

Titoism, Self-Determination, Nationalism, Cultural Memory

VOLUME TWO, TITO'S YUGOSLAVIA, STORIES UNTOLD

Edited by Gorana Ognjenović & Jasna Jozelić

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Editors

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Volume Two, Tito's Yugoslavia, Stories Untold

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To my parents, Faketa Ćurčić Jozelić and Krunoslav Jozelić, who taught me that justice is the essence of humanity. They taught me to follow the belief that "unity and brotherhood" and "equality for all" are not just political paroles but a way of living.

The Uniqueness and Non-uniqueness of Josip Broz Tito—A Foreword

This volume, ably assembled by Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić, tells the story of the man who led socialist Yugoslavia for three-and-a-half decades and of his collaborators in constructing a system that was not entirely "of the East," while clearly not "of the West" either. The range of topics covered in this volume is impressive, ranging from the Tito regime's controlling destinies of the internees from Yugoslavia in Nazi camps in Norway after World War II to the annual Tito birthday celebrations, to Partisan films, to more traditional but no less interesting subjects, such as non-alignment, brotherhood and unity, and the suppression of the multi-party system immediately after World War II. And, as these chapters show, socialist Yugoslavia had some unique features.

Josip Broz Tito was and remains unique in some politically telling ways. First, he is the only Eastern European Communist leader of the immediate post–World War II generation who continues to command a certain amount of adulation in parts of what once was socialist Yugoslavia. Whether one thinks of Hungary's Mátyás Rákosi or Poland's Bolesław Bierut or Albania's Enver Hoxha, or any of the other Communists who came to power in Central and SouthEastern Europe at the end of World War II, none of them attracts particular interest, let alone a following. Yet in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia, Tito is still remembered with respect—at least in some circles. Croatia's capital city even boasts a public square named after the longtime Yugoslav president, while in Serbia, in late 2009, Tito's grandson, Josip Joška Broz, was elected head of a newly forming Communist Party. In Bosnia, one may find Café

Tito in downtown Sarajevo, and Tito mugs, adorned with his likeness, continue to be on sale, alongside other Tito paraphernalia.

Tito was unique in a second respect. Where the Communists holding leadership positions in the Soviet bloc based their claim to legitimacy on the promise of economic equality and full employment, commitment to a full welfare state (anti-capitalism), and proletarian internationalism (translated as subservience to the Soviet Union), Tito and his immediate successors based their claims on an entirely different triad. Two of the elements of this triad—self-management and non-alignment—were devised specifically to legitimize Yugoslavia's independent path, eventually accepted by the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in 1955. Self-management, or so the Yugoslav Communists proclaimed at their Seventh Congress in 1958, was no less than a higher stage of socialism that the Soviets had achieved, while non-alignment provided a rationale for the repudiation of proletarian internationalism. To these, the Yugoslavs added the concept of brotherhood and unity, in effect a claim to inter-ethnic harmony. Tito himself would claim, in 1979, that the Yugoslav "national question" had been solved *in principle*, and, by "in principle" he meant that it had not yet been solved *in practice*.

What is striking about the legitimizing schemes of both the Soviet bloc states and socialist Yugoslavia is that neither scheme referred to political succession as such and, as Guglielmo Ferrero noted more than 70 years ago,[1] agreement on the rules and procedures of political succession is central to achieving political legitimacy. Thus, dynastic monarchies, whether absolute or constitutional, have justified succession by the rule of primogeniture, or some variation thereof. Systems of representative government have justified political succession by professing to honor the rule that the candidate or political party that gains the greatest number of votes is entitled to take the reins of government. Both of these schemes are open to subversion—by imposters (such as the two False Dimitrys in early seventeenth-century Russia) in the case of dynastic succession and by electoral fraud in the case of representative systems. But what they have in common—the justification and the disqualification of voters of incumbency according to a rule of succession—distinguishes both of them from Communist systems. The latter, whether explicitly (as in the case of Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin or Romania's Nicolae Ceauşescu) or implicitly, ultimately laid claim to office on the basis of their superior understanding of the principles of governance—de facto appealing to a principle reminiscent, up to a point, of Plato's *Republic*.

Tito was unique in yet a third respect, namely in erecting a system of collective leadership that was supposed to take charge after his death. The widespread slogan in summer 1980—"after Tito, Tito"—already suggested that the system hung on the symbolic power of a leader who was no longer among the living. The brief era of collective leadership in the post-Stalin USSR is not comparable for two reasons. First, the eight members of the Yugoslav collective presidency represented the eight federal units comprising the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia and were organized as a formal body. The post-Stalin collective leadership in the Soviet Union was not a formal body, even though it was made up of the strongest members of the Politburo, and, with the exception of Anastas Mikoyan, consisted entirely of Russians. And second, the chairmanship of the Yugoslav collective presidency rotated each year—in a system that lasted for a decade. In the Soviet case, by contrast, Khrushchev immediately took the post of First Secretary for himself, while Georgi Malenkov occupied the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers until he was replaced in 1955 by Nikolai Bulganin who, in turn, had to surrender the post three years later to Khrushchev. And finally, Tito was more generous than other Communist leaders in allowing various associations to function outside party control. These included a music guild for young people, a technical council, film clubs, and mountain-climbing associations.

To be sure, there are also ways in which Tito was *not* unique. To begin with, in Yugoslavia as elsewhere in the Communist world, the Communist Party exercised a monopoly of power and did not permit other parties to compete in the political arena. Second, as elsewhere, the system that Tito and his associates set up involved systematic efforts to penetrate or influence the churches—whether (as in the early days) through the establishment of regime-friendly priests' associations or through the recruitment of clergy as informers.[2] Third, one may recall the brutal way in which Tito dealt with political opposition in the early years, first driving non-Communist politicians such as Milan Grol and Dragoljub Jovanović from power and then rounding up pro-Stalin Communists after June 1948, and sending them to Goli Otok (Bare Island), the notorious prison camp. Fourth, Tito established a system of control over and censorship of the media and publishing, which was typical of Communist countries. And fifth, the cult of the leadership was itself a typical feature in the Communist world, even if the details differed from country to country.[3]

Many commentators have stated that Tito was larger than life. Thus, in Chap. 5 for this two-volume book, Latinka Perović quotes Serb novelist

Dobrica Ćosić describing Tito as having "an unusual, impressive personality" and of exuding "strength, health, manly beauty, simplicity, and superiority." Fitzroy Maclean, who met Tito during the Partisan War (or, the People's Liberation War, as it was officially termed), would later recall the Yugoslav leader's "never-failing sense of humor; his unashamed delight in minor pleasures of life; a natural diffidence in human relationships, giving way to a natural friendliness…; a violent temper…; a considerateness and generosity constantly made manifest in small ways; [and] a surprising readiness to see both sides of a question."[4] Above all, there was the strength of his personality, so that David Binder could comment, in the film *Tito and the Power of Resistance* (1978), that, upon entering a room, Tito's presence would fill the entire space.

Tito displayed a firm determination to win at politics, and a readiness to resort to ruthless means to do so. This ruthlessness was clearly shown in the speedy suppression of the re-emergent multiparty system at the end of World War II, as Zdenko Radelić shows, as well as in the treatment of suspected Soviet sympathizers—Cominformists as recorded in Tvrtko Jakovina's contribution to this set. And when Fidel Castro tried to divert the Non-Aligned Movement into a "progressive," that is, pro-Soviet, direction, Tito traveled to Havana, at the age of 88, in order to do battle with the Cuban leader and keep the movement equidistant between the blocs. Although as Zachary Irwin notes, "the aspirations of the [non-aligned] movement could not prevent serious conflict among its members," it remained symbolically and perhaps also politically important for more than two decades—until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 demonstrated the impotence of that movement in the face of military muscle.

Tito and his coterie had come to power as a result of their victory in 1944–1945, and they made the most of the Partisan myth in an effort to legitimize their rule. This entailed silence about Partisan atrocities, as well as about atrocities committed by Chetniks who crossed over to Partisan ranks. But the Partisan myth also involved active propaganda and here, as Chap. 3 by Jurica Pavičić shows, the genre of Partisan films played a vital role, even spawning subgenres such as Partisan thrillers, Partisan comedies, Partisan spy films, and of course Partisan epics, such as the 1973 film, *Sutjeska*, in which Richard Burton, who had played the role of Leon Trotsky in a film released just the previous year, was cast as Tito.

Elected eventually as "president without termination of mandate"—rather than merely "president for life"—Tito seemed larger than life even in death. After lingering for four months between life and death in the Ljubljana Medical Centre, Tito succumbed on 4 May 1980. His funeral, rehearsed and re-rehearsed for weeks on end, was staged as a mass spectacle, with representatives from 128 countries, including 31 presidents, 22 prime ministers, 4 kings, 6 princes, and 47 foreign ministers. Hundreds of thousands of Yugoslavs lined the streets of Belgrade to watch the funeral procession, while Yugoslavs in Dubrovnik, Split, and elsewhere huddled wherever there was a television, in order to witness the end of an era. For weeks after the funeral, Yugoslavs gathered at railway stations and other public places to sing the patriotic song "Jugoslavijo" and the old Partisan song "Comrade Tito, we pledge to you that we shall not deviate from your path." As time would tell, it took less than a decade for certain Yugoslavs in high places precisely to deviate from Tito's path and to set the country on the road to fragmentation, collapse, and war.

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Notes

1. Guglielmo Ferrero, *The Principles of Power: The Great Political Crises of History* (New York: Arno Press, 1972 [original publication, 1942]).
2. For details, see Sabrina P. Ramet, ed., *Religion and Politics in Post-Socialist Central and Southeastern Europe: Challenges since 1989* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, in production).
3. Concerning leadership cults in Eastern Europe, see Balazs Apor, J.C. Behrends, P. Jones, and E.A. Rees, eds., *The Leader Cult in Communist Dictatorships: Stalin and the Eastern Bloc* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004).
4. Fitzroy Maclean, "Tito: A Study," in *Foreign Affairs,* vol. 28, no. 2 (January 1950), p. 241.

Tito's Yugoslavia *Stories Untold* Preface

As the disintegration of Tito's Yugoslavia into its successor states proceeded, the power also decentralized and therefore a lot of information, previously unknown became available to the public. Today, it is possible to search in archives for documents, earlier unknown information, that can result in further developing of the knowledge about Tito's Yugoslavia. As a result, a more detailed and nuanced picture of what Yugoslavia was all about is slowly emerging throughout the academic research literature. After reading most of the literature published on the theme, we came to a conclusion that this volume needs to be organized in order to meet some mishaps and flaws in already existing descriptions, followed by a serious lack of detail and nuance in certain aspects of the descriptions already made. Examples are some important details were still untold, some aspects of the narrative were selectively told, and some descriptions of what we knew about whom we were and what in the end happened, were simply wrong. Our aim by producing this volume is to challenge decades of some superficial and selective rhetoric that came from different sides/political interests, foreign as well as domestic. In other words, our contributions are meant to fill in some of those black holes that unfortunately got to see the daylight and lived long and prosperous lives determining the idea of what Tito's Yugoslavia was, longer than should have been the case. What we are hoping to achieve is a more detailed picture that might surprise those who thought they knew it all, as well as we are hoping to inspire others to read more about this historically social experiment that against all odds actually did exist and prospered for a while, in the midst of the spiderwebs of the global political chaos that even today does not seem to

be on its way to reach equilibrium of global peace that is actually practically possible.

Why is the study of *Tito's Yugoslavia* relevant today?

Neither the rise nor the fall of Tito's Yugoslavia occurred in a political vacuum.

In the end for various reasons it vanished more or less overnight in one of the worst bloodsheds ever seen in Europe. A bloodshed that, despite all international expectations and demands, seems not to be easy to either forget or forgive, especially in those areas of the formal Republic devastated by the conflict. All reconciliation studies show that the process of healing needs honesty about crimes committed and systematic positive action, which would provide conditions necessary for wounds to heal, of which, unfortunately, there is not much to be seen as yet.

Since Tito's Yugoslavia physically no longer exists, one would think that the task of retrospectively reflecting on it as a phenomenon would be easier, but, as we all know, appearances can be deceiving.

In these two volumes, we take up a series of questions that deeply affected the politics, which belonged to the core definition of the political dialectics between the former Yugoslav republics. These questions and answers we present have a key role in understanding the art of fine balancing between the Communist (revolutionary) totalitarian regime and socialist republic as its antidote. The result of which was pulling a great number of population as active participants into Tito's idealist project. The fact that "we" (as citizens of Yugoslavia) at some point actually surpassed the republic borders. This is why repeating some of these questions in the light of the newly gained information based on documented facts are of great importance for the Yugoslav successor states in their current state of political independence from one another.

In these two volumes, by *Tito's Yugoslavia* we mean the time period of the country's existence (1945–1990). Therefore, essays will not in the same degree refer to Tito's person as a key answer to the countries rule as

such. Essays in various degrees refer to Tito's persona as the key ruler of the country in its totalitarian and the consequent socialist edition.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić

A single point that everyone can agree upon is that during its existence Tito's Yugoslavia represented many different things to many different people around the globe. For example, in 1999, Tito was classified by *Time* magazine, 19 years after his death, as one of the '100 Most Important People of the Twentieth Century'. Titoism as a cultural phenomenon in Yugoslavia was already in motion during the 1950s. It was a cultural phenomenon well combined with the public Communist ideology that was systematically presented as 'savior' and therefore had a monopolistic position as official ideology and culture. In the beginning, this combination was necessary for the recovery of the newly born nation, as an ideological glue for patching up the rifle holes in common memory so that the country could be built from the ruins. As World War II and revolutionary totalitarianism increasingly became distant memories slowly fading away, the cult was only growing in size and intensity. Titoism as a cult was a complex issue. First, Tito was a leader of the anti-fascist movement that resulted in liberation of the country. After the war, he quickly became a symbol of an absolute authority (politically, military, and symbolically) by becoming general secretary of the Komunistička Partija Jugoslavije and

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the country's lifelong president and army marshal/commandant. The symbolism employed in the development of the cult was clearly a result of a process (during and after the war, and many years after), rather than a marketing strategy.

On some levels the classical cult phenomenon resembled any other cult in North Korea or the USSR. Since 1957, Tito's official birthday was celebrated as Youth Day. The relay race was organized for the first time in 1945 and many millions of people took part in it. The relay race took place every year, where a baton was carried with a birthday pledge to Josip Broz Tito, ostensibly from all the young people of Yugoslavia. Almost all the cities had his name on the main streets and squares and even some cities were named after him. Many of his residences were built around Yugoslavia, even though they were never his private property. In his birth town of Kumrovec a monument was raised and his house was turned into a museum, a place that became an obligatory destination for all followers of his personal cult.

On other levels, its development did not even have anything to do with Tito's personal interference, an example being the Yugoslavian film industry[1], which lived a life of its own and contributed primarily to the glorification of the revolutionary period and Tito only as a secondary motif. The glorification of the 'revolutionary spirit' and 'new nation' and the 'way it supposedly came about' was served in Hollywood style: a series of movies that the younger generations were exposed to on every front, at home, in schools, and so on. This was a part of an official ideology and culture. Even though Tito was fascinated by Hollywood films and stars, movies, and everything American, the films created as part of the Yugoslav filmography were not a part of the conscious political plan of building and supporting the personal cult.

The cult developed further during the 1960s and as the years went by and society's needs changed, the cult also shifted its role. During the 1960s it was all about smoke and mirrors for the purpose of patching up the black holes once each nation started heading in its own direction as the crisis in 1962 had shown. Officially, the character of the state changed through the amendment to the constitution in 1971, where the union of state republics 'discusses' important issues. The leadership becomes a group affair, even though Tito kept his position (awaiting his natural departure). The whole transition was masked by the Titoism as a cult, as a strategy for 'saving face'.[2]

The ideological core of Titoism was not Tito. Only the conceptual base for the performance act of Titoism was Tito. The ideological core or the backbone of Titoism, which enabled him to recruit for his cause so many individuals across the social classes, ethnic groups, and nations, was built much earlier than when Tito's Yugoslavia came into being. It was the idea of national self-determination (including succession). The idea that was taken over from Lenin and Stalin and developed and adapted for the making of Tito's Yugoslavia was 'revolutionary self-determination' resembling heavily a 'democratic political right' of the individual and nation, followed on the ideological level by 'Titoism' as a historical phenomenon or an institution.[3] It was one of the revolutionary promises that Tito kept and delivered in a final edition of the constitution in 1974. This was nonetheless a concept that demonstrates the historical continuity of these collective human rights in the state-building aspirations of the Yugoslav and other nations and ethnic groups represented in this territory. Being the backbone of Yugoslavia, it was the same concept that played the key role for later breaking of Tito's Yugoslavia as we knew it. It was nevertheless an ideological concept that very well reflected Tito's personal conviction and faithfulness to the idea of national equality. The formula of federal organization was supposed to settle the national question and the survival of the Yugoslav state.

Tito's authenticity as an ideological leader, his true belief in one nation, was obvious in every speech or public address, where he always had plans for the entire nation on equal grounds. This willingness to see everyone as equals was demonstrated in his decision in 1971, when for the first time Bosnian Muslims/Bošnjaks were allowed to declare themselves as a nation and not only a religious group. In addition, autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo, which existed from 1945, was finalized by 1973 through amendments to the constitution as an independence on the level of the republics.

One of the effects that such intense transformation or modernization of what Yugoslavia was before World War II to Tito's Yugoslavia from 1945, had its price. Modernization demanded much flexibility and futuristic vision that not everyone around Tito was either able or willing to accept or follow. The reluctance was clearly stated in their support of the idea of a unitary and centralized socialist state as the only possible Yugoslavia, against the market economy and confederation format of Yugoslavia that was embodied in the constitution from 1974.[4] The approach was taken by individuals whose relationship toward communism was a substitute for their relationship towards religion: the ideals were clean but they were betrayed.

The source of disagreement was formulated in 1951 when the focus was turned to the mismatch between revolutionary ideals and post-revolutionary reality/developments that some define as the crisis of the (Serbian) nation.

Due to either inability or unwillingness to follow the speed of developments of Tito's Yugoslavia and its tremendous social, political, and economic transition within a relatively short time, a parallel political dimension was slowly developing: a remedy for a crisis, a form of existential security, was searched for in the past. A remedy or a new definition of what progress should have been and an interpretation of the crisis of (Serbian) nation represented was spread through literature as one of many effective methods. Soon after, the project became a collective project, an institution, a networking system, where nationalism became the key notion. The redefinition included the new understanding of Tito's Yugoslavia, which in the new interpretation was seen as a negative episode of the history of Serbia, an era of demise of the great Serbian nation. Soon after Tito's death, a speech made at the Kosovo celebration in 1981, confirmed that with Tito's demise, the Titoism had left the premises as well. The 'de-titoisation' that followed envisioned Tito as the greatest enemy of the Serbian people. With the demise of Brionic Tito, Brionic Yugoslavia, and Brionic socialism, according to them the war was inevitable for the purpose of re-establishing the old/new order of things.[5]

Was the demise of Tito's Yugoslavia the result of the Serbian nationalists program only?

Not quite. First, in 1990 Slovenia declared its return to Kardelj's interpretation of self-determination in its constitution, including the right to succession, as an enduring, integral, and inalienable right, reasserting the Slovenian national project.[6] That same year, Franjo Tudjman, the newly elected president of Croatia, used the principal of national self-determination for doubting Tito's most important accomplishment: the Yugoslavian federation. Tudjman stressed the fact that the Croats never abandoned the principles of Antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije and that Croats are only reaffirming the right of the nation to self-determination, resurrecting also their own national project. Soon after the Serb minority in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina followed their example and demanded their right to self-determination by expelling all non-Serb population from their occupied areas and proclaiming their 'National Assembly of the Serb Republic' a state. The international community on the other hand decided to ignore the principle of self-determination as the concept underlying the

state independence of Croatia and Slovenia. Instead it concluded that the Yugoslav state collapsed and that the disassociation of its federal units was thus possible.

Even though Tito's Yugoslavia did not stand its final test of time, the recent findings prove that one cannot say the same when it comes to Titoism as a culture.

Just when everyone thought that Tito's Yugoslavia at best was all over and long forgotten and only remembered as the worst thing that ever happened to any of the nations, nostalgia kicked in.

The amnesia and selective memory enforced by the contemporary nation (successor) states is increasingly challenged by a new form of fashion statement based on clothes that previously were a part of compulsory apparel (i.e. pioneer and military uniforms); a new form of cultural nostalgia for Tito's Yugoslavia as a form of criticism of the current state of affairs.[7] Nonetheless, Tito as a cult[8] figure is experiencing a second renaissance through fashion choices; an increasing use of memorabilia and sales of souvenirs such as t-shirts with the message, '*Tito come back, we forgive you everything*'. This post-socialist nostalgia in its sentimental and emancipatory aspect, and global retro-aesthetics are the 'untold stories' from those times as they appear and develop here and now, in post-Yugoslav and post-socialist transition: a past in contemporary political discourses is actually worn. The current political and economic situation in the successor states and the new rise of the right wing extremism within them leads the people to make association to the revolutionary period of Tito's Yugoslavia.

Kumrovec, as the birthplace of Tito, was a part of the Titoist ideological message communicated as a complex yet very direct message that had become an annual pilgrimage for all those who are mourning its demise. The groups of individuals who visit Kumrovec are only growing in numbers each year. It used to be a must destination for all Titoists during the existence of Tito's Yugoslavia. Kumrovec was one of the important carriers of Tito's legitimacy: it highlighted that he was one of the people, that he was of peasant origin. In the 1990s Kumrovec was the forbidden socialist anti-national symbol with all the stigma attached to it[9] moved underground throughout Croatia, became *terra incognita*: memories were stored deep down in the freezer of history, never to be released in public again.[10]

Today, even though Kumrovec to a certain extent still bears the stigma of the symbolic 'cradle' of the former socialist ideology, its reputation

seems to be on a rebound. In May 2014 the latest celebration of Tito's birthday climaxed to a whole new level. The organization, choreography, and the structure of the event, as well as diverse practices of the participants, largely resembled the previous celebrations. Several thousands of visitors from various parts of Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia, and so on, came together to reminisce together over 'the good old times'. The mainstream politicians, the representatives of local and county government climbed the stage in Kumrovec and in front of the sign 'The Day of Youth—the Day of Joy', they addressed the participants by highlighting Tito's merits and the need to look up to his anti-fascist ideals in times of hardship. For the first time the local authorities officially acknowledged that people keep coming to Kumrovec, whether the political elites regard it as a forbidden place or not. They come to Kumrovec to express their nostalgia, to create continuity between their past and their present, to criticize their current circumstances and the power relations, or just to have fun with their old comrades and enjoy the picturesque scenery. In Kumrovec they tell and re-enact the stories rarely told in the public spheres of today's Croatia.

But if we are to speak of aspects of Tito's ideology that were invented 'before their time', there is no better candidate than 'brotherhood and unity',[11] despite the fact that it never was either completely true or existing on all levels of the Yugoslav nation.

This concept is the only one that outlived its purpose within the borders of former Yugoslavia only to regain its reapplication on the European level: the concept 'brotherhood and unity' a futuristic social vision, projecting already then what will be happening now.

These days, all this seems rather bittersweet, when all the Yugoslav successor states are so keen on entering the European Union (EU), for which recognizing the rights of others is one of the entry conditions. It feels almost as a self-irony brought about by the increasing need on the EU level to reassess the multicultural ideology and its mechanisms that existed in the region, and, at least for awhile, used to unite different ethnic, religious, and cultural groups. Not the least because even though the peoples today reside in the successor states, the multicultural ideology is a basic part of the identity and daily practice that never changed, despite the conflicts during the 1990s and multiple horrific crimes of ethnic cleansing in all its parts. Understanding former multicultural attempts is crucial for adopting a new type of multiculturalism in postwar ex-Yugoslav countries that are mainly still in the process of transition. At the same time analyz-

ing multicultural experiences from the Balkan history in their complexity, especially the ongoing practice of denouncing the distinction between religion and ethnicity and what it has to say for multiculturalism of the modern nation-states, in the light of the recent developments in Ukraine, seem to be of increased relevance. Understanding this form of politicization of religion done by religious organizations that currently function as a political organization in its complexity appear to be some of the most fertile ways of developing the new contemporary multicultural ideologies and enterprises for the purpose of their realization in new as well as in the same old environments. What 'brotherhood and unity' once was in the case of Yugoslavia, is what 'multiculturalism' represents today in the case of its successor states: after all we have come around 'full circle'.

Notes

1. Jurica Pavičić, *Titoist Cathedrals: The Rise and Fall of Partisan Film*, see this volume.
2. Sergej Flere, *Da li je Titova država bila totalitarna?*, Političke perspektive Časopis za istraživanje politike Originalni naučni rad UDC 316.334.3:321(497.1) 316.46:929 Tito, p. 10.
3. Albert Bing—*Titoism and National Self-determination*.
4. Latinka Perović—*Dobrica Ćosić and Josip Broz Tito*, see this volume.
5. Sonja Biserko—*Yugoslavia's Implosion: The Fatal Attraction of Serbian Nationalism*, The Norwegian Helsinki Committee, 2012.
6. Albert Bing *Titoism and Self-determination*, see this volume.
7. See also Arne Johan Vetlesen, *Nostalgia as Critique*, Dictum The Critical View, no 2 (2005).
8. Mitja Velikonja—"*Yugo vintage?*" *Preserving and Creating MemoryRthrough Clothing*, see this volume.
9. Nevena S. Alempijević and Kirsti Hjemdahl,—*Kumrovec: Tito's Birthday Party in the 21st Century*, see this volume.
10. Bet-El, Ilana, "Unimagined Communities: The Power of Memory and the Conflict in Former Yugoslavia", in *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe. Studies in the Presence of the Past*, edited by Jan-Werner Müller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 206–222.
11. Nena Močnik—*Brotherhood and Unity Goes Multiculturism*, see this volume.

CHAPTER 2

Yugoslavia's Authentic Socialism as a Pursuit of 'Absolute Modernity'

Gorana Ognjenović, Nataša Mataušić, and Jasna Jozelić

We shall focus on the impact and consequences of Tito's split from the Cominform by considering Tito's development of the socialist ideal. We believe that the Tito-Stalin split reinforced the goal of a form of Yugoslav communism that was pursued differently after 1948. One initial goal consisted of creating a form of Communist Party pluralism, resulting from broader ideological consequences of the split.

We believe that Yugoslavia attempted to create and implement a version of 'authentic socialism' distinct from that of the USSR. Five main characteristics of Yugoslav's 'authentic socialism' express the main differences between the Yugoslav's 'authentic socialism' and the Soviet/Eastern bloc's 'real-socialism'.

(a) Self-management socialism: social instead of private ownership, workers alone were in charge of decision-making about production and distribution of goods and profits (decentralisation) through the workers union;

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(b) The politics of the non-aligned that resulted in an international recognition and the alternative form of power position that resulted;
(c) Multi- (Communist) party system;
(d) Country's open borders;
(e) Western culture's (all of its aspects) influence on the ordinary people's lives: film, music, fashion, arts, and sciences…

We consider it self-evident that the historical and political events that brought Yugoslavia to this extraordinary position within the Communist world were dramatic and unexpected, even for those who had no choice but to actively participate in them.

The Initial Road Signs

At the end of World War II, Yugoslavia enjoyed the prestige of its victorious resistance against fascism, and a positive global reputation. Even though Yugoslavia was never able to draw the postwar map of Europe, the country managed to advance its goals despite the fact that these objectives often clashed with those of 'higher powers'. Yugoslavia's battle for its 'authentic socialism' falls under the category of these goals.

As a part of its domestic policies, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and its leader, Josip Broz Tito, pursued their goals on two levels simultaneously. On one hand, they communicated propaganda through strong and well-organised communication channels of the forces fighting the Peoples Liberation War. On the other hand, they led battles for the final liberation from Fascist occupation. As a result of this parallel strategy against fascism and the majority of participants of Peoples Liberation Movement supported the idea of a federal Yugoslavia and abolition of the monarchy.[1]

Already then, Tito's leadership style demonstrated a consistent and broadly based revolutionary spirit. This leadership spirit, combined with his leftist and independent style of decision-making and creative improvisations, had irritated Tito's greatest role model, Stalin. The problem was that Stalin, in exchange for his 'support' and 'inclusion' of little Yugoslavia in the Eastern bloc expected a total submission of the Yugoslav people to his rule, a submission identical to the Eastern bloc countries that followed Stalin either freely or less so.[2]

At the end of the war, the Peoples Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was established (29 November 1945). At this point the attribute 'socialist'

is still not in its name. In the same way in the 1946 constitution (based on the constitution of the USSR), the attributes 'socialist' or 'communist' are still nowhere to be seen. However, in practice, the 'grass-roots' realisation of the Communist/socialist ideas actually exceeded the tempo of the same processes in other socialist countries.[3]

The agrarian reform (August 1945), practically realised under the slogan 'land belongs to those who are working it' was the first revolutionary act of Communist rule by which peasants gained the private ownership of the land.[4] Prior to introducing this agrarian reform, multiple confiscations of the same land from the various private owners were executed. Land was confiscated from those convicted of taking side with the enemy. The *Volksdeutsch* properties were nationalised since most of the *Volksdeutsch* people were either killed or deported to Germany.[5] Land was taken (by either expropriation or confiscation) from more or less everyone, the rich landowners, shareholder societies, the church, and so on, and given to the poor. The ones who gained the private ownership of this land, as result of the agrarian reform, were mainly poor families from the remote rural areas that were moved to the rich agricultural areas during a 'colonisation process' popularly known as the '8th Offensive'. People were brought to Vojvodina, Baranja, and eastern Srijem by the so-called trains without timetable. As a rule those families whose members took part in the National Resistance Movement against occupation were of course prioritised as 'the most deserving' recipients.

The second revolutionary step of the new rule was the nationalisation of private business (December 1946) by which the most important and the most profitable businesses lost their independence. In this way the private ownership was almost completely eliminated (except the very small service branches).[6] This nationalisation meant also breaching of international legal agreements, since all of foreign businesses were also nationalised (sequestration). This particular 'revolutionary step' represented one of the biggest nationalisations of private property in Central Europe (the one executed in Czechoslovakia some years later was also as extensive), while the speed of nationalisation and development of the socialist sector in daily practice was more intense than the one developing in the USSR at the time.[7]

In 1947 the state established the first Five-Year Plan of development 1947–1951 (more popularly known as the First-Five Summers Plan since it was based on the one introduced in the USSR), which promoted the high-speed industrialisation, development of independent energy sources,

and circulation of goods.[8] Exactly from 1947 in connection to promotion of the Five-Year Plan development, the term 'socialism' is finally introduced. This brand new terminology for the institutionally established Five-Year Plan was going to be the clear indication of the introduction of socialism in Yugoslavia.

At this point the future seemed rather bright. The party seemed convinced of its correct path when suddenly a 'strange mistake' was uncovered: The legislation of the agrarian reform and colonisation from 23 August 1945 was based on an assumption that land belongs to those who are working it. As result of this agrarian reform, peasants held the private land. The only problem was that this particular reform legislation in practice turned out to be contrary to Marx's ideological attempt to eliminate individual peasant ownership and to establish collective (state) ownership. But was this really a mistake as everyone was led to believe at the time? Could it be that this particular move, creating a reform and legislating it, though contrary to Marxist legacy, was one of building 'authentic socialism' and one of its creative leadership tactics for gaining another step ahead of others? Many claim this particular event as a form of 'con act' for the purpose of leading another 'double game' like those during the war. As it happens, at the time (May 1945), just before the elections for the constitutional parliament (11 November 1945), Tito and his comrades were in dire need of the peasants' political support in the coming democratic election. Once the support from the peasants was official and the election won, the legislation was simply reversed in order to fit again perfectly with the ideological setting of the new state while privatised land was blamed as a 'legislative error'. In other words, another battle was won through rhetorical strategy in order to avoid the threat of confrontations after the war just ended.

Tightening the Ropes

In order to gain a firmer grip on power and to start up the rationalisation and mechanisation of the agriculture (a task almost impossible to execute on smaller properties) in July 1947, the Communist rule legislated the so-called basic law of agricultural unities, which implemented collectivisation of the peasant properties according to the Soviet model. The violent introduction of this law happened at the same time as passage of the Cominform Resolution. In this way, Yugoslavia was the only country that actually chal-

lenged the ideological and practical pre-eminence of the Stalin' model. Strong peasant resistance developed into serious protest, which compelled the state in 1954 to eliminate the peasant working unions as a form of collective ownership. At the time, this event was explained as yet another one of Tito's strategies to attempt to win sympathy from other Cominform Communist states by showing as groundless Stalinist accusations while proving Yugoslav loyalty to the proclaimed Communist ideology. There was more complexity to Tito's ideological strivings than what was possible to read off these events at the time.

Establishment of the socialist social system (order) in Yugoslavia, in Communist ideology was thought of as a transitional period from capitalism to communism or to a totalitarian egalitarian society. This transition was realised under the rule of the Communist Party, and throughout the existence of Yugoslavia it was officially and ideologically based on a single party monopoly in control of all sections of political, social, economic, and cultural (even private, for example, religious) life. In practice, Yugoslav socialism implied a reduction and censorship of personal and civil liberties. The main methods of enforcement of this regime were the Communist Party, police, and secret service. At the same time the collective socialist consciousness was promoted through Pioneer and Youth organisations as well as labour brigades. When seeking employment the members of the Communist Party were always prioritised, independently of their individual skill or real individual capabilities.

This 'one-party system' became a primary source of anxiety in Western political circles when it came to what was 'more' or 'less' acceptable about Yugoslavia as a 'new form' of European socialism. In relationship to its 'friends', Yugoslavia gained through its political pragmatism and despite this particular objection. What no one from the outside seemed to understand was that Tito's 'one-party system' never was just a one-party system. Still today, such mistaken accusations are present in historical and political debates despite the countless studies proving the fact that different Communist parties (according to each republic) and the fractions within the Communist Party of Yugoslavia were both numerous and influential. Tito's speech to protesting students in 1968, when he claimed that the League of Communists would not allow 'parties within the parties', made a clear reference to this phenomenon that everyone was so keen to claim did not exist. The speech in itself was used as an attempt to calm the situation down, which was ultimately achieved. Latest studies show that the 'parties within the party' were in addition to the party sections across a

number of republics and autonomous municipalities. Communist 'pluralism', the fact that every Republic had their own Communist Party, also was expressed through well-organised elite circles around Tito that were pulling the party decision-making each in distinctive directions to win realisation of their own goals as 'lobbies'.[9] Moreover, the split from the USSR demonstrated even further an ideological pluralism, which resulted in clear differentiation of the types of Communist pluralism practiced in this form of Yugoslav and Soviet political dialectics. As a result of the split with the USSR, Tito established a form of Communist pluralism, consistent with Communist rule, while at the same time redefining the Soviet model in a way unacceptable to Stalin.

Yugoslavian internal developments were closely connected with the developments on the international political scene. As soon as World War II was over, organisation was immediately started of the two ideological, military, and economic blocs. Accordingly, in April 1949 in Washington, DC, the 12 states from both sides of the Atlantic founded the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Pact. One of the tasks of this group, if not the primary task of NATO, was to challenge threats from the Communist part of the world and stop the spread of communism in the rest of Europe. Two years earlier, in Fulton, Missouri, Winston Churchill in his famous speech stated: 'from Stechin (Stettin) in the Baltic to Trieste in Adriatic, an iron curtain has fallen across the continent. Behind that black line lie capitals of all old states in Eastern Europe: Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Bucharest, Budapest, Belgrade and Sofia, all these famous cities and citizens from these territories, I have to say, lie within the Soviet domain and they are under influence, one way or the other, not only of the Soviet ideology but also the control of Moscow which is under constant increase … Communist parties, which previously were very weak in these countries, are increasing in influence and their power which is greater than themselves are attempting to promote the totalitarian power everywhere.'[10]

The Warsaw Pact, the contract or the agreement about the 'loyal friendship, cooperation and reciprocal help' was signed in Warsaw on 15 May 1955. All Communist countries in Europe signed this treaty (except Yugoslavia) and included the USSR, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, German Democratic Republic (DDR), Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Through this agreement, the USSR gained a right to intervene if a member country tries to stray from the path of socialism. This social-political organisation of the countries (USSR and Eastern

Bloc) is ever since the 1970s referred to as 'real-socialism'. The term was introduced for the first time by the Soviet and Eastern European theorists. Later on, the term was also accepted and broadly used by all the critics of the Soviet system. The term 'real-socialism' was used to stress the difference between themselves and other Communist systems, which also had their ideology source in Marx-Leninism (Yugoslavia, Mao's China, and selected Third World countries) therefore also called themselves 'socialist'.

Until 1948, Yugoslavia was no different from 'loyal' socialist countries of Eastern and Central Europe under the control of the USSR. Yugoslavia had almost the same kind of socialist system as the so-called peoples democracies. To promote cohesion among the Communist parties in Europe, the 'Inform Bureau' or Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) was founded in September 1947. The original Soviet idea was that the Inform Bureau should consist of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Italy, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR (obviously excluding Albania and the DDR). The Inform Bureau's main office was in Belgrade, the capital of Yugoslavia. The sudden choice of Belgrade afforded Yugoslavia many advantages as the leading Communist country in southeastern Europe. Its position was intended as a location for the exchange of information and resolving problems within and between parties. The idea of a uniform approach expressed Stalin's way of spreading Soviet influence in Europe

The most difficult time for the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) came on 28 June 1948 with the Inform Bureau's resolution condemning the Yugoslav party. Stalin's apparent annoyance suggested multiple sources. The CPY was accused of a lack of 'democracy' and 'further strengthening of the forces of capitalism'. Despite this sharp rhetoric, these claims were in reality only an expression of a frustration about and an attack on the Yugoslav territorial ambitions in Italy and Austria on one side and Soviet clear rejection of support to Tito on the other. The Cominform Resolution was also an attack on the Yugoslav role in the Greek war that resulted in Tito's direct confrontation with Stalin as well as Tito's plans for Balkan federation (Yugoslav aspirations on territories of Albania and Bulgaria), a lack of acceptance for the non-equal relationship in economic relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR, and finally the Soviet attempt to force its domination on the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Some theorists, such as Sabrina P. Ramet, argue that the problem was that Tito did not have any intentions of submitting himself and

his country to a total Soviet rule, as did Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavs thought of themselves as co-operators of Stalin while Stalin thought of himself as the ruler of Yugoslavia, until the conflict exploded in June 1948.[11]

In addition, one can always speculate whether this moment of disobedience was a result of Tito's confidence, since he won a number of essential battles through rhetorical persuasion in contrast to pure terror/iron fist as practiced in the USSR by Stalin. Even today in the aftermath of Tito's rule and strong criticism of his methods of rule, times were as bloody as Stalin's, Tito managed to avoid becoming anyone's 'messenger'. Instead, he singlehandedly made the worst (violent) decisions of his political career, making it easier to focus the blame on him after his death in 1980.

At this point the USSR and all other Communist countries stopped all contact with Yugoslavia. Being completely dependent on the financial and military help from the USSR and having bad relationships with Western countries, Yugoslavia confronted an impossible situation.[12] Because of the danger of a military intervention, a general mobilisation was announced and huge military and police forces were organised and a general state of emergency proclaimed, one not called off before 1953.

The general state of emergency did not only consider the enemies from the outside because the enemy from within was just as big of a threat. Consequently, an uncompromising purge took place. 'Stalin's methods' were used to clean Yugoslavia of Stalinists. All those who actually were sympathisers and those who were just suspected of sympathising with the Resolution were exiled to Bare Island, which in the summer of 1949 was turned into a prison camp. Bare Island and St. Gregory were the main island camps, even though the incarcerated Inform Bureau members and sympathisers were placed at other locations as well. In Croatia the other camps were in Sisak, Lonjsko Polje, and the islands of Ugljan, Vis, Komiža, Stara Gradiška, and even parts of the earlier Ustaša camps Jasenovac. In Serbia they were in Sremska Mitrovica, Banjica, Glavnjaca, and Petrovaradin. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, camps were in Zenica, Vareš, and Bileća.[13] Due to its ideological background Bare Island became a symbol of the Communist oppression for coming generations.

The number of incarcerated Inform Bureau people at these locations was never revealed with certainty. According to Aleksandar Ranković, minister of domestic affairs in FNRY at the time, from 1948 to 1952, according to an administrative procedure (meaning without any form for juridical procedure), 11,128 people were punished. The punishment came

in a form of administratively corrective measures of socially useful labour to which prisoners at these locations were sentenced. The methods of punishment or torture practiced at these prison camps were developed by agents of the Central State Security (UDB-a). In addition, regular civil and military courts incarcerated 2527 individuals.[14]

In August 1983 Radovan Radonjić, professor of political science at University of Titograd and a leading Montenegrin Communist, published the first complete statistics of incarcerations carried out during the purge of 'Comminformists'. In his analysis there are 55,663 registered and 16,268 incarcerated or sentenced Inform Bureau individuals. Among them there were 4153 officers of the Yugoslav army, 1722 members of the state security agency (police), and 2616 various political leaders, where 8 were members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.[15]

Even though many years had passed since the first deportations of Inform Bureau prisoners to Bare Island and St. Gregory in July 1949, the truth about the horrors, the life of torture, and the cruel methods of isolation, 'methods of re-learning' and 'forced "socially useful" labour', the Yugoslav public remained mainly unaware of this aspect of Tito's rule. It is exactly because of the routine torture and abuse to which prisoners were subjected that prisoners were unwilling to discuss their experience. The administrators such as Jova Kapčić, a Montenegrin member of the CPY and former assistant to Aleksandar Ranković and one of the organisers of the incarceration system at Bare Island, attempted to excuse the brutal methods by blaming it on political pressure: 'It was like to be or not to be, we were under an enormous pressure. If we did not organise Bare Island, the whole of Yugoslavia would have turned into Bare Island. We were suppressed and we were not going to allow the Fifth Column to grow'.[16]

The Third Exit

In its relationship to the Western countries, Yugoslavia's pragmatic approach was a useful instrument in overcoming the ideological differences. A decision of the US National Security Council in February 1951 concluded that an independent Yugoslavia can be supported only through support of its Communist regime as an anti-Soviet regime.[17]

That same year (14 November) a military agreement between Yugoslavia and the USA was signed, and enormous amounts of military equipment was brought into the territory of Yugoslavia, everything from

heavy artillery to war airplanes. Tito visited Great Britain, as his first visit to a Western country after the end of World War II.

By signing the Balkan Pact 28 February 1953 with Greece and Turkey, who already were members of NATO from 1951, Yugoslavia indirectly became a member as well.[18]

The attempt to separate Yugoslavia ideologically from the USSR, to pursue domestic legitimacy, demanded taking the nation in a completely new direction. 'While looking for a new direction they [the CPY] criticised the bureaucracy and the socialist practice at the time, they called for a cooperation between the workers and they planned the early death of the state'.[19] In order to mark this innovation from the Soviet concept of a social development, a new 'law of self-management' was introduced that gave workers direct control over the businesses where they worked. Of course, this form of direct control was not the same as 'total control', since the party and state still oversaw everything taking place within the official state borders. Nevertheless, this law was characteristic of Yugoslav socialism (this 'workers self-rule' model was kept up as a social model until 1991).[20] The basis of self-management claimed that the means of production belonged to workers (the state ownership is abandoned and a new category of social ownership is introduced), and producers (workers) determined the means of production and the distribution of profits.

But the self-rule was not essentially an achievement of the Yugoslav Communists. In theory, instead of following *Das Kapital*, Yugoslav Communists looked to Marx's writing on the French revolution. Here they abstracted three basic ideas: a man is never an instrument, but the goal of an action; self-management, where big businesses have to be under workers control; anti-statism and the elimination of bureaucracy.[21]

The ideological ground for this self-management framework was developed by Josip Broz Tito, and its theory and the practice elaborated by Edvard Kardelj, with help from a Croat, Branko Horvat, who contributed fundamentally to the development of its theoretical and practical framework.

Because the state expropriated the means of production, the slogan 'giving the factories to workers, land to the peasants' lacked concrete meaning, even though it was never intended only as an abstract slogan. Like other slogans defining Yugoslav socialism, its expression was intended to have a deeper ideological meaning. It contained an entire programme of the socialist relations within production in a form of the rights and obligations of the workers. Therefore, the nation had to realise this slogan in

practice as well as if the nation was to really 'build socialism' (Josip Broz Tito, 26 July 1950). This was a completely new form of socialism that brought about a reduction of the centralised power and a strengthening of the local decision-making and workers rights. Even though businesses were still dependent on the state (central) planning, this was an enormous progress and the reason for the intense economic progress that followed during the years to come.

This intense progress continued all the way to the crisis in the mid-1960s, the unemployment numbers were low while the living standard was almost as high as in the Western capitalist countries. At this point, on the other hand, the contrast between the ordinary people's living standard in Yugoslavia and ordinary people's standard of living in Eastern bloc countries was incomparable.

Typically, the new Croatian constitution from 1953 affirmed social rule (worker's self-management) as the basis for the system of self-management. The introduction of the self-management resulted in a decentralisation, because a greater number of people were taking part in decision-making processes concerning business and social activities. Self-management was desired not only by the workers but also by the local and Western intelligence that saw in it a historic alternative to the Western liberal capitalism and Soviet real-socialism.[22] Some commentators considered workers self-management as a real alternative to liberal capitalism because liberal capitalism was unable to overcome its deep-seated inherent flaws.[23] When workers cooperate in production and when they realise that the profit from their work belongs to them and not to the owners of the capital, the workers self-management can clearly demonstrate that from various reasons it represents a superior form of organisation of production activities.[24]

Turning to the Western countries brought to Yugoslavia and Croatia significant trade and military support. After Stalin's death in 1953, the relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR and other Eastern European countries were established again. Yugoslavia suddenly had an open and uncompetitive Soviet market for its goods, contracts were signed and money loans were arriving. The fact that Yugoslavia had a good relationship with both sides of the bloc politics, resulted in a privileged position of balance and important political and economic support.

Since Tito would not pick a side during the Stalin years, he was not going to pick a side during better times either. Instead, Tito chose to continue Yugoslavia's journey down the third route paved by his foreign

affair politics. This third exit was the route of cooperation with previous African and Asian countries or ex-European colonies. In 1956 he met with the president of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and the president of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, in Brioni. This meeting initiated the Non-Aligned Movement, whose first conference was organised in Belgrade in 1961 under Tito's guardianship. At the conference there were presidents of 25 countries from all continents and different nationalities. The purpose of this movement, as written in declaration from Havana in 1970, was to insure the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and protection of the non-aligned countries in their battle against 'imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid and racism, including Zionism and all other shapes and forms of aggression, occupation, domination, hegemony, just as much as the bloc politics'.[25] Even though, in retrospect, the number of enemies of the non-aligned seems rather inflated, if not pretentious.

Distancing away from the East bloc and West bloc and the special relationship with the USA, at the time when there already was the bloc division and high position of Tito in the Non-Alignment Movement insured Yugoslavs international recognition and a position of prestige. Non-alignment was inherently an alternative escape route from the West and therefore could also be understood as anti-Western, until the Soviet promotion of the non-aligned as 'natural allies' of the socialist bloc advanced in 1979 at Havana.

It was through Tito's recognition of trends and positioning of his country through non-alignment in world politics that Yugoslavia was able to strengthen its foreign political influence around the world and in Europe. This was nevertheless due to the fact that the vocal point of the Non-Alignment Movement represented not only a specific phenomenon within communism but also in a wider perspective.[26] At the same time, Yugoslavia's friendly attitude towards the West was demonstrated by eliminating visa requirements for all foreigners (in 1957), liberalisation of the issuing of passports to the Yugoslavs (after 1962), the possibility of gaining employment outside of Yugoslavia (from 1961), and reducing harassment of the opposition. These factors presented the Communist regime in Yugoslavia as significantly different from the Communist regimes in other Eastern European countries. Finally, in the constitution of 1963 the country got its final name: Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.

Other Results

If one is to pinpoint the external effects/results of this type of social rule for one of the two strong demonstrations of Yugoslav 'authentic socialism' in reference to our starting point are countries' open borders that allowed almost everyone to visit the country and form their own opinion about what this type of socialism was all about. An especially interesting fact demonstrating this view was published in a English tourist guide for Croatia in 1958 that described the country as 'the only communist country in the world that allows everyone to stick their noses in its borders in order to see how Marx works in practice'.[27]

Why? Because Yugoslavia was at the time seen as desirable destinations for various reasons: (a) a communist country, (b) a comfortable and safe tourist destination, (c) a country with open borders, (d) a country where Marx's theory was realised in practice, (e) a privileged and a special place in what at the time was a bipolar worldview, (f) a country where foreign currency is used daily, (g) and a country that is being perceived, in this case by Great Britain, as very positive despite the distaste for its political ideological orientation.

Thanks to such perception, Yugoslavia became a popular travelling destination for all left-oriented Westerners who sympathised with its goals and aspirations of wanting to create an authentic socialism heaven for all those who shared their views about what a well-functioning society could be.

If one was to list and analyse the internal effects/results that brought about this intense contrast between Yugoslavia and other Communist countries, one of the most intense indicators must be standard of living and education. The swift change (changes occurred within only a 45-year period) that the country went through after World War II as a result of political, social, economic, and institutional reforms driven by the state is the education of the general population.

Multiculturalism (or a Little Europe)

Is the entire question of 'authentic socialism' theoretically and practically weak because of the problem of nationalism or the assumption that national sentiment fades with modernisation?

These days, many are very quick to opt for the misconception that Yugoslavia was a multi-ethnical and multireligious community that served as an example for others. This idea also implies that after the 1990s

Yugoslav successor states are somehow less multi-ethnic and multireligious! This groundless misconception ignores the fact that Yugoslav successor states always were, are now, and always will be multi-ethnic in ways less obvious to West Europeans. This assertion does not deny the presence of tensions due to violence from the 1990s. However multi-ethnicity and multireligiousity in this part of Europe never was understood as a 'policy option that can be chosen' or not. Instead multi-ethnicity and multiconfessionality was, is, and always will be a condition of existence.

One of the most specific characteristics of Yugoslavia was its multiethnic structure of six nationalities (national) republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina (the only republic without a majority nationality, since the 'Muslim' nationality was not officially accepted before 1968). The two other major minorities being Jews and Roma.

There were two autonomous municipalities connected to the Republic of Serbia. They were Vojvodina and Kosovo Metohija. There were five nations and the sixth 'Muslim' nation for the first time used in the counting of population in 1971. There were three main religions and three official languages (Croatian-Serbian/Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian, and Macedonian) and, from 1971, five official languages (including Albanian and Hungarian)

There were two alphabets (latin and cyrillic) and there were nine national minorities, what was actually quite a large number when we think of the size of Yugoslavia as a state.

In this way the Slavic nations governed their own republics, non-Slavic nations, or ethnic minorities who governed in autonomous municipalities (Hungarians in Vojvodina and Albanians in Kosovo), even though their main nations are just across the borderlines. In addition, ethnic minorities lived in Yugoslavia (differences between which were accumulated through centuries). Tito tried unsuccessfully to create a stable regime because other European nations' interests in the area managed during the 1990s to successfully sabotage the Yugoslav multi-ethnic society.

Complexity of the system of languages was even more complicated and greater than political arrangements. Even though in Serbia one-third of the population is non-Serbian (Albanians, Hungarians, and Croats) in the constitution the republic was still called a republic of Serbian nation and everyone had to learn the Serbian language (even in Kosovo 90% of the Albanian population was required to learn the Serbian language, even though they did not have to learn the Albanian language). Only in the

constitution revision of 1968 was the Albanian nation recognised. and the concept 'Šiptar' was replaced by Albanian. All this despite the fact that Kosovo Albanians are the only aboriginal group in the area, present at this location before the Slavic tribes arrived. This places Serbia in a very strange light, considering the Great Serbia Project they openly attempted during the 1990s and practiced ever since the establishment of the first Yugoslavia.[28]

On the other hand, even though in Croatia 10–12% of the population was Serbs (less than one-third), the constitution proclaimed it as the Republic of Croats and Serbs. At the same time, instead of trying to keep up the bilingual structure of one and the same language all the time, there were attempts to enforce Serbo-Croatian as single lingual norm.

In this way Yugoslavia was a very specific form of federation, one strongly resembling a confederation. This was very clear, especially after the constitution revision of 1974 announcing the end of centralization of power in Belgrade. Unfortunately, this announcement meant also intensification of the Great Serbian Project within all sectors of the state.

However, Yugoslavia's socialism as compared with the Soviet version was perceived as a more humane socialism.

The concept of Yugoslavs or being Yugoslav (Yugoslavs–Yugoslavian) was officially (from countries) looked upon as an unsuccessful attempt of integration process (identification with the state instead of identification with a nation). For the first time, for the purpose of the 1961 census, citizens had the possibility to declare themselves as 'Yugoslav' nationality, which in the eyes of the nationalists seemed as 'nationality undeclared'. At the time 317,215 individuals opted for it.

The 1963 constitution guaranteed every citizen 'the right not to have to declare its ethnic nationality: one did not have to even declare oneself belonging to a nationality within Yugoslavia' (Article 41, clause 2, Constitution 1963). This constitutional rule was an important part of development of the Yugoslav nation. In 1971 it was recorded 273,077 were Yugoslav or 1.33% of the total population of Yugoslavia. Ten years later it was recorded 1,216,463 or 5.4% of the total population of Yugoslavia, meaning that 94.6% of the population was still insisting on their ethnic belonging. In 1991 almost 1 million people were Yugoslavs and most of them were in Bosnia-Herzegovina. One of the reasons for the increase in the number of 'Yugoslavs' were mixed marriages in which neither of the sides demanded any longer that the children had to take up the nationality of one parent but instead they declared themselves as

'Yugoslavs'. The history of mixed marriages across religious communities goes all the way back to the middle ages where people also married for reasons other than belonging to a certain religious orientation or ethnic group.

Why Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Most of the contemporary analyses of Bosnia-Herzegovina represent a typical and frequent mistake theorists commit when trying to understand the complexity of its identity by seeing the situation through the division lenses, divided up in different religions and ethnic groups.

Bosnia-Herzegovina was culturally the 'great enforcer' of the Yugoslav state of mind and therefore also evidence of the divisive tendencies of ethnic nationalism in the area. One such false vision of Bosnia is the Dayton Accord, which for some strange reason allowed establishment of a state within state due to self-proclaimed ethnic territory.

Due to its geographic position, Bosnia has a complex ethnic structure and large Bošnjak population that did not opt for either Croatia or Serbia as they were forced to for so many years after World War II. It is only from 1968 that the Bošnjak nation is officially recognised as an ethnic group so that in 1971 (as Muslims) a large number of Bošnjaks opted for this as their ethnic belonging. Muslims in Sandžak (partially on Serbia's and partially on Montenegro's territory) did the same. Therefore, in the statistics for 1971 it was not an expressed number of population according to ethnic belonging.

However, it is very difficult to judge this aspect since the possibilities of declaring oneself as 'Yugoslav' were always institutionally controlled and are currently banned through making it a 'non-option'. The census option became a particular problem for all the new generations coming from the mixed marriages that simply had no option to declare as such, or for individuals who would have opted for other choices than those available. During the 1991 census, once the option 'Yugoslav' was eliminated, people were claiming to be of 'Eskimo' origin in order to avoid taking sides in the growing ethnic confrontations that eventually resulted in a war, ethnic cleansing. and genocide committed by Serbs and Serbians. In the same fashion. the latest census in Bosnia-Herzegovina eliminated the possibility of declaring oneself as 'Bosnian' as a substitute for Yugoslav. Instead, one had to opt for one of the three ethnic groups or simply declare oneself as 'undeclared' or 'the rest'.

Therefore, 'authentic socialism', as we have understood the phrase, cannot apply to an entity less than Yugoslavia as a nation, because a consistent approach to nationality as 'authentic socialism' would have avoided nationality conflicts.

Yugoslavia or the Balkan region was always multi-ethnical and multi confessional, and it is now multi-ethnical and multi confessional and it will always be multi-ethnical and multiconfessional: not only multi-ethnical as if different multi-ethnic and religious groups were living together, but also ethnic groups mixing and thereby producing the real Yugoslav nation in addition to the one where individuals belonging to one specific ethnic group still declared themselves as Yugoslavs from voluntary choice. These two groups at the eve of the 1990s horror meant that by disappearance of the real Yugoslavia in 1991 their country disappeared.

A single essential political effect this multi-ethnic and multi confessional co-existence had on the institutional political level is the multi-party system, since every Republic had its own Communist party. In contrast to the USSR, in Yugoslavia there was an effective multi-party system consisting of six different Communist parties, one for each republic in addition to the Central Committee in Belgrade. This institutionalised multi-party system was going to protect everyone's interests even though the clear overtones of centralised power from Belgrade were obvious over the whole area. Tito was at times accused of selling himself to Serbians in Serbia since he was an ethnic Croat. This is why some influential commentators on Tito's era were confused once they heard the speech he made to the students in 1968 where he states clearly: 'we shall not allow party within the party'. The effects of this speech were undoubtedly clear. It served the purpose, students calmed down and went home. At the same time everyone knew that Tito actually did believe in the multi-party system and a Communist pluralism. In Yugoslavia the multi-party system was a fact due to the Communist parties within different republics, a model strongly challenging the Soviet totalitarian one party for all models. Tito was aware of various streams within the CPJ, the official and the unofficial ones. What some argue today is that this was a direct reference to something much worse, namely a reference to further fragmentations in each party section, strong elite movements that in their essence were another form of multi-party system within already existing party system of the seven.[29]

However, if one is to claim the biggest spontaneous difference that occurred as a result of the split between Tito and Stalin, one has no choice but to opt for the territory of the high culture.

High Culture

In addition, this specific character of the Yugoslav humane socialism was most obvious in contrast with other Communist countries on the level of high culture and art. Within this particular context of Yugoslav self-management, socialism and its position 'between East and West', cultural expression was divided into the politically desirable (mainstream social realism) and cultural resentment (alternative).

Some forms of cultural production and behaviour were recognised as an expression of the 'modern' unwanted influence from the West. Modernistic cultural conception of artistic production gave ideas that promoted democratisation of the cultural-artistic activity as a symbol of the general freedom. This idea was expressed through different media of the artistic activity, from painting, films, and music to literature and theatre.[30]

At the end of the World War II, during the creation of the new socialist rule Agitation-propaganda (Agit-prop) section of the Central Committee of Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the party controlled all sections of the cultural production and science and professional intellectual activity. Public media, especially newspapers, assumed an important role in spreading the Communist ideology and mobilisation of the masses for new rule. All other newspapers, the ones that were also regularly published during the war, were eliminated. Journalists who cooperated with the occupation were forced into exile and private publishers were nationalised.

It was not before the mid-1950s that some newspapers allowed themselves somewhat dissident undertones (as did the weekly magazine *Naprijed,* which also became the Central Committee's Union of Croatian Communists magazine for social, political, and cultural questions). *Vjesnik* became the biggest newspaper-publishing house not only in Yugoslavia but also in Eastern Europe.

In the 1960s, a number of magazines of informative and entertainment character appeared, without any political overtones: *Plavi vjesnik*, *Pop express*, *Start*, *Studio*, *Vikend*, *Vijesnik u srijedu*, alike cartoon editions from publishing house in Gornji Milanovac (*Miki*, *Politikin zabavnik*). The theoretical journal *Praxis* was banned due to its anti-bureaucratic attitude, and formally completely eliminated in 1975. In 1975 the new newspaper *Polet* came out, as weekly newspaper for the Union of the Socialist Youth of Croatia and marked a change on the Yugoslav media scene.

Within the field of literature, instead of new realism (1935–1941), a 'socialist realism' was introduced with its social and teaching role. Most of

the authors published are Russians and classics of the Croatian literature. The dominant form of the forced literature expression was not completely accepted; some writers followed it while others chose to express resistance to it.

The expectations of the greater artistic freedom and freedom from the social realism were symbolically announced by Miroslav Krleža at the Congress of Writers in Ljubljana 1952. Here a spirit of tolerance was affirmed, as was the right to difference and the right to one's own artistic expression. Intolerance of ideological compulsion was openly expressed.

When it comes to artistic expression of fine arts, social realism was most expressed in the monumental realistic sculpture by Antun Augustinčić. Since some styles of painting were not suppressed during World War II, they continued to live and thrive (such as Edo Murtić and Zlatko Prica) since the social realism did become a theme, but not in the format of painting. In the beginning of the 1950s, quickly after the separation from Stalin, the artistic group EXAT (Experimental Atelie) 51 appeared and included painters and architects (Vlado Kristl, Ivan Picelj, Aleksandar Srnec, Bernardo Bernardi, Vjenceslav Richter) who are promoting an abstract (non-figure) art or as Radovan Ivšić explained, an art where the goal was not abstract art but freedom.

As continuation and development of the thinking behind EXAT-a, in the period from 1961 to 1973 in the Gallery of Modern Art in Zagreb, international exhibitions are organised under the title 'New Tendencies', which had as their goal synthesising of different forms of art from the 1960s and 1970s.

At the end of the 1950s the art group *Gorgona* appeared (Julije Knifer, Đuro Sedar, Josip Vanista, Ivan Kozarić) and promoted unconventional forms of artistic work. The most known publication is their (anthology) journal *Gorgona,* where each edition represented a separate work of art.

At the beginning of the 1970s another painting art group, *Biafra* (1970–1978), appeared, leading a way as an alternative to already existing artistic, cultural, and social conventions, as well as all forms of abstract art. Members of the group were coming and going, while the most known names were Branko Bunić, Stjepan Gračan, Ratko Petrić, Ivan Lesiak, and Zlatko Kauzlarić-Atac. As Feđa Vukić explains, 'Especially interesting part of this component modernization is this new way of organizing artists, in other words creating social circumstances in which freedom of expression outside of the ideological limits was possible (art colonies, groups, student galleries and theater, festivals of popular music, alternative social activities…).'

During the 1970s a whole chain of alternative theatre groups appeared: *Kugla glumište, Cooccolemocco*, and *Akter*. Members of the student satirical acting organised *Kugla glumište* in 1975. The change in the name used also represented a change in the concept of the traditional theatre. Instead of the traditional distinction between the stage and audience, the audience is placed on the stage, they are taking part in creating scenes of streets and town squares. This group was one of the most important theatre, multimedia, and interdisciplinary art groups in former Yugoslavia.

On the musical scene, the manifestation of *Muzički biennale*, where the modern musical progress or the so-called new sound from the whole world presented was organised for the first time in Yugoslavia in 1961. During the 1960s a number of the local rock'n'roll music groups were organised, such as Crveni Kralji in 1962, which sold more than 100,000 long-playing (LP) records, which was a true achievement at the time since there were not as many LP players in the entire Yugoslavia. Until then, the foreign popular music could be heard only if one could get imported LPs.

Finally, in 1976 the Rolling Stones had a concert in Zagreb, a concert that was not imaginable for any other country behind the 'iron courtain'. The Yugoslav socialism was without any doubt special even though it was not by any means perfect.

Confirming again that, unlike in other Eastern bloc countries, Yugoslav socialism life seemed unique. [31]

At the End of the Day

If we are to reflect over what this intense development is, what the search for authentic socialism meant for lives of ordinary people, standards of living and education are especially indicative.

Standard of Living

The statistics[32] show that the death rate dropped from 14.9% in 1939 down to 9% in 1990, meaning that the death rate reached the level of the developed European countries. Out of 1000 births in 1939, 132.3 babies died, while in 1990 the rate of deaths among infants out of 1000 births was down to 20.2. Expected life expectancy among Yugoslavs from 1939 to 1990 increased from 45.1 years to 71.5 years.

The rural population decreased from 76.2% in 1939 to 20% in 1990.

Total employment rates were increased 5.7 times from 1947 to 1990 while in industry and mining the rate was 6.8 times larger. The national income increased 6.1 times from 1951 to 1990, meaning 4.3 times per single person. Industrial production increased 22.1 in 1990 in relation to 1939, and in relation to 1946 it increased 27.5 times.

The production of electricity increased 70 times, production of coal 11 times, sugar 8.9 times, clothing 18.4 times, soap and detergents 24.8 times in 1990 in relation to 1939. The total agricultural production from 1950 to 1990 increased 3.2 times and crops per hectare 4.1 times.

Further, 75,000 kilometres of roads were built and modernised. More than 51,000 km of high power cables were set up across the country so that 96% of residents had electricity available in their homes. The number of tourists visiting the country was 61 times bigger, and 601 hotels of various quality were built, most of them being in luxury classes. Yugoslavia traded with more than 100 countries and it increased its export trade 46 times from 1955 to 1990.

Exports and imports also drastically changed: industry exported 92%while 70% of this amount were industrial products. From 1953 to 1989, 4.3 million apartments were built in the public sector.

The structure of the individual consumer changed drastically. The dietary consumption decreased while consumption of higher standard products increased. Over 88% of households owned their own refrigerators, and 90% own televisions sets, 38.5% own cars. Dietary habits also drastically changed. There was a decrease in consumption of crops and increase in consumption of meat, eggs, fruits, and vegetables and dairy products. There was also a decrease in the number of individual patients per single physician 7.6 times.

Education

Education being maybe the biggest indicator of the achievements of the socialistic Yugoslavia, in 1981 education could be compared with most Western European countries and, most importantly, education was free for everyone from primary school to a university education.

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia, according to the numbers of literacy and formal education, was one of the last countries worst in Europe (in some parts the amount of illiteracy was up to 75%). Since 1945 enormous investments were made into general education of the population. Illiteracy among the Yugoslav population over 10 years old drastically dropped from

45.2% in 1939 to only 5% in 1991. Almost all children attended primary school, 5.7 million of 45 year-olds had a high school education. There were 10 times more universities, 19 times as many professors at universities, while the numbers of students exceeded any prognosis:

In Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija there were 1.34 million students from 1922 to 1939, but only 29,080 students got their university degrees. The level of university education was drastically increased during 1953–1981 (ten times). The obligatory secondary school (eighth grade) was introduced in 1957. The detailed statistics[33] show the following:

1. Primary school education was obligatory and free for everyone:

   1938/1939: 1,482,000 pupils
   1945/1946: 1,442,000
   1989/1990: 2,776,000 pupils
   1989/1990: there were 1574 schools with a teaching programme executed on nine different languages, including the languages of the ethnic minorities.

2. High school education:

   1953 only 6.5% had high school education
   1960 77.3% pupils had high school education while in 1990, 89.5% the same

3. Higher education

   1938/1939 there were 29 colleges and universities with 17.734 students where only 22% were women
   1950/1951—84 of the same with 59,822 students of which 33% were women
   1989/1990—310 of the same with 341,341 students and 49% were women

In addition to the republic and autonomous municipal centres, colleges and universities founded in 60 different locations—a large number of children of working class children also attended universities and colleges.

From 1945 to 1990, 1,325,865 individuals got university degrees (universities, academia, and universities of art) among which 47% were women.

Doctoral degrees were given to 20,907 individuals among which 21% were women

From 1962 since Magisterium is introduced until 1990, 36,239 candidates got their magisterium titles, among which 31.3% were women.

During the first years after the liberation, 5% of the national income was used for educational purposes. In 1989, 17.8% of the same was used for investment in the education. The same higher education was 17% of the total education investment, which at the time was above the international average.

But most of all technical subjects, over 40%, the social studies were marginalised and under strict control of the state despite the free education policy, including stipends and student homes.

In 1990, 49,278 students were placed in 80 student homes.

In:

1939 out of 1000 individuals 402 were illiterate
1981 out of 1000 individuals only 68 were illiterate (mainly elderly)
1939 out of 1000 individuals only 140 had only primary school education (fourth grade)
1961 out of 1000 individuals 548 or 4 times as many had primary school education
1939 out of 1000 individuals only 13 had high school education
1981 every 4th individual had high school education, which was 39 times more than in 1939
1939 of every 1000 individuals only 1.5 had a university degree or college degree
1981 for each 1000 individuals 16 had university degree or college degree

The End of Authentic Socialism?

When concluding about the end of Yugoslavia, there are usually a few different routes that researchers take, routes in connection to our starting point.

One route is the one where they argue that Yugoslavia's one-party system did not last because it was totalitarian and inevitably died out as a result of its own mechanisms.

This kind of conclusion is very problematic because, as we already explained, the multi-party system in Yugoslavia was a fact. It was based on the multi-ethnic co-existence on the level of republics. Each republic had its party, in addition to the movements within leading elites of each republic. Furthermore, Tito's opposition to fractions being just another area of control within the Eastern bloc, actually resulted in an even greater ideological alternative than what the sum of two (Tito's & Stalin's model) would ever be.

The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 was just another reason why one can say that Tito's authentic socialism was a viable route when compared to Stalin's route. If the economics followed, if Yugoslavia was able to develop economically in order to compete better on the free market, the ethnic conflict would have been probably dealt with under control. On the other hand, if Yugoslavia got the economic help it begged from the international community in the 1990s, the outcome of the situation might have been different.

Another route some other researchers take for concluding their arguments is the one confronting these 'change statistic numbers' with the events of the 1990s (falling apart of the state and genocidal practices that followed). What they claim goes as follows: It should not be of much surprise that even though the ideological base for the ethno-nationalist genocidal practices was provided by the elites, the practical executors who were again the average men and women that previously underwent Tito's intense chase for modernity but still somehow managed to resist modernisation as such.[34] This 'sceptic route' likes to point out that one of the problems is that modernization of the mentality did not follow the institutionalised change. The minds were among other things still very much sensitive to the traditional mechanisms of the classic manipulation practices.[35]

This kind of conclusion can be accepted only to a degree as long as we keep in mind the fact that the development of this mentality did not happen because it could not follow the tempo set by the institutional reforms. Of course this part of the social economic change hardly had anything to do with the ethnic complexity of the nation structures since multi-ethnic and multiconfessionaly reality always was the reality of Yugoslavia.

But even so, if we take a look at the results of these differences and changes the systematic institutional modernisation brought about within a very short period of time, we cannot fall short of thinking that they are forms of 'social engineering', nothing short of stunning. In this way then one of many things Tito can be accused of is actually being too optimistic or for treating the area like a playground without concern for what will

happen later on. At the end of the day, one cannot ignore the fact that reforms were favourable to the nation as totality, it was just that the time or the lack of it to digest all the changes that was too short; one might argue that it simply was just too much too soon.

Yet another possible conclusion is the one served by the globalisation theorists who seem to think that globalisation of the world is what swings the ethno-nationalist feelings in motion. We can indeed play along these lines and say that today's regress or Kundera's 'unlearning of one's liberties'[36] seems even bigger in the light of the global developments that the Yugoslav successor states are confronted with these days. Today's challenges are of a completely different calibre, a *tension* between the nation state values[37] fought for during the 1991–1995 conflicts (and genocide that followed) and the neo-liberal ideal of social atomism[38] that gives rights primacy over obligations to others, affirming the individual's self-sufficiency. This tension results from the nation state ideal, based on the socialist welfare state idea of community that in its core demonstrates a key value (*responsibility for others*) being plundered of its content by neo-liberal globalisation of the world economy where everyone is nothing but a number in a theoretical abstraction.[39]

Nevertheless, the reality of Yugoslav successor states is even more interesting when one thinks of self-management and advanced economic policies that brought the country up out of its ashes after World War II. Today, being confronted by contemporary challenges of the generation X[40]: climate change, environmental problems, poverty, existential emptiness, and unemployment, in other words, the challenges that do not discriminate against anyone, but instead affect the entire region as a whole. In the age of globalized economy[41] and all the troubles and new forms of colonialization following with it, such as the fallen financial world market and global pollution, wasting peoples' lives.[42]

Would it be too much to conclude that this was exactly the most sustainable model of the political and economic rule?

Finally, when thinking of all the policies that the EU is imposing on each ex-Yugoslav republic in their attempts of gaining a position as a member state, policies such as civil rights, children's rights, gay rights, minority rights, carbon quotas, and so on, it seems that the pursuit of absolutely modern authentic socialism continues endlessly despite the fact it is called by a different name. The dynamics are these days more intense than what they were when Tito ran the country and what results will bring long-term, on the ground remains, just like the last time, an open ques-

tion: "*If we cannot change the world, let's at least change our lives and live them freely…If every life is unique, let's live uniquely. Let's reject everything that is not fresh and new. It is necessary to be absolutely modern*."[43]

Notes

1. This together with the fight against the occupation meant also a fight against a conception of Yugoslavia under the Karađorđević dynasty, that the government-in-exile in London and the Yugoslav royal army (Četnicks back home) represented.
2. See Ivo Banac "Sa Staljinom protiv Tita, Informbirovski rascjepi u jugoslavenskom komunističkom pokretu" (Zagreb: Globus, 1990.) pp. 9, 19–56. Nothing was supposed to rock the firm unity of Stalin, USA, and UK, which at the time was also a protector of the emigrant Yugoslav government in London and saw Dražo Mihajlović as the only leader of the resistance movement in Yugoslavia.
3. Zdenko Radelić, Hrvatska u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji 1945–1991, From unity to separation (Zagreb: školska knjiga, 2006.) p. 178.
4. The legislation about the agrarian reform and colonisation from the 23 August 1945, Article 1: "With goal of giving land to the peasants who do not have or do not have enough land, the Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia is executing an agrarian reform and colonisation under the rule: The land belongs to those who are working on it."
5. Schwabish-Deutcher cultural union, a union for preservation of and spreading of culture was organised in 1920 in Novi Sad. Straight after the capitulation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, this union ceases to exist. Instead, German nationals organise Der Deutche Volksgruppe with official power. This institution had a character of a military and semi-military national-socialist organisation, and they were subordinated to leadership of all Germans that lived outside the Third Reich (Volksdeutsche mittestelle). See Vladimir Geiger, Sudbina podunavskih Nijemaca u bivšoj Jugoslaviji, Međunarodni znanstveni skup Jugoistočna Evropa 1918–1995, Zagreb, 1995.
6. The legislation for nationalisation of private businesses from 5 December 1945, Article 1, states: "By establishment of this legislation all private businesses of the general state and republic importance from the following branches, are nationalised".
7. Zdenko Radelić, Hrvatska u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji 1945–1991. From unity to separation (Zagreb: školska knjiga, 2006.) p. 178.
8. Zakon o petogodišnjem planu razvitka narodne privrede FNRJ u godinama 1947–1951.

9. The latest of these studies being a study by Dino Mujadžević titled 'Politička djelatnost Vladimira Bakarića'.
10. *The Speeches of Winston Churchill* (London: Penguin, 1990), pp. 303–304.
11. Sabrina P. Ramet, Tri Jugoslavije (Zagreb: Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga, 2009), p. 232.
12. In 1946, it rejected help from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration due to the instruction from Stalin. Yugoslavia also rejected Marshall's plan through which the USA gave financial help to European countries.
13. Ivo Banac, Sa Staljinom protiv Tita, Informbirovski rascijepi u jugoslavenskom komunističkom pokretu (Zagreb: Globus, 1990), p. 232.
14. Aleksandar Ranković, "O predlogu novog Statuta Komunističke partije Jugoslavije i nekim organizacionim pitanjima Ppartije", Šesti kongres KPJ (Belgrade: narodna knjiga, 1952), p. 127.
15. Ivo Banac, Sa Staljinom protiv Tita (Zagreb: Globus, 1990), pp. 148–149.
16. Tamara Nikičević, Goli otoci Jove Kapičića (Zagreb, Belgrade, Sarajevo: V.B.Z., 2010), p. 144.
17. Tvrtko Jakovina, Američki komunistički saveznik. Hrvati, Titova Jugoslavija i Sjedinjene Američke Države 1945–1955 (Zagreb: Profil, 2003), p. 281.
18. Zdenko Radelić, Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji 1945–1991, od zajedništva do razlaza (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 2006), p. 281.
19. Ibid., p. 290.
20. *Osnovni zakon o upravljanju državnim prvrednim poduzećima i višim privrednim udruženjima od strane radnika,* from 27 June 1950.
21. Zdenko Radelić, Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji 1945–1991. Od zajedništva do razlaza (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 2006), p. 285.
22. Vuk Perišić, Prekasno je, čestiti don Ivane, za "tvornice radnicima" www.tportal.hr/komentari/komentari.
23. Herbert Marcuse, *One-dimensional Man* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991).
24. Michael Lebowitz, "/teških pitanja o samoupravljanju u bivšoj Jugoslavivji" www.hap.bloger.hr.
25. 6th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, Havana, Cuba 3–9 September 1979, Final Document—Political Declaration—On Disarmament.
26. Tvrko Jakovina, "Pogled u svijet zamjenili sa pogledom u dvorište" 7 May 2011.
27. Igor Duda, "Dokono mnoštvo otkriva Hrvatsku—engleski turistički vodiči kao izvor za povijest putovanja na istočnu jadransku obalu od 1958. Do 1969" in Časopis za suvremenu povijest, vol. 35, no 3., p. 816.

28. Sonja Biserko, "Yugoslavia's Implosion—Fatal Attraction of the Serbian Nationalism", Norwegian Helsinki Committee, 2012.
29. Dino Mujadžević, "Bakarić. Politička biografija", Plejada—Hrvatski institut za povijest, Podružnica za povijest Slavonije, Srijema i Baranje u Slavonskom Brodu (Zagreb, 2011).
30. Feđa Vukić, "Pitanje modernosti (The Modernity Issue)" in Oris Časopis for architecture and culture, Nr 14, pp. 112–122.
31. Milan Kundera, *Life Is Elsewhere* (New York: Penguin Books, 1986), p. 46.
32. Ibrahim Latifić, *Jugoslavija 1945–1990* (Belgrade, 1997), pp. 164–165.
33. Ibid., pp. 109–116.
34. Arne Johan Vetlesen, *Evil and Human Agency, Understanding Collective Evildoing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
35. Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić, eds. Politicization of Religion, 2 vols. (New York: Palgrave, 2014).
36. Milan Kundera, *Life Is Elsewhere* (New York: Penguin Books, 1986), p. 46.
37. Sabrina P. Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918–2005* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006); Sabrina P. Ramet, *Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
38. Charles Taylor, *Philosophy and Human Sciences, Philosophical Papers, vol. 2* (Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 187–189.
39. James G. Carrier, Introduction to *Virtualism: A New Political Economy,* edited by James G. Carrier and Daniel Miller (New York: Berg, 1998); see also Karl Polanyi, 'Aristotle Discovers the Economy', in Karl Polanyi, Conrad M. Arensberg and Harry W. Pearson, eds., *Trade and Market in the Early Empires: Economies in History and Theory* (New York: Free Press, 1957); see also Gareth Dale, *Karl Polanyi: The Limits of the Market* (Cambridge, MA: Polity, 2010); Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia From the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milosevic,* 4th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002).
40. Zygmunt Bauman, *Wasted Lives* (Cambridge, MA: Polity, 2004), pp. 11–13. See also Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization The Human Consequences* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Polity, 2000).
41. Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization: The Human Consequences* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
42. Zygmunt Bauman, *Wasted Lives: Modernity and Its Outcasts* (Cambridge, MA: Polity, 2004).
43. Milan Kundera, *Life Is Elsewhere* (New York: Penguin Books, 1986), p. 47.

CHAPTER 3

Titoist Cathedrals: The Rise and Fall of Partisan Film

Jurica Pavičić

In a famous and often quoted sentence, the leader of the Russian Communist revolution, Vladimir Ilich Lenin, allegedly said, that "for a communist, film is the most important of all arts."[1] In most Eastern European Communist societies, Lenin's sentence from a conversation with the writer Anatoly Lunacharsky was not an empty slogan, but an important principle of cultural policy. Whether rich or poor, whether they had previous cinema tradition or not, Eastern European Communist societies invested significant money, paid political attention, and directed intense interest toward the cinema industry and culture.

If Lenin's slogan about film as the "most important art form" is relevant to almost every Eastern European Communist state, there are very few where it is more relevant than in Yugoslavia. For Tito's Communist Yugoslavia, the formation and development of a home-grown film industry was a crucial element, not only of cultural policy. Tito's Yugoslavia was a country obsessed with cinema, and there are several reasons why.

No Yugoslav culture—not even those most culturally developed like Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia—had serious cinema production before World War II. In all-Yugoslav cultures, the prewar film tradition was restricted to individual amateur filmmakers, and several production units specialized in educational and propaganda films.[2] By founding a cinema

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industry (not just *one* cinema industry, but *eight* of them—one studio in each federal unit), the Communist government sent a message: illiterate, colonized, culturally backward South Slavic nations are now on a par with former colonizers. It is no wonder that the very first film shot in Slovenia after the war—*Na svoji zemlji* (*On Our Own Land*, 1948, France Štiglic)—proudly proclaimed that it was "the First Slovenian Film" before its opening credits. In an effort to preserve the meticulous balance between unity and diversity, during the 40 years of its existence, Yugoslav cinema produced films in minority languages, in smaller and less developed federal units, including production of films using Albanian language in Kosovo from the 1960s onward.[3]

The second reason why cinema was essentially important for Titoist society was probably the very same reason why it was important to Communist ideology in general: because cinema was a social metaphor for successful modernization.[4] Even before World War II, Yugoslavia was an underdeveloped, rural land with one of the highest illiteracy rates in Europe and almost 90% of the population living in villages. After the war, the country was left in ruins and rubble. The process of modernization was one main goal of Communist society within the first two postwar decades, and that modernization included the construction of industry, railroads and hospitals, as well as mass literacy courses, the promotion of health care, urban planning, the equality of women, the banishment of traditional Islamic clothing for women in Muslim areas, irrigation, and the elimination of endemic diseases. During the 1950s the Yugoslav economy was one of the fastest growing in the world, reaching its peak between 1955 and 1961 at 13% GDP growth in some years.[5] Rapid industrialization and urbanization was accompanied by the rise of consumption and popular culture, from pop music to supermarkets, from leisure magazines to film festivals. Part of that development was the rise of the cinema industry and distribution network, which was included in the first five-year plan (*Petoljetka*).[6] In this context, film was part of the pattern of modernization, often expressed through the slogan "*technology to the people*!" (*tehnika narodu*!). If cinema was understood primarily as part of achieving technological skills, it is little wonder that cinema production consciously imitated the professional routine, directing and acting practices, technological achievements, dramaturgy, and genres of the Western—particularly Hollywood—studio system. Absorbing good Hollywood practice and professional standards was part of the general template of Yugoslav society, which was hungry for technological knowledge and eager to import

(or steal) it from the technologically most advanced societies (see more in Pavičić, 2008).

One other reason why cinema was so important for Titoist Yugoslavia, although trivial but nevertheless very important, was that Tito, dictator of Communist Yugoslavia, was himself a fan of film. According to many personal records and testimonies—collected recently in the excellent documentary *Cinema Comunisto* (2012) by Serbian director Mila Turajlić—Josip Broz Tito was an avid film fan. He had a projection room or a small cinema in each of his numerous residences, and watched several films every evening. He particularly liked Hollywood classics and Westerns, and among Westerns he was especially keen on films by John Ford. This may have been one reason why Communist Yugoslavia gave the Medal of Yugoslav Flag with the Golden Wreath to Ford in 1971, although the director of *The Searchers* and *My Darling Clementine* was (ironically!) politically right-wing and anti-Communist.

It is little wonder therefore, that the main festival in the Yugoslav cinema culture took place in the old Vespasian Roman arena in the city of Pula, not far from Tito's summer residence on the Brioni Islands. Tito frequently attended festival openings and premieres. His opinion was sometimes crucial for the success or discrete banishment of certain films.[7] When important high-budget epics were in production, Tito often had preliminary conversations with the director, and films were often screened privately for him prior to the premiere and the granting of official approval. Although Tito never practically managed the cinema industry, the whole system and style of Yugoslav cinema coincided with his personal taste. This meant, therefore, that the main goal of Yugoslav cinema until the mid-1960s was to produce quality mainstream films that would appeal to a broader audience, that would disseminate directly (and later—indirectly) ideological messages, and, at the same time, that would resemble good examples of Western/American mainstream cinema.

"Partizanski Film": A Question of Genre

If the cinema industry was important for Communist Yugoslavia, there is one particular genre that stood out as the most important one of Yugoslav cinema. That was the genre of *partizanski film* (*partisan film*).

Throughout the 43 years of Yugoslav cinema, partisan film was commercially the most successful, ideologically the most representative and culturally the most typical of all film genres in Yugoslavia. It is the only

autonomously created genre of Yugoslav cinema. It was born within Yugoslav Communist society, and it died with it. Of the six Yugoslav feature films nominated for Academy Awards for the best foreign film, three were partisan films. Partisan films were regularly first on the list of most successful local hits. Some partisan films—like *Bitka na Neretvi* (*The Battle on Neretva*, 1969, Veljko Bulajić) or *Valter brani Sarajevo* (*Walter Defends Sarajevo*, 1972, Hajrudin Krvavac) were huge international hits, ranging from being released and watched from Western-European cable TVs to a broad distribution in Communist China. Some of them are still popular, and are often screened on public and commercial television channels in most of the former Yugoslav republics. Some of them became cult films. Their dialogue lines, soundtracks, acoustic, and visual motives have been repeatedly quoted, sampled, pastiched, used for polemical, parodical, or ironical purposes. But, the importance of partisan films within Yugoslav communist society cannot only be measured through their commercial success, popularity, and international prominence. For Communist Yugoslavia, partisan films had a role equivalent to the role of gothic cathedrals in medieval Christianity. Through partisan films, Tito's regime efficiently disseminated its ideological message. Through the professional skill and production values of these films, the regime clearly demonstrated its technological capacities and triumphant grandeur. Through partisan films, Communist Yugoslavia elaborated and propagated its own founding myth—the myth of the partisan movement as a home-grown, people's revolution. However, partisan films were not just films about the past: while discussing World War II, partisan films implicitly commented on contemporary politics and society.

The first partisan film ever made was at the same time the first feature film ever produced in Communist Yugoslavia. The film was *Slavica* (1947), a war melodrama directed by Croatian actor Vjekoslav Afrić, a prewar star of the Zagreb Croatian National Theatre who had escaped to the partisan guerrillas directly from the theater stage, and immediately after the war directed his first—and Yugoslavia's first—feature film.[8] *Slavica*—a melodrama set among Dalmatian fishermen (Afrić was a native of the island of Hvar)—was the first Yugoslav feature film, and a film that is a cornerstone of the *partizanski film*. If the choice of *Slavica* as the first feature film is obvious and indisputable, it is slightly more difficult to pinpoint the last partisan film. However, we might say that the role of the involuntary undertaker of the genre could be ascribed to a Bosnian film

Gluvi barut (*Deaf Gunpowder*, 1990), by Sarajevo director Bahrudin Bata Čengić. This film about the early days of the uprising among Orthodox Serb peasants in Eastern Herzegovina won the prize at the last Pula festival held before the collapse of Yugoslavia.

During the 43 years between these two films, eight Yugoslav film communities produced vast numbers of partisan genre films. Although the exact number of partisan films has not and cannot be counted because it depends on the definition of the genre, about 200–300 out of 890 feature films produced in Yugoslavia between 1947 and 1990 were *partizanski film*.[9]

Writing about *partizanski film* as a separate genre is contestable. Partisan films themselves come within a broad variety of different genres: partisan thrillers (*Ne okreći se sine/Don't Look Back, My Son My Son, Don't Turn Round*, 1956, Branko Bauer), partisan comedies (*Mačak pod šljemom/Cat under the Helmet,* 1978, Berislav Makarović), partisan epics, and partisan spy films (*Kota 905/Point 905,* 1960, Mate Relja). Partisan film has its own sub-genres, including one that is particularly important—*film o ilegalcima* (film about "illegal fighters", a colloquial term for underground resistance members operating in occupied cities). Last but not least, many partisan films cannot be pigeon-holed into a particular genre, because they are not genre films. Partisan film includes highbrow art films, films that use a World War II setting and partisan characters to discuss moral and existential doubts or political issues. It also includes opulent and bombastic war epics as chamber pieces based on psychological discomfort, terror, and fear; unpretentious action films with relentless shooting and explosions; highbrow art films with slow pace and ambitious philosophical topics; socialist realism films with heavy-handed, declamatory propaganda statements; and subversive, politically daring films like *Zaseda/Ambush* (1969) by "Black Wave" classic Živojin Pavlović. There are few elements that hold together this broad variety of heterogeneous films. However, one of these elements is the historical setting: World War II and the immediate postwar period in Yugoslavia. A second element is iconography, which appears very early in partisan films and is kept unchanged until the end. This iconography (uniforms, German helmets, Chetnik beards, Ustasha black uniforms, machine guns, hand grenades, Spanish-war three-pointed hats) is not restricted to partisan films. It can also be found in partisan comic books, like the most famous partisan comic book serial *Nikad robom* (*Never Slaves*, 1963–1979, Desimir Žižović Buina) or in many other

Yugoslav comic books by respected authors like Jules Radilović or Andrija Maurović.

The fact that the partisan genre was defined by a historical setting and strict iconography evokes parallelism between partisan film and the globally famous genre that is also based on specific geo-temporal settings and iconographies: the Western. The Western is, like partisan film, defined by clear socio-historical and geographical boundaries: North-American Midwest in the second half of the nineteenth century. Like partisan film, the Western has a precise and elaborate iconography that did not change significantly over time. Both genres examine a period that, at the time of their formation, was recent history. Both genres deal with a part of history that was a constitutive, founding myth of the nation. Both genres disappeared when society no longer believed in that founding myth. In the case of America, this happened during the cultural turmoil of the 1970s. In the case of Yugoslavia, this happened in the 1980s, when Yugoslavia sank into a deep economic and political crisis, which culminated in a series of wars from 1991 to 2001. Both genres evolved in a way that we might talk about pre-classic, classic, post-classic, and modernist partisan films, in a way we talk about the Western. Both genres started by affirming a founding myth, but from the mid 1960s on, they both started to undermine it. Both genres depended on the exploitation of the wild, virgin landscape as a reflection of the untamed character of the nation. Both sometimes included mass movements of the people: colonizers, soldiers, refugees, and the wounded. With all these similarities, it is little wonder that the Western tropes were occasionally used and recycled in partisan films and comics, especially in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The fact that one of these two genres served liberal capitalists and the other as Titoist-communist propaganda was not of any concern, particularly not to Tito himself: two myth-making machines of two different ideologies merged successfully in a field of popular culture.

Formation of the Genre: Postwar Collective Epics

Immediately after the end of the war and after the constitution of a new regime, Yugoslav cinema started production with a series of partisan war films. In the first six years of Yugoslav cinema (1947–1953), 12 out of 24 feature films were partisan films. Almost all national studios in different

federal units initiated their feature production with one groundbreaking partisan film, which often reflected local aspects of partisan war.

The first Yugoslav film—Afrić's *Slavica*—was a story about Dalmatian fishermen and fish-cannery workers who joined the resistance and formed the partisan navy.[10] The same year, the newly founded Zagreb studio Jadran Film began with the partisan epic *Živjeće ovaj narod/This People Is Going To Live* (1947, Nikola Popović). In 1948, Belgrade studio Avala film produced the first partisan film with a Serbian topic—*Besmrtna mladost/ Immortal Youth* (1948, Vojislav Nanović). The same year, Slovenian studio Viba film produced the "first Slovenian film", partisan film *Na svoji zemlji/On Our Own Land* (1948, France Štiglic).

These films differ in quality and level of directing skill, from the pompous naiveté of *Slavica*, the clumsy narrative chaos of *Immortal Youth*, to the expressive visuality and relative directing maturity of the Slovenian film (made by Štiglic, who would later become one of the most respected Yugoslav directors).

Despite their differences, however, these films have much in common. All of them discuss not individual, but collective, destiny—the destiny of a village, region, and/or generation. All of them are strictly local: Nanović's film is a film about urban youth in Belgrade, Štiglic's about peasants in the Italian-Slovenian border region of Primorska, Slavica, about the Dalmatian fishing community. All of them are narrative frescoes with an abundance of characters of different class, gender, and age. All of them organize their narrative around the legitimization of the new regime through its war merits. The real hero of the film is the people as a group (of individuals), organized by and flocked around the patriarchal figure of a local Communist leader (often political commissary). The films consciously emphasize the patronizing role of the wise party/partisan leadership, legitimizing in that way the new postwar Communist elite. The dramatic core of these films is often organized around the opposition between heroic partisan youth and those who are reluctant or simply traitors. In *Slavica*, the class enemy (*parun*—boss of the fishing boats) soon becomes a national traitor, in *Immortal Youth*, young rich men from the Serbian Cultural Club decline the offer to join the resistance, and to the end of the film openly collaborate with the Germans. In *On Our Own Land*—dramatically the most sophisticated of these films—the main hero is reluctant whether to join partisans, fully supported by his sweetheart, or obey his "counter revolutionary," overprotective mother. In the end, the defeated character becomes the hero and dies. Those who persist in

their treason are supposed to be punished: in the very last shot of *Slavica*, an angry revolutionary crowd surrounds the occupier's aides and class oppressors, and the last thing we see in the film are their terrified faces. This last shot is particularly disturbing if we are aware of the mass murders of traitors or class enemies committed by partisans in May and June 1945 throughout Yugoslavia.

In these early films we see something that remains typical of partisan films. While talking about the past (war), these films actually comment on present politics, legitimize Communist rule, and serve to (in)directly defame potential opponents. While watching these films, a contemporary audience could easily recognize the "bad guys" from the Serbian Cultural Club, or *kulaks* (rich peasants), or prewar bosses, and identify them with potential political opponents of the young regime. As part of the process of legitimizing the new Communist authority, these films occasionally mention or show Tito himself. Tito does not appear in these films as a character, but he quite often appears as a portrait or poster on the wall (coupled with Stalin's portrait of the same size), and, in one of the most pompous scenes of *Slavica*, the main female character (Irena Kolesar) rejoices because she is sent on a mission to the island of Vis: there, Slavica says, she will be able to see Tito.

With the exception of Štiglic's Slovenian epic, these early films are rather naive. In terms of the narrative, they are clumsy and predictable, and the characters are uninteresting, typified and repetitive. Some of this could be explained by the inexperience of the young, more or less dilettante film-making community. But many of these weaknesses were not the result of a lack of professional skill. Many of them have their roots in a model of the socialist realist epic, which was a prescribed, privileged aesthetic model for narrative and figurative arts in Yugoslavia until the Yugoslav-Soviet breakup in 1948. But when this breakup happened in June 1948, partisan film was sucked into a whole aesthetic revolution that happened in Yugoslavia in the 1950s.

The 1950s: Socialist Noir and Socialist Western

The split between Stalin and Tito in the summer of 1948 was sudden, and particularly for Western observers, totally unexpected. Although in the following years Yugoslavia tried to present this split as an ideological one, the fact is that there was no ideological dispute or difference between Tito and Stalin in the mid-1940s, and that Western politics considered Tito as

one of the most dedicated Stalinists. After the split, Western diplomacies for some time did not believe it was serious.

Although the split had other non-ideological reasons, Yugoslavia started to legitimize the conflict with Moscow with *a posteriori* ideological arguments. Suddenly, the previously undisputed and idealized practice of Soviet socialism became an object of fierce criticism, and Yugoslavia criticized Zhdanov's concept of socialist realism. In its early stages, that debate took place within the ranks of Communist intellectuals—writers, theorists and critics. Fast aesthetic-theoretic transition was helped by two historical facts. First, socialist realism had already been aesthetically criticized within Communist intellectual circles before the war, particularly in the 1930s when the important writer and party member Miroslav Krleža attacked Zhdanov's doctrines and opened an intellectual ideological war known as "the conflict on the literary left" (*sukob na književnoj ljevici*). Second, Yugoslavia had a home-grown revolution originating from the guerrilla war. Many artists, painters, writers, poets and philosophers participated in the partisan war and produced a culturally relevant canon of modernist works reflecting it. It is little wonder, therefore, that the artists who were early critics of socialist realism or who practically dismantled it, were Communists and partisan veterans, like the writer of modernist novels Petar Šegedin or abstract-expressionist painter Edo Murtić. Their "impeccable" past gave them maneuvering room for aesthetic change.

In the traditional arts, the slow abandonment of the socialist realism in the early 1950s did not cause a creative blockade because these arts had a previous, prewar modernist tradition to revive and continue: modernist psychological novels, expressionist painting, and modernist poetry. The situation with cinema was different. There was no such prewar high-culture template. Cinema had to resolve a kind of identity crisis, which is evident in the cinema production of the mid-1950s. Of all the film genres, the one that had to cope with the deepest identity crisis was partisan film, because it was significantly rooted in a model of (now detested) Soviet socialist/realism. In some Yugoslav cinema communities this caused a real paralysis: in Croatia, for instance, there were no partisan films between 1949 and 1956, and the film that in 1956 broke the drought, *Ne okreći se, sine* (*Don't Turn Round, My Son* by Branko Bauer), was an atypical partisan film, a chamber thriller set in occupied Zagreb. In Serbia, partisan film faced the same problem, and searched for the answer in literature, by exploiting fiction through a new generation of leftist writers such as Oskar

Davičo and Dobrica Ćosić. Partisan film became less didactical and changed its focus to personal dilemmas, individual destinies, and psychology.

An example of this change is the film *Daleko je sunce* (*Far Away Is the Sun*, 1953, Radoš Novaković), based upon the novel of the same name by a young Communist writer and future prominent, notorious ideologist of Serbian nationalism, Dobrica Ćosić. In the film, partisan commander Pavle (Branko Pleša) decides his squad must leave the Serbian mountain area of Jastrebac, where he and his fighters have their origins. When he commands an evacuation to the safer Bosnian mountains, the old peasant Gvozden (Radomir Felba) does not comply with the order because he believes the squad must stay close to the villages and protect the neighboring people from the Germans. Gvozden's disobedience is considered to be a mutiny, and Pavle orders Gvozden's execution. The squad is divided into two groups: one under the command of commander Pavle, and the other under the command of political commissary Učo (Teacher, Rade Marković), who was initially against the evacuation. Ignoring Pavle's order, Teacher decides that his group will remain in Jastrebac Mountain. During the following winter, Pavle's squad grows and becomes stronger: Teacher's group, on the other hand, suffers from hunger and cold and loses the support of the peasants. Učo dies in action, bitterly realizing his mistake. The film again serves to legitimize Communist political choices. It explains and legitimizes Tito's concept of a more-than-local, broader partisan war in comparison with the parochial, narrow guerrilla concept favored by Gvozden and Učo. But, while defending the official line, the film describes gray areas of revolutionary practice, from the execution of an honest peasant to a not-always idyllic relationship between partisans and peasant masses. As Dragan Batančev writes, "some topics … were fully treated or at least hinted at in several Yugoslav films, while official national historiography remained silent."[11] Even such early examples as *Far Away Is the Sun* prove this to be true.

Further psychologizing of the genre is obvious in two urban, chamber thrillers shot the same year (1956) in Serbia and Croatia. These films were *Ne okreći se sine/Don't Turn Round, My Son* by Branko Bauer, and *Veliki i mali/The Big and the Small* by Vladimir Pogačić. Both films were immediately successful and became classics: Pogačić's film won the best director award in Karlovy Vary in 1957, and Bauer's film won the best film award in Pula. Both of them abandon the village, mountain, and landscape and search for a revolutionary morality play in the city. Both of them have

important child characters. Both are firmly middle class in their setting, and both show how the war and resistance affected urban bourgeoisie.

The hero of Bauer's film is a resistance member, Novak (Bert Sotlar), a middle-class engineer who is arrested, but escapes from the train on its way to a concentration camp. He is looking for the connection to reach free partisan territory, but before that he has to find his son who is supposedly in the custody of cousins in Zagreb. He is stunned when he realizes that the young boy is actually in Ustasha-Nazi boarding school, completely brain-washed and loyal to the regime. He has to lie to the boy to convince him to leave school and go with him. Novak hides on the streets of Zagreb, sleeps in lofts and abandoned apartments, escapes controls, fears from double agents and false connections. At the same time, he has to maintain the protective lie toward his child as he cannot be sure as to whether the boy will betray him. Bauer and his screenwriter Arsen Diklić first realized that, if they want the audience to emotionally connect to a revolutionary hero, they need to give him a motive more personal than abstract ideological dedication. In this case, Novak's motive is parental love—the strongest of all motives. Another innovative aspect of Bauer's film is his refined approach to characters. In previous partisan films, characters are generally class-determined and often one-dimensional. For the first time, Bauer shows the complexity and moral ambivalence of life under occupation. Novak's former friend (Lili Andreis) is a glamorous blonde who dates a German officer, but at the same time gives Novak crucial help. His old friends, the Dobrić family, help Novak, although their son fights in Bosnia on the opposite side as a colonel, and when their son criticizes them because they helped a rebel, his parents do not justify their deed with political, revolutionary, or patriotic arguments, but with basic loyalty to a friend. Father Dobrić explains to his enraged son that he could not let his friend down, because "he has an old-fashioned upbringing." Like many other Bauer films from the outside, this film works well as a revolutionary action movie, but from the inside it is a love letter to old-fashioned middle-class morality and citizenry, and is very unusual for Eastern European cinema of the 1950s.

Veliki i mali (*The Big and The Small*) is also set in urban (Belgrade) middle class. The heroes of the film are an educated, middle-class father and his young son. One morning, the father's old schoolmate knocks at their door in panic. He is a member of the underground resistance discovered by the Nazi. The police and soldiers are looking for him in the neighborhood, and he seeks refuge. Frightened that the Nazi would punish him,

the father asks him to leave, but the young boy gives shelter to his father's friend in his room. The police start a meticulous search of the block, and decide to leave one of the agents in the hero's apartment, believing that the member of the resistance will come by sooner or later. From that point, the psychological chess game starts within the apartment, a game in which every detail—a stain on the floor, a gust of wind, a cry of the younger daughter—could be fatal for all. If in Bauer's film ethics of resistance is rooted in old-fashioned bourgeois morality, here the response to fascism divides the "Big" and the "Small." The "Small" (the boy) helps the revolutionary without hesitation, and the "Old/Big" (the father) is reluctant to assist. At the end of film, he refuses advice to escape to join partisans and pays for his hesitation with his own life.

The success of Pogačić's, and particularly Bauer's, film made an impact. In the mid-1950s chamber, urban thrillers about *ilegalci* become the most important sub-genre of partisan films, particularly in Croatia. Films like *Naši se putovi razilaze/Our Paths Are Diverging* (1957, Šime Šimatović), *Osma vrata/The Eighth Door* (1959, Nikola Tanhofer), *Akcija/Action* (1960, Jane Kavčič), or *Abeceda straha/Alphabet of Fear* (1961, Fadil Hadžić) clearly follow in the success of Bauer and Pogačić. In *The Eighth Door*, the main character is an elderly gentleman from Belgrade who has to come to terms with his fear and delivers an important piece of paper to a resistance hideout (apartment No. 8) before it is intercepted by the Germans. In *Alphabet of Fear*, an educated, sophisticated girl active in the resistance becomes a cleaning lady in the home of a high-ranking Ustasha civil executive. She spies on her new bosses, reads secret documents, while at the same time has to preserve the appearance of an illiterate country girl, and lets the teenage daughter of the patrons "enlighten" her with reading lessons. All these films have much in common: thrill, fear, moral doubts, and gray zones—and all that within the claustrophobic urban spaces—apartments, cellars, corridors, stairs, lofts, and narrow night streets. From the iconographical point of view, we might even define these films as "socialist noir."

Contrary to that trend, another line of partisan films appeared in the mid 1950s that avoided narrow cityscapes, and insisted on magnificent landscapes, open spaces and exteriors. These films were strongly influenced by classic American Westerns. Particularly important among these films were two made by Serbian director Žika Mitrović, both set in Kosovo: *Ešalon doktora M* (*Echelon of Doctor M*, 1955) and *Kapetan Leši* (*Captain Leshi*, 1960). Both were huge local hits, and *Captain Leshi* became the most suc-

cessful and most popular war film made in Yugoslavia at that time. The main actor, Aleksandar Gavrić, became a major film star, and the character of Captain Leshi became a role model for a "positive," "acceptable" Albanian within Yugoslav society.

The plot of *Echelon of Doctor M* takes place in immediate postwar Kosovo, where the remaining members of the Albanian nationalist militia *Balli Kombëtar* (in Serbian: *balisti*) continue fighting against the newly established partisan-Communist government. Doctor M (Marijan Lovrić) is an idealistic partisan physician who runs an improvised village hospital in an area isolated from the territory under Communist control. With limited sources of drugs and equipment, Doctor M saves the lives of patients, but cannot cope with a typhoid epidemic. At the point of utter despair, he calls the army for help and organizes a caravan of wagons to deliver the wounded and sick to a town hospital. A local squad of Albanian nationalists intends to intercept the convoy, and sends three of its members to join the convoy using false identities. One of them is a rich landlord's nephew Ramadan (Severin Bijelić) who is hesitant about *balli's* cause. His confidence is additionally shaken when he finds his wife Hatidža (Nadja Regin) in the convoy as a nurse, Doctor M's aide, and as it seems—too close a friend. Hatidža saves Ramadan's life by pretending that she does not know him. Torn apart by ideological doubt and jealousy, Ramadan in the decisive moments redeems himself, changes sides, joins partisans, and kills his own uncle.

In *Captain Leshi*, the plot again takes place in Kosovo in the immediate postwar period (1945). The main character is again a member of the Albanian aristocratic elite, and an ideological gap again divides him from his own blood. His brother is a *balli* squad leader in the mountains, and the main reason he has chosen to join the *balisti* is the fear that the Germans would take revenge by maltreating the rest of the family because of Leshi's Communist rebellion. Like in *Echelon of Doctor M*, in *Captain Leshi* the main character is torn between his ideological choice and his sense of guilt because he confronts his own family. As in *Echelon of Doctor M*, an action plot is again peppered with a love triangle, in this case with one man (Captain Leshi) and two women (a gypsy tavern singer), Lola, and a teacher from the north, Vera (Marija Točinovski, Semka Karlovac).

Both films by Mitrović intentionally imitate Westerns on the level of iconography and plot. In both films, we have horse races, duels, coaches resembling Western wagons, magnificent mountain canyons, and rocky reefs as scenery. Both films use Kosovo as an exotic setting in a similar way

to Westerns using tex-mex and Mexican iconography. With the skillful eye of a superb professional, Mitrović finds perfect Orientalist spaces for his action scenes. One of the most prominent is in *Captain Leshi,* which uses a dervish monastery (*tekke*) as the scenery for an elaborate duel scene.

In the 1960s, all these iconographical similarities with Westerns gave rise to criticism in Yugoslavia. Some commentators criticized Mitrović's approach to Westerns as too slavish and mechanically imitative, like Zagreb critic Hrvoje Lisinski, who in 1960 wrote that Mitrović's use of the Western was like "planting lemons in Siberia."[12] But, Mitrović's film does not only borrow iconography of the Western. On a deeper level, Mitrović borrows something much more important: the political meaning of wilderness, and the concept of taming wilderness as a foundation of state ideology.

In *Captain Leshi*, that political subtext is organized through a sentimental triangle, in a way that is a direct copy of one of the greatest Westerns ever, *My Darling Clementine* (1945, John Ford). In Ford's film, rough Westerner Wyatt Earp chooses refined Easterner Clementine instead of a Mexican Chihuahua, and the new pairing brings peace and civilization in Tombstone, making way for the foundation of the nation. In *Captain Leshi*, an Albanian aristocrat-action hero fights his own brother, chooses the blonde educated Northern girl Vera and leaves Gypsy singer Lola, constructing the "marriage" between East and West, modernization and the Balkans. If Titoist Yugoslavia considered itself as a land between East and West, and if the central goal of communism in Yugoslavia was modernizing the Balkans, Captain Leshi's emotional *ménage à trois* in fact illustrates the main ideologies of Titoism in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Captain Leshi's emotional choice, as much as Wyatt Earp's one, makes Yugoslavia possible. His choice, like Earp's, is a sort of *national cosmogenesis.*[13] Many times, by discussing the past, partisan films in fact discussed the present.

Captain Leshi was a huge commercial success. Although reviews were either negative or mixed, 200,000 watched the movie in Belgrade alone in only 20 days.[14] Internationally, the film was sold to MGM, and it received a respectable income for the Belgrade studio. Before that film, partisan films were not significantly more commercial than films with contemporary topics, and—with exception of early postwar films—the biggest Yugoslav hits were not war films. Fifteen years after the war, audiences were able to fully embrace a war film that was fast, action-driven, free of ideological speech and pathos, unpretentious and escapist. The triumphant success of *Captain Leshi* clearly marked the line between two

decades and two periods of partisan film: the 1950s and 1960s. *Captain Leshi* brought forth a new genre that would prevail in a new decade: the partisan action spectacle.

The Sixties: Black Wave and Red Wave

During the 1950s, partisan films ceased to serve as a vehicle for cardboard slogans of ideology. Leaving behind the template of the socialist realism, *partizanski film* in the 1950s fully embraced the style, practice, and genre conventions of Western commercial cinema. During that period, partisan film for the first time re-connected with an established literary culture by introducing psychological topics, moral dilemmas, and individual fears. During the 1950s, partisan film became more and more local, abandoned "big stories" and revolutionary frescoes, and focused instead on specific geographic and social universes. As a consequence, Tito disappeared from partisan films in the 1950s. Now undisputed leader of the Yugoslav regime, the partisan leader no longer appeared in any significant partisan film during this period, and he was rarely mentioned in any of them. During the 1950s, partisan film formed its own specific sub-genres (like the film about illegal fighters from 1956 on). Finally, during the 1950s, partisan genre slowly split into two directions—on the one hand, culturally unpretentious and action-driven "lowbrow" partisan films, and, on the other, "highbrow" partisan films, which pay more attention to psychology and drama, and try to emulate cultural values of higher literary culture.

Such a division was already visible in the 1950s. But, during the 1960s, the division would create a real gap, a gap between the modernist, subversive revisiting of World War II, and mainstream war films.

However, even within the field of mainstream/commercial/action partisan film there was another dichotomy. On the one hand, there were pretentious war epics, mainly based on true events, usually Tito's great battles. On the other, there were unpretentious, ideologically mainly empty action movies, films full of blasts, shooting and pyrotechnics, films that were a guilty pleasure for Yugoslav film audiences.

As a consequence, we are able to outline three separate streams of partisan film during the 1960s and 1970s. The first is the modernist film, which revisits the founding myths of partisan past and questions them. The second is unpretentious action film that neither questions nor emphasizes the myth, but uses it as an empty iconographical and topical vessel,

and exploits that myth in a genre game that aims at pure entertainment. Using parallelism with the American notion of "exploitation film," we might even talk about "parti-exploitation" production in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The third is the larger-than-life epics, usually based on real historic events, opulent, state-sponsored blockbusters that affirm the political myth of Titoism, and serve as a moving-image monument of Tito as a person. These films brought partisan genre into a central position within the cultural field of Yugoslav culture, a position that genre had not occupied so clearly before. Since the films were economically privileged, and sometimes perceived as an ideological counter response to the "Black Wave," during the 1970s they were ironically called the "Red Wave."

The first group of films includes some of the greatest and most prominent Yugoslav films of the 1960s. In films like *Akcija/Action* (1960, Jane Kavčič), *Čovek iz hrastove šume/Man from the Oak Forrest* (1963, Mića Popović), *Tri/Three* (1965, Aleksandar Petrović), *Prometej s otoka Viševice/Prometheus from the Island of Viševica* (1965, Vatroslav Mimica), *Jutro/Morning* (1967, Puriša Đorđević) *Kajo, ubiću te/Kajo, I'll Kill You* (1967, Vatroslav Mimica), *Crne ptice/Black Birds* (1967, Eduard Galić), *Praznik/Holiday* (1967, Đorđe Kadijević) *Zaseda/Ambush* (1969, Živojin Pavlović) *Kad čuješ zvona/When You Hear the Bells* (1969, Antun Vrdoljak), or *U gori raste zelen bor/Pine Tree in the Mountain* (1971, Antun Vrdoljak), there is the use of partisan film against its initial function. While partisan films used World War II topics to discuss the present, these films did the same thing, but in reverse: by questioning myths, discussing dark areas, moral doubts and complex political issues of the 1940s, they actually questioned the legitimacy of the political system existing in the era in which their authors lived. These films soon gained a broad reputation and became a core of the cultural canon of Yugoslav cinema. This chapter does not discuss them in detail, because many of these films are already internationally famous, and are an established topic of mainstream filmology. Many of them have been anthologized,[15] and some film historians, such as William Golding, set out the history of Yugoslav cinema around these maverick films that confront a revolutionary past.[16]

The second group, "partisan exploitation film," appeared when partisan film was already established as a central film genre in Yugoslav culture. Building on this status, these films completely disregard ideological demands and highbrow cultural canons, and use already petrified, canonized iconography of the genre for an almost abstract genre game. The best example of this genre are the works of Bosnian Sarajevo-born director

Hajrudin Krvavac, whose war films like *Diverzanti/Demolition Squad* (1967), *Most/Bridge* (1969), *Valter brani Sarajevo/Walter Defends Sarajevo* (1972), and *Partizanska eskadrila/Partisan Air Force Squad* (1979) were enormously popular. During the Yugoslav era, Krvavac and his films had the status of a sub-culture cult. Music and dialogue lines from *Walter Defends Sarajevo* were often quoted and sampled as a symbol of Sarajevo resistance and spirit. Igor Stoimenov, the Belgrade director and author of the documentary *Partisan Film* in a public interview with the author of this chapter in Motovun in 2009 said that Krvavac was something similar to a "Yugoslav Howard Hawks." There is some truth in this: like Hawks' films, films of Hajrudin Krvavac were based on characters that were larger than life, tacit, very masculine heroes, sober professionals that solve military obstacles with detached professionalism. But, Hajrudin Krvavac was not alone in this vein of "parti-exploitation" cinema. Particularly during the 1970s, Yugoslav cinema produced a large number of similar, action-driven, mannerist partisan spectacles, like *Crveni udar/Red Blast* (1974, Predrag Golubović), or *Partizani/Partisans* (1974, Stole Janković).

Tito is not to be found in either the first or second group of partisan films from the 1960s or 1970s. Modernist and/or Black Wave partisan films usually dealt with personal destinies, local stories outside the main stream of revolutionary history. The fact that these films subvert and question the constitutive Yugoslav political myths meant that Tito as a person or politician was way beyond the reach of these films. Even in the relatively liberal political atmosphere of the late 1960s, Tito himself was one of the few topics beyond the limits of criticism or relativization. Therefore, for modernist, politically provocative war cinema in Yugoslavia, Tito was, and had to be, invisible, absent.

Tito is equally absent from "parti-exploitation," action-driven genre films like those of Krvavac. Although in his films Krvavac occasionally used real events or people (like the real, short-lived partisan air force,[17] or person of Valter Perić, an important Bosnian communist, who gave his name to the film *Walter Defends Sarajevo*), directors of action-driven and genre partisan films avoided big topics and central events of the partisan war, partly because that kind of film would require a different level of "seriousness." Although popular, at that time these films were considered slightly trivial. Some of them were even criticized for commercialization and trivialization of the revolution, like the film *Red Blast* by Predrag Golubović, which was attacked by Kosovo's Minister of Culture Fazli Sulja as an "aesthetic and ideological mistake," because it trivialized and

caricaturized the revolution in Kosovo.[18] Obviously, the presence of Tito as a character was unimaginable in any of these lowbrow, culturally undignified action movies.

Great War Epics

If the first and second group of partisan films from the 1960s and 1970s deliberately excluded Tito, there was another group that could not avoid the representation of the Yugoslav leader. These films were great "Red Wave" epics, based on historic battles, particularly on the so-called seven offensives (*sedam ofenziva*) organized against Tito by the Italians and Germans.

This group of big partisan war epics includes films like *Kozara* (1962, Veljko Bulajić), *Desant na Drvar/Raid on Drvar* (1963, Fadil Hadžić), *Bitka na Neretvi/The Battle on Neretva* (1969, Veljko Bulajić), *Užička republika/The Republic of Užice/Guns of War* (1974, Žika Mitrović), *Vrhovi Zelengore/Peaks of Zelengora* (1976, Zdravko Velimirović), and *Veliki transport/Great Transport* (1983, Veljko Bulajić). These grand epics had a central role in the cinema culture of Yugoslavia during the 1960s and 1970s. Many of these films were huge hits and their audience was measured in millions, partly because of organized projections for schools. Some of these films have been seen so often on TV, or sold frequently on bootleg DVD disks even today, that they sometimes overshadow the rest of the partisan production, and stand as the only reference to the whole genre. They had such a big social impact that people sometimes forget that the epic partisan spectacles were just one stage in the development of the genre, restricted to a relatively brief period of Yugoslav cinematic history, between 1962 and the mid-1970s.

These grand partisan epics are clearly distinguishable from other partisan film productions because they have a lot of production, thematic, and poetic elements in common, which do not appear in other partisan films.

From the production point of view, these epics were not produced through the regular channels of Yugoslav film studios or film funding grants. They were usually financed by outside sources, often through so-called *Funds for the preservation of revolutionary traditions* or similar extra-cinematographic sources. They had proportionally larger budgets than regular films in Yugoslavia, and they often included international stars. For instance, the casting list of the most ambitious partisan epic ever—*The Battle of Neretva*—included Yul Brynner, Franco Nero, Orson

Welles, Hardy Krüger, Sergei Bondarchuk, Oleg Vidov, Sylva Koscina, and virtually all of the biggest stars of Yugoslav cinema. In *Sutjeska* (1973) Tito was impersonated by Richard Burton, and Irena Papas played an episode role of the hero's mother. In *Peaks of Zelengora*, three important roles were given to Sergei Bondarchuk, Josephine Chaplin, and Alain Noury.

From the thematic point of view, these films differed from the rest of the partisan genre because they were based on real events, and events that were central in the history of partisan war, and that (with the exception of Bulajić's *Kozara*) involved Tito and his main headquarters. The main topic of these partisan epics were the so-called "seven offensives" organized by the Germans and Italians to destroy Tito and the core of the partisan guerrilla. Almost each of these seven offensives got its own "film monument" during the brief era of partisan epics. The first offensive, September–November 1941, in Western Serbia was described in *Užička republika/The Republic of Užice/Guns of War* (1974, Žika Mitrović). The second, January 1942, Eastern Bosnia, was described in a film *Igmanski marš/Igman March* (1983, Zdravko Šotra). *Kozara* (1962, Veljko Bulajić) describes a battle on the mountain of Kozara (June 1942, Western Bosnia) often mistaken for the third offensive. The fourth offensive, March 1943, Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina, was described in *The Battle on Neretva*. The fifth offensive, May and June 1943, Montenegro and Eastern Herzegovina in *Sutjeska* (1974) and *Peaks of Zelengora* (1976). The seventh offensive, the parachute attack on the town of Drvar in May 1944, Western Bosnia, was described in *Raid on Drvar* (1963, Fadil Hadžić). The only one not portrayed in its own great film was the sixth offensive, October 1944, which was not single, focused military action, but broader action in which the Germans regained territories in Dalmatia that were under partisan control after the capitulation of Italy.

The fact that these films were based on real events had its thematic and dramaturgical consequences. During most of the period from 1942 to 1944, Tito's guerrilla war was in fact a perpetual game of hide-and-seek, in which outnumbered and poorly equipped partisans used the karst, mountain backwoods of Bosnia, Herzegovina and Montenegro to escape the much stronger Axis troops. In a way, all battles from this central, most mythical period of partisan war could have only two outcomes: defeat or successful retreat. That fact was of course a problem for screenwriters of great epics. They solved that problem by emphasizing the bravery and self-sacrifice of partisans who sacrificed themselves for their commander or

wounded and ill comrades. In terms of dramaturgy, partisan epics solved problems by using a deus ex machina ending: when partisans are most desperate and on the edge of destruction, a miraculous counterattack occurs, and the good guys are saved. Sometimes—like in *Kozara*—the ending is just verbally declared: an old peasant climbs out from their hiding place and screams "*završila ofenziva!*" (*The offensive is over!*). These films always finish with similar conclusive shots: a long column of partisan soldiers, now safe, retreating somewhere farther into the mountainous Yugoslav heartland. The problem of "adjusting" a historic war reality to the principles of storytelling remained problematic in most of the partisan epics. Some directors were fully aware of this problem, like Veljko Bulajić, who declined the offer to direct *Sutjeska* after the triumphant success of his previous—and Yugoslavia's biggest—war epic, *The Battle on Neretva*. In a recent public interview at the Motovun Film Festival in 2012, he explained that he had not known what to do with the battle on Sutjeska, which was carnage—a bloody and painful defeat of Tito's partisans.

The second consequence of the fact that great epics were based on real events was the fact that these films had to deal with real historic people. In some of them, characters of enemy commanders are real persons, like Generaloberst Lothar Rendulic, the real-life commander of the raid on Drvar, who has an important role in the film *Raid on Drvar*. Some of the real persons represented in these films were part of the English and other military missions, like British officers Deakin and Stewart, who are characters in the film *Sutjeska*. Treatment of real-life partisans and revolutionaries in these epics depended heavily on whether they were dead or not at the time of production of the film. Partisan epics generally avoided mentioning or glorifying any real-life resistance commander besides Tito himself. However, an exception could be made for war heroes who died in war (Lika Sava Kovačević, the hero of the Sutjeska Battle, played in homonymous film by Ljuba Tadić), or for relevant cultural persons, like the classic old Croatian poet Vladimir Nazor who—although 66 years old—joined partisans in 1942, and appears as a character in *The Battle on Neretva*. But Tito's closest political co-workers, prominent Communists and postwar politicians are meticulously removed from Titoist epics: Tito's central role in the revolutionary pantheon could not have a competitor.

The fact that grand epics deal with real events related to the Headquarters and Tito, caused a problem in regard to the representation of Tito himself. With few exceptions, partisan epics generally avoided Tito being played by an actor. Tito's iconic, omnipresent photos were hanging

in every classroom, conference room, and office in Yugoslavia, but also in many homes. This oversaturation of public space with Tito's real appearance produced a kind of iconoclastic restraint regarding playing Tito by an actor. However, there were two significant exceptions: one of them was *Sutjeska,* where Tito was played by the larger-than-life Hollywood star Richard Burton. The other significant exception was *Užička republika* (1974), where he was played by the great Serbian actor, Rade Marković. In both cases, it seemed that the audience had difficulty accepting any face other than Tito's as Tito. It is also worth noting that Tito was not very satisfied with Burton playing him. In a documentary *Partizanski film* by Stoimenov, the famous actor Bata Živojinović recalls an anecdote that Tito complained to Delić, the director of the film saying "damn it, when I was commanding in the Sutjeska Battle, I certainly was not drunk!"

In most cases, directors understood the difficulty in portraying Tito, and invested significant screenwriting and directing maneuvering to avoid the physical appearance of the partisan leader from the films in which he was technically the main hero. Veljko Bulajić remembers in recent interviews that he had a conversation with Tito regarding his presence/absence from *The Battle on Neretva*, and that Tito reluctantly agreed that his character should be off-screen, because Bulajić convinced him that unless this was so, the film would be interpreted as propaganda, and would lose its international appeal. In *Raid on Drvar*, Hadžić uses a mixture of strategies to avoid Tito's physical presence.[19] Tito is absent from the film, but his newly sewn uniform is present the whole time (at a certain point, Germans capture the uniform as a humiliating substitute for Tito in person, who fled). In one scene, partisan soldiers observe the Headquarters through binoculars, but in subjective shots through binoculars we see Tito and his aides in authentic documentary shots from the war. In *The Battle on Neretva*, Tito is mystically substituted with pieces of paper on which his orders are written, orders that commanders deliver to soldiers on duty.

Big partisan epics were produced in a period when the Titoist regime was confident and internationally established through the Non-Aligned Movement. That self-assured feeling of its own global importance is clearly visible in partisan epics, which in a way served the purpose of giving a diachronic rooting to this sense of importance. Many epics start with fake or real newsreels that explain the situation by describing a certain period, and the importance of the Yugoslav resistance, which causes trouble for the Germans and Italians in the heart of the Axis of Europe. In *Kozara*, at the beginning, we hear a German telegram with orders to attack. In

Raid on Drvar, at the beginning of the film, we see a scene from Hitler's Cabinet where off-screen Hitler yells at Rendulic and insists on capturing the "bandit Tito." Part of the narcissistic, self-glorifying role of partisan films were characters of foreign officers on a military mission at Tito's Headquarters. They appear in many partisan epics in a role of "arbiters" (in Ann Übersfeld's meaning), witnesses who weigh the events, and give moral evaluations. The role of foreign missionaries/correspondents is the role of a witness who observes the Yugoslav partisan heroism through foreign eyes and gives deserved appraisal to it. In *Raid on Drvar*, such witness is an US war reporter. In *Sutjeska*, this role is played by an actual historical figure, British Major Deakin who at the peak of battle compliments partisan bravery with the sentence "What an amazing people!." This role of "arbiter" is occasionally played by the Germans. In *The Battle on Neretva*, German officer (Hardy Krüger), moved by the singing of partisans in the trenches, disobeys orders of his superiors, and orders a retreat. In *Walter Defends Sarajevo*, two German officers walk on the Sarajevo promenade above the city center, desperate because they failed to catch Valter—the infamous chief of the resistance. In the end, one of them says to the other that he finally realizes who Walter is, then indicates the view of the old town and Municipal house, and says "*Das ist Walter!*" (*This is Walter!*).

In an effort to give trans-historic roots to Titoism, to represent it as an essence of all-Yugoslav spirit and history, Titoist epics often use landscape and cultural heritage in a role that could be described almost as an "ally" of partisans. Partisan epics place enormous importance on mountain landscape, which is often (*Kozara, Sutjeska*) presented as an establishing shot in the very first scene. Many of these films construct an almost mystical link between untamed nature and an untamed spirit of rebellion. As Miranda Jakiša writes, there is a "telluric idea presented in partisan films—such as originating locally from the country, defending one's own home from the underground and staying in touch with the earth."[20]

Sometimes, even cultural heritage is used and recycled to fit the political message of film. For instance, in the central fighting scene of *The Battle on Neretva*—the scene of the battle between partisans and Chetniks, whose leader is played by Orson Welles—Chetniks use mortars to attack partisans, who hide behind huge Bosnian medieval gravestones—*stećak*. In the cultural memory of Bosnia, *stećak* gravestones are (inaccurately, from the historic point of view) related mainly to the medieval religion of the Church of Bosnia, or so-called *bogumils*, or *patarenes*, who professed

poverty and were opposed to both Western Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy. By using this cultural symbol in a crucial battle scene, Bulajić sends a clear ideological message to the Yugoslav audience of that time: he equates medieval heretics with partisan war, and partisan war with non-aligned Yugoslav communism, another ideology that had chosen a "third path" between East and West.

Bulajić: Master of War Epic

Contrary to popular belief, larger-than-life partisan epics appeared rather late in the history of Yugoslav cinema. The first was *Kozara* (1962) by Montenegrin-Croatian director Veljko Bulajić, who would later personify this sub-genre.

Ironically, *Kozara* was never meant to be a cornerstone of Tito's "epic cinema." When he made that film, Bulajić was a young neo-realist director who studied at the Centro Sperimentale in Rome, and made two very good neo-realist dramas (*Vlak bez voznog reda/Train without A Timetable*, 1959, and *Uzavreli grad/Boom Town,* 1961). In *Kozara*, he made a neo-realist film about Serbian peasants from Western Bosnia who suffered persecution and genocide committed by the Germans and Ustashas during the Battle of Kozara/the Kozara Offensive in June/July 1942. Neither Tito, nor the partisan Headquarters participated in that battle, which was later in Yugoslav popular tradition mistaken for the Third Great Enemy Offensive, although the third offensive was an entirely different battle. That confusion was partly caused by the success of the film. Bulajić's film became the biggest hit in the history of Yugoslavia: it attracted 3.3 million viewers in Yugoslavia, won the Best Film Award in Pula as well as several international awards, including an award at the Moscow International Film Festival. It became so famous that it gave further prominence to the battle it depicted, and inspired the production of a string of big partisan epics.

If Bulajić's name goes hand in hand with the first partisan epic, his name is also connected to the most famous one: *Bitka na Neretvi/The Battle on Neretva*. This film, produced in 1969, was, and still is, the most expensive Yugoslav film, the most ambitious and the most successful partisan film. The official budget was US$4.5 million, excluding the cost of soldiers who acted as extras, military ammunition, vehicles, planes, and gasoline. According to *Variety*, a film weekly magazine, the real cost of *The Battle on Neretva* was US$ 12 million.[21] Production of the film took more

than four years, shooting almost 18 months, and the film crew blew up the real bridge across the river Neretva, giving rise to the protests by the locals of the town of Jablanica, who for a brief time did not have a bridge. The cast of the film included a jaw-dropping list of Hollywood and European stars. The extent of Bulajić's ambition is also visible from the fact that one of the posters for the film was made by Picasso!

Even the premiere of the film was one of a kind. According to geographic requirements and the subtle Yugoslav sense of federalism, the premiere was held in Sarajevo (the battle on the Neretva river took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina), on the main Yugoslav holiday, Republic Day (November 29). Among the celebrities who attended the premiere were Sophia Loren, Carlo Ponti, Anna Magnani, Maria Schell, and Omar Sharif.[22] After the premiere, the film became a huge hit, partly thanks to organized school visits. The film was sold internationally to 84 territories (a record for a Yugoslav film), and as a final triumphant touch, it was nominated for an Oscar for the best foreign film. However, the complete success of *The Battle on Neretva* was diminished by the fact that the local critical reception of the film was modest: even on the eve of *Neretva-frenzy*, many Yugoslav critics criticized the film as a shallow spectacle.[23] Despite that, *Neretva* was a success, but that success in a way changed the course of the whole genre of partisan film. It inspired a series of "*Neretva-lookalikes*," expensive and far less successful "Red Wave" films made by directors whose talent was inferior to the talent of Bulajić. It was not until the early 1970s that these "Red Wave" productions became unpopular among cinema professionals and journalists, who criticized such an irrational, opulent waste of money. In 1975, TV Zagreb even organized a TV debate about expensive projects in Yugoslav cinema. The debate, which was mainly focused on Bulajić, was filmed and banned.[24] In that period, Bulajić was perceived as a personification of the "Red Wave," and his name has remained associated with this until today.[25]

In a way, this is unfair. First, prior to *Kozara* (1962) Bulajić had a rather interesting list of works, including *Uzavreli grad/Boom Town*, a brilliant neo-realist study of the young industrial working class in the fast-growing cities of early socialism.

Second, the film, which started a series of great epics, is a good film. In *Kozara*, Bulajić reached the peak of his professional skills and successfully merged elements of the war spectacle with a neo-realist film about collective masses. That collective mass—the people—in Bulajić's film is never homogenous, and never propagandistically dull. It is vibrating, pulsating,

hesitating, subjected to the opposing impulses, doubts, rage, and malice. Although relentless in pace and action, *Kozara* is at the same time a film full of memorable emotional scenes, and a film with at least 10 or 12 well-rounded, convincing characters. At the same time, Bulajić was a true master of spectacle, capable of orchestrating scenes with thousands of extras, of controlling multiple narratives and merging action with the melodramatic or even comical elements. The only comparison with other partisan epics, by far inferior films like *Sutjeska* (1973) or *Peaks of Zelengora* (1976), demonstrates the real measure of Bulajić's talent, his directing skill, his ability to control a complex narrative, shift different moods, and create unforgettable scenes.

End of Partisan Film

Veljko Bulajić was the director who made *Kozara*, a film that started the era of great epics. He was the director of the biggest war film Tito's Yugoslavia ever made—*The Battle on Neretva*. In a strange twist of fate, he was also the director of a film that ended the era of great epics, a film whose failure was a sign that the time of the grand partisan films was over.

The name of that film is *Veliki transport* (*Great Transport)*. Released in 1983, *Great Transport* was the last of the epic war films produced in Yugoslavia. Produced in the Serbian Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, the film was based on a historically true story about the transport of food and other supplies that peasants from Vojvodina delivered to partisans in Eastern Bosnia in spring 1943. At the beginning of the 1980s, the film was encouraged by the local Vojvodina Communist leadership, who wanted "their own" partisan film that would emphasize the role of Vojvodina in the partisan war, the role of the region where, due to the flat landscape and dense population, guerrilla war was impossible, and the partisan movement hardly existed. Pursuant to a production model already established in the late 1960s, Bulajić cast Hollywood actors (James Franciscus, Steve Railback, Robert Vaughn), European stars (Helmut Berger), and local stars. He raised money from the government, national companies, and foreign investors. However, at the time of production, Tito died, the Kosovo crisis re-opened, the country suddenly fell into deep debt and the first post-Tito government announced a humiliating "stabilization program." A whole generation of Yugoslavs was faced again with a situation that was familiar to the rest of Eastern Europeans, but for them it was a distant, forgotten past: queues, shortages, bans on shopping abroad, and

electricity reductions. In such a context, a film like *Great Transport* was seen as an utter anachronism. The context was radically different compared with *Neretva* or *Sutjeska*: no more school projections, no sense of global importance and success, no unifying father figure and no enthusiasm for big, costly film projects. *Great Transport* was a failure. Audiences ignored it. It received chilling reviews. Worst of all, a series of financial scandals plagued production of the film, scandals that accelerated the fall of Vojvodina Communist leadership, and helped the rise of Slobodan Milošević through the ranks of the Serbian Communist establishment.

In the 1980s partisan film was in a deep crisis. From the 1970s onwards, partisan film was already in its "baroque" stage of opulent, decadent spectacles with overblown budgets that used petrified iconography and old, sometimes overweight stars to reproduce a formula that was fresh 15 years earlier, but not anymore. *Great Transport* was the final straw. In the history of partisan film, it had a role similar to the role of *Cleopatra* (1963, Joseph. L. Mankiewicz) in the history of Hollywood biblical epics. A commercial flop, a critical fiasco, and financial scandals surrounding it clearly indicated that the era of big partisan films was over.

Partisan film went through the same change of fortune that Westerns had gone through 10 years earlier, in the Watergate and Vietnam era, when US audiences ceased to believe in the ideological pylons of the genre, and the genre itself slowly disappeared from its privileged position in Hollywood. Partisan film had a similar fate: in the 1980s, a crisis of ideology killed the genre that depended on an enthusiastic belief in the ideology on which these films were based. In the 1980s, a young, urban Yugoslav generation reacted to cultural manifestations of Titoism either with irritation, or with superior, ironic mockery. As a part of that process, partisan film was perceived as something outdated, ridiculous, provincial, and old-fashioned.

The rise of nationalism, the Yugoslav breakup and revisionist ideologies in the 1990s finally killed partisan film. In the revisionist 1990s, no one identified with either Yugoslavia or partisans any more. Under the blanket of official relativist ideology, unofficial glorification of the Ustashas and Chetniks became the dominant perception of World War II. Partisan films disappeared from television, some directors "refurbished" their filmographies by omitting partisan films, and some—like Tuđman's vice-president Antun Vrdoljak—forbade the screening of their partisan films abroad.[26]

But ironically, even in this unfavorable context, partisan film had proved its myth-making capacity and the power of its image-making.

Recent interviews conducted by Natalija Bašić demonstrated that among interviewees of three generations, partisan films were and still are the main source of knowledge about World War II, and are more dominant than school programs or textbooks.[27] Many radical nationalist paramilitary formations organized in Serbia and in Croatia during the wars in the 1990s completely constructed their image and clothing around the image of villains from partisan films. For a whole generation of Yugoslavs, partisan films constructed a representation of bad nationalists, and when these generations embraced nationalism as their ideology, they simply used ready-made images that were familiar to them. In a dark and ironic way, "Chetniks" and "Ustashas" from the 1990s proved Oscar Wilde's statement about life which imitates art.

Today, partisan film is dead in the production sense. But, as a living memory, and as a group of classic films, it lives on. Many partisan films are shown on television. Many are regular items on the bootleg-selling desks from Skopje to Neum. Many are common cultural reference points for Yugoslavs, and the object of artistic recycling, sampling and quoting. As a part of the cultural heritage, partisan films are still alive, living long after the death of the country that created them and the ideology whose monument they were supposed to be. There are several reasons why partisan films are so vividly present in the new cultural and political context. Chief among these is the fact that many of them are simply good films.

Notes

1. Antonin M. Lim i Mira Lim (Antonin J. Liehm, Mira Liehm), *Najvažnija umetnost- istočnoevropski film u dvadesetom veku*, Beograd: Clio, (2006), p. 44.
2. Such as Army Geographical Institute in Serbia, and Škola narodnog zdravlja (School of Public Health) in Croatia, which produced educational documentaries and cartoons promoting preventive health care and hygienic standards. See more in Dejan Kosanović,'Da li je bilo filmske umetnosti u Kraljevini SHS/Kraljevini Jugoslaviji?', *Hrvatski filmski ljetopis* 33 (2003), p. 203.
3. Agim Sopi, *Pregled povijesti albanske i kosovske kinematografije* (Zagreb: ADU, 2009), p. 19.
   Petrit Imami, '*Film na Kosovu posle drugog svetskog rata*,' *Novi filmograf*, 5/6, ¾ (Belgrade, 2009), p. 66.
4. Hrvoje Turković, 'Film kao znak i sudionik modernizacije,' *Hrvatski filmski ljetopis*, 68 (2011), p. 109.

5. Dean Duda, *U potrazi za blagostanjem, O povijesti dokolice i potrošačkog društva u Hrvatskoj 1950-ih i 1960-ih* (Zagreb: Srednja Europa.2005), p. 54.
6. Hrvoje Turković, 'Film kao znak i sudionik modernizacije,' *Hrvatski filmski ljetopis*, 68 (2011), p. 109.
7. Bogdan Tirnanić, *Crni talas*, Filmski centar Srbije, (Belgrade, 2008), p. 136, for instance, speaks about the Croatian film *Lisice* (*Cuffs*, 1969) by Krsto Papić, which touched on the then-sensitive topic of the arrests of pro-Soviet Communists in summer 1948. The film was politically criticized, but the criticism ceased after the festival in Pula, where Tito commented on Papić's film positively in an unofficial conversation. *Cuffs* won Golden Arena, the main festival award, and was screened in Cannes.
8. Afrić escaped and joined partisans after the show in which he played Faust: that became a central motive of the acclaimed theater play *Hrvatski Faust/ Croatian Faust* (1981) by Slobodan Šnajder.
9. In the only monography on partisan film written during the Yugoslav era, Belgrade critic Milutin Čolić counted and commented on 193 partisan films produced until 1984. This number includes foreign co-productions directed by non-Yugoslavs, but thematically focused on Yugoslavia in war; see Milutin Čolić, *Jugoslavenski ratni film I-II*, Belgrade, Užice: Institut za film, Vesti 1984.
10. The film was based on historical facts: the partisan navy, which numbered ten wooden fishing boats and tugboats equipped with machine guns, was founded on 10 September 1942 in the village of Podgora, 60 km south of Split.
11. Dragan Batančev, *A Cinematic Battle: Three Yugoslav War Films from the 1960s* (Budapest: Central European University, 2012), p. 11.
12. Jurica Pavičić, "Lemons in Siberia': a new approach to the study of the Yugoslav cinema of the 50s,' *New Review of Film and Television Studies* (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 33.
13. Dragan Batančev, *A Cinematic Battle: Three Yugoslav War Films from the 1960s* (Budapest: Central European University, 2012), p. 27.
14. Dragan Batančev, *A Cinematic Battle: Three Yugoslav War Films from the 1960s* (Budapest: Central European University, 2012), p. 31.
15. Dina Iordanova, ed., *Cinema of the Balkans, 24 Frames* (London: Wallflower Press, 2006).
16. Daniel J. Goulding, *Jugoslavensko filmsko iskustvo, 1945–2001* (Zagreb: V.B.Z., 2004), p. 88–115.
17. Formation of partisan air force is connected with two pilots—Franjo Kluz and Rudi Čajavec—who in May 1942 took their planes, escaped from the Ustaša Croatian Air Force, and landed on an improvised airfield Urije near Prijedor, in Western Bosnia, to join partisans. That first attempt to form a

partisan air force was short-lived, because both planes were destroyed by Germans after 45 days. Franjo Kluz was later involved in a second formation of a partisan air force, in southern Italy in 1944.

18. Bogdan Tirnanić, *Crni talas* (Filmski centar Srbije, Belgrade 2008), p. 183.
19. Jurica Pavičić, 'Igrani filmovi Fadila Hadžića,' *Hrvatski filmski ljetopis* 34 (2003), p. 13.
20. Miranda Jakiša, 'Down to Earth Partisans: Fashioning of YU Space in Partisan Film,' *KINO!* 10 (2010), p. 55.
21. Ivo Škrabalo, *101 godina hrvatskog filma 1896–1997* (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Globus, 1998), p. 361.
22. Ivo Škrabalo, *101 godina hrvatskog filma 1896–1997* (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Globus, 1998), p. 362.
23. Dragan Batančev, *A Cinematic Battle: Three Yugoslav War Films from the 1960s* (Budapest: Central European University, 2012), p. 66.
24. Dragan Batančev, *A Cinematic Battle: Three Yugoslav War Films from the 1960s* (Budapest: Central European University, 2012), p. 70.
25. Tomislav Šakić, Filmski svijet Veljka Bulajića: poprište susreta kolektivnog i privatnog,' *Hrvatski filmski ljetopis* 57–58 (2009), p. 14.
26. In 1999, Vrdoljak,—at that time deputy for cinema in the Croatian Ministry of Culture,—forbade the screening of his partisan films from the 1960s in the retrospective of Croatian cinema in Rotterdam.
27. Dragan Batančev, *A Cinematic Battle: Three Yugoslav War Films from the 1960s* (Budapest: Central European University, 2012), p. 2.

CHAPTER 4

Tito(ism) and National Self-Determination

Albert Bing

This brief study touches on the historical circumstances surrounding individual aspects of so-called revolutionary national self-determination and the role played by Josip Broz Tito in promoting it when establishing the second Yugoslav state. In that context, this work deals with the problems of social cohesion and the functioning of a society founded on a specific correlation between a political leader and his people.

Tito and his People

Foreign reporters asked an elderly Russian man (during the Soviet era): "What would you do if your country's borders were opened?" After thinking it over briefly, the old man replied, "Well … I'd climb a tree."—"Climb a tree… why?" asked one of the puzzled reporters. "So the masses don't trample on me on their way out."

This short sketch on the Yugoslav attitude toward the Communist Soviet Union is one of numerous examples of a mass political (counter) culture: "banned" political jokes, which were an inevitable component of everyday life in Yugoslav society during the time of Tito's socialist Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was, however, often presented as something of a

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political counterpoint in relation to the "real communism" generally epitomized by the Soviet Union.[1] As opposed to other Communist states, in which isolation and sweeping Party control were the norm, Yugoslavia—in both the West and East—was perceived as a relatively open society. In the liberal democracies, the image of "socialism with a human face" emerged.[2] On the other side of the Iron Curtain, as noted by Czech film director Jiří Menzel, socialist Yugoslavia was seen as the "America of the East."[3]

This brief outline of perceptions of Yugoslavia brings several questions into focus: Was Tito's Yugoslavia a free or unfree state? What was the nature of its government and what role was played by Josip Broz Tito as the embodiment of Yugoslavia? If, as Hannah Arendt believed, "terror is the essence of totalitarian rule," it would appear that many residents of Yugoslavia (at least during its developed stage) did not perceive it as a totalitarian state despite one-party rule and rigid social conventions. Although Yugoslavia's opening to the West was a process that entailed not a few deviations, it is an indisputable fact that nobody in the Yugoslav state—at least as far as freedom of movement was concerned—had "to climb a tree" after its political consolidation, the easing of repression and its opening to the West. Moreover, postwar Yugoslavia's history was characterized by dramatic evolution in all spheres of social life. In many aspects, Yugoslavia was truly a state in which there was no shortage of "sharp turns" and various forms of social experimentation.[4] Both aspects of social development—evolution and a willingness to experiment—were very closely connected to the foundation on which the diverse but nonetheless monolithic Yugoslav society rested: the authority of a single individual, Josip Broz Tito. The unique influence of Tito's personality on Yugoslavia's development in this sense has been noted by numerous observers of this "experiment." Thus, from the standpoint of one Western observer, Tito's contemporary Robert Coughlan (the editor of Churchill's wartime memoirs) pointed out that "Titoism may be compared to the birth of a new planet." To Coughlan, who witnessed Tito's rise and his political and social influence (which in his time began to surpass the Yugoslav framework), *Titoism* was "not an entity, it was not some solid, measurable and tangible concept, but rather an emerging historical phenomenon."[5]

More recently, however, and particularly after socialist Yugoslavia's collapse, many—often controversial—views of the Yugoslav sovereign have been expressed, in which elements of myth and reality, ideological blindness and political convictions forged by the experience of an arduous past and spiced with personal experiences of "Titoism's" impact all intermingle

in equal measure. Efforts to establish new frameworks for scholarly discourse were also emphasized therein. One of the more recent researchers into Tito's "life and times," Pero Simić, stated that the Yugoslav sovereign was "a phenomenon, perhaps one of the greatest in the twentieth century."[6] Croatian-American historian Ivo Banac, one of the most important contemporary critics of Tito and Titoism, characterized the Yugoslav sovereign as "the symbol of the defeat of several Croatian generations."[7] Banac detected in Tito's personality a lasting historical paradigm for the South Slav zone: a sort of "ill fate of the Balkans" which exhibits "the need for order in a mobile encampment, faith in an imperial idea as the sole guarantor against chaos."[8]

One may therefore speak of Tito and Titoism from numerous different perspectives, and emphasize individual events or social processes in which Tito participated. But one of the most intriguing and certainly historically most relevant motifs was the unusual symbiosis between the Yugoslav sovereign and his "people." Tito's ascent to the *plebiscitary throne* (to use Banac's coinage) emerged as the final step in the convoluted paths of Balkan historical ambiguities, in an "apocryphal ghetto at the periphery of the actual course of history." Not long after Tito's death, the peoples that he ruled "with an iron hand in a velvet glove" succumbed to the "trumpets of public hysteria," a tardy, "tireless promotion of major projects of the state and nation" which led to a series of new "plebiscites." As it turned out, the latter were based on the conviction that "common life 'just like that' was never even possible."[9] In the decade after Tito's departure, it seemed that the history of the state he created and maintained with his authority through tireless repetition of the mantra of "brotherhood and unity" was only "the history of waiting for the right moment, in which each nation pointedly slammed the door in the noses of those who were their neighbors only the day before."[10]

According to official ideology, the country ruled by Tito was the result of the unique path of the Yugoslav nations into a freer and more just society. Postwar Yugoslavia was portrayed as a state whose structure—rooted in the legitimate decisions of the second session of the Anti-fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ)—was "an expression of the will and the objective and permanent interest of the Yugoslav peoples to live together in equality and create a new society of freedom and equality."[11] This paradigmatic example of the understanding of *freedom* (national liberation and class emancipation) by the Yugoslav Communist intelligentsia was based on an interpretation according to which the

Communist Party of Yugoslavia under Tito's leadership not only organized effective resistance under the conditions of occupation and a liberation war, but also carried out its historical mission: a socialist revolution. As opposed to the unitary Greater Serbian Kingdom of Yugoslavia which did not fulfill the popular aspiration "for life in equality," the new state emerged "on the right to [national] self-determination, including secession, and voluntary unification in a common state." The Yugoslav peoples "created their nation states, federal units, in the People's Liberation Struggle and the socialist revolution, resting on the sovereignty of nations and the people's committee authorities."[12] The personal role of Tito in these events was incontestable, and probably crucial to the outcome of the war and the future organization of the state. Countless documents testify to Tito's direct engagement. As the already articulated central figure in the resistance movement in Yugoslavia—already the object of a cult,[13] Tito wrote the "National Question in Yugoslavia in the Light of the People's Liberation War" in 1942, in which he indicated a federal reorganization as a solution to the national question.[14]

More perspicacious and critically oriented Yugoslav analysts attempted to explain the problem of independent decision-making by a nation on its own fate "voluntary unification into a common state" (similar to the plebiscitary acceptance of the achievement of the revolution: the "dictatorship of the proletariat")—through an intriguing interpretation whereby Yugoslavia actually emerged "on the basis of the *revolutionary self-determination* of its nations."[15] Throughout history, a direct driver of social change has been, as a rule, the charismatic leader, who knows how to exploit social conditions, and whose personality embodied certain ideals that could move the masses, often accompanied by bloodshed and uncertain outcomes. In the first half of the twentieth century, the syndrome of conveying the individual right to self-determination onto a charismatic leader became a paradigm for the emergence of totalitarian societies and so-called leader-based democracies ("plebiscitary democracies").[16]

Tito himself was *installed by plebiscite* in revolutionary fashion. After a series of vital decisions on the fate of the future state (formulated and approved in advance by the Politburo), among them the decision to prohibit the return of the king until the "people express their preference for a monarchy or a republic," Tito was promoted to marshal of Yugoslavia to much acclaim. As Milovan Djilas recalled, this was accompanied by "a tumultuous and zealous unanimity" among those present (this act was preceded by a decision to appoint Tito the chairman of the highest

body of the interim executive authorities, the National Committee of Yugoslavia's Liberation NKOJ).[17] This revolutionary alliance between the people and their leader, despite occasional friction, would remain intact until the sovereign's death in 1980. Even though the frenetic expressions of enthusiasm, esteem and boundless loyalty on the part of Tito's adherents faded with time—becoming a Pharaonic ritual and subservience on the part of the "court entourage"—the actual death of the Yugoslav leader was accompanied by impressive displays of devotion to and admiration for Tito.[18]

A decade after Tito's death, the concept of "brotherhood and unity""the sole theme which he [Tito] constantly reiterated to the very last, including his New Year's greetings in 1980"[19]—was shattered in a series of brutal wars together with the state that Tito personified. When the leaders of the new national elites spoke out with their variously interpreted demands to exercise the right to national self-determination, the responses from global organizations did not exhibit any understanding nor sensibility for complex Balkan nuances. The attitude of the West was summarized by Italian historian Indro Montanelli: "The West would like to see a new Tito; not only Yugoslavia, for the entire West would be happy if they could recreate a new Tito, in spite of the mountain of corpses which he climbed to seize power."[20]

Many interpreters of the Yugoslav conflicts looked to the past in their attempts to shed light on the causes of the periodic crises in the "Balkans." A question that imposed itself in this regard was the political model that would be most suitable to maintain peace and stability in this (proverbial) fault line. In this context, it would be worthwhile to consider reminiscences according to which Tito and Titoism are viewed as a sort of digression in relation to the historical tendency of nation-state formation in the nineteenth century. This "digression" is interpreted as a continuation of the policy of maintaining multi-ethnic states, such as the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Some of the parallels could be taken literally. At Tito's initiative, the slogan "brotherhood and unity"—which originated at the time of the Habsburg Monarchy, was revived in order to underscore the integrity of the Yugoslav state. As observed by Milovan Đilas, for Tito it was the emotional equivalent of the Party's political centralism.[21] Even in 1948, A.J.P. Taylor noted, "Marshal Tito was the last of the Habsburgs: ruling over eight different nations, he offered them 'cultural autonomy' and reined in their nationalist hostility. Old Yugoslavia had attempted to be a Serbian national state; in the new Yugoslavia the Serbs received only

national equality and tended to think themselves oppressed. There was no longer a 'people of state;' the new rulers were men of any nationality who accepted the Communist idea."[22] As opposed to the Habsburgs, who—sometimes employing astonishing real-political acrobatics—attempted to preserve the Monarchy's unity,[23] striking a balance between reformist tendencies (allowing political liberties) and effective supervision over these processes, Tito founded and maintained a multi-ethnic Yugoslav society by imposing a specific view of "plebiscitary people's democracy." One of the interesting comparative possibilities for comparing the "two multi-ethnic empires" emerges with reference to the question of national self-determination, which played a vital role in the geopolitical tremors that sealed the fate of both of these multi-ethnic constructs.

The final decade of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, its disappearance, and the geopolitical reorganization of the region, was characterized by countless discussions in which the question of self-determination was approached quite differently. Thus, for example, Hungarian statesman Baron József Eötvös "consistently rejected the right to national self-determination, political territorial autonomy, and recognition of corporate legal subjectivity to separate groups within historical states" with the explanation they would lead to "the destruction of the borders of existing multiethnic states."[24] For their part, in their first platform drafted in Brno in 1899, the Austro-Marxists approached the question of self-determination from the standpoint of preserving the Monarchy's framework while validating Trialism (equating the status of the Austrian Slavs to that of the Germans and Hungarians) and introducing broad local autonomy, albeit rejecting the right to territorial secession.[25] Although, via Austro-Marxism, the leadership of the CPY (immediately after its establishment) "endorsed the federal formula for the state without a leading nation,"[26] with time the Leninist formula of self-determination that included the right to secession began to increasingly come to the fore; this option, which was supplemented by Lenin's successor Stalin, was ultimately adopted and decisively shaped in Yugoslavia by Tito.[27] In late November 1943 the Anti-fascist Council of the Yugoslav People's Liberation (AVNOJ) in Jajce "postulated federalism as the constitutive principle upon which Yugoslavia will be organized after the war." This act was simultaneously an act of revolution that promoted the Yugoslav variant of "revolutionary self-determination."[28] Despite its proclaimed "democratic form" (will of the people) as Aleksa Djilas observed, "both AVNOJ and ZAVNOH [Territorial Anti-fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Croatia] were actually under the

complete control of the Communists."[29] And the Communists, to be sure, were controlled by Tito.

The axiom of "people's democracy"—in which Tito (as the authority) was guardian of "what the people had struggled for"—would be retained until the Yugoslav sovereign's death, but it would reappear during Yugoslavia's collapse in a mutated paradigm of an inherited political culture. The historical context vital for an understanding of Tito's concept of plebiscitary democracy was perhaps best summarized by one of his wartime comrades, Vladimir Velebit: "From the broken, mutilated and lost components remaining after the catastrophes of April, into which the country was brought by the ruling class, a new community of Yugoslav nations was resurrected, built from the materials of the revolution, with a new, higher content as a federation of equal and free nations. … Thus was built that potent bond which tied Tito to the aspirations and desires of the majority of Yugoslavs, regardless of their nationality."[30] And while, as noted by Louis Adamic, "references to the Communist leaders of the 'people's democracies' of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Albania, and Rumania evoked laughter," in the West, Tito's Yugoslavia was excluded from this company, particularly after the break with Stalin.[31]

As opposed to the Austro-Hungarian pluralist model of self-determination, Tito, the "last Habsburg," closed the chapter on multiethnic geopolitical formation in the region by using the formula of "revolutionary national self-determination." In his study on the crisis in Kosovo written in the latter half of the 1980s, one of the most lucid analysts of this phenomenon, Branko Horvat, made several intriguing observations on the nature of Tito's stance on national self-determination: "A characteristic of Yugoslav state-political practice is that it is based on obtuse, contradictory, and ad hoc theories. This even applies to the renowned theory on the right to self-determination, including secession, which applies to nations, but not to national minorities as well, because nations are the bearers of sovereignty—and national minorities are not. According to this theory, the difference between a nation and a national minority lies in the fact that a national minority lives in a 'somebody else's' state, and not in its own 'home' state."[32] Even more notable is Horvat's observation as to actual treatment of the "proclaimed 'Leninist principle of self-determination up to secession.'" In a television program entitled "Tito on the National Question," President Tito "clearly and unequivocally expressed his political stance at the time: 'If they even decided this in some republic by plebiscite—which, of course, could never come about—

as the head of state I would employ extreme measures.'"[33] This statement by Tito (if genuine) is interesting from the perspective of the observation that "Josip Broz (…) almost never, or never, particularly after the People's Liberation Struggle and the armed phase of the Revolution, spoke of elements of *the right to self-determination including secession*."[34] The controversies in the understanding and interpretations of the principle of national self-determination were directly reflected in Yugoslavia's collapse. The remainder of this study deals with the genesis and historical context of the affirmation of (revolutionary) national self-determination and the correlation between this principle and Tito's activities. Although in both cases these are complex historical phenomena that must be considered diachronically and synchronously, the focus has been placed on the period in which the Yugoslav variant of revolutionary national self-determination was articulated, which is relevant to Tito's rise (1937–1945). This shortcoming is partially rectified in the following section, which provides a brief overview of the promotion of national self-determination within the framework of both Yugoslav states and the period of war and occupation.

The Genesis of National Self-Determination in the Yugoslav State and Tito

The almost century-long genesis of the concept of national self-determination that accompanied the various geopolitical manifestations of the Yugoslav state demonstrates the historical continuity of this collective human right in the state-building aspirations of the Yugoslav and other peoples represented in this territory. The right to national self-determination played a vital role in both the creation and later collapse of the Yugoslav state (Yugoslavia rose from the ruins of two immense multi-ethnic empires—the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire, while the process of national homogenization and creation of nation states that began prior to the appearance of this multi-ethnic state continued after the death of Yugoslav sovereign Tito).[35] As World War I neared its end, and once it concluded, political circumstances in this region were influenced by two parallel variants of national self-determination: the "American" concept of Woodrow Wilson promoted at the Versailles Peace Conference as one of the pillars of postwar geopolitical restructuring, and the "Russian" Communist model of Vladimir Lenin, which began to spread rapidly after the success of the Bolshevik Revolution.[36]

At the level of regulative principle, these two philosophical paradigms of the broadest political articulation (expression of a nation's will to statehood) would play a significant role in the rhetoric of politicians engaged in the creation of the Yugoslav state and, later, in the formulation of Yugoslav politics during the interwar period. When the Yugoslav state was finally created, this tendency was reflected in attempts to then create a Yugoslav national "amalgam," to which the Constitution of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes of 1921 testifies. For example, Article 3 of this Constitution stipulates that the official language of the kingdom is "Serbo-Croato-Slovenian."[37] Therefore, by conception it was devised as "a unitary state, manifesting the national self-determination of the Yugoslav nation."[38] However, Yugoslavism was never validated as a civic framework for national integration of "equal tribes," as "one of the most distinguished Croatian intellectuals" engaged in the new state's creation, Frano Supilo, had hoped, but rather as a façade for the "nationalist ideology of Serbia in the form of 'uncompromising and integral Yugoslavism.'"[39]

The interpretation of Yugoslavism as the final act in the self-determination of the "Yugoslav tribes" prompted new opposing interpretations. During the course of 1919 and 1920, "the myth of freedom melted away into a psychosis of hatred into which the idea of South Slav unity was submerged."[40] As a result of such circumstances, national self-determination obtained a new meaning. It became the legitimist mainstay of Croatian opposition politics in particular, led by Stjepan Radić, demanding "that the self-determination of the Croats be implemented in practice." Opposing the unitarist policies of "the [Serbian] Radical Party and particularly Nikola Pašić, who agitates under the Greater Serbian aegis," Radić sought to internationalize the Croatian question. His primary instrument was the "catchphrase 'self-determination,' in which the Croats assumed the lead over the remaining provinces."[41] At the same time, as a consummate pragmatist and syncretist, Radić elevated the formula of self-determination to a generally accepted Croatian stance, linking it to the founder of the Party of the (Statehood) Right and the icon of Croatian nationalism, Ante Starčević, and his ideology of the continuous tradition of the Croatian statehood right.[42]

These standpoints would significantly influence the views and notions of national self-determination held by all Croatian political parties, including the Communists and Tito, particularly during the period of his political growth in the 1920s.

Having become a section of the Third Communist International, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia—like all of the world's Communist parties—had to accept the admission requirements adopted at the second congress of the Communist International (Comintern) in 1920. However, from the very moment the Yugoslav Communists became active, the national problem, linked to the question of national self-determination, imposed itself as a major component of their policies. In 1919, the Comintern already assessed the creation of the first Yugoslav state union as a case of colonial expansion by certain powers that came out of the war as victors (rather than an expression of national self-determination), wherein it was observed that their interests were being "defended by the Serbian bourgeoisie and dynasty."[43] This is why the Comintern treated the first Yugoslav state union "as an expanded Serbia," which would be reflected in the activities of the Yugoslav Communists over the next two decades and become a source of frequent disputes in the interpretation of the national question.[44] Stalin himself personally intervened in Yugoslav national debates; thus, in his prophetic observations on the character of inter-ethnic relations made in March 1925, Stalin directly linked the question of national self-determination to the right of the Croats and Slovenes to secede. Stalin, moreover, emphasized that denying the Slovenes and Croats the right to secession from the Yugoslav state would be pointless, for "if a war begins, or when a war begins (…) …*they* (will) unreservedly turn on each other, of that there can be no doubt."[45]

The political rise of Tito coincided with a time of harsh persecution against and considerable erosion of the Communist Party, which was transformed from "a formerly respectable parliamentary party with over 65 thousand members" to a "sect-driven party consisting of a handful of Yugoslav fanatics."[46] The actual date of Tito's admission to the Communist Party has not been precisely ascertained,[47] but at the beginning of 1928, Tito appeared as a trade union delegate at the Zagreb party conference. He was elected political secretary of the Zagreb local committee, and he came into a position to contact the Moscow central Comintern (the *de facto* foreign policy office of Stalin and the Soviet Union), which precisely at this time issued its *Open Letter*, addressed to "all members of the CPY," seeking an "establishment of order" among the "factions" of the divided CPY. In confronting "factionalism," in which a major role was also played by the national question, Tito's Zagreb group (party organization) demanded unity: "a Bolshevik organization, as though cast in a single piece." This did not go unnoticed in Moscow. Seeking unity pursuant

to class principles, in national questions Tito advocated the right of each nation to political independence. It was within such a political context that Tito delivered one of his first notable public political speeches, for in the spring of 1928 he "sought that the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes introduce the right to self-determination of all nations, including secession as the primary strategic orientation in the struggle against hegemony and the oppression of non-Serb peoples."[48]

Tito's stance reflected the conclusions of the Fourth Congress of the CPY held in Dresden in October 1928, where "the right to secession was recognized even for national minorities." The Resolution on Yugoslavia's economic and political situation and the CPY's tasks state that "the Party is obliged to help the liberation movements of oppressed nations and national minorities, to lead the struggle against imperialism and to defend without hesitation the right to self-determination including secession."[49] Although Tito, as a pragmatic politician, would adapt concepts such as self-determination to his own ideas (later even creating events in compliance with his influence), until the end of his life he remained faithful to the idea of national equality.

The rise of fascism, particularly after Hitler's ascension to power in 1933, resulted in a new Comintern policy with regard to Yugoslavia. The suppression of the national urge in the international workers' movement in this time of "fear of the apocalypse of war" was transformed into "the codeword of the time: We'll defend Yugoslavia!"[50] After the slogan of the so-called Popular Front (which first appeared in France, and was then reaffirmed throughout as a response to the spread of fascism) was adopted at the Party's plenum held in Split in June 1935, the significance of national equality and self-determination was relegated to the background. Gordana Vlajčić observed "the fact that the slogans on Yugoslavia's dismantling began to disappear from the CPY's platforms could also be seen in the consultation of the CPY Central Committee in Moscow in the summer of 1936. At the time, it was entirely, definitively asserted that the altered circumstances in Europe provoked by Hitler's accession to power and the decisions of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern influenced the CPY 'to change its tactics on the national question, and to discard the principle of self-determination of all nations, including secession.'"[51]

The concept of federal reorganization was the formula that was supposed to settle the national question and the survival of the Yugoslav state; henceforth, the CPY fought for the creation of a Yugoslav state modeled after the USSR. This line was also assumed by Milan Gorkić, and

it was carried forward in practice by Tito once he became CPY general secretary in 1937.[52] The Comintern's appointment of Tito to the post of secretary of the CPY Central Committee was portrayed in the official Communist historiography as a "long-term process."[53] However, this was a period characterized by the still insufficiently illuminated controversies surrounding Tito's illegal activities, his role in the Spanish Civil War, the factional struggles inside the Party and the Stalinist purges. In the period leading into World War II, Tito worked to consolidate the Party, which was on the verge of collapse due to factional infighting. The formations of the CP of Slovenia and CP of Croatia in 1937 were vital steps in rounding off the stance on the national question. By familiarizing himself with the functioning techniques of Communist organizations in the Soviet Union and Comintern and establishing useful contacts (with Georgi Dimitrov, Wilhelm Pick, and others) during the particularly perilous time of purges in 1936–1938,[54] Tito gradually gained invaluable experience, which made it possible for him to impose himself as the top official of the Yugoslav party cell (and survive). His political activities, which were, as a rule, combined with decisive action, assumed a sophisticated and systematic form of policy implementation that would later crystallize into a comprehensive system of functioning for Communist governing techniques.

World War II provided the historical framework for affirmation of the so-called revolutionary national self-determination that would be imposed as the foundation of the reconstructed Yugoslav state by the war's victors: the Communists under Tito's leadership. The Communists found a solution to the heritage of inter-ethnic antagonisms in the state's federalization, wherein the Leninist principle of national self-determination, including secession, was incorporated into the constitution of the new multi-ethnic Yugoslav state as an axiom to protect national interests. Thanks to the charisma of the country's leader, built up during the war but also due to his indisputable acumen as a politician and statesman, Tito managed to steer the development of Yugoslav society up to the time of his death, wherein the problem of inter-ethnic relations was accorded special attention. Consistently citing the revolutionary achievement of "national equality and unity in the people's liberation struggle," he decisively opposed any attempt to raise national tensions. As a legitimist basis for opposing unitarism and the supremacy of any nation, self-determination became the motto for national equality, and Tito himself shaped and guaranteed it.

After World War II, the socialist multi-ethnic Yugoslav state passed through a number of developmental phases, from copying Stalinist

methods of governance in the immediate postwar years to a broad opening toward the West, which began after the break with Stalin in 1948. Despite the systematic development of "brotherhood and unity," the feeling of belonging to a Yugoslav community and the related problems of political articulation (including national self-determination) were among the most complex social phenomena.[55] The constitutional amendments from the 1967–1971 period and finally the constitution of 1974 stratified "federal centralism" into "six republics, two provinces and the Federation." The central role of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, headed by Tito, remained unquestioned, and moreover, as noted by Branko Petranović, it manifested itself as a "complete melding between the state and the Party": "the Party transformed the state into its 'transmission,' while its monopoly on ideas, politics and personnel constituted an 'umbrella' safeguarding the state apparatus from the influence, control and criticism of citizens."[56] Almost ritually, questions of "social and state significance" were dealt with by professional "socio-political" workers of whom there were roughly 7000 in various "socio-political" organizations and roughly 5000 in "representative bodies."[57] This "professional core" was surrounded by "a broader elite in the municipalities and at other levels, enjoying privileges and material benefits." The Yugoslav intellectual elite also functioned within such a political system, and most often intermingled with it.[58]

In one of the earlier syntheses about Yugoslavia and Tito published in the 1960s (by Phyllis Auty), the author observed the critical point in a system based on the supreme authority of a man who was also the central integrative bond between society and the state: "The portraits of Tito that are displayed all over Yugoslavia are less a sign of enforced hero-worship than a symbol of national unity, like the singing of the national anthem in Britain or the United States. The question of national unity is pre-eminent for Yugoslavia. The greatest test of Tito's achievement is not whether his Communist system will continue unchanged but whether he has founded a stable and united Yugoslav state that can survive into the future."[59]

When the Yugoslav state began to fall apart ten years after Tito's death (in 1980), all participants in this process legitimated their demands by citing the right of (revolutionary) national self-determination. The initial demands for a redefinition of status within the state (by exercising the right to self-determination) already appeared in Kosovo in 1981, which remained a permanent focal point of the Yugoslav crisis. When, at the end of the 1980s, a fierce debate arose between advocates of enhanced autonomy for the republics and provinces and adherents of recentralization

of the state by returning to the constitutional solutions from the 1950s and 1960s, Slovenia returned to the originalist interpretations of Edvard Kardelj and posited the Slovenian nation's right to self-determination in its constitution, including the right to secession, as an enduring, integral and inalienable right.[60] After the introduction of political pluralism in 1990, individuals such as the newly elected Croatian president, Franjo Tuđman, cited Tito and the principle of national self-determination while simultaneously questioning Tito's most important accomplishment, the Yugoslav federation.[61] Thus, Tuđman often stressed that "the Croats never abandoned the principles of AVNOJ," rather they actually "reaffirmed the right of the nation to self-determination": "under these new circumstances, we are no longer willing to agree to the preservation of Yugoslavia at any cost, and we are particularly not willing to watch as it becomes Greater Serbia."[62] On the other hand, the Serbs in Croatia immediately cited the right to self-determination in their aspiration to merge parts of Croatian territory with Serbia (one foreign journalist called this "a secession within a secession")[63]; their fellow Serbs in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina, also calling on the "natural, inalienable and non-negotiable right of the Serbian people to self-determination," began to systematically expel the non-Serb population, and then, following a decision of the "National Assembly of the Serb Republic," proclaimed the independence of their "state."[64]

The chaos that ensued in the wake of Yugoslavia's collapse and the general reaffirmation of the right to national self-determination after the fall of communism prompted endless debates on the universality and general feasibility of this principle (as contained in the UN Charter and the documents of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe).[65]

The controversies did not even bypass the international arbiters who participated in the creation of the region's geopolitical architecture. Moreover, citing the concept of national self-determination within the context of Yugoslavia's collapse provoked many disputes and rancorous polemics among legal scholars, political scientists, historians and other observers and participants in the Yugoslav drama.[66] Ultimately, the international community (the so-called Badinter Commission at the Conference on Yugoslavia in 1991) did not accept the principle of self-determination as the concept underlying the state independence of Croatia and Slovenia, rather it concluded that the Yugoslav state collapsed and that the disassociation of its federal units was thus possible.[67]

Krleža, Tito, and National Self-Determination on the Eve of World War

Writer Miroslav Krleža's enormous, multi-layered contribution to Croatian and Yugoslav culture may be roughly subdivided into "the two social focuses of his creative arc (…) *the national and class questions.*"[68] Krleža's historical vision of national liberation and the establishment of a socially just society "fixed the national question in a markedly Leninist sense of the freedom of each nation to self-determination and the unification of several similar peoples into an equal union in the focus of his interests."[69] As opposed to Tito, who, as an extremely pragmatic personality, generally adapted complex theoretical political concepts (such as self-determination) to his own way of thinking (to be sure, always making sure not to step too radically beyond the imposed Party canon of the Stalinist ideological catechism), Krleža was an autonomous and exceptionally self-aware analyst whose keen observations were drawn equally from broad historical and cultural premises and current political circumstances.

An intriguing phenomenon in this regard was Krleža's complex relationship with Tito, which endured over four decades: from their first meeting in 1937, through the so-called conflicts on the literary left (which culminated in 1939–1940) and Tito's failed efforts to draw Krleža into the Partisans, to Krleža's postwar, 'controversial' status as a confidant and his promotion to the status of one of the most important intellectual authorities who, like Tito, grew into something of an icon of Yugoslavia during his lifetime (in his own field, to be sure).

Krleža had rounded off his many years of contemplation of the problems surrounding the articulation of national interests (and the concept of national self-determination) precisely at the time when Tito assumed the top post among the Yugoslav Communists. Within a period of several years after the outbreak of the war, the principle of self-determination would be elevated from a pointless "political phrase"—as Krleža perceived it prior to the war—to one of the primary tenets undergirding the legitimacy of establishing a new social order and one of the fundamental legalistic principles in the formation of a new multi-ethnic Yugoslav state, wherein Tito played a central role.

At several places in the political considerations brought together in his so-called Theses for a Discussion in the Year 1935, Krleža exhaustively examined the "ballyhooed" self-determination of nations—which had been "so oft-extolled in recent times by both left and right"—while

bringing into focus the broad scale of pressing political issues.[70] His critical interpretations of self-determination, like those of Sima Marković before him, are particularly interesting in relation to the complementary position of the "obedient" party cadres who had to adjust their views—whether they liked it or not—to the controversies of practical politics and the official positions of Stalin and the Comintern (to some extent this also pertained to Tito himself, given his carefully devised political career in the Communist movement).[71]

Already at the time of affirmation of the Popular Front, Krleža expressed scathingly heretical standpoints in which he touched on the problem of defining self-determination; he linked the question of why "socialism in Croatia has become helpless in the face of burgeoning Radićism" to the left's relinquishment of the right to self-determination to "Radićism." Skeptical of the strength of the Communist Party and its negligible role in the Popular Front, Krleža noticed that under Croatian circumstances, Radić's Croatian Republican Peasant Party appeared as the sole relevant political force capable of defending the principles of republicanism and the right to national self-determination.[72]

The respect that Krleža expressed for Radić, despite his disagreements with the latter, was of the same type that he would later develop for Tito. As an intellectual and elitist who generally detested hands-on political involvement (e.g., he refused to head the Popular Front), Krleža valued men of action who knew how to lead the masses. In this sense, his appreciation of Tito was sincere, despite their differences of opinion, and far from classical servility. For his part, in his political career Tito preferred to surround himself with strong independent personalities (Andrija Hebrang, Milovan Djilas, Koča Popović) rather than sycophants. In the period in question, Krleža, true to his acerbic criticism and leftist orientation, did not limit himself to empty rhetoric, rather he exhaustively analyzed the significance and extent of the self-determination principle in the political circumstances of the time: "Until it is applied as a principle, 'the right to self-determination including secession' is mere rhetoric, and like all rhetoric normally seen in resolutions, and applied *de facto* politically, in practice this right is transformed into nationalism, into irredentism, into a counter-revolutionary, destructive ideology, which in our case can only serve foreign interests."

Despite his acknowledgment of "Radićism," to Krleža the calls to national self-determination and secession advocated by Croatian bourgeois political forces had as their primary function "the most purposeful

possible creation of an independent market, suited to the independent bourgeois (actually, today capitalist) right of exploitation, monetary development, thus profit based on their own, sovereign policies."[73] Therefore the tendency toward "'self-determination of the Croatian nation, including' from the Serbs and Slovenes" was just as "counter-revolutionary" as "the concepts of King Alexander for the self-determination of the Serbian people to Novska and Glina (amputation) were counter-revolutionary."[74] An almost identical position was adopted by Tito and the CPY in its critique of "capitalist universalism" after the signing of the Cvetković-Maček in 1939, which was supposed to have regulated the question of relations between the Croats and Serbs.

Krleža was also skeptical about the activity of the current Popular Front. This European movement, which was gradually formed after 1933 as an alternative to Nazism and fascism at the initiative of the Comintern (at the 7th Congress in Moscow in 1935. by Georgi Dimitrov and Palmiro Tagliati), became the official framework for the activity of all "democratic forces" of leftist orientation, united in a common front in the struggle against "military-fascist dictatorships."[75] Referring to the ideological inconsistency of the strategy of "a broad democratic Yugoslav front," Krleža noticed that self-determination was being "forced" as a "slogan" in its activities, "regardless of the fact that here in our Croatian terrain it is exclusively a façade, and that it cannot be applied in practice, simply because this thesis on 'national self-determination, including secession' contains within it such a mass of contradictions that it actually constitutes a squared circle;" that is, "today this slogan is a pure abstraction!"[76] Krleža saw that the sole sensible alternative to the collusion between the "national" and "bourgeois" manipulation of national interests and the unprincipled disorientation of the Yugoslav Communists was a return to Lenin's original postulates: "On the question of national self-determination, we are above all interested in the self-determination of the proletariat within a single nation (Lenin)."[77]

Citing the empirical historical "Austro-Hungarian example," Krleža demonstrated that in "the mosaic of national questions (…) the proletariat can in no case whatsoever attain their own self-determination."[78] Underscoring Lenin, Krleža concluded that "the 'abstract' metaphysical 'right to self-determination' only gains its deeper sense when it is truly transformed into the revolutionary act of full socio-political creation. The right of 'self-determination, including secession' practically, in the case of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, can mean nothing other than:

a state divorce from a foreign national, coerced relationship, state-building independence to free constitutional sovereignty and independence with all international legal attributes."[79]

As opposed to the independent and fiercely critical positions of Krleža and other distinguished left-oriented intellectuals, Tito's political positions were "formed" in compliance with his political "evolution." This implied a balance between adaptation to the dictates of the Comintern and the aspirations to carry forward his own ideas, which ensued from Tito's personal assessments of political relations in Yugoslavia and the Party itself. In this sense, the rejection of views that "Yugoslavia is only an artificial construct" and acceptance of the framework of "a democratic federal republic of Yugoslavia" (according to the letter of the Party's general secretary, Gorkić, from the end of 1936) became the point of departure that would predominate in the period of the CPY's political activities within the Popular Front. In compliance with these guidelines, Tito, as a new member of the CPY's leadership with special authorization, in the so-called Letter for Serbia (November 1936), set forth the positions that composed the framework of his approach to questions of inter-ethnic relations and that would denote his policies in the forthcoming period: "The resolve that the right to self-determination of all nations will be respected must be expressed clearly and unambiguously in the platform, i.e., not just the right of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, but also the Macedonians and Montenegrins, and by the same token the right of the peoples in Vojvodina and Bosnia-Herzegovina to decide whether they will preserve their regional independence in a federal state. The rights of national minorities, the Germans, Hungarians and Albanians, to equality must also be emphasized."[80]

In compliance with the policies of the Popular Front, Tito stressed that the Communist position corresponded to "the position of the Peasant-Democratic Coalition."

The commitment to an independent plebiscitary democratic procedure was an obvious ideological concession by the Communists to the social democrats (who had earlier been compared to the fascists), because it was at odds with the doctrine of revolutionary overthrow; peaceful democratic transition did not comply with the spirit of Leninist-Stalinist practice that viewed the establishment of "people's democracy" ("democratic centralism") as an objective that should follow after the violent change of government—a revolution led by professional Communist revolutionaries who presented themselves as the "vanguard" of the working class.

However, despite these inconsistencies (which Krleža also criticized) and that would come to the fore with the validation of "revolutionary self-determination" during the war, the further course of the CPY's organizational restructuring undertaken by the new general secretary Tito ran toward the establishment of new canons for national balance. The establishment of the Communist Party of Slovenia and the Communist Party of Croatia (1937), as well as the focus on the question of the status of the Macedonians and Albanians (1938–1940) and the definition of the Muslims as a separate ethnic group (whereby Bosnia-Herzegovina was also directed toward autonomous status), created new possibilities for interpretations of national self-determination. Tito's position was precisely formulated by Edvard Kardelj-Sperans. Guided primarily by Slovenian national interests, whose satisfaction he saw within the Yugoslav framework, but also in the interpretations of Stalin and the Comintern, Kardelj extensively elaborated the right to self-determination, including the right to secession: "the state unity of the Yugoslav peoples, wherein the long-held aspirations of these nations and the concrete need for the defense of their independence" may be achieved "only on the basis of recognition of the right to self-determination and full independence of all the peoples of Yugoslavia: the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians and Montenegrins."[81]

These positions on the approach to the national question based on the right to national self-determination with preservation of the Yugoslav framework would become the ideological postulate of the revolution that the Communists tied to the liberation war and the constitutional foundation of the new state.

Tito and Revolutionary National Self-Determination

By calling on the nations of Yugoslavia to take up arms against the occupiers and their collaborators in 1941, the CPY, adhering to the principles of the Popular Front from the very beginning of the resistance, stressed that their objectives must include "the basic national, social and democratic demands of the broad popular masses." A text in *Vjesnik*, the bulletin of the Yugoslav People's Liberation Front (August 1941), emphasized that the aim of their struggle was "to expel the occupiers, overthrow the imposed regimes and allow the people to choose for themselves their

government and social order in line with the desires of the free majority of the people."[82] Already in the autumn of 1941, the so-called People's Liberation Committees (*Narodnooslobodilački odbori*—NOO) began to be formed as alternative bodies of authority that "performed all governing functions except military, which were administered by Partisan squad staffs." Although it was stressed that the NOOs "were not organs of any party or organization," it was apparent that the CPY, as the backbone of the resistance movement, "from the very beginning linked the armed struggle to the question of setting up a new government."[83] Herein, the equality of nations was portrayed as one of the key prerequisites for effective resistance to the occupiers and Quislings, but also one of the most important goals of the struggle.

To be sure, the question of democracy, the concept of national equality and the interpretation of the practical implementation of national self-determination also had, in addition to its national roots, the features of a Machiavellian strategy. Despite the continuation of the policies of the Popular Front, the broad anti-fascist formation that declared the struggle of democracy against totalitarian fascism, the people's liberation struggle had clearly recognizable elements of a revolutionary act from its very beginnings. In a text under the title "The national question in Yugoslavia in the light of the people's liberation struggle"—published in the Party bulletin *Proleter* in 1942—Tito personally underlined the differences between the stance on the national question in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the importance of national equality in the liberation war: "The current People's Liberation Struggle and the national question in Yugoslavia are inextricably linked (…) The term *people's liberation struggle* would only be a phrase, even a deception, if it did not encompass, besides the general Yugoslav sense, the national sense for each nation separately, i.e., if it did not mean, besides the liberation of Yugoslavia, the simultaneous liberation of the Croats, Slovenes, Serbs, Macedonians, Albanians, Muslims, etc."[84]

These positions were promoted at the second session of AVNOJ in Jajce on 29 November 1943, where the new Yugoslav state was created on federal principles.[85] Despite contacts with the government-in-exile and the political opposition in occupied Yugoslavia, and tactical negotiations with the Chetniks, and later even with the Germans, the stance of the Communists and Tito on the national question was clear and consistent. In comparison to the prewar principled stance on the need to combat "chauvinist and separatist movements" (pro-fascist nationalists) and the bourgeoisie as a class enemy, national self-determination grew from an

unclear regulative principle (e.g., as it was seen by Krleža) to an effective act narrowly tied to the essential goals of the people's liberation struggle. Moreover, the Communists systematically depicted the occupation and the establishment of Quisling regimes like the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) as brutal, treasonous and anti-democratic constructs that were opposed by the people's liberation movement rooted in the legitimacy of national self-determination. The clear stance of the NDH authorities, which explicitly rejected both democracy and self-determination, worked to their advantage.[86] In this sense, the NDH was portrayed as a traitorous anti-Croatian construct, while the People's Liberation Struggle and Tito were portrayed as fighters for Croatian equality and freedom.

As noted by Janko Pleterski, the refusal to recognize the occupation and legitimacy of the states set up by the Quisling nationalist regimes was "a strong argument favoring the wartime mobilization of the people in all parts of the country: it was an argument for all anti-fascists, regardless of nationality and the different positions of individual nations in the country prior to the occupation."[87] The affirmation of such policies completed an important political cycle that coincided with Tito's political ascent. At the time of the so-called January Proclamation of the CPY in 1937, in which a solution to the problem of national equality was confirmed following advocacy of national self-determination with the simultaneous preservation of Yugoslavia, until the outbreak of war—which was exploited as an event to implement the CPY's political platform—the Communists managed to transform their theoretical and ideological concepts into action. Even though the liberation struggle led by Tito put forth the establishment of "a democratic federal state" as its objective, in line with the policies of the Popular Front, it was apparent that this was simultaneously a matter of a "revolution," the affirmation of "people's democracy," which had few points in common with the liberal democracies of the West.

The Western allies were aware of these facts as well. It was clear to the British military mission to the Supreme Command that the Communist Tito, as the head of the strongest Allied military formation, would play a major role in the outcome of the Yugoslav situation.[88] Furthermore, Tito was recognized as a person who already at that time demonstrated considerable self-sufficiency.[89] Analyzing Tito's temperament, the chief of the British mission, Fitzroy Maclean, observed the marked "independence of his spirit" and noticed that it was "incompatible with orthodox Communism" (which may be the first anticipation of Tito's break with Stalin).[90] Certainly, the British government would have rather supported

the Chetniks commanded by Draža Mihailović (as an exponent of the friendly Yugoslav government-in-exile),[91] but despite his unconcealed communism and pro-Soviet orientation, Tito's concept of mass resistance prevailed as the most effective in opposing the enemy. In any case, it was clear that the goal of the Communists was not to maintain continuity in the (wartime occupied) Kingdom of Yugoslavia, but rather its radical reconstruction, wherein a new approach to the national question was one of the central concerns. In one of his later statements, Tito clearly confirmed this position (16 December 1948): "It was only during the people's liberation war that we set relations between the nations on other, new, better foundations. Formally we separated only to practically become even more firmly bonded."[92]

The mass acceptance and participation of members of different nations and social classes in the liberation struggle, which grew as the Axis powers began losing the war, was interpreted as an act of self-determination. Thus, for example, the highest body of popular authority in Croatia—the Territorial Anti-fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Croatia (ZAVNOH)[93]—which, to be sure, had particular weight given the establishment of the NDH—was portrayed as "a reflection of the desires of the Croats, threatened for centuries by Germans, Italians, Hungarians, Ottomans and other foreigners," and "a reflection of the difficult position of the Serbs (…) threatened by the Ustasha NDH." ZAVNOH was, therefore, simultaneously "a safeguard (…) against all greater nation Croatian and Serbian aspirations and, within their framework, racist orientations as well."[94] Normatively, the principle of sovereignty was "at the core of all of ZAVNOH's acts." At the third session of ZAVNOH, held in Topusko on 8–9 May 1944, the principle of national equality obtained legal sanction (in compliance with AVNOJ's decisions), particularly in the "Declaration on the Fundamental Rights of Nations and Citizens of Democratic Croatia."[95] This declaration stressed that the "Croatian and Serbian nations in Croatia are equal." All "national minorities" were explicitly guaranteed "the right to national life," while Article 2 stipulated: "All citizens of the Federal State of Croatia are equal regardless of nationality, race and religion." The equality of nations was also explicitly cited in the "Decision on Approval of the Work of Representatives of Croatia at the Second Session of AVNOJ" on 9 May 1944. These provisions "sanctioned the right to self-determination of the nations of Croatia, the legally expressed voluntary decision of the nations of Croatia, based on their right to self-determination [which was underscored in Article 1

of the Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and Article 2 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Croatia] and the equality of nations, to jointly enter a common state with the other nations of Yugoslavia as an equal member of this community."[96]

Several years after it was constituted, ZAVNOH was thus perceived as "an obvious actualization of the socialist principle of national self-determination," whereby "the 'Croat question,' insoluble in the old, pre-war state, was constitutionally solved." The explanation for this stance, which remained the general foundation for the doctrine of "revolutionary national self-determination" until the collapse of the Yugoslav state, was rendered in an interpretation (based on Croatia's example) whereby the Croatian-Serbian antagonism "could be resolved only by the working people under the leadership of the CPY," at that point "when the basic hindrance thereto was removed: the bourgeois government and the influence of imperialist powers, and when the movement for the rights of the nation was headed by that social force whose interests were identical to the interests of the nation as a whole." Thus, it was emphasized that "here this could only be achieved in the past people's liberation war, when the national revolution was staged and a new state was created on the basis of socialist principles."[97]

Tito and the Paradox and Social Foundation of Revolutionary National Self-Determination

The foundations of Tito's Yugoslavia were rooted in the Leninist-Stalinist variant of national self-determination including secession, which was not confirmed in the Soviet Union as an expression of democratic standards (it was a matter of the free will of individuals or nations).[98] The problems surrounding the affirmation of people's democracy in Yugoslavia, and in this regard the right to self-determination, clearly emerged during the war itself and particularly at its final phases and the first postwar years (a period of mass repression). Keeping in mind the controversies associated with national and other divisions that appeared in Yugoslavia during World War II, the legitimacy of national self-determination appeared questionable. In general, under wartime conditions—which in occupied Yugoslavia indisputably had the features of a civil war as well (the members of the same nation participated on opposing sides)—is it possible to implement the act of free political articulation on vital state-building matters?[99] Although

during the war the Communist leadership undertook extraordinary organizational efforts, not only in successful resistance to the occupier but also in the parallel establishment of authority (the footing for democratic legitimacy was sought in the People's Liberation Committees ;"at all levels, from village/local to county and district"),[100] the fact remained that the "social base" of this authority and the political articulation that proceeded in its bodies were formed in the extraordinary circumstances of civil war. The coarsest discrepancy between the freedom-loving concept of national self-determination and the political realities of retaliation and the struggle for power at the end of the war and the immediate postwar years was demonstrated by the mass executions of defeated "people's enemies"—"domestic turncoats"—to whom "people's justice" was meted out, as well as the forced expulsion of minority groups for collaboration with the occupying powers (Germans, Italians, Hungarians). These considerations certainly also rendered dubious the "scholarly" assessments of the victors, according to which the CPY's prewar policy, which "struggled for a solution to the national question of all non-Serb nations of Yugoslavia based on the right to self-determination" achieved its culmination in the people's liberation struggle and revolution ("resolution of the national question in the course of the People's Liberation Struggle was a consistent continuation of the CPY's struggle to solve in the national question in the old Yugoslavia").[101]

Despite posing such justified questions, it is certainly no less important to consider the social basis of revolutionary self-determination. As noted in 1943 by a member of the British military mission,[102] F.W.D. Deakin, the widespread support for the Partisans and the layered social and national structure of the resistance movement left "the deepest impression of the Partisan military formations on the Britons: "each unit formed a community and refuge of mutually close persons who fled from their destroyed villages and massacres of their relatives."[103] This social structure in Tito's resistance movement formed a genuine basis for the promotion of national self-determination (as a sort of "revolutionary plebiscite") and the specific understanding of unit as forged in wartime conditions. Tito himself addressed this directly (e.g., in the newly liberated Zagreb on 21 May 1945): "Our victory is not the victory of a single nation of Yugoslavia, but rather of all of its nations. The new Yugoslavia was not created at the negotiating table, but rather in four years of suffering by all of our nations. In this new Yugoslavia, all nations will be granted those rights that they have earned, having given their blood and their finest sons for them."[104]

The cult of Tito already began to be systematically built in 1943.[105] In several years, Tito became a potent symbol, a living myth that would function as the most important integrative component of Yugoslav society until his death in 1980.[106] The validation of Tito as a personality whose charisma imposed itself as a phenomenon of postwar Yugoslav society was based less on the concept of rigid Communist structure, and to a greater extent on the cultural traditions of the diverse Balkan region and the historical circumstances from which it emerged. "Balkan frontier mentality" suited the maintenance of "a tradition of long-standing personal rule, gerontocratic authority" (the Partisan fighters called Tito *Stari*—'Old Man') and "veneration of the liberator." According to this same outlook, "the institution of a separation of powers" (liberal democracy) under Yugoslav conditions without democratic traditions of the Western type would impel conflicts in which national disputes dominated.[107] In this milieu, charismatic popular leaders played a stronger mobilizing role than the aristocracy or bureaucracy.[108] However, the crucial element of the mythologization of Tito was the recognition of the popular leader who shared the fate of his people: "staying with the people in the most trying circumstances is the oddly constant component of wartime charisma." Such conduct was "more important than symbols and ceremonies," and it resulted in the plebiscitary support to a popular leader whose personage was rapidly deified into a cult of the liberator."[109]

One of the many witnesses and chroniclers of the Battle of Sutjeska, photographer and film director Žorž Skrigin, described the dramatic scene in which the surrounded and helpless Partisan troops and wounded, among whom many were suffering from typhus and dysentery, simply laid down in a mountain ravine, awaiting death. As Skrigin recalled, at one moment somebody saw the silhouette of a man on horseback through the mist, moving along a mountain ridge, and shouted "Tito's coming!" After this, the half-dead men stood up and continued their agonizing struggle.

The memoirs of a member of the British military mission in Yugoslavia may be taken as an unbiased testimony to the character of the relationship between Tito and his troops (and the masses of refugees). In his entry for August 1943, Dr. Mladen Iveković wrote about Tito leading a column of his troops: "Today Comrade *Stari* is in the lead—one voice can be heard in the darkness. This means that we'll set off soon. Comrade *Stari* (Tito) has a reputation as the best foot soldier in the Supreme Command's columns." This resembles the anecdotal sketch of *Life* magazine's war correspondent John Phillips: "Tito strode so briskly that one Partisan who

was walking alongside him gasped: 'Please, give him a horse, then we'll at least march slower.'"[110] One of the many summary assessments of Tito was made by historian Basil Davidson, chief of the Yugoslav Section, Special Operations Executive, in Cairo, Egypt, during the war, who also had direct experience of the war in Yugoslavia (Bosnia, Srijem): "Men and women followed him through mortal dangers because he had found the way to epitomize, for them, the destiny that had to be found. His authority came from the successes of the partisan struggle, but it also came—and this is another statement of the same thing—from his sheer demands of self-sacrifice and the serving of the common interest."[111]

All of these statements speak of a genuine historical basis for Tito's charisma, which would be imposed as the most important factor of social cohesion in Yugoslav society. However, Tito's system of rule in which he was the undisputed authority during his lifetime had many weaknesses. The history of socialist Yugoslavia's development shows "many halts, contradictions, tremors and reactive responses."[112] Despite Yugoslavia's considerable opening to the West, Communist political culture did not overcome the pseudo-democratic canons of "people's democracy" in which Party oversight and arbitration dominated, with Tito as the supreme authority to be sure. This system was ratified by the constitution of 1974. The leading social role continued to be played by the Party, while in the same year the Assembly of Yugoslavia elected the 82-year-old Tito president for life of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, it soon became increasingly apparent that Tito's position as supreme arbiter was the greatest shortcoming of his system. Then, after his death, the structure of Yugoslavia began to "burst" at those places where it was weakest: along the "national seams." Even though cosmopolitan (not only declaratively), Yugoslav political culture did not develop "extra-Party mechanisms for interethnic tolerance, which is why supra-national, non-ideological patriotism remained undeveloped." One of the immediate consequences of the high concentration of power in the hands of a single man was a political vacuum—the irreparable systematic failure of having a supreme authority and arbiter—after Tito's death. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia also fell to pieces a decade after Tito's death (1990). Political elites with a strong nationalist character (generally converted Communists) came to the fore. As Kuljić observed: after "almost a half-century of predominance of the politically enlightened Communist understanding of the nation," it disappeared relatively easily, while the dominant social trend became "the revival of the romantic ethnic-genealogical concept of the nation."[113]

The validation of political pluralism opened the doors to criticism that did not bypass Tito himself. The harshest condemnations came from the two nations whose relations marked both Yugoslav states: from Kosta Čavoški in Serbia, who said Tito was one of the "greatest despots of the twentieth century,"[114] to the accusations leveled by Igor Zidić in Croatia, calling him "a mystifier and a fraud" and a murderer whose acts—culpability for mass killings of prisoners and expulsion of members of the nations defeated in the war, as well as repression by the Communist authorities—paradigmatically testify to the "marginalization of ethical judgment" in the twentieth century.[115] Such assessments are not uninteresting from the standpoint of interpretations whereby the "conditions for the Communist rise to power in Yugoslavia were largely created by the conflict between the Croats and Serbs."[116] At the same time, there was no shortage of expressions of loyalty and maintenance of the continuity of Tito's charisma by his admirers and adherents, who preserve the memory of his life and works.[117] From today's perspective, equally burdened by the troubling heritage of the past and an uncertain future, these ambivalences point to the importance of persistent critical re-examination of the past. This is reflected in individual observations such as those made by Jasmina Bavoljak, who created the exhibition "Reflections on the Times, 1945–1955 (from the ethical standpoint of the most contested but also historically most substantial period of Tito's rule): "In the horizon of living historical times, events have a long-term impact, in interaction with creative and/or destructive actions and acts. If this is the case, then even the time from 1945 to 1955, present in the recollections of the promised, lived and destroyed communism/socialism, lives and acts, so to speak, both openly and hidden, in the (self-) awareness of today's generations, in their (self-)interpretation, in the value systems and in social, cultural, artistic and living practice."[118]

The shift from the concept of (revolutionary) national self-determination, whose continuity in the 1990s played a major role in the violent collapse of the Yugoslav multinational community, to the expression of the need for validation of (self-)awareness and critical interpretation of history certainly represents an important change. On the other hand, a renewed calls for secession based on national self-determination can occasionally be heard in some parts of the former Yugoslavia as well (e.g., Republika srpska in BiH).[119] In a way, either tendency represents a legacy of "Tito's self-determination."

Notes

1. At the time when I first heard this joke (1980), another one also was also circulating, which commented on two current events: the Soviet Union's military intervention in Afghanistan and the hosting of the "truncated" Olympics in Moscow (which were boycotted by many Western countries). The answer to the question, "what's the newest discipline being promoted at the Moscow Olympics?" was "the hammer and sickle throw over foreign borders." Not uninteresting is that in many similar jests, Americans, as opposed to Russians, were usually portrayed as "the good guys."
2. Basil Davidson, "The Death of Josip Broz Tito," *History Today*, 1980.
3. From a documentary by Jiří Menzel, *Moja Hrvatska*, Croatian Television (18 August 2011).
4. Dennison Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment: 1948–1974* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977).
5. From John Phillips, *Jugoslavenska priča* (Belgrade, Zagreb: Jugoslavenska revija, Mladost, 1983), p. 150.
6. Pero Simić, *Tito-fenomen stoljeća* (Zagreb: Večernji posebni proizvodi, 2009), p. 21.
7. Banac's criticism was in line with the emphasis on Tito's culpability for mass crimes perpetrated during the Second World War and immediately thereafter.
8. Ivo Banac, *Acta turcarum* (Zagreb: Durieux, 2006), p. 32.
9. Aleš Debeljak, *Sumrak idola* (Zagreb: Meandar, 1995), pp. 21, 48.
10. In his observations, Debeljak critically examines the complex question of the affirmation of national homogenization in the process of the Yugoslav state's collapse: 'If we accept such an approach, then we are throwing out the baby of culture together with the fertile bathwater of politics. If we accept "ethnic cleansing" as a historical necessity, we undoubtedly forget that the former Yugoslavia knew a multitude of inspirational enjoyments of differences.' Ibid., p. 21.
11. Ibid., p. 29.
12. Ibid.
13. Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Yugoslavia's Great Dictator-A Reassessment* (London: C. Hurst Company, 1992), p. 39.
14. Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo, *Revolucija koja teče dalje, Memoari*, I (Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 1972), p. 335. Based on Jože Pirjevec, *Tito i drugovi* (Zagreb: Mozaik knjiga, 2012), p. 157.
15. Branko Horvat, *Kosovsko pitanje* (Zagreb: Globus, 1987), p. 137. An identical formulation in a somewhat different context was also used by Janko Pleterski, "Istorijska metoda i revolucija," *Sveske*, no. 21, g.

VI. Edited by Čedo Kisić, Sarajevo: Institut za proučavanje nacionalnih odnosa CK SKBiH, 1988.

16. According to Karl Levit, Max Weber was one of those theorists who blazed the trail for authoritarian states and dictatorship, because he advocated irrational charismatic leadership and leader-driven democracy [plebiscitary throne]: 'Weber is responsible for reinforcing the spiritual situation in which the individual was liberated from the burden of his own self-determination. The most important theorist of the transition from parliamentary democracy and the national liberal state toward the authoritarian and dictatorial democracy of the total state is Carl Schmit. (K. Lowith, based on: M. Schmitz, Die Freud-Feind Theorie C. Schmitt, pp. 72–73) See also Todor Kuljić, *Teorije o totalitarizmu*, first ed. (Belgrade: Istraživačko-izdavački centar SSO Srbije, 1983), p. 40. On the phenomenon of "unlimited plebiscitary dictatorship based on the masses" into fascism, see Robert O. Paxton, *Anatomija fašizma* (Zagreb: Tim press, 2012), p. 216.
17. See Jože Pirjevec, *Tito i drugovi (*Zagreb: Mozaik knjiga, 2012), pp. 162–163.
18. On this see Tvrtko Jakovina ("Uvodno slovo—Tito Jože Pirjevca") in Jože Pirjevec, pp. 9–11.
19. Based on Predrag Matvejević, *Jugoslavenstvo danas*, (Zagreb: Globus, 1982), p. 129.
20. *Jutarnji list*, Katja Marcan, Montanelli: Zapad bi volio pojavu novog Tita, 17. 09. 1999.
21. Vladimir Velebit, *Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita*, (Beograd: Rad, 1984), p. 322. Based on Jože Pirjevec, pp. 152–153.
22. A.J.P. Taylor, *Habsburška monarhija 1809–1918,* (Zagreb: Znanje, 1990), pp. 323–324.
23. Taylor noted that in Galicia in 1846, Metternich "had been accused of communism, and Bach of 'worse than communism' in 1850" (due to support for the rebellious conservative peasants in Galicia as opposed to the liberal, nationalistically oriented land-owners). Ibid., pp. 70, 324.
24. Horst Haselsteiner, *Ogledi o modernizaciji u srednjoj Europi* (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1997), pp. 335, 355.
25. Todor Kuljić, *Tito* (Zrenjanin: Žarko, 2005), p. 104.
26. Ibid.
27. V.I. Lenin, *O pravu nacija na samoodređenje* (Zagreb: Kultura, 1949).
28. On this see Branko Horvat, *Kosovsko pitanje* (Zagreb: Globus, 1988), p. 137.
29. Aleksa Djilas, *The Contested Country. Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution, 1919–1953* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 158.

30. John Phillips, "Jugoslavenska priča," *Jugoslavenska revija* (Belgrade, Zagreb: Mladost 1983), pp. 26–27.
31. Louis Adamic, *The Eagle and the Roots* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1952), p. 99.
32. Branko Horvat, p. 105.
33. Television program prepared by Pero Damjanović, "Tito o nacionalnom pitanju," 18 August 1987. According to Branko Horvat, p, 104. Although the source may be dubious, Horvat's observation points to the core of the problem of the right to national self-determination in the Yugoslav state.
34. Slavko Milosavlevski, *Kontradikcije Josipa Broza* (Belgrade: KIZ Dositej, 1990), p. 189.
35. On national politics in the Balkans, see Mark A. Mazower, *Balkan: Kratka povijest* (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2007). For more on the same topic within the scope of contemporary global circumstances, see Mazower's lecture at Columbia University: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=imY8H3TUh88.
36. Josip Horvat, "Zapisci iz nepovrata, Kronika okradene mladosti 1900–1919," Marijan Marković, ed., *Rad JAZU—knjiga 400.* (Zagreb: JAZU, 1983), pp. 97, 118, 152–153.
37. Based on Peter Radan, "The Badinter Arbitration Commission and the Partition of Yugoslavia," *Nationalities Papers*, 1997, vol. 25, no. 3, p, 538.
38. See Alex N. Dragnich, *Serbia, Nikola Pasic, and Yugoslavia* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1974), pp. 132–192. Based on Peter Radan, "The Badinter Arbitration Commission and the Partition of Yugoslavia," *Nationalities Papers*, 1997, vol. 25, no. 3, p. 538.
39. Dinko Tomašić, *Politički razvitak Hrvata* (Zagreb: Hrvatska književna naklada neovisnih književnika, 1938), pp. 43, 103.
40. Josip Horvat, *Hrvatski panoptikum*, 2 (Zagreb: Globus, 1982), pp. 220–221.
41. Ibid., pp. 223–224.
42. In this sense, Josip Horvat was correct when he observed that Stjepan Radić "was in his mental heritage actually a Rightist," particularly when "he pontificated that he would secure 'justice' before the peace conference in Paris, as though the latter was some sort of judicial forum," and "he gathered signatures for a memorandum to Wilson" (based on the right to national self-determination). Ibid., pp. 220–221.
43. Gordana Vlajčić, "Revolucija i nacije, Evolucija stavova vodstva KPJ i Kominterne 1919–1934," *Naše teme*, 1, Zagreb, 1978, p. 49.
44. Ibid., p. 51.

45. J.V. Stalin, "O nacionalnom pitanju u Jugoslaviji, Govor u jugoslavenskoj komisiji IKKI 30. marta 1925 g." *Marksizam i nacionalno—kolonijalno pitanje*, *Zbornik izabranih članaka i govora*, Kultura biblioteka marksizma—lenjinizma, 1947, p. 204. On this see also Gordana Vlajčić, "KPJ i nacionalno pitanje 1919.-1941." *Socijalizam i nacionalno pitanje*, edited by Andrija Dujić, Radule Knežević, Božo Novak, Zdravko Tomac and Radovan Vukadinović (Zagreb: Centar za aktualni politički studij, 1970), pp. 90–91.
46. Pero Simić, *Tito-fenomen stoljeća*, p. 52. Although the number of members grew considerably once Tito took over the Party in 1937, on the eve of World War II the total membership was only about 6500, thus less than in 1920 by a factor of ten. Ivan Jelić, *Komunistička partija Hrvatske 1937–1945 Prvi dio* (Zagreb: Globus, 1981), p. 400.
47. Pero Simić, p. 21.
48. Pero Simić, p. 52; Josip Broz Tito, *Sabrana djela*, book 1 (Belgrade: Izdavački centar Komunist, Beogradski izdavačko-grafički zavod, Zagreb: Naprijed, 1983), p. 106.
49. "Rezolucija o privrednom i političkom položaju Jugoslavije i zadacima KPJ," *Istorijski arhiv KPJ*, book II, p. 195. Based on Kosta Čavoški, *Tito—tehnologija vlasti* (Belgrade: Dosije, 1991), p. 217.
50. According to individual interpretations (Duc de Broglie), the French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou and Yugoslav King Alexander were "the first victims of the Second World War." One of the central motives of the assassins (the Croatian Ustasha and the Macedonian IMRO) was to prevent the signing of the Yugoslav-Italian treaty, mediated by Barthou, as one of the key advocates of a collective security plan. Eduard Čalić, *Evropska triologija: Atentat u Marseilleu i Drugi svjetski rat, Anatomija Versaillesa, knjiga 2* (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Matice Hrvatske, 1993), p. 583.
51. Gordana Vlajčić, "KPJ i nacionalno pitanje 1919-1941," in the anthology *Socijalizam i nacionalno pitanje* (Zagreb: Centar za aktualni politički studij, 1970), pp. 93–94.
52. Jere Jareb, *Pola stoljeća hrvatske politike 1985–1945* (Zagreb: Pretisak, 1995), pp. 119–120.
53. Pero Simić, pp. 112.
54. One of the more relevant assessments of Tito as a successful politician and statesman was made by Stanko Lasić: "Tito, from his very entry into politics until his death, was a great and authentic politician, and this means a *hypocritical pragmatist*: he did what could be done at a given moment, concealing his true insights and objectives which, allowed him to overcome the limitations of his practice." Lasić linked Tito's political and statesman-like instincts to his tendency for "prag-

matic cunning," which he best demonstrated as the "strategist that not even Stalin could deceive;" even though he broke with Stalin, "he was simultaneously a Stalinist in that sense that he believed he would find a solution to all problems (and particularly a solution to relations with the socialist super-power), provided that he seized power, created a legion loyal to him and built an iron dictatorship of his proletariat. He therefore played a game worthy of the greatest statesmen." Stanko Lasić, *Mladi Krleža i njegovi kritičari 1914.-1924* (Zagreb: Globus, 1987), pp. 590–591.

55. For individual aspects of these relations, see Ivan Šiber, "Socijalno-psihologijski pristupi izučavanju međunacionalnih odnosa" (Zagreb: Institut za političke znanosti Fakulteta političkih znanosti u Zagrebu, 1984), p. 3.
56. Branko Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije 1918–1988, Treća knjiga* (Belgrade: Nolit, 1988), pp. 459–460.
57. Ibid., p. 460.
58. A certain level of political culture and "insight" by Ivo Josipović, until recently the president of Croatia, and Boris Tadić, the former president of Serbia, may be linked to their membership in the former Yugoslav intellectual elite (the same, with some caution, could also be said many other Croatian and Serbian politicians, including Franjo Tuđman and Dobrica Ćosić).
59. Phyllis Auty, *Yugoslavia* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1965), p. 218.
60. On this see Ciril Ribičić, Zdravko Tomac, *Sončne in senčne strane federacije (Usuglašavanje ili preglasavanje*) (Ljubljanja, Zagreb: 1989), pp. 11–84. Serbian constitutional legal scholars criticized such positions and generally attacked the confederal elements of the 1974 Constitution. See Miodrag Jovičić, "Elementi konfederalizma u jugoslovenskom federalnom uređenju," *Federacija i federalizam*, edited by Miodrag Jovičić, Niš: Gradina, 1987.
61. Albert Bing, "Franjo Tuđman i samoodređenje naroda," *Dr. Franjo Tuđman u okviru hrvatske historiografije*, edited by Vijoleta Herman-Kaurić (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2011), pp. 79–89.
62. Marinko Čulić, "Jamčim revanšizma neće biti," *Danas*, 1 May 1990.
63. *The Sunday Age-Agenda*, "What it's all about," 7 April 1991. Cited from Albert Bing, "'Croatia down under': Australian journals on the outbreak of war in Croatia and dissolution of Yugoslavia 1990–1991," *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, no. 3, 2003, pp. 769–803.
64. See the Constitution of the Serb Republic, Preamble (modified in amendments XXVI and LIV): "Setting forth from the natural, inalienable and non-negotiable right of the Serbian people to self-determination on which basis this people, as any other free and sovereign people,

independently decides on its political and statehood status and secures its economic, social and cultural development; (…) Acknowledging the natural and democratic right, will and preference of the Serbian people in the Republic of Srpska to fully and closely bond with other states of the Serbian people, bearing in mind the readiness of the Serbian people to commit to peace and friendly relations with other nations and states," the National Assembly of the Serb Republic adopts Article 1 and the modified amendment XLIV which reads: "The Republic of Srpska will be the state of the Serbian people and all other citizens." From Zoran Pajić, "Bosna i Hercegovina: raskrsnice državnosti." See http://www.spiritofbosnia.org/bs/volume-1-no-4-2006-october/bosnia-and-herzegovina-statehood-at-the-crossroads/.

65. See John McGarry "'Orphans of Secession': National Pluralism in Secessionist Regions and Post-Secession States," *National Self-Determination and Secession* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 215–322. Cited from Brian Barry, *Kultura i jednakost, egalitarna kritika multikulturalizma* (Zagreb: Naklada Jesenski i Turk, 2006), p. 100.
66. See for example Sabrina P. Ramet, *Postkomunistička Europa i tradicija prirodnoga prava* (Zagreb: Alinea, 2004), pp. 59–91.
67. Alain Pellet, "The Opinions of the Badinter Committee. A Second Breath for the Self-determination of Peoples," *European Journal of International Law* (1992), pp. 178–185.; Peter Radan, "The Badinter arbitration commission and the partition of Yugoslavia," *Nationalities Papers*, vol. 25, no. 3 (September 1997), pp. 537–557.
68. Vlado Mađarević, *Krleža i politika* (Zagreb: Spektar, 1984), p. 21.
69. Ibid.
70. Miroslav Krleža, "Pravo samoodređenja" section in "Teze za jednu diskusiju iz godine 1935." in: *Deset krvavih godina* (Zagreb: Zora, 1957), p. 556.
71. With regard to the conflict on the literary left in 1939, in which Krleža assumed the central role in opposing the positions of the CPY's Central Committee (M. Djilas, R. Zogović), Stanko Lasić expressed the following view on the stance of CPY general secretary Tito: "All that a CPY general secretary (who perceived the full depth of alienation from Stalinist communism, but knew that this was the only way for the Yugoslav revolution to succeed) could achieve by defending (openly or covertly) Pečatesque [author's note: a reference to the journal *Pečat*, edited by Krleža] revisionism was: to put himself in jeopardy. In the new CPY Central Committee, Tito was probably the only one to hold some sort of private misgivings toward Stalinism, as he was surrounded by youthful associates imbued with a mythical consciousness. Krleža

was tearing down the Party's ideational and organizational structure, so he had to be removed. Had Tito even wanted to eliminate Zogović's frenzy, it would hardly have succeeded. Krleža did not have to be told that the article in *Proleter* (the CPY's official bulletin) was ultimative: he knew that any attempt at solidarity would mean a break with the CPY." Stanko Lasić, *Sukob na književnoj ljevici 1928–1952* (Zagreb: Liber, 1970), 206.

72. Miroslav Krleža, "Radićevština," in: "Teze za jednu diskusiju iz godine 1935." *Deset krvavih godina* (Zagreb: Zora, 1957), p. 554. On this, see also Velimir Visković, "Krležina politička esejistika," *Dani Hvarskoga kazališta. Građa i rasprave o hrvatskoj književnosti i kazalištu*, 2004, vol. 30, no. 1, p. 43.
73. Miroslav Krleža, *Deset krvavih godina*, p. 556.
74. Ibid., p. 557.
75. Dušan Živković, *Narodni front Jugoslavije, 1935–1945* (Belgrade: Institut za suvremenu istoriju, 1978).
76. Miroslav Krleža, *Deset krvavih godina*, pp. 557–558.
77. Ibid., p. 558.
78. Ibid., p. 559.
79. Ibid., p. 556.
80. Pero Damjanović, *Tito pred temama istorije* (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga Beograd, Dnevnik Novi Sad, Naša knjiga Skopje, 1977), p. 281.
81. On this see Edvard Kardelj-Sperans, *Razvoj slovenačkog nacionalnog pitanj*a (Belgrade: Kultura, 1958), 11, 16.
82. *Vjesnik*, 11 August 1941. From: *Komunistički pokret i socijalistička revolucija u Hrvatskoj*, Dušan Bilandžić, Ivan Jelić, Josip Cazi et al., eds. (Zagreb: Institut za historiju radničkog pokreta Hrvatske, 1969), 219.
83. Ibid., pp. 220–221. On this see also Ferdo Čulinović, "Razvitak ZAVNOH-a," *Historijski zbornik*, Yr. 2, No. 1–4 (Zagreb: 1949), pp. 13–17.
84. *Proleter*, December 1942. Taken from *Josip Broz Tito, govori i članci* (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1959), pp. 119–120.
85. On this occasion, the entire supreme organ of the state authorities (AVNOJ) and state administration (NKOJ) were formed, and the first fundamental state laws (Decisions) were made. These "Decisions" were sanctioned after liberation by confirmation of the Interim Assembly of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia (DFY) and the Decision of the Constitutional Assembly of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FNRY) of 1 December 1945 and the provisions of Article 136 of the Yugoslav Constitution.

86. Ivo Bogdan, ed. *Dr. Ante Pavelić riešio je hrvatsko pitanje* (Zagreb: Naklada Europa, 1942). On relations between these two revolutionary political options, the Ustasha and the Communists in the period between the two World Wars and during the occupation, Albert Bing, "Samoodređenje naroda i koncepcije hrvatske državnosti u kontekstu Drugog svjetskog rata—refleksije povijesnog kontinuiteta," *Radovi 45* (Zagreb: Zavod za hrvatsku povijest Filozofskog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, FF-press, 2013), pp. 129–154. In this context, Aleksa Djilas observed that "Great-Croatian solutions had been completely compromised by the Ustasha movement," while on the other hand, "ZAVNOH demonstrated to the Croats that the communists were responding to their demands for national autonomy," Aleksa Djilas, *The Contested Country. Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution, 1919–1953* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 159.
87. Janko Pleterski, "Istorijska metoda i revolucija," in Čedo Kisić, ed., *Sveske*, no. 21, g. VI (Sarajevo: Institut za proučavanje nacionalnih odnosa CK SKBiH, 1988), p. 63.
88. Documents from this time reflect the pragmatic thinking of Britons. Thus, a British diplomat in Cairo, Ralph Stevenson, in a telegram sent to the British Foreign Office, wrote: "Our policies must be based on three new factors: (1) the Partisans will rule Yugoslavia. (2) They are so militarily important to us that we must wholly support them and subordinate political preoccupations to military need. (3) Whether we may consider the monarchy a factor in Yugoslavia's unification is very questionable." Walter R. Roberts, *Tito, Mihailović and the Allies 1941–1945* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1973). From: Sabrina P. Ramet, *Tri Jugoslavije-Izgradnja države i izazov legitimacije 1918.-2005* (Zagreb: Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga, 2009), p. 211.
89. Fitzroy Maclean, *Zlatni drum, Pijesak orijenta, Rat na Balkanu* (Zagreb: Zora-Državno izdavačko poduzeće Hrvatske, 1953), p. 310; originally published in Fitzroy Maclean, *Eastern Approaches* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1949).
90. Fitzroy Maclean, p. 341.
91. On this see David Martin, *The Web of Disinformation: Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder* (San Diego, New York, London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990.)
92. Ibid., pp. 62–63.
93. The first session of ZAVNOH was held in Otočac on 13 June 1943.
94. Petar Strčić, "Pristup Hodimira Sirotkovića proučavanju ZAVNOH-a," In: Hodimir Sirotković, *ZAVNOH—Zemaljsko antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Hrvatske* (Zagreb: Dom i svijet, 2002), p. 313.

95. Ferdo Čulinović, "Razvitak ZAVNOH-a," *Historijski zbornik*, Yr. 2, No. 1–4 (Zagreb: 1949), p. 31.
96. Ibid., p. 31.
97. Ibid., p. 31.
98. Michael Howard, *Rat u europskoj povijesti* (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2002), pp. 125–126.
99. For more on this, see Albert Bing, "Samoodređenje naroda i koncepcije hrvatske državnosti u kontekstu Drugog svjetskog rata—refleksije povijesnog kontinuiteta"
100. The People's Liberation Committees were specified as a form of the Popular Front from below. On this see Dragutin Šćukanec, "Osnivanje i rad ZAVNOH-a 1943." Franjo Tuđman, ed., Putovi revolucije, Year I, No.. 1–2 (Zagreb: Institut za historiju radničkog pokreta, 1963), pp. 20–21, 33.
101. See Franjo Tuđman, "Uvod u historiju socijalističke Jugoslavije," *Forum* no. 2–8. Based on Dragutin Šćukanec, "Osnivanje i rad ZAVNOH-a 1943." Franjo Tuđman, ed., *Putovi revolucije*, Year I, No.. 1–2 (Zagreb: Institut za historiju radničkog pokreta, 1963), p. 20.
102. During June and August 1943, six British missions were deployed to the Partisan commands in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia, which had radio contacts with Cairo.
103. F.W.D. Deakin, *Bojovna planina*, (Belgrade: Nolit, 1973), p. 134; for similar views see Basil Davidson, *Partisan Picture* (Bedford: Bedford Books Ltd, 1946).
104. From the speech delivered by Marshal Tito on the central square from the newly liberated Zagreb, 21 May 1945. From: Zvonko Štaubringer, *Maršal mira* (Zagreb: Globus, 1980), pp. 20–21.
105. Kosta Nikolić, "Proslave Titovih rođendana 1945–1949. Izgrađivanje kulta ličnosti," *Tokovi istorije*, no. 3–4, (Belgrade, 2004), pp. 7–27.
106. See Louis Adamic, *The Eagle and the Roots* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1952), pp. 84, 94–98. In a more critical context on this, see Igor Zidić in the foreword to Zvonimir Despot, *Tito—tajne vladara, Najnoviji prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza* (Zagreb: Večernji posebni proizvodi, 2009), pp. 17–20.
107. Todor Kuljić, *Tito* (Zrenjanin: Žarko, 2005), pp. 284–285.
108. Ibid., p. 55.
109. Ibid., pp. 48, 54, 86.
110. John Phillips, *Jugoslavenska priča*, (Belgrade: Jugoslavenska revija; Zagreb: Mladost, 1983).
111. Basil Davidson, "Makers of the Twentieth History: Tito," *History Today* 30, issue 10 19 80 2001.
112. Todor Kuljić, *Tito*, p. 187.

113. Ibid., p. 292.
114. Kosta Čavoški, *Tito—Tehnologija vlasti* (Belgrade: Dosije, 1990), p. 301.
115. Igor Zidić in the foreword to Zvonimir Despot, *Tito—tajne vladara, Najnoviji prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza* (Zagreb: Večernji posebni proizvodi, 2009), pp. 22–23.
116. Aleksa Djilas, p. 216.
117. See for example Tomislav Badovinac, *Titovo doba—Hrvatska prije, za vrijeme i poslije* (Zagreb: Savez društava "Josip Broz Tito" Hrvatske, 2008); *O Titu kao mitu*, edited by Nevena Škrbić Alempijević, Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl (Zagreb: Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Filozofski fakultet, FF-press, Srednja Europa, d.o.o., 2006). See also *Titomanija*: https://www.google.hr/#q=titomanija&hl=en&psj=1&ei=mutdUebmNujR4QS2z4DIDw&start=0&sa=N&bav=on.2,or.r_cp.r_qf.&fp=58751edca3ae5bc1&biw=1366&bih=612. Accessed on 1 February 2013.
118. Catalogue of the exhibition *Refleksije vremena 1945–1955* (Zagreb: Galerija Klovićevi dvori, 2012), p. 7.
119. See http://www.novimagazin.rs/svet/premijerka-republika-srpska-ima-pravo-na-samoopredeljenje. Accessed on 25 May 2015.

CHAPTER 5

Dobrica Ćosić and Josip Broz Tito—A Political and Intellectual Relationship

Latinka Perović

To know something means to know how that something is related to other things. To understand something means to understand how it has resulted from other previously existing things, that is, to know it as a result of history. Therefore, historical understanding is the highest level of understanding.[1]

An analysis of the political and intellectual relationship of Dobrica Ćosić—a member of the political underground, a partisan, one of the participants in the revolutionary government, a writer, a national ideologist, the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—to Josip Broz Tito—a Communist leader, the commander-in-chief of the national-liberation army in the anti-fascist war, an opponent of Josif Visarionovič Stalin, a statesman, the life-long president of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—is a demanding research task. Even though this relationship lasted half a century and went through different phases, its boundaries can be precisely measured. At the same time, careful research discovers a missing link that connects these phases into a politically and ideologically complex entity.

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What Justifies the Need for an Historiographic Research of Dobrica Ćosić's Relationship to Josip Broz Tito?

There are three factors that single out Dobrica Ćosić from the rest of Tito's contemporaries: his long, extremely active life full of paradigms; self-understanding and an understanding of his own role. The history of Serbia in the second half of the twentieth century involves the following: a struggle for the restoration of Yugoslavia, a struggle within, then clashing with it even after its crash, as well as the history of the idea of communism in Serbia, which does not coincide in time with the rule of the Communist Party, that is, the League of Yugoslav Communists: it was much longer.

The place of birth and roots (29 December 1921, Velika Drenova, near Trstenik) are not only the beginning of the biography of Dobrica Ćosić, but the starting point of his involvement and role in politics and literature: "My parents and ancestors are peasants and, of course, they were soldiers in all wars around Morava."[2] This was a fact that determined Dobrica Ćosić. He finished grape and fruit growing junior school in Aleksandrovac and Agricultural High School in Bukovo, near Negotin.[3] His first required reading was the documents of such popular tribunes as *Vasa Pelagić* and *Adam Bogosavljević*. A poor village, peasants with crippling debt, a corrupt government, a difficult life, especially for peasant women—"those women martyrs … same as my mother Milka was"[4]—that was the background where young Dobrica Ćosić formulated his social ideals. To achieve his ideals, he needed faith: he searched for it and incorporated it into his way of thinking. In his late childhood he committed himself to the movement of the Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović.[5] Ćosić's biographers mention this information as an aside. Even Serbian historians do not pay attention to this piece of information. But it is an important fact on both sides. Not only because the writer (Ćosić), as it may seem at first, felt close to the teaching of the theologist at the end of the twentieth century due to his convictions about the Serbian issue, Yugoslavia, and Europe. This information shows that young Dobrica Ćosić was at the turning point while searching for his social ideal. But only the parallel line of research would show that he also "strayed from" the teaching of Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović.[6] Without this information, it is difficult to understand communism, which became Dobrica Ćosić's new faith and religion after he had joined the League of Yugoslav Communist Youth in 1939. "A child fascinated" by corn and grapes, walnuts and elm trees, Ćosić was, first of all, a poor peasant who

missed the opportunity to get in touch with Christianity. "I was looking for some answers. The Almighty refused to give them to me. I was ready to accept communism."[7]

His first contact with communism in the form of eschatology, promising that justice was to be served, was of crucial importance for the 18-year-old Dobrica Ćosić, who spent his childhood and school years in a village:

> If there was anything important in my life before the war, it was certainly me joining the League of Yugoslav Communists in 1939. All the things that happened later came out of this. Literally speaking, I am the man who started the communist movement. My whole intellectual background, first perception about the world, personal recognition, my whole spiritual being, even its emotional structure were conditioned by a communist orientation, by the League of Yugoslav Communists, by the Party, by the war, by the Revolution. My only life and literary chance was this—the Revolution! If I was to get one more life and if I could choose, I would choose the same, I would not be interested in experiencing anything new, any new joy, nor to feel any new pain.[8]

Those who are familiar with the works of Dobrica Ćosić also like to emphasize the crucial importance of how he discovered communism as a new religion and "full of enthusiasm sensed a higher call and a higher sense of his personal life."[9] Dobrica Ćosić questioned the post-revolutionary reality rather than his new religion. Ideals are pure but betrayed. That was not only the first reaction of Dobrica Ćosić to the Communist government he had fought for and participated in establishing, but was also a constant that would later be manifested as a criticism of the social system after the Revolution in regard to the ideal. "The Communist ideals are, he believed," says the historian of his novels, Milan Radulović, "the only hope and comfort one has, new and original true religion, and these ideals are not coming true the way they were meant to. Worried and melancholic, depressed and intellectually curious and brave, Ćosić was looking for an answer to this question."[10] What kind of answers did he give, how did they influence him, and did he care about their effect at all? Before going any deeper into these questions, unless a researcher wants to simplify things, he or she should take as an important starting point *the attitude of Dobrica Ćosić towards communism as his new religion*. Then the researcher should follow all the things in the life of Dobrica Ćosić, in his work and activities that came about as a result of this attitude.

First, his position in 1941: a member of the political underground, a partisan, a commissar of the Rasin squad, an editor of a newspaper called *Mladi borac (A Young Fighter)*, where he published his first literary works under the pen name *Gedža* and won the first of many awards during his lifetime.[11]

There was also his participation in establishing the revolutionary government. At the first meeting of the National Assembly of Serbia (1945), Dobrica Ćosić was elected a member of parliament, and later the same in the National Assembly of the Federal National Republic of Yugoslavia. At that time, as a member of parliament and a party activist he traveled often all over Serbia. And in Serbia, in the villages—poverty, distrust, resistance toward the new government as toward all the previous governments, some sort of cruelty—in everything.[12] "The village does not want socialism" peasants "do not want to change."[13] They think that they have been deceived again: Was it not Dobrica Ćosić himself, a former promoter of communism and now a member of parliament, who promised that they would not have to pay taxes during the Communist rule?[14] In the city, on the other hand, in Belgrade—"'luxury': packages from the USA, betting places, horse races… Again, the old bourgeois, and gentlemen with their ladies from 'Majestic.'"[15] But also, "theft, malversation, corruption, favoritism, extravagance and the luxury of managers and officials."[16] Wherever he looked, to Ćosić "reality was less and less resembling the ideal."[17] Desperate and angry because of the gap between ideal and reality, and sympathizing with the peasants, those "poor people under coverings and with fur-caps," and at the same time merciless:

> Nevertheless, peasantry has to be destroyed so that people could be happy on Serbian land. This is cruel and bloody. But every progress has to be fed and paid in blood.[18]

In his diary, Dobrica Ćosić asked himself: Why did the revolution bring so little change; isn't it betrayed, most of all, by those who started it? An argument with Stalin in 1948, when Dobrica Ćosić started to work in the Central Committee of the Serbian Communist Party (as a member of Agitprop, he was in charge of culture and art), postpones the answers to these questions. There are no doubts about the goals of the Communist ideology; Stalin stepped down, leaving Lenin alone, and betrayed the ide-

als of communism and not only the Russian revolution, but the Revolution as well. Stalin betrayed a midwife of justice and equality, which annuls all differences between state and society, person and nation, town and village.[19]

In 1951, Dobrica Ćosić quit his professional work in the Party, when his first novel, *Daleko je sunce (The Sun Is Far Away)*, was published. Troubled by the differences between revolutionary ideals and post-revolutionary reality, Dobrica Ćosić did not retrace his steps into literature, but he found a new stage in it where, fascinated by his own power to invent people and events, he could indulge his revolutionary impulse: "to fix the world, to direct the development of history and to change human fate, his own fate and the fate of his people."[20] *That is the second important starting point for a researcher.*

The years after his first novel, which was a tremendous success and which opened the doors into literature and made him very popular, even outside literary circles, were, at the same time, years of non-conceptual engagement for Dobrica Ćosić, quite vividly expressed in the title of his book *Action*.[21] When a writer takes an active part, then Ćosić considers it not as "duty, but happiness, chance and freedom." It is about following one's ideals, which do not have to be "used up and limited only to a literary work written in a study room, at one's desk" by a writer.[22] And, indeed, Dobrica Ćosić did not stay at his desk but got himself engaged in "a task." "An important link between the political and intellectual elite in Serbia, he started the weekly paper called *NIN*, a magazine *Delo*, a review *Bagdala* in Kruševac… He is one of the ideological founders of the Museum of Modern Art, of the Atelier 212, of the Slobodište in Kruševac… He visited Goli otok,[23] he was in Budapest in 1956, during the rising against the Soviet Union.[24] He also participated in writing the Program of the League of Yugoslav Communists.[25] He traveled across Serbia and Yugoslavia for various reasons. As a member of literary and parliamentary delegations he traveled across the East European countries, after relations were restored (in 1952). He gave interviews to numerous local and foreign media… At the same time, during that same decade, he wrote two novels. At the end of 1954, his novel *Koreni (Roots)* came out, which gave Ćosić the foundation on which he was planning to construct a novelistic construct.[26] This construct is, like an achieved goal, without precedent in the Serbian literature: 9 novels in 15 books. What is fascinating is that it actually represents a concept of an earlier plan that has been realized. Ćosić considered himself

to be a writer " who sets himself a precise and a rational task."[27] Just as his book *Koreni (Roots*) was to be published, he said:

> You already know, I turned to the past. Certainly, the reason for it is I can see us, the contemporaries better through it. There are ideological and esthetic reasons for it, as well… I went back to the 19th century to find the roots to our passion, low spirits and restlessness. I rummage through these old graves, which are, still young (that is what one of my heroes says, you know) and not covered up in grass yet, so to speak. And the more I see these always upset our elderly people, the more convincing the truth sounds: we were always asking for more in life. Our past is a big drama and I am one of those who tried to bring out one dark piece of it into the daylight… I don't strive for an invention, not that I don't want it. But my ambition is also that I listen to other people. It is necessary that those who crossed the longest way today should light up many more fires in our fireplaces in our homes[28].

Is this not an attempt to differentiate between real and fictional values of the traditional society and the Communist ideals as a new religion? Is this not a new manifestation of ideas that are older than Dobrica Ćosić, ideas on *backwardness that are considered to be an advantage* and of *Serbian civilization*?

In 1959, Ćosić's novel *Deobe (Partitions)* was released, But his novel *Koreni (Roots)* is the third starting point for someone who is researching the multi-faceted Dobrica Ćosić: a Serbian village infant, a member of "the mankind from Morava," a Communist, a writer, a historian, "the father of the nation." Every research of controversy related to Dobrica Ćosić should begin with this novel. Is he a creator of the historical crisis of the Serbian people or is this crisis only reflected in his work? What is the relationship between the crisis and the interpretation of it: Does the interpretation help to solve the crisis or just make it deeper? Is the nation in crisis or is it an interpretation of their history?

Dobrica Ćosić was fully aware of what he was doing through literature and outside literature, almost to the degree of indivisibility: He was saying to himself and his revolutionary generation that nothing started with them. Everything had its certain origin, that is, roots which they neglected so wrongfully. This origin should be brought out into daylight and used as a guiding point in the battle for *permanence*. One of these roots, and perhaps the one that was as it was said, the "rotten root of Serbian culture,"[29] was the one that explains not only the popularity of Dobrica Ćosić outside literature, but also his authority in the political and intellectual elite of

Serbia and the respect he had in other milieus of former Yugoslavia. In the history of ideas, as Richard Pipes says, "it is not the meaning of someone's ideas that counts but how they are received by the public."[30] When looking back, the thing that Dobrica Ćosić was saying about *Koreni (Roots)* and on the occasion of *Koreni (Roots)*, not only seemed as if it was programmatical but it really was the program:

> In my vision, I establish only some continuities between my generation and the generation of our fathers and grandfathers… Adolescence is, first of all, unjust, it does not contemplate the graveyard. It does not like to remember. Adolescence is selfish. It plans the future. I was wondering about those who gave us birth, who they were and what they were like. Whose blood is it that runs through our veins and what is it like? And why did we give up so abruptly and strongly on the ideals and visions of our fathers and grandfathers, and now we have a completely different vision of happiness and we fight for it in a completely different way? *I got down to the 19th century and at the very bottom of it, which I dragged out to the top, I found some of my own roots and the roots of my generation* [underlined—author's note]. Although I didn't want to judge those who were silent in the blades of grass, it seems to me that our time brought the injustice. I am much younger than they and their bones are, but, nevertheless, I found a lot of misery and even more strength down there. It is passion. I began to think about that lovely and horrible passion for permanence, for lasting. *Permanence defeats everything* [underlined, author's note]. It seemed to me that the most exciting thing about a man is that he wants to exist after death, in a certain way, and wants and can outlive himself. This perception helped me to write the novel *Koreni (Roots)*.[31]

In the early 1950s, the connection rising out of the concept that crystallizes in his novel *Koreni (Roots)*, and his activism (which cannot be compared to anything else in its magnitude and character), makes the novelistic building of Dobrica Ćosić (which should be read as a novel) an integral unit. It is based on patriarchal culture and was created by mixing the imaginary past and the active connection to contemporaneousness from the point of view of the past as it was. "Within the being and the soul of Dobrica Ćosić," says Milan Radulović, "there are spiritual energies of patriarchal culture, myth creating visionaries, Christian spirituality and one specific pragmatism which makes the collective empirical and historical experience absolute and canonical, exalting it."[32] It was given different names: new utopia, ideology, historiosophy—this entity has made its

creator irreplaceable in the Serbian history of the second half, especially at the end of the twentieth century. This is where the scientific relevance in the relationship of Dobrica Ćosić to Josip Broz Tito comes from: neither was Dobrica Ćosić only one of Josip Broz Tito's contemporaries, nor was this a personal relation.

Somewhere between his novels, *Koreni (Roots)* and *Deobe (Partitions)*, and between the novels *Deobe* and *Bajka (A Fairytale)*,[33] Dobrica Ćosić is both strongly active and present in public life. Numerous high-circulation publications of his works[34] appeared filmed, dramatized, and were included into required school reading. He received numerous literary awards.[35] At the same time, he had his membership in the Central Committee of the League of Serbian Communists and his function as president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This double role in a mentally agrarian and truly authoritarian society, together with his personal self-confidence in these roles, makes Dobrica Ćosić some sort of an institution, a specific collective project creating a whole network of social, political and intellectual connections. He was one of the key figures in politics and culture for decades.

The beginning of the 1960s was full of challenges for Yugoslavia. The country and the society came to an important turning point. For the first time since 1948, important decisions were to be made without any danger of foreign influence, which always ended in internal homogenization and the strengthening of authoritarian society. The process of industrialization was complete, and from an underdeveloped agrarian country, Yugoslavia became a mid-developed country with big development degree differences inside the country itself, which coincided with the national differences. The military and economic pressure of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries was weakened: with constant ideological tensions, interstate relations went back to normal. This lasted until 1968, when the Warsaw Pact troops intervened in Czechoslovakia, opposing the internal reforms in the country and for "socialism with the human face." In a world that was divided into blocs, the politics of nonaligned countries was inaugurated. Exterior borders were soft, and the international credibility of Yugoslavia was high. The next question was one of further orientation within the domestic development of the country in this social, political and cultural ambient. Reforms were necessary in Yugoslavia. The ruling elite was concentrated on three issues: the economic system, the Party and the federation.

At the beginning of the 1960s, questions were asked that had been continually asked since 1948, and they became even more acute. Differences in understanding the conflict with Cominform (the Communist Information Bureau) *as a way to defend the independence of a country and authentic socialism and as a start to gradual distancing from the Soviet model of socialism*. Over a period of time these questions have crystallized into various orientations within the Party, and they have not overlapped with the national differences without the rest. Where is Dobrica Ćosić in these distributions? *This is the fourth important starting point for someone researching* his relationship with Josip Broz Tito.

In the spring of 1951, Dobrica Ćosić wrote in his diary:

> I am against Cominform with all my heart. Cominform is an attack on the freedom of a man and a nation; Cominform, is the deformation of socialism, making pointless all the victims who gave their life for socialism. But: all these events, just like a torrent does to skittles, are taking us to the wings of capitalism. As if America becomes what Russia used to be in 1948. It hurts. We were raised to hate capitalism.[36]

Dobrica Ćosić was deeply engaged in the debates related to this dilemma, closed ones as well as open ones, that in the 1960s became rather popular with the masses. His engagement as a member of the Party lasted to mid 1968, often on his behalf or with his authority, which was understandable due to his political role.

At the end of 1961 and the beginning of 1962, when the socialist-state reform of the economy became actual, with inevitable consequences for the political system, especially for relations in the Federation, Dobrica Ćosić and the Slovenian intellectual Dušan Pirjevec had an important discussion.[37] What they had in common was that they belonged to the Communist movement and participated in the anti-fascist war. The difference between them was their intellectual experience: Pirjevec belonged to the fourth revolutionary generation of the Slovenian intelligence; Ćosić belonged to the new intelligence created by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, as an alternative to civic intelligence. The discussion was held in literary magazines.[38] But, because of the explicitly political character of the question (nation–integration, Slovenian nationalism–Yugoslav nationalism, as well as their personalities, the latter the "father of the nation" and the other one of "the greatest Slovenians in the 20th century")[39], the discussion reflected deeper differences existing not only among the intellec-

tual elite but also among the formally unique Communist political elite in the former Yugoslavia. As in the 1920s, due to a discussion on nationality in the forbidden Communist Party of Yugoslavia, a paradigm determining the near future was made, thanks to a formula for federation,[40] so the discussion between Dobrica Ćosić and Dušan Pirjevec indicated that in regard to the old paradigm, state–property relations, monopoly of the Communist Party, unitarian and centralized federation as the elements of the state or national cohesion of the South-Slavic people, there was no more unity. This came from the point of view of their European integration, as Pirjevec already claimed. This period of discussion can also be considered to be the start of the fight for Tito—neither side in the dispute thought about the possibility of gaining superiority without him. But it took more than a decade for the confederation to appear as a new paradigm, a paradigm that was inseparable from the state economy reform and from the party with its political monopoly. Conflicts about the confederal form of the state, despite the apparent consensus, were the main characteristics of the period until Yugoslavia collapsed in the wars in the 1990s. In these conflicts Dobrica Ćosić had a unique role, first inside the Party, then as a leading person of the opposition coming from the outside of institutions in Serbia. This role became unique, not only because he was confident that he should explain the events that were more than dynamic in the sixties of the last century, but for the special state of mind that appeared in Serbia, which assumed political and ideological condensation.

First of all, the economic reform in 1965, in the eyes of a foreign historian, was seen as "the most ambitious set of market-oriented changes that has ever been made anywhere in the Communist world prior to 1989."[41] Its swing "simply erased their main opponent Aleksandar Ranković,"[42] the most significant representative of Serbia in the party and state leadership. Ćosić emphasized his opinion that was well known to the Party in his diary notes:

> As I can hear, the peasants support Ranković. This truly Serbian nation is devoted to him and they feel sorry for him as an incarnation of Serb nationality, as a man imposed by history to be its political personality of a new age and a new country. They do not respect him, because he is the organizational secretary of the Communist party and the head of the Yugoslav State Security Service (YSSS); they respect him because they believe he is the state symbol of Serbia. That is why they forgive him the terror of YSSS, buying offs, cooperative farms… Peasants do not believe the newspapers. All that

> is written in the newspapers is considered to be fraud, deceit and the execution of a man who represents Serbia and Serbian people, he was imposed on others who disapproved his way of managing and doing things that were on his mind.[43]

In other words, to have a representative in the Yugoslav state and party leadership who does not have the institutions of power under control, as Aleksandar Ranković did not have the party apparatus and the state security service at his disposal, means for Serbia, as Dobrica Ćosić said, the same as if there is no representative.[44] This is because the power was incorporated in forming the Yugoslav country in 1918.[45] In the state where there is a difference between the winners and losers, it is forgotten that the power does not have only a political meaning. As Montesquieu said in the second half of the eighteenth century, "You can ask yourself if it is possible in modern Europe that one nation, similar to the Romans, continually dominates others," and concluded, "I think that from the moral point of view something like that is out of the question."[46] Change of power proportion in the Yugoslav state and party leadership had multiple and far-reaching consequences for the Yugoslav state and its social system, according to Dobrica Ćosić, who not only was well informed about internal polarization but was actively engaged as well. Prior to removing Aleksandar Ranković from office, Dobrica Ćosić wrote in his diary:

> The struggle against Belgrade and Serbia, is a struggle against socialism, with a severe anti-Soviet attitude. It is believed that Serbia with all its leaders and its political atmosphere is pro-Russian. An anti-Serbian atmosphere is growing everywhere.[47]

After Aleksandar Ranković was relieved from his post, who according to Dobrica Ćosić was the main line of defense for the restoration of capitalism and the confederation,[48] Dobrica Ćosić became upset because Serbia lost its position, and he was politically engaged so much that he was desperate, according to his diary notes:

> I am desperate and filling this book with so-called social and political problems, and not with: literature, which is my vocation and torment.[49]

But, it is not dramatic because of the time lost for literature, but because of the fact that the writer spent this time in politics, which is "not a science

nor a skill but a game for gaining power and a game with power."[50] It took Dobrica Ćosić two years to ask for a revision of the politics in regard to the national issue, which, in his opinion, was disgraceful to the Serbian people, unjust and which closed the historical perspective, and he was able to do it at the meeting of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, as one of its members. He consulted his friends, who gave him support in his intention to come forward.[51] He was feeling safe: "I knew the intellectual circles would support me."[52] Only a few of them were reserved. Ivo Andrić, in Dobrica Ćosić's opinion, "a self-confident and unique person, the most authentic intellectual,"[53] advised him to stay away from "one thought" and warned him that "history has many faces."[54] But Andrić said, "The village does not understand and does not like… He does not know Serbia. He is a man from Bosnia and a man from a library."[55]

His coming forward had no consequences regarding his membership in the League of Communists. Events that followed simply pushed this aside, first of all, students' riots in June 1968. At the beginning of the reform, as it usually happens—there was a revolution.[56] Then this was followed by the occupation of Czechoslovakia, a topic that he mentioned in his diary pages contemplating on the consequences it might have regarding the fight against the ruling red tape, which in his opinion, was the main political obstacle in reaching a degree of authentic socialism.[57] After his coming forward, Dobrica Ćosić, as he says, was "planning his next actions."[58] He thought to resign from his membership in the Central Committee and in the League of Communists: "I cannot be a public official in this context any more."[59] Nevertheless, he did not do it. He quit the League of Communists only in 1971, of his own will. In the meantime, he held important positions in the institutions of a national culture.[60] In 1969, he was elected as president of the Serbian Literary Association. He was re-elected in 1971. As the goal of "his new mission in the Serbian Literary Association," he announced that it was going to be to defend the unity of the Serbian national culture regardless of republic borders.[61] He was elected as correspondent of the Serbian Academy of Science and Art in 1970, and a full member in 1976. He held a speech *Literature and history*[62] at the ceremony of the Serbian Academy of Science and Art on 29 March 1977. This, by all means, is not the first evidence of Dobrica Ćosić's obsession with the past, which is equal to history, in his eyes. But, taking into consideration the place where his speech was held, it gave a lift to a resulting process, according to Dobrica Ćosić, of mass obsession with history. Only a few years later, he writes in his diary notes:

> History is not a guiding philosophical concept in literature and social sciences any more, it is imbued with the everyday life, everyone's opinion and thinking about society and nation, it has charmed everyone, at coffee shops, and in interpersonal relations.[63]

Anyhow, only after he achieved strong positions in the institutions of national culture where, according to definition, the intellectual elite is concentrated, Dobrica Ćosić, who had already rejected the current policy on the national issue, became dangerous for the political elite. As if the question was asked, who is going to be who.[64] For the first time, one of this most awarded writer's books was forbidden; it was his book titled *Moć i strepnja (Power and Fear)* (1969), as well as his speech in the Serbian Academy of Science and Art.[65] Having no argument for a dialogue, the political elite were frightened, and their critics wanted them to show that actions speak louder than words. This effects the position of Dobrica Ćosić being a public official, but it does not determine his career as a writer. All this is due mostly to the Yugoslav context. Indisputable is the deprivation of freedom: one cannot discuss ideas or political intentions until freedom is guaranteed. In Slovenia the works of Dobrica Ćosić have been turned into drama (1975)[66]; in Croatia his selected works have been published in nine books (1980),[67] and then his book *Stvarno i moguće (Real and Possible)* as well (1983).[68] In Serbia, however, he experienced bans. His first two books of the novel *Vreme smrti (Time of Death)* (1972) were banned as well, and they are going to be, as Ćosić wrote in his diary notes back in 1967—organically connect to *Koreni and Deobe* and together with them and with *Zapisi Dušana Katića* on the postwar period, they will form my novelistic vision of several Serbian generations.[69]

A great number of readers of his novel *Vreme smrti (Time of Death)*, and especially its dramatized version (*Kolubarska bitka—Kolubarska Battle* on the stage of the Yugoslav Theater of Drama in 1983)[70] made Dobrica Ćosić not only the most popular Serbian writer but also "the father of the nation."[71] This title, regardless of the different interpretations, explains the role of Dobrica Ćosić during the last two decades of the twentieth century. But this also raises the question of a society that needs this kind of role, and where it was possible to have that same kind of role. That is why *Vreme smrti (Time of Death) —is the fifth important starting point for a researcher of the works of Dobrica Ćosić*. In the 1980s he continued his novelistic building—: *Grešnik (The Sinner)*, *Vernik (The Believer)* and *Otpadnik (The Outcast)*. At the same time, in public life, he was fulfilling

his position of "the father of the nation," which was interpreted literally and metaphorically, but it was actually an institutional position. From 1980, when the government obstructed the publishing of his new oppositional newspaper, *Javnost (The Public)*, the title of which was associated with a gazette of the founder of socialism in Serbia, Svetozar Marković, whose steps he retraced quite a lot,[72] Dobrica Ćosić was in the middle of all initiatives that aimed the politically heterogeneous out-of-institutional opposition, which was one when it came to non-acceptance of the market economy and the confederal form of the Yugoslav country, to make public. Opposing the confederation, first in the Party then as a head of the external opposition, Dobrica Ćosić made an ideological basis for an alliance of the Serbian elite, which took place in the second half of the 1980s. Nevertheless, Dobrica Ćosić was, as Predrag Palavestra says, one "of the key figures who formed the opinion at the end of the 20th century," a writer whose works "framed the moral and spiritual history of the epoch,"[73] or was his work from the second half of the 1950s an expression of the opinion the roots for which he was searching, dragging it from the past, from "the depth of history" to bring it to the surface?

Dobrica Ćosić is a person of strong self-reliance:

> I easily, even passionately, burst into big social events of my time; as a revolutionary, I wanted to participate in the 'creation of the history' of my society and nation. That is why 'history' reflexively devised my life, making it exciting, hard and dangerous.[74]

In his own eyes, Dobrica Ćosić is "the leading person of a new national politics"[75] "in his generation a kind of paradigm of Serbian fate"[76] an historical actor whose influence "in the second half of the 20th century will be distinguished."[77]

The self-confidence of Dobrica Ćosić is, nevertheless, not without cover. It has more grounding, in the intellectual elite, with literary historians and critics,[78] with philosophers[79] and historians.[80] Nobody ignored Dobrica Ćosić: not Josip Broz Tito, nor Aleksandar Ranković, nor Milovan Đilas, nor Jurij Andropov.[81] And especially not the Serbian party leadership, to whom it always made a difference where Dobrica Ćosić was going to find himself: in all important dramatic situations, for the party, he was the one they always spoke to.[82] And they treated him well: he was a fellow fighter and a writer but also a nitroglycerine that could explode any moment. The novels of Dobrica Ćosić, according to the National Library of Serbia,

when they were published, were the books that were read the most[83]. And according to public opinion surveys, Dobrica Ćosić was "the most popular person"[84] and he was "very highly respected."[85] Even without the bibliography of the works written by Dobrica Ćosić, it is well known that many discussions and books were written about his literary works and about him and his influence as well. Among the latter ones are the books in which he personally put a lot of effort, in order to be understood more accurately.[86] What are these facts about? If there is no answer to this question, then there is no understanding of his personality nor his works as a specific collective project, as an ideology.[87]

The concept of ideology, of a centralized and unitarian socialist country as the only possibility for Yugoslavia, as opposed to the concept of a federation supported in the Constitution from 1974,[88] returned/regressed Dobrica Ćosić, and not only him and not only under his influence, back in the time into the nineteenth century.[89] Placing the unrealized goal—the Serbian state, at the end of the twentieth century, consequentially determined everything else that came after. Priorities: the mobilization of the people and their strong unity against the internal and external goal opponent.[90] Means: wars to be fought for national borders.[91] The relationship toward everything that, due to this historical dynamic, became an objective obstacle on the way to achieving the previously fixed goal, including the development of the Serbian people[92] and Europe,[93] that is, the world.

In 1992, during the middle of the war, Dobrica Ćosić became the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was the remaining part of the other Yugoslavia, and he was firmly positioned in the matrix of an unitarianist and centralized country.[94] If that was an historical irony,[95] in modern Serbia it is not without a precedent. Earlier, the writer Dobrica Ćosić, a legal theoretician and historian, Slobodan Jovanović, experienced the same irony as a president of the Yugoslav state in exile during World War II.[96] But the scientist was more aware of that irony.[97] The writer, only sometimes balancing between fear of making a mistake and his passion to fight, was aware from the very beginning of his role and his influence[98]: of himself as a paradigm of "the Serbian fate."[99]

A child from a Serbian village, and from the one that took him to communism and the Revolution, and from the imaginary one, the one that was "fixed by him" on thousands of pages of his books—Dobrica Ćosić always refused, regardless of the retoric on modern things, to accept towns or cities and the civic community,[100] technical progress and mobility,[101] social and political pluralism,[102] or to accept anything that was beyond "mankind

from the Morava region"—on Earth and in the Universe.[103] This refusal was described in all the works of Dobrica Ćosić. But, in this comprehensive part there was some room for synthesis which was the main code for reading his books. These are the parts in his diary notes from the beginning of the 1990s, where he writes about the end of patriarchal civilization as the end of the Serbian people; about post-Tito-era where there was a gap between ideals and reality; about the eventual mistake made by numerous enemies of the Serbian people as his last chance. These are the balance spots: this is where Dobrica Ćosić closed the circle, which he had described for many years. That is why these spots have been quoted so many times in this work.

> The village where I was born and grew up does not exist any more. I don't know the people. The old houses have been demolished. The cattle has been replaced by cars and tractors. The graveyard has changed as well. Old tombs built from the belovodski sandstone by Brajkovo stone-carvers have been replaced with geometrical shapes made of black granite. In their appearance these monuments completely deny the monumental spirit and its material culture. It belongs to someone else, it's black, it's aggressive. *The end of the patriarchal civilization. The tradition break is drastic.* The nation has given up its native esthetics, its architecture, its material; they have accepted something new, strange, ugly. A great technical progress hasn't brought order and cleanliness to the village; everything is dirty, piled up, in a mess. The old system has been disintegrated, and a new hasn't been established. Older villagers are in an untidy peasant's clothes, the younger generation wears jeans or the most fashionable clothes. The change is enormous but with no civilized meaning.
>
> There was not a single thing in Velika Drenova that made me happy. *Not the cemetery, not the village, not the people, they were not a part of my homeland.* I burst into tears at the graves of my parents, my grandfather and my brother. Out of sadness but even more because I felt that life had no sense. Why were Serbian people so ruined? Or was it my present time and its optical that made me see the world as so meaningless and ugly that I couldn't see it in the right perspective?[104]

No one wants to fight for the Serbs in Croatia. Hopelessness eroded the conscience and soul of the people. The nation feels, sees, and senses its decay. A sense of decay—their thoughts about themselves is what matters. Decline is a necessity such as dying of incurable diseases. Changes and rebirth that would heal people are necessary.[105]

> My time in everything that I thought was life is ending, as well. What else can and should I write? What emerges is not what we, the critics, the deniers and the destroyers of Titoism wanted. The changes that occur are incompatible with our ideas and thoughts. Again we deceive ourselves.
>
> I was severely punished for optimism and pride in my youth, but also for 'criticism of everything existing' in maturity. [106]
>
> Germany won the Second World War at peace, now it crashes all the achievements of their military defeat [the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, author's note]. Serbia must be punished for its victory and national ambitions. There is no force that could stop Germany would prevent this. There is no Soviet Union.[107]

People became desperate just like in April, 1941. *Serbia is unstoppably falling*. We will lose Kosovo and Metohija as well. We will lose Northern Bačka as well. We are losing all the wars of liberation that we had in the twentieth century.[108]

> What happened with the Serbian people? Are they unable to exist? Not worthy of existing? Punished by a higher power for their unforgivable sins? [109]
>
> I do not know who is worse: the government or the opposition. And nobody knows the way to salvation. We simply do not have brains or the will or the skills to save ourselves. If we get ourselves out of this historical and political wilderness, it will only be because of the enemies. Hopefully, they may make a mistake that will allow us to survive.[110]

Already released from duty as the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Dobrica Ćosić wrote in his diary notes: "The development depressed me. But I have no will nor strength to keep up with it."[111] He was not interested in the future because, as he said, he would not live that long. This, however, was not the attitude of a writer who was tired. It is one of the starters of the Serbian historiosophy. Radovan Samardžić thinks that the "unconcerned and ambivalent attitude of Serbs towards the future originates from the belief that due to old sins they are not entitled to it."[112] The only salvation of the Serbian people Dobrica Ćosić saw was in its decay. But, "the Serbian decay has to become its [of the Serbian people. author's note] magnitude."[113] Within the circle he described, Dobrica Ćosić concentrated on the revitalization of the main idea of the Serbian national ideology, the idea of the Serbian people united in a national country.[114] Among the assumptions for this argu-

ment, after the defeat at the end of the twentieth century, an important thing was the negative relationship to the period of history symbolized by Josip Broz Tito and Yugoslavia as a community of nations. It has to be proven that the reasons for the decay of the Serbian people are to be found in this period; to assure those people who experienced this period that they were misled; and those people who did not experience this period—to have them hate it and turn them off it. These are the leading points of the novels *Vlast* and *Vlast II (The Authority* and *The Authority II*), by Dobrica Ćosić,[115] and also his books that do not belong to the novelistic building that he was persistently building for more than a half a century, as persistently as a fanatic. What is the relationship between a writer being a fanatic and a politician being passionate?[116] Do they come from the same matrix or different ones?[117] If there are no answers to these questions, then it is impossible to understand the attitude of Dobrica Ćosić toward the Revolution and Yugoslavia, and his relationship to Josip Broz Tito. From an historical point of view—who is static and who is dynamic in this relationship is difficult to understand without exploring the wide scope of books and the long political activity of Dobrica Ćosić.

What Sources Can this Research be Based on?

There are plenty of sources to be found on the topic of the relationship between Dobrica Ćosić and Josip Broz Tito for those who do the research. The researcher's problem would be how to master all these sources: first of all, the written works of Dobrica Ćosić: volumes (25 books) and diversity (fiction, nonfiction, political and ideological texts, various documents, diary entries). Dobrica Ćosić himself and literary historians and theorists pointed to an internal relatedness, the unity of the written part. But research tasks, set in this paper, require the establishment of an hierarchy of sources. They cannot be overcome with a single procedure, and, for a start, in order to set an empirical basis for the study of the relationship between Dobrica Ćosić and Josip Broz Tito, it is necessary to make functional a variety of sources. From this point of view, the six books published so far of *Piščevi zapisi (Writer's Notes)*, emerge as the first one.[118] So, Dobrica Ćosić sees them: "It seems to me that *Piščevi zapisi (Writer's Notes)* are going to be my most important books on Titoism."[119] What makes them such?

Piščevi zapisi (Writer's Notes) cover a long period, from 1951, until 2000.[120] In some periods, they were written from day to day, yet in some of them interruptions were made in the writing sequence, or a material written by Ćosić was confiscated. [121] Resulting in one way or another, the gaps have been supplemented later by adding the parts of the *Piščevi zapisi (Writer's Notes)* meant for the publication of other Ćosić's books. [122] By nature, *Piščevi zapisi (Writer's Notes)* is, as Ćosić says, "a kind of autobiographical novel, in narratives and drama of which, in addition to the author, History participates as well."[123] According to it, it will be possible to not only see my understanding of the nature of social change in the Yugoslav system, for which I stand, but also my intellectual me and understanding.[124]

Dobrica Ćosić is a rare writer who, in numerous interviews, told the history of each of his novels: different title variants, reasons for how it began, the plan, and implementation. The meaning of each of these small histories was to tell himself and his readers how far he got in his literary task, in raising the novelistic building. However, in *Piščevi zapisi (Writer's Notes)* Ćosić does not write about literary matters nor literary life, although he actively participates in the classification of modernists and realists. He does not write about the literary works of writers—contemporaries (Ivo Andrić, Miroslav Krleža, Marko Ristić, Oskar Davičo, Meša Selimović, Antonije Isaković), but evaluates them in terms of their out-of-literature role in the "History" of their relationship to Yugoslavia and the Serbian question.

About his private life in *Piščevi zapisi (Writer's Notes)*, Ćosić speaks very briefly. The most important events—the birth of his daughter, the murder of his brother, the death of his loved ones—he registers briefly, with just one sentence. Diary notes about traveling through the countries of East and West and in Africa are not descriptions of nature, nor of the people. There is not a single impression that is able to move Dobrica Ćosić. What then is the subject of *Piščevi zapisi (Writer's Notes)*?

"Politics becomes my curse. A penalty for my revolutionism and dedication to the general good. A nightmare of my engagement. The revenge of liberation"[125]—says Ćosić on 21 January 1966. And in several places in the diary notes he is desperate, because the political engagement separates him from his literary work and he assures himself and the reader that he is, above all, a writer. Political engagement has two levels: one public and one unavailable to the public, that is made of a multitude of relationships and connections with the holders of the highest party and governmental

functions, of the representatives of the humanistic intelligence but also of the people. That is where difficulties for researchers start; some are manageable and some are not, at least not quickly, and not without the introduction of research and other sources.

Piščevi zapisi (Writer's Notes) is not a lonely writer talking to himself; a skeptical intellectual confiding his concerns to the paper. They document a passionately engaged political actor, confident in his ideas and his mission. They are written to be published during the author's life. One cannot exclude the assumption that particularly the first books of *Piščevi zapisi (Writer's Notes)* could have been corrected. A researcher may establish this if he is to be familiar with all the written works of Dobrica Ćosić. Above all, these are the parts that refer to Josip Broz Tito. But, even regardless of the context of *Piščevi zapisi (Writer's Notes)* and his intuition, a researcher can eventually speak with certainty only if the released version has been compared to the original manuscript. Itis not about catching the author of *Piščevi zapisi (Writer's Notes)* in inconsistencies or about the possibility of changing his perspective. After several years and decades, the author who has been writing so long, could get back to some events. Dobrica Ćosić did that (with a visit to Goli otok; a discussion with Jože Pirjevec; traveling through African countries accompanied by Josip Broz Tito; with a text for the twentieth anniversary of the uprising, an edition of the Serbian Literary Society). It is necessary to compare *Piščevi zapisi (Writer's Notes)* with other historical sources. First of all, with archive material relevant to the work of Dobrica Ćosić on the party and governmental functions, as well as cultural and scientific institutions, and in editorial offices, one cannot avoid even comparisons with the memories of his contemporaries who talk about the events, and actors mentioned by Dobrica Ćosić as well.

In *Piščevi zapisi (Writer's Notes)* there are, however, parts that are unverifiable or hardly verifiable. These parts include Dobrica Ćosić talking to Josip Broz Tito in private,[126] and to Aleksandar Ranković.[127] But also talking to people like Mika Ćurčić[128] and Radisav Keglić,[129] who are "the voice of the people," "the voice of the Serbian people" in *Piščevi zapisi (Writer's Notes)*. Actual or unreal, verifiable or unverifiable, these conversations, like everything else in the author's writings, explain the narrator who is not observing reality but is immersed in it, and he wants to change it according to the ideas presented in his novels. With all of the aforementioned features of *Piščevi zapisi (Writer's Notes)*, the researcher shall take

into account this last one. However, he does not mind using *Piščevi zapisi* (Writer's Notes), which were created during the course of half a century, as the basis for the reconstruction of the relations between Dobrica Ćosić and Josip Broz Tito. At the same time, he has in mind that *Piščevi zapisi* (Writer's Notes) are not the only source relevant to the aforementioned relationship, but one of the sources. His insights are, therefore, insights based on *Piščevi zapisi* (Writer's Notes) as they are.

But it must be said that, between researchers and the personalities they explore, there is a difference in understanding history: hence, a difference in relationship to the sources. A researcher makes a selection of sources, but he does not ignore any of them.[130] He at least can accept, even if it was just rhetoric, that the discontinuity of one age is achieved by destroying the sources of that age[131]: this would deprive historical science not only of its instruments but also of its meaning.

A researcher takes into account the existence of different historical perspectives; he does not make the truth relative but he seeks it. A lie can never be elevated to the level of principle.[132]

What Sort of Guidance Can the Researcher Find After Having the First Insight into These Sources?

A source such as *Piščevi zapisi* (Writer's Notes) provides more insight, of course. However, only one of these insights is given in this paper, the one that could be formulated as *a differentiation period in the relationship of Dobrica Ćosić to Josip Broz Tito.* To begin with, it is important to establish the chronological boundaries and internal features of each of these periods. Conditionally, these periods could be titled as: (1) Fascination by Tito (1941–1961); (2) Fight for Tito (1961–1966); (3) Non-acceptance of defeat (1968–1980); (4) The ideological war against Titoism as anti-Serbian (1980–1991); (5) Armed war for resolving Serbian national issues (1992–1999); (6) Anti-Titoism as the basis of a new Serbian identity (1999–2000).

1. During the years of the Second World War, Dobrica Ćosić saw Tito as the supreme commander of the Liberation Army in the anti-fascist struggle.[133] Nor did he ever question it much later: "History cannot deny his [Tito's, author's note] struggle against fascism and his leading the largest anti-fascist resistance movement in Europe."[134]

In the years of conflict with the Cominform, Tito is a symbol of Party unity. [135] The leader of the Revolution, who was found by history:

> This is a man who appears only once in the life of several generations in the history of a nation… I cannot imagine the Yugoslav party without Tito. He is the personification of the Yugoslav revolution.[136]

In the first direct meeting in summer 1955, Dobrica Ćosić " was hypnotized" by Josip Broz Tito:

> The first time I shook hands with Tito and sat with him and Marko [Aleksandar Ranković, author's note]. Unusual, impressive personality. Strength, health, male beauty, simplicity and superiority. I was astonished by the plainness of the great leader.[137]

The report of Dobrica Ćosić about the dramatic days in Budapest in 1956 opened the path that led directly to Josip Broz Tito. That report, says Ćosić

> introduced me to the Commission for the Communist Party program, and my work in the Commission got me on the *Seagull* and took to Africa. It was for me an incomprehensibly large-minded attitude at that time.[138]

And before he has become a member of the delegation that accompanied Josip Broz Tito on his long journey from 14 February to 26 April 1961 to African countries, Ćosić wrote that"Tito as the essence of our social being is already … an historical category, 'a Titoism' state of mind and the frame of our ambition."[139] The journey on the *Seagull*, where he accompanied Josip Broz Tito, made him realize that it was an opportunity offered by history:

> I need to see and know what kind of a man he is—he who dared to condition the fate of Yugoslavia; to whom his own poor and Balkan country became too small to care for; with whom the anti-Stalinist era should start in world socialism.[140]

Five years after the first meeting with Josip Broz Tito, after lengthy discussions and observations on the *Seagull*, Dobrica Ćosić says:

> Tito leaves the impression of a modern politician and statesman. He rejects the hypocrisy of classical diplomacy. He does not smile at diplomats, does not pat the partners, does not hide his intentions. He has the power of honesty. He is ready to adjust the interests of his country to world interests and the interests of his partners. [141]

Forty years later, regarding his *Piščevi zapisi* (Writer's Notes) (1951–1968), the first of six books published in 2000, Dobrica Ćosić talked about things that were not written in the diary notes, which he "deliberately withheld." And he deliberately withheld certain things because everything he saw and realized on the *Seagull* was "so unexpected, painful and dangerous that," Dobrica Ćosić explained later, "could only translate it into his literary mood."[142] The main reason for the "deep disappointment" of Dobrica Ćosić in Josip Broz Tito, the commander in chief and the leader of the partisan revolution, was his hedonism:

> I simply got sick from disappointment in Tito and his colleagues. I realized on the *Seagull* that the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia with Tito as a leader—was a monarchical, bureaucratic oligarchy, morally hypocritical and unscrupulous in his love of power. On the other hand, I have never separated socialism from morality, justice and liberty.[143]

In both the political and the intellectual elite in Serbia in the 1960s, Dobrica Ćosić was not the only one who considered Josip Broz Tito to be the guarantor of socialism and justice and equality as ideals of the Revolution, not to speak of the masses. From the positions of revolutionary ideals, criticism of revolutionary government began, and criticism of the leader of the Revolution. The clash of ideals with reality was solved in favor of the ideals.[144] And this was not possible without violence. This is an important insight that *Piščevi zapisi (Writer's Notes)* provide to researchers, an important point of reference for their further investigation.

2. Dobrica Ćosić went on the *Seagull*, well informed about the differences in the Yugoslav communist leadership on the strategy of the further development of state and society.[145] The leader of one group was Edvard Kardelj, "an ideologist and theoretician … of self-managed socialism" who wanted to establish public law, namely, that the republic, "with administrative boundaries," would be given the status of a

> national state. That is why he wanted constitutional reforms and the adoption of a new constitution. [146]

The other group was led by Aleksandar Ranković, "who was supported by Tito then"[147] Ranković was not

> a theoretician, a reformer and a modernizer; he supported the ideology of the partisan Yugoslan nation and a pragmatic sovereignty of Yugoslav character; he was against every nationalism, republicanism and particularism

while

> for Kardelj. 'reformers,' nationalists, republicans and 'creative marxists' he was a conservative centralist and a supporter of hegemony.[148]

At that time, Dobrica Ćosić, as he wrote in his *Piščevi zapisi (Writer's Notes)* on 1 April 1961, had a great belief in Aleksandar Ranković. Assuming that he

> chooses associates, capable people, no matter how long and if they had been party members and regardless of their war merits, he would probably derive the partisan revolution in the fastest and most effective way out of this mud it had sunk into, at the time when it wanted to believe, when it believed that it was triumphant.[149]

Since it was not achievable without some sort of party strike and coup d'etat, it was of great importance to have Tito on their side. This estimate was logical and it proved to be correct:

> Mainly thanks to Tito, Kardelj's confederal conception of Yugoslavia was suppressed at the time; the block Tito—Ranković prevailed on the political scene at that time.[150]

In the above-mentioned context there is also a discussion of Dobrica Ćosić at the end of 1961, and the beginning of 1962, held with a Slovenian intellectual, Dušan Pirjevec.[151] Through these two people, leading political persons were simply checking what the limit was that they could not exceed, leaving enough room to maneuver. Whether Dobrica Ćosić was aware of that, it is hard to say, because all his notes from that period were taken away from him. But, in additional written notes about these events he says:

> Pirjevec supported the ideological and national opinion of the leadership of the Communist Party of Slovenia: at the beginning of the discussion, I was supported by Tito, Ranković and the leadership of the Communist Party in Serbia, and then I was attacked and accused of 'doing a lot of damage to the Party.'[152]

In this same context, is also written the preface by Dobrica Ćosić for Josip Broz Tito's book, *Četrdesetprva (The Year 1941)*, honoring the 20th anniversary of the 1941 uprising. In autumn of 1968, Ćosić says in his *Piščevi zapisi (Writer's Notes)* :

> I will never regret enough the words of praise and glory that I wrote in Tito's book preface, published in a blue cover by the Serbian Literary Association in 1961. This is the only text I am ashamed of, but I will not deny it. I will print it over and over again as long as I live. But with a post scriptum: How I betrayed the future by believing in it.[153]

Nevertheless, at the time when it was published, Ćosić's preface expressed a victorious attitude of the centralists over the confederalists, a triumph of the partisan Yugoslav nation, the personification of which was Josip Broz Tito.

> The real preface to this book is the entire history of the people of Yugoslavia until April 6th. And we, the contemporaries, have the right to add only one preface: what are the things that place us under obligation by this book… In these last two decades we started many actions, but our lives are too short to carry them out… With their revolutionary goals, the partisans did not determine all the revolutionary goals of their descendants. Their children are not growing up in the shadow of their fathers. That is actually the main creative and humanistic sense of the Yugoslav revolution. To be a Tito's follower means to have his life attitude, to think as Tito does, to fight as Tito fights in your time, in your present, always … this book *(The Year 1941)* hasn't been finished yet. And one has a need to always add some new thoughts. Its creator does it, and millions of Yugoslav people along with him.[154]

Dobrica Ćosić estimated the period from 1945 to 1962 as a stable period. He believed that the factors of stability were "existential": the people suffering and the victims, peace, and the "absolute mandate" of the Yugoslav Communist Party leadership. Retrograde motion begins at the end of this period, and historians have to ask the question:

> when did the Yugoslav political leadership cease to be Yugoslavian, when did it become rational, particular and in which aspects? This question is fundamental to understanding the political history and the fate of Yugoslavia created by the anti-fascist war and the revolutionary coup.[155]

Although he set this question to historians only in 1992, the subsequent memory of Dobrica Ćosić, instead of those that were taken away from him, suggested that he already had the answer. He found it in the Constitution of 1963, which, after strengthening the republics, opened the way for the Confederation. And then, in the federalization of the 8th Congress of the Communist Party in 1964. The Serbian intellectual elite shared this view. [156]

The aforementioned events showed that in the conflict between the centralists and the confederalists, the scales shifted toward the confederalists. It was important not to move Tito. "You have to," they advised Dobrica Ćosić after the removal of Aleksandar Ranković, "stay along in Tito's cassock and under his auspices. Without the red cassock and the so-called Tito's cap, you cannot serve people and fulfill your mission."[157] In his speech at the session of the Central Committee of the Communist Association of Serbia (CK SKS) in March 1964, where Tito's call for ideological action in culture was discussed, Dobrica Ćosić referred to Tito eight times, insisting on the durability of the action:

> It is not good to grade these tasks with short terms because, and I believe in this, Tito is inviting us to a far-reaching work and long-term actions and not to campaign propaganda and organizational actions… If our attitude doesn't change, I am afraid that little will be accomplished in bringing these ideas to life and carrying out the intentions of comrade Tito and the Executive Committee.[158]

Nevertheless, balancing a conflict is two-sided: if it was the other way round—balance would not be possible. In those additionally written memories, Dobrica Ćosić wrote that "on November 17 or 19 around 9 o'clock" (1966), a colonel came to see him and "told me in confidence that I was called by the comrade Marshal." In a talk that lasted until midnight, Josip Broz Tito was telling Dobrica Ćosić about a fraction, Kardelj—Ranković, and about his intention that on 22 December, when the Army day used to be celebrated, he would come out with the truth. "You are going to be in charge of the Party in Serbia," Josip Broz Tito was offering this to Dobrica

Ćosić. Upset, Ćosić was assuring Tito "that the Serbian Party is united on his line and that there was nobody, and shouldn't be anybody creating an organization against Tito."[159] To the given offer, request or test, he said: "I cannot be the Party Chairman. I am a writer and want to stay just a writer,"[160] and it made Tito angry and disappointed.

Except for his diary,[161] Ćosić confided this important discussion to his friend, who is known only by initials, and his friend informed about this conversation Aleksandar Ranković, whom Josip Broz Tito thought to be a leader of the one of two factions in the Yugoslavian party leadership. The day after the New Year in 1966, Ranković invited Ćosić to a family lunch. On that occasion,

> Ranković told me that he was very calm because he could inform me that 'the misunderstanding between me [meaning Ranković, author's note] and Tito was cleared' and that their 'cooperation would continue in a friendly spirit.' 'I wanted to inform you that the issues you knew about, have been settled. And there were nasty things and intrigues. But, it's not your problem.'[162]

But the fight for Tito is still going on. At the session of the Central Committee of the Communist Association of Yugoslavia (CK SKJ) on 28 February 1966:

> Aleksandar Ranković was accused only [of] Serbian chauvinism. He, apparently, had to speak only as a Serb, not as a secretary of the Central Committee. Tito showed the highest political concreteness and passion for solving any kind of problems in the country.[163]

Problems of maturation: rampant nationalism in Croatia,[164] while in Serbia everyone talks about the question of nationality.[165]

In this atmosphere, in March 1966, Josip Broz Tito called Dobrica Ćosić again. In the notes, Ćosić is trying to glimpse the reasons:

> I do not understand why, because of the trust or the manipulation again, as in 1961, in controversy with Pirjevec i.e. with the Slovenes and their leader Kardelj.[166]

In the discussion, Tito says again that Serbia is against him:

> Those from the leadership are working secretly. They spread nationalism. They managed to blur the whole situation, even in the masses as well. The Belgrade bazaar is full of all kinds of stories.[167]

Ćosić reassures Tito again and suggests to him

> to visit central Serbia and check the mood of the people towards him and Yugoslavia.[168]

Tito is asking Ćosić to follow him.

> That call scared me. He will draw me into political confrontations in Serbia, which means that I must not let him.[169]

After Tito's visit, Tito and Ćosić met in Vrnjačka Banja in April 1966:

> Tito has a better attitude towards the Serbs. He was joyfully surprised by the welcome in Serbia, the reception was beyond his expectations.[170]

Ćosić suggests to Tito that in a toast at a banquet in Vrnjačka Banja he should "talk about Yugoslavianism."

> He listened to my advice and … talked, as before, about the Yugoslavians. After the toasts, he asked me if I was satisfied. Of course, I told him that I was very pleased. And the next day in the newspaper, where his toast was published, there was not a word about Yugoslavianism; I asked him in protest: why his word about Yugoslavians wasn't released.[171]

During this meeting, Tito insisted on new meetings. He claimed, according to *Piščevi zapisi*, that he respected Ćosić's

> openness, honesty and courage in the vision and the presentation of our situation and circumstances.[172]

And Ćosić told him "about some serious mistakes in politics" and hinted at

> the risk of non-compliance with national dignity of the Serbian people, which lately was present everywhere.[173]

The unique communication of Josip Broz Tito with Dobrica Ćosić was not only by but also against the leadership of the Party in Serbia; the frequency of these meetings; the content of the conversation that is in *Piščevi zapisi,* although only partially communicated, putting off everything for some other more convenient times, explain how Dobrica Ćosić was certain of himself when he, immediately upon receiving the notification of the case Ranković wrote a letter to Josip Broz Tito. He was not bound by the views of the Central Committee of Serbia, although he was their member: His relationship with Tito was direct. In addition, Ćosić knew that in the conflict between the centralists and the federalists, scales move: it already happened in 1961 and 1963. It was still necessary to fight for Tito.[174]

Piščevi zapisi does not provide the basis for assuming that the respect that Dobrica Ćosić stated in the letter to Tito was done under extorted circumstances:

> If I personally would not utter these few words to you, I would have considered that I *had betrayed You* [underlined D.Ć.], and that in my life you are not what you are.
> If I did not know that you know how much I respect and appreciate you, I would have no right, no reason, no courage to write this letter to you.[175]

But the letter content was with a warning reaction. An historical recapitulation: Serbs, whose representative was Aleksandar Ranković in the Yugoslav revolution, identified themselves with Yugoslavia, and Tito embodied the revolution and Yugoslavia. Any disruption of this formula has far-reaching consequences for the revolution, for Yugoslavia and for Tito.

Dobrica Ćosić writes to Josip Broz Tito:

> You are well aware that Aleksandar Ranković, after you, is the most authoritative moral and political figure of the Yugoslav revolution, that after you, he enjoys the greatest respect and love of the working class and the people. All other significant and worthy people are far behind him … *When it comes to Serbia in particular, it sees Ranković with you and always next to you* [underlined D.Ć.]. Talking about the feelings of love and respect of the Serbian people, Ranković is right after you. And whatever happens in the political fate of one or the other, both will be affected … Without you, Aleksandar Ranković does not mean much, but you too will be weaker without him … After this fall of Aleksandar Ranković, I am afraid that Tito will not be the

> same Tito, the Yugoslav Communist Association (SKJ) neither especially what the world believes it is in the avant-garde renaissance of socialism and the exceeding of the Stalin epoch.
>
> This is so because none of the leaders of the Communist Party identified themselves with You, nor scrupulously followed you in an ideological and political sense as Aleksandar Ranković did.[176]

Friends warned Dobrica Ćosić:

> No need now to stand by the people who were Udba and police. One should not fall along with the first officials of Udba.[177]

Ćosić was also aware that Aleksandar Ranković "is not a format," that "he is not a man worthy of great anger from the people or offense."[178] But he is a national symbol: "the affair (is) anti-Serbian by methods, character, consequences."[179] However, at the session of CK SK Serbia, which was held after the fourth session of CK SKJ in Brijuni, Ćosić didn't say a word.[180] He had his diary entries as a vent:

> The Albanian communists led a furious attack on Ranković and Serbian nationalism in Kosovo
>
> Yesterday [a note on 16 September 1966,—author's note] Serbia, its political leadership, surrendered Kosovo and Metohija to Albania.
>
> I, ashamed, silent and raising my hand for the decision of the Executive Committee of the League of Serbian communists … I betrayed myself. [181]

In *Piščevi zapisi,* Dobrica Ćosić draws conclusions. By removing Aleksandar Ranković, which was "planned and directed by Tito,"[182] Serbia suffered a severe blow that caused embarrassment to Serbian people. But:

> Poor culprits! Revenge will come and it will be more expensive than any political victory of my contemporaries and political opponents. People have the right to do whatever they wish; persons have no right to win at the cost of the embarrassment of their people, what just happened these days.[183]

Dobrica Ćosić felt a great personal responsibility "before this age and in this age."[184] But he says that he was advised to remain formally and publicly in the "Tito cassock."[185] It took him two and a half years of high engagement, personal and within the non-institutional opposition, whose epicenter he was, to settle accounts in *Piščevi zapisi*:

> I am happy that I have so radically broken up with the Tito regime, which will certainly ruin opportunities and the meaning of the national revolution. Well, that's already happened![186]

The hesitation of Dobrica Ćosić to throw off "Tito's cassock" was not just tactics. There was also a risk involved. Josip Broz Tito symbolized ideological values and the interests of the Serbian people. The ruling ideology did not include capitalism nor liberalism, nor the dominant ideologies in Serbia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. That ideology was formed in reliance on Russia. The entire Serbian nation lived in the renewed Yugoslavia. It was governed by a party similar to a party—hegemony, which held power for the longest period of the Serbian state before the creation of Yugoslavia. The army, the third force in Europe, with the highest percentage of Serbs in command and in regular posts, which was financed by the republics proportionately to their national income, had the task not only to protect the external borders but also to solve internal conflicts. The removal of Aleksandar Ranković brought this formula into question: Tito himself was to be called into question—Dobrica Ćosić warned him in his letter on that occasion.

3. Two years after the removal of Aleksandar Ranković, at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Serbia, on 29 May 29 1968, within the regular discussion on national policy, Dobrica Ćosić suggested that "the ruling concept of the Association of Communists of Yugoslavia in national policy and in the practice of creating social self-government" should be critically examined.[187] This speech, as he says in *Piščevi zapisi*, which received support from members of the intellectual elite, was the basic point to Dobrica Ćosić, and to the others, for determining the relationship to Yugoslavia, or to Josip Broz Tito, in the years of its constitutional transformation into a confederate state: the constitutional amendments of 1968, and 1971, and the Constitution of 1974. Key points of that basically program speech are: the unity of the Serbian people; the incompleteness of Balkan issues; Serbian preconditions for the existence of Yugoslavia; and the Albanian question, namely Kosovo as the question of all questions.

Dobrica Ćosić did not accept Serbian identity to be "some sort of primitive and anachronistic political mentality," to have "a vision of Serbia

from Užice to Zemun" and "with a lack of understanding" for differences within Serbian people, "that lasted and developed under different social and cultural circumstances."[188]

Dobrica Ćosić viewed the unfinished national integration of the Serbian people in the context of unfinished Balkan issues: ethnically and territorially mixed, Balkan nations didn't establish a national and state union, and were facing a choice. If the

> certain developmental tendencies in our country and in the world go on in a traditional way, 'the national question' will remain a torment and a concern of the next generation as well.[189]

The same applies to Yugoslavia, if within it the following prevails:

> traditional nationalist-etatist policies and an individualistic orientation, if the democratic forces of socialism don't take a final victory over the bourgeois forces and disorganization, if the old historic goal should flare up and a national ideal with the Serbs—consolidation of Serbian people, in a single state.[190]

Finally, we should look "into the heart" of the "Kosovo truth." Resolving the "Shiptar and Albanian problem" in the state-nationalist framework

> sets … the problem of borders, the problem of three hundred thousand Serbs and Montenegrins.[191]

In Dobrica Ćosić's opinion, there is only one way:

> To create a society where national equality is achieved in social relations, without a form of state, state attributes, national ideology and national or bureaucratic 'agents' and 'representatives' … It is a way of creating social relations where class, general social and individual interests are more important than the national-state affiliation.[192]

Is Dobrica Ćosić contradictory or doctrinaire?[193] In order to answer this question, it is important how he sees Josip Broz Tito after the removal of Aleksandar Ranković, and after the defeat of the concept of state socialism, centralized federation and of uniform Party. Definitely, it's a lost battle for Josip Broz Tito on his side. But does he shift his support to the other side,

to the reformers and confederalists, or, even if reluctantly, does he once again establish balance?

In Dobrica Ćosić's notes from the 1970s[194], Josip Broz Tito was *a great manipulator and triple impostor*. However, to deceive Stalin, the world and the people of Yugoslavia, with supernatural personal qualities, the time and the era when he appeared and acted, was very convenient :

> Tito was sent by the Comintern to rule Yugoslavia. He performed his task absolutely successfully and expanded his power and mandate: After the death of Stalin and the reckless excommunication from the Kremlin Synod, Tito got an American blessing in 'the name of the free world.' It is obvious: as he manipulated and deceived the people of Yugoslavia, this 'triple national hero, the great, the wise, the world statesman and the leader of the Third World,' he would do the same with America and the Third World. Because he, indeed, is a world impostor. Not only are his cheating capabilities of a planetary scale, but because the whole world politics today is based on espionage, deceit, manipulation. Tito is a real man of his time. He is a politician of this era. The era of impostors.[195]

Long manipulation seemed to be turned into a hypnotic state. At the time of the death of Josip Broz Tito—universal mail: the world, the ruling bureaucracy, former internal opponents (retired generals, "liberals," "Ranković supporters"): "No one to confront him, not even now that he is dead."[196] Ćosić was desperate because of the people:

> Groups of people, silently scuttling in place, walking slowly towards the Assembly Building, just to pass by Tito's catafalque after six to seven hours of standing and waiting … I felt chills going as I was going opposite of them, completely separate, that was the first time I felt loneliness, separation from the people of my country … I am here alone, with all that anti-titoic feeling.[197]

Again, as well as 30 years ago, the peasantry, the Serbian people, and pity and rage: "In fact, the peasantry is the political foundation of Titoism."[198] Maybe "Tito is exactly the way he is, Tito, a bureaucratic monarch, just the right man of this world."[199] Be sacred the one whom suits a lie and who enjoys his own corruption, where his national feelings atrophied, and readiness for sacrifice disappeared:

> that Yugoslavian and a Serb who with a little effort lives great; of course, he was a Tito-supporter and, of course, this Serb was not concerned by

> Kosovo neither with the Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia; or that they do not have their own state while all the others around him do; he was not bothered by the fact that his historical identity and integrity were crashing, that he was exploited by Slovenia, that poor Serbia helps those who are more developed than it is.[200]

Only what matters to him is, as a farmer, Radisav Keglić said to his friend Dobrica Ćosić in June 1968, "just let there be peace, that people can live and work."[201] From the nineteenth to the end of the twentieth century, conscientious representatives kept the people from that pragmatism, which weakened the willingness to sacrifice for the national ideal, a willingness for war.[202] Their status, of separation from rural people,[203] did not mean a disruption of their organic unity: "a Serb man is not a man, if he is not a Serb; and if there is no awareness of the people, whether you celebrate it or curse it."[204] Status only gave the right to interpret the ideals and needs of the people. These were the things that strangers already noticed among Serbs in the nineteenth century.[205] Vladimir Jovanović, the founder of liberalism in Serbia, thought that "the people … had to be led and somewhat protected by the educated people … the class of educated people were to rule with the people's consent."[206]Intelligence (educated people) whose essential feature "was an ideological rather than a professional and an economic group," represented much more than Berdyaev thought for Russian intelligence.[207]

4. Aware of "Tito's longevity myth"[208] and of the "deep roots of Titoism,"[209] in the first decade after the death of Josip Broz Tito, Dobrica Ćosić questioned the personality and the doctrine, and Tito and Titoism. However, he did not destroy the myth with rational knowledge, but by creating an anti-myth and remaining a prisoner of ideology.

In Tito's personality there are characteristics that marked the moral collapse of the revolution, or the beginning of a moral counter-revolution, "hedonist, sergeant, agent of the Comintern," tyrant:

> With his personal life, his greed for power, wealth, luxury, courts and balls, glory and medals, swaggering, inactivity and tourism, and unseen, unlimited extravagance, Tito marked the moral breakdown of the revolution; he supported and deepened the collapse with his politics and style of government,

> finding a lie instead of the truth in society, and he first of all provided a spiritual and moral counter-revolution.[210]

Tito ruled for a long time and without competition. He ruled tyrannically, and his tyranny is unprecedented in human history:

> Tito was having a Caligula complex regarding his own excellence … In the First World War—a sergeant, in the Second—a Marshal, in the Kingdom—a proletarian and a convict; under the rule of the Communist Party—the absolute monarch; from the Comintern agent to the ruler who was admired by all the rulers of the world, a man of average intelligence could not withstand the effort, the level … What Caligula could only dream—has become Tito's reality.[211]

But Tito was "the greatest enemy of my [Serbian, author's note] people in the last century," says Dobrica Ćosić. He, that is, Titoism, has

> paralyzed human and natural resources of the Serbian people, their institutions and their spirit deliberately and decisively replacing with reduced consciousness and delusions, with rusty institutions and a primitive bureaucratic organization of society, which has led to stagnation, which meant light decay and rotting.[212]

Salvation is in "de-Titoization." It began during the lifetime of a "great manipulator" and with demonstrations in Kosovo in 1981, which showed that with Tito, Titoism was disappearing as well:

> I think that the Serbian people, in the cries of Kosovo Serbs, are starting to realize that they have been historically deceived, tricked and enslaved … Blood will be shed again in this country of trenches and cemeteries.[213]

Tito's governance

> begins with blood and runs in dirt. It will end up again in blood because our life is so dirty that only blood can clean it away.[214]

But, socially and morally, Titoism for Dobrica Ćosić is not just hedonism of the "monarch from Brijuni," but also the conformity of the masses. Nationally, it is, above all, confederalism, established by the Constitution of 1974, according to which Tito, "in panic and fear of the Serbs, finally

stood by his enemies, chauvinized Croats and Slovenes."[215] By rejecting this Constitution, "the Serbian people returned to where they stepped out of themselves and their history,"[216] their own consolidation, which was their ideal and goal:

> We are back in the 19th century again. We have to create our Serbia again. We have to create that kind of Serbia where everyone on the planet will be able to see his or her own homeland.[217]

Dobrica Ćosić is aware that this goal is not possible to achieve without wars: on 1 January 1991, he wrote:

> I believe that the war between Serbs and Croats, Serbs and Muslims, and Serbs and Albanians is inevitable.[218]

5. After 1968, when he abandoned his illusion or when he left the winning tactics regarding Tito,[219] Dobrica Ćosić, in his diary entries, was obsessed with Titoism.[220] It was defined in different ways: As"an era of negative progress … moving from bad to worse,"[221] an order based on "political differences compared to other regimes of Communist parties hoping that things would get better,"[222] and therefore the support of the majority of people for whom the question of existence is always put before the issue of freedom. From this point of view, Titoism was the nicest, and in all respects most comfortable of all the political regimes in the twentieth century. People will regret it if it disappears. It will be a "golden age" of Yugoslavia.[223]

Since the Serbian people have a modern state, Titoism was not the worst regime for them because it was an undemocratic regime. However, from the standpoint of the national and state ideas of the Serbian people, Titoism, by Dobrica Ćosić, was fatal. Anti-Serbian, not only in the final outcome, but as the target: from the Comintern and AVNOJ over removal of Aleksandar Ranković, distancing from the partisan Yugoslav people, and centralized federation, to the constitutional changes in 1963, 1968 and 1971, which were crowned by the confederal Constitution in 1974: "the constitution of Brijuni," partially by "a Brijuni tyrant."

> From the perspective of Serbia and the Serbian people, Titoism, according to Dobrica Ćosić, is the key to an explanation of its historical stagnation.

> A distinct regression of Serbia occurred in Yugoslavia … it was reflected in the economy, in civil liberties, the political democracy, *the destruction of an ethnic whole of* the *Serbian nation, in the absence of the Serbian state* [underlined, author's note], the loss of a grand culture of the Middle Ages. Serbs are the only people in Europe who had not only lost their ethnic territories by the Constitution in 1974, reduced to the limits specified by the Berlin Congress, but also the only European nation where one ideology annexed the entire Middle Ages and canceled its liberation wars.[224]

Thus, *de-Titoization* for the Serbian people becomes an imperative, a matter of life and death. On what grounds will it be done, and what is its purpose? There was not only one answer to this question, not even to the Serbian people. Dobrica Ćosić, as long as he had the role of a writer, did not have to take into consideration any of the historical processes nor the standards of research nor a scientific objectivism. He says:

> In my experience, the greatest risk for writers and an intellectual is if they believe that they can be a nation's interpreters and proclaimers of its goals.[225]

At the same time, he, again by self-determination, is just that: an ideologist, an inspirer, a proclaimer:

> This is my project of termination with Titoism and the current order and the creation of a new democratic, civilized state of Serbian people—Serbia and Montenegro.[226]

says Dobrica Ćosić while presenting his theses for a new policy, in 1991, on the rally of SASA, *Serbian people at the beginning of a new century.*

A "new era" appeared when Josip Broz Tito died. When it was realized that Tito was dead, it was understood that along "with the Brijuni monarch Brijuni Yugoslavia died and Brijuni socialism as well."[227] The confederal form of the Yugoslav state was identified with Titoism. Almost simultaneously, at the top of the intellectual elite[228] and at the top of the ruling Communist elite[229] in Serbia, an opinion prevailed that the Constitution from 1974, was unsustainable.

Each Yugoslavia—Karađorđević, AVNOJ, federal, confederal—proved to be a big mistake of the Serbian people. They filed for it the greatest sacrifice, because they believed that, with its creation, they will complete their unification. Therefore, according to Dobrica Ćosić, Yugoslavia, "which was created on rivers of blood," demolished in Brijuni according

to the procedure of the "Brijuni constitution of 1974," cannot de facto be demolished "without bloodshed." There is no peaceful solution to the post-Tito Yugoslav crisis: it must be converted into a bloody splitting up of one monster, created by victims, delusions, hallucinations and the historical stupidity of the Serbian people.[230]

Once again, the relationship of Dobrica Ćosić toward the Serbian people lies somewhere between pity and anger. Between love and a stick:

> Why and how a nation with an eight centuries long political and cultural history and tradition, the people of Kosovo mythos, of liberation uprising, rebellion, banditry, with two Serbian states in the nineteenth century, with participation in two world wars on the side of the Europeans and world democracy, the people of the March 27, and July uprisings in 1941,—became a nation without historical consciousness and national dignity, turning into minions who run away from the violence of a minority, following their rulers and adoring minorities of a Brijuni monarch, therefore, what kind of violence and corruption forced and bribed the Serbian people to put up with domestic occupiers and political hustlers, how did this nation agree to accept the Brijuni Constitution from 1974?[231]

But there is still hope. The end of the Tito era can be a new beginning. If everything else is put aside, internal development and progress, and the focus is on the leading idea of the national ideology, the Serbian nation, "after two centuries of fighting," can "finally settle down" in their country. With the end of "Titoist Yugoslavia," said Dobrica Ćosić in his speech at the ceremony in honor of the Serbian composer, Stevan Mokranjac, on 14 September 1991,

> For the first time in history, Serbian people as a whole acquired the national, social and spiritual consciousness necessary for a new era that comes. In the era of epochal shocks and the changes that are sweeping the world and our country, in addition to unrest and uncertainty, we have reason for hope and confidence, because after 1912, and 1914 as well, we have never been stronger, more experienced, and more ready to master our destiny, as we are becoming, and as we are today.[232]

With a certainty that characterized the other originators of the national idea,[233] Dobrica Ćosić—a writer, an ideologist, a key figure of the opposition of non-institutional, intellectual and political arbiter—found himself in the middle of wars for the decomposition of Titoism, at the highest

place in the hierarchy of power: he became the chairman of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It was not his personal choice:

> My friends and I, we were two and a half decades in opposition to Titoism, we did not like, nor want to rule … in this intellectual sphere our role ended … if my country hadn't come into this difficult situation, very difficult situation, sometimes it seemed—it was a hopeless situation, along with the world community persistent to persevere in penalties, fines, prosecution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—a new political entity of united Serbia and Montenegro—I would have never sat in Broz's office. I would have never entered this chamber.[234]

Unlike Vaclav Havel, also a writer who, before becoming a president of Czechoslovakia, was imprisoned for opposing the Stalinist regime and the Soviet occupation in 1968, who, according to Dobrica Ćosić, "apparently likes the power and the Presidential position… I do not like authority, and I am unhappy that I am a president."[235] But Dobrica Ćosić considers his duty to be a missionary, a sacrificial duty, not profane.[236]As the FRY President, Dobrica Ćosić experienced some difficulties, which, as an ideologist of the national revolution at the end of the twentieth century, especially as a writer, he did not expect. First, it turned out that not all opponents of the Titoist "Brijuni Yugoslavia" had the same motives.[237] Then, some important factors, from the standpoint of national ideology and factors essential to the creation of a state of the Serbian people, did not have the supposed power, and some were unexpectedly absent. Serbian people, who, in Dobrica Ćosić's opinion, lost consciousness in the Titoist Yugoslavia, were not prepared to sacrifice, which was always the main argument for the borders that Serbia had in all wars. And in the wars for creating the state of Serbian people on the ruins of the anti-Serb Titoist "Brijuni Yugoslavia," suddenly: "Live with Serbs … today's Serbs and Serb women do not allow their children to die for Kosovo."[238] In addition, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the loss of Russia as an element of national ideology, Dobrica Ćosić experiences in the same manner as Nikola Pašić described the collapse of Tsarist Russia in 1917.[239] Finally, a difficult task that is solved by Dobrica Ćosić, the Chairman of the state:

> How to create a democratic, prosperous country out of Yugoslav ruins—ideological, economic and moral? … here history has done its work, and I need to start it.[240]

And the feeling of loneliness:

> I work day and night. I don't know how long I can handle this and there are so many unscrupulous and incompetent people in this state. Many of them are stupid, ignorant, frauds. To change this country—one should be out of his head to set a goal like this.[241]

However, during all this time, and although a writer, Dobrica Ćosić did not even think that Josip Broz Tito could also have had some problems of governance. For Ćosić, as a national ideologist, Josip Broz Tito was the greatest enemy of the Serbian people. And the enemy is always in one piece: no contradictions, doubts, hesitations, risk. And while in his novels many characters, products of his imagination, seemed too anthropomorphic, Dobrica Ćosić turned Josip Broz Tito, a real historical figure, into a phantom.

6. With joined forces, radical members of that same opposition in Serbia that created the Constitution of 1963, and the Constitution in 1974, who after the death of Josip Broz Tito, out-of-institutionally gathered around Dobrica Ćosić, and members of the ruling Communist elite, who were the first to realize that "Tito died," and prejudiced the confederal Constitution of 1974, shook the state structure of "Brijuni Yugoslavia" removed Dobrica Ćosić from the duty of the president of FRY. Obsessed for more than half a century with Josip Broz Tito, whose shadow haunted him even when he was the FRY President SRJ,[242] Dobrica Ćosić, who was convinced that he reached his highest peak as the president,[243] was now able to concentrate on writing a book on Josip Broz Tito, and to devote himself to his longfully wished task.[244] He chose the literary form in the novel *Vlast II*, and completed his journey from fascination to the negation of Josip Broz Tito. Dobrica Ćosić considered this path paradigmatic not only for his revolutionary generation but also for the Serbian people in the second half of the twentieth century:

> Communism is replaced by nationalism.[245]

He did not pave this path, however, he was not the only one among the revolutionary nationals who found themselves in this area.

Anti-Titoism remained at the core of the engagement of Dobrica Ćosić after both the biological and historical death of Josip Broz Tito—now the basis for the reconstruction of the identity of the Serbian people. By leaving state socialism, Titoism betrayed social and, indirectly, national ideals of the Revolution. It corrupted the Serbian nation as a standard; its epic heroism and devotion were replaced with conformism and defeatism. It made them historically weary people.[246] This is the main cause of the failure of the internal national revolution at the end of the twentieth century. In 2008 Dobrica Ćosić said:

> The Serbian nationalism that equated the Serbian question with national issues was long since defeated.[247]

Long since, but not forever, because that would mean the end of a dream of two centuries about uniting the Serbian nation into their own country.

> The collapse of communist and Bolshevik ideology should not be turned into the defeat of every utopia … new emancipation should not be americanization.[248]

The Serbian people, whose main reserves are in the past and in its geopolitical position, need ideology.

Notes

1. Božidar Knežević, *Misli*. S predgovorom D-ra Ksenije Atanasijević. SKZ. Kolo XXXIV, br. 208. (Belgrade, 1931), p. 53.
2. Dobrica Ćosić, *Razgovori*. Priredio Radovan Popović. Dela Dobrice Ćosića. Kolo IV. Knjiga 24, (Belgrade, January 2005), p. 10.
3. *Životopis (1921–2001)*, Ibid., pp. 329–362. In this work, used as the basis for a reconstruction of the life of Dobrica Ćosić.xxxxx.
4. Dobrica Ćosić, *Razgovori*. Priredio Radovan Popović. Dela Dobrice Ćosića. Kolo IV. Knjiga 24, (Belgrade, January 2005), p. 226.
5. Pietism as a movement that appeared in Serbia before World War I, but until the 1920s the movement was not organized, they had no official name nor clear orientation. They were made "official" by the Serbian Orthodox Church in 1920, and the following year, rules were adopted and the first assembly was held. Pietism as a movement was an autochthonous movement with Serbs, although similar movements can be found with Russians as well. In the opinion of contemporaries, this

movement appeared as a reaction to a bad situation within the Serbian Orthodox Church but certain influence of Slavic ideas can be found regarding pietism. Members were mostly peasants. The main characteristics of the movement were the strict respect of church dogmas, poverty, complete dedication to religion, common ceremonies, providing support for the organization and so on. Holm Zundhauzen, *Istorija Srbije od 19. do 21. veka* (Belgrade, 2008), pp. 318–321;. Radmila Radić, *Narodna verovanja i spiritizam u Srbiji XX veka*, (Belgrade, 2009), pp. 196–228.

6. Reference for this research is an interesting work by a Polish scientist, Dorota Gil, "Istorija naroda kao misterija greha, kazne i iskupljenja. Mesto Njegoševih toposa u srpskoj istoriozofiji XX veka" in: *Njegoševi dani*. Zbornik radova, Nikšić, 2009, pp. 85–93.
7. Rafael Soren, *Questionable Balkans*. Quote according to Milan Radulović, *A Novel of Dobrica Ćosić* (Belgrade: Foča, 2007), p. 333.
8. Dobrica Ćosić, *Razgovori*. Priredio Radovan Popović. Dela Dobrice Ćosića. Kolo IV. Knjiga 24 (Belgrade, January 2005), p. 32.
9. Milan Radulović, *Roman Dobrice Ćosića* (Belgrade: Institut za književnost i umetnost; Foča : Pravoslavni bogoslovski fakultet, 2007).
10. Ibid., p. 61.
11. Dobrica Ćosić, one of the first editors, *Sećanje na ratničke dane "Mladog borca," Mladi borac* (Belgrade, 15 February 1954); Ana Ćosić—Vukić, *Mladi borac (1944–1951)*, Književna istorija, (Belgrade, 2003), XXXV, pp. 120–121.
12. Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1951–1968)* (Belgrade, 2000), p. 34. Editions of all six books of *Writer's Notes* that were used in this work, are stated in section 2, footnote 114. All books were prepared for printing by his daughter, Ana Ćosić—Vukić, a literary historian. If any other edition was used, it was stated in the work.
13. Ibid, pp. 34,155.
14. Ibid., pp. 99–100.
15. Ibid., p. 20.
16. Ibid., p. 106.
17. Ibid., p. 23.
18. Ibid., pp. 33–34.
19. Ibid., p. 103.
20. Milan Radulović, *Roman Dobrice Ćosića* (Belgrade: Institut za književnost i umetnost; Foča: Pravoslavni bogoslovski fakultet, 2007), p. 298.
21. Dobrica Ćosić, *Akcija. Zapisi. Pogledi. Odgovori*. Priredio Živorad Stojković (Belgrade, 1964).
22. Ibid, pp. 87, 358.

23. "On October 30, 1952, an idea came to my mind to write a novel about the Cominform supporters… The next day, I talked to Krcun right away [Slobodan Penezić, author's note] and asked him to introduce me to some prominent Cominform supporters. He promised to provide me with some material about them, and a possibility to see 'Mermer' [Goli otok, author's note] and to talk to the most important Stalin supporters." Ibid., p. 26.
24. Dobrica Ćosić was in Budapest from October 23 to 31, 1956. As soon as he returned to the country, following the suggestion of leading politicians in Yugoslavia, he published the journal *Sedam dana u Budimpešti (Seven Days in Budapest)*. But the most interesting details of his stay in Budapest only became known in 2000, when his book *Writer's Notes (1951–1968)* was published. Some of these details are: a Soviet officer on a tank comes to the hotel where Ćosić stayed with the intention to take him to the Soviet division HQ, but Ćosić refuses; a special airplane sent for Ćosić to Budapest by Aleksandar Ranković who was a vice president of the Yugoslav government; then there was Jurij Andropov, a Soviet ambassador in Hungary then, the former head of the KGB and a general secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union Communist Party, who was also closely watching Dobrica Ćosić. Ibid., pp. 114–118.
25. "I was [in the Commission for preparing the Yugoslav Communist Party program, author's note] the only ordinary Party member here, and they suspected of me that I was a Đilas supporter and a prominent modernist of modern Serbian literature… I can't remember that I have ever worked that much… My texts in the Program are: the introduction, a chapter on education, science and culture and the end, the final chapter of the Program." Ibid., pp. 117, 140.
26. While talking to the writer Miodrag Bulatović in 1954, prior to the novel's publication, Ćosić says: "My wish is to add a larger novelistic wing to *Koreni (Roots)*," Prosveta, 1954 Dobrica Ćosić, *Razgovori*. Priredio Radovan Popović. Dela Dobrice Ćosića. Kolo IV. Knjiga 24 (Belgrade, January 2005), p. 8.
27. Dobrica Ćosić, *Akcija. Zapisi. Pogledi. Odgovori*. Priredio Živorad Stojković (Belgrade, 1964), p. 67.
28. Dobrica Ćosić, *Razgovori*. Priredio Radovan Popović. Dela Dobrice Ćosića. Kolo IV. Knjiga 24, Belgrade, January, 2005, pp. 7–8.
29. See: Stanko Cerović, *Monitor*, Podgorica, 22 June 1992.
30. See: Vid. Latinka Perović, "Rodonačelnik ruskog socijalizma" in: Aleksandar Hercen, *Ruski narod i socijalizam*, Podgorica, 1999, p. 32.
31. Dobrica Ćosić, *Razgovori*. Priredio Radovan Popović. Dela Dobrice Ćosića. Kolo IV. Knjiga 24, Belgrade, January, 2005, p. 33.

32. Milan Radulović, *Roman Dobrice Ćosića*. Belgrade: Institut za književnost i umetnost; Foča: Pravoslavni bogoslovski fakultet, 2007, p. 69.
33. The novel *Bajka (A Fairytale)* was published as a new novel in the eight volumes of the *Complete Works of Dobrica Ćosić*, which were published in 1966 by a group of publishers—*Prosveta* from Belgrade and *Svjetlost* from Sarajevo. Although it was considered to be a turning point "in Ćosić's spiritual development," and a heretic one as well, because it was in this book that "he was set free from communism as the quasi-religion, but not from a belief in ideals that this quasi-religion taught," but the readers did not take an interest in *Bajka (A Fairytale),* as was the case with his other books. See: Ibid., p. 69.
34. According to data from 2005, "the novel *Daleko je sunce (The Sun Is Far Away),* was printed in one and a half million copies; *Koreni (Roots)* in about 300,000 copies; *Deobe (Partitions)* in more than 50,000; *Vreme smrti (Time of Death)* in 180,000 copies; *Grešnik (The Sinner)* in about 115,000 copies, and *Otpadnik (The Outcast)* in more than 80,000." *Životopis (1921–2001),* pp. 353–354.
    According to the number of editions and circulation, the novel *Daleko je sunce (The Sun Is Far Away)* can be compared only to *Hajduk Stanko (Stanko, the Outlaw),* written by Janko Veselinović, and to *Knjiga o Milutinu (The Book on Milutin),* by Danko Popović.
35. Dobrica Ćosić received the *NIN* prize twice (1955, 1962), and from the 1980s, he won awards nearly every year, sometimes three awards in the same year: from the Association of Serbian Writers for exceptional significance in literary creation, from the Jakov Ignjatović Foundation from Budapest, then the Njegoš Award, a special Vukova award, then such awards as Skender Kulenović, latni krst kneza Lazara, Meša Selimović,Svetozar Ćorović, Kočićevo pero, Petar Kočić, Laza Kostić, Zlatni prsten Stefana Lazarevića. Ibid., pp. 334, 337, 348, 350, 352, 354, 359, 360, 361.
36. Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1951–1968)* (Belgrade, 2000), pp. 18, 19.
37. See Latinka Perović, *Kako su se izražavali različiti politički interesi u Jugoslaviji? Polemika između Dobrice Ćosića i Dušana Pirjevca 1961/1962. godine*. Dijalog povjesničara/istoričara, 9 (Zagreb, 2005).
38. In Belgrade– the magazine *Delo*; in Ljubljana—*Naša sodobnost.*
39. Taras Kermanuer, *Skupinski portret z Dušanom Pirjevcem. Ob 25-letnici Pirjavčeve smrti* (Ljubljana, 2002), p. 37.
40. See Latinka Perović, *Od centralizma do federalizma: KPJ u nacionalnom pitanju* (Zagreb, 1984).

41. Džon R. Lempi, *Jugoslavija kao istorija. Bila dvaput jedna zemlja*, (Belgrade, 2004), p. 236.
42. Ibid.
43. Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1951–1968)* Belgrade, 2000, p. 263.
44. After Aleksandar Ranković was replaced, Koča Popović was elected the vice president of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia; he was an intellectual, fought in Spain, was a war commander and a diplomat. Dobrica Ćosić writes in his diary: "Koča Popović is not any kind of active person. He is pompous, spectacular, intelligent and his narcissism and irony use up all his wisdom." Ibid., p. 270.
    In the Yugoslav party leadership Serbia was presented by Mijalko Todorović, an engineer, a prewar Communist, a political commissioner of the first proletarian brigade, one of the architects of the economic reform and the Party. The historian Milorad Ekmečić writes: "After the fall of Aleksandar Ranković in 1966, in the federal Central committee there was no old-school, from the revolutionary times when Serbs left." Milorad Ekmečić, *Dugo kretanje između klanja i oranja. Istorija Srbije u Novom veku* (Belgrade, 2007), p. 527.
45. "This union, formed through war trenches, was not motivated by the same goal for Serbs, Croats and Slovenians, nor was it carried out in equal terms … this union was the union of war winners and the defeated ones, of the liberators and the liberated. In history, liberators were not only liberators, nor the liberated ever repaid in justice, truth or loyalty to their liberators. This, I would say, anthropologically negative term of unity, of the South-Slavic people in a Yugoslav country, is going to be of enormous political, moral and psychological influence on the entire life of a new state." Dobrica Ćosić, *Promene*. Izbor tekstova Milorad Vučelić, Novi Sad, 1992, p. 271.
46. Quote according to Karel Kosik, *O dilemama suvremene povijesti* (Zagreb, 2007), p. 60.
47. Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1951–1968)* (Belgrade, 2000), p. 242.
48. "Opposite Kardelj and his nationalistic group striving for the confederation of republics states, was Aleksandar Ranković, with the majority of Serbian staff and officials who believed in the self-government socialism of the Yugoslav structure. Aleksandar Ranković, who was, at that time [(1961–1962), author's note], supported by Tito, was not a theoretician, reformer and a modernizer; he was supporting the ideology of partisan Yugoslavianism and the pragmatic national constructiveness of Yugoslav character; he was against every nationalism, republicanism and particularism; he was for the Kardelj 'reformers,' nationalists, republicans and 'creative Marxists,' he was a conservative centralist and a supporter of a great country." That line in 1962 defeated the Kardelj

confederal conception of Yugoslavia: "political winners in the party leadership were Tito and Ranković." Ibid., p. 216.

49. Ibid., p. 312.
50. Karel Kosik, *O dilemama suvremene povijesti* (Zagreb, 2007), p. 60.
51. Ibid., p. 324.
52. Ibid., p. 330.
53. Ibid., p. 372.
54. Ibid., p. 368.
55. Ibid., pp. 368,369.
56. "This was the first big movement in Yugoslavia of socialist-oriented masses against their own country and 'heir party,' with a radical left-wing and the moral criticism of non-socialist contents, relations and tendencies, requiring faster and true democracy and consistent socialist politics and morale. This was shown most obviously in their disappointment in Tito… I am very concerned. I am afraid of the sectarianism and political immaturity of 'the red university of Karl Marx.'"
"Regardless of the outcome, the students' riot has an enormous social and political meaning. A fight for democracy and socialism enters a new phase. Mass revolutionary actions are starting… They [the students, —author's note] did not have time, they are not mature enough to formulate a complete and more far-fetched program. Now they were a rebellion force, expressing their anger, the spontaneous energy of progress." Ibid., pp. 338–339, 333–334. See Mihailo Marković, *Juriš na nebo*, knjiga prva (Belgrade, 2008), p. 38.
57. "If we stay independent, the Yugoslav red tape immortalizes with this danger for the state sovereignty." Ibid., p. 373.
58. Ibid., p. 347.
59. Ibid.
60. The Central Committee of the Association of Communists refused to interfere in the election of the president of the Serbian Literary Association. They tried to have a dialogue but this brought only the Party's resistance and the Association to be reserved. See Latinka Perović, *Zatvaranje kruga. Ishod rascepa 1971–1972* (Sarajevo, 1991), pp. 306–315.
61. See. *Životopis (1921–2001),* p. 342.
62. Ibid., pp. 342,344.
63. Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1981–1991)* (Belgrade 2002), pp. 196–197.
64. Then it seems as if the interest spheres have been broken: to the educated classes—comes the freedom of creation, to the politicians—power. Petar Stambolić said to Dobrica Ćosić, after Milovan Đilas was

removed from the post—"You, literature people, do whatever you want. This is where I am listening to you. But leave the politics to me. Do not interfere." Aleksandar Ranković, after solving all misunderstandings with Tito—"The another thing I wanted to tell you was: you, writers and artists should not be afraid of socialist realism and Stalinism coming back. The Party is going to defend the freedom of creation. And do not make a lot of fuss when some dogmatist speaks about decadence and western influence. And there are a lot of them in the Party and in the Central Committee." Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1951–1968)* (Belgrade, 2000), pp. 55, 240.

65. See *Životopis (1921–2001),* pp. 342, 344–345.
66. Ibid., p. 344.
67. Ibid., pp. 346–347.
68. Ibid., p. 347.
69. Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1951–1968)* (Belgrade, 2000), p. 306.
70. Ibid., p. 347.
71. Dobrica Ćosić said that he wrote *Vreme smrti* with one goal: "One of the main planned tasks in V*reme smrti*, which was in the very motive when this novel was created, was the following: reasonably, critically bring to daylight and make it a general awareness—our human and national magnitude; our capability to do great things; our power to fight for the highest ideals; our longing for justice and dignity; our power to respect, understand and love something else and those who are different from us; our ability to not be vindictive and to fear our hate etc. This is the highest spiritual task of the generation I belong to." Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1969–1980)* (Belgrade, 2001), p. 167.
72. Dobrica Ćosić was attracted to the social ideas of a young Svetozar Marković: not repeating the path of the West, meaning without capitalism by improving patriarchal institutions—cooperatives. The same as Marković's ideas on the role of critically judging minorities, meaning the lesser part of the educated masses originating from the nation itself, so it has no difficulties in communicating with people, and needs no mediator—bureaucracy.
73. Predrag Palavestra, *Istorija srpske književne kritike*, tom II, Novi Sad, 2008, p. 600.
74. Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1951–1968)* (Belgrade, 2000), p. 118.
75. Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1992–1993)* (Belgrade, 2004), p. 366.
76. Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1993–1999)* (Belgrade, 2008), p. 141.
77. Ibid., p. 143.
78. "Three literary critics closest to Ćosić, Borislav Mihajlović Mihiz, Zoran Gavrilović and Petar Džadžić, are presented [in Ćosić's book *Moji prijatelji*, author's note] as friends and close followers from the writer's

study room. All three of them were the creators and founders of Ćosić's literary reputation." Predrag Palavestra, *Istorija srpske književne kritike*, tom II, Novi Sad, 2008, p. 601.

79. "Where all the roads were closed and all the holes filled up, he [Dobrica Ćosić—author's note] opened them." Ljubomir Tadić, *Kriza i velikosrpski hegemonizam*. Izabrana dela, t. VIII, (Belgrade, 2008), p. 461.
80. "The first who opposed this draft [on national economies, author's note] was Dobrica Ćosić. He realized that it was aiming towards national states, to the state that prevailed until 1990 in the sense of internal disintegration of the Yugoslav state." Milorad Ekmečić, *Dugo putovanje između klanja i oranja*,. *Istorija Srbije u Novom veku*, (Belgrade, 2007), p. 524.
81. "Tonight [June 2, 1973,author's note] an unknown man rang at my door and introduced himself as a Soviet diplomat. He asked me to go two floors down because he wanted to tell me something confidential… He whispered in a mix of Russian and Serbian that comrade Andropov wanted to inform me that my life is in danger from highly-positioned people and that I should watch my back: for medical treatments do not go to the military hospital, do not go to coffee bars and restaurants where my friends usually were, sit only in a car driven by my wife or a close friend, in a busy street do not walk on the edge of the pavement, during the night do not walk in the alleys, do not travel to the village by myself, and note that there are provocateurs in my company… And that all these things he said to me—he actually did not say. And he would 'take the liberty' to inform me about new events, if there were any, and if he thought it was necessary.. I did not get to thank him. Why did comrade Andropov worry about me?… It remained an unsolved puzzle to me; What game did the Soviet intelligence service want to drag me into? Or was this some new combination of Udba? Maybe they wanted to frighten me and force me to live like a mouse? Anyhow, I would not forget these pieces of advice." Quotation according to Dobrica Ćosić, *Lična istorija jednog doba 2. Vreme otpora 1969–1980* (Belgrade), p. 101.
82. Dobrica Ćosić, (*Piščevi zapisi p. 1951–1968*) (Belgrade, 2000), pp. 57, 248, 321.
83. *Životopis (1921–2001)*… pp. 348, 353.
84. Ibid., p. 355.
85. Ibid., p. 359.
86. Slavoljub Đukić, *Čovek u svom vremenu. Razgovori s Dobricom Ćosićem* (Belgrade, 1989); *Šta je stvarno rekao Dobrica Ćosić*. Prepared by Milan Nikolić (Belgrade, 1995).

87. In 1991, at the conference of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts, *Ćosić* presented his "Thesis for New Politics" with the "Serbian nation as the beginning of the century." He said: "The collective mind needs to work on the creation of the new national program. Collective imagination. Young people. The program for rebirth and necessary changes, can never be worked out by an individual, however smart, gifted, educated he might be." Ćosić, *Promene* Izbor tekstova Milorad Vučelić, Novi Sad, 1992, p. 176.
88. "The Serbian people are divided again by state borders, Serbia became again 'inner Serbia.' This result, after four wars and one revolution in this century, ended the battle of Serbian people for its liberation and unification."Ćosić *Promene* Izbor tekstova Milorad Vučelić, Novi Sad, 1992, p. 156.
89. "We are in the 19th century again. We have to make our Serbia again. We must create Serbia in such a way so that all Serbs on the planet can see their homeland." Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1981–1991)*… p. 295.
90. "I fear for Serbia. In order to defeat all these enemies, to grab some justice and rights from this cruel world and rotten Europe, we have to mobilise all our mental, moral and physical strength… All those who fight against the Serbian nationalism, fight against the freedom of the people… It is not necessary to strive for ethnic Serbia but to liberate those who do not feel free with the Serbs and those who limit and pollute the freedom the Serbs have in their country." Ibid., pp. 402, 416; *Promene*… p. 176.
91. "I don't believe that Yugoslavia can be disintegrated without spilling blood, that same Yugoslavia which was made on blood running knee-deep … I believe that a war between Serbs and Croats, Serbs and Muslims, Serbs and Albanians is inevitable"… Dobrica Ćosić, *Promene*…, p. 193; *Piščevi zapisi (1981–1991)*…, p. 303.
92. "Standard and conformism destroyed the citizens' spirit and collectivism … In this nation there are no serious and young people any more who are ready to sacrifice themselves. We don't exist any more as a historical nation, as a subject … Only few Serbs are ready to die for unity of the Serb nationality and for their country … The Serbs want to live." Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1969–1980)*…, p. 167; The same, *Piščevi zapisi (1981–1991)*…, p. 386; The same, *Piščevi zapisi (1993–1999)*…, p. 150.
93. "Europe is against us. Europe thinks of itself to be a model of democracy. And this is the ground of evil, crime, wars, slavery, lies… This Europe is against the Serbs and Serbia. That German Europe hates us

for Austro-Hungarian reasons and arguments." Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1981–1991)*…, p. 402.

94. "It can't go this way any more. These are two independent states where the party leaders make decisions… In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in its national constitution—Titoism was established. This current balancing of equality among unequal republics is hard to keep and it is not lasting … I am the president of a fictitious country… I am a fictitious president." Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1992–1993)* (*Belgrade, 2004*), p. 87, 100, 104.
95. "From Tito's presidential cabinet in the Federation Palace, where he didn't work, to Tito's hospital suite, where he wasn't treated." Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1992–1993) Belgrade, 2004* p. 198.
96. See. *Slobodan Jovanović. Ličnost i delo.* The Serbian Academy of Science and Art. Scientific meetings. Book XC. Dept. of Social Sciences. Book 21, Belgrade, 1998.
97. Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1992–1993)* Belgrade, 2004, p. 151.
98. "In the second half of the 20th century my traces will be distinguished." Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1999–2000). Vreme zmija* Belgrade, 2008, p. 141.
99. Ibid., p. 230.
100. "In Geneva I felt alienated from the world; as if I was on another planet. The city of Geneva—an abstract picture. The lake itself didn't seem real; only a few wild but yet 'urban' ducks which were swimming instinctively resembled the life on Earth." Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1992–1993)* (Belgrade, 2004), p. 178.
101. "Standards and conformism destroyed the citizens' spirit and collectivism, a car is a fatal device in this country of peasants. And everything that refers to a car is fatal for the whole human race: speed, traveling, tourism." Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1969–1980)* (Belgrade 2001), p. 167.
102. "The Serbs got used to their rights and freedom as citizens, they accepted and understood their values, but national freedom was above the civic one." Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1981–1991)* (Belgrade 2002), p. 174.
103. "There were lots of reasons in me why I was not happy when a man touched down on the Moon." Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1951–1968)* (Belgrade, 2000), p. 163.
104. Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1992–1993)* (Belgrade, 2004), p. 12.
105. Ibid., pp. 12–13.
106. Ibid., p. 13.
107. Ibid., p. 14.
108. Ibid., p. 15.

109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
111. Dobrica Ćosić,*Piščevi zapisi (1993 – 1999)* (Belgrade, 2008), p. 143.
112. Radovan Samardžić, *Ideje za srpsku istoriju* (Belgrade, 1989), p. 24. See. Dorota Gil, "Istorija naroda kao misterija greha."
113. Ibid., p. 214.
114. In May 1993, at a session of the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, Dobrica Ćosić said: "For two centuries we have had one common goal, and it is the struggle for the liberation and unification of the Serbian people. This is the seventh war that leads to the achievement of that objective. We were convinced that in two Yugoslavias we solved the Serbian national question … We were deceived by history; we deceived ourselves; we were deceived by the world; we were deceived by our brothers, who were with us together in the same state … we belong to a nation that gets wars and loses peace. Here is a new temptation [Vance-Owen plan, which was rejected by the Assembly of RS, author's note] to turn the war that we won into defeat. Let's not turn our great historic victory into defeat. We have the conditions for getting the final victory in peace … that we get in peace what we have started in the war, what we set up as a foundation for the final victory with the war, the victims, the trenches." Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1992–1993)* (Belgrade, 2004), pp. 379, 380.
115. In this novel Dobrica Ćosić completes his vision of Tito as the greatest enemy of the Serbian people: "Tito's Croatian destruction of Yugoslavia started working, authoritative arbitrariness and Austro-Hungarian syndrome, a Comintern ideological matrix of disuniting Yugoslavia with anti-Serbian motives."
"Crazy Serbs believed that Yugoslavia was their country because a lot of them died for it, convinced that they were let down instead of feeling liberated and saved."
Now that nature has done its job: "We are becoming again what we were, small and powerless. And ready for anything. The world forces us to do so. Only then, perhaps, can we survive." Dobrica Ćosić, *Vlast II*, (Belgrade, 2007), pp. 162, 358, 378.
116. Varlam Shalamov, for example, said that Alexander Solženjicin subordinated literature to politics and because of his political activity, bears a great responsibility for the events at the end of the twentieth century. Zorislav Paunović, *Russian themes* (Belgrade, 2010), p. 121. See Milan Subotić, *Solženjicin anđeo istorije* (Belgrade 2007).
117. "I don't continue anybody's politics. I run my policy. My books are proof of my politics and my beliefs. I want to fulfill ideas from my books." said Dobrica Ćosić in 1992, in an interview for the Italian

newspaper *Corriere dela serra*. Ćosić, *Razgovori*. Priredio Radovan Popović. Dela Dobrice Ćosića. Kolo IV. Knjiga 24 (Belgrade, January 2005), p. 137.

118. Dobrica Ćosić: *Piščevi zapisi (1951–1968)* (Belgrade, 2000); *Piščevi zapisi (1969–1980)* (Belgrade, 2001); *Piščevi zapisi (1981–1991)* (Belgrade, 2002); *Piščevi zapisi (1992–1993)* (Belgrade, 2004); *Piščevi zapisi (1993–1999)* (Belgrade, 2008); *Piščevi zapisi (1999–2000)*, *Vreme zmija* (Belgrade, 2008). If any other publication is quoted, it has been marked.
119. Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1993–1999)* (Belgrade, 2008), p. 199.
120. For the period to 1951, Ćosić's interviews are relevant as well as the press from that period, especially the newspaper *Mladi borac*. See. Footnote 10.
121. Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1992–1993)* (Belgrade, 2004), p. 10.
122. Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1951–1968)* (Belgrade, 2000), p. 216; Ibid., *Promene…* p. 18.
123. Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1992–1993)* (Belgrade, 2004), pp. 9–10.
124. Dobrica Ćosić, *Promene*. Izbor tekstova Milorad Vučelić, Novi Sad, 1992, p. 11.
125. Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1951–1968)* (Belgrade, 2000), p. 243.
126. Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1951–1968)* (Belgrade, 2000), pp. 238,243, 244.
127. Ibid., p. 240.
128. Mika Ćurčić, "a student forever, he was not a Communist but a supporter of the agrarian socialism," in July 1966, after Aleksandar Ranković was released of his duty, in Vrnjačka Banja, "gives a warning" of his friend to Dobrica Ćosić that says: "Remember: Dobrica Ćosić, this is your era and you are obligated to be faithful to it to the end. To follow it and to outwit it. *This is something the Serbian people expect you and ask you to do* [underlined—author's note]. We don't want only a presentation, we need a judgement of this era." Dobrica Ćosić takes it seriously: "This era and its reality are not only material for my novels. My responsibility for this era and in this era is much bigger than the responsibilities of a writer." Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1951–1968)* (Belgrade, 2000), pp. 260, 261.
129. Dobrica Ćosić writes about the indifference of peasants toward students' mutiny in June 1968. The peasants are not interested in anything that will not bring them any direct profit or use. They are "the homeland army" and they die only under its flag. Ćosić's friend, a peasant Radisav Keglić, tells him: "Students rebel, that is not good. Let Arabs and Albanians rule, only to have peace, so that the people can live and work," Ibid., p. 341.

130. "A new age history [Titovog doba, author's note] cannot be written on the basis of traditional documents: statesmen speeches, newspapers, books, notes from assembly meetings, government meetings, speeches of prominent people. It would be a monstrous history of lies about a society that doesn't resemble any other society in Europe and in political civilization." Dobrica Ćosić, *Lična istorija jednog doba 2*..., p. 278.
131. "The next revolution in this country ruled by Communists, Stalinists, and Titoists should be: burning paper. Burning all books, all texts and newspapers written by communists. Burning all 'revolutionary' texts from the First World War onwards. Our literacy should begin with Miroslavljevo gospel." Dobrica Ćosić, *Promene* Izbor tekstova Milorad Vučelić, Novi Sad, 1992, p. 70.
132. "De Gaulle says to Malro: 'With us nothing that is lasting can be based on lies!' I say to my notebook; with us it can. We have an historical condition to tell lies, to listen to lies and believe in lies. Serbs were slaves for a long time, forced to be ambivalent: fighting for their freedom and religion, they had to be slaves and change religion at the same time. These two features stimulate each other and give a dualistic character to the Serbian national being." Dobrica Ćosić, *Lična istorija jednog doba 2* (Belgrade, 2009), p. 278.
133. See Dobrica Ćosić is one of the first editors, *Sećanje na ratničke dane* "*Mladog borca*," *Mladi borac*, (Belgrade, 15 February 1954); Ana Ćosić—Vukić, *Mladi borac (1944–1951)*, Književna istorija, (Belgrade, 2003), XXXV.
134. Dobrica Ćosić, *Promene*. Izbor tekstova Milorad Vučelić, Novi Sad, 1992, p. 26.
135. Due to the results of secret voting on the 5th Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia whose delegate he was, Dobrica Ćosić wrote: "I remember that hot July night for being disappointed: five delegates did not vote for the Party leader. Out of one thousand and a few hundred people present. We were devastated that these five delegates didn't vote for Tito. Are there people among us who don't want him (Tito)?" Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1951–1968*) (Belgrade, 2000), p. 27.
136. Ibid., p. 30.
137. Ibid., p. 104.
138. Ibid., p. 117.
139. Ibid., p. 165.
140. Ibid., p. 168.
141. Ibid., p. 194.
142. Ibid., p. 213.
143. Ibid., p. 214.

144. In the Party and outside it, Dobrica Ćosić was always a supporter of ideas and movements that were against the social differentiation of a society. While he was working on the Program for the Communist Party (1958), which, as it was believed, was a radical splitting with dogmatism, Dobrica Ćosić wrote: "The Executive Committee of CK SKJ sent a letter to organizations on February 17 (1958). Non-socialist issues in the social relations were criticized. This is the most revolutionary document of that kind after the Party came to power." Ibid., p. 143.
145. About these conflicts, Dobrica Ćosić wrote for *Piščevi zapisi* additionally in 1998, because his notes from the end of 1961, and the beginning of 1962, disappeared from his study room, "due to the routine skills of the Dolanc (Stane) police." He tried to find them even when he was the president of SRJ but without success. Ibid., p. 215.
146. Ibid.
147. Ibid.
148. Ibid., p. 216.
149. Ibid., p. 220.
150. Ibid., p. 216.
151. See Latinka Perović, *Kako su se izražavali različiti politički interesi u Jugoslaviji? Polemika između Dobrice Ćosića i Dušana Pirjevca*. Dijalog povjesničara/istoričara, 9 (Zagreb, 2005).
152. Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1951–1968)* (Belgrade, 2000), p. 215.
153. Ibid., p. 383.
154. Josip Broz Tito, *Četrdeset prva*, SKZ. Kolo LIV. Dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the uprising. Book 364 (Belgrade, 1961), pp. Ix–x.
155. Dobrica Ćosić, *Promene*. Izbor tekstova Milorad Vučelić, Novi Sad, 1992, p. 279.
156. "The tendency of the confederation was spotted by me already when the Yugoslavian constitution was established in 1963." Ljubomir Tadić, *Kriza i "velikosrpski hegemonizam"* Izabrana dela, t. VIII (Belgrade, 2008), p. 556.
"The main changes came along with the constitution from 1963." Milorad Ekmečić, *Dugo putovanje između klanja i oranja Istorija Srbije u Novom veku* (Belgrade, 2007), p. 523.
157. Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1958–1968)* (Belgrade 2000), p. 260.
158. Dobrica Ćosić, *Akcija. Zapisi. Pogledi. Odgovori*. Priredio Živorad Stojković (Belgrade, 1964), pp. 277–278.
159. Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1951–1968)* (Belgrade, 2000), p. 238.
160. Ibid.
161. This part of *Piščevi zapisi* is additionally written because the original manuscript was taken away.
162. Ibid., p. 240.

163. Ibid., pp. 243–244.
164. In January 1966, Dobrica Ćosić visited Karlovac and Zagreb and he saw Kordun. He wrote in his notes about his impressions: "Croats have sunk into nationalism so deeply that they don't distance themselves even from the Ustashas as well. Zagreb smells like chauvinism." Ibid., p. 242.
165. "Serbia has to set its question, its life problem, to express its conception of the future. It cannot go on like this any more." Ibid., p. 244.
166. Ibid., p. 244.
167. Ibid., p. 245.
168. Ibid.
169. Ibid.
170. Ibid., p. 246.
171. Ibid.
172. Ibid.
173. Ibid.
174. Ranković gave the details on the role of Josip Broz Tito in this conflict between the centralists and the confederalists to Ćosić after he was removed from his post. See. *Piščevi zapisi (1951–1968)* (Belgrade, 2000), pp. 287–295.
175. Ibid., p. 252.
176. Ibid., pp. 253, 254.
177. Ibid., p. 275.
178. Ibid., p. 260.
179. Ibid., p. 262.
180. That is when the term *brionizam* was mentioned in *Piščevi zapisi*: "Brionizam is more and more unscrupulous"… Ibid., p. 272.
181. Ibid., p. 276.
182. Ibid., p. 267.
183. Ibid.
184. Ibid., p. 261.
185. Ibid., p. 260.
186. Ibid., p. 388.
187. Dobrica Ćosić, *Srpsko pitanje–demokratsko pitanje,* 2nd ed. (Belgrade, 2003), p.13.
188. Ibid., p. 15.
189. Ibid., p. 20.
190. Ibid.
191. Ibid., p. 23.
192. Ibid., p. 24.
193. At the 14th session of the Central Committee of SK Serbia, which rejected his proposals, Dobrica Ćosić said in his closing argument:

"Even after this session I will not change my opinion which is communist and humanistic." Ibid., p. 27.

194. These notes were published for the first time in the book of Dobrica Ćosić *Promene* Izbor tekstova Milorad Vučelić, Novi Sad, 1992.
195. Ibid., p. 34.
196. Ibid., p. 20.
197. Ibid., pp. 22, 23.
198. Ibid., p. 49.
199. Ibid., p. 23.
200. Ibid, p. 49.
201. See footnote 125.
202. See Latinka Perović, *Između anarhije i autokratije. Srpsko društvo na prelomima vekova (XIX–XXI)* (Belgrade, 2006).
203. Dobrica Ćosić describes Ivo Andrić's impression by the home of the Ćosić family: "He hid his surprise when he saw the house. He was surprised by the culture and taste of the lady housekeeper in furnishing the house. He looked around the house, looked at the furniture, paintings as if he was amazed. Intimately, he was convinced that we were spontaneous, gifted people but also that we know each other well." But, also the impressions of the Foreign Office Minister of Great Britain Douglas Heard: "He was confused with our house. He was looking carefully at books and paintings. He thought that I was living in a Balkan hut." Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1951–1968)* Belgrade, 2000, p. 369; Ibid., *Piščevi zapisi (1992–1993)* (Belgrade, 2004), p. 109.
204. Dobrica Ćosić, *Promene*. Izbor tekstova Milorad Vučelić, Novi Sad, 1992, p. 109.
205. See Latinka Perović, *Srpsko-ruske revolucionarne veze. Prilozi za istoriju narodnjaštva u Srbiji*, (Belgrade, 1993), pp. 41–49.
206. Slobodan Jovanović, *Vladimir Jovanović* in: Moji savremenici, Vindzor, 1962, pp. 45–46.
207. See Latinka Perović, "Rodonačelnik ruskog socijalizma" in: Aleksandar Hercen, *Ruski narod i socijalizam* Podgorica, 1999, p. 32.
208. Dobrica Ćosić, *Promene*. Izbor tekstova Milorad Vučelić, Novi Sad, 1992, p. 20.
209. Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1992–1993)* (Belgrade, 2004), p. 188.
210. Dobrica Ćosić, *Promene*. Izbor tekstova Milorad Vučelić, Novi Sad, 1992, p. 66.
211. Ibid., pp. 67–68.
212. Ibid., p. 188.
213. Ibid., p. 125.
214. Ibid., p. 132.
215. Dobrica Ćosić, *Vlast II* (Belgrade, 2007), p. 225.

216. Ibid., p. 190.
217. Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1981–1991)* (Belgrade, 2002), p. 295.
218. Ibid, p. 303.
219. In *Piščevi zapisi* a moment of last hope, that is, the beginning of hopelessness was registered—*9 June 1968*: "Tito saved the bureaucracy with his inspiring almost genious move. He outdid himself with his speech on TV in tactical, wide political concept: he spoke as a historical figure… This man redeemed himself for the whole decade… Students are celebrating the victory! … After Cominform, this was the biggest and most expensive victory in the Yugoslav society." *15 June 1968*: "Tito didn't keep his word and promises. Vulgar impostor! … There is no hope for this society. All this will end in chaos, blood, dictatorship and collapse." Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1958–1961)*… pp. 342–343, 344.
220. See Notes published by Dobrica Ćosić for the first time in the books *Promene* Izbor tekstova Milorad Vučelić, Novi Sad, 1992 and *Srpsko pitanje–demokratsko pitanje,* 2nd ed. (Belgrade, 2003), I, II.
221. Dobrica Ćosić, *Srpsko pitanje–demokratsko pitanje,* 2nd ed. (Belgrade, 2003), I…, p. 103.
222. Dobrica Ćosić, *Promene* Izbor tekstova Milorad Vučelić, Novi Sad, 1992, p. 50.
223. Ibid., p. 50.
224. Ibid., pp. 288–289.
225. Ibid., p. 193.
226. Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1992–1993)* (Belgrade, 2004), p. 63.
227. Dobrica Ćosić, *Srpsko pitanje–demokratsko pitanje,* 2nd ed. (Belgrade, 2003), I…, p. 344.
228. "Draft of a Memorandum [Serbian Academy of Science and Art, author's note] convincingly uncovers the undemocratic constitutional structure of Tito's Yugoslavia as determined by the Constitution from 1974… So far, this is the most authoritative critique of Titoism."" Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1981–1991)* (Belgrade, 2002) p. 202.
229. "Slobodan Milošević contributed the most of all Yugoslav communists in breaking the Titoist state structures." Dobrica Ćosić, *Srpsko pitanje–demokratsko pitanje,* 2nd ed. (Belgrade, 2003), I…, p. 346.
"The most successful destroyer of the Tito state order, the man most responsible for Serbia's leaving the half of a century long servitude to an anti-Serbian coalition, the communist who established the Serbian state which was abolished by Serbian communists, the politician who aroused the historical awareness of millions of Serbs." Dobrica Ćosić, *Promene* Izbor tekstova Milorad Vučelić, Novi Sad, 1992 p. 168.

"He is the first Party official in Serbia who supports the Academy and France [Association of Serbian writers, author's note]. He supports progressive intellectuals, condemns the criticism of 'enemies' in the Academy and the Association of Writers. These are new attitudes and new words. They resemble reformism. This is the beginning of anti-Titoism.

Today, after the depression, here in Academy we were all happy and full of hope. Slobodan Milošević is a reformer and a destroyer of Titoism. We were saying hello to each other in the street with hope." Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1981–1991)* (Belgrade, 2002), p. 275.

230. Dobrica Ćosić, *Promene* Izbor tekstova Milorad Vučelić, Novi Sad, 1992, p. 194.
231. Ibid., pp. 245–246.
232. Ibid., p. 214.
233. Vasily Štandman, a Russian diplomat in the Kingdom of Serbia, notes his conversation with Nikola Pašić, the prime minister after the ultimatum of Austria-Hungary was rejected: "When I asked what cash amount is at Serbia's disposal at the time, he replied in a roundabout way, saying that their own money is enough for about 20 days." Vasilij Štandman, *Balkanske uspomene* (Belgrade, 2009), p. 333.
234. Dobrica Ćosić, *Razgovori.* Priredio Radovan Popović. Dela Dobrice Ćosića. Kolo IV. Knjiga 24 (Belgrade, January 2005), p. 146.
235. Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1992–1993)* (Belgrade, 2004), p. 268.
236. "I convinced myself, and a lot of people and my contemporaries do the same every day, that I am needed by Serbian people today." "I have to suffer the suffering of my nation and share it to the end." "I cannot leave my duty these days [13 March 1993, author's note]."Ibid., pp. 237, 294, 299.
237. First of all, Slobodan Milošević: "That man is fatal for Serbia. He has to go."'With no hesitation, I can see this man as a dangerous someone who likes power. This tyrant will not step down … he is ready to destroy Serbia in order to stay in power. I knew that he was a willful administrative leader but I didn't know that he was so unscrupulous. And I didn't suspect that he was a political liar, indeed." Ibid., pp. 57, 152.

But the anti-Titoistic intelligence: "My friends—Mihiz (Borislav Mihajlović), Mića (Popović), Matija (Bećković), Braca (Predrag Palavestra) … even after the session in the Parliament [Vidovdan session in Belgrade in June 1992, author's note], will continue to fight for the democratic kingdom of Serbia. Our political break up is inevitable. Separation again. How long and why?" Ibid., p. 93.

238. Ibid., pp. 150, 223.

239. "When Stalin's empire collapsed, Serbian people were struck by misfortune. Russia lost all its power and could not express nor confirm its interests in Balkans. Not affection for its Yugoslav brothers, but for its interests only! Serbs counted on these selfish Russian interests in their politics from 1804, to 1948, or even to 1988. Serbian people are today subjected to the influence of the American interests only i.e. factors without which Russian opponents, Russian or any other European—even if it is French, become existentially dangerous for the Serbian people… We Serbs have every reason to wish that democratic Russia will be established as soon as possible, and that it will again come to the Balkans and Eastern Europe with their interests and establish balance of external factors in this part of the world." Dobrica Ćosić, *Promene* Izbor tekstova Milorad Vučelić, Novi Sad, 1992 p. 142.
240. Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1992–1993)* (Belgrade, 2004), p. 68.
241. Ibid., p. 120.
242. "Regarding the grandeur environment, I always feel fear when I stay alone. This is probably the biggest office on the Balkan peninsula. This is the office of Josip Broz, where he entered only a few times, probably only to have a glass of whisky. However, when I am alone, I have a feeling that the door is opening and that general Žeželj is at the door (Milan, an adjutant of Josip Broz Tito), Josip Broz is coming in with Politbureau, and they are 'showing' me the door (laughter)." Dobrica Ćosić, *Razgovori*. Priredio Radovan Popović. Dela Dobrice Ćosića. Kolo IV. Knjiga 24 (Belgrade, January 2005), p. 132.
243. "I am a negation of Tito's power in every sense, regardless of the fact that in my little power there is an essence of power: institution-based authority which provides a possibility to carry out one's own political will and ideas, but also offers privileges and feeds vanity." Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1992–1993)* (Belgrade, 2004), p. 200.
244. "I am obsessed with an idea to write a book about Tito. It is necessary to write about him while he is alive and powerful; today [January–April 1976, author's note] one should oppose him not only politically and ideologically. He should be placed in the national history and in the fate of modern Yugoslav generations. I have decided to explore the biographies of great tyrants. I will postpone my work on the fourth book *Vreme smrti*." Dobrica Ćosić, *Lična istorija jednog doba 2. Vreme otpora 1969–1980*, Službeni glasnik, 2009, p. 183.
245. Dobrica Ćosić, *Promene* Izbor tekstova Milorad Vučelić, Novi Sad, 1992, p. 145.
246. "History of the Serbs finally stopped, tired. Old people recall the earlier Serbian magnitude, brave warriors with big goals, and the young listen to them indifferently. Serbian history turned into leaving the village

and looking for a job in cities, moving in, into apartments with a TV and a sofa; driving a car, building a summer house, having a bank account, American Express credit card'… Serbs are, in the twentieth century, the only European nation which is—denationalized-in peace, under the influence of politics and money." Ibid., p. 278.

247. Dobrica Ćosić, *Piščevi zapisi (1999–2000). Vreme zmija* (Belgrade 2008), p. 159.
248. Dobrica Ćosić, *Srpsko pitanje–demokratsko pitanje,* 2nd ed. (Belgrade, 2003), p. 331.

CHAPTER 6

Kumrovec Revisited: Tito's Birthday Party in the Twenty-first Century, An Ethnological Study

Nevena Škrbić Alempijević and Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl

The topic we are dealing with is the collective memory expressed through the commemorative Day of Youth Festival in Kumrovec in 2004. The questions we are raising are: What happens when the past we honour turns infamous and the memories we cherished become stigmatized and tabooed? How then do we reconcile these memories and, more importantly, how do we express this changed attitude? What happens to the place, once declared the central topos of socialist ideology and the cradle in which "the greatest son of our nations and nationalities" was rocked, in a new ideological framework?

We are a group of young researchers within ethnology[1] whose methods are phenomenologically inspired; we seek to be on site, at the place where this recent past is explored, celebrated, performed, and set on stage.[2] Our focus is both on the ways in which the era is celebrated by those who

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participate, as well as on a more structured understanding of the process that Kumrovec has undergone the last 60 years. We examine the processes of building and rebuilding Kumrovec into a socialistic monument that evolves into a hidden anti-national symbol removed from the map, but is still remembered by a young researcher group that had lived the idea of Kumrovec as home to Tito's pioneers.

During the socialist era, Kumrovec communicated complex yet very direct messages. It legitimized Tito as one of the people, highlighting his peasant origins in an outdoor museum, and monumentalized the prosperity of socialism through modern architecture, spectacular Day of Youth celebrations, and numerous state visits. What happened in Kumrovec in 1991 anticipated how that recent socialist past moved underground throughout Croatia in the 1990s and became *terra incognita*. Memories were stored deep down in the freezer of history, as Bet-El formulates it, never to be released in public.[3]

By 2004, there was nothing but untold stories voiced in Kumrovec, connected to both the Day of Youth Celebration and the specific place of Tito's birth. To start off from this concrete place, in an attempt to grasp processes of memory and amnesia, to focus on bodily experiences and practices, and to identify actual celebrations and rituals, seemed therefore to be the best possible route. As Edward Casey puts it, place is the most fundamental form of bodily experiences; it is from place that culture arises.[4] Given that culture exists, it must exist somewhere, and it must exist in more concrete and complex ways in these places than in thoughts and symbols Revisiting Kumrovec in 2004 was a challenge for the young researchers, as neither the place nor the DAYC event had become a metaphor for a lost utopian past, of an imagined safe and peaceful society. An important discussion is therefore how one as a young researcher in an era of "one truth" enters the particular recent past of Kumrovec and the potential nostalgic critique in the Day of Youth Celebration. How does one grasp the diversity and complexity of the untold stories? Those are the issues we will present in this chapter.

Ten years after our research, nothing has changed dramatically in "the world's most famous village," as Kumrovec was defined in socialist times. In the public discourse in Croatia nowadays the place bears the stigma of the symbolic "cradle" of the former socialist ideology. The fact that it is still frequently perceived as a contested space is concretized in the shape and (the lack) of function of once impressive wonders of modern architecture—the Political School, the Memorial Park and Villa Kumrovec. These

edifices, owned by the state, are considered to be some sort of dead capital in a village where the unemployment rate is currently higher than 15%. Since 2009, when the left-oriented Social Democratic Party's candidate Dragutin Ulama won the elections for mayor, one sees numerous local initiatives and pleas aimed at the state government, hoping to resolve the status of the unused buildings and structures in Kumrovec. Diverse plans to redevelop this area and transform the former socialist institutions into facilities that would create value for Kumrovec have been announced in the media. Suggestions range from the proposal to recondition one as a retirement home or an acupuncture treatment and massage therapy clinic, to the efforts to redesign another into a conference centre or a museum of the twentieth century or a film museum (since Tito was very fond of movies). Various investors have been mentioned as potential new owners of the state property: the Chinese, the Russians, the Saudis, the Slovene owners of the Spa and Wellness Centre in the neighbouring place of Tuhelj, rich men from other parts of the former Yugoslavia, among others. What has recently changed, according to a marketing expert in the region, is that, at least on the local level, Tito has begun to be perceived as "a brand and bait for tourists." In spite of this activity, all those ideas have come to a dead-end. The materiality of socialist Kumrovec is still devastated and stuck in a vacuum created by the clash of opposing ideologies. Despite this lack of progress, Kumrovec continues to trigger people's imagination. Most recently, in September 2014, the latest project for the reconstruction of Tito's desolate residence, titled Josip Broz SuperStar(i),[5] was presented. The aim of the project, as defined by a director of an advertising agency in Zagreb and supported by the local municipality, is to "open new content, attract visitors, but also potential investments into the former Political School and the Memorial Park." Obviously, evocations of the socialist past in search of a different future for Kumrovec, takes on new shapes all the time.

This is also the case with contemporary celebrations of the late Marshal's birth in his home village. In May 2014, several thousand visitors from various parts of Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and other locales, gathered to put their memories of "the good old times" into practice. The choreography and the structure of the event, as well as diverse practices of the participants, largely resembled the previous celebrations. What differed was the acknowledgement by mainstream politics that the celebration had been actually taking place year after year. These time representatives of local and county government climbed onto the stage in Kumrovec and, in front of the sign "The Day of Youth—the

Day of Joy," they addressed the participants by highlighting Tito's merits and the need to look up to his anti-fascist ideals in times of hardship. The main organizer of the Day of Youth since 1990s, Tomislav Badovinac, was given an annual award of Kumrovec Municipality. In his speech, the mayor explained the Municipality's decision to give him this award as an act of gratitude shown to a person who kept bringing participants of the Day of Youth celebration to Kumrovec even in the 1990s, "while Kumrovec was a forbidden place." People keep coming to Kumrovec, whether the political elites regard it as a forbidden place or not. They come to Kumrovec to express their nostalgia, to create continuity between their past and their present, to criticize their current circumstances and the power relations, or just to have fun with their old comrades and enjoy the picturesque scenery. In Kumrovec they tell and re-enact the stories rarely told in the public spheres of today's Croatia.

However, in order to understand what the Day of Youth means today, how and why it was socially forgotten, and how it has been reinterpreted and filled with new content, it is important to observe the history of the Day of Youth celebration, its constructive elements, performances and narratives that turned it into a prominent date on the calendar of Yugoslav citizens.

The Day of Youth as It Once Was

The Day of Youth is a symbol commonly evoked whenever individuals or groups come to think of socialism today. But how was the Day celebrated during the socialist era? May 25 was a public holiday widely marked throughout the former Yugoslavia from 1945 to 1988, and officially defined as the celebration of Josip Broz Tito's birthday, although the Yugoslav president was actually born on 7 May. The importance of this symbolic birthday was explained through various narratives; according to some sources that date was written in Tito's false documents that he used at the beginning of his revolutionary activities. Others explained that day as a moment of Tito's "re-birth," the day of the German attack on Drvar in 1944.[6]

In 1956, Tito himself dedicated the day to the youth: "Although this day commemorates my birthday, I think it should be given a different name: the day of our youth, the day of sports, the day of a young generation and its further spiritual and physical development."[7] Perhaps its

firm status in social memory is connected with the number of people and resources this celebration mobilized.

Traditionally, a variety of gifts were prepared for the birthday party, their shapes and messages mostly symbolizing the maker's birthplace or trade. Two groups of presents were highlighted: the first included objects that were generally seen as appropriate birthday presents, such as handkerchiefs, tablecloths, pillows, socks and the like, that mostly evoke traditional rural culture. Such handmade gifts, tapestries with Tito's figure patiently woven or wedding rings melted to build a statue for the president, were specially highlighted in the media, which reported on the personal affection and admiration all nations and nationalities expressed for their leader. The second group of birthday gifts comprised models of various machines and factory products that were crafted by men, workers, and soldiers.[8] On this occasion, peasants sent Tito the fruits of their labour, pioneers their paintings and writings dedicated to him or to Yugoslavia, workers their success charts and so on.[9] Through these gifts Yugoslav citizens presented their president with symbols of their working success.

In addition, carefully prepared letters and greetings arrived from every corner of Yugoslavia, conveying messages like "May you be with us for a long time to come, comrade Tito." In these messages, the figure of Tito functioned as Yugoslavia personified, since his well-being was represented as the ultimate desire and interest of all its citizens. Examples include: "you have become part of us, we have come of age with you in our hearts," and "your words and deeds speak the thoughts and desires of the working man." Greetings were also sent by foreign statesmen from all around the world, especially from the non-aligned African and Asian countries. For instance, in 1965 Tito was wished a happy birthday by Brežnjev and Johnson, Sukarno and Janos Kadar, the presidents of India, Pakistan, Cambodia, Ghana, and numerous others.[10] Their birthday wishes were a regular topic of media reports, which aimed at advancing the notion of the strength and influence of Yugoslavia, and the power and popularity of Tito himself on the global stage.

Relay batons, so-called *štafeta*, were specially designed for the occasion and incorporated messages wishing Tito and the State a long and prosperous life or existence. They were carried across the country relayed from hand to hand by the most outstanding representatives of schools, sporting clubs, firms and institutions, using all methods of transportation, from walking and running to travelling by sea or air. In 1956, the baton travelled some 63,000 km and passed through 1.2 million hands.[11] Mass

parades and celebrations were organized in towns and villages along the route. Greatly admired individuals who achieved excellence in sports, science, or culture were chosen to deliver batons to Tito personally, or after his death, to state officials in a ceremonial setting in the monumental stadium in Belgrade. This moment, meticulously choreographed and widely broadcast, represented the peak of the celebration. A massive and visually impressive sporting and musical event was organized, demonstrating the abilities of the Yugoslav youth and their resoluteness, as words of a popular song stated, "not to stray from Tito's way." For example, in 1965 on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the liberation of Yugoslavia, more than 6000 young people participated in the spectacle; 450 members of various folk ensembles, wearing folk costumes from all over Yugoslavia, performed a joint wheel dance; Sailors of the Pula Navy garrison carried out a rescue drill; the Yugoslav People's Army recruits put on a judo routine and 200 ballerinas from Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana and Skopje danced for Tito. Finally, a pioneer parade was organized that ended with a magnificent performance entitled "The Flower of the Sun."[12]

Kumrovec as Showcase of a Good Socialistic Welfare

Along with the capital of Yugoslavia, there was another place that had a prominent position in the public eye—Kumrovec, the president's birth village. Reflecting Tito's strenuous journey from a village situated in northwestern Croatia, near the Slovene border, to the forefront of the country, many relays started from his birthplace. Here was "the cradle where the Marshal was rocked," as declared in brochures inviting Yugoslav citizens to visit the birthplace of their leader. This was the spot from where "the great socialist leader" and "the great Yugoslav idea" emerged.

In a tourist guidebook that commemorates the ninetieth anniversary of Comrade Tito's birth, published on the occasion of the Day of Youth, the seemingly inseparable connection between Tito and Kumrovec was set out.[13] Considerable effort was put into transforming and marking Kumrovec as a significant place within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Ethnologist Marijana Gušić, the founder of the open-air museum in Kumrovec, succeeded admirably in her efforts to put Kumrovec, "a village with some 300 inhabitants, until recently located in the backwoods of the region of Hrvatsko zagorje," on the map as a sig-

nificant place. A place closely attached to Tito, socialism and the place for a proper "ideological upbringing of our people, especially our youth."[14] In the process of connecting Tito and Kumrovec, the village was in many ways transformed into a showcase of a good socialist example of welfare and prosperity. As stated in the tourist guidebook: "After the liberation of the country, like many regions of our socialist homeland, Kumrovec has also changed its appearance, it has got new traffic communications, new houses, and new cultural buildings."[15]

This seems to be quite an understatement, when looking at the actual investment that took place in this little village during the period of socialism. Few regions in the socialist homeland could compare with the physical demonstration that arose in Kumrovec as proof of the new and modern era. Marshal Tito Memorial Museum situated in Tito's birth house, gradually transformed into an open-air museum named Old Village. Other examples include: the monumental elementary school Marshal Tito, the Memorial Post-Office, the Home of Veterans of the National Liberation War and of the Yugoslav Youth (declared the best architectonic realization in the Socialist Republic of Croatia in 1974), the Political School of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito hotel rebuilt into residential "Villa Kumrovec" (exclusive and always prepared to accommodate Tito, his family and delegates of the Party), the transformation of Tito's elementary school into a Memorial school, the steel factory Kumrovec, and the erection of numerous monuments and plates celebrating Yugoslavia and Tito in his birthplace. As stated in the brochure *Memorial-Park Kumrovec*, more than 500,000 people came to Kumrovec every year and "thousands of visitors from children to well-known world statesmen have written their impressions in the commemoration book."[16] No wonder a tree-lined path of 88 red maple trees was planted here for Comrade Tito the year he died to commemorate and pay tribute to every year of his life.

Many of these structures served as scenes for mass celebrations of the Day of Youth in Kumrovec. Numerous delegates would visit Tito's birthplace on that day, but the emphasis was again placed on the young people coming from all parts of Yugoslavia and gathering in Kumrovec. This is how the media described the Day of Youth events in Kumrovec in 1965 and the enthusiasm of the youth participating in them: "in spite of the bad weather, singing rang through Kumrovec streets and bonfires were lit by youngsters and scouts."[17] Tito's birth house represented a central place next to which there were speeches given by youth representatives

and senior politicians, interrupted by chants of "We are Tito's, Tito is ours!" A letter to Tito was read from there, and young participants joined a wheel dance in front of the house. The Thirteenth Partisan March entitled "Through Tito's Home Country" started from there. Also, a concert by the Music Youth was held and a radio programme from Kumrovec called "Youth Meetings" was aired on all Yugoslav radio stations.[18] In this way, the birthplace became present in numerous narratives and practices related to the Day of Youth celebrations throughout Yugoslavia.

In the late 1980s, initiatives, actions, and debates related to the Day of Youth celebrations reflected the deep political crisis that was shaking the foundations of the State. As reported by Zagreb weekly *Danas* in June 1986, at the Yugoslavian Socialist Youth Alliance's 12th Congress in 1986, a representative of the Edvard Kardelj University in Ljubljana voiced this opinion: "We believe that time has come to end antiquated rituals. Heroic times have passed, the time of idealizing youth has passed, and times of blind patriotism have passed. Therefore we think that running with a baton and exercising in a stadium is senseless."[19] The two subsequent celebrations were marked with heated debates, protests and antagonism, and there were no celebrations in 1989. With the breakup of Yugoslavia and the bloody wars that ensued, Tito, Kumrovec, and the Day of Youth have become undesirable remnants of an unwanted past. That process has influenced the course of our research carried out in Kumrovec.

As Tito Becomes Untouchable, Kumrovec Becomes Invisible

In many ways, the modern Kumrovec of 2004 is on its way to becoming ruins.[20] The buildings of Villa Kumrovec, the Political School, the Memorial Park, and Memorial School are all closed down and monitored by security guards and volunteers from Kumrovec. It is easy to detect how the once magnificent architecture has not been maintained by the easily recognizable dank smell of moisture that develops in buildings that are never heated, the concrete that is dissolving in stairs and walls, the thermo-insolation that hangs on walls and the spiderwebs that cover the doorways. There are traces of anger, bitterness, disappointment and sorrow directed at these relics from the past political regime, reflected in broken windows and doors, destroyed interiors, covered placards and statues of previous political heroes, and books with Cyrillic letters and

socialist content lying about on the floor. One photo book was used as a toilet before being closed and thrown on the floor of the Political School, graphically indicating the strength of some emotions. The statues and monuments have either been removed to be stored in safe places, left outside to be forgotten, or—like the statue of Tito in the garden of his birth house—blown up with explosives.[21]

It is actually difficult to get a glimpse of the buildings, if one does not know about them, because of the trees covering the view. Even Villa Kumrovec and the Memorial Park are difficult to see, although both are on hillsides or hilltops surrounding the village. No one cuts the forest surrounding them so they are more visible. On the contrary, it seems that people are content to reduce their visibility as landmarks of the once proud village of Kumrovec. The former school of Marshal Tito has been renamed "Josip Broz" and attempts have been made to remove the text once covering the wall by the entrance.

In these circumstances, Kumrovec itself has become a topic people whisper about. As one of our interview partners states, there were attempts to erase the place both from the geographic and, more importantly, from the mental maps of Croatia: "For a while, we were not on the map at all. My kid went to fifth grade ten years ago and Kumrovec was not present on the maps in schoolbooks and school maps. I have them at home. (…) Now Kumrovec has been returned to the geographic maps. The representatives of the HDZ were removing signs to Kumrovec starting from Zabok on. A potential visitor didn't know how to get to Kumrovec. After 1996 things have gradually changed."[22]

It seems like the only elements that still remain inscribed in the landscape are the street names of Josip Broz and *Omladinske stube* (Stairs of Socialist Youth). Of course, the celebrations of the Day of Youth still take place in Kumrovec, despite all attempts to remove the layers of Tito and socialism from this place in Zagorje. Despite this cleansing, Kumrovec is far from a depoliticised place.

Getting Used to the Idea of Going to Kumrovec

"We can't make this research project an obligatory course. Forcing students to go to Kumrovec on the Day of Youth would be like yet another assault. Participation in this project has to be a totally voluntary choice," the Croatian co-author of this paper explained to the Norwegian researcher. The ethnologist from the University of Bergen

had arrived in Zagreb in order to study the transformation of Kumrovec as a political place in the post-socialist society of contemporary Croatia. The Croatian researchers found the project rather strange and challenging. Since Tito's Yugoslavia fell apart, the Yugoslav People's Army, of which he was the commander, turned against the Croatian people in the Croatian War of Independence. The political system that Tito built was proclaimed backward and suffocating, while negative connotations have been attached to the social era and its main figure. When modern Croatia placed a taboo on Tito and topics concerning the Communist area, this included the academic literature lists at universities. For the majority of ethnology and cultural anthropology students, the initial, main attraction for participating in this project was based on the desire to learn more about phenomenologically inspired fieldwork.[23] As the work progressed, the participants increasingly reported on reactions to this project from outside the classroom.

As the themes dealing with the heritage of socialism have been removed from nearly every public sphere, and more or less tabooed, it is professionally challenging for researchers in Croatia to pursue such a project—but it is challenging also from a personal point of view. Both the place and the topic created many dilemmas and self-questioning for the group of young ethnologists and revived many of their own, often intentionally forgotten, memories. So getting ready to go to Kumrovec not only focused on academic preparation through lectures and discussions on phenomenology, culture as text and as praxis, and multi-sited fieldwork, but it also involved quite a lot of reflection on self-experiences, thoughts and preconceived notions.[24] In a phenomenologically inspired research such personal elements are also regarded as meaningful and important to incorporate within the analysis, and we therefore started to record our own discussions and write our own expectations on what was going to take place in Kumrovec.[25]

At the same time there was also a need to constantly work on separating the role as researcher from the one as political participant in the event. Mostly in reassuring ways: isolating researching on partisans from dressing as pioneers, getting emotional when hearing old communist songs, buying Tito statues, singing along, or cutting loose in a ring dance—all the while not turning oneself into a political participant. This "detached-participation" has the potential to open up a field of new meanings and understandings that can be further explored, discussed, and analysed as researchers.[26] It was easier to come to terms with the different levels when

at a distance and relating theoretically to them, than it was actually being immersed in them.

Doing Complex Fieldwork[27]

It is the afternoon before the ethnological research in Kumrovec 2004, and uncommon field preparations are taking place in one of the old Zagorje houses at the open-air museum *Staro selo* (Old Village). From a bag sitting on the floor, one item after another is brought into open daylight after being stored in bottom drawers for many years. A blue skirt, a white blouse, a red scarf, and a little blue hat with a red star attached to the front. In order to get hold of the whole pioneer uniform, several households had to contribute. Every new piece or fragment that is revealed from this seemingly ordinary bag provokes laughter, surprise, anticipation, all combined with a somewhat nervous commotion. It is the tangibility of a silenced past that is coming out of the bag, with memories attached to it.

Two colleagues are helping the researcher to put on this disguise and the "proper way" a pioneer girl should be dressed is eagerly discussed. We are not dressing in the pioneer uniform because we want to pay tribute to "the greatest son of our nations and nationalities," who "loved pioneers most of all, because the world remains on the shoulders of the young." Rather we do it in order to trigger reactions both within our group of researchers, to make us aware of the preconceived notions we hold about the socialist culture, and to trigger reactions among visitors from all countries that once formed a part of ex-Yugoslavia, to evoke their memories on life under socialism and to find out how and why they commemorate, in a significantly changed political and social context, Tito's 112th birthday. The participants have different approaches to this celebration, and dressing in this pioneer uniform is only one method of carrying out this multisided fieldwork.

As the aim for this Kumrovec study was to understand and examine how the Day of Youth happens for the people actually taking part in this celebration, and as no one from our group of researchers would have chosen to go to Kumrovec on the Day of Youth if it had not been for this research project, it was essential to find the participants who would.

Most of the people we talked to about our research topic were not even aware that this celebration was still going on. It was essential to search widely. "Whose story are you going to tell?" a lot of people asked when hearing that we were going to Kumrovec. Most often followed with the

warning: "There is no way you can make a coherent, mutual, or even unified, story of anything connected to Tito in this post-socialist society. There are only many and diverse stories to tell." The patchwork of practices and narratives is even more colourful concerning the fact there is no longer one official truth about Kumrovec nor the public discourse about the Day of Youth anymore; the whole event is veiled in intentional silence. Apart from that, we have been aware of the fact that in the course of our research in Kumrovec only a portion of the experiences of the celebration's participants will be documented, whereas the stories of all those deciding not to participate in the event and their interpretation of this socialist culture, will remain untold.

Every researcher had his or her own specific aspect to focus on and follow-up on the day of the festival. Most of the group arrived the day before, to engage in the last preparations and to be in place when the crowds entered during the early morning hours of 22 May. One group entered Kumrovec in a bus together with the organizers of the event, the anti-fascist fighters, and walked towards the birth house with the delegation laying flowers by Tito's statue.[28]

Several researchers were focused on how the day was organized and executed: standing beside Tito's statue to see how people approached him,[29] mingling among the people queuing to write a greeting in the guest book in Tito's birth house,[30] following the footsteps of people dressed as pioneers and partisans[31] or dressed in different kinds of folk costumes,[32] joining the school classes on excursion,[33] hanging around the pub "Kod Starog" to listen to the music being spontaneously played and sung,[34] standing by the stage listening to the speeches that were delivered or by the souvenir stands to check up what was put on sale and what was bought.[35]

Others were more focused on geographical and age differences of the people that attended the celebration: on the organizers of the event, members of Josip Broz Tito Association and the assembly of anti-fascist fighters and anti-fascists of Croatia, on young people who were born in the late 1970s and early 1980s who had once been Tito's pioneers,[36] on people coming from different regions in present-day Croatia,[37] on the local people from Kumrovec,[38] or on school excursions to Kumrovec.[39] How they acted on the day, what their reasons were for attending, their experience of the event, their thoughts about this Communist heritage from the recent past, and their view of the future.

There were also some researchers that placed themselves more in the periphery of the event: those who visited the rather empty places of the former Political School and the Memorial Park in Kumrovec,[40] or the ones sitting in Split and following the media coverage of the event,[41] the researchers in Slavonia trying to trace the stories of Tito's Tikveš hunting castle,[42] the ones watching the documentary of five women sharing their experiences of living in Tito's Yugoslavia,[43] the ones discussing the growing myth around Tito from a historical perspective and tracing the origin of the celebration of the Day of Youth,[44] and the ones spending time in study rooms of the Croatian State Archives in Zagreb, examining the content of the archive boxes of the founder of the Memorial Museum in Kumrovec, Marijana Gušić.[45] From all these perspectives we were ready to research the celebration of Tito's birthday, 24 years after his death.

Being in Kumrovec on the Day of Youth Focusing on Praxis

By following in the footsteps of people dressing as pioneers and partisans, it was possible to look beyond the overwhelming symbolic readings of the use of such uniforms that day and to grasp how this kind of dressing-up makes the Day of Youth happen not only for the ones wearing these outfits but also for the people meeting them. For example, by following a two-year-old Tito "pioneer" and his father, it felt somehow like constantly being at the centre of events, although they neither listened to the official programme from the stage, nor did they visit Tito's overcrowded birth house, the latter being one of the imperatives for the majority of participants. Still, the crowds opened up and paid attention to the pioneers everywhere he or she went, and by walking in their footsteps one got to experience their reactions and emotions. By observing these practices, the researcher can conclude that the donning of uniforms from World War II and the socialist period encourages the telling of some "good old" stories, as well as the creation of new ones. Frequently, the participants come together with era-appropriate body language, like the raising of the fist to the partisan greeting, and the voicing of the paroles like "Long live Comrade Tito," "Death to fascism, freedom to people" among others. The uniform itself is a statement (although different every time). And the stories that their wearers want to tell with them on the Day of Youth in Kumrovec are in some cases burdened with a 15-year-long silence.[46]

When dealing with a statue that has suffered several attempts to blow it up and out of Kumrovec's landscape, and whose removal in safer manners has recently been discussed, Marijana Belaj tried to understand the complexity and the effect the statue has on the visitors by being there and following the praxis surrounding it on the Day of Youth. By focusing on the experience rather than the representation of this statue of Tito situated next to his birth house, she explores how identities are not a question of ideas but of ordinary practice. Belaj poses the question of whether people on the Day of Youth in Kumrovec approach Tito's representation or Tito himself. Namely, certain actions, patterns, and ways of addressing it signal an experience of the statue beyond merely its physical appearance. Such perception is expressed in the following example, not unique during this celebration: "One woman came running into the garden and shouldered her way to the statue, obviously very excited. She stroked it several times, and at every stroke she would say: 'This is for Radenković, this is for Majda…'—and so on. Obviously she was fulfilling her commitment to her friends, as well as their joint commitment to the meaning of the statue." By observing the bodily, the sensory, and the individual, a bronze statue of a reflexive man in a military coat is, in front of the researcher's eyes, transformed into the focus of ritual behaviour.[47]

Before entering her site of research around the birth house, Petra Kelemen was rather certain that she was placed right in the centre of events. When she actually arrived there, she was not so sure anymore. It was so quiet. People were talking a bit when queuing in front of the house, but the further she got inside the house, the quieter the people got. By the time she came to the guest book, it was still. What was this? The silence disappointed in a peculiar manner, maybe because it was so unexpected. The centre of events on a Day of Youth was expected to be much livelier, full of sounds, and rhythms. Where did all the noise disappear to? Could it be that arriving in front of the guest book was a kind of existential centre of events, and that the understanding of this centre needed to be revised? That this location provided the most personal meeting with the past Day of Youths, where one actually was able to address Tito through the writing? Much more than the physical space of the birth house, the pages of the guestbook were filled with dissonant voices, exhibiting signs of being more of a battle zone. Symbols and messages laden with political nuances, ones supporting the earlier socialist

system and Tito contrasting with those that opposed to them. But here the researcher has also found numerous children's traces, not associated with politics at first sight. On one page there was an outline of a palm, with a girl's name written in it. Her first name was written in Latin and her last name in the Cyrillic script. The parallel use of both scripts in the writings of a little girl exemplifies a distinct battle—the battle between the past and the present in the lives of children for whom Kumrovec does not have all the connotations it has for the people who lived with socialism.[48]

Petra Kelemen, who joined the queue of people wanting to sign the guest book in the birth house of Tito, as well as Željka Petrović and Tihana Rubić, who focused on music being spontaneously performed on the Day of Youth, benefitted from differentiating the symbolic and the praxis, the texts and the doings, in order to understand how Kumrovec is there for the people taking part in the celebrations. While they all delved into analysing the texts of songs, lyrics or written greetings, they also discussed how it is the actual writing and singing that opens up a more complex understanding of the event and happenings in Kumrovec. They all conclude that writing, singing, dancing, that is *performing* of the Day of Youth, give its participants a chance on that day to publicly express their attitude towards the past.[49]

By focusing on praxis and inspired by the upside-down world of Kumrovec souvenirs offered on the Day of Youth, Jasmina Jurković examines the life-cycle of objects ranging from the so-called commie-junk to desirable souvenirs. Along with "classic" souvenirs, such as caps, T-shirts, cups, lighters, pens, plates, ceramic vases and those bearing direct associations to the Tito-myth (like Tito-wine and cigars the Marshal adored), there are also objects from World War II and the socialist period such as books, uniforms, coins and Tito's framed photographs. Spending her day among the stands, the researcher raised the questions: Where and how is it possible to make a career selling Tito-stuff in a post-socialist society? Who is buying these things, and what are they doing with them after this celebration? Where on earth do you wear a Tito t-shirt outside of Kumrovec? The souvenirs offered at the 2004 Kumrovec Youth Day celebration, concludes Jurković, brought into the light of day a diverse body of objects related to socialism and the "life and deeds" of Josip Broz, stuff that is otherwise either buried with the "junk of the past," or carefully preserved to be presented at such events.[50]

Yugo-Nostalgia and Innovative Balkan Culture

"The lack of history in the sense of grand narrative made the place emerge with an intensified significance," says Frykman when discussing regionalism in Istrien and the potential of poetic analysis.[51] At the same time, he warns that it would be a mistake to look upon the obsession with place simply as a compensation for the worlds we have lost. "That would really turn them into ideology. It is rather an exciting field for studying how something old is re-circulated and at the same time renewed. Places are arenas for actions, dreams and practices; they are fields where something new is being tried out."[52]

This is also very much Jasna Dasović's point when she explores the multi-layered identities of Kumrovec and the process of creating an identity of place. When joining the bus of Savez Boraca on its way to celebrating the Day of Youth, she is also going through her own prejudices of what this is about. Even though she meets a lot of people missing the "good old times," which easily could have been interpreted as compensation, she ends up concluding that there is no universal reason for people to come to Kumrovec. And as she puts it herself, "it took days of *not thinking about it* to realize it."[53]

Dubravka Ugrešić comments upon how the travel back in time is about much more than politics, ideologies, or the compensation for a lost world. She claims that when ex-Yugoslavs meet today, it is more about the everyday culture of music than politics and ideologies:

> They no longer remember party congresses, or year of change, or the replacement of political terminology every ten years, or the years of "self-management" or the names of political leaders; they hardly remember their common geography and history; they have all become Yugo-zombies! But what they do most often and most gladly recall are the years of festivals of pop music, the names of singers and songs. In other words, they remember the history of triviality poured into verses, rhythm and sound; they remember their common "musical idiots." And it is just this culture of the everyday—and not a state or a political system!—that is the source of Yugo-nostalgia, if such a thing exists today. Nostalgia belongs to the sphere of competence of the heart.[54]

The Slovene sociologist, Mitja Velikonja, adds even more to this notion of Yugo-nostalgia, when insisting that the so-called Balkan culture also exists as innovation, self-identification, new cultural receptions, and

productions—all of which are more a matter of choice than fate. Velikonja claims that cultural preferences, family ties, old friendships and memories of past times cannot be erased by political and ideological swings or by new borders, but states quite firmly that these phenomena are limited to the realm of culture, personal choices and everyday life.[55]

It Is About Politics Too

Being rather familiar with these notions of Yugo-zombies, Yugo-nostalgia and innovative Balkan culture, which actually seems to dominate the understandings of a present-day relationship with the era of Yugoslavia, communism and Tito, we were quite taken by surprise that the Day of Youth was also about Yugo-politics. We were caught by surprise when, for instance, the main speaker of the celebration, a lady from the association of anti-fascist fighters Varaždin, went on stage, claiming that people could not travel both to Bleiburg and Kumrovec, but they had to choose one. The message was received with a big round of applause from the audience. It was quite surprising when the head of the association of anti-fascist fighters from Zagreb, did not want us to dress in pioneer uniforms because we were not children anymore and therefore not proper conduits for this outfit, along with the seriousness that this idea of wearing the pioneer uniform in the proper manner. This was discussed within the group of researchers. As if there were in fact ways, needs or wants to "properly" dress in this outfit in 2004.

But, the awareness that we are not treading in politically neutral terrain was felt not only in the organizers' rhetoric, but also in the rhetoric of the numerous "users." The appearance of a two-year-old dressed as a pioneer triggered not only the memories of the golden age of youth for the majority of participants, but also occasionally a belief that these times will return, through the restoration of the past political system. An elderly lady was at the verge of tears when she saw the boy and she reacted:

> "Oh, my little angel! My children used to wear pioneer dress when they were little. We don't have such costumes any longer, it's such a pity! Ah, yes, what can we do? But there will be, we will see more of pioneers, they will return to us, won't they, my precious!" She is clinging to his hand, as if, when she let go of the little pioneer, the idea would be lost also.[56]

Suddenly, in front of our eyes, the resurrection of the ideological platform that is a "thing buried in our past" is evoked. Other details also pointed to the fact that the attitude towards this event and the appearance of the socialist iconography in Kumrovec show that it is not exactly carnivalesque. A conversation with an elementary school teacher from Zagreb, who appeared in Kumrovec with a red scarf around her neck, was interrupted by the headmaster, who claimed the school already had enough problems without "such incidents."

Maybe because we read these analyses espousing an anti-political direction, we also expected to meet a kind of pop-art relation to the whole celebration of Day of Youth—at least among the youth. Certainly, from time to time we encountered an alternative reinterpretation of socialist symbolism and new ways of explaining one's participation in the celebration:

> "I haven't come here for the music or stage performances, but to buy a T-shirt. (…) I don't know which one I would prefer: to be reprimanded by a teacher for wearing a T-shirt with Tito, so that I can pick up a fight with him, or to be supported by him."[57]

However, such explanations are exceptions, even among the younger people present on the Day of Youth. Frequently we met politically engaged young people who, although they had not lived in the socialist era, had taken over the ideological myth of people's solidarity at that time that they interpret as a political model that should be followed even today. Some of them have even expressed contempt towards an artificial usage of symbols, without a real understanding of the context from which they emerged; such visitors, in their opinion, come to Kumrovec for the "wrong reasons":

> I find that ridiculous. That is like with Che Guevara, you ask him who the guy is he is wearing, he doesn't have a clue. I have my own ideals, but I don't impose them on anyone.[58]

The essay of Nenad Kovačić, analysing the stories of five young Croatians travelling to "the good old days" for one day in Kumrovec, is a good example of the different reasons for revisiting to this past. One would expect that five male youngsters, all taking this somewhat out-of-mainstream choice of celebrating the Day of Youth in 2004, in some ways would have a coherent analytical perspective. Kovačić shows that even

members within this relatively homogenous group have quite different life stories leading them to Kumrovec and unique ways of being there. But it is also rather clear that some of these young people attending the celebration were not all that "alternative Balkan culture oriented," rather they were surprisingly updated on, serious about and conscious of the political dimensions of the former regime of Tito.

Unlike the seriousness of the Croatian researchers towards the pioneer uniform, or the serious rhetoric used by the young people from Croatia attending the celebrations in Kumrovec, the group of Slovene students that came to Kumrovec because of Day of Youth had much more of an easygoing "pop-art" relation to the Balkan culture that Velikonja describes as a rather ordinary sub-culture phenomena in Slovenia.[59] When one of the students in their group entered the bus in the early morning hours, dressed as a pioneer, the response was one of laughter. But there was also a quite different subcontext: "Oh shit, why didn't we think of that as well. What a good idea. We really have to remember this for the celebrations next year."[60]

The nine days of war that Slovenia "got away with" is the most common explanation for both the popularity of the so-called Balkan culture and pop-art relationship to Tito among the Slovenes. As Danijela Birt points out when focusing on the different Croatian regions (Slavonia and Istria), and different former Yugoslav republics (Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina), as examples for understanding this importance of place, there are some crucial and common experiences connected to the different regions of Croatia and former Yugoslavia that impacts how one relates to the role of Tito. But still, this geographically based experience is not necessarily equivalent to the one at an individual level.[61]

Unwanted Storytelling of the "Forbidden"

In 1992 Dubravka Ugrešić wrote a critical article called "Pure Croatian Air," where she claimed that in the new system of values the Byzantine Blood was the most dangerous polluter. This was simply another and more refined expression for Serb and Orthodox. Other enemies of the state were insufficiently good Croats, saboteurs, traitors, anti-Tuđman commandos, commies, Yugo-nostalgics, and unlike-thinkers. About these undesirables, Ugrešić said that all the candidates of the parties in the recent pre-election

campaign promised "a great clean-out."[62] In a postscript written five years after, she tells of the reactions she got from this article:

> Although the text was not published in the local press, everyone immediately knew what was in it and the author was suddenly cast into the role of isolated target of frenzied attacks by her compatriots: the new political elite, newspapers, television, radio, fellow writers, colleagues at the Arts Faculty in Zagreb, friends, anonymous writers of threatening letters, unnamed righteous telephone callers … Her furious compatriots—proclaiming the author a liar, traitor, public enemy and a witch—fuelled a pyre and the author, consumed by fire in her own homeland, left to continue her life in exile. During a brief Christmas visit to Zagreb in 1996, the author was greeted by an anonymous message on her answer phone: *Rats, you've been hiding! So you're still here! You're still breathing under the wonderful Croatian sky? Get out of Croatia!*[63]

When Slavenka Drakulić, who is well known as a critic of both the ideologies of communism and the last decades' nationalist uprisings and wars, was in Zagreb the summer of 2004 to promote her books (that were finally translated into Croatian), she was asked why she had been so silent the last years. She replied "I have not been silent, no one has really been there to listen," observing how she suddenly stopped being invited to public discussions and asked to write comments in the newspapers. "When the voice is your working tool, it's like someone cuts off a limb. It really feels like a handicap."

How the mainstream press in Croatia corresponds with the major ideologies of their time becomes visible when focusing on how the media have been covering the Day of Youth from a historical perspective.[64] Radovani brings forth the notion of uneasiness in voicing the forbidden, which occurred in the 1990s. This time it is sketched in the form of media silence entangling the figure of Tito and his birthplace, topics reported about on a daily basis in the newspapers of the 1960s. As the guest books in the birth house of Tito are not edited or censored in the same way as newspapers or television, there is a wider diversity of expression in the analysis of Petra Kelemen, who is studying the writings of these books.[65] As both Radovani and Kelemen delve into the same historic episodes in their examinations, it provides possibilities for an interesting comparison between these two sources of storytelling.

An overall impression in dealing with this topic is that you have to be persistent in order to do so. The scepticism the researchers initially met in

Kumrovec when approaching people in order to "get their stories," they often made requests to turn off the recorder before continuing to speak. The detective work of tracing down people willing to talk and the somewhat hidden and private suggestions on where to meet, indicates that it takes courage to tell these stories that no one really wants to listen to, and to bring remembrance to an era that most want to forget. "Death threats are a regular thing," claims one researcher that went public, stating that the worst thing was not that she and her colleague themselves received such threats, but that her parents did as well.

After the statue of Tito in Kumrovec was bombed on 27 December 2004, several family members of the researchers participating in this project expressed concern for the safety of their loved ones. Were they going to be met with threats after publishing an anthology about Tito, Kumrovec, and the socialist era of Croatia? There were discussions among the researchers whether to write under pseudonyms, but in the end they decided not to do so. To research on this topic, events and places should not be considered deviant, inappropriate, dangerous or something that should be silenced. On the contrary, one goal should be to publicly highlight that what is deviant is dealing with socialist culture as researchers in the twenty-first century and suffering such experiences and facing such questions and threats. Silence never increases knowledge and understanding. Discussions, analysis, and the willingness to raise one's voice do.

Why Does Kumrovec Matter?

Kumrovec provides an opportunity to understand and gain knowledge about a society, to explore cultural processes and changes, to discuss change and the continuation of power relations that are often best accessible when approached from the sideline. Kumrovec offers one a glimpse of an ideology that was built through a strong relationship with this place that, with the help of rituals and events such as the Day of Youth, brings people together and provides opportunities to face a past that most other places show no trace of. The Kumrovec experience also provides a glimpse into the difficulties in dealing with a transformation process from one ideology to another, and raises questions about how one can deal more thoroughly with this process by including unwanted, painful and difficult topics.

Using Kumrovec as a model, the researcher can easily think of other political places that have or could have reached back in order to learn from, deal with, and maybe also heal from a troublesome past.

The social processes viewed through current celebrations commemorating past events define remnants of a stigmatized socialist ideology. The places portrayed as deviant matter to the theoretical, outsider's perspective in search of and in comparison with similar transformational phenomena in other transitional countries.

It matters even more from the position of the insider, not only in the sense of learning about one's past, but also in the act of facing it. Integrating the memories from the life under socialism into the fabric of that era's life-story, no matter how gruesome and burdening they may be, leads to a more multifaceted insight into our recent past. It is profoundly unlike the uniform, value-charged notions previously created about the period (during socialism's reign conceived as the "heroic" and the "only right" era, and in the 1990s judged as "the dark ages").

Voicing the "forbidden remembrance" also includes an element of healing, both at the individual and the more general community levels. The need for gathering of very different, often opposing, narratives and personal experiences of the recent past, has become even more obvious in Croatian society. In spite of this need, systematic and politically unbiased research of such "tabooed" topics is still rarely conducted, as a researcher from the Peace Studies Centre in Zagreb points out. She is working on establishing a Documentation Centre, focusing on collecting accurate information about the recent history of Croatia and of ex-Yugoslavia. Even though she believes that things have changed for the better in Croatia when it comes to voicing opinions and generating public debates, there is still a long way to go. She is convinced that there is a need for dealing with this difficult past, and that the process can actually open more potential, energy and creativity for the future. She compares it to something that was frozen and that needs to be opened up and thawed. It is an ongoing process:

> I believe that all can be processed, but it is an ongoing process of dialogue, additional research, it is ongoing process of cultural projects, more theatre performances, more books, and more films. (…) There have been so much talk about history textbooks in Croatia, increasingly they are getting better, and it is not such a horror as it was, although history curriculum is a problem. But then, you know, what will take us very many years is getting rid of this notion of one truth.[66]

Notes

1. Nineteen ethnologists from the University of Zagreb, and one Norwegian from the University of Bergen.
2. Jonas Frykman and Nils Gilje, "Being There: An Introduