says about the matter [*über die Sache*]. (56/75; emphasis added)

Our “apprehension and comprehension” (*Auffassung und Erfassung*) of the whole world happens through this expressness; it is “already having been spoken and talked over” (*Schon-gesprochen-und-durchgesprochen-sein*) (ibid.).

On the other hand, we read that our assertions are always made “within” or “in a concrete and actual perception” (56/75). That is, our perceptual assertions ‘breathe,’ as it were, within the environment of assertion-free “concrete” perceptions. In rather Husserlian terms, we even read that perceptual assertions are after all *founded* upon such concrete and actual perceptions (60ff/80ff). Hence, we may assume that for Heidegger, in the end, there is a considerable *difference* between perceptual assertions and perceptions themselves. But what is actually the case?

### 7.2.2 *Perceptual Assertions and Perception: The Obvious Difference*

More particularly, when Heidegger says that perceptual assertions are performed “within concrete perceptions,” he means the following: “Apprehended *at first directly and simply* [*erfaßt zunächst schlicht und einfältig*]” is “the [perceived] matter [...] in its *unarticulated* totality” (*die in unabgehobener Ganzheit Sache*) (57/76–7; emphases added). And what the assertion makes is the following.

[It] makes certain relations stand out from the matter [*hebt aus der bestimmte Verhalte heraus*]. [...] It draws these relations out of the originally given, [perceptually] intuitive content. (ibid.)

So, it is crucially important to get a clear view of what this “at first” “directly and simply” apprehended “perceptual matter,” which is “given originally” in concrete perception as an “unarticulated” totality is, or what it contains.

One option is that this *Unabgehobenheit* might mean a chaotic “unarticulatedness.” Heidegger, however, does not have something like this in mind. Rather, he means an articulatedness whose ‘articles’ or ‘modules’ are not yet emphasized or

highlighted (have not yet been made to stand out).<sup>1</sup> As we read in the relevant lines, what simple concrete perception gives us is “the complete content [*vollen Sachgehalt*] of the real subject matter [*Sache*] ([e.g., of this] chair) found before us” (57/77). Of course, in order to understand what is meant by this purely perceptual “complete content of the real subject matter before us,” we must discover how it differs from what the assertion itself asserts with regard to this very same subject matter, i.e., its difference from the ‘assertive’ state of affairs corresponding to the assertion itself.

Heidegger explains that such a corresponding assertion may say, e.g., “this chair is yellow and upholstered.” He then suggests that if we are to locate the sought for difference, we must examine the assertion from the point of view that makes it what it is. We must examine it with regard to the possibility of its being true (of false). On what basis (or on the face of what) can this truth be decided and experienced? Tradition says that perceptual matter is what decides assertive truth. Nonetheless, Heidegger continues, we must ask: are the “this,” the “is” and the “and” of the above assertion demonstrable on the face of the strictly perceptual subject matter? As Heidegger sees it, in the context of a concrete perception, I can see its being-upholstered and its being-yellow, but not the “this,” the “is,” or the “and” (57/77). Clearly drawing upon Husserl’s original point in §§43–44 of the sixth LI (a train of thought which he has followed up to this point), Heidegger immediately adds this: if we are more careful, we realize that in a simple concrete perception, what is perceptually given in a *strict* sense is not the *being*-yellow but the *color* yellow; “*being*-yellow” “cannot be perceived” (58/78).<sup>2</sup> The reason for this is that, as “Kant already said,” the existential “being” is not a real predicate; it is not a “real moment in the chair” like its color, its hardness, etc., and “this also holds” for the “being” in the sense of the copula (58/77–8).

Now, the original sense of Husserl’s discovery of categorial intuition is precisely this: even though ‘elements’ like the “this,” the “is,” the “and,” etc., do not belong to the sphere of the real content of a being about which an assertion asserts this or that, the assertion *can* be found to be true with reference to the judged state of affairs. This *judged* state of affairs stands as the corresponding ‘object’ of the judgment, and amounts to a *new* kind of intentional objectivity. The latter, though, is not intuited in the context of a mere sense perception, but in the context of a *categorial* perception or, better, categorial *intuition*.

‘Elements’ like the “this,” the “is,” and the “and,” are categorial, not sensory.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, such elements seem to constitute parts of the new kind of intentional

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<sup>1</sup>In the context of this citation, Heidegger tells us that this at first un-highlighted totality of the perceived thing is comprised of the constituents listed before in the context of *PHCT*, §5. This content is also presented in the following lines.

<sup>2</sup>See also Dahlstrom 2001, 79–80.

<sup>3</sup>With regard to “being,” see also 70/95. Among such non-sensory elements, Heidegger also mentions “thisness,” “unity,” “plurality,” “or,” etc. (see 58/78). We will discuss these later, in §7.6.3.

objectivity called “state of affairs,” i.e., the noematic correlates of acts of linguistic meaning. So, it is tautological that these specific objects, the objects of *categorical* intuition that directly fulfill a judgmental intention, are *categorially* formed, i.e., that they are “pervaded by categoriality.”

Phenomenologists would absolutely agree on all this. We can call this “the platitudinous thesis.” The point at stake, however, is somewhat different. Heidegger does not exactly claim that the *judged state of affairs*, i.e., the direct and commensurate fulfilling intentional object of the at-first empty act of judgment, is categorially formed. He claims that “simple perception” *itself* is pervaded by categorial formation and, at the same time, insists that categorially formed assertions *cannot* be fulfilled on the basis of simple, concrete perception. On what charitable but reasonable understanding can this double thesis be maintained?<sup>4</sup>

### 7.2.3 *Implicit and Explicit Categorical Formation*

Immediately after having said that assertive empty intentions *cannot* get their fulfillment in simple concrete perception, Heidegger engages in a new round of explications concerning the ‘simplicity’ of the simple perceptual acts (§6.b.β).<sup>5</sup> In simple perception, we read, the object is given in its self-same totality, in the sense that its parts, moments, portions, features, etc., are already co-given: they are there in it.<sup>6</sup> This, however, does not mean that all these elements are given *explicitly* and *distinctly*.

[In simple perception] [t]he totality of [this] object is explicitly given through the bodily sameness of the thing [ . . . ] [in the sense that] the parts, moments, and portions of what is at first simply perceived [ . . . ] are there implicitly, unshrouded [*sind dagegen unabgehoben, implizit da*—but still given so that they can be made explicit. (61–2/83; emphases added)

In the simply perceived thing, these parts, moments, and portions “do not stand out in relief [*sind unabgehoben*]” (63/85). Heidegger immediately lets us know what this means: in simple perception, the thing’s parts, moments, portions, features, etc., are not *abgehoben*. In his analysis of the linguistic thematization of the simply

<sup>4</sup>We will return to this problem in §7.4. The relevant literature is confused on this point. I will try, in §7.4, to apply the principle of charity and disentangle some of these difficulties. In Heidegger’s analyses in the *PHCT*, however, there is another problem of coherence that *cannot* be overcome. I refer to Heidegger’s analyses concerning the “three” concepts of truth in Husserl’s *Phenomenology* and, more particularly, the relation of the third of these with monothetic intentionality. I dedicate a section to this problem (§7.7 of the present chapter).

<sup>5</sup>On this occasion, we once again come across a clear statement of the enigmatic idea that we have already seen: “even simple perception, which is usually called sense-perception, is [in its simplicity] already intrinsically pervaded by categorial intuition” (60/81). See also §§7.7.3, 7.7.4, and 7.7.5.

<sup>6</sup>Heidegger had already presented this idea in §5 of the *PHCT*, where his preparatory analysis of intentionality and perception are to be found.

perceived (§6.c), we read that in our *predicative* judgment “the *S* (chair) is *q* (yellow)” we simply “draw out [*herausfassen*] the color as a specific *property* in the chair [...] and make the ‘yellow’ present as a moment [in a way] which was not present before in the simple perception of the thing.” At the same time, this move also “involves *accentuation* [*Hebung*] of *S* [...] as a whole [*Ganzen*] containing the *q* within itself” (63/85; emphases added).<sup>7</sup> More specifically, what now, with the judgmental act, “becomes *visible* through the [predicative] articulation [of the state of affairs ‘*S* is *p*’]” is “[t]he *previously unarticulated* [and in-visible, we are forced to assume,<sup>8</sup> simply perceived] thing [*die vordem ungegliederte Sache*]” (63/85; emphases added). Before this thematization, “the chair does not contain its *being-yellow* as a real property. What was real was [merely, e.g.,] the yellow” (63/86) and the unarticulated totality of other similar sensory elements of the thing.

### 7.2.4 Real Relatedness and Categorial Formation

As was said earlier, for a moment one may of course assume that the “unarticulated” real elements in the ‘simply perceived thing’ are chaotically disposed. Heidegger, though, means something different. In the same context,<sup>9</sup> we are led to understand that in ‘simple perception,’ the parts, moments, and portions that constitute the *Realität* (*Sachheit*) of the perceived object as a whole are given together with their *real* relations. A real relation is a relation “given [together] with the intuitive [sic!] presentation” (65/88) of the real relata. For example, a real relation holds between, say, two patches of green, where one is brighter than the other.<sup>10</sup> Of course, this relatedness and articulation of the very real content of a thing in ‘simple perception’ (no matter what “thing” might mean here) has nothing to do with the categorial formation that drives the thing for the first time to its appearance. Even such a relation and its relata appear only if a judgmental drawing out and accentuation has been applied to them.

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<sup>7</sup>Notice that in §6.c (“Acts of Synthesis”) Heidegger treats the relation between subject and predicate as a *part-whole relation* without any further specification. More particularly, he presents the subject of a predicative expression as the simply perceived *thing in its totality*. Bernet, for instance, also explicitly conflates these two radically different kinds of synthesis (1990, 141). This is a very un-Husserlian reading of Husserl’s views regarding the intentional process of substratization and of subjectivation on the basis of the holistically given simply perceived. On this, see also Chap. 5.

<sup>8</sup>Heidegger presents the purely sensuously perceived thing in a way that renders it *in-visible*, unseen, and non-appearing! It appears and becomes visible only on the basis of its “articulation;” which is *categorial* (in the sense that it is the form that a *predicative* assertion imposes upon the—invisible—sensuous ‘material,’ as we will see). We already saw Heidegger saying that we *see* only what and when we *say*.

<sup>9</sup>See §6.c, and especially 63/85–6, 64–5/87–8.

<sup>10</sup>For more concerning this thematic, see also Husserl’s 6th *Logical Investigation*, §50.

Heidegger says that in an assertion, “a real relation is [just] thematically asserted” (65/87), i.e., is just made explicit and, we must conclude, also *seen* for the first time: “[T]he real relation ‘brighter-than’ is already there at the ground level of [simple concrete] perception as a content of the real subject matter” (65/88). “‘Being-brighter-than,’ however, is accessible only in a new act, namely, in the first founded act of [the assertoric]-*predicative* relating” (65/88).

This *accentuated* state of affairs, i.e., this (in the end) *assertive-predicative* structuring of the very state of affairs, is neither a real part of the concretely perceived subject matter, nor a real relation among the parts of such a subject matter. It is an *ideal* relation—even if it is as objective as the real relation. As we might expect, this ideal relation is called “*categorial form*.”<sup>11</sup>

## 7.3 A Step Further in What Heidegger Really Means by All This

### 7.3.1 Recapitulation of the Situation

On the basis of the above, we can understand that according to Heidegger, in Husserl’s Phenomenology the *appearing* perceptual object is *explicitly* formed in the manner of the assertive-predicative form “*S* is *p*.” The content of its appearing totality is already formed according to a corresponding predicative assertion (predicative form). In contradistinction, the linguistically-judgmentally unarticulated—not yet self-understandably appearing—‘simple’ and ‘concrete’ perceptual thing is a whole of real relata in real relations, with only an *implicit* judgmental categorial forming.

Of course, with this, we are approaching an understanding of what Heidegger thought was the difference between ‘simple concrete perception’ and categorially pervaded perception. We have, however, also seen him claim that ‘simple sensory perception’ is through and through categorially formed. Remember, e.g., this: “even simple perception, which is usually called sense-perception, is [in its simplicity] already intrinsically pervaded by categorial intuition” (60/81). In addition, we saw Heidegger claim that ‘simple perception’ cannot fulfill our empty linguistic intentions.<sup>12</sup> Does all of this actually make sense?<sup>13</sup> Either perception is already

<sup>11</sup>See 64/87. See also note 3 above and §7.6.3 of the present chapter. In his Zähringen seminar, now translated in the text that is known with the title *Four Seminars (FS)*, Heidegger also attributes to Husserl the view that in perception we also have a categorial intuition of the *substantiality*, or of the “is” qua *Vorhandenheit*, of the perceived-qua-substance (*FS*, 65–6/112–4). See also Chap. 8 of the present book.

<sup>12</sup>See 56ff/77ff, 68/92. See also the penultimate paragraph of §8.3.1 below.

<sup>13</sup>Dahlstrom’s reading of the relevant sections of the *PHCT* suffers from the lack of such a guiding question. Thus, although he makes the observation that Heidegger in fact *effaces* the distinction

categorially structured, and thus it is this categorially shaped perception that fulfills a relevant assertion, or an assertion cannot be completely fulfilled by a simple concrete perception, because the latter is not categorially structured. To be sure, we have the implicit/explicit thesis. Nevertheless, if the difference between a perceived thing and a state of affairs founded upon it is just a matter of explicitness, I cannot see how an assertion could not be completely fulfilled by a relevant (even implicitly categorial) perception.

### 7.3.2 *Heidegger's Point of View Reconstructed*

At this point, we cannot help but notice a tantalizing difficulty in Heidegger's analysis. We can say that Heidegger speaks here (wrongly) of ('simple') "perception" and that he should have instead spoken of mere *sensibility*. This is what he actually tries to do (problematically, again) in passing, on page 58/78. There, he undeservedly speaks about *Sinnlichkeit* interchangeably with *Wahrnehmung*. Even though this equation admittedly goes beyond Husserl's Phenomenology, in what follows, I will try to track Heidegger's point of view.

Again, Heidegger's two theses under discussion are the following:

- a. The complete assertive intention "This *S* is '*p* and *q*'" does *not* find its complete fulfillment in the domain of a 'simple concrete perception';
- b. 'Simple concrete perception' is always already permeated by categorial formation, in the sense of the "we see what we say rather than say what we see" idea.

If both of these theses are to be accepted as true, i.e., if we are to apply the principle of charity, then we cannot but arrive at the following conclusions regarding Heidegger's position.

He obviously fuses together two different senses of "simple perception," which must be kept apart: (i) non-appearance-supporting, mere sensory 'perception,' and (ii) appearance-supporting, predicatively formed intentional perception.

Non-appearance-supporting, mere sensory perception is a mere sensing or having of the 'real subject matter,' that is, of a mere sensory manifold, already somehow arrayed in particular compounds of 'really related' sensations—possibly also organized in corresponding (non-appearing) *Gestalten*.

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between simple perception and the relevant perceptual judgments (2001, 72), he thinks that the only problem here is that Heidegger lets us come to the realization that—as Dahlstrom sees it—something like a sensory perception is an *abstraction* (2001, 84ff). On this, see also §7.8 below. Further, Taminaux explicitly says that, as he sees it, Husserl himself *corrects* his theory of "simple perception" by means of the introduction of the doctrine of categorial intuition. More specifically, Taminaux argues that there is *no* act of perception apart from that which is already categorially formed and serves as a "fulfilling act of confirmatory self-presentation" (1985, 105); "confirmatory" with respect to an at-first empty perceptual judgment. In Chap. 5, we saw that this reading of Husserlian perception is misguided. In the present chapter, this will be further examined and entrenched, with Heidegger's reading in mind. Øverenget simply passes over the problem of coherence here (1998, 57, 52–3).



This “having” of sensations amounts to merely a living-through, to a *feeling* of these sensations and not to a complete intentional *seeing*.<sup>14</sup> That is, on the level of the mere having of the sensations, we do not actually live in a *complete* intentional act in which we intuit a transcendently appearing intentional object.<sup>15</sup>

Now, in thinking about how we arrive at a complete intentional experience of things in perception, two alternative possibilities may be considered. The first is that the merely sensorially lived-through whole of real contents and real relations is somehow already implicitly structured in accordance to judgmental categorial forms. In this case, the perceptual thing does not appear before our explicit assertion. The second is that we have a full-fledged perceptual intuition of the thing only when a predicative-judgmental synthesis has at first *tacitly* predicatively structured the sensory manifold. In this case, the perceptual thing does not appear to us in a fully conscious perceptual experience. It does so only when we explicitly assert what was implicitly the case with it. Heidegger does not really make himself clear on what he thinks about all of this. In any case, questions concerning (i) whence the categorial structuring within the sensory whole of real contents and (ii) what a tacit judgmental categorial formation may be, do not seem to have any intelligible answer. Given the uninteresting bizarreness of the second alternative, in what follows we will continue to opt for the interesting bizarreness of the first alternative.

Be that as it may, with regard to the specific level on which implicit categorial structuring is at work, an actual judgment should be considered as the *explicit mirroring*<sup>16</sup> of the structure responsible for the constitution of the perceptual object.

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<sup>14</sup>“Sensuousness is therefore the title for the totality of the constituents of the beings [*Gesamtbestand des Seinden*] which are given beforehand in their material content [*Sachhaltigkeit*]. Materiality in general and spatiality in general are sensory concepts [...]. This broad concept of sensuousness is really at the bottom of the distinction between sensory [intuition] [*sic!*] and categorial intuition” (70/96; trns. sl. md.). In his Zähringen seminar, Heidegger also insists that, in Husserl, sensuous intuition (read: sensory perception) is strictly speaking not the *perception of a thing*, but rather the ‘perception’ of *sensory givens*, that is, the affection by the sensory hyle and its specifications (blue, black, extension, etc.) (see *FS*, 65–6/113) Of course, if this were the case, Husserl wouldn’t have actually managed to talk about perception as a really intentional act that offers its object in evidence, that lets its object manifest itself. According to Heidegger, the intentional sensory perception (appearance) of a thing is, as we saw above, the result of a categorial forming. On this, see also Taminioux 1985, 106–7. In Chap. 6, we saw what Heidegger thinks that Phenomenology should maintain with regard to how we are led to this experience of an appearing sensory perceptual thing.

<sup>15</sup>As we have already seen, at several points Heidegger calls this merely sensorial perception of, e.g., a color, “sensory intuition” (see, e.g., 58/78, 92/68; emphasis added). Cf., however, 59–60/80, where even a thing-like object is, surprisingly, characterized as *sensory-real*, despite the fact that a few lines later we read that *simple* perception is already categorially structured. Heidegger actually never manages to offer a fully coherent, faithful and charitable presentation of Husserl’s teaching regarding perceptual intentionality and the constitution of the perceptual object. Later, in §7.7.3, we will see that Dahlstrom makes a considerable effort to deal with “simple perception” in the slightly different terms of a “single-layered act that offers its object in one stroke.” This, however, does not affect the core of the argument up to this point (or at any other point) of the present chapter.

<sup>16</sup>For this see, e.g., 48/65, 57/76–7, 56/75, 62/84, 63/85, 64/87, 65/87.

Correspondingly, the relevant empty judgmental meaning-intention seeks and finds fulfillment in correlation with the implicitly judgmentally-structured perceptual object.<sup>17</sup>

What is admittedly impressive in all these points, of course, is that Heidegger does not—not even in a glimpse or as a mere suspicion—bring perception to the surface in the sense analyzed earlier in the present book (in Chap. 5). This genuinely Husserlian possibility, of understanding intentional perception phenomenologically is, in Heidegger and Heideggerian readings, either totally suppressed or simply ignored.

### 7.3.3 *An Additional Major Double Claim*

On the basis of the above, we can see that on Heidegger's reading, the following two theses regarding the categorial and its relation to perception must be emphasized.

- a. In the phenomenological context, there is only *one* possible way of talking of categories, no matter whether they are meant to describe intentional structuring in the sphere of sensory experience, or in the sphere of linguistic expression.
- b. The only intelligible way of seeing the difference between sensory perceptual experience and linguistic expression is to say that, in the first, the 'categories' are *implicitly* meant and, in the second, *explicitly* posed.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>Heidegger seems to make this kind of understanding (as reconstructed just above) more explicit in his *Zähringen Seminare* (FS, 64ff/110ff). Dahlstrom's (2001) understanding of §§5–8 of the *PHCT* shows that he agrees with these latter points. The same can be said of Øverenget's account of the relation between perception and perceptual judgment (1998, 42, 58ff, 62); Bernet's understanding of Heidegger's interpretation of the text under discussion here (1990, 140–1) also runs along these lines. Philipse takes such views—together with the difficulty of discerning the correlational structure in its two different moments (empty noesis and fulfilled noema) in the *already* fulfilled perception—as evidence that Husserl anticipated the linguistic turn (1995, 239). This view, however, does considerable violence against the view that whereas this *may* have been something self-evident in, e.g., Kant and in German Idealism, Husserl is the initiator of the idea of a complete *pre-predicative* intentional experience. In Chap. 5, we saw what this may mean. In the present chapter, we will further entrench this reading, and direct it against Heidegger's and Heideggerian views in particular.

<sup>18</sup>Tengelyi (2007) adopts this double idea (the first point silently, the second expressly). He suggests that the only difference between a category functioning in sensory perception and its counterpart in predicative language is that between the spatially incongruent counterparts, e.g., the left and the right hand, in Kant's arguments against the non-conceptuality of intuitions. The context there, however, makes it clear that this is nothing really different from the implicit/explicit schema we already saw in the main text above or, perhaps better, nothing different than the mirroring relation between something original and its (mirror) image. Examining the category "identity" he maintains that in sensory experience it is just "at work," whereas in our articulated linguistic intentionality this *same* "identity" has become itself an object (e.g., via a thematizing reflection). Even though I totally sympathize with his serious effort to trace and safeguard the difference under discussion, this choice does not exactly meet Husserl's caution, in the *Ideas I* (§124), (of which

For the moment, we can only say that these two theses do not correspond to Husserl's phenomenological account of the relation between perception and its linguistic thematization and expression. In sub-section 7.6.3., I will try to show why this is so.

### 7.3.4 *Summation of Heidegger's Reading*

We can now sum up the main idea driving Heidegger's presentation of Husserl's theories of perception and categorial intuition. The real sensory content (in its real relatedness) of a 'simply perceptual thing' is somehow given, e.g., merely lived-through in the senses (we may suppose). This having of the real content (in its real relatedness), though, does not yet amount to an experience of an intuitional appearance of the perceptual thing. The thing, with its content (and real relatedness), appears for the first time only when a judgment is directed toward it, to its real sensory content, i.e., when the categorial form of the predicative "is" is activated and explicitly posed within it.

Be that as it may, this judgmental act does not really change anything with respect to the originally given (simply and sensorially perceptual) thing. It only explicitly "draws out" and "accentuates" what was implicitly already there within it. Then, all of a sudden, what did not appear now appears. Thus, what we see is what we have just said, via the judgment. That is to say, it is only when the judgmental categorial form is explicitly applied to the receptive whole of the real sensory content of the simply perceived thing that the thing becomes, for the first time, visible and recognizable in its judgmental structure (and a potential truth-maker).

One naturally wonders, though, how we happen to be directed to an unperceived whole of real sensory parts (and real relations) which we now articulate, linguistically thematize, and make appear for the first time.<sup>19</sup>

Another point must be noted here. Since the simply sensory perceptual thing as such does not actually appear, it is a mere theoretical *abstraction*. (Recall, though,

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Tengelyi is, paradoxically, totally aware) to *not* take the mirroring metaphor (between perception and judgment) too literally. It rather totally succumbs to the latter's beguilement (see Tengelyi 2007, 194–5).

<sup>19</sup>Heidegger would reply that this is a problem for Husserl. Husserl would naturally reply that this is a problem for whoever espouses the theory that creates it. All phenomenologists, I believe, would agree that this is the problem for all *pan-glossism*, and, first of all, for Carnap's view of how a linguistic system gets established and institutes experience of beings, and for Quine's naturalistic view of language learning and experience institution. In any case, it is phenomenologically unintelligible that a community of language users first establishes or acquires a language and only then experiences beings in a world. The simple reason is that *all these processes already presuppose that we have perceptual experience* of others, of spoken words, of written signs, etc. Of course, an adequate treatment of all this requires another occasion, for which I reserve myself. For the time being, the interested reader may wish to consult the intimately relevant Theodorou 2004.

that Heidegger characterizes it also as “concrete”!). The truly appearing perceptual thing is a being that is judgmentally constituted. Because it appears as *phenomenon*, it is not a theoretical abstraction, something merely theoretically speculated. From the point of view of Heidegger’s Phenomenology, though, the appearing perceptual thing in Husserl’s Phenomenology is the *result of a theoretical construction*.

In a nutshell, then, Heidegger’s position is as follows. Primordially, we experience instruments, e.g., a hammer, in the special kind of intuiting called “circumspection” (*Umsicht*). Husserl wrongly considers perceptual things as more primordial givens upon which the “instrumentality” of the instruments is founded, since, strictly speaking, a perceptual thing is either only an abstractly hypothesized but not appearing whole of real sensory material, or what appears only because it is judgmentally structured. Since Heidegger does not recognize in Husserl (or in Phenomenology in general) the possibility of a simply perceptually appearing thing (in the sense developed in Chaps. 4 and 5 of the present book), he also directs us to the following conclusion. The appearing perceptual thing that Heidegger projects in Husserl’s Phenomenology can only be a theoretical construct, founded upon what Heidegger considers as primordial phenomenological being, i.e., upon instruments.

We have dealt with this complicated phenomenological issue in Chap. 6. In the following sections, we will dissolve the remaining problems and, thus, further entrench the findings of Chaps. 4 and 5. We will have then completed our understanding of what exactly Husserl and Heidegger are claiming with regard to primordial phenomenological givenness.

## 7.4 Perception and Categorial Formation in the Current Phenomenological Literature

### 7.4.1 Sokolowski’s View

Sokolowski draws no distinction between explication (*Explizierung*) of a perceptual object in its parts (as presented in Chap. 5) and the imposition of a categorial form, in the sense of a predicative formation of that object. For example, he does not make any distinction between highlighting an abrasion of a car as being a part of the whole car and declaring “this car is damaged” (2000, 205–6). Sokolowski takes as identical the explicit distinguishing of a perceptual whole and one of its parts, on the one hand, and the many-rayed (*mehrstrallig*) intentionality of categorial consciousness, i.e., of judgment, on the other. For him, linguistic syntax simply *expresses* the relations of part and whole that constitute the simply perceptual thing; part and whole are just ‘brought out’ in the corresponding categorial consciousness (2000, 206). Thus, he makes no distinction between a phenomenological descriptive explication of the perceptual articulation of a perceptual object, and a thematic appropriation of that object, seen under a particular interest and fixed in a specifically categorial form of language. Interestingly, Sokolowski writes as if he wanted

to faithfully echo Heidegger's remark with regard to the meaning of "categorical constitution." "Categorical constitution," he says, should not be meant as a creation of the categorical object or an imposition of subjective forms on reality. To constitute a categorical object simply means to "bring it [the perceptual object] to light, to articulate it, to bring it forth, to actualize its truth" (2000, 208).<sup>20</sup> With this, of course, Sokolowski undermines his own will to keep apart the one-rayed givenness of the perceptual object from the many-rayed givenness of the categorical object that is founded upon the perceptual object (This distinction will concern us in the forthcoming section). For, if "categorical constitution" means simply to "bring it"—i.e., the perceptual object as already categorially constituted object—to light, there can be no substantial difference between the one-rayed perceptual and the multi-rayed categorical object. Sokolowski, in this sense, seems to want to simultaneously step on two boats.

### 7.4.2 Drummond's Understanding of Our Issue

Drummond suggests that, after his *LI*, Husserl himself came to see that even naming and perceiving are categorially formed (2003).<sup>21</sup> Drummond does this by explicitly equating the articulative and the categorial (*ibid.*, 131–2). More particularly, in order to avoid the collapse of the fundamental Husserlian distinction between perception and judgment, which threatened to ensue after the alleged recognition of the categoriality of perception (*ibid.*, 132–3), Drummond moves in the following way.

First, he accepts the view that, at least in the *Ideas I*, the articulation in the perceptual objectivity has the form of a predication, where the determinable X functions as the subject of the predicates discoverable in the perceptual object (*ibid.*, 132–3). And, he adds, the perceptual noema is already structured in a certain manner; namely, the manner corresponding to the "differentiation that makes possible the substantival or adjectival forming of a stuff" (*ibid.*, 135), e.g., of the stuffs "rose" and "red" in this perceptual red rose. Now, Drummond continues, this differentiation is not the one that refers us to the *syntactical*, propositional, subject-and-predicative categoriality of the syntactic form "[S] is [p]"; rather, it is a pure *grammatical* substance-and-adjective categoriality, which refers us to the meaning intentions of "S" and "p" underlying nominal expressions, such as "rose" and "red" (*ibid.*, 135). "[T]he categoriality of substantivity and adjectivity is present in the meaning intentions [inherent in the perceptual acts] underlying nominal expressions [ . . . ] [and] it indicates that perception tends toward judgment,

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<sup>20</sup>Cf. *PHCT*, 70.

<sup>21</sup>To this, it must be added that even perception can, in a sense, be seen as a categorial act; this is accepted by Husserl, even in his *LI* (see the remarks at the end of §58 of the sixth *LI*). I will return to this harmless case below.

but it is not yet judgment. From the perspective of syntactical categoriality the [...] [pure grammatical] categoriality is only ‘empty’ or ‘anticipatory’” (ibid., 135).

Drummond’s reading of the categoriality of perception appears to differ from Heidegger’s. However, neither reading can be accepted, for both overlook the fact that perceptual objects are not constituted (immediately or mediately) in terms of subjects and predicates, but in inter-founded part-whole relations that pertain to their special primordial make up (e.g., color with color loci, adumbrations with adumbrations, etc.). Perceptual objects, as simply perceived, do not contain predicates, whereas as expressly named (as wholes or in parts) but-just-named, do not contain substantivities and adjectivities in any way. In Heidegger’s case, we should say that we do not perceive predicatively constituted states of affairs. In Drummond’s case, we should say that nomination does not amount to substantiation or adjectivation (let alone to subjectivation and predicativation). As I see it, these nominal aimings at first aim and name concrete objects and qualities, e.g., correspondingly “apple,” “red.” In simply naming these objects, no additional classification is necessary. “Red” is not necessarily named already as ‘adjectable’ or as to-be-‘adjected’ to the apple. Nomination, qua mere tagging something with a name, could not differentiate the named as either a substance or an adjective. The substantiation and the adjectivation, about which we have spoken in Chap. 5, come in a next step, that of the last stage of the explication (*Explicierung*) of the perceptual (as there described). It comes as a result of the imposition, on the part of the active intellect, of a syntactical categorial form—the *only categoriality proper* in the context of the issue under discussion here—upon the simply perceived (I will develop this point later). Substantival and adjectival stuffs are the result of the activity of our specifically linguistic conceptual intentionality, not of simply perceptual intentionality.<sup>22</sup>

### 7.4.3 Dahlstrom’s View

Dahlstrom criticizes Heidegger’s presentation of Husserl’s analysis of perception and categorial intuition. He does this very late in his analysis of the relevant topics (2001, 84), but it should be noted that he indeed goes into an admirable degree of detail concerning this crucial problem of the *PHCT*. Heidegger, we read, places so much weight on the role of categorial intuition that the difference between it and sensory intuition is obscured or even effaced.<sup>23</sup> Referring to the idea behind Heidegger’s remark that all of “our compartments are in actual fact

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<sup>22</sup>This forms the core of the problems that Husserl repeatedly tried to accommodate in a clear and tidy way. The results can be found in his *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and his *Experience and Judgment*, which also form the background of my approach. The way in which the approach of those works is presupposed here was delineated in Chaps. 4 and 5.

<sup>23</sup>Dahlstrom 2001, 84, 99.

pervaded through and through by assertions” (*PHCT*, 56), Dahlstrom observes that if perceptions are indeed saturated by the ability to express (expressiveness), then the distinction between sensory and categorical intuition becomes the distinction between merely *tacit* and *explicit* perception.<sup>24</sup> Nevertheless, the only problem Dahlstrom sees here is that with this move, Heidegger just wants to let his students start realizing that purely sensory intuition is a sheer *abstraction* that cannot be justified in the context of a proper Phenomenology.<sup>25</sup>

Then, presenting Heidegger’s account of Husserlian intentionality in the *PHCT*, Dahlstrom writes that, more specifically, Heidegger speaks in a way that lets his students understand the following. Speaking of that intentionality, we should connect it with what Husserl calls “objectifying acts,” “namely, those belonging to the sphere of Logic” (2001, 59). Dahlstrom’s last remark can be read as meaning that objectifying acts, the paradigmatic and most fundamental case of which, in Husserl, is the act of perception, fall under the command of Logic. Objectifying acts in general (and perception in particular) constitute their objects by means of syntheses, the formal rules of which are the subject matter of Logic (qua formal theory of judgments and syllogisms).

And, when Dahlstrom refers to Heidegger’s presentation of the Husserlian idea of empty intending and intentional fulfillment, he says two more interesting things. First, he says that based upon the distinction between objectifying and non-objectifying acts, “the very schema implied by objectifying acts is in Heidegger’s view inadequate, indeed, a source of *confusion on Husserl’s part* when it comes to the analysis of truth. [...] [In Heidegger’s] opinion something is basically *awry*, if not with the distinction itself, then at least with the way it functions in *Husserl’s analysis*” (2001, 59–60; emphases added). Second, Dahlstrom says that in Husserl’s analysis, “[w]hat is merely meant or emptily entertained [...] is intuitively ‘fulfilled’ [...] when it is given ‘in the flesh’ in a *perception*” (2001, 60; emphasis added). Dahlstrom indeed reflects the very same problematic understanding we found in Heidegger’s own reading of the relevant ideas of Husserl. We will see, however, that his endeavor is at least based on mistakes, regardless of whether Heidegger wanted to show his students that in Phenomenology something like a mere sensory perceptual experience of a thing is a sheer abstraction, or whether Husserl was confused in his analysis of truth (if not of both perception and truth).

The apex of Dahlstrom’s approach is found on pages 71–73,<sup>26</sup> where he connects Husserl with what he calls the “logical prejudice,” i.e., the traditional idea that truth is something pertaining *only* to judgment. To be sure, Dahlstrom explains, Husserl does not naively fall prey to this prejudice, for he has claimed that truth pertains not only to synthetically (relationally) objectifying acts, i.e., to acts of judging, but also to *monothetically* (non-relationally) objectifying acts, i.e., to what he means by

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<sup>24</sup>Dahlstrom 2001, 85.

<sup>25</sup>Dahlstrom 2001, 85.

<sup>26</sup>See also *ibid.*, 104ff.



“nominal” acts. However, he immediately adds that there is *no possibility of making sense* of Husserl’s idea! Thus, relying on Heidegger’s reading of the issue of empty intending and intuitional fulfilling in Husserl’s analyses of truth, he comes to the following conclusion.

What renders Husserl’s account of nominal acts obscure [...] is that, while insisting on their difference from judgments, he nonetheless accords them a *syntheticity that implies a judgment*. [...] Husserl speaks of the *derivativeness* of the ‘nominal object’ from the “state of affairs to which it belongs” (*LU* II/1, 470). According to Husserl, non-relational acts of naming or attributing “emerge” from the perception of a state of affairs that can itself be elaborated in the form of a judgment. (2001, 72; emphases added)<sup>27</sup>

Thus, in conclusion, Dahlstrom understands the relation between simple perception and its expression precisely in the terms presented above in §7.3. In the founded acts of expression (and its correlative intuitional fulfillment), the objects straightforwardly given in simple perception are just *explicitly* grasped for what they already *implicitly* are.<sup>28</sup> Finally, Dahlstrom, under the strong influence of Heidegger’s analysis, speaks as if whole-part and subject-predicate “explication” of a simply perceived thing is one and the same phenomenological consciousness (and givenness) (see, e.g., 2001, 83–4). As we will see in the following sections, this is far from the truth.

## 7.5 Evidence and Reasons, Found in the Husserlic Corpus, Which Underpin the Heideggerian Reading

From the point of view of the charitable reading being attempted here, I think that when Heidegger says that simple full-fledged intentional perception is permeated by categorial intuition, he aims at neither an overt nor a covert criticism of Husserl’s theory of perception.<sup>29</sup> In the same vein, I will abstain from considering the possibility that Heidegger purposely disorients his audience with respect to Husserl’s actual teachings. The presentation could be the result of his sincere reading of Husserl’s original ideas. After all, his own teachings regarding the famous relation between the hermeneutic and the apophantic “as” in *BT* face analogous difficulties. He only thinks that he is bringing to the fore what is already meant or, curiously enough, even said, in the 6th *LI*, where Husserl analyses his views regarding intentionality and categorial intuition.

The possibility, though, of a deliberate partial over-interpretation of Husserl’s ideas cannot be totally excluded (in Chap. 6 we already saw folds of Heidegger’s dubious appropriation of Husserl’s Phenomenology). It may also be the case that

<sup>27</sup>See also *ibid.*, 105ff, 130–1, 139ff, where the “logical prejudice” is presented as inextricably tied up with the conception of Being as presence (*Vorhandenheit*). See also §7.6.3 below here.

<sup>28</sup>See *ibid.*, 83.

<sup>29</sup>Dahlstrom (*ibid.*) initially agrees on this point, although he is later on led to different conclusions.



Heidegger finds the opportunity to build his new way into Phenomenology by somehow taking advantage of Husserl's problematic analyses. It is certain, though that this problematic status was not merely made up and projected upon Husserl. Even though the latter's analyses are path-breaking and deep, they do suffer from unclarity. Naturally, this is not a problem that is exclusive to Husserl's philosophy.

More specifically, we must recognize that in his *LI*, and in particular in the sections of the sixth LI that Heidegger seems to have especially in mind, Husserl is not as clear as he would later try to become concerning the problem of the difference between simple perception and its possible linguistic thematizations. An examination of this specific Investigation will show that Husserl offers Heidegger certain direct and indirect interpretative handholds.

### 7.5.1 *Perceptual Articulation and Logico-Syntactical Articulation*

Husserl remarks that the idea that there is a sheer mirroring relation between expression and perception is *wrong*.<sup>30</sup> If this remark is right (at least in terms of Husserl's Phenomenology), then it appears that several points of Husserl's own analysis in the *LI* (and, *mutatis mutandis*, elsewhere) suffer from inaccuracies. Consider this passage.

[The] fitting [of the perceptual object] into its categorial context [*die Einordnung in den kategorialen Zusammenhang*] gives it a certain place and role in this context, the role of a relatum, and in particular [the role] of a subject- or object- member [copulatively related with a corresponding predicate- or property-member]. (*LI*, 796/157)

Husserl's aforementioned remark should normally mean that the phenomenological description of the manner in which the perceptual object is *articulated* in its *sensory* dependent and independent parts at the level of perception *cannot*, after all, be equated with cognitive-determinative judgments that *re-articulate* the perceptual object in the *logical subject-* and *predicate-*members. As it appears in the above citation, however, Husserl's suggestion goes against this. It must be noted, though, that from the context of the citation, we can conclude that what Husserl means there by "subject" (and, to this effect, by 'subjectivation') is what he presents a page later under the title of "nomination." We can, that is, still claim that what he considers as subject in the cited passage is the perceptual object turned into a *just named* object (an object merely tagged with a name, with no further semantic content). Points like this show that, in his *LI*, Husserl lacks a clear understanding of the phenomenological transformations that enter into the move from perception to expression. This is especially conspicuous in his later attempts at a reworking of the *LI*, and the matter is only clearly settled in *EJ*. In his *Ideas* I, Husserl in fact

<sup>30</sup>See notes 18, 36 and §7.6.1 here.

repeats the former scheme of thought in a mode that is even more susceptible to misreading. There, Husserl refers to the act of explicating the perceptual object as an act by which we acquire the “predicates” of that object.<sup>31</sup>

### 7.5.2 *Categories as Philosophical Heritage*

It is true that at least with regard to part-whole relations, in §48 of the sixth LI, Husserl treats the linguistic thematization of a perceptual object almost in the same terms as Heidegger. In our straightforward (*schlichte*) perception, says Husserl, the perceptual object simply stands before us; its parts and features are indeed in it, but are not yet made our explicit (*expliziten*) objects. However, “the same object can be grasped by us in explicating (*explizierenden*) fashion: acts of articulation can put its parts ‘into relief’ [*in gliedernden Akten ‘heben’ wir die Teile ‘heraus’*]” (LI, 792/152–3). Husserl also expresses the idea that categorial forms do not alter the appearing perceptual object at all (§49 of the sixth LI). Again, this idea may make us (and probably made Heidegger) think that a categorial form is just the explicit equal of what is already implicitly formative in the appearing perceptual object.

Husserl additionally refers to part-whole relations (among either independent or dependent elements) in terms of *categories* (cf., e.g., LI 478/280, 794/155). This, though, seems to be an unsuccessful attempt at a connection with the history of metaphysics, rather than a delicate and informed terminological choice. What Husserl wants to indicate is that these relations are of a *non-sensory* sort, i.e., of a sort not corresponding to a real sensory content (cf., e.g., LI 478/280, 794/155). These relations cannot be found among the real contents of our sense-intuition. However, Husserl applies the term “categorial” to both the founding relations on the level of *passive sense intuition* (perception), e.g., the relation between color and surface or, for that matter, of the actual adumbration with other potential adumbrations of the same object, and the founding relations on the level of the forms projected by the *active conceptual reason* (thought), e.g., the relation “aggregate” (cf., LI 478/280, 480/282). Husserl distinguishes only the forms of the type “triangle,” etc., which he calls “sensuous forms” (see LI, 795/156, 476ff/277ff).

Passages like these may be considered as direct evidence (or at least as convenient handholds) for Heidegger’s reading currently under discussion.

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<sup>31</sup>Thus, it comes as no surprise that Drummond actually comments on this idea by saying that “Hence, we can say that the determinable X as the ‘bearer’ of ‘properties’ is the ‘subject’ of ‘predicates’” (2003, 131; emphasis added). Cf. also the double motto of this chapter.

### 7.5.3 *The Objectivity of Categorial Forms in Phenomenology*

There is also (at least) one more serious piece of indirect evidence.

In PHCT, §6.d.α, Heidegger insists that in Phenomenology, properly understood, we must avoid understanding categoriality in the traditional terms of *form*, in contradistinction to an independently available *matter*. We should also avoid understanding categoriality in the specifically modern terms of an intellect that acts as the spontaneous formative principle of a receptive matter, already offered as such (qua sense data) to an inert sensuousness. This, it is said, sustains the old mythology of an intellect that, with its own forms, glues and rigs together ‘world’s matter.’ If we are to take into account the phenomenological meaning of “intentionality,” Heidegger continues, we will understand the following.

[Categorial forms] are not constructs of acts but *objects* [*Gegenstände*] which manifest themselves in these acts. They are not something made by the subject and even less something added to the real objects, such that the real entity is itself modified by this forming. Rather, they actually present the entity *more truly* in its ‘*being-in-itself*.’ (70/96; emphases added)

The categorial forms are a special constituent on the side of the objects themselves, and any thematization just highlights (as it were) these constituents. “‘*Constituting*’ [as in Husserl] does not mean ‘producing’ in the sense of ‘making’ and ‘fabricating’; rather, it means ‘*letting the entity be seen [as it already is] in its objectivity*’” (71/97).<sup>32</sup>

This, of course, is how Heidegger interprets Husserl’s over-cited and notorious remark in *LI*, where the latter condenses the spirit of his breakthrough philosophical conceptions that moved him away from his teacher Brentano, and away from his first, quasi psychologistic philosophical efforts, in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*.

It is not in the reflection upon judgments nor even upon fulfillments of judgments but rather *in these fulfillments themselves* that we find the true source of the concepts ‘state of affairs’ and ‘being’ (*in the copulative sense*). It is not in these acts as objects but *in the objects of these acts* that we find the abstractive basis for the realization of the concepts [or categories] in question. (*LI*, 783–4/141; emphases added)

To the categorial concepts mentioned in the last citation, Heidegger also adds the concepts “being” (as ontological category), “this,” “and,” “or,” “one,” “several,” “aggregate,” etc., (59/79).

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<sup>32</sup>These phrases are connected with Heidegger’s reading that, in Husserl, there is no perceptual intuition proper (appearing of transcendent objects) independently of categorial intuition. What appears should already be categorially formed. In Husserl, a purely pre-categorial (qua pre-judgmental) sensory perception is, according to Heidegger, something that can be found only ‘reflectively’; that is, subsequently and abstractively, as an artificial theoretical construct. Heidegger’s phenomenological ‘objectivism’ will also be examined later in the present chapter, as well as in Chaps. 8 and 9. See also the next note.

### 7.5.4 Heidegger's Amazement at the Objectivity of the Categories

On the basis of his reading of this famous passage, Heidegger seems to draw at least two important conclusions.<sup>33</sup>

First, he seems to think that if categorial forms are not subjective constructs, and if they are the abstractive basis for universal-objective concepts like “state of affairs,” “being,” etc., then in Husserl’s Phenomenology, they—or at least a portion of them—have to be present by themselves *already*, on the object-side of the *most elementary* kind of experience, that of simple intentional perception.

Second, this subject-independent categorial formation, even if it is proven to be involved in a historical dynamic, i.e., even if the object-formation is liable to a potential change in time, it must always retain the character of a linguistic formation—in Husserl’s Phenomenology: it retains, always, the character of a *categorial-predicative* linguistic formation.

The combination of these two points is crucial (but the second is the most important). To put it dramatically, it is connected to the nature and possibility of Phenomenology and of phenomeno-logizing. As Heidegger conceives of the meaning of Phenomenology (both in §9 of *PHCT* and in §7 of *BT*), Phenomenology is the way in which philosophy can—at last—be descriptively faithful or totally adequate to the things themselves. In other words, Phenomenology is the way philosophy, after so many centuries of unsuccessful efforts, discovered how to let the happening of the appearing of the beings in the world take place in an unspoiled manner, and guarantee that its talk about them leaves them undistorted. If Phenomenology is to be consistent with its very motto (“to the things themselves!”), it has to have the possibility of *saying* the things *as they themselves are*; it has to be developed as a discourse capable of disclosing the things *as they show themselves by themselves*. This means that Phenomenology, even if it has to deal with the most primordial phenomena, *cannot* claim that these phenomena *elude* the articulative possibilities of language. It means that Phenomenology has to be able to make the happening of the constitution and of the appearing of beings belonging to all the levels of being-giveness adequately explicit. Since Phenomenology is a λέγειν τὰ φαινόμενα (saying the phenomena), i.e., a faithful discursive explicitation of the phenomena, it has to be able to express its corresponding discoveries in an *intelligible linguistic manner*; *without altering* the content and identity of the discovered things themselves.

Of course, in the *PHCT*, the presentation concerns Husserl’s way of understanding and corresponding to this. Heidegger, meanwhile, had discovered other kinds of primordial givenness of phenomena and was in search of a new kind of

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<sup>33</sup>If they were not, the corresponding concepts would lose the objective status that is normally attributed to them; they would acquire, instead, a time-dependent content (which, at least in Husserl and the tradition, is not the case). Dahlstrom makes a similar remark (Dahlstrom 2001, 75–6).

language, a new Grammar (*BT*, 34/39), that would leave these beings and their original givenness undistorted. We will return to these matters below (in §7.8, and in Chaps. 8 and 9). Here, however, we have presented the core of the idea.

From this arch-phenomenological citation, however, Heidegger draws an additional important conclusion concerning the *objectivity* of Being (in the context of his Fundamental Ontology). As we will see, his—problematic (as it will turn out)—understanding of the last citation shapes the way in which he decides to treat his life-long question of Being. The previous remark, about the Heideggerian search for a Grammar that would be adequate to the phenomena, applies of course to the case of Being—to the extent, of course, that Being can be given as phenomenon. We will come back to this in Chaps. 8 and 9.<sup>34</sup>

## 7.6 In Husserl's Phenomenology of Perception, the Perceptual Is Not Predicatively Constituted

### 7.6.1 Husserl's Warning Against Overemphasizing the Mirror Metaphor

It is of special interest that, already in the *LI*, Husserl had sufficiently warned us that there is a considerable difference between perceptual intuition and linguistic expression.

[I]n the case of structured [*geformter*] expressions, the notion of a more or less *mirror-like* mode of expression [...] [is] *quite unavailing* [*die Idee eines gewissermaßen bildartigen Ausdrückens ganz unbrauchbar ist*] in describing the relation which obtains between meanings expressing [the intuitions], on the one hand, and intuitions that are expressed [in these meanings], on the other. (*LI* 778/134–5; trns. md.; emphases added)<sup>35</sup>

Thus, after the development of his views regarding the phenomenology of intuition and expression in the context of his *correlational* intentional analyses too, Husserl returns anew to this important point in §124 of his *Ideas* I. This time, he makes clear that “expression [...] is a mental [*geistige*] formation exercising *new* intentional functions” (*Ideas* I, 297/288; trns. slightly altered, emphasis added) upon

<sup>34</sup>Let it only be added here that Heidegger's objectivist reading of Husserl's gesture toward assigning special weight on the object side, in his *LI* elucidation of the foundation of the categories, seems to have been enhanced, if not directly influenced, by Lask's seminal 'objective' (ontological atheological) twist of the neo-Kantian perspective on the meaning, scope, and content of Transcendental Logic and First Philosophy. Lask himself made this turn under the influence of the relevant ideas of Husserl's *LI*. This is basically manifested in Lask's *Die Logik der Philosophie* (1911). A lucid presentation of this connection may be found in Crowell 2001.

<sup>35</sup>Farber wrote: “between meanings to be expressed, on the one hand, and expressed intuitions, on the other.” The German text reads: “zwischen den ausdrückenden Bedeutungen und den ausgedrückten Anschauungen.”

the expressed theme originally given in perception. In addition, he also repeats the remark of the *LI*. More specifically, Husserl notes that in expressional intentionality, the objectivity under thematization gets ‘conceptually’ *ex-pressed* (*‘begrifflich’ sich ausprägt*) or *mirrored* (*widerspiegelt*)—according to form and content—in the noematic sense (*noematischer Sinn*) of the correlative state of affairs. He also gives the following loud warning.

[However] these locutions of *mirroring* or *depicting* [*Spiegeln oder Abbilden*] [. . .] are to be taken *with care*, since their *metaphorical* use can easily lead to *error*. (*Ideas I*, 295/286; emphases added)

If, then, a ‘careless’ conception of the relation between expression and perception in mirror-like terms is wrong, it appears that Husserl’s analysis in his *LI* (see, e.g., the previous citation from *LI* 796/157) and, *mutatis mutandis*, elsewhere, suffers from phenomenological inaccuracies, which may indeed lead to a misguided understanding of the intuition-expression relation.<sup>36</sup> A phenomenological description of the manner in which the perceptual object is (at the level of intentional perception) *articulated* in its sensory dependent and independent parts cannot be equated with cognitive-determinative judgments that *re-articulate* the perceptual object in the logico-syntactical subject- and predicate-members.<sup>37</sup> This becomes explicitly clear

<sup>36</sup>Among the phenomenologists who take the mirror metaphor less metaphorically than they should, Tengelyi is also included (see 2007, 185ff, where he basically deals with “Der *Parallelismus* von Erfahrungssinn und Ausdrucksbedeutung”; emphasis added). As in most similar cases, the question of what has suddenly happened to simple concrete sensory perception (in the sense discussed in Chap. 5), if a perceptual expression *just mirrors* an already categorially-predicatively structured perception, is again posed, but answered according to the lines of the foregoing §7.3 (Tengelyi 2007, and especially the transition from pp. 187 to 188). His final conclusion is that “In der sechsten Logischen Untersuchung führt die phänomenologische Analyse des stetigen Wahrnehmungsverlaufs bis zu dem Punkt, an dem ein sich fortbildender gegenständlicher Sinn greifbar wird. Husserl erfaßt jedoch diesen Sinn nicht. Deshalb *kennt er*, wie wir gesehen haben, *keinen anderen Begriff von Gegenstand als einen kategorialen*. Dieser Mangel entzieht eigentlich seiner ganzen Gegenüberstellung zwischen sinnlicher und kategorialer Wahrnehmung den Boden” (Tengelyi 2007, 195; emphases added). We should, however, also take into consideration the reference to his work in note 18 above. Melle (1990) also appears to belong to this circle of understanding. For him, Husserl showed that only the “logisch-erkennenden, die intellektiven Akte” (1990, 36) are objectivating. That is, we have our experience of intentional objects in our judgments.

<sup>37</sup>It is true that even though Husserl had indeed made a distinction between a wider and a narrower sense of “perception,” he wasn’t totally coherent in the corresponding description of the difference between these. Thus, in the *LI* we read the following. “[O]ne also speaks of ‘perceiving,’ and in particular of ‘seeing,’ in a greatly widened sense, which covers the grasping of whole *states of affairs* [. . .]. In the narrower sense of perception (to talk roughly and popularly) we perceive everything objective that we see with our eyes, hear with our ears [. . .]. In ordinary speech, no doubt, only external things and connective forms of things (together with their immediate *qualities* [*Merkmalen*]) can count as ‘perceived by the senses’” (*LI*, 781/138). See also §46 of the 6th *LI*. This talk of “qualities” referring to the simply perceived thing may easily be misunderstood as referring to “properties” that have been already implicitly predicated in or of the thing.

later, in *EJ* (probably in reply to previously circulating misinterpretations). The *LI* and the *Ideas I*, though (together with Heidegger's reconstruction) suffer from unclarities and inadequacies.

