THE HOLOCAUST AND COMPENSATED COMPLIANCE IN ITALY

Fossoli di Carpi, 1942-1952

Alexis Herr



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

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In dedication to those whose scholarship inspires me to study the Holocaust and genocide: Taner Akçam, Debórah Dwork, Thomas Kühne, Primo Levi, Robert Melson, Jonathan Petropoulos, and John K. Roth

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Abbreviations and Foreign Words

GermanT erms

Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA)	Reich Security Office
Geheime Staatspolizei	Gestapo
Sicherheitsdienst (SD)	Security Service
SS-Oberstrumbannführer	Lieutenant Colonel
Sicherheitspolizei (Sipo)	Security Police
SS-Oberscharführer	Sergeant First Class
Wehrmacht	German Army

Italian Terms

Questura	Police
Podestà	Mayor
Il Repubblica di Salò (RSI)	Italian Social Republic
Guardia Nazionale Repubblicana (GNR)	National Republican Guard
Partito d'Azione (PdA)	Action Party
Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI)	Italian Communist Party
Comitato di liberazione nazionale alta Italia (CNLAI)	National Liberation Committee for Upper Occupied Italy
Democrazia Cristiana (DC)	Christian Democracy
Comitato Liberazione Nazionale (CLN)	National Liberation Committee
Democrazia del Lavoro (DDL)	Labor Democratic Party

Partito Liberale Italiano (PLI)	Liberal Italian Party
Associazione Nazionale Partigiani d'Italia (ANPI)	National Association of Italian Partisans
Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI)	Italian Socialist Party
Gruppi di azione patriotica (GAP)	Patriotic Action Group
Azione Cattolica (AC)	Catholic Action
Carbinieri	Italian Police
I camici neri	The Blackshirts
Movimento dei cattolici comunisti (MCC)	Movement of Catholic Communists
Fronte Democratico Popolare	Italian Popular Front

ArchiveA bbreviations

Archivio del centro di documentazione ebraica contemporanea, Milano (CDEC)
Archivio dello stato di Modena (AdsM)
Archivio storico del comune di Carpi (ASCC)
Imperial War Museum Archive, London (IWMA)
International Tracing Service (ITS)
National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC (NARA)
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM)

Introduction

Sixty-seven years have passed since Italian Holocaust survivor Primo Levi published his memoir *Se questo è un uomo* (*If this is Man*, released in the United States under the title *Survival in Auschwitz: The Nazi Assault on Humanity*).[1] Untarnished by the passage of time, Levi's testimony remains a touchstone of Holocaust study.[2] His narrative extends beyond descriptions of physical suffering of camp life and offers a philosophical inquiry into humanity and inhumanity in Auschwitz. For Levi, the camp was a "social experiment" that released "the human animal in the struggle for life." In the fight for one's survival, commonplace categories of opposites such as "the good and the bad, the wise and the foolish, the unlucky and the fortunate," became far more complex.[3]

Reflecting upon humanity and the erosion of ethics in concentration and death camps, Levi arrived at a fundamental insight. "We do not believe in the most obvious and facile deduction: that man is fundamentally brutal, egoistic and stupid in his conduct once every civilized institution is taken away," Levi declared. "We believe, rather, that the only conclusion to be drawn is that in the face of driving necessity and physical disabilities many social habits and instincts are reduced to silence."[4] He went on to explain that "survival without renunciation of any part of one's own moral world—apart from powerful and direct interventions by fortune—was conceded only to very few superior individuals, made of the stuff of martyrs and saints."[5] In Auschwitz, survival required moral compromise.

Levi understood that determining the morality of behavior in Auschwitz was far from straightforward. It is with this thought in mind that he coined the term "gray zone" in his book *The Drowned and the Saved*, published 40 years after his memoir. "Anyone who today reads (or writes) the history of the *Lager* reveals the tendency, indeed the need, to separate evil from good, to be able to take sides, to emulate Christ's gesture on Judgment Day," explains Levi.[6] The camp, however, promoted a "moral collapse" and thus attempts to apply simplified ethical constructs are inadequate.[7] "It is a gray zone," Levi argues, "poorly defined, where the two camps of masters and servants both diverge and converge. This gray

zone possesses an incredibly complicated internal structure and contains within itself enough to confuse our need to judge."[8] The camp world, in short, was not black and white. And scholars' attempts to reduce prisoner behavior to "right" or "wrong" obfuscates a far more complicated history of human behavior.

Looking at Auschwitz through the lens of the gray zone illuminates key aspects of camp life created intentionally by the perpetrators to dehumanize Jews. In the struggle to survive Auschwitz, a person had to rely on one's animalistic nature to live another day. "It is neither easy nor agreeable to dredge this abyss of viciousness," Levi confesses, "and yet I think it must be done, because what could be perpetrated yesterday could be attempted again tomorrow, could overwhelm us and our children."[9] Levi's gray zone avoids placing blame, but it does not shy away from close scrutiny of victim behavior in the *Lager*.

The term "bystander," used by scholars to describe gentiles who fell somewhere between perpetrators and victims, has taken on a gray-zone-like quality. Researchers hold bystanders part of a broad category of action—or inaction—difficult to label or judge. Gentiles had many reasons to remain silent, including their own survival. Using the term "bystander," scholars acknowledge what Levi stressed in *Survival in Auschwitz*: the Holocaust is rarely a history of neatly defined black and white categories.

A fundamental difference exists between Levi's gray zone and scholars' bystanders, however. The former leads to greater understanding of the Holocaust, while the latter stymies sharper analysis of gentile contributions to the genocide. "Bystander" has come to mean less than perpetrator, or less responsible. Yet, less responsible does not mean uninvolved.

The Holocaust and Compensated Compliance in Italy: Fossoli di Carpi, 1942–1952 is first and foremost an investigation of gentile silence and the ambiguity of the bystander category in Italy during the Holocaust. This study scrutinizes a ten-year history of Fossoli—the camp from which Germans transferred Levi to Auschwitz—and its relationship with the neighboring town of Carpi to address how civilians not targeted for annihilation took part in a system set on mass murder and then evaded responsibility for Judeocide after the war.[10]

ChapterS tructure

The Holocaust and Compensated Compliance in Italy is divided into two chronological and thematic sections in order facilitate clear analysis of a decade of camp operations, local involvement in each phase, and the incongruity between the public memory and the historical reality of

Fossoli.[11] "Part I: The War Years" concentrates on the reasons for and modes by which ordinary gentiles participated in camp affairs during the war. "Part II: After the War" examines the postwar political, social, and economic conditions that shaped Fossoli's legacy as a symbol of Italian victimization during the German occupation.

The wartime uses of Fossoli discussed in "Part I" illustrate how individuals, some of whom did not self-identify as Fascist or antisemitic, carried out actions that supported both Fascism and antisemitic programs. Chapter 1 situates Fossoli's creation as an Italian Prisoner of War Camp for Allied soldiers captured in North Africa (May 1942–September 1943) within the historical context of Benito Mussolini's violent rise to power in the 1920s, Italians' waning support for Fascism in the early 1940s, and political ambiguity during the Pietro Badoglio period. The next three chapters trace the camp–town dynamic under the German occupation of northern Italy and the Repubblica di Salò (RSI), the Italian Social Republic. Chapter 2 scrutinizes the relationships forged between Carpi and Fossoli during the camp's use as an Italian-administered concentration camp for Jews (December 5, 1943–March 14, 1944). Chapters 3 and 4 analyze local and regional involvement in Fossoli's use as a jointly run Italian and German deportation camp for Jews and non-Jewish victims (March 15–August 1944). Despite the changing political tides and shifting operations at Fossoli, camp-town interactions remained a constant throughout the war.

"Part II" explores the camp–town interconnection throughout Fossoli's operations in the postwar period to illuminate the pressing political, social, and economic demands that overshadowed and then elided Italian contributions to the Holocaust. Chapter 5 examines Fossoli's use as an Allied prison for war criminals (spring–summer 1945), an Italian-run prison for RSI Fascists (winter 1945–spring 1946), and an Allied—then Italian—managed refugee/displaced persons camp (February–May 1947). Chapter 6 details Fossoli's repurposing as a Catholic orphanage and humanitarian center (May 1947–February 1952). In continuing our analysis through the immediate postwar era, *The Holocaust and Compensated Compliance in Italy* lays bare not only the pattern of silence that facilitated mass murder, but also the economic, political, social, and religious motivations for that silence first during, and then after, the Holocaust.

Terms

While "bystanders" are often considered silent witnesses, the term remains opaque. Political scientist Raul Hilberg conceived of bystanders as

helpers, gainers, and onlookers.[12] Historians Robert Ehrenreich and Tim Cole conceptualize a more fluid category than that proposed by Hilberg. In their view, a nonvictim/nonperpetrator is capable of transitioning from bystander to perpetrator according to her/his decision to engage actively in the persecution of the victim group.[13] Philosopher Arne Johan Vetlesen's study, on the other hand, meditates on a bystander's ability to resist. He contends that "bystanders represent the potential of resistance," and that an onlooker's capacity for action renders her/him responsible for acts of genocide.[14] Political scientist Ernesto Verdeja similarly argues that a bystander's choice not to act removes her/him from a passive to an active state. He further asserts that, "although knowledge and ability to act certainly characterize the bystander category, this category is by no means uniform."[15] Indeed, it is this lack of consensus that makes the bystander category so difficult to define and analyze.

Despite the diversity of the bystander category, however, studies that examine towns and cities neighboring camps elucidate a pattern of support of and acquiescence with genocide. Scrutinizing local contributions to camp operations, two modes of civilian support of atrocity outside of the perpetrator–victim dichotomy emerge. The most common is the passive action of individuals whose lives remained separate from all matters concerning the camp. Others came to engage in camp affairs through active action, as individuals seeking or presented with opportunities to gain financial compensation for their contributions to camp functions. Here I speak specifically of economic incentives for cooperating with a totalitarian regime set on genocide. I call this *compensated compliance*, or acquiescence for economic gain. This differs from safety. Passive action may have brought security and protection, which in itself was a type of compensation. And safety may have been a byproduct of compensated compliance, but it was not the sole profit tendered.

Let us consider how civilians' actions affected prisoners in Fossoli. In the first few pages of *Survival in Auschwitz*, Levi describes the day of his deportation from Fossoli and the intersections between the town and his deportation emerge.

> Dawn came on us like a betrayer; it seemed as though the new sun rose as an ally of our enemies to assist in our destruction. The different emotions that overcame us, of resignation, of futile rebellion, of religious abandon, of fear, of despair, now joined together after a sleepless night in a collective, uncontrolled panic…
>
> Many things were then said and done among us; but of these it is better that there remain no memory. With the absurd precision to which we later had to accustom ourselves, the Germans held the roll-call. At the end the officer asked "*Wieviel Stück?*" The corporal saluted smartly and replied

> that there were six hundred and fifty "pieces" and that all was in order. They then loaded us on to the buses and took us to the station of Carpi. Here the train was waiting for us, with our escort for the journey. Here we received the first blows: and it was so new and senseless that we felt no pain, neither in body nor in spirit. Only a profound amazement: how can one hit a man without anger?[16]

This shows Fossoli's integral role in the genocide of European Jewry and infers the mechanisms of its success. Carpi's train station was located just a few blocks from the town center. Who are the enemies to whom Levi referred? Was the Carpi construction cooperative *Cooperativo Muratori* that built the camp an enemy? What about Autoservizi Dita Valenti-Carpi, the local car service that drove Levi from the Fossoli camp to the train station? Were the bread rations Levi received from Carpi bakery Forno Chiesi for the journey to Auschwitz from an enemy? If *Cooperativo Muratori*, Autoservizi Dita Valenti-Carpi, and Forno Chiesi were not enemies, what were they? Were they part of the "first blow" on Levi's life?

An analysis of the camp's financial transactions reveals the profit companies in Carpi and the surrounding area enjoyed due to business conducted with Fossoli. Their dealings demonstrate some local residents' compensated compliance through economic incentives. It also shows that locals had the opportunity to see the camp and its prisoners. Thus, they knew what took place within their town limits and to what they contributed.

Construction and expansion of Fossoli by *Cooperativo Muratori* provides one example of how compensated compliance enticed locals' involvement. Local and regional officials from town mayors to Fascist offices in Rome employed this cooperative to build the camp, and then reengaged it for all subsequent repairs and expansions from 1942 to 1945. Similarly, locals in the town neighboring the Operation Reinhard death camp Sobibór built that annihilation camp.[17] While Sobibór and Fossoli had very different functions—Fossoli served as a transit camp to deport Jews to death camps, whereas Sobibór was a mass murder site—in each case those neighboring the camp built the facility. Does the camp function shape how we understand the labor of Carpi and Sobibór civilians? Or, perhaps more importantly, what does viewing the two locations and situations from an economic perspective say about material motivations for genocide?

Questions Surrounding Italian "Consent"

Questions surrounding Italian "consent" to Fascism, anti-Jewish policies, and the Holocaust focuses on Italian antisemitism and the legacy of the

Resistance, both of which intersect with the "*brave gente*" ("good folk") myth. Renzo De Felice brought attention to these issues in the 1960s when he examined the mechanisms and structural components set in place by Fascist authorities to engender support for Mussolini's regime and policies. While he admits that Fascists were responsible, in part, for the persecution of Jews during the German occupation, he concludes that antisemitism was a foreign concept imposed by Nazi Germany. He also argues that Italians did not support the anti-Jewish campaign.[18]

Scholars analyzing Italian antisemitism reject De Felice's claims and so doing demonstrate Italian consensus for antisemitic legislation. Works by Historians Giorgo Fabre, David Bidussa, and Aaron Gilette refute the common assumption that Benito Mussolini was not antisemitic.[19] Scholars Mauro Raspanti, Giorgio Israel, and Pietro Nasti examine how Italian racial theories influenced Fascist policies.[20] Research by historians Giuliana Marisa and Garbiella Cardosi's assess Fascist racial laws and their application to Jews of "mixed marriages" (marriages between Jews and gentiles).[21] Historian Michele Sarfatti's scholarship details how Italian Fascist laws predating the occupation were employed under German occupation to streamline deportations of Jews.[22] Works by historians Carlo Capogreco, Davide Conti, Ruth Ben-Ghiat, and Liliana Picciotto Fargion demonstrate the ways in which deportations and camps rallied support for xenophobic and racial policies.[23] And recent research by historian Guri Schwarz sheds light on how denial of Italian antisemitism intertwines with the "*brava gente*" myth.[24]

The "*brava gente*" myth—which refers to a public memory of the Holocaust that omits Italian participation in Fascism and the Judeocide—ignores Italian consent completely.[25] Again, the historiography does not reflect popular memory because scholars have scrutinized the many ways by which Italians supported Fascism.[26] In part, the absolution of Italian autonomy in the Holocaust originates in early postwar claims that Italians were not antisemitic or racist. Historian Filippo Focardi, among others, demonstrates that the nascent Italian republic elided evidence of Italian antisemitism and racism (particularly in regards to Italian colonialism in north Africa) in order to separate Italy from Germany.[27] The failure to hold Italian officials and soldiers accountable for war crimes after the liberation and the popularization of the Italian Resistance also supported claims that painted Italians as "good" and Germans as "bad." The issuing of a widespread amnesty for Fascist criminals in 1946 was thus part of an Italian political strategy that severed popular memory from the historical memory of the war years. Indeed, the Italian republic unilaterally depicted "ordinary" Italians as Resistors, not collaborators or perpetrators.[28]

Consent and Compensated Compliers

My argument regarding the consent of some *Carpigiani* to Fascism, National Socialism, and genocide hinges on the documentation of compensated compliance. The prospect of working either with or for the camp for financial gain facilitated individuals and local businesses to seek contracts to supply and work at Fossoli. Similarly, historian Harold Marcuse explains that "during the months of the Nazi takeover in Dachau, local businessmen were optimistic about the economic impact of the new concentration camp."[29] And historian Gordon J. Horwitz finds an analogous pattern of civilian involvement with Mauthausen. "Establishment of the concentration camp," he notes, "brought business to local artisans and tradesmen which they welcomed and pursued. The camp needed their skills."[30] While Horwitz refers to these individuals as "observers," I (as we shall see) view them as active participants because of the information such observations provided them.[31]

Thus, I trace the creation of the camp under Italian Fascism and its transition to Nazi rule, laying bare the local collusion at each stage that facilitated the victimization and deportation of Italian Jews, as well as Resistance efforts that sought to save them. Locals' consent to Fascist and then Nazi demands did not occur overnight. The groundwork for business with and the administration of Fossoli was laid years prior to German occupation, when the camp was a Fascist institution built to house Allied Prisoners of War (POWs) in 1942. A pattern of compensated compliance emerges in the interactions between the camp and town throughout the era of Nazi-occupied Italy. *Carpigiani* who benefited financially from the camp were not necessarily perpetrators; rather, they were compensated compliers and active participants in genocide. It is worth noting, however, that their compensated compliance often afforded them personal knowledge of how the Holocaust unfolded in Italy.

Horwitz notes that local citizens' involvement in camp operations at Mauthausen yielded mounting evidence of camp violence. In much the same way, *Carpigiani* gained varying degrees of knowledge regarding Fossoli's inner workings and its function through their financial relationships with the camp. In particular, Carpi officials acquired extensive information through their financial oversight of camp operations. Paying for and facilitating prisoner transport back and forth between the Carpi train station and the camp located six kilometers outside of the town afforded town leaders detailed knowledge of population transfers and arrivals. And Carpi businesses such as Forno Chiesi supplied food for camp inmates and Autoservizi Dita Valenti-Carpi transported

prisoners to and from the camp and train station; their employees must have appreciated the constantly arriving and leaving prisoner population. Indeed, far from mere onlookers, Carpi's municipal leaders and the businesses they hired and paid actively contributed to operations at Fossoli.[32] What are we to make of such seemingly mundane acts of compensated compliance?

The local Carpi and Modena governments' fulfillment of German orders paint an even more complicated picture. Officials in both areas began to work with the camp before its transformation into a deportation site. It is unclear what they could have done to save Jews and others and what the cost would have been to their own safety. Had they joined the Resistance would they have ended up at Fossoli? Were they "compliers" like local companies, or were they something more? Were they perpetrators? Without a doubt, Carpi town administrators knew their actions facilitated the deportation and death of thousands. This fact could not have escaped them. And this knowledge very well may have prevented their opposition out of fear for their own lives.

Even faced with the threat of death, however, many people chose to resist. The legacy of the Resistance fighters remains the hallmark of Italian Holocaust history.[33] Many of those who fought against Fascism and Nazism ended up at Fossoli. Their courage and bravery loom large in public memory. The legend of Italians as "*brava gente*" gains credibility from the stories of Resistance fighters, many of whom lost their lives in defense of freedom. There is no popular memory of Italian compliance, although including the stories of compliers would make the Resistance fighters shine even more brightly.

The final two chapters scrutinize the underlying postwar mythology that divided public memory from historical memory: the victim myth, debate over Italian antisemitism, and the "*brava gente*" narrative. Historian Rosario Forlenza argues that public memory of the Holocaust portrays Italians as victims of Fascism and denies—or at best reduces—their Axis membership.[34] In short, the victim myth fails to distinguish between targets of German reprisals and those marked for genocide.[35] In so doing Italian responsibility for the Judeocide is overlooked. Just as the victim myth elides Italian involvement in the persecution of Jews, claims that Italians were not antisemitic further detract from some Italians' participation in the Judeocide. The myth of Italian benevolence allowed for a collective pardon for Italian Fascism, violence, joining the Axis in 1940, racism, war crimes, and genocide. And despite scholars' best efforts, public memory of the Holocaust remains tethered to the "*brava gente*" myth.

In *Holocaust City*, historian Tim Cole realized that the ordinariness with which gentiles played small and big roles in setting spaces for the Holocaust to unfold constitutes an important component of why and how the Holocaust occurred. Reconstructing the formation of ghettos during the Holocaust, primarily in Budapest, Cole found himself pondering the engineer who had worked diligently in an office in Berlin to create an efficient door for the crematoria oven in Auschwitz. This thought led him to contemplate the Budapest municipal government's role in implementing a ghetto, as well as that of the non-Jewish neighbors to the ghetto. "In short," he explained, "I'm interested in that question which obsesses anyone who encounters the Holocaust: Why?"[36] *The Holocaust and Compensated Compliance in Italy* scrutinizes compliance and acquiescence with genocide in order to explain why and how silence prevailed for the majority of Italians in the occupied zone during and then after the Holocaust.

Part I

The War Years

1

In the Marketplace: Fascist Socialization and Consent in Carpi

Primo Levi begins his short story "Small Causes" by sharing a conversation he had with a group of friends on the influence that a seemingly innocuous occurrence can have on history. He writes, "small causes can have a determining effect on individual histories, just as moving the pointer of a railroad switch by a few inches can shunt a train with one thousand passengers aboard to Madrid instead of Hamburg." Levi contends that looking back on the definitive past it is easy to theorize what might have been if things had been different.[1]

Levi's "Small Causes" often reminds me of the questions my students ask me upon learning that Hitler took the entrance exam to the Vienna Academy of the Arts, but failed to gain admission. A student will inevitably raise her or his hand and ask me if I think the Holocaust would have still occurred if Hitler had got into art school instead of pursing politics. Ultimately, such questioning can only lead to a dead-end because historical hypotheticals are queries without satisfactory answers. And yet observing such crossroad moments may help us to understand Hitler's path to power.

The history that follows traces the start of a long chain of small and big causes that help to explain how the people of Carpi became entwined in the workings of a key deportation camp in Italy during the Holocaust. Benito Mussolini's rise to and consolidation of power paved the way for Carpi's participation in the construction of a Fascist mandated POW camp and in turn made all those involved in its operations actively engaged with the aims of Fascism. This chapter traces how the violent ascent of Fascism in Carpi, and the 20 years under Mussolini that followed it, created the *macchina di consenso* (the machine of consent).[2] We will consider the ways

in which violence in the years leading up to the Fascists' march on Rome in 1922 informed *Carpigiani* (Carpi residents) reception to Mussolini's newly minted regime and why Pietro Badoglio's overthrow of Mussolini in July 1943 failed to inspire a revolt against Fascist structures in Carpi.[3]

In order to analyze local involvement in Fossoli during its use as a deportation camp for Jews from December 1943 to August 1944, we must begin by scrutinizing the camp–town nexus forged under Fascism in 1942. This chapter argues that despite no longer sympathizing with Fascism, the majority of townspeople complied with the regime's demands to build and run a POW camp. Indeed, consent to Fascism made Prisoner of War (POW) Camp 73 possible. With the construction of POW Camp 73, many Carpi leaders, citizens, and industries transitioned from silent compliers to Fascist functionaries. And conceding to Fascist demands in 1942 introduced new financial incentives for Carpi. Subsequent chapters will reveal that a pattern of fear and compensated compliance would endure for the whole war.

The Creation of a Fascist Society in Carpi and the Construction of POW Camp 73

The construction of Fossoli and its reliance on Carpi created an environment of local compliance similar to the one forged between the Mauthausen concentration camp and its Austrian neighbors. In his study of Mauthausen, historian Gordon J. Horwitz concludes that its operations were tied to the locals' compliance to the camp. "[Mauthausen's] first tasks," he explains, "were bound up with achieving title to the land; gaining superiority over existing public authorities and placing itself above the law; securing the material and logistical assistance of local contractors, suppliers, and laborers; and winning the compliance of the local population."[4] While Fossoli never became a forced labor camp such as Mauthausen, a similar pattern of events that incited cooperation unfolded in Carpi.

Local Leadership

The issue to acquire land for a POW camp for Allied soldiers captured in North Africa marked the Carpi leadership's first fulfillment of Fascist demands in support of the camp. Two years of warfare alongside Germany in Italy's African colonies prompted the construction of POW Camp 73 to house enemy fighters.[5] Bonfiglio Tesi, Carpi's *podestà* (municipal administrator or mayor), scrambled to comply when the IV Army Corps

of Bologna ordered the city (May 28, 1942) to appropriate a large area of farmland in Fossoli, a small suburb of Carpi.[6] The order declared that "the military will occupy the suburban area of the city of Carpi lying between the street Via di Grilli and the irrigation canal Canale della Francesca."[7]

Located far from the fighting and near a train station facilitated convenient transfers of Allied prisoners held in North Africa and southern Italy to the small northern town. Carpi is part of Emilia Romagna—one of 20 regions that make up the Italian state. Of Emilia Romagna's eight provinces (Bologna, Ferrara, Forlì, Modena, Parma, Piacenza, Ravenna, and Reggio Emilia), Bologna (the capital) and Modena are the most populous. Modena is home to three municipalities: Modena (the provincial capital), Mirandola, and Carpi. Carpi, just under 12.5 miles north of Modena, spans slightly over 50 square miles of rich farmland. Ten small towns (Quartirolo, San Croce, Gargallo, Cibeno, Migliarina, Budrione, San Marino, Cortile, San Martino di Secchia, and Fossoli), each with fewer than 15,000 inhabitants, are situated in the municipality.[8]

Because Carpi lies within the province of Modena, the Army Headquarters in Bologna kept Giorgio Boltraffio, the *prefetto di Modena* (Modena prefect), appraised of its plans for Fossoli.[9] The day after issuing the command to acquire land, Alberto Terziani, the *generale di corpo d'armata comandante* (Lieutenant General of the Army, Bologna), informed Boltraffio that the farmland would be used to build a "prisoner of war concentration camp for 4,000 officers and troops in Carpi."[10] Leadership in Bologna, Modena, and Carpi often reached out to various Fascist offices in Rome for financial and logistical support. Boltraffio, for example, wrote to the *ministero interno direzione generale della P.S.* (Interior Ministry Police General) in Rome and requested that he send police to help support camp security, which at that time was overseen by the Carpi police. Thus, Fascist leadership in Bologna, Modena, and Carpi coordinated and managed the construction of POW Camp 73.[11] In hindsight, we can observe that this action set the stage for the town's subsequent involvement in camp affairs until the end of the war.

Business Opportunities for Local Companies and Cooperatives

Carpi's civilian population first learned of the military's presence within Carpi when the town leadership complied with Bologna's order to post an announcement of the "seized land for public interest."[12] In accordance with Law n. 2359 of June 25, 1865, land taken by the government required that the authorities compensate those forfeiting property.[13] *Carpigiani* became directly involved in the camp's creation a few weeks later when

the *Ufficio Lavori del Genio Militare di Bologna* (Bologna Army Corps of Engineers) hired Carpi's Fascist construction cooperative *Società Anonima Cooperativa Muratori, Cementisti e Decorati* di Carpi (hence force referred to as *Cooperativa Muratori*) to build the POW camp.[14]

The fact that *Cooperativa Muratori* was a Fascist organization only explains in part the cooperative's decision to build the Fascist mandated camp. Actually, *Cooperativa Muratori* was originally a socialist organization; one of many *camera dei lavore* (workers unions) formed in the 1890s that fell victim to Fascist violence in the interwar period. The central goal of a *cooperativo* (cooperative) was to provide mutual assistance to its members.[15] This was a significant step in the advancement of labor unions. Cooperatives eventually became the center of political development and social consciousness. Carpi's *Cooperativo Muratori*, for example, led a successful workers' strike for higher pay in 1901 that spread through Modena.[16]

Modena's central government had created a *camera del lavore*, a central leadership for workers unions across all fields, and that same year (1906) Carpi established its own *camera del lavore*, which advocated on behalf of 26 workers' leagues including *Cooperativo Muratori*.[17] Carpi's *camera del lavore* contributed to the rise of socialism, which developed in parallel to the workers' unions.

At the end of the 1800s, Emilia Romagna was home to some of the country's first and most fiery apostles of socialism: Camillo Prampolini, Gregory Agnini, Zirardini Gaetano, and Giuseppe Massarenti. Italians elected 33 socialists to Parliament, securing 13 percent of 508 seats. The town of Carpi elected Guido Albertelli, its first socialist, in 1913. He was one of 70 socialist deputies elected nationally that year. The removal in 1912 of a literacy test and property qualification for men to vote enlarged the electorate from about 7 to 24 percent of the population. Increased participation in politics helped form a strong socialist identity in Carpi from 1913 through World War I.[18] It is worth noting that voting statistics only provide insight into men's political orientation because the Italian government did not grant womens' suffrage until 1946.

Historian Luigi Ganapini's study of Modena's *camera de lavoro* stresses the importance of the nascent workers leagues to Italian political identity. He explains that in addition to offering communal benefits to its members, the *camere del lavoro* symbolized a form of liberal political progress and a desire for the working class to gain a say in societal affairs.[19] This push toward liberal democracy, however, made it a target for advocates of early totalitarian Fascism. Historian Roberto Vivarelli argues that after the first war, Fascists created a totalitarian doctrine and political movement that depicted itself as in permanent revolution. Thus,

Fascist attacks on socialists should be viewed as both a political and a social confrontation.[20]

Fascist political violence during the early years of Fascism (1919–1925) targeted socialist institutions such as Carpi's *camera di lavoro* and in so doing destroyed the socialist workers movement.[21] Historian Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi argues that, "all socialist structures were occupied and destroyed by the Fascists."[22] Capitalist and nationalist desires to blame socialists for Italian failures in World War I motivated Fascist attacks during the so-called *squadrismo* years (1920–1922).[23] Local Fascists assaulted Carpi's *camera del lavoro* on December 11, 1920.[24] The next month (January 25, 1921) they targeted the *camera del lavoro* again, this time looting the premises and setting the building on fire.[25] These attacks in Carpi and others throughout the region suppressed socialist political cohesion by eliminating its centers of operation.[26] Within a matter of months Carpi's *camera del lavoro* closed permanently. This was a significant achievement for the Fascists followers given that, as of 1920, the Carpi organization had 17,000 members.[27]

Fascists established their own workers' unions, and locals either reluctantly or willingly joined to secure jobs during the period of high unemployment.[28] Guerrazzi contends that this was part of Fascist strategy and that by dismantling socialist workers leagues, Carpi labors had little choice but to join the Fascist party after Mussolini's march on Rome.[29] While Carpi had wielded a strong socialist identity for nearly two decades, it quickly folded under Fascist pressure.[30] "The goal of domestic violence was not simply to eliminate a few 'degenerate' groups," argues historian Micheal Ebner, "but also to force Italians to behave according to the central tenets of the Fascist state: authority, centralization, hierarchy, and discipline."[31] Thus, we must understand that *Cooperativo Muratori*'s construction of a Fascist camp in 1942 (despite its Socialist beginnings), was possible because of early Fascist intimidation and aggression.

The early years of Fascist violence remained a lasting threat and memento throughout Fascist rule.[32] Even Carpi citizens who had formerly supported Fascism and had lost faith in the regime by the 1940s still belonged to Fascist institutions such as *Cooperativo Muratori* in order to avoid scrutiny and make an income. Hence, 22 years later, *Cooperativo Muratori*, formerly destroyed by Fascist violence, accepted 874,264.48 lire to build a Fascist-mandated POW camp and locals accepted jobs building it.[33]

Because the labor opportunities were substantial, so was civilian involvement in building the camp. Danilo Sacchi, who grew up on a neighboring farm, recalled his family's conversation around the dinner table one night regarding whether or not his uncle should seek such employment. After debating the pros and cons—earning much-needed

money versus supporting a Fascist project—the family decided, "a few bucks more [would] not hurt."[34]

Each labor and material need meant another financial advantage for *Carpigiani* and reveals the sustained involvement of Carpi officials in the camp's establishment and operations.[35] The *podestà* was responsible for assigning government-financed contracts for public works.[36] Located as it was on former farmland, everything from bricks to electrical wires had to be purchased from and transported by locals to the camp. The Carpi administration became increasingly involved in executing such tasks. Carpi *podestà* Tesi, for example, wrote to *ufficio del genio civilie di Modena* (the office of civil engineers, Modena) on October 30, 1942 to update them on steps taken to bring electricity and waterlines to the camp.[37] Tesi and *Società Emiliana di Esercizi Electrici*, a nearby electrical company, had been working together for months to get new electrical wires to reach the remote site.[38]

Indeed, Tesi and subsequent Carpi *podestà* were in some way involved in nearly every contract generated between the camp and town. Although Bologna Army Corps IV had hired *Cooperativa Muratori* to build the camp, for example, a Carpi *podestà* facilitated the contract and payment of the cooperative.[39]

Cooperativo Muratori quickly assembled a provisional tent camp (see Figure 3.1, "Prisoner of War Tent Camp Plan") to meet immediate internment demands while workers erected a large barrack complex across the street.[40] The temporary camp plans indicate 191 tents divided by barbed wire into two sections of 96 and 95 tents, respectively.[41] Each side had latrines and a kitchen, and midway between the two sectors stood a small hospital squared off with barbed wire. The guard quarters were located outside, to the south of the camp across Canale Francesca.[42] When the time arrived to staff the camp, a mix of high-ranking Fascists and local police signed on.[43] Colonel Giuseppe (Polo) Ferraresi commanded the camp from July 1942 until September 1943 on behalf of the Armed Forces High Command in North Africa. The 300 to 350 guards[44] were *Carabinieri Reali*—royal guards—and local police officers.[45]

Camp Operations and Italian Consent

For us to trace the routes by which *Carpigiani* became active in the Holocaust, we must begin by scrutinizing camp–town dynamics under Fascism. Religious scholar Victoria Barnett analyzes the ways by which Europeans not targeted for annihilation became passive onlookers and perpetrators during the Holocaust. She contends that a bystander's

passivity might be considered a form of agency, thus becoming a perpetrator was but one way of joining in. "[T]o understand the perpetrators as 'ordinary people,'" Barnett argues, "is to view them as individuals who did not start out as convinced fanatics or disturbed, potentially violent people, but as bystanders."[46] Camp–town relations demonstrate the ways by which passive actors became key players—actively or passively—in facilitating Fascist aims at Fossoli.

The disastrous consequences of Italy's entry into World War II had diminished faith in Fascism and, as a result, distrust of the Fascist regime overtook animosity against captured Allied soldiers.[47] The first prisoners, 1,800 men, arrived in Carpi on July 18, 1942 at a time when Fascist fervor was in a state of decline. Mussolini's ability to inspire loyalty and trust faltered as Italy's losses in World War II undermined Fascist visions of Italian grandeur. Italy suffered a series of military defeats in the Balkans, Greece, and Italy's African colonies from June 1940 through July 1943. Each failure contradicted Mussolini's assertion that Italy's entry into war would bring prosperity and pride.[48]

An overall more critical outlook on Fascism in combination with amicable interactions between prisoners and locals—such as bakers, construction workers, priests, onlookers, and the town administrators—demonstrate that the *Carpigiani* may have not even viewed the POWs at the camp as enemies. Nonetheless, locals, many motivated by fear and/or financial incentives, remained involved with the camp.

Camp Structures and Prisoner–Guard Interactions

British POW Abbie Jones's wartime diary supports the theory that *Carpigiani* may have not viewed the POWs as enemies. Indeed, he offers a positive review of the Fossoli camp and his guards.[49] In a diary entry dated October 7, 1942, Jones confessed, "Everything that the Italians can do for us is being done and up to now P.O.W. life is far above my expectations. In the near future we are moving across the road into brick buildings which we hope will be better still…I am confident that we shall be made quite comfortable as up to date."[50] Jones's reference to his treatment in Fossoli highlights congenial prisoner–Italian guard relations. Although they were adversaries, many locals in the region and camp guards did not view the Allied soldiers as enemies.

Despite Italian benevolence toward their captives, the POWs' internment was far from comfortable. In addition to the infrequency of parcel arrivals and fears of malnutrition, dropping temperatures in the fall and winter months made life under canvas tents hazardous to the prisoners'

health. Jones stopped leaving his bed by mid-November 1942 and spent his days huddled under blankets. Eventually, he became so sick that he had boils on his neck and had to be transported to a military hospital in nearby Modena where Italian medical staff tended to him. Prisoners' living conditions improved on November 18, 1942 when the guards moved the inmates into the barrack camp.[51]

The camp held 97 barracks of which 46 housed prisoners and the rest served various purposes: offices, guard dorms, hospitals, storage space, and bathrooms.[52] Dormitories accounted for the majority of the buildings and each measured 19 feet wide by 104 feet long. Hay-mattress bunk beds lined the walls of the prisoner barracks in two rows and each barrack could hold up to 100 prisoners. The sole entrance to the camp passed through the command headquarters, guard headquarters, and service facilities. A double fence surrounded the prisoner barracks. The outer fence stood 6.5 feet high and the inner one measured just over 3 feet. In addition to marking the camp perimeter, barbed wire fences also lined the pathway into the camp and extended to the end of the facility, effectively dividing the prisoner section into two parts, with two openings in the wire to each side (four in total). This barbed wire passageway stretched 1,049 feet. Guard towers were located at 164 feet intervals around the camp outer wire (18 in total).[53]

The creation and staffing of the camp signifies that *Carpigiani* were supporting Fascist aims, even if they no longer held faith in the regime. The very existence of the camp requires closer scrutiny of the neighboring population if we want to understand *Carpigiani* compliance with Fascism. British POW E. Barrington recorded (January 10, 1943) that "the Alps [are] in sight but unfortunately some of Mussolini's minions have put several layers of barbed wire and machine guns in between us."[54] Although Italy's wartime failures eroded the town's overall faith in Fascism, their actions tell a different story.

Prisoner Demographics and Numbers

Just as the construction of the camp relied upon local businesses and laborers, the arrival of prisoners furthered the towns' involvement with the camp. The influx of thousands of POWs at the Carpi train station just south of the town center allowed for locals to meet their "enemies"—as defined by the Fascist regime—for the first time and watch as they marched six kilometers past the city limits to the camp.

The sizable prisoner population required local involvement in guarding, feeding, and attending to POW health needs, but before we discuss

the myriad of ways locals came to interact and provide for prisoners, let us begin by examining the prisoner population figures in order to better appreciate the scope of town involvement. Although documentation on prisoner arrivals is sparse, those available reveal the approximate size of the prisoner population. Letters between Carpi and Modena officials note the following arrival dates and numbers of POWs for the month of August, which gives an idea of prisoner population growth (see Table 1.1).[55]

Ettore Tirelli (1873–1945) is another key source of information. The Carpi born priest was ordained 1896 and served the town for nearly half a century as the chaplain at the Hospital of Carpi and, as of 1937, became a canon in the Carpi cathedral. He was an avid chronicler of events and for most of his 72 years he kept a log of activities in Carpi. His position in the hospital afforded him contact with POWs in need of medical care. Furthermore, his family's optical shop, located right outside the town hall, was a popular meeting location, and a great place for Tirelli to visit and hear town gossip.[56] In his log from July to November 1942, he noted the arrival of three groups of prisoners (see Table 1.2).[57]

POW wartime journals and postwar testimony offer additional data on prisoner numbers. In his postwar testimony, Wilmott explained, "This camp was the collecting center for men from all the surrounding hospitals, Parma, Lucca, Piacenza, Bergamo, Modena and Castel San Pietro."[58] It is unclear how many prisoners resided in the provisional tent camp when they finally were marched to the barrack camp. Government documents stated that the barrack camp could accommodate between 3,500[59] and 4,000[60] people.

Table 1.1 August Prisoner Arrivals

Date	*Number of Prisoners*
8 August	43[a]
30 August	1,255[b]
30 August	41[c]
31 August	1,235[d]
Total	**2,574**

[a] Ads Modena Questura d'Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, B. 6, "prot. 0917, oggetto: Campo concentramento prigionieri di guerra" (August 8, 1942).
[b] Ads Modena, Questura d'Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, B. 6, "prot. 2865, oggetto" (August 19, 1942).
[c] Ads Modena, Questura d'Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, B. 6, "prot. 917" (August 31, 1942).
[d] Ads Modena, Questura d'Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, B. 6, "prot. 013914" (August 30, 1942).

Table 1.2 Ettore Tirelli's Arrival Log[a]

Date	*Number of Prisoners*
21 July	1,800
20 August	50
31 August	1,500
Total	**3,350**

[a] Archivio Nomadelfia, "Campo di Fossoli, Memorie e Documenti," 15B-01, B.

The national makeup of the inmates is equally unclear. By the time Germany had occupied Italy in September 1943, nearly 80,000 Allied POWs were housed in 73 camps throughout Italy. British and Commonwealth troops accounted for approximately 68,000 men, and French, Yugoslavs, Greeks, and Americans made up the rest.[61] In his wartime log, Tirelli mentioned Britons, Australians, New Zealanders, Americans, Canadians, and Indians in the Fossoli camp.[62] Internal government correspondence dated July 25, 1943 also mentions South Africans detained at Fossoli.[63] Contemporary British POW testimony recorded French and Russian inmates.[64]

Infestations

Prisoners' dismal living conditions within the camp created additional financial opportunities for vendors, farmers, and medical professionals.[65] Locals were hired in February 1943, for example, to wash the POWs' clothing in order to combat the lice and bedbugs that plagued Fossoli prisoners.[66] Many of the soldiers had spent time in other camps without hygienic facilities prior to their arrival. They brought vermin with them and, in spite of the washroom facilities, infestation spread. The unhygienic conditions of POW life affected some soldiers' morale in addition to plaguing their bodies. W. G. Harvey served in the British 106th Company of Royal Engineers in North Africa before the Germans captured him in Egypt in June 1942. Prior to Fossoli, he had been in the Otranto internment camp in southern Italy. Reflecting years later on his time in POW Camp 73, he explains, "we felt like caricatures of soldiers."[67]

The lice accompanied the prisoners from the tents into the barracks and prisoners had little success in freeing themselves of this pest. In his wartime diary, British POW Barrington described an instance in which the guards shaved the entire body of a fellow inmate to quell an uncontrolled lice infestation.[68]

Food and Supplies

POWs received inconsistent and often insufficient food rations and subsisted on inadequate portions from the camp cookhouses. According to contemporary testimony, a standard meal consisted of clear soup, bread, and coffee—not enough to satisfy the men's hunger.[69] At times, the soup contained vegetables, at other times only rice. Barrington expressed frustration over his short bread ration too. When Barrington complained about the matter, the camp commander told him "[he] would run the camp his own way and wanted no welfare committees."[70]

Much appreciated Red Cross packages supplemented their caloric intake and POWs purchased extra food and goods in the camp cantina with the money issued to them as a result of Chapter 7, Article 23 of the 1929 Geneva Convention. This clause ensured that, officers and persons of equivalent status who were POWs, would receive from the detaining power the same pay as officers of corresponding rank in the armed forces of that nation monthly. Local businesses stocked the small store with merchandise ranging from food to toothpaste powder.[71] The fact that during this period POWs received Red Cross food packages and had funds to spend in the camp speaks to the camp's (and Italy's) general adherence to the 1929 Geneva Convention at this time.[72]

Abbie Jones wrote optimistically of his initial weeks in the tent camp and discussed the usefulness of the cantina and the POW funds. In a diary entry dated October 3, 1942, he wrote, "Back pay due from 21st June to 30th September is 41 Lire total. We now have our canteen at which we can buy fruit every other day, cigarettes and toilet necessities."[73] Access to the cantina offered a backup in the event parcels did not arrive. "On Sept. 28th we had a visit from the Red Cross people from Geneva," explained Jones. "We received some very welcome information as regards to the issue in the future of food parcels…that all subsequent issues will be under consistency to a scale, i.e. one per man every 7 to 10 days and one of the main things we are looking forward to now is word from home."[74] Upon writing this Jones had yet to receive an individual package but remained hopeful all the same.

If they encountered farmers, the POWs were permitted to buy food from them.[75] Prisoners also earned food by volunteering to work on local farms in the area surrounding the camp.[76] Additionally, the camp organized walks for 100 prisoners at a time around the land surrounding the camp. In short, the prisoners may have slept behind barbed wire, but they were not completely isolated from the local population.

POW Health Care

POW access to health care in the camp clinic and local hospitals afforded Italians ample opportunity to interact with foreign combatants and earn a profit. Many of the arriving prisoners required medical attention as a result of malnutrition, which in turn created another avenue for prisoner and local interaction.[77] Less than a month after opening Fossoli camp, commander Ferraresi sent a notice on August 5, 1942 to the *ufficiale sanitario del commune di Carpi* (health officer of Carpi) reporting that the prisoners had experienced the first instance of infectious disease.[78] When an inmate fell ill, a local doctor traveled to the camp to treat the patient on site. Prisoners requiring medical attention beyond the means of the camp infirmary were transferred by ambulance to local hospitals, typically the Carpi town hospital or the nearby Modena military hospital.[79]

Sick prisoners also meant more occasions for *Carpigiani* to benefit financially from the POW camp and interact with the enemy soldiers. Carpi nurses who staffed the ambulances received 20 lire per visit. Ferraresi complained to Tesi that the hospital employed too many nurses for this purpose and he did not want to pay for unneeded personnel. He also criticized the hospital for overcharging the camp for the ambulance fuel. The drivers reported a round-trip distance of 17 kilometers, when in fact it was 14 kilometers.[80]

The POWs may have been enemies to Fascism, but the *Carpigiani* did not fear the foreign soldiers. Let us consider the case of British POW Abbie Jones. He was sent by ambulance to a local hospital and ended up sharing a room with Italian children.

> I am in a ward with two Italian kiddies—it is a queer place and I can't quite get the hang of it yet. It seems to be for the poorer classes judging by the kiddies' families when they visited them. The old man ate the child's ration of bread as if he had never eaten for days. Many people have come into the ward to listen to me trying my utmost to speak Italian.[81]

The fact that Italian patients shared their rooms with enemy soldiers suggests something about citizen–prisoner interaction in the early stages of the camp. The decision to house enemy soldiers alongside Italian children reveals how unthreatened locals felt by the so-called enemy soldiers. Locals visiting Jones to hear his comical attempts at Italian reveal a population unmoved by the nation's rhetoric of war. This was reinforced by the fact that some of the poorer *Carpigiani* were even hungrier than the POWs.

While townspeople visiting Jones or sharing his room may not have viewed the Englishman or other Allied soldiers as adversaries, the local administrators opposed such fraternization. Thus, by January 1943 the local Carpi hospital opened a special wing to accommodate POWs. Bologna once again awarded the contract to *Cooperativa Muratori* to construct the POW hospital section and paid them 300,000 lire for this task.[82]

Carpi officials also arranged for the burial of soldiers. The POW wing lost its first patient on February 11, 1943. Walter Lancaster, a British POW, was 27 years old at the time of his death. Other POWs later met the same fate and the town of Carpi arranged for their burials in a local cemetery.[83] On the whole, these deaths do not appear to be the result of negligence, as prisoner testimony from that time indicates that hospital personnel treated patients well and the latter appreciated the warm room and better food.

The Church and the Camp

Religion, like health care, created greater opportunities for prisoners to interact with Italians. Local and national religious figures made arrangements to meet with prisoners, provide spiritual guidance, and baptize captives throughout Italy. Such interactions occurred inside and outside the camps. In his wartime log, for example, Tirelli recorded that on June 22, 1943 one of his colleagues baptized a British prisoner in the hospital chapel. And Vigilio Federico Dalla Zuanna, the acting Archbishop of Carpi, confirmed William Rader, a 23-year-old British soldier being treated at a hospital.[84] Barrington wrote in his journal about a papal nuncio visiting the camp. "By 11:30 am [on 15 January 1943] the bugle sounded for General Parade and addresses by the Apostolic Nuncio Monsignor Gustavo Testa,[85] a high official from Vatican city to give us the Pope's New Year greetings," Barrington recorded. "His blessing [was] to all Roman Catholics but only his best wishes to others. He also distributed several hundred Christmas booklets with the Pope's message inside."[86] The severe winter temperature kept the sermon short. Afterwards POWs, guards, and camp officials clustered around the apostolic nuncio for autographs. Barrington wrote:

> His signature looked more like "Pumpkin" than "Testa" which amused us greatly. However he was pretty blue with cold [and after a few minutes] he said "I catcha da pneumonia, the convention only say 10 and already I have signed twenty." Photographs were taken in dozens by [Italian] officers and press officials and I suppose the incident will have some propaganda value.[87]

Barrington does not specify if he meant that the photos held propaganda value for the Church, Fascist state, or both. Publishing photos of Vatican emissaries visiting POWs would have served to paint Church officials in a favorable light as well as relay the Church's neutral stance on the war. By not outwardly condemning Fascism, the Vatican leadership guided Catholics to do the same.[88]

The interaction between Carpi religious authorities and interned soldiers shows how the Carpi religious community viewed the inmates as Christians (or potential Christians) first and enemy combatants second (if at all). According to Barrington, fellow POWs as well as local priests held Sunday sermons. He always made an effort to attend services and thus on Sunday, January 10, 1943, he braced the bitter cold and trudged to hut 44 for a POW-led prayer meeting. "The Padre gave us another brilliant sermon on 'gratitude' and how we should count our blessings," wrote Barrington. "He certainly is one of them keeping very fit and energetic for a P.O.W. of his age, standing on a top bunk and showing a shining example of enthusiasm for his cause."[89]

These weekly services also provided an opportunity for the inmates to gossip, speculate about their release, and discuss the state of the war. Rumors were fueled by bits of information shared by the town priests visiting the camp and the influx of new prisoners. POW Jones wrote in his diary that the priests encouraged them to be confident that their freedom was not far away.[90]

Fossoli and Carpi Under Badoglio

Mussolini's removal from power in July 1943 reinforced the priest's reasoning that the POWs' freedom was near, but in reality the dismissal of the Duce (Italian for "leader") had little effect on camp operations. Mussolini's ability to inspire loyalty and trust faltered as Italy's losses in World War II undermined Fascist visions of Italian grandeur and faith in Mussolini. Italy suffered a series of military defeats in the Balkans, Greece, and Italy's African colonies from June 1940 through July 1943. Each failure contradicted Mussolini's assertion that Italy's entry into war would bring prosperity and pride. In the past, Fascists had employed a rhetoric that exalted war to validate their political ideology. The glorification of war had helped to unify a deeply divided society. It was war, however, that ultimately sowed discontent with Fascism and Mussolini.[91]

The Council gathered on July 19, 1943 to address Mussolini's dismissal. Dino Grandi drafted the Council's resolution, which declared its lack of trust in the Duce's leadership and its intention to return full

power to King Victor Emmanuel. Mussolini met with the Council on July 24, during which Grandi presented his proposal. The meeting lasted through the night and Grandi's resolution prevailed on the morning of July 25 by a vote of 19–7. As the Council was an advisory board, its decision did not worry Mussolini and he went to work as usual. Little did he know, in less than 24 hours he would be arrested. That evening, when he reported to the Villa Savoia royal residence, the King informed Mussolini of his appointment of Marshal Pietro Badoglio as the new head of government.

In fact, it was not until Badoglio stumbled in September 1943, as he tried to withdraw Italy from its alliance with Hitler that Carpi was impacted by Mussolini's fall. Badoglio's new role placed him in a fragile position as he labored to appease the Allies in a manner that would not provoke a German attack.[92] Thus, in his address to the public the day Mussolini was incarcerated, Badoglio stated for the benefit of the Germans, "the war continues."[93]

Badoglio's fear of Germany undermined his government during its 45-day tenure between July and September 1943.[94] Numerous Italians rejoiced at Mussolini's removal, but Badoglio's stance dampened their celebrations. Journal entries and letters of this time show that many Italians understood that Badoglio's announcement was lip service to the Germans and they held out hope for an armistice. Italian communists in Emilia Romagna, for example, led a strike on July 27, 1943 as a means of pressuring Badoglio to annul Italy's alliance with Germany.[95]

Before the communists in Emilia Romagana even considered their strike, however, the Allies and Badoglio had conducted secret talks about how to handle the POW situation. The Allies feared that the Germans would transfer all the Allied POWs to Germany and Badoglio's government worried that if they released the POWs, they would engage in guerrilla warfare. Their shared concern, however, was German retaliation for freeing captives. As a solution to their anxiety, General Bernard Law Montgomery, commander of the British Eighth Army, suggested what became known as the "Stay Put" order, which was sent out in coded letters and radio transmissions to Italian POW camps:

> In the event of an Allied invasion of Italy, officers commanding prison camps will ensure that prisoners-of-war remain within the camp. Authority is granted to all officers commanding to take necessary disciplinary action to prevent individual prisoners-of-war attempting to rejoin their units.[96]

The Allied POWs thus remained in camps until Badoglio determined how to release them without provoking the Germans.

Meanwhile the prisoners, unaware of Badoglio and the Allies plans to sit and wait, rejoiced at the news of Mussolini's demise. In his wartime journal, Barrington recorded his elation upon hearing the news:

> So at long last Mussolini has been kicked out. Now our freedom is definitely near and Churchill can talk peace terms with the new Duce… [E]veryone is wildly excited and even our few pessimists haven't much to say… We can hardly imagine that soon we may be on the way home.[97]

Guards at Fossoli seemed to share in their captives' optimism that Fascism would disappear with Mussolini; yet another sign of Italian ambivalence about the war. While at roll call a few days after the Duce's replacement, Barrington had even observed that many of the guards had removed their Fascist party ribbons.[98]

POWs speculated as to whether their Italian guards would leave their posts, which speaks to the prisoners' low expectations for their supervisors' commitment to Fascism. "The Colonel addressed his troops twice today," Barrington observed, "they are in a flat spin outside and do not know what to do until Italy's future has been decided. I consider it a 100–1 chance they pack in, and hear the Colonel is supposed to have said that by Sept. 1st this camp will be cleared."[99]

Either the Colonel or the rumor that Barrington heard was wrong. Instead, the inmate population increased. The influx of prisoners, both prior to and following Mussolini's removal, indicates a certain level of operational continuity between the Badoglio and Mussolini regimes. Four days before Mussolini's fall, for example, 402 POWs from Fossoli were sent to Germany (July 21) for forced labor.[100] Their bunks did not remain empty for long as over the next month another 1,700 British, American, and Indian POWs prisoners entered the camp.[101]

This increasing number of POWs came to rely on the camp cantina to supplement their diet when Allied bombings in Milan disrupted the supply chain of Red Cross provisions.[102] With the Italian economy in decline, local businesses continued to benefit from the services and goods they sold to the camp. Additionally, *Cooperativa Muratori*, the company that had built the camp, continued its construction of a new barracked section.[103]

Town and camp relations under Badoglio continued as they had under Mussolini's Fascism with only minor changes.[104] Carpi residents supplied the camp as they had before and the camp relied on the same companies to build barracks and transport goods to the camp. The continuation of the camp–town nexus during the Badoglio phase highlights the limbo in which many Italians found themselves. The overthrow of Mussolini illustrated the erosion of Fascist support, but waiting for change characterized the Badoglio period.

Conclusion

With the construction of POW Camp 73, the war officially came to Carpi. Primed by nearly two decades of Fascist rule, the town accepted its position as proprietor and supplier of the Fascist camp for POWs. The friendly contact between *Carpigiani* and the POWs highlights a prevailing war fatigue and lack of enthusiasm for Fascism that culminated in Mussolini's removal in the summer of 1943.[105] Badoglio's assumption of power did not bring the immediate end of Fascist rule or an Italian exit from the war. Instead, the townspeople of Carpi lived in state of uncertainty as they went about their daily activities with the camp as if Mussolini had never been arrested. The machine of compliance was still in motion.

The following chapters detail Carpi's increasing contact and interaction with the camp through the occupation, liberation, and postwar repurposing of Fossoli. Despite the momentum of the war and its end, the town–camp nexus never wavered from that first established under Fascism. Thus, when considering how some *Carpigiani* became involved in the deportation and persecution of Jews, we must remember the camp–town dynamic forged during Fascism that paved the way for locals' contributions to the Judeocide.

2

Germany and Its Occupied Ally: The German Occupation, the *Repubblica di Salò*, and the Deportations of Jews

Mussolini's arrest had infuriated Hitler. He would have ordered an immediate attack on Rome were it not for his advisors Field Marshall Erwin Rommel and Alfred Jodl (Chief of the Armed Forces High Command Operations Staff) urging him to take a different course of action. Germany flooded Italy with swastika clad troops and in so doing stalled an announcement of an armistice. When Badoglio finally dissolved Italy's partnership with the Reich, the Germans were already in position to take Rome.[1] Badoglio's announcement of an armistice with the Allies on September 8, 1943 and the subsequent invasion of German forces into Italy furthered camp–town relationship. Locals' service of Fossoli continued uninterrupted as the Germans commandeered the camp, deported the POWs, and instructed the town leadership to prepare for Fossoli's new function as an internment camp for Jews.

This brief period (September 9, 1942–March 14, 1943) constitutes an essential component of our analysis of Fossoli and *Carpigiani*. The established routes of compensated compliance—acquiescence for financial gain—prior to the Germans' arrival at Fossoli shaped locals' participation thereafter. Following the German occupation, however, *Carpigiani* obedience evolved from compliance with a Fascist regime to full cooperation with a joint Fascist–Nazi system intent on murdering Italy's Jews. With fear and individual gain still fueling the machine of consent, many *Carpigiani* became complicit in Judeocide. And while these factors may have motivated compliance with German commands to build, supply, and staff a camp for Jews, at what point—if at all—did locals realize they were party to mass murder?

Germany and Its Occupied Ally

A lack of military support and direction from Rome resulted in Fossoli guards' cooperation with its German occupiers. Learning of Italy's truce with the Allies, German troops attacked their former partner, and the king and Badoglio did nothing to stop the invasion or prepare Italian soldiers. Instead, as German forces surrounded Rome, the royal family and Badoglio fled to Allied-occupied Brindisi for safety. The fall of the capital city and the flight of Italy's leadership cast an ominous shadow over the German-occupied zone. Without guidance, Italian soldiers soon threw down their weapons and either yielded to the Germans or went into hiding. Likewise, Fossoli guards, lacking military support, surrendered to the Germans.

British POW Abbie Jones's wartime diary suggests that Fossoli guards had initially considered fighting the Germans.[2] Jones recorded that the day Badoglio announced the armistice, camp commander Colonel Giuseppe Ferraresi told Major Garnett (a POW leader) that "he would like to give us arms but could not" and asked that if the situation became grave "would we give assistance and we agreed most heartily."[3] Ferraresi also celebrated Italy's truce with the Allies by drinking wine with a few of the POWs.[4]

While Jones and his fellow POWs toasted the armistice, German forces in Italy sprung into action. Shortly after Badoglio announced the armistice on the *Ente Italaino per le Audizioni Radiofoniche* (EIAR), the Italian broadcasting system, the Germans radioed their own message, which included the word "Achse" (Axis), the Germans' code word to respond to the suspected Armistice.[5]

Jones went to bed in the early hours of September 9, 1943 and awakened to find that the German military had surrounded Fossoli. "The Italian guards were still on the wire as dawn broke," Jones recorded. "Some of the boys saw what we thought to be Italian soldiers out in the field. The next thing we knew, four German armoured cars rolled up and took positions at each corner of the compound…and two hours later the German infantry closed in and took over the camp without trouble at all."[6] Thus, as Badoglio fled, the Germans converged.

The surrender of Fossoli's guards mirrored events occurring throughout the German-occupied zone and help us to contextualize the fall of Italy's armed forces.[7] Aroldo Vaccari, a member of the 36th infantry of Modena sent to Fossoli in 1942 to help organize the camp, described the guards' surrender. In an interview years later, he explained that "a [German] commander [came] to the camp and spoke with our captain and as a result we gave up our weapons and the 36th Infantry returned to Modena…" According to Vaccari, nobody resisted.[8] The Germans

retained only two Fossoli guards—Captain Marco Bertoli and Major Luigi Bissignangi—to act as their conduits to the town authorities.[9]

Like the POWs some had guarded, Italian soldiers were now subject to arrest, detention, and deportation to Germany. German propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels issued a directive on September 10, calling for the disarmament of the Italian army. This was followed by a September 12 decree from Wilhelm Keitel, head of the Reich's armed forces, that mandated the murder of Resistance fighters and deportation of soldiers.[10] Vaccari and the remainder of the 36th infantry stayed in Modena until the end of September, at which time they were sent to *Stalag* IIC, a POW camp in Woldenberg, Poland.[11]

Fear of reprisal had silenced Italian resistance in Carpi against Fascism and the same pattern of fear-induced compliance remained in place under the Germans.[12] The German army captured, disarmed, and interned between 650,000 and 850,000 Italian soldiers in Italy and Italian-occupied territories (France, the Balkans, and the Greek islands).[13] More than 600,000 Italian soldiers serving outside Italy metamorphosed from allies into potential victims of German oppression overnight.[14] Former Fascist soldiers who managed to evade capture joined pre-existing anti-Fascist groups or formed new resistance bands.[15] Without a leader, Italians now had to fend for themselves.

The *Repubblica di Salò*

German paratroopers liberated Mussolini on September 12 from *campo imperatore* in Italy's "Little Tibet," a plateau in the Abruzzo region. They brought along *carabinieri* general Fernando Soleti, who ordered the 80 guards monitoring Mussolini to stand down. The men complied, and the Germans rescued Mussolini without firing a single shot. The Germans then took Mussolini to Germany and started preparations to reinstate him as head of a new Italian Fascist state.[16]

Germans combatted budding Italian opposition in part by establishing the *Repubblica di Salò*, or RSI—a renewed Fascist government under Mussolini—to suppress Resistance fighters and control Italian citizens. Germany reestablished an Italian government to help enforce Italian cooperation, deter budding resistance efforts, and provide an opportunity to collaborate. The Germans focused on extorting Italy's financial, industrial, agricultural, and human resources, and the RSI attended to overseeing Italians' acquiescence to German demands.

Rudolf Rahn, plenipotentiary of the Reich in Italy, advocated for the creation of an Italian collaborationist government. He played the

master role in the formation of the new Fascist command and handpicked Mussolini's cabinet members. Mussolini learned of Rahn's selections just four days before the announcement of the new regime on September 23, 1943. SS officer Karl Wolff installed Mussolini in the small town of Salò on Lake Garda and employed an SS detachment to monitor him. The RSI was rebuilt with the inclusion of hardcore Fascists including Giovanni Preziosi, Renato Ricci, Vittorio Mussolini (Mussolini's son), and Alessandro Pavolini. All four had been with Hitler and his leaders shortly after the armistice to explain what had happened and to plan for a renewed Fascist government. Hitler grew particularly fond of Preziosi, a model of Fascist and antisemitic extremism, because of their shared views on race.[17]

Mussolini and his cabinet administered a small part of the Italian peninsula. German-occupied Italy was divided into two areas: the German administration had direct control of northeastern Italy (Udine, Gorizia, Trieste, Fiume, Pola, and the Italian Tyrol), which was treated as German territory, while the rest was considered an occupied zone. The RSI ostensibly governed the occupied region, but the Germans had created an administration to oversee it and ensure that nothing would interfere with the war effort.[18]

The RSI's supporters included pro-Germans, opportunists, and "Mussolinians"—radical Fascists who rallied around the person of Mussolini more than the regime itself.[19] In addition, historian Philip Morgan has noted that an "embattled core of hardline young and middle-aged Fascists [extremists]" supported the RSI with the hope that it would "return Fascism to its uncontaminated squadrist and syndicalist origins of the early 1920s."[20] Some of these Fascists enthusiastically took on the roles of perpetrators and collaborators because they supported Nazism, Italian Fascism, and antisemitism.

Many in the occupied zone, however, did not support the RSI. A clear indication of dissent is the fact that 90 percent of captured soldiers elected deportation and forced labor rather than pledge allegiance to the RSI, which would have meant acknowledging the RSI as a legitimate government.[21] The RSI government's power thus relied heavily on German reinforcement and popular fear. Historian Lutz Klinkhammer estimates that during the occupation alone, the Wehrmacht and SS killed approximately 10,000 civilians, most of whom were women and children.[22] Wolff continued to wage a violent, murderous campaign against civilians even though Rahn worried that it would undermine Mussolini.[23]

It is worth mentioning that RSI supporters also took violent action against their countrymen and women. Historian Angelo del Boca insists that the brutal reality of the occupation in the north from September 8,

1944 to April 25, 1945 should leave no room for myths that purport only Germans persecuted civilians. Del Boca makes this point clear when he argues that the RSI Fascists "exhibited ferocity as their main virtue."[24]

Collaboration, Resistance, and a Season of Doubt

Historian Claudio Pavone explains that the occupation on September 8 created an opportunity for Italians to pick sides: resist or comply.[25] Germans proclaimed their absolute authority over Modena through a circular dated September 10, 1943.[26] The first of eight directives decreed: "The German armed forces have assumed the protection of the Italian population from the threats of anarchy and [Allied] invasion." The edict declared that in order to safeguard Italians, "all German orders are absolute and must be observed."[27] Italian officials were called upon to collaborate with the Germans and enforce civilian compliance. While scholars have devoted considerable attention to the *guerra civile* (civil war) waged during the occupation between the Resistance and RSI supporters, the story of the compliers has been largely overlooked.

Publicizing punishable civilian behavior, local leaders stood in for German officials. The Germans employed regional and local Italian officials to oversee civilian activities and requests. Berlin dictated on September 14, 1943, for example, that persons requesting permission to visit with soldiers arrested by the Germans had to meet first with their local police department or prefect. This contact with local leaders helped create the impression that local level Italian leaders supported the Germans.[28]

Carpi's municipal prefect Romolo Vezzani, for example, made known the Germans' decrees regarding civilian acts on September 17, 1943.[29] The first of the eight points warned that Carpi citizens conducting acts of sabotage would face prison or execution. Article three instructed Carpi citizens to relinquish all weapons to the town mayor who in turn would surrender the arms to the German command. Points six and seven threatened "severe penalties" for anyone caught helping POWs in any way. Article eight proclaimed that the police and town leaders would be "held personally accountable for the full execution of these orders."[30]

The eighth article is of particular importance to our study of local collusion. It warned that anyone who abandoned his or her work and thus hurt the war effort would face jail time and, in severe cases, the death penalty.[31] Indeed, the repercussions for resistance were high. Italy's Interior Ministry presented an additional twelve-article circular on October 9 that clarified what the Germans had intended by "severe penalties." The first article dictated that anyone who aided POWs in any way

would be killed. The second point explained that those who contacted or tried to communicate with prisoners faced from ten years to life in prison. Wary of German reprisals, many civilians in the area continued their business as usual and catered to the aims of the German command just as they had done under Fascist rule. The threat of punishment was great enough to ensure that the vast majority of Italians silently obeyed Nazi and Fascist orders.

While the Modena region can boast of its significant Resistance movement toward the end of the war, Historian Santo Peli refers to the period of September–December 1943 as "the season of doubt."[32] Historian Emanuele Guaraldi's research confirms Peli's conclusions, adding that while a modest group of "rebels (maybe the term 'partisan' at this time is inappropriate) in Modena existed at the time of the armistice, its membership records show a progressive decline, reaching its lowest point in December."[33] Others, though, occasionally ignored the warnings against helping prisoners.

The story of British soldier Alfred Moore and his escape from Fossoli provides one example of locals who put their lives in danger in order to aid POWs. Axis forces had captured Moore in June 1942 in El Alamein, Egypt. He spent two months in a camp outside of Tripoli before he was sent by boat to Capua, Italy and then by train to Fossoli. Civilians watched as he and his comrades marched from the train station to the camp. "Because we were such a pitiful sight, most cried 'Poor things!' even though we sang as we marched," Moore explained decades later.[34]

Singing served to connect Moore with Luigi, a local Italian guard who was also a singer. Luigi brought in wine and shared it with Moore, and in turn Moore offered chocolate from his Red Cross packages for Luigi to take home to his children. One night, Moore persuaded Luigi to put on a concert with the POWs. "He played guitar and his first song was 'O Sole Mio'. It was wonderful and he received a round of applause," recalled Moore. "Around the barbed wire of the camp the Italian guards, with rifles in their arms, shouted 'Bravo! Again!'"[35] In the end, this performance cost Luigi his job and he was fired for "being too friendly with the POWs."[36]

Moore befriended other Italians stationed at the camp and one offered to help him break out. When the Germans took over Fossoli and removed the Italian guards shortly thereafter, Moore decided it was time to escape. Joined by two friends, the three of them crawled under the barbed wire fences while another POW distracted the guards by showing off his best German language skills. They evaded detection and made their way clandestinely through the neighboring farmland. Exhaustion set in and they fell asleep in pitch-black darkness only to wake up not far from a farmhouse lit by the morning sun. Moore watched in horror as

an old woman left the dwelling and rushed to them through the cornfield. "*Sono inglesi*?" (Are they English?) were the first words out of her mouth. All three soldiers scrambled to explain at the same time in broken Italian of their escape. She listened, and then said, "*Avete fame*?" (Are you hungry?).[37] She returned to her house and came back with bread, a big jug of milk, and six of her family members who were curious and wanted to meet the escaped British soldiers. They all sat down in the cornfield and ate breakfast together. "They asked hundreds of questions as we ate our delicious breakfast," Moore recalled. "It was wonderful to be free and be helped by these good Italians, our so-called enemy, on a beautiful September morning."[38]

Moore and his friends continued to hide in the field and the Italian family brought them meals. One day Moore spotted the former guard who had been dismissed for singing with the prisoners. Luigi was thrilled to see his friend once again. He provided the British soldiers with clothes and bikes and helped them find a new hiding place in a shack by a nearby river. Luigi visited them frequently and brought them food. When locals discovered the POWs and urged them to leave the area out of fear for German reprisals, Luigi hid the POWs yet again. Relying on Italian hospitality, all three of the soldiers managed to avoid detection and survived the war in hiding.[39] Their story, however, is most unusual as the vast majority of POWs at Fossoli faced deportation and locals did not—or could not—rescue them.

The aid Moore and his colleagues received from Luigi and others illuminates a key point in our study of Italian civilians at that time. While the vast majority of local citizens did not take an initiative to help, when presented with an opportunity, some did. Luigi's actions were not motivated by personal gain, but by something else. As we try to understand the landscape of civilian actions throughout the war, it will become apparent that circumstance and opportunity played a central role in modes by which one participated, obstructed, and/or facilitated camp activities. And the types of interaction were not static.

While Moore and his colleagues had been lucky enough to find shelter in locals' good will, no one helped the other POWs left in Fossoli. The Germans sent approximately 5,000 Allied POWs from the camp to greater Germany in less than two weeks.[40] Carpi priest Ettore Tirelli recorded five separate deportations of POWs from the camp.[41] Cars arrived to take the men to the local train station and German units then shuffled the prisoners into compartments. The first group of 1,200 prisoners was sent to an unknown destination on September 14, 1943.[42] Over the next three days cars shuttled prisoners from the camp to the Carpi train station. Tirelli counted 160 cars in total transporting prisoners.[43] On September 18,

a group of approximately 2,000 left Carpi, among them Barrington. He traveled by cattle truck via Verona, Brenner Pass, Innsbruck, Munich, and Leipzig to Stalag IV B. Muhlberg, Germany.[44] Shortly thereafter, on September 25, the last large group of 1,200 left Fossoli.[45] Carpi's Ramazzini hospital housed a few remaining prisoners who were too weak to travel.[46]

A group of 20 POWs tried to escape during the final transfer, but German guards stopped them, gunning down three in the process. Don Francesco Venturelli, a local priest, recorded the event in his wartime log. "It happened at two o'clock in the morning, on the 26th of September. The Germans wrapped them in blankets and tent cloth, and buried them in the camp area without the benefit of coffins."[47] The injured were taken to the Carpi hospital wing for POWs and deported on September 27 along with another 70 POWs still at the hospital.[48]

The central location of the Fossoli train station ensured that the town bore witness to the POWs as they left and some residents even felt a sense of solidarity with the foreign captives. After all, like the POWs, at that same time thousands of Italian soldiers were being deported from all over German-occupied Italy to labor camps in Germany and Poland.[49] Thus, during the last deportations, residents gathered at the train station to see off the British POWs. They offered the men cigarettes, flowers, and bread as they passed. The German troops did not punish the townspeople for this act of defiance.[50]

Instead, the Carpi authorities intervened. To prevent further interactions between prisoners and civilians, the Carpi municipality issued a decree prohibiting civilian use of certain streets utilized for deportations.[51] Vezzani issued an additional circular to discourage locals giving gifts to POWs to shore up compliance. Vezzani had become the prefect just two months earlier, during the first week of the Badoglio government. The rapid turn of events with the German occupation, however, made him doubt his ability to lead. He confessed this to the public, writing:

> In early August I had been obliged to administer Carpi. Since then, dramatic and unexpected events have occurred one after another. As of today, my considerable work as an administrator has become chiefly and exclusively a political position. Until yesterday, I shied away from politics and I simply don't possess the temperament, experience, or capacity to become a politician overnight.[52]

Vezzani subsequently elected to step down on September 30 and Gian Battista Focherini took his place.

Vezzani's choice to leave a position that would have required him to collaborate with Germans, in contrast to those who yielded to German

commands, signifies the levels of allegiance to Fascism. The silent manifestation of civilian support of POWs also elucidates the transient notion of resistance and compliance during the war; where were the civilians who handed gifts to the POWs two months earlier when Italian officials deported POWs from Fossoli to work camps in the east? Perhaps most importantly, the range of responses and their timing demonstrate that opposition, compliance, and collaboration are far from static categories of analysis. Indeed, Italian gentiles moved between all three groupings throughout the war.

The establishment of an Italian collaborationist government on September 28, just two days before Vezzani left office, presented Focherini with greater opportunities to collude with German forces. The Germans made good use of their Italian sympathizers and charged them with various tasks, which often required Carpi's new prefect to coordinate with former Fossoli guards Luigi Bissignani and Marco Bertoli, who now oversaw the camp.[53] During the POW deportations, the German authorities delegated financial responsibility for running and supplying the camp to the town of Carpi. This prompted Vezzani and Bissignani to send a letter to the *Ufficio Prigionieri di Guerra di Roma* (Prisoner of War Office in Rome), the office responsible for POW internment, requesting additional funds to pay for supplies and cover expenses required to administer the camp.[54] The town of Carpi paid companies and individuals for their work with the camp. Local businesses were compensated by compliers who supplied the camp, just as they had under Mussolini and Badoglio.

The Germans left Fossoli less than a month after their arrival and assigned local authorities to safeguard the camp. They tasked guards Bertoli and Bissignani to oversee Fossoli. They also ordered Carpi on October 7, 1943 to manage the repair of the camp. And they required town authorities and the local police to take a more active role in the camp management.[55]

With the Germans gone, locals broke into the abandoned camp to pilfer whatever they could. Venturelli remarked upon the German departure in his wartime log:

> On the night of the 30th of September, the Germans abandoned the camp. The camp was left in the hands of two Italian MPs [military police]. The people were afraid the Germans would [return and] appropriate all the things left in the camp, so they started hauling away everything they could lay their hands on. But during the afternoon of the 1st of October, a group of Italian MPs suddenly showed up and arrested 20 women. Subsequent to this, an order came out prohibiting anyone from approaching the Fossoli Camp with the intention of looting.[56]

Even after the Germans had left, municipal and camp authorities executed German commands.[57] The town council hired nine agricultural workers belonging to *Il Fiduciario di Fossoli dei Lavoratori agricoli* (The Trust of Fossoli farm workers) to clean the camp.[58]

Complying with a Genocidal System

In order for us to frame Carpi's action thereafter, it is prudent to consider the impact of the Germans' presence in Italy. After Italy capitulated, the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt* (RSHA) Berlin office ordered the deportations of Resistance fighters, partisans, and Jews. The expulsion of Italian Jews to death camps furthered Germany's genocidal plan for European Jews, while relocation of non-Jewish Italian civilians to the Reich afforded the Reich free forced labor, a valuable wartime commodity. Germany also grabbed Italy's industrial and agricultural resources. Albert Speer played a particularly vital role in the acquisition of Italy's resources for the war effort. Hitler authorized Speer (September 13, 1943) to take all necessary measures to guarantee the war economy in Italy, and Speer ordered the nation's industrial materials and supplies to be shipped to the Reich. Meanwhile, Herbert Backe (Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Food) authored a plan to take over Italy's agricultural sector to secure food for the war. Backe's work resulted in the confiscation of food stocks for Germans and the implementation of a German-style ration system of foods and goods on October 14.[59] It is hard to imagine that most Italians would have welcomed and or supported the economic, industrial, and agricultural plundering of their nation. And yet, Italian compliance helped facilitate German objectives.

In Carpi and Modena, local officials' conformity to Nazi-Fascist demands facilitated the deportation of Jews to mass-murder facilities. Postwar narratives typically depict collaborators as extreme Fascists, but an examination of locals who contributed to RSI aims without strongly supporting the regime's exploitative and genocidal aims reveals another facet of the Italian wartime experience.

Furthering a Pattern of Compliance

The significance of local compliance took on new weight at the end of November 1943. The reason for attending to and readying the camp after the German's departure became clear when longtime Fascist supporter RSI Interior Minister Guido Buffarini-Guidi issued the November 30, 1943 n. 5 Police Order, which sealed the fate of Jews in Italy.

1. All Jews, even if discriminated [privileged], of whichever nationality, and in any case residing within the national territory must be sent to the relevant concentration camps. All of their personal possessions and property must be submitted to be immediately sequestered, before being confiscated in the interest of the RSI, that will assign them to benefit poverty-stricken victims of invasions in enemy zones.
2. All those, born of mixed marriages, who have, in application of the current Italian racial laws, the certainty of belonging to the Aryan race, must be placed under special surveillance by the police. The Jews are, in the meantime, placed in provincial concentration camps before being gathered in special concentration camps established for this purpose.[60]

Prior to the November 30 decree, interned Jews in Italy had not been threatened by deportation. This new legislation underscored the intensification of antisemitism under the RSI in northern Italy. It also triggered a series of events that led to the internment of Jews at the Fossoli camp and the local populations' acquiescence to Judeocide.

Again, the Modena prefect called upon Carpi to orchestrate incarceration, furthering the pattern of collaboration and compliance. Modena's newest prefect, Bruno Calzolari, sent an order on December 2, 1943 to Carpi's prefect Focherini to prepare the camp for the arrival of Jews.[61] "As it is necessary and urgent to create a concentration camp to accommodate Jews in this community, please make arrangements with the police to have this work executed immediately so that the camp can begin to operate as soon as possible."[62] The document also noted that Calzolari would consult Modena's *questura* (police department) to determine funding for readying the camp for new prisoners. Focherini responded two days later requesting an advanced sum for the reconstruction of Fossoli and titled his letter "Concentration camp for Jews."[63] The new classification of "Concentration Camp for Jews" officially came into effect on December 5, 1944 when the first Jews arrived.

The Modena Police Headquarters assigned Italian police commander Giuseppe Laudani to oversee the camp and sent ten RSI policemen to help manage the reorganization of Fossoli.[64] Laudani sent a letter to Carpi *podestà* Focherini informing him of the imminent arrivals of more Jewish prisoners.

> The Fossoli concentration camp, which currently holds 97 Jewish interns, anticipates the arrival of another 800 Jews from various provinces. Currently, the camp is run by 37 military personnel. The camp is completely without firewood for both cooking food and heating. Please advise about this.[65]

This communication, in addition to many others, illuminates the integral role played by the town in managing the incarcerated Jews. The town's oversight of Fossoli afforded it an awareness of what was happening inside the camp. Thus, the town administrators were not ignorant bystanders.

Financial Incentives and Deportations

Despite the changing uses of the camp, the town administration's collaborative role in Fossoli's operations remained constant.[66] In fact, the town grew even more involved. The Carpi prefecture arranged new contracts and attended to those established prior to the occupation. And this financial oversight afforded Carpi's leaders with a great awareness of camp activities.

The office of the Carpi *podestà* ordered supplies, paid for services, and sought remittance from the Modena prefecture. Correspondence between the two offices reveals that Fossoli was often in the position of having to write to Modena to request additional funds to pay for Fossoli. It appears that Modena was habitually behind in paying for camp operations, which left Carpi responsible for assuring angry businesses that they would eventually be paid. *Cooperativa Muratori*, for example, wrote to the Carpi *podestà* (February 7, 1944) to complain that it had not yet received payment for work rendered at the camp.[67] Thus, Carpi leadership wrote to Modena (February 9) to ask for additional funding. Carpi explained that of the 400,000 lire sent to pay for the camp, 300,000 had gone to *Cooperativo Muratori* and the other 100,000 had already been exhausted.[68] The Modena prefecture responded on February 14 promising to send 200,000 lire, but as of 21 February Capri had yet to receive the money.[69]

In addition to overseeing camp construction, town administrators coordinated supplies and food for prisoners and thus were aware of the volume of prisoners coming and going from Fossoli. The Modena *questura* wrote to Carpi's *prefettizio* on December 15, 1943 to inform them that they would coordinate with the camp director to arrange for rations and supplies for the Jewish prisoners.[70] The Carpi prefecture then sent a letter on December 21, 1943 to Modena's police department and prefecture acknowledging its administrative function for the camp and requested a 100,000 lire advance to attend to future camp expenses.[71] The Modena prefecture approved this request and issued payment on January 5, 1944.[72] Carlo Alberto Ferraris, who replaced Carpi prefect Focherini on January 1, 1944, performed the role of intermediary when he wrote to the Modena *questura* and copied *Cooperativa Muratori* requesting additional details on the extent of work to be carried out at the camp.[73] POW food rations had been determined by the *Ufficio Annonario* (Ration Office),

but providing for the Jewish prisoners required a new system in which the camp commander coordinated directly with town officials to determine appropriate food and supply deliveries.[74] The town leaders' direct involvement with the camp means a greater understanding of prisoner movement via fulfillment of food and supplies requests.

Like the town officials, locals who had previous financial dealings with Fossoli also soon learned of the camp's new function to house Jews. Focherini sent letters to companies with outstanding contracts, such as the local electric company *Società Emiliana di servizi elettrici*, Carpi, to inform them of the camp's new title.[75] *Cooperativo Muratori*—the same construction cooperative that had built the POW camp—accepted a contract that explicitly stated that it would build a new section for Jews. Its reconstruction and expansion of the Fossoli camp continued as Jewish prisoners arrived. *Cooperativo Muratori* earned 759,982.31 lire for work on the former POW camp and as of February 7, 1944 was prepared to start on the Jewish sector.[76]

Businesses that developed new partnerships with Fossoli also understood the camp's new prisoner demographics. Focherini sent out a request to local merchants for forks, knifes, glasses, pans, and chamber pots for the camp. The order for supplies clearly specified Fossoli's designation as a concentration camp for Jews.[77] The Carpi company Guerzoni Ubaldi earned 61,840 lire in exchange for tables and benches for the Fossoli camp. Ferraris and the camp commander negotiated the terms of their contract.[78] G. M. Merighi, a garage, service, and transport company, earned 357 lire (minus a 7 lire tax) on January 3, 1944 to transport "clothing and beds from the Carpi train station to the concentration camp for Jews."[79]

While most business transactions did not require civilian–prisoner interaction, transportation of goods or people provided locals an opportunity to witness those they helped to incarcerate. Carpi officials paid amendable locals to transport Jews from the town train station to Fossoli. The number of prisoners in the RSI-managed camp increased from 60 Jews on December 5, 1943 to 97 Jews by December 29. Another 827 Jews were scheduled to arrive shortly thereafter from various towns: Florence (500), Venice (163), Aosta (37),[80] Forlì (14), Milan (51), Ancona (10), Turin (8), Rieti (14), and Varese (30).[81] Each arrival of Jews at the Carpi train station created another opportunity for locals to profit as they were shuttled by Carpi car companies from the train station to the camp. For example, Carpi paid the company Impresa Cav. P. Valenti e Frat. -Carpi 612 lire to transport 93 Jews on January 1, 1944 in two Fiat buses from the train station to the camp, and collected 12 lire in taxes.[82]

Local business, companies, and town administrators knew that the camp held Jews—Italian and foreign alike—as of December 1943, but

they were not yet aware that Fossoli, and Carpi's citizens, would become a cog in the annihilation of European Jews. The official contracts and correspondence referred to Fossoli as "a concentration camp for Jews," not a deportation facility. While this classification did not change even after Jews were deported, locals' awareness of the camp's function surely did.

Although knowledge that Jews were held at Fossoli does not clarify whether local collaborators understood the camp's role in the annihilation of European Jewry, they may have become suspicious in early January when Modena officials were called upon to aid in the deportation process. Head of the Modena police Paolo Magrini (a member of the Blackshirts *Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionle*, or Voluntary Militia for National Security) informed Tullio Tamburini, head of the RSI police, that Wilhelm Harster, head of the Reich Security Office in Verona, had requested that he deliver the Jews in Carpi to the Germans.[83] Tamburini wrote, "[to this end] I have already visited the Carpi concentration camp and requested from those in charge a list of all the Jews in the camp in order to prepare for their transfer to Germany."[84]

SS Captain Theodor Dannecker's visit to the camp on January 20 surely hinted that it would not be long until deportations would begin. Adolf Eichmann had sent Dannecker to Rome in early October 1943, where he had led 365 SS police and armed Waffen-SS men into the Roman ghetto to arrest Jews. His inspection of Fossoli just three months later set in motion the first removal of Jews from the camp. He ordered that the "Jews of British citizenship be separated" from the other captives, and he requested a list of their names. He also demanded that the Jews be moved into the newly completed camp since "it [would be] easier to separate the English Jews from the Italians." Laudani wrote to the Modena *questura* to relate Dannecker's demands and to request additional guards to tend to the British Jews.[85]

It remains unclear who these British Jews were or where they came from, but it is likely that they were Libyan Jews with British passports. At the time of the Italian alliance with Germany (June 10, 1940), approximately 2,000 British citizens resided in Libya, of which some 870 were Jews, many of whom were expelled to Italy for internment.[86]

Carpi priest Venturelli wrote to camp commander Laudani for permission to visit them. Laudani supported this appeal and wrote to Modena's *questura* in support of Venturelli's request. The *questora* awarded Venterelli permission (on December 12) to meet with inmates and provide spiritual guidance to the so-called Catholic Jews, presumably those who despite being defined as Jews by the 1938 "Laws for the Defense of the Race," were practicing Catholics or had converted while in Fossoli.[87] Venturelli also brought wool socks and shoes (January 4, 1944), gloves,

books, and clothes (January 12, 1944) for the Libyan Jews had arrived in the depths of winter and had no warm clothing.[88]

With the prisoner population growing, new camp director Mario Taglialatela requested an additional 20 Carpi policemen to help control the Jewish section of the camp. And at Dannecker urging, Taglialatela wrote a letter to the Modena *questura* on January 20, 1944 asking for additional guards. He explained that the Jewish sector at that time (January 1944) held 500 prisoners who were guarded by 60 RSI police and 30 Carpi policemen.[89]

Deportations

Carpi officials who facilitated transportation to and from the camp and cared for the operating needs of Fossoli were more involved in camp affairs than compensated compliers. By February 1944 their oversight of the camp provided them with a clear perspective of how Fossoli supported the Reich's annihilation machine. Their actions coupled with this awareness made them collaborators, if not perpetrators.

On the heels of the camp director's request for more guards, three representatives from the IVB4 Verona office (department for Jewish affairs in the Reich Main Security office) descended on Fossoli on February 10. They met with Taglialatela and informed him that they required accommodations and an office because their commanders had directed them to stay at the camp in order to supervise the British Jews.[90] Following the arrival of the Germans, Taglialatela sent a letter to the Modena *questura* requesting even more guards for the camp and describing prisoners' reactions to the Germans:

> With regard to the surveillance of the camp, I have already stated that the number of guards needs to be increased, not only because of the insufficient ratio of guards to inmates but also because the Jews have become alarmed by the presence of the German military in the camp. A rumor has spread that all able-bodied Jews will be deported to Germany.[91]

German troops oversaw the transfer of the prisoners from Fossoli to the Carpi train station. The first group of Jews left the camp on January 26, 1944. This small transport of 83 Anglo-Libyan Jews was sent to Bergen Belsen, where they arrived five days later.[92] Two days after the first transport left Carpi, *Cooperativa Muratori* received 200,000 lire for work rendered building the camp.[93]

Just as the arrival of Jews in Carpi offered business opportunities, so did their deportations. Let us consider, for example, the first deportation of Jews to Bergen Belsen noted above. The Carpi bus company Impresa

Cav. P. Valenti e Frat., for example, earned 816 lire to "transport approximately 90 Jews with their baggage in two buses from the concentration camp of Fossoli to the Carpi train station," minus a 2 percent tax of 16 lire collected by the town.[94]

In total, the Italians—both stationed in and outside the camp—facilitated deportations of Jews on four occasions prior to the Germans' taking up official residence and assuming management of the Jewish prisoners on March 15, 1944: 69 Jews deported to Bergen Belsen on February 19, 1944; 517 Jews deported to Auschwitz on February 22, 1944; 71 Jews deported to an unknown destination on March 12, 1944.[95] Local car companies shuttled all 740 Jews from the camp to the train station.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated how *Carpigiani* remained involved in the supply and operation of Fossoli both prior to and after the German occupation. The fact that *Carpigiani* gained an appreciation of Fossoli's actions when it began holding Jews is key to our study of locals' participation in camp affairs. Ignorance was neither a motivation nor excuse for *Carpigiani* collusion with the RSI and Nazi Germany. This fact will be considered further in "Part II" of this study when we scrutinize the lapses between the history and memory of Carpi's involvement in camp affairs.

In particular, this chapter has shown that fear and a preexisting pattern of compliance inspired *Carpigiani* cooperation with RSI and Nazi authorities. The Fascist, RSI, and Nazi leadership put in place restrictive policies that threatened to imprison and/or execute anyone who did not stay in line. Thus out of fear many *Carpigiani* sat in waiting for the first few months after the German occupation before they joined the Resistance. Others continued their business as usual. However, business as usual had become something more. Now locals were turning a profit from the arrest, incarceration, and deportation of Jews.

3

Fossoli and the Final Solution

An SS German command took up residence at Fossoli on March 15, 1944 and divided the camp into two sections: one administered by the RSI and run by Italians and the other staffed by Germans and overseen by the IVB4 (department for Jewish affairs in the Reich Main Security office) in Verona. This chapter examines the implementation of Judeocide and persecution of non-Jewish Resistance fighters in the German-managed section.[1]

The German command directed the persecution and deportation of Jews at Fossoli from March 15 onward; and they employed Fascist concepts of "race" to support their operations. We begin with an overview of the execution of the Final Solution in Italy in order to situate Fossoli within the broader landscape of Fascist-legislated antisemitism that predated the occupation and continued under the RSI. By focusing on the application of the Fascist regime's racial laws in the German section of Fossoli, this chapter reveals the ways in which Italian Fascists and RSI antisemitism supported the genocidal aims of the Third Reich.

In addition to analyzing the escalation of violence toward Jews in the German-occupied zone and Fossoli, this chapter considers the persecution of non-Jewish political prisoners held in the German-run camp. In considering both victim groups we are able to observe how Jewish and gentile experiences of Fossoli differed, which opens up a deeper discussion on the victimization of Italians in the German-occupied zone. While Italian public memory typically conflates Jewish and gentile suffering, each group experienced the Holocaust differently. An individual's status as a "racial" or "political" prisoner carried very different consequences.

German–Italian Collusion

The occupation provided the Germans an opportunity to achieve their genocidal agenda in Italy in two swift phases. In the beginning, German

forces seized towns and cities and rapidly arrested and deported Jews directly to Auschwitz and other killing sites. The second period centered on the creation of camps to assemble and then deport Jews in large numbers. Each stage brought an intensification of violence, antisemitism, and discrimination. Fossoli features prominently in the second stage of deportation.

The German Command

Three key German officials coordinated and facilitated Italian involvement in the Judeocide: Wilhelm Harster, Theodor Dannecker, and Friedrich Bosshammer. Harster, head of the RSHA (Reich Security Office) in Verona, oversaw the *Geheimestaatspolizei* (Gestapo) and the *Sicherheitsdienst* (security police, or SD), both of which played key roles in the persecution of Jews. Harster devoted himself to the RSHA goal of deporting the 33,000 to 34,000 Jews (Italian and foreign) residing in Italy after the occupation.[2] *SS-Obersturmbannführer* Adolf Eichmann[3] dispatched SS-Captain Dannecker to Rome to help Harster eliminate Roman Jews.[4]

Dannecker's arrival in Rome on October 6, 1943 signaled the first phase of deportations from Italy and a murderous new stage in the persecution of Jews.[5] He began by leading a small group of German police in the October 16 dragnet of Roman Jews.[6] Dannecker and his unit subsequently conducted similar actions in cities throughout northern Italy, which resulted in the deportation of some 1,400 Jews to Auschwitz in less than three months.[7] He intended these lightning raids to catch Jews off guard and prevent them from going into hiding. Moving north, Dannecker's mobile group rounded up Jews in Florence, throughout Tuscany, and Bologna (November 5–8), and then the Turin, Genoa, and Milan triangle (October 27–November 8).[8]

Italian Involvement in Phase One of Deportations

While only some Italians jumped at the chance to help the Germans hunt down Jews in 1944, all Italians were familiar with racial and antisemitic discrimination. Racial thinking predated Mussolini's rise to power. As early as 1815, for example, prominent Italian thinkers Massimo D'Azeglio, Cesare Correnti, and Pasquale Stanslao Mancini had openly contemplated the concept of distinct races among humanity. The onset of colonization in the 1890s marked the emergence of biological racism and in 1908 Italian president Giovanni Giolitti signed into law an act

declaring Italian's ethnic supremacy over Africans in the Italian colony of Eritrea.[9]

Under Fascism, Italian racism blossomed. Two years before Mussolini entered the war alongside Hitler (1940), the regime had enacted Racial Laws that had stripped Jews of jobs and property.[10] To insulate "Aryan" Italians from Jews, Article 1 of Royal Law number 1390 (September 13, 1938) expelled Jews from public schools and Article 1 of Royal Law number 1728 (December 9, 1938) prohibited marriage between Jews and non-Jews.[11] Mussolini's government started to intern foreign Jews in 1940.[12] And with the passage of the RSI's November 30, 1943 decree—which required the internment of all Jews residing in Italy—Italian discrimination against Jews transitioned from oppression to facilitation of Judeocide.

Despite Italy's long tradition of racism and antisemitism, the popular assumption that Italians were not antisemitic has often been credited as the root cause of Jews' survival in Italy during the Holocaust. Contrary to such assertions, the mass deportation of Jews reveals a slice of the population able and willing to ensure the eradication of Jews. While the "*brave gente*" myth depicts Italians as sympathetic rescuers, neighbors, and Resistance fighters, the story of the Italian police, the implementation of the antisemitic legislation, and internment of Jews and others in camps prior to and after the occupation paint a very different picture.[13]

The Italian police's role in the apprehension, incarceration, and deportation of Jews speaks to cooperation. Indeed, the Germans relied on Italian police to apprehend, incarcerate, and deport Jews. The *questura* of Asti, for example, captured Jews in its community and surrendered them to the SS directly or sent them to Fossoli.[14] And the Fascist militia helped the Germans' operations in Siena by arresting Jews (November 5–6).[15] The increasing number of prisoners at Fossoli resulted in 20 additional guards station at the camp in January 1944.[16]

With the November 30 law, the Italian police officially participated in the execution of the Final Solution: by arresting Jews, Italians helped facilitate genocide. Shortly after the November 30 decree, for example, Italian authorities in Venice arrested 150 Jews overnight (December 5–6, 1943). Police burst into known Jewish homes while the families slept and arrested the residents.[17]

Italians Cooperating with Germans during Phase Two of Deportations

By January 1944 Dannecker's raids, aided by Italian authorities, had lost the element of surprise and proved less and less successful. Eichmann

replaced Dannecker with Friedrich Bosshammer at the end of January 1944, which opened the second stage of deportations in Italy. As the new chief of the anti-Jewish campaign, Bosshammer headed the local RSHA IVB4 office in Verona, a suboffice of Harster's Sipo-SD office.[18] Together with Harster, Bosshammer exchanged Dannecker's system with a more administrative model of persecution and deportation that partnered with Italians.

The regional Italian police chiefs' role in arresting and sending Jews to Fossoli demonstrates the widespread system of Italian involvement in the Holocaust throughout northern Italy. Italian police in the German-occupied zone swiftly arrested Jews and arranged for their relocation to Fossoli. The camp's location in the Modena region meant that the Modena *questura* received letters from other police departments detailing transports of Jews to Fossoli. Paolo Magrini, Head of the Modena police, reacted by alerting camp officials to expect their arrival. Such was the case when the Modena *questura* wrote to the Fossoli camp on February 15, 1944 and listed the names of six Jews arrested in Rome who would be arriving at Fossoli.[19] In some instances other *questure* contacted the camp directly. Dr. Alberto Belli, director of the Bergamo *questura*, for example, addressed camp officials in a letter dated February 23, 1944 and explained that RSI police would be collecting Jews arrested in Bergamo and bringing them to Fossoli.[20] A few days later he wrote to Fossoli officials with the names of the apprehended Jews.[21] The Ferrara *questura* contacted both the Modena *questura* and the camp (February 25, 1944) listing 12 Jews to be sent from Ferrara to Fossoli.[22] Indeed, the regional *questure* played an active role.

Bosshammer's assumption of command inspired the transformation of Fossoli into a deportation camp and prompted Italian–German cooperation at Fossoli.[23] Fossoli's conversion under Bosshammer involved the Modena *questura* and Carpi administrators' full cooperation. Magrini received a letter on February 28, 1944, which detailed Harster's plan to divide the camp in two by March 15.[24] A newly built section, *il Camp Nuovo*, the New Camp, was to be taken over by German guards and controlled by the RSHA in Verona.[25] In preparation for the German appropriation, Harster directed Magrini to move all prisoners residing in the New Camp to the former POW camp, commonly referred to as *il Campo Vecchio*, the Old Camp.[26] The Old Camp would remain under the jurisdiction of the Modena prefecture and primarily intern civilians. Harster also asked Magrini to meet with Carpi municipal officials to acquire land adjacent to the camp. Through Magrini's diligence and his work with Carpi officials, the Germans acquired 12,000 square meters of additional ground.[27]

Province commander Pier Luigi Pansera's response on February 28 to the German order to move the 1,215 prisoners residing in the New Camp to the Old Camp (March 15) suggests that not all Italian leaders fully comprehended the German's absolute hold on power or the German–Italian dynamic after the occupation. Pansera had not yet learned that under German occupation, for example, his role as head of the province now held little influence when it came to German plans. Pansera had urged RSI police chief Tullio Tamburini to persuade the Germans to reconsider because the Old Camp had deteriorated significantly since the Germans had abandoned it in October 1943 and required extensive renovations.[28] Despite Pansera's reservations, the Germans ordered that all the prisoners residing in the New Camp be moved into the Old Camp by March 15, at which time the German SS took command of the entire camp and reclassified the New Camp as a *Polizei-und-Durchgangslager*, police and transit camp.[29]

The new German–Italian partnership at Fossoli was not an equal one. Its intent was to streamline Judeocide and to suppress the Resistance in that order. Because these two objectives took precedence over all others, the Germans mandated that all repairs made to Fossoli start in the New Camp despite the fact that the Old Camp was in far worse shape. The Modena *questura* ensured that this objective was met, and wrote to the camp director and the *Ingegnere Capo del Genio Civile* (chief engineer of civil engineering in Carpi) to communicate the Germans' directives.[30]

By executing German orders, Italian officials helped transform Fossoli into a key juncture in the annihilation assembly line.[31] This union between the Germans and local administrators ensured that camp operations progressed smoothly. Italian officials continued to inspect both camps and report back to the RSI police despite the fact that the Germans had full control of the German section. Perhaps the RSI held inspections in order to better service the needs of Fossoli. Inspector general of the Italian police Alberto Carlo Rossi, for example, was assigned to visit Fossoli for this very reason. With Italians managing the civilian camp, the Germans devoted their full attention to deporting Jews and hunting Resistance fighters.[32]

Italian Victims in the New Camp: Racial and Political Prisoners

The German overhaul of the New Camp exacerbated the persecution of Jews and Resistance fighters. The Germans at Fossoli most likely monitored the Jews because they figured most prominently in Hitler's

plan for Europe. They also oversaw the Resistance fighters because they threatened Nazi and RSI control of Italy. We will see, however, that although the two camp sections appeared similar, the treatment of non-Jewish Resistance fighters and racial prisoners at Fossoli were not the same. By analyzing the different treatment of two groups, we can draw distinctions between gentile Italians whose actions made them targets of RSI and Nazi oppression and Jews whose activities had nothing to do with their imprisonment. Scrutinizing the distinctions between prisoner types will help us further dismantle key elements of Italian postwar myths.

The Jewish and Political Prisoner Sections in the Campo Nuovo

The Jewish section of the New Camp fulfilled the Third Reich's primary directive to rid Europe of Jews. It contained eight barracks, each of which could accommodate 256 prisoners, yielding a total capacity of 2,048. Each structure measured 11.6 meters long by 47 meters wide.[33] A long corridor created a hallway down the barrack center and there were 8 small rooms on each side for a total of 16 rooms per half. Walls two meters high that stopped short of the ceiling divided the little rooms. There was a large table with chairs and two stoves in the middle of the hallway. Originally, Jews were interned in their family units, each residing in the small rooms (four people per bunk, eight people per room). This changed in May 1944 when the genders were separated.[34] In the four northernmost barracks men were kept in one section of the camp and women and children occupied the rest. A line of barbed wired divided the two groups, and men and women were allowed to visit each other for half an hour on Sundays.[35]

The Resistance fighters, held east of the Jewish area, posed a threat to German operations in Italy, but when captured, provided much-needed slave labor for the Reich. Thus, the Germans also saw to the incarceration of Resistance fighters and their deportation to forced labor camps. The section with political prisoners contained seven barracks similar to those housing Jews. Each structure could accommodate 320 prisoners, yielding a total of 2,240 beds.[36] At first, female political prisoners were quartered in one barrack in the political section, but eventually they were moved and interned with women and children in the Jewish section.[37] The Jews' barracks were surrounded by two lines of barbed wire fences, as were the political prisoners' barracks.

A Snapshot of Life in the Jewish Section[38]

The postwar "*brava gente*" myth has been nourished by positive assessments of camp life in Italy. This myth, however, fails to account for the role that antisemitic legislation passed *before* the occupation played in the treatment of Jews during the German occupation. The "*ebrei misti*" ("mixed blood") category, for example, supported the destructive racial ideology of the Fascist and Nazi regimes.[39] Those with non-Jewish relations received preferential treatment since they possessed traces of "superior blood." The "*ebrei misti*" classification influenced a Jew's tenure and life at Fossoli.[40]

Racial categorization put into law by the Fascists exposed individuals' ethnicity and religious beliefs and turned them into destructive markers. Jews arriving at Fossoli thus faced a series of questions from Fossoli vice-commander Hans Haage and his aide, "*ebrei misti*" Nina Neufeld Crovetti, in order to classify their racial makeup as articulated in Article 8 of Royal decree law 1728/1938:

a) a person is considered to be of the Jewish race who is born from parents who are both of the Jewish race, even if said person professes a religion other than the Jewish;
b) a person is considered to be of the Jewish race who is born from parents of whom one is of the Jewish race and the other is of a foreign nationality;
c) a person is considered to be of the Jewish race who is born of a mother of the Jewish race when the father is unknown;
d) a person is considered to be of the Jewish race who, even if born from parents of Italian nationality, of whom only one is of the Jewish race, professes the Jewish religion, or is enrolled in a Jewish Community, or has, in some other way, manifested his Judaism. A person is not to be considered of the Jewish race who is born from parents of Italian nationality, of whom only one is of the Jewish race, and who on 1 October 1938-XVI, belonged to a religion other than the Jewish.[41]

Individuals who fell under provisions (a) through (d) were Jews according to Fascist law.[42] Classifications became more complicated with regard to children of mixed union parents (one Aryan and one Jewish). Before 1939, such a child was registered as a Jew, but after 1939, grandparents' religious affiliations were taken into consideration.

Grandchildren with more than 50 percent "Jewish blood" were classified as Jews. But grandchildren with two Jewish grandparents could be identified as either Jews or Aryan depending on additional considerations. If the grandparents were a Jewish and Aryan couple at least one of the grandchild's "*ebrei misti*" parents had to belong officially to a non-Jewish religion before October 1, 1938 to be considered Aryan.[43]

Because Jews were not always interrogated and registered immediately upon arrival, some managed to obtain "*ebrei misti*" status although they may not have otherwise. Following the arrival of Franco Schönheit and his family, a fellow prisoner approached him with advice that may have saved his life. The prisoner asked, "'Where are you from? Do you have any relatives who are not Jews?' When we told him we did, he said, 'You must tell the Germans immediately that you are part Catholic.'" Franco's father then inquired, "'But won't they ask us whether we were married in the temple in Ferrara?' And the man said, 'They won't ask. The Germans care only about race, not religion. They will want to know whether you have any 'pure blood' and whether you have some documentation that can prove it.'"[44]

Like other "*ebrei misti*," the Schönheits held positions of responsibility and received privileged treatment. "Every month the camp would fill with Jews gathered in roundups from all over Italy," Franco explained. "Mixed Jews, Jews married to non-Jews, and the children of mixed marriages all remained behind to organize the departure of the others and to maintain the structure of the camp. Month in, month out, we would watch as these people streamed in and headed out for Auschwitz."[45] The length of stay for a "full-Jew" could span anywhere from a few days to up to five weeks. Eugenio Ravenna, for example, reported in a postwar interview that she was at Fossoli for just ten days before the Germans selected her for deportation.[46] An "*ebreo misto*" could remain for months.

The length of incarceration influenced whether an inmate worked at the camp. "Full Jews" whose transit time at Fossoli lasted less than 24 hours were not assigned work. Those interned from a week to a month often did agricultural work, cooking, washing, and cleaning. Because "*ebrei misti*" were the last deported and remained in Fossoli longer than a month, they typically held jobs. Franco's parents became barrack *capos* (leaders) and Franco helped the Italian camp commander in his office.[47]

Prisoner Edvige Epstein Balcone believes that the Germans and Fascist authorities did not know what to do with the "*ebrei misti*."[48] While Balcone and other "*ebrei misti*" did some work, it appears that the perpetrators put little planning into it. Fellow "*ebreo misti*" Gilberto Salmoni's

recollection of Fossoli supports Balcone's assessment. "The camp was not equipped to make inmates work," he argued.[49] During his incarceration, he worked as a shoe shiner.[50]

The Germans recruited some "*ebrei misti*" such as Nina Neufeld Crovetti to help in the deportation process. A Polish Jew, Crovetti was arrested in Sondrio and arrived at Fossoli in mid-February 1944. She received the privileged status of "*ebreo misto*" because of her marriage to a non-Jew; her son and Italian Catholic husband were not arrested.[51] She remained at Fossoli until her deportation on August 1, 1944 with the other "*ebrei misti*." Nina spoke fluent German without an accent because she had worked as a translator in Berlin for 12 years. Her language skills and her privileged status secured her a job as a secretary and interpreter for the German command. One of Nina's tasks was to assist in the creation of deportation lists.[52]

Like Crovetti, Renato Fano's marriage to a Catholic secured him a place among "*ebrei misti*." As a "privileged Jew," Renato had the liberty of sending and receiving mail. In a letter to his family dated April 2, 1944, Renato wrote about his job tailoring German guard uniforms. "On Monday I went to a barrack near the entrance of the camp and effectively became a tailor. There were four sewing machines and, for the time being, three women help me . . . . I work from 8 to 12 and from 12.30 to 4 . . . my work is rewarded with extra soup and some cigarettes."[53] The lighter work hours and "rewards" speak to Franoc's "privileged status" as an "*ebrei misti*."[54]

Regardless of employment—or unemployment—all Jews followed the same daily routines. Don Sante Bartoli, a priest held at the camp, described the roll call in his diary.

> The day begins with roll call, and as usual 2,000 inmates line up in rows in front of armed SS with machine guns. When your number is called, you have to yell present. A small delay can be fatal. But there is an old Jew who is not in line with the others and does not hear his number being called. The old man is deaf. The executioner [guard] pulls out his gun and at point blank range, knocks him in the back of the neck so that he falls to the ground. Then he puts the revolver in its holster and, laughingly says "Next time you will pay attention!"[55]

"*Ebrei misti*" helped lead roll call. Work followed. Those without a job assignment reported for a medical examination at the camp infirmary and were then assigned to manual labor, heavy or light, according to physical strength and health. Everyone received small meals of mainly bread and vegetables.[56]

Jews' Experiences at Fossoli

In addition to Jews' racial standing, their country of origin, length of stay, age, and previous, as well as subsequent, incarceration conditions influenced how they experienced internment at Fossoli and reflected upon it afterward. It is important to contextualize Jews' recollections of Fossoli with these factors in mind in order to understand the sometimes-contradictory memories of camp life.[57]

Hungarian teenager Goti Herskovits Bauer, for example, had been living illegally with his family in Viserba, Italy. His father had taken ill and the Bauers called in a doctor to attend to him. Goti believes the physician informed the local authorities of their whereabouts, which prompted his family to flee. They were captured (May 2, 1944) trying to cross the border into Switzerland. Brought first to San Vittore in Milan, Italian guards then sent (May 13) them on a three-day journey by truck to Fossoli. In a written testimony nearly 38 years later, Gotti reflected on his capture. "It is difficult to understand it today, but the arrest provided a certain sense of liberation: we no longer had to run, hide, decide, or search for refuge," he explained. "Our destiny was no longer in our hands: we just had to endure passively, and somehow that seemed easier."[58] Fossoli felt like a brief break from the rough three-day journey that had depleted his already sick father.[59] The Germans deported Goti and his family on May 16 to Auschwitz. Guards killed Goti's father Luigi and mother Rebecca upon arrival. His comparatively favorable account of Fossoli is framed by the fear he experienced prior to his internment as well as by the brutality of Auschwitz thereafter.[60] His less critical descriptions of his imprisonment at Fossoli had nothing to do with Italian benevolence and much to do with his previous and subsequent wartime experiences.

Unlike Goti, Brenno Coën described his time at Fossoli as miserable. At 23, Coën was arrested and taken to San Vittore prison where he was detained in a cell with other Jews. The torture that he and those around him endured weighed heavily upon him and informed how he viewed his next incarceration. Eventually, he was transported to Fossoli along with 70 others.

> We were in a miserable state: dying of hunger and exhausted (none of us closed our eyes and during our trip the SS opened the door just once for fresh air), and semi-asphyxiated by the pestilential odor in which we remained for four long days and nights…I had heard of [Fossoli], but I had never been there. We quickly learned, however, that life at this camp was horrible. We endured a black hunger. Children, men,

> and women tore at and ate the grass growing in the camp while the well-fed, arrogant, and violent Germans with satisfied bellies paraded in front of us.[61]

For Coën, Fossoli only compounded the despair he suffered at San Vittore.

Prisoners' experiences during their incarceration also may account for their varied recollections of camp life. Jews at the camp who witnessed acts of violence, for example, might have been more likely to speak critically about their internment at Fossoli. Political prisoner Dante Bizzari recalled one such act of assault in a testimony he recorded years later for the trial of Fossoli vice-commander Haage. While standing by the fence near the patrol pathway that separated the Jews from the political prisoners Bizzari witnessed Haage's savagery. "Marshal Hans stopped near the group of Jews—there were six or seven of them talking amongst themselves—almost in front of me, across the street that divided [the New Camp into] two camp sections," explained Bizzari. "Through the fence he said something in German to the Jews. He had a holster with a revolver. He pulled his gun, targeted a Jew, and shot him dead. He then quickly fired five to six shots at the rest of the Jews in the group killing one in the process. Hans then turned around to face us, revolver in hand, and told us to go."[62] Had they survived, the Jews killed that day, and their families, surely would have had a different perspective on Fossoli than Goti. If Goti witnessed the killing that day, would his recollections of the camp been altered too?

For Jews like the Bauers, the camp offered a brief rest stop, whereas Coën and others perceived Fossoli as a horror unto itself. This variety of descriptions complicates our picture of Jews' lives at Fossoli. A range of factors influenced prisoners' experiences and memories of those experiences: racial categorization, national origin, and wartime events prior to and after incarceration colored their recollections. Some survivors' positive assessments of camp life in Italy have been used to support claims that Italians were kinder and more benevolent than their German counterparts, however, such explanations are too simplistic. It is for this reason that it is important to avoid viewing to the treatment of Jews in camps in Italy as indicative of Italians' indifference to racism.

Fascist racial laws influenced the amount of time a Jew spent in Fossoli, the antechamber of death for nearly all those deported. The movement from the 1938 Racial Laws to the passage of the RSI November 30th decree elucidates an escalating Italian mandated racial policy that affected the treatment of Jews at Fossoli and their route to death. While the Germans ultimately ordered the deportation of Jews, the victims' path to Fossoli had begun prior to the occupation and had been paved by Italians.

A Snapshot of Political Prisoner Life[63]

Political prisoners incarcerated adjacent to the Jewish inmates also were victims of German brutality and in some ways their day-to-day existence was similar to "*ebrei misti*." Like their Jewish counterparts, political prisoners sometimes participated in camp labor. Arrested in Bologna, Nella Barconcini Poli arrived at Fossoli on May 6, 1944. She worked periodically during the three months she was there until her deportation to Ravensbrück. "[Fossoli] wasn't a work camp and most of the time we had nothing to do: sometimes we girls were taken to clean the SS rooms or work in the kitchen," she recalled. "I worked in the kitchen. The SS rooms were outside the fences, but in a barrack like ours. The men did other types of work," which included constructing and fixing wire fences.[64]

Political prisoners encountered a more extensive entry process than that described by Jewish prisoner Franco Schönheit. Socialist Arrigo (Enrico) Boccolari fought in the Zambelli brigade in the Modena mountain division prior to his arrest and incarceration at Fossoli.[65] "Upon arrival at the camp, my friends and I were subjected to a processing procedure that was a sort of torture," he explained. "We had to fill out dozens of forms both in Italian and German…[and] we were then photographed—front view and side view—finger printed, stripped bare (our clothes were put into autoclaves for disinfestation), shoved under showers (in groups), shaved completely bald, and issued an olive-green military shirt and two long cotton drawers (the type with closure strings at the bottom)." Boccolari's shirt and pants were marked with the number 2469. At Fossoli, political prisoners' clothing also carried a red triangle, which distinguished it from foreigners' clothing, which had a light-blue triangle, and Jews' clothing, which had a yellow rectangle.[66]

Testimony from *partito d'azione* (Action Party) resistance fighter Leopoldo Gasparotto notes the harassment of Fossoli inmates with red triangles.[67] His journal provides a perceptive record of life in the political section, as well as of the struggles posed by internment. "Indeed," wrote Gasparotto, "life in a concentration camp truly reveals all of man's negative qualities: useless questions continually arise, idle discussion, jealousy, envy. Many prisoners are prone to forget that we are not Germans."[68]

The stress of uncertainty about their future that political prisoners faced caused some to unravel. "Some prisoners are deeply affected by their imprisonment and it rattles their mental stability," Gasparotto observed. "A former aviation lieutenant, for example…lashed out at those around him over the slightest disturbance in his environment." A young Roman exhibiting signs of mental illness climbed the barbed wire fence separating the political and Jewish sections the morning of May 10, 1944. He fell

and lay stretched out where he landed until a guard came by and kicked him until he got up. The guard threatened to lock him in a cell if he did not stop behaving erratically. When the guard asked if he understood, the Roman responded "No." The guard followed through on his threat and locked the Roman in a cell. The prisoner immediately launched himself against the window until he was covered in blood at which point he was carried off to the infirmary.[69]

Political prisoners requiring medical attention received care in the medical unit located in the Jewish section. Gasparotto went there every other day to receive calcium injections and as a result learned much about the prisoners on the other side of the fence.[70] Gaining information about the Jews in the adjacent section in the New Camp, he described news of an impending deportation in an entry dated May 15, 1944. "Tomorrow the Jews are [being deported]; poignant farewells in the infirmary: there are pregnant women, babies only a few months old, and a five-year-old separated from his parents." Gasparotto's observations on pregnant women and newborns deported from Fossoli illuminates a clear distinction between the types of victimization experienced by Jews in contrast to that targeting the political prisoners.[71]

The actions of political prisoners resulted in their incarceration, whereas agency had little to do with Jews' wartime trajectory.[72] It is hard to imagine a newborn having agency. Although resistance efforts may have prompted the arrest of some of Fossoli's Jewish inmates, ultimately it was their "race" that determined their fate.[73]

Violence Targeting Political Prisoners

While Jews were slated for genocide from the beginning, political prisoners' actions, not ethnic identity, determined what the Germans and their allies had in store for them.[74] Unlike vice-commander Haages's random attack on Jews within Fossoli noted previously, German violence toward political prisoners was intended to suppress partisan activity within and beyond the camp.

Mimmo Franzinelli, the editor of Gasparotto's journal, has suggested that the Germans most likely learned of Gasparotto's clandestine organizing activities within the camp, and this prompted his execution. Gasparotto had plotted his and his fellow inmates' escape. Political prisoner Lodovico Barbiano di Belgiojoso recorded, "One evening [Gasparotto] told me he had spoken through the fence with a certain Italian named [Italo] Cortese, through which he communicated with partisan organizations for the liberation of a convoy."[75] In the last sentence of his diary (June 21, 1944), Gasparotto mentioned meeting with Cortese.[76]

The following day (June 22) Armando Maltagliati, the Italian political prisoner camp commander, came to Gasparotto's barrack and escorted him to the German command. Marshall Haage told Gasparotto that he was to be taken to Verona for interrogation.[77] In fact, the SS put Gasparotto in a car and drove him to a meadow a short distance from the camp and shot him. Later that day, rumors spread throughout Fossoli that the Germans had murdered Gasparotto. Fellow prisoners got word to Barbiano that blood was leaking from a van guarded by the SS, presumably from Gasparotto's corpse. Later that night guards took Gasparotto's body to the Carpi cemetery and buried him in an unmarked grave. Government documents concerning a request by the German guard to the Carpi cemetery claim that the grave was needed for a prisoner killed while trying to escape.[78]

Resistance movements outside the camp fences also affected the Germans' treatment of political prisoners.[79] During his deposition camp commander *SS-Untersturmführer* Karl Titho gave a statement (October 14, 1947) on how the largest massacre of Fossoli inmates unfolded.[80]

> One day in June 1944 I went to Verona to meet with [Verona Gestapo Chief] Kranebitter. Kranebitter told me that 70 inmates at my camp were to be shot. The reason for this was that partisans had killed seven German soldiers in Genova[81] and I had to pick 70 hostages from the camp who came from Genova. Kranebitter asked me if the hostages could be shot at my camp and I replied that it wasn't possible because the camp was too small and all the other prisoners would see the execution. Kranebitter told me, however, that the execution would be carried out and that he would send Lieutenant Müller to assist me in choosing and carrying out the shooting of hostages.[82]

Titho recalled in his testimony that Karl Müller came to the camp two days after their meeting and explained that the executions would take place at a field six kilometers outside the camp at the small hamlet Cibeno, north of the city of Carpi.[83]

The Germans commissioned eight Jews to dig the mass grave, Giorgio Sealtiel among them. "July 11th, [SS-Scharführer Otto Rieckhoff] appeared at our barrack and asked for volunteers for work in Carpi," recalled Sealtiel. He volunteered, hoping that this might offer a chance for him to escape. Instead, Rieckhoff escorted Sealtiel and the other Jews in a small van to the execution site. The Jews were given shovels and spades to dig a mass grave. Not knowing whether the grave was intended for him, Sealtiel asked Rieckhoff. "[H]e responded no, to be calm, and to continue our work." Any hope that Sealtiel held about informing others of their activities evaporated as his group spent the night sequestered from the rest of the prisoners.[84]

The 71 political prisoners selected for death were also separated from the other inmates the night before their murder and kept in barrack 19 in the guard section of the camp. Haage entered barrack 19 at 4 a.m. on July 12, 1944 and called the first 20 names in alphabetical order. Two of that 20 avoided the massacre. Teresio Olivelli managed to hide in barrack 15 (used for storage)[85] and Renato Carenini, a bricklayer, was spared last minute because it was decided he was too valuable to kill at that time.[86]

The morning of the massacre Jewish prisoner Olga Bergmann watched behind barbed wire as the political prisoners departed the camp. The political prisoners thought the Germans were transferring them to another camp.[87] Instead, camp guard *SS-Oberscharführer* Josef König drove the prisoners to the massacre site where a special execution platoon sent from Verona carried out the shootings.[88] The first group of prisoners arrived at the mass grave and the Germans instructed them to line up along its edge. Eugenio Jemima quickly appraised the situation and yelled out, "Why are you killing us?" to which the others raised their voices inciting chaos. The Germans opened fire and in the confusion Jemima managed to flee unnoticed into the accompanying field. The next two groups of prisoners brought to the execution site did not resist.[89]

Carpi priest Vigilio F. Dalla Zuanna learned that the Germans were executing prisoners outside the camp.[90] He raced to the site and arrived just after the third batch of prisoners had been shot. He demanded to speak to the person in charge. On Captain Titho's orders, one of the guards pointed a machine gun at Zuanna's chest and yelled, "One more step and I'll shoot!" Zuanna was forced to return home where he wept for the 67 political prisoners who lost their lives that day.[91]

Despite this massacre, some political prisoners speak less critically of their time at Fossoli because they experienced worse before and/or after their time in Modena. Max Boris, for example, was arrested in Firenze on February 26, 1944 as a result of his activities for the *Partito d'azione*. He had spent just over 3 months in solitary confinement at Villa Triste or Murate prior to arriving at Fossoli. He described joining the general political prisoner population as a welcome reprieve from his prior isolation. He was deported weeks later along with 960 other prisoners to Mauthausen.[92]

Deportations

All the prisoners in the New Camp faced deportation. The number of prisoners held in the *Campo Nuovo* changed constantly and once a section reached capacity, German commanders organized deportations. In the New Camp, the Jewish section could accommodate 2,048. The political

prisoner barracks could quarter up to 2,240. While political prisoners were sent primarily to forced labor camps in Germany and Poland, Jews were targeted for a different fate.

The *Wehrmacht*, SS, and Italian police amassed Jews from all over the German-occupied zone at Fossoli. The arrivals were composed primarily of Italian Jews and a smaller number of foreign Jews who typically had sought mistaken refuge in Italy. The list of arrivals at Fossoli on May 23, 1944, for example, noted that of the 52 new prisoners, 39 were Jewish, 3 were English, 7 German, 2 Polish, and one Czech.[93]

Foreign Jews' knowledge of what transpired at German camps in the east had a significant impact on Italian Jews. Dr. Leonardo De Benedetti had learned of the horrors that awaited Italy's Jews from Polish, Yugoslavian, German, and Austrian prisoners at Fossoli. When asked in an interview in 1970 whether he knew what awaited Jews deported from Fossoli, namely death, he responded, "I knew with certainty."[94] Fellow intern Luciana Nissim Momigliano was more reluctant to believe the rumors. Yugoslavian Jews interned with Momigliano had told her about gas vans (early mobile gas chambers), but it was not until she arrived at Auschwitz that she believed what she had heard.[95]

The Germans orchestrated the deportations. Camp commander Titho went to the Verona headquarters to report prisoner numbers in the *Campo Nuovo* every two to three weeks. "First I would look for [Fritz] Kranebitter, head of [the] IV department, and give him the number of prisoners," Titho explained. "Then I would go to Bosshammer who was in the same office, the floor below, and give him the number of Jewish prisoners."[96] Titho described the whole process as rather informal. "They would ask me the number of persons in the camp and I added the figures." According to Titho, he never sent his superiors a written report because mail communication between Fossoli and Verona was unreliable.[97]

When the camp neared capacity, Titho and Haage worked together to create transportation lists of Jews. "The convoys always included several hundred people. Among them were men, women, and children," he recalled. Titho described the makeup of the political prisoner deportations as similar to the deportations of Jews except "it was organized according to different criteria. The separation between the Jews and politicals was rigorous." Titho attended to the deportations of the political prisoners.[98]

The day before a transport, he elaborated, Wilhelm Berkefeld and Hans Arndt came from Verona to Fossoli and delivered the official order from the BdS in Verona to prepare a transport for the following day. According to Haage's postwar testimony, he did not follow any precise criteria in creating the list, and the number of prisoners corresponded with the capacity of the trains available for deportation.[99] He worked with "*ebrea mista*"

Nina Crovetti. Haage brought her the prisoner registration files and she wrote out the names of those to be deported.[100]

Haage relied on Corvetti to do much of the administration work. Crovetti's postwar testimony prepared for the Bosshammer trial spoke to other German guards in addition to Haage. Once or twice she remembered *SS-Sturmscharführer* Otto Koch visiting the camp to drop off orders from Verona. With his red hair and red face, Crovetti described him as "Fieser Ein Kerl," or a repugnant one. *SS-Untersturmführer* Karl Titho was the head of the camp, although prisoners rarely recall seeing him. Jewish survivor Olga Bergmann remembered *SS-Untersturmführer* Walter Lessner (head of administration) in her testimony and said, "He behaved, if one may say, quite humanely." Other guards included *SS-Oberscharführer* Josef König and someone named Eugen Keller. Documents on these and other German guards at Fossoli have failed to emerge in the postwar era.[101]

Haage announced which prisoners had been selected the day before the transport. The prisoners received minimal provisions for the journey, such as small loaves of bread. Prior to his departure, Gilberto Salmoni recalled Haage's announcement. "Our departure was preceded by a brief talk by vice commander SS Hans Haage. He said, 'Until now you have been on vacation, now you will go to more organized camps.'"[102] While Salmoni's testimony suggests that Jews were informed of their departure a day in advance, political prisoner Pio Passarin's description of his deportation from Fossoli indicates that he learned of his transport within hours of leaving.[103]

> The sirens that morning rang out earlier and faster than normal and shortly thereafter the SS entered our barracks and ushered us out aggressively. It was the first time I had seen the guards act so domineering. They quickly distributed a broth called "coffee" and a slice of bread with margarine. The appell in the main square was different this morning… [w]e were numbered into groups of roughly five prisoners… Following the appell, we were told that we would depart *for another destination!*[104]

Deportations occurred with full knowledge of the local population. At first, prisoners marched six kilometers from the camp to the main piazza in Carpi where buses awaited to drive them the short distance to Verona. As they walked from the camp into town, locals silently displayed solidarity by handing out food and clothing. Prior to getting on the buses, however, the guards made the prisoners give up their handouts.[105] Edi Antonelli, a Fossoli di Carpi resident, confirms that locals witnessed deportations and that on one occasion he managed to hand off a carrot to a Jew being loaded on a train.[106]

No precise log of the number of political prisoners deported from Fossoli has surfaced. Passarin estimates that some 1,200 inmates departed Carpi on buses to Verona where they were put into trains and sent on to various camps such as Mauthausen, where he was sent. The general consensus among historians suggests that approximately 2,500 political prisoners passed through Fossoli.[107]

Research on a deportation camp in Gries on the outskirts of Bolzano suggests that many political prisoners may have been sent from Fossoli to Gries, and then eastward. The first political prisoners from Fossoli, along with a few Jews, arrived at Bolzano, Gries on July 21, 1944. Once Fossoli ceased its operations as a deportation camp for Jews in early August, commanders Haage and Titho went to Gries and ran that camp just as they had Fossoli. From July 1944 to April 1945, at least 11,116 political and racial prisoners were deported from the Bolzano camp.[108]

The "*ebrei misti*" were the last to leave and their departure came as a surprise to their relatives. Renato's family learned about Fossoli through the bi-weekly letters he sent them.[109] Using a special terminology, he referred to other prisoners as "fellow sufferers," guards as "my principal," and the concentration camp as "the establishment." Ugo Fano, Renato's son, recalled years later that this language masked the reality of the camp as a deportation site. Ugo explained, "our family always thought that he was okay and that his job as a tailor for the Germans was a normal factory job."[110]

The Fano's illusions disappeared when they received a letter on July 30, 1944 informing them of his deportation. "I am resigned to face all possible situations with the comfort of your affection. We are hoping for a more pleasant future [and] that my absence will be short…I advise you to remain calm and to cope serenely with each event. Fate has been cruel, but we will get through this…. The camp has been liquidated for military reasons and all my mates suffer the same fate." In his last letter, he said that he might be sent from Verona to Germany and he expressed his wish that his tailoring skills would help save him.[111]

The hope expressed in Renato's final letter to his family echoes the feelings of other "*ebrei misti*." They had watched as hundreds had been deported while they remained behind. For some, this opened the possibility that they might avoid deportation all together, but this optimism partnered with sorrow. Franco Schönheit, for example, observed approximately one-third of the more than 7,000 Italian Jews who perished in Nazi camps pass through Fossoli between February and August 1944.

Among those deported were family members and friends. Years later, Franco recalled the deportation of an aunt, uncle, two cousins, and the uncle's elderly parents. "So the whole family of six, including a boy of

fifteen, a girl of five, and their two grandparents in their eighties, was sent to Auschwitz," Franco explained. "It was a terrible shock, but none of us had any idea they were being taken off to be killed… We knew that there was a risk that they might die, but of natural causes, not through some organized extermination: the notion that the Germans would ship thousands of people hundreds of miles just to kill them seemed inconceivable. It was from this lack of comprehension that our hope sprang."[112] In the end, however, their privileged status merely delayed their deportation east. Like the "full Jews" before them, "*ebrei misti*" were deported from Fossoli to Verona and then on to Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Ravensbrück, or Bergen Belsen.

Fossoli Fondazione-Ex-Campo, the organization responsible for maintaining and conserving Fossoli today, estimates that the Germans and RSI deported a total of 5,000 prisoners from the camp prior to its closure in August 1944.[113] Jews comprised half of the deported, 91 percent of whom were sent to Auschwitz. Of those, 94 percent perished.[114] For the majority of Jews deported from Carpi, Fossoli was the site of their final incarceration before annihilation. During the German occupation, the camp played an integral role in the annihilation of Italian Jews, serving as the deportation site for nearly one-third of all Italian Jews murdered during the Holocaust (see Table 3.1, "Deportations of Jews from Fossoli").

Conclusion

The common assumption that Italians were either victims or Resistance fighters during the Holocaust fails to engage with some Italians' contributions to the Judeocide. Racial Laws and race ideology implemented by the Fascist regime prior to the Germans' arrival set the scene for the violence waged under the German occupation. The November 30 law officiated the transition from Fascists laws suppressing Jews to facilitating genocide. Italian involvement in arresting and sending Jews to camps for deportation was tantamount to directing Jews to their death. The agency of Italian police in funneling Jews to Fossoli and on to death camps demonstrates that Italians played a role in the victimization of Jews and others.

Fossoli, and other camps like it, became essential tools through which to eradicate Italian Jewry. The 1938 Fascist racial categories of "*ebrei misti*" further debased Jews in Fossoli by segregating them into tiers of "racial worth" that either prolonged or quickened their route to death camps. Thus, while the "*brave gente*" narrative describes Italians as either Resistance fighters or victims, the history of Fossoli reveals Italian participation in and support of Judeocide.

The fate of the political prisoners deported from Fossoli has yet to be discovered, but the legacy of their internment is important too. The political prisoners epitomize the courage displayed by Italians who consciously chose to risk their lives because of their religious or political ideals. The fact that political prisoners comprised half of the 5,000 persons deported from The New Camp and that most violent acts at Fossoli were directed at them reflects the Germans' determination to destroy all opposition.

Table 3.1 Deportations of Jews from Fossoli

Convoy	*Departure date*	*Date of arrival*	*Place of departure*	*Destination*	*Number deported*
1	1.26.1944	31.01.1944	Fossoli	Bergen Belsen	83[a]
2	2.19.1944	24.02.1944	Fossoli	Bergen Belsen	69
3	2.22.1944	26.02.1944	Fossoli	Auschwitz	517[b]
4	3.12.1944	17.03.1944	Fossoli	Unknown	71
5	4.5.1944	10.04.1944	Fossoli	Auschwitz	564[c]
6	5.16.1944	23.05.1944	Fossoli	Auschwitz	582
7	5.16.1944	20.05.1944	Fossoli	Bergen Belsen	122[d]
8	6.26.1944	30.06.1944	Fossoli	Auschwitz	504[e]
9	8.1.1944	06.08.1944	Fossoli-Verona	Auschwitz	156[f]
10	8.1.1944	04.08.1944	Fossoli-Verona	Buchenwald	21
11	8.1.1944	5.08.1944	Fossoli-Verona	Ravensbrück	19
12	8.1.1944	6.08.1944	Fossoli-Verona	Bergen Belsen	49
Total					**2,757**[g]

[a] The transport data for convoys 1–4, 6, and 9–12 are provided by Picciotto in *L'alba ci colse come un tradimento* (p. 232) and reflect her dedication to naming and recording the deportation and death of Italian Jews. The figures should not be viewed as definitive, however; they are an approximation of the number of deported Jews. Picciotto recognizes this, and notes that an additional 21 Jewish inmates remain unaccounted for. I have noted any discrepancies that my research has unearthed.

[b] In Ettore Tirelli's wartime log he mentions the February 22nd deportation and notes that it departed for Germany. Archivio Nomadelfia, "Campo di Fossoli, Memorie e Documenti," 15B-01, B.

[c] In *L'alba ci colse come un tradimento* Fargion lists the number of deported as 558, but a deportation list located in ASCC records 564. ASCC, Campo di concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, Fasc. 2, campo concentramento ebrei, sf. 2/8, 1, "elenco di 564 prigionieri partito dal Campo (dato 5 Aprile 1944)."

[d] Among those deported on May 16 were 31 Jews sent to Fossoli on May 5 from a camp in Ascoli Piceno that had been bombed on May 3, 1944. ITS, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, doc. 459503_0_1. For a list of the names of Jews sent from Ascoli Piceno to Fossoli see, ITS, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, doc. 459506_0_1.

[e] Picciotto contends in *L'alba ci colse come un tradimento* that the June 26, 1944 deportation held 550 Jews (p. 130). She does not provide information explaining how she came upon this number and instead footnotes a personal record listed as "Picciotto, File ricerca sugli ebrei deportati dall'Italia" (p. 288, ftn. 108). Carpi priest Don Venturelli recorded his own list on 504 deportees, a copy of which resides at ASCC. Because I am not able to confirm Picciotto's findings, I have elected to cite the source available to me. ASCC, Campo di concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, Fasc. 2, campo concentramento ebrei, sf. 2/5, 1, "elenco presenti campo ebrei Carpi partiti il 26 June 1944."

[f] The four deportations that occurred on August 1, 1944 were composed of the remaining "*ebrei misti*" prisoners.

[g] In addition to the estimated 2,757 Jews deported from Fossoli, a number of Jews also died in the camp: Giulia Consolo (66 years old at the time of death), Roca Doczi (84 years at the time of death), Carolina Jesi (85 years at the time of death), Pacifico di Castro (40 years at the time of death), Teodoro Sacerdoti (85 years at the time of death), Magneta Nissie (92 years at the time of death), Arturo Morsello (59 years at the time of death), Leone di Consiglio (age unknown), Giulio Venna (71 years at the time of death). This list of names was compiled by Carpi officials in 1949. ASCC, Campo di conentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, Fasc. 2, campo concentramento ebrei, sf. 2/7, 1, "Elenco ebrei deceduti."



Figure 3.1 Construction Plan for New Camp

Note: Archivio Nomadelfia, "Progetto Trasformazione campo di Fossoli, 1947–48," 14 D–D 4.

4

Deconstructing the So-called Silent Assent: The Chain of Command, Compensated Compliance, and Resistance

The acquiescence of regional officials, municipal authorities, and Carpi businesses to Nazi and RSI demands to arrest and deport Jews supported and facilitated the Judeocide. While some scholars and politicians have argued that only Nazi and RSI officials perpetrated the Judeocide, the history of Fossoli suggests another conclusion.[1] Analyzing the actions of regional *questure* (police offices), town officials, Italian guards, local laborers and businesses, and Resistance fighters, this chapter scrutinizes non-Jewish Italians' actions during the Holocaust.

Every Italian who took part in, profited from, or enabled Fossoli's operations to continue—with the exception of Jewish victims and resisters—bears responsibility for the murderous function of the camp.[2] Scrutinizing the use of Fossoli as an Italian-run deportation camp (December 5, 1943–March 14, 1944) and the subsequent restructuring under German control (March 15–August 1944) reveals that, in addition to RSI officers and soldiers, ordinary Italians played an active part in supporting the purpose of the camp. They were not the architects of atrocity. But they had a key and vital role.

Eschewing the commonly used tripartite classification of perpetrator, victim, and bystander, we seek to clarify how collective silence and obedience enacted genocidal practices and policies. Raul Hilberg's *Perpetrators Victims Bystanders* codified these categories and the terms have evolved over the past quarter century to define not only an individual's role, but also her or his degree of responsibility.[3] If the perpetrator and victim categories appeared straightforward, bystanders posed a greater challenge.[4] Including compliers and onlookers, bystanders have claimed far

less critical attention than the other two groups. Yet they loom large in the history of Fossoli. Analyzing the myriad ways that Italians ranging from blue-collar workers to RSI perpetrators participated in a system dedicated to the mass annihilation of Jews illuminates the scope of Italian involvement in Fossoli. The breadth of reactions to the occupation and the establishment of the deportation camp highlight an individual's ability to choose her/his path.

Chain of Command: Prefects, Police, and Carpi Officials' active role in the Judeocide

Moving beyond the constraints of the "bystander" category, we shall consider the actions of all Italians on a spectrum of direct to indirect participation in atrocity. My aim here is to analyze the actions of prefects, *questure*, and town officials who fulfilled RSI and Nazi orders rather than specify whether they were bystanders or perpetrators. Political scientist Ernesto Verdeja might have categorized them as moral bystanders, "those who bear some responsibility by virtue of being in a position to intercede and consequently alter the direction of events, yet fail to act." He argues that knowing that one's action will facilitate violence and doing nothing to correct her/his behavior "counts as moral complicity." To Verdeja, moral bystanders bear more responsibility than silent onlookers.[5]

It is clear that the greatest percentage of Europeans during the Holocaust were neither victims nor murderers, yet their collective silence was central to the fulfillment of Hitler's genocidal plan. Nonvictim/nonperpetrators, regardless of their position or knowledge, encouraged the Holocaust by not interfering. The choice to avoid direct involvement made them indirect supports of atrocity. Italian prefects', police departments', and town officials' fulfillment of Nazi orders, on the other hand, exemplify active participation in the machinery of annihilation. Thus our focus is on how everyday silence and compliance facilitated the Holocaust.

The German occupation and creation of the RSI enabled the move by some Fascist leaders and town administrators to become active functionaries of genocide. The internment of Jews in Italy (following the RSI law of November 30, 1943) relied upon provincial administrators' compliance with SS demands to seize and arrest them.[6] Historian Michele Sarfatti reflected on the Fascist regime's fulfillment of Nazi commands: "The absence of known Italian protests seems to suggest that the Fascist regime adopted an attitude of 'silent assent.'"[7] His assessment minimizes the participation and agency of Italian compliers, the police, and provincial and town authorities who carried out the deportations. Their actions are thrown into relief by contrast with Dr. Luciano di Castri.

Modena prefect from September to October 1943, Castri refused to collaborate with the German authorities and resigned from his post. Urged by the RSI leadership to reconsider, Castri would not budge. The RSI then appointed Bruno Calzolari to replace him. Francesco Barracu, Secretary of the Presidency of the RSI Council of Ministers, invited Castri to support the RSI in December 1944 as a Councilor to the Court of Auditors, and Castri accepted. He had relinquished his role as prefect because he took issue with the Germans, not the RSI.[8]

The order for deportations emanated from the Germans, but it fell on Italians to carry them out. While Castri elected not to support the Nazis, other officials in Emilia Romagna fulfilled Fascist and Nazi orders, which ensured the arrest and incarceration of Jews, political prisoners, and civilian hostages. Calzolari, for example, wrote (January 4, 1944) to Paolo Magrini, *questura di Modena* (Modena Police Chief), relaying RSI orders that Carpi assume "the management of the concentration for Jews at Fossoli."[9] And the SS directed Magrini to surrender all Jews in regional camps and send them to Fossoli, whence the Germans planned to deport them to German-occupied lands. Upon receiving this order, Magrini sent a telegram to RSI Police Chief Tullio Tamburini (police chief from October 1, 1943 to June 23, 1944) informing him of the Nazis' intended use of Fossoli to funnel Jews from throughout occupied Italy to the East.[10] Magrini called upon Carpi officials to manage the daily functions of the camp and to ready Fossoli for its new function as a deportation camp.[11] Magrini sent another letter on March 6, 1944 to Carlo Alberto Ferraris, Carpi prefect since January 1, 1944, telling him that the German SD in Verona needed the farmland bordering the camp.[12] Ferraris then contacted the relevant farm owners and obtained the land, just as Bonfiglio Tesi (Carpi prefect January 15, 1942 to early August 1943) had in spring 1942 in preparation for the construction of the POW camp.[13] German orders to round up and deport Jews relied upon a chain of command that began with the Germans, filtered through Italian prefects and police chiefs, and was facilitated by Carpi administrators.

The regional police chiefs' role in arresting and sending Jews to Fossoli demonstrates the widespread system of Italian cooperation with and support of the Holocaust throughout northern Italy. Italian police in the German-occupied zone swiftly arrested Jews and arranged for their relocation to Fossoli. The camp's location in the Modena region meant that the Modena *questura* received letters from other Italian police departments detailing transports of Jews to Fossoli. Magrini reacted by alerting camp officials to expect their arrival. Such was the case when the Modena *questura* wrote to the Fossoli camp on February 15, 1944 and listed the names of six Jews arrested in Rome who would be arriving at Fossoli.[14] In some

instances other *questure* contacted the camp directly. Dr. Alberto Belli, director of the Bergamo *questura*, for example, addressed camp officials in a letter dated February 23, 1944 and explained that RSI police would be collecting Jews arrested in Bergamo and bringing them to Fossoli. A few days later he wrote to Fossoli officials with the names of the apprehended Jews.[15] The Ferrara *questura* contacted both the Modena *questura* and the camp (February 25, 1944) listing 12 Jews to be sent from Ferrara to Fossoli.[16] Thus, the regional *questure* played a far more active role than that suggested by "silent assent."

Normalizing Genocide through Compensated Compliance

The compliance of the *questure* with and fulfillment of German demands surely influenced Carpi authorities' decisions leading to the town's proprietorship of Fossoli on behalf of the Modena *questura*. The town leaders' actions normalized and legitimized behaviors that might otherwise have been viewed as immoral or criminal. Psychologist Ervin Staub identified a general pattern of a bystander's ability to influence others: "[One] can define the meaning of events and move others towards empathy or indifference… [and] by their passivity or participation in the system can affirm the perpetrators." Thus, in addition to fulfilling the demands of Nazi officials, Carpi authorities were responsible for creating an environment that inspired compliance.[17]

In her study of complicity, Victoria Barnett observed that: "In the shadow of the Holocaust are the bystanders: millions of human beings conspicuous not by their absence, but by their silence."[18] Carpi administrators may have never fired a shot, but they certainly helped facilitate mass murder. During Fossoli's short tenure as an Italian-run concentration camp (December 5, 1943–March 14, 1944), the Germans executed four separate deportations and the town arranged for transport of the Jews they had selected from the camp to the train station. When the Germans took over the camp (March 15, 1944), Fossoli was reclassified as a *polizei und durchgangslager* (police and transit camp). The German overhaul of Fossoli and the addition of a new Italian-run section for civilian prisoners required Carpi officials' sustained involvement in and knowledge of camp affairs. And, just as the *questore* influenced Carpi's cooperation, the town administration fostered local participation. Even Carpi citizens who did not have direct contact with the camp played an essential role because their calculated silence supported the function of Fossoli.[19] Carpi citizens' decision to remain silent—whether for self-preservation or economic gain—ultimately encouraged town leaders to carry out Nazi demands.

Carpi officials' active management of the expansion, supply, and needs of Fossoli during the German occupation structured the normalization of genocide. Their oversight of camp finances, for example, required the local government to compensate businesses for work related to the camp. Companies delivered goods to Fossoli, accompanied by a delivery ticket that served as a packing slip, much like the modern-day postal service system. A guard at the camp signed the form to confirm receipt. The suppliers then filled out an invoice and submitted it along with the signed delivery ticket to the *comune di Carpi*. Carpi government functionaries typed up two copies of the invoice, one for the Modena prefecture and one for Carpi files.[20] Carpi officials submitted the duplicate to Modena officials and awaited reimbursement. Businesses utilized this system to provide goods for both the Italian- and German-run camps.[21] The *ufficio economato del comune di Carpi* (business office of Carpi government) also routinely sent a list of transactions to the camp for its records.[22] Paying companies to supply, build, and maintain the camp established a socially accepted structure in which it was standard to accrue financial gain from other people's suffering.

Carpi officials were well aware of what they were doing. Managing Fossoli's operating expenses afforded them detailed knowledge of camp life. Town expenditures included costs ranging from payment for the transfer of Jews from the camp to the train station, to the expense of murdered Resistance fighter Leopoldo Gasparotto's burial in an unmarked grave in the Carpi cemetery.

Handling the financial burden of the camp, however, had its challenges. The Modena *questura* had issued an order on December 15, 1943 stating that the Carpi municipality would assume for the time being "the cost of establishing and managing the camp." Seven months later, Carpi still covered camp managerial expenses. In fact, this became so financially taxing that the *comune di Carpi* wrote a letter (July 17, 1944) to the Modena *questura* asking for financial assistance. They explained their inability to settle debts totaling 700,000 lire and specified that, "the creditors harass the city to pay them, and [the creditors] do not want to hear excuses of any sort."[23] The documents I unearthed did not suggest that Carpi officials were concerned for the deported prisoners. Instead, they expressed disquiet regarding their inability to compensate *Carpigiani*.

The chain of command from German offices to Modena officials, and from Modena officials to the RSI and to Carpi's *podestà*, ensured that all parties carried out orders effectively. Yet one wonders whether the significance of the orders faded as they passed from office to office. When Carpi administrators acted upon orders issued by the Germans and communicated through the Modena *questura*, did they feel ownership over their

actions? Did they recognize that by following orders they participated in Judeocide? Or, did the significance of their actions and the meaning of the orders get lost somewhere along the chain of command? Given that orders to Carpi officials were funneled through Modena rather than directly from the Germans, did Carpi officials feel like they were simply fulfilling Italian orders rather than being a part of the Germans' murderous actions against the Jews?

Knowledge of the camp's function could not have escaped Carpi officials as they financed its daily expenses just as they had prior to the occupation. The municipality of Carpi, for example, sent a letter to the Modena prefecture on June 1, 1944 detailing the sum paid for construction at the camp from December 29, 1943 to April 13, 1944 totaling 820,000 lire.[24] Town officials also bore responsibility for hiring members of their community to provide services such as construction of the camp and employment of vehicles for transportation between the camp and train that facilitated the murder of Italian Jews and deportation of others to forced labor camps. This normalization process filtered down to local businesses as well. In a continuation of the chain of command, the fact that their town administration paid them for this work encouraged locals' participation in genocide. Through their financial dealings, Carpi administrators came to support and participate in the genocidal aims of the Third Reich.

The Italian-Run Camp

The reconstruction (and eventual liquidation) of the Old Camp provided a multitude of opportunities for the local population to make money off the camp. In the months following the German abandonment of Fossoli after the mass deportation of POW prisoners (September 1943), the clay soil had swelled and pushed through the floors of the buildings. Prisoners peered through the cracks and gaping holes that punctuated the barrack brick walls, and walked around the shattered remains of windows littering the camp ground. The plumbing had also been affected and drainage was obstructed.[25] Each repair signified a way for the local population to interact with the camp.

And with 93 buildings—46 used as dormitories and the rest for various services such as offices, staff housing, storage, and warehouses—repairs required the immediate attention of Carpi officials.[26] Carpi financed the rebuilding of Fossoli and refurbished barracks with bunk beds and tables to replace those that had been looted in the days following the camp's closure.[27] It hired laborers to repair the damage and convert some of the

barracks into dormitories for families, divided with partitions, as in the quarters for Jews in the New Camp.[28]

Carpi's rebuilding of the Old Camp provided for the internment of foreign nationals of enemy states and suspects of the regime.[29] A number of prisoners in the civilian camp were foreigners captured in North Africa and sent to Italy. Hector Bastico, the governor of Libya, prompted their incarceration. Panicked by economic collapse and lack of supplies, he pushed the Italian Interior Ministry in 1942 to expel foreign nationals residing in Libya. French Jews were forcibly moved to Tunisia while British Jews, a small number of Greek citizens, and a large community of British Maltese were sent to Italy for internment. Many ended up in Fossoli.[30] In addition to the foreign nationals, the camp held Italian "volunteers" for work in Germany and parents of draft evaders.[31]

The name "civilian camp" creates the illusion that the prisoners in the Old Camp and German camp were markedly distinct. Prisoner demographics reveal another picture, elucidating yet another layer of Italian participation in the system of mass murder. A telegram to the Modena *questura* from Italian camp director Mario Taglialtela dated May 2, 1944 illustrates the overlap of prisoner groups. There were 1,743 "civilian interns," he reported. This included 661 Jews; 783 Anglo-Maltese; 136 Greeks and other foreigners; and 163 political prisoners and *rastrellati* (non-Jewish victims of Fascist and Nazi roundups). Taglialtela noted, too, that an additional 900 political prisoners were housed in the New Camp under German surveillance.[32] The fact that political prisoners and Jews were interned in both the Old and New Camps highlights a shared function between the sections. And, although little information has survived about the so-called volunteers, it appears they were not always housed in the Old Camp. A group of 450 gentile Romans, for example, were arrested and housed in the New Camp until their deportation on June 24 for labor in the Reich.[33]

Sparse as it is, the primary source material on prisoner groups in the "civilian camp" is essential to an analysis of Italian involvement in the Holocaust after the Germans took up residence in the camp. Few documents provide data on demographics in the Old Camp, and of those only some classify prisoner groups. Table 4.1, "Civilian Camp Prisoner Demographics," presents figures as noted in correspondence between camp commanders and regional offices in Modena.

The Jewish prisoner figures in the Old Camp challenge Holocaust narratives that charge Germans alone for the persecution of Jews in Italy. The fluctuating number of Jews held in the Italian-run Old Camp—with a high of 666 prisoners (March 31, 1944) and a low of 31 (April 10, 1944)—reveals that Italian guards monitored Jews who were constantly arriving and

Table 4.1 Civilian Camp Prisoner Demographics, 1944[a]

Date on document	*Total prisoners in Old/ Civilian Camp*	*Jewish prisoners*	*Anglo-Maltese*	*Political prisoners*	*Greeks & other foreigners*
March 14	1,391 civilian interns	382	674	165 (described as "Political prisoners and others for labor")	170 (described as Greeks and Slavs)
April 2 (in relation to prisoners on March 31)	1,615 civilian interns	666	659	175	115
April 15	1,261 civilian interns	305	681	157	118
April 27	1,633 prisoners in Old Camp	499	758	109	136 "general foreigners," and 161 "Political prisoners and others"
May 2	1,743 civilian interns	661	783	163	136
May 27	1,433 prisoners in the Old Camp	–	–	–	–
May 31	1,541 civilian interns	405	820	176	140
June 15 (in reference to prisoners in camp on April 11)	1,628 civilian prisoners in the Old Camp	487	809	191	141

June 25	1,412 in Old Camp	–	–	–	–
June 30	729 in Old Camp	31	452	149	97
July 8	689 in Old Camp	–	–	–	–
July 15	262 in Old Camp	–	–	–	–

[a] Some documents refer to the Italian camp as the Old Camp and others the Civilian Camp. The prisoner category titles in the chart, unless otherwise noted, reflect the language used in the documents themselves. Ads Modena, questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, Busta 6, "N 01233, Prot. 088124, oggetto: fonogramma a mano compo concentramento Fossoli di Carpi" (March 14, 1944); Ads Modena, questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, Busta 6, "oggetto: statistica quindicinale= Internati" (April 2, 1944); Ads Modena, questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, Busta 6, "N 01233, oggetto: Stastica quindicinale internati" (April 15, 1944); Ads Modena, questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, Busta 6, "N 001233, oggetto: Fonogramma a mano" (April 27, 1944); Ads Modena, questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, Busta 6, "001233, oggetto: Stastica quindicinale internati" (May 2, 1944); Ads Modena, questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, Busta 6, "Telegramma N. 239" (May 27, 1944); Ads Modena, questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, Busta 6, "N 001233, oggetto: Statistica quindicinale internati" (May 31, 1944); Ads Modena, questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, Busta 6, "N 002133, oggetto: Stastica quindicnale internati" (June 15, 1944); Ads Modena, questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, Busta 6, "Telegramma di stato, Ministero Interno Sicurezza Sede Campagana" (June 25, 1944); Ads Modena, questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, Busta 6, "N 001233, oggetto: Statistca quindicnale internati" (June 30, 1944); Ads Modena, questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, Busta 6, "Telegramma a mano Questura Modena" (July 8, 1944); Ads Modena, questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, Busta 6, "Telegramma a mano Questore Modena" (July 15, 1944).

deported. This raises the question of the extent to which camp guards and officials in the Old Camp were involved in the deportation of Jews. The archival record shows that despite the fact that the Old Camp and New Camp were technically two separate entities—the Germans officially monitored the New Camp under the direction of the RSHA headquarters in Verona and the Italians attended to the Old Camp following orders from the RSI communicated via the head of the Modena prefecture—Italian guards helped monitor Jews just as they had prior to the Germans' March 15 arrival. Owing to overcrowding in the political prisoner section of the German camp, for example, three barracks in the civilian camp were cleared out on May 6, 1944 and used to house an overflow of politicals. These prisoners would have been attended to by Italian guards.[34]

The same Italian guards stationed at the camp before March 15 remained in place after the German takeover. Now, in addition to Jews, they monitored their former comrades who had joined the Resistance.[35] Civilian camp director Taglialatela had sent a letter (February 16, 1944) to the Modena *questura* a month prior requesting more guards.[36] According to this document, in February, 30 policemen and 60 RSI guards were stationed at Fossoli. In addition, 20 RSI guards, 16 policemen, and 12 men (possibly civilians from town) came to the camp everyday to monitor prisoners.[37]

The Italian camp provided another level of participation in and awareness of the Judeocide rarely addressed by scholars. Like their German counterparts, Italian guards took on the role of oppressor and facilitated the incarceration and subsequent deportation of Jewish prisoners to death camps. Italian guards thus directly contributed to the annihilation of European Jewry. The question is: why?

In his study of local police collaboration in Belorussia and Ukraine, historian Martin Dean found that antisemitism alone does not explain what motivated indigenous perpetrators. Dean posits that other considerations included greed, peer pressure, careerism, and anti-communism.[38] Testimony from Fossoli's Jewish inmates suggests antisemitism did not motivate all the guards at Fossoli.[39] In fact, "*ebreo misto*" prisoner Franco Schönheit spoke fondly of the Italian guards decades later. "As long as there were Italians in the camp it wasn't so difficult," he explained. "The Italian policemen helped a great deal. One Italian guard would call my father to his guard tower in the evening and give him little bags full of bread—not sell, give. And this was a time when bread was rationed in Italy, almost impossible to get."[40] Still: if a guard acted benevolently and shared bread with prisoners, he was part of the system that kept these prisoners trapped inside barbed wire. What influenced the guards' choice to continue as usual?

Because the Italian guards were not involved in the direct killings of prisoners, they may have not felt responsible. Historian Gordon Horwitz's study of communities neighboring death camps proposes that "not all townsfolk took up instruments to strike directly at the inmates; some of the former took refuge in a spurious neutrality."[41] Guards too may have taken shelter in the fact that they were not directly involved in the killings and thus not have felt responsible for the eventual death of their charges.

Perhaps fear fueled the guards, too. After all, they oversaw prisoners who had resisted. The July 1944 murder of 67 political prisoners just outside the camp was (and was meant by the Germans to be) a harsh example of what befell resisters.[42] And RSI guards in particular must have been aware of their Fascist colleagues' arrest and torture of Resistance fighters.[43] Alternatively, the camp staff may have been Fascists persuaded by the propaganda of the day, which cast members of the Resistance as enemies to national unity and peace. The RSI guards, who made up the majority of the Italian camp personnel, were most likely young third-tier fascists like most local RSI enthusiasts.[44]

Historian Christopher Browning's examination of Reserve Police Battalion 101—a unit of the German Order Police that participated in roundups, guarding and liquidation of ghettos, and mass shootings in Eastern Europe—explains how ordinary men become executioners for tens of thousands of Jews.[45] He encourages his readers to avoid explaining the Police Battalion's actions as the "acts of evil men," and instead as motivated and encouraged by a host of factors including persuasive propaganda, fear, social acceptance, anger, hate, and dissonance (considering their commanders responsible for their actions). While the Italian guards at Fossoli came nowhere close to participating in the level of violence Browning describes, the guards' motivations for their wartime activities may bare resemblance.[46]

And whatever the reason, Italian guards participated in the oppression of Jews and Resistance fighters until the civilian camp closed in mid-July 1944 (a few weeks before the New Camp ceased operations), at which time the nearly 1,000 prisoners were transferred or released. Dr. Emanuele Giordano, who worked for the Modena *questura* and might have at one time headed the Italian camp,[47] reported: "The Italian camp was disbanded and all the inmates were set free, with the exception of the English, Americans, Russians, Poles, and French, who were transferred to the German camps."[48] On July 19, numerous "voluntary workers" and inmates were also deported to Germany. The Anglo-Maltese had been transferred in early June, many of whom were sent to Bergen Belsen.[49]

A number of factors appear to have precipitated the relocation and deportation of prisoners in the Italian camp.[50] Poor sanitary conditions

may have prompted the removal of Anglo-Maltese prisoners.[51] Letters among Italian officials (Interior Ministry, Modena *questura*, Fossoli camp director) remarked that the barracks were unable to accommodate prisoners due to deterioration.[52] The escalated fighting and German losses might have also triggered the closure of the New Camp. Throughout the summer Allied planes flew more and more frequently over Fossoli. Air raid alarms incited panic. Fossoli historian Anna Maria Ori suggests the July 20 assassination attempt on Hitler's life that provoked another form of frenzy that stepped up deportations throughout Europe had the same effect in Fossoli.[53] Another concern was the possible flight of prisoners. The prisoner population greatly outnumbered the guards, and authorities feared that prisoners would attempt a large-scale escape.[54] Partisan attacks in the area had become increasingly aggressive, which also may have motivated the camp closure. Partisans had bombed the nearby Modena-Mantova railway lines (June 25), for example. The Germans shot six civilian hostages in retaliation for the June 25, 1944 bombing.[55]

Carpi authorities' responsibility for the camp did not end once the prisoners left. As prisoners were shoved out the front gate, Dr. Sanctis, the Modena *questore reggente* (chief police commissioner) sent a letter (July 14) to Fossoli and to the Modena *Comando Reparto Agenti di P.S.,* a mobile unit of the Modena police, declaring that "this command will provide for the collection of all the barrack materials in the camp, transporting those now available to Modena, as well as the remaining materials [when dismantled]."[56] Carpi administrators arranged for the camp furnishings to be sent to Modena for the Germans to repurpose.[57]

Sanctis sent a separate letter to the "Director of the Concentration Camp, Fossoli di Carpi" a few days later (July 18), which asserted that "the premises [of the civilian camp] unless taken over by the [German authorities], shall be given over to the mayor of Carpi."[58] As the Germans had no real use for the Old Camp, it sat abandoned; they focused on deporting the last Jews from the New Camp. Meanwhile, Carpi employed laborers to perform various tasks at the camp (see Table 4.2, "Hired Labor at Camp, July 1944").

The Germans utilized the New Camp from August 6 to mid-November 1944 as *Durchgangslager 152* (transit camp 152) to deport gentiles. Fritz Sauckel, *Generalbevollmächtigte für den Arbeitseinsatz* (General Plenipotentiary for Labor Deployment), organized the deportations and Bruno Zimmermann served as the camp commandant. During this period an estimated 2,000 Italian citizens—men and women—were collected at Fossoli and sent to Germany for forced labor. They remained at Fossoli for less than 48 hours, just enough time to have their work skills assessed. A bombing raid hit the camp on August 20, killing 19 persons

Table 4.2 Hired Camp Labor, 1944[a]

Dates	*Number of workers*	*Total hours worked*	*Total cost of labor (lira)*
April 2–8	26	1,367	7,758.10
April 9–15	24	1,041	5,924.30
April 16–22	20	926	5,896.20
April 23–29	24	1,359	7,941.30
April 30–May 5	22	1,147	6,649.20
May 7–13	18	936	5,445.60
May 14–20[b]	19	847	4,920.50
May 21–27	19	880	5,076.80
May 28–June 2	15	766	4,442.60
June 3–9	16	734	4,266.60
June 11–17	18	904	5,192.80
June 18–24	18	746	4,254.20
June 25–July 1, 1944	12	562	3,181.40
July 2–8, 1944	14	700	3,989.20
July 9–15, 1944	12	584	3,298.40
July 16–21, 1944	13	472	2,656.80
Total		**13,971**	**80,894.00**

[a] ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, Atti dal 1942 al 1949, b. 2, f. 18, sf. 2, 3.
[b] The document corresponding to this week of labor does not indicated the exact start and end of the work week. Instead, it states work for the "week of 14 May 1944." We can assume, however, looking at the date on the labor documents buttressing this week that the labor was conducted from May 14 to 20, 1944.

and destroying some of the barracks.[59] After the attack, the number of prisoners arriving at Fossoli slowly dwindled to zero in mid-November, when the Germans abandoned the camp for good.

Little information has survived detailing the camp's operations during its last few months. Those records suggest that the town continued to play its role as camp financier. Correspondence on August 16, 1944 between Carpi *podestà* Volturno Bonacorsi (Carpi mayor as of April 1944) and the Modena prefect specifies 300,000 lire sent to the town to pay for work at the camp.[60] And receipts for services rendered substantiate the town's sustained involvement.

Fossoli and Local Companies for Profit

Commerce between the camp and town provides one example of the economic gains the camp offered locals, but such transactions did not necessarily afford the companies or their employees an intimate knowledge of the camp's function. Still, they profited from the camp's operation.

Local laborers' and businesses' economic partnerships with the camp established during the POW era of Fossoli continued when the camp took in Jews and civilians. The workers and companies carried on as before. Consorzio Agrario Provinciale, for example, supplied lumber to build barracks and fuel stoves.[61] A document sent by the director of the Old Camp dated April 3, 1944 noted three separate invoices for wood amounting to 19,038.85 lire paid to Consorzio Agrario Provinciale.[62] The Guerzoni Ubaldo company profited from tables it sold for use at Fossoli. Indeed, correspondence between the Modena *questura* and the *comune di Carpi* (January 13, 1944) shows that Modena believed Guerzoni Ubaldo overcharged for its work and asked Carpi to try to negotiate lower rates.[63] Carpi collected 360 lire from the camp for corpse transportation and burial in the town cemetery.[64]

While some businesses benefited from the materials they sold for use in Fossoli, others conducted work within the camp and in so doing gained greater awareness of camp operations. In the first four months of 1944 alone, *Cooperativo Muratori* completed more than 514,362.50 lire worth of work constructing barracks in Fossoli.[65] Its builders undertook projects at the camp, giving them an intimate view of the inmates and camp conditions. Olinto Pellacani, for example, earned 5.20 lire per hour for his 80 hours of general construction work at Fossoli, while Otello Salvarani worked 96 hours at 5.20 lire for a total of 499.20 lire.[66] Egidio Zanasi and Pederzoli (no first name noted) each spent 35 hours replacing broken glass at the camp in December 1943. Zanasi made 4.00 lire per hour and Pederzoli somewhat less at 3.50 lire.[67] Unlike employees of local companies selling goods to the camp, the laborers of *Cooperativo Muratori* saw the victims within the camp itself.

Additionally, the municipality of Carpi hired men for "various work" in the camp (see Table 4.2, "Hired Camp Labor, 1944"). A list of invoices housed in the Comune di Carpi archives reveals that from April 2 to July 21, 1941, for example, the office of the mayor paid laborers a combined total of 80,894 lire for 13,971 hours of work. Marino Frignani, the "collocatore," signed each invoice and nearly all have stamps from both the Carpi mayor's office and the Italian police office at the camp. The contract laborers worked anywhere from 17 to 82 hours a week and earned either 4.30 lire or 5.90 lire per hour. We do not know for certain whether these men managed to see or interact with the prisoners; however, given the sizable amount of hours they spent at the camp every week it is not a stretch to say they gained an awareness of the camp behind the barbed wires.

Despite not having direct contact with prisoners, local bakeries must have gained an idea of inmate population growth and decline from the

fluctuating bread orders.[68] Forno Chiesi prepared rations for prisoners being deported; according to one receipt, the company provided bread for 517 Jewish prisoners deported from Fossoli to Auschwitz on February 22, 1944. That food served as the last meal for nearly all the deportees. Luciana Nissim Momigliano was one of the prisoners to receive rations from Forno Chiesi on February 22 when she departed from Fossoli to Auschwitz. She recalled that the marmalade that accompanied the bread quickly coated all surfaces until everything was sticky.[69]

Local car companies also witnessed activities in the camp. Not only did they shuttle supplies to and from the city center, they also moved people. Savani Emma, for example, made four transfers of prisoners to the camp from March 28 to 31, 1944. The first three transports (two on March 28 and one on March 30) escorted three people per trip to the camp for the price of 120 lire. The March 31 transport of six prisoners cost 240 lire.[70] Manicardi Mentore-Autotrasporti drove two loads of civilian internees to Fossoli, the first on July 18, 1944 for 2,385 lire and the second on July 19, 1944 for 3,000 lire.[71] Autoservizi Ditta Valenti-Carpi transported 517 Jews from Fossoli to the Carpi train station on February 22, 1944, where they were forced onto trains bound for Auschwitz. It took the company 15 separate trips to move the prisoners: 5 loads in an Alfa Romeo, 6 in a Lancia, and 4 in a Fiat. Autoservizi Ditta Valenti-Carpi earned 4,500.00 lire for this task, 8.70 lire per person.[72]

An analysis of the transactions with the camp reveals the profit companies in Carpi and the surrounding area enjoyed due to business conducted with Fossoli. How are we to understand these transactions? Primo Levi was one of the Jews loaded into an Autoservizi Dita Valenti-Carpi car on February 22, brought to the Carpi train station, and sent to Auschwitz. Bakeries like Forno Chiesi—which made money from the rations for Levi's deportation—were as culpable as Autoservizi Dita Valenti-Carpi, the car company that carried him to the Carpi train station for deportation. These companies' dealings demonstrate local residents' economic opportunism and compensated compliance. Through their business transactions, residents gained an awareness of and contributed to what took place within their town limits. Their financial dealings made them an active part of the system that annihilated Jews and thus directly encouraged genocide.

WhyR esist?

Partisans actively sought opportunities to obstruct Nazi and RSI progress. Like compliers, Resistance fighters were motivated by an array of

factors. In *Storia della resistenza in Italia*, historian Santo Peli classifies Resistance groups into two categories, those that supported "continuity" and those that supported "discontinuity."[73] The former were rogue soldiers and officials who wanted to expel Nazi forces so that Badoglio and the king could regain control. Those for "discontinuity" were Marxist supporters whose vision for Italy's future favored a revolution, a new military tradition, and civilian government that excluded the king and Badoglio. The "continuity" fighters did not join the Resistance until after the occupation, whereas socialist and communist groups had predated the occupation.[74] Regardless of each group's political agenda, the Resistance movement as a whole sought to redefine Italy. And the only way to do so was to unseat Nazi and Fascist forces.[75]

Stories of individual Catholic Resistance fighters reveal that politics alone were not the sole prompt for resistance.[76] Milan priest Giovanni Barbareschi, whose Resistance activities eventually landed him in Fossoli, explained years later that he had simply decided "to be a rebel for love."[77] Don Giovanni Tavasci was caught helping shuttle those targeted for internment through the Italian-Swiss Alps. Fellow priest Roberto Angeli described him as the "Alps priest: strong, serious, of few words, but with a profound spirit." Father Camillo Valota was also arrested while escorting a group of refugees to Switzerland. Father Angeli described Father Paolo Liggeri as the best-known priest at the camp because of his previous position as the director of the Opera Cardinal Ferrari a Milano. Created in 1921 to help the homeless and destitute, this institute became a site of salvation as Jews, foreigners, and partisans sought it out for refuge and assistance with escaping.[78]

Incarcerated in Fossoli, the priests sought ways to provide solace and support for their fellow inmates. Father Paolo organized gospel readings and discussions in his barrack and the other priests went from bunk to bunk offering prayer, condolences, confession, and practical help. "Together with some [of the other priests]," explained Father Angeli, "I took up the task of collecting charitable donations of food and relief supplies from the most affluent prisoners (those who received parcels from home), and redistributed them to comrades who were in need."[79]

Catholic values shaped the actions of some laypeople, as well as religious. Teserio Olivelli's Catholic ethics prompted his decision to join the Resistance, and his altruism has earned him a place in popular Italian Holocaust memory. Early on, Olivelli had supported Fascism as an ideology that could elevate Italian nationalism, combat social and economic problems that plagued post-World War I Italy, and do so in a way that conformed to a Christian code of ethics.[80] This changed with Germany's 1935 and Italy's 1938 racial legislation. Olivetti then began to distance

himself from Fascism and to speak out against Nazi racial policies as anti-Christian.[81]

Captured by the Germans in September 1943, he escaped from a camp in Ruhm (Germany) and slowly made his way back to Italy where he rejoined the Resistance and started the paper *Il Ribelle* (*The Rebel*) that advocated a new Italy grounded in Christian values. He explained: "An organization without a soul permits greater poverty, the anarchy of production, the exploitation of man by man, steeped in the cult of violence, in state despotism and self-consumption of war. Emerging from this is a workers' society, freer, more just, with greater solidarity, and more Christian."[82] His writings became dogma for many Catholic Resistance members.

Arrested in Milan (April 27, 1944), Olivelli was sent to San Vittore and then to Fossoli alongside local priests, including Don Liggeri. Throughout his internment, which later included Bolzano (deported from Fossoli to Bolzano August 1944) and Flossenbürg (deported from Bolzano to Flossenbürg in September 1944) where he eventually was killed, Olivelli was identified as a "political prisoner," a blanket categorization for anyone opposing Fascist or Nazi doctrine.[83] Olivelli's Resistance, however, was rooted in Christian opposition to discriminatory policies. His religious principles and his political beliefs prompted his activism.

Active Resistance

Support of and membership in the Resistance mirrored the successes and failures of the Allied advance. The preexisting anti-fascist rebels' membership experienced slight growth in January 1944 when the Allies landed in Anzio, but it was not until the Allied liberation of Rome in June 1944 and the landing in Normandy that same month that the Resistance truly blossomed.[84] Indeed, data from September 1943 to January 1944 revealed only a 7.3 percent increase in Resistance numbers. Looking at partisan registries in Emilia Romagna from 1944 to 1945, historian Luciano Casali confirmed that the number of registered partisans experienced its greatest growth in July 1944. His research shows that of an approximate 79,749 partisans in the Emilia Romagna, 18,947 were located in Modena province. More than 50 percent of them joined after June 1944.[85] Overall, from May to July the Resistance experienced 21.9 percent growth.[86] This slow start suggests that most partisans tested the water before jumping in.

Spontaneity and contingency characterized the first few months of the Resistance in Modena after the German occupation. The *Gruppi d'azione patriotica* (GAP), or the Patriot Action Group, set off bombs targeting

Fascist and German soldiers. In response to the strong German presence in the city of Modena, the *Partito Comunista Italiano* (PCI), or the Italian Communist Party, moved its Resistance efforts to the hills in order to carry out more successful forms of guerilla warfare. Some former soldiers who had fled to the mountains to escape forcible recruitment into the RSI or deportation to forced labor camps volunteered their skills and leadership to the PCI.

Fossoli's geographical location in the middle of an open field made direct attacks on the camp or rescue missions nearly impossible, but that does not mean the Resistance completely gave up. Reports from this period by *Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale per Alta Italia* (CLNAI), or Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy, detailed the obstacles to Resistance efforts at the camp.[87] A CLNAI report titled "Situation in the Fossoli Concentration Camp" dated June 15, 1944 described the long list of challenges to Resistance efforts at Fossoli. A law that prohibited civilians from approaching the camp except on official business made reconnaissance difficult. And a barbed wire fence surrounding the camp erected in the summer of 1944 complicated any attempt to help prisoners escape.[88] Then too, the camp's exposed position made it difficult to approach stealthily and, even if an outbreak occurred, the terrain offered little shelter in which to hide.

Because Resistance members could not drive up to the camp, break through multiple lines of fencing, or hide during an escape, partisans sought other ways to disrupt camp life through acts of sabotage. Interrupting communication lines became a favored Resistance tactic. Disrupting and knocking down phone lines, such as the May 17 blow up of a telephone line in Rubbiara and the May 30 toppling of telephone and telegraph lines in Soliera, San Vito, and on via Campi in Modena, offered an important avenue for weakening communication among Fossoli, Carpi, German, and RSI offices.[89]

In order to compel Italian gentiles to stay inline, German authorities responded vigorously to such acts of sabotage. Imposing fines on municipalities where they occurred, the Germans dunned the Modena municipality 8,000 lire for the destruction of German telephone cables. Modena was also required to set up a security service at its own expense composed of civilians under the control of German soldiers.[90]

Trains and transports became another central focus of Resistance efforts. An attack on the railway line near Fossoli (June 24, 1944), for example, caused the derailment of a German military train, the death of two German soldiers, and injuries to five others. The German military authorities retaliated by shooting six Fossoli inmates the next day.[91] The same month, partisans attempted an act of sabotage during a deportation.

Distracting the German guards at the Carpi train station with cigarettes and wine, they handed packages to prisoners in which they had hidden saws, one per carriage. During the transport, some prisoners managed to saw out of the train and escape.[92]

Without a way to free prisoners already interned at Fossoli, the Resistance organized to provide aid packages to camp inmates. This was not easy. In addition to the difficulty of purchasing food and supplies in the impoverished countryside, a specific prisoner's name had to be clearly displayed on the package. With prisoners coming and going, this information was crucial because a box sent to a prisoner no longer at the camp might not be returned and instead be left to the guards. Resistance fighters relied on Italian guards to obtain the identities of the interns.[93] The 285 packages they managed to send contained bread, cheese, meat, wine, liquor, cigarettes, sugar, tea, sweets, and other items.[94]

Aided by like-minded partisans, clergy in the region focused their efforts on sheltering antifascists and rescuing and hiding Jews. For example, organized by the *Delegazione per l'Assistenza degli Emigranti Ebrei* (DELASEM), or the Delegation for the Assistance of Jewish Emigrants, Villa Emma in Nonantola (approximately 10 kilometers northeast of Modena) became a refuge for Jewish children who had survived massacres in German-occupied Yugoslavia.[95] Following the German occupation of Italy, a local Fascist led a group of Nazis to the villa.[96] By the time they arrived it was completely empty. In less than 24 hours, locals had managed to hide all 11 adults and 42 children. Nuns in the area took in 30 of the younger children.[97]

While some Jews hid from Nazi and Fascist forces, others relied upon partisan aid to flee persecution. Not far from Villa Emma, for example, Don Elio Monari in the nearby city of San Biagio, with the help of some younger members of *Azione Cattolica* (AC), or Catholic Action (a nonpolitical Catholic lay organization), arranged for numerous Jews to escape through the mountains to Switzerland.[98] Monari kept in touch with Carpi clergymen Don Nino Monari (no relation) and Don Francesco Venturelli, both of whom did what they could to aid Fossoli prisoners, providing goods and counsel. Don Dante Sala, pastor of San Martino Spino (near Mirandola), also helped Jews cross the border into Switzerland, acting as their guide.

The Black Brigades arrested Don Dante Sala on December 4, 1943 at a train station in Como while he and the Jews he planned to transport awaited their hired car. The Jews watched from inside the station's coffee shop as Fascist forces swooped in and surrounded the priest. While Don Sala was hauled off, they managed to evade capture. The Black Brigades brought the priest to Monte Olimpino for questioning. Don Sala managed

to hide his contact list and money for the car he had hired in his cell prior to his interrogation. He reclaimed them afterward while his guards took a cigarette break. When he was transferred to San Donnino prison by taxi, he passed the incriminating documents to his driver who just so happened to be Don Sala's friend. He was released from San Donnino two months later, thanks to a lack of evidence.[99]

Upon release, he joined forces with partisan Odardo Focherini, the administrative director of *Avvenire d'Italia* (one of the few Catholic newspapers not smothered by Fascist law) and president of the Carpi dioceses of AC. The 37-year-old-father of 7 managed to save at least 105 Jews before he was arrested on March 11. Deported from Fossoli, he died a few months later (December 24, 1944) at the labor camp Hersbruck, a subsidiary of Flossenbürg concentration camp.[100]

Focherini was one among thousands of Italians who sacrificed their lives to end Nazi and Fascist rule. The legacy of heroic partisan action in postwar Italy has been championed to such an extent that all Italians are viewed as members of the Resistance and victims, thus occluding the range of Italian actions during the genocide. And, in some instances, the deportation of Resistance fighters is held as equivalent to that of Jews. The creation of the *Museo Monumento al Deportato* (Deportee Memorial Museum) in the center of Carpi in 1973 provides an example of how the murder of Resistance fighters and Jews are conflated. The museum consists of 13 rooms, each with an emotional trigger, such as a piece of barbed wire or a striped prisoner uniform, as a means of depicting the German concentration camp system. In the last room, the names of some 15,000 Italians deported to German camps are chiseled into the wall. After the war, Italian society adopted a narrative depicting wartime Italy as victim to Nazi occupation and persecution, and the *Museo Monumento al Deportato* tells that story. Thus, no distinction is drawn between Jewish and gentile deportees, implying that Nazi cruelty oppressed all Italians.

Conclusion

Perhaps understanding why some resisted while others complied is beyond our reach. Yet comply and resist they did. Holocaust literature and survivor testimony expert Lawrence Langer has commented that Primo Levi had that idea when he penned *Survival in Auschwitz*. "Indeed," explained Langer, "I suspect that from the outset he was more concerned with prodding his readers to reflect on what happened than to hope to understand it."[101] The history of Fossoli shows us that genocide happened, in part, because of silent witnesses, compensated compliers, and acquiescent followers.

While we may not understand why Carpi citizens and leaders struck up relationships with Fossoli, we now know some of the ways they did. Far from silently assenting to genocide, Carpi laborers and businesses chose to undertake work that brought them financial and, perhaps, physical security. Their active engagement with and support of the Germans' aims through compliance made them active participants in the system of genocide. The affairs of the *comune di Carpi* and the Modena offices fulfilling German orders paint an even more complicated picture of responsibility. Carpi officials began working with the camp before its transformation into a deportation site and continued to be involved even after the last prisoners left. It is unclear what they could have done to save Jews and others and what the cost would have been to their own safety had they embarked on such a course. What is clear is that the *comune di Carpi* knew its actions facilitated the deportation and deaths of thousands.

Even faced with mortal risk, however, many chose to resist. The legacy of the Resistance fighters remains the hallmark of Italian Holocaust history. An estimated 2,500 of those who fought against the aims of Fascism and Nazism ended up at Fossoli. The notion of Italians as "*brava gente*" gains credibility through the legacy of Resistance fighters such as Focherini. At the same time, however, there is limited memory of Italian compliance, although that history would make the memory of the Resistance shine all the brighter.

Part II

After the War

5

The Politics of Blame

Historian Paolo Favero argues that the "*brava gente*" myth, which promotes an image of Italians as intrinsically benevolent, "good folk," has become a cleansing agent used to remove all the stains of Italy's past.[1] The myth first came into existence during Italy's era of colonization and has since been applied to whitewash evidence of Italian racism, imperialism, xenophobia, Fascism, antisemitism, and war crimes.[2]

While previous chapters have explored the complex and diverse actions of *Carpigiani* during the Holocaust, in this chapter we will scrutinize the erosion of historical memory of Italian collaboration. This chapter analyzes how postwar politics bleached all traces of ordinary Italians' role in the Judeocide from public memory and in so doing fostered a shared perception of national innocence. Scrutinizing Fossoli's postwar functions as an Allied prison for German criminals and collaborators (spring–summer 1945), an Italian Interior Ministry jail for Fascists awaiting trial (winter 1945–spring 1946), and an Allied—then Italian—managed refugee/displaced persons camp (February 1946–May 1947), we shall see that each incarnation allowed Carpi collaborators and compliers to escape scrutiny and become members of the "*brava gente*."

Trials, Errors, and Tribulations: Political Posturing and the Rebranding of Fossoli

The first two postwar uses of Fossoli, first as an Allied-run prison for Nazis and RSI criminals, and second as an Italian-run jail for Fascists, illustrate how national and international politics informed camp operations. Although Fossoli held perpetrators and their collaborators, nearly all were set free. The quick turnover of camp functions in the first year after the liberation elucidates how postwar chaos paved the way for Fascists and compensated compliers to avoid scrutiny for their wartime activities.

Fossoli as an Allied-Run Prison

When the Western Allies reached Modena in April 1945, the army quickly refashioned Fossoli to detain their German and Italian adversaries. Fossoli's first postwar use gratified Britain's desire to hold Italy responsible for declaring war on its empire in 1940. Sparse information has survived regarding the Allies' oversight of Fossoli from April through June 1945. And none of the available materials offer any insight into camp operations or the identity of Fossoli captives.

Resistance Groups Take Control of Fossoli

Resistance groups in Modena and the surrounding area supported Britain's efforts and petitioned to convert Fossoli into an Italian-managed camp for Italian collaborators facing trials for war crimes.[3] The CLNAI[4] had headed the Resistance in the north and as part of its mission to punish Fascists after the war, CLNAI sent former partisan commander Pietro Migliavacca to Fossoli in July 1945 to meet with Allied leaders and discuss CLNAI's intention to oversee Fossoli as a prison for Fascists.[5]

The CLNAI's 18-month civil war against RSI and German forces had cost thousands of partisans their lives and they did not want these deaths to go unanswered. Historians Giorgio Pisanò and Paolo Pisanò have identified the names of 3,976 individuals killed from September 1943–May 1945 in Emilia Romagna. The region was the heart of the communist uprising in Italy. The province of Modena, which includes Fossoli, accounted for 1,228 of those killed from September 19 to June 4, 1949.[6] It is with their dead comrades in mind that the CLNAI sought and received approval from the Allied commander of Milan, Colonel I. M. Rorimer, and Commander of the 5th Army, Major Noble A. Abray,[7] to "use the Fossoli concentration camp to intern former Republican Fascists [RSI members], dangerous social elements, or transitionally, as a clearing house for political refugees."[8]

Approving CLNAI's call to hold Fascists responsible also benefitted the Allies' plan to establish a democratic Italy. For them, rebuilding Italy meant creating a bulwark against Stalin. Despite England's skepticism of Italians' ability to govern, the United States supported and guided the creation of a temporary multiparty coalition (April 1944) with Badoglio and the six leading parties of the *Comitato Liberazione Nazionale* (CLN), or the National Liberation Committee.[9] The CLN had been formed in Rome in July 1943 to pressure Mussolini and the king to broker an armistice. Its members included the Christian Democrats (*Democrazia Cristiana*

or DC), the Italian Communist Party (*Partito Comunista Italiano* or PCI), the Italian Socialist Party (*Partito Socialista Italiano* or PSI), the Labor Democratic Party (*Democrazia del Lavoro* or DDL), the Action Party (*Partito d'Azione* or PDA), and the Liberal Italian Party (*Partito Liberale Italiano* or PLI). The leaders of all six factions endorsed the message of Italians as members of the Resistance and designated April 25 a national holiday in its celebration. Placing Fossoli in the hands of CLNAI, the northern branch of CLN, reflected the Allies' desire to reward the Resistance and unify Italy in the process.

The Allies feared that the intense poverty caused by joblessness and financial damage, and Italians' post-Fascist disgust with nationalism, threatened to drive the nation apart and make it vulnerable to Marxist ideology. Five years of war and over 20 of Fascist dictatorship had devastated Italy's infrastructure, economy, and morale. Extensive bombing had obliterated housing, schools, and hospitals while wreaking havoc on transportation and the industrial sector. Fighting between the Allies and Axis had damaged 90 percent of Italian port facilities and destroyed one-quarter of all railway lines. The war had cost Italy approximately one-third of its national wealth and left high unemployment and inflation in its wake.[10]

Carpi, too, had sustained substantial damage in the final years of war and the rebuilding and reopening of Fossoli created jobs and provided an economic stimulus. *Cooperativa Muratori*—the cooperative that had built the camp, seen to its wartime expansions, and dismantled the Old Camp after the Germans abandoned Fossoli in December 1944—accepted the job of repairing the New Camp section to hold Fascist prisoners.[11] Accounting for both labor and new materials, *Cooperativa Muratori* estimated the total cost to be 20 million lire.[12] The Modena prefecture approved the Carpi branch of the *Associazione Nazionale Partigiani d'Italia* (ANPI), or National Association of Italian Partisans—a partisan Resistance group formed after the German occupation—to manage Fossoli's daily supplies.[13] ANPI contacted grocers, butchers, and bakers in Emilia, Lombardy, and Venice to provide for Fossoli inmates.[14] And some 110 former partisans and war veterans gladly accepted positions as guards in addition to 45 men sent from Rome for the same purpose.[15] ANPI had arranged to provide for 1,500 Fascists at Fossoli. In the end, far fewer prisoners enter the camp as escalating economic and political concerns derailed early CLN and Allied enthusiasm for trials.

Ultimately, politics in Italy superseded the left's call for justice. The Western Allies' posturing for a DC-led government prompted Marxist parties to abandon the crusade for punishment and join the fight for political power. Democracy was the Allies' stated goal. But they had their

version of democracy in mind. To that end, they retained considerable influence over the new Italian government. The Allies and a small group of CLN leaders replaced the PSI coalition leader Gerrucio Parri with the Allied-backed DC leader Alcide De Gasperi in the summer of 1945. In so doing, the DC and Allied governments established a quasi-democratic governing coalition that could manage state affairs until Italians could vote to elect their own leaders.[16]

The Allies reasoned that leaving the monarchy and Badoglio in charge would engender continuity when the country was fully liberated. This enraged members of the CLN, who asked the king to abdicate and Badoglio to resign on June 8, 1944. The king obliged and was temporarily replaced by his son. Badoglio also stepped down and was succeeded by Ivanoe Bonomi, who announced the formation of a new Constituent Assembly on June 25. But PSI refused to negotiate with Bonomi because he had been a member of the pre-Fascist elite. He was replaced two months after the war ended by Gerrucio Parri, whose tenure was also short-lived. Parri wanted local CLN blocs to run the country, but the Western Allies and the Vatican feared that this would lead Italy toward communism.[17]

The national battle for political power had an impact on Fossoli. By the time the Allied-supported DC leader De Gasperi unseated Parri in 1945, only 51 Fascists (as of December 6) were held at Fossoli, increasing to 89 by May 22, 1946. Throughout its tenure as a Fascist prison, Fossoli never held more than 130 inmates, all of whom were released by spring 1946 as a result of a widespread amnesty for Fascists.[18]

The Italian left's hopes for far-reaching trials were dashed when the DC and Allies managed to secure De Gasperi's leadership of the coalition government in late 1945. The function of Fossoli as a prison for Fascists and its subsequent closure paralleled the political interests of the Western Allies and Italian right and their suppression of the left. The Western Allies, DC, and the Vatican feared that bringing Fascists to trial would strengthen leftist support. The "red" partisans had composed the majority of the 35,000 Resistance fighters murdered at the hands of Nazi and Fascist forces.[19] Trying and punishing Fascists was tantamount to valorizing the majority "red" Resistance. It would give them too much favorable publicity, too much visibility, and too strong a voice. None of that would do.

The Italian political parties volleyed for control while the Western Allies played referee. Palmiro Togliatti, leader of the PCI, wanted to use the popular image of the Resistance to rally Italian support for communism. After Germany's defeat, Italy's PCI, a party of a few thousand members, had grown into a huge organization with 1.7 million followers, making it the largest communist bloc outside the Soviet Union.[20] The Americans worried that such positive press for communists would inspire

Italians to vote red in Italy's first parliamentary election in decades scheduled for June 2, 1946. And the British, initially more inclined than the Americans to force Fascists to face justice, were too busy with Palestine to press the issue. Furthermore, Yugoslavia's occupation of Trieste and part of Venezia Giulia (early May to mid-June 1945) had underscored Italy's fragile national position and the urgent need to rebuild the country. Angering the Socialist party, the PCI agreed unity was more pressing than Fascist trials.[21]

To absolve Italians of their Fascist past and silence the PCI's calls for tribunals, the Allies and DC depicted Mussolini and Hitler as the main responsible actors. The royal family was also criticized for having allowed Fascism in the first place. Targeting Mussolini and the king allowed many Italians to exonerate themselves. At the same time, American and Italian officials labored to shift public attention from the nation's former partnership with Germany.

Allied forces stationed in Modena and Carpi sought out ways to celebrate and reward citizens who had helped POWs. Italian leaders, working on behalf of the Allies, reached out to their communities and called upon such individuals to present themselves for rewards such as food and money. As a result, instead of holding trials, the Allies in the north used their funds to applaud those who had helped their comrades.[22]

The Allies feared that Italian trials of Fascists would create unwanted comparisons with trials of high-ranking Nazis in Nuremberg, Germany. However little the national appetite for trials at home, there was even less for legal actions against Italians abroad. At that time, Yugoslavia and Greece were pressuring Italy to hand over Fascists who had committed crimes while stationed in those countries. Indeed, Yugoslavia sent a request to the United Nations asking for 40 identified Italian military figures to sit trial in Yugoslavia. Italian newspapers treated this request as an insult to Italian sovereignty. Had Italy agreed to send Fascists to Yugoslavia and Greece, it would have prompted a comparison to Nazi war criminals who were also sent abroad for trials. Italy refused Yugoslavia's and Greece's requests and rescinded its charges against both German Nazis and its own Fascists to sidestep foreign demands to bring Fascist criminals to trial.[23]

Using Germans as scapegoats for Fascist crimes allowed Italians to see themselves as "*brava gente*." Historian Guri Schwarz has written extensively about the propaganda of Italian benevolence. "By avoiding trials against Italian war criminals, obscuring the horrors of the colonial domination in Africa, and, in general erasing all the sins of a nation that had long supported the regime's actions," he writes, "the government and state apparatus helped lay the foundations on which the national community

could gaze at itself in the distorted mirror of the 'myth of the good Italian' for over forty years."[24]

Historian Robert Ventresca might consider the public memory of Mussolini's hanging an example of Guri's "distorted mirror." "To remember Mussolini's execution as an act of the Italian people rather than one man or one political party," Ventresca argues, "is to give birth to a founding myth of postfascist Italy; the myth of Italy as a nation of antifascists."[25] Holding Mussolini and his inner circle the sole perpetrators of the genocide heightened the image of all Italians as antifascists and supporters of the Resistance.

Without trials of Fascists, the multifaceted Italian wartime experiences of collaborators, resisters, and compliers were replaced with a singular narrative of the "*brava gente*." Historian Pilippo Focardi argues that during the creation of the Italian Republic, the "*brava gente*" myth became part of an intentional diplomatic strategy to absolve Italy of its Fascist past and allowed for transference of responsibility from "good Italians" onto "bad Germans."[26] Symbolically, by the time the last Fascist prisoners left the camp, all of the former Italian-run camp had been obliterated.[27]

Victims and *"Brava Gente"*

The postwar conflation of Italian victimhood, operating in tandem to the "*brava gente*" myth, also has distorted the memory of Italy's Fascist and collaborationist past.[28] Efforts to depict gentiles and Jews as equal victims of Nazi violence allowed former Fascists and RSI collaborators, for the most part, an opportunity to evade scrutiny.[29]

While the Italians did suffer at the hands of the German and Fascist forces, their suffering was not like that of the victims. Lawrence Langer makes a similar point when he writes: "The subtext of loss exerts its own influence on the narrative."[30] Italy's decision not to hold Fascists and collaborators accountable allowed Carpi to elide the town's contributions to genocide and place their full attention on rebuilding the town from the ground up. The amnesty granted to the majority of Fascists furthered this development. By March 1946, the Badoglio government commission charged with purging the civil service of Fascists closed operations. Three months later the first wave of amnesties canceled all prison sentences of less than five years.

The acquittal of former Fascists and oblivion of their guilt allowed for continuity between the RSI and new Italian Republic.[31] Many government employees who were interviewed about their Fascist past claimed that their actions had been forced, as Fascist party membership had been

required of all civil servants.[32] Nearly every mayor, prefect, and mid-level bureaucrat was rehired and avoided payment of previously imposed fines. By 1960, 62 of the 64 prefects active in the provincial administration and all 135 police chiefs had held office during Fascist rule.[33] "The suppression of civil and political liberties, extremist nationalism, colonialism, racism, and antisemitism," argue Paolo Pezzino and Guri Schwarz, "were therefore barely considered by the Italian collective conscience."[34]

The widespread amnesty for Fascist crimes brought an end to Fossoli's function as a prison for Fascists and its 130 inmates were released in spring 1946. In total 43,000 Italian civilians were charged with collaborating with the Nazis, of which 23,000 were released due to the widespread amnesty and another 14,000 freed for various reasons. Of those arrested, 5,928 were sentenced to pay fines and spend time behind bars, and of those 259 received the death penalty. Ultimately, 91 capital punishments were carried out. The amnesty also benefitted 5,328 Fascists arrested for wartime crimes.[35]

Fossoli's closure coordinated with the political agenda of the Italian right and Western Allies. Elections in June 1946 solidified the DC's leadership, stripped the monarchy of power, and closed the question of trials. With 35 percent of the vote, the DC won 207 seats out of 555 total. The PSI placed second with 21 percent and 155 assembly members. The PCI earned 19 percent and 104 seats. While the DC received 9 million votes, the PSI and PCI (both Marxist parties) earned 10 million combined. Although the left won more votes, because they were split between the PSI and PCI the DC was victorious.

The Town of Carpi's Role After the War

National efforts to obscure Fascist crimes made Carpi authorities' elision of responsibility possible. Town leaders—who had transitioned from providing for Fossoli's wartime needs to managing outstanding bills and responding to missing person inquiries—followed suit and blamed the Nazi forces. These postwar occupations and a blanket refusal to accept responsibility supported a overly simplified image of all *Carpigiani* as victims despite the fact that some had willingly collaborated with Fascist and Nazi forces.

Town authorities' refusal to pay outstanding wartime contracts exemplifies the type of postwar finger pointing employed by former collaborators and Fascists. Let us consider, for instance, the case of Società Italiana Acquedotti, the Milanese company that provided the water for Fossoli. The company wrote to Carpi to request 12,001,55 lira in payment for

water it had supplied to the camp in 1944.[36] Carpi consulted with the Modena *questura*, which decided that Società Italiana Acquedotti should contact the "Wehrmacht for payment," not the town.[37] Società Italiana Acquedotti responded by quoting, at length, the contract signed by Mr. Vezzani, Carpi's mayor at the time. It argued that his signature on the contract confirmed that the water company's business was with Carpi, not the Germans.[38] Carpi's newest mayor Bruno Losi (who replaced Volturno Bonacarsi in April 1945), contended that the contract held no legal bearing on Carpi because the camp had been under German control when it was signed.[39]

This approach of holding the Germans financially responsible occurred in other instances. For example, Telefoni Italia Media Orientale (TIMO), the telephone company that serviced the camp, also had difficulty collecting payment for the period during which the camp fell under German command.[40] Holding others responsible permitted Carpi and Modena officials to absolve the town of debt and themselves of culpability.

Letters between Losi and relatives of the deported conformed to the national narrative that held Germans responsible and painted Italians as victims. Despite the vital role of Carpi municipality in the incarceration, persecution, and deportation of Jews, POWs, and civilian interns, family members of the deported relied on the same town bureaucracy to provide word of their missing loved ones after the war. Else Beer sent a letter to Carpi's mayor, for example, in search of her Jewish Viennese husband Carlo Beer. She had lost contact with her husband in May 1944 and his last known location was Fossoli. Her letter implored the mayor to help her locate her husband. "I await your response with anxiety," she concluded.[41] Many people received standardized replies from Losi identical to the one sent to Elsa Beer. Losi wrote that the camp had closed in November 1944 and he apologized for not having any additional information.[42] The Germans, he explained, had not given information on the deportations. We now know the fate of many of the persons identified in these letters. Else's husband Carlo, for example, was deported from Fossoli on May 16, 1944 to Auschwitz, from which he did not return.[43]

Florence resident Valentina Padova wrote a heartfelt letter to the mayor seeking news of six of her Jewish family members, or as she referred to them, "my loved ones."[44] She also sought word on Roberto Fano, who had been somewhere between the age of three to four when he arrived in Carpi. She relayed all the information she had been able to accumulate on her family, including their arrest locations and dates as well as their estimated date of arrival at Fossoli. In his response, the mayor explained that he had passed all her information to the local priest, Venturelli; perhaps he knew more.[45] Fully aware of Venturelli's wartime work at the camp,

the mayor appears to have consulted with him on numerous occasions before responding to such letters. Venturelli's logs proved to be important in preserving the history of the camp, and his record sometimes included the names of those deported. These lists were eventually given to Losi.

Although the mayor could not supply information about Valentina Padova's family members, we now know their fates. All were deported to Auschwitz and never heard from again: Dr. Ermanno Fano (deported April 5, 1944); Giorgina Padova Nei Fano (deported August 2, 1944); Luciano Fano (deported April 5, 1944 and killed on arrival); Liliana Fano deported April 10, 1944 and killed on arrival); toddler Roberto Fano (deported April 5, 1944 and killed on arrival); and Alba Fano (deported April 5, 1944).[46]

The mayor referred to Venturelli's logs when he responded to one Angiolo Cassuto. The latter wrote to the mayor (August 22, 1945) seeking information regarding his mother and aunt who had entered the New Camp in June 1944. He wanted to know if they had died at Fossoli or been sent to Germany.[47] The mayor responded (September 1, 1945) saying only that Cassuto's family was not on the list of those who died at Fossoli.[48] We now know that his aunt, 82-year-old Dolce Eugenia Ghiron, and his 92-year-old mother Regina Ghiron,[49] were deported from Fossoli on June 26, 1944 and killed upon arrival at Auschwitz on June 30.

The lack of communication between German authorities and Carpi officials on the identities of the deported made it easy to blame the Germans for the deportations and avoid any acknowledgment of the town–camp nexus. Losi undertook an immense task in replying to letters and he typically apologized for not having sufficient information. And if the mayor used his own ignorance as a tool to deflect responsibility, he was not alone.[50]

Losi's subsequent 25-year tenure as Carpi's mayor (1945–1970) speaks volumes on his constituents' favorable regard for his leadership. Elected at the age of 34, the young communist's electoral success reflected Carpi's postwar political hue. Regardless of his political creed, Losi focused on healing Carpi. Dante Colli, one of Losi's city councillors and a member of the DC, described Losi as a pragmatist who put Carpi's needs ahead of political bantering.[51] And instead of focusing on righting the towns' wartime errors, Losi and his cabinet concentrated on reestablishing agricultural cooperatives, opening schools, and creating jobs.[52] Although Carpi voted against the national trend by electing a communist instead of a DC leader, Losi's dedication to rebuilding Carpi trumped his politics. His repeated electoral success over the next two decades affirmed that the town of Carpi, despite its own left leanings, also wanted to rebuild Italy.

Former head archivist of the Archivio Communale di Carpi Paola Borsari explained that Losi's actions signaled his "need to earn the city's trust by providing a return to normalcy. He viewed a system of services and institutions as a concrete sign of progress that would become the basis of redemption and reconstruction of the Carpigiani."[53] Normalcy, however, is perhaps not the right word. It was not Carpi's past Losi sought to create; instead it was a bright future. And in this vision of the future, there was no room for accounting for their role in the Judeocide.

The discerning nature of the "*brava gente*" myth has come to speak for the whole by leaving out all evidence to the contrary. Historian Fiamma Lussana contends that memory, unlike history, can be selective. She posits that "the timeless dimension of memory and its fluctuation" relate a "memory in time" instead of "a time in history." A "memory in time" connotes a plurality of memory, whereas a "time in history" is part of linear chronology of events. [54] Memory has the ability to be selective and not account for the whole, which is exactly what the "*brava gente*" myth attempted, and attempts, to do.

Illegal Entry, Refugees, and *"stranieri indesiderabili"*

Italian oversight of thousands of refugees traversing through Fossoli at that time illuminates how a national narrative of Italian benevolence allowed for a nation of former collaborators and Fascists to become caretakers of foreign victims, perpetrators, collaborators, and refugees.

By the time Fossoli was repurposed as a camp for *stranieri indesiderabili* (undesirable foreigners) in February 1946, the Allies allowed Italians greater autonomy over wartime prisoners. Initially, Italians were excluded from management of the refugees, including Jews, because of continuing British mistrust of its former adversary. By January 1946, however, the escalating refugee crisis prompted a British request for Italian assistance to guard ports, staff Displaced Person (DP) camps, and curb unsanctioned entry.

Italy's involvement with the refugee question was also guided by the Allies' plan to lessen its financial burden of caring for refugees and DPs. Initially, the Western powers had established the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in November 1943 to provide assistance to and resettle millions of refugees and displaced persons. The newly formed agency immediately clashed with the Soviets. This East–West conflict boiled down to politics; the West would not force individuals to return to Soviet territories and the Soviets contended that only refugees and DPs who returned home would be eligible for aid.

In the end, the Western powers and the Soviets agreed to compromise. Individuals would not be forced to repatriate, but those who did not voluntarily return home would only receive assistance for six months. This meant that after six months' time, the Western powers had to provide for refugees unwilling to repatriate.[55] By the end of 1946, there were still approximately 158,000 refugees and DPs in Italy of whom an estimated 20,000 were Jews.[56]

To lessen the political and economic weight shouldered by the United States and Great Britain, they took steps in late 1946 to abandon the UNRRA and establish the International Refugee Organization (IRO) in order to further international participation and include Italians in resolving the DP problem. Unlike the UNRRA, the IRO tied refugees' status to a fear of persecution. Once recognized as a refugee, the IRO would not forcibly repatriate individuals and instead coordinated relocation opportunities abroad.[57]

The Allied Commission and IRO shared the burden of managing the refugee/emigration process and the Italian government took on the role of supervising the day-to-day care of internees. Italian officials also conducted interviews with camp residents who were then sent on to the IRO and Allies for immigration opportunities.[58]

And the groups they monitored were diverse. Priest Carlo Signorato visited Fossoli on behalf of the Vatican and remarked upon its mixed population in a letter dated October 14, 1946. "I recently visited the concentration camp Fossoli (Carpi-Modena)," he explained. "It is in dire poverty; the conditions of the poor people are disgusting in every respect. There are 600 [people] of 23 nationalities! They are also of different religions!"[59] The diversity of the inmate population was a result of Italy's status in 1946 as the most popular route out of Europe for refugees, DPs, Jews, and former perpetrators.[60]

Files created by the Modena police on nearly every prisoner who passed through Fossoli during this period reveal the range of prisoner ethnicities, ages, and reasons for internment. These records show that Fossoli housed Jewish camp survivors arrested in Italy after the war without permission to be in the country alongside *stranieri indesiderabili*, foreigners who had committed crimes, entered Italy illegally, refused to repatriate, or were classified as ineligible for immigration because of past crimes.

Italian responsibility for the management of this prisoner population, which included Italy's former Axis partners and victims alike, reinforced the image of Italian benevolence and implicitly absolved Italians of their own war crimes.[61] The opportunity to care for Jewish refugees and coordinate with the Allies worked to Italy's advantage by helping to associate Italians with these groups rather than the Nazi prisoners they also

guarded. We will now consider how Italian supervision over Fossoli's diverse inmate population during this period mirrored the national and international acceptance of the "*brava gente*" myth.

Jews

Covert entry of thousands of Jews into Italy posed a serious problem for the British and prompted the Allies' offer to Italy to oversee its former victims. Jews sought a route to Palestine via Italian ports, and more Jews set sail from postwar Italy to Palestine than from any other European country. The British struggled to prevent mass immigration to the national homeland.[62] Yet, with the help of the Palestinian Jewish brigades stationed in the peninsula, some 15,000 Jewish refugees crossed clandestinely into Italy in the summer of 1945 alone. In addition, at the end of July 1945, the Bricha (Hebrew for escape) slipped nearly all the Jews who were in the British zone in Austria into Italy. And despite British requests to stop helping these smuggled-in refugees, UNRRA and the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) welcomed Jews brought to Italy by the Palestine Jewish Brigade and Bricha.[63] Thanks to the help of the Bricha, Palestinian Jewish brigades, the JDC and other organizations, 20,000 Jews entered Italy—openly or clandestinely—by October 1945, according to British intelligence estimates.[64]

The great number of Jews overwhelmed aid organizations set up in Italy. Lacking sufficient support, some Jews turned to crime to survive and those caught were arrested and sent to Fossoli. Yugoslavian citizen and Jewish refugee Papo Danko slipped into Italy in 1944 and the Allies arrested him in 1946 for "excessive theft." His wife and their two children stayed in Milan and petitioned for his release from Fossoli. While at the camp, he requested approval for his family to immigrate to either the United States or Palestine.[65] Bernardo Raab, a Polish Jewish survivor of Mauthausen, was also sent to Fossoli for theft in Italy. After liberation, he had boarded a train to Italy with other Jewish refugees. The authorities arrested Raab and sent him to Fossoli to await immigration.[66]

Because most Jews had no papers or were stateless—which hindered their residency and travel requests—the IRO and international community worked together to streamline immigration and provide Jews with travel permits. The London Agreement signed by 21 countries in October 1946 aimed to help provide IRO travel documents to stateless individuals and played an important role in Jewish resettlement. For example, the IRO granted Fischel Szwerszarf, a Polish Jew at Fossoli in May 1946, a visa to Bolivia. Italian officials at Fossoli filled out Szwerszarf's immigration

application and then sent a copy to the IRO offices in Italy.[67] Polish Jew Marcov Sasha turned himself in to the Allies so he could get their help filling out immigration forms. He had suffered for three years in a concentration camp (the name of which was not included in his file) and requested permission to travel to Palestine.[68] Starting in 1950, DPs could seek immigration papers directly from police headquarters.[69] Thus, just five years after the war, Italian police—some of whom had facilitated the internment of Jews within Italy and had only kept their positions because of the 1946 amnesty ruling—took on the same roles as their liberators.

Italians' part in filling out immigration forms and facilitating Jews' resettlement distanced Italians from the Judeocide, and political and religious figures capitalized on the situation to support their claim that antisemitism was a foreign theory imposed by Nazi Germany. Indeed, Italians, they argued, were innocent of antisemitism because it was a contradiction of the Catholic morality pulsing through Italian society. The 1948 *Catholic Encyclopedia* even asserted that "antisemitism has never existed in modern Italy."[70] Alleging that racism was alien to Italian culture, the 1938 racial laws were dismissed as the result of Nazi pressure. No mention was made—by the Italian Zionists or the government—of the nearly 7,000 Italian Jews who perished in death camps, nearly one-third of whom had passed through Fossoli. Instead, stories of Catholic charity were deployed to depict all Italian actions during the Judeocide.

Historian Guri Schwarz provides an example of this propaganda. The Italian ambassador in Brussels sent a letter (September 21, 1945) to all Italian prefect offices summarizing reports by the provincial prefects on the application of race laws in their provinces during the war. "Our race laws had scant application in the individual instances," he assured the recipients. "Nearly the entire body of administrative authorities…had actually competed with one another to sabotage them completely or, at least, to mitigate their effects as far as possible."[71] The rosy picture painted by the Italian ambassador contradicts the actions of the Modena prefecture that, as we have seen, played a central role in the incarceration and deportation of Jews in the Emilia Romagna province. The history of events contradicts the accepted public memory that racial thinking was a mere formality and not actualized in Italy.

Although Italy's postwar position as a caretaker of Jews merely flowed from the location of its ports in the flight to Palestine and the Allies' need for assistance, Italians have been celebrated as particularly generous to Jewish refugees. Yet no dedicated Italian or Allied administrative body existed to deal with arriving Jews. Camp survivors received the same services (or lack thereof) as the Fascists and Nazis held at Fossoli. A group of survivors from Auschwitz and Mauthausen complained that the Italian

guards beat and mistreated them and that the camp failed to provide medical services. They demanded more food and expressed outrage over their side-by-side internment with perpetrators.[72] Historian Susanna Kokkonen argues that this lack of support for displaced Jews reflects a general apathy with regard to survivors. But, the side-by-side internment of Jews and perpetrators at Fossoli goes beyond apathy. It speaks to utter disregard for survivors, which stands in direct contradiction to Italy's self-congratulatory narrative of postwar aid and assistance to Jews.[73]

Illegal Entry, Criminals, and Vagabonds

Gentiles as well as Jews from all over Europe traveled to Italian port cities after the war seeking opportunities to leave the continent. Again assuming the role of the benevolent official, local police and camp authorities at Fossoli conducted interviews to determine what the *clandestini e irregolari*, non-Jews who entered Italy illegally, wished to do. Many preferred to settle outside their homelands for both political and personal reasons.[74] Some fled to avoid standing trial for crimes committed during the war. Poles and Russians made their way into Italy hoping to escape the oppressive communism of their homelands with passage abroad or by taking up residence in the peninsula.

The IRO in concert with foreign consulates chose where Fossoli interns would be sent and, once a decision was made, the Italians facilitated their departure. Working with the relevant consulates, Italians arranged for the intern's release and passage to her/his final destination. For example, French police arrested Austrian citizen Ferdinando Weissteiner while trying to cross the Brenner Pass (direction is not noted) and sent him to Fossoli. The Displaced Persons and Repatriation Division of the Allies' Liaison and Civil Affairs Branch in Rome granted Weissteiner's repatriation and sent a letter to the prefect of Modena dictating the next stage of his journey.

> The Administration of Fossoli di Carpi Camp, and the release and repatriation of subjects in the Camp, is the responsibility of the Italian Government, Ministry of Interior: who should get in touch with the Austrian Representative in Rome, 133 Viale Brune Buozzi, if they wish to release and repatriate these [above mentioned] Austrian subjects.[75]

Coordination between the Allies and Italian officials served to present Italians in a favorable light. Working alongside the Allies, Italians' efforts to repatriate delinquents they themselves were further distanced from their own crimes by tending to the needs of foreign criminals.

The Allies operated under the principle that the Italians referred to as *non rimpatrio coattivo*, or no compulsory repatriation. Austrians and Germans, who accounted for the majority of interns, were generally willing to repatriate.[76] Many of the Germans arrested in Italy and held at Fossoli had been members of the Wehrmacht and had entered the country in 1943 as combatants. German citizen and former Wehrmacht soldier Alfredo Ulrich,[77] for example, entered Italy in 1943 and was arrested when he tried to cross the Brenner Pass to return home in 1946. As the Italian police could not be sure whether he was entering or leaving, he was sent to Fossoli to await repatriation.[78]

While many Germans wanted to return to their homeland, others had lived in Italy illegally until their arrest and preferred to remain. And while forced repatriation was not official policy, it appears that it was standard procedure for Germans and Austrians.[79] Otto Melchior had fought in North Africa until he sustained an injury to his right leg in 1943. After four months in a hospital in Tivoli, he was returned to Germany and discharged. He crossed back into Italy in January 1946 and went to Terlano, where he took a job in a local factory. Terlano officials arrested him on November 4, 1946 and brought him to Bolzano, where he was discovered to have used a false identity card to attain work. He was sent to Fossoli to await repatriation. He was involved with Esterina Luca, an Italian woman, and would have preferred to remain in the country.[80]

Romantic relationships between people of different nationalities complicated the final destination of inmates. Greek citizen Timolam Rallis, for example, was engaged to fellow intern Elsa Maier, a German citizen. Their police files indicate that they sought permission to marry in the camp so that they could be sent to Greece together. The documents at the Modena State Archives do not indicate how such requests were received.[81]

Japanese citizen Liliana Salusso preferred to stay in Italy rather than return home. She was born in Tokyo on January 9, 1928. Her father Giuseppe Salusso was born in Italy but had immigrated to Japan before his daughter was born and the only mention of her mother is her name, Sharpline Ghirht. Salusso's police file does not explain why or how she ended up in Europe. In an interview with Italian officials she claimed to have been in Berlin when the Red Army took the city. The Allies had sent her first to a camp in Aversa and then to Fossoli.[82]

The role Italians played in handling the *irregolari e clandestini* was shaped by necessity. The Western Allies did not have the ability to manage everyone who had slipped into Italy, the expense of which weighed heavily on Italy's ravished economy, which the Allies laboriously refinanced. Italian involvement at camps such as Fossoli thus reflected pressing postwar needs. It had nothing to do with benevolence.[83]

Germans

The Vatican's and International Committee of the Red Cross's (ICRC) roles in relocating Nazis abroad, in combination with their Italian helpers, demonstrates how politics helped to shape the myth of benevolent Italians.[84] Vincent La Vista, a senior official at the US Embassy in Rome, wrote a top secret memorandum dated May 15, 1947 to Herbert J. Cummings at the State Department in Washington that sheds light on work performed by the ICRC in cooperation with church officials to help war criminals emigrate. La Vista described the Vatican as "the largest single organization involved in the illegal movement of emigrants," and argued that the Vatican worked in concert with ICRC. "The justification of the Vatican for its participation in this illegal traffic," he explained, "is simply the propagation of the Faith."[85] And in postwar Italy, propagation of the faith meant insulating Catholicism from communism. Thus, created in 1945 to help Nazi Catholics, the *Pontificia Commissione di Assistenza* (PCA), or Vatican Relief Commission, helped Nazi Catholics flee.

Pius XII saw communism as the Holy See's primary enemy. Historian Robert A. Ventresca describes Papa Pacelli's pragmatic approach to Germany after Hitler's rise to power, explaining that the future pope had concluded that Catholicism would fare better under National Socialism than the atheist political leadership of socialists or communists. Similarly, historian Michael Phayer reasons that "for Pope Pius XII, the Cold War began in 1945 not 1948." The Vatican's war against communism, or as historian Peter C. Kent refers to it, the Vatican's "religious cold war," continued long after the liberation. "With the war over," writes Phayer, "there was no longer a danger of Rome being destroyed by bombs. But the pope's other great fear, Communism, hung over Europe, over Rome, and over him. For Pius, the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe and eastern Germany was extremely worrisome, not the Germans who had just murdered between five and six million Jews."[86]

Kent argues that while Pius XII took a firm stand against communism, not all of the Roman Curia shared his point of view. Pius XII placed Monsignor Giovanni Battista Montini (later Pope Paul VI) in charge of the PCA. "Montini believed," writes Kent, "that it was possible to cooperate with communists politically while opposing them spiritually."[87] Thus, while the PCA was a Vatican organization that helped Nazis escape Europe, whether or not those involved were convinced of its aims is not as clear. What we do know is that under Montini, the PCA helped Catholic Nazis—regardless of their wartime crimes—escape Europe in order to allow the Allies and West Germany to concentrate on upending communism. Eventually many states recognized ICRC identity documents

as substitute passports and did not scrutinize the identities of arrivals, allowing war criminals to find safe haven outside of Europe.[88]

Because the IRO refused to serve criminals, former Nazi soldiers and officers turned to the ICRC and PCA to obtain the identity papers needed for a travel visa. Individuals arrested without papers or found guilty of using false documents were sent to repatriation camps such as Fossoli. Herbert Zimmermann had served in the German military since 1940. After the war, he traveled from Wroclaw, Poland, through the Alps, and finally entered Italy on November 28, 1946 somewhere between Udine and Florence. It was his first time in the country. He was arrested in Rome on December 13, 1946 and interrogated three days later. "I went to Vatican City, Rome with the goal of obtaining a Red Cross passport to immigrate to South America," he explained.[89] Klaus Ohlwein's story is similar. He too made his way to Italy after the war to obtain a passport for travel to the Americas. While in Rome, authorities discovered that his identity card and passport were invalid and he was sent to Fossoli to await repatriation instead.[90] Gerado Wolf entered Italy (December 7, 1943) as a Wehrmacht soldier. The Allies captured him on May 2, 1945 and held him at a prison in Sicily until October 12, 1946. Upon his release he traveled to Bolzano to marry Milanese resident Stefania Rizzoli. He was arrested again when he was discovered using the identity card of a deceased German citizen. When questioned about using the false papers, he refused to explain his motivation and was sent to Fossoli.[91]

In addition to using false papers, crime and violence landed some Germans at Fossoli. Mario Thil, for example, had entered Italy in 1943 and was arrested in July 1946 for aggravated assault. During his interrogation he claimed to be a dentist and tried to insist that his captors release him so he could retrieve his dental equipment left at his last place of residence.[92] Former Wehrmacht soldier Alfredo Francesco Woike had entered Italy in June 1943, and after the war he obtained permission from the Allies to remain in Bolzano. Woike was arrested on June 20, 1946 for stealing a bicycle.[93]

It appears that Austrian Bishop Alois Hudal's work to secure travel visas for Nazi war criminals held at Fossoli was motivated by reasons other than those expressed by Pius XII and Montini. Hudal sympathized with National Socialists and supported their attack on Russia. He also agreed with German nationalism and was a convinced antisemite. His leadership in liberating and relocating Nazi criminals—first as the founder of the Austrian Liberation Committee and afterward the head of the Austrian branch of the PCA—was thus motivated by his admiration of and respect for perpetrators.[94] SS soldiers relied on the PCA to validate their falsified identity for the IRO, which in turn granted them access to

the Americas. Hudal and other Vatican officials met with Nazis and confirmed their false identities and procured visas.[95] Letters of recommendation from the PCA attesting to a Nazi's assumed identity submitted to the PCI were honored without further questions.[96]

Although La Vista's report shows the US government's awareness of the so-called rat-line escape route for war criminals out of Europe, it did little to prevent Nazis from disappearing abroad. And despite some clergy members' claims that they had no way of knowing if the person they helped was a victim or perpetrator, some such as Hudal knowingly helped.

Fossoli thus functioned as the final resting point for Nazis absconding from Europe. And, significantly, Italian oversight of the Nazi prisoners—even those who were smuggled out of Italy—helped Italians elide accountability for their war crimes.

Gendered Dynamics

Within a decade of the liberation, women in Italian society had increased autonomy. The female prisoner files, on the other hand, illuminate women's disadvantaged place in society and how far they had to climb.

Female Collaborators

Fossoli housed a number of women collaborators who had been arrested for their wartime support of Nazi forces.[97] Maria Musevic and her daughter Hilde came to Italy from Yugoslavia and had been arrested for multiple crimes beginning in 1928. Over the years Maria had been jailed for blackmail, using counterfeit money, prostituting her daughter, and selling liquor on the black market. From 1943 through the end of the war, Maria and Hilde worked as informers for the Italian troops in Yugoslavia. The Questura of Bergano requested their arrest on the grounds of "having collaborated in favor of the Nazi-Fascist forces during the period of the German occupation." Italian police apprehended and questioned the Musevics on June 28, 1945, resulting in their 13-month imprisonment, part of which was at Fossoli. They were released following the general order for amnesty.[98]

Similarly, Fossoli prisoner and German citizen Gertrude Mombard was also arrested for informing and collaborating with the Germans. She moved to Rome in 1937, and in May 1944 was transferred to the East were she taught Italian to the German military. During the Nazi-Fascist period, she denounced Princess Rospigliosi for listening to London Radio. For these actions and for being "pro-German" she was denied Italian citizenship and sent back to Germany.[99]

Both Musevic and Mombar were tried as collaborators, not perpetrators. While neither Musevic nor Mombard had been members of the military, their work in support of the Nazis made them collaborators. Given the great consistency of former Fascists holding leadership positions in postwar Italy, it appears that Italian officials viewed collaboration with the Nazis as a greater offence than supporting Fascism, as many of the officials had themselves done. Thus, by January 25, 1952, 5,000 collaborators were still in prison as compared to only 442 Fascists.[100]

Women and Children at Fossoli

The dynamic between Italian male officials and female interns suggests the moral high ground the male guards claimed. Italians role as guards of former male collaborators and perpetrators asserted their authority over criminals. The dynamic of male guards over foreign female interns does that and more.

The police often accused women of prostitution and deemed them guilty of "pessima condotta morale" or "cattiva condotta morale," immoral behavior. Female internees' files contain moral judgments, mostly about their perceived or inferred sexual activities. Italian police described Viennese-born Gerda Renhard as a Wehrmacht follower who entered Italy in 1942 and served as a nurse in Rome and Merano. After the war, she settled down in the Alto Adige with former SS member Massimilano May. May came to Italy after the war and found work in Merano and the surrounding area. He was arrested while conducting business in Milan, and it is unclear if she was taken into custody at the same time or afterward. Italian police referred to her as of "dubious morality" because she shared a bed with May without being married. Conforming to contemporary sexual mores, no such moral condemnation exists in her SS lover's file. Instead, Italian police remarked that as a foreigner he had no reason to stay in the country and they feared that he posed a security threat.[101]

Maria Thaler's profile provides further evidence of the moral overlay with regard to women prisoners. Maria entered Italy illegally in July 1945. The Italian police arrested her and sent her to Fossoli as she had no proof of employment. "As a result of poor moral conduct," writes Bolzano police officer Antonino Pilizuto, "[Thaler was] admitted to Bolzano hospital in May because she had venereal disease." Her lack of proper papers and assumed immoral conduct, which resulted in a sexually transmitted disease, landed her in Fossoli.[102]

Many women held at Fossoli after the war had entered Italy between 1943 and 1945 with the Wehrmacht, and were often deemed prostitutes or of "dubious morality" in their files. Austrian Maria Uferer followed the Wehrmacht to Italy and served as a typist in the German command

at Brunico. After moving to Bolzano in January 1946, she worked first as a hairdresser and later as a maid. By the end of the year, however, Uferer was arrested and interned at Fossoli. Her file fails to state the reason for her arrest, and describes her simply as an "undesirable foreigner singled [out] for immoral conduct."[103] This may have been a reference to her work for the German army, but was more likely in relation to assumed sexual activity. The absence of moral judgment in male German soldiers' files reveals that former Fascists guards and police reserved judgment for women and not male soldiers. Perhaps judging the German soldiers hit too close to home. Women were an easier target.

Conclusion

In Italy, a national image of benevolence influenced local elision of past crimes. Carpi officials' wartime actions were never brought into question in the postwar era. Avoiding postwar trials strengthened the happy "*brava gente*" myth and Italian logistical support of Allied deportation and immigration centers reinforced the misleading portrayal of Italians as members of the Allies.

The Western Allies and the Vatican supported the "*brava gente*" myth in order to gain Italian support in the burgeoning Cold War. As Allied fears of the Soviet communist threat came into focus, a desire to foster closer ties with Italians led to greater reliance on Italy to manage German and Fascist prisoners. At the end of 1946 the Allies considered handing the camps to the Italians, and by 1947 administration of the UNRRA camps shifted to Rome.

The Allied, Vatican, and DC handling of postwar affairs during the first two years after the war fostered the positive image of Italians that endured until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Italians' roles as postwar guards, administrators, and immigration officers at Fossoli placed former Italian Fascists in positions of power and ensured that they would not be held accountable for their crimes. The immediate focus on suppressing communism meant that Italian Fascists who had facilitated the annihilation of Italian Jews were not brought to justice. It meant, too, that there was no public soul-searching, no self-scrutiny, and certainly no self-criticism for nearly half a century. On the contrary the Italians were "*brava gente*."

6

From Concentration Camp to Christian Utopia: a *battaglia per la moralità*

Guards stationed at Fossoli peered from watchtowers on the morning of May 19, 1947 as Priest Don Zeno Saltini and 200 orphans approached in a column of trucks and cars, leaving a trail of dust in their wake.[1] The children's voices joined in song as the trucks halted in front of the gate, melodically requesting entry. Refugees and prisoners in the adjoining camp climbed onto the barrack roofs to get a look at Don Zeno and his orphan brigade. Don Zeno's official requests to Interior Minister Mario Scelba to inhabit the camp and turn it into a Catholic orphanage had gone unanswered so the Carpi priest's unexpected arrival forced the issue. When the guards finally opened the gate, the interns cheered. Don Zeno led his entourage to an unoccupied section of the *campo indeserabili* quartered off by barbed wire.[2]

Camp director Raffaele Bellotti traveled to Modena immediately and met with vice-prefect Giua Loy. They agreed that taking up arms to eject the orphans would result in public condemnation. Loy called Scelba and he phoned Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi who said to leave them alone. No one wanted to face the embarrassment of evicting orphans. Don Zeno was officially awarded the camp a few months later when all of the remaining prisoners and refugees were shipped off.[3] He interpreted his good fortune as Divine Providence, writing to his friend Ercole Crovella (July 9, 1947), "the signs are very strong that God wants this."[4] While God may have wanted it, in the end, the Christian Democrats, Allies, and Holy See managed to use Don Zeno's new establishment for their benefit, too.

The transformation of Fossoli into a Catholic orphanage in 1947 turned Fossoli into a battleground between competing visions of social,

ideological, and political order. The two warring parties in Italy—the DC, backed by the Western Allies and the Vatican, and the PCI, supported by Moscow—vied for power and influence in Italy's nascent republic. Don Zeno's plan to resurrect Fossoli into an orphanage and Christian utopia sought to combine Catholic and communist principles, which the Holy See considered blasphemous. This chapter argues that just as the war between the DC and the PCI had far-reaching consequences for the memory of the Holocaust in Italy, the struggles between Don Zeno and the Holy See altered the legacy of the Fossoli camp.

The contentious state of postwar Italian politics ensnarled the formation of Holocaust memory in Italy. In analyzing the postwar memory of the Ardeatine Cave massacre outside Rome, Historian Alesssandro Portelli writes: "Memory divides, more painfully and dramatically, also *within* persons and within texts…One sure way of missing its meaning is to carve it into pieces, divide it up, and use those pieces that serve our purpose."[5] The DC, PSI, and PCI manipulated memory of the war, the Resistance, and the Holy See's leadership during the Holocaust to serve their own agendas. Likewise, the Marxist and Catholic media employed the image of Don Zeno Saltini (commonly referred to as Don Zeno by his congregants), his transformation of Fossoli, and his creation of *Nomadelfia* to best serve their political interests.

The Vatican's plan for Fossoli buttressed its attempts to rebrand Italian identity as tied to religious motifs. Don Zeno's compliance with, and at times defiance of, Papal orders and DC politicians' warnings speaks to the contentious state of postwar Italian politics and the *battaglia per la moralità* (battle for morality) in postwar Italy. Historian Marco Barbanti explains that for the Catholics, winning the *battaglia per la moralità* was to cement Catholic ideology within all sectors of an individual's life. And fearful that communists would overtake the Italian republic, the Catholic Church depicted communism as a harbinger of moral decay.[6] Likewise the communists claimed that a Christian Democratic victory and capitalist economy would allow for a return to Fascism and an economic collapse.[7]

The conflict between the Holy See and Don Zeno waged at the Fossoli camp sheds new light on the religious tenor of the "*brava gente*" myth. Don Zeno's and the Vatican's plans for Fossoli, while prompted by worthy intentions, elided Fossoli's former function as an antechamber of death for thousands of Jews. The establishment of a Catholic organization housed in barracks once occupied by Jewish victims physically and symbolically replaced the memory of those who had died and painted over ordinary Italian's role in the Judeocide. In so doing, the former deportation camp of Fossoli buttressed claims of Christian benevolence.

War, Violence, and New Identities

The antecedents of the Holy See's postwar *battaglia di moralità* and Don Zeno's upbringing frame our analysis. In order for us to better comprehend conflicts after World War II between the Vatican and Don Zeno we must start at the beginning. Although both the Vatican and the Carpi priest sought to strengthen Catholicism, their divergent approaches are the result of their different histories. While the Vatican maneuvered to ensure its institutional survival, Don Zeno sought to protect the religious integrity of Catholicism. These two different approaches converged at Fossoli between 1947 and 1952 and came to redefine the legacy of the camp.

The Holy See's reluctance to participate in or acknowledge a unified Italy had resulted in the Church's sustained absence in politics, which will become important when we trace Don Zeno's civic development later in this chapter. The Vatican's withdraw from the government (1861) in protest against its loss of territory during unification had weakened its ability to provide for its followers and advocate for the poor. Even when Italian troops finally broke through the walls and declared Rome part of the Italian nation (September 29, 1870), the Church refused to cooperate.[8] The Church's sustained absence from affairs of state shaped the religious and political climate of Don Zeno's youth and influenced his interest in Marxism.

Fossoli as a "Microcosm of the World"

Don Zeno described the Carpi suburb of Fossoli in the early 1900s as "a microcosm of the world." Indeed, conflicts in Fossoli between wealthy landowners and impoverished seasonal farmhands at the turn of the century mirrored the political strife reverberating throughout Italy.[9] Saltini's education was thus informed by the political commentary he absorbed from socialist farmers and the weekly sermons by Carpi priest Dalla Zuanna. Saltini came to value moral duty as defined by the church and civic responsibility as advocated by socialists.

Saltini's youth in the Carpi township of Fossoli informed his future endeavors. He was born on August 30, 1900 during a period of escalating criticism of the Vatican as a result of its self-seclusion. By 1900, the socialist party (formed in 1892) had gained favor as it labored to meet the needs of the underserved neglected by the Holy See.[10] Many of the workers employed by Saltini's grandfather to tend to the family's 17 farms were among the legions of blue-collar workers who had turned away from the Church and toward socialism. The young Saltini listened attentively

to the socialist laborers' complaints about class and exclusionary voting practices.[11] Moved by the political climate around him, Saltini dropped out of school at the age of 14, reasoning that he could learn more from the hired hands tilling his grandfather's land than from his teachers.[12]

An Epiphany

After World War I, Saltini had an encounter with an anarchist that inspired his endeavor to combine Marxist and Christian principles. Saltini enrolled in the army on March 20, 1918 and continued his service after the war. While stationed in Florence in the spring of 1920, he had a life-changing conversation with a close friend and fellow soldier. Saltini was splayed out on his cot playing cards with his comrades when his colleague approached him. An anarchist, this friend had an ongoing debate with Saltini on the relationship between God and humanity. Saltini viewed them as one and the same, while the anarchist considered them opposing forces.[13]

The anarchist interrupted Saltini's card game to debate the matter again. The two started to shout and the barracks quieted as all leaned in to see if they would come to blows. The anarchist defended his view that Christianity was an obstacle to human progress and that, were it not for Christianity, humanity would have already achieved social justice.[14]

Saltini did his best to argue the contrary but failed to drive his point home. The anarchist mocked him, calling all Catholics ignorant. "He was educated, I uneducated and overwhelmed," recalled Don Zeno years later. "Almost all the soldiers yelled out in his favor and I was forced into silence."

The other soldiers whistled and laughed as Saltini stood up and left the barrack, retreating to a friend's room. "I had a quick look at my life," recalled Don Zeno. "I said: 'I can no longer waste my time on other things. Instead, I must respond to this young man's [criticism of Christianity], which to me represents all of humanity and its anguish.' In fifteen minutes I dismantled my whole life and became a new man."[15] Dismissed from military service on August 16, 1920, Saltini returned to Fossoli, resumed his studies, and was graduated a decade later with a law degree (December 19, 1929) from Università Cattolica, Milan.[16] Immediately after graduation he traveled to Carpi and attended seminary.

The Lateran Accords and the Piccoli Apostoli

As Saltini took steps to become a Catholic leader, the Catholic Church focused on reasserting its leadership. Despite the Church's decision to

maintain a neutral position with respect to World War I, Pope Benedict XV attempted to bring peace to Europe by persuading Germany and France to end the hostilities. The Great Powers, however, paid him little attention because they viewed the Vatican as subject to Rome. In order for the Church to regain credibility at home and abroad, it required official recognition from Italy as an independent state.[17] And to combat criticism of the Church as well as competing religious and political doctrines, the Vatican needed to foster better relations with heads of state.[18]

Cardinal Secretary of State Pietro Gasparri's signature on behalf of the Vatican to the Lateran Accords (1929) institutionalized the Church's recognition of an Italian Fascist state and, in turn, granted Pius XII sovereignty.[19] The Church's negotiation with and acceptance of the Fascist government was the first of many compromises the Holy See would make with totalitarian regimes in order to ensure its survival and influence.[20] The Vatican supported the DC after World War II (in part) because it feared that the PCI and PSI would annul the Lateran Accords and annex Rome.[21] The Vatican had chose wisely; thanks to the DC's uninterrupted reign, the Lateran Accords remained in effect until 1985.

Resistance, Silence, and Compromise: San Giacomo Roncole and the Piccoli Apostoli

Ordained on January 4, 1931, Don Zeno was assigned six months later to San Giacomo Roncole Church in the Mirandola province of Modena. He brought along a young orphan from Carpi named Danilo whom he had met and later adopted while in seminary. The young Carpi priest's relationship with Danilo inspired him to open an orphanage called *Piccoli Apostoli* (Little Apostles). During the years he spent as head of San Giacomo, he cared for hundreds of orphaned children.

In his position as a priest in a rural farming town, Don Zeno did what Pope Pius XII could not or would not. Don Zeno's altruism and vocal criticism of National Socialism and Fascism earned him the respect of his community. Don Zeno encouraged the orphans under his care and his San Giacomo congregants to think critically about human rights, the Bible, and National Socialism. In addition to confronting humanity's most pressing issues in his sermons, he committed his thoughts to paper and distributed them throughout the community in a journal titled *L'Apostolo*.[22] And people from Mirandola and the neighboring communities flocked to the San Giacomo church to attend a film series Don Zeno hosted. He chose movies that challenged autocracy and led discussions that inspired his congregation to reevaluate totalitarianism.

Don Zeno, for example, called for a general assembly in his church just five days after Mussolini's fall and urged his congregants to jettison Fascism in favor of Christian fraternity.[23] While in the neighboring town of Carpi the locals continued their activities supporting the aims of the Fossoli camp, Don Zeno led his congregants down a different path.

When Pius XI died in March 1939, Don Zeno looked to the new pope to guide Catholics out of the darkness of Fascism. And he felt it was his duty to uphold Catholic virtue in Mirandola.[24] He continued to lead the small farming community and take in orphans and in so doing earned the respect and support of the clergy and other religious leaders throughout the region. Carpi Bishop Dalla Zuanna was a strong supporter of Don Zeno and surprised churchgoers on September 16, 1941 when he unexpectedly attended mass, sitting among the congregants. Zuanna praised Don Zeno afterward, saying his work was "born in the heart of Jesus."[25] Priests from the diocese of Modena and Carpi also supported Don Zeno, particularly his work with the *Piccoli Apostoli*. Together they formed the *Unione dei Sacerdoti Piccoli Apostoli*, or Union of Priests for the Little Apostles. Similarly, 224 local family heads also joined together (October 27, 1942) to form the *Unione dei 'Patres Familias'*, male family heads in support of the Carpi priest. And some young women were so moved by Don Zeno's spiritual, political, and humanitarian convictions that they volunteered to cloister themselves and serve as *mamme di vocazione*, mothers for all the orphans.[26]

Don Zeno published an article on July 30, 1943 (just days after Mussolini's removal from power) advising the public to combat the oppressive social and political norms imposed by Fascism, including the racial laws. Inevitably such public condemnation of the government caught the attention of the police. The *Piccoli Apostoli* orphans pressed their little faces against the windows on the second floor of San Giacamo Church one summer day in 1943 to catch a glimpse of the *carbinieri* (police) as they made their way into the church to apprehend Don Zeno. He was released later that evening, but his brief incarceration was a warning of what would come if he continued to speak out against Fascist and German authorities.[27]

The German invasion of Italy following the armistice worried Don Zeno, who feared that his long-standing open rejection of Fascism and Nazism would provoke the Germans to arrest him and thus put the orphans at risk. As a result, he and 25 others fled south (September 19, 1943) to seek sanctuary in the Allied-occupied zone.[28] Bishop Dalla Zuanna accepted Don Zeno's resignation (September 28) and nominated priest Don Luigi Bertè to replace him as priest of San Giacomo and coordinator of the *Piccoli Apostoli*. Bertè oversaw the *Piccoli Apostoli* until Don Zeno's return after the war.

Defending Catholicism: Church Politics in Liberated and Postwar Italy

Don Zeno's public cry for righteousness and Pius XII's dedication to the Church's survival characterize their wartime and postwar activities. Their differing political, religious, and humanitarian convictions collided in the postwar period and inspired and informed the Carpi priest's overhaul of the Fossoli camp. The Holy See maneuvered to protect the Lateran Pacts, electing to support the DC in order to buttress Italian stability with Catholicism. Don Zeno, on the other hand, concerned himself with mediating inclusive of peace across party lines.

Fossoli's geographical location in the so-called Red Belt of northern Italy adds another dimension to our analysis of the Vatican during this time. In his study of the left and their political opponents in Bologna (which is also located in Emilia Romagna), Historian John Pollard stresses the importance of the region's support of socialists and communists. "It was against this background, and of course in the context of an Italy slowly and painfully recovering from the devastation of war," he explains, "that the Vatican developed its response to the threat from the left."[29] As we will see, Fossoli became a prominent battleground in the Vatican's fight against leftist parties in Emilia Romagna.

Vatican Politics in Liberated Rome

The Allies' liberation of Rome afforded the Vatican leadership ample opportunity to participate in Italy's rebirth. As we have seen in chapter 5, Pius XII endorsed the DC in order to combat the rise of Marxist parties within Italy. The fight between the Church and Italian communism, historian Alfonso Botti has argued, was a battle over politics and religious culture more than a fight for or against religion because many Italian communists were also Catholic. Thus, Pius XII's speeches in the postwar period framed support for the DC as a moral decision in order to draw communists back to the church. In his view, only the DC could bring real peace to Italy.[30]

The Carpi priest's message of peace and fraternity aligned with Pius XII's encyclical message of April 15, 1945, which called for "that the internecine strife of peoples and nations [to] cease to rage and that all citizens, joined in a friendly pact, strive peacefully to build from the heaped up piles of rubble . . . a new building for the human community."[31] The two diverged, however, on the shape that such an inclusive society would take.

Don Zeno, like members of the *Movimento dei Cattolici Comunisti* (MCC), or Movement of Catholic Communists, viewed social concepts of communism as compatible with Catholicism.[32] While the Church feared Marxist atheist principles, Don Zeno did not share Vatican's concern. In a letter to dalla Zuanna on August 16, 1945, Don Zeno stated that "if Marx has subverted the human spirit, I as a priest, feel stronger than him."[33]

To this end, Don Zeno authored an important pamphlet while in self-exile in the Allied Zone titled *The Social Revolution of Jesus Christ*, in which he predicted that communism or capitalism alone would undermine Christianity.[34] The best defense of Christian values, he argued, was a policy of fraternity across all party factions.[35] And he reached out to many religious authorities in Rome in order to explain the success of the social-Christian work of the *Piccoli Apostoli*.[36]

"Fate due mucchi…"

While in exile, Don Zeno wrote to Pius XII requesting a meeting,[37] but when three months passed without a reply the Carpi priest pressed on.[38] He viewed the pope's silence as a test imposed by Providence to advance a social revolution that would guide the church back to Christ's path.[39] Returning to San Giacomo on May 1, 1945 after the Allies liberated the north, he resumed his position as head of the *Piccoli Apostoli*.[40] The CLN honored Don Zeno's long-standing opposition to Fascism and invited him to speak in Carpi's main piazza on May 5, 1945. Local priest Tirelli was in the audience that day and remarked on Don Zeno's ability to draw in the crowd. "He got the audience to laugh from beginning to end," he explained. "He spoke in [both the regional] dialect and Italian and finished in song."[41]

From the balcony of the *palazzo municipale*, with arms outstretched, Don Zeno painted a picture for his audience that would become the visual slogan of his campaign: *Fate due mucchi*. "Make two piles," he said, "in one, those who have money, and in the other, those who do not." It would become evident, he explained, that the poor were the vast majority. If they resisted the temptation to splinter into separate political parties, they would have the numbers to change the balance of power.[42] "Since we always have a government that protects the forces of capitalism," he reasoned, "we the 99 percent stay poor."[43] He urged the people to abandon the political parties of 1919, including the DC, which gave way to Fascism, and instead together seek a new solution to Italy's problems. The crowd's boisterous applause reverberated throughout the stone walkways and brick alleys lining Carpi's central square.

That speech in Carpi resonated with many. His message of peace and advocacy for the poor prompted other political, church, and resistance groups throughout northern and central Italy to invite him to address their members. He embarked on a rigorous lecture tour, presenting 130 such talks in 90 days.[44] He called for unity and forgiveness in the tense postwar climate. Partisans in the region continued to hunt down and kill Fascists and their supporters and this, he argued, served only to destroy unity. Don Zeno also viewed the political maneuvering of the DC, PCI, and PSI as obstacles to social cohesion. He worried that the political leaders were so engrossed in their own affairs that they were neglecting the pressing needs of the poor.[45]

While Don Zeno considered the parties' attempts to gain popular favor unchristian, the Vatican championed the DC.[46] In response to a letter from the Modena Catholic newspaper *La Lanterna* (April 23, 1946), Don Zeno predicted that Italians would never band together as long as each political faction fought for its own hold on power. The Vatican, however, would not welcome Catholic communists. Thus, when the Vatican newspaper *Osservare Romano* proclaimed communism incompatible with Catholicism, the MCC dissolved and its members either returned to the DC or joined the PCI.[47] The PCI, for its part, announced in January 1946 that it welcomed anyone who agreed with the party's platform.[48]

Don Zeno's outlook on unity, eradication of social class, and criticism of the bourgeoisie earned him accolades from the left and encouraged his decision to respond to the Pope's condemnation of Catholic-communism by forming a political movement called *Fraternità Sociale*, or Civic Brotherhood.[49] And his pamphlet *The Social Revolution of Jesus Christ* struck a chord with communists, as shown by a letter the Bomporto section (municipality of Modena) of the PCI sent to him.

> Your work, written in simple words, is understandable to everyone, but even more so, it penetrates all hearts and it moves all spirits. Don Zeno, we consider you a true messenger of God and, as such, you have our respect and our admiration… Rest assured that we will remain active propagandists of your book [*The Social Revolution of Jesus Christ*] and simultaneously we will be defenders of your ideas… As you are fond of teaching us, more than just being comrades, we are brothers.[50]

The communists' affinity for the Carpi priest illuminates a key aspect of that party and a sharp distinction between Don Zeno and the Vatican. Many communists remained believers; they were not afraid to praise Don Zeno's work and even call him God's messenger. The Vatican, however, criticized Catholic-communists.

Don Zeno's attempts to encourage a Vatican-supported *Risorgimento* within the Church that included Catholic-communists failed to gain traction in the months leading up to June 2, 1946, when Italians elected parliamentary representatives and voted for a republic instead of a monarchy. The subsequent flight of the king must have worried the Vatican leadership. Historian Fillipo Focardi suggests that suppression of the monarchy amounted to a dispute over memory. The antifascists' victory over the king allowed them to hold him responsible for Mussolini's ascent to power.[51] What would prevent them from blaming the Vatican in the same fashion?

Pius XII's narrative of DC support as an ethical action meant that in order to be a good Catholic, one had to shun Marxism, and in order to be a good Italian one had to vote for the DC. Don Zeno refused to take such a polarized approach. The Catholic churches in Emilia Romagna feared that Don Zeno's growing popularity would unite Marxist factions and undermine the DC's popularity. Vying for power with the PCI and PSI, the DC knew full well that a unified Marxist front left them vulnerable. A defeat of the DC threatened to undermine the Holy See; the church leaders in the Emilia Romagna therefore defended the DC in order to protect themselves. Thus Don Zeno was on the agenda of the first postwar meeting of the episcopate in Emilia Romagna (July 5, 1945). In an attempt to rein in the Carpi priest, Bishop Dalla Zuanna wrote a letter (July10) to Don Zeno on behalf of the episcopate. "In view of the general conclusions reached at the Conference of Bishops in the Emilia, held last Thursday," he explained, "I believe it is my duty to ask you to suspend your public addresses regardless of the source of the invitation."[52]

Dalla Zuanna's attempt to silence the Carpi priest, despite having supported Don Zeno in the past, reflects the influence of politics on the Church's postwar operations and its desire to neutralize anything that threatened its or the DC's reputation. During the war, the bishop had praised the Carpi priest, calling his work "born in the heart of Jesus." Don Zeno's message of peace and fraternity had not changed, but the Catholic leaderships' fears of losing political ground to communists spurred Don Zeno's early clergy enthusiasts to rescind their support of a man preaching a social vision that diverged from that issued by Pius XII.[53]

Don Zeno pressed on, determined to give life to a social revolution inspired by the gospel and Marist tenants of community: providing for those in need and shunning materialism. But, as he prepared to lead a grassroots conference of 100,000 people, Dalla Zuanna petitioned the Vatican to forbid it. With the opposition buttressed by the Vatican, Zeno canceled his rally.[54]

A New Christian Order through Fraternity

Despite the Vatican and local Church leaders' objections to Don Zeno's political and spiritual ambitions, the Carpi priest forged ahead. But how could he give life to *Fraternità Sociale* without the Vatican's help? Don Zeno turned to his parishioners for support. In the summer of 1946 they gathered at San Giacomo to discuss a practical manifestation of their politician-religious vision: to provide for the steadily increasing number of orphans.[55] In the end, they decide to form a cooperative.[56]

Creating unity, however, was easier said than done. Some of the family heads expressed concern as to whether or not Christianity could foster peace. "[The family heads] say that Christianity is in crisis," Don Zeno lamented. "I think that humanity is what is in crisis and that Christianity has not yet arrived. There are those who say that the sun is setting on Christianity. Instead, I have always maintained it is not even its dawn."[57]

In an interview with film director Giuseppe Fina recorded in 1981, Don Zeno recalled that he had begun by considering other forms of organized brotherhood. "It is strange. I believed, for example, that communists were brothers, but I discovered that the state imposed the shape of that brotherhood…" He preferred a comradeship that was the work of all instead of the design of a few. His vision for *Piccoli Apostoli* mirrored his hope for Italy in that he wanted the state to be a product of complete collaboration and fraternity. And he wanted to avoid the traps of capitalism that undermined religious groups' attempts to sow unity. "Those who managed to stay solvent," he explained, "did so through capitalism and in so doing sacrificed their initial value system in order to secure financial success." He feared that social classes created by capitalism would disrupt unity. Don Zeno wanted to build a Christian society in which everyone shared everything.[58] And he hoped that advocating unity among Catholics and Marxists might help them create peace in Italy. The DC's success in the June election, however, had intensified fighting and strife in Emilia Romagna and pushed the parties further apart. The voting results outraged the region's communists, who blamed the Allies and Vatican for influencing the outcome.[59]

The mounting criticism of the Church worried Don Zeno, a fact that he expressed openly to Bishop Dalla Zuanna and Pius XII. He had written to the bishop nearly a year prior urging the Church to take responsibility for the criticism it engendered as a result of its support of the DC. "The unilateral aims of the Christian Democrats as is will not save Italy," Don Zeno warned, "but instead will bring about its complete destruction and, upon reflection, the masses will blame the church and thus exacerbate a deep infernal hatred of the Church itself."[60] The violence that erupted

in the red north in the wake of the June 1946 election did little to abate his fears. Again, the Carpi priest picked up his pen and wrote to Pius XII (January 6, 1947), urging him to reconsider his support of the DC. He confessed that his own vote for the DC had made him sick, but having no other alternative he had cast his ballot in their favor.[61]

He believed that the DC had found support among the wealthy and catered to them exclusively. Thus, the blue-collar workers and the poor turned to the communists for support. Without the Vatican's intervention, Don Zeno feared Catholicism would languish as the poor gave up on the Church. He recognized the Pope's fear that supporting Catholic communists might weaken the Church's authority, but urged Pius XII to have faith in God. "You have to believe in God's omnipresent power to enter the masses, raise their spirits, and rejuvenate the world," he wrote. "In this time of great suffering, we need a leader like Joan of Arc, certain of God's call, willing to throw herself upon the masses and guide them to a new law of social justice . . . influenced by the strength of Christianity."[62] Don Zeno contended that Pius XII needed to become that generation's Joan of Arc and foster a unity among Italians to bring true and everlasting social accord.[63]

Don Zeno Sets his Sights on Fossoli

Don Zeno worked to practice what he preached and thus set his sights on the Fossoli di Carpi camp. While visiting his family in the fall of 1946, Don Zeno met with his colleague, priest Don Paolo Morotti, who suggested that *Piccoli Apostoli* move into the former deportation camp. At that point, 150 people remained in the camp and half of it had been dismantled. Don Zeno inquired with the local authorities if it would be possible for him to use unoccupied barracks for his orphans. The authorities ignored his requests.[64]

The ascent of the Vatican-supported DC meant that, in addition to being ignored by the Church, the heavily DC-saturated government ignored him, too. Shortly after mailing his letter to Pius XII, Don Zeno sent another (February 19, 1947) to Interior Minister Mario Scelba requesting permission to transform the Fossoli camp "into a place of love and work."[65] Scelba, however, was particularly suspicious of any "red" organization in the Emilia and he viewed Don Zeno as "half-red and half-mad."[66] As Interior Minister, Scelba had made his first order of business the purge of all partisan police officers and government officials from Emilia. He estimated that 8,000 of Emilia's 30,000 officers "were communists, ready to take action against the state from within."[67] Scelba's intense focus on

uprooting communist support in the region meant that he would soon become one of the Carpi priest's greatest adversaries.

The Pope and the DC believed themselves at war with the communists and, despite Don Zeno's altruism, they refused to support someone sympathetic to Marxism. Had it not been for Don Zeno's outspoken call for inclusivity after the war, Pius XII might have praised Don Zeno's work for the *Piccoli Apostoli* instead of challenging it. Indeed, the Pope had made a point of encouraging Catholics and clergy to do more to help war orphans. In an encyclical dated January 6, 1946 titled "Pleading for the Care of the World's Destitute Children," Pius XII asked Holy See supporters to "take to heart the extremely grave plight of these needy children."[68] But at that time, Don Zeno's initiative could not be condoned without acknowledging his movement.

Political–Religious Conviction

Don Zeno, determined to bring life to a new political and socioreligious movement, found a home in the Fossoli camp and in so doing brought the war between the Vatican and communism to the former deportation camp. Once again, Fossoli was engulfed by postwar politics. Commandeering the camp against the wishes of DC leaders forced the Vatican's hand and they turned Fossoli into the epicenter of DC political propaganda in the Emilia Romagna. The positive narratives of the press, DC, and Vatican employed to present Don Zeno's transformation of Fossoli to the world projected an image of Catholic benevolence onto the former site of Jewish suffering, masking Fossoli's history as a site of Italian participation in the Holocaust.

From Deportation Camp to Catholic Orphanage

The Vatican and DC's newfound backing of Don Zeno was tied to the political climate of the Carpi priest's takeover of Fossoli. Elections in April 1947 had confirmed the rising popularity of the PCI. To combat its influence, De Gasperi blamed the PCI for Italy's slow recovery, accusing its leaders of vetoing his economic proposals. De Gasperi dissolved his cabinet on May 13, 1947, just three days before Don Zeno occupied Fossoli, and re-formed it without the PCI party. This removal inspired the so-called Red Scare of 1947, in which thousands of PCI members staged strikes and demonstrations for weeks on end. Scelba responded by having his officers lead raids on homes and factories to confiscate weapons in the red stronghold. The PCI retaliated in December 1947 by joining with PSI to form the

Popular Front (Fronte Democratico Popolare). Their collective strength in the 1946 and 1947 elections spurred the US government, the Vatican, and the DC to spring into action to suppress the Marxist threat.[69]

Despite their earlier criticism of Don Zeno and his projects, the Vatican, DC, and Americans became the financial backers of his new community at the camp. Don Zeno's speaking tour after the war had earned him the respect of communists and Catholics alike, so the Americans hoped he might stir Catholic communists to vote for the DC in the upcoming election.[70] The US government gave the community 80 million lira. Even Minister Scelba followed suit, deciding that the best way to silence Don Zeno's complaints about the DC was to gift 13 million lira to his establishment.[71]

Perhaps to entice Don Zeno to support the DC, Pope Pius XII finally agreed to meet with Don Zeno in March 1948, just after De Gasperi had announced the call for a general election to be held on April18. This election was of particular importance as those selected were tasked with creating a new constitution.[72] Ventresca views the 1948 vote as a crucial moment in Italian history. Although minor and leading political parties made the ballot, the true contest was between the Italian Popular Front and DC. When Italians cast their votes they were choosing between two competing and clashing visions of the future. "The choice was between a conservative, Roman Catholic, capitalist Italy as envisioned by the governing Christian Democrats," explains Ventresca, "and a revolutionary, secular, socialist Italy as envisioned by the Popular Front. This clash of ideologies left little room for middle grounds, as Italy's Marxist parties made a concerted bid to seize power at the ballot box."[73] Don Zeno, however, was seeking a middle ground.

Don Zeno walked out of his 12-minute meeting with Pius XII confident that he had managed to persuade the pope of his ideas. This was the first and only meeting he would have with Papa Pacelli.[74] Pius XII pledged 100,000 lire to support Don Zeno's community and in so doing mollified the Carpi priest and inspired positive press that could attract Catholic communists back to the DC.[75]

Don Zeno put his funds toward the reconstruction of the camp as a Christian utopia. He hired *Cooperativo Muratori*, the same construction cooperative that had first built the camp in 1942 and had handled all previous remodeling and expansions. The project involved refashioning 29 barracks into sleeping quarters, offices, schools, a chapel, a garage, a wood working studio, and an infirmary. *Cooperativo Muratori* also paved the roads and refitted the plumbing and electrical wires.[76] The orphans aided in the reconstruction of their new home, and thus the concentration camp was transformed into a symbol of Catholic charity.

The Vatican and DC's newfound support for the Little Apostles tells us a great deal about Church policy in the postwar era. Scholars examining Pius XII's wartime silence on Germany's racial laws and genocidal program typically focus on three main threats that speaking out may have posed. The first two, fear of provoking a Nazi occupation of the Holy See and the danger of making matters worse for religious leaders (such as Nazi attacks on priests), centered on the physical dangers that opposing National Socialism might have yielded. Both these threats were absent after the fall of the Nazi regime and Pope Pius XII waited until then to speak out against communist leaders in the East and in Italy. The third threat, or as historian Michael Marrus has termed it, the "essentialist threat" (which Marrus speaks of in connection to the war years), was still a risk in the postwar period. According to Marrus, the "essentialist threat" was the Vatican's fear during the war that "its moral authority would evaporate if it took sides conspicuously [against Nazi Germany], that doing so would shatter what remained of universal standing of the Church, expose its weakness, and that if its calls for concrete actions were spurned the only result would be the humiliating and debilitating loss of authority."[77]

The Vatican's newfound support of Don Zeno was a postwar piece of the Holy See's long-standing self-preservation plan. To the Church, the fact that Don Zeno was turning barracks that once housed Jews awaiting deportation into schools and homes was irrelevant. And it was of little to no importance to Don Zeno either. Instead, he focused on creating a home for his war orphans. While both the Holy See and Don Zeno advocated on behalf of their own beliefs, there was no one left to do so for the Jews. Thus, no one objected when Don Zeno turned former barracks into a chapel and erected a large cross that cast a shadow across the camp. And indeed, such practices were common in the immediate postwar era when Europeans were facing a housing crisis. The distinction with Fossoli, however, was the message of Catholic benevolence. The cover of this book provides us with a key image of such propaganda.

Nomadelfia

As Italy prepared to vote in the April elections that would determine the authors of the country's constitution, the *Piccoli Apostoli* orphans and their caretakers joined together on February 14, 1948 to sign a constitution of their own. Their document officially inaugurated the transition from *Piccoli Apostoli* into Nomadelfia and the former deportation camp for Jews into the birthplace of a new Christian order. The name

originates from two Greek words, "*nomos*" meaning law and "*adelfos*" signifying brother, translating to "the place where fraternity is law." The name encapsulated Don Zeno's hope for a new Christian utopia arising from a unified community. Article 1 defined the meaning of Nomadelfia and included the following bible passage, "I do not ask on behalf of these alone, but for those also who believe in Me through their word; that they may all be one; even as You, Father, are in Me and I in You, that they also may be in Us, so that the world may believe that You sent Me."[78]

Don Zeno commonly quoted scripture in speeches and letters to Catholic authorities as a means of connecting his movement with the teachings of the gospel. His alignment of the Bible and the fundamental principles of Nomadelfia served to highlight the community's dedication to living an existence true to God and Don Zeno's vision for Italy as a whole. Article 49 in the Nomadelfia constitution called for loyalty to the Church in all matters and promised to respect the common laws of the Church and state.

Don Zeno's ultimate goal was to create a Christian utopia on the site of the former concentration camp, and he viewed this endeavor as symbolically significant.[79] He was not the only one who saw the symbolism in that transformation. Journalists from around the globe visited the camp and praised the community's efforts. Donations soon followed.[80] Edward E. Swanstrom published a long article (July 14,1950) in *Commonweal* titled "A Kind of Miracle: Christian Charity in what was once a concentration camp," in which he used the camp as a metaphor to undermine communists and elevate Don Zeno's Christian charity.[81] Brazilian newspaper *A Gazeta—San Paulo* described the Italian government's significant financial support and kindness.[82] American newspaper *Everybody's* ran an article (March 26, 1949) titled "Where They Are Happy" in which its author noted: "You cannot ignore a city of a thousand children who, in less than a year, have established their lives on ground dishonored by war. And who, with their own hands, have torn down the shed where five hundred Jews were murdered, and are using the same materials to build a Chapel upon the same site."[83] While the historical accuracy of his message was inaccurate, his meaning was clear.

Don Zeno modeled Nomadelfia on the social structure of his grandfather's farm, with many family generations living under one roof. Its constitution declared that a *comunità familiari*, or family community, would replace traditional nuclear families. And Article 53 proclaimed that Nomadelfia would be organized into *borgate*, mini-villages with orphans and traditional families living together. The founders envisioned that the *borgate* would foster greater inclusion. As Article 58 explained: "From

a secular perspective, each borgata is a township. From an ecclesiastical point of view, each borgata is a parish [of Nomadelfia]." Don Zeno sent a letter to De Gasperi on November 16, 1948 explaining that in just a year's time the community had grown from 280 orphans dispersed into 28 families to 780 children in 56 "borghi."[84]

The oldest males of each family grouping acted as heads of that unit, much as Don Zeno's grandfather had on the farm. Men worked in the fields, managed administrative matters, and attended to the various camp industries including printing presses and auto repair shops that Don Zeno hoped would make the community self-sufficient. The women were mothers to all the children and took on traditional female-gendered roles such as seamstresses, teachers, nurses, and cooks. Article 18 of the charter defined the *mamme di occupazione*, women who gave up marriage and having children in order to devote themselves entirely to the orphans.

Marxist theory on property and eradication of social class were re-envisioned in a Christian form at Nomadelfia. Article 2 specified that all members had to work for the shared good of the community and relinquish individual property and money. Don Zeno's aversion to a "culture of privacy" originated in his belief that, to create a religious utopia, all must unite in a shared sense of purpose and spirituality. He employed a Marxist approach to family and private property tempered by Christian values to prevent individual ownership and traditional family units from dividing the community.[85] He intended Nomadelfia to move its followers to the social life promoted by communism, "but in the womb of the church."[86]

In any case, economic necessity forced the community to unite in order to continue. The April18 election, which attracted 92 percent of all eligible voters, had shown that the anticommunist propaganda machine had largely succeeded. By the morning of April 21, all the ballots had been counted and the election results announced. The DC secured power, winning 48.5 percent of the vote, which awarded it 305 of 574 seats in parliament. This was a huge gain from the June 1946 election in which the DC received 36 percent.[87] No longer needing Nomadelfia for propaganda purposes, DC, Vatican, and US support for the project evaporated.

The Church Responds

The DC's electoral victory in 1947 did little to ease Pius XII's polarized interpretation of Italian politics and objection to Catholic communism. Newspapers reported on July 14 on Pius XII's decision to excommunicate

Catholic communists worldwide. The *St. Petersburg Times*, for example, reported that, "It is believed that the decree will have tremendous repercussions in countries like Italy . . . where the communists insist there is no essential conflict in membership."[88] Don Zeno resumed his public talks. Audiences once again gathered in 1950 to hear him criticize the DC for nurturing deep social divisions and denounce an epidemic of rich priests. He also lambasted the Vatican's decision to spend money on building new churches while the poor went unfed.[89]

Scelba feared that Don Zeno's popularity, buttressed by his ever-expanding community, would foster a renewed interest in a communist–Catholic coalition that could rival the DC in the red north. By October 1950 *Nomadelfia* had approximately 1,200 members in 65 houses and Don Zeno's political speeches remained popular. As the country's economy continued to rebound, Carpi industries had recovered and started funneling money into the camp.[90]

Scelba stirred up trouble for Don Zen by attempting to undermine the community's financial security. He met with Countess Maria Giovanna Albertoni Pirelli, one of Nomadelfia's most important financial backers, and urged her to stop funding it.[91] He also encouraged the Vatican to send a representative to assess Nomadelfia.[92] Vatican official Mons. Crovini visited the camp (1950) and disputed Scelba's rendering of Don Zeno, explaining that the priest was not the heretic he was made out to be.[93] At Dalla Zuanna's request, Apostolic Nunzio Mons. Borgongini Duca also visited Fossoli and reflected (June 18, 1950) in a letter: "I have visited many cities, but I have never seen a city like this." He praised the community and Don Zeno's creation as a true Christian utopia.[94] Even Milan's Cardinal Alfredo Ildefonso Schuster celebrated Don Zeno's accomplishments, affirming "Nomadelfia represents a page of the holy gospel."[95]

Despite accolades from Vatican emissaries and church officials, Don Zeno's politics earned him criticism in the new political climate of the Cold War, which brought the DC and the Vatican closer together. He advocated for a social revolution in Italy mirroring what he had already accomplished at Nomadelfia and what he hoped to build in Grossetto, Tuscany, the second site of Nomadelfia. His community represented a reformation of the Church, he argued, and he wanted the DC to follow suit. On June 10, 1951, approximately 200 of Don Zeno's supporters joined together and abstained from voting for the DC in the local Carpi administrative election. Instead, on their ballots they wrote, "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity."[96] The Nomadelfians' abstention from voting threatened the social power of the DC and the religious power of the Vatican and cost Don Zeno many of his most important backers.[97]

Don Zeno's previous support from the clergy turned to criticism. Cardinal Schuster, who had referred to Nomadelfia as a page out of the Bible, openly condemned Nomadelfia's leaders the following year. The right-wing newspaper *L'Italia* ran a lengthy article by Schuster (May 27, 1952) that referred to Nomadelfia's leaders as ruining "an ideal humanitarian program" by joining it with a social theory "beyond ecclesiastical discipline." He even disparaged the name "Nomadelfia," calling it intentionally ambiguous so that its founders "could justify any moral disorder."[98] Schuster's criticism resulted in the collapse of *Amici Nomadelfia*, a group of Catholic parishioners who raised money for the orphans under Don Zeno's care. Carpi Bishop Dalla Zuanna revoked Nomadelfia's diocesan approval (May 16, 1952), originally awarded to the *Piccoli Apostoli* on August 27, 1937.

Discrediting Don Zeno, not Nomadelfia, became both the Vatican and DC's primary aim. Don Zeno reported to Archbishop Duca Francesco Borgongini (February 5, 1952) who read a Vatican decree ordering the priest to leave Nomadelfia and report to his bishop to select a new parish. The decree also informed Don Zeno that Silesian priests would henceforth attend to Nomadelfia. Don Zeno felt he could not protest because the pope himself had issued the statement.[99]

Don Zeno penned a letter to his congregants on February 9, 1952 explaining that the Vatican had ordered his resignation from Nomadelfia and the newspaper *Corriere della Sera* published it the following day without commentary. "God sent me to you and together we have built [Nomadelfia]," Don Zeno wrote. "I have loved you as my true children and now the Church has torn me from you." He thanked God for the opportunity to obey the pope as promised when he joined the priesthood in 1931, but also made a point of telling his followers that "this is my promise, not yours." Despite the Vatican's instructions for him to join a new parish, Don Zeno decided to give up his collar after more than 20 years of priesthood.[100] And, instead of accepting Don Zeno's replacement, the community of Nomadelfia elected to abandon the Fossoli camp, move to Grossetto (Tuscany), and begin anew. Located outside of Italy's red zone and beyond the walls of the former camp, the Vatican finally left the community to its own devices.[101]

Conclusion

The myth of Italian Catholic altruism during the war has dominated the memory landscape of the Holocaust in Italy. For decades after the liberation, commentary on Catholic and hence Italian benevolence

overshadowed discussion of Italian's contributions to the Holocaust. Journalist Tas Luciano's book *Storia degli ebrei Italiani* published in 1987, for example, argued that Italian Jews survived the war because of Italian Catholic altruism. He included a picture of Fossoli and attributed its place in the Judeocide to the German command.[102] The history of Fossoli's function as a home for Catholic orphans fortified the impression of Christian compassion and charity. However, as this chapter has shown, the Vatican only supported religious charity if it served their political end. Thus, Pope Pius XII's directive to remove Don Zeno from Nomadelfia reflected a greater need to control and define the image of Catholics.

Pius XI and Pius XII had prioritized the Vatican's stability and failed to object to German National Socialism and Italian Fascism. Pius XI's support of the Lateran Accords bolstered Mussolini's power. Pius XII too chose to protect the Holy See at all costs, first through silent compliance during the war and then by championing the myth of Catholic benevolence afterward in order to promote the DC. The political maneuvering of both popes was done to benefit the Church.

Don Zeno's youth in Carpi, as well as his experience of Fascism and World War II emboldened him to do all within his power to benefit the community around him. Politics became a component of his path to the glorification of God, a way to unite all people regardless of party affiliation or creed. Nomadelfia became the living version of Don Zeno's worldview and what he hoped Catholic leadership could accomplish.

After the war, Don Zeno and the Vatican acted in what each considered the best interest of the Church, and for both, this had nothing to do with the Judeocide or its memory. Instead, as each party sought to achieve its aims, the legacy of an Italian-run deportation camp for Jews became fodder for a redemptive narrative of Catholic charity. Focused on protecting the Holy See's sovereignty, Pius XII threw the weight of the Church behind the DC, going so far as to excommunicate Catholic-communists in order to drive believers to the DC. In contrast to the Bishop of Rome, the humble local priest Don Zeno prioritized his congregants, many of whom sympathized with communism. Don Zeno's determination to find a middle ground challenged the Vatican's attempts to champion Catholicism as the sole righteous political force.[103] Acting in what each believed to be Italy's best interest, the interests of the Jews was first marginalized and then forgotten.

Figure 6.1 Don Zeno Saltini Leading Prayer in the Fossoli Camp
Note: Archivio Nomadelfia, "Fossoli 1947–1952," doc. 00176e01.

Figure 6.2 Don Zeno Saltini Speaking in Rovereto
Note: Archivio Nomadelfia, "Fossoli 1947–1952," doc. 00113–01.

Figure 6.3 Mamma Sirte, a *mamma di vocazione*, holding a baby at the Fossoli Camp

Note: Archivio Nomadelfia, "Fossoli 1948–1952," doc. 00143–03.



Figure 6.4 Reconstruction Plan to Transform "New Camp" into Nomadelfia

Note: Archivio Nomadelfia, "Progetto Trasformazioni Campo di Fossoli, 1947–48," 14 D–D 2.

Figure 6.5 Don Zeno Saltini with a War Orphan in Front of a Former Guard Tower

Note: Archivio Nomadelfia, "Fossoli 1947–1952," doc. 00213–02.

Conclusion

When I began my research years ago I intended to write a concise history of Fossoli's wartime operations, but the primary sources I had uncovered told a more complex story. Studying camp operations, I saw additional questions: Who built the camp? What inspired *Carpigiani* business transactions with Fossoli? How were Italian officials involved in the incarceration and deportation of Jews and others? Why did gentiles in the area join the Resistance and what motivated others to abstain? Should I think of those who did not resist as perpetrators, victims, or something else? What postwar conditions allowed *Carpigiani* to elide responsibility for their support of the camp? And what postwar political and religious factors shaped early memory of the Holocaust in Italy? Thus, while the camp history from May 1942 to March 1952 is the subject of *The Holocaust and Compesnated Compliance in Italy: Fossoli di Carpi, 1942–1952*, my analysis has engaged with themes outside the camp walls and beyond the wartime period.

The buoyancy and longevity of the "*brava gente*" myth in popular Holocaust memory has obscured Italian participation or, at best, relegated it to an abstruse footnote in the immense chronicle of the Judeocide. Instead, Italian heroism is often viewed as a beacon of light in a dark history.[1] We have only to look to Primo Levi's poetic reflection of Fossoli di Carpi to see the fault in such formulations. Titled "Sunset at Fossoli," Levi reflects: "I know what it means not to return./ Through barbed wire I have seen/ the sun go down and die." For nearly every Jew who passed through it, Fossoli was an antechamber of death. And Italians, not Germans, erected the barbed wire fences that surrounded the Italian-built camp and then they eventually drove Levi to the train that delivered him to Auschwitz.

This study of a camp, from its origins to its postwar functions, exposes not only the pattern of silence that facilitated mass murder, but also the national and international political motivations for that silence. And, as we have seen, Italy's wartime past is far from a single-note narration of benevolence. This emerges clearly as we scrutinize a decade of uses of Fossoli.

Fear and Compensated Compliance

The Holocaust and Compensated Compliance in Italy argues that fear alone fails as an explanation for why some *Carpigiani* carried on financial partnerships with the camp throughout the war. "Part I: The War Years" (chapters 1–4) contextualizes the ways in which some locals contributed to camp operations and their motivations for doing so. This study claims that although violence and fear engendered *Carpigiani* silence during the war, they were not the sole motivators for locals' fulfillment of Nazi and RSI demands. While violence and fear played a key role in priming *Carpigiani* obedience, this study presses us to consider the years prior to Fascism in order to understand conformity to Fascist demands in Carpi.[2] The *camici neri* (black brigades) used intimidation and aggression after World War I to suppress Carpi socialists, destroy the town's *camera dei lavore* (workers' unions), and commandeer its *cooperative* (cooperatives).[3] Fascists eliminated all armed opposition to Mussolini's regime in Carpi so that there was no one left to resist by the time the IV Army Corps of Bologna ordered town officials to build a POW camp in 1942.[4]

Yet, even when Badoglio replaced Mussolini on July 26, 1943 and the threat of forceful reprisals for disobedience dissipated, locals continued to manage and conduct business with the Fascist camp. While former supporters of the regime ripped Fascist insignia off their uniforms and the few remaining communist Resistance bands in the area paraded down Modena's main streets, camp operations in Fossoli di Carpi continued unabated.[5] Thus, fear and intimidation were not the sole reason *Carpigiani* maintained business relationships with the camp.

In addition to fear, a myriad of other factors, including monetary gain, contributed to non-Fascist *Carpigiani* actions. Fascist orders to build, staff, and supply the camp in 1942 created an opportunity for economic gain. Those financial incentives extended into and beyond Badoglio's 45-day rule. Carpi's compensated compliance, however, took on new meaning when the Germans occupied Italy in September 1943, deported Fossoli's POW population, and instructed town officials to ready the camp to hold Jews.

The Victim Myth and the Resistance

Alongside accounts of individuals who complied with and facilitated genocide are stories of the Resistance, which offer a more popular and well-known narrative. Notwithstanding the past 15 years of scholarship by Luca Baldissara, David Bidussa, Angelo Del Boca, Filippo Focardi,

John Foot, Robert Gordon, Paolo Pezzino, Fiamma Lussana, Claudio Pavone, Guri Schwartz, Robert Ventresca, and many more, the stubborn public memory of the Italian Resistance's heroism has overshadowed the persecution of Italy's Jews at the hands of Italians.[6]

Armed and unarmed Resistance efforts landed thousands of Resistance fighters from all over German-occupied Italy in the jointly run German–Italian camp. Following the liberation of Rome on June 4, 1944, Resistance activities in the Modena region surged and efforts were made to disrupt camp operations.[7] Because the camp's position in the middle of open farmland precluded direct attacks, Resistance bands bombed railway tracks, cut telephone lines, and organized care packages for partisans held at Fossoli.[8] The murder of 67 Resistance fighters rounded up from Fossoli and shot into a mass grave just beyond the camp exemplifies the risk that rebellion posed.

Thousands of Resistance fighters and civilians suffered during the German occupation and the *guerra civile* that followed. Yet the typical postwar practice of conflating the suffering of Jews and gentiles is historically inaccurate. Using the conflation of victimhood in Carpi's *Museo Monumento al Deportato* as an example, chapter 4 shows that after the war, Italian society adopted a narrative depicting wartime Italy as victim to Nazi occupation and persecution, and the museum in Carpi's main piazza built in 1973 tells that story. No distinction is drawn between Jewish and gentile deportees in the room of names of deported Italians, implying that Nazi cruelty oppressed everyone.[9]

In an interview shortly before his death, Levi clarified the difference between these two victim groups. "The conditions under which the political prisoners lived in the camps were different from ours because they had a moral as well as political armor that most of us lacked," Levi explained.[10] His comment highlights that gentiles' agency informed their incarceration, not their "race." And according to Levi, racial persecution was a more complete victimization. In short, Resistors did not die in gas chambers—that fate was reserved for Jews and Jews alone.

The victim myth, which positions all Italians in Italy as victims of German oppression, simplifies at best, or elides Italian antisemitism and gentile contributions to the arrest, incarceration, and deportation of Resistance fighters and Jews.[11] The acquiescence of regional officials, municipal authorities, and Carpi businesses to Nazi and RSI demands to arrest and deport Jews supported and facilitated the Judeocide. While some scholars and politicians have argued that only Nazi and RSI officials perpetrated the Judeocide, the history of Fossoli suggests another conclusion.[12] Every Italian who took part in, profited from, or enabled Fossoli's operations to continue—with the exception of Jewish victims

and the Resistance—played some part in the murderous function of the camp.[13] Indeed, the history of genocide requires closer scrutiny of perpetrators and their enablers: the silently complicit.

The history of German–Italian supervision of the camp from March 15 to August 1944 offers a counter-narrative to the universal victim myth. While previous studies of Fossoli have depicted Italian and German operations at Fossoli as separate—claiming that Italian guards did not monitor Jews—my research has shown that prisoner populations overlapped between the Old Camp and the New Camp and Italian guards attended to civilian, political prisoners, and Jews.

"Brava Gente"

The myth that all Italians were victims and only the Germans were to blame developed in the immediate postwar years as part of an intentional policy by the Italian coalition government and supported by the Western Allies.[14] This blurring of history distorted public memory of Fascism and Italian collaboration.

Historian Robert Gordon argues that Italians sustained this diplomatic strategy "to distance Italian Fascism from German Nazism, [and] to talk up individual acts of courage, including aid to and rescue of Jews and others…"[15] The "*brava gente*" myth attributes Italian Resistance to Italians' inherently benevolent character. Indeed, in postwar Italy the victim myth and popularization of Resistance narratives buttressed "*brava gente*" claims. The "*brava gente*" became the colander through which all national questions were strained.[16] And it is in this way, argues historian Rosario Forlenza, that collective memory—the benevolent image of Italians fostered by Catholics, communists, socialist, liberals, and moderates—became public memory.[17]

National efforts to distort Italy's former alliance with Nazi Germany boiled down to a simple format: Italians were "good" and the Germans were "bad." Guri Schwarz's research on Italian antisemitism elucidates how the "myth of the good Italian" involved purging Italy of its Fascist past and disputing any history or memory that painted Italians as antisemitic. "[A]ntisemitism was always judged as a phenomenon absolutely foreign to Italian culture, history, and national character" he explains.[18] Blaming the Germans for antisemitism in turn depicted Italians as victims of Nazi oppression instead of originators, collaborators, or enforcers of racism.

This book presents an alternative history to these claims and demonstrates how Fascist laws and structures informed the persecution of Jews in the camp. The "*ebrei misti*" ("mixed blood") category as outlined in the

1938 Racial Laws, for example, influenced and had an impact on prisoners' lives in Fossoli from December 1943 to August 1944 (chapter 3). The original structures set in place by the local and regional Fascist leaders—such as supply and delivery of goods—made some *Carpigiani* compensated compliers with genocide (chapters 3 and 4). And the RSI's passage of the November 30 decree, which called for the internment of all Jews in Italy, relied upon the initiative of *prefetti* and *questure* throughout the German-occupied zone (chapter 4). By eliding Italian Fascism and Italy's anti-Jewish racial laws, Fossoli's role in the Judeocide was wiped clean and placed neatly into the "good Italian" category.

Then too, the decision of the Italian coalition government to suspend trials of Fascists allowed Italians to view themselves as innocent victims and not guilty of war crimes, at home or abroad. Historian Robert Ventresca refers to this as a process of "collective amnesia," which he argues "was institutionalized, in a sense, by the Italian government's refusal, backed by the Allies, to agree to a thorough investigation and prosecution of war crimes committed by Italians in formerly occupied areas, namely the Balkans, Greece and Africa."[19] Without trials of Fascists, the multifaceted Italian wartime experiences of collaborators, resisters, and compliers were expunged from popular memory. And although Fossoli had operated briefly as a prison for Fascists awaiting trial, its prisoners were released as a result of a widespread amnesty announced in May 1946 (chapter 5).[20]

Again, national politics shaped Carpi's perception of its role in the Judeocide. National efforts to obscure Fascist crimes made Carpi authorities' elision of responsibility possible. As Fossoli's Fascist prisoners departed the camp free men in spring 1946, Carpi authorities denied payment to companies for business conducted at the camp during the German occupation. In addition, Italian oversight of thousands of refugees traversing through Fossoli as a camp for *stranieri indesiderabili* (undesirable foreigners) from February 1946 to May 1947 solidified *Carpigiani* understanding of their own innocence. Thus a nation of former collaborators and Fascists became caretakers of Jews, perpetrators, collaborators, and refugees (chapter 5).

Blaming Germans alone for the Holocaust had long-lasting consequences for Italian Holocaust memory. Schwarz maintains that "by avoiding the trials of Italian war criminals…the conscience of a community which obstinately pursued a convenient oblivion, [was] happy to look at itself in the distorting mirror of the myth of the good Italian."[21] And if prominent Fascists were not held accountable, why would the *Carpigiani* acknowledge their role in the Judeocide? Symbolically, by the time the last Fascist prisoners left the camp, all of the former Italian-run camp had been obliterated.[22]

Good Italians, Good Catholics

Religious explanations for Italian benevolence are imbedded in the "*brava gente*" myth. Here too we see antisemitism dismissed as a German invention and once again claims of German victimization of Italians come to the forefront. The final chapter uses the story of Don Zeno, *Nomadelfia*, and the Vatican at Fossoli to elucidate how and why religious leaders and politicians employed religious motifs to redefine Italian identity. The conversion of Fossoli into a humanitarian center (May 1947–February 1952) played a significant role in fostering a postwar amnesia around Italian collaboration. Newspapers throughout Italy and across the globe depicted *Nomadelfia* as an example of Catholic and Italian benevolence, as well as a poignant illustration of a postwar redemption and rehabilitation initiated by Christian Italians.

Newspapers and magazines praised the changes Don Zeno wrought at Fossoli and described the orphanage as "the City of the Sun," "the City of Dreams," and "the City of God."[23] No one questioned his cannibalization of the Italian-run section of the camp to rebuild and transform the New Camp, nor did anyone question such appellations as "the City of Love" and the "City of God" to describe a former deportation camp.[24] Fossoli had functioned as a place of hopelessness and despair. For many, it was the last stop before deportation to death. The orphanage, on the other hand, looked to the future. Clearly, the war and the orphanage were intertwined—the children were war orphans, and the institution was created from the remains of a former concentration camp. Did the orphanage overwrite the memory of the former deportation camp, or merely distract attention from its darker history?[25]

The Vatican stepped in when Don Zeno drew attention to Catholic passivity (1951) to Nazi wartime atrocities and criticized the dominant and Vatican-supported Christian Democrat Party.[26] The Pope requested that Don Zeno step down as leader of *Nomadelfia* and, being a devoted Catholic, Don Zeno complied. Immediately, the press picked up the story, but this time to criticize the Carpi priest and accuse him of scandalous behavior ranging from embezzlement to planning a communist uprising in the Emilia Romagna.[27] By 1953, Don Zeno had been cleared of all accusations, stopped wearing his pastoral collar, and relocated his entire community to Grosseto, Tuscany.

Don Zeno's transformation of the camp into a place of hope and the Vatican's involvement in its relocation to Tuscany, is part of a comprehensive history of Fossoli and the role of the church during and after the Holocaust. The new image that Don Zeno created did not and could not completely erase knowledge about the use of Fossoli as a deportation

camp; however, it could—thanks in part to the Vatican—and did shift responsibility for its wartime use onto the Germans.

"Bystanders," Collaborators, and the Gray Zone

Early formulations of Italians promulgated by the Allies and nascent Italian Republic viewed "bystanders" and the "*brava gente*" as inhabiting the same space. As Gordon has argued, the "*brava gente*" myth, much like Levi's gray zone, has become "a convenient lens through which to see Italy's wartime history."[28] In short, if an Italian was not a member of the RSI, then he or she must have been "good." And if she or he did collaborate with the Nazis or RSI, then she or he had no choice but to follow orders.

The Holocaust and Compensated Compliance in Italy argues that the "bystander" category and the "*brava gente*" myth fail to explain civilian involvement in camp operations during the German occupation. As discussed in the "Introduction," the term "bystander" often refers to those who were neither perpetrators nor targets for annihilation. Similarly, the unilateral conclusion that all Italians were inherently good has circumvented critical analysis of civilian contributions to atrocity.

We need more concise language to explain the broad range of civilian contributions to Judeocide. This will promote historical accuracy and clarity, and it will help us define and examine civilian motivations during genocide. It is for this reason, for example, that I refer to individuals who profited financially from the camp as compensated compliers, not bystanders. Clearly *Carpigiani* were under considerable pressure to follow orders. Indeed, the consequences for rebelling against Nazi and RSI forces were dire. And yet, as has been shown, fear alone does not explain compliance.

FinalC onsiderations

Italian writer Ferdinando Camon conducted a series of interviews with Italian Holocaust survivor Primo Levi beginning in 1982, the last of which took place a few months before Levi's suicide in 1986. In one such interview, Camon asked Levi whether all Germans supported the Judeocide. No, Levi replied. "One can and should, however, accuse the German people of cowardice," Levi went on to explain. "Those who knew kept silent, those who didn't know were afraid to ask questions… It's certainly true that state terrorism is a very strong weapon, one that it's very hard to resist, but it's also true that the German people, on the whole,

didn't even try to resist."[29] The same can be said of the Carpi officials and businesses involved in the running of Fossoli.

Many *Carpigiani*, for example, became imbedded in a system set on destruction and mass murder via the Fossoli camp, perhaps without realizing that they were getting their hands dirty. It is debatable how much bakers and laborers with contracts to provision and to work at Fossoli knew about the Jews' final fate. One thing is for sure: had they wanted to know, they could have found out.

Levi brings up this point later in his conversation with Camon, in which he remarks "the Germans could have known much more about the extermination if they'd wanted to, and if the few who knew had had the courage to speak, but this didn't happen. Those who knew kept silent, those who didn't know were afraid to ask questions—eyes, ears, and mouths stayed shut."[30] The same could be said for Carpi.

Notes

Introduction

1. Primo Levi, *Se questo è un uomo* (Torino: F. de Silva, 1947) and *Survival in Auschwitz: The Nazi Assault on Humanity* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
2. Robert S. Gordon, "Which Holocaust? Primo Levi and the Field of Holocaust Memory in Post-War Italy," *Italian Studies*, Vol. 61 (Spring 2006), pp. 85–113.
3. Levi, *Survival in Auschwitz*, p. 87.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., 92.
6. Primo Levi, *The Drowned and the Saved* (New York: Summit Books, 1988), p. 37.
7. Ibid., p. 39.
8. Ibid., p. 42.
9. Ibid., p. 53.
10. Historian Robert Gordon argues that "Holocaust" is a problematic term in Italy because it includes victims groups beyond those targeted for genocide, such as civilians killed during the German occupation of Italy and Italian resistors. Thus, I chose to use "Judeocide" here to speak specifically to Jewish victims. Gordon, "Which Holocaust," p. 92.
11. Unless otherwise noted, I will refer to the camp built in Fossoli, a township of Carpi, by the town name.
12. Raul Hilberg, *Perpetrator Victims Bystanders: The Jewish Catastrophe, 1933–1945* (New York: Aaron Asher Brooks, 1992), pp. 212–216.
13. Robert Ehrenreich and Tim Cole, "The Perpetrator-Bystander-Victim Constellation; Rethinking Genocidal Relationships," *Human Organization*, Vol. 64, No. 3 (2005), p. 218.
14. Arne Johan Vetlesen, "Genocide: A Case for the Responsibility of the Bystander," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 37, No. 4, Special Issue on Ethics of War and Peace (July 2000), p. 521.
15. Ernesto Verdeja, "Moral Bystanders and Mass Violence," in *New Directions in Genocide Research*, ed. Adam Jones (New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 161.
16. Levi, *Survival in Auschwitz*, p. 16.

17. Historian Yitzhak Arad found that in addition to lay construction workers, 80 Jews were also called upon to build Sobibor. While the civilians were left unharmed, all 80 Jews were shot when the work was done. Arad, *Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka: The Operation Reinhard Death Camps* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), p. 30.
18. Renzo De Felice, *Mussolini il rivoluzionario* (Turin: Einaudi, 1964) and *Le interpretazioni del Fascismo* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1969).
19. Giorgio Fabre, *Mussolini Razzista: Dal Socialismo al Fascismo, La Formazione di un Antisemita* (Milan, Italy: Garzanti Libri, 2005); David Bidussa, *Il mito del bravo italiano: Persistenza, caratteri e vizi di un paese antico/modern, dale leggi razziali all'italiano del Duemila* (Milano: il Saggiatore, 1994); and Aaron Gillette, *Racial Theories in Fascist Italy* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002).
20. Maruo Raspanti, "L'ideologia del razzismo" in *La Menzogna della Razza: Documenti e immagini del razzismo e dell'antisemitismo fascista*, ed. David Bidussa (Bologna: Biblioteca Communale dell'Archiginnasio, 1994); and Giorgio Israel and Pietro Nastasi, *Scienza e razza nell'Italia fascista* (Bologna: Società Editrice Il Mulino, 1998).
21. Giuliana Cardosi, Marisa Cardosi and Garbiella Cardosi, *Sul confine. La questione dei "matrimoni misti" durante la persecuzione antiebraica in Italia e in Europa (1935–1945)* (Torino: Silvio Zamorani editore, 1998).
22. Michele Sarfatti, *Mussolini contro gli ebrei: Cronoca dell'elaborazione delle leggi del 1938* (Torino: S. Zamorani editore, 1994).
23. Ruth Ben-Ghiat, *Fascist Modernities: Italy, 1922–1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Davide Conti, *L'occoupazione italiana dei balcani: Crimini di Guerra e mito della "brava gente" (1940–1943)* (Roma: Odradek, 2008); Carlo Spartaco Capogreco, *I campi del duce: L'internamento civile nell'Italia fascista (1940–1943)* (Torino: Einaudi, 2004); and Liliana Picciotto Fargion, *Il libro della memoria: Gli ebrei deportati dall'italia (1942–1945)* (Milano: Mursia, 1991).
24. Pavan Ilaria and Guri Schwarz, *Gli ebrei in Italia tra persecuzione fascista e reintegrazione postbellica* (Firenze: Giuntina, 2001); Guri Schwarz, "On Myth Making and Nation Building: The Genesis of the 'Myth of the Good Italian,' 1943–1947," *Yad Vashem Studies*, No. 1 (2008), pp. 111–143; Guri Schwarz, *After Mussolini: Jewish life and Jewish memories in post-Fascist Italy* (Edgware, Middlesex and Portland, Oregon: Vallentine Mitchell, 2012).
25. "Public memory" refers to founding myths of the Italian republic that still resignate in popular culture today. I am employing Rosario Forlenza's definition, which he defines as "the collective memory of the war imposed between 1943 and 1947 by the anti-fascist forces—Catholics, communists, socialists, liberals, moderates—which was to become the public memory of the Republic." See: Forlenza, "Sacrificial Memory and Political Legitimacy in Postwar Italy: Reliving and Remembering World War II," *History and Memory*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall/Winter 2012), p. 74.

26. Historian Victoria De Grazia employs a bottom-up perspective, arguing that the *dopolavoro* (leisure-time organization) represents a "depoliticized underside of fascism." She contends that the Fascist movement was not the product of a "mass society" by highlighting the pluralities and inconsistencies within Fascist culture. Similarly, Historian Marla Stone analyzes the process whereby unstable and ever-changing Fascist culture translated into Fascist patronage. Political Scientist Edward R. Tannenbaum and historian Tracy H. Koon have demonstrated how Fascist youth organizations informed the younger generation's belief in Fascism. Victoria De Grazia, *The Culture of Consent: Mass Organization of Leisure in Fascist Italy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Marla Susan Stone, *The Patron State: Culture & Politics in Fascist Italy* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998); Edward R. Tannenbaum, *Fascism in Italy. Society and Culture 1922–1945* (New York and London: Basic Books, 1972); and Tracy H. Koon, *Believe, Obey, Fight. Political Socialization of Youth in Fascist Italy, 1922–1943* (Chapel Hill and London: UNC Press Books, 1985).
27. See: Filippo Focardi, *La guerra della memoria: la Resistenza nel dibattito politico italiano dal 1945 a oggi* (Roma: Laterza, 2005); Robert S. Gordon, "The Holocaust in Italian Collective Memory: *Il Giorno Della Memoria*, 27 January 2001," *Modern Italy* 11, No. 2 (2006); Angelo Del Boca, *Italiani, Brava Gente?: Un Mito Duro a Morire* (Vicenza: N. Pozza, 2005); and David Bidusa, *Il mito del bravo italiano* (Milano: Il Saggiatore, 1994).
28. A number of scholars have written about the absence of trials in Italy and how it has impacted and continues to influence public memory of the Holocaust. See: Laca Baldissara and Paolo Pezzino, eds., *Crimini e memorie di guerra* (Napoli: L'ancora, 2004); Michele Battini, *The Missing Italian Nuremberg: Cultural Amnesia and Postwar Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Mimmo Franzinelli, *L'amnistia Togliatti, 22 giugno 1946. Colpo di spugna sui crimini fascisti* (Milano: mondadori Editore, 2006); and Fiamma Lussana, "Memoria e memorie nel dibattito storiografico," *Studi Storici*, Anno 41, No. 4 (October–December 2000), pp. 1048–1059.
29. Although local business did increase initially, by the end of 1934 Dachau still had the lowest per capita tax revenues in Bavaria. Harold Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau: The Uses and Abuses of a Concentration Camp, 1933–2001* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 25–26.
30. Gordon J. Horwitz, *In the Shadow of Death: Living Outside the Gates of Mauthausen* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), p. 41.
31. Ibid., p. 54.
32. Town archives (Archivio Comunale di Carpi and Seimario Vescovile di Carpi), Italian state archives (l'archvio dello stato di Modena, and l'archvio dello stato di Roma), Jewish archives in Milan (Centro di Documentazion Ebreaica Contemporanea), and matierial housed at institutions outside of Italy (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum archive and the Imperial War Museum archive) reveal just how involved the town of Carpi came to be with the Fossoli camp.

33. For more on Resistance fighters and Italian antifascist movements, see: Giuliano Albarani, Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi, and Giovanni Taurasi, *Sotto Il Regime: Problemi, Metodi E Strumenti Per Lo Studio Dell'antifascismo* (Milano: UNICOPLI, 2006); Elio Apih, *Italia: Fascismo E Antifascismo Nella Venezia Giulia (1918–1943): Ricerche Storiche* (Bari: Laterza, 1966); Lorenzo Bertucelli, Stefano Magagnoli, and Istituto Storico della Resistenza e di Storia Contemporanea di Modena e Provincia, *Regime Fascista E Società Modenese: Aspetti E Problemi Del Fascismo Locale (1922–1939)* (Modena: Mucchi editore, 1995); Luciano Casali and Istituto storico provinciale della Resistenza (Bologna Italy), *Bologna, 1920: Le Origini del Fascismo* (Bologna: Cappelli, 1982); Marco Impagliazzo, *La Resistenza Silenziosa: Leggi Razziste e Deportazione nella Memoria Degli Ebrei di Roma* (Milano: Guerini e associati, 2013); Claudio Pavone, *Una Guerra Civile: Saggio Storico Sulla Moralità Nella Resistenza* (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 1991); and Claudio Silingardi, *Una Provincia Partigiana: Guerra E Resistenza a Modena, 1940–1945* (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 1998).
34. Forlenza, "Sacrificial Memory and Political Legitimacy in Postwar Italy," p. 74.
35. For more information on the victim myth and Italian and German collaboration during the occupation, see: Albarani, Guerrazzi, and Taurasi, *Sotto Il Regime;* Luca Baldissara and Paolo Pezzino, *Crimini e memorie di guerra: Violenze contro le popolazioni e politiche del ricordo* (Napoli: Ancora del Mediterraneo, 2004); Mimmo Franzinelli, *Le Stragi Nascoste: L'armadio Della Vergogna: Impunità E Rimozione Dei Crimini Di Guerra Nazifascisti, 1943–2001* (Milano: Mondadori, 2002); Lutz Klinkhammer, *L'occupazione Tedesca in Italia, 1943–1945* (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri Editore, 1993); Claudio Pavone, *A Civil War: A History of the Italian Resistance* (London; New York: Verso, 2013); and Roberto Vivarelli, *Storia delle origini del Fascismo: L'Italia dalla grande guerra alla marcia su Roma* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1991).
36. Tim Cole, *Holocaust City: The Making of a Jewish Ghetto* (New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. xi–xii.

1 In the Marketplace: Fascist Socialization and Consent in Carpi

1. Primo Levi, *Moments of Reprieve* (New York: Summit Books, 1986), pp. 109–114.
2. For more on the historical precedents that shaped Fascism and its reception, such as the unification of Italy and World War I, see: Elio Apih, *Italia: fascismo e antifascismo nella Venezia Giulia (1918–1943)* (Bari: Laterza, 1966); Marina Cattaruzza, *L'Italia e il confine orientale: 1866–2006* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2008); Simona Colarizi, *L'opione degli Italiani sotto il regime 1929–1943* (Roma-Bari: Gius. Laterza & Figli, 1991); Andrea Di Michele, *L'italinizzazione imperfetta: l'amministrazione pubblica dell'Alto*

Adige tra Italia liberale e fascismo (Alessandria: Edizioni dell'Orso, 2003); Anna Vinci, *Sentinelle delle patria: Il Fascismo al Confine Orientale, 1918–1941* (Roma: Laterza, 2011); and Roberto Vivarelli, *Storia delle origini del fascismo: L'Italia dalla grande Guerra alla Marcia su Roma* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1991). For a more detail discussion on Italian consent, see the Introduction.

3. While we focus primarily on how violence (1919–1922) later impacted *Carpigiani* cooperation with Fascist authorities (1942–1944), it is worth noting some of the reasons Fascists turned to violence. Historian Anna Maria Vinci explains, for example, that many factors motivated Fascist violence after World War I including poverty, mourning, anger about Italy's uncertain future, and access and widespread presence of weapons after World War I. Historian Mimmo Franzinelli focuses on early Fascist squad violence, paying particular attention to Fascist anger and resentment for socialists and communists. See: Anna Maria Vinci, *Sentinelle Della Patria: Il Fascismo Al Confine Orientale: 1918–1941*, 1. ed., Quadrante Laterza (Roma: Laterza, 2011), and Mimmo Franzinelli, *Squadristi: Protagonisti e Tecniche Della Violenza Fascista, 1919–1922*, 1st ed. (Milano: Mondadori, 2003).
4. Gordon J. Horwitz, *In the Shadow of Death: Living Outside the Gates of Mauthausen* (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1990), p. 26.
5. Italy forged an alliance with Germany on November 1, 1936 and announced a Berlin–Rome axis a week later. Germany, Italy, and Japan united on September 27 and signed the Tripartite Pacts commonly known as the Axis alliance. As an Axis member, Italy was compelled to fight Allied soldiers in North Africa. More than 5,000 Allied soldiers captured in Africa were held in the Fossoli camp.
6. Fascist decrees of February and September 1926 abolished democratically elected municipal councils and replaced them with a *podestà*, a municipal administrator or mayor appointed by royal decree. For more, see: Philip Morgan, "I primi podestà fascisti: 1926–32," in *Storia contemporanea*, June 1978, pp. 407–423.
7. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, Atti dal 1942 al 1949, b. 1, fasc. 1, campo di concentramento prigioni di guerra (n. 73) dal 1942, sf. 1/1, 1, "prot. 14319, oggetto: descrizione sommaria delle carte" (May 28, 1942). This document gives three different dates, which has caused inconsistencies in the existing scholarship with regard to when Bologna mandated construction of the camp. Enea Biondi, Caterina Liotti, Paola Romagnoli reference May 30, 1942, which is the date the town of Carpi received the letter. Lilliana Picciotto Fargion cites a different document entirely and uses the date May 29, 1942; however, protocol 14319 precedes the one she references. Biondi, Liotti, and Romagnoli, "Il Campo di Fossoli: evoluzione d'uso e trasformazioni" in *Trentacinque progetti per Fossoli*, ed. Giovanni Leoni (Milano: Electra, 1990), p. 35; Fargion, *L'alba ci close come un tradimento: Gli ebrei nel campo di Fossoli. 1943–1944* (Milano: Mondadori, 2010), p. 35.

8. Pietro Alberghi, Il fascismo in Emilia Romagna: dale origini alla marcia su Roma (Modena: Mucchi, 1989), pp. 16–17.
9. Boltraffio was born in Milan on June 23, 1883. After graduating with a law degree, he went on to have a career in public service. He headed the Modena prefecture from August 1939 to August 1942. The *prefetto*, or prefect, was the senior administrative figure in the province and acted on behalf of the central government. He oversaw civil society by monitoring the *questura* (police), judiciary, education system, welfare program, and local governments in cities such as Carpi. Prefects ranked above the *federale* (provincial Fascist secretary) by 1927 and became important figures in the creation of the police state. Before assuming the position of Prefect of Modena, Boltraffio had served as a vice-prefect and then prefect of Milan (March 1920–August 1937), prefect of Treviso (March 1930–April 1932), Pesaro and Urbino (October 1932–January 1934), Caltanissetta (January 1934–July 1935), Asti (July 1935–August 1939). See: Paul Corner, "Everyday Fascism in the 1930s: Centre and Periphery in the Decline of Mussolini's Dictatorship," in *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (May 2006), pp. 198–199; Michael R. Ebner, *Ordinary Violence in Mussolini's Italy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 47; Philip Morgan, "The prefects and party-state relations in Fascist Italy," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 3(3) 1998: 241–272; and Matteo Truffelli, "Politica e partiti nei giudizi dei prefetti italiani fra fascismo e Repubblica," *Studi Storici*, Anno 42, No. 4 (October– December 2001), pp. 1041–1090.
10. Ads Modena, Questura d'Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, B. 6, "Prot. 014/5646/T, oggetto: Campo concentramento p.g. per 4000 sottuff. E truppa in Carpi" (May 29, 1942).
11. Ads Modena, Questura d'Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, B. 6, "n. 013914, oggetto: Carpi—istituzione di un campo di concentramento per prigionieri di guerra" (June 2, 1942).
12. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, Atti dal 1942 al 1949, b. 1, fasc. 1, campo di concentramento prigioni di guerra (n. 73) dal 1942, sf. 1/1, 1, "prot. 14319, oggetto: descrizione sommaria delle carte" (May 28, 1942).
13. A handwritten note on the back of the decree sent to the Carpi town authorities listed the owners of the land: Bonifica Parmigian Moglia of Carpi, the A.R.A. Company of Carpi, Aldo Ferrari of Modena, and Archimede Malavasi of Cavezzo. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, Fasc. 1, campo di concentramento di guerra (n. 73) dal 1942, sf. 1/1, 2, "prot. 5010" (July 13, 1942).
14. *Società Anonima Cooperativa Muratori, Cementisti e Decorati di Carpi* started construction of the camp in mid-to-late June 1942. Ads Modena, Questura d'Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, B. 6, "prot. 08197, oggetto: Campo concentramento prigionieri di guerra" (June 23, 1942).
15. Workers belonging to a cooperative paid a monthly fee that benefitted unemployed, disabled, or ill members. In the brief span of time between 1890 and 1893, 35 cooperatives formed in the Modena providence alone

and 185 in Emilia Romagna in total. Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi and Claudio Silingardi, *Storia del sindacato a Modena 1880–1980* (Modena: Ediesse, 2002), pp. 12–16.

16. Catholic disengagement, dismal working conditions, and an exclusionary government drove the Carpi working class to organize internally to achieve stability and form the first workers' organization in 1890. Alfredo Bertesi was the father of Socialism in Carpi. Socialism and trade unionism created an opportunity to change the system. See: Remo Rinaldi, *Storia di Don Zeno e Nomadelfia: Volume Primo (1900–1946)* (Roma: Fondazione Nomadelfia, 2003), p. 29 and Maurizio Degl'Innocenti, Fanco della Pertuta, and Angelo Varni, *Alfredo Bertesi e la società Carpigiana del suo tempo: Atti del convegno nazionale di studi, Carpi, 25027 gennaio 1990* (Modena: Mucchi, 1993).
17. Guerrazzi and Silingardi, *Storia del sindacata*, p. 24.
18. James L. Newell, *The Politics of Italy* (Cambridge, UK: University Press, 2010), p. 18.
19. Luigi Ganapini, "La storia di una camera del lavoro," in *Un secolo di sindacato: La camera del lavoro a Modena nel novecento*, ed. Luigi Ganapini (Roma: Ediesse, 2001), pp. 17–44.
20. Vivarelli, *Storia Delle Origini del Fascismo*, pp. 297–299.
21. Giulia Albanese, "Violence and Political Participation during the Rise of Fascism (1919–1926)," in *In the Society of Fascists: Acclamation, Acquiescence, and Agency in Mussolini's Italy*, eds. Giulia Albanese and Roberta Pergher (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 53.
22. Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi, "Alcune Domande Da Porre Alla Fonti Documentarie Sull'antifascismo Modenese," in *Sotto Il Regime: Problemi, Metodi E Strumenti Per Lo Studio Dell'antifascismo.*, ed. Giuliano Albarani, Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi, and Giovanni Taurasi (Milano: UNICOPLI, 2006), p. 184.
23. Ebner, *Ordinary Violence in Mussolini's Italy*, p. 25. For more on the *Squadrismo* period, see: Matteo Millan, "The Istitutionalisation of Squadrismo: Discipling Paramilitary Violence in the Italian Fascist Dictatorship," *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 22, Issue 04, November 2013, pp. 551–573.
24. *Il Fascio di Carpi* (the Fascist party of Carpi) formed at the end of 1920. For more, see: Anna Maria Ori, "Carpi, fascio della prima ora. Autorappresentazione dei "Superfascisti Carpigiani," in *Fascismo e antifascismo nelle valle Padana*, ed. dell'Istituto Mantovano di Storia Contemporanea (Bologna: Cooperativa Liberaria Universitaria Editrice Bologna, 2007).
25. Guerrazzi and Silingardi, *Storia del sindacata*, p. 41.
26. Historian Mimmo Fanzinelli has compiled a comprehensive list of acts of violence committed by Fascists from 1919 to 1922. He demonstrates the scope of squad violence throughout Italy. For more information, see: Franzinelli, *Squadristi*, pp. 277–403.
27. Alberghi, *Il fascismo in Emilia Romagna*, p. 340.

28. The summer months, which typically offered increased employment for fieldwork, did not yield jobs after the devastation of war and the number of those without work grew to the thousands. Thus unemployment and party pressure persuaded out-of-work Carpigiani to join Fascist institutions from 1919 to 1921. Marco Cattini, "Profilo di un secolo di storia economica e sociale (Carpi 1843–1945)" in *La Banca dei Carpigiani: 150 anni della Cassa di Risparmio di Carpi (1843–1993)* (Modena: Editore Graziano Manni, 1993, pp. 11–88), pp. 77–78.
29. Guerrazzi, "Alcune domande da pore alle fonti documentarie," pp. 187–188.
30. Stefania Cappello and Alfons Prandi, *Carpi: tradizione e sviluppo* (Bologna: Società Editrice il Mulino: 1973), pp. 26–27. Historian Tommaso Baris views middle class consent to Fascism as a multistep process. He explains that during the *squardrismo* (armed Fascist squads) years "consent in favor of Fascism referred to the successful *self*-mobilization . . . in order to seize the political stage at the expense of the older ruling classes." During the middle years of Fascism, Baris argues that "support for Fascism referred to acceptance from *outside* the regime, based on the state's ability to offer material advantages and especially on its (relative) lack of interference in the everyday life of the Italian bourgeoisie." Tommaso Baris, "Consent, Mobilization, and Participation: The Rise of the Middle Class and Its Support for the Fascist Regime," in *In the Society of Fascists: Acclamation, Acquiescence, and Agency in Mussolini's Italy*, eds. Giulia Albanese and Roberta Pergher (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 70.
31. Ebner, *Ordinary Violence in Mussolini's Italy*, p. 263.
32. Albanese, "Violence and Political Participation during the Rise of Fascism (1919–1926)," p. 64.
33. The documents that speak to the work of *Cooperativa Muratori* suggest different dates of construction. The Bologna military document indicates that the work began on June 25, 1942 (Archivio Nomadelfia, "Campo di Fossoli, Memorie e Documenti," 15 B-2, A), whereas in an internal Modena police document, Police Brigadier Carlo Cerbellini notes that camp construction had begun on or before June 23, 1942 (Archivio dello Stato di Modena, Questura d'Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, B. 6, "prot. 0917, oggetto: Campo conentramento prigionieri di guerra" (June 23, 1942).
34. Danilo Sacchi, *Fossoli: transito per Auschwitz, quella casa davanti al campo di concentramento* (Firenze: Giuntina, 2002), p. 32.
35. The town leaders involvement started with the order to acquire land to build camp and continued for the rest of the war. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, ati dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, fasc. 1, campo di concentramento prigioni di guerra (n. 73) dal 1942, sf. 1/1, 2, "prot. 6031, Elenco delle carte che si trasmettono al Comune di Carpi" (June 17, 1942).
36. Paul Corner, *The Fascist Party and Popular Opinion in Mussolini's Italy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 85–86.

37. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, B1, Fasc. 1, sf. 1/1, 7, "prot. 6347, oggetto: Domanda 30/6/1942-XX° della Società Emiliana di Esercizi Elettrici per autorizzazione alla costruzione ed all'esercizio della linea elettrica a 10 KV…" (October 30, 1942).
38. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, B1, Fasc. 1, sf. 1/1, 3, "Prot. 5410, oggetto: Passaggio di una linea per trasporto energia electrica" (June 4, 1942), and ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, B1, Fasc. 1, sf. 1/1, 3, "n. 7.680, Società Emiliana di Esercizi Elettrici" (July 4, 1942).
39. Ads Modena, Questura d'Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, B. 6, "n. 0917, oggetto: Campo concentramento prigionieri di guerra" (June 23, 1942).
40. Italian-built internment camps fell into two categories. The first repurposed existing buildings such as schools, convents, or castles into holding centers for prisoners. The second and more common type employed newly built barracks and huts surrounded by barbed wire. As the war raged, Italy continued to erect camps to accommodate captured soldiers. Adrian Gilbert, *POW: Allied Prisoners in Europe, 1939–1945* (London: John Murray, 2006), p. 69.
41. In "Il Campo di Fossoli" in *Trentacinque progetti per Fossoli* authors Enea Biondi, Caterina Liotti, and Paola Romagnoli cite Archivio Curia Vescovile di Carpi (hereafter ACVD), sec. IVB, f. 55, May 12, 1943, Father Bartolomeo Moriondo, "Relazione sul Campo prigionieri di Guerra n. 73." I was not permitted to see these documents when I visited this archive. I thus cite these dates with some trepidation because I have not reviewed the originals. In *L'alba ci colse come un tradimento*, Fargion also cites *Trentacinque progetti per Fossoli* (35).
42. Archivio Nomadelfia, "Progetto Trasformazioni Campo di Fossoli, 1947–48," 14 D-04.
43. Chief of Police Carmine Senise sent a telegram to Modena Prefect Giorgio Boltraffio in which he explained that local police would join the camp guards commissioned by the military. Ads Modena, Questura d'Modena, 1932–1972, Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, B.6, "State grave deficienza numerica personale" (June 27, 1942).
44. Anna Maria Ori, *Il Campo di Fossoli: Da campo di prigionia e deportazione a luogo di memoria 1942–2004* (Carpi: Nuovagrafica, 2008), p. 10.
45. Archivio dello Stato di Roma (here after ADSR), PS-Massime, B. 101, fasc. 16, sf. 1, ins. 7, "prot. N. 800/9814, oggetto: Agenti di P.S. e Carabinieri Reali adetti ai campi di concentramento e alle colonie di confine" (March 25, 1943), and ADSR, PS-Massime, B. 101, Fasc. 16, sf. 1, ins. 7, "prot. N. 800/9814 E. 5, oggetto: Agenti di P.S. e CC.RR. addetti ai campi di concentramento e alle colonie di confine" (July 17, 1943).
46. Victoria J. Barnett, *Bystanders: Conscience and Complicity During the Holocaust* (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1999), p. 28.
47. Paolo Pombeni, "Il Partito nazionale fascista nel declinare del regime. 1938–1943," in *Sulla crisi del regime fascista, 1938–1943: la società italiana*

dal consenso alla Resistenza, ed. Angelo Ventura (Venezia: Marsilo Editori, 1996), pp. 3–20.

48. Archivio Nomadelfia, "Campo di Fossoli, Memorie e Documenti," 15 B-01, B.
49. Abbie Jones was sent to three POW camps prior to his arrival at Fossoli. He had spent June and July 1942 in the North African camps of Derna and Benghazi and early August in Prisoner of War Camp 65 in Gravina, Italy.
50. From an entry dated October 7, 1942, Imperial War Museum Archive (hereafter IWMA), Abbie Jones, 92/10/1. Jones's reference to brick buildings refers to the more permanent barrack camp being built to replace the tent prison.
51. The construction for the new site began on June 25, 1942 and was completed by November 18, 1942. Construction that was to take 115 days stretched to 145. Archivio Nomadelfia, "Campo di Fossoli, Memorie e Documenti," 15 B-2, A.
52. Ads Modena, Questura d'Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, B. 6, "prot. 0917, oggetto: Campo concentramento prigionieri di guerra" (August 8, 1942).
53. Biondi, Liotti, and Romagnoli, "Il Campo di Fossoli," in *Trentacinque progetti per Fossoli*, pp. 35–36.
54. E. Barrington had been in captivity for six months in North Africa and Italy before his arrival at Fossoli in December 1942. IWMA, E. Barrington, 88/58/1.
55. The available archival materials only mention arrival dates for the month of August, although prisoners certainly arrived during the following months. Historian Carlo Spartaco Capogreco suggests that the lack of government documents specifying the number of prisoners (from Italy's entry into the war until September 8, 1943) might be explained by the transfer of ministerial headquarters from Rome to Venice when the Salò Republic was created. Capogreco suggests that some of these documents were probably stolen, destroyed, or lost during this transfer. Capogreco, *I campi del duce: L'internamento civile nell'Italia Fascista (1940–1943)* (Torino: Einaudi, 2004), p. 64.
56. Anna Maria Ori, "All'armi eran Fascisti.…Novant'anni fa, nel 1920, nasceva il fascio di Carpi," *Voce di Carpi*, May 25, 2010.
57. Archivio Nomadelfia, "Campo di Fossoli, Memorie e Documenti," 15B-01, B.
58. IWMA, E. H. Wilmott, 98/91/1.
59. Ads Modena, Questura d'Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, B. 6, "prot. 47/1, oggetto: Concentramento di prigionieri di guerra a Carpi" (June 17, 1942).
60. Ads Modena, Questura d'Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, B. 6, "prot. 013914, oggetto: Carpi-istituzione di un campo di concentramentp per prigionieri di guerra" (June 2, 1942).
61. Gilbert, *POW*, p. 66.
62. POW testimony from British soldiers offers few details on the Indian interns. In a journal entry dated January 13, 1943, E. Barrington wrote of

the Indian group saying, "At 2pm all the Indians left Camp for a special Indian compound . . . and I immediately appropriated their top bunks under the light; mine bearing the cognomen [*sic*] 'Mustafa Khan.'" (IWMA, E. Barrington, 88/58/1).

63. Ads Modena, Questura di Modena, "1932–1972, Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, B. 6, "prot. 01612" (July 25, 1943).
64. IWMA, Wilmott, 98/91/01. It is possible that Roma and Sinti were also among these early prisoners, as the Ministry of the Interior sent a telegram to local governments within Italy ordering the internment of these groups as of September 11, 1940. Little is known of the fate of Italian Roma and Sinti. While a few camps were created in Italy specifically for them, historian Koral Fings argues that they most likely ended up in camps throughout the country. Karola Fings, *In the Shadow of the Swastika: The Gypsies during the Second World War*, Volume 2 (Hertforshire, UK: University of Hertfordshire Press, 1999), pp. 15–28.
65. The establishment of POW camp 73 funneled money into the community. *The Miniestro dell'Interno* (Interior Ministry) in Rome sent money to Prefects to staff and supply camps. Bologna, for example, received a line of credit for 80,000 lira and Modena 50,000. The financing of Fossoli's construction was provided by the Bologna Army Corps of Engineers. ADSR, PS-Massime, B. 100, Fasc. 7, s. fasc. 1, ins. 3, "Elenco delle aperture di credito da disporsi a favore delle prefetture del regno ler l'es. 1942–1943 per le spese reiguardanti il servizio degli internati e funzionamenti dei campi di concentramento" (1942–1943) and ADSR, PS-Massime, B. 100, Fasc. 7, s. fasc. 1, ins. 3, "Prot. 113220, Oggetto: Spese per il funzionamento dei campi di concentramento e per il mantenimento degli internati. Aperture di credito ai funzionari delegate" (November 9, 1942).
66. From diary entry dated February 18, 1943, IWMA, E. Barrington, 88/58/1.
67. IWMA, G. Harvey, 06/51/1.
68. From diary entry dated January 8, 1943, IWMA, E. Barrington, 88/58/1.
69. A. Bulgarelli (no first name given), the party secretary of the local Carpi Fascist party sent a letter to Carpi prefect Bonfiglio Tesi on January 15, 1943 which stated, "It has been brought to my attention [that] the food for the noncommissioned English prisoners in the Fossoli Camp is largely supplied with rabbit and poultry which is collected from the town market in Carpi which itself is short of goods" (ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, B. 1, Fasc. 1, Sf. 1/1, 1943 f. 1, "prot. 526/XXI, al commissario prefettizio del comune di Carpi" (January 15, 1943). Prisoner testimony, however, contradicts this complaint by the local Fascists. In fact, it would seem that any meat purchased in the market and brought to the camp most likely went onto the camp guards' plates.
70. Irritated by the varying bread rations, Barrington and a friend constructed a scale made from a pencil, wool, and two bars of soup weighing six ounces, the same as the bread ration. "We weighed both loaves and they must have been only ¾ weight," he wrote in his diary on January 23, 1943. Prisoners staffed the cookhouses and Barrington did not trust them or the Italians.

"One can always get a loaf [from the cookhouse] for 25 English [cigarettes] and those loaves can only come from the rations," he lamented. From diary entry dated January 23, 1943, IWMA, E. Barrington, 88/58/1. Although the prisoners lacked proper rations, camp personnel enjoyed a varied diet. From December 6, 1942 to August 8, 1943, a total of 17,718.30 lire worth of goods (food, wine, cheese, medicine, liquor) were spent to provide for the staff of the camp. The list indicates a rich diet, notwithstanding wartime conditions. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, b. 1, fasc. 1, sf. 1/1, 5, "appalto imposte di consume" (May 4, 1943).

71. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, B. 1, Fasc. 1, campo di concentramento prigioni di guerra (n. 73) dal 1942, sf. 1/1, atti 1943, 5–6.
72. In September 1939 the ICRC had requested assurances from belligerents that they would adhere to the terms of prisoner treatment established by the 1929 Geneva Convention. During World War II, internment conditions of POWs ranged from strict adherence to the Convention to utter disregard, and a prisoner's treatment depended largely on when he was incarcerated, his nationality, and the nationality of his captor. Italy signed on to the 1929 Geneva Convention and initially followed its stipulations. In practice, this meant that Rome agreed to maintain adequate standards of living (food, shelter, hygiene) and permit the ICRC access to camps to ensure adherence to these requirements. Although POW journals, letters, and diaries, as well as reports from the ICRC discuss the Red Cross presence in Fossoli, the ICRC archive in Geneva (Switzerland) holds only two reports that mention the camp. The first speaks broadly to camps visited in the Modena region in April 1943 and the second refers to June 1944. For more information on POW treatment in Italy, see: S. P. MacKenzie, "The Treatment of Prisoners of War in World War II," *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 66, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 487–520.
73. From diary entry dated October 3, 1942, IWMA, Abbie Jones, 92/10/1.
74. From diary entry dated October 3, 1942, IWMA, Abbie Jones, 92/10/1.
75. Biondi, Liotti, and Romagnoli, "The Fossoli Camp" in *Trentacinque progetti per Fossoli*, p. 51.
76. The Interior Ministry in Rome issued a letter to all regional prefects (July 5, 1942) explaining that political and Jewish prisoners could work so long as it did not compromise Italian security or take away jobs from Italians. The war effort had put a strain on Italy's workforce and as such prefects could decide as they saw fit to utilize the prisoner population for labor. ADSR, PS-Massime 13/79, 3, B. 99, Fasc. 16, sfasc. 1, Ins. 1/1, "prot. 442/18947, oggetto: Lavoro dei confinati politici ed internati politici" (July 5, 1942).
77. While camps in Emilia Romagna maintained superior sanitation conditions to those in North Africa, they were not exempt from disease. Red Cross representative Dr. B. Beretta, who visited camps in the Emilia-Romagna area between April and May 1942 (prior to the creation of POW Camp 73), reported that "the region of the Po Valley in which lie the provinces of Bologna and Modena is one of the safest of the peninsula, the climate is mild and temperate, there are no cases of malaria, and supply conditions are

among the best of Italy." This statement did not hold true for POW Camp 73. Archives du CICR, B/JPe/MBG.

78. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, b. 1, fasc 1, sf. 1/1, 6, "prot. 449/9, oggetto: Malattie infettive" (August 5, 1942).
79. Fossoli camp commander Giuseppe Ferrari sent a letter to Carpi's *Ufficio Sanitario* (Health Office) to inform them that two prisoners were to be sent to a military hospital in Modena to be treated for diphtheria. Ferrari elected to send the POWs to Modena because the camp did not have the space necessary to quarantine the POWs. ASCC, Camp di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, Fasc. 1, campo di concentramento prigioni di guerra (n. 73) dal 1942, sf. 1/1, 5, "prot. 439/1, oggetto: Casi disfetirita" (August 4, 1942).
80. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, b.1, fasc 1, sf. 1/1, 3, "prot. 570/a, oggetto: Elenco dei servizi fati con l'autolettiga" (March 15, 1943), and ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, b.1, fasc 1, sf. 1/1, 2, "Prot. 3047, oggetto: Servizio autoambulanza trasporto prigionieri" (March 13, 1943).
81. From an entry dated November 19, 1942, IWMA, Abbie Jones, 92/10/1.
82. On November 27, 1942, *Cooperativa Muratori* agreed to build a POW wing at the Carpi Hospital and was paid a sum of 300,000 lire. Archivio Nomadelfia, "Campo di Fossoli, Memorie e Documenti," 15B-2, A.
83. Carpi oversaw the expense for burying soldiers. POW Alfred Hind's funeral on April 27, 1943, for example, cost 437 lire. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, Fasc. 1, campo di concentramento prigioni di guerra (n. 73) dal 1942, sf. 1/1, atti 1943, 4, "prot. 5264, oggetto: Rimborso spese attolettiga e spese funerarie" (May 3, 1943).
84. Archivio Nomadelfia, "Campo di Fossoli, Memorie e Documenti," 15B-01, B.
85. Apostolic Nuncio Monsignor Gustavo Testa (1886–1969) was ordained on October 28, 1910. Over the course of his career, Testa was an apostolic delegate in Jerusalem, Palestine, Trasjordania, and Cyprus. And in he attended the Second Vatican Council and was a member of the conclave that elected Pope Paul VI in 1963. For more, see: Niccolò Del Re, "Gustavo Testa," In *La Sacra Congregazione Per Le Chiese Orientali Nel Cinquantesimo Della Fondazione. (1917–1967)* (Roma: Tipografia Italo-Orientale, 1969) pp. 95–96.
86. From diary entry dated January 15, 1943, IWMA, E. Barrington, 88/58/1.
87. From diary entry dated January 15, 1943, IWMA, E. Barrington, 88/58/1.
88. For more on the Vatican's silence and its influence to civilian consent to Fascism, see: Alberto Monticone, "L'evoluzione dell'opinione pubblica cattolica dalla guerra fascista alla resistenza," in Ventura, *Sulla crisi del regime fascista 1938–1943*, pp. 579–594.
89. From diary entry dated January 10, 1943, IWMA, E. Barrington, 88/58/1.
90. From diary entry dated February 15, 1943, IWMA, Abbie Jones, 92/10/1.
91. For more information about a breakdown of faith in the Fascist party, see: Giancarlo Bertuzzi, "La società friulana alla vigila e durante la seconda

guerra mondiale. Note su alcuni problemi economici e sociali," in *Sulla crisi del regime Fascista 1938–1943*, ed. Ventura, pp. 197–228; Paul Corner, "Italy 1915–1945: Politics and Society," in *The Oxford History of Italy*, ed. George Holmes (Oxford University Press: New York, 1997); and Philip Morgan, *The Fall of Mussolini: Italy, the Italians, and the Second World War* (Oxford University Press: New York, 2007).

92. Pietro Badoglio was a leading military personality in Italy. He served as Chief of the Armed Forces general staff for 15 years (1925–1940) and for a time simultaneously acted as governor-general of Libya (1928–1933) and then commanded the Italian armies in Ethiopia (1935–1936). He resigned from the general staff in December 1940 following Italy's failed invasion of Greece. For more information on Badoglio, see: Anthony Majanlahti and Amedeo Osti, *Roma occupata, 1943–1944: itinerary, storie, immagini* (Milano: Il saggiatore, 2010), pp. 57–58.
93. As quoted in Gloria Gabrielli, "La propaganda anglo-americana alla radio in Italia (1943–1945)," in *La Seconda Guerra Mondiale e la sua memoria*, eds. Pietro Craveri and Gaetano Quagliariello (Naples: Soveria Mannelli, 2006), p. 45.
94. Claudio Pavone, *Una guerra civile: Saggio storico sulla moralità nella Resistenza volume I* (Torino: Univerale Bollati Boringhieri, 2006), p. 6, and Giorgio Pisanò and Paolo Pisanò, *Il triangolo della morte: La politica della strage in Emila durante e dopo la guerra civile* (Milano: Mursia, 1992), pp. 11–13.
95. Giorgio Pisanò and Paolo Pisanò, Il triangolo della morte: La politica della strage in Emilia durante e dopo la guerra civilie (Milano: Mursia, 1992), p. 11.
96. As quoted in Adrian Gilbert, *POW*, pp. 282–283.
97. From diary entry dated July 26, 1943, IWMA, E. Barrington, 88/58/1.
98. From diary entry dated July 28, 1943, IWMA, E. Barrington, 88/58/1.
99. From diary entry dated July 29, 1943, IWMA, E. Barrington, 88/58/1.
100. Ads Modena, Questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1948, Serie: Internati Liberi, B. 6, "prot. 01113" (July 22, 1943).
101. Government documents report the following arrival dates and numbers of POWS: 200 on July 30, 1943, 500 on August 29, 1943, and 1,000 on August 30, 1943. Ads Modena, Questura di Modena, 1932–1972, Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, B. 6; Archivio Nomadelfia, Campo di Fossoli, memorie e documenti, 15B-01, B.
102. Barrington once again noted (August 6, 1943) how life in the camp had changed in just a year saying, "it is quality not quantity we desire now in food—so the scene changes, and last year in this month we were sharing cookhouse refuse and rotten potatoes stinking to the skins" (IWMA, E. Barrington, 88/58/1).
103. Archivio Nomadelfia, "Campo di Fossoli, Memorie e Documenti," 15B-2, A.
104. One such minor interruption was Matteo Negro's assumption of control of the Modena region (July 26, 1943). This new role placed him in charge of the police, armed forces, and displaced residents in the province of Modena.

Instituto Storico della Resistenza e di Storia Contemporanea di Modena, Fondo 16 "messerotti," fasc. 14/16, "Comando del Presidio Militare" (July 26, 1943).

105. For more on war fatigue in Modena and the Emilia Romagna, see: Claudio Silingardi, *Una Provincia Partigiana: Guerra e Resistenza a Modena, 1940–1945* (Milano, Italy: FrancoAngeli, 1998).

2 Germany and Its Occupied Ally: The German Occupation, the *Repubblica di Salò*, and the Deportations of Jews

1. Lutz Klinkhammer, *L'occupazione tedesca in Italia, 1943–1945* (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri editore, 1993), p. 29.
2. Historian Adrian Gilbert explains that some guards abandoned the camps and returned home while others remained at their posts. A number followed Montgomery's "Stay Put" order to help the POWs, while others handed them over to the Germans. "Some camps certainly contained a Fascist hard core who threw in their lot with the Germans," he writes, "but it is also possible that a few commandants deluded themselves that they would be able to defend their camps against German interventions, while others, after years of holding men in captivity, simply could not bring themselves to let their prisoners go." Fossoli guards talked about fighting off the Germans, but in the end elected to throw down their weapons. Gilbert, *POW: Allied Prisoners in Europe, 1939–1945* (John Murray: London, 2006), pp. 283–284.
3. From diary entry dated September 8, 1843, IWMA, Abbie Jones, 92/10/1.
4. From diary entry dated September 8, 1843, IWMA, E. Barrington, 88/58/1.
5. Circo Paoletti, *A Military History of Italy* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), p. 186.
6. From diary entry dated September 9, 1943, IWMA, Abbie Jones, 92/10/1.
7. Klinkhammer, *L'occupazione Tedesca in Italia*, pp. 24–47.
8. Some of the Italian staff had abandoned their posts after learning of the armistice. Capitalizing on the opportunity to take food home, they had broken into the Red Cross parcels and seized many personal packages sent by POW families. British POW E. Barrington wrote in his journal that, on the day of the German arrival, he saw a former guard dressed in workman overalls with a rake on his shoulder "put his finger to his lips to shush us and snuck off past the camp." Diary entry dated September 10, 1943, IWMA, E. Barrington, 88/58/1.
9. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, Atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, Fasc. 1, campo di concentramento prigioni di guerra (n. 73) dal 1942, sf 1/1, Atti 1943, 10, "prot. 9967, oggetto: campo concentramento prigionieri di guerra N. 73 in Fossoli (Carpi Prov. Modena)" (September 24, 1943).
10. Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi, *Storia della Repubblica sociale italiana* (Rome: Carocci editore, 2012), pp. 53–54.
11. Giovanna Procacci, "Internati militari italiani cinquantotto interviste," in *Deportazione e internamento militare in Germania: La provincia di Modena*,

eds. Giovanna Procacci and Lorenzo Bertucelli (Edizioni Unicopli: Milano, 2001), p. 257.

12. Historian Claudio Silingardi has found that by the time Italy entered World War II alongside Nazi Germany, all antifascists in Carpi had been arrested. As a result, any resistance to Fascism at this point was individual and not group oriented. Silingardi, *Una provincial partigiana: Guerra e Resistenza a Modena 1940–1945* (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 1998), pp. 4849.
13. Philip Morgan, *The Fall of Mussolini: Italy, the Italians, and the Second World War* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 87.
14. Ibid., p. 122.
15. Luciano Casali, "Aspetti sociali della Resistenza in Emilia Romagna. Alcune considerazioni," in *Identikit della Resistenza: I partigiani dell'Emilia-Romagna*, a cura di Luciano Casali and Alberto Preti (Bologna: Cooperativa Libraria Universitaria Editrice Bologna, 2011), pp. 35–36.
16. Guerrazzi, *Storia della Repubblica sociale italiana*, pp. 45–46. For more on Mussolini and the RSI, see Mimmo Franzinelli, *Il prigioniero di Salò: Mussolini e la tragedia italiana del 1943–1945* (Milano: Mondadori Editore, 2012).
17. Guerrazzi, *Storia della Repubblica sociale italiana*, pp. 42–44 and 60.
18. Alexander De Grand. *Italian Fascism: Its Origins and Development* (University of Nebraska Press: Lincoln & London, 2000), pp. 130–131.
19. Ibid., pp. 130–131.
20. Morgan, *The Fall of Mussolini*, p. 174.
21. Ibid., p. 105.
22. Klinkhammer, *Stragi naziste in Italia*, p. 15.
23. Ibid., p. 105.
24. Angelo del Boca, *Italiani, Brava Gente? Un mito duro a moririe* (Vincenza: N. Pozza, 2005), p. 286.
25. Claudio Pavone, *Una guerra civile: saggio storico sulla moralità nelle Resistenza* (Torino: Universale Bollati Boringhieri, 2006), p. 221.
26. The circular issued in Modena was the same as those distributed in towns throughout the occupied zone. Prison or death sentences for Resistance fighters were intended to prevent opposition and reinforce German power. Dianella Gagliani, "guerra terroristica," in *La politica el terrore: Stragi e violeze naziste e fasciste in Emilia Romagna*, eds. Luciano Casali and Dianella Gagliani (Napoli e Roma: L'ancora, 2008), pp. 22–23.
27. ISRSCM, Fondo 16, "messerotti," Fasc. 14/16, "Appello alla popolazione di Modena" (September 10, 1943).
28. ISRSCM, Fondo 16, messerotti, Fasc. 14/16, "Coma?do [ibid.] militare tedesco" (September 14, 1943).
29. The Germans had disseminated these orders by dropping leaflets from a plane flying over the town. Prefect Vezzani shared the information with the town more widely by posting the directives. ASCC, Categ. 1, avvisi vari pubblicati all'albo pretorio, Fasc. 3, "prot. 9326" (September 17, 1943).
30. Modena's prefect announced a list of similar regulations on September 20, 1943, but in Modena these did not include a provision that held local

leaders responsible for the fulfillment of the orders as had been done in Carpi. AISRM, Fondo 16 "Messerotti" numero Fasc. 1–17, Fasc. 14, Sfasc. lIV 31/3, "Stemma comunale col fascio—Comune di Modena" (September 20, 1943).

31. AISRM, Fondo 16 "Messerott," numero Fasc. 1–17, F.14, Fasc. 16, "Disciplina dei cittadini" (October 20, 1943).
32. Santo Peli, *Storia della Resistenza in Italia* (Torino: Einaudi, 2004), p. 56.
33. Emanuele Guaraldi, "Modena," in *Identikit della Resistenza: I partigiani dell'Emilia-Romagna*, a cura di Luciano Casali and Alberto Preti (Bologna: Cooperativa Libraria Universitaria Editrice Bologna, 2011), p. 178.
34. Alfred Moore, "Ricordi di un ex prigioniero di guerra inglese evaso dal Campo di Fossoli," *Ricerche Storiche*, 5 (1971): 27, pp. 99–100.
35. Ibid., pp. 101–102.
36. Ibid., p. 102.
37. Ibid., p. 107.
38. Ibid., pp. 107–108.
39. Fred, one of the soldiers hiding with Moore, decided to take his chances and managed to cross into Allied territory three months before the end of the war.
40. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, Atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, Fasc 1, campo di concentramento prigioni di guerra (n. 73) dal 1942, sfasc. 1/1, atti 1943, 10, "prot. 9967, oggetto: campo conetnramento prigionieri di guerra N. 73 in Fossoli (Carpi Prov. Modena)" (September 24, 1943).
41. Tirellli noted deportations on the following dates: September 14, 15, 17, 18, 22, and 25. Archvio Nomadelfia, "Campo di Fossoli, memorie e documenti," 15B-01, B.
42. Archivio Nomadelfia, "Campo di Fossoli, memorie e documenti," 15B-01, B, "Tirelli."
43. Archivio Nomadelfia, "Campo di Fossoli, memorie e documenti," 15B-01, B, "Tirelli."
44. IWMA, E. Barrington, 88/58/1. For more on Stalag IV B. Mühlberg, see Achim Kilian, *Mühlberg 1939–1948: Ein Gefangenenlager mitten in Deutschland* (Böhlau Verlag Köln Weimar: Wien, 2001), and Tony Vercoe, *Survival at Stalag IVB: Soldiers and Airmen Remember Germany's Largest POW Campo of World War II* (North Carolina: MacFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2006).
45. Archivio Nomadelfia, "Campo di Fossoli, memorie e documenti," 15B-01, B, "Tirelli."
46. Carpi's police marshal Carlo Corbellini wrote to the Modena police department to inform them that few prisoners remained and to inquire what would happen to the camp once the Germans departed. Ads Modena, Questura di Modena, 1932–1972, elenchi varie, 1940–1949, serie: internati liberi, B. 6, "Div. Gab. N. 01113, oggetto: Segnalazione" (September 26, 1943).
47. As quoted in Enea Biondi, Caterina Liotti, Paola Romagnoli, "The Fossoli Camp: Usage Evolution and Relative Transformations," in *Trentacinque Progetti Per Fossoli*, ed. Giovani Leoni (Electra: Milano, 1990), p. 52.

48. Archivio Nomadelfia, "Campo di Fossoli, memorie e Documenti," 15B-01, B, "Tirelli."
49. Guerrazzi, *Storia della Repubblica sociale italiana*, pp. 36–44.
50. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, Atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, Fasc, 1, campo di concentramento prigioni di guerra (n. 73) dal 1942, S. fasc. 1/1, Atti 1943, 11 (September 26, 1943).
51. ASCC, Atti dell'Amministrazione Comunale 1945, Fasc. 1, as reproduced in Anna Maria Ori, "Attenzione, Attenzione…: Comunicazioni a mezzo altoparlante del Comune di Carpi Settembre 1943–Giugno 1945," Comune di Carpi, 2003, p. 11.
52. ASCC, Atti dell'Amministrazione Comunale 1945, Fasc. 1, n. 14, as quoted in Anna Maria Ori, "Attenzione, Attenzione…Comunicazioni a mezzo altoparlante del Comune di Carpi Settembre 1943–Giugno 1945" (Carpi: Comune di Carpi, 2003), p. 13.
53. The depletion of POW prisoners under the German command created a surplus of food stocks. Vezzani and Bissignani coordinated to ensure extra goods would be returned to the town and distributed to needy citizens. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, Fasc. 1, campo di concentramento prigioni di guerra (n. 73) dal 1942, sfasc. 1/1, atti 1943, 9, "prot. 9946" (September 23, 1943).
54. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, Atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, Fasc. 1, campo di concentramento prigioni di guerra (n. 73) dal 1942, sfasc. 2/3, 3, "prot. 015286, oggetto: Ebrei internati" (December 15, 1943).
55. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, Atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, Fasc. 1, campo di concentramento prigioni di guerra (n. 73) dal 1942, sfasc. 1/1, Atti 1943, 14, "prot. 10215" (October 7, 1943).
56. Venturelli as quoted in Biondi, Liotti, and Romagnoli, "The Fossoli Camp," p. 52.
57. Venturelli sought and received permission from local authorities to exhume and rebury the three unnamed soldiers in the Carpi cemetery. He laid them to rest on October 3 in the cemetery in which POWs had been buried under Mussolini's rule. Anna Maria Ori, "Fossoli, dicembre 1943-agosto 1944," in *Il Libro dei deportati*, volume II (Mursia: Milano, 2009), ftn. 17.
58. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, Atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, Fasc. 1, campo di concentramento di prigionieri di guerra (N. 73) dal 1942, sf 1/1, Atti 1943, 16, "prot. 10480, oggetto: Pulizia della Camerate" (October 18, 1943).
59. Klinkhammer, *L'occupazione tedesca in Italia*, pp. 98–99.
60. As quoted in Renzo de Felice, *The Jews in Fascist Italy: A History*, translated by Robert L. Miller and Kim Englehart (Enigma Books: New York, 2001), 598, ft. 1178.
61. RSI member Calzolari (born March 20, 1897 in Castel d'Aiano, Bologna) had replaced Modena prefect Luciano di Castri (born March 13, 1882 in Francavilla Fontana, Bologna) at the end of October. Di Castri, a member of the Fascist party since May 1936, had served as prefect in Catanzaro

(September 1942–June 1943) and Viterbo (June–August 1943) before taking up the same post in Modena in September 1943. He refused, however, to work alongside the Germans and thus resigned in October. He did not face any penalty for this decision. Calzolari did not share his predecessor's distaste for the Germans and as a member of the Black Brigades (former commander of the 72nd division) was a fierce supporter of Mussolini. He served as Modena's prefect temporarily from October 25 to December 10, 1943. Pier Lugi Pansera replaced Colzolari and headed the prefecture from December 10, 1943 to May 12, 1944. "I nuovi capi-provincia," *Gazzetta dell'Emilia*, October 21–22, 1943.

62. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, Fasc. 2, campo conetramento ebrei, sfasc. 2/3, 1, "prot. 32056, oggeto: Campo di concentramento. Spese" (December 2, 1943).
63. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, Fasc. 2, campo concentramento ebrei, sfasc. 2/3, 1, "prot. 11624, oggeto: Campo di concentramento per gli ebrei" (December 4, 1943).
64. Ads Modena, Questura di Modena, "1935–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: internati Liberi, Busta 6, "copia di telegramma, Prec. Assol" (December 13, 1943).
65. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, Fasc. 2, campo concentramento ebrei, sfasc. 2/3, 4, "prot. 289/3, oggetto: Campo concentramento ebrei di Fossoli.=Riscaldamento" (December 29, 1943).
66. The Carpi company *Eredi Ermete Galli Carboni e Legna*, for example, wrote to the Carpi prefecture on September 28, 1943 requesting 106,218 lire to fulfill an outstanding bill for wood purchased in 1942 to build the original POW camp. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, Fasc. 1, campo di concentramento prigioni di guerra (n. 73) dal 1942, sf. 1/1, atti 1943, 13, doc. 7067 (September 28, 1943).
67. Ads Modena, Questura di Modena, 1932–1972, elenchi varie, 1940–1949, serie: internati liberi, B 6, "Società An. Cooperativa Murator, Cementisti e Decoratori" (February 7, 1944).
68. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, Fasc. 2, campo concentramento ebrei, sfasc. 2/3, 7, "prot. 1228" (February 9, 1944).
69. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 2, Fasc. 21, sfasc. 2, 2, "prot. 1556, oggetto: Ordinativo di pagamento—anticipazione spese per il campo Concentramento ebrei" (February 31, 1944).
70. Ads Modena, Questura di Modena, 1943–1972, elenchi varie, 1940–1949, serie: internati liberi, busta 6, "prot. 015286 Gab., oggetto: Ebrei internati" (December 15, 1943).
71. Ads Modena, Questura di Modena, 1932–1972, elenchi varie, 1940–1949, serie: internati liberi, busta 6, "prot. 12020, oggetto: ebrei internati—spese campo di concentramento" (December 21, 1943).
72. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti 1942 al 1949, B. 2, Fasc. 21, sfasc. 2, 2, "prot. 90, oggetto: Riscossione somma" (January 5, 1944).

73. Ads Modena, Questura di Modena, 1932–1972, elenchi varie, 1940–1949, serie: internati liberi, B. 6, "prot. 19, oggetto: lavori di sistemazione del campo di concentramento ebrei di Fossoli" (January 10, 1944).
74. Ads Modena, Questura di Modena, 1932–1972, elenchi varie, 1940–1949, serie: internati liberi, B. 6, "prot. 6023, "oggetto: Ebrei internati" (December 9, 1943).
75. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, Fasc. 2, campo concentramento ebrei, sfasc. 2/1, 1, "prot. 11210, oggetto: fornitura elettrica" (December 7, 1943).
76. Ads Modena, Questura di Modena, 1932–1972, elenchi varie, 1940–1949, serie: internati liberi, busta 6, "Società An. Cooperativa Murator, Cementisti e Decoratori" (February 7, 1944).
77. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, Atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, Fasc. 2, Campo Concentramento ebrei, sfasc. 2/3, 2 (December 5, 1943).
78. The Modena prefect wrote to the Carpi prefect to complain that Ditta Guerzoni had overcharged for its services and insisted that the Carpi prefecture renegotiate the terms of the contract or hire another company. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, ati dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, Fasc. 2, campo concentramento ebrei, sf. 2/3, 5, "prot. 12397" (January 3, 1944); "Guerzoni Ubaldo, Preventivo di spese per le seguenti tavole e panche da usarsi per il refettorio Campo concentramento di Fossoli di Carpi," December 31, 1943); and ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, ati dal 1942 al 1949, sfasc. 2/3, 6, "prot. 05569, oggetto: Refettorio per il Campo di Concentramento Ebrei di Fossoli di Carpi" (January 13, 1944).
79. ASCC, "Economato Copie Fatture," 1944–5, trasporti dicembre 1943, gennaio 1944, "G.M Merighi, Servizi fatti per il campo di concentramento ebrei" (January 3, 1944).
80. Primo Levi, famed Holocaust survivor and writer, was among the Jews deported from Acosta.
81. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, Fasc. 2, campo concentramento ebrei, sfasc. 2/4, 1, "prot. 015682, oggetto: ebrei di altre provincie in arrive per essere internati nel Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli in Carpi" (December 29, 1943).
82. ASCC, "Economato Copie Fatture," 1944–5, trasporti dicembre 1943, gennaio 1944, "servizio transport Ebrei 'al Campo'" (January 1, 1944).
83. Silingardi, *Una provincial partigiania*, p. 129.
84. As quoted in Liliana Picciotto Fargion, *L'alba ci colse come un tradimento: Gli ebrei nel Campo di Fossoli, 1943–1944* (Mondadori, Milano, 2010), pp. 42–43.
85. It is unclear when the new section of the camp was completed. Ads Modena, Questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi varie, 1940–1949, Serie Internati Liberi, B. 6, "prot. 00121, oggetto: Campo concentramento ebrei" (January 20, 1944).
86. Between January and March 1942, a group of about 420 British Jews was shipped to Italy, a number of whom were among those deported from Fossoli on May 16, 1944. Maurice M. Roumani, *The Jews of Libya: Coexistence,*

Persecution, Resettlement (Sussex Academic Press: Portland, Oregon, 2009), pp. 31–32; 990 British prisoners were transferred from Fraschette di Altari to Carpi. Archivio centrale dello stato, Roma, Ministero dell interno, D.G. Pubblica Sicurezza, Div. AA. GG. RR., Massime, B. 127, Fasc. 16, N. 16, S. Fasc: 2, affari per provincia, Ins. 18/3.

87. Ads Modena, Questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi varie, 1940–1949, Serie Internati Liberi, Busta 6, "prot. 3e/II, oggetto: Campo concentramento degli ebrei di Fossoli" (December 12, 1943), and Ads Modena, Questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi varie, 1940–1949, Serie Internati Liberi, Busta 6, "prot. 08000, oggetto: Assistenza spiritual agli ebrei cattolici internati nel campo di concentramento di Fossoli di Carpi" (December 12, 1943). For more on the 1938 race laws, see chapter 3.
88. Curia Vescovile di Carpi, Sezione IV, Filza 556, "Don Venturelli."
89. Ads Modena, Questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, serie: internati liberi, B. 6, "prot. 00674, oggetto: servizio vigilanza del Campo" (February 16, 1944).
90. In a handwritten note dated February 10, 1944, Mario Taglialatela recorded their visit without naming the German officers. Ads Modena, Questura di modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, B. 6, "Dal Campo concentramento ebrei Fossoli (Carpi)" (February 10, 1944).
91. Ads Modena Questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati liberi, B. 6, "prot. 8854, oggetto: urgentissima" (February 11, 1944).
92. Fargion, *L'alba ci colse come un tradimento*, pp. 113–114.
93. Ads Modena, Questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati liberi, B. 6, "prot. 756, oggetto: Campo ebrei di Fossoli—spese lavori di sistemazione" (February 4, 1944).
94. ASCC, "Economato Copie Fatture," 1944–5, trasporti dicembre 1943, gennaio 1944, p.g.: N. 772, "per servizi al campo di concentramento ebrei" (January 26, 1944).
95. Fargion, *L'alba ci colse come un tradimento*, p. 232.

3 Fossoli and the Final Solution

1. Chapters 3 and 4 consider the myth of the "*brava gente*," or benevolent Italians, by investigating Italian experiences of victimization in the German camp (chapter 3) and then scrutinizing multifaceted contributions of the RSI, regional leaders, and Carpi officials and businesses to the annihilation process (chapter 4).
2. Peter Longerich, *Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 401.
3. Head of IVB4 (department for Jewish affairs in the Reich Main Security office), Eichmann orchestrated the transport of Jews from all over Europe to killing centers.

4. Dannecker had considerable experience with such activities; Eichmann had sent him, aged 27, to execute deportations in Paris in 1940. For more on Dannecker's leadership in France, see: Jacques Adler, *The Jews of Paris and the Final Solution: Communal Response and Internal Conflicts, 1940–1944* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
5. Historian Frauke Wildvang's research on the deportation of Jews from Rome highlights the many ways in which Italians collaborated with the Germans on October 16, 1943 and during the months that followed. She argues that the additional 1,000 Jews deported from Rome to camps in the east in the months that followed offers evidence of Italian collaboration with the Germans. Wildvang, "The Enemy Next Door: Italian Collaboration in Deporting Jews During the German Occupation of Rome," *Modern Italy* 12, no. 2 (2007), pp. 189–204.
6. For more information of the deportation of Roman Jews, see: Gianni Campus, *Il Treno Di Piazza Guida: La Deportazione Degli Ebrei Di Roma* (Cuneo: L'arciere, 1995); Giacomo Debenedetti, *October 16, 1943; Eight Jews*, trans. Estelle Gilson (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001); Marco Impagliazzo, *La Resistenza Silenziosa: Leggi Razziste E Deportazione Nella Memoria Degli Ebrei Di Roma* (Milano: Guerini e associati, 2013); and Susan Zuccotti, *Under His Very Windows: The Vatican and the Holocaust in Italy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000).
7. Longerich, *Holocaust*, p. 401.
8. Michele Sarfatti, *The Jews in Mussolini's Italy: From Equality to Persecution* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), p. 186.
9. For more on Italian colonization in north Africa, see: Ruth Ben-Ghiat and Mia Fuller, eds., *Italian Colonialism* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Alberto Burgio, *Nel Nome della Razza: Il Razzismo nella storia d'Italia, 1870–1945* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1999); and Patrizia Palumbo, ed., *A Place in the Sun: Africa in Italian Colonial Culture from Post-Unification to the Present* (London: University of California Press, 2003).
10. Italian race ideology and Mussolini's opinion of it has been the subject of a number of significant works. See: Alberto Burgio and Luciano Casali, eds. *Studi sul razzismo italiano* (Bologna: CLUEB, 1996); Giorgio Fabre, *Mussolini razzista: dal socialism al fascism, la formazione di un antisemita* (Milano: Garzanti Libri, 2005); Aaron Gillette, *Racial Theories in Fascist Italy* (London; New York: Routledge, 2002); Fabio Levi, ed., *L'ebreo in oggetto. L'applicazione della normative antiebraica a Torino (1938–1943)* (Torino: Zamorani, 1991) and "L'applicazione delle leggi contro le proprietà degli ebrei (1938–1946)," *Studio Storici*, Anno 36, No. 3 (July–September, 1995), pp. 845–862; Michele Sarfatti, *Mussolini contro gli ebrei: Cronaca dell'elaborazione delle leggi del 1938* (Torino: S. Zamorani editore, 1994); Roberto Vivarelli, *Storia delle origini del fascismo: L'Italia dalla grande Guerra alla Marcia su Roma*, Volume I (Bologna: Società editrice il Mulino, 1991); and Susan Zuccotti, *The Italians and the Holocaust: Persecution, Rescue, and Survival* (New York: Basic Books, 1987).

11. I have put the term "Aryan" in quotations in order to indicate the arbitrary nature of this designation. Sir William Jones, a British colonial administer in India, first used this term in the 1700s to group linguistic commonalities in northern India and western Europe. Joseph Arthur, Comte de Gobineau, turned "Aryan" into a racial term in the 1800s when he used it to connote white supremacy. For more, see: C. Loring Brace, *"race" is a Four-Letter Word: The Genesis of the Concept* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 119–121.
12. The original Racial Laws passed by the Fascist government can be found at, "Le leggi antiebraiche dell'italia fascista," Fondazione Centro di Documentazione Ebraica Contemporanea, http://www.cdec.it/home2.asp?idtesto=589&idtesto1=558&son=1&figlio=877&level=4 and they are translated in Marla Stone, *The Fascist Revolution in Italy: A Brief History with Documents* (Boston: Bedord/St. Martin's, 2013).
13. For more on internment camps in Italy, see: Carlo Spartaco Capogreco, *I campi del duce: L'internamento civile nell'Italia fascista (1940–1943)* (Torino: Einaudi, 2004).
14. ITS, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, doc. 459509_0_1.
15. Sarfatti, *The Jews in Mussolini's Italy*, p. 186.
16. Ads Modena, Questura di Modena, 1932–1972, elenchi varie, 1940–1949, serie: internati liberi, B. 6, in copia, "oggetto: 5568, oggetto: assengnazione di agenti di PS al Campo di Concentramento" (January 19, 1944).
17. Liliana Picciotto Fargion, *Il Libro Della Memoria: Gli Ebrei Deportati Dall'italia (1943–1945)* (Milano: Murisa, 1991), pp. 899–900.
18. Zuccotti, *The Italians and the Holocaust*, p. 171.
19. International Tracing Service (ITS), United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, doc. 460181.
20. ITS, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, doc. 460187.
21. ITS, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, doc. 460187.
22. ITS, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, doc. 460195 and doc. 460197.
23. Other camps in the area held Jews in addition to Fossoli and after the occupation, those camps fell under German command, too. The town of Asti, for example, had interned ten Jews in their community. The German command took over the Asti camp on January 28, 1944. The community continued to arrest and incarcerate Jews, and then the Germans came into the camp and deported them. On May 24, 1944 the Germans removed the 19 Jews held there. While we do not know where they were taken, we do know that some were sent to Fossoli. ITS, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, doc. 459510_0_1, doc. 459511_0_1, and doc. 459512_0_1.
24. While the order to separate groups from each other emanated from the Germans, the Italians had discussed separating political prisoners from Jews as early as January 14, 1944. The only reason prisoners were not divided was because the camp did not have sufficient staff to manage two sections. As of that date, the camp held 500 Jews and an undetermined

number of political prisoners. The camp had only 30 guards at that time and in July 1944 the camp director was still writing to Modena officials requesting additional personnel to monitor prisoners. Ads Modena, questura di Modena, 1932–1972, elenchi varie, 1940–1949, serie: internati liberi, B. 6, "prot. 05568, Campo di concentramento di Fossoli in Carpi" (January 14, 1944) and Ads Modena, questura di Modena, 1932–1972, elenchi varie, 1940–1949, serie: internati liberi, B. 6, "prot. 001233, oggetto, Fonogramma a mano" (July 6, 1944).

25. Harster's letter came after a SS representative from Verona visited Fossoli a few days earlier and asserted that all prisoners should be sent to the east for forced labor. Ads Modena, questura di Modena, 1932–1972, elenchi varie, 1940–1949, serie: internati liberi, B. 6, "promemoria, Il campo di concentramento è stato visistato dal Generale Germanico comandante le SS in Italia…" (February 26, 1944) and Ads Modena, questura di Modena, "1932–1972," elenchi varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, B. 6, "oggetto: Campo Fossoli" (February 28, 1944).
26. The terms *il campo vecchio* (the Old Camp) and *il campo nuovo* (the New Camp) were used early on by Italian officials to distinguish between camp sections. Ads Modena, questura di Modena, 1932–1972, elenchi varie, 1940–1949, serie: internati liberi, B. 6, "prot. 088208, oggetto: telephone per il Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli di Carpi" (April 20, 1944).
27. Ads Modena, questura di Modena, "1932–1972," elenchi varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, B. 6, "prot. 1877, oggetto: Camp di Fossoli—terreno adiacente" (March 1, 1944) and Ads Modena, questura di Modena, "1932–1972," elenchi varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, B. 6, prot. 08894, oggetto: campo Fossoli" (March 6, 1944).
28. Pietro Lotti's (inspector general of the Italian police) visit to Fossoli on April 13, 1944 recorded the state of both sectors. Larger than the New Camp, the Old Camp was composed of 93 buildings of which 46 were used as prisoner dormitories and the rest as offices, dormitories for staff, storage, warehouses. The clay soil beneath the buildings had pushed through the floors. The dormitory walls were cracked, bricks were missing, and glass windows long gone. The plumbing had also been affected and drainage was obstructed. At the time of his visit, Lotti noted that the Old Camp housed 854 civilians and the New Camp held 261 Jews. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, Atti dal 1942 al 1949, b 1, Fasc. 2, Campo concentramento ebrei, sf. 2/9, 1, "oggetto: Vechio campo di concentramento di Fossoli di Carpi in Provincia di Modena. Risp. Al telegramma n. 451 del 3 corrente" (April 13, 1944).
29. While we do not know the exact number of prisoners held in each section at the time of this transition, we do know that as of March 22, 1944 the total prisoner population was approximately 1,500. Ads Modena, questura di Modena, 1932–1972, elenchi varie, 1940–1949, serie: Internati liberi, B. 6, "prot. 008961, 42 Comando Militare Provinciale" (March 22, 1944).
30. Ads Modena, questura di Modena, 1932–1972, elenchi varie, 1940–1949, serie: internati liberi, B. 6, "prot. 08894, oggetto: Lavori di riattamento e restauro del campo vecchio di concentramento di Fossoli" (March 19, 1944).

31. Chapter 4 will explore in further detail Carpi officials' and civilians' contributions to the Judeocide.
32. Ads Modena, questura di Modena, 1932–1972, elenchi varie, 1940–1949, B. 6, "Italia Rep. Questori Italia Rep., num. 73175" (May 23, 1944).
33. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Carpi, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, Fasc. 2, campo concentramento ebrei, sf. 2/9, 1, "Risp. Al telegramma n. 451, oggetto: Vecchio campo di concentramento di Fossoli di Carpi in Provincia di Modena" (April 13, 1944).
34. Giuseppe Mayda, *Storia della deportazione dall'Italia*, *1935–1945: military, ebrei e politici nei lager del Terzo Reich* (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002), p. 162.
35. Fargion, *Il Libro della Memoria*, p. 919.
36. Ibid.
37. The decision to separate the male political prisoners and male Jews yet allow female prisoners from both sides to cohabit raises some questions about German intent. One motivation for separating the male prisoners from the women and from each other may have been to suppress a possible camp uprising.
38. There are few documents that speak to camp life; the vast majority of Jews deported from Fossoli perished at annihilation camps. I rely primarily on testimony to depict prisoner life under German occupation. With few testimonies, I am able to provide only a snapshot rather than a more comprehensive picture of the Jewish section of the camp.
39. For more information on how Italian anti-Jewish legislation compares to laws in other European countries at that time, see the volume *La legislazione antiebraica in Italia e in Europa* (Roma: Camera dei deputati, 1989).
40. Lists of the "*ebrei misti"* held at Fossoli can be found at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum within their International Tracing Service database. ITS, 461651_0_1 through ITS, 461656_0_1.
41. Royal Decree Law 1728/1938, as quoted in Sarfatti, *The Jews in Mussolini's Italy,* p. 335, ftn. 171.
42. The *Direzione Generale per la Demografia e la Razza* (General Administration for Demography and Race), known by the abbreviation DEMORAZZA conducted a special census (August 22, 1938) to identify Jews. The survey found that 58,412 persons in Italy had at least one Jewish or formerly Jewish parent, of which 48,032 were Italians and 10,380 were foreign-born Jews residing in the country for at least six months. In total, 37,241 Italians and 9,415 foreigners declared themselves or were identified as Jews while the rest broke down into various subsets, the principal of which consisted of persons who had abandoned Judaism (2,600) and the children of Jewish and non-Jewish parents (approximately 7,000). Sarfatti, *The Jews in Mussolini's Italy*, pp. 126–127.
43. Sarfatti, *The Jews in Mussolini's Italy*, p. 133.
44. Alexander Stille, *Benevolence and Betrayal: Five Italian Jewish Families Under Fascism* (Penguin Books: New York, 1991), p. 292.
45. Ibid.

46. CDEC, Raccolta di documentazione per le procure tedesche, 1.2.1.10.2, Tribunali di Dortmund e Berlino (Processo Bosshammer), B. 3 "Risposte ai questionai 1970–1," F. 18, "Tesimoni deportati il 22.2.1944" (copie dei questionai raccolti per la procura del Tribunale di Berlino—1970/1971), "Eugenio Ravenna."
47. CDEC, Raccolta di documentazione per le procure tedesche, 1.2.1.10.2, Tribunali di Dortumnd e Berlino (Processo Bosshammer), B. 2, F. 9–14, "Testimonianze di Franco Schönheit" (recorded May 21, 1967).
48. Giulian Cardosi, Marisa Cardosi and Gabriella Cardosi, *Sul confine. La questione dei "matrimoni misti" durante la persecuzione antiebraica in Italia e in Europa (1935–1945)* (Torino: Silvio Zamorani editore, 1998), pp. 80–81.
49. Chiara Bricarelli, *Una Gioventù Offesa: Ebrei Genovesi Ricordano* (Firenze: Giuntina, 1995), p. 78.
50. Ibid., pp. 77–78.
51. Nina Neufeld Crovetti survived to testify against Bosshammer. CDEC, Raccolta di documentazione per le procure tedesche, 1.2.1.10.2, Tribunali di Dortmund e Berlino (Processo Bosshammer), B. 2, F. 9, "Testimonianze Nina Crovetti nata Neufeld" (recorded May 24, 1967).
52. CDEC, Raccolta di documentazione per le procure tedesche, 1.2.1.10.2, Tribunali di Dortmund e Berlino (Processo Bosshammer), B. 2, F. 9, "Testimonianze Nina Crovetti nata Neufeld" (recorded May 24, 1967).
53. Cardosi, *Sul confine*, p. 84.
54. ITS, USHMM, No. 82313083 (/10064/0009@5.1), p. 9.
55. Don Sante Bartoli, *Da Fossoli a Mauthausen: Memorie di un sacerdote nei campi di concentramento nazisti* (Modena: Istituto storico della resistenza, 1966), p. 36.
56. Emilio Jani, *Mi ha salvato la voce: Auschwitz 180046*, 2nd ed. (Milano: Centauro Editrice, 1960), p. 73. Finzi was deported from Fossoli to Auschwitz on August 2, 1944 and died at Mauthausen on February 3, 1945.
57. An additional consideration to keep in mind with regard to Jewish testimony is that nearly all those who have provided postwar recollections of Fossoli spent time in Auschwitz. Experiences at Fossoli pale in comparison to the horror of the Nazi annihilation sites and such postwar recollections of Fossoli are typically brief, with the bulk of the testimony describing later camps.
58. Teodoro Morgani, … *Quarant'anni dopo* (Roma: Carucci, 1986), p. 63.
59. Ibid., pp. 64–65.
60. Those who perished were aged 40 to 92. CDEC, CRDE-Roma, 1.3.22, B. 5, F. 100, "elenco dei cittadini italiani e stranieri di religion ebraica deportati nel campo di Concentramento di Fossoli e deceduti nel comune di Carpi" (April 12, 1949).
61. Giancarlo Ottani, *Un popolo piange. La tragedia degli ebrei italiani* (Milano: Spartaco Giovene Editore, 1945), pp. 61–62.
62. CDEC, Raccolta di documentazione per le procure tedesche, 1.2.1.10.2, Tribunali di Dortmund e Berlino (Processo Bosshammer), B. 2, F. 9., "Testimonianza Dante Bizzari" (recorded May 25, 1967).

63. Few documents pertaining to political prisoner camp life have emerged and those available are almost exclusively from the male vantage point. I thus provide an overview of prisoner life rather than a comprehensive description.
64. Lidia Beccaria Rolfi and Anna Maria Bruzzone. *Le donne di Ravensbrück: testimonianze di deportate politiche italiane* (Torino: Einaudi, 1978), p. 246.
65. Istituto storico della resistenza e della società contemporanea in provincia di Modena, Fondo: Boccolari Arrigo, B. 1, Fasc. 4, estremi cronologici: 1944–1945.
66. Giovanni Leoni, ed., *Trentacinque Progetti Per Fossoli* (Milano: Electra, 1990), p. 57.
67. Gasparotto's efforts leading and organizing Resistance during the war culminated in his arrest (December 11, 1943), subsequent imprisonment and torture at San Vittore, and internment (April 27, 1944) and murder at Fossoli (June 22, 1944). He had spoken against the Fascist party throughout his youth as a law student at university. Joining the *Partito d'azione* in 1942, he eventually became the military commander of the Resistance forces in Milan. The *Partito d'azione* formed in the summer of 1942 and advocated for a new form of political action that stood between socialist and communist parties at that time. For more on Gasparotto, see: Leopoldo Gasparotto, *Diario di Fossoli*, ed. Mimmo Franzinelli (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2007), pp. 97–174, and Ruggero Meles, *Leopoldo Gasparotto: Alpinista e partigiano* (Milano: Ulrico Hoepli Editore S.p.A., 2011). For more on the *Partito d'azione*, see: Giovanni De Luna, *Storia del Partito d'azione, 1942–1947* (Roma: Editori riuniti, 1997). For more on political Resistance movements in Italy, see: Tom Behan, *The Italian Resistance: Fascists, Guerrillas and the Allies* (London; New York: Pluto Press, 2009), and Claudio Pavone, *Una Guerra civile: saggio storico sulla moralità nelle Resistenza*, Volume I (Torino: Universale Bollati Boringhieri, 1991).
68. Entry dated May 8, 1944 in Gasparotto, *Diario di Fossoli*, p. 36.
69. Gasparotto, *Diario di Fossoli*, p. 36–38.
70. Entry dated May 8, 1944 in Gasparotto, *Diario di Fossoli*, p. 34.
71. The Jews deported from Fossoli on May 16 were sent to Auschwitz. Ibid., p. 56.
72. Lutz Klinkhammer, *Stragi naziste in Italia: la guerra contro i civili (1943–44)* (Roma: Donzelli, 1997), p. 15.
73. Luciana Nissim Momigliano explained in an interview conducted in 1970 that she had been arrested on December 13, 1943 by a group of Italian soldiers for her participation in a resistance group in Valle d'Asota. She arrived at Fossoli via police transport and when she admitted to being Jewish, she was deported to Auschwitz (February 22, 1944). Famed Holocaust survivor and author Primo Levi, also arrested by Italian military police for partisan activity, was sent in the same transport. CDEC, Raccolta di documentazione per le procure tedesche, 1.2.1.10.2, Tribunali di Dortmund e Berlino (Processo Bosshammer), B. 3 "Risposte ai questionai 1970–1," F. 18,

"Tesimoni deportati il 22.2.1944" (copie dei questionai raccolti per la procura del Tribunale di Berlino—1970/1971), "Luciana Nissim Momigliano, December 5, 1970)," and "Primo Levi."

74. German soldiers often targeted civilians in addition to partisans for reprisals in order to punish and prevent future resistance efforts. For example, see: Victoria de Grazia and Leonardo Paggi, "Story of an Ordinary Massacre: Civitella della Chiana, 29 June, 1944," in *Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Autumn, 1991), pp. 153–169. For more on partisan and civilian reprisals in Modena, see: Claudio Silingardi, Una provincia partigiana: guerra e Resistenza a Modena, 1940–1945 (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 1998).
75. Lodovico Barbiano di Belgiojoso. *Notte, nebbia. Racconoto di Gusen.* (Parma: Guanda, 1996), p. 14.
76. Italo Cortese was a military delegate from the CLNAI in Lugano and planned to help prisoners escape to Switzerland. See: Gasparotto, *Diario di Fossoli*, pg. 91 ftn. 117.
77. Gasparotto, *Diario di Fossoli*, p. 164.
78. ASCC, Campo di concentramento di Fossoli, Atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 2, F. 19, sf 1, "verbale di sepolutra di persona sconosciuta" (June 23, 1944), and ASCC, campo di Fossoli di concentramento di Fossoli, Atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 2, F. 18, sf. 1, "Bescheinigung" (June 23, 1944).
79. For a more detailed discussion of resistance groups refer to chapter 5.
80. Karl Friedrich Titho was born on May 14, 1911 in Veldrom, Germany. He joined the SS in 1932 and worked alongside Gruppenführer of the SS Wilhelm Harster in the capture of Holland's Jews. After the September 8, 1943 armistice, Titho assumed the position of head of the Security Police in Italy.
81. The partisan attack took place on June 25, 1944 at Bar Olanda on Via del Campo in Genova. Six Germans died and many others sustained injuries.
82. The prisoners chosen came from all over Italy, not just Genova as suggested here. Titho as quoted in Paolo Paoletti, *La strage di Fossoli: 12 luglio 1944* (Milano: Gruppo Mursia Editore, 2004), p. 177.
83. Ibid., p. 177.
84. Giorgio Sealtiel as quoted in Fargion, *L'alba ci colse come un tradimento*, p. 99.
85. Olivelli thought the group was going to be deported to Germany. He wanted to avoid that fate as long as he could. See: Paolo Rizzi, *L'amore che tutto vince: Vita ed eroismo Cristiano di Teresio Olivelli* (Libreria Editrice Vaticana: Città del Vaticano, 2004).
86. Liliana Picciotto Fargion, *L'alba ci colse come un tradimento: Gli ebrei nel campo di Fossoli, 1943–1944*. 1st ed. (Milano: Mondadori, 2010), p. 101.
87. CDEC, Raccolta di documentazione per le procure tedesche, 1.2.1.10.2, Tribunali di Dortmund e Berlino (Processo Bosshammer), B. 2, "Testimonmante post 1967 trascrite dal Domoti 1975 da nostri appunti pressi al CDEC" (copie per dossier Carpi), "La Sig.ra Olga Bergmann, domenica 12.9.71."

88. According to Paolo Paoletti's extensive research on this massacre, the execution squad included SS Karl Müller, Fritz Ehrke, Karl Rotter, Kurt Hasenstein, and Ludwig Schroeder. Political prisoner Polacco Umberto has suggested that six or seven *Guardia Nazionale Repubbblicana* guards from Florence also participated in the mass murder. AISDM, Fondo 16 Messerotti, B. 14.22, Fasc. 15, sf. 2, "campo di fossoli 1945–1955 (June 20, 1945).
89. From testimony of Eugenio Jemina as quoted in Mimmo Frazinelli, *Le stragi nascoste: L'armadio della vergogna, Impunità e Rimozione dei crimini di guerra Nazisfascist, 1943–2001* (Milano: Mondadori, 2002), p. 218.
90. A list of the murdered Italians can be found at, INSMLI-Milano, Fondo: Barbareschi Giovanni, B. 1, Fasc. 1, sf. 1.
91. Remo Rinaldi, *La Resistenza di Un Vescovo: Figilio Federico Dalla Zuanna Vescovo di Carpi tra guerra e ricostruzioni* (Cinisello Balsamo: San Paolo, 1996), p. 197.
92. From testimony presented in Mimmo Franzinelli, *Le strage nascoste: L'armadio della vergogna: Impunità e rimozione dei crimini di guerra Nazifascisti, 1943–2001* (Milano: Mondadori, 2002), pp. 209–210.
93. CDEC, CRDE-Roma, 1.3.22, B. 5, F. 100, "Elenco degli ebrei deportati il 23/5/44 al campo di Fossoli di Carpi."
94. CDEC, Raccolta di documentazione per le procure tedesche, 1.2.1.10.2, Tribunali di Dortmund e Berlino (Processo Bosshammer), B. 3 "Risposte ai questionai 1970–1," F. 18, "Tesimoni deportati il 22.2.1944" (copie dei questionai raccolti per la procura del Tribunale di Berlino—1970/1971), "Dr. Leonardo De Benedetti."
95. CDEC, Raccolta di documentazione per le procure tedesche, 1.2.1.10.2, Tribunali di Dortmund e Berlino (Processo Bosshammer), B. 3 "Risposte ai questionai 1970–1," F. 18, "Tesimoni deportati il 22.2.1944" (copie dei questionai raccolti per la procura del Tribunale di Berlino—1970/1971), "Luciana Nissim Momigliano, 5 December 1970." For more on the use of gas vans in the east, see: Eugen Kogon, *The Theory and Practice of Hell: The German Concentration Camps and the System Behind Them* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006), p. 232.
96. From the deposition of Karl Titho, recorded June 18, 1970, and quoted in Picciotto, *L'alba ci colse come un tradimento*, pp. 105–106.
97. Ibid., 106.
98. Ibid., 106.
99. Trial testimony, as quoted in Picciotto, *L'alba ci colse come un tradimento*, pp. 106–107.
100. The files kept on each Jew contained the name, date and place of birth, profession, and day of arrival at Fossoli.
101. CDEC, Raccolta di documentazione per le procure tedesche, 1.2.1.10.2, Tribunali di Dortmund e Berlino (Processo Bosshammer), B. 2, F. 9., "Testimonianza Nina Crovetti" (interviewed May 24, 1967).
102. Gilbert Salmoni, "I fratelli hanno ucciso i fratelli," in *Una Gioventù Offesa*, Chiara Bricarelli (Firenze: Giuntina, 1995), p. 79.

103. Pio Passarin was arrested in an anti-partisan raid on Badia Calavena, a municipality in the province of Verona, on the night of May 22, 1944 and sent to Fossoli. He was deported to Mauthausen on June 14, 1944.
104. Pio Passarin, *Da Verona a Mauthausen via Fossoli e ritorno* (Verona: Cierre, 1995), p. 8.
105. Ibid., pp. 8–9.
106. INSMLI, Fondo: Rai-La mia guerra-1990, Serie: Testiomnianze, Doc. 1005, "Edi Antonelli."
107. Historian of the camp Anna Maria Ori has investigated this matter. See: Anna Maria Ori, *Il Campo di Fossoli: Da campo di prigionia e deportazione a luogo di memoria* (Carpi: Nuova edizione, 2008) p. 37. Fossoli Fondazione Ex-Campo has also conducted research on this and arrived at the same number. In her book, Picciotto cites the number as stated by Fossoli Fondazione. See: Picciotto, *L'alba ci colse come un tradimento*, p. 68.
108. Historian Giuseppe Mayda suggests prisoners were moved from Carpi to Gries because of the encroaching war and that Gries was 280 kilometers closer to the Reich. Mayda, *Storia della deportazione dall'Italia 1943–1945*, pp. 165–166. Until August 1944, all transports departing Fossoli embarked from the Carpi train station. Thereafter, prisoners were taken in civilian chartered buses from Fossoli to the Verona train station, bypassing the Carpi station altogether. Significant acts of sabotage on train lines between Carpi and Verona prompted the decision to bus deportees to trains in Verona.
109. "*Ebrei misti*" like Renato were permitted to write two letters a week. Cardosi, *Sul confine,* p. 85.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
112. Stille, *Benevolence and Betrayal*, p. 295.
113. Fossoli Fondazione Ex-Camp, *"Campo Fossoli-La storia."* April 12, 2009, http://www.fondazionefossoli.org/storia1.htm.
114. Sarfatti, *The Jews in Mussolini's Italy*, p. 201.

4 Deconstructing the So-called Silent Assent: The Chain of Command, Compensated Compliance, and Resistance

1. Narratives proposed by scholars, politicians, and religious leaders that exonerated Italians during the Judeocide gained traction in the postwar era and thrived for decades thereafter. Religious scholar Margherita Marchione, for example, argues that only the RSI and German forces were responsible for the persecution of Jews. In her view, silent Catholics carried no responsibility. For more on the international politics that promoted the so-called *brava gente*, see chapter 5. For more on the Vatican's role in promoting Catholic innocence and eliding institutional and lay responsibility for the atrocity

refer to chapter 6. Marchione, *Yours is a Precious Witness: Memoirs of Jews and Catholics in Wartime Italy* (New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1997).

2. The actions of Carpi and Modena officials, Resistance members, and compensated compliers demonstrate the agency involved in choosing to be a direct supporter of or Resistance fighter during the Holocaust. Despite the mortal risk of joining the Resistance, which may explain why silent compliance was so prevalent, some citizens still elected to fight the occupying forces.
3. Hilberg defined perpetrators as "people who played a specific role in the formulation or implementation of anti-Jewish measures." Hilberg, *Perpetrators Victims Bystanders: The Jewish Catastrophe 1933–1945* (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), p. ix.
4. The definition of "bystander" remains ambiguous. Hilberg conceived of "bystanders" as helpers, gainers, and onlookers. Robert Ehrenreich and Tim Cole conceptualize "bystanders" as a more fluid category than that proposed by Hilberg. Cole and Ehrenreich view a nonvictim/nonperpetrator as capable of transitioning from a bystander to a perpetrator according to her/his decision to actively engage in the persecution of the victim group. Philosopher Arne Johan Vetlesen's study, on the other hand, meditates on a bystander's ability to resist. He contends that "bystanders represent the potential of Resistance," and that an onlooker's capacity for action renders her/him responsible for acts of genocide. Ernesto Verdeja similarly argues that a bystander's choice not to act removes her/him from a passive state to an active state. He goes on to assert that, "although knowledge and ability to act certainly characterize the bystander category, this category is by no means uniform." See: Robert Ehrenreich and Tim Cole, "The Perpetrator-Bystander-Victim Constellation; Rethinking Genocidal Relationships," *Human Organization*, Vol. 64, No. 3, 2005, p. 218; and Arne Johan Vetlesen, "Genocide: A Case for the Responsibility of the Bystander," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 37, No. 4, Special Issue on Ethics of War and Peace (July 2000), p. 521.
5. Ernesto Verdeja, "Moral Bystanders and Mass Violence," in *New Directions in Genocide Research*, ed. Adam Jones (London and New York: Routledge, 2012). pp. 154–155, 529.
6. As shown in earlier chapters, Fascists had started interning Jews in 1940. The German occupation radicalized and intensified a preexisting network of camps.
7. Michele Sarfatti, *The Jews in Mussolini's Italy: From Equality to Persecution* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), p. 197.
8. Alberto Cifelli, *I prefetti del regno nel ventennio fascista* (Roma: SSAI, 1999), pp. 102–103.
9. Ads Modena, questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, Busta 6, "Spese per il capo di concentramento ebrei di Fossoli."
10. Sarfatti, *The Jews in Mussolini's Italy*, p. 197.

11. Acting as the bridge between German commanders and the RSI, Paolo Magrini, the Modena Questura at that time, had sent a telegram to the RSI head of police on February 28, 1944 stating the Germans' intention to take control of Fossoli to convert it into a deportation camp. Ads Modena, questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, Busta 6, "08846=06883 punto Generale Germanico Comandante S.S. Italia residente Verona visitando campo concentramento internati Fossoli…"
12. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, Atti dal 1942 al 1949, b1, fasc. 4, sf. 2 (March 6, 1944).
13. For further detail on this matter, see chapter 2.
14. ITS, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, doc. 460181.
15. ITS, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, doc. 460187.
16. ITS, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, doc. 460195 and doc. 460197.
17. Ervin Staub, *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and other Group Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 86–87.
18. Victoria J. Barnett, *Bystanders: Conscience and Complicity During the Holocaust* (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1999), pp. xiii–xiv.
19. In her discussion of apathy among those not targeted by Nazi oppression, Barnett suggests that the chain of command allowed individuals to evade the burden of responsibility. "The compartmentalization of mass murder, in which many of those directly involved either never saw their victims or did not directly witness their murders," Barnett has explained, "is certainly a contributing factor to the passivity of some individuals." Barnett, *Bystanders*, pp. 15–16.
20. Liliana Picciotto Fargion, *L'alba ci colse come un tradimento: Gli ebrei nel campo di Fossoli, 1943–1944* (Milano: Mondadori, 2010), pp. 238–239.
21. In another pattern of operational continuity, Carpi officials also responded to Red Cross inquiries, echoing their working relationship during the POW Red Cross delivery era. For instance, documents indicate that the Red Cross contacted the *Comune di Carpi* looking for specific prisoners. In one case, the Italian Red Cross tried to locate prisoner Frieda Hirsch Agnitsch and sent a letter (July 14, 1944) to Carpi inquiring about her. The Carpi prefect responded a month later, explaining that the Germans had deported the prisoner in question and advising the Red Cross to contact the SS in Verona for further information. ASCC, Campo di concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, b1, fasc. 2, campo concentramento ebrei, sf. 2/5, 2.
22. For example see ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, b. 2, f. 18, sf. 2, 4, "Servizio di Economato" (February 29, 1944), and ASCC, campo di concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, b. 2, f. 18, sf. 2, 15, "Amano, al signor economo del comune di Carpi" (March 11, 1944).
23. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, Atti dal 1942 al 1949, b1, fasc. 2, campo concentramento ebrei, sf. 2/3, 13 (July 17, 1944).
24. ASCC, Campo di concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1932 al 1949, b. 2, f. 21, sf. 1, 11 (June 1, 1944).

25. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, Atti dal 1942 al 1949, b 1, fasc. 2, Campo concentramento ebrei, sf. 2/9, 1, "oggetto: Vecchio Campo di concentramento di Fossoli di Carpi in Provincia di Modena" (April 13, 1944).
26. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, Atti dal 1942 al 1949, b 1, fasc. 2, Campo concentramento ebrei, sf. 2/9, 1.
27. Sante Pivatti, president of S. A. Cooperativa Braccianti, for example, wrote to the Municipal of Carpi (January 20, 1944) to confirm a verbal request for 52 tables and 104 benches. In his letter, Sante indicated that the total cost of the tables and benches would be 57,824 lire. AdS Modena, Questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, b. 6 (January 20, 1944).
28. AdS Modena, Questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, b. 6 (December 24, 1943) and Anna Maria Ori, *Il Campo di Fossoli: Da campo di prigionia e deportazione a luogo di memoria 1942–2004* (Carpi: Nuovagrafica, 2008), p. 22.
29. For more information on civilian camps prior to German occupation, see: Carlo Spartaco Capogreco, *I campi del duce: L'internamento civile nell'Italia fascista (1940–1943)* (Torino: Giulio Einaudi editore, 2004).
30. Picciotto, *L'alba ci colse come un tradimento*, p. 52.
31. Germans solicited Italians to volunteer to work in Germany to support the war effort. Rogue Italian soldiers captured by RSI or Nazi forces were also labeled volunteer civilian workers. See: Lutz Klinkhammer, *L'occupazione Tedesca in Italia, 1943–1945* (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri Editore, 1993), p. 371.
32. Ads Modena, questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, Busta 6, "Gab. 088124, statistica quindicinale—Internati."
33. Ori, *Il campo di Fossoli*, pp. 42–43.
34. Ads Modena, questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, Busta 6, "N. 002669."
35. A document signed *questore*, which we can assume to be the Modena head of police, sent a directive on March 6 to the camp director explaining that the camp would be divided and that the guards would continue their work after the takeover. Ads Modena, questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, Busta 6, "N. 08894, Oggetto: Campo nuovo di concentramento."
36. A number of men served (in succession) as camp directors. To complicate matters further, the majority of the documents from this era are signed as "camp commander" and not with an actual signature, so scholars are forced to guess when a new director took office. According to Lilian Picciotto's research, the Italian camp commanders were: Gino Carli (assigned to Fossoli December 15); Domenico Avitabile (assigned December 29); Mario Taglialatela (assigned February 10, 1944); and Angelo Vannucchi (assigned early July). See: Picciotto, *L'alba ci colse come un tradimento*, pp. 44–45.

37. Ads Modena, questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, Busta 6, "N. 00674, oggetto: Servizio vigilanza del Campo."
38. Martin Dean, *Collaboration in the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941–44* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), p. 163.
39. Still, antisemitism was a fundamental component of the RSI. The German occupation served to strengthen preexisting antisemitism within Italy. For more information, see: Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi, *Storia della Repubblica sociale italiana* (Roma: Carocci editore, 2012), pp. 124–127.
40. Alexander Stille. *Benevolence and Betrayal: Five Italian Jewish Families under Fascism* (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 293.
41. Gordon J. Horwitz, "Places Far Away, Places Very Near: Mauthausen, the camps of the Shoah, and the bystanders" in *The Holocaust: Origins, Implementation, Aftermath*, ed. Omer Bartov (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 214.
42. The massacre occurred during July 1944, when the Resistance experienced its greatest growth. For more information, see Luciano Casali and Alberto Preti, *Identikit della Resistenza: I partigiani dell'Emilia Romagna* (Bologna: CLUEB, 2011) p. 8.
43. For examples of Fascist Resistance and punishment in Carpi and the surrounding area, see Claudio Silingardi, *Una provincial partigiana: Guerra e Resistenza a Modena, 1940–1945* (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 1998) and Mimmo Franzinelli, *Le stragi nascoste* (Milano: Arnoldo Mondadori Editore S.p.A., 2002), pp. 207–221.
44. The German-RSI force announced on April 18, 1944 that Resistance fighters would be killed without trial and that anyone who offered partisans food or lodging would be killed or face a minimum of 15 years in jail. For more information, see: Amadio Guerrazzi, *Storia della Repubblica sociale italiana* (Roma: Carocci, 2012), pp. 47, 68, and 147–148.
45. Christopher Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the final solution in Poland* (New York: Harper Collins, 1992).
46. Browning's analysis of an individual killer's dissonance from his violent actions reflects a common postwar Italian narrative of events that holds only the Germans and the top echelons of the RSI responsible for war crimes. Those issuing orders were held accountable, not those who actually pulled the trigger. We will discuss this phenomenon further in chapter 5.
47. In her quest to unearth the identities of camp commanders, Picciotto found a diary entry by local priest Don Venturelli, in which he mentions Dr. Emanuele Giordano. Picciotto, *L'alba ci colse come un tradimento*, p. 139.
48. Enea Biondi, Caterina Liotti, and Paola Romagnoli, "The Fossoli Camp: Usage Evolution and Relative Transformations," in *Trentacinque progetti per Fossoli*, ed. Giovanni Leoni (Milano: Electra, 1990), p. 59.
49. Ads Modena, Questura d'Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, Busta 6, "N. 088285 Gab."

50. Testimony from political prisoners suggests they were sent to Ravensbrück, Flossenbürg, and Mauthausen; however, no precise data on the number and final tally of deportation sites has emerged. Some political prisoners and "volunteer" workers may also have been sent to Bolzano deportation camp and then on to the camps listed above. For more information on the deportations of Jews, see chapter 3.
51. Ads Modena, Questura d'Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, Busta 6, "Telegramma, Ministero Interno Sicurezza Sede Nord, 088124" (May 20, 1944).
52. A telegram to the *Ministero Interno Sicurezza Sede Nord* (North Headquarters of the Ministry of Internal Security) from *Il Capo Provincia* (head of the province) dated May 27, 1944 states that 1947 prisoners resided in the camp, but that 1,433 beds were not occupied because of "poor hygienic conditions." See: Ads Modena, Questura d'Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, Busta 6, "Oggetto: Telegramma a mano Questura Modena, N. 003235 at 088124."
53. Ori, *Il campo di Fossoli*, p. 37.
54. In a reported dated June 28, 1944, Ads Modena, questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, Busta 6, "Prot. N. 088222 P.S., oggetto: Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli di Carpi, al capo della polizia maderno."
55. Mario Pacor and Luciano Casali, *Lotte sociali e guerriglia in pianura: La Resistenza a Carpi, Soliera, Novi, Campogalliano* (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1979), pp. 166–167.
56. This document also informed the camp and Modena police unit assigned to this task to work with Vice Commissioner Dr. Fantauzzi to provide the "means of transport" for the materials. This is the first time Dr. Fantauzzi is mentioned in the documents and I have not yet been able to uncover any further information on him. Ads Modena, questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, Busta 6, "n. 88/5583 Gab., Oggetto: Materiale di Casermaggio esistente nel Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli di Carpi."
57. Ads Modena, questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, Busta 6, "Prot. N. 999.7386, Risposta al foglio del 21.7 p.p." (September 25, 1944).
58. Ads Modena, questura di Modena, "1932–1972," Elenchi Varie, 1940–1949, Serie: Internati Liberi, Busta 6, "Gab. 088/015286, Scioglimento del Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, Al Direttore del Campo di Concentramento Fossoli di Carpi."
59. The town of Carpi sent the belongings of Amos Poltronieri, killed during the bombing, to his wife Delia Pradella as well as the small sum of 3,934 lire. ASCC, campo di concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, b. 1, fasc. 8, sf. 1 (November 21, 1944).
60. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, b. 2, f. 21, sf. 2, 2 (August 16, 1944).

61. Vittorio Barone of Modena also sold wood to the camp. From May 31 to July 14, 1944 he sold a total of 84,167.45 lira worth of wood to Fossoli. ASCC, Campo di concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, b. 2, f. 18, sf. 2, 19 (July 19, 1944).
62. ASCC, Campo di concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1943 al 1949, f. 18, sf. 2, 15 (April 3, 1944).
63. ASCC, Campo di concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, b. 1, fasc. 2, campo di concentramento ebrei, sf. 2/3, 6 (January 13, 1944).
64. A receipt for "mortuary services" rendered February 18, 1944 for Jewish prisoner Giulio Ravenna cost L. 360. ASCC, campo di concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, b. 2, f. 18. sf. 2, 10 (February 18, 1944).
65. From document 3231 dated May 9, 1944 from Carpi to the Modena Prefect. ASCC, Campo di concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, b. 2, fasc. 21, sf. 1, 11 (May 9, 1944).
66. ASCC, "Economato Copie Fatture," 1944–5, Lavori vari al campo, dicembre 1943, luglio 1944.
67. ASCC, "Economato Copie Fatture," 1944–5, Lavori vari al campo, dicembre 1943, luglio 1944.
68. ASCC, Campo di concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, b. 2, f. 18, sf. 2, 11 (February 19, 1944); ASCC, Campo di concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, b. 2, f. 18, sf. 2, 2 (March 18, 1944); ASCC, Campo di concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, b. 2, f. 18, "Gestione Campo Concentramento Ebrei di Fossoli Elenco dei Fornitori." For more information and samples of receipts, see: Picciotto, *L'alba ci colse come un tradimento*, pp. 239–244.
69. Alessandra Chiappano, ed., *Luciana Nissim Momigliano: Ricordi della casa dei morti e altri scritti* (Firenze: La Giuntina, 2008), p. 35.
70. ASCC, "Economato Copie Fatture," 1944–5, Trasporti diversi, gennio-luglio 1944, "P.G. 2929=N 108."
71. ASCC, "Economato Copie Fatture," 1944–5, Trasporti diversi, gennio-luglio 1944, "PG N. 388."
72. ASCC, "Economato Copie Fatture," 1944–5, Trasporti diversi, gennio-lugio 1944, "PG 1871-N47."
73. Santo Peli, *Storia della Resistenza in Italia* (Torino: Einaudi, 2006), pp. 25–30.
74. Modena's antifascist movement had all but been destroyed by 1940. Claudio Silingardi's extensive research on the Resistance finds that the few Resistance groups in existence prior to the German occupation were small and disorganized. Silingardi, *Una provincial partigiana*, pp. 48–55.
75. Socialist and communist fighters figure most prominently in the history of the Resistance in the Modena region. As farmers and blue-collar workers typically supported the Marxists parties, it makes sense that Carpi resistance bands would identify with the PCI and PSI. For more on Resistance in the Emilia Romagna, see: Franca Pieroni Bortolotetti, ed., *Donne e Resistenza in Emilia Romagna* (Milano: Vangelista, 1978); Mario Pacor and Luciano Casali, *Lotte sociali e guerriglia in pianura*; Pietro Secchia,

L'azione svolta dal partito comunista in Italia durante il fascismo, 1926–1932 (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1970); Claudio Pavone, *Una guerra civile: saggio storico sulla moralità nella Resistenza* (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 1991); Jane Slaughter, *Women and the Italian Resistance, 1943–45* (Denver: Arden Press, 1997); D. J. Travis, "Communism in Modena: The Provincial Origins of the Partito Comunista Italiano (1943–1945)," *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 875–895.

76. The priests whose activities landed them at Fossoli included: don Delindo Bragalli, arciprete di Lama di Setta in Bologna, don Sante Bartolai (priest of Savoniero, Modena), don Giuseppe Elli (prison chaplain in San Giovanni in Monte, Bologna), don Giovanni Tavasci (priest of Piuro, Como), don Roberto Angeli (priest of Livorno), don Giuseppe Celli (priest of Secchiano di Cagli, Pesaro), don Mario Crovetti (pastor at Roncoscaglia, Modena), don Paolo Liggeri (director of "la casa," Milan), and don Camillo Valota (priest of Bianzone, Sondrio).
77. Yad Vashem celebrated Giovanni Barbareschi's benevolent work saving hundreds of Jews and others by acknowledging him as a Righteous Among the Nations. Perhaps it was out of love and a hope for peace or his understanding of Christian charity that Barbareschi intervened again in the postwar period on behalf of Nazis and RSI leaders, asking for their release and the forgiveness of their crimes. SS leader Karl Wolff was so grateful for Barbareschi's support that he wrote a postcard to the priest in 1952 saying it would be a pleasure to reconnect. For more information, see: Garzoni Marco, "Monsignor Barbareschi il ribelle per amore," *Corriere della Sera* (7 Dic. 2011), and INSMLI-Milano, Fondo: Barbareschi Giovanni; Busta 1, Fasc. 3, "Eugenio Dollman, Karl Wolff."
78. Roberto Angeli, *Vangelo nei Lager: un prete nella Resistenza* (Firenze: La Nuova Italia (Quaderni del Ponte, 1965), pp. 78–80.
79. Ibid., p. 81.
80. Paolo Rizzi. *L'amore che tutto vince: Vita ed eroismo cristiano di Teresio Olivelli* (Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2004), pp. 242–248.
81. Giorgio Vecchio, "'Left Catholicism' and the Experiences 'on the Frontier' of the Church and Italian Society (1939–1958)" in *Left Catholicism 1943–1955: Catholics and Society in Western Europe at the Point of Liberation*, eds. Gerd-Rainer Horn and Emmanuel Gerard (Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press, 2001), p. 177.
82. Ibid.
83. Nazareno Fabbretti. *Teresio Olivelli ribelle per amore* (Milano: Edizioni Paoline, 1992), pp. 17–18.
84. Emanuele Guaraldi, "Modena," in *Identikit della Resistenza: I partigiani dell'Emilia-Romgagna*, eds. Luciano Casali and Alberto Preti (Bologna: Cooperativa LIbraria Universitaria Edirice Bologna, 2011), p. 179.
85. Casali and Preti, *Identikit della Resistenza*, p. 18.
86. Ibid., p. 26.
87. The CLNAI formed in November 1943 to direct Resistance efforts in Northern Italy to defeat Nazism and Fascism. For more information on the

CLNAI see Gateano Grass, *"Verso il governo del popolo": Atti e documenti del CLNAI 1943/1946* (Milano: Feltrinelli Editore, 1977).

88. INSMLI, Fondo: Cln Alta Italia [Clnai], Serie: Periodo clandestine, Sottoserie: Attività interna del Clnai, Titolo del fascicolo: "Pratiche della Segreteria—affair interni," B 3, Fasc. 6, sotto fasc. 12, "Fossoli," "Situazione del campo di concentramento di Fossoli."
89. Silingardi, *Una provincia partigiana,* p. 222.
90. Ibid., p. 222.
91. Ibid., p. 334.
92. INSMLI, Fondo: Cln Alta Italia [Clnai], Serie: Periodo clandestine, Sottoserie: Attività interna del Clnai, Titolo del fasicolo: "pratiche della Segreteria—affari interni" B 3, Fasc. 6, S. Fascc. 1–7, "Fossoli," sf. 12.
93. INSMLI, Fondo: Cln Alta Italia [Clnai], Serie: Periodo clandestine, Sottoserie: Attività interna del Clnai, Titolo del fascicolo: "Pratiche della Segreteria—affair interni" B 3, Fasc. 6, sotto fasc. 12, "Fossoli," "Lavoro Svolto a f3 dal 1 luglio al 3 agosto 44."
94. INSMLI, Fondo: Cln Alta Italia [Clnai], Serie: Periodo clandestine, Sottoserie: Attività interna del Clnai, Titolo del fascicolo: "Pratiche della Segreteria—affair interni," B 3, Fasc. 6, sotto fasc. 12, "Fossoli," "Lavoro Svolto a f3 dal 1 luglio al 3 agosto 44."
95. DELASEM formed in Genoa in 1939 to offer assistance to Jews. For more information, see: Rosa Paini, *I sentieri della speranza. Profughi ebrei, Italia fascists e la "Delasem"* (Milano: Xenia, 1988).
96. Susan Zuccotti, *The Italians and the Holocaust: Persecution, Rescue, and Survival* (New York: Basic Books, 1987), pp. 67–68.
97. Silingardi, *Una provincia partigiana*, p. 157.
98. Ibid., p. 159.
99. Dante Sala, *Oltre l'olocausto* (Milano: Movimento per la vita, 1979), pp. 55–64.
100. Silingardi, *Una provincia partigiana*, p. 160.
101. Lawrence Langer, "The Survivor as Author: Primo Levi's Literary Vision of Auschwitz," in *New Reflections on Primo Levi: Before and After Auschwitz*, eds. Risa Sodi and Millicent Marcus (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 132.

5 The Politics of Blame

1. Paolo Favero, "Italians, the 'Good People': Reflections on National Self-Representation in Contemporary Italian Debates on Xenophobia and War," *Outlines-Critical Practice Studies*, No. 2 (2010), pp. 140.
2. For studies of the "*brava gente*" myth within these contexts, see: Pierluigi Battisti," Italiani <<brava gente>> Un mito cancellato," *La Stampa* (August 28, 2004), p. 6; Ruth Ben-Ghiat and Mia Fuller, *Italian Colonialism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); David Bidusa, *Il mito del bravo italiano* (Milano: il Saggiatore, 1994); Enzo Collotti, ed., *Razza e fascismo: la*

persecuzione contro gli ebrei in Toscana, 1938–1943 (Roma: Carocci, 1999); Alexander De Grand, "Mussolini's Follies: Fascism in Its Imperial and Racist Phase, 1935–1940," *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (May 2004), pp. 127–147; Angelo Del Boca, *A un passo dalla forca: atrocità e infamie dell'occupazione italiana della Libia nelle memorie del patriota ohamed Feikini* (Milano: Baldini Castoldi Dalai, 2007); Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi, *The Italian Army in Slovenia, Strategies of Antipartisan Repression, 1941–1943* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Guri Schwarz, "Appunti per una storia degli ebrei in Italian dopo le persecuzioni (1945–1956)," *Studi Storici*, Anno 41, no. 3 (July–September 2000), pp. 757–797; Patrizia Palumbo, ed., *A Place in the Sun: Africa in Italian Colonial Culture from Post-Unification to the Present* (University of California Press: London, England, 2003); and Michele Sarfatti, *Mussolini contro gli ebrei. Cronaca dell'elaborazione delle leggi razziali* (Turino: Einaudi, 2000).

3. Under the freshly formed Bonomi government in June 1944, the PCI and other leftist groups pushed for trials. The united leftists met resistance from the military, Allies, moderate anti-Fascist parties (most importantly the DC), and the crown.
4. Paul Ginsborg explains that the CLNAI became the "supreme organ of the Resistance" in the north in January 1944. Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 1943–1988* (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), pp. 15–16.
5. Costantino Di Sante, *Il campo per gli "indesiderabili": Documenti e immagini del "Centro raccolta profughi stranieri" di Fossoli (1945–1947)* (Torino: EGA Editore, 2008), p. 9.
6. See, Pisanò, *Il triangolo della morte: La politica della strage in Emilia durante e dopo la guerra civilie* (Milano: Mursia, 1992).
7. ACS, PCM 1944–46, f. 21.3 42896 CLNAI, as reproduced in Di Sante, *Il campo per gli "indesiderabili"*, pp. 30–31.
8. ACS, PCM 1944–46, f. 21.3 42896 CLNAI, as reproduced in Di Sante, *Il campo per gli "indesiderabili"*, p. 29.
9. The British had not forgiven Italy for declaring war on their empire in 1940, which is why the armistice refers to Italy as a "co-belligerent" rather than an Ally nation. While the English advocated for tighter control, the Americans trusted Rome and focused on repairing the country's economy.
10. Robert Ventresca, *From Fascism to Democracy: Culture and Politics in the Italian Election of 1948* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), pp. 25–28.
11. As of April 8, 1945, the town of Carpi had still not paid *Cooperativa Muratori* 675 lira for its work dismantling the camp after the Germans abandoned it in December 1944. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 2, f. 21, sf. 2, 4, "prot. 3015, oggetto: Spese mantenimento campo di concentramento di Fossoli" (April 8, 1945).
12. Ninety-four of the barracks had sustained damage beyond repair and the cooperative suggested to CLNAI that materials from the destroyed Old Camp be used to rebuild the New Camp. Camp mayor Burno Losi signed

his approval for the repurposing of the Old Camp. ACS, PCM 1944–46, f. 21.3 CLNAI, as reproduced in Di Sante, *Il campo per gli "indesiderabili"*, pp. 32–33, and ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, fasc. 1, campo di concentramento prigioni di guerra (n. 73) dal 1942, sf 1/3, 3, "prot. 6455, oggetto: Rettifica art. 4 U.P. della convezione fra l'amministrazione militare ed il comune di Carpi ler la demolizione dei manufatti costituenti il campo di concentramento prigionieri di guerra n. 1 di Fossoli; sgombro e sistemazione del terreno" (July 2, 1946).

13. ACSS, Fondo ANPI atti dal 1942 al 1949 B. 2 f. 19. Commissione di azienda, as reproduced in Di Sante, *Il campo per gli "indesiderabili,"* pp. 32–33.
14. ASCC Fondo ANPI atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 2, f, 19. Commissione di azienda, as reporudced in Di Sante, *Il campo per gli "indeserabili,"* pp. 37–40.
15. Di Sante, *Il campo per gli "indesiderabili,"* p. 27.
16. Robert A. Ventresca, *From Fascism to Democracy: Culture and Politics in the Italian Election of 1948* (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2004), p. 45.
17. Ibid., pp. 38–48.
18. ACSS, Fondo ANPI atti dal 1942 al 1949 B. 2 f. 19. Commissione di azienda, as reproduced in Di Sante, *Il campo per gli "indesiderabili,"* pp. 37–40.
19. Alessandro Brogi, *Confronting America: the Cold War between the United States and the communists in France and Italy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), p. 16.
20. Ibid., p. 14.
21. Filippo Focardi, *La guerra della memoria: La Resistenza nel dibattito politico italiano dal 1945 a oggi* (Rome and Bari: Gius. Laterza & Figli Spa, 2005), p. 335.
22. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, Fasc. 1, campo di concentramento prigioni di guerra (n. 73) dal 1942 al 1949, sf. 12, 9, "n. 1082, oggetto: Assistenza ex prigionieri di guerra alleati" (February 6, 1946) and ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, Fasc. 1, campo di concentramento prigioni di guerra (n. 73) dal 1942 al 1949, sf. 1/2, 4, "Avviso Importante."
23. Michele Battini, *The Missing Italian Nuremberg: Cultural Amnesia and Postwar Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
24. Guri Schwarz, "On Myth Making and Nation Building: The Genesis of the 'Myth of the Good Italian,' 1943–1947," *Yad Vashem Studies*, No. 1 (2008), p. 117.
25. Robert A. Ventresca, "Mussolini's Ghost: Italy's Duce in History and Memory," *History and Memory*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2006), p. 96.
26. Filippo Focardi, *La Guerra della memoria: La Resistenza nel dibattito politico italiano dal 1945 a oggi* (Roma e Bari: Gius. Laterza & Figli, 2005), p. 17.
27. Documents from that time referred to the Italian-run section of Fossoli as "the ex prisoner of war camp," and thus fail to even note Italian involvement during the occupation years. For example, see: ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, fasc. 1, campo di concentramento prigioni di guerra (n. 73) dal 1942, sf. 1/3, 2, "prot. 15893,

oggetto: Fossoli=Convenzione col Comune di Carpi per la demolizione dei manufatti costituenti l'Ex Campo prigionieri di guerra" (July 18, 1946).

28. See Claudio Pavone, *Alle origini della Repubblica. Scritti su fascismo, antifascism e continuità dello Stato* (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 1995), pp. 70–159.
29. According to historian Mimmo Franzinelli, antifascists and partisans murdered between 12,000 and 15,000 Fascists. The greatest number of retaliatory violence occurred in Turin and Milan in the first few months after the liberation. Franzinelli, *L'amnistia Togliatti, 22 giugno 1946: Colpo di spugna sui crimini fascisti* (Milano: Mondadori Editore, 2006), p. 259.
30. Lawrence Langer, *Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 242.
31. Rosario Romeo, *Italia mille anni* (Florence: Le Monnier, 1981), pp. 197–198.
32. Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (New York: Penguin Group, 2005), p. 47.
33. Ibid., p. 48, ftn. 1.
34. Paolo Pezzino and Guri Schwarz, "From Kappler to Priebke: The Holocaust Trials and the Seasons of Memory in Italy," in *Holocaust and Justice: Representation and the Historiography of The Holocaust in Post-War Trials*, David Bankier and Dan Michman, eds. (New York, Oxford, and Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2010), p. 306.
35. Mimmo Franzinelli, *L'amnistia Togliatti: 22 giugno 1946: colpo di spugna sui crimini fascisti* (Milano: Mondadori Editore, 2006), 259.
36. Società Italiana Acquedotti requested payment in the first months of 1945. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 2, f. 21, sf. 2, 3, "Ci risultanto ancora scoperte le bollette del terzo trimester 1944…" (February 3, 1945). ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 2, f. 21, sf. 2, 8, "A stim. Vs/ 28 giugno u.s. n 1206 di protocollo, allio oggetto, 'Pagamento consume acqua al campo concentramento di Fossoli'" (July 13, 1945). ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 2, f. 21, sf. 2, 11, "Boletta acqua potabile ex campo prigionieri abbon. N 1176" (December 27, 1945).
37. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 2, f. 21, sf. 2, 14, "prot. 7543, oggetto: Liquidazione fatture Soc. It. Acquedotti—Campo concentramento di Fossoli" (March 13, 1945).
38. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 2, f. 21, sf. 2, 7, "Bollette consume acqua campo di concentramento di Fossoli" (June 21, 1945).
39. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 2, f. 21, sf. 2, 12, "prot. 62, oggetto: Liquidazione fattura Societa Italiana Acquedotti; fornitura acqua al Cmapo di Concentramento Ebrei" (March 2, 1946).
40. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 2, f. 21, sf. 2, 13, "prot. 2235, oggetto: Quote arretrate- apparecchio n°2 Campo Fossoli" (March 14, 1946).

41. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, fasc. 14/1, 17, "Else Beer" (no date).
42. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, fasc. 14/1 Bis, sf. 17, "Prot. 2402, oggetto: Ricerche" (July 24, 1945).
43. Liliana Picciotto Fargion, *Il Libro della Memoria: Gli ebrei deportati dall'Italia (1943–1945)* (Milano: Mursia, 1991), p. 137.
44. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, Atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, fasc. 14/1 bis., 34, "Scusate se mi permetto disturbarVi con la presente, ma mi anno dato il Vostro indirizzo quale persona che forse può fornirmi qualche indicazione circa alcuni miei…" (December 9, 1945).
45. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, Atti dal 1942 al 1949, B.1, fasc. 14/1, 34, "prot. 7447, informazioni" (January 17, 1946).
46. For more information, refer to Picciotto, *Il libro della memoria*, pp. 275–277.
47. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, fasc. 14/1 bis., sf. 27, "Mi rivolgo alla sua coresia, per avere la sequente informazione" (August 22, 1945).
48. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, Atti dal 1942 al 1949, B.1, fasc. 14/1, 27, "prot. 3696, oggetto: Richiesta informazioni" (September 1, 1945).
49. Picciotto, *Il Libro della Memoria*, pp. 321–322.
50. While the town claimed to be ignorant of the ongoing at the camp, they had managed to draft a list of locals who had helped the Allied POWs. They may not have known their crimes, but they could point to their heroes. ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, fasc. 1, campo di concentramento prigioni di guerra (n. 73) dal 1942, sf. 1/2, 10, "prot. 1964, elenco nominativo delle persone che hanno assistito prigionieri di guerra Alleati…" (February 28, 1946).
51. Fabrizio Stermieri, "Ommaggio a Bruno Losi il primo sindaco dopo la Liberazione," *Gazzetta di Modena*, November 21, 2011.
52. Paola Borsari, "Dopo la Liberazione," in *Carpi dopo il 1945: Sviluppo economico e identità culturale*, ed. Paola Borsari (Roma: Carocci editore, 2005), pp. 25–29.
53. Ibid., p. 30.
54. Fiamma Lussana, "Memoria e memorie nel dibattito storiografico," *Studi Storici*, Anno 41, No. 4 (October–December 2000), pp. 1048–1059.
55. Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rule for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 79–80.
56. Arieh J. Kochavi, *Post-Holocaust Politics: Britain, the United States, and Jewish Refugees, 1945–1948* (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), p. 247.
57. Barnett and Finnemore, *Rule for the World*, pp. 79–80.
58. Di Sante, *Il "campo per gli indesiderabili,"* p. 49.
59. Il Archivio del Vaticano, Ufficio Informazioni Vaticano, Prigioniere di Guerra, 1939–1947, B. 523, fasc. 34: "Campo di concentramento Laterina e Teranto."

60. Gerald Steinacher, *Nazis on the Run: How Hitler's Henchmen Fled Justice* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 1.
61. These documents, housed in the Archivio dello Stato di Modena, are sealed. I was able to gain access to approximately 1,000 of an estimated 5,000 prisoner profiles, however.
62. Susanna Kokkonen, "Jewish Displaced Persons in Postwar Italy, 1945–1951," *Jewish Political Studies Review*, Vol. 20, No. 1/2 (Spring 2008), p. 97.
63. Kochavi, *Post-Holocaust Politics*, p. 247.
64. Ibid., pp. 238–239.
65. Ads Modena, Serie E3 corrispondenze in genere non contemplate nella precente categoria (1932–1972), Tit. 1932–1972 P-R, Questura di modena, "Internati a Fossoli 1946, B. 84, N. 09746, "prot. 02876 Str., oggetto: Papo Danko di Raffaele-jugoslavo" (August 6, 1946).
66. Ads Modena, Serie E3 corrispondenze in genere non contemplate nella precente categoria (1932–1972), Tit. 1932–1972 P-R, Questura di modena, "Internati a Fossoli 1946, B. 84, N. 09746, "prot. 00135/Str., oggetto: polacco Raab Bernardo fu Emilio" (August 22, 1946).
67. Few of the documents identify prisoners as Jews. This does not mean that few Jews passed through Fossoli. Rather, it may suggest a postwar reluctance to identify people as Jews or fear on the part of Jews to self-identify.
68. Ads Modena, Serie E3 corrispondenze in genere non contemplate nella precente categoria (1932–1972), Tit. 1932–1972, Sa-Sp, questura di Modena, "Internati a Fossoli 1946," B. 85.
69. Steinacher, *Nazis on the Run*, pp. 13–15.
70. Antonino Romeo as quoted in Guri Schwarz, "On Myth Making and Nation Building: The Genesis of the 'Myth of the Good Italian,' 1943–1947," *Yad Vashem Studies*, No. 1 (2008), p. 4.
71. Schwarz, "On Myth Making and Nation Building," p. 11.
72. ACS, MI, Direzione Generale PS, Affair Generali e Riservati, Massime 1/4, Istruzini di polizia militare, B. 77, F. 69 n. 30 Stranieri internati, Ins. I Dispozioni di massima, as reproduced in Di Sante, *Il campo per gli "indesiderabili,"* p. 72.
73. Kokkonen argues that "apathy toward [the Jews] is indicative, first, of their small numbers and second, of the general social conditions. References to Jewish issues were also scarce in immediate postwar publications. When references do exist, they treat the persecution of Jews as a product of the alliance with Germany, thus initiating the myth of the 'good fascists' and 'good Italians.'" Kokkonen, "Jewish Displaced Persons in Postwar Italy," p. 95.
74. ACS, MI, Direzione generale PS, Affari Generali e Riservati, Massime 1/4, Istruzioni di polizia militare, B. 77, F. 69 n. 30 Stranieri internati, Ins. i Disposizioni di massima, as reproduced in Di Sante, *Il campo per gli "indesiderabili,"* pp. 63–64.
75. Ads Modena, IE3, "Internati a Fossoli 1946," questura di Modena, B. 87, n. 09732, "Liaison and Civil Affairs Branch, Rome, APO 794, Displaced Persons and Repatriation Division" (February 19, 1947).

76. ACS, MI, Direzione generale PS, Affari Generali e Riservati, Massime 1/4, Istruzioni di polizia militare, B. 77, F. 69 n. 30 Stranieri internati, Ins. i Disposizioni di massima, as reproduced in Di Sante, *Il campo per gli "indesiderabili"*, p. 64.
77. Many of the police files on German soldiers housed at the Modena State Archives have Italian names, which raises the question of whether the Italians conducting the interviews wrote the Italian version of the German names on the files. In the case of Alfredo Ulrich, for example, it is possible that his name was actually Alfred.
78. Ads Modena, Serie-E3 Corrispondenze in Genere non Contemplate nella precente categorie (1932–1972), Tit. 1932–1972 St-Wa, questura di Modena, "Internati A Fossoli 1946," B. 86, "Prot. 022284, oggetto: Avviamento a Fossoli di Carpi di elementi indesiderabili ULRICH Alfredo nato 6.2.1925 ad Ammendorf Germanico" (October 30, 1946).
79. In *Nazis on the Run*, Gerald Steinacher found that the vast majority of Soviet citizens were repatriated, many against their will. In the first two years alone, 93 percent of Soviet citizens were returned home (6).
80. His file does not say if his request was granted or the motivation behind his return to Italy. Ads Modena, Corrispondenze in genere non contemplate nella precente categorie (1932–1972), Tit. 1932–1972, M-O, questura di Modena, "Internati a Fossoli 1946," B. 83, "Prot. 024873 P.S., oggetto: Avviamento a Fossoli di Carpi di elementi indesiderabili MELCHIOR Otto di Ernesto, nato 11/3/1914…" (December 3, 1946).
81. Ads Modena, Serie E3 corrispondenze in genere non contemplate nella precente categorie (1932–1972), Tit. 1932–1972 P-R, Questura di modena, "Internati a Fossoli 1946," B. 84 (various).
82. Ads Modena, Serie E3 corrispondenze in genere non contemplate nella precente categorie (1932–1972), Tit. 1932–1972 SA-SP, questura di Modena, "Internati a Fossoli 1946," B. 85, n. 07926, "n. 1653, oggetto: Suddita giapponese SOLUSSO Liliana di Giuseppe e di Sharplhie Ghirht nata a Chaieh (Tokio) il 9/1/1928" (May 7, 1946).
83. For more on Italy's economy after the war, see: Valerio Castronovo, "L'economia Italiana Dal Secondo Dopoguerra a Oggi," *Rivista di storia contemporanea,* Vol. 2–3 (1992).
84. The International Committee of the Red Cross had involved itself with the Holocaust as early as 1939 when it requested that the German Red Cross acquire permission for ICRC delegates to meet with Viennese Jews who had been deported to Poland. Unable to gain access to Jewish prisoners until a few days before the war's end, however, in the end ICRC focused its energy on helping all prisoners regardless of religion or race. The ICRC sent food packages to POWs held at Fossoli from 1942–1943, for example. After the war, the ICRC continued its operations helping all those affected by the war no matter the person's role in the conflict. For more information, see: Jean-Claude Favez, *The Red Cross and the Holocaust* (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1999).

85. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, "Vincent La Vista report on illegal immigration in and through Italy," RG-19.003*01, AN 1992.A.0089.
86. Robert Ventresca, *Soldier of Christ: The Life of Pope Pius XII* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press, 2013); Peter C. Kent, *The Lonely Cold War of Pope Pius XII: The Roman Catholic Church and the Division of Europe, 1943–1950* (Montreal, Kingston, London, Ithaca, NY: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002); and Michael Phayer, "Ethical Questions about Papal Policy," in *Pope Pius XII and the Holocaust*, eds. Carol Rittner and John K. Roth (London & New York; Leicester University Press, 2002), p. 227.
87. Kent, *Lonely Cold War of Pope Pius XII*, pp. 180–181.
88. Steinacher, *Nazis on the Run*, pp. 55–6, 102–110.
89. Ads Modena, IE3, questura di Modena, "Internati a Fossoli 1946," B. 87, F, "verbale interrogatione 17 December 1946."
90. Ads Modena, Corrispondenze in genere non contemplate nella precente categorie (1932–1972), Tit. 1932–1972, M-O, questura di Modena, "Internati a Fossoli 1946," B. 83, 013094, "prot. 05149 PS, oggetto: Ohlwein Klaus di Wilhelm nato a Gladbeck il 2/5/1922 cittadino germanico" (December 20, 1946), and Ads Modena, Corrispondenze in genere non contemplate nella precente categorie (1932–1972), Tit. 1932–1972, M-O, questura di Modena, "Internati a Fossoli 1946," B. 83, 013094, "prot. 05149, oggetto: Ohlwein Klaus di Wilhelm nato a Gladbech il 2/5/1922 cittadino germanico" (December 19, 1946).
91. Ads Modena, IE3, questura di Modena, "Internati a Fossoli 1946," B. 87, "prot. 024147 STR., oggetto: Avviamento a Fossoli di Carpi di elementi indesiderabili- Wolf Gerardo di Walter, nato a Hohesntein il 19/5/1918, germanico" (November 7, 1946).
92. Ads Modena, Serie-E3 Corrispondenze in Genere non Contemplate nella precente categorie (1932–1972), Tit. 1932–1972 St-Wa, questura di Modena, "Internati A Fossoli 1946," B. 86, 010192, "prot. 985, oggetto: Thil Mario di Ignoto nato a Dresden il 3/2/1913, Medico Dentista, sudito Tedesco" (October 25, 1946); Ads Modena, Serie-E3 Corrispondenze in Genere non Contemplate nella precente categorie (1932–1972), Tit. 1932–1972 St-Wa, questura di Modena, "Internati A Fossoli 1946," B. 86, 010192, "prot. 985/2, oggetto: Thil Mario di N.N. e di Elsa Thil nato a Dresden il 3/2/1913, professione Dentista, suddito Tedesco" (October 14, 1946); Ads Modena, Serie-E3 Corrispondenze in Genere non Contemplate nella precente categorie (1932–1972), Tit. 1932–1972 St-Wa, questura di Modena, "Internati A Fossoli 1946," B. 86, 010192, "n. 37392 Str, oggetto: Thil Mario di N.N. ed Elsa, nato 13.12.1913 a Dresda [ibid]—germanico" (October 3, 1946); Ads Modena, Serie-E3 Corrispondenze in Genere non Contemplate nella precente categorie (1932–1972), Tit. 1932–1972 St-Wa, questura di Modena, "Internati A Fossoli 1946," B. 86, 010192, "n. 443/57004, oggetto: Suddito germanico Thil Maro, nato a Dresda [ibid] il 13.12.1913" (August 14, 1946).

93. Ads Modena, IE3, questura di Modena, "Internati a Fossoli 1946," B. 87; "n. 46130, oggetto: Woike Alfredo fu Otto e di Giovanna Lange nato a Schichenan il 19.10.1906; germanico" (October 22, 1946).
94. Historian Michael Phayer asserts that "although Bishop Hudal knew that any number of the refugees he assisted had been, like Franz Stangl and Adolf Eichmann, central figures in carrying out the Holocaust, we cannot say that the pope himself or his Undersecretaries Montini and Tardini knew this, but they had every reason to suspect it with Hudal as their agent." Phayer, *The Catholic Church and the Holocaust, 1930–1965* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), p. 168.
95. Hudal and the PCA's efforts focused primarily on freeing prominent Nazis and members of the SS, whereas lower ranking German soldiers were left to fend for themselves. As it turned out, they only needed two people to vouch for their assumed identity in order to obtain travel papers and often asked their Nazi comrades to attest to their false history. For more information, see Steinacher, *Nazis on the Run*, p. 68.
96. Ibid., *Nazis on the Run*, p. 72.
97. The documents I managed to obtain spoke primarily of female collaboration. It is unclear whether this charge was levied on women alone.
98. Serie-E3 Corrispondenze in Genere non Contemplate nella percente categorie (1932–1972), Tit. 1932–1972 M-O, questura di Modena, "Internati A Fossoli 1946," B. 83, "n. 44360817, oggetto: Musevic Mari fu Francesco, nato a Brbovsko 23.3.1900 e figlia Hilde di ignoto nata a Postunia 23.3.1919—jugoslave" (August 6, 1946).
99. Serie-E3 Corrispondenze in Genere non Contemplate nella percente categorie (1932–1972), Tit. 1932–1972 M-O, questura di Modena, "Internati A Fossoli 1946," B. 83, 08484, "n. 06100/13 Str. A. 12, oggetto: Mombard Gertrude fu Roberto e von Kessel Ellen, nata a Kolmar il 3/3/1888, tedesca" (July 16, 1946).
100. Franzinelli, *L'amnistia Togliatti*, pp. 259–260.
101. Ads Modena, Serie E3 corrispondenze in genere non contemplate nella precente categorie (1932–1972), Tit. 1932–1972 M-O, questura di Modena, "Internati a Fossoli 1946," B. 83, 012578/012596, "prot. 014279 PS, oggetto: avviamento a Fossoli di Carpi di elementi indesiderabili May Massimilianao, nato Vienna 21/XI/1910 et comcubina Reinkard [ibid] Gelda, nata Mödling 17/5/1904—austriaci" (November 30, 1946).
102. Ads Modena, Serie E3 Corrispondenze in genere non contemplate nella precente categorie (1932–1972), Tit. 1932–1972 St-Wa, questura di Modena, "Internati a Fossoli 1946," B. 86, 09734, "N. 37163, oggetto: THOLER Maria di N.N. e di Tholer [ibid] Luisa, nata Innsbruch il 23.3.1908—austriaca" (October 19, 1946).
103. Ads Modena, Serie E3 Corrispondenze in genere non contemplate nella precente categorie (1932–1972), Tit. 1932–1972 St-Wa, questura di Modena, "Internati a Fossoli 1946," B. 86, 012487, "prot. 024722, oggetto: Allontanamento di elementi stranieri indesiderabili: UFERER Maria di Karl, nata 9/7/1917—austriaca" (November 25, 1946) and Ads Modena,

Serie E3 Corrispondenze in genere non contemplate nella precente categorie (1932–1972), Tit. 1932–1972 St-Wa, questura di Modena, "Internati a Fossoli 1946," B. 86, 012487, prot. 1319/3, oggetto: UFERER Maria di Karl e di Haliza Giuseppina, nata a Krems il 9/7/1917, bambinaia suddita austriaco" (November 29, 1946).

6 From Concentration Camp to Christian Utopia: a *battaglia per la moralità*

1. A small group of priests and women caretakers were among the 200 orphans and Don Zeno. Gianni Ciceri e Edmea Gazzi, eds., *un'intervista, un vita* (Firenze: Libreria Editrice Fiorentina, 1986), p. 217. Archivio Nomadelfia, NOM, minuta del telegramma 19 maggio 1947 del viceprefetto Giua-Loy al Ministero dell'Interno.
2. Ciceri and Gazzi, *un'intervista, un vita*, p. 217.
3. The camp director presented a document confirming Don Zeno's ownership of the camp and that night all 280 members of the community joined together and celebrated their new home. Gianni Ciceri e Edmea Gazzi, eds., *un'intervista, un vita* (Firenze: Libreria Editrice Fiorentina, 1986), pp. 217–218.
4. Don Zeno a Mons. Ercole Crovella, 9 luglio 1947, as published in *Don Zeno di Nomadelfia*, Volume I, p. 130.
5. SS Captain Erich Priebke and SS Captain Karl Hass oversaw the murder of 335 Italian civialians in the Ardeatine Cave Massacre outside of Rome in reprisal for a bomb set off on Via Rasella in Rome by the Patriotic Action Group (Gruppi di Azione Patriotica, or GAP) that killed 42 policemen. Alessandro Portelli, *The Order Has Been Carried Out: History, Memory, and Meaning of a Nazi Massacre in Rome* (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2003), p. 206.
6. Marco Barbanti, "Cultura cattolica, lotta anticomunista e moralità pubblica," *Rivista di storia contemporanea*, Fasc. 1 (January 1992), p. 144.
7. Mario Einaudi, "The Italian Elections of 1948," *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (July 1948), pp. 349–350.
8. Pope Benedict XV (September 1914–1922) realized during World War I that instead of demanding more land, the Church should seek recognition as a sovereign nation separate from Rome in order to gain greater influence in international affairs. See David I. Kertzer, *Prisoner of the Vatican: The Popes, the Kings, and Garibaldi's Rebels in the Struggle to Rule Modern Italy* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Books, 2004) and Roberto Pertici, *Chiesa e Stato in Italia: Dalla Grande Guerra al nuovo Concordato (1914–1984)* (Roma e Bologna: Mulino, 2009).
9. Ciceri and Gazzi., *un'intervista, un vita*, p. 19.
10. Socialist publications at that time criticized the Vatican's failure to advocate on behalf of the poor. See Maurizio Ridolfi, *Il Psi e la nascita del partito di massa, 1892–1922* (Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1992).

11. The abandonment in 1912 of a literacy test and property qualification for men to vote increased the electorate from about 7 to 24 percent of the population. Improved participation in politics helped form a strong socialist identity in Carpi from 1913 through World War I. For more information on the rise of socialism in Emilia Romagna see chapter 1.
12. Don Zeno's parents objected to their son's request to leave school. Don Zeno credits his priest, Don Sisto, for helping convince them to support his decision. Ciceri and Gazzi, eds., *un'intervista, un vita*, pp. 18–20.
13. Italian anarchists called for a violent revolution to overthrow existing political, religious, and social order. They considered religion and government instruments of oppression. On Italian anarchism, see: Roberto Carocci, *Roma Sovversiva: Anarchismo e conflittualità sociale dall'età giolittiana al fascism (1900–1926)* (Roma: Odradek, 2012).
14. Don Zeno as quoted in Ciceri and Gazzi, *un'intervista, un vita*, pp. 28–29.
15. Ibid.
16. Returning to Carpi, Don Zeno became more active in the political climate around him. In particular, he became involved with the *Federazione diocesana dei circoli giovanili di Azione cattolica* (AC). He joined the group in between his deployments during the Great War and continued his activities as president thereafter. The AC sought to bring men back to the church through social action. Don Zeno remained an active member of Carpi's AC until he moved to Milan to pursue a law degree. It took him nearly ten years to complete his studies because he had to pick up whence he left off at age 14 and his attention to politics often distracted him from his schooling.
17. Church affairs in Mexico offer one example of attacks targeting Catholics. The year of the Russian Revolution (1917), Mexico enacted a new Constitution that attacked the church's wealth, eliminated clergy from school teaching, and granted the State exclusive authority over religious matters. See: James W. Dow, "The Expansion of Protestantism in Mexico: An anthropological View," *Anthropological Quarterly*, Vol. 78, No. 4 (Autumn 2005), pp. 827–851.
18. The Holy See was also inclined to negotiate with the Fascist regime in favor of preventing further Fascist violence targeting Catholic clergy and the AC. See Alberto Guasco, *Cattolici e fascisti: La santa sede e la politica Italiana all'alba del regime (1919–1925)* (Bologna: Società editrice il Mulino, 2013), pp. 211–223.
19. Although he had a long-standing disdain for priests and Catholicism, Mussolini understood that the Vatican's support of Fascism would lend him and his regime credibility. Mussolini worked hard to gain the Vatican's compliance and even had his children baptized (1923) to demonstrate his willingness to negotiate with the Holy See. The two entered talks in 1926 and immediately clashed over education. After three years of negotiations, the Vatican signed the Lateran Accords on February 11, 1929 and the Italian parliament ratified it on June 7. For more on Mussolini's criticism of the church prior to 1922, see Lucia Ceci, *L'interesse superiore: Il Vaticano e*

l'Italia di Mussolini (Roma-Bari: Gius. Laterza & Figli Spa, 2013), pp. 3–36. On the negotiations, see pp. 85–101.

20. The concordat between Italy and the Church (1928) was but one treaty signed between the Vatican and European states that granted the Church permission to teach Catholicism in schools. The *Reichskonkordat* (1933) between Germany and the Vatican is perhaps the most famous and has been criticized as legitimizing Hitler in the same way the Lateran Pacts did for Mussolini. In truth, the concordats had more to do with the Church securing influence within society than advocating for Fascism or National Socialism. Any attempts to portray otherwise fail to take into account the greater complexities of the Vatican's lack of power during World War I (which motivated, in part, the 1929 concordat) and the threat that atheistic communism posed in Germany (which motivated, in part, the *Riechskonkordat*). For a view into the historical debate on the significance of these concordats, see: Frank Coppa, ed. *Controversial Concordats: The Vatican's Relations with Napoleon, Mussolini, and Hitler* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1999); Liliana Ferrari, *Una storia dell'Azione Cattolica. Gli Ordimamenti Statutari da Pio IX a Pio XII* (Genoa: Marietti, 1989); Michael Phayer, "Questions about Catholic Resistance," *Church History*, Vol. 70, No. 2 (June 2001), pp. 328–344; Pertici, *Chiesa a Stato in Italia;* Robert Ventresca, *Soldier of Christ: The Life of Pope Pius XII* (Cambridge, MA and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard university Press, 2013); and John Pollard, "The Vatican, Italy and the Cold War," in *Religion and the Cold War*, ed. Dianne Kirby (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 103–117.
21. Miccoli, "Cattolici e comunisti nel secondo dopoguerra: Memoria storica, ideologia e lotta politica," *Studi Storici*, Anno 38, No. 4. (October–December 1997), pp. 960–963.
22. *L'Apostolo* assumed the name *Piccoli Apostoli* in 1935.
23. The Vatican had criticized the 1938 Fascist racial laws, but only so far as to object to the discrimination of Christians who had converted from Judaism. Don Zeno, on the other hand, viewed the racial laws as in opposition to God's law of fraternity among all. Archivio Nomadelfia, Don Zeno Saltini, "Ai Padri di Famiglia della Bass modenese," in *Piccoli Apostoli* luglio 30, 1943.
24. Pope Pius XI may have been more like-minded with Don Zeno than his successor. He had commissioned Father John La Farge to write an encyclical opposing Nazi racial policy in July 1938. Pope Pius XII had the option to publish it upon becoming Pope, but chose to pursue a path of silence. See Georges Passelecq & Bernard Suchecky, *The Hidden Encyclical of Pius XI: The Vatican's Lost Opportunity to Oppose Nazi Racial Policies that led to the Holocaust (*Hardcourt Brace & Company: New York, 1997); and Emma Fattorini, *Hitler, Mussolini and the Vatican: Pope Pius XI and the Speech that was Never Made* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011).
25. Bishop Dalla Zuanna as quoted in *Don Zeno di Nomadelfia: lettere da una vita, volume I: 1900–1952* (Bologna: Edizioni Dehoniane Bologna, 1998), p. 35.

26. On July 21, 1941, Irene, a young student, became the first vocational mother of *Piccoli Appostoli.* She was just 18 when she volunteered her life in support of Don Zeno's organization. See: Norina Galavotti, *Mamma a Nomadelfia: Autobiografia di una madre di 74 figli* (Roma: Fondazione Nomadelfia, 2002).
27. The residents of Mirandola assumed the Germans would march into Italy through the Brenner Pass, which wound through Mirandola. In preparation for the imminent arrival of German troops, Don Zeno organized the community and together they stormed the *sede del Consorzio Agrario Provinciale*, the Fascist store holds, and confiscated grain as well as fuel, wire, feed, rubber, and shoes. Remo Rinaldi, *Storia di Don Zeno e Nomadelfia: Volume Primo (1900–1946)* (Roma: Fondazione Nomadelfia, 2003), p. 335.
28. Livio Zeno Paolo Lanternari was among the volunteers to flee south with Don Zeno. Lanternari had converted from Judaism and then joined *Piccoli Apostoli* in July 1943. Once he reached Rome, he disappeared. A Nomadelfia archivist located him in 1984 and discovered that Lanternari had returned to Judaism and married a Jew in Ancona, Italy. For more on Lanternari see Marco Galvagno, "Don Zeno e i piccoli apostoli durante la seconda guerra mondiale," pp.185–211, in a Maurilio Guasco e Paolo Trionfini, eds., *Don Zeno e Nomadelfia: Tra società civile e società religiosa* (Brescia: Editrice Morcelliana, 2001), pp. 190–192.
29. Pollard, "The Vatican, Italy and the Cold War," pp. 106.
30. Alfonso Botti, *Religione questione cattolica e DC nella politica comunista (1944–5)* (Rimini: Maggioli Editore, 1981), p. 88.
31. Pope Pius XII, Communium interpretes doloraum Encyclical, April 15, 1945, http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Pius12/P12COMMU.HTM.
32. Lacking guidance from the pope, resistance-minded Catholics joined forces with communists and formed the *Movimento dei cattolici comunisti* (MCC), or Movement of Catholic Communists. The young founders of the MCC viewed the social aims of Communism and Catholicism as well aligned. During the occupation, the MCC and PCI resistance forces joined together. This leftist band of Catholic-communists posed a problem for Pope Pius XII in the postwar period, during which he sought to portray Catholicism and communism as incompatible. For more information, see: Carlo Felice Casula, *Cattolici-comunisti e sinistra Cristiana (1938–1945)* (Bologna: Mulino, 1976), pp. 101–107; David I. Kertzer, "Participation of Italian Communists in Catholic Rituals: A Case Study," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 14, No. 1 (1975) and David Kertzer, "Participation of Italian Communists in Catholic Rituals: A Case Study," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (March 1975), pp. 1–11.
33. Don Zeno Saltini, *Don Zeno di Nomadelfia: Lettere da una vita, volume I 1900–1952* (Bologna: Edizioni Dehoniane, 1998), p. 116.
34. Don Zeno Saltini, *La Rivoluzione Sociale di Gesù Cristo*, 1st ed., S. Giacomo Roncole, Tipografia Piccoli Apostoli, 1945 (2nd ed., Tipografia Piccoli Apostoli: S. Giacomo Roncole 1946).

35. Remo Rinaldi, *I movimenti popolari politici di don Zeno Saltini nella Bassa Modenese (1945–1946–1950)* (Verona: Fiorini, 2002), p. 12.
36. Don Zeno sent a copy of *The Social Revolution of Jesus Christ* to Dalla Zuanna and asked for his thoughts. In his response (August 18, 1945), Dalla Zuanna expressed concern that Don Zeno's pamphlet was "too violent and likely to agitate the masses rather than to educate and uplift them." Vigilio Federico dalla Zuanna to Don Zeno, August 18, 1945, Archivio Nomadelfia, Corrispondenza di Autorità Religiose.
37. Don Zeno wrote to Pope Pius on December 10, 1944 asking his Holiness to guide the Church back to God's path. "As a priest, I feel that we walk among the ruins of a Christian civilization that demands the return to the active apostolic age." Don Zeno urged Pius XII to study the operations of Mirandola's *Piccoli Apostoli* and view it as an example of social-Christian success. "Like Joan of Arc saved France, the *Piccoli Aposotli* is called upon to save Italy." Archivio Nomadelfia, lettera dicembre 10, 1944 di Don Zeno al Santo Padre Pio XII.
38. The Vatican was involved in providing assistance and protection to Romans following the liberation of the city. Perhaps Pius XII did not respond to Don Zeno's letter because he was overseeing the humanitarian needs of the local residents. For more information on the Vatican's postwar activities in liberated Rome, see: Lidia Piccioni, "Roma e gli Alleati. Solo il primo gradino di un lungo dopoguerra," in *L'altro dopoguerra, Roma e il Sud 1943–1945*, Nicola Gallerano, ed. (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1985), pp. 207–208.
39. Gerd-Rainer Horn, *Western European Liberation Theology: The First Wave (1924–1959)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 159.
40. Word spread that the priest was taking in war orphans and his enterprise grew rapidly. Don Zeno wrote to Catholic, political, and Allied leaders to secure funds to support *Piccoli Apostoli*. He wrote an emotional plea to the CLN, for example, a few months after resuming his charge of the *Piccoli Apostoli* requesting their financial backing in order to build a new home for the orphans. Archivio Nomadelfia, CZ-AC40–52, 45CZAC, doc. 451100 CZ.AC.
41. Ettore Tirelli as quoted in Remo Rinaldi, *I movimenti popolari politici di don Zeno Saltini nella Bassa Modenese (1945–1946–1950)* (Verona: Fiorini, 2002), p. 17.
42. Saltini, *Don Zeno di Nomadelfia*, p. 113.
43. Ciceri and Gazzi, *un'intervista, un vita*, pp. 28–30.
44. Ibid., p. 198.
45. Ibid., p. 201.
46. The Vatican elected to support the DC to assure and the Catholic-social laws legislated in the Lateran Accords remained intact in Italy's new constitution. For more information, see: Giovanni Sale, *De Gasperi, gli USA e il Vaticano: All'inizio della guerra fredda* (Milano: Eitorial Jaca Book Spa, 2005), pp. 247–389.
47. The Pope's declaration pushed the boundaries of Catholic-communists' faith. The First Vatican Council (convoked by Pope Pius IX on June 29,

1868) had proclaimed the Pope God's infallible representative on Earth. For the most devoted, Pope Pius XII's denunciation of Catholic-communists was paramount to God calling communism an abomination.

48. Elisa A. Carrillo, "The Italian Catholic Church and Communism, 1943–1963," in *The Catholic Historical Review*, Vol. 77, No. 4 (October 1991), pp. 644–657.
49. The party name *Fraternità Sociale* encapsulated the inclusivity Don Zeno wanted to create. When a journalist or party leader asked Don Zeno what political faction he belonged to, he answered, "I am with you." This simple statement defined his political and spiritual worldviews. He believed that everyone would benefit from a nation resembling a family state. "When the state is the family of families, we are all brothers," he explained. "The law itself wants and protects [fraternity]. The spirit of the elected must always infuse it into their consciousness rendering their service to the state noble, high, and generous." Don Zeno as quoted in Paolo Trionfini, "Don Zeno e la vita politica italiana (1940–1962)," in acura di Maurilio Guasco e Paolo Trionfini, *Don Zeno e Nomadelfia: Tra società civile e società religiosa* (Brescia: Editrice Morcelliana, 2001), p. 267.
50. Archivio Nomadelfia, C/V. Lettera della sezione "R. Zambelli" di Bomporto del febbraio 3, 1946.
51. Filippo Focardi, *La guerra della memoria: La resistenza nel dibattito politico italiano dal 1945 a oggi* (Roma e Bari: Gius. Laterza and Figli Spa, 2005), p. 15.
52. Bishop Dalla Zuanna as quoted in Rinaldi, *Storia di Don Zeno*, Volume I, p. 472.
53. The Church's involvement in politics eroded what was once a close relationship between Don Zeno and Dalla Zuanna as shown in a letter the Carpi priest wrote (June 27, 1945) to his former supporter. "It grieves me to say that politics have come between us…I cannot support any political meddling that threatens to widen the political abyss and alienate the masses keeping from Lord." Don Zeno's worried that the Dalla Zuanna and the Church's approach to politics only encouraged Catholic-communist criticism of the Holy See. Archivio Nomadelfia, CZ-AR45–1952, doc. 450627CZ.AR.
54. Don Zeno wrote a letter to Dalla Zuanna (August 18, 1945) the day after receiving word from the Carpi bishop that the Vatican had condemned his lecture series. Don Zeno criticized the Church's fears of communism and urged Dalla Zuanna and other Catholic leaders to take responsibility for the country's significant communist following. Don Zeno, unlike the Vatican, viewed the rise in communist supporters the result of the Church's wartime and postwar neglect of its followers. While many Church leaders viewed Don Zeno as leading credence to Marxist theory, the Carpi priest saw it in reverse. Archivio Nomadelfia, lettera agosto 18, 1945 a di Don Zeno a Mons. Vigilio Federico Dalla Zuanna, Vescovo di Carpi.
55. Giuseppe Morselli, *Dalla parte dei poveri: Don Zeno Saltini, il romanzo di un uomo* (Modena: Mundici e Zanetti Editori, 1981), p. 101.

56. Inspired by the exciting potential of their plan, Don Zeno met with his congregation every night for a week to plan their organization. By the end of the week, between 600 and 700 community members had joined in the conversation. Ciceri and Gazzi, *un'intervista, un vita*, p. 211.
57. Ciceri and Gazzi, *un'intervista, un vita*, p. 213.
58. Ibid.
59. Morselli, *Dalla parte dei poveri*, pp. 103–104.
60. Don Zeno a Mons. Vigilio Federico Dalla Zuanna, Vescovo di Carpi, agosto 18, 1945, as published in *Don Zeno di Nomadelfia*, Volume I, p. 119.
61. Don Zeno al Santo Padre Pio XII, epifania 1947, as published in *Don Zeno di Nomadelfia*, Volume I, pp. 125–127.
62. Don Zeno al Santo Padre Pio XII, epifania 1947, as published in *Don Zeno di Nomadelfia*, Volume I, pp. 125–127.
63. Ibid.
64. Remo Rinaldi, *Storia di Don Zeno e Nomadelfia*: *Volume secondo (1947–62)* (Fondazione Nomadelfia: Rome, 2003), p. 15.
65. Archivio Nomadelfia, CZ/AC, lettera febbraio 19, 1947 al ministro dell'Interno.
66. Morselli, *Dalla parte dei poveri*, pp. 103–104.
67. Mario Scelba as quoted in Antonio Gambion, *Storia del dopoguerra. Dalla liberazione al potere DC* (Roma e Bari: Editori Laterza, 1975), p. 301.
68. Encyclical of His Holiness Pope Pius XII "Pleading For the Care of the World's Destitute Children," January 6, 1946, http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Pius12/P12QUEMA.HTM.
69. The Central Intelligence Agency also mounted its inaugural operation in Italy to combat Marxism. In addition to providing covert funding to the DC, US Secretary of State George Marshall publically threatened to deny Marshall Plan funds to Italy if the country went red. Robert Ventresca, *From Fascism to Democracy: Culture and Politics in the Italian Election of 1948* (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2004), pp. 5, 66, 71, 219, and 241.
70. Giovanni Taurasi, "Mondo cattolico e mondo comunista a Carpi nel secondo dopo guerra," Tesi di Laurea a Università Bologna, 1995/1996, n. inv. 1428, p. 178.
71. Morselli, *Dalla parte dei poveri*, pp. 108 and 198.
72. The recent communist putsch in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 and subsequent assault of Catholics in that country intensified the Holy See's attack of communism in Italy. For the Western Allies, Czechoslovakia's fall made Italy the front line for its battle against communism. Frank Coppa, "Pope Pius XII and the Cold War: The Post-War Confrontation between Catholicism and Communism," in *Religion and the Cold* War, ed. Dianne Kirby (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 57–58.
73. Ventresca, *From Fascism to Democracy*, p. 4.
74. Andrea Riccardi, "Don Zeno e la Santa Sede," in Maurilio Guasco e Paolo Trionfini, eds., *Don Zeno e Nomadelfia: Tra società civile e società religiosa* (Brescia: Editrice Morcelliana, 2001), p. 299.

75. Remo Rinaldi, *La Resistenza Di Un Vescovo: Vigilio Federico Dalla Zuanna Vescovo Di Carpi Tra Guerra E Ricostruzione* (Cinisello Balsamo: San Paolo, 1996), p. 305.
76. Archivio Nomadelfia, "Progetto trasformazioni campo di Fossoli, 1947–48," 14D – 08.
77. Michael R. Marrus, "Pius XII and the Holocaust: Ten Essential Themes," in *Pope Pius XII and the Holocaust*, Carol Rittner and John K. Roth, eds. (London and New York: Leicester University Press, 2002), p. 49.
78. John, Chapter 17: 20–21.
79. Morselli, *Dalla parte dei poveri,* pp. 117–118.
80. The story of a concentration camp transformed into a place of peace resonated with many people and generated considerable donations. Milan resident Paola Levi learned of Don Zeno's work through newspapers and sent him 7,000 lire. In a letter to Don Zeno she wrote: "I am an admirer of your organization that has successfully transformed Fossoli, the antechamber of death, into a place of love and generosity." Archivio Nomadelfia, "Campo di Fosoli, Memorie e Documenti," 15B-01, B.
81. Archivio Nomadelfia, Edward E. Swanstrom, "A Kind of Miracle: Christian Charity in what was once a concentration camp," *Commonweal*, Volume LII, Number 14, July 14, 1950, pp. 338–340.
82. CVS, Sezione IV, Filza 556, Don Venturelli, Giornali dell'Epoca, "A cidade dos pequenos apostolos," *A Gazeta – S. Paulo*, 31 marco 1951.
83. Archivio Nomadelfia, "Where They Are Happy," *Everybody's*, March 26, 1949.
84. Archivio Nomadelfia, CZ-AR45–52, 481116 CZ. AC.
85. Giorgio Campanini, "Don Zeno e l' 'utopia' di una società cristiana," in *Don Zeno e Nomadelfia: Tra società civile e società religiosa,* eds., Maurilio Guasco e Paolo Trionfini (Brescia: Editrice Morcelliana, 2001), pp. 332, 324–326.
86. Archivio Nomadelfia, CZ-AR45–52, doc. 480328 CZ. AR.
87. The Popular Front's meager 31 percent of the vote surprised many Italians. The poor performance can be partially attributed to the right wing Socialists' split from the party (August 11) just prior to the election. In the end, being anti-communist meant voting against the Popular Front. The coalition did well, however, in Italy's reddest zones: Emilia, Tuscany, and Umbria. These regions had not adopted reform socialism, so the split of the Socialists from the Popular Front did not affect their votes. Ventresca, *From Fascism to Democracy*, pp. 215, 236–237.
88. "Catholics who back communist party are excommunicated," *St. Petersburg Times*, July 14, 1949.
89. Morselli, *Dalla parte dei poveri*, pp. 122–123.
90. Ibid., pp. 119–125.
91. Paolo Trionfini, "Don Zeno e la vita politica italiana (1940–1962)," *249–293* in *Don Zeno e Nomadelfia: Tra società civile e società religiosa,* eds., Maurilio Guasco e Paolo Trionfini (Brescia: Editrice Morcelliana, 2001), p. 279.
92. Ibid., pp. 271–272.

93. Riccardi, "Don Zeno e la Santa Sede," p. 301.
94. Ibid., p. 298.
95. Rinaldi, *Storia di Nomadelfia e Don Zeno: Volume secondo*, pp. 82–89.
96. Morselli, *Dalla parte dei poveri*, p. 128.
97. Daniele Bettenzoli, *Nomadelfia: utopia realizzata?* (Milano: Celuc Libri, 1976), pp. 72–88.
98. *L'Italia*, 27 May 1947, as quoted in Rinaldi p. 256.
99. Rinaldi, *Storia di Nomadelfia e Don Zeno: Volume secondo*, p. 235.
100. Archivio Nomadelfia, lettera febbraio 6, 1952 di don Zeno a don Calabria.
101. Archivio Nomadelfia, lettera febbraio 9, 1952 di don Zeno ai Nomadelfi. For more on the community's success in Grosetto, Tuscany, visit the Nomadelfia website: www.Nomadelfia.it.
102. Tas Luciano, *Storia degli ebrei italiani* (Roma: Newton Compton editori, 1987), pp. 163–164.
103. Pope Pius XII's successor Pope John Paul II made amends for his predecessor's mistreatment of the Carpi priest on May 21, 1989 when he visited Nomadelfia's home in Tuscany and praised the community.

Conclusion

1. For example, see Elizabth Bettina, *It Happened in Italy: Untold Stories of How the People of Italy Defied the Horrors of the Holocaust* (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2009) and Alessandro Cassin, "Brava Gente? The Resurgence of the Shopworn Myth of Italian Benevolence During Fascism," *i-Italy*, July 29, 2009, accessed July 18, 2014, http://www.i-italy.org/10288/brava-gente-resurgence-shopworn-myth-italian-benevolence-during-fascism.
2. Historian Anna Vinci aruges that one must scrutinize the years that preceded Fascism in order to understand the local forms it took. See: Anna Vinci, *Sentinelle della patria: Il fascismo al confine orientale, 1918–1941* (Roma : Quadrante Laterza, 2011).
3. Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi, "Alcune domande da porre alla fonti documentarie sull'antifascismo Modenese," in *Sotto il regime: problemi, metodi e dtrumenti per lo studio dell'antifascismo.*, ed. Giuliano Albarani, Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi, and Giovanni Taurasi (Milano: UNICOPLI, 2006), p. 184.
4. Luciano Casali, *Storia della resistenza a Modena* (Modena: ANPI, 1980), p. 8, and Claudio Silingardi, *Una provincial partigiana: Guerra e Resistenza a Modena 1940–1945* (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 1998), p. 32.
5. Casali, *Storia della resistenza a Modena*, p. 5.
6. See: Luca Baldissara and Paolo Pezzino, *Crimini e memoria di guerra: violenze contro le popolazioni e politiche del ricordo* (Napoli: Ancora del Mediterraneo, 2004); David Bidussa, *Il mito del bravo italiano* (Milano: Il Saggiatore, 1994); Angelo Del Boca, *Italiani, brava gente?: un mito duro a morire* (Vincenza: N. Pozza, 2005); Filippo Focardi, *La guerra della memoria: la Resistenza nel dibattito politico italiano dal 1945 a oggi* (Roma: Laterza, 2005); John Foot, *Italy's Divided Memory* (Palgrave Macmillan: New York,

2009); Robert Gordon, "The Holocaust in Italian Collective Memory: *Il giorno della memoria*, 27 January 2001," *Modern Italy*, Vol. 11, Issue 2 (2006), pp. 167–188; Fiamma Lussana, "Memoria e memorie nel dibattito storiografico," *Studi Storici*, Vol. 41, Issue 4 (October– December 2000), pp. 1048–1059; Claudio Pavone, "La resistenza oggi: problema storiografico e problem civile," *Rivista di storia contemporanea*, Vols 2–3 (1992), pp. 456–480, and *Alle origini della Repubblica. Scritti su fascismo, antifascsmo e continuità dello Stato* (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 1995); and Robert Ventresca, "Debating the Meaning of Fascism in Contemporary Italy," *Modern Italy*, Vol. 11, Issue 2 (2006), pp. 189–209.

7. Emanuele Guaraldi, "Modena," in *Identikit della Resistenza*, eds. Luciano Casali and Alberto Preti (Bologna: Cooperativa Libraria Universitaria Editrice Bologna, 2011), pp. 178–179.
8. Silingardi, *Una provincia partigiana*, p. 222.
9. According Claudio Silingardi, approximately 45,000 Italian civilians (including 8,500 Jews) were deported to Germany, of whom 4,000 returned (approximately 10 percent). *Una provincia partigiana*, pp. 168–9. Additionally, the Germans and Italians collected some 650,000 Italian soldiers and sent them to Germany for forced labor, or worse. The great majority of them remained in Germany as military interns. Among them, somewhere between 30,000 and 50,000 perished due to malnutrition, exposure, mistreatment, forced labor, or summary executions in the last chaotic days of the war. Santo Peli, *Storia della Resistenza in Italia* (Torino: Giulio Einaudi editore, 2006), p. 16.
10. Primo Levi and Ferdinando Camon, *Conversations with Primo Levi*, 1st English language ed. (Marlboro, Vt.: Marlboro Press, 1989), p. 21.
11. A number of early postwar studies argue that antisemitism as a foreign import. See: Antonio Spinosa, "Le persecuzioni razziali in Italia," *Il Ponte*, No. 7 (1952), pp. 964–978; Luigi Salatorelli and Giuseppe Mira, *Storia d'Italia nel periodo fascista* (Roma: Novissima, 1952); and Leon Poliakov, *Harvest of Hate: The Nazi Program for the Destruction of the European Jews* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1954).
12. For an overview of scholars and politicians who redirected Italian memory, see Guri Schwarz, "On Myth Making and Nation Building: The Genesis of the 'Myth of the Good Italian,' 1943–1947," *Yad Vashem Studies*, No. 1 (2008).
13. The actions of Carpi and Modena officials, Resistance members, and compensated compliers demonstrate the agency involved in choosing to be a direct supporter of or resister to the Holocaust. Despite the mortal risk of joining the Resistance, which may explain why silent compliance was so prevalent, some citizens still elected to fight the occupying forces.
14. Filippo Focardi, *La Guerra Della Memori: La Resistenza Nel Dibattito Politico Italiano Dal 1945 a Oggi*, 1st ed., Storia E Società (Roma: Laterza, 2005), pp. 3–32.
15. Robert S. C. Gordon, *The Holocaust in Italian Culture, 1944–2010* (Stanford, CA: Standford University Press, 2012), p. 149.

16. Ibid., p. 153.
17. Rosario Forlenza, "Sacrificial Memory and Political Legitimacy in Postwar Italy: Reliving and Remembering World War II," *History & Memory*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall/Winter 2012), pp. 82–83.
18. Schwarz, "On Myth Making and Nation Building," p. 3.
19. Ventresca, "Debating the Meaning of Fascism in Contemporary Italy," p. 196.
20. Mimmo Franzinelli, *L'amnistia Togliatti: 22 giugno 1946: colpo di spugna sui crimini fascisti* (Milano: Mondadori Editore, 2006), pp. 259–260.
21. Guri Schwarz, *After Mussolini: Jewish Life and Jewish Memories in Post-Fascist Italy*, trans. Giovanni Noor Mazhar (London and Portland, OR: Gius. Laterza & Figli, 2004), p. 124.
22. Documents from that time referred to the Italian-run section of Fossoli as "the ex prisoner of war camp," and thus fail even to note Italian involvement during the occupation years. For example, see: ASCC, Campo di Concentramento di Fossoli, atti dal 1942 al 1949, B. 1, fasc. 1, campo di concentramento prigioni di guerra (n. 73) dal 1942, sf. 1/3, 2, "prot. 15893, oggetto: Fossoli=Convenzione col Comune di Carpi per la demolizione dei manufatti costituenti l'Ex Campo prigionieri di guerra" (July 18, 1946).
23. See: "Una città di fratelli," *Il Popolo*, April 1, 1951 and Corrado Alvaro, "Un poco d'amore," *La Stampa*, April 1, 1951.
24. "Un camp de concentration deviant une oasis d'amour," *La Croix*, October 2, 1951.
25. As you contemplate the answer to this question, I encourage you to revisit the cover image of this book, which is a copy of a poster of Don Zeno's community of "Young Apostles" from 1949. Photo courtesy of Archivio Nomadelfia.
26. Don Zeno's disapproval of capitalism earned him communist support and in so doing inspired the Vatican's reproach of his vocal criticism of the DC. For more on the tensions between communism and the Catholic hierarchy in the early postwar period, see Giovanni Miccoli, "Cattolici e comunisti nel secondo dopoguerra: memoria storica, ideologia e lotta politica," *Studi Storici*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (1997), pp. 951–991; Michael Phayer, *The Catholic Church and the Holocaust, 1930–1965* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2001); Roberto Pertici, *Chiesa e state in Italia: dalla grande guerra al nuovo concordato (1914–1984)* (Roma e Bologna: Mulino, 2009); Alfonso Botti, *Religione questione cattolica e DC nella politica comunista (1944–5)* (Rimini: Maggioli Editore, 1981); and Carlo Felice Casula, *Cattolici-comunisti e sinistra Cristiana (1938–1945)* (Bologna: Mulino, 1976).
27. For an overview of the representations of Don Zeno by the press, see: Umberto Casari, "Don Zeno Saltini in alcune testimonianze giornalistiche del dopoguerra," in *Don Zeno e Nomadelfia: Tra società civile e società religiosa*, eds. Maurilio Guasco and Paolo Trionfini (Brescia: Editrice Morcelliana, 2001), pp. 149–163, and Remo Rinaldi, *Storia di Don Zeno e Nomadelfia: Volume Secondo (1947–1962)* (Roma: Fondazione Nomadelfia, 2003), pp. 198–215.
28. Gordon, *The Holocaust in Italian Culture*, p. 149.
29. Levi and Camon, *Conversations with Primo Levi*, p. 25.
30. Ibid.

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