Nonetheless, this does not mean that a careful reading of the *LI* and the *Ideas* does not already show that, even at the time of their writing, Husserl considered intentional perceptual constitution to be different from judgmental constitution. From the beginning, intentional perception constitutes its objects on the basis of structurings that fuse together, in a *non-judgmental* forming, dependent and independent parts in transcendently appearing totalities. This concerns parts like the color and its surface, this or that colored patch with other such patches, but also this or that adumbration with other adumbrations of the same thing.<sup>38</sup> Failure to fully estimate the special weight of these latter modes of intentional constitution leads to all the misunderstandings that we have met up to this point. This also comes from Heidegger's analyses of perceptual intentionality, in §5 of *PHCT*. Among the kinds of contents that partake in the constitution of the 'perceived thing,' he lists parts, moments, portions, features, etc., i.e., elements that can be confused for being already predicables, but not also—although in a confused way—the *adumbrations* of the perceptual thing, which cannot.

To be more specific, on the one hand, the adumbrative structure belongs, according to Heidegger, merely to the *perceivedness* of the thing, i.e., to the qualitative character of the act, to the kind of appearing of the perceptual thing. It does not, that is, belong to the very *ontological* constitution of the perceptual thing; something that amounts to a serious misrepresentation of Husserl's theory regarding intentional constitution in perceptual experience. On the other hand, Heidegger considers the actual and possible adumbrations of the perceived thing as belonging to and comprising the content of the total intended thing in perception; these adumbrations are considered to be the *Wahrnehmungsgelalt* of the total perceived thing. But this latter treatment of the adumbrations in the context of perceptual constitution remains surprisingly marginal and suppressed, and causes only further confusion, rather than elucidating the core of Husserl's original teaching.<sup>39</sup>

At the beginning of §6.b.α.β, also, Heidegger gives us an account of the perceptual thing's constitution, in which this thing is considered as the identical totality of an adumbration-series accomplished in a one-level act. Soon after, however, the scene shifts again toward the implicit/explicit scheme of conceiving

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<sup>38</sup>Husserl devoted a large number of especially dedicated lecture notes and research manuscripts to these constitutions. They have for long been available in the *Husserliana* volumes *Ding und Raum* and *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis*. See also Chaps. 4, 5, and 6 of this book. On this issue, Lohmar's discussions in his relevant series of publications (see, e.g., Lohmar 2002) are also helpful. A detailed treatment of the matter regarding the nature of the multifarious perceptual syntheses and of the way they are meant by Husserl to found our predicative-categorial consciousness of their correlates is to be found in Vassiliou's recent doctoral thesis (*Primordial Perception, Linguistic Thematization, and Scientific Idealization in E. Husserl's Phenomenology*, 2014; in Greek).

<sup>39</sup>On this, see *PHCT*, 43/58.

the relation between perception and expression. These accounts are, of course, in conflict. For how, on the one account, is the simple perceptual thing constituted on the basis of adumbrations, and how, on the other, is its inner structure just that of an implicit subject-and-predicate structure? This is the second (irreparable) contradiction in Heidegger's analysis of Husserl's *Phenomenology*.<sup>40</sup>

Thus, Heidegger's reading of Husserl's theory of perceptual constitution caused much confusion in the phenomenological camp, blocking opportunities for the further development of Husserl's original theory of intentional constitution in problem areas, such as theory of science, theory of values, etc. Failure to take into account the original meaning of Husserl's *Phenomenology* of perception and expression prejudices failure in our understanding of its real novelty and content, as well as in terms of the possibilities for further developing and exploiting it—especially toward the project of a Normalized Phenomenology that does justice to the maximum possible positive (partial) contributions of Husserl, Heidegger, and the other great phenomenologists.

### 7.6.2 *A Few Answers on Issues Pending*

Having thus set the in-principle borderline that separates perceptual constitution from categorial (qua linguistic, judgmental or predicative) constitution, we can, for a moment, return to a few issues that remained un-answered in §7.5 above.

We saw that for Dahlstrom, Husserl's account of nominal acts is obscure, especially in its application to simple perceptual objects. He says that Husserl insists, on the one hand, that they are different from judgments and, on the other hand, that Husserl “accords them a *syntheticity* that implies a *judgment*.” In addition, Husserl also “speaks of the derivativeness of the ‘nominal object’ from the ‘state of affairs to which it belongs’”; that is, he claims that “non-relational acts of naming or attributing ‘emerge’ from the perception of a state of affairs that can itself be elaborated in the form of a judgment” (2001, 72; emphases added).

The problem which Dahlstrom points toward here, however, is not a real one; the actual case is different, as can be realized by careful examination of the relevant context (fourth LI, §11; fifth LI, §34ff, 49f). Husserl does not in any way mean that nomination is *only* possible on the basis of already given predicatively structured states of affairs. He just wants us to understand that nomination is possible *even* in the case of such states of affairs. We can merely nominate not only a simply perceived appearing thing (in the sense of Chap. 5), by just tagging, as it were, an empty name, a *flatus vocis*, to it. This move can be made without further ‘including’ in this name any tacit definition that, in a supposedly self-understandable manner,

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<sup>40</sup>In the literature, however, no proper attention is paid to this. See, e.g., Øverenget 1998, 58ff.



has already distinguished and accumulated properties of a substance and predicated them to a subjectivized version of the latter. In this specific sense, we can *also* nominate a predicatively constituted state of affairs.<sup>41</sup>

We also saw Husserl expressing the idea that categorial forms do not alter the perceptual object itself at all (§49 of the sixth LI), something that probably made Heidegger—or gave him the right to—think that a categorial form is just the explicit equal of what is already implicitly formative in the perceptual object. Husserl, however, means something totally different. He means that in our linguistic thematizations of an appearing, simply perceptual object, *this* object does not suffer any change in its original sensory-perceptual constitution. It remains the same, forming the founding basis for the constitution of a new objectivity of a higher order, namely that of the corresponding predicatively formed state of affairs, or of other still higher noematic layers.<sup>42</sup> The unchangeableness of the perceptual object under the imposition of a categorial form does not mean something like the prior “presence” of that form within the simply perceptually appearing thing. It only means that a categorial form works on a new level, higher than the simply perceptual, with the latter serving only as the foundation for the categorial.

Now, we saw how Heidegger understood the citation from *LI*, 783–4/141 and especially the point that even the meaning of “being” is recoverable by reflection on the ‘objects’ that fulfill the empty judgmental aiming acts. For Heidegger, this means that in Husserl, any intentional formation of an intuited object is necessarily already a linguistic formation, i.e., that perceptual objects are always already predicatively constituted. With regard to this idea, the following must be said.

Husserl refers there to *already* predicatively constituted states of affairs as fulfilling objects (as objects that fulfill the judgmental empty aimings), and not to intentional objects in—primordial for him—simple perception! Thus, the idea is indeed that the meaning of “being” in the copulative sense can arise only by reflection on the (noematic) objective, predicatively formed state of affairs, which truly fulfills the (noetic) empty judgmental aiming. Interestingly, a few lines after the quotation under discussion, Husserl makes a remark that it is not mentioned by Heidegger in the relevant analyses of *PHCT*. Husserl explicitly remarks that the concept “being” (*Sein*) can arise only when a certain *particular being* (*irgendein Sein*) is given. From this, it is plain that, this time, Husserl does not have in mind the “being” in its copulative sense, but the “being” in its ‘existential’ sense, i.e., in the sense of the so-called “absolute position” (discussed there). It seems that the latter

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<sup>41</sup>It is a common mistake among scholars who read Husserl through Heidegger's eyes (see, e.g., earlier in Sects. 7.4.2 and 7.4.3) to think that nominal acts *presuppose* and are derived from synthetic categorial acts. For the Husserlians, however, it is almost a commonplace that, in the *LI*, simple pre-predicative perceptual objects can be nominalized *without* alternation in their original constitution.

<sup>42</sup>For a more detailed analysis of this process, and of the way the whole complex correlate appears to the suitably modified consciousness, see Theodorou 2010b.

concept of “being,” another ‘category,’ can arise on the basis of reflection upon an object of simple perception that is not already judgmentally constituted.<sup>43</sup>

### 7.6.3 *Some Forms of ‘Categoriality’ Harmlessly Connected with Perception*

To be sure, there are other senses that Heidegger connects to his remark that in the context of Husserl’s Phenomenology, perception is permeated by categoriality (other than the predicativity). In fact, albeit indistinctly, by the categoriality-claim Heidegger also means that in the constitution and givenness of the perceptual thing, the “categories” “identity,” “unity,” and “reality” also function.<sup>44</sup> More particularly, Heidegger means that perception of an object is accompanied by a consciousness of the fact that the object *is* (*existence*), and is intended as the unitary (*unity*) and *self-same* (*identity*) object it is, throughout an enduring perceptual act. Moreover, the intentional constitution of that object presupposes a kind of pre-understanding of the *eidos* of that object (*generic eidos*). These, however, are not crucial elements for our understanding of Heidegger’s reception of Husserl’s theory of perception, if the issue is specifically whether the appearing perceptual object is or is not always already categorially shaped (whether the appearing perceptual object is or is not judgmentally-predicatively constituted).

The ‘categories’ under discussion in this subsection appear to play a role that lies beyond the latter question. More specifically, “identity” takes part in the constitution of the perceptual thing only at the level of *res temporalis* (in Husserl’s sense) and, in any case, *it does not structure its internal horizon*. “Unity,” on the other hand, has shaped the internal structure of the thing, but, as I see it, with no particular ‘interest’ in what this internal horizon comprises and on what the kinds of their internal relatedness may be. This “unity” doesn’t really ‘care’ for what and how it is unified. Our question, on the contrary, concerns precisely this: what is unified in the structure of the simply perceptually appearing thing, and how? Generally speaking, in appropriating Husserl’s theory of perception, what we must consider as a fundamental question is whether the perceptual object is *predicatively* and not generally categorially shaped. As for the “generic *eidos*,” I must at this point refer back to Chaps. 4 and 5 on perceptual sense and its corresponding regional essence. Here I will only add (or remind the reader) that in the *LI*, for everything experienceable there should be an *a priori*, whereas later on, e.g., in the *Ideas I*,

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<sup>43</sup>In the same context, moreover, Husserl explicitly equates his analyses concerning categorial forms and categories (*LI*, 784/141). And if the latter, existential “being,” is not the categorial form of the copula, then it is obvious that this existential “being” is, in Husserl’s mind, also a category! The situation is of course complex, but not beyond accountability. We will return to this issue in Chap. 8.

<sup>44</sup>See *PHCT*, 49/66–7, 60–1/81–2, 61/83, 59/80, 61/82–3.

Husserl makes clear that regional essences could be the lowest a priori. Of course, it is in any case interesting to know what one thinks with regard to the inner structure of these a priori conditions.

Categoriality, then, is one thing, and predicativity is quite another. As a first approximation, the issue here is—and on this I think I agree with Dahlstrom—whether there is a *predicativity*-free level of intentionality, and not whether there is a generally *categoriality*-free intentionality. In any case, the conflation of these two separate issues creates unnecessary additional fuzz around the matter under examination. Being, unity, identity, and *eidōs*, we can agree, are indisputable constitutive presuppositions for perceptual intentionality, even in Husserl's sense.<sup>45</sup> However, as already discussed above, these 'categories' are not involved in the inner formation of the corresponding intentional object in simple intentional perception.

Beyond this admission, an additional remark must be made at this point. We saw that a certain 'categoriality,' e.g., unity, identity, regional essence, etc., is presupposed even in monothetic intentionality, i.e., also in simple intentional perception and in nominative acts. This, however, does not yet decide the matter of whether the aforementioned categories belong to the *logical* genera or not. That is, the foregoing admission does not yet say that the constitution of a simply perceptually appearing thing presupposes the categories of logical thinking, i.e., the general forms to which our capacity for linguistic thinking and syllogizing comply. In short, we have not yet decided the matter of whether or not the 'categories' under discussion are discursive. To put it more crudely, (and in a way that would make Heidegger raise an eyebrow), what we have admitted just above does not yet say that animals cannot have simple sensory experience of perceptually appearing things because they lack the discursive capacity!

As I see it, Husserl himself was fully aware of these intricacies, and he later tried to clarify matters in *FaL* and in *EJ*. According to my reading, Husserl later tried to show that the logical categories presuppose the pre-givenness of a non-logico-categorially constituted appearing world with its beings. From this point of view, identity, unity, and reality are not primordially logical categories! There is a whole sphere of intentional conscious life, the 'intelligence' of which is not that of (linguistic) discourse, i.e., the theories of which are not exactly Formal Logic and some factual discursive Grammar, but rather a set of more primordial rules for the negative and positive possibility of truth. This issue, however, by far surpasses the scope of our concerns in the present book.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>45</sup>This is the case throughout the 2nd LI and, e.g., *Ideas I* (*Hua* III.1, 12, 15, 115ff, and §5). Heidegger is clear enough on this (see 115–6/160–1). Øverenget rejects the possibility of having non-categorial intentionality, e.g., in monothetic acts like naming. However, he is not clear on what he means by "categoriality" here (e.g., predicativity, identity, unity, etc.) and, in addition, he claims that Heidegger clearly rejects the possibility (1998, 55). Heidegger, however, is very cryptic on this particular issue (see foregoing notes 3, 11).

<sup>46</sup>See, however, also Chap. 6, §6.3.1 and especially note 17, which offers an additional simple reason in favor of the thesis maintained in the present chapter and in the current section.

## 7.7 Husserl's Proto-Hermeneutic Concept of Truth in Perception and Its Downplaying or Suppression in the Phenomenological Tradition

### 7.7.1 *The Puzzle of the Monothetic Acts*

In the previous chapters and sections, we have seen that although Husserl is usually unclear and, at times, even incoherent, he has given us enough guidelines on how to understand the constitution of perceptual things from the point of view of the philosophy he introduced. A sober recollection of fundamental points from his analyses suffices to allow us to realize that perceptual constitution does *not* follow the pattern of the categorial constitution of objectivities of a *higher order*. We have already seen how these simply perceptually constituted things are given to us. Before closing this chapter, an additional remark on this matter seems due. It will be developed in the following four subsections.

At this point, let us pick up anew the thread of Heidegger's reconstruction. One can, obviously, raise the question: Why does Heidegger after all treat Husserlian intentionality, truth, and intuition only in terms of predication? Isn't it true that Husserl gave us analyses also of *monothetic* acts, and that he considered one particular sort of such act, simple perception, as the threshold of our intentional lives? We have already seen that there is some puzzlement with how exactly this latter possibility works. Here, we will develop the necessary elucidation. Once this is done, we will have settled the two dire issues that block the Husserlian understanding of Husserl's Phenomenology, and make Heidegger's interpretation appear as good pharmon. The first is the issue of whether perception can offer its own object in truthful appearance. The second concerns what it means that judgmental aimings get their direct fulfillment on the face of the judgmentally structured states of affairs, whereas the latter are phenomenologically founded upon the pre-given ground of simple perceptual objects.

### 7.7.2 *The Three Senses of Truth Analyzed in the PHCT*

At the beginning of §6 of the *PHCT*, we already find Heidegger saying the following. Categorial intuition concerns the simple apprehension of the categorial (we could also say: the "supra-sensory-morphic") that shows itself qua a kind of *constituent (Bestand)* in the beings that are simply perceived. In addition, Heidegger says that categorial intuition is found as an *inclusion (als Einschluß)* in every concrete perception (as analyzed in §5 of the *PHCT*).<sup>47</sup> In order to clarify what he means by this remark, he engages in an analysis of emptily intending and intuitional fulfillment, as well as intuition and expression.

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<sup>47</sup>See 48/64.

In intuitional fulfillment, we have a *coincidence* (*Deckung*) between what was emptily intended and what was given in the relevant fulfilling as intuitionally bodily or in-person present. This bringing-into-coincidence is an act of *identification*. Thus, in this fulfillment, we have the experience of evidence as experience of the intuitionally given, in its being identical with the emptily intended or, as we could also say, as—a non-thematic—experience of the *identity* between the emptily intended and the intuitionally given.<sup>48</sup>

These considerations bring us to the phenomenologically interpreted ideas of *truth* and *being*. More specifically, the context of these phenomenological analyses enables us to discern three meanings of the concept “truth.”

- (i) “Truth” may mean the *being-identical* of the presumed or emptily intended and the intuitionally given; the *subsistence* of this identity. This conception of truth means the having of the intuitionally given in the non-attentional evidence of its being identical with the emptily intended (*adaequatio*). As we may also say, in this case we live in the truth of the intuited objectivity. Now, Heidegger says, this particular intentionality, in which we live in the non-attentionally-being-brought-into-coincidental-identity of the given as it was presumed, is “in touch with the [intuited] subject matter [*bei der Sache*]” (52/70).
- (ii) The second conception of “truth” is connected with the *act* of the intention (*intentio*). “Truth” now means the structural coincidental identity between the act of emptily intending and the act of intuitionally giving. Truth in this sense is understood as a character of knowledge, as an act; that is, as intentionality. This time, “truth” does not mean non-attentionally living in the truth of the intuited in its coincidence with the presumed, but thematically knowing that the intuited is identical with the presumed (*adaequare*).
- (iii) The third conception of “truth” goes deeper than the previous two. This time, “truth” connects with the intuited as such, with the very given intentional objectivity that—in our originary intuition of it—provides the ground for the truth qua identification in both senses (i) and (ii). In other words, in order for the possibility of a truth in sense (i) and (ii), we presuppose the *real givenness* of the truth-maker, of the really given corresponding objectivity. “Truth” here means “that which makes knowledge real.” In this sense, “true” amounts to *being*, to the *being-real of the intuitionally given itself*.<sup>49</sup>

Heidegger then immediately distinguishes two different senses of *being* (is). As expected, we can identify these as the so-called “existential” and “copulative” senses. In the sense of the copula, “is” is a “structural moment,” a “relational factor” in the intuited state of affairs itself. Nevertheless, at the point where Heidegger remarks that the third definition of truth represents a radicalization of the scholastic notion of truth, i.e., of truth qua adequation (connected with the first two concepts of truth), the above (here pre-announced) second contradiction seems

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<sup>48</sup>See 49/66–7.

<sup>49</sup>See 66–7/71.

to arise.<sup>50</sup> According to the aforementioned third concept of truth, evidence is no longer restricted to the realm of judgments, since Phenomenology has shown that the concept of *truth does not apply only to relational acts* (*PHCT*, 52, 55), but also to *monothetic* or one-rayed acts. Nevertheless, if there is indeed a distinct concept of truth connected exclusively (and discernibly so) with the givenness and intuition of the correlates of monothetic acts, then how can Heidegger claim that, in Husserl, all intentionality, even that of simple perception, is categorially-predicatively structured? Isn't it, rather, that in such a case there would be no *distinct* concept of truth pertaining specifically to monothetic acts and especially to their case *par excellence*: perception itself!

Kisiel reluctantly remarks that Husserl's fourth conception of truth, truth as being, "is taken into account tacitly [by Heidegger] in the following subsection [*PHCT*, §6.d.8]" (*PHCT*, 52 translator's note). Øverenget (1998, 47–8) and Tamini-aux (1985, 105) too are willing to take the notion of being discussed there as radically different from that of the copula and, thus, as a concession by Heidegger to Husserl that the latter freed "being" and truth from the narrow context of judgment. Heidegger, though, talks there merely about truth as *subsistence* of the correspondence between judgmental aiming and predicative state of affairs judged. That is all. The actual fact, then, is that nowhere in Heidegger do we find an unambiguous recognition that Husserl has a concept of truth as being in the sense of the evident appearance of a primordial pre-predicative intentional correlate in its actuality (*Wirklichkeit*, not *Substantivität* or *Substanzialität*). So, *PHCT*, §6.d.8 only *appears* as such a concession. The problem, then, remains: what is the meaning of truth in the non-relational, monothetic acts in Husserl's Phenomenology?<sup>51</sup>

### 7.7.3 *The Missing Solution in Heidegger's Treatment of Truth in Monothetic Acts*

Heidegger remarks that, in the above context, truth is examined in the context of "expressions or, in the broader sense, of objectifying acts" (*PHCT*, 54/73). But then, he immediately recognizes that in Husserl's Phenomenology, truth does

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<sup>50</sup>The first is produced by Heidegger's claim that even simple perception is categorially qua predicatively formed, but also that perceptual assertions cannot be fulfilled on the face of simple perception. We saw that this was dissolvable, if we accept the analyses in Sects. 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5. Meanwhile, we also confronted another potential contradiction. We saw that Heidegger claims both that the simply perceptual thing is constituted out of partial adumbrations (and other such parts), and that it is constituted according to a subject-and-predicate synthesis. We explained the point (pp. 225–6), so can let it pass here.

<sup>51</sup>I have shown this concept of truth in Husserl in Chaps. 4 and 5. See also §7.7.5 below. To be sure, we will see below how Dahlstrom suggests a "simple perception" understood as a single-layered act that offers its object in one stroke (see §7.7.3). It will turn out, though, that his suggestion doesn't work. See also Chap. 8, §8.3.1, of the present book.

not exclusively concern *relational* (*beziehende*), i.e., judgmental acts, but also the *monothetic* objectifying act of simple perception (and of simple nomination too). Nevertheless, having posed the question of whether *assertoric* truth is the primary phenomenon upon which we would seek an answer to the “fundamental question of the meaning of being” (54/73), Heidegger informs us that, according to him, the aforementioned distinctions in assertoric truth hold equally well for *all* objectifying acts; that is, for both the polythetic predicative-assertoric acts and the monothetic acts of “simple apprehension,” of “perception as such,” and of “the simple perception of something” (55/73). But, then, *what is the difference between polythetic and monothetic acts?*

We read in the same context that for Phenomenology, even monothetic acts can be true or false, since they can also be analyzed in the two intentional phases of ‘presumption’ and givenness of their intended objects. This means that, with this, a return to the Aristotelian conception of truth is made. Nevertheless, Husserl supposedly remained unaware of this fact, and thus only helped us to arrive at a better understanding of the scholastic idea of truth qua *adequatio intellectus et rei* and in freeing truth from its conception in terms of images (or representations) that correspond to the realities.<sup>52</sup>

However, Heidegger does not give us any separate clues with regard to the exact nature and content of an *empty monothetic* intentional act, or, more specifically, with regard to the kind of intentional forming or structuring in the constitution pertaining to *simple perception*. To the contrary, as he presents the matter, and as far as he speaks about perception as an intentional act, we are persistently guided to understand that even the—*mutatis mutandis*—‘empty’ monothetic act of perceptual aiming (noesis) is somehow structured according to the *predicative* scheme; a disturbing fact indeed.

Thus, Heidegger closes all the possible roads that could help his reader come to an understanding of the following two differences. Firstly, the difference in the relation between presumed and given in linguistic intentionality and in monothetic (pre-linguistic or simply nominative) perceptual intentionality; secondly, the difference in the inner constitution of the intuitively appearing perceived thing and of the equally intuitively appearing predicatively structured state of affairs.

Nowhere do we find an analysis of truth particularly related to perception as a monothetic act. Even though Heidegger assures us that what he has said applies equally to the case of empty intending and intuitional fulfillment in the sphere of monothetic acts, in acts of simple apprehension, etc., he nowhere gives us any further explanations or some example of this specific application. The truth of monothetic acts may thus be at best understood either in terms of the identification of the perceived with itself, as at first emptily intended in a linguistic empty intention

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<sup>52</sup>See 55/73. See also Chaps. 4 and 5 here. Regarding the importance of the issue under discussion here (monothetic perceptual intentionality in its relation to polythetic judgmental intentionality) for the development of Heidegger's treatment of the question concerning the meaning of Being, see Chaps. 8 and 9 of this book.

(perhaps by a subject-concept of a potential judgment), or in terms of the self-givenness of the perceived itself (self-identity of the predicatively formed object in an enduring act of perception). More specifically, Heidegger does not even say exactly whether his idea that perception is through and through categorially shaped (“we see what we say”) applies equally well in the case of *intentional* “simple apprehension” or *intentional* “simple perception”<sup>53</sup> (whatever this might be in the *PHCT*, since in his presentation of the different kinds of perception we do not come across anything like a perception different to that offered as a case of intuitional fulfillments in acts of linguistically structured empty intendings).

### 7.7.4 *The Non-solution in an Interpretation of Heidegger’s Silence on the Issue*

According to Dahlstrom’s views regarding our present concerns (presented above in §7.4.3), the problem we have been facing in the last few pages is actually due to Husserl’s clumsiness. Even though Husserl wanted and announced the possibility of truth in the sphere of monothetic acts like fully intentional perception (and nomination), he actually didn’t find a way to give us an intelligible or satisfactory account of it. Thus, the story goes, as Heidegger made clear to his students, the only fully intentional perception, i.e., (let us make it clearly explicit again) perception that can give its object in intuitional appearance or in truth (qua being or evidence), is the already categorially-predicatively structured perception. Any other talk of perception in Husserl necessarily remains outside the proper field of phenomenological descriptions, and is destined to account for an extra-phenomenological, pre-intentional, hypothetical sensation.

Again, the possibility of an intentional perception that constitutes its objects according to the general lines drawn earlier in this book (in Chaps. 4 and 5) is absent. I assume that the hindrance is precisely the non-obvious (until now) ‘truth-mechanism,’ so to say, in an intentional simple perception as monothetic (non-relational) act. But is it true that Husserl actually has no idea of how to develop a theory of truth capable of smoothly incorporating our intentional experience in monothetic acts like the—already legendary by now—intentional simple perception? What must be added here to the picture presented in Chaps. 4 and 5 is a more concrete hint about the monothetic truth-mechanism. But let us first do justice to Dahlstrom’s reading.

Dahlstrom writes that even though Heidegger in fact acknowledges Husserl’s distinction between relational (predicative) and non-relational acts, together with the latter’s idea that truth pertains also to non-relational monothetic acts (naming and perceiving), Husserl has nothing to say on where this difference lies. Following

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<sup>53</sup>Again, see below (§7.7.4). Dahlstrom suggests that a “simple perception” should be understood as a single-layered act that offers its object in one stroke. See the following sub-section.



Heidegger's reading of the relevant Husserlian ideas, Dahlstrom thinks that Husserl may indeed introduce this distinction, but that he does not offer any coherent account of how to *maintain* it. As we have twice seen, according to Dahlstrom, Husserl's confusion arises due to his not paying attention at another point in the development of his theory, namely in his thesis that a nominal object is derived from the "states of affairs to which it belongs. [...] [N]on relational acts of naming [...] 'emerge' from the perception of a state of affairs that can itself be elaborated in the form of a *judgment*" (2001, 72; emphasis added). Thus, the idea is that we are in fact guided by Husserl to realize that *intentional* life as a whole is through and through predicatively formed, regulated by predicative syntheses and, accordingly, if we are to look at the side of fulfillments, by *categorial qua predicative intuition*.

Dahlstrom does not see any possibility for an unproblematic, judgmentally-free concept of truth in monothetic acts. As we repeatedly read, Husserl falls prey to what Dahlstrom calls "the logical prejudice." The logical prejudice here means that in Husserl, truth is in the end "preeminently propositional or at least equivalent to the truth of an assertion or judgment" (2001, 131), and understood as dependent on the realization of a fulfilling intention, which "is itself the intuitive identification of something *on hand* [*vorhanden*] as that upon which the truth of an assertion typically depends" (2001, 130; first emphasis added).<sup>54</sup> This means that Husserl cannot avoid the presupposition of a (predicative) categorial intuition in his characterization of truth.<sup>55</sup> Thus, at the point where he dedicates some further pages to the issue of the viability of Husserl's distinction between simple sensory perception and categorial intuition, Dahlstrom complains about the cursed and notorious obscurity of Husserl's relevant analyses.<sup>56</sup>

Nonetheless, when it comes to Husserl's explicit teaching that categorial acts are *themselves* founded acts, Dahlstrom explains that what stands as the necessary *foundation* of the categorial acts is *simple straightforward* perception. And what he means by the latter is an act in which what is intuited, i.e., the perceptual object, appears such that "no relation is determined within it nor is it related to anything else" (2001, 82). But, again, if *there is* such a perception, on what grounds

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<sup>54</sup>On this, see also his 2001, 105ff, 131, 139ff. This means that according to Heidegger and Dahlstrom, Husserl was caught in the web of the understanding of Being as constant presence, i.e., as *Vorhandenheit*. In order to be accurate here, I must say that Dahlstrom does express some reservations with regard to Husserl's supposed entrapment within the understanding of Being as presence, as on-handness (e.g., 2001, 140). However, he does not work out any clear account of a Husserlian answer to the corresponding criticisms of Heidegger. On the contrary, time and again, Dahlstrom decisively follows Heidegger in attributing the "logical prejudice" to Husserl.

<sup>55</sup>See, e.g., 2001, 74.

<sup>56</sup>See 2001, 84ff. We see, then, how important an adequate understanding of Husserl's concepts of truth is, and especially his concept of *truth as being*, which is intimately connected with what is truth in the sphere of monothetic acts like perception and naming. It is on this, precisely, that we can base our understanding of the role categorial intuition seems to have played in Heidegger's development. But to this (and on its hermeneutic nature) we will return in Chaps. 8 and 9 (see also §7.4 below).

can one claim that perception is through and through permeated by categorial intuition? Dahlstrom, drawing upon Heidegger's views,<sup>57</sup> claims that what Husserl meant with the simplicity and straightforwardness of perception proper refers only to the fact that this perception—in contradistinction to the 'hypothetical,' non-intentional, pre-predicative, speculative sensation of real contents (referred to above)—is a single-layered act that offers its object as a homogenous unity that is presented immediately (in one stroke).<sup>58</sup> That is, simplicity and straightforwardness of perception are explained only with respect "to [merely] the manner of givenness and *not* [to] *the make-up* of the given object itself" (2001, 82). The intentional perceptual thing introduced here by Dahlstrom, as a foundation of the founded (to be sure) categorial acts, is actually structured in a predicative manner, but is now taken in a simple and straightforward way, which supposedly means that its actual internal structuring is left unnoticed; a move that supposedly makes this structure fade away.

This explanation, though, cannot be considered satisfactory. It suffers from at least two serious flaws. First, the non-relatedness (inner and outer) or monotheticity, single-rayedness, etc., is one thing; straightforwardness or immediateness, etc., is another. The only way to bring together these two views regarding simple perception (non-relatedness and straightforwardness) with Heidegger's claim that "we see what we say" is the one offered here in §7.3. In fact, Dahlstrom is forced to add, in passing, the remark referred to earlier in §7.3 (but not also in the *PHCT*) that "the categorially perceived [predicatively, after all, constituted perceived thing qua] state of affairs is *experienced* but *not grasped*, not 'thematized' in the simple, founding perception" (2001, 84; emphasis added). The second and most serious flaw in this suggestion is that it commits the *petitio principii*. The suggestion here boils down to the idea that what founds the categorial acts, i.e., most of all the very judgments, is a perceptual object that is in fact already made up in a judgmental way, even though it is now supposedly grasped in one stroke (simply and straightforwardly). Otherwise put, even though it is acknowledged that categorial acts are founded on simple straightforward perception, the latter is actually said to arise out of a modification of the former.

Unfortunately, Dahlstrom's treatment of Husserl's idea of acknowledging the possibility of truth even in monothetic acts—basically, simple perception and nomination—suffers from a clear miss. He does not really appreciate the situation that with the idea under discussion here, Husserl radically breaks with the tradition on the issue of truth, i.e., from what Dahlstrom calls "logical prejudice" (a conception of Being as presence and the idea that any positing of an objectivity is only possible by means of a judgmental synthesis). He does not reach a clear

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<sup>57</sup>Dahlstrom 2001, 80ff. For this view, Heidegger refers us to Husserl's *LU II/2*, 145ff (*PHCT*, §6.b.β).

<sup>58</sup>See Dahlstrom 2001, 82, where he refers to *PHCT*, §6.b.β, where the internal tensions in Heidegger's presentation of simple perception, sensory perception, and already categorially pervaded simple perception culminate. The same hold for Øverengen 1998, 44ff, 57ff.

view of the fact that Husserl in fact elucidates and extends, in an innovative and path-breaking manner, Aristotle's remark regarding the fabled infallibility of the sensory experience of the proper sensibles and of *apprehensio simplex*. With his idea of truth in the sense of being, even simple and genuinely monothetic perception (that of our Chaps. 4 and 5) can be a truth-claiming intentional act! Its object is given as being, in the sense of "truly given," or of truly appearing-as-it-was-and-is-being-intended. Relying on what was said in Chap. 4, we can also add: as it was interpretively projected by the perceptual sense (*Wahrnehmungssinn*) on the basis of its adumbration that is at each time actually offered for such a perceptual interpretation.

### 7.7.5 *The Hermeneutic Nature of Truth in Perception as Genuinely Monothetic Act*

Only the following remains to be said. It is surely the case that truth, in the case of perception as a clearly monothetic act, creates a mystery mostly due to a double paradox. The first is that in a thusly considered perception, it is not at all clear *what exactly it is to noetically aim* in perception, in order for someone to noematically check whether this is or is not the case. The second is that, as has already been explained, perceptual intentionality is *always already fulfilled!* Nevertheless, the "phenomenological secret," as it were, that solves this paradox, is Husserl's discovery of the inner transitory "distance" within the perceptual act between the empty phase and the fulfilling phase. There are suggestions in Husserl's writings that this paradox had perplexed him for a long time, and that he was continuously trying to find a clear way to put it, etc. I have already (in Chap. 2) given the basic layout of the way Husserl treats these folds of the problem in his theory of intentional and perceptual constitution. There, I emphasized the fact that the scheme of his general theory of constitution is interpretative or, as we may also say, *hermeneutic*. We saw what this means in terms of perceptual constitution through the analyses of the passages (in Chaps. 2, 4, and 5) where Husserl explicates how he understands *perceptual sense* as a rule for the intentional constitution of appearing perceptual things.

A notable exception to the still attractive fashion for the (previously mentioned) appropriation of Husserl's path-breaking connection of truth to simple perception is Caputo's *Radical Hermeneutics* (1987).<sup>59</sup> In Phenomenology, hermeneutics is

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<sup>59</sup>See especially his Chap. 2. On the hermeneuticity of Husserl's account of the intentionality of perception, we also find remarks made by Dastur. However, she suggests that the structure of perceiving is already in itself hermeneutical because it demands a surplus of meaning, which, as she sees it, is a surplus of "categorical forms" (1991, 50). According to our presentation here, though, this 'surplus'—necessary for the constitution and appearing of the perceptual thing—is not categorial; at least not in the sense that the "logical prejudice" would be willing to maintain.

not a cluster of ideas and schemes first invented by Heidegger. Heidegger was of course the first in Phenomenology to see the importance of Husserl's discoveries for hermeneutics. Outside Phenomenology, though, Dilthey had already understood this importance, and had spent a good deal of time studying the *LI*. Caputo rightly traces the history of phenomenological hermeneutics back to Husserl's theory of perception. In fact, as we will see in Chap. 8, this is Husserl's idea that can contribute to a better understanding of Heidegger's novel treatment of the question of Being. Heidegger does not refer to Husserl's theory of *perceptual* truth (neither in the here developed sense, nor on *his* own understanding of it) as his source of inspiration. He explicitly refers only to Husserl's teaching on categorial intuition (basically, of predicatively constituted states of affairs). This absence of any reference to perception is probably due to the following two factors. First, Heidegger does not make this connection, because in attributing to Husserl the view that even perception is permeated by categorial *structure* as he does, he chooses to talk about the supposedly universal phenomenon, rather than about one of its exemplifications (perception). Secondly, Heidegger wanted to decisively disentangle any trace of his truly hermeneutic view of pre-predicative intentional constitution and truth from Husserl's theory of perception in order to secure that the difference and novelty of his own approach could in no way be connected with any suspicion that its core could be somehow found also in the latter's original phenomenological teachings. Certainly, the fact that Heidegger was truly the first phenomenologist to comprehend the full hermeneutic impact of Husserl's original discoveries gives him some right to act accordingly.

We will probably never learn which of these alternatives supplies us with the real reason why Heidegger chose to talk about Husserl's discovery of categorial intuition of synthesis, i.e., of judgmental intentionality, as his sole source of inspiration. For our present philosophical purposes, it suffices to have elucidated the original possibilities and their true potential.

## 7.8 A Word on Phenomeno-logy's Sought-for λόγος ἀλαθής

To be sure, according to Husserl, in perception there is more than what is simply sensed. Indeed, Husserl tells us that in the constitution of the perceived, more than the sensible plays a part. Monotheticity or one-rayedness do not mean single-contentness and unstructuredness. They only mean comprehension of the structured parts in their unitary wholeness. Again, structuredness in such a whole does not mean judgmental categoriality. In the perceived there are connections, or a formation holding together its parts (starting from its adumbrations and ending, possibly, at its notorious *Emfindungsdaten*). We saw that primordial perceptual structuredness is a hermeneutic interrelatedness of sensory parts (simple or more complicated) on the basis of pre-predicative and pre-logical relations. However, one cannot claim that an assertion, e.g., "the chair is yellow," finds its complete

fulfillment on the face of a thusly understood pre-assertively structured perceived thing. The serious reason for this is that the linguistic assertion does not speak about *those* connections. It speaks about connections of a completely different sort, namely the copula as capable of connecting subjects and predicates, etc. An assertion in the context of language, qua thematizing medium, obeys the laws of Formal Logic and of Grammar (of a given language). For example, Husserl writes that the members of a set, which are brought and held together by the logical “and,” do not unifyingly participate in the set in the same way that the parts of a sensuous whole participate in that sensuous whole.<sup>60</sup> In the latter case, we have ‘interior’ relations pertaining to the sensuous syntheses of partial coincidence, whereas in the former the members are related in an ‘external’ way that is formal-syntactical. We have also seen in the foregoing chapters and sections that neither Indo-European nor Universal Grammar connects the themes it linguistically focuses upon in the original perceptual thing in the precise way that these themes participate in the originally perceived thing. We could say here that an assertion ‘posits’ exactly logico-discursive connections, whereas the connection of the perceived as such are metaphysical-synthetic (as to their nature) or aesthetico-intuitional (as to their applicability and result).

The parts, moments, portions, etc., to which Heidegger refers as standing already there in our merely sensory perceptual object in their real relations are not already articulated in the form of an “*S* is *p*.” Something analogous holds for what we here referred to as intentional or appearing pre-predicatively constituted simple perceptual things. All the parts, moments, portions, etc., involved in these two latter cases may already be pre-formed according to some functions of the vaguely understood type ‘and,’ ‘or,’ etc. As I claimed earlier, in §7.6.3, these articulating functions are not from the very start of our perceptual intentional life logico-grammatical; they are at first *metaphysical-intuitional, pre-logical or proto-logical*. The way color is always already connected with extension, the way an adumbration is always already connected with another adumbration in the unity of the one appearing perceptual thing is not a (predicative) logico-grammatical way.<sup>61</sup>

If this is the case, then we understand that our perceptual assertions do not quite adequately correlate to the primordially appearing in simple perception. Linguistic description talks about this originally appearing being in a way that does not perfectly match that which it allegedly describes. Here, I do not mean the discrepancy between our linguistic description and what has already been isolated in the originally perceived in order to become a part in the predicative state of affairs. That is, I am not referring to the categorial surplus ‘above’ the sensory cores

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<sup>60</sup>*EJ*, 248/296–7; see also *ibid.*, §43.d. See also the reference in note 37 above.

<sup>61</sup> Things with Husserl are of course always hard. What, in his third LI (in the analyses concerning the connection between color and surface), Husserl calls “categorial form” (i.e., not real, sensorial) has nothing to do with what this very expression means in the context of his sixth LI, where he contraposes categorial and sensuous forms (what has been projected by a thematizing linguistic consciousness). On this, see also Chap. 6, §6.3 and, more specifically, note 17.

of the predicative state of affairs. I am referring to the discrepancy between our linguistic description and the perceptual primordially appearing whole. So, here is the problem. If any linguistic thematization is doomed to fall short of the primordial phenomena, then how can Phenomenology claim that it faithfully elucidates the original phenomena it discovers? How can Phenomenology claim to be able to articulate a *logos alathēs* (λόγος ἀλαθήης), a discourse that does not miss its intended mark, a language of truth, with reference to the original and primordial phenomena it claims to have disclosed?

Of course, at this point we have reached the starting point of analytic philosophy. For it, language with its logical and grammatical theory is our ultimate ground of communication and understanding, and also our ultimate means for accessing the phenomena and treasuring their cognitive content. Language is the universal medium. For Phenomenology, though, this stance amounts to the joke about the drunk's lost key and the available light on the post. So, it is something of a wager to see what Phenomenology can actually achieve in its effort to go in search of the lost key, rather than to stay content under the light.

Heidegger, we may also say, already projects linguistic forms in the sphere of sensory intuition, because he cannot see how else someone could make perceptual *Phenomeno-logy*, i.e., articulate and express a *logos* about what is experienced in sensory intuition and also remain *faithful to the things themselves*. From a Husserlian point of view, though, it is wrong to specify the intentional perceptual field in terms of cognitive judgmental formations. Beneath (as it were) the predicatively-formed re-experiencing of the perceptual at the level of the thematic states of affairs, the perceptual is constituted on the basis of formations quite different from those of judgments.

This, however, does not mean that, e.g., perception's formative functions and the respective perceptual forms cannot be put into words in an appropriate syntax and grammar. Thus, normally, a Phenomenology adequate to the primordial phenomena it wants to describe (e.g., perception in Husserl and tool givenness in Heidegger) has to 'light up' the corresponding formations in their original structuring, and discover the appropriate terminology, syntax and grammar, in order to let it appear in language for what it itself is as such.<sup>62</sup> Husserlian phenomenology of perception, in particular, must properly adhere to that level of experience: at the level of

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<sup>62</sup>Recall Heidegger's urgent forewarning for Phenomenology's necessity of a new Grammar at the close of §7 in *BT*. It is interesting that this understanding of the whole issue is also transferred to *Being and Time*, where it creates difficult problems; for one, at the point where Heidegger has to keep apart the ways in which ready-to-hand and present-at-hand beings are structured. For him, the perceptual field is already permeated by the cognitive judgmental linguistic form "*S is p*," which reflects the corresponding understanding of "Being" in terms of constant presence. (We saw Dahlstrom including this in "the logical prejudice.") The field of tool-givenness, on the other hand, is structured in a different mode corresponding to the concerned hermeneutic "as." How should a phenomenologist testify or report the content of these two very different experiences? For the former, he can use familiar categoric-predicative language. But in what language can someone 'speak the' latter experience and what happens in it? For Heidegger's attempted solution, see also Chaps. 8 and 9.

simple perception (before it has *re*-appeared—accordingly transformed this time—at the level of thematic, predicative linguistic consciousness). Its descriptions must find their fulfillments at the ultimate level of perception proper, not at that of a predicatively structured state of affairs. But what are we supposed to do until the discovery of such a language or expressive medium? And what if no such medium is possible? As we will see in Chap. 9, Heidegger desperately tried to find solutions in this direction. It is questionable, though, whether they can be said to have succeeded.

It may be true that the sought-for terminology, syntax and grammar that is *denotative, mirror-like and literal* is simply a myth, and we can only refer to the original phenomena in the *indicative* and *metaphorical* way we already use (the judgmental predicative). Phenomenology would then have to be satisfied with having and using the available connections as carriers or ‘hosts’ in order to transfer the ‘appearingly’ structured content from the sensory intuitional field to linguistic understanding and communication.

Nonetheless, even if some phenomenologists do, in the future, manage to build a really literal language for adequately phenomeno-logizing the perceptual as such (or any other primordial experience), this would be no reason to conclude that “we see what we say.” One can say whatever one likes, even syntactico-grammatically perfect utterances, without being in the position to intuit (to see) what is said, without *Bedeutung* in Kant’s sense of the term. Aristotle’s remarks in the mottos of this chapter also make this clear. Without sensory content and without perceptual intentionality, i.e., without suitable interpretation into appearing transcendent unities, no possibility of seeing and hearing (and, for that matter, *no possibility of language itself*) would be possible. Since the sphere of the non-logico-categorical (or, more narrowly put, of non-predicative) intuition seems to have a life of its own, which enjoys precedence with regard to our intellectual-reflective capability, the achievement under discussion in these closing lines would simply show that the phenomenologist would have managed to *actually* “say what we (already) see.” Until then, perceptual life as such will always be the pre-expressive but still vivid primordial horizon, within which we first have something like a sentient experience of appearing beings in a world, and upon which all the rest of our possibilities for intentional correlation rely for their actualization.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>63</sup>This chapter is based on a paper I presented at the Husserl Circle meeting of 2007 that was held in Prague. I would like to thank the participants of the session for their patience and their questions, from which I have benefited a lot. I especially thank Steven Crowell, for his meticulous commentary and his erudite remarks.

## Part IV

# Heidegger's Advancement and Course

[I]t remains the exclusive privilege of the greatest thinkers to let themselves be influenced. The small thinkers, by contrast, merely suffer from constipated originality, and hence close themselves off against any influx coming from afar. (M. Heidegger: *WCT*, 95/99)

*Husserl* gave me eyes [die Augen hat mir *Husserl* eingesetzt]. (M. Heidegger: *OHF*, 4/5; transl. md.)

In the final hours of the seminar, I publicly burned and destroyed the *Ideas* to such an extent that I dare say that the essential foundations for the whole [of my work] are now cleanly laid out. (M. Heidegger: letter to K. Löwith from February 20, 1923, cited in *PTP*, 17)



## Chapter 8

# Husserl's Doctrine of "Categorial Intuition" and Heidegger's *Seinsfrage*

Beyng prevails as the essence of the difference; such Beyng [...], prior to the difference, is the event [*Ereignis*] and for this reason *without* beings. (M. Heidegger: *P*, 374 n. a)

Being never prevails [...] without beings, [...] a being never is without Being. (M. Heidegger: *P*, 233)

### 8.1 Introduction

Even in the relatively recent literature on the issue of the philosophical relation between Husserl and Heidegger, some scholars recognize that despite a large number of very good accounts, the darkness surrounding the matter has not yet been totally lifted. In particular, we still lack a complete account of the exact influence that Husserl's Phenomenology exerted on Heidegger's project of a Fundamental Ontology. To use, e.g., Dahlstrom's wording, until now, the available works on this subject "merely provide *points of departure* for an explanation of the relation between the two phenomenologists" (Dahlstrom 2001, 142 n. 103; emphasis added).

The situation is, of course, somewhat awkward, since Heidegger himself not only admitted his debt to Husserl's philosophy, but also sometimes tried to guide us through the inner itineraries of this debt. In his *Ontology: the Hermeneutics of Facticity* (SS 1923), Heidegger admitted, in front of his students, that it was Husserl who gave him his philosophical eyes: "*die Augen hat mir Husserl eingesetzt*" (GA 63, 5). There are many occasions on which Heidegger thematizes his debt to Husserl's Phenomenology.<sup>1</sup> Two years later, in his *Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time* (SS 1925), he introduced his students to what he presented as the "three fundamental discoveries" of Husserl's Phenomenology: intentionality,

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<sup>1</sup>Dahlstrom (2001) and Taminioux (1985), e.g., cite a sufficient anthology of such occasions.

the doctrine of categorial intuition, and the phenomenological sense of the a priori, thereby publicly acknowledging his admiration for Husserl's work.<sup>2</sup> Both there and in *BT*,<sup>3</sup> (1927) as well as in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (SS 1927), Heidegger constantly acknowledges the decisive dependence of his philosophy on Husserl's thinking.

In other texts, Heidegger is even more specific as regards the exact content of this debt. In his "*Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie*" (1963), he says:

As I myself practiced phenomenological seeing, teaching and learning in Husserl's proximity after 1919 [...] my interest leaned anew toward the *Logical Investigations*, above all the sixth investigation in the first edition. The distinction which is worked out there between sensuous and categorial intuition revealed itself to me in its scope for the determination of the 'manifold meaning of being.' (*TB*, 78/98)

Some 10 years later, in his last seminar at Zähringen (1973), he reiterates that "In order to unfold the question concerning the meaning of Being, Being must be *given* in order to inquire after its meaning" (*FS*, 67/116); this is something that, as Heidegger says, was secured by Husserl's *Phenomenology* of the sixth *LI* and the doctrine of "categorial intuition."

All the available textual evidence, then, makes clear that Heidegger considered the doctrine of *categorial intuition*, developed in the sixth *LI*, as the most decisive influence from Husserl on his own thought (with intentionality and the phenomenological a priori following closely). Now, what precisely is the meaning of this influence? How might that Husserlian doctrine have helped Heidegger shape the way in which he treated the sole concern of his entire philosophical career, namely the question of Being (*Seinsfrage*)?

In what follows, I will try to articulate a few thoughts on this special issue of the significance of Husserl's categorial intuition on Heidegger's strategy and tactics in dealing with the *Seinsfrage*.

Of course, it must be admitted that if this issue is examined against the backdrop of some of the most influential literature on Husserl and Heidegger produced in the second half of the previous century and in the first decade of the present one, it becomes very difficult to see how we could be really enlightened. For Husserl is said to have developed a *Phenomenology* that, in comparison with Heidegger's *Phenomenology*, is blind with regard to the ontological difference, that is less radical, that uncritically accepts the privilege of *Vorhandenheit* in its understanding of Being, and that is combined with an attempt at an ultimate grounding in an immanent consciousness, etc. This, the respective scholars say, is due to the fact that Husserl considered knowing, theoretical cognition, as the intentional phenomenon par excellence.<sup>4</sup> In the end, Husserl's supposed entrapment within the traditionally 'evident' understanding of Being as *Vorhandenheit* prevented him from posing the

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<sup>2</sup>*PHCT*, 121/168.

<sup>3</sup>*BT*, e.g., [MR] 62/38, [MR] 490 n. x/50 n. 1.

<sup>4</sup>See for example, Taminioux 1985, 93.

philosophical arch-question of the meaning of "Being."<sup>5</sup> If Husserl was not simply the example of what a phenomenologist must avoid, in what sense might he have been of any help in Heidegger's development?

Moreover, as Heidegger tells us in his "*Mein Weg*," he tried to find an answer to the question regarding the possibility of a single unitary meaning of Being against the Aristotelian multiplicity of its senses presented by Brentano, when, during his first semester at the university (1909–1910), he found, on the shelves of the university library, a seemingly very promising work by a student of Brentano's; it was Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (1900–1901). Even though he did not find any immediate way of answering his first question, he was fascinated by that work, and he kept reading it again and again. Heidegger nonetheless wants us to understand that whereas the *LI* was neutral as to the issue of whether Phenomenology bases its analyses upon subjectivity or not, *Ideas I* (1913) makes an explicit turn toward a Cartesian *ego cogito* (by means of 'the' phenomenological reduction). From Heidegger's point of view, this move reduced the Being of beings to an objectivity grounded or constituted in and by an absolute subjectivity.<sup>6</sup> But, as we know from *BT*, despite all these faults in Husserl's thinking regarding Being and the metaphysics of humanness, Heidegger remained fascinated, and did after all manage to make radical progress from the initial reception of the question of Being (from Brentano's dissertation) toward the question of the meaning of Being in *BT*.

Thus, the following question emerges. If, as the aforementioned points show, an abyss yawns between the philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger, will it be of any help to try to understand the possible sense of Heidegger's own claims regarding the significance that Husserl's Phenomenology had for the development of his (Heidegger's) *Seinsfrage*? Phenomenology's internal clarity depends on deciphering these claims. We have to try to overcome the seeming awkwardness of the situation. It is Heidegger himself, after all, who somehow assigns us the duty of walking further in this direction. In *BT*, at the end of the exposition of the question of the meaning of Being, we read that "the following investigation would not have been possible without the foundation laid by Edmund Husserl, with whose *Logical Investigations* Phenomenology achieved a breakthrough" (*BT*, 34/38).

In previous chapters, we have already discussed whether Husserl considered theoretical consciousness to be the exemplary form of intentionality, and how Husserl actually understood transcendental subjectivity and its constituting functions. In this chapter, the analysis will focus on the teachings of the *LI* that were a source of fascination for Heidegger from his first reading until the years of his first teaching assistance under Husserl in 1919, and even much later. That is, we will turn to *categorial intuition*, which, in its difference from sensuous intuition, "revealed" to Heidegger "its scope for the determination of the 'manifold meaning

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<sup>5</sup>See Taminioux 1985, 95.

<sup>6</sup>Taminioux accepts these points of Heidegger's (see Taminioux 1985, 96–7). I must, of course, remind the reader at this point of the relevant analyses of these issues, developed in the previous chapters of the present book.

of Being'” (*TB*, 78/98). The question that still remains to be answered is this: how did the core phenomenological teaching of categorial intuition form the 'ground' for Heidegger's *Seinsfrage*? In the end, we will have certainly moved one step further toward overcoming Phenomenology's original divide, and we will have come closer to a Normalized Phenomenology.

Another issue that must be dealt with at this early stage is the following. In his “*Mein Weg*” Heidegger reports that his quest of Being started after reading (1907) Brentano's dissertation, *On the Manifold Meaning of Being in Aristotle* (1862). The first shape of his *Seinsfrage* was: “If a being is predicated in manifold meanings, then what is its leading and fundamental meaning?” (*TB*, 74/93). Heidegger then adds that during the final years of the period during which he was busy with the *LI* (1919), he also started studying “the Greeks” (*TB*, 78/97). As he witnesses, he then realized that Aristotle and Greek thinking in general had thought more originally what in Husserl's Phenomenology is thematized as a “self-manifestation of phenomena” in the acts of intentional consciousness. This is done through the concept of truth as ἀ-λήθεια, “as the unconcealedness of what is present, its being-revealed, its showing itself.” Thus, Heidegger arrived at the question:

whence and how is it determined what must be experienced as ‘*die Sache selbst*’ in accordance with the principle of Phenomenology? Is [this ‘*Sache selbst*’] consciousness and its objectivity [revealed by means of ‘the’ phenomenological reduction] or is it rather the Being of beings [which, meanwhile, is considered not simply as a meaning, but] in its *unconcealedness and concealment*. (*TB*, 79/99; emphasis added)

Starting from this latter point, Taminiaux treats the whole problem as one of explaining the role Husserl played in the commencement of Heidegger's *Seinsfrage* in the unconcealedness/concealment form.<sup>7</sup> This basically means that in our efforts to understand the sense of Husserl's influence on Heidegger's treatment of the *Seinsfrage*, we can hope for some helpful indications on Heidegger's part only if we consider the texts he wrote *later* than *BT*. As I see it, though, Husserl's categorial intuition has nothing decisive to do with that form of the question. The indications we have, though, suggest that Husserl's categorial intuition played a crucial role in Heidegger's elaboration of the Being-question *toward* and *until* *BT*. This later development of the unconcealedness/concealment scheme will not occupy us any further in this chapter. We will, however, return to this issue in Chaps. 9 and 10.

In the following, then, I will try to offer an answer to the issue posed in the title of this chapter, by taking into serious consideration the indications Heidegger himself showed us. First, with the latter in mind, I will sum up what Husserl's doctrine of categorial intuition consists in (§8.2). Then, I will examine some of the key ideas offered in the readings of those scholars who have dealt with the issue under discussion (§§8.3 and 8.4). After this, I will direct my attention to several points in Heidegger's mature work (*BT*) that give us a fairly clear picture of the way he was trying to approach the issue of Being, taking Husserl's teaching of categorial

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<sup>7</sup>Taminiaux 1985, 97–8.

intuition as his point of departure (§§8.5 and 8.6). Finally, I will try to articulate my view of how we could further advance our understanding of the question examined here (§§8.7 and 8.8).

## 8.2 Husserl's Discovery of Categorial Intuition

Since it is Heidegger himself who openly admits the influence that Husserl's categorial intuition exerted upon his way of grasping the question of Being, should we rely on Husserl's presentation of that notion, or should we rather appeal to Heidegger's own reconstruction of the same notion in his *PHCT*? Of course, in order to answer to this question, we need to know whether Heidegger's reconstruction differs drastically from Husserl's original presentation.

I think that one difference between these primary sources lies in the fact that, as we saw in Chap. 7, Heidegger makes the very strong claim that categoriality permeates the whole range of intentionality. This claim is so strong because, in the end, it means that even simple perception is categorially-qua-predicatively structured. With this claim, Heidegger immediately locates simple perception in the context of theoretical consciousness, and opens up the way for his discovery of a supposedly more originally primordial intentionality, namely, that of everyday coping with equipment.

Another deviation from the original spirit of Husserl's *Phenomenology* is Heidegger's insistence that categorial forms are not in any way the result of a projection on the part of a transcendental consciousness. As we will see, this claim results from a mistaken emphasis on Husserl's analysis of intentionality and the methodology of the reductions.<sup>8</sup> With this claim, though, Heidegger prepares the ground for his novel approach to the question of Being, even in *BT*.

Apart from these ominous indications, Husserl's original presentation can also help us see many possible characteristics of categorial intuition that Heidegger never brought explicitly to the fore to his own exclusive audiences and readers. Thus, in our effort to elucidate the key issue, we will at first focus on Husserl's presentation, keeping always an eye on Heidegger's differentiations and departures from both the letter and the spirit of Husserl's doctrine.

The sixth LI is dedicated to a "phenomenological elucidation of knowledge." Truth, the central problem of that investigation, is treated there as a matter of the intuitional fulfillment of what is at first emptily intended in a meaning act. For

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<sup>8</sup>One may of course wonder how Heidegger's insistence (intended not as a criticism of Husserl's *Phenomenology*, but, rather, as a supposedly faithful reconstruction of his teacher's thought) could be coherently combined with his other claim—to be found also in his *PHCT*—that Husserl's *Phenomenology* is still caught in the web of traditional subjective metaphysics. The answer is that Heidegger recognizes all these positive elements only within the context of Husserl's pre-transcendental *Phenomenology*, i.e., in the latter's *LI*. With his *Ideas I*, Husserl supposedly relapses into some kind of traditional subjectivism.

example, following the rules of Husserl's *Prolegomena* (1900) and the fourth LI for the phenomenologically acceptable meaning formations, i.e., for meaningful empty linguistic aimings, we may perform the empty significative act "the apple is red." For Phenomenology, if this meaning formation is to count as a carrier of the relevant knowledge, it must be found to be actually fulfilled by the intuitive givenness of the corresponding state of affairs "the-apple-is-red." But what does it mean, not for the sensorially intuitable apple itself, but for such a state of affairs to be intuitively given?

The epistemological tradition has recognized that intuition is the way in which we acquire consciousness or awareness of particular qualities and object-like entities. We may have a sensory intuition of that colored patch, or of that natural thing. Thus, in the context of the sixth LI, we may at least pretend that we can easily see the possibility of an intuitional fulfillment of the partial meanings "apple" and "red." It is difficult, though, to see in what sense partial meanings like "the," "is," etc., (which Husserl calls "categorial forms") can get such an intuitional fulfillment. The question, then, concerns what functions as the intuitional fulfillment of the meaning components corresponding to the "categorial forms." Chapter 6 of the sixth LI opens with this question: "What can and must furnish fulfillment for those aspects of meaning which make up propositional form as such, the aspects of 'categorial form' to which, e.g., the copula belongs?" (*LI*, 774/129).

Husserl's solution is to propose an expansion and upgrading of the notion of intuition. According to Husserl's Phenomenology, in addition to the intuition recognized by traditional epistemology, e.g., that of Kant, we can phenomenologically recognize that there is an intuition of the categorial forms themselves (firstly, together with the 'matters' they form)! This means that as intuitional givens, we may have not only the sensory red patches of the apple's currently offered surface or of the simply sensorially perceived apple itself as a perceptual whole, but also the specifically *predicatively* structured state of affairs "the-apple-is-red." What is given in this new intuition, the categorial intuition, is *the apple in its being red* or, more narrowly, the *being-red* of the apple.

With this move, which concerns categorial acts of synthesis,<sup>9</sup> Husserl sets the ground for a specifically phenomenological theory of knowledge, which manages to steer clear of the impasses, abstractions and gaps of the past, and to remain close "to the things themselves." For example, Husserl's Phenomenology seems to overcome impasses like that which arises in the traditional representational theory of knowledge ("if we actually have access only to our mental cognitive states, in what sense do our judgmental representations indeed correspond to the outer natural reality?"). The same happens with the abstraction connected with the fact that traditional epistemology transferred the whole issue of knowledge to the level of linguistic consciousness ("if our experience or knowledge is through and through

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<sup>9</sup>Analogous results are found with regard to categorial acts of ideation, in which we intuit not the thematically synthesizing categorial forms, but the *universals* (of both the pre-thematically intuited beings and the pure categorial forms). On this, see also Chap. 2, §2.6.1 here.

judgmentally formed, how can we know that our judgments can be actually exposed to some critical friction with something beyond themselves?”). The same holds as regards the gap between the linguistic claim to knowledge and the simply perceptual ultimate truth-maker (“how can we say that the *linguistic* judgment is justified on the face of some heterogenous natural *reality*, psychological or physical?”). At the same time, however, some additional, decisive and positive consequences are also achieved.

Firstly, with this solution, Husserl found a way to *de-psychologize* the epistemological ground of the most fundamental concepts in science and philosophy (“being,” “non-being,” “unity,” “number,” “ground,” “consequence,” “thing,” “identity,” “totality,” “set,” etc.). The source of these concepts was no longer to be found through reflection on the immanent psychologically occurrent acts of the knowing subject, but by direct intuition of the transcendently *appearing* or phenomenologically *given* objective reality and its equally objective categorial formations.<sup>10</sup>

Secondly, in making this move, Husserl also wanted to *de-naturalize* metaphysics. Reality, the meaningful milieu within which humans live and act, is not reducible to merely sensory conglomerations that interact mutually in a causal-mechanical way. For us, the appearing objective reality is itself constituted by various forming-relations; these are not sheer fictions, but are intuitable and subject to normative principles.

Given our knowledge regarding the priorities of Heidegger’s mature philosophy, it is no surprise that in the doctrine of categorial intuition, Heidegger himself acknowledged the central discovery of Husserl’s Phenomenology. In the following, we will see in what sense this is the case.

Before anything else, however, it is necessary to look briefly at the secondary literature, to see how this basic picture of Husserl’s path-breaking discovery is thought to have contributed to Heidegger’s formation and treatment of his *Seinsfrage*.

## 8.3 Overview of Key Approaches to the Question Under Discussion

### 8.3.1 Taminiaux’s View

With respect to the question that concerns us here, Taminiaux (1985) says that whereas Heidegger’s written work shows how the difference between sensuous and categorial intuition finally formed the ‘ground’ for the question of Being, there is

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<sup>10</sup>This, however, as we saw earlier (Chap. 7, §7.5) is not the whole story of the meaning of Husserl’s discovery of categorial intuition. This story lacks the correlational perspective that Husserl tried to establish after his realization of the epistemological shortcomings of his *Philosophy of Arithmetic*. We will say more on this point in §8.8.1 below.

some kind of further explanation to be found in Heidegger's *oral* work, namely, in his Zähringen seminar (1973). In that seminar, Heidegger tried to give a deeper explanation of his attempt to properly pose and pursue the *Seinsfrage* through Husserl. This was Heidegger's reaction to the question that Jean Beaufret posed to him: "To what extent may it be said that there is no question of Being in Husserl?"<sup>11</sup> According to the relevant protocols of that meeting, Heidegger responded in a two-fold manner.

Strictly speaking, he said, there is no such question in Husserl. Husserl raises strictly metaphysical questions, like that of the categories. Seen from a different angle, metaphysics seeks the being of beings. Heidegger, on the other hand, having managed to work at a level beyond metaphysics, seeks something like "the being of Being" or, better, "the truth of Being," where truth is meant to be understood in terms of the "safekeeping in which Being is sheltered as Being."<sup>12</sup>

Looked at more loosely, however, the question could be answered in a more positive manner. In that case, Heidegger adds, it could be said that with the notion of categorial intuition in Chap. 6 of the sixth LI, Husserl "touches upon, grazes ever so lightly, the question of Being."<sup>13</sup>

As Taminiaux reports, Heidegger's commentary on Husserl's theory of categorial intuition, although based on some citations from Chap. 6 of the sixth LI, "is not fully intelligible until it is related to the movement of the chapter as a whole" (1985, 106) (an effort in which Taminiaux engages at length). The participants of the seminar, moreover, were in agreement on something "surprising," namely "his discretion [...] in the dialogical movement of the seminar" (1985, 106). What is more surprising, though, is the explanation that Taminiaux proposes: this discretion "seemed to us to indicate, on the one hand a kind of modesty [sic!] in expressing the extent of insight that this fascinating text had exerted on him and, on the other hand, an invitation [sic!] to the participants, armed only with a few signs, to reconstruct on their own the path that led from Husserl's text to *Seinsfrage*" (1985, 106). But, was it simply about the take-home exam by a humble teacher?

Following Heidegger's remarks and indeterminate protreptic gesture, Taminiaux is convinced that in order to understand the path leading from Husserl's categorial intuition to the *Seinsfrage*, we should start from Heidegger's explanation of the difference between sensuous and categorial intuition. The idea is developed in two moves. Firstly, as Heidegger lets his audience at Zähringen understand, strictly speaking, *sensuous intuition*, in Husserl, is "not the perception of a thing, but rather the perception [*sensing*] of *sensory givens*, the affection of the hylé" (1985, 106).<sup>14</sup> The perceptual thing or object is not given in the hylé, and yet Taminiaux remarks

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<sup>11</sup>See Taminiaux 1985, 99.

<sup>12</sup>For all these, see *FS*, 64–5, and Taminiaux 1985, 99.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.* I think, however, that with regard to the issues bothering us here, the more accurate reference to the *LI* is given only in *BT* (406–7 n. 34/218 n. 1).

<sup>14</sup>In Chap. 7, we were led to the same conclusion on the basis of a thorough reading of Heidegger's *PHCT*. Chapters 4 and 5, however, show how misleading such a reading is.



that it is after all perceived. Appealing to Husserl via Heidegger, then, Taminaux writes “With the sensory givens in perception comes the appearance of an object” (1985, 106–7). As what does this appearing object ‘count,’ though? Under the influence of Heidegger, Taminaux writes that this perceptually appearing object is “according to the philosophical tradition, [...] a ‘substance’” (1985, 107; emphasis added) with this substance being recognized under its corresponding “category” (ibid.; emphasis added). But, as Heidegger insisted during the seminar, contrary to what is the case in Kant, Husserl “thinks of the categorial as a given [...] a being-present” (1985, 107). According to the protocols, although the category “substance” is neither a sensory given nor a perceptually appearing thing, it is something “without which I could see nothing at all” (1985, 107). In a similar phrasing “It is the substantiality in its non-[perceptual]-appearance which allows what appears to appear” (1985, 107). Secondly, Heidegger connects this substantial constitution and appearing of the thing with the verb “is.” “The ‘is’—by which I note the presence of the ink-well as object or substance—is ‘in excess’ [*Überschuß*] among the sensuous affections: the ‘is’ is not added to the sense-impressions, but is ‘seen,’ even if it is seen in a way other than that which is visible. In order to be seen thus, it is necessary that it be given” (FS, 66).<sup>15</sup> That is, according to Heidegger’s explanations at Zähringen, Husserl’s doctrine of categorial intuition meant that, e.g., in perception we do not just sense the hyletic data, but also intuit the substantiality (or “is”), qua form in the sense of “category,” in the perceived thing as substance (FS, 65–6).

Have we gained anything so far? Taminaux himself is reluctant to say that we have. “This commentary [by Heidegger] is discreet” (1985, 107). On the one hand, it just brings out Husserl’s notion of the categorial *Überschuß* (over the sensory content), connected in Heidegger with the existential “is.” On the other hand, however, this *Überschuß* of the existential “is” is connected with the category of *substance*.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup>See §8.8.1, where I analyse Heidegger’s objectivist obsession—stemming from his understanding of the famous passage of *LI*—“it is not in these acts as objects . . .” (*LI*, 783–4/141)—with the non-subjective source of the categorial in Husserl and of the ontological a priori in his thought.

<sup>16</sup>Note here that as we saw in Chap. 7, Heidegger does not exactly think that in Husserl we first have a conscious experience of the sensory perceptual appearance of a thing with the mere application of the category “substance” upon the merely lived-through sensory contents. How could this application be possible anyway? Substance would be applicable to something that remains constant throughout some change (to rely here tentatively on a basic explanation of that category). This does not apply to ‘single’ sensory contents (all of them are in flux), but only to a ‘common denominator of a cluster’ of them—but in what sense of the latter? Here is the crux of the matter. We saw in Chaps. 4, 5, and 6 how this could be meant in Husserl’s theory of simple perception. In Heidegger’s interpretation of Husserl, though, something gets constituted for the first time as ‘substance’ as soon as a judgmental-predicative form has articulated the lived-through sensory contents in a constant whole. This is why perception supposedly made the appearance of its object possible for the first time by being through and through categorial. So, in this context, “substance” means (or presupposes) at the same time “copula,” i.e., the categorial form of predicative synthesis.

Taminiaux, then, undertakes the task of “clarifying [...] Heidegger’s discretion.” The question he thinks he must ask is “in what sense was the discovery [of categorial intuition] an ‘essential stimulus’ for the formulation of the *Seinsfrage*?” (1985, 107). With the discovery of the *surplus of the categorial*, Heidegger told the audience of the seminar, Husserl did not give an exhaustive answer to the question of Being. What he did, however, was to elucidate an essential difficulty, stemming from the two-fold meaning of the word “see”: I may see this white paper, but “I do not see the substance [‘white paper’ ‘in’ it] ‘as’ I see [this] white paper” (1985, 107–8).<sup>17</sup> At this point, Taminiaux again observes that this remark by Heidegger is too “discreet” since, for Heidegger, the question is less about the excessiveness of substance with respect to sensory givens than it is about the excessiveness of *Being* over that which is.<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, Taminiaux argues, the reader of the *LI* can see that Husserl himself—as even Heidegger acknowledges at another point of the seminar (*FS*, 67)—freed Being from the context of judgment<sup>19</sup> and recognized the excessiveness of Being over that which is given in intuition. Husserl, of course, trapped within the sphere of theoretical intentionality as he was (according to Heidegger and the interpreters that follow him), did not manage to conceive of any meaning of Being other than that of *Vorhandenheit*, constant presence.<sup>20</sup> Be that as it may, though, it must have been this latter excessiveness of Being (qua *Vorhandenheit*) over “that which is” that motivated Heidegger’s fascination with the *LI*.<sup>21</sup> Thus, in the end, Heidegger makes clear that it was Husserl’s way of making Being present (“phenomenally present in the category,” i.e., showing that “Being is no mere [empty] concept, a pure abstraction obtained thanks to the work of [a speculative] deduction” as in Kant) that enabled Heidegger to discover the “ground” he had claimed to be seeking for his question of Being.<sup>22</sup>

Here is how Taminiaux summarizes the “ground” that Heidegger found in Husserl’s categorial intuition:

1. Husserl showed the excessiveness of Being as a category over “that which is”
2. Husserl conceived of it as that by virtue of which beings appear
3. Husserl recognized at it the status of an originary phenomenon, and thus

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<sup>17</sup>See also *FS*, 66.

<sup>18</sup>Taminiaux thinks that this transition from the thematic of substance to the thematic of Being is opaque, and thus problematic in Heidegger’s explanation (see also 1985, 109). See, however, also the second remark in the closing paragraphs of this subsection.

<sup>19</sup>For Taminiaux’s presentation of this point, see his 1985, 103 ff., especially 105. On this, see my second remark at the close of this subsection. See also Chap. 7, §7.7.2 and note 50.

<sup>20</sup>Taminiaux 1985, 94ff., 110ff. Of course, other commentators, such as Dahlstrom, think that Husserl never freed himself from the spell of the logical prejudice, i.e., from the traditional epistemological view that truth pertains only to the sphere of predicative judgments. This fact shows very clearly the confusion in the literature about the philosophical relation between Husserl and Heidegger.

<sup>21</sup>See Taminiaux 1985, 108.

<sup>22</sup>See *FS*, 67.

4. Husserl introduced (as it were) a fragile pre-Heideggerian version of the ontological difference.<sup>23</sup>

In response to this summary, the following two remarks (at least) are needed. Firstly, it seems to me that analyses of Husserl's influence on Heidegger's *Seinsfrage* that stop at Taminiaux's conclusions are condemned to provide us with only a vague hint of these constituents: (a) the a priori of Being, as the proper theme of philosophy, is not some other being given to the senses (either outer or inner), and (b) Phenomenology can be a non-speculative philosophy, since its theme, the a priori, can be an intuitionally given objectivity and not a concept-category that is argumentatively or speculatively (transcendentally, dialectically, or analytically) formed. But this is not enough.

Secondly, we saw (just above) that Heidegger acknowledges that Husserl "freed Being from the context of judgment." But how can Heidegger articulate a claim like this, and what does it mean? Isn't it the case that as we saw in Chap. 7, Heidegger himself told us that, at least in Husserl, all experiences are in fact permeated by a predicative categoriality ("we see what we say")? And doesn't it follow from Heidegger's reading of Husserl's supposed substantiality *Überschuß* (the surplus of the category "substance") that, after all, if the perceptually appearing thing is a substance, it is also constituted in terms of subject and predicate?<sup>24</sup>

To be precise, two possible ways of understanding "substance" must be taken into consideration, namely in the Kantian and the Aristotelian senses. In the Zähringen seminar, Heidegger explicitly poses it in the Kantian sense.

In such a case, we are led to see that not only the category or form "substance," in the sense of the *Überschuß* Being qua *Vorhandenheit*, but also the predicative form "... is ..." and its categorial intuition must have played a crucial role in Heidegger's approach to (and understanding of) the issues connected with the *Seinsfrage*. This situation manages to sustain either the mystery of whether Heidegger was influenced by a Husserlian categorial intuition of the existential or of the copulative "is,"<sup>25</sup> or the suspicion that Heidegger must have systematically

<sup>23</sup>See also Taminiaux 1985, 109ff.

<sup>24</sup>In his reading of Husserl, Heidegger equates these two seemingly different things, substance qua category and Being (qua category); he attributes this substantial-categorial conception of Being to Husserl (to the Husserl of both the *LI* and the *Ideas I*). Substance, i.e., οὐσία (ousia), is the way traditional metaphysics understood Being, that is, with the meaning of a being's constant presence. Thus, with respect to what he thinks he found in Husserl, Heidegger is quite 'clear and indiscreet' at this point. The question, of course, is how this supposed conception of the categorial in Husserl worked as an inspiration for Heidegger's radically non-metaphysical-categorial conception of Being. We will deal with this in the forthcoming sections.

<sup>25</sup>This situation is to be found also in Heidegger's analyses concerning the role perceivedness plays in the possibility of a Husserlian perceptual experience in his *BPP*. Characteristically articulated, Heidegger's idea is that "With respect to its possibility, *perceivedness is grounded in the understanding of presence-at-hand*. [Die *Wahrgenommenheit gründet* hinsichtlich ihrer Möglichkeit im *Verstehen von Vorhandenheit*]" (*BBP*, 71/101; transl. md.). See also, e.g., *BBP* 67-8/94-5, 70-1/99. This means that what Heidegger acknowledges as perception in Husserl should

downplayed and blurred the deeper core of the influence that Husserl's original discoveries had upon him.<sup>26</sup>

Taminiaux's reference to Heidegger's supposed acknowledgement that Husserl "freed Being from the context of judgment," however, drives us to the need to consider the possibility of understanding "substance" in the Aristotelian sense as well. To my knowledge, Heidegger unambiguously traces the possibility of experiencing truth outside judgment only in Aristotle. This happens in the latter's "simple sensory experience" (*schlicht sinnliche Vernehmen*) (*BT*, §§6–7; *PHCT*, §6.a.8). We know, nonetheless, that in Aristotle this clearly concerns the proper sensibles. This idea, of course, offers additional explanation for Heidegger's problematic reading (Chap. 7, Sect. 7.3) of Husserlian perception, but also raises further questions for his refusal to allow himself an understanding of the latter along the lines developed here (Chaps. 3, 4, and 5). Heidegger time and again blocks this way of understanding the matter. From 1925 (*PHCT*) through to 1973 (*FS*), Heidegger steadily projects onto Husserl a judgmentally permeated perceptual intentionality.<sup>27</sup>

In sum, we can say that according to Taminiaux's treatment of our question, Husserl contributes to Heidegger's *Seinsfrage* only in the sense that Husserl showed that the intuitional givenness of beings is only possible through the mediation of traditional categories or categorial forms, which are themselves not mere speculated or deduced concepts, but intuitable as phenomena.

### 8.3.2 Øverenget's Interpretation

Øverenget (1998) begins his interpretation with a standard account of the *supersensuousness* of the categorial elements that structure the intentional objects of higher-order, and the *intuitability* of these elements.<sup>28</sup> He does not thoroughly

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bring with it everything that Heidegger had connected *Vorhandenheit* with, i.e., the full package of "theoreticity." See Chap. 7 of the present book.

<sup>26</sup>By the way, if Heidegger indeed wanted to thus limit the content of the influence of Husserl's idea of the categorial intuition in terms of the *Überschuß* that the category "substance" in the Kantian sense represents, and especially as signifying the meaning "*Vorhandenheit*," then he should have spoken *not* of the (Kantianly) relational category "substance," but of the modal category "actuality" (*Wirklichkeit*). A careful reading of the schematization of the respective categories shows why. The category "substance" has a synthetic-formative function in Kant, and this function is expressed not by the meaning of *Vorhandenheit*, but by its organizing the sensory manifold in a representable manner, i.e., according to the semantic terms *subject* and *predicate* (or the metaphysical terms *substance* and *properties*). This is the meaning of the fact that "substance" is a relational category. In the context of that category, the synthesis of the manifold is achieved in time and in a representational manner. The way the experiencing subject comes to understand the thus synthesized being in the context of the forms of intuition, i.e., in space and basically in time, with reference to *himself* only, is determined by the modal category of actuality.

<sup>27</sup>See also Chap. 7, §7.7.2 and note 50; moreover, see §8.3.2 and note 31 below.

<sup>28</sup>Øverenget 1998, 36 ff.

distinguish the supersensuousness of the existential from the copulative “is,” and he accounts for the intuitability of the “is” in terms of “presencing.”<sup>29</sup> In a way that makes this evident, he follows Sokolowski’s presentation of Husserl’s categorial intuition, and writes that when we see, e.g., a red car, we grasp not only the car (which *is*) and the red (which *is*), but also the car’s *being* red (“the car *is* red”). That is, we intuitively grasp the *presencing* of the objective correlate of straightforward perception and (simultaneously, we must add) also a relation within the thing itself as a moment in it. Later on, we read that whereas the objective correlate of the straightforward—and, for him, already predicatively shaped—sense-perception is “a unitary real object,” the objective correlate of a categorial act is “the *unity* of the unitary real object” (1998, 46).

Thus, combining these two ideas, we can conclude that according to Øverenget, the meaning of categorial intuition in Husserl is that in it, we experience the presencing of the predicative unity of the object of a straightforward perception.

In the *PHCT*, though, Heidegger says something more. Husserl disentangles the mainly categorial “being” from its traditionally exclusive bond with judgment, and makes it not a correlate only of judgments but of all acts in which an object is given.<sup>30</sup> Moreover, Heidegger defines intuition as “simple apprehension of what is itself bodily [or ‘in person’] found just as it shows itself” (*PHCT*, 47). Intuition is normally accompanied by evidence of some degree, where evidence is nothing mystical or psychological, but only the “act of obtaining insight, as identifying fulfillment” (*PHCT*, 50) between what was at first empty intended and what is now intuitively given. In combination, these two things tell us that Husserl prepared Heidegger to see that there is a simple apprehension of the categorial that regulates the whole horizon of intentionality.

Heidegger also appropriates Husserl’s analyses concerning truth. In his *PHCT*, Heidegger presents us with a three-fold analysis of phenomenological truth.

1. From the side of the given objective correlate (*intentum*): adequation in the sense of the being-identical of the intended and the intuited.
2. From the side of the act of empty intention (*intentio*): the act-structure of evidence itself as this coincident identification.
3. The original conception of truth: the concretum of both the *intentio* and the *intentum*; truth as that which makes knowledge true. This latter notion of truth is recognized by Heidegger as truth in the sense of *being*, and he connects this with early Greek philosophy.<sup>31</sup>

However, a careful reading shows that not only the third but also the first two notions of truth have their own sense of truth *qua* being.<sup>32</sup> The first concept of truth means, e.g., the truly being of the being-yellow of that chair, i.e., it means the

<sup>29</sup>Øverenget 1998, 40, 42.

<sup>30</sup>Øverenget 1998, 47–8. Cf. also Chap. 7 and §§8.3.1 and 8.3.2 in the present chapter.

<sup>31</sup>See Øverenget 1998, 50f; and *PHCT* 51 ff. See also Chap. 7, §§7.4.3 and 7.7 in this book.

<sup>32</sup>*PHCT*, 53. Cf. Chap. 7, §7.7.4 in this book, especially the closing paragraph.

*subsistence* of the identity between what was at first presumed and then intuited. In other words, Being means being-real.<sup>33</sup> To the second concept of truth corresponds “being” in the sense of the copula; “being” as a *structural moment* of the state of affairs *itself*.<sup>34</sup> These two aspects of truth and the corresponding senses of “being” are always meant together as the *subsistence* and the *stasis* (*Bestand und Stehen*) of the judged-and-intuited state of affairs in the truth relation, i.e., of intentionality as such (*PHCT*, 54). The third concept represents a radicalization of the traditional concept of truth as adequation. As Husserl showed, evidence could no longer be considered as something related to assertions or judgments. As Heidegger puts it, Phenomenology breaks with the restriction of truth to relational acts (judgments). The truth of relational acts is only one particular kind of truth; the other is the kind of truth pertaining to non-relational, monothetic, or single-rayed acts.<sup>35</sup>

According to Øverenget, it is on the basis of all this that we gain a proper understanding of the nature of categorial intuition. While the first notion of truth emphasizes the traditional conception, the second is proper to Phenomenology. In the latter, we find “an emphasis on the *expression* being-*p* of *S*, in which the copula is considered a structural moment of *the state of affairs* itself. With this second concept of truth Heidegger indicates the direction in which he is moving. But this view is still too narrow, in that it focuses upon traditional [‘]acts of judgment[’]” (1998, 53; second emphasis added). To this, Øverenget adds that in order to see the full trajectory of Heidegger’s move, we must bear in mind his remark that the categorial applies or is to be found in the whole sphere of experience, even in everyday experience, perceptual or otherwise.<sup>36</sup>

Next, in the series of Husserlian ideas regarding the categorial, which must have contributed to Heidegger’s development and treatment of his *Seinsfrage*, is Husserl’s notorious idea in §44 of the sixth LI. There, Husserl says that the source of the categories is to be found not in categorial acts, but in the objects of these acts. For Øverenget, this means that “Being is a correlate of an act of consciousness” (1998, 57), i.e., something discoverable solely on the side of the objects of consciousness, an ‘objective’ element in the order of the world itself (not “in itself”).

Another station in Øverenget’s effort to reveal the meaning of Husserl’s influence upon Heidegger’s *Seinsfrage* occurs in his remark that according to the latter, categorial acts *disclose* the simply given objects *anew*, in the sense that the *implicitly* predicatively structured objects of simple perception<sup>37</sup> are *explicitly* disclosed in their inner relationality.<sup>38</sup> Acts of synthesis disclose states of affairs, and acts of

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<sup>33</sup>*PHCT*, 53–4.

<sup>34</sup>*PHCT*, 54.

<sup>35</sup>*PHCT*, 55. For the complications in Heidegger’s combined views on truth in Husserl, see Chap. 7.

<sup>36</sup>*PHCT*, 48; Øverenget 1998, 54. In the foregoing Chap. 7, we saw the dead-ends and perplexities that this idea leads us into.

<sup>37</sup>On this, see Øverenget 1998, 54, 59, 62. On this issue, see also Chap. 7 of the present book.

<sup>38</sup>Øverenget 1998, 61.

ideation disclose generality.<sup>39</sup> According to Øverenget, Heidegger emphatically stresses the supposedly Husserlian doctrine that even sense perception is permeated by categoriality (in the sense of an implicit predicative syntheticity, due to the “is”). This means that the syntheticity of categorial synthesis is not a matter of merely adding together elements that are at first separate. Primary in categorial intuition is “the relating itself, through which the members of the relation as such first become explicit” (*PHCT*, 64).<sup>40</sup> Øverenget explains that Heidegger makes the remark under discussion because if there were something like simple objects of perception (i.e., objects not already structured by the copulative “is”), he could not have maintained the thesis of the universality of the categorial. That is, he would have had to admit that there is a kind of intentionality, namely perceptual intentionality, in the context of which intentional entities appear or are experienced without it being necessary for this appearance or experience to be regulated by categorial intuition! In the case of such a restriction, Øverenget claims, Heidegger would in the end lose any justification for his own particular approach to the *Seinsfrage*.<sup>41</sup>

Finally, according to Øverenget, important for Heidegger’s treatment of the question of Being is his remark that even in Husserl’s own *Phenomenology*, categoriality and categorial constitution do not mean a *subjective creative making or fabricating*, directed upon inert givens. They only mean “*letting the entity [a complete intentional objectivity] be seen in its objectivity*” (*PHCT*, 71). According to what we have already seen, the idea is that the categorial simply discloses anew<sup>42</sup> an already categorially structured entity, by turning it from its *implicit* to its *explicit* mode of categorial apprehension.

Concluding his chap. 2, Øverenget summarizes the importance of Husserl’s categorial intuition for Heidegger’s re-appropriation of the *Seinsfrage*. This doctrine, we read, furnishes Heidegger with a ground of capital importance: without the distinction between sensuous and categorial intuition, Heidegger would have no access “to the *appearance of being* and thus [...] there would be no way of establishing the key notion of *ontological difference*” (Øverenget 1998, 70–1; emphases added).

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<sup>39</sup>Øverenget 1998, 68.

<sup>40</sup>See Øverenget 1998, 63.

<sup>41</sup>Øverenget 1998, 63. This is interesting. On the one hand, in Chap. 7 we established that the possibility here excluded by Øverenget is in fact absolutely valid in Husserl. On the other hand, the problem that this creates does not actually threaten Heidegger’s project. We will see below that Heidegger’s (pre-theoretical and pre-logical) constitutive a priori “Being” cannot only be elucidated by Husserl’s logical categories (substance and copula), even though this is openly acknowledged by Heidegger as the first inspiration for his *Seinsfrage*. As a suppressed and unconfessed (or at least eluded) second and deeper source for a questioning after Being in Heidegger’s sense, we can take Husserl’s equally pre-theoretical and pre-logical constitutive a priori, as disclosed in his analysis of the primordial givenness of the simply perceived thing (as presented here in Chaps. 4, 5, and 6). Especially in Chap. 4, the original praxial sense of this a priori (in its temporal grounding) was particularly stressed.

<sup>42</sup>Øverenget 1998, 70.



Øverenget, though, opens up another dimension in our quest. Concerning the meaning of the influence that categorial intuition exerted upon Heidegger's treatment of the question of Being, he also brings to the fore the dependence of Heidegger's analyses upon Husserl's *part-whole analyses*. In a word, Husserl's categorial intuition and Heidegger's Phenomenology of Being are two different versions of part-whole analysis. More particularly, Heidegger's *disclosedness-of-Being* and *discoveredness-of-beings* is continuous with Husserl's analyses concerning subject and predicates, *qua parts* in the *whole* state of affairs.<sup>43</sup>

Ultimately, Øverenget argues that on the one hand, Husserl's straightforward perception and Heidegger's discoveredness have a structural similarity: they are directed toward entities in the world, toward beings. On the other hand, both Husserl and Heidegger emphasize that no entity can be encountered unless something else is also encountered along with it, an "order" that cannot be encountered in the way entities are encountered. In Heidegger, "[t]his order is the context or the world, or the Being of beings. The latter is appresented or disclosed. Thus [Heidegger's] disclosedness resembles [Husserl's] categorial intuition, in being directed toward that within which beings appear, i.e., the world or Being" (1998, 197).

### 8.3.3 Dahlstrom's Approach

Dahlstrom also develops his reading around Heidegger's presentation in the *PHCT* of Husserl's distinction between non-relational and relational acts and his allowance for the possibility of truth in the case of the non-relational acts. At first, Dahlstrom says that Heidegger was indeed not as clear as we would like him to have been with regard to the just mentioned distinction and its meaning. Heidegger, however, maintains this distinction for the crucial reason that "it anticipates his own conception of the originary truth of a 'primary' understanding. Much as [(supposedly) according to Husserl] the truth is experienced (achieved) unthematically, [actually] not in naming, but in the use of a name [...] [applied, though, on a pre-given relational act of predicative-categorial judgment], so being discloses itself—or makes sense—originally, according to Heidegger, in practical dealings with things that lie in advance of any explicitly relational (and—*nota bene*—objectifying) act. [...] [Husserl's] non-relational act is re-interpreted by Heidegger as a way of behaving (*Verhalten*), a so-called primary understanding that in a decisive respect—like sensations—cannot be false" (2001, 73).

Remembering (from Chap. 7) Dahlstrom's analysis regarding Husserl's idea of a truth pertaining to monothetic acts, this passage in fact says that the inspiration Heidegger gets from Husserl amounts to the following. Heidegger realizes that there is the possibility of a truth not exclusively connected with directly lived-through

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<sup>43</sup>Øverenget 1998, 39, 59, 172ff. The point remains essentially unexploited there. We will see below, however, how Husserl's mereology does indeed underpin Heidegger's project.



relational acts. This can be accounted for by means of an unthematically lived-through identity of a meant-and-given, seen as a monolithic whole (even though it cannot but be already internally articulated in terms of a relational-predicative synthesis). In Chap. 7, we saw that Dahlstrom's reading of this point does not rest upon a firm footing. In Dahlstrom, although the truthfully given is originally given in its predicative articulation, in monothetic acts we are supposed to experience something 'simply' given, by sleight of hand. Monothetic acts are considered to turn only secondarily upon the originally predicatively structured objects of (judgmental) relational acts.

Dahlstrom, then, explains that in Husserl, "intuition" has a sense similar to that of the terms "observe" and "examine." Observing and examining, Dahlstrom says, "entails relating things or parts of a thing to each other or relating one or more of them to the entire set of them (just as examination of one thing is typically a matter of relating one or more features of it to other features or to all of its features as a whole)" (2001, 76). Thus, according to Dahlstrom, categorial intuition of a *Sachverhalt* is an intuition of "the relation (difference and unity) making up a thing or fact [...] [or else of an] object which [...] is not a simple perceptual object [since, in the end, there is no such thing for Dahlstrom], but an object infected with syntax" (2001, 76; emphasis added).

Dahlstrom also notes the following as regards the meaning of Husserl's categorial intuition. In it, we are given (or we experience) not real but ideal objectivities like the states of affairs, e.g., "the Eiffel Tower curves gently outward to the ground," the togetherness of a collective, e.g., "A and B" in their logical conjunction, the universalities "triangularity," "redness," etc. As for the importance of categorial intuition for Heidegger, we read that this discovery of Husserl's means that "a decisive blow is struck against the naturalist view that all objectivity must be reducible to sensory realities and the spatiotemporal and causal connections among them" (2001, 90).<sup>44</sup> For example, in the categorial intuition of "*a* is brighter than *b*," the real relation "... brighter than ..." "becomes 'explicitly present'" (2001, 90). "[I]t presents itself objectively in an ideal, yet intuitive (not merely signitive) way. [...] What thus presents itself is the 'object' of the categorial intuition, namely, the external relation: *a* is brighter than *b*. Its objectivity then obtains even when neither *a* nor *b* can be perceived" (ibid.).

Finally, Dahlstrom points out that we must not forget that for Heidegger, Being is considered as the a priori of a priories. Thus, what in the context of Phenomenology holds for Being also holds, in a more general fashion, for the a priori. Due to

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<sup>44</sup>It may indeed be admitted that, roughly put, in his *PHCT* Heidegger understands the importance of the discovery of categorial intuition in the following way. "[I]n categorial intuition we can come to see that the objectivity of an entity is really not exhausted by this narrow definition of reality, that objectivity in its broadest sense is much richer than the reality of a thing, and what is more, that the reality of a thing is comprehensible in its structure only on the basis of the full objectivity of the simply experienced entity" (*PHCT*, 89; emphases added). Dahlstrom registers this passage, but does not elaborate on the meaning of the emphasised phrase. As will become clear, however, it is precisely the meaning of this phrase that is crucial.

this, whatever Heidegger says about the third fundamental Husserlian discovery, the original sense of the a priori (*PHCT*, §7), i.e., about its direct givenness, its non-dependence on a subjective immanence, etc., applies equally well to the specific issue of the givenness of Being. More specifically, when Heidegger says that the phenomenological a priori is identifiable in itself in a straightforward intuition (*PHCT*, 73ff), he means that it is given in (categorial) intuition. This means, Heidegger says, that our access to the phenomenologically understood a priori is non-inferential. That is, it is not the result of a speculative method (as is the case even in Kant's transcendental deduction), but it is the 'object' of an originally giving and unmediated intuition. The a priori in (Husserl's) *Phenomenology* is intuitionally justifiable. The same, then, holds and must hold in the phenomenological research into Being and its meaning.<sup>45</sup>

## 8.4 Distilling the Views Examined Up to This Point

We must now make a quick assessment of what the above interpreters actually say about Heidegger's own admission that Husserl's discovery of categorial intuition decisively influenced his phenomenological questioning after the meaning of Being. I believe that the different folds of the approaches examined thus far can be codified in the following theses.

### 8.4.1 *The Excessiveness of the Category "substance" Leads to the "ontological difference"*

In Husserl's doctrine of categorial intuition, we find the idea that in our intentional experiences, we correlate ourselves with objectivities, the givenness of which is structured and made possible by an at first "implicitly holding" and then "explicitly thematizable" forming factor, which can be identified with the Kantian category

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<sup>45</sup>Dahlstrom also refers us to Heidegger's last seminar at Zähringen, where he said that "In order for the question of the sense of Being to be able to unfold at all, Being would first have to be [itself] given" (*FS*, 67/378). Dahlstrom proposes that according to Heidegger, "Husserl's accomplishment [...] lies precisely in showing, by means of his doctrine of categorial intuition, how being is given ('phenomenally present in the category')" (2001, 96). However, Dahlstrom does not elaborate further upon this. He does not turn to the problem of what it means that Husserl makes Being present by means of his doctrine of categorial intuition and of what "phenomenally present in the category" might mean. Instead, he just continues in the spirit of the "pre-thematicity" (which we have repeatedly met in him) (see 2001, 97). This analysis does not really get us any further than the idea of a pre-thematic categoriality, tacitly inherent even in perception. This is an idea that, as we saw in Chap. 7, has its own problems, since it actually misses the trace of the distinction between monothetic and polythetic acts.

“substance.” Thus, intentional objects are experienced as subsisting or (as Heidegger tells us) as characterized by the mode of Being known as *Vorhandenheit*. The *supersensuous excessiveness* of that category, in its contrast to the sensuous contents and the perceptual thing (considered as mere objectual substances) of our experience, was then taken by Heidegger and transformed into the famous *ontological difference* of his *Fundamental Ontology*; a move, however, that overcomes the shortcomings of the traditional metaphysics of presence.<sup>46</sup>

#### **8.4.2 *The Pre-predicative Truth Introduced in the Sixth LI Leads to the Truth as Discoveredness and Disclosedness in BT***

In the analyses of truth presented in the sixth *LI*, Husserl tries to open up a new locus for the experience of truth: that of the *pre-predicative* non-relational or monothetic intentional life, e.g., that of simple perception. This effort, the idea says, even though seriously caught up in ambiguities and confusions,<sup>47</sup> somehow paved the way for Heidegger’s radicalization of the phenomenon of truth at a level deeper than that of the assertion. From this questionable effort of Husserl’s, Heidegger was inspired in his search of truth as *discoveredness* and *disclosedness*. Thus, in *BT*, the pieces of equipment appear to us (or are encountered by us) in their truth and in the manner of discoveredness, whereas their Being becomes a phenomenon (or is truthfully opened up for us) in the mode of disclosedness.<sup>48</sup>

#### **8.4.3 *The Phenomenologization of the Categories in the LI Leads Toward the Phenomenologization of Being in BT***

With his doctrine of categorial intuition, Husserl renewed philosophy by showing us the possibility of a method of research into the categorial realm (the *a priori* in general) that is non-merely-conceptual, non-inferential, and non-speculative. The categorial is now recognized as an *objective phenomenon* that can be given and examined in an intersubjective fashion. This development inspired Heidegger, making him realize the possibility of a *radicalization* of Ontology as Existential/Fundamental Ontological research into the meaning of Being. This research is

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<sup>46</sup>On this, see especially the foregoing references to Dahlstrom, Taminiiaux, Øverenget, but also Watanabe 1993, Bernet 1990, and Stapleton 1994, especially pp. 222, 227ff, 233.

<sup>47</sup>See Chap. 7 of the present book with regard to the problem of deciphering the actual meaning of Husserl’s idea concerning truth in monothetic acts.

<sup>48</sup>On this, see especially Taminiiaux 1985 and Watanabe 1993.

characterized precisely by the abandonment of a merely conceptual, inferential, and speculative argumentation, in favor of a direct examination of a *self-given* Being.<sup>49</sup>

#### 8.4.4 *The Mereology of the Third LI Leads Toward the Part-Whole Ontico-Ontological Analyses of BT*

As Heidegger remarks in his *PHCT*, the discovery of categorial intuition cannot stand in isolation from Husserl's two other fundamental discoveries, intentionality and the phenomenological conception of the a priori. Now, the idea here is that following Husserl's analyses concerning the general pattern of intentional constitution, i.e., the exemplary case of categorial constitution (with the subject-and-predicate relation representing its most salient case), we can see that all of these are based on the phenomenological mereology found in the third LI. Moreover, the idea continues, from a careful inspection of Heidegger's relevant analyses in his *PHCT* and in *BT*, we can arrive at the conclusion that the latter's thought was decisively influenced by that mereology. *BT* abounds in part-whole analyses. For instance, the analysis concerning the constitution of beings having the mode of Being "*Zuhandenheit*" is treated precisely in terms of *part-whole relations*.<sup>50</sup>

Despite some confusion regarding the issue of truth in Husserl, these interpretive theses are valuable, and they supply us with helpful insights as to the sought-for answer to the question at stake. As will become manifest, however, they are also partial, and in great need of further and more detailed analysis.

### 8.5 Four Issues Involved in a Sufficient Elaboration of Our Question

Of course, in all the foregoing approaches to our question, many things were said with regard to the categorial in Husserl and Heidegger, and concerning the transformation of the former's traditionally understood (basically, logical) "being" and "is" into the latter's existential-ontological Being. In all of these analyses, though, and in almost all the analyses regarding Heidegger's ontological understanding of "Being," matters are presented as if we all know what this "Being" is, and what Heidegger saw in it as phenomenon in his *Phenomeno*-logy. This, however, is far from obvious.

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<sup>49</sup>See especially Dahlstrom 2001.

<sup>50</sup>See especially Øverenget 1996.

For an appropriate and minimally sufficient treatment of the problem posed in this chapter, I think that we must take into account four interrelated but different factors.

First, as Heidegger himself tells us, the thematic of categorial intuition is inextricably intertwined with the thematic of intentionality, and both of these with the thematic of the a priori (*PHCT*, 59, 72).

Second, all the accounts offered suffer from a leveling tendency with regard to the seeming influence of categorial acts of synthesis and ideation on Heidegger's development. The aforementioned scholars also somehow conflate Husserl's analyses concerning the categoriality of the copulative "is" with those concerning the existential "is" (unquestionably attaching to the latter what Heidegger calls Being in the sense of *Vorhandenheit*).<sup>51</sup>

Third, we must bear in mind that Heidegger's own stance toward the question of Being (and of the possibility for a proper phenomenological grasp of it) is not homogenous. On the contrary, it seems that we can locate basically three main phases in this stance: the categorial, the existential, and the post-existential, roughly corresponding to Heidegger's early thinking along the lines of Husserl's and Lask's philosophies, to his middle way from the 1919 courses toward *BT* and its philosophy, and to his later so-called "post-turn" efforts after the early 1930s.<sup>52</sup>

Fourth, it is a common characteristic of all the systematic and non-systematic interpretations of Heidegger's indebtedness to Husserl that they do not engage in a sufficient exposition of Heidegger's understanding of Being as phenomenon. They all limit themselves to what is generally known as ontological difference and do not go beyond this.

In order to reach a clear view of the influence that Husserl's categorial intuition exerted upon Heidegger's understanding of the problem of Being, we must clearly distinguish all these different components of the problem, yet at the same time we must bear in mind their interdependencies. Let us, then, engage in a more thorough examination of these points.

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<sup>51</sup>This is probably the result also of Heidegger's own move of referring his audiences and readers, e.g., in his Zähringen talks (1973) and in his "My Way . . ." (1963), exclusively to Chap. 6 of the sixth *LI*, but not also to Chap. 5 of the same work. As we can see from a careful reading of Chap. 5 of the *LI*, Husserl there advances his idea concerning truth in the sense of *being*, which can indeed be approached as an elementary exposition of something like Heidegger's notion of ontological difference. Moreover, and more interestingly, this idea is presented mainly in the context of what we know as pre-theoretical and pre-predicative intentionality, that of non-relational or monothetic acts, normally represented by acts of perception. On the contrary, in Chap. 6 of the sixth *LI*, we find Husserl's analysis concerning the problem of truth stated exclusively with respect to *predicative* intentionality.

<sup>52</sup>On Heidegger's early thinking, see also §8.6 below. On the second (crucial) turn in particular, see Theodorou 2010a.

### 8.5.1 *The Intentional, the Categorial, and the A Priori*

We can immediately say that according to Heidegger, the meaning of categorial intuition is that the totality of our intentional life is always already shaped by categorial elements, and that the relevant categorial shape of all the correlative intentional objectivities is a surplus, something exceeding sensory contents. Moreover, this surplus is itself given in intuition of a peculiar kind, as discovered by Husserl; namely, categorial intuition. Thus, intentionality is in the end a transcendence that originally relates not to mere sensory items but to objective (i.e., self-standing, not subjectively produced) structures that make these items appear as parts of intentional entities.<sup>53</sup> Now, a priori in intentionality is this very objective structuring that always already regulates our most original experiencing. Regionally seen, this a priori is the Being of the beings experienced by us as belonging to each of the various ontological spheres. All these regional Beings of the corresponding beings, however, must be capable of being seen from the ultimate universal perspective of some Being in general (*Sein überhaupt*) or Being as such (*Sein als solches*), qua a priori of the a priori. Otherwise, as Heidegger Platonically insinuates, we could not be in any position to comprehend and experience these different Beings as differing *Beings*.

### 8.5.2 *Husserl's Treatment of the Copulative and of the Existential "Is"*

In Husserl's analysis of the copulative "is," we find the idea that it is a categorial form responsible for the unification of a predicate and a subject. This categorial form, which stands for a special kind of inner unification of these somehow traceable parts into the objective integrated whole we call a "state of affairs," is intuited in the act of categorial intuition. The case with the existential "is," however, differs considerably.

More specifically, Husserl attributes the same role to that "is," both in the context of the primordial pre-predicative intentionality appertaining to simple perception and in the context of the founded predicative intentionality related to propositional meaning intentions. From another point of view, that "is" means that our empty intentions finally find or meet their correlative intentional objects as unitary and self-same objectivities that *appear*. Put in different words, this means that our intentionally but emptily presuming consciousness is, in the end, provided with its sought-for being in a correlation where the appearing objectivity is synthesized—according

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<sup>53</sup>For Heidegger's full (albeit not fully consistent) account of this, see Chap. 7. The following must be noted too. We can call this appropriation of the categorial (i.e., of "categorial merely as supersensuous") "minimal." This, however, cannot do full justice to what is at play in Phenomenology and in the line of influence that leads from Husserl to Heidegger. In this chapter, we are seeking the deeper dimensions of this issue and of the story behind this *Wirkungsgeschichte*.

to content and form—precisely according to the manner that it was empty pre-delineated by our consciousness (pre-predicatively or predicatively so). With this, we come to understand that in Husserl, the existential “is” means the evidential appearing of a being that comes to this appearance due to a corresponding empty pre-designed and projected synthesis of partial contents. Husserl calls this appearing of beings (due to their suitably synthesized contents) “truth”; it is the case of *truth* in the sense of *being* (sixth LI, §39).<sup>54</sup> Thus, in Husserl, the existential “is” has, reversely, the meaning of “truth.” Here truth does not have the meaning of subsistence (an enduring presence of something standing over against us). Seen otherwise, in Husserl, “being” in the “sense of truth” does not mean what Heidegger means by *Vorhandenheit*. If we were forced to somehow cement Husserl’s meaning of truth in the sense of being, something like the following articulation would come close: “shining forth of a being, which has come to its presencing on the basis of an intentional hermeneutic interrelatedness of its parts, guided according to specific sense-structures realizable within the horizon of ‘inner’ time.”<sup>55</sup> In a word, that a being *is* means that it has been constituted according to a priori possible sense-patterns. In Husserl’s *Phenomenology*, this concerns, first of all, our pre-predicative perceptual intentionality. More specifically, according to the specific types of the relevant time-syntheses, we get a more determined sense of “being.” For example, the being of perceptual beings is characterized by their enduring, quasi-integrated and self-same unity, which is due to ‘bodily’-praxial time-syntheses according to what we know as “perceptual sense” (*Wahrnehmungssinn*).<sup>56</sup> Predicatively structured states of affairs are characterized by interest-guided and historically determined ways of possible thematic givenness of simply perceptual beings, according to the guidance of these particular interests, etc.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>54</sup>Øverenget (1998) combines Husserl’s analysis of “is” in the sense of the copula and in the existential sense. For example, we read: “The objective correlate of ‘being’ in ‘The car *is* red’ is not *a* being the way car is. It refers instead to the being of an object: the car’s *being* red” (1998, 40). However, the ‘is’ not being *a being* (like a car is a being), the car’s *being-red*, and the car’s *being* a being, are totally different things. The same problem can be detected also in Taminioux (1985). This is their way of simplifying and shortening the road leading from Husserl’s categorial intuition to Heidegger’s question of Being. Nevertheless, this ‘short-circuit’ causes an undesirable black-out to the whole issue.

<sup>55</sup>Husserl’s original conception of a truth in the sense of being (existence) clearly means two things: (i) appearing and givenness of a being that is constituted on the basis of its a priori possibility, i.e., its constituting *sense*, and (ii) appearing and givenness of this very possibility or condition, which does not itself necessarily appear in the same way and in the same move as the appearance and givenness of the being that was thus made possible and actual. This conception of truth lies, of course, in the opposite direction of what Heidegger tried to convey with regard to the meaning of truth and being in Husserl’s *Phenomenology*. In the latter, “truth” does not necessarily mean correctness or correspondence, whereas “being” in no way exclusively means constant presence (*Vorhandenheit*).

<sup>56</sup>See also Chap. 4.

<sup>57</sup>For more on this, see Theodorou 2010b.

It is true that Husserl did not explicitly pose the questions of the meaning of Being and the question of the truth of Being. We just saw, though, that the first question is implicitly posed and answered in Husserl's *Phenomenology*. As for the second question, i.e., the question regarding the source from which the series of the regional pre-thematic and thematic meanings of Being stem, we can respond by saying that the way Heidegger himself tried to answer the question must make us very hesitant with regard to its meaningfulness, effectiveness, or success. Husserl connected all of this to the possibilities of an egoic transcendental consciousness in a problematic way that may be understood as rendering this source dependent on an equally egoic 'will.' In Heidegger, though, the task of phenomenologizing such an extra-egoic, volition-free, extra-historical and non-phenomenal arch-source does not appear to have been achieved any more successfully.<sup>58</sup>

### 8.5.3 Heidegger's Phases in His Quest of Being

Generally speaking, in the accounts offered by scholars with regard to the meaning of Heidegger's indebtedness to Husserl's categorial intuition, there is no talk of the history of Heidegger's own understanding of Being. More particularly, no one explains precisely that Heidegger himself went through at least three main phases in his quest of the *Seinsfrage* and, more specifically as to its character, to its possibility of complete phenomenologizability and its way of unifying the multitude of its various senses. Since the latter issues still remain a puzzle, in focusing on the first two of these, we should make the following clear at the outset.

Heidegger's *early phenomenological* stance (1909–1919) is informed by some version of a *categorial* conception of Being. During this period, Heidegger treats his problem much along the lines of the traditional terms of the categories as concepts of high generality. Being is one such (peculiar) category. Here, Heidegger's ground is Husserl's *Phenomenology*, as interpreted through the Neo-Kantian lens of Lask.<sup>59</sup>

Next is the *phenomenologically proper* stance of Heidegger's mature thought (1919–1927), during which Being is approached in an expressly *non-categorial* way (it is not the highest genus concept), and is thought of as a possible phenomenon (sense or truth) capable of being given or of becoming manifest primordially in non-cognitive-intellectual acts. Husserl's *Phenomenology*, as read through some of Aristotle's thinking, is now his source. Heidegger's understanding of the question of Being is now non-categorial and regulated by what, in *BT*, is known as Being in the sense of the worlding of the worldliness of the world.

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<sup>58</sup>For more on all the latter, see Chaps. 9 and 10.

<sup>59</sup>On this, see Heidegger's own later indication in *GA* 1, 55 (1972). At the same time, and in his effort to further develop his questioning along the lines of Husserl's second LI, he asked about the Being of the species, i.e., of the universal, and more specifically about the Being of "meaning" or of "sense."



There is also the later *post-phenomenological* approach to Being (after *BT*), when Heidegger fully realizes the irreducible and un-circumventable importance of the *non-phenomenologizable* potential of Being as such.<sup>60</sup> After *BT*, his understanding of the non-categorical understanding of Being is regulated by what is known as the problem of the truth of Being. Heidegger then tries to invent and apply methods of philosophical inquiry that ostensibly transcend the phenomenological method. The remembrance of the history of Being's partial self-revelations in history is tested as a possible route of research. To be sure, this idea had already been coined in *BT*, but the issue of whether, in what sense, and to what degree this route can or cannot lead us to an adequate experience of Being as such is still held in confusion.

Thus, Heidegger's two main explicit allusions to his indebtedness, namely in his "My Way . . ." and in his Zähringen seminar, are treated as if they concerned one and the same question of Being; moreover, they are presented in a way that confusedly conflates the question of Being before *BT*, in *BT*, and after *BT*. I think that an adequate interpretation of Heidegger's explicit acknowledgment of his indebtedness to Husserl's doctrine of categorial intuition should take into account this historicity of the *Seinsfrage* in Heidegger's own thought.

#### 8.5.4 Heidegger's Categorical Conception of Being

In this section, I will establish a connection with Heidegger's pre-*BT* occupation with the question of Being. In the sections that follow, I will try to elucidate the meaning of the mentioned indebtedness with reference to the second phase of Heidegger's struggle with this question. Chapters 9 and 10 pursue the issue of the way in which Heidegger, moving with the impulse that Husserl's *Phenomenology* gave him, passes from his *Seinsfrage* in *BT* to his later understanding.

At first, Husserl's discovery of categorial intuition must have shown Heidegger (like some of the Neo-Kantians known to him, especially Lask), that there was the possibility of re-undertaking and further enhancing traditional research on the categories. Being was then still seen as a category, and the way opened up by Husserl's discovery seems to have struck Heidegger as a revelation. We must connect this first phase of his understanding with what he attributes to Husserl as progress toward the conception of the question of Being. Heidegger's understanding here is guided by what he still later attributes solely to Husserl as "surplus"

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<sup>60</sup>It is generally known that Heidegger remained silent with regard to the problem that haunted his project for a *Fundamental Ontology* (ala *BT*), and which led him to abandon it (see, e.g., Taminiaux 1991, xxii). Taminiaux thinks that the problem can be solved with reference to Heidegger's own remark, in his fourth volume on Nietzsche, that *BT* was dangerously close to reaffirming subjectivity (ibid., xxii). In Chaps. 9 and 10, however, the different view that is being presented in outline here (and is related to the problem of the phenomenologizability of Being) will be further developed.

in the context of perception, understood, however, as the surplus of a *category* ("substance").<sup>61</sup>

Later on, when Heidegger appeals to the work of Aristotle, it seems that he comes to realize that the way to Being via the tradition of the categories is not as genuine and as fundamental as it should be if philosophy is to seek, non-contemplatively, the question of the meaning of Being in general. Reading books 1–3 of *Physics*, 9 of the *Metaphysics*, and 6 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Heidegger seems to have come to the realization that episteme and its logic was not the only way in which that which is (ὄν) can appear, or be given, in truth (ἀληθεύειν) of that which is.<sup>62</sup> It is not that the Being of all beings can be accounted for on the basis of its belonging in the subsumptive series of species and genera. It cannot be said that all beings are just because they are instantiations of their essence or members of the extension of their concept. Phusis (φύσις) and praxis form a completely different τόπος of truth, of the possibility of things to come to be, to be given, or to meaningfully appear. Phusis and praxis offer a new kind of 'milieu' or 'pattern' within which beings can come to be and be what they are. More importantly, praxis seems to be the most suitable kairological context where beings are given as what they, each time are.<sup>63</sup>

Thus, from then on, Husserl's teaching of the categorial intuition acquires new meaning for Heidegger, and he turns to phenomenologically proper analyses of Being. In a sense, we may claim that this moment of Heidegger's development arose from his realization that traditional categories are one thing, whereas Husserlian categorial forms are in actual fact (probably contrary to Husserl's own understanding of the matter) a totally different thing. Accordingly, he abandons the quasi-platonic and Neo-Kantian understandings of Husserl's Formal Logical and Formal Ontological analyses of the *Prolegomena* by Lask. Being can no longer be seen as some version of the traditional categories. Heidegger decides that for something to be, it was no longer self-understandable that it should fall (be subsumed) under some kind of ultimate genological-conceptual perspective. A being *is* not due to its having been caused (instantiated) by a *valid* idea or by a form that falls under a more (empty) universal form. A being *is* not due to its being a representation that is subsumed

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<sup>61</sup>See the relevant references above, from Heidegger's Zähringen seminar (also Taminiaux 1985, 107ff.).

<sup>62</sup>"It has long been known that Heidegger's reading of Aristotle was essential to his entire life's work. [...] It was in those early Freiburg and Marburg lectures that Heidegger tried out what he called 'a transformed understanding of Aristotle,' which was his basis for his eventual break with Husserl. [...] And Aristotle's influence continued to work even on the later Heidegger. [...] But if the influence of Aristotle on Heidegger is undeniable, the manner and degree of it remain among Heidegger's best-kept secrets" (Sheehan 1983, 133, 134, 135).

<sup>63</sup>"There are many indications which, in my opinion, speak in favour of the hypothesis that Heidegger arrived at an Aristotelian determination of praxis while trying to solve the problems that Husserlian phenomenology had raised but which, in his view, the Husserlian understanding of subjectivity had left open rather than resolved. [...] Heidegger, however, distances himself from Husserl because the Husserlian determination of transcendental subjectivity seems to him to have been won, predominantly and unilaterally, on the basis of a theoretical consideration of the acts of the life of consciousness" (Volpi 1992, 102–3).

under another representation, etc. “To be” no longer means standing under the light of a suitable genological perspective, from the point of view of which it is targeted in theoretical seeing.<sup>64</sup>

But if this is so, what role does categorial intuition play in Heidegger’s new understanding of Being and its meaning?

### 8.5.5 *Heidegger’s Existential Conception of Being*

Those scholars who have written on the issue that concerns us here restrict themselves to Heidegger’s notion of the ontological difference. What they mean by this is that the formal idea that something that is *not* itself a being is what makes beings be (without it necessarily being given in this appearing together with the appearing being). Nevertheless, we have no positive indication as to *what* this Being (of *BT*) might be. That is, the literature is notoriously reluctant and proverbially stingy in giving us any elucidatory account with regard to the issue of what Heidegger means by his key-term “Being” in *BT*.

Sheehan, one of the most daring and eloquent scholars on this issue, attempts to frame the issue of Being and its truth and sense in Heidegger’s thought via descriptions such as the following: “The being of an entity is the meaningful presence of that entity within the range of human experience” (Sheehan 1998, Summary). “[T]he meaningful presence of things is what Heidegger means by being” (ibid., §2). “[H]umans understand an entity by knowing it in its being, that is, in terms of how it happens to be present” (ibid., §1). “Aletheia—disclosure-as-such—how it comes about, the structure it has, and what it makes possible—is the central topic or ‘thing itself’ of Heidegger’s thought. He sometimes calls it the ‘clearing’ of being. He also calls it ‘being itself’ or ‘being-as-such’ (that is, the very engendering of being). Frequently, and inadequately, he calls it the ‘truth’ of being” (ibid., §4). “Heidegger claims that disclosure-as-such—the very opening up of significance in Dasein’s being—is intrinsically hidden and needs to remain so if entities are to be properly disclosed in their being. This intrinsic concealment of disclosure-as-such is called the ‘mystery.’ Since Heidegger sometimes calls disclosure-as-such ‘being itself,’ the phrase becomes ‘the mystery of being.’ The ensuing claim, that the mystery of being conceals itself while revealing entities, has led to much mystification, not least among Heideggerians. Being seems to

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<sup>64</sup>A very important presentation of this episode in Heidegger’s pursuit of the question of Being, together with the first clues as to the maturing of his existential understanding of it, can be found in his first two 1919 courses, now published under the title *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie* as *GA* 56/57. See also Theodorou 2010a.

become a higher but hidden Entity that performs strange acts that only the initiated can comprehend. This misconstrual of Heidegger's intentions is not helpful" (ibid., §5).<sup>65</sup>

As is remarked time and again in the literature, the evidence we have with regard to what Heidegger meant by his key concept "Being" is not very clear, and nor is it sufficient. It seems to me, though, that we can point to some very important thematics in Heidegger's writings that can provide us with at least some preliminary clues, which could help guide us toward a better understanding of the content or 'texture' of Being. To be sure, the understanding of "Being" in Heidegger would extend only to what Heidegger calls Being as *sense* or *disclosed* Being, or Being as *truth* or *understood* Being—not to Being in general, or as such or itself (which, in Chaps. 9 and 10, will be proved a phenomenologically *unaccomplishable* task, even for Heidegger throughout his career). Within these limits, what was said in the previous subsection is helpful. Aristotle's *phusis* and *praxis* probably showed Heidegger that beings can come to be in a kind of constitution different than that of belonging under higher and higher concepts. In the cases under discussion, the beings are constituted and appear in a knotting- or knitting-like process; they are cemented within milieus or contexts of particular patterns. This will become clearer in the remaining sections of this chapter.

It must be noted, though (as was said in §8.1 above), that whatever "Being" might mean or be, special care must be taken when we try to inspect the question under discussion with reference to Heidegger's explanations in the Zähringen seminar. The reason for this is that the latter are far removed from the problematic of Being that we find either in Heidegger's early period or, more especially, in the mature writings in *BT*. In the seminar, Heidegger characteristically repeats that in the rigorous sense, the question of Being "aims [. . .] at the being of Being, or better: it aims at the *truth* of Being (*Wahrheit des Seins*), where *Wahrheit* must be understood according to the safekeeping in which Being is sheltered as Being" (*FS*, 65/111). Failure to realize this, we read Heidegger saying, means a relapse into the context of metaphysics. "Metaphysics seeks the Being of beings" (*FS*, 65/111). Heidegger, on the other hand, has supposedly moved beyond metaphysics. "If I pose the question of the meaning of Being, already I must be beyond Being understood as the Being of beings" (*FS*, 67/115). In *BT*, though, Heidegger keeps reminding us that in the context of Phenomenology, the sought-for Being must be rendered a phenomenon, and this is possible due to the fact that "Being is always the being of a being" (*BT*, 7/9)! Thus, even though the truth of the statement from Zähringen is not as absolute as it seems,<sup>66</sup> from that point of view Heidegger abolishes the philosophy of *BT* as

<sup>65</sup>On this, see, e.g., Marx 1971, 191; Philipse 1998, 6; Capobianco 2010, 7ff. Of course, every attempt to elucidate what Heidegger had in mind with "Being" has to overcome various difficulties, hesitations, silences, and suppressions. Heidegger himself, at the age of 80, claimed in a TV interview that our inability to understand Being is inherent, since in our time Being is itself in a state of withdrawal (*Entzug*)—whatever this might, after all, mean for a phenomenologist. In the sections that follow, and in Chap. 9, I will try to disentangle some of the ideas just mentioned.

<sup>66</sup>On this, see Chap. 9.

caught in the web of metaphysics. After his notorious “turn,” then, the burning issue for Heidegger is no longer that of the meaning of Being or, what amounts to almost the same, that of Being as sense or truth. In his attempt to move to a more authentic philosophical point of view, he realized that he should instead ask the question of the meaning of the sense or of the truth of Being, that is, of the *meaning of the ‘fact’ that Being always ‘partially’ comes as sense or truth* within the becoming of history. This, however, is a totally different question to the question of Being found in either the early writings or in the specifically and explicitly phenomenological *BT*.

All this means that the treatment of the question that concerns us here will remain insufficient and confusing as long as we do not distinguish the three different Heideggerian conceptions of Being: (a) Being as some kind of category, (b) Being as the existentially meaningful and phenomenologizable Being of beings, and (c) Being beyond Being (understood as the Being of beings). In the following, I will focus on case (b).

## 8.6 Sketch of Heidegger's Tests with Being in *BT*

Let us now pass to a short presentation of Heidegger's treatment of Being and its function in *BT*. Indeed, Heidegger is never as clear as we should like him to be with regard to the exact details of his understanding of Being. We may assume, however, that—at least for our present purposes—§§14–18, 32–33 of *BT* offer very interesting evidence concerning how Heidegger tries to approach Being in his mature but pre-‘turn’ philosophy.

A phenomenological description of the world, Heidegger says, amounts to the showing (*aufweisen*) and the conceptual determination of the Being of beings in the world.<sup>67</sup> This is a good start, but what is “world?” World, he writes, although not an inner-worldly being, is that which is *responsible* for the fact that inner-worldly beings *are* and we encounter or discover them.<sup>68</sup> More particularly, when Heidegger speaks of the world, he does not mean it ontically (as the sum total of beings) or existentially (the world of our jobs, of our hobbies, etc.) or even traditionally ontologically (as the *essence* of beings). He means it in an existentially-ontological sense. That is, by “world,” Heidegger means the *worldliness*, i.e., the conditioning structure of the presupposition of beings. In other words, “world” or, better, “worldliness,” means, for Heidegger, the *phenomenologically proper Being of the beings*.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>67</sup>*BT*, 59/63. And this, since as we read in the phenomenological *BT*, “Being is always the Being of a being” (*BT*, 7/9).

<sup>68</sup>*BT*, e.g., 67-8/72, 77/83.

<sup>69</sup>*BT*, 60-1/64-5.

In order to proceed with his description of this worldliness, Heidegger at first selects the kind of beings known as “equipment.” The phenomenological examination of the way we come across pieces of equipment in the surrounding world lets the Being of these beings come to the fore. What is worldliness (or, equally, Being in its structuredness) can be paradigmatically exhibited by means of describing the givenness of *equipment* or *useful things* (*Zeug*).

Strictly speaking, writes Heidegger, there is no such thing as a piece of equipment (or useful thing). A useful thing always belongs to a *totality* of useful things. Only within such a totality can a useful thing *be*, and be *what* it is. In the midst of such a totality, a useful thing is essentially “something in order to . . .” in the sense of serviceability, helpfulness, usability, handiness, etc. This structure of the “in order to . . .” contains a *reference* (*Verweisung*) of something to something.<sup>70</sup>

When we fix our sight on the useful things and examine them ‘theoretically,’ we lack an understanding of their worldliness or Being. Whence do we know it? Our very using and handling of the useful things is not blind, but has its own way of *seeing* in accordance to which we encounter them exactly as useful things *in* their handiness. Our dealings with the useful things in their manifold “in order to . . .” references is guided by the special seeing (read: “intuiting”) which is called *circumspection* (*Umsicht*).<sup>71</sup> At this level, however, we have a pre-ontological and pre-phenomenological awareness of the *worldliness* or *Being* of the useful things. We presuppose it in experiencing these beings, even though we do not experience it in the same way and with ‘explicit’ evidence. Heidegger calls this kind of Being, the Being of useful things, *readiness-to-hand* or *handiness* (*Zuhandenheit*).

There are, however, some ‘natural’ modifications of this encountering of useful things that give us the possibility of a phenomenologically more proper—and, eventually, ontologically proper—‘catching sight’ of the handiness qua worldliness or Being of the useful things. Heidegger registers three problematic ways of practical dealings with things (*conspicuousness*, *obtrusiveness* and *obstinacy*) as situations in which what is at hand is in a sense isolated and marginalized, whereas handiness itself somehow comes to the fore ‘at the limit’ by its, so to speak, “bidding farewell.”<sup>72</sup> More particularly, what shows itself in these situations is the structure of being of what is at hand as useful thing, which, as was said, consists in the nexus (*Zusammenhang*) of the “in order to . . .” references.<sup>73</sup> This nexus now *appears*—and is not something obtained indirectly, by inference, say—not as something not seen before, but as a nexus that was continually, even though latently, seen in our circumspection.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>70</sup>For all these, see *BT*, 64/68-9.

<sup>71</sup>For all these, see *BT*, 65/69.

<sup>72</sup>*BT*, 69/74.

<sup>73</sup>*BT*, 69/74.

<sup>74</sup>*BT*, 70/75.

Up to this point, the discussion concerning the world qua Being started from the most primordial—according to Heidegger—level of our existence in the everyday world and phenomenologically brought to the fore some of its general characteristics. The basic element in the foregoing analyses was the idea of *reference*. This, however, does not suffice for a proper illumination of the structure of Being (worldliness). “Reference” (*Verweisung*) can tempt us to treat it in terms of its formal universal ‘counterpart’ of “relation” (*Beziehung, Relation*), leading to the irreparable loss of crucial phenomenological information in the analyses of Being.<sup>75</sup> Thus, in §17 of *BT*, Heidegger attempts a *deeper* and *more acute* approach. “Reference” is fixed more steadily and is also further determined in its decisive details. For this reason, he appeals to a *special* kind of useful things or equipment, the *signs*, and more precisely to a subdivision of these, the *winkers* (car turn-signals).

Signs *indicate*, and indication shows “more intensely” what “reference” means in the analyses given just above. Indication becomes prominent in the useful things that we know as *winkers*. But what, exactly, becomes so *eminently* (*vorzüglich*)<sup>76</sup> manifest in the indicating reference that the winkers accomplish? On the one hand, Heidegger explains, this specific sign is handy or ready-to-hand for *all* the people involved in the *world* of traffic and its regulations. On the other hand, in our dealings with these signs, our corresponding “comportment (being)” (*BT*, 74/79) toward such an encountered sign is shown, e.g., in “moving aside,” “remaining still,” etc. But these possible comportments are a way of *taking a direction* (*Einschlagen einer Richtung*), and this belongs essentially to *Dasein* in its Being as being-in-the-world. In its being-in the world and being-by the beings, *Dasein* is always somehow *directed* and *underway* (*ausgerichtet und unterwegs*).<sup>77</sup> Thus, *mutatis mutandis*, the circumspection following the winkers brings the actual ‘aroundness’ of the surrounding world (*Umhafte der Umwelt*) into an explicit ‘overview’ (‘*Übersicht*’). We realize that this world is characterized by a certain *orientation* (*Orientierung*).<sup>78</sup> In sum, what becomes manifest in this overview is precisely the ontological structure or worldliness pertaining to handiness (*Zuhandehiet*), in the form of a *specifically orientated, directional, referential totality*.

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<sup>75</sup>“Relation,” we read, is not the genus of the species “reference,” which has as its subspecies signal, symbolic, expressional, and significative reference. Thus, if we were to conduct our analyses in terms of relations, everything phenomenologically crucial would be lost. Relation itself has its ontological origin in reference, *not* the other way round; and this is *because* of the formal universal character of relation. That is, the latter is simply the result of a *formalizing* abstraction on the former, or the remnant of a formalizing privation of it. See *BT*, 72-3/77-8, 82/88. What Heidegger wants to claim here is that a formal analysis of Being, be it of the regional beings “equipment” or even Being as such (i.e., in the end, a Formal Ontology like that designed by Husserl) could never have the potential to serve as a Fundamental Ontology. Cf. above, with regard to Heidegger’s early understanding of Being. This is not yet clear in the relevant bibliography.

<sup>76</sup>See *BT*, 73/79.

<sup>77</sup>*BT*, 74/79.

<sup>78</sup>*BT*, 74/79.



Moreover, this way of inter-referentiality, on the basis of which totalities of useful things are comprised, is *not* an arbitrary inter-connection. The inter-referentiality of the “in order to . . .” is a kind of dependence that relates to *suitability* (*Geignetheit*). That is, one ready-to-hand being is *suitably bonded* or fittingly *jointed* (*es hat mit ihm bei etwas sein Bewenden*) to a different being involved in the same referential totality. From this point of view, its character is that of *relevance* or, better (I think), fitting *jointness* (*Bewandtnis*).<sup>79</sup> Each such jointness is prefigured by its superordinate total jointness, e.g., of a workshop (*Werkstatt*) which, in the end, is determined by an existential possibility of *Dasein*, i.e., of the ultimate “what-for” (*Wozu*) of a handy thing or, simply, of the for-the-sake-of-which (*Worum-willen*) (οὐ ἕνεκα).<sup>80</sup> However, this ‘patterned’—we can now say—jointness, within which a handy thing or, more generally, *every* being *is* and *is what* it is, is *not*, Heidegger stresses, something that *we* first make or produce (*zur Sein bringen und herstellen*). We may only speak of an a priori letting-a-jointness-be-established (*Bewendenlassen*) within which beings are freed (*freigegeben*) in a letting-be (*Sein-lassen*).<sup>81</sup>

But, to repeat, that *for* which the handy things (and the beings of whatever kind of Being generally) are after all a priori freed, is *Dasein*. This means that *Dasein* always has an a priori *understanding* of the Being of beings; it has an understanding of the world qua *disclosedness* within which the beings are *discovered*.<sup>82</sup> By this, we realize that since the disclosure, i.e., that within which the jointness ‘moves,’ it is being held ‘in front,’ as it were, of an *understanding*, the character of the nexus of jointness may be grasped as a *signifying* (*bedeuten*). The respective *totality* of signification, i.e., the structure of the very world in which, as we saw, *Dasein* is always already the ‘zero point’<sup>83</sup> of *departing* (pro-tending or anticipatory) and *arriving* (re-tending or retrospective) significations, may then be called *significance* (*Bedeutsamkeit*).<sup>84</sup>

We can now move to an analysis of §§32–33 of *BT*, where Heidegger addresses this ‘correlation’ between understanding and significance in more detail and depth. In that fuller ontologico-existential approach, and to the degree that there is indeed understanding of significance, what is understood is now called, more generally, “*sense*” (*Sinn*). From this point of view, we can now say that *Dasein* can only

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<sup>79</sup>See *BT*, 78/83.

<sup>80</sup>See *BT*, 78/84.

<sup>81</sup>See *BT*, 79/84–5.

<sup>82</sup>See *BT*, 80/85–6.

<sup>83</sup>I use this expression in absolute deliberation, in order to make an overt allusion to the parallel thematic found in Husserl's *Ideas II* (1912–1913), in the context of his analysis of the constitution of perceptual beings on the basis of our embodied consciousness. I presented this thematic in Chaps. 4 and 5. It is important to bear to mind that Heidegger studied the manuscript of that book intensely sometime before his course “Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time” (1925), in which he seems to have formed the final plan for his *BT*.

<sup>84</sup>See *BT*, 81/87.



discover beings due to its understanding of that sense in its a priori. And this circumspective discovering is now said to have the character of an *interpretation* (*Auslegung*). What is circumspectively interpreted is the beings in their “in order to . . .” as such, i.e., as partial members of the totality of equipment within which only they are and appear in what they are. Correspondingly, we say that the beings that are thus circumspectively discovered “as that which they are” “have sense.”<sup>85</sup> And what is “sense”? In *BT*, Heidegger gives us a very important definition.

Sense is that wherein the intelligibility of something maintains itself [*worin sich Verständlichkeit von etwas hält*]. What can be articulated in the understanding disclosure we call “sense.” Sense, structured [in terms of understanding and interpretation] [. . .], is the upon-which of the project [*das Woraufhin des Entwurfs*] on the basis of which something becomes intelligible as something. [. . .] Sense must be understood as the *formal-existential framework* [*das formal-existenziale Gerüst*] of the disclosedness belonging to understanding. (*BT*, 142/151; emphasis added, transl. sl. md.)

This sounds totally alien. Our acquaintance with Husserl's descriptions of what he understands as “sense” can, however, bring the definition down to earth. In the end, we read, when we ask about the *sense* of Being (*Sinn von Sein*) we are not in fact after something deep-lying that stands, as it were, ‘behind’ Being. On the contrary, we question *Being* itself, *insofar as it stands within the intelligibility* of *Dasein* (*sofern es in die Verständlichkeit des Daseins hereinsteht*). That is, Being as the disclosed supporting or bearing ‘ground’ (*tragender “Grund”*) of discovered beings, is only accessible as *sense*.<sup>86</sup> Thus, when we, in the foreground of *BT*, ask about the sense of Being, we are in fact after Being *qua sense*.

The entirety of the foregoing analysis is summarized by Heidegger himself in a magnificent marginalium of his “Introduction” (1949) to “What is Metaphysics?” (1929). In the main body of the text, we read that the truth of Being and the sense of Being are one and the same thing, and that Being as such, in its historical *un-concealedness*, means nothing other than *sense*. And sense (the *formal-existential context* of the disclosure),<sup>87</sup> the marginalium now says, has the meaning of the “*Wegrichtung des Sach-Verhalts*” (*GA* 9, 377)! Moreover, in his *BPP*, Heidegger says that the ecstasis (intentionality) of *Dasein* projects a horizon that appears as a concrete openness, or as a schematic pre-delineation (*schematische Vorzeichnung*) of that toward which the ecstasis is directed, that is, of Being (*GA* 24, 435)! In the latter two cases, the incessantly ‘migrating’ Heidegger could not have helped us more in tracing the footprints of his laborious but almost constantly concealed itinerary. Whoever has followed, up to this point, the references and the analyses of the Husserlian thematics of the categorial intuition of the *Sachverhalte* and of their

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<sup>85</sup>See *BT*, 139/148-9.

<sup>86</sup>See *BT*, 142/152. In Chap. 9, we will return to the issue of the relation between Being as sense and Being as such or itself.

<sup>87</sup>Note here (as well as a few lines earlier) the use of the suffix “existential”; this marks a necessary contrast to the formal-logical and formal-ontological.

pre-designation in empty thinking as noetic sense (*noetischer Sinn*), and has a fair familiarity with the Kantian thematic of schematization, is already prepared for the analyses that will follow, both here and in Chap. 9.

Before moving on, however, let me first add a further remark. Øverenget thinks that there is a “continuity” between the notion of categorial intuition in *LI* “as it is presented by Heidegger in *PHCT*” and the distinction between primary presence and appresence (analyzed by Husserl in his *Ideen* II, 16, 162–3), which has the meaning of the co-presence and co-giveness of the horizon within which the presence of the particular beings takes place.<sup>88</sup> Øverenget rightly criticizes Dreyfus’ reading of the role of the discussion of signs in *BT* (he thinks that it reveals just another way of our becoming aware of the significance making up the world, but now without appealing to some of the types of disturbance: malfunction, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy).<sup>89</sup> Even on that occasion, though, he claims only that in his discussion of the signs, Heidegger just attempts to investigate assignment or reference (*Verweisung*) “more precisely” (1998, 186 n.). In this direction, he remarks that Heidegger’s analysis of signs is useful to his project due to the fact that “while a piece of equipment generally ‘hides’ its references as long as it functions normally [on this see again his 1998, 181ff], signs are a kind of equipment whose normal function is precisely that of [simply] *calling attention* to the nexus of references that constitutes readiness-to-hand” (1998, 186; emphasis added). Even though this remark goes considerably further than Dreyfus’ reading, it is not, in the end, radically different from it.

As I see it, the usefulness of Heidegger’s analyses of signs goes beyond the mere calling of attention to the mereological nexus of references defining *Zuhandenheit*. Rather, it is the best example he can use in order to make evident one crucial element in the whole thematic of worldliness and referentiality: namely, the *orientatedness* or *directionality* (see *BT*, §17) of the meaning-assignments. This advancement from mere relationality to referentiality actually constitutes progress. But if we are to take an even more thorough step into the depths of Heideggerian Phenomenology, an additional move is necessary; one that gets us from referentiality to orientatedness and directionality. This factor excludes from any possible analysis of any—at least regional—Being the possibility of falling back to some conceptual or formal ontological analysis of referentiality and to mere relationality. It is a referentiality which develops itself within a horizon characterized by its defining orientatedness and directionality pertaining to this or that specific scheme according to which this or that regional existential-constitutive function hermeneutically builds up the corresponding beings. Referentiality specifically determined in accordance to orientatedness and directionality is precisely the factor that makes appearing a drama playable only within the context of concrete intuition (and not of concepts or arguments and formal ontological mere relations or even references). In the end, Heidegger wanted to reduce all orientatedness and directionality to existentio-praxial possibilities in the primordial horizon of human life-planning and,

<sup>88</sup>See Øverenget 1998, 172, 171.

<sup>89</sup>See Dreyfus 1991, 100.

ultimately, to account for all these in terms of the latter's sheer time structure. This final attempt, however, is highly questionable, and Heidegger himself renounced it.

## 8.7 Revisiting the Husserlian Origins of Heidegger's Inspiration

What does this reconstruction tell us with regard to the question that concerns us? Keeping in mind what was said in §8.2, the four interpretive theses presented above (§8.4), and the reconstruction of the previous section, I will proceed quickly to the guidelines of a new proposal.

First, we must observe the general insufficiency of the available analyses concerning the possibility and meaning of the move from Husserl's teaching of the *categorial* to Heidegger's mature *Seinsfrage*. The problems started with the appropriation of Husserl's idea of the *categorial*, which, as we saw in Chap. 7 and in the foregoing sections of the present chapter, was understood in the sense of what Dahlstrom called "the logical prejudice." Husserl's categorial was seen as the supra-sensuous excessiveness (surplus) of logically forming factors that allegedly determine the constitution of all the intentional objects (indiscriminately of whether they are perceptual in simple acts of passive syntheses or higher order objectities in acts of linguistic synthesis). We also saw that no special care is taken to show the difference between Husserl's categorial (proper) and Heidegger's emphatically *non-categorial* analysis of the 'excessiveness' of Being and its peculiar structuredness.

On the basis of the point of view reached above, in order to reach an adequate answer of the question under discussion in this chapter, we must realize at least the following things.<sup>90</sup>

### 8.7.1 Husserl's Categorial Forms and Heidegger's World Horizontality: Digging Deeper

A characteristic of Husserl's analysis regarding the intentionality related to categorial acts is that even though categorial objects are not like the usual perceptual things, they are still objectities of some kind, i.e., they are indeed objects in the sense that they are given as correlates of acts of *objectification* (of objectifying acts).<sup>91</sup> For

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<sup>90</sup>In the present context, I will take it for granted that in Husserl's doctrine regarding the objective source of the categorial concepts, there is nothing more than what is found in Heidegger's and in the relevant literature's parallel idea regarding the 'objectivity' of Being. For my reading of what Husserl meant with his idea regarding the 'objective' basis for the origin of the fundamental concepts of science and philosophy, though, see below §8.8.1.

<sup>91</sup>See also, e.g., Drummond 2007, 149; Øverenget 1998, Chap. 2 and especially p. 168.

Husserl, the categorial is always related with a singular objectivity, e.g., states of affairs like “the-apple-is-red” or even “this-green-is-lighter-than-that-green”; it is a forming factor, responsible for the *inner* make up of such objectivities. The latter are states of affairs, founded upon either single perceptual objects or more complex collections of such objects. No matter how extended the founding basis may be, the categorial objectivity is a single object-like pole. To this extent, the categorial would be a logically forming operation upon *sub-ontical* elements, toward the making-actual (constitution) of the whole of an ontic (categorial) particular. This is the standard account (which we will revisit in this subsection).

Now, Heidegger's doctrine is supposed to amount to a radicalization of Phenomenology; a deepening of it in the direction of the discovery of pre-theoretical levels of intentionality, generally equated with praxial comportment. It is claimed that Heidegger's analysis of equipment and its Being goes to a phenomenological deeper level than Husserlian perceptual intentionality, which allegedly has a ‘theoretical’ rather than a praxial nature.<sup>92</sup> However, how can Heidegger say that categorial intuition formed the “ground” for the plan of his Fundamental Ontology? Why not Kant's doctrine of the First Analogy of Experience (based on the category of “substance” and its constituting function according to the pattern “S is p”)?<sup>93</sup> Can we be satisfied with only the possible answer that, whereas in Kant, “substance” is merely a concept and is just inferentially introduced, Husserl shows us its intuitability and, thus, the way for a non-speculative metaphysics? I think that we must ask for more. In this sub-section, we will see just this.

Heidegger's appropriation of Husserl's ‘categorial,’ that is, Heidegger's view of *Being*, is characterized by peculiar features. To begin with, it does not presuppose the availability of pre-constituted objects or of objectivities. Being, as a *meaningful, open, intra-differentiated, directionalized and orientationalized horizon of existentio-praxial inter-referentiality*, is what for the first time constitutes (lets) full-fledged particular beings be and be given or appear in corresponding intuitions. Primordially, this happens through *Zuhandenheit* constituting equipment that appears in circumspection. What Heidegger calls “understanding of Being” is not something like a Husserlian founded objectifying act, in which we nominalize some categorial form. In his presentation of anxiety (*Angst*), Heidegger gives us some indications of how we could grasp the possibility Dasein has of such an understanding. It may be either a pre-ontological intuiting (understanding) of this horizon in his presentation of circumspection (*Umsicht*) (the way of seeing the inter-referentiality of equipment, and, to this degree, the equipment itself) or a fully ontological intuiting. Understanding or the various kinds of non-theoretical

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<sup>92</sup>We dealt with this in Chap. 4 of the present book.

<sup>93</sup>Remember how Heidegger referred his audience at Zähringen to the category “substance” as possibly influenced by Husserl's discovery concerning categorial intuition. Heidegger, in fact, says that the Husserlian categorial is tantamount to the “Kantian forms” (*FS*, 66/114). Nevertheless, this reference wasn't found to be satisfactory after all, either by that audience or on the basis of the criticism provided here.

*seeings* are not, thus, objectifying acts; they are not acts that set against themselves *isolated objects* (of whatever inner complexity).<sup>94</sup> Crucial, then, in Heidegger's mature conception of Being, is this 'ambiental' or *horizontal directionally inter-referential* character, pointed to above in §8.6.

Interestingly, in the context of his analyses concerning intentional constitution in general, Husserl does not actually lack the idea of such a *horizontal-inter-referentiality*. Surely, we can locate this idea of the constitutive a priori as a horizontal structure in his analyses of *perception*. I think, though, that we can trace its presence even in his analysis of categorial synthesis. Let us see how this is so.

Firstly, as we saw in Chaps. 3, 4, and 5, Husserl's teaching regarding perceptual constitution are clearly analyses concerning *horizontal syntheses*. The latter are based on *arrangements* of sensuous parts, according to *patterns unfoldable in directional and orientated horizontal fashion*. Further, one can argue that the Husserlian horizontal that can be *interestingly* paralleled with the Heideggerian horizontal is Husserl's horizontal intentionality as found in his analyses concerning what he calls "*outer horizon*"—in contradistinction to the inner structural horizon of the particular perceptual things. This is equally important in Husserl's theory. The priority he gives to the "inner horizon," in the context of perceptual constitution, is methodological and not systematic.

Despite the in-principle explanation just offered, an objection that may arise here is this: since Heidegger himself explicitly identifies *categorial* intentionality as the key influence from Husserl's side on his mature conception of Being, what sense does it make to pull, 'unfittingly,' the thematic of *perceptual* intentionality into the account? I will give an answer to this shortly (§8.7.3). Before this, however, let me pass to a second point.

I think that the foregoing standard account of Husserl's notion of the categorial is very restricted. For reasons that cannot be analyzed here in detail, I would suggest that not all categorial acts should count as objectifying.<sup>95</sup> More specifically, if perception and nomination are the objectifying acts par excellence, then judgments cannot self-understandably be objectifying without further explanation. I fully understand that this view would be unusual, to put it mildly. A predicative state of affairs, though, or other categorial acts like that of summation and universalization,

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<sup>94</sup>Thus, a problem arises: *what* exactly is that which Being constitutively "forms" and lets be and appear, especially for the first time? In Heidegger, there is no account of the inner constitution of the being (equipment). They are what they are only within the context of significance or jointness with other such beings, but we lack clear evidence of *what* is thusly jointed. This, then, created the paradox of the reversed intentional founding of the perceptual upon the equipmental. We dealt with this in Chap. 6 of the present book.

<sup>95</sup>For an adequate solution to the problem, we would naturally need a definition of "object." Nevertheless, the question "what is an object?" is notoriously difficult to answer. The same holds in Phenomenology. Husserl's mereology in the third LI attempts to delimit the question of what a whole is, and does not exactly suffice in deciding what an object is. We know, moreover, that for Kant the ego is not an object, and that for Husserl we cannot have adequate evidence of the ego (although we do have apodictic evidence that it is). See also Chap. 10 of the present book.

do not and cannot amount to objects in the sense that a perceptual object (before or after its nominalization) is. The special logical relatedness that is projected even upon a perceptual object turns it into a complex that no longer has the original unity of the simple perceptual object. This is clearer in relational judgments of the sort “this apple is bigger (or different, etc.) from that apple.” Consider also cases like “history is a time horizon wherein unknown things have happened and unexpected things may happen” or “I am a being that becomes what it is.” At the limit, though, the same can be accepted even for judgments of the sort “this apple is red.” That is, states of affairs are not self-understandably “objects.” They may also be open-horizon directional structures that let their constituents appear in the way meant by the judgmental intentionality. Of course, states of affairs can *become* objects after a process of nominalization, as in e.g., “that this apple is different from that apple . . .” or “that history is a time horizon . . .” This double identity (so to speak) of states of affairs confuses our views about them, and Husserl's analyses of them is also confused.

Despite all the above, we have seen that Heidegger mixes the perspectives of purely sensory perception and of categorial shaping in Husserl, claiming that in the latter, all intentionality is through and through categorial; and this in the standard sense drafted at the beginning of this subsection. Unfortunately, this situation inhibited the possibility of arriving at a clear view of the inspiration he seems to have drawn from Husserl. Categoriality, as standardly analyzed here and in §8.2 above, indeed does the job of explaining the *Überschuß* character of Being, etc.; it does not, however, enlighten us with regard to the more important characteristics of the Being Heidegger has in mind in *BT*. Hopefully, the disentangling of the different perspectives attempted here has begun to make clear what is actually the case.

### 8.7.2 *Husserl's Part-Whole Constitutive Analysis: Setting It on Its Proper Footing*

In all of his remarks about the influence Husserl exerted upon him, Heidegger emphasizes the centrality of the doctrine of categorial intuition. In the end, this was basically understood as an intuition of a mere copulative connection between the subject and the predicate in a state of affairs, which, in its turn, is treated as nothing more than a part-whole connection.<sup>96</sup> This, however, neither brings to the fore the complete potential of Husserl's categorial intuition, nor does it suffice to phenomenologically understand the complete swing from Husserl's original discoveries to Heidegger's conception of Being in *BT*. At this point, we will look at an additional fold of the problem.

What is of fundamental importance in our understanding of the meaning of phenomenological material or contentful constitution—the key issue, after all, for

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<sup>96</sup>Øverenget (1998), who is faithful to Heidegger's account, says something like this.

both Husserl and Heidegger—is not mere part-whole *relationality*. The pattern which is to be found in both Husserl's and Heidegger's analysis regarding categorial intuition and the 'being' and function of Being is not simply that of part-whole analysis.<sup>97</sup> The key idea here is not that something *is* as far as it is a mere part in an undifferentiated whole. It is not accidental that in his concrete non-formal *regional* analyses in *BT*, Heidegger repeatedly writes that the worldliness or the meaning-context that enables the appearing of beings *cannot* be treated in the merely *formal* terms of an undifferentiated 'relationality.'<sup>98</sup>

In Husserl's categorial intuition too, the categorial relating is *not* a neutral relating that interconnects *undifferentiated* members. The latter may happen only in the context of a highly *formalized* interrelating, like the one that keeps together the members of, e.g., a mathematical set. The case par excellence of categorial synthesis, nonetheless, is not this latter case, but that of a non-formalized *predicative* relating. This relates regional *subjects* with regional *predicates*. And this relation, if it is seen properly as a regional categorial possibility (and not as a possibility in the sphere of mere and proper Formal Ontology) is determined in a special way, since a *predicate* is copulatively connected with a *subjectivized* objectivity. Thus this relating is *differentiated* and, in an interesting sense, even *orientated* or *directional*. As Kant taught us in his Transcendental Logic as a positive theory of knowledge, "S is p" is not reversible to "p is S" as it is in merely negative Formal Logic (properly so called). In the context of objective experience, i.e., of knowledge about beings with real possibility, the synthesis of a perceptual state of affairs must always have the form "S is p," *without* it being possible to reverse it in the form "p is S." As we know from his teachings regarding Transcendental Logic and Regional Ontology, Husserl further deepened and extended these original insights of Kant's theory of judgment. What is crucial in both Kant and—in a really radical sense—in Husserl is their special concern not only for the conceptual in knowledge, but also for the intuitional.

Of course, this concern for the intuitional recalls Kant's notion of the *schema* as he presents it, especially with reference to the empirical concept "dog." In order to pass from the concept of dog to the intuition of a dog, the content of the concept (its *definiens*) should attain a schema, which is described by Kant as the pattern that

<sup>97</sup>We have already seen above that Øverenget (1998) nicely thematizes it, but does not fully elaborate on its crucial—for our purposes—details.

<sup>98</sup>See, e.g., *BT*, §§12, 17, 18, 28. As we saw, Øverenget (and Dahlstrom) present the syntheticity of the predicatively constituted state of affairs in terms of a *mere* relation. For example, Øverenget writes that "the car's being red [...] is a *relation* within the thing itself, a state of affairs" (1998, 42; emphasis added). As will be evident, what is of crucial importance here is not this *flat* relationality, the mere state of affairs; it is a kind of 'directionality' and '*orientationality*' that is found in these syntheses. Of course, in Heidegger's Fundamental Ontological analyses proper, dealing with Being in general or Being as Being, the case is *not* exactly the same as when dealing with, e.g., *Zuhandenheit*. This, however, is not an issue that can be adequately treated here. At this point, we are only dealing with the first decisive steps in Heidegger's questioning after Being: his understanding of the primordially disclosed Being as sense in its (constitutive) letting equipment be and be what it is. For more, see Chaps. 9 and 10 of this book.



determines the specific intuitional places of the parts falling under the partial sub-concepts of the original concept, e.g., head, mouth, teeth, legs, tail., etc., and the orientations according to which all these are to be interconnected, etc.<sup>99</sup> Husserl's notion of the *noematic sense*, we must add, represents—unfortunately, in a way possibly unknown to him—his development and extension of Kant's concept of the schema, in a way that makes it applicable to cases of predication and also intuitable as structuring either a predicative state of affairs or simply a pre-predicatively formed perceptual thing.<sup>100</sup> Furthermore, as we have already seen (§8.6), it was Heidegger himself who described Being in terms of the schema. It was he, moreover, who suggested in *BT* (as well as in his *KPM*) that in his theory of schematism, Kant indeed somehow reawakened the original neighboring of humans with Being.

In sum, what we find, first in Husserl and then in Heidegger, is the idea that if something is to be or appear concretely, it must be a *part of a harmonious intra-differentiated, intra-orientated, and intra-directed horizontal unity of meaning references, which hermeneutically assigns it a specific functional role*. We are not dealing with mere “relations.”

### 8.7.3 *Husserl's Influence in Heidegger's Seinsfrage: A Combined View*

Heidegger's emphasis that his inspiration came from the difference between categorial intuition and sensuous perception seems to have driven the scholars away from Husserl's perceptual intentionality. However, we have seen that for Heidegger, sensuous perception is nothing more than the living through of mere sensory contents, and that Husserl's perceptual intentionality is thoroughly permeated by categorial structures. In Heidegger's *PHCT*, simple intentional perception and categorial (qua predicative) intuition are brought together in an unholy mixture. Thus, the following question arises: should we lean upon Husserl's theory of judgment or upon Husserl theory of perception in order to better understand Heidegger's conception of Being? In §8.7.1 I touched upon this issue, but at this point a closer inspection is necessary.

The inspiration Heidegger received from Husserl's categorial intuition seems to be something like this. Heidegger read Husserl's analyses concerning the relation between simple perception and perceptual judgments as a *mirroring* transition from what is *implicitly* articulated and intended, to what is *explicitly* so stated and intended. It is true that as we saw in Chap. 7, Husserl himself gives enough reasons

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<sup>99</sup>In connection with this point, see also Kant on the schema of a triangle (*CPR*, A140-1/B180-1).

<sup>100</sup>To my knowledge, this connection (between Husserl's noematic sense and Kant's schema, especially in their controlling the appearing of the object of knowledge in intuition) has not been yet made in the literature.



for doing so. However, we may charitably suppose that Heidegger understands categorial intuition through some kind of a *filtering effect* produced by Husserl's actual analyses concerning *perceptual* constitution.

More specifically, as is evident from the *PHCT* and the *BPP*, in his appropriation of the sixth *LI* Heidegger conflates, on the one hand, the phenomenological analysis concerning the constitution of the *objectivity content* of the intentional object and, on the other hand, the analyses concerning what he calls the "*perceivedness* of the thing," i.e., the *qualitative* character of the act and of the appearing of the perceptual thing.<sup>101</sup> Thus, in his account concerning the content, he speaks of *subjects* and *predicates*, whereas in his (very short) account concerning perceivedness, he speaks of the *adumbrative* givenness of the thing. Heidegger actually seems to hold two at first glance incompatible views regarding the intentional constitution of perceived things. On the one hand, we have seen that he holds the view that in Husserl's analysis of perception, the perceived thing is constituted in terms of a subject and predicate synthesis. On the other hand, he holds the view that if we are to take into our account the "how of the givenness" of the perceived, the "perceivedness of the thing," we find that it is constituted in terms of an adumbrative synthesis that is capable of letting us see something like the character of the being of the perceived.

Drawing upon the charitable analysis of this conflict in Chap. 7, we can put the current matter in the following way. Heidegger thinks that in Husserl, the sensory content of the appearing perceptual thing is predicatively-categorially structured *and* the way of its givenness is at the same time that of orientatedly inter-referring adumbrations of the thing (in its inner and outer horizontal contexts). From the Husserlian perspective, this view is untenable. It may, however, have guided crucial details of Heidegger's conception of the structure of Being, especially in its primordially disclosed sense. We can justifiably assume that when Heidegger refers to the doctrine of categorial intuition, he has in mind (in a confused way) contents of the type "subject" and "predicate," which are nevertheless synthesized in 'categorial' forms that enigmatically, for him, let the perceptual thing appear by way of horizontally inter-referring adumbrative synthesis. Heidegger remained stubbornly silent on the way he sees the combination between these two things.

Now, in the *LI*, Husserl calls this formative constituting factor "intentional perceptual matter" (*Materie*) and in *Ideas I* it is re-conceived, and re-named "perceptual sense" (*Wahrnehmungssinn*) or, correlatively, perceptual noematic sense

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<sup>101</sup> See *PHCT* 40/52, and especially 43/58, 60/81-2; *BPP* §9.c. At the beginning of *PHCT* §6.b.α.β, Heidegger gives us an account of the perceptual thing's constitution in which this thing is considered as the *identical totality of an adumbration series* accomplished in an one-level act. Soon after this, however, the scene changes toward the implicit/explicit scheme. In fact, *there is* a story of how one should have proceeded from this perceivedness in the givenness of the perceived, i.e., from the very adumbrative *constitution* of the perceived toward another dimension of Heidegger's inspiration regarding how to deal with the question of Being in *BT*. It is the story that Heidegger seems to suppress in his reconstructions of Husserl's Phenomenology and of his development on the basis of it; the same story that we are trying to bring to the surface in this sub-section.

(*noematischer Sinn*).<sup>102</sup> Our last supposition here can then help us move a step further in the direction of deciphering the sought for additional dimension of Husserl's influence on Heidegger treatment of the *Seinsfrage*. Bearing in mind the special characteristics that Heidegger attributed to Being,<sup>103</sup> the latter dimension perhaps gets more amply illuminatory if we recall some of Husserl's crucial descriptions of his "sense."

[T]he sense is not a concrete entity [or being (*Wesen*)] in the total composition of the noema but a sort of abstract *form* [*Form*] inherent in the noema. (*Ideas* I, 316/273; emphases added)

[In the] perceptual sense [...] there are directives [*Anweisungen*], unfulfilled anticipatory and retrospective indicatory interpretations [*Vordeutungen und Zurückdeutungen*] which we only have to follow up. [...] All the different *directions of determination* [*Bestimmungsrichtungen*] which lie in the thing-meaning [*im Dingvermeinten*] as such are thereby traced in advance [...] [as its] essential interweaving [*Wesensverflechtungen*]. (*Ideas* II, 38/35)

In every moment of perceiving, the perceived is what it is in its mode of appearance [as] a system of *referential implications* [*system von Verweisen*] with an appearance-core upon which these have their hold [*Anhlat*]. And, in these referential implications [*Verweisen*], it calls out to us, as it were: "There is still more to see here, *turn me* so you can see *all my sides*, let your gaze *run through me*, *draw closer to me*, *open me up*, *divide me up*; keep on looking me *over* and *over* again, turning me to see all sides." (*APAS*, 41/5; translation modified; emphases added)<sup>104</sup>

This "call" that comes objectively, as it were, from the perceptual object itself, is nothing but perceptual sense itself. Our self-transcending intentional life is primordially regulated by this sense, which sets itself a task to be accomplished, the appearance or *epiphany* of the perceptual object, and guides its bodily and sensory means toward this accomplishment.<sup>105</sup> The actual object always "exhibits the index [*Index*] for the whole determined system of teleologically unifying fashionings of consciousness [*einheitlicher Bewußtseinsgestaltungen*]" (*Ideas* I, 348/337). The sense is the *rule for an interpretation*<sup>106</sup> or *constitution*, which 'develops' itself (organisingly) 'around' a given part (in perception of an object: a *reell* content,

<sup>102</sup>See *Ideas* I, 317/305. For my understanding of these terms in the context of Husserl's Eidetic and Transcendental Phenomenology, see Chaps. 2, 3, and 4 of the present book.

<sup>103</sup>On this, see §8.6 above. These characteristics can also be traced in the case of the sense regulating the constitution of the predicative state of affairs appearing in the corresponding categorial intuition, i.e., in the sense which amounts to the categorial form "X is Y" (note the difference from the undifferentiated "... is ..."), i.e., to the copulative "is," in the objectivities of the sort "S is p."

<sup>104</sup>See also *FTL* §§3–4; *Ideas* I, 295/286.

<sup>105</sup>"In der Wahrnehmung *kommt* der gegenständliche Sinn zur leibhaften Gegebenheit oder, was dasselbe, zur Erscheinung]" (*Hua* XI, 505 n.321.18; emphasis added). On this, see also *Ideas* I, 357–8/346–7, 348/337; *Ideas* II, 29/33 38/35, 91/86. See of course also Chaps. 4 and 5 in this book.

<sup>106</sup>*Ideas* I, 111/118, 333/344, 332/343, 347/357, 346/358; *Ideas* II, 86/91, 33/29. See also *APAS*, 5.

e.g., an adumbration, which, as such, and in isolation, *does not appear* at all<sup>107</sup>).<sup>108</sup> Husserl in fact generalizes this perspective, regarding his conception of sense and its functioning as capable of considering the *world* itself as a sense “and beyond that nothing.”<sup>109</sup>

We may summarize all of this by saying that in Husserl, sense (be that inner or outer-horizonal in perception or actively diaretic and synthetic in categorial intentionality) does exactly this: *it synthesizes differentiated parts, by harmoniously jointing them into meaningful patterns of orientational-directional inter-referentiality, according to our kinesthetic or, more broadly conceived, intentional-praxial possibilities, ‘aiming’ at the achievement of the appearance or of the truth of unitary wholes.*<sup>110</sup> Naturally, what was just said brings us back to the previously cited, famous, and impressively eloquent—even if bizarre, when we first met it—definition that Heidegger gives to sense (*Sinn*) and, accordingly, to Being in *BT*.<sup>111</sup>

At the same time, we must of course realize that even though Heidegger acknowledges that with his doctrine of categorial intuition, Husserl succeeded “in thinking the categorial as given” (*FS*, 66), Heidegger himself *did not* think Being in terms of *categories*. That is, he does not treat Being as the (highest) geno-logical a priori. It is plain that in *BT*, Heidegger sets forth the project of a Fundamental Ontology that seeks the meaning of Being in strictly non-categorial terms. His rejection of genological (that is, in the end, categorial) metaphysics is severely and aggressively in favor of what he there calls *existential* terms.<sup>112</sup> And it is precisely this *non* categorial or geno-logical understanding of Being that is best understood not only on the basis of the peculiar categorial sense of the copulative “is” in

<sup>107</sup>Hua X, 116–7; *PP*, 137–8/179. Cf. Heidegger’s phrase that “Strictly speaking, there ‘is’ no such thing as a useful thing [*Ein Zeug ‘ist’ strenggenommen nie*]” (*BT*, 64/68).

<sup>108</sup>Another definition that Husserl gives of noematic sense is more widely known. “The ‘sense,’ of which we speak repeatedly, is this noematic ‘object in the how,’ with all that which the description characterized above is able to find evidently in it and to express conceptually” (*Ideas* I, 314–5/303). On the noematic sense generally, see also *Ideas* I, 217–8/206–7, 309–17/297–305.

<sup>109</sup>See *Ideas* I, 128–9/120, 112/106, 113/107; *CM* 8/49, 89–91/122–3, 93–4/125–6, 136/163, 151/177, 136–7/164; *Hua* IX, 329.

<sup>110</sup>See Chaps. 4 and 5 here.

<sup>111</sup>See the close of §8.6 above. See also *BT* [MR], 370–1/324. To this effect, especially interesting are also Husserl’s marginalia to his own copy of *BT* at the points *SZ* 324.1–5, 324.22–32, which indicate that in Heidegger’s explication of sense, the former recognizes his analyses of intentional correlation (see *PTP*, 381–2).

<sup>112</sup>It is an irony, of course, that Heidegger himself calls his sought for ‘Grail’ “*Sein überhaupt*” or, in English, “Being in general!” In the marginal note on p. 37 of his personal original copy of *BT*, however, he is quite self-critical of this choice: “*Sein—keine Gattung, nicht das Sein für das Seiende im allgemeinen; das ‘überhaupt’ = καθόλου [not ‘ἐν γένει’] = im ganzen von: Sein des Seienden; Sinn der Differenz.*”

Husserl's theory of predicative synthesis and of predicative categorial intuition, but also on the basis of the suitably approached non-categorial functioning of perceptual sense.<sup>113</sup>

## 8.8 Additional Points with Regard to the Full Content of Husserl's Influence on Heidegger's Framing of the *Seinsfrage*

We can now deal with the issues remaining from §8.5, in our effort to comprehend Heidegger's move from Husserl's Phenomenology to his own philosophy of Being.

### 8.8.1 Regarding the 'Objectivity' of the Categorial Forms

It is a constant concern of Heidegger's to repeat that in Phenomenology, "the 'is,' through which I observe the presence of the inkwell as object or substance, is a 'surplus' [*Überschuß*] in relation to the sensuous affections. But in a certain respect the 'is' is given *in the same manner* as the sensuous affections: the 'is' is not added to the sense-data; it is 'seen'—even if it is *seen* differently from what is sensibly visible. In order to be 'seen' in this way, it *must be given*" (*FS*, 66). The same idea is presented even more emphatically in his *PHCT*. This is one of Heidegger's most constant obsessions. The doctrine that being or 'is' is not added, not subjectively projected, etc., occurs in his relevant writings again and again. Now, although this is sometimes considered as one of his most important deviations from the supposedly subjectivist-metaphysical Phenomenology of Husserl, it is in fact a view that, for him, finds ample support by Husserl's thought—even if in a way that resulted from an over-interpretation of the latter's famous passage from the sixth LI.

It is not in the reflection upon judgments nor even upon fulfillments of judgments but rather in these fulfillments themselves that we find the true source of the concepts 'state of affairs' and 'being' (in the copulative sense).<sup>114</sup> It is not in these acts as objects but in the objects of these acts that we find the abstractive basis for the realization of the concepts in question. (*LI*, 783–4/141)

Heidegger understands this in his own way. It means that Being is not something which has a subject as its source. Being is the most genuine and absolute transcendent principle. As we saw in Chap. 7, in §6.d.α of the *PHCT*, Heidegger maintains that in Phenomenology we must avoid understanding categoriality in

<sup>113</sup>See also §8.8.2 below.

<sup>114</sup>Heidegger also adds here the concepts "being" (as a category), "this," "and," "or," "one," "several," "aggregate," etc. See 59/79.

terms of a form that is projected by an active and voluntary intellect upon some inert matter. This supposedly sustains the metaphysical mythology of an intellect, which, with its own forms, glues and rigs together the world's unformed and neutral matter. If we are to take into account the meaning of "intentionality," Heidegger insists, we will understand that the categorial forms "are not constructs of acts but *objects* [*Gegenstände*] that manifest themselves in these acts. They are not something made by the subject, and still less something added to the real objects such that the real entity is itself modified by this forming. Rather, they actually present the entity *more truly* in its '*being-in-itself*'" (70/96; emphases added). The categorial forms are a special constituent on the side of the objects, and any thematization just highlights, as it were, these constituents. "'*Constituting*' [and, for Heidegger, Husserl's 'categorial constituting' too] does not mean producing in the sense of making and fabricating; it means '*letting the entity be seen in its objectivity*'" (71/97).

This appropriation of Husserl's view regarding the origin of categorial concepts and categorial forms determines Heidegger's understanding of Dasein and of Being in *BT*. Being may be found as *understood* on the side of Dasein. However, it is not the case that this Being is also a construct or a *clearly active* projection of Dasein. On the contrary, Dasein finds itself in the respective understanding projection only because of its being always already *thrown* (*geworfen sein*) within this understanding. In a way, the projected Being is something 'haunting' or 'concerning' the beings themselves, i.e., it resides on the side of the beings.<sup>115</sup> At least two things must be noted here, however.

Firstly, it is true that Husserl writes that even "The unity of perception does not [...] arise through *our own synthetic activity* [but] the unity of perception comes into being as a *straightforward unity, as an immediate fusion of part-intentions*" (*LI*, 789/148). This phrase, however, does not presuppose Heidegger's reading of perceptual intentionality in Husserl as being always already permeated by categorial elements. Thus, what Husserl means is that whereas the pre-categorial syntheses of perception are not a result of our *deliberate active*, i.e., not passive (*not non-*

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<sup>115</sup>Øverenget somehow bypasses the impact that this clue has for Heidegger's mature posing and understanding of the question of Being, both in comparison and in contradistinction to Husserl's own idea. He concludes that its importance for Heidegger lies only in the latter's realization that "Although 'being' does not *belong* to the [immanent] psychological sphere, it is nonetheless subjective in the sense that *it appears to* the subjective perspective. Being is a ['subjectively' appearing objective] correlate of an act of consciousness. [...] [A]lthough non-sensory and ideal concepts express something which cannot be found perceptually, they are 'nothing like consciousness, nothing psychic, but a special kind of objectivity'" (1998, 57). Øverenget reads Husserl's notion in the usual sense, which is to be found also in Heidegger's reading. See, however, below (in the main text), with reference to Husserl's notion of *Bedeutungstinktion*. Even though the sound categorial could not be merely something designed at will in a self-enclosed subjective immanence, it would still be a mistake to think that the categorial can be freed from any dependence on the side of some experiencing and thinking consciousness. This would amount to a surprisingly strong anthropic principle. See also Chap. 10.

actional), synthesizing acts, our categorial re-synthesizings of the perceptually given *are* indeed a result of our deliberate active acts.<sup>116</sup>

Secondly, the emphasis given by Heidegger and other interpreters to Husserl's passage is actually totally wrong. The history of thinking that led Husserl to this phrase is long and complicated (starting with his epistemological efforts in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, 1891). However, in the end, our understanding must be complemented by Husserl's analyses of the ideal unities of meaning to be found in his—much ignored—second LI. There we see that it is *not* the case that Husserl does not see the possibility of finding acts or, better, some suitable component of these acts, as a legitimate source for the meaning of philosophical and scientific concepts. On the contrary, what Husserl there calls *Bedeutungstinktion*,<sup>117</sup> i.e., what he later recognizes as *noetic sense*, is indeed (under specific conditions) such a legitimate source for the abstractive tracing of the origin of the fundamental concepts he explores. What “under specific conditions” means here is that in order for someone to complete phenomenological epistemology, a source like the latter does not *suffice*. It must *also* be possible that the correlative meanings (noematic senses) can be sought for and *found* on the side of the intuitionally appearing objectivities that fulfill the at-first empty aimings. In other words, the abstraction on the *Bedeutungstinktion* of an intending act *would* suffice, on the condition that we already know that a correlative objectivity is in fact actual, or even really possible, on the side of the (fulfilling) intuition. That is, the described abstraction would suffice if we were to know that our concept is not objectless (*Bedeutungsloss*, in the Kantian sense of the term).<sup>118</sup>

What all this means is that Husserl was equally sensitive to the danger of a dubious subjective grounding of philosophy's and science's most fundamental concepts, but he discovered a phenomenologically solid way of accomplishing this grounding on the basis of a sound intentional correlativeness. He thus avoids the phenomenologically unintelligible strong anthropic objectivism that Heidegger flirts with. Heidegger's approach to Being wants to be non-subjective. His understanding

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<sup>116</sup>Øverenget, on the contrary, interprets this point in the vein indicated by Heidegger: categoriality is not added to the categorial objectivities by us, but is always already a moment in intentional objectivity and, first of all, in perception (1998, 44ff). The most curious thing here, though, is that Øverenget refuses to accept that even the categorially (predicative) syntheses are the result of our active intentional projection (of the correlational sort, to be sure). This, however, comes as a natural result of his espousal of Heidegger's claim that, in Husserl, even simple perception is always already categorially shaped.

<sup>117</sup>See Husserl's Introduction to the second LI.

<sup>118</sup>Let me add only this last remark on this 'objectivism' issue. My hypothesis is that all analogous forms of traditional 'objectivism' that do not recognize in humans the possibility to constitute/re-constitute or otherwise ontologically 'shape'/re-'shape' objects (especially at the most primordial level of givenness) can be traced back to manifest, disguised, or secularized theological prejudices. In a nutshell, such a human-initiatory intervention and radical re-arrangement of the worldly setting would either make God or universe's logos lose track of its creation, or make us lose track of God's or universe's logos great plan for our return to a celestial or mundane Eden. I really doubt, however, that this is a sound worry. For more, see Chap. 10.

of “Being” is not achievable (primordially) by means of a subject over against a theoretically constituted object. The understanding he is after is based on a completely different grasp of the stance of the ‘agent’ toward the givens or the beings of a world. This stance is the—broadly speaking—*existentio-praxial* one. The agent can no longer be called a “subject” in the sense of a Cartesian theoretically-representationally observing and knowing agent. Interestingly, however, the significant core of Heidegger’s approach can also be found in Husserl.<sup>119</sup> In addition, though, Husserl avoids Heidegger’s dogmatic objectivism in favor of a (more phenomenologically sound) *correlativist* approach.

At any rate, Husserl does not seem to have been Heidegger’s sole or primary source as regards this aspect of his understanding of Being. Aristotle also appears to have played a crucial role.

### 8.8.2 *On Aristotle’s Influence on Heidegger’s Mature Conception of Being*

I will now make a further remark regarding the meaning of Heidegger’s testimony in his “My Way . . .,” where he writes that when he finally started collaborating with Husserl (as his assistant) he also started trying to interpret Aristotle in a manner of his own. What does Heidegger actually find in Aristotle that could fit with his parallel reading of the *LI*? The answer to this question is extremely difficult and tricky as, e.g., Heidegger’s notoriously cryptic “*Natorp-Bericht*” (1922) shows. This is not the place to analyze that manuscript, but we can give an in-principle glimpse of its spirit, and of Heidegger’s overall fascination with Aristotle.

It seems to me that what Heidegger finds in Aristotle is the possibility that there are beings that are, and are what they are, not due to their being *mimetic* instantiations of ideal prototypes, but because a synthesizing *forming* process lets them come to be. Both nature and *techne* can be seen as such ways of letting beings be. In *praxis* too, the same pattern of constituting process can be discovered. Primordially, however, beings are not constituted by the human intellect or by the creative productive, voluntarism, and interfering of any higher intelligence. There is, in Aristotle’s metaphysics, a highest constitutive principle, the Unmovable Prime Mover; this, however, does not actively engage in the processes of intra-worldly *phusis* and action. It is the source of all motion on Earth and in the heavens only in the sense of an uninterested beacon, as it were, according to the final-destination light of which all forms (formal causes) orientatedly unfold their processes and let beings be and appear throughout history. Human beings are, like all other beings, placed in the middle of all this becoming, but they are also called to respond by themselves (*ἐκαστοίως*) to all this. Primordially, humans discover themselves caught within this cosmic becoming by way of being *praxially* engaged within

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<sup>119</sup>See Chap. 4, especially §§4.8, 4.9, and 4.10.2; see also §8.8.3. below.



various dealings with other human and non-human beings. It is within these nexuses that they first experience beings and that they experience them as beings involved in such dealings. Naturally, although the Prime Mover, as highest principle non-interventionally regulating all motility, is not from the start known to humans, they will manage to live in virtue (i.e., to exist and act in the way corresponding to their unspoiled essence) only to the extent that they philosophically acquire intuitional understanding of how the cosmos is articulately ordered by this Prime Mover. It is within the (suitably in each context) directional-oriented articulatedness of the cosmos that humans experience primordially and otherwise meaningfully appearing beings and comport themselves toward them, with or without virtue. The root of most Heideggerian thematics and concerns can be traced back to the main Aristotelian points present in this brief account. Of course, Heidegger's fascination with Aristotle is not linear and steady and not without serious differentiation; that, however, is not our concern here.

I will press a little more on just one point. As we already saw, in Heidegger, the primordial constitution (of equipment) does not happen because equipment is caught in a merely 'relational' nexus. For instance, tools are, and are what they are, only due to the directed orientatedness of meaningful relationality, of the "in order to . . . ." Moreover, Heidegger maintains the view that neither nature-things nor formal logical something or the primordial *Uretwas* may be used as the appropriate phenomenological indicatory clue for the phenomenologization of Being as such, which he was already seeking in 1919.<sup>120</sup> Instead, the historically existing human being in its most primordial meaningful engagement with the world was then selected as that clue. The element of directed orientatedness functioning in Husserl's analyses of categorial constitution and intuition (but also and more clearly so in his analyses of perceptual constitution and intuition) resonate nicely with the 'teleology' involved in the praxial comportment and constitution of beings in the practical world in both Aristotle's and Heidegger's accounts.<sup>121</sup> Accordingly, since it is such a directional web of meaning or intentional inter-referentiality that makes beings be and be what they are, it can be seen that this should be acknowledged

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<sup>120</sup>Phenomenology, we have seen, needs a given a foothold in order to let synthetic or universal structures that make this given possible appear in their making it possible or actual. Husserl generally called this foothold *Leitfaden*. In his early maturation, Heidegger sometimes confusingly called it *formale Anzeige* (in fact, it can be anything *but* formal). The specific change of perspective in Heidegger's research into Being, which leads to this view, is depicted in Theodorou 2010a. See also Chaps. 9 and 10 of this book.

<sup>121</sup>His "*Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles*" (1921) and his so-called "*Natorp-Bericht*" (1922) are in fact his first elaborations of this new research perspective, regarding Being as such through key-thematics of the Aristotelian philosophy. In that period, Heidegger struggled to bring together the fundamental insight we are here trying to delineate with the thematics of poiesis and praxis, with *techne* and *phronesis*, and with *phusis* and historical living. The vexing inner complexities that still bother Heidegger's interpreters will not however trouble us here any further. A picture of the problems may, though, be gained by a survey of, e.g., Bernasconi 1986, 1989; Brogan 1989, 1994, 2005; Sheehan 1981, 1983; Taminaux 1987, 1991; Volpi 1992.



as the sought-for (and now *hermeneutically* understood) Being. Ontology can thus move away from the traditional logico-categorical metaphysical conception; it can claim to have started becoming (more) Fundamental.

Since the just mentioned oriented teleological happening can be unfolded only within the horizon of *time*, of the time that appertains to the macro-level of real engaged life (and beyond), this Being and its 'functioning' is understandable only on the basis of the grand-scale time of real and, to be sure, *finite* life (and beyond). Thus, Being is no longer a category; it is no longer the highest possible logical concept or idea. It is, rather, this or that historically unfoldable style of life-meaningfulness that is epochally found to determine the existentio-praxial possibilities of finite human lives. Being as such is the very highest principle enabling all this.

### 8.8.3 *Time as Ultimate Meaning of Husserl's Notion of Sense*

These last remarks bring us to a final crucial point regarding the philosophical relation between Husserl and Heidegger. Simply put, the general perspective Heidegger explicitly opens up, that the meaning of Being is time, can in fact be traced also in Husserl's own intentional constitutive analyses. In Husserl, the latter are synthesizing functions that unfold within the medium of the immanent micro-time of individual human consciousness, in the mode of retentions and protentions around an always-in-the-move living present.<sup>122</sup> In Heidegger, though, time is transcendent and belongs to the macro-level of the entire life span. It is the pre-theoretical time of our everyday concerns and possible projects, however, that lets hermeneutic syntheses enfold and unfold, in a mode parallel to that which we meet in Husserl.<sup>123</sup>

As is well known, Husserl felt in a way betrayed by the way Heidegger clearly downplayed the importance of his own analyses regarding time-consciousness.<sup>124</sup> This situation has a parallel in the way Heidegger continuously kept in almost complete darkness the actual meaning of the inspiration he drew from Husserl's analyses concerning categorial intuition (and perception).

Of course, Husserl's micro-time of a monadological, internal time-consciousness, and of the perceptual and generally cognitive syntheses does not know anything of the finite fate of human existence throughout the epochs of history. Thus, it can only provide us with the necessary ground for the passive perceptual constitution of nature-thingness qua bearer of what each time has value for

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<sup>122</sup>Among the most recent works on Husserl's time-consciousness, the reader may consult de Warren's 2009 penetrating and lucid analysis of time, in Husserl's Phenomenology and Lohmar's and Yamaguchi's 2010 rich and rewarding collection of essays.

<sup>123</sup>See also Øverenget 1998, 175 n. See also Chap. 4, §4.10.2 of the present book.

<sup>124</sup>See, e.g., Sheehan's Introduction to *PTP* (edited) and especially pp. 26ff. See also Chap. 4, §4.10.2, in the present book.

man as an existing being with finite life-perspective, within which praxially and existentially meaningful plans and projects are expected to unfold historically. For this latter possibility, which is unavoidable in a Phenomenology of values and in a Phenomenological Ethics, Heidegger's macro-time perspective can be the unexpectedly most fruitful ground—albeit not exactly in the way he intended it. Indeed, Husserl's Phenomenology and its model of inner time-consciousness cannot by itself be applied to the analysis of practical life. We discovered that something analogous holds for his constitutive analysis of culturality in terms of values qua properties of perceptual things. In these last two cases, it seems to me, it is necessary to enter the extremely important analyses Heidegger gave us in his *BT*—even if we would, then, be forced to commit what Heidegger in his “Letter on Humanism” called “blasphemy against Being” (*P* 265/349). But the development of all this must await another occasion.<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>125</sup>Meanwhile, nonetheless, the reader may consult Theodorou 2012a, 2014a.

## Chapter 9

# The Phenomenology of Anxiety and of Nothing: Ontology and Logic in Heidegger

οὔτε γὰρ ἄν γνοίης τό γε μὴ ἔδον (οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστόν) οὔτε φράσαις.” (“Because you can neither know the non-being—since it is unsurveyable—nor put it into words. (Parmenides: Frg. 2; transl. mine)).

Ὅποταν τό μὴ ὄν λέγωμεν [...] οὐκ ἐναντίον τι λέγομεν τοῦ ὄντος ἀλλ’ ἕτερον μόνον.” (“When we speak about non-being [...] we do not talk about something contrary to being, but only about what is ‘other.’ (Plato: *Sophist* 257b; transl. mine)).

Everything depends upon this alone, that the truth of being come to language and that thinking attain to this language. Perhaps, then, language requires much less precipitate expression than proper silence. (M. Heidegger: *P*, 261–2/344)

### 9.1 The Question of Nothing and the Possibility of Apophantic Truth

Heidegger connected his name with the endeavor of renewing the question regarding Being (*Seinsfrage*). In *BT* (1927), he attempted to bring the issue of Being and everything concerning it back to the fore, by investigating the question of what the things themselves (*die Sache selbst*) are in its case. In this way, he managed to maintain his distance from the inherited and uninterpellated theories and speculations around “Being” (εἶναι). At the time, he continued to think that the precondition for arriving at the very things themselves was—more or less—the phenomenological method that Husserl introduced in his breakthrough phenomenological opus, the *Logical Investigations* (1900–01). On this basis, in his “What is Metaphysics?” (1929) (*WM*), Heidegger explicitly maintained that the truth with regard to the issue of Being could and should be mediated—no matter how paradoxical this may sound—through the question regarding Nothing (*Nichts*).

Parmenides, to be sure, had warned that nothing (μηδέν) is not, for that which is the εἶναι, and that only with what is can understanding (νοεῖν) and speaking (λέγειν)

be correlated. The possibility of arriving at truths depends on propositions that say “is” with regard to what is, and “is not” with regard to what is not. Heidegger, however, thought that the most important issue for philosophy as ontology (but even for humans as beings engaged in praxis) was Nothing (*Nichts*)—and, moreover, Nothing as Being!

But how could someone conceive of and bring to language these obviously limit subject matters? Haven’t we seen that Logic, following Parmenides’ instruction, has progressively burked all talk of Being, and barred all talk about Nothing?

In *WM*, Heidegger tries to overcome these barriers. Logic, in its general conception as self-standing heir and reformer of philosophy itself, either devalues any concern with Being and Nothing, or sets strict limits to that concern. But whence does Logic draw this power? Heidegger proposes a challenging thesis, maintaining that in ontological research that has Being and Nothing as its theme, Logic is not only useless but also harmful. The core of the problem, according to Heidegger, consists in the fact that Logic is not the suitable mathesis for the commensurate ‘thematization,’ i.e., phenomeno-logization of the “Not” (Greek: μῆ) in the Nothing (Greek: μηδέν). The phenomenologically closer route taken by Logic in such a task, i.e., negation, is not only *inappropriate* for the treatment of Nothing, but in addition *presupposes* it.

The “not” does not originate through negation; rather, negation is grounded in the “not” that springs from the noning [*Nichten*] of the Nothing [*Nichts*]. But negation is only one way of noning, that is, only one sort of comportment that has been grounded beforehand in the noning of the Nothing. [...] In this way the above thesis in its main features has been proven: the Nothing is the origin of negation, not vice versa. If the power of the intellect in the field of inquiry into the Nothing and into Being is thus shattered, then the destiny of the reign of “Logic”<sup>1</sup> in philosophy is thereby decided. The idea of “Logic” itself disintegrates in the turbulence of a more originary questioning. (*P*, 92/116–7; tnsf. md.)

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<sup>1</sup>According to a clarification that Heidegger himself offers us in the 1943 edition of the text, this term is placed within inverted commas, in order to show that by it, only one possible interpretation (*Auslegung*) of the essence of thought is meant (*WM*, 85/109 n. b). As Borgmann (1968) notes, Heidegger’s criticism of the logistic conception of language (λόγος), that is, of the project that wants to reduce philosophy to Formal Logic—a criticism which started with his 1915 *Habilitationsschrift* on Duns Scotus’ theory of categories and meaning and was extended through his subsequent thought as a whole—moves along the following lines. First, Heidegger raises objections against the view that the totality of rational thought can be reconstructed in the form of a calculus. For example, as Borgmann notes, we know that material implication and counterfactual conditionals offer unsurpassable resistance to such a possibility of reduction. Second, Formal Logic did not succeed in becoming either an exhaustive or even an indeed elucidatory basis for the reduction of Mathematics. Third, much like Husserl, Heidegger claimed that Formal Logic did not succeed in becoming a complete philosophy of science in general. Fourth, the sovereignty that Logic experienced during the twentieth century, connected with developments in technology, enabled it to raise highly questionable claims as to the in-principle equalizability between human beings and calculating machines, as well as between language and the sequences and combinations of symbol rows (see Borgmann 1968, 148–9). Nevertheless, in this chapter, we will try to deal with something perhaps more fundamental, namely Heidegger’s view of the look and the presuppositions of one of the most elementary and fundamental subject matters or constituents of Logic itself: *negation*. (Note also that in all the following cited passages, some

This rather strong double idea has indeed troubled Heidegger's advocates, and has attracted the wrath and depreciation of all logico-linguistically oriented analytic philosophers (and of all those who read Heidegger having drawn their inspiration from these philosophers). Thus, on the side of the former, there is a general puzzlement as concerns the precise meaning of Heidegger's cited claim, whereas on the side of the latter, an open hostility can easily be detected that extends to the totality of Heidegger's thought.

This second stance was initially based on Carnap's targeted attack against Heidegger, in his essay "*Die Überwindung der Metaphysik durch die logische Analyse der Sprache*" (1932). This stance has since moved on, based either on blind faith in the authority of Carnap or on a generally prejudiced reading of Heidegger's writings. Thus, in the literature, we meet either the usual ridiculing of the emblematic phrase of *WM*, "The Nothing itself nons" (90/114), as a supposedly par excellence example of a non-sensical proposition, or readings that uncritically repeat Heidegger's strange phrasings.

On the one hand, then, it seems that we remain in need of a better and fuller elucidation of Heidegger's provocative double claim. On the other hand, this elucidation may perhaps help in establishing, progressively at least, an elementary degree of mutual understanding between the two aforementioned philosophical camps. Agreement, even if only with regard to the precise nature of a disagreement, is always better than blind hostility.<sup>2</sup>

## 9.2 Logic's Predicament vis-à-vis Being and Nothing

Traditional Logic and, *mutatis mutandis*, modern Symbolic Logic, is presented as the a priori theory of the linguistic means for the possibility of knowledge, i.e., of concepts, judgments, and syllogisms, on the basis of which only (correct or rational) thinking can discover and treasure all possible systems of true propositions in its

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silent changes may have been made. In particular, the term "*Nichten*" is here rendered as "noning" and not as "nihiliating" or "noth-ing," etc. The reason will become apparent in the sections that follow.)

<sup>2</sup>In the rather hostile recent readings of Heidegger, especially on the issue of Nothing and its relation to Logic, we find Philipse (1998; on our subject matter, see pp. 9–15, 203–204, 331ff in particular) and Witherspoon (2002). Defences of Heidegger in response to Carnap's reproach are offered in Inwood (1999, 272–5) and Käufer (2001, 470ff). Of special interest here is also an incident in the analytic bibliography that has been generally suppressed. In 1965, the journal *Philosophical Review* published, in bilingual format, a very interesting short text written by Wittgenstein in 1929. This text is a letter that Wittgenstein sent to Weismann. In the original text, Wittgenstein speaks in very positive terms about Heidegger's concepts of anxiety and Nothing, having in mind, according to all indications, the latter's *WM*. It has generally gone unnoticed, however, that in the aforementioned publication of that letter, Wittgenstein's positive references to Heidegger were eliminated. (Apparently, this was perhaps a more effective elimination of 'metaphysics'!) On this, see also Murray 1974.

theories. From this point of view, Logic understands itself as the theory of thinking that can become true; that is, in the end, as the a priori theory of science. Science, however, always refers to beings as its objects. In their determinative definitions, the sciences basically say “this is thus and so” or “this is not thus and so.” Moreover, when the sciences attempt to talk about the possibility of their own object-beings, they are forced to appeal to other beings. For instance, Anthropology, which sets as its object-being the human being, is forced to say, e.g., “human beings are rational animals,” and so on with all the sciences. In the sphere of the natural sciences too, which also claim to enjoy priority and fundamentality, the way object-beings are approached is, generally speaking, with reference to material *substances*: that is, material subjects with appropriate predicated properties. Despite the fact that the sciences have evolved to such an extent, they begin from a consideration of their objects, which presupposes beings as something that basically exist, in the sense of *constantly lying over there*, confronting us in steady *presence*.

In contraposition to all this, Heidegger’s philosophy calls us, on the basis of phenomenological principles, to avoid this definitional infinite regress from one being to another, as well as to disengage fully from all analogous speculative metaphysical considerations regarding the meaning of “being.” It asks us to stay faithful to the Aristotelian directive of ἀκολουθεῖν τοῖς φαινομένοις (following the phenomena); or, as Phenomenology would render it, to let ourselves be open *zu den Sachen selbst!* In this case, we discover that the primordial and phenomenological (not speculative) data are neither material substances with properties nor logical subjects with predicates, but *instruments* (*Zeuge*) in their possible constituting interreferentialities of *significance*, e.g., of usefulness, for concrete human beings in concrete practical activities. If these beings are the primordial givens for us, then, on the one hand, Logic cannot tell us how they are constituted and, on the other hand, it must admit that it constantly presupposes them, having nevertheless unquestionably transformed them, in its thematizing judgments, into substances with properties. In addition, and even more primordially, philosophy itself realizes that the fact that human beings do indeed experience, in this or that way, some *being* (of this or that sort or ontological level) means that we have always already understood something like “Being” as ‘cause’ that makes, or rather, as a possibility that lets, beings *be* (since each being *is*, “being” means that each of them *is*, and that all it takes for a being to be is that it *be*: hence, *Being* is what ‘makes’ a being *be*). And, in the end, that we have always already pre-understood something like “Being” becomes evident as a phenomenon in a very special, limit thymotic state (θυμικότης, *Befindlichkeit*), in *anxiety*. Being, nonetheless, is not *a* being (nothing would have been gained if we were to say that what makes a being be is another being, since we would have to pose the question of the meaning of “Being” anew, etc., ad infinitum). On the contrary, Being is an ‘otherwise’ (ἄλλως) than being. Between Being and beings, a chasm yawns—the chasm of *ontological difference*.

Can we then know and say something about this Being, qua fundamental presupposition of being? Apparently, this is not something that could be thematized through the usual logico-grammatical means. The latter would allow us to say “is” or “is not” within the context of a thematizing grasp of a being that has already

been turned into a subject of possible predication (essential or not). The ontological difference, however, says that Being, qua presupposition of beings, is not just another being, but the *non-ontic* condition for all sorts of beings. How can we then approach Being and, in the end, how can we conceive of Nothing as Being? If we say "Being is," it seems that we end up with an idle, empty tautology. If we say "Being is this and that," it seems that we miss the mark with regard to content.<sup>3</sup> If we say "Being qua otherwise than being 'is not,'" we fall into a contradiction. If we say that "the 'otherwise than being' can be conceived as Nothing and the latter is not," we return to a tautology. If we simply say "Nothing is," we fall into contradiction once again.

So, if we are to restrict ourselves to our direct subject matter, what can we say about this Nothing? Heidegger undertakes the task of showing to us two things. On the one hand, the thinking that is guided by the available propositional and predicative Logic of non-contradiction cannot thematize this Nothing as Being that constitutes the theme par excellence of Heidegger's Ontology. On the other hand, this very Logic must realize that according to the phenomena, it has already multifariously presupposed this Nothing, and it must therefore allow another mathesis, more fundamental than itself, to bring to the fore what is the case with regard to Nothing. In the end, philosophy will have to bring back from oblivion its most precious—albeit elusive—subject matter in a way that does not once again throw us against the wall of logical contradiction. Through this endeavor, Logic will have gained fuller self-consciousness of its fundaments.

How does Heidegger approach this Nothing (at least until *WM*)? How could Nothing appear or, otherwise put, how could Nothing be truthfully given as Being? How could Nothing constitute the ground for the possibility of arriving at truths, by means of logically acceptable assertions, where thinking unfolds?

Science neither will nor can investigate this Nothing/Being. Thus, it has ignored it, neglected it, and in the end—not knowing why—it has rejected it. The situation that has arisen as a result of this course of distantiation that science has followed with regard to Nothing/Being has produced and continues to produce a host of problems. On the one hand, as time passes, the issue regarding the understanding of the nature of science and its truths becomes all the more acute. On the other hand, the polyphony of proposed answers makes us lose any hope of finding a solution. In addition, as long as this issue remains in suspension, the meaning of philosophy's original quest to arrive at a secure reply to the most vital question of humanity, "what should we do (amidst what is)?" by first having scientifically secured a reply to the question "what is?" becomes all the more vague and impossible.

Nothing/Being plays the central and decisive role in constituting the most universal presupposition of beings in general, of beings of science, and also of our thinking about and acting over against them. Thus, in the end, Heidegger's Phenomenology—but *mutatis mutandis*, also Phenomenology as a whole—turns upon it, in seeking to elucidate the possibility and meaning of Nothing/Being, qua a

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<sup>3</sup>With regard to the difficulty we have in defining Being, see also *BT*, §1.

priori of the a priori. And as we have already said, if this duty is to be undertaken by Phenomenology, then all its findings must be discovered through recourse to the things themselves as *phenomena*, and not by discursive speculation. Hence, as long as Heidegger practices Phenomenology, he must guide us—in a way that can be controlled and checked—in front, as it were, of Nothing/Being as phenomenon. Taking as our guide the analyses of the foregoing chapters, especially Chap. 8, in the text that follows I will try to elucidate this difficult course.

Nonetheless, if as was said above, *anxiety* appears to be the royal route to Nothing as Being, then we must first examine more closely what Heidegger has to say about it. Before engaging in the task of examining the ontological function of anxiety in making manifest Nothing, however, we must deviate briefly in order to prepare ourselves, by way of a brief review of the Grammar, General Logic, and Transcendental Logic of negation.

### 9.3 The Doublicity of Negation: Contraposition and Renouncement

We ask: “yes” or “no”? And we may reply: “no.” We inform someone who is puzzled by the behavior of a strange man: “He has a *no(n)*-conventional personality.” It is also possible that we may have dealings with a fellow human being who is *anti*-conformist. It is also usual to come across people who are rather *unwise*. Sometimes we might hasten to warn a child: “*Do not* harry!” In other cases, we may discover with disappointment that “the roses are *not* red” or that “it is *not* true that these roses are red” or that “there is *no* time for fun!”

Logic, in the most pluralistic moments of its history, after examining cases of negative expressions like the former, seems to have arrived at the conviction that there are in fact only two basic species of negation, the one introduced by the particle “not” (Greek: οὐ) and the other introduced by the prefix “no(n)-” (Greek: μὴ). It would be reasonable to suppose that the difference in the function of the two negations corresponds to the different meanings of the relevant parts of speech. In vain, though, will one search for such a difference in the dictionaries. Only some distant echo seems to be reflected in the relevant lemmas of the actual matter at stake.

For example, the Merriam-Webster Dictionary explains that “not” is a negative particle used as a function word (i) “to make negative a group of words or a word,” or (ii) “to stand for the negative of a preceding group of words,” as, e.g., in “it is sometimes hard to see and sometimes *not*.” “No(n)-” is there defined as a prefix with the meanings: (i) “not,” “other than,” “reverse of,” “absence of,” (ii) “no consequence,” “unimportant,” or (iii) “lacking the usual especially positive characteristics of the thing specified.” In Greek, Demetrakos’ monumental *Mega Lexicon* notes that throughout the history of the Greek language, “οὐ” (no or not) “expresses negation of a fact [...] in general [...] in contradistinction to ‘μὴ’ [no(n)-] which expresses negative will.” Moreover, “in the approved Attic



speech” “οὐ” “negates something; is absolute, objective,” whereas “μή” “rejects, is relative, subjective.” The difference “is reflected also in the corresponding composites οὐδέις and μηδέις.” In sum, “οὐ” negates (ἀρνεῖται) and μή rejects (ἀπορρίπτει). To negate, according to the same dictionary, means “refusing to give assent; saying ‘no’ (οὐ),” whereas to reject means to “refuse to recognize something, despise something, decline, refuse to accept, renounce.” “Renounce” (ἀποποιούμαι), especially, is explained there as to “keep something away from me” “refuse to accept something offered to me.” All these clarifications can help us only as first indications toward the experience and the *phenomena* we are after.

In modern philosophy, especially in the German tradition, the distinction within negative (*negativ*) judgments between denying (*verneinend*) and infinite or indeterminate, was posed explicitly in Kant’s *Transcendental Logic* (but not in the *General or Formal Logic*). In this treatment of negation, we come closer to a more elucidatory understanding. To the category of denying judgments belong those of the form “A is not B” and in the category of infinite or indeterminate judgments belong those of the form “A is non-B.” As an example of the first case, Kant uses the sentence “*Die Seele ist nicht sterblich*” (“The soul is not mortal” (A72/B97). An example of the second case follows almost immediately: “*Die Seele ist nichtsterblich*” (“The soul is non-mortal”). As Kant remarks, *General or Formal Logic* considers indefinite judgments (the ones that say “no(n)-”) as affirmative judgments with a denying predicate. Indeed, *Formal Logic* thinks that the “not-”saying of the judgment can be equally transferred to the “no(n)-”saying of the predication, and vice versa. Despite developments after Kant, *Formal Logic* still recognizes no difference between these two transcendently different forms of negation.

Kant, however, struggles to save a way of negating that has meanwhile been concealed and forgotten, in the process guided by the search for ever more extended formalization in linguistic analysis, in thinking and, in the end, in experience and truth. Here is how Kant accounts for the character of the denying judgment (in Kemp-Smith’s translation):

Since the mortal constitutes one part of the whole extension of possible beings, and the non-mortal the other, nothing more is said by my proposition [“the soul is non-mortal”] than that the soul is *one of the infinite number of things which remain over* [übrigbleiben] when I *take away* [wegnehme] all that is mortal. The infinite sphere of all that is possible is thereby only so far limited that the mortal is excluded from it, and that the soul is *located in the remaining part of its extension*. (A72/B97-8; emphases added)

Mutatis mutandis, at the appropriate point below, we will come to better appraise the value of the hidden possibilities that Kant offers us here.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Independently of this, in his lecture course *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason* (WS 1927–28), Heidegger declares that he is not satisfied with Kant’s treatment of Nothing. In Kant, Heidegger says, Nothing is still considered a *concept* (see GA 25, 204). Heidegger connects Nothing with a supposed *intuitional* phenomenon, which can appear as an intentional correlate in a very special thymotic experience: anxiety. Regardless of whether

According to Kant's clarifications, there is, we may say, a *transcendental* difference (but not, of course, a *formal* one) between the negations introduced with "not" and "no(n)-." We should agree with this. Denying judgments are those that in English say "not" and in German *Nein* (it is for this reason that Kant calls them *verneinende* or *Nein-sagende Urteile*) or *nicht*, in the sense of the Greek οὐ. These judgments express an opposition or contra-position to what is said. As regards indefinite (*unendliche*) or restrictive (*limitisierende*) judgments, in English these say no(n), and in German *nicht-*, in the sense of the Greek μὴ. These judgments reject or renounce (German: *abweisen*) what is said. In this move, however, they *highlight*, as it were, *the rest of the field of possible predicables, which remains intact after the decline of the focal predicate.*

For present purposes, if this is how things are, then indefinite (or, from now on, also renouncing) judgments are not founded in a *ver-nein-end* 'mental' function (read: intentional stance), which is directed *vertically*, so to say, against the focal predicate, in order to oppose what it says. We are, rather, dealing with a *ver-nicht-ende* 'mental' function, which refers to the focal predicate in order to tacitly direct or turn our gaze *around*, as it were, it, to the thus elucidated and indefinitely open field of other possible predicables.

At this point, the question of course arises as to whether and how all this deviation through Grammar, Formal Logic, and Transcendental Logic plays any significant role in our task of understanding Heidegger's suggestion regarding a supposedly viewable Nothing as Being. To be sure, this revitalization of the issue concerning the duplicity of negation increases our expectations of Phenomenology (which, as it is already understood, is especially fond of sensitivities like that concerning different modes of negation). We will see that Phenomenology—and especially Heidegger's Phenomenology—demands from us a *still greater* sensitivization in order to achieve our task. We are thus going to be directed toward a *third* fold of the phenomenon of negation, which does not necessarily belong on the same plane as the two we have just considered.

## 9.4 A First Delineation of Nothing

Is it possible that all this fuss about Nothing touches upon no substantial issue after all? Isn't it possible that we in fact are dealing with the usual "nothing," as in expressions of the sort "there is nothing left," which Logic seems to be in a position to handle with the negation "not," as in the expression "there is not a thing left," or in the reply "no" (*nein*, οὐ) to the question "is there anything left"?

Heidegger is emphatic:

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Heidegger is here doing justice to Kant or not (I believe not), we will see what he means by all this in what follows.

The “no(n)-” [of Nothing—read: No(n)-thing and Greek: Μη-δ-έν] does not originate through negation [of the “not” sort]; rather negation [i.e., the “not”] is grounded in the “no(n)-” that springs from the noning of the Nothing [*dem Nichten des Nichts*]. (P, 92/117; trnsl. md.)

How could we become more familiar with this mysterious but also fundamental Nothing? A first idea is given by a question Heidegger poses in *WM*. There, he asks:

But how could the deniable [*Verneinbares*] and what is to be denied [*Zu-verneinendes*] be viewed as something susceptible to the “no(n)-” [*Nichthaftes*] unless all thinking as such has already caught sight of the “no(n)-” [*auf das Nicht schon vorblickt*]? (P, 92/116; trnsl. md.; emphasis added)

Does this make any sense at all? What are the deniable, the to-be-denied, denial, that which is susceptible to the “no(n)-” or the non-like, Nothing, and noning? How do they relate to one another? We will explore these issues by focusing on the meaning and possibility of this very non-like (*das Nichthaftes*; Greek neologism: τό Μη-ν-ῶδες).

In his “Letter on ‘Humanism’” (1946) (*LH*), Heidegger offers us a useful clue regarding the non-like in its most primordial form: “That which nons is lit up<sup>5</sup> as the non-like [*Was nichtet, lichtet sich als das Nichthaftes*].” (P, 272/359; trnls. md.). But that which nons is Nothing, and Heidegger assures us that there is a special experience in which Nothing is lit up by itself in itself. That is, the most primordial non-like is Nothing itself, while it is lit up by itself in its noning. This is what interests us here: the function and, first of all, the very possibility of a Nothing that, as it is claimed, is able to become self-en-lightened or self-illuminated, i.e., to appear as phenomenon.

Given that what nons is lit up as the non-like, Heidegger appears to claim that the negation of “not,” i.e., that about which Formal Logic speaks, qua—supposedly—complete theory of knowledge, is founded upon the negation of “non” or, more accurately, on the strange non-like, which is the character of that which nons (that is, of Nothing), which becomes manifest when it lights itself up and appears in its noning. We realize, then, that in *WM* the possibility of the pre-visioning or pre-surveying sight of the non-like, qua lit up Nothing that nons, is considered as more primordial than the contra-posing of “not,” vis-à-vis the possibility or the claim that a subject is or that it is this or that. But what kind of ‘operator’ might the “no(n)-” (of Nothing) be, and how can it be said that Nothing relates with Being to the extent of being identical to it?

In what follows we will see various folds of these issues and will further investigate them.

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<sup>5</sup>Here, I connect *lichten* primarily to the light (*Licht*) and mediately with the clearing (*Lichtung*) as openness (*das Offene*). More specifically, by “light,” in this case, I do not mean a light *beam* that emanates from a source and makes this or that being visible in the openness; rather what is intended is the self-luminosity of what makes manifest that openness in its horizontality.

## 9.5 The Manifestation of Nothing in Anxiety

From the known texts, it appears that the thematic of Nothing connects seamlessly with the thematic of anxiety in *BT* and in *WM*. Hence, we can take up this thread, starting from the analyses concerning anxiety in *BT* and arrive at Nothing, about which much more is said in *WM*.

In §40 of *BT*, we read that “In what Anxiety is about, the ‘it is nothing and nowhere’ [*das ‘Nichts ist es und nirgends’*] becomes manifest.” (*BT*, 175/186). Can we accept, however, that this reference to the “nothing and nowhere” already means something *ontological* and, more specifically, something like Nothing qua Being? In the context of the analyses contained in *BT*, I think that the answer should be “yes,” because this “nothing” does not constitute something like the “not” of a being. This particular use of *Nichts* relates to the uncanniness of that in front of which, in *BT*, anxiety stands: the whole Being of Dasein and the possibility of Dasein’s being free to choose or, better, to undertake itself. It is about the uncanniness of that which, at first, has made Dasein (a) flee before the possibility of being authentic and (b) fall in the inauthenticity of the ‘they’ (*das Man*).<sup>6</sup>

More precisely, in *BT*, we read that in a fundamental thymotic disposition (*Befindlichkeit*), in anxiety (*Angst*), Dasein lives-through the experience of Nothing. When a human being is found in this state, the beings supposedly slide back under the pressure of an increasing *meaninglessness* (*Unbedeutsamkeit*); they become unimportant (*belanglos*). In anxiety, the worldly beings become disconnected from their fitting jointness (*Bewandnisse*), which we met in Chap. 8, and are left to sink or founder (*versinkt werden*), or to slide (*vergleiten*) outside or beneath their concernfully meaningful places in the world. The question then arises: is there anything left after this general loss of the beings?

In *WM*, Heidegger makes it clear:

In anxiety there occurs a stepping-back-before-... [*Zurückweichen*] that is surely not any sort of flight but rather a kind of spellbound calm. This “back-before-...” takes its departure from Nothing [and not from Dasein’s volition]. Nothing itself does not draw [our glance] upon itself; it is essentially a dismissal [or away-sending] [*abweisend*]. But this dismissal is itself, as such, a referring that—in the manner of a letting-slide-away—[takes our glance from the beings that are losing their meaningfulness and turns it] toward the [now] sinking-away beings in-their-totality [*auf das versinkende Seiende im Ganzen*]. This totally away-sending reference [*abweisende Verweisung*] toward the slipping-away beings in-their-totality [*auf das entgleitende Seiende im Ganzen*], as a move forced upon the Dasein by Nothing in anxiety, is the essence of Nothing: the noning [*die Nichtung*]. (*P*, 90/114; trnls. mdf.; emphases added)

<sup>6</sup>Analogous is the meaning of the reference to anxiety and ‘nothing’ (*Nichts*) on pp. 245/266, 315/343 of *BT*. Here, we find the connection with the thematic of Nothing as it is introduced in *WM* (1929) (see also Inwood 1999, 289). In fact, anxiety is connected, in Heidegger, not only with the ontological function, which we are here trying to elucidate, but also with a fundamental *praxial* function (of which we were given a hint just above in the main text). For further development of this *praxial* function of anxiety, however, a separate treatment would be necessary.

In the fifth edition (1949) of the text, Heidegger adds to the expression “away-sending reference,” a very important explication and correction that helps us to better understand the original text: “away-sending: [from] beings by themselves; re-ferring: in [or better: to] the *Being* of the beings [*ab-weisen: das Seinde für sich; ver-weisen: in das Sein des Seinden*].”

Here we are then! The analyses presented in Chap. 8, along with this basic idea, can help us find our way around the thematic of Nothing as Being and its noning. In anxiety, a universal and complete vitiation of worldly beings occurs, with a simultaneous emergence of Being as such as their condition of possibility, as what makes—or, rather, made—they be. This is what, in a sense, is *left over*: the Being of beings. In that special state, Dasein loses sight of the beings before it, and is referred to a seeing of No-thing as Being or, as we read in the citation, of the beings-in-their-totality (*das Seinde im Ganzen*).<sup>7</sup> Given our preparation regarding the modes or forms of negation, and taking into account Heidegger’s marginal note from 1949, we must note here that it would have been better if instead of originally writing that, in anxiety, Nothing as Being is left over as “the beings in their totality,” he had actually *indeed* spoken about the “sinking- or slipping-away ‘beings in-their-totality’” (with hyphens) or, better, about “the totality of the sinking- or slipping-away beings” (*die versinkende oder entgleitende Ganze des Seienden*) or, even better, about the “wholeness [*Ganzheit*] of the sinking- or slipping-away beings.”<sup>8</sup>

Of course, Heidegger is not sufficiently clear with regard to either the precise relation between Nothing and Being, or to the nature or texture of this Nothing or Being qua “phenomenological residuum” in the experience of anxiety.<sup>9</sup> We will now

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<sup>7</sup>We will see that this mention of the beings-in-their-totality creates problems in our understanding of Heidegger’s analyses regarding Nothing. Problems like this, together with others concerning the polysemy of Nothing and of the *lethe* (λήθη) of Being, make us recognize that the difficulty of our subject matter is intensified by a certain vacillation by Heidegger himself with respect to the issue of Nothing, its relation with Being, and the ‘essence’ of these notions. See also the next note.

<sup>8</sup>Despite the possible agreement with Sheehan (2001) on the meaning of Logic’s unsuitability for thematizing Nothing, and the dependence of negation upon the presupposed experience of Nothing, our views on the meaning and function of anxiety vis-à-vis Nothing diverge. Here is how Sheehan, in the section “What the Nothing Does: It relegates openness to what-is,” interprets (renders) the cited passage from *GA 9*, 114: “In dread we ‘draw back from . . .’ This is not flight, but the calmness of wonder. This movement ‘back from’ is initiated by the nothing. The nothing does not draw us into itself; rather, its essence is to push us away. In pushing us back away from itself, it directs us to the receding beings that it lets slip away in terms of their whole. This business of pushing us back and directing us toward the beings that are slipping away as a whole, is the way the nothing presses in upon openness during dread.” The difference in our perspectives is palpable. For Sheehan, Nothing is something that could draw us “into” itself, but pushes “us” back away “from itself,” and “direct us to the receding beings.” In the following, the difference in our readings will become more visible.

<sup>9</sup>This characterization of Nothing/Being as a “phenomenological residuum” in anxiety is not accidental. In the wider context of the way the function of anxiety in Heidegger’s *Phenomenology* is here understood, anxiety should be considered as having a role analogous to that which *transcendental reduction* has in Husserl’s *Phenomenology*. From a certain perspective, the role of both is to make the a priori intuitable. A more extended explanation of this idea, however,

examine both problems in general terms. Later, in §9.7, we will focus especially on the second.

In texts from the period around *WM*, a mediate or immediate *equation* of Nothing and Being is attempted. For example, in *WM*, we read that Nothing's noning, which 'affords' us the experience of Nothing and lets us realize that "beings *are*," "makes possible in advance the manifestness of beings in general," whereas, with regard to the "manifestness," Heidegger remarks in a subsequent marginal note: "i.e., [of the] *Being* [of the regional beings]" (*P*, 90/114; emphases added). Immediately following this, we read that in its noning, Nothing "brings Dasein for the first time before beings as such"; a marginalium adds: "specifically before the *Being* of beings, before the distinction [of Being over against the beings]" (*P*, 90/114; emphasis added). Moreover, Heidegger also writes that if Dasein were not "transcending, which now means: if it were not in advance holding itself out into the Nothing, then it could never adopt a stance toward beings"; this may be complemented with another marginalium from 1949: "i.e., Nothing and Being the same [*d.h. Nichts und Sein das Selbe*]" (*P*, 91/115).

In "On the Essence of Ground" (1928), Heidegger's expressions also identify Nothing and Being: "The *Nothing* is the "no(n)-" [*Nicht*] of beings, and is thus *Being*," where he also explains: "experienced from the perspective of beings." (*P*, 97/123; transl. md.; emphases added). To return to *WM*, Nothing was also there characterized as the "bright [or even luminous] night" (*helle Nacht*) of the beings, that is, the light that spreads throughout the night of the beings; night that fell upon them from the "no(n)-."<sup>10</sup>

Elsewhere, we read that "In the Being of the beings the noning of the Nothing occurs" (*P*, 91/115), and that "The Nothing does not remain the indeterminate opposite of beings, but unveils itself as *belonging to* [or as accompanying or appertaining to] [*zugehörig zu*] the [essence of the] Being of beings." (*P*, 94/120). However, on the same page, we read: "Being and the Nothing do belong together [...] because Being itself [...] manifests itself only in the transcendence of a Dasein that is held out into the Nothing." In the Postscript to *WM*, though, Heidegger returns to the explicit identity scenario: "[T]he *Nothing*, which attunes anxiety in its essence, [...] [does not] exhaust itself in an empty negation of all beings, [...] [but it] *unveils itself as that which* distinguishes itself from all beings, as that which *we call Being*." (*P*, 233/305; emphases added). At another point, we read: "[T]his Nothing [as par excellence other over against the beings, i.e., as non-being] essences as Being [*west als das Sein*]." (*P*, 233/306).

The detailed examination of the relevant passages discloses the extreme polysemy of the crucial term "Nothing," and the intimate relation between Nothing

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cannot be given here. In this chapter, I focus strictly on the meaning of the connection between Nothing/Being and the aforementioned totality or, better, structural wholeness of the beings that became insignificant or meaningless in anxiety.

<sup>10</sup>See *P*, 90/114.

and Being.<sup>11</sup> How can we solve the problem of this polysemy? Might we do so through a direct identification of the analyses about anxiety contained in *BT* and the corresponding analyses of the *WM*? In order to answer this question, we must, once more, pick up the thread from *BT*.

## 9.6 Heidegger Appears to Identify Nothing and Being, But He Connects Nothing with the Phenomenology of Anxiety: Not with the Phenomenology of Understanding: Why Is That?

### 9.6.1 *The Givenness of Being in BT*

On the basis of what we have seen in §§9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5, the following question can be posed. Working phenomenologically, Heidegger's task is to arrive at a phenomenologically appearing Nothing as Being. If this is so, then why is it that he does not seek it in accordance to what is said in §32 of *BT* regarding understanding (*Verstehen*)? If the Nothing we are after is the Being about which the sections of *BT* concerning understanding and Being as sense talk, then why not rest content with the availability of Being as sense, to our understanding, and with a phenomenological description of its essential structure? Following the steps in *BT* takes us from §2, concerning the structure of questioning according to the phenomena, and from §7, concerning what to accept and what to expect as a phenomenologizable phenomenon, to the analyses of §14, concerning environmental worldliness (*Umweltlichkeit*) and worldliness in general (which have, meanwhile, been seamlessly connected with the idea of Being). Why does Heidegger not just follow these steps (up to §32) for the purpose of thematizing and displaying

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<sup>11</sup>White (1985) refers to this relation between Nothing and Being, understanding it as an unexplainable relation of mutual implication or inclusion (Nothing is a part of Being) (52, 56, 214 n. 6). Elsewhere, Being is supposedly "limited by the active presence of Nothing" (53), in the sense that Nothing constitutes the receding of the totality of beings and, thus, delimits or restricts Being as its coupling, as it were, state; for this reason Nothing merely stands on the same ontological level as Being as such (55). From the point of view of what we have seen up to this point, this view is not quite correct. Nothing does not amount to or constitute something like the *nothing* of beings, in the sense of their "not" qua denial or absence of beings-in-their-totality (it is not their οὐδέν—i.e., it does not mean "not a single being"). Such an understanding of Nothing does not yet distinguish it from logical negation (even if we assume that we do not have to do with the nothing of one particular being, but with the nothing of a group of beings). From this point of view, as we will also see below (§9.8), White's understanding of Nothing still appears *ontic*, not ontological. This is why, given that Heidegger actually identifies Nothing with (*ontological*) Being, White justifiably wonders how is it possible that Nothing could constitute "a factor *within* the totality of beings" (56).

Nothing as phenomenon, if it is no different from Being as sense?<sup>12</sup> If Nothing is so indistinguishably related to Being, then why appeal to something so unusual and problematic—from the point of view of epistemology—as a ‘feeling,’ i.e., anxiety, and not to a phenomenological description of the structure of Being as phenomenon, in accordance with the description of the worldliness of the world as it is openly accessible in average everydayness, etc.?

In §32 of *BT*, we read that in every existential possibility of Dasein, a thrown projection is essentially developed, characterized by a hermeneutic-understanding structure. As I read it, this says that in every generally sentient or intelligent comportment of itself, Dasein:

- (i) has already, i.e., with some sense, understood something like Being; a fact that opens up, for it, a horizon of possible appearance of beings, a world; (this is the moment of *Vorhabe*);
- (ii) has already somehow set itself on the trajectory of following the chain of beings involved in comportment within this pre-opened world; (this is the moment of *Vorsicht*);
- (iii) has already somehow pre-grasped or pre-recognized or even pre-conceptualized every being that is met or is to be met along every such trajectory, by means of concepts that are expected to correspond to what each one of these beings is; (this is the moment of *Vorgriff*).

If, then, every existential possibility of the Dasein conforms to this triple hermeneutically circular structure of every thrown projection, then why does Heidegger appeal to anxiety in order to offer us the sight of (some) Being through Nothing (and/or vice versa)?

Remembering that Heidegger determines his analyses as *phenomenological* (at least at the stage in his thinking that interests us here), and the place of *BT* where the analyses concerning anxiety are offered, our answer to the questions under discussion should have two parts.

### 9.6.2 *Nothing Qua Being Is a Phenomenon*

We have said that while being thrown, all human beings enjoy a pre-understanding of Being according to which they have this or that experience of beings (that *are*). In what way, though, can this pre-thematic, pre-ontological understanding of Being, qua condition of the appearing beings, become *phenomenological*?

Through a process that shares some facets with the development of the Kantian transcendental deduction of the categories (and, more precisely, with that of the second deduction of the *Critique of Pure Reason*), in the progression from §2 to

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<sup>12</sup>In Chap. 8, §§8.6, 8.7 and 8.8, we have already seen what such research can yield with regard to Being as sense.



§14 of *BT*, Heidegger shows us the following. Something like Being is presupposed as the condition for the possibility of intra-worldly given beings—most immediately, of the primordially given instruments in the experience of circumspection (*Umsicht*). What, however, convinces us that this process is not just a *speculative* train of thought, equal to a mere *mythology* regarding Being? Does this talk about Being refer, after all, to some Being as an intuitable phenomenon given by itself and in person, or are we just engaged in idle talk concerning a mere *ens rationis*?

Naturally, one can ask the following question: doesn't Being become for the first time a theme, (i.e., isn't it true that human beings arrive for the first time at an *awareness* of Being), due to some process of intellectual *reflection* (like the aforementioned transcendental reduction)? Can't we say that it is exactly through such a move that we first come to know something like Being as it itself is? Being, after all, was introduced in philosophy as a category, i.e., as a high-level *concept* or function (*Funktion*) of our spirit (reason or understanding).

The answer to the latter question is: yes, probably. However, such a reflective-conceptual acquaintance with Being does not suffice to elucidate it with the appropriate and necessary *phenomenological* soundness and fidelity. The core phenomenological thesis of §44 of Husserl's sixth LI, which we met earlier in this book (Chap. 7, §7.5.3 and Chap. 8, §8.8.1), is now applied in Heidegger's research. For him, the fact that we make Being a subject matter for our thinking does not suffice in order to justify the objective *truth* and existio-ontological soundness of our discourse about it. Anxiety is the decisive provider of Being as a self-standing appearing phenomenon (truth as appearance) over against which we can develop an adequate phenomenological discourse. Even if, in *BT*, anxiety is not an experience of beings as phenomena, it is an experience of a fundamental phenomenon: namely, of the very *horizon* of the *Da* of Dasein, that is, of what Heidegger called the "nothing and nowhere" of the beings. In *WM*, Heidegger explicitly and emphatically tells us that anxiety is the experience of Nothing as Being with the character of *phenomenon*. (The precise identity of this Being, however, is still vague. It will be clarified later, in §9.8).

### 9.6.3 *Nothing as Being Is Over-Objective*

Heidegger does not treat Nothing via a description of the Being that is available as phenomenon in the understanding projection, that is, e.g., via a description of the Being of instruments (*Zuhandenheit*). There are two reasons for this. Firstly, this Being is always connected with and offered to an understanding projection on the part of Dasein. Heidegger, though, subsequently expressed qualms about a subliminal 'subjectivism' that runs throughout *BT*, and his later estimation of that work was that it was quasi-metaphysical.<sup>13</sup> Given this, a treatment of Nothing by

<sup>13</sup>See, e.g., *CP*, 136/173–4, 174/222–3, 208–9/295–7.

way of Dasein's projective comportments (i.e., Dasein's understanding) would be liable to the danger—and the possible accusation—of a peculiar 'subjectivisation' and 'representalization' of the a priori. Secondly, all Being that is understood in every actual everyday projective comportment of Dasein is necessarily acknowledged in *BT* as *sense (Sinn)*: that is, as Being somehow currently understood by Dasein as regulating the conditions for the possibility and effectuation of such comportments, in which we confront the beings appertaining to and involved in them. In other words, all understood Being is Dasein-related and restricted in *some* worldly disclosed sense. Moreover, all understood Being regulating actual or past comportments enabled them either as tacitly understood in concealment (latency) during the inauthentic life of the Dasein, or as explicitly experienced, when this Being is thematically disclosed in the authentic life of Dasein. In the former case, Being is *sense*, concealedly (latently) conditioning the actual intentional comportments of Dasein. In the latter case, Being is not only sense but is also *a traced phenomenon*, not only conditioning in concealment (latency), but also *truly appearing as such*, i.e., evidently disclosed as the sense it is. None of the descriptions we have of this, though, starting with those in *BT*, refers definitely to *Nothing* as a condition of *specific actual* intentional comportments toward beings (belonging to some ontological region or apprehended according to some particular historical understanding of the essence of such a region). None of these descriptions, moreover, refers to Nothing as 'present' qua *sense* in any definite or unequivocal way, and *much less as truth*.

Given Heidegger's repeated (if obscure and transient) attempts to identify Nothing and its fate with Being, the two latter and peculiar facts will keep us busy for the rest of this chapter. In this subsection, though, we have to resolve the issue of the *objectivity* of Nothing.

We just said that Heidegger keeps the analysis of Nothing apart from his analyses concerning understanding, qua one of the two pillars constituting the *Da* of Dasein. Understanding, let us say again, would somehow 'subjectivize' Nothing, render it as sense and hold it forth, exposed to the light of truth. Nothing, however, does not seem in any clear way to share this aspect of the fate of Being as sense (for reasons that will become more apparent in the sections to follow). If, in the context of *BT*, Heidegger is careful to render Being in the least subjective way possible<sup>14</sup> (even if with questionable success), he treats Nothing with absolute devotion, aiming to render it as objective as possible. If Being should be non-subjective, then a special over-objective status (as it were) is reserved for Nothing. Anxiety, as extreme or special thymotic state, is a possibility of Dasein. Nonetheless, it pounces on Dasein abruptly, unexpectedly, and totally unprojectively and involuntarily; it overwhelms and conquers it. With regard to Dasein's relation to Nothing, this can be said: Dasein does not exactly find itself in an experience that makes or even lets Nothing appear; rather, Nothing finds Dasein and discloses itself to it. In this meeting, Nothing escapes the measures of Dasein, and Dasein is 'at the mercy' of Nothing, without

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<sup>14</sup>On this, see Chap. 7, §§7.5.3 and 7.5.4; Chap. 8, §§8.6, and 8.8.1.

being able to fully know whence Nothing came upon it, or whether Nothing has *totally* uncovered its essence under the light of the *truth* that is possible at the *Da* of the Dasein. In the existential mode of experiencing anxiety, Nothing simply ‘drags’ Dasein in its *Da*. To this extent, Nothing is a totally transcending and *objective* factor for Dasein’s make-up.<sup>15</sup>

## 9.7 Nothing, Being, and Their Relation in *BT* and in *WM*: Take I

In the context of the analyses of §§29–32 and 39–41 of *BT*, i.e., in the course of the development of the Existential Analytic, anxiety is apparently more strongly connected with the (pre-phenomenologically latent or dormant) experience of Being as sense. In front of discovered beings, and within the horizon of the understandingly opened up Being as sense, anxiety brakes, falls upon and conquers us, canceling (as it were) the beings, leaving us in front of their remaining wholeness as mere *framework*, as *web* of the meaningfulness that—in suspension now—had previously made the beings possible.

From all this arises the first possibility of reading the essence of Nothing, Being, and of their relation.

(A) Nothing is the *nothing and nowhere* that comes about by the trivialization of worldly beings, according to the perceptible treatment of anxiety in *BT* or, e.g., in *WM*, 93/117.

Here, we are dealing with the very worldly disclosed Being, which, until the outburst of anxiety, latently underpinned the discoveredness of the given beings. Here, Nothing is the very *currently* ‘other’ of the beings, i.e., their very opened up Being, e.g., *WM*, 91/115 and n. c (where Nothing is explicitly identified with Being) or *WM*, 94–5/120 (where Being itself or Being as Being or Being in general<sup>16</sup> is said to be finite, in that it is disclosed as Nothing—qua Being as sense—correlated with Dasein’s transcendence). There, every reference that concerns Being in its truth or Being as truth (and *only* as truth or sense) also concerns Nothing/Being-as-sense or Nothing/Being-of-the-beings.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>15</sup>This subsection is re-arranged and orientated, in comparison to the corresponding Greek original publication.

<sup>16</sup>*Sein überhaupt*. Remember the *marginalium* of the *Hütte* copy of the *BT*, where Heidegger makes clear that by “*überhaupt*” he means the καθ’ ὅλου, the universal, the in itself—not, that is, something genological or generic, something like ‘genus’ (see *SZ*, 17 note a). Thus, it would have been better if instead of Being in general, we referred to Being universally, or to Being in itself, or to Being as such, or to Being itself.

<sup>17</sup>As is sometimes clarified, e.g., in the “Postscript” of the *WM* (233/306 n. b). See also the relevant references in the second half of §9.5.

In anxiety, this Nothing/Being-as-sense becomes a phenomenon (a glowing “luminous night”), and in its noning constitutes a sending-away-(from the beings) reference (*WM*, 90/114), i.e., a ‘gesture’ like the second kind of negative movement “no(n)-” (the *abweisend* one) hinted at above, at the close of §9.3. In this negation, Nothing appears to be *holding* or *swaying* (*wärt*) (over or, perhaps better, amongst beings) and *granting* or *allowing* (*gewärt*)<sup>18</sup> (beings to be). To be sure, Nothing does not glow or hold at some point *next* to the positions of the trivialized beings; it does not hold another such position, and is not itself such a position. Once beings slide below the level of their worldly significance, Nothing does not make its appearance as a certain thing previously hidden behind or among them. Nothing is not something (a being) and somewhere (here, there, or afar); rather, nothing sways, permeates as ‘surroundness,’ as the “no-thing and no-where” before which the fundamental thymotic state of anxiety drags and lets us stay.<sup>19</sup>

Within this context, a second and closely related possibility arises.

(B) Nothing is the very move of *referring* (away-sending of the type “no(n)-”) from given beings to the current ‘other’ (to their current ‘other’), i.e., to the worldly opened up Being as sense.<sup>20</sup>

Many of Heidegger’s interpreters conceive of the relation between anxiety, Nothing, and Being in the context of a unitary problematic, which officially starts in *BT* and continues unchanged in all its subsequent appearances. In such texts,

<sup>18</sup>These meanings are suggested by Heidegger himself, in the fifth edition of *WM* (see *P*, 114 n. b).

<sup>19</sup>“Nothing” also has the same sense in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* (1928) (*GA* 26, 252), while, as Heidegger explains in his “*Zur Seinsfrage*” (1955), in *WM*, having as his audience mainly scientists who think that truthful is only the being(s) and “beyond that nothing.” Nothing is the most convenient way of introducing them to that which is not (a) being, but rather is the condition for the *possibility* of being(s), i.e., to the Being of being(s) (*P*, 316–7/418). In the literature, there is always some uncertainty when someone has to refer more determinatively to the Being about which Heidegger talks either before or after the notorious “turn” in his thought. For the time being, let what is already said here and in Chap. 8 be considered sufficient. See, however, also Theodorou 2010a.

<sup>20</sup>See, e.g., the pages of *BT* regarding anxiety (“the ‘nothing’ and ‘nowhere’” within the opened up world) or of *WM* (*P*, 90 n. b/114 n. a, 234/307). In *WM*, Heidegger already talks about another thymotic disposition in which we are set before the wholeness of beings. When authentic boredom bursts out, “drifting here and there in the abysses of our existence like a muffing fog” (*P*, 87/110), the beings in their entirety are pushed aside into sheer indifference. Boredom, though, must not be confused with anxiety itself, in which Nothing makes its appearance. Nothing, as Heidegger makes explicitly clear, is not the result of negating (saying “not” to) the totality of the beings as they have been put together or grouped in the indifference of boredom, or even of joy (*P*, 87/110). We will see how very different the indifference about beings in their entirety during boredom is (or even the negation of the thusly grouped beings) from the fundamental loss (*Ausfall*) of beings in anxiety, which discloses Nothing to us. Hence, it is an issue whether Heidegger ever *replaces* the treatment of anxiety with that of boredom or, at least, whether he equates them with one another or not. That there exists a substantial difference between anxiety and boredom has been rightly pinpointed by Käufer (2005, 486–7); below, I refer to Käufer’s view regarding what happens in anxiety. Inwood, for his part, despite distinguishing the function of anxiety from that of boredom (Inwood 1999, 274–5), erroneously suggests that this distinction does not hold in Heidegger (*ibid.*, 285–6).

moreover, Nothing is approached via the central phrase of the lecture, in which it is identified with the “totality” of beings.<sup>21</sup> This path, however, leads to serious dangers.

Explaining Nothing, White (1985) is content with Heidegger’s reference to the “totality,” and understands anxiety as an experience concerning not this or that being, but the totality of beings considered as a unity or, rather, as a unity that “recedes.” This makes him think that the key to understanding Nothing is the factor of *unity* in the totality of the receding beings (before which anxiety sets us). In the end, and with doubtful consistency, Nothing supposedly reveals the totality of the receding beings as “pure other.”<sup>22</sup> White’s analyses, however, convince us that he conceives this Nothing as the nothing (οὐδέν) of the unitary totality of beings, which has now retired.<sup>23</sup> Thus, Nothing gets misinterpreted, conceived of in a merely ontic way.

Käufer deals with the issue of Nothing in two papers (2001, 2005). At one point in the first of these, whose basic aim is to elucidate the Logic which Heidegger attacks (rather than the essence of Nothing, of Being, and of their relation), he writes: “The totality of beings, Heidegger tells us, is not [a] being, and the negation of all beings is not the nothing [the “not-even-a-thing” or οὐδέν].” (2001, 471). Nevertheless, in a relevant note, we read that “Of course many philosophers are happy to define being as the totality of beings. Heidegger suspects the unwarranted dominion of logic in ontology behind such a definition.” (ibid., 474 n. 24). Given this wide acceptance of the core idea in this “definition,” we are, however, left with the question of whether Heidegger himself, after all, *ever* accepted the definition of Being in terms of the totality of beings.

In his second paper on the issue, Käufer seems to undertake the duty of further specifying his views. Here, on the one hand, he connects (as in the first text) the thematic of Nothing exclusively with Being as sense or world. On the other hand, while he makes clear that the Being of beings is not itself a being, he does not fully escape the danger of understanding it as some kind of totality of things, even though he now explicitly makes a distinction between the additive totality or sum-total (*Allheit*) and what he calls wholeness (*Ganzheit*), with no other qualifiers. More specifically, he maintains that Heidegger uses the difference between wholeness and additive totality in order to highlight the “holistic implications” of his ideas regarding *Bewandtnisganzheit* and *Verweisungsganzheit* in *BT*.<sup>24</sup> More specifically,

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<sup>21</sup>See §9.5 above. This means that as a rule, within such an interconnection between the thematics of *BT* and of *WM*, Nothing is basically understood via *BT*, i.e., as being apparently identical with Being as sense.

<sup>22</sup>See White 1985, 50–1.

<sup>23</sup>See White 1985, 53, 55; see also notes 11, 41 in this chapter. As long as no clear distinction is made between the wholeness (or whole or, even better, as is here already marked, *structural wholeness* or *web-context*) of the beings and their totality as entirety, the content of the experience of anxiety, i.e., the essence of Nothing, will remain confused.

<sup>24</sup>See Käufer 2005, 483–4, 501 n. 7.

we read that in anxiety, the meaningfulness of the world as the wholeness of the involvement (*Bewandtnis*) between worldly beings falls apart, collapses (2005, 487). The ensuing insignificance is there interpreted as a referring or directing to “entities as they are in themselves. As their significance recedes, they light up as entities in themselves, i.e. as [...] a reference to entities as a whole [...] The reference of insignificance thus has the character of referring-away (*abweisen*). Heidegger chooses to call this specific referring ‘*nichten*.’” (ibid., 487–8; emphases added). In this way, anxiety supposedly makes manifest Nothing as “part of the background against which entities are intelligible.” (ibid., 486) or as an “aspect of the being of entities” (ibid., 488).

As I see it, in *WM* nothing of this sort happens; this is because, due to the aforementioned first interpretative possibility, Heidegger correlates the thematic of Nothing neither with the simple sum of beings nor with something like the net (even holistically understood) totality. For Heidegger, even such a holistic totality of beings, e.g., like that among the parts of a living organism as a whole, constitutes another—albeit more complicated—being. In the end, Käufer does not totally isolate that which would make the difference: the very being(s)-free, web-like, directional and orientated wholeness of the referential involvedness (*bewandtnismäßige Verweisungsganzheit*) of the worldly beings, i.e., the very ‘abstract’ worldliness.<sup>25</sup>

Inwood, for his part, claims that in anxiety it may be true that the whole of beings escapes by sliding away, but this does not mean that it totally disappears to leave behind “sheer nothingness” (1999, 275). In anxiety, we have the experience of the whole of beings, but, again, as a whole that slips away.<sup>26</sup> Thus, he concludes, what is left is the bare structure of Dasein, a bare world, a net Being-in-the-world without the “usual accompaniments” (ibid., 285).

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<sup>25</sup>See also Chap. 8, §8.6 of the present book. Moreover, we must abstain from the particulars of this approach, i.e., from the idea that in anxiety the significance of the beings recedes, in the sense that it gets lost, as it were, with the beings now shining forth even more intensely as an absolutely sovereign holistic totality of entities in themselves. What I have already said up to this point suffices to make the difference in perspective visible. To be sure, Käufer characterizes this holistic totality of the remaining and magnified or emphasised beings as the background of our comportment toward the beings; a background of meaning-conditions that make the beings be (2005, 483–4). However, he conceives it as the background comprised by the “rest of the beings” when we relate ourselves directly with one of them in their world (ibid., 484). At the crucial moments of explanation, Käufer makes do with pinpointing such a holistic conception of the beings. A holistic unity of beings, though, is nothing more than *a* being. Thus, his explanation of Nothing in *WM* remains (i) *ontic*, since it does not fully meet the exigencies of the phenomenon Heidegger describes, (ii) one-dimensional, because it restricts itself solely to Heidegger’s suggestion regarding the identification between Nothing and Being and the description of *abweisende Verweisung* as contained in the main text of *WM*, and (iii) misleading, due to the way in which this latter peculiar referentiality is ultimately interpreted.

<sup>26</sup>See Inwood 1999, 275, 278–9, 284.

Despite its figurativeness, the lack of further distinctions, and the problem of how is it possible for anxiety (the experience of Nothing) to be lived-through by an *abstract* Dasein, this approach appears to be the most sensitive from an ontological point of view.

The very history of the philosophy of negation and of Nothing shows that according to all indications, the difficulties that were pinpointed above accompanied all previous attempts to make sense of the relevant phenomena. In the Platonic *Sophist*, for example, despite the fact that the difference between the negations of “not” and “no(n)-” is thematized, the non-being resulting from the negation of “no(n)-” (μηδέν) is ontically conceived. This non-being may be other than the being (idea) that gets negated, but the ‘other’ of the being in a sense that does not clearly move beyond the meaning of “other beings” (other ideas).<sup>27</sup>

As far as I am aware, the fact that all the analysis of Nothing in Sartre’s *Being and Nothingness* is ontic has not yet been fully detected in the literature. In a characteristic manner, the analyses there are permeated by the ontic conception of Nothing, in the sense of *nothing*, of *not-even-a-thing* (οὐδέν), of the absence of this or that being. The direction that Heidegger gives us in his *WM*, though, is—to put it rather generally—that we understand Nothing as the *radically* “other” of the beings and, furthermore, as the other-of-being(s) *generally* (*überhaupt*). In essence, that is, Heidegger calls us to conceive of Nothing through the ontological difference between Being and the beings. This is why he wants to identify Nothing with Being. This also additionally explains why he never stops remarking that his philosophy belongs in the sphere of ontology and not the sphere of existentialism (as is the case with Sartre).

## 9.8 Nothing, Being, and Their Relationship in *BT* and in *WM*: Take II

Is the analysis of Nothing we have thus far presented sufficient? Is the relation between anxiety and Nothing and the essence of Being sufficiently illuminated? I tend to believe that in *BT* (and also in *WM*), Heidegger is characteristically ambivalent—if not clearly confused (because of time pressures and impatience)—about all of this. The precise role of anxiety, and the precise identity of the Being that on the one hand should be true, and on the other hand could be true, understood and phenomeno-logized as phenomenon, remain unstable and unclear. This creates new problems that we must deal with here. So, let us see how these problems are created and where they lead us.

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<sup>27</sup>This is why the confusion with regard to the relation between negation and Nothing, detected earlier in White (1985), is further intensified when he undertakes the task of comparing and *fully paralleling* the problem of Nothing in Heidegger and the problem of the non-being in the Platonic *Sophist* (1985, 63).



In the Existential Analytic, if anxiety is connected simply with Being as sense, since it is explicitly given the role of securing Being/Nothing (i) as an evidently appearing *phenomenon*, and (ii) as an *objective* phenomenon, then an important question arises. Isn't it true, after all, that Being qua sense is as much phenomenon as it should be, and as much objective as is needed *already*, within the phenomenological elucidation of average everydayness? Isn't Being as sense sufficiently brought out and put on the map both as appearing and as objective phenomenon when Heidegger talks about the worldliness of the world and about the structure of the *Da* as the horizon that is opened up in the thrown-like understanding projection?

I think that even if, until 1930, Heidegger remains generally ambivalent on this, in the specific context of *BT* he allows us to answer the latter question in the affirmative. Anxiety does not add anything substantial in making manifest the 'phenomenality' and the 'objectivity' of Being as *sense*. The analyses in the development of Being-in-the-world secure for Being qua sense as much 'phenomenality' and 'objectivity' as it gets. Worldliness and Being-together (*Mitsein*), in the context of everydayness, appear to safeguard this double demand sufficiently.

After this, however, things become less simple. Anxiety no longer seems to have any place within the context of the course that the Existential Analytic covers from *Being* to time. Hence, anxiety can be recognized as the borderline moment, the *reversal* toward the road of the so-called "turn" from *time* to Being (which, as Heidegger repeatedly warns us, has not been really covered in *BT*). Phenomenologically and architectonically, then, its natural role can be that of the connection between an Existential Analytic and a Fundamental Ontology, properly so-called. In other words, in the plan of the question regarding Being, anxiety is called upon for the following reason. It is expected to render Nothing a phenomenon, but *not* Nothing as Being in its accomplished worldly truth (Being as sense)—the Being of this or that ontological region of beings or of their prevalent epochal understanding, or of the 'average' understanding of the series of the latter. This 'Nothing,' qua currently truthful Being, is as much phenomenon and as much objective as it can be due to the *structure of the understanding projection*. Above all, anxiety is allowed to rush onstage in order to render Nothing as Being-in-general a phenomenon, i.e., Being as the *historically never exhaustively opened up, never purely true source* of all and every Being as sense.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>28</sup>This is the core of Heidegger's approach to the question of whether there is an all-inclusive condition (of utmost 'generality' or, better, universality) for the possibility of beings, i.e., a meaning of "Being" from which all other meanings of "Being" take their origin in whatever way. Perhaps a better way to conceive of this problem may be considered; better than the traditional Platonic geno-logical or generic conception. Heidegger, however, was never clear on what this way could be. It may, moreover, be questioned whether this sought-after (and still unavailable) alternative way would truly be better than Aristotle's *analogical* conception of Being. For the time being, let us stop with this provisional comment. In Chap. 10, §10.5, we will have the opportunity to examine some further points concerning the precise position and limitations of anxiety within Heidegger's original phenomenological and post-phenomenological questioning regarding Being.



We are thus led to the third possibility of understanding the essence of Nothing, of Being, and of their relation.

(C) Nothing is the no(n)- “*in general*” of the ever possible beings, i.e., of the very morphic possibility of the ontological difference between possible beings and their latent or lighted-up ultimate source of possibility; it is the ‘abysmal well’ Heidegger calls “Being as Being” (for this reading, see, e.g., *P*, 233/306, 237–8/312).

In *WM* (but, *mutatis mutandis*, also in *BT*) we thus have a borderline state in which Heidegger still talks about the Being of beings (see case A above), while simultaneously questioning himself about Being *as such*. Nothing with its no(n)- is, then, considered mainly for the purpose of manifesting the Being of beings (in the ontological difference of the first over against the second). Simultaneously, however, we have meaning-shifts toward Being *as Being*.<sup>29</sup> Especially from the point of view of *WM*, especially the “Postscript” (1943) and the “Introduction” (1949), it seems that Heidegger attempts a more decisive incorporation of Nothing in the very perspective of the thinking that regards Being as Being (or Being as such or Being itself, etc.).

Finally, on the basis of the latter possibility under discussion, a fourth and closely related possibility may be suggested.

(D) Nothing is the very abysmal *possibility* for Being as sense; the elusive potentiality of Being as Being for its mysterious historical outbreaks, for Being-as-Being’s lurking readiness on the verge for an—unpredictable in its concrete essence, but, kairologically, probably expectable—surge from its self-concealment toward some truthful self-manifestation within the world (see, e.g., *P*, 289–90/382, 237–8/312).<sup>30</sup>

The evidence that Heidegger provides us with during the period we are focusing on is not always full and unambiguous enough to draw a clear-cut distinction regarding which particular meaning of Nothing animates the term on every occasion

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<sup>29</sup>In studying *BT*, it is not difficult to feel one’s attention caught by the fact that in various places of that work where Heidegger refers to Being, he later adds, in the margins, questions of the sort: “which Being?”, “Dasein’s Being?”, “Being as sense?”, “Being as Being?”, “Being as such?”, etc. This is a reflection of the ambivalence we previously discussed.

<sup>30</sup>As in our times (in our *καίρως*), let us say, which seem to harbour new sense-givings, a new era, and a new actual worldliness (nobody can know yet if that is for good or bad—Heidegger thinks “for good,” since he accepts Hölderlin’s view, in his “Patmos,” that “But where danger is, / the salvatory power grows too”; my transl.). By the way, we can also add an intermediate meaning of Nothing here: that of the infinitely thin border, limit, or verge that separates the at-each-time disclosed Being (as sense) from the limitless abysmal source of all such Beings, i.e., from Being as such or Being as Being (see *P*, 234/307–8, 237/311, 238/312). Heidegger even refers to Nothing as the “veil” that hides Being as Being (*Seyn*). These latter ‘two plus one’ meanings of Nothing (C, D, and the ‘intermediate’ one just mentioned) will become very important for the (no longer phenomenological) way in which Heidegger treats Being after *WM*.

of its employment.<sup>31</sup> Of course, the question arising at this point is: are we still dealing, in the case of Nothing qua Being as Being, with the negation of the no(n)-we already met above? Is it that, phenomenologically, we are referred to this Nothing with the same negating move we saw above, i.e., with the away-sending (from the beings) and toward-turning (to what is no(n)-thing)? I suspect that even Heidegger does not have a conclusive answer to this question. We can only guess that he may always have hoped that an affirmative reply to this question would not be totally wrong.<sup>32</sup>

In the context of the literature that relates closely to our present discussion, it cannot go unnoticed that only rarely do we come across a clear and sufficient thematization of the two basic sorts of Being, i.e., Being as sense or as accomplished truth and Being as Being or Being as such.<sup>33</sup> Sheehan (2014) recognizes how difficult it is to make sense of Heidegger's focal concern. "What was the final goal of Heidegger's thinking? What was he ultimately after? [...] Was his goal "being," *das Sein*? Or was it something "being-er than being" (*wesender als das Sein*)? And might that be "being itself," *das Sein selbst*, sometimes written as *Seyn*? Or was it rather, as Heidegger says, *Seyn* qua *Seyn*—and if so, what might that mean? Again: Was Heidegger's main topic *die Wesung der Wahrheit des Seyns*? or was it *die Wahrheit der Wesung des Seyns*? Or was his topic *Anwesen*, "presencing"? Or the *Lichtung*? Or *Ereignis* as just another name for Being Itself? Or was it, rather, *Enteignis*? Or ἀλήθεια? or perhaps the Λήθη that lurks within ἀλήθεια? Or was it the ontological difference, as some scholars hold? [...] There is, in fact, considerable confusion at the heart of the Heideggerian enterprise, and it may not be the fault of Heidegger scholars." (Sheehan 2014, 250). And "In what sense is Heidegger's basic question, in its traditional ontological formulation, concerned

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<sup>31</sup>From the above, of course, it is implied that, in essence, the fundamental meanings (C) and, most basically, (D) of Nothing are both already present in *BT*. It is possible that this may raise the objection that, if true, then the thematic of the self-concealing/self-disclosing Being can already be found in *BT* and is not a radically novel element in Heidegger's thought after the so-called "turn" of the early 1930s. Indeed, as I see it, in *BT* there is enough evidence to help us understand that in the already published part of that work, the analyses are conducted—even if from an as yet not totally decided point of view—from within the scheme of the turn from the self-disclosing/self-enclosing kairological Being as Being to the disclosed historical Being as sense. The present context, however, is not the place for a further elaboration of this point. Meanwhile, and solely indicatively, one can look at Marx 1971, Richardson 1963, Pöggeler 1963, and Capobianco 2010.

<sup>32</sup>We will return to this issue in Chap. 10.

<sup>33</sup>For exceptions, see von Hermann 1993 and De Gennaro 2008. It is a bit of a surprise that Richardson's tradition of Heidegger interpretation does not seem to have fully entered the sphere of the difference under discussion. To refer to its most recent exposition, Capobianco (2010), although an elegant treatment (that is close to Heidegger's thinking) of some crucial key-concepts, one of which is that of Being, special care is taken only to separate Being from beingness, and not Being as sense from Being as such (or Being itself or Being in general or *Seyn*, etc., that is, Nothing). See Capobianco 2010, Chap. 1 and, especially pp. 8–9.

with *das Sein selbst*, and in what sense is it not? This question has bedeviled Heidegger scholarship from the beginning.” (Sheehan 2014, 258).<sup>34</sup>

To my knowledge, this lack is unfortunately felt, especially when we turn exclusively to the issue regarding the relation between Nothing, Being, and Logic. Fay (1977), for instance, aims at the elucidation of the dependence of Logic on Nothing: on the one hand, he has very little evidence to offer us with regard to the very Nothing as Being. On the other hand, he involuntarily treats Being as sense alongside Being as Being. We read then, that Nothing is “inextricably bound up with Being,” and that Being which sends itself to Dasein is “a revelation that is shrouded in darkness because it is inextricably bound up with the Nothing” (Fay 1977, 39). Fay also tells us that Nothing is always “somehow held in Being,” since despite the fact that Being reveals itself as sense, this disclosure is simply the other side of concealment. Moreover, Nothing is “not the opposite of being in its totality,” it is not some object or some quality of objects, neither *nihil negativum*. Nothing as Being is the “‘Not’ between being and Being”; it is another name for ontological difference (generally speaking).<sup>35</sup>

Thus, Fay agrees with Carnap that whereas “Nothing is” is contradictory, the expression “the Nothing nothings” (for us here read: nons) is nonsensical. However, for Fay, Carnap is right on the *syntactic* level but not on the semantic level, because the view Logic holds, that there can be no talk about Nothing, may perhaps not be the only approach to reality.<sup>36</sup> What, however, could a possible alternative “approach to reality” be? Poetry and philosophy, says Fay, may be considered as candidates here. These, according to Fay, have a more primordial awareness of Nothing and of Being, and have their own unique linguistic laws.

But is the issue of Nothing and Being simply a matter of a *choice* concerning laws of language? If yes, then why? Is it merely because of our need to find ways out from a boring or outdated, ineffective etc., language? For Carnap, whom we know as a philosopher who poses questions in such terms, this is indeed an affair concerning *choices* made according to pragmatic measures of simplicity, practicality, efficiency,

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<sup>34</sup>I have my reservations about Sheehan’s identification of Heidegger’s *Befragtes* with “*das Sein selbst*: The very being [of things] is under investigation.” (ibid., 258). The *Befragtes* is simply the particular being that a phenomenologist has to interrogate in order to arrive to the first and closer appearance of Being as Being of the beings, or Being as sense or as truth and, from it, to Being as such. The *Gefragtes* is clearly Being and the *Erfragtes* is the point of view from which we are interested into this Being, i.e., from the point of view of its meaning. This is why Heidegger says that he is after the meaning of Being, which he generally discovers to be time-like. When he tries to be more specific, he also tells us that Being as sense always has the meaning of some historical understanding of the time character “*Zeitlichkeit*,” the time in which we run our lives. In contrast, when the question turns to Being as such, we are forced to speculate another time-character, that of *Temporalität*, the time in which the *Ereignis* happens qua ‘essencing’ of Being as such in the historical state of some Being as sense, understood and appearing in the clearing of the historical Dasein. The question of whether Heidegger remained a phenomenologist, as Sheehan suggests, in his quest of Being as such, is one we will return to in Chap. 10.

<sup>35</sup>See Fay 1977, 39, 45.

<sup>36</sup>See Fay 1977, 42.

productivity, and other such criteria. For Carnap, we first construct a (syntactic) linguistic system and then come with a semantic interpretation, which at the same time constitutes the content of our experience and knowledge, i.e., an ‘ontology’ or even a ‘world’ (as he himself understands them).

In this sense, Carnap is an advocate of the view that “we see what we say” rather than of “we say what we see.” In Chap. 7, we saw that Heidegger attributed to Husserl such an un-phenomenological view (like the first just mentioned alternative). We can now add that what Heidegger probably despised in such a view was not of course the idea of a commensurance between language and experience, but rather the hidden (subjective) linguistic *voluntarism*—or at any rate ‘arbitrarism’—that he wanted to connect with Husserl (and potentially with Carnap too). Our experience may, for Heidegger but not for Husserl, already be shaped in conformity with the essence of language. In Heidegger, however, this can only mean that language expresses the phenomena as they are already correlatively formed *by Being* itself (see Chap. 8, §8.8.1 of the present book). At least, in his phenomenological period, Heidegger lets philosophy speak the phenomena as they show themselves *by themselves*. Thus, that Nothing surely “is not” but ‘*nons*’ is not a matter of a pragmatically chosen semantics for some inert syntax but a deeply ‘syntactic’ one, dictated by the supposedly appearing structure of the very elusive phenomenon it expresses. The Nothing, that is, or Being as Being dictates, as it were, the structure of the linguistic articulation in which we can adequately and commensurably speak about it, as Heidegger remarks in the closing lines of *BT*, §7. Hence, the question is: *the experience of what alleged phenomenon has Heidegger set himself to express with his ‘il-Logical’ talk about Nothing and Being?* Fay does not tell us anything substantial concerning this. Above, I have tried to develop a useful answer. In what follows, we will see what significance Heidegger attributes to his research results vis-à-vis the traditional conception of Formal Logic as the Organon of ontology and science.

## 9.9 Once Again on the Logic That Heidegger’s Criticism Concerns

Käufer (2001) attempts to elucidate the meaning of Heidegger’s claim that Logic is detrimental to the quest for a Fundamental Ontology. He claims that the Logic Heidegger has set as his target is Kant’s Transcendental Logic, which the Marburg Neo-Kantians—from whom Heidegger drew inspiration, at first—had absolutized over the Transcendental Aesthetic. These Neo-Kantians maintained that “the forms of [Transcendental] Logic constitute the entire origin of human experience, i.e. that there is no element of experience that is not so constituted.” (2001, 458). Of course, Heidegger also attacks the logistic version of Logic in Frege, Russell, and Carnap, but only as far as in it, the same idea—that “must” be detectable also in ancient

Greek philosophy—inheres latently.<sup>37</sup> On this basis, then, Käufer engages in an effort to show how the just mentioned “idea” or tension of Transcendental Logic is hidden in Carnap’s Logic—but also in ancient Greek philosophy.

The expression “the Nothing nothings” (read: nons), Käufer maintains, is not il-logical. If Heidegger manages to give the appropriate meaning to these terms, “then ‘the nothing nothings’ might very well have a proper logical form” (2001, 472). The greatest logical violation that Heidegger commits is supposedly that he “switches from the negative existential form to the noun” (ibid.). But, so the thought goes, Heidegger makes this alteration by simultaneously marking the noun with a capital first letter (*Nichts*) and uses this difference in order to show that “‘*Nichts*’ is not a quantification over entities [. . .], [quantification that runs] *over a range of beings*” (ibid., 474; emphases added). Additionally, at another point we read that Nothing is not used with the rule dictated by Logic; “the nothing, Heidegger says, precisely doesn’t mean negation of *all* entities” (ibid., 472; emphasis added). And Heidegger himself, after all, does not attack the Logic which “govern[s] conceptual encounters of ontic entities according to relations of *genus, species, identity, negation, etc.*” (ibid., 471; emphases added). By contrast, “[Nothing/]Being, however, is not related to beings according to a *logical relation*; it is related to them by an ontological relation, such as constitution, or transcendence, or what Heidegger calls temporality.” (ibid., 471; emphases added).

Hence, according to all indications, Logic constitutes the negative or merely formal theory for the cognizing conceptualization of beings. It envisions them through the generalizing perspectives of species and genera or—equivalently, after all, in essence—through the quantification that surveys the beings as discrete elements of logical extensions. Indeed, Logic does not seem to know of some negation move or operation that turns from thusly genera-lized beings (as additive collections or as an extensional series of particular beings) to the *totality* of beings as a *whole*, in the pregnant sense.<sup>38</sup> Very generally speaking, this narrow constellation of points must find us in agreement. Why, nonetheless, should this Logic be the Kantian Transcendental Logic?

A thusly understood Logic, i.e., a theory of the non-contradictory judgmental combination of specifically/generally seen concepts, is *not* Kant’s (or anybody else’s) Transcendental Logic. On the contrary, it is what Kant calls General Logic, that is, what we nowadays, *mutatis mutandis*, call Formal Logic, i.e., the formal theory of coherent *discursivity*—but *not also of positively possible truth* nor, for that matter, of knowledge—in general. Kant, but also Husserl, also calls this Logic a *negative* Logic of truth. Transcendental Logic is a special *supplement* to this Logic; a supplement that can expect also to furnish a *positive* Logic of truth.

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<sup>37</sup>Thus, according to Käufer “What Heidegger repudiates is not what Carnap exalts.” (2001, 458). That is, Heidegger does not actually repudiate a Logic fully purged of Neo-Kantian obsessions. On this, however, see also the closing remarks concerning Fay’s reading in §9.8 above.

<sup>38</sup>Let us recall here Käufer’s idea that in Heidegger, Nothing concerns the beings in their holistic—unfortunately not further specified—totality (see §9.7 above here).

Broadly speaking, i.e., without relying exclusively either on Kant or in Husserl, the latter is expected to be able to introduce a *material*—this time—normativity. The latter should be ‘justified’ on the basis of the necessity concerning the mergings and fusions of the constituent parts contained in the *phenomena themselves* as they can appear to our *intuition* (*Anschauung*). Naturally, Heidegger ultimately attacks the conception of General or Formal Logic—or Logic of non-contradiction and consistency—as the sole foundation for ontology and for language. And in *WM*, his target is this Logic, which conceptualizes generically/quantifyingly, ontologizes identifyingly, thinks in non-contradictory subject-predicate or function-argument judgments, and argues validly (with mere consistency). It would be a misinterpretation, though, to suggest that Heidegger also rejects what we know as Transcendental Logic—at least if we think that he does this in the same way in which he rejects General Logic (for the duties he has in mind). It is not Kant’s wise (even if partial and superficial) complement to Formal Logic, but Formal Logic itself that is Heidegger’s main target.

It wouldn’t be too far-fetched to claim here that Heidegger’s new Grammar, of whose necessity he had informed us as early as §7 of *BT*, can be considered as a radicalization of Kant’s and, to some degree, Husserl’s Transcendental Logic. This is a radicalization that no longer follows, like Kant, the modalities of judgment as a guiding clue for an a priori positive theory of truth. By further building on Husserl’s already proto-hermeneutic mereological truth-seeking syntheses, it aspires to investigate the very ground of everyday phenomena, in order to phenomenologically-intuitively bring to surface their regional and super-regional (most non-formally universal) a priori condition of possibility or, rather, their actuality. Heidegger was indeed searching for these a priori conditions using the names of (this or that) Being as sense and of Being as Being or Being in general, or Nothing, etc. Since these a priori conditions extended far beneath judgmentally formed experience, which as higher-order theoretical possibility presupposes the former deeper and founding levels, the expression of their content appears to be in need of an inexistent Logic or, rather, a Grammar. Here is how Heidegger puts it.

With regard to the awkwardness and ‘inelegance’ of expression in the following analyses, we may remark that it is one thing to report narratively about beings and another to grasp beings in their Being. For the latter task not only most of the words are lacking but above all the “Grammar.” (*BT*, 34/38–9)

Heidegger had already found a novel grammatical way of expressing the phenomenological experience (intuition) of the way Being-as-sense *worlds* (*es weltet*) in its being-constituting worldliness. Let, then, Heidegger’s ‘illogical’ Grammar of the Nothing that *nons* be his way of further extending this endeavor toward the thematization of the at-least-expected—and I stress this: *expected*—phenomenological experience of Nothing as Being qua Being. Each time, and in each ontological region, the respective Being as sense accomplishes its being-constituting work, not by way of an ontic logical subsumption of or causal impingement upon some indefinite ‘material,’ but by its *worlding* as world of the beings it constitutes. Heidegger then seems to imply that Nothing accomplishes its

own work by its *noning*. To the degree that all this is experienceable in phenomena, the discourse which Logic wants to be its theory *does not* suffice in articulating this outlandish subject matter. Hence, Heidegger's experimentation with the bizarre expressions we have been examining follows.

## 9.10 In What Sense Does Logic Stand Within the Lethe of Being/Nothing?

According to the general pattern of Heidegger's stance toward Logic and its relation to the question of Being (Nothing), things stand as follows. Logic went as far as ruling Western thought in general, because Being was overlooked from the time of Plato and Aristotle until that of Hegel and the Neo-Kantians. Because philosophers thought the problem of being totally apart from the problem of Being, they did not manage to foresee that being is one thing, and Being ('thanks' to which beings *are*) is quite another. Thus, also failed to realize that the discourse that thematizes being *ontically* (considering its a priori condition as idea or concept and, generally, as another being) needs to be analogously different in comparison to the discourse that lets Being appear and be talked about *ontologically* (as worlding or non-being or noning, etc.).

What does it mean, according to Heidegger, that Logic came to the fore by usurping—almost from the start—the place of genuinely First Philosophy (Fundamental Ontology), due to the fact that Being is somehow not always trivially available in appropriate experience? Fay (1977) recapitulates the essential reasons why Logic's claim to being First Philosophy (its sole Organon) is deeply problematic as follows. For Dasein, concepts do not have priority; Being (unspecifiedly) is conceived of pre-conceptually. Being is not determined by thinking and its linguistic articulations in judgments; Being's truth is originally conceived of pre-predicatively, and the conception of Being (unspecifiedly) is not effected by an active, voluntary cognitive subject, but grasped in a 'eucharistic' (εὐχαριστιακό) happening that is experienced by Dasein. In sum, Fay concludes, Logic is not the primary norm for thought.<sup>39</sup>

This, however, is rather vague. Between the pre-conceptual grasp of Being *as sense* and the 'eucharistic' gesture of letting ourselves be submitted to the self-disclosing/self-concealing 'grace' of Being *as such* in the *Ereignis*, there is the same thematic distance that separates the worldly ontological difference from the disclosability of Being as Being. We can now say that the problem of Logic's insufficiency on the issue of the elucidation of Being and of its a priori constituting role, together with the problem regarding the paramorphosis that it brings about when it unfittingly gets applied in an effort to elucidate it, is not the same in the aforementioned cases.

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<sup>39</sup>See Fay 1977, 35.

Heidegger developed at least two different great thematics regarding the non-availability or retreat of Being. As we have already seen, in his writings until the early 1930s, these two thematics remain conceptually and architectonically confused. If we were to engage in an effort to distinguish them (as we did in §§9.7 and 9.8, correspondingly) in terms of the relation between Nothing and Being, we could say that the first thematic is present and prominent in the published part of *BT*, and the other has a brief and restrained presence in *BT*, but basically introduces itself around the “turn” in Heidegger’s thought (ca. 1930).<sup>40</sup>

In the first thematic, Being stands in non-accessibility while it is already ontologically *actualized*, if not also properly *disclosed*; it has been unfolded and ‘realized’ within history, and constitutes the regional beings it constitutes in each case. Dasein is focused only on the multiplicity of regional beings, and cannot discern among or around them, as it were, the disclosed and at-work Being that—in its horizontal worlding (Being as sense)—rendered them possible and keeps them actual. This Being is disclosed as the current historical worldliness, even though it may not yet be manifestly or thematically evident, a fully appearing and grasped phenomenon. This disclosed Being as sense supposedly becomes such a phenomenon in experiences like the ones described, in *BT*, in the context of our *problematic* confrontation with equipment, or with the beings that mostly occupy us in each epoch, etc. We may also assume that it can become the subject matter of a wondering philosopher, etc. The philosophical examination of this non-availability or non-accessibility becomes possible on the basis of our *authentic* grasp of the very ontological difference (in all the respective cases). Let us agree that the name of this non-availability is “*lethe*” (λήθη) or *forgetfulness* (*Vergessenheit*).

In the second thematic, Being stands in non-availability in the sense that, despite its disclosing unfoldings and realization within history, Being as Being or Being in its mysterious universality (that Heidegger aspires to explore and decipher) has never exhaustively unfolded the entirety of its possible disclosures and realizations within the epochs of history. No matter how many times or how much Being itself has effectuated itself within history as sense or truth, there is always a not-yet-disclosed ‘reserve’ of it that has not yet come to its truth. This ‘reserve’ of undisclosed Being-senses can never be lighted up in their entirety and at once. Since this is an inescapable fate for Being as such, in its relation to us in history, Being (generally speaking) is not only truth but also non-truth (without this latter meaning “falsity”). In *BT*, Heidegger hoped that Being as Being or Nothing could somehow present itself in the limit thymotic state of anxiety. According to all indications, however, he very soon realized that something like this is impossible. There is a sense in which Being as Being always remains in *radical* retreat. The examination of this non-availability and the possible ‘logic’ of its epochal and self-disclosing coming within history becomes Heidegger’s later obsession. In *BT*, this examination is carried out via a destruction or a decomposition of the layers

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<sup>40</sup>Sheehan (2014) refers to this, and sees only the hiddenness of Being as sense, which was already explicitly thematized in *BT*.



and parts of history or, later, when the radical retreat of Being as Being has been accepted, of remembrance (*Andenken*), i.e., of the vivid preserving in memory of all the previously occurring ‘flares’ of that entire ‘reserve’ in its originality. Let us now agree that the name for this kind of unavailability is, consistently, *concealment* (*Verbergung*).

In *BT* and *WM*, but also in the discussions of this issue in the literature, these two conceptions of Logic in its relation to absentmindedness (generally speaking) are always interwoven and confused.<sup>41</sup> Of course, both the first and the second ‘absentmindedness’ (and unavailability) *can* be connected to the widely understood debt of Logic to Nothing as Being. From what has been said up to this point, however, this connection cannot but have a different meaning in both cases, in accordance with the remarks developed above in §§9.7 and 9.8.

### 9.11 In What Sense, Finally, Does Logical Negation Presupposes Nothing and Why Can Logic not Ask Primordially About Nothing/Being?

On the basis of what we have seen, we can now move toward a sufficiently clear and distinct view of the two issues posed in the citation from *WM* given above in §1.

First of all, we must understand the following. Scientific thinking, regardless of whether this belongs to the natural or the human sciences, always poses its corresponding thematic being as its subject matter, and undertakes the task of examining its properties and expressing the relevant hypotheses and discoveries in the judgments of a corresponding theory. But, as Heidegger repeatedly remarks, we have beings only because we have Being. Hence, we also have scientific beings only because we have Being. Science, nevertheless, always posits its beings in its thinking, which, as Logic—qua, supposedly, complete theory of this thinking—says, always takes the form “All *As* are *B*,” or “All *As* are not *B*.” But this definitional, predicative, categorical “is” or, respectively, “is not,” through which our cognitive thinking lives and works, is nothing but a modification of the ontological “Being”; of that which makes beings be (at all). And as we saw, this Being is nothing other than whatever is illuminated in the very Nothing as such (in each of the two

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<sup>41</sup>If these two different kinds of lack of awareness with regard to Being (and Nothing) are not kept distinct, the meaning of Heidegger’s claim concerning the foundedness of the logical negation upon Nothing remains confused. In chap. 1 of Fay’s book (1977), we start with indistinctly parallel references to these two kinds of unavailability (until p. 14), while later we turn exclusively to the first. Chapter 2 of the same work starts with the second thematic, and two pages later we are brought back to the first, just in order to continue again with the second (on p. 32). The same occurs in chap. 3 (as can be characteristically certified, in e.g., the transitions from pp. 38–39 and pp. 44–45). Chapter 3 is of special interest to us here, since it concerns the special issue of the relation between Logic and Being. The vagueness regarding these thematics is detectable also in other scholars. Cf. also Sheehan 1998, §§4–7.

pairs of possible understanding (see §§9.7 and 9.8). Nothing, though, does not found only the “is” (in either an affirmative or a negative judgment) and the positing of the being. The very ‘movement’ of logical negation presupposes the more primordial ‘movement’ that makes possible the experience of the difference of the discovered being(s) from the non-being(s),<sup>42</sup> i.e., from the—in forgetfulness and concealment standing—Nothing as Being (of some sense). This primordial experience of (i) the intuitional move of away-turning from the being(s) and (ii) of the simultaneous letting of the no(n)- of being(s) emerge as phenomenon, i.e., as the noning Nothing (in the restricted sense of the one or the other Being that make ‘its’ proper beings be) founds logical negation.<sup>43</sup>

But is there any chance that in the context of this first reading, Heidegger also means something thoroughly different with regard to the precise meaning of logical negation’s dependence on Nothing? In his “Letter on ‘Humanism’” (1946) he develops an analysis that might appear different. In this crucial and explicatory work, Heidegger does not move along the lines of thinking crystallized above. The negation, as the *Verneinung* from which the no(n)- does *not* arise (but vice versa), is there also called by Heidegger *Nein-sagen*: “no-saying” (οὐ-λέγειν)—a negation that was here identified with the negation of the “not” (§9.3). According to the same, this apophatic no-saying names volitional subjective positing and, thus, the correspondingly negative attitude of the thematizing-objectifying thinking or (which, for him, is the same) of the self-positing subject that *decides to stand in some way over against* the beings. Thus, if we are not to succumb to the easy solution of a slight terminological incoherence on the part of Heidegger (an option that would not be absolutely unjustified), we can suppose this: what is important at that point for the differentiation of the “no(n)-” (*Nicht*, μὴ) of the *noning Nothing* from the “no” (*nicht*) of the *logical negation* (οὐ) is the “saying” in the “no-saying,” qua negation,

<sup>42</sup>In the explanations of the interpreters concerning the priority Heidegger attributes to Nothing over logical negation (of the “not”), no particular distinction is made with regard to the different moves that are involved in the two negations. See, e.g., Tugendhat 1970 and Philipse 1998 (specifically p. 12).

<sup>43</sup>Some interpreters tend toward a rounding of the subject matter to such a degree that it loses its significance. White (1985), for instance, thinks that *WM* concerns Nothing, “i.e., negation as such” (1985, 46). After this, his analysis is restricted to Heidegger’s reference (*P*, 85/109) that “Nothing is the full negation of the totality of beings” and parallels Nothing with propositional falsehood, which “conceals beings as a totality” in the sense that it “hides Being from the scope of its extension” or, more specifically, in the sense that it constitutes the false in contraposition to the true (1985, 48–9). It is then suggested that we should understand Nothing as “that which is not true,” “that which does not appear as true.” Thus, even though White touches upon the issue that according to Heidegger, Nothing founds logical negation (1985, 53), he simply thinks that logical negation is the *formal* version of negation, i.e., that which concerns (linguistic) judgments, irrespective of their content, whereas Nothing is the *material* version of negation, i.e., that which concerns beings. This analyses, however, barely approaches the hard phenomenological core of Heidegger’s views on the matter.

with the usual sense of the negative sentence. In the no-saying ‘or’ no(n)-saying of the apophatic sentence, Heidegger connects the *–saying* with the (ontic) positing power of subjectivity (*Setzungskraft der Subjektivität*).

We have, then, the following contraposition. On the one hand, there is talk about primordial—according to *involuntary* anxiety—negation as the No(n)- of the beings in the noning of Nothing, which is additionally identified in a peculiar manner with a primordial letting-be of the existing *Da-sein* (*ein Sein-lassendes der Ek-sistenz*). On the other hand, we have the “no(n)-” ‘or’ “no” of the “no(n)-” ‘or’ “no-saying,” in which, to be sure, the “No(n)-” of the noning is remembered, recalled, or evoked (*angesprochen werden*). The “no” ‘or’ “no(n)-” of the apophatic sentence, as founded or deduced negation, responds to the call of the illuminated noning (*antwortet auf den Anspruch des gelichteten Nichtens*).<sup>44</sup> This “-saying” of the “no-” ‘or’ “no(n)-saying,” as “no” (*Nein*) ‘or’ “no(n)” (*Nicht*) of the logical negation, as generally *op-posing* or *contra-posing*, is the possibility of a subject or of its thinking that turns toward there-standing (*vorhanden*) objects with properties, and sees *only* (such) beings.

We are dealing, then, with the stance of *ontic-positing* (and of the corresponding negation) that pertains to the way in which all these are understood from the modern philosophical perspective, which sees self-positing theoretically cognizing subjects that voluntarily adopt affirmative or negative stances over against present-at-hand beings. Logic can only handle this kind of thinking—and only at the formal level. In this Logic, negation is only nihilation (‘*Nichtung*’) as *annihilation* (*Vernichtung*) and not as noning; it can, moreover, be operated only by the human being as theoretical *subject*. That is, it is only the negation that is accomplished as ‘de-saying’ (ἀπο-φάσις—cf. ἀποφατικός and apophatics).<sup>45</sup> This negation is what I earlier called *contra-position* (ἀντί-θεσις, *Gegensatz*), in contradistinction to the intuitional ontological negation as renouncing or away-sending (ἀπο-πέμπειν, *Abweisung*).

Hence, despite the seeming difference and the seeming inconsistency in the analysis, I am of the view that the problematics regarding the founding of logical negation upon Nothing is unitary in *BT*, in *WM*, and in the “Letter.” The common basis for the whole discussion is the following. Logical negation turns (actively) and focuses ontically on the geno-logically or generically conceptualized—present-at-hand being and its properties. In the (non-active) away-sending referring of the

<sup>44</sup>For all this see *P*, 272–3/359.

<sup>45</sup>On this, see *P*, 273/360. In the “Letter on ‘Humanism,’” however, Heidegger calls renouncing or away-sending (*Abweisung*) the nihilating that a self-positing subjectivity commits as annihilating (*P*, 273/360). We must keep in mind, though, that in that work this renouncing or away-sending (*Abweisung*) is used in order to maintain the *priority* of Nothing over ontic negation in Logic. In the 5th edition of the *WM*, Heidegger notes that the No(n)- consists in this double movement: “away-sending: [from] beings by themselves; re-ferring: in [or better: to] the *Being* of the beings [*ab-weisen: das Seinde für sich; wer-weisen: in das Sein des Seinden*].” (*P*, 90/114).

anxiety, though, Nothing (in each of the aforementioned two pairs of approaches, in §§9.7 and 9.8) is illuminated in its ontological nothingness as the “other” qua “No(n)-” of the being(s).<sup>46</sup>

## 9.12 Concluding Remarks

What we were mainly interested in this chapter was the effort to make as clear as possible the meaning of Logic’s inappropriateness for the task of founding Fundamental Ontology, i.e., in Heidegger’s sense, First Philosophy in its most primordial and genuine meaning.

From the above, it must now be clear that in the context of the first pair of possibilities in our approaching the relation between Nothing and Being (§9.7), the inappropriateness of Logic consists in the fact that Being as sense is not *a* being with properties, found in an object-like external *relation* to the rest of the beings. Logico-grammatical means are insufficient, then, for something as significant as the phenomeno-logization of the fundamental presupposition of all beings: Being in its rootedness in Nothing and Nothing in its self-historization as Being (of this or that regional-historical sense). No matter how much we refine Logic, no matter how much we nominalize it by introducing existential quantification, no matter how much we formalize or model-theorize the modalities, no matter how much we extend and make inferential techniques stricter and more mechanical, Logic will always remain grounded upon the very same presuppositions—and

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<sup>46</sup>Before moving to the last section of this Chapter, there is another approach to the present issue that demands a comment. Tugendhat (1970) reaches the point of claiming that in reality, what is given in the experience of anxiety can be described by the—semantically *ontic*—proposition “there is nothing from which I can hold on” (“*es gibt nichts, woran ich mich halten kann*”). Heidegger, though, being totally hostile to the logical (*das Logische*), does not want to simply articulate his idea in one clause, and thus sets himself in search of its contentful meaning (1970, 156–7). In other words, while Heidegger actually means that in anxiety we have the experience of the state of affairs that is expressed in the universal negative existential proposition “there is not something” (“*es gibt nichts*”), he chooses to talk about “the Nothing” because he wants to refer us *to the very beings that are lost* for us within the complete indifference of anxiety. In a way, in that very anxiety we have the experience of Nothing, whereas in its linguistic expression, the content of this experience takes the (supposedly) equipotential form “there is not something” (cf. *ibid.*, 158 n. 22). This, Tugendhat continues, can be fully paralleled with Heidegger’s tactic of saying “the being is” (“*das Seiende ist*”), instead of the universal affirmative existential proposition “there is something” (“*es gibt etwas*”) (*ibid.*, 157). Generally, then, from the perspective of his rather linguistic-analytical approach, Tugendhat claims that the expression “the Nothing” is the objectified reference of that which is meant by the universal negative existential proposition, just as, supposedly, the expression “the Being” is the objectified reference of that which is meant in the universal affirmative existential proposition “there is something” (*ibid.*, 160). It is difficult here for a phenomenologist to make his mind up as to what to wish for; Tugendhat’s being correct, despite the ensuing demythologization of Phenomenology, or Heidegger’s having indeed discovered genuinely novel phenomena, no matter how dark his reports on these might have been.

even more dangerously so, as long as it retains them under the thick carpet of ontological oblivion (λήθη), and as its self-confidence becomes all the more vertiginous as a result. How, then, can we acquire the view of something like Being (generally speaking)? This is supposedly manifested in the Existential Analytic of the understanding and in anxiety. And what happens there cannot be witnessed either in a Carnapian linguistic system or even within the logically looser language of everyday. Here, we are in need of *other articulations in the λόγος*, articulations that forget the system of *ontic* beingness and predication: Being/Nothing is not; it *worlds* (*weltet*) and *nons* (*nichtet*).

In the context of the second pair of possibilities (§9.8), the inappropriateness of Logic is not due to the fact that it presupposes an active cognizing subject, endowed with spontaneous constituting capacities (as Fay suggested); rather, it is due to the fact that there is not yet any suitable language and suitable Grammar to describe the process of Nothing's self-unfolding within history as Being qua sense. The difficulty of the logically meant Grammar of the language that has to witness and to report Being as sense (or truth) is indeed a problem touched upon in *BT* and in *WM*, and was there originally connected with the first thematic of the non-availability of Nothing/Being. In the later Heidegger, though, the problem is posed somehow differently. It no longer concerns the phenomeno-logization of the (non-ontic) disclosed Being as sense or truth, but concerns the phenomeno-logization of the Being-as-Being's 'logic' (!) of historical self-development and self-disclosure as this or that epochally prevailing Being as sense. In other words, the problem does not concern the *truth* (ἀλήθεια), but the incompletely *becoming-true* (ἀληθεύειν) of Nothing qua Being as such. Heidegger tried to conceive of this in the thematic of the so-called 'properizing-event' (*Ereignis*).<sup>47</sup>

We could sum this up in the following schematic way. In the first case, the issue concerns that which—even if non-being—'makes' *beings* be. In the second, it concerns that which—even if non-disclosed Being—'makes' *Being(s)* 'be.'

At any rate, Heidegger's phrase, "the Nothing itself nons" (either as World or as *Ereignis*), can no longer be isolated, turned around and populistically mocked. Philosophy, of course, does not need either the suspicious or naively enthusiastic commissioners of a *logical anamorphic ordering* of humanity—all the more so since we are still (possibly) in the dark about both the ground and the consequences of such an ordering and about humanity's ultimate essence. Priority, then, cannot be given to the—so much and so intensely pursued in our history—blissful quieting upon the pillow of a solution to a problem we ignore. It seems to me that the only authentic way to avoid the errors of the catastrophic over-simplifications of the past is to sharpen our vigilance and to keep cultivating our understanding of the problems, as well as our self-awareness concerning our finitude.


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<sup>47</sup>On this see, e.g., *P*, 250/328.

Meanwhile, let us not fool ourselves—and this also concerns us within Phenomenology. In the field of praxis, where all our real disquietude and unrest ultimately moves throughout humanity's journey, no science and no logically reconstructed version of it can ever lighten the burden of deliberation, preference, and choice by means of scientific or apocalyptic one-ways. Let us, then, re-evaluate prudence (φρόνησις) against life's irreducibly original difficulty.

## Part V Phenomenology at Its Limits

Ἄ, δὲ, ὡς φησιν Εὐδημος, οὕτως ἠρώτα τὸν λόγον· ἐν τῷ ἐσχάτῳ οἶον τῷ ἀπλανεῖ οὐρανῷ γενόμενος πότερον ἐκτείναιμι ἂν τὴν χεῖρα ἢ τὴν ῥάβδον εἰς τὸ ἔξω ἢ οὐ· καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ ἐκτείνειν ἄτοπον· εἰ δὲ ἐκτείνω, ἤτοι σῶμα ἢ τόπος τὸ ἐκτός ἐσται (διοίσει δὲ οὐδέν, ὡς μαθησόμεθα). ἀεὶ οὖν βαδιεῖται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ τὸ ἀεὶ λαμβανόμενον πέρασ καὶ ταῦτὸν ἐρωτήσει, καὶ εἰ ἀεὶ ἕτερον ἔσται ἐφ' ὃ ἡ ῥάβδος, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἄπειρον.<sup>1</sup>



Archytas at the edge of the firmament (unknown artist)

<sup>1</sup>“But [Archytas],” as Eudemus says, “used to propound the argument in this way: ‘If I arrived at the outermost edge of the heaven [that is to say of the familiar cosmos horizon], could I extend my hand or staff into what is outside or not?’ It would be paradoxical not to be able to extend it. But if I extend it, what is outside will be either body or place. It doesn’t matter which, as we will learn. So then he will always go forward in the same fashion to the limit that is supposed in each case and will ask the same question, and if there will always be something else to which his staff [extends], it is clear that it is also unlimited.” (A24 Eudemus, *Physics* Fr.65 preserved by Simplicius’ comment to Aristotle’s *Physics* 203b22 ff., cited in Carl A. Huffman, *Archytas of Tarentum*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005, 541)

# Chapter 10

## Hence and Thence Phenomenology's Borderline

What writing projects must I carry out? Which problems take up? [...] In the first place I mention the general problem which I must solve if I am to be able to call myself a philosopher. I mean: *A critique of reason*, a critique of logical and practical reason, of normative reason in general. [...] Without getting clear on the general outlines of the sense, essence, methods and main points of a critique of reason, without having thought out, outlined, formulated and justified a general sketch of such a critique, I cannot live truly and sincerely. (E. Husserl: *EW*, 493–4)

If there is something like catastrophe in the creative work of great thinkers, then it consists not in being stymied and in failing to go farther, *but precisely in advancing farther*—that is to say, in their letting themselves be determined by the initial impact of their thought, an impact that always deflects them. Such going 'farther' is always fatal, for it prevents one from abiding by the source of one's own commencement. The history of Western philosophy will have to be assimilated in times to come with the help of this way of looking at things. The result could be some very remarkable and very instructive insights. (M. Heidegger: *N II*, 81/337–8; emphasis added)

### 10.1 Introduction

In the preceding chapters, we have had the opportunity to see how we can avoid several key misunderstandings in the phenomenological thought of Husserl and Heidegger with regard to fundamental questions of doctrine and teaching. Hopefully, enough justice has been done to the original concerns of these two founding figures of this philosophy. We have discovered that despite various severe critiques (mutual, and from both within and without the phenomenological camp), these concerns can be made intelligible for phenomenologists of all particular persuasions—and, with some luck, not only for phenomenologists. The basics of the phenomenological methodology and research results restored in the previous chapters can thus be combined to constitute a well-standing teaching and way of



philosophizing. This, then, may form part of the ground of a joint phenomenological program that could be called "Normalized Phenomenology." Of course, it is not only Husserl's and Heidegger's Phenomenologies that could contribute to this endeavor, but also those of Scheler, Merleau-Ponty, Hannah Arendt, and many others.

Husserl offers us the context of intelligibility for conducting phenomenological research into the constitution of the multifaceted and multilayered nature of actuality itself, in accordance with sustainable teachings regarding correlative intentional synthesis that may be further developed. At bottom, his teachings provide us with access to the most primordial level of experience, i.e., to the perceptual appearance of the world with its beings. On top of this, his theory of linguistic thematization and scientific intentionality elucidates the way in which we are led from perception to the categorially and idealized constitution and experience of reality. We saw that there is a way in which all these analyses of Husserl's retain their value and escape all the accusations on the part of Heidegger and the Heideggerians. Various other constitutions are then possible as internally or externally founded upon this perceptual correlation. These upper levels in intentional constitution correlate us with what, in Chap. 6, we loosely called "spiritual" and "cultural" actuality. It is my contention that, although Husserl prepared the ground for an appropriate understanding of the issues involved in this constitution, he did not manage to offer us a correspondingly sufficient account. This is the point at which future Phenomenology can depart from the analyses offered by Husserl and turn to Heidegger (and Scheler), even if this is by way of a radical modification of the original teachings of the latter. This is not the place to present a full account of the relevant necessary and possible transformations, but the following indicative idea will suffice for the moment.

On the occasion of analyzing the meaning of the inspiration Heidegger admitted to have drawn from Husserl's categorial intuition, in the direction of the development of his analysis of Being, we saw how the phenomenology of Being works and what Being achieves in matters of intentional constitution. I want to be clear here that contrary to Heidegger's explicit warning (if not austere prohibition) against reading his phenomenology of Being in terms of a philosophy of values, I suggest that we take the necessary precautions and do exactly the opposite, i.e., commit what, in his "Letter on 'Humanism'" (1946), he called "blasphemy against Being."<sup>1</sup> With this 'impious' move, I believe that we can at last combine Husserl's precious analyses concerning the givenness of the perceptual or nature-thing with Heidegger's advanced analyses concerning our experience of instruments or goods (value-beings) in the context of a promising and new phenomenological path. Until now, this possibility has remained unimaginable, because of Phenomenology's unresolved internal disputes and the impermeability of its thusly formed credos.

This move, combined with a correspondingly measured re-reading of Scheler's theory of emotions and values, would further strengthen and extend the possibilities. Phenomenology will be capable of dealing with complicated matters in Axiology

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<sup>1</sup>This is suggested in Theodorou 2014a, and further prepared in Theodorou 2014b.

and Ethics (which did not have a proper place in Heidegger's work) as well as in praxeology as a whole, from economy to politics to the philosophy of art. We need only to give Scheler's magisterial *Formalism in Ethics* (1913, 1916) a transcendental-phenomenological twist (another 'impious' move) against the realistic-phenomenological consolidation of its original content. Of course, this is easier said than done, but time will tell.

What has been realized here can be saved for Phenomenology's future—if not for philosophy as a whole. But this can be done only *under a certain further condition*. It is this additional condition that will be our main concern in this final chapter. After the analyses developed in what follows, a new beginning will have been prepared for Phenomenology.

## 10.2 The Question of a Critique of Intentionality's 'Reason'

The optimistic perspective opened up by the preceding possibilities and promises does not grant that everything in this research project is rosy. Phenomenology may be a philosophy of infinite tasks, but it cannot pass for a philosophy of infinite means. By its very methodological principle, this philosophy is restricted to the elucidation of the phenomena in their horizontal and vertical (as it were) structure or, otherwise put, in their synchronic/diachronic or static/genetic structuring. To this extent, the specifically phenomenologically justified significance of Phenomenology's discoveries and teachings is restricted to the phenomena themselves, to what is *phenomeno-logizable*. To be sure, this restriction does not necessarily signal a diminishing of Phenomenology's dignity as a kind of philosophizing. As we will see, what it signals is a more deeply entrenched self-awareness.

Both Husserl and Heidegger nonetheless flirted with (and were sometimes fully enchanted by) the charm of the non-phenomenologizable. It is in the nature of our truth-seeking process in philosophy to frequently find ourselves moving along the boundary that separates the soundly intuitional from the merely speculative. According to Phenomenology's strict rule, the possible drift into the merely speculative is the philosophical original sin against truth and knowledge, yet Phenomenology does not appear fully innocent of this drift. In this final chapter, we will have the opportunity to see what I believe to be the most crucial trespasses of these self-posed phenomenological limits. Generally speaking, this might be an expected result, given philosophy's own high expectations in the field of truth and knowledge. The fact remains, however, that without any specific notice both Husserl and Heidegger do on occasion pass from the domain of phenomenological description of the things themselves into a speculative conjecturing of the phenomenologically unchartable. In their efforts to further extend the elucidatory capability of Phenomenology, fully absorbed in following the traces of the phenomena under investigation, they allow themselves to fall down the rabbit hole.

Naturally, no authoritarian decree can ban speculation from the practice of philosophizing. Nonetheless, as Aristotle and, after two millennia, Kant carefully observed, the simple dichotomy between science and simple doxa is not enough.

Science must be distinguished as sharply as possible not only from simple but also from educated doxa, even though the latter should always be recognized and evaluated in its own sphere and according to whatever its merits may be. Scientific apodictic knowledge is not tenable in all fields of human research, and no matter how much effort one is willing to expend, there are cases in which apodictic science is not possible.<sup>2</sup> In such cases, we are allowed to self-consciously appeal to the best possible examined doxai, without subreptively allowing these to pass for knowledge. To put it concisely, and in Kant's modern critical manner, objective experience of intuitable phenomena exhausts the range of true knowledge, and merely discursive dialectical theorems about non-appearings can at best have the dignity of a regulative practical guide.

This is all the more crucial, since Phenomenology was supposedly designed by Husserl, at least in his *Ideas I*, as a complete *Critique* of intentionality's 'reason,' of consciousness' possibility for truth. Simplistically put, however, the available criterion for this critique was nothing more than that of *evident givenness*. Here is how Husserl phrases it in his famous "principle of all principles."

*[E]very originary presentive [originär gebende] intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition [Erkenntnis], [...] everything originally (so to speak, in its 'personal' [leibhaften] actuality) offered to us in 'intuition' is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there. (Ideas I, 44/51; emphasis added)*

Several kinds of experience and several beings in their worlds, though, have been and could be said to be given with evidence: the perceived thing, the perceiving act, a predicative state of affairs, the thinking act, the principles of Formal Logic, Euclidian axioms, the Pythagorean theorem, the Aristotelian topology of the cosmos, Newtonian absolute space, the principle of inertia, the material continuum, the corpuscular composition of matter, the atomic theory of matter, Riemann's non-zero curvature tensors, the principles of relativity, six-dimensional space, the expanding universe, the superposition state of Schrödinger's cat, the principle of complementarity, something imagined, the streaming flow of the *reell* hyletic data, the transcendental ego, the monad, a benevolent almighty creator God, the utilitarian ethical principle, the deontological ethical principle, the invisible hand of the free market, class struggle, the historical teleology of communism, the historical teleology of capitalism, the end of history, etc. But can all the corresponding claims connected with these cases be recognized by Phenomenology as knowledge? My estimation is that Phenomenology has not yet dealt with this issue in depth, and that it is about time to start doing so.

In the following sections, I will first try to deal with the question of what is generally to be expected of meaningful talk of a phenomenological method and phenomenological knowledge. What does it mean to say that a premeditated or 'unpremeditated' method safeguards our path to truth? More specifically, §10.3 pre-

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<sup>2</sup>For further elucidation on the meaning of the issues only in-principle discussed at this point, see also Chap. 2, §2.7.1 and Chap. 3, §3.4.1.

prepares us for an examination of some limit claims to phenomenological knowledge made by Husserl and Heidegger. In §§10.4 and 10.5, I will focus on what I take to be exemplary cases of silently trespassed phenomenological limits in Husserl's method and Heidegger's 'non-method.' In particular, I have in mind Husserl's entanglement with the issue regarding the origin and availability of the so-called hyletic data, in connection with his appeal to the monadological transcendental consciousness and its logos. I also turn to Heidegger's effort to search for and to thematize Being as Being in its kairological flow and enigmatic relatedness to Dasein (at least within the still phenomenological horizon of *BT*). The chapter continues by offering some first statements of what a critical phenomenological standpoint could be (§§10.6, 10.7, and 10.8). After having treated some of the problems and pitfalls of phenomenological philosophy in previous chapters, and after having realized its possibilities and limitations in the present chapter, we will have to answer the following question: what should sustain our commitment to Phenomenology? In §10.9, we will see that a good deal of original phenomenological teachings and its promised prospect are sustainable, and can lead to fruitful work in the future.

### 10.3 Method, Discovery, and the Soundness of Phenomenology's Teachings

Naturally, this is not the proper point at which to engage in a detailed discussion of the problem of method in scientific or philosophical or scientific-philosophical discovery of truths. I will therefore accept without argument that there is something right about both Husserl's and Heidegger's stances. Husserl was right that if the method that leads us to our discoveries cannot be shown, then it is as if we accept these discoveries as the godly revelations to an oracle.<sup>3</sup> Likewise, Heidegger was right that we have to be careful not to let our prejudices and predispositions enter into the way we devise and follow such methodological steps, because there is a real danger of 'contaminating' our original phenomena and our results.<sup>4</sup> There is, however, another side to these claims. Husserl was wrong to believe that method means total control over our stance and findings. Discoverers in general—and I refer basically to *a priori* work in philosophy or in the sciences—simply cannot decide the content of their discoveries in advance. This content lies beyond any subjective volition and methodic research steps. In an important sense, ideas 'come' to us: in other words, we suddenly find ourselves having them.<sup>5</sup> Heidegger was right on this.

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<sup>3</sup>See *Crisis*, 189/192.

<sup>4</sup>See Seeburger 1975, 218ff. See also, e.g., Heidegger's *TDP*, §19, and especially pp. 85/101, 87/103.

<sup>5</sup>For the disbeliever, I will only cite two self-testimonies from science's history of discoveries. Poincaré reports: "One morning, walking on the bluff, the idea came to me, with brevity, suddenness and immediate certainty. [...] Most striking at first is this appearance of sudden

There is something of an uncontrollable 'revelation' as regards this particular point about research. Heidegger, however, is wrong to let us suppose that new ideas and discoveries *simply* fall into the minds of the lucky or chosen ones. Laborious and systematic preparation is the *sine qua non* for the possibility of having a new idea or being led to a new discovery. Husserl was certainly right on this. A combination of these views can surely help us to reach a much better understanding of what is going on in every discovery—especially in the a priori discoveries of philosophy and science.<sup>6</sup>

We must not, however, limit our interest only to the origin of the possibility of recognizing problems, forming questions, adopting particular points of view, and discovering relevant answers (conceiving new concepts, senses or meanings, ideas, or principles).<sup>7</sup> That is, in more phenomenological terms, the way we find ourselves with new tentative and possible intentional *noetic senses* (either for ontic or for ontological interpretation and experience)<sup>8</sup> as conditions for correlative intentional experiences or comportments should not be our sole concern. Of equal if not higher importance is our being aware of the possibility and character of the connectedness of our new ideas or noetic senses with the core elements on the noematic side (the intentional objects aimed at). Otherwise put, it is crucial to elucidate the nature of the possible or alleged fit of these noetic senses to what we already sense or experience. Here, I will try to focus mostly on the specific case of Phenomenology's suggested ideas or senses and their relation to reality.

Phenomenology has set a normative epistemic guideline for itself. As we have seen, this demands that the grounding of the meaning of all cognitively significant concepts and claims, including its own, has to be achievable in conformity with the phenomena in evident intuition. Phenomenology's truths, that is, have to be discoveries regarding the phenomena, not merely fanciful conceptual inventions. This means that what Phenomenology suggests as candidate knowledge must be able to be seen as objectivity that had previously gone unnoticed or inactive within the things themselves. This does not hold in the cases where utility,

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illumination, a manifest sign of long, unconscious prior work." (cited in Horvitz 2002, 1). Gauss, who struggled for four years on a mathematical problem, gives a similar description of his discovery of the solution: "As a sudden flash of light, the enigma was solved. [...] For my part I am unable to name the nature of the thread which connected what I previously knew with that which made my success possible." (ibid., 2). This account of a sudden flash, of an unexpected illumination, etc., is given in almost all cases of great scientific discoveries, from Archimedes to Planck.

<sup>6</sup>We will return, from another perspective, to this thematic of the origin of our ideas, mostly in Phenomenology, in §10.8 below. As for the reader who finds the idea of a priori discovery in science (especially in the empirical natural sciences) paradoxical, I will only refer him or her to Chaps. 2 and 3 of this book, in which the Kantian, Husserlian, and eventually Kuhnian views are presented, in condensed form. See also Theodorou 2010b, 2012b.

<sup>7</sup>Naturally, this may mean two things. Firstly, it may refer to the origin of solutions to given intriguing or problematic states of things. Secondly, it may refer to the origin of our very recognition of these states of things as intriguing or problematic.

<sup>8</sup>For a phenomenological account of this in science, see Theodorou 2010b.

interest, conviction, etc., make us project and accept certain ideas or meanings as conveniently fitting some problematic givens. Truths should be accepted with reference not only to whether their subject matter somehow appears as aimed at, but also to the epistemic manner and warrant (to put it this way) that the corresponding situation of appearance essentially enjoys.<sup>9</sup>

Phenomenology may search for truths regarding the way we perceive and the structure and givenness status of the things thusly appearing. It may also, however, search for truths regarding the way we hope and about the structure and givenness status of the object hoped for. In both cases, Phenomenology accepts that we can have apodictic knowledge of the character of the respective intentional acts. But if in both cases the object of the act is, say, a house, we must not fail to realize that our knowledge of the structure and givenness status of the object means two different things in the corresponding acts. In the first, it means the structure and givenness status of the house as perceived, and in the second, it means the structure and givenness status of the house as hoped for. The first imposes, as it were, its identity upon our acts. In the second case, we somehow impose its identity. In the latter case, imagination and other (not necessarily active) mediating syntheses have surreptitiously and uncontrollably intervened. Here, we must not fail to realize that the achievement of knowledge regarding the acts does not guarantee the same for the object in both cases (with regard to existence status, ontology, etc.). In the first case, I have the reality of the house in the threshold—and, for me, *reference*<sup>10</sup>—consciousness of reality. In the second, I do not have the house in its perceptual reality, but only the house in an “as-if” reality. Consider now a case that is much more complex and more liable to confusions, in which we can try to examine intentional acts like hoping and wishing, that aim at beings or states of affairs about which we have no ‘literal’ or immediate clues whatsoever from previous perceptual acquaintance. Let us see.

Phenomenology teaches that we can intuit the state of affairs “the apple is red” in the predicative interconnectedness of its synthesized cores. Some, however, also claim to intuit the state of affairs “matter is discrete” or “matter is corpuscular” or “material bodies are mutually attracted by the universal gravitational force,” etc. Others claim to evidently intuit that “humanity suffers because a higher intelligence wants to make it realize its faults, and thus has the opportunity for final redemption.” Still others claim to intuit the state of affairs “great humanitarian destructions in history are the cunning means by which some universal reason progressively prepares final happiness for all.” Innumerable other claims to evident experience are to be found in almost all belief systems, whether religious or secular. The question

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<sup>9</sup>Borrowing the jargon from another philosophical field, one could put this matter in the following way: in order to have a clear sense of the meaning and value of some suggested truth, we should care equally about the context of discovery and the context of justification.

<sup>10</sup>This is not the place to argue for this point, though it does have many interesting phenomenological and ontological repercussions that would demand a full and separate treatment. This treatment must be postponed until another occasion.

is whether Phenomenology has taken into serious consideration all the differences involved in the latter cases, and in its own research and teachings.

I believe that Phenomenology has succeeded on many fronts. In the preceding chapters and on other occasions, I have tried to present some of its teachings that I consider good candidates for conveying necessary truth about the things themselves. For example, Phenomenology's theory of perceptual constitution together with the famous law regarding the necessary connection of colors with surfaces, or the theory concerning the trilateral division of color or sound givenness, can be said to represent knowledge. Phenomenology's truths regarding the structure and function of judgmental intentionality also appear to satisfy this demand. Perceptual sense or the copula may not be sensory givens, but they can be given intuitively as forming factors that immediately or seamlessly fit the relevant sensory perceptual elements, in a way that is formatively objective and that builds up the corresponding appearing objectivities. The principal idealized truths of Geometry or Physics are also formatively objective within their own paradigmatic limits, and can count as such theoretic regional phenomenological truths. The a priori work and discoveries in these fields are successfully accountable from Phenomenology's point of view. Of course, in some of its analogous claims, Phenomenology may be wrong on the actual content of the truth, whereas a host of other areas of such possible experience remain totally unexplored. There are, however, also phenomenological claims that fall totally outside these domains. What is to be done in such cases?

Kant had a strict way of distinguishing between the phenomena about which we can have sound apodictic (and inductive) knowledge, and the sphere of dialectical speculation about which there is no such knowledge but, at best, only irrational or rational hope (to put it this way). Has Phenomenology put forward any such criterion for distinguishing, among all intentional correlations, those that contain knowledge from those that are merely wishful thinking of only possible practical significance?

As was mentioned earlier, Husserl propounded the famous "principle of all principles" (cited in §10.2). It includes the condition that "every originary presentive intuition" or "everything originarily (so to speak, in its 'personal' [*leibhaftig*] actuality) offered to us in 'intuition'" "is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being" and, thus, as "a legitimizing source of cognition [*Erkenntnis*]" (*Ideas I*, 44/51). Of course, this principle also includes the condition that all this should be done "*only within the limits in which it is presented there*" (ibid). Above, in this section, I have tried to illustrate the meaning of this condition by way of some examples. The question is: to what degree has Phenomenology remained loyal to these specifications?

In Kant's critical endeavor, we have knowledge only within the sphere of sensory experience, where objects are constituted in space and time by fixed and objective categories. Outside this sphere, the corresponding functions of the mind would work only idly and without friction. Our concepts of purported beings outside the sensory experiential sphere are merely rational ideas that do not correspond to anything testable in empirical reality. And yet we just cannot help building them! Phenomenology, though, claims to have *liberated our experience and knowledge from its sensory chains*. It claims to have discovered the possibility of *categorial*

experience—a possibility that, in Kant's context, is simply a contradiction in terms. This new possibility seems to open the way for knowledge claims of the sort raised a few lines above, about a reality that is constructed and given in correspondingly formative ways. It appears that just as one can claim to have noematic (straightforward or reflective) experience of categorial forms of syntheses and of universal objects (morphological or idealized), one can also claim to have noematic (straightforward or reflective) experience of natural teleology or progress in history, of God's creative and caring relation to reality, of the universal logos in the cosmos and in the human mind, etc. That is, one can claim that it is possible to *intuit* the elements of reality being *formatively interconnected* in accordance to the latter corresponding *structural (categorial) relations*. This may be a problem, though. Strasser expresses an aspect of this point in a manner that is closely related to our present concerns.

Husserl distinguishes himself from Kant because *for him the idea is not a 'heuristic fiction,'* valuable uniquely for the regulative use of the understanding. *It is for him an ultimate reality, an absolute reality.* We can therefore conclude by remarking that God is for Husserl from the speculative point of view an 'ideal' (in the sense we have just determined [i.e., not of "fictive and heuristic idea" but of "ultimate or absolute reality"]), from the practical point of view an ideal telos [qua objective authority determining our actions]. (Strasser 1979, 329; emphases added)<sup>11</sup>

Analogous things can be said with regard to all the matters raised above. Should Phenomenology proceed in this way, which certainly corresponds to Husserl's and, *mutatis mutandis*, to Heidegger's views (as we will see below)? What happened to the condition "*only within the limits in which it is presented there,*" which we met and illustrated earlier in this section? If we stick solely with Strasser's correct estimation of Phenomenology's original view, we will soon realize that while the aforementioned phenomenological widening of the notions of intuition, experience, and knowledge is proved to be a blessing, it may also in cases prove to be a curse. To be sure, God and theodicy or 'historiodicy' are not our central concern here. These are only raised as the limit case in order to demarcate the somewhat more modest issues that will keep us busy in what follows.

In the previous chapters of this book, we addressed a series of systematic and interpretive issues regarding the Phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger, but now an issue of another kind needs to be dealt with. If we have now properly understood and restored central phenomenological teachings, how phenomenological (or, for that matter, critically sensitive) are they, really? In what follows, I will first focus on Husserl's key-teachings (§10.4) that I consider not to express phenomenological knowledge in the strict sense. I will then turn to the examination of equally precarious claims on the part of Heidegger (§10.5), which are, analogously, left

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<sup>11</sup>Husserl's famous Fichte lectures are also extremely eloquent. We will refer to these again in the next section. Of course, for a complete and proper understanding of the problems underlying the latter points and this passage, Husserl's unsurpassable directive on the grounding of our sound concepts from *LI*, 783–4/141, must be recalled here.



open from the discussion of his philosophy in previous chapters. These concern the life of Dasein, the source of Being(s) as sense(s), and the relation between the two.

## 10.4 Husserl on Monad and Hyle

As we saw in Chaps. 2 and 4, Husserlian phenomenological constitution of objects means a formation process that takes in some raw 'material,' the *reell* hyletic data, and lets us find our empirical selves in front of the actual, transcendentally appearing beings in their world-horizons. But what is the origin of the hyletic data? Naturally, the data are not constituted according to the same scheme, since they are *not* intentional objects at all. This seems to be a really serious *crux interpretum* not only in Husserlian scholarship but, in the first instance, in Husserl's own 'system.'<sup>12</sup> This is why we must agree with Gadamer in his sober estimation of the overall situation as regards Husserl's Phenomenology.

The really open questions issuing from Husserl's Phenomenology do not lie, therefore, [...] in "difficulties" that result from his adherence to the process of the transcendental reduction. Husserl believed himself the master of these problems. [...] The point where problems that form the real object of controversy lie is *the level of the fundamental question of constitution*, that of the *primal ego itself*, that is, of the *self-constitution of temporality* [and its *reell* contents]. (Gadamer 1976, 164; emphases added)<sup>13</sup>

This perspective seems to have worried Fink. Thus, on the one hand, he goes as far as to apologize for the provisional if not naive conception of the hyle (from the mundane transcendental perspective of the *Ideas* I) in terms of a "heterological" factor in comparison to the essence of the transcendently

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<sup>12</sup>It has been suggested that when, in his analyses concerning internal time consciousness, Husserl was forced to deal with the problem of the origin of the *reell* contents (or hyle), he realized that his classic *content-interpretation* constitution schema (that we saw in Chaps. 2 and 4) could no longer be followed. Representative and influential on this is Sokolowski 1964; see especially 110 ff., 162 ff., 177 ff., 204 ff. Allegedly, the reason is that there is some 'constitution,' that of hyle itself, which, on pain of an infinite regress, cannot be accounted for in terms of conformity to the classic schema. First of all, it is unfortunate that Husserl calls this hyle "object" (*Gegenstand*), a choice that passes uncontested by commentators (see, e.g., Sokolowski 1964, 178–9). As I see it, at least three more things must be said. Firstly, throughout his thought, Husserl's deeper concern is not to let us think that hyletic data are given independently of or separately from any simultaneous accompanying, intentional apprehension (in the pregnant sense). Secondly, his discussions of the specific problem of the origin of the hyletic data remain basically aporetic rather than definitive and binding for Phenomenology. Thirdly, since hyletic data cannot actually be seen as objects in the pregnant sense, Phenomenology must realize that their so-called "constitution" is not necessarily a *phenomenological-constitutive* problem. We will say more on this in what follows. All of this means that in Husserl's theory regarding genuinely objective constitution, e.g., in perception and judgment, nothing really changes. For a very similar recent view, see Williford 2013, especially 504 n. 10.

<sup>13</sup>See also Levinas 1973, 150. Derrida also offers an acute critical view on the problem under discussion (see Derrida 2003, 63, 85ff, 92–3).

constituting consciousness, i.e., as something alien to the latter's essence.<sup>14</sup> On the other hand, he tries to overcome this 'spurious' choice within the context of Husserl's full-blown monadological idealism.

[In the *Ideas I*] the deeper lying constitution affected by transcendental temporalization (*Zeitigung*) cannot be cast into relief, thus permitting the "hyle" to appear as pure matter for this kind of intentional [constituting] activity. In truth, however, there is *no dualism of heterological moments* in the phenomenological idea of constitution but *only relative strata within the unified constitutive disclosure of the world's origin from within the depths of the transcendental subject's life*. Both the hyle, which is first exhibited as the act's non-intentional moment, and the totality-form of the act itself are constituted within the depths of the intentional *self-constitution of phenomenological time*, a constitution which, however, does not [itself] proceed [again] by means of [intentionally constituting] acts. (Fink 1970, 136–7; emphases added)

This problem of heterologicality, arising in the idealistically unified perspective of the fully monadological intentional constitution, looks to be a novel "unintelligibility" problem resulting from the solution to the known "unintelligibility" discussed in §2.7 of the present volume. To Fink's and Husserl's eyes, after the 1920s, the yielding to the temptation of a heterological hyle is a repugnant taint upon the purity of Transcendental Phenomenology's monadological idealism, against which severe measures should be taken.<sup>15</sup> Egological consciousness is an all-encompassing monad, the source of all that is and all that comes to be. It is the cradle of everything and the source of the stuff out of which all beings are constituted. As we know, Husserl even asserted its immortality.<sup>16</sup> He also tried to offer an account of how a monad, in its peculiar wide-open self-enclosure, produces history. Husserl, then, soon finds himself forced to accept a logos principle responsible for history's evolution. What he claims is that this logos is in a process of progressive self-maturation, and that humanity should be confident that a future determined by an absolutely rational spirit lies ahead.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>14</sup>See Fink 1970, 135ff.

<sup>15</sup>See also Gadamer 1976, 147, 165, 168, 186. Husserl worked on this problem in his manuscripts concerning immanent time, but he announces nothing in the *Ideas I* (1913), and offers us some clues as to his views only as late as 1929 (*FTL*, 286ff/292ff; see also *CM*, §§18, 37, 38, 39, 46). On the passive self-constitution of the hyletic data in the monad, see also *PITC*, 115/110; *Hua XXXIII*, 158–9, 281–2, 351–2; *APAS*, 150/105; *Hua Mat VIII*, 99–100. Sometimes it is thought that Husserl actually considers sensory contents as the result of external stimulation of the senses. Evidence is sought in his *Hua X*, where we read that "*Bewußtsein ist nichts ohne Impression*." (100), or, in *EU*, where we come across a description of an incident in which the barking of a dog strikes (*reizt*) one's ears (61). However, it is clear that by "*Impression*" Husserl means "*Ur-Impression*" or "*genesis spontanea*" or "*Urschöpfung*," a happening that is of course not a product of intentional synthesis proper, but a 'singularity' within consciousnesses' time-field. For the transcendental idealist Husserl, whether we like it or not, the sound that is apprehended as the barking of a dog out there in the distance has arisen by such a 'singularity.'

<sup>16</sup>Notoriously, Husserl claimed that the monad is immortal (see, e.g., *APAS*, 467).

<sup>17</sup>See, for instance, *FI*, 120–1/278–80; see also his Vienna lecture on "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity" (*Crisis*, Appendix A.I) and his *Kaizo* papers (in *Hua XXVII*). In all of these, standard appeal is made to a logos (reason) and its historical unfolding in a way that safeguards

But is there sufficient phenomenological evidence of the self-enclosed monad (perhaps in its peculiar intersubjectivity), its pre-intentional doings, its almost godly powers, and the absolute range of its sovereignty? Is the monad a phenomenological given about which Husserl can assert so many questionable traits?

Behind the discursive transcendental proofs of Kant's critical transcendental idealism, but also behind the allegedly intuitional transcendental evidences of Husserl's phenomenological transcendental idealism, a philosophical taboo remains: the unaccountability of the *radically* transcendent, of Fink's "heterological" something, of German Idealism's "irrational." Kant and Locke, for instance, decided to permit, under certain conditions, this radically transcendent into their systems. Of course, with this move they expose their systems to the charge that they contain inconsistent leaps. In the empiricist camp, Berkeley and Hume refused, each in his own way, to accept Locke's "*je ne sais quoi*." In the rationalist camp, Leibniz (before Kant), Fichte, and German Idealism as a whole tried to follow their own 'purely' rational ways. They endeavored to become fully consistent in the way they built their philosophical beliefs, in accordance with their accepted rational principles: the rational is real and real is only the rational. Tortured by the problems of Brentano's intentionality and by the restrictions he tacitly placed upon himself in the *LI*, Husserl soon found himself attracted to German Idealism. Here is how he becomes explicit on the train of thought that appears to have inspired his way of dealing with the issue under discussion.

[Fichte] swept away, as did others who preceded him, *the affecting things-in-themselves* and pronounced that they were the last remnant of a *naive dogmatism*. He sought to show that *transcendent beings*, for which becoming-conscious was non-essential, things *which, in themselves have nothing to do with subjectivity* and only accidentally enter into a relation with it, are something *completely nonsensical*. According to Kant we receive the sense impressions from without; we owe them to affecting, completely unknown and unknowable, *things-in-themselves*. If these are unthinkable, then whence comes the sensible manifold that is continuously pre-given to us and is the material for the constitution of nature? Why does it appear and why does it appear precisely in the order and with the qualities that permits a nature to be formed? [...] According to Kant, the subjectivity which produces objectivity can only be active after it previously was passive. *Fichte, the man of will and deed*, cannot be satisfied with that. *Through the canceling of things-in-themselves [external] affection is eliminated*. Now in subjectivity there remains as a dead residue a whirl of material from sense impressions. *Can there be in subjectivity something that it itself has not produced? No.* (*FI*, 116–7/274–5; emphases added)

Fichte and German Idealism, along with Husserl, follow the Procrustean solution of cutting off whatever seems to exceed the circle of human intellectual capacities, re-accommodating this as another kind of non-heterological content of consciousness. Thus, they chose to exorcize the methodo-logically flawed external unity of the heterological account in favor of the methodo-logically flawless internal unity of

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progress. Husserl did not systematically suggest that the connection just made was crucial to the exposition of his thought, and he is not so well known for these views. This line of thought can however be extracted from his writings. As we will see in the next section, Heidegger was more systematic and persistent on these matters.

the homogenological account. This is the way of absolutist philosophy. Husserl appears to have been led to the suggestions discussed here not on the basis of phenomenological givens, but rather of discursive-argumentative ‘roundness,’ so to say. Instead of following the phenomena, Husserl indulged the power of argumentative consistency. Thus, he projects the monad and its baroque requisites as a made-up *fiction*. Especially in its role of generating the hyle out of ‘thin air’ (out of time), the monad becomes a merely conceptual (i.e., not even imaginable) *ens rationis*.<sup>18</sup>

As we saw in Chap. 2, Husserl shaped his mature concept of monad in the process of self-criticism turned against his first mundane conception of Transcendental Phenomenology. This self-criticism took the form of a retrospective tracing of the “unintelligibility” connected with the transcendental reduction in the *Ideas I*. After the full-fledged monadological transformation of transcendental subjectivity, intentional transcendence is indeed a “transcendence in immanence” (this expression is a perfect fit for the new monadological intentional transcendence), in the immanence of the *all-inclusive* monad. Thus, the “unintelligibility” is lifted.<sup>19</sup> In the new system, however, the question of the origin of the hyle arises. The specifications of the monad do not allow the real importation of heterological elements. Thus, it is obliged to be self-sufficient, even with regard to the ‘raw materials’ for its constitutions. The concepts work in a frenzy to close or to bridge theoretical gaps, but it is very doubtful whether our intuitiveness actually offers a sufficient foothold (even for the self-persuaded).<sup>20</sup> One aporia leads to the other and the situation soon runs out of control.

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<sup>18</sup>I must say right away that I sympathize with Mertens (2000) and Kaehler (1995) in their serious objections to the possibility of assimilating monadology in Phenomenology; these objections are based on the specifications that Husserl himself prescribes for the monad on the basis of the monadological transcendental reduction (entire-world-inclusive but finitely-subjective). My objection, though, does not focus on the consistency of the specifications, but mostly on the final *phenomenologizability* (according to the “phenomenological principle of all principles”) of a being like the monad.

<sup>19</sup>A reference to the effect that the monad is Husserl’s attempt at solving such problems can be found in Kojima 2000, 184. See also Hopkins 2011, 150ff., 160ff.; Zahavi 2003, 74; Mertens 2000, 2, 14 n. 3—even if no mention is made of Husserl’s later self-criticism that in the *Ideas I*, this transcendently *functioning* subjectivity was still conceived mundanely (as a part of the whole world).

<sup>20</sup>Smith (1977) offers us a nice juxtaposition of his rejection of Husserl’s theory of hyle with Sartre’s. The latter rejects it for reasons regarding theoretical coherence (Smith talks about “logical cogency”). For Sartre, “the hyle could neither be consciousness, nor derive its being from consciousness” and “if the hyle derives its being from itself alone,” having, thus, “the characteristics of a thing and the characteristics of consciousness” then hyle becomes “a hybrid being which consciousness rejects and which cannot be a part of the world” (see Smith 1977, Introduction). Smith argues quite convincingly that hyle does not stand also as a phenomenologically descriptive content. Indeed, hyle is not what appears as part of a perceptual object in the transcending apprehension of the perceptual act. (On this, cf. McKenna 2005, 148.) It is merely a lived-through *reell* content. As I see it, both are right, if we consider Phenomenology from the point of view of its absolutist demands. By means of critical re-adjustment, however, i.e., once we become aware

The [properly monadological transcendental] reduction leads us into the *darkness of something unknown*, something with which we have not been previously familiarized in terms of its formal style of Being. [...] A *life-stream of acts* thereby comes to phenomenological self-givenness. [...] The transcendental self has no "limits," that is, it cannot be known from the start in the full extent of its Being. [...] Transcendental knowledge of egological subjectivity is not carried out within the medium of universal subjectivity, that is, of validity for every transcendental subjectivity, but is limited to the *one* factual streaming. But the concepts "one" and "factual life of acts" are *worldly concepts* in origin. [...] To this extent Phenomenology is in a state of *permanent perplexity as to how to express* what it makes visible in evident self-givenness [sic!]. [...] Transcendental egology becomes transcendental "monadology." (Fink 1970, 127–8; first and last emphases added)

Even the most elegant definitions of the concept of the phenomenological transcendental monad cannot satisfy the general phenomenological demand for relying only upon what is the case with the things themselves. Unfortunately, this is also true of Fink's otherwise masterful narrative. This is so only because the Kantian or Aristotelian appeal to an *ignotum* thing-in-itself or indefinite matter (ἀόριστος ὕλη) is considered as an ir-rational move within a fully monistic, rational, and self-enclosed logos, that should be our essence.<sup>21</sup> The result is an obviously mysterious projection that, one way or another, does violence to the limits of our ability to comprehend and intuit.

I think that in terms of advancing Phenomenology as a research program, this direction does not lead anywhere; put otherwise, it leads *everywhere* that one might like to go. It may appear formally consistent, but the question with any phenomenological research program is not mere consistency, but phenomenological evidence of *originary givenness* and concrete experiential coherence (continually *tested* against the resistance of what is the case with the things themselves).<sup>22</sup> Phenomenology teaches that this is the only way to avoid illusions due to misperception, and should be clearly extended in a way that also excludes illusions due to

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of the limits and the ensuing change in epistemic modalities, phenomenologists can continue to theorize about it.

<sup>21</sup>There is also an extended background regarding the introduction of the concept of the monad, which relates it to the Judeo-Christian theological agenda of *ex nihilo* creation and with the possibility of our partaking in God's knowledge of reality in its becoming. We simply cannot enter into these intricacies here.

<sup>22</sup>As Hill notes, "it was Karl Weierstrass who awakened Husserl's interest in seeking radical foundations for knowledge. Weierstrass' thoroughgoing, systematic treatment, *ab initio*, of the theory of analytic functions, the efforts he was making to transform analysis into a purely rational theory made a lasting impression on Husserl, who said that he had acquired the ethos of his intellectual strivings from Weierstrass and had sought to do for philosophy what his mentor had done for mathematics." (Hill 2012, 95). Aristotle's remark with respect to Plato's aspirations appears to be the reply that is needed here: "[I]t belongs to an educated person to seek out precision in each genus to the extent that the nature of the matter allows." (*NE*, 1094b23–25). "[O]ne must not seek out precision in all matters alike but rather in each thing in turn as accords with the subject matter in question and insofar as is appropriate to the inquiry. [...] One ought to try to go in search of each in turn in the manner natural to them and to be serious about their being nobly defined." (*ibid.*, 1098a27–b7).

dialectic-speculative subreption. If this condition cannot be satisfied, then no other justification seems proper and sufficient to claim knowledge. Naturally, a quantum of logical, theoretical, or existential solace cannot and should not be forbidden, but, equally, it must not be allowed to pass for literal truth. I think that Phenomenology can advance by avoiding the awkwardness resulting from its over-idealism without losing even the slightest grain of its real philosophical dignity. We will have more to say on this below in §§10.5 and 10.6.

## 10.5 Heidegger on Dasein and Nothing

It is generally considered that Heidegger was troubled by the Husserlian “aporia of the belonging of the subject to the world and of the simultaneous constitution of the world by the subject,” and that he distanced himself from his teacher “because the Husserlian determination of transcendental subjectivity seems to him to have been won, predominantly and unilaterally, on the basis of a theoretical consideration of the acts of the life of consciousness.” (Volpi 1992, 102–3). Thus, the story goes, Heidegger turned to the Aristotelian account of praxis, where he discovered a way of solving, absolutely, the aporia that the Husserlian Phenomenology of subjectivity had left open. I take it that by this remark, Volpi means that according to Heidegger, (a) despite the fact that Husserl made a transcendental turn, he in fact remained trapped in intentional analyses that were still considering constituting in terms of a psychological happening with full ontological pretensions (the “unintelligibility” problem we saw in §2.7) and (b) that Husserl never managed to overcome the theoretical and dichotomic (traditional subject-object) approach to intentionality and intentional experience.

With regard to (b), I hope that enough was said in Chaps. 4, 5, 6, and 7 to purge that accusation from Husserl’s Phenomenology. Perhaps Husserl never actually managed to offer a sufficiently delicate differentiation of his analysis of consciousness from traditional analyses to the degree that Heidegger achieved with his analysis concerning Dasein, but the mark of such a differentiation can be easily retrieved from his works. With regard to point (a), as we saw earlier in this book (Chaps. 2 and 3), Husserl in fact made his transcendental turn in two separate steps: the one of the *Ideas* I, and the other with his fully monadological transcendental turn of the 1920s. The accusation of transcendental psychologism may under certain conditions apply, but only at the first step (in the *Ideas* I). In the second step, Husserl appears fully aware that transcendental consciousness is not a worldly being along with all other worldly beings; rather, he holds that it is some kind of horizontally open time-field within which the intentional correlation of mundane human and worldly beings gets constituted. In this case, then Husserl should not be found guilty of psychological transcendentalism at the time of the “*Britannica* Article,” on the occasion of which, as Volpi too remarks, Heidegger framed his ultimate judgment concerning the identity and the possibilities of Husserl’s Transcendental

Phenomenology (and upon which the standard conception of the issue by the Heideggerians is based).

Of course, as we just saw above, the problem remains of whether Husserl's monadological transcendental consciousness is fully justified in Phenomenology's effort to unveil the mystery of all mysteries: that beings are and appear to us in their Being.

The interesting point, however, is that the above description of Husserl's transcendental monad could have been given also as a synoptic paraphrase of Heidegger's own analysis, in *BT*, of the *Da* of Dasein or of the Dasein in its *Da*. Surprisingly enough, Husserlian Phenomenology was not unique in being caught in the monadological whirl caused by the counter-torque forces guiding all rationalist philosophy in Germany, i.e., very broadly speaking, the claim to infinite scientific accountability by means of basically mental principles (concepts and categorial intuition). Careful examination allows us to realize that even Heidegger's philosophy presupposes something like a monad. At first sight, the Dasein of *BT* appears to be a mundane being that still projectively constitutes the world in the historical disclosures of its meaning (or in the meaning of its historical disclosures). From this point of view, since it too is some kind of worldly (and for that matter constituted) being, it is itself in need of being constituted by its very self. Thus, if Heidegger did indeed silently offer a solution to these *prima facie* conflicting needs (parallel to Husserl's "unintelligibility" problem), that solution can be understood in the way suggested just above with regard to Husserl's case. If we recall what was discussed in Chap. 3 of the present book, concerning the way in which Heidegger strives to communicate with Husserl on the latter's problem of "unintelligibility," we will realize what he really means by the Dasein. Dasein is not a human being in its empirical constitution, but is essentially the field of *Da* or *Lichtung*, wherein the human being discovers itself as having the experience of its empirical self as being praxially and otherwise existentially related to other beings in the world. The Dasein of *BT* appears, after all, to be in a peculiar state, similar to that which characterizes the Husserlian fully monadological transcendental consciousness. Indeed, as we saw in Chap. 3, Heidegger says this quite clearly.

For the Dasein, *there is no outside*, for which reasons it is also *absurd to talk about an inside*. (*BPP*, 66/93; emphases added)<sup>23</sup>

As we know, this is the almost standard way of describing monads (either in the imperfect mundane style or in the fully absolutistic way). Despite the fact that in *BT* Heidegger indeed tried to understand "sense" (sense of Being) in a way that was 'objectively' polarized,<sup>24</sup> he is actually forced to render this sense as the transcendent principle that, unknowingly, like an enduring afflation, always conditions the intentional life of the monadological Dasein.

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<sup>23</sup>See also *BT*, 58/62.

<sup>24</sup>See §8.8.1 of this book.

Heidegger seems to have found a way that does not force him to first stumble on the problem of “unintelligibility” about which Husserl wrote in his manuscripts for the “*Britannica* Article” with regard to the mundanely conceived transcendental subjectivity (§2.7). The larger picture of *BT* and the works following it lead us to understand that the Dasein does not have to constitute the world and itself from within the constituting functions of its mundane self. It is Being as such that is responsible for all this, but as we just saw, a Being that cannot do this other than by functioning as the principle determining what the (empirical) Dasein is going to experience on the scene of its (supra-empirical) monadological *Da*.<sup>25</sup> Dasein, then, appears to be a monad allowing, within its internally lit openness, the historical drama of the worldly relation “human-beings,” dictated by its logos-like disclosed Being as emanating from the hyper-logos of Nothing.<sup>26</sup>

Being as such is transcendent with regard to the ontic mundane Dasein (the empirical human being), but, we can now say, it somehow becomes the disclosed Being that pervades and defines the *Da* as monadological Dasein’s “yard of miracles.” Being as such (or, better, Nothing) is an extra-mundane and extra-historical source, kairologically letting the appropriate meanings or Being-qua-sense ‘emanatively’ come to possess or “appropriate” (*Ereignis*) Dasein in its intentional compartments. If Dasein has the monadological status described just

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<sup>25</sup>In this case, Heidegger also has to face a problem analogous to that of the origin of the first material for the constitution of the beings in the world. On this, see §6.10.1. In the analyses of *BT*, the silent full monadologization of the Dasein also has to silently concord with German Idealism’s view regarding the self-affective production of the first material for the constitution of the worldly beings, e.g., of the sensory information inhering (one way or another) in the equipment. This has not yet been clearly understood in the Heideggerian literature. Heidegger’s ominous silence on these matters does not self-understandably support a “robust realism.” Cf. Dreyfus 1991, 251ff; Dreyfus and Spinoza 1999. For a successful critical answer and presentation of Heidegger as an idealist, see Blattner 1994a; see also Malpas 1999.

<sup>26</sup>Of course, Dasein is notorious for its definitive relation to death. So the question arises: is this a radical difference in comparison to Husserl’s immortal transcendental monad? The obvious answer is a simple “yes.” Interestingly, though, things are not that simple. Consider Heidegger’s remark from *BT*. “If death is defined as the ‘end’ of Dasein, that is, of being-in-the-world, no ontic decision has been made as to whether ‘after death’ another being is still possible, either higher or lower, whether Dasein ‘lives on’ or even, ‘outliving itself,’ is ‘immortal.’ [...] But our analysis of death remains purely ‘this-worldly’ in that it interprets the phenomenon solely with respect to the question of how it *enters into* [*this or that*] *actual* Dasein as its possibility-of-being [*wie es als Seinsmöglichkeit des jeweiligen Daseins in dieses Hereinsteht*].” (*BT*, 230/247–8; emphasis on “actual” is mine). The scholars are somewhat puzzled by this passage. Llewelyn reports Edward and Russell’s view that there is finality to Dasein’s death and, not without expressing dissatisfaction with Heidegger’s ambiguity, declares his opposing view that the passage from *BT* reflects a Kierkegaardian abstention from the very meaningfulness of the question (Llewelyn 2001, 121–2). Blattner suggests that with reference to Dasein we cannot speak about stopping or cessation, because the latter appertain to mere things and processes, whereas Dasein, unlike the concrete living human being, is an ontological structure (Blattner 1994b, 65). The same view is expressed in Haugeland (2013, 210). To make this more specific, I would say that in *BT*, Heidegger is ambiguous on “Dasein.” This or that actual Dasein, i.e., this or that empirical human being, is mortal. In contrast, Dasein, as the supra-empirical condition for the possibility of the empirical Dasein, is immortal.



above, Being as Being is precisely the hyper-logos or highest principle that with its disclosures as Being-as-sense (or revealed logos—Heidegger refers to it also as *Rede*) conditions all being and becoming in the historical world that appears in Dasein's *Da*.<sup>27</sup> But, again, is this Phenomenology? Or is it the super-idealist teaching of Plotinus and Hegel? What phenomenological evidence does Heidegger offer for these views? What evidence does he offer for his view regarding Being as such or Nothing?

In a sense, then, this conception of the relation between Being qua Nothing and the fully monadological Dasein, which lets the mundane Dasein experience a historically constituted world with beings, in fact leads us back to Husserl (§10.3). On these issues, however, Heidegger is much more aware than Husserl. Until 1927, Heidegger seems to retain the hope that he can somehow fully disclose Being as such *from within* the mundane experiences of the historical Dasein. Put otherwise, he still thinks that the 'objective,' whole Being as such can be fully reached from the perspective of its already accomplished disclosures in this world; as some hidden or unnoticed code within its revealed historical senses. After his lecture "What is Metaphysics?" and for a second time after the first attempt of 1919,<sup>28</sup> he starts to realize that Nothing, the source of Being(s) as sense, *cannot* be found entirely within the confines of the historically disclosed worldlinesses. This realization makes Heidegger abandon the perspective of *BT*, i.e., his explicitly phenomenological methodology, and to instead turn to alternative *non-phenomenological* ways of exploring and talking about Being as such.

More specifically, until his "What is Metaphysics?" the path of Fundamental Ontology was consolidated on the firm phenomenological belief that "Being [every and all Being] is always the Being of beings."

Because phenomenon in the phenomenological understanding is always just what constitutes being, and furthermore because *being is always the being of beings*, we must first of all bring beings themselves forward in the right way if we are to have any prospect of exposing Being. (*BT*, 32–3; emphasis added)<sup>29</sup>

Thus, the crucial choice of the appropriate formal indication (*formale Anzeige*) in *BT*, i.e., the historically concrete Dasein itself—no longer the primal, pretheoretical something (*Uretwas*) of his 1919 *Kriegsnotsemester*—was expected to function as the necessary *Leitfaden* that would lead us to the self-appearing possibility of

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<sup>27</sup>Until some redemption and final salvation comes, which grows in the greatest danger, as Heidegger's beloved poem "Patmos" of Hölderlin's says. This is Heidegger's salvatory reading of human history in the world.

<sup>28</sup>On that project and its failure, see Theodorou 2010a.

<sup>29</sup>See also, e.g., *BT*, 131 (neither of the English translations, however, adequately renders the corresponding point made on p. 139 of the original text: "*Diese [die Empfindlichkeit] vermag, wie jede ontologische Interpretation überhaupt, nur vordem schon erschlossenes Seiendes auf sein Sein gleichsam abzuhören.*").

Being in general or Being as such.<sup>30</sup> As we saw in Chap. 9, when the decisive moment comes, i.e., when Being as Nothing needs to become a *phenomenon*, Heidegger appeals to the exceptional thymotic state of Dasein, i.e., to anxiety. He then attempts to let Nothing appear as Being of the beings that recede and slide away, as indifferent, from the scene of intentional experience, when anxiety takes hold of Dasein.<sup>31</sup> Once again, this solution won't work, just as the solution of 1919 didn't work. We should note that when beings recede as indifferent, what is brought to the surface is necessarily the disclosed Being of the region to which those beings belonged. This means that if some Being makes its appearance in anxiety, it is the regional Being (as sense) of the receding beings, and not the sought after Being as such or Being in general.

It seems that this probably lead Heidegger to go through an unconfessed crisis. Deferred reflection of it can be found in the torturous ambivalence accompanying the later texts that he wrote for "What is Metaphysics?" In the original "Postscript" (1943), much later than his abandonment of the strictly phenomenological methodology of the *BT*, we read in dramatically emancipatory tones that "Beyng [read: Being as such] prevails as the essence of the difference; such Beyng [. . .], prior to the difference, is the event [*Ereignis*] and for this reason *without* beings" (*P*, 374 n. a). But in the next edition (1949), the "Postscript" once again timorously acknowledges the problem. What we now read is this: "Being never prevails [. . .] without beings, [. . .] a being never is without Being." (*P*, 233). But the Being of which beings can Being as such (or Nothing) be? Traditionally, one would think that it is the Being of the *being in general* or, better, of the *something in general* (*etwas überhaupt*). However, this formal logical or, more properly here, formal ontological possibility is actually in-principle excluded both on the basis of Heidegger's research in 1919 and in *BT*.<sup>32</sup> So Being as such (or Nothing) is the Being of *no beings*. But is it possible to phenomenologize the Being of no beings? That is, is it possible to do phenomenology when there is no available foothold from which to phenomenologize? Is there a phenomenology of that about which no commensurate ontic *Leitfaden* can be found? Doesn't this mean that in the end,

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<sup>30</sup>The meaning and function of formal indication in Heidegger's early thought has been a strongly debated issue in the relatively recent literature. I cannot enter this dialogue in further detail here. The reader who wishes to explore these issues further may consult Theodorou 2010a.

<sup>31</sup>The slight change of perspective signalled with this move should not escape our attention. Instead of actually tracing Being worlding around Dasein, it is again (as in 1919) sought around the objects of Dasein's experience. Now, however, in *BT*, this is attempted in careful correlation of the beings with the historical Dasein's own transformations of experience within its inherent dynamics.

<sup>32</sup>This is seen in the transition from the 1919 *Kriegsnotsemester* to the "Natorp-Bericht" and then in Heidegger's treatment of Being as mere relation in *BT*. As I see it, Heidegger makes good points against the view that Husserl's Formal Ontology could play the role of a Fundamental Ontology as he (Heidegger) conceived of it. See *SZ*, 10, 78, 159–60 and especially the marginal note *a* on page 160; *TDP*, 91; also Chap. 8, §§.5.2, 8.7.2 of the present book; and Theodorou 2010a. On this, I have to agree with Philipse 1998, 40, 100, 110. For a different estimation of this matter, see Hopkins 2001, 136. Of course, Heidegger's Platonic endeavour did not after all reach an unambiguous and final answer to the ultimate problem regarding Being in general or Being as such.

Heidegger is looking for something radically non-phenomenological?<sup>33</sup> Doesn't this also mean that Heidegger's overall aspiration to phenomenologize Being as such is doomed to fail?

This can also be put from another perspective. Being as such is not and could not be a phenomenon, since it hasn't yet exhausted itself in its 'essencing' within available history. There is no *sufficient* discovered basis for the purpose of absolutely grounding the meaning of Being as such. Being as such is 'something' that cannot be known phenomenologically, unless it has exhausted its full potential, so to speak, of historical senses of Being: senses of Being that have come within history and have determined, in each epoch, the way we understand what is.

After this harsh realization, another way of considering Being as such appeared possible to Heidegger. Given that it lies outside history and the worldly clearing of the *Da*, Heidegger tries to find convenient or suitable ways of *guessing*, i.e., *speculating*, what Being as such may be (what its hyper-logos may be). The method of destruction of its until-now actualized history is here used only as a possible basis for this (from now on) non-phenomenological purpose. Heidegger's later effort with the process of *Andenken* is used in this context and direction, but all these ways offer only insufficient resources (if you are not the whigish Hegel—but if you are, then you are not a 'phenomenological' phenomenologist). What is disclosed through various forms of evidence is only what is currently opened in history, i.e., Being as (some) sense or truth (traced as worlding 'around' some regional beings). And this does not suffice to offer us knowledge of anything beyond itself, of what is 'reserved' as humanity's fate. This, unfortunately, does not allow us to make full sense of the phases of the world we have come through.<sup>34</sup> This is another way of referring to the precariousness of the human condition.

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<sup>33</sup>This is why I have to disagree with Sheehan's thesis that "Heidegger *remained a phenomenologist from beginning to end* and that phenomenology is exclusively about meaningfulness and its source" (2014, Abstract; emphasis added). Phenomenology may be about a priori sense or meaning, but not about *mere* sense or meaning; it is also about the source of this meaning, as Sheehan nicely remarks. It is not about simply conceivable meaningfulness, but about sound meaningfulness 'confirmed' by intuitional phenomena. And at this point, no such accessible source appears to be available that would bring Heidegger's endeavour to phenomenological completion.

<sup>34</sup>I believe that Heidegger toyed with another possibility, without making it explicit and without adopting it as his ultimate suggestion. There might be a concrete Being as sense or truth that has been disclosed within human history from its very start, but which afterwards became concealed under its privative and derogative self-modifications. This may be considered as the universal, whole, or complete Being, whereas the rest of its privative versions may be considered as the series of its subsequent historical essencings. *Zuhandenheit* or *Existenz/Sorge* may be considered as candidates for the role of such Being. Again, however, at least two serious *phenomenological* problems would lift any hope that this could provide a final answer to the *Seinsfrage*. On the one hand, it would indeed be difficult if not totally impossible to show that all the kinds of Being are such modifications of *Zuhandenheit* or *Existenz/Sorge*. On the other hand, we would again be clueless as to the internal 'logic' and coherence or unifiability of such modificatory process.

## 10.6 What Is at Stake with Philosophy's (and Phenomenology's) Possible Limitations

In the phenomenological method, the reproach for a lack of phenomenologizability or criticality stands or falls on whether the philosopher does or does not forget to change the relevant epistemic operator in front of the debated claims. First of all, we must be sufficiently self-conscious about the fact that Phenomenology may develop a discourse beyond the critical bounds delineated in §10.3. Having this in mind, in §§10.4 and 10.5 we saw that monadological ontology, the appeal to some stuff inherently generated therein, and a supra-worldly source of sense that supposedly guides intentional constitution, etc., belong here. This fact, however, should not be taken as an unsurpassable and definitive obstacle for phenomenological philosophy. It is only the realization of a certain *limitedness* that calls for appropriate treatment.

But why does philosophy in general consider this limitedness an issue at all? Why is it so difficult for it to acknowledge and accept it? Put extremely densely, we can understand the situation in its full significance only if we realize that throughout its history, humanity is tortured by an arch-question that, in many cases, is only whispered in tremor: *what are we, what is this wherein we are, and what we should do?* Our existence and action, our aspirations and endeavors, and the meaning of life and death depend on the answer to this shivering question. A fully certain and binding answer to it of course depends on how much *certain knowledge* is available concerning all the intervening factors and folds. Knowledge of what essentially is and of the principle that should meaningfully order our existence and praxis is needed. Only through such knowledge would we arrive at a trustworthy, integrated, intelligible account of ourselves and of reality as a whole, within which we could know what the normatively advisable kind of existence and praxis is. If no such knowledge is possible, human life would then seem accidental, groundless, and arbitrary, a mere chaotic sequence of contingencies.

When philosophy appeared, it claimed that knowledge or objective truth or (apodictic) science could be discovered about anything. Thus, it ascertained that it could also reach a global, final, and all-round answer to the questions under discussion. Plato should be considered the first to have systematically elaborated such a philosophical project and ascertainment. Aristotle was the first to have systematically criticized the absolute feasibility of the project and to have warned us of the possible dangers lurking behind its superficially shiny attractiveness.<sup>35</sup> Since their time, an annoying and worrisomely silent war has extended up to the present

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<sup>35</sup>For a quick reference, see the citations in note 22. From the phenomenological camp, Arendt and Taminaux become prominently relevant here. For the time being, see also Theodorou 2014b.

day concerning which view corresponds to the things themselves. Husserl did not have a clear view of these issues. Heidegger, however, was fully aware of this fact, and silently but decisively took a side.<sup>36</sup>

During some periods of history, majorities have been convinced or forced to accept that such knowledge (and an answer to the arch-problem) was available. At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginnings of the twentieth, however, the grounds were once more shaken and the answers fell. After a relatively short auspicious period, following the atrocities of the Second World War, we are now once again in the dark. Admittedly, this has happened because what was offered as knowledge was actually not or was not enough. We can accept that since philosophy's original conception of the aforementioned plan, humanity has achieved knowledge in Mathematics and in the natural sciences.<sup>37</sup> But is this enough to furnish an answer to the arch-question? From the very start of the modern era, the scientific revolution and the new sciences of nature, voices have argued that it is not enough. This thesis, though, may be understood in two ways. One says that the arch-question simply makes no sense because humans too are mere physical matter, and simply participate in the meaningless causal processes in nature. The other says that the question probably makes sense, but that an answer cannot be given by the sciences, which merely talk about what is inductively the case, not about what should normatively be or be done. In response to the latter case, several alternative possibilities exist. According to some, it is we who make sense of everything in conformity with our best reflective arguments (as rational believers in God's plan) or arbitrarily (as living beings competing with one another and with nature), or conventionally (as societies seeking prosperity). According to other philosophers, we must insist on the powerfulness of our rational nature and, by means of a science other than the natural sciences, must continue searching for a real or literal apodictic truth about everything that would dictate an unconditionally normative principle of action. Phenomenology is silently thought to be moving along this latter route, which was explicitly the way of traditional and German Idealism. Phenomenology's celebrated a priori synthetic or contentful apodictic knowledge regarding the many (and in some cases unprecedented) fields that we came across above generated unbridled hopes. All these important contributions and possibilities, though, should not lead us to confuse our hopes and wishes for

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<sup>36</sup>For further discussion of this only rarely discussed issue, see, e.g., Taminaux 2007; also Theodorou 2013.

<sup>37</sup>The latest realizations in the history and philosophy of science, to be sure, instruct us to consider this knowledge only as valid in the sense of accepted paradigms. In addition, there is a dispute between philosophical traditions as to the kind of knowledge that is possible, especially in the natural sciences. Is it inductive, apodictic, or a sum of both? From the phenomenological point of view, we are prepared to accept a combined view. On the one hand, I suggest that we accept a version of Kant's position (i.e., that scientific principles are synthetic a priori, whereas scientific laws are inductive generalizations). See also §§2.6.1 (especially n. 53), 2.7.1 and 3.4.1 (especially n. 18). On the other hand, we should also accept the findings of historicist epistemology. A kind of measured phenomenological perspectivism would thus ensue.

completed cognitive accomplishments. We have seen that in Phenomenology, a certain supererogation can also be detected.

Should we therefore remain content with the knowledge natural sciences offer, understanding ourselves as mere thermostats physically adjusting to external stimuli, and stop considering meaningfulness as ineradicable from human life and existence? Of course not. Philosophical research on normative meaningfulness and its possible source must continue. But should we simply rely on the available answers and, e.g., pretend that we share with them the great humanistic optimism of ultimate justification, or the supposed effectiveness of instrumental reason? No! Phenomenology must search for its own road. But how can it proceed further, given the limitations we have detected?

One response is that we can happily choose to continue philosophizing phenomenologically, and appeal to limit claims like the ones we met above, but only if we are to take them for what they are, i.e., speaking generally, improvable *hypotheses* that may be useful for the possible settlement of questions regarding existence and praxis. For a long time now, the natural sciences themselves have known how to distinguish between knowledge of experiential regularities and hypotheses regarding unobservables, without losing an inch of their dignity. Relatively recent developments in the philosophy of science also show that science can even accept that what Kant calls special metaphysics (the supposedly unalterable a priori synthetic part) of the sciences also has a kind of hypothetical character (hypotheses that are *not* exactly “falsifiable” but simply abandonable).<sup>38</sup> So, for Phenomenology to accept some of its teachings as hypotheses would not do any real harm to its status and prospects. There is also another response, though. Phenomenology can ascertain that there remains a wide range of phenomena and problems to which it can still hope for a priori synthetic truths and knowledge. As we will see, these two responses are not mutually exclusive: in fact, they are complementary.

Naturally, the train of thought presented in the preceding paragraphs leads to new questions that demand immediate answers. The content of a Phenomenology that, critically, allows itself the luxury of controlled hypotheses will be dealt with in the next section (§10.7). The precise field and research character of positive phenomenologizing will be developed in §10.8. Finally, in §10.9, some of our ultimate reasons for remaining specifically committed to phenomenological philosophy will be presented.

## 10.7 Phenomenology's Course: Beneath and Above

First of all, we must address the following issue: if we are to continue working in Phenomenology in accordance with this critical way, what are we to expect from it vis-à-vis the arch-question? Can we expect it to deliver a correspondingly renewed

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<sup>38</sup>See Theodorou 2012a, n. 18.

imperative that would fix all the problems in human existence and praxis? Husserl and Scheler did indeed attempt to offer such a contentful imperative. Heidegger thought that once his *Seinsfrage* was answered, the imperative would simply follow from our understanding of that answer. In order for this question to receive a critical phenomenological answer, extensive work on emotions, values, and action need to intervene. Thus, for the time being, the answer will be suspended. Its general character, though, can be discerned in what will be said here.

Another question stands in the queue, in need of an answer. If we are to critically continue in the aforementioned way, what general direction should we follow? To put it schematically, if we decide to proceed critically, should we accept the Kantian *Dinge an sich*, or should we rather abstain from them and experiment with German Idealism's absolutist conceptual principles? Put in a simplistic form, should we continue by abolishing any appeal to the 'irrational' factic or not? Or, to put it another way, should we proceed according to Fichte's and German Idealism's exemplars or to Kant's?

Before any attempt at an answer, a word must be said on the possible grounds from which one proceeds with such dilemmas. (We have to bear this word in mind in all that remains to be said in this chapter.) It is almost impossible to give a fully explicit and exhaustive account of why one decides to engage in or to abandon a paradigm (in the Kuhnian sense). And the views referred to immediately above constitute large philosophical paradigms or research programs, if you like. We know how difficult or even unsolvable the latter problem is, based on the apparently more palpable case of competing *scientific* paradigms, as thematized in the history and philosophy of science in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Popper, Kuhn, Feyerabend, Lakatos, et al., strove for decades to offer a clear and rational account of how scientists decide that a research program or a paradigm is degenerate and should be abandoned, and how they choose the one to be abandoned among competing research programs or paradigms. The factors that were especially thematized by Kuhn and Feyerabend (finiteness and situatedness) also appear to be decisive factors in our envisaging or finding ourselves engaged in this or that philosophical paradigm. For, given a problem situation, history shows that there is a series of open possibilities in our thematizing it and in our offering the most appropriate interpretive narrative. No one, however, waits for the development and elaboration of all these different possibilities, and no one is able to fully scrutinize all the ideas (in science and philosophy) that have appeared or will appear on the face of Earth, in order to make a fully justified and ideally rational choice. Within our human life span, and from the window it allows for an acquaintance with such possibilities, we make merely reasonable finite guesses and choices. This is all the more the case now, since human ideas have started flourishing to a degree that practically precludes surveyability. Unavoidably, this move will always retain the aura of a (not fully rationally accountable) 'conversion.' In hermeneutics, this would be better described as the situation in which we are expected to make our estimation on the basis of accumulated experience and cultivated prudence. I do not really know to what degree these latter virtues condescend to my efforts here, but I will try to unravel some folds of my point of view.

We know, and have seen in this book, that Phenomenology stands balanced between Aristotle's and Kant's traditions on the one hand, and Plato's and German Idealism's traditions on the other. Nonetheless, its origin in Austrian thinking, and its long preoccupation with issues concerning sensory perception, experience and practical usage of tools, bodily intentionality, emotions, actual praxis in the world, etc., but most of all in Husserl's institutional guideline that all knowledge should be traced back to its origin in *concrete experience*, allow us to claim that it is more originally tied to the first tradition rather than the second. The traditions of empiricism and critical rationalism appear to be closer to Phenomenology's original specifications. Of course, the so-called "Munich realists" would have strongly disagreed, as would those who still draw inspiration from them. But, as I said just above, this is how paradigms work and compete with each other. Phenomenology's subsequent leaning toward the dogmatic rationalist and idealist tradition, with its all-round self-consistent 'solutions' for everything, appears to have been a desperate response of embarrassment, the result of the combination of its initial sense of powerfulness and the severe problems it had to face almost immediately afterwards.

From a suitably adjusted point of view, then, consciousness could be considered as the capacity for passive and active intentional syntheses that get their 'raw material' from a metaphysical *ignotum* and indefinite in-itself. Phenomenology, that is, can allow for, e.g., an agnostic metaphysical realism of an unknowable but still *interpretable* in-itself. We can legitimately theorize about this, considering it as a dimension of reality that *surprises* us by means of facticity's unpredictable richness and resistance to our protentions and general expectations. The natural sciences in particular usually appeal to this dimension behind the veil of the appearances, offering ingenious and empirically successful interpretations for the way it is causally involved in our intentional constitution of the phenomena. Phenomenology's in-principle position in the debates over scientific realism/antirealism can be based on this simple thesis. Intentional syntheses, then, organize the bits and parts in time and space, given through the sensory organs of our living body according to constitutive senses (meanings) as rules of these syntheses. At bottom, the perceptual syntheses are rigidly built-in to the relevant modules of our overall make-up. Various instinctive and emotive syntheses are equally built-in and become founded upon the former, but in ways that are transformable and re-organizable in habitual formations and that let us have the variously evaluated experience of the phenomena. There are then the theoretical views of the phenomena and their causes, related to cognitive and existential interests. In the end, we find ourselves having this or that ethos and cognitively and praxially experiencing human and non-human beings, in accordance to corresponding cosmic projections or worldviews and the principles connected with them. Instincts, emotions, the so-called "willing phenomena," motivation, and the formation of ethos or *ordo amoris* should be given particular attention in Phenomenology's future developments toward a phenomenological general praxeology.

This brings us to the other side of the coin. What is the source of the higher noetic senses that are the specifically theoretical and praxial principles that guide our corresponding intentional responses to facticity? In other words, what can



Phenomenology say about the source of human theoretical or existential and praxial meaningfulness? Let us see what can be said about this in the present context.

Neither the source of hyle nor the source of meaningfulness for human existence and action in the historical cosmos are purely phenomenologizable. The point is ambiguous. As was said at the start of §10.3, there is something uncontrollable in the way we find ourselves with ideas, senses, meanings, or principles: they 'come' to us. This has tempted many to think that what thus 'comes' to us has actually been *sent* by some supra-human source, and that its 'cause' is an intelligence that is alien and superior to worldly reality: a demon, a god, a universal logos of the cosmos or of history, absolute spirit, Being as such, etc. As was also said in §10.3, however, in the process of acquiring ideas, senses, meaningfulness, etc., there is also something controllable: we prepare ourselves, through working on a problem, in order for this acquisition to happen. This indicates that the sources under discussion are none other than ourselves, the very human being. We only tend to consider this supposed source as something beyond us because the content of the ideas, meanings, etc., and the moment when they come to us do not depend upon our decisions. But this does not mean that they depend on the decisions of some other intelligence. In Phenomenology, we can proceed in this moderate way. Ideas and meanings arise out of the "well of possibilities" for meaningful intentional correlations, which we ourselves are. The source or well of meaningfulness resides in us; it is our potential for truthful intentional transcendences. It is the series of possible rules of synthesis that can condition our intentionality in corresponding acts and compartments (generally cognitive, specifically theoretical, and praxial).<sup>39</sup>

In all these cases, projecting a source beyond us is a move of sheer *fetishization*. It arises from our felt need for objectiveness, for some Archimedean point of view, for an authority that absolutely knows what is, what goes on with us, and where we and everything else are heading to. The otherwise understandable and respectful idealized hope behind such a move need not guide our researches any longer.

If the above deliberations have some value, moreover, we are here guided to speak not so much of a source, but better of a *happening* of forthspringing, or a self-formation of meanings and meaningfulness in us or at us. This very happening may again be non phenomenologizable, but what results from it or in it *is the known* series of discoverable noetic senses that condition our intentional acts and compartments, the possibility of intentional correlations with beings in a world.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>39</sup>A certain scent of "philosophy of life" is simply not accidental. I have the term "life" in mind in a way that opposes the brutish "titanic individual overman" or "blond beast" Klagesean version of Nietzsche's prototype (I take the quoted expressions from Polanyi 1933) but also differs from the—one way or another—complacent tone it has in Aristotle, Dilthey, Jonas, pre-*Stellung* Scheler, and Varela and Maturana. A few more remarks toward the 'discontentful' direction hinted at here will be offered in the following sections. Further development of the point must be reserved for another occasion.

<sup>40</sup>Cf. Crowell (2002b), where various views regarding Phenomenology's possibility or entitlement of containing metaphysical knowledge are examined. However, the perspective of these concerns and our own is somewhat different. The question there is basically whether the method of reduction

This means that we must accept a certain asymmetry in our speculative adventure. On the one hand, a bullet, or what scientists call “cosmic radiation,” or a beast, or a “virus,” have the power to permanently interrupt any intentional life (human or animal), and any intentional life needs some heterological material nutrients in order to be sustained. On the other hand, no higher intelligence can analogously interfere in a direct and objective way and interrupt or benefit some intentional life or inanimate course of things (in the same way). Appeal to something transcendent in this sense is basically made with the hope of settling matters of meaningfulness (epistemological and praxial): e.g., we cannot control or we do not know anything; someone else does. Of course, these remarks are not intended as final or decisive arguments. Ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses can keep coming to the table until the end of time.<sup>41</sup> Only an Occamian principle can end this game. Simply this remains then: all of these suggestive remarks and refuting replies will be formations in *our* intentionality. (We will return to this in the next section.) Otherwise, another kind of “bad consciousness” will continue to lead the course of human lives; appeal to higher intelligences only privilegedly accessible by ‘chosen ones’ will continue to be the excuse that seeks to legitimize fanatical action.

We arrive, then, at the following comprehensive picture. Perception locks us inflexibly with the threshold appearing beings and world, i.e., with nature-things in their perceptual horizon. Instincts and action makes us stumble upon the variously valued things of the world and respond to them cognitively and praxially. Science, in particular, gives us the principles for the best explanations to the questions of constitution and lawfulness, which are created in this confrontation with beings and

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and eidetic description means that Phenomenology is ontologically neutral, or whether it also contains claims regarding, e.g., the meaning of “being,” a classification of perfection among the possible and actual beings, an onto-theological agenda (as in Sokolowski’s et al. appropriation of Phenomenology), etc. The remarks made above in the main text of the present work are not, however, intended only to show the limits of the strictly phenomenologizable and simply reject what goes further (cf. Crowell 2002b, 438). They also want to make some room for metaphysical hypotheses explicitly so acknowledged.

<sup>41</sup>Chalmers’ colourful pen presents us with an incident from science’s history that can immediately give us a clear idea of how the dispute develops in such cases. “Having carefully observed the moon through his newly invented telescope, Galileo was able to report that the moon was not a smooth sphere but that its surface abounded in mountains and craters. His Aristotelian adversary had to admit that things did appear that way when he repeated the observations for himself. But the observations threatened a notion fundamental for many Aristotelians, namely that all celestial bodies are perfect spheres. Galileo’s rival defended his theory in the face of the apparent falsification in a way that was blatantly ad hoc. He suggested that there was an invisible substance on the moon filling the craters and covering the mountains in such a way that the moon’s shape was perfectly spherical. When Galileo inquired how the presence of the invisible substance might be detected, the reply was that there was no way in which it could be detected. [ . . . ] An exasperated Galileo was able to show up the inadequacy of his rival’s position in a characteristically witty way. He announced that he was prepared to admit that the invisible, undetectable substance existed on the moon, but insisted that it was not distributed in the way suggested by his rival but in fact was piled up on top of the mountains so that they were many times higher than they appeared through the telescope.” (Chalmers 1999, 76).

the world. In praxis, we struggle to discover and follow principles prescribing what is good to do in the world. Our philosophies try to give coherent accounts of the meaning of all this, and also to themselves suggest principles (general and special metaphysics of the sciences and praxial principles for human action).

If the first gateway to speculation with regard to human affairs is that regarding the sources of the factic and the principles, here we have just come across the second gateway, concerning the conception of the *character* and *content* of the principles. We said that speculation in general cannot be banned, even from the context of Phenomenology. We only demand that it be self-aware with regard to its status and function. But does this mean that Phenomenology should accept that all these principles are mere wild guesses, mere blind conjectures? I will return to this question in the second part of §10.8. Before this, I will immediately return to the pending "second response" raised at the close of §10.6.

## 10.8 Phenomenology's Course: Intentional Life and Hermeneutics

In all the above, something crucial cannot have passed unnoticed. In all the intentional compartments in the world, it is *we* who noetically respond to what variously and on various levels affects us. And, in varying degrees of 'freedom,' from sensory/instinctual inflexibility to theoretico/praxial hermeneutic openness, *our intentionality* tends to establish and present us with beings and situations within a cosmos-like reality. It is we who feel, act, theorize, speculate, and posit. In a sense, then, we conceive and experience (or try or pretend to experience) our sound or unsound intentional-noetic possibilities. Even the ideas of perfection, ideality, infinity, and absoluteness arise out of specific modifications of our intentional noeses. Arendt, who held Phenomenology, Aristotle, and Kant in high esteem, phrased this in an unequalled way.

[W]herever we try to transcend appearance beyond all sensual experience [...] in order to catch the ultimate secrets of Being, which according to our physical worldview is so secretive that it never appears and still so tremendously powerful that it produces all appearance, we find that the same patterns rule the macrocosm and the microcosm alike [...]. Here again, we may for a moment rejoice in a refound unity of the universe, only to fall prey to the suspicion that what we have found may have nothing to do with either the macrocosmos or the microcosmos, that *we deal only with the patterns of our own mind* [...] in which case it is really as though we were in the hands of an evil spirit who mocks us and frustrates our thirst for knowledge, so that wherever we search for that which we are not, *we encounter only the patterns of our own minds*. (Arendt 1958, 286–7; emphases added)<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>42</sup>With this, Arendt in fact repeats Kant's notions of *subreption*, that stands at the centre of the latter's critical project, and the (closely connected) tendency of reason to surpass its own limits of application and unjustifiably raise claims to knowledge beyond the sphere of the phenomena.

If this is what we are and what we do, then we have a serious research field and a serious research duty: the exploration of *how exactly* all this happens with regard to the ideas, etc. Pure Mundane Transcendental Phenomenological Psychology<sup>43</sup> is the a priori scientific mathesis that can indeed thrive in this area: the ways in which *we* intend or tend to experience in whatever direction (e.g., perceptually, in the scientific world, unobservable material reality, or universal principles regarding being and acting). It may be that we will never arrive at knowledge or literal truth concerning the texture of unobservable material reality, or concerning whether there is a progressive logos in historical evolution, etc., but we can at least always, both philosophically and scientifically (a priori and also a posteriori), study the ways in which we find ourselves *striving to intentionally correlate* with the appearing beings and parts of reality.

There is (and can be) no guarantee that what can have 'effects' on our overall constitution and on the paths existence and actions take is destined to be literally conceived or intuited in its complete texture and content. Neither can anyone guarantee that our conceivability and intuitability are made so as to be able to penetrate into whatever is, in its complete content and constitution. Moreover, there is no (and can be no) guarantee that the way in which we tend to complement the phenomenal fragments and build a meaningful cosmos is the one predestined for us by a God, absolute spirit, logos, or Nothing. But we can turn and examine the ways in which we tend to interpret, posit, and seek evidence for all this. The aforementioned phenomenon of seeking the cause of the phenomena, an authoritative source of meaningfulness and normativity, and the fetishization of all the latter, are of course among the phenomena in need of such phenomenological-psychological elucidation. The same of course holds with the very noetic senses and principles that are or arise in us in the above discussed way. All these folds of the overall happening of our various intentional correlations with beings in a cosmos, according to corresponding noetic senses, can and must be *purely* phenomenologically-psychologically explored. For some of these, phenomenology has already established remarkable results that can serve as a guide for further philosophical (but also empirical scientific) research.

With this, we have reached a point from which we can proceed further. The aforementioned noetic senses (ideas, meanings, or principles that condition our overall intentional life) grow in our intentional noeses (or rather *with* them). Can Phenomenology help us to say more of a scientific nature about the character of the way in which we are found with such noetic senses and how we tend to accept some of these?

Phenomenology should first of all be confident that this is an issue regarding our truth-aiming intentionality in the fields of general cognition and praxis. Moreover, it should also learn the lessons of *hermeneutics* and historicist philosophy of science more fully. It would then acknowledge that apart from what is given in primordial

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<sup>43</sup>For the precise mark and specifications of this mathesis, the reader should consult Chaps. 2 and 3.

perceptual experience, the possibilities of thematizing it and of coping with it conform to principles that are susceptible to historical change, and which give birth to further new such possibilities that are tenable from ever new perspectives, etc.<sup>44</sup> Elsewhere, I have dealt in detail with the problem concerning the nature of the process by which we are found with principles regarding our cognitive (pre-theoretical and theoretical) intentional life.<sup>45</sup> Here, I will proceed by referring mainly to the same problem regarding our praxial principles.

Aristotle and Kant managed to figure out that philosophy can only *think* that it can discover or that it already possesses *knowledge* about what is 'below' and 'above' what appears or, as we have approached it in the present context, about the cause of the phenomena and the source or ground for the principles of praxis. They nonetheless accepted that philosophy is entitled to try to offer accounts of these two antipodean provinces, the ultimate material and supreme final causes—to put it this way—of being and action. They permitted that we can be bold in trying to make sense of how to “save the phenomena” of nature and praxis. They think, however, that there is *only one* good reasonable way to accomplish this. Kant, in particular, hoped that the whole Christian agenda (at least some pietist version of Protestantism) could still be shown as the most possible and only plausible one to believe in, and let this agenda determine the normative principle for our existence and praxis. In his *Genealogy of Ethics*, however, Nietzsche was very quick to notice this and very bold in making it explicit. What he (and subsequent philosophers) brought to the surface is the realization that traditional philosophy's pretensions to providing unique solutions for the issues under discussion could no longer be accepted. The old ways that religion (and then philosophy) had available to claim authority on these matters was effectively questioned and refuted. Our epoch of galloping nihilism testifies to this.

How can we move on? This question naturally concerns two things: content and process character. On the one hand, if we have meanwhile also rejected, as we should, Nietzsche's promotion of the overman and the will to power (which so impressed and variously motivated the ideologies of the twentieth century from beginning to end) as unfortunate, we would like to know what view of things will determine our future direction. Does Phenomenology have something to say about this? For example, Scheler's anti-Nietzschean and in the end also post-religious efforts in this direction have (with his interest in love and solidarity) their own considerable merit, but are in need of radical re-evaluation and re-orientation. What might the directive mark of such a general effort be? This is perhaps *the hardest question* to reflect upon in preparing the ground for an alternative answer. On the

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<sup>44</sup>To be sure, no relativist view will be promoted here. Given the non-reductivist and non-single-principled basis of the approach that is (programmatically) being delineated here, not relativism but *perspectivism* would be the appropriate term. Objective truth can be claimed only at a formal level. Factic richness, noetic natality and historical fluidity point to perspectivism as regards content (of senses, meaningfulness, principles, etc.).

<sup>45</sup>I have done this in my Ph.D. thesis, and in Theodorou 2006, 2010b. See also Chap. 3 of the present book.

other hand, if we cannot answer the latter question here and now, could we perhaps at least come to know more about the very nature of the process that leads to it?

After his triumph in theoretical philosophy, Kant dealt with the problem of complementing the general and special non-speculative metaphysics of mere physical nature in the *First Critique* in a way that would let him present the view of a world within which meaningful human action would be possible. He then saw the power of *reflective judgment* as the capacity that finally suggests *the* objective regulative universals for the purpose of grounding the normativity of his ethical and political principles. Phenomenology must take care that this element of Kant's critical transcendental idealism is suitably adjusted to suit the context of its own territory. A century after Nietzsche's triggering of the suspicion, Phenomenology must first do full justice to the *hermeneutic* road opened up by Heidegger's approach. Secondly, it must be informed by a *historist philosophy of science*. It will then be possible to develop something like a hermeneutics of 'creativity.' After what has been already said in the foregoing sections, however, the latter term cannot be assumed to have a self-understandable meaning. The very potential of noetic senses that condition possible and actual intentional correlations appears to be hermeneutic. Thus, we should instead speak of a *hermeneutics of intentionality* itself. Analyses like Kuhn's account of paradigm acceptance and Gadamer's criteria for what may count as eligible hermeneia can help us understand this phenomenon further, not as sheer wild speculation or merely closed discursive dialectics, but rather as a rule governed process (both noetically and noematically) of intuitional adequacy.<sup>46</sup> In our search for new ideas regarding the hidden cause of the phenomena, or the formation of principles that should guide our action, the measure here is again *hermeneutic success*—an issue that remains open, of course. From Phenomenology's point of view, though, we must not overlook the fact that this hermeneutics of intentional sense self-genesis can itself be elucidated by appeal to the open process of *eidetic variation* in the field of both theory and praxis.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>46</sup>We have already seen the fertility of this idea, first introduced in a systematic way by Husserl, in the case of the phenomenology of perception and judgment. This is already solid ground for further research. See, for example, Theodorou 2014b.

<sup>47</sup>I have developed the prerequisites of this approach in Theodorou 2006. On the very notion of eidetic variation, see Chap. 2, §2.6.1. With regard to "hermeneutic success," what I basically have in mind here is an approach along the lines defined by Gadamer's (1987) ideas concerning the possibility of criteria for objective (or, rather, successful) interpretation, and Makkreel's (1990) attempt to approach Kant's reflective judgment in terms of hermeneutics (albeit, on my part, not quite by relying on common sense to such a great extent). Understandably, these issues are still strongly debated, as shown in the dispute between Gadamer and Habermas and, on other grounds, between the former and Emilio Betti and E. D. Hirsch.

## 10.9 Why Continue with Phenomenology's Research Program?

Before closing this book, there is at least one more pressing question to address. If Phenomenology faces so many interpretive problems, internal divisions and limitations like those surveyed in the foregoing chapters and sections, are we justified in pursuing it? Is there any possibility of worthwhile collaborative work along an identifiable phenomenological path? Is there any stable phenomenological ground from which to attempt the further development and fruitful work on phenomena along the lines indicated in the last two sections?

Starting from Husserl's founding thought, and keeping the broader phenomenological tradition in view, my estimation is that Phenomenology is a philosophical research program with extended unexploited reserves, to which we can still commit and that still has many contributions to make. It is important to safeguard some encouraging answers to serious internal issues (as I have done above), but this estimation of Phenomenology is also based upon fundamental reasons, such as the following.

Phenomenology abandons the traditional epistemological view that our experience is representational. It has introduced the idea of *intentional transcendence* toward the world and toward its beings. Phenomenology offers profound non-representational approaches to memory, imagination, perception of images, etc. It has further elucidated the nature of intuition in contradistinction to mere conceptuality, and has discovered further dimensions of intuitionality beyond mere sensory experience. It is fully aware of the fact that there is no such thing as so-called "purely conceptual analysis" without a necessary underpinning in the *intuitions* (*Anschauung*—not clairvoyance) offering objects of the concepts (even when the concepts and the objects are categorical).<sup>48</sup>

It distinguishes between the *pre-linguistic* and strictly sensory (but still intentional) experiential dimension and specifically linguistic experiential levels. It has offered a thorough-going elucidation of language's nature (bringing to the fore something similar to what is now known as "deep grammar") and, most basically, of the nature of our *linguistic experience*. *Categorical experience* in acts of synthesis constitutes a major contribution to philosophy's 'text book.'

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<sup>48</sup>Let me add here, in the most approving tone, a citation from Crowell 2002b. "[The so-called] conceptual analysis contains an ineradicable moment of eidetic 'intuition.' It appears that only ignorance informs the view that Phenomenology's results are nothing but conceptual analysis. One might more justly say that there is conceptual analysis only because there is phenomenology, even though its practitioners don't recognize themselves as phenomenologists." (2002b, 441). Thus, Crowell's later suggestion is, to summarize it here somewhat clumsily, that Phenomenology would be justified as a philosophical research program even if it were to be taken into account just for the fact that it is an a priori inquiry into intuitionally appearing phenomena, which is actually *presupposed* by analytic philosophy. However, by going deeper than the latter, Phenomenology also shows that philosophy at large retains its tasks and dignity, becoming (after all) immune to the recent threats of reductive/eliminative naturalization.

Phenomenology has elucidated the difference between the ideal and the factual, the idealized and the concretely lifeworldly. It has a sense of the differentiation between various levels and kinds of concepts such as *formal/material and regional/specific*. It does not fall victim to the undifferentiatedly formalist and logical understanding of the concepts (universality over particularity), as the traditional rationalist and empiricist traditions do. It *does not conceptualize reductively* (in a manner that eliminates or even forgets the intuitional particular), but wants to remain close to reality's concreteness and facticity.

Phenomenology offers amazing conceptions of *time*. Both in Husserl and Heidegger, as well as in Ricoeur and the numerous contributions of the Phenomenology scholars, we find thoroughgoing elucidations of the multi-layeredness of time. These start from the primordial flow of lived time, or from the time of the life-time existence of Dasein, and proceed to the time of history and the highly mediated conceptions and experiences of natural-scientific time.

Equally important and fruitful are Phenomenology's accounts of *space*. The spatiality of the world-horizon, where our primordial intentional transcendence meets its sensory objectual correlates, and the objective space of Euclidian Geometry or the highly mediated spatial-aiming of the non-Euclidian Geometries, find attractive groundings.

Phenomenology has viewed language and the sciences not as merely *logical deductive* systems (or formal-theoretically holistic systems), but as a much more complex hierarchical system of expressed intentional possibilities and components that goes beyond mere pragmatic conventionality, etc. Phenomenological philosophy of science, both in general and in particular, has offered (and can continue to offer) satisfactory analyses of issues like those of scientific change, the metaphysics of scientific entities, thought experiments, etc.

Phenomenology has thematized anew the already sophisticated Kantian account of the *a priori*, analytic and synthetic. It has overcome Kant's view of the *a priori* as a merely theoretical condition of constitution, deepening and extending it by means of uncovering deeper founding and higher founded levels of intentional experiences. It has developed novel accounts of the analytic and the synthetic *a priori*. It does not approach *analyticity* as a relation between the contents of concepts, but as the (indifferent-to-contents) conceptual synthesizing *functions* of consciousness.

Phenomenology has introduced the idea of consciousness' 'plasticity.' This idea, in fact, underlies Phenomenology's *historicization of the a priori*. This was its way of overcoming Kant's failure to recognize a mind that goes beyond fixed and supposedly 'hardwired' categories. It opens up new possibilities for understanding the *historicality* of thematized experience, theoretical knowledge, existence, and culture. It has ways of escaping the Platonic and Kantian stationary conception of human being, and the Hegelian basically deterministic and whigish account of historical development. Phenomenology's understanding of the human historicality goes beyond what Carnap (with his pragmatic analytic *a priori*) and Quine (with his naturalist pragmatic understanding of all the levels of truths) recognized. It can be easily connected in a productive hybrid with *hermeneutics*, and can find applications beyond any prediction, e.g., in history, art, philosophy of science, ethics, politics, etc.



Phenomenology brought to the surface the (broadly meant) *bodily* dimension of the intentional transcendence of human life and experience. It manifests a concern for the bodily aspect of the person that is not restricted to superficial praise of the body and its needs, but seeks in it concealed normativities that have been forgotten under naïve sedimentations.

Phenomenology has thematized the non-theoretical *non-conceptually-cognitive* dimensions of human existence, sensory perception and *emotive* life, saving also for them intentionality and experience of correlative objectivities. It has refused to abstract away from these dimensions, and has refused to see them as irrelevant to the overall philosophical questioning of the human condition at large. It thus opens up the possibility of a broader conception of the *λόγος* of the mundanely intentional (not necessarily bifurcated by internal relations of logical subordination).

Without falling victim to deconstructive exaggerations, Phenomenology can accommodate a good sense of the *finiteness* and *limitness* in the possibility of communication and knowledge or of personal identity. Without lapsing into mere relativism, it can accommodate a healthy and moderate *perspectivism* that may correspond to the modularity of our make-up and, thus, to the irreducibly multifaceted ways in which we meet reality historically and situatedly.

Phenomenology has moved us closer to the core of the mystery that (in a considerable sense) the content of our experience of the world and its realities is an *accomplishment of human beings*. It has managed to enlighten phenomena like the *crisis* of meaning in the sciences, and has incorporated these into the broader landscape of the crisis of life and of western civilization in general.

Phenomenology has thematized the problem of the nature of *values*, of our preferring this or that value system, and of concretely deciding on the basis of this or that specific value in the real circumstances of life. Mostly in the writings of Scheler, Phenomenology thus connects and further develops the important thematics that first reached a climax with Nietzsche and his critique of western culture (without, however, espousing the latter's 'solution' to humanity's problems).

Phenomenology opens up the ground for another conception of normative *Ethics* beyond the formalism that characterizes Kant's Ethics, and beyond the contingencies of empiricist Ethics. This phenomenological Ethics digs down to the generally concealed intentional emotive constitution of human existence as the ultimate fundament for the material (contentful) and concrete value Ethics of our irreducibly real lives.

On this basis, Phenomenology has also prepared the ground for an analogous *politics*, removed from Platonistic theoretical politics or the modern naïve ideological "politics of the experts (or technocrats)," or from the mere power politics of empiricists and pragmatists. Phenomenology thus shows us a way of saving both the a priori normative dimension of political institutions and of soberly separating the ideal from the factic, the concrete, and the finite. It accommodates *existentialist* constituents that offer Phenomenology the possibility of enhancing and deepening its concern for the facticity of life in general. Thus, it can easily and thoroughly abandon the idealistic Platonic view of life and praxis as a *geometrical* problem, and can naturally re-connect with the Aristotelian tradition of *phronesis* and open public deliberation.

In a sense, perhaps broader than that of mere 'internal' grounds for self-persuasion, all of the above feature among the good reasons that many phenomenologists implicitly share in their conviction about the viability of Phenomenology's research program. Personally, I think that all these points remain intact and powerful, even if we reject Phenomenology's occasionally uncritical and absolutist deviations into the wildernesses of unbridled speculation.

Even if some phenomenologists were at some time convinced that Phenomenology was or could become a "science of everything," this can clearly not literally be the case. It must be recognized that a strict critique is necessary. Phenomenology could never fulfill young Raymond Aron's promise to Sartre, in 1932, that it was a philosophy capable of providing exhaustive knowledge of the whole range of details around the fact that the latter was drinking an apricot cocktail in a particular Paris café at a particular time within the total history of the universe.<sup>49</sup> Even so, huge and important chapters of Husserlian Phenomenology remain intact, as does the promise of fresh future results. The same can be said of the philosophies of Heidegger, Scheler, Gadamer, Merleau-Ponty, Arendt, and Ricoeur, to name only a few. Indeed, Phenomenology lies not in its actuality but in its possibilities.<sup>50</sup> Many of these remain unexplored. It will, then, contribute to overcoming the seductive but also venomous utopias of the past, religious and secular alike, and to reflecting on the present brute nihilist crisis, and on what we can await in the future. The pretense that we are something more than what we actually are is no longer necessary. No claim that we are the crown of creation or of history's spirit, but also no call to become overmen, should lure and blind us. Our tormenting worries should be faced from the level of our fragility and desperate need for safety and meaningfulness. This unconfessed human desperation in the face of Ἄνάγκη (Anagke, Need) is *sublimity enough*. Let no appeal to further idealizations, whether fictional, celestial or secular, glamourize our predicament. An exercise in measured and finite prudence is what remains.

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<sup>49</sup>I extrapolate on a description of the incident cited in Spiegelberg 1994, 484–5.

<sup>50</sup>As Heidegger says, in his well-known remark from *BT*, 34.

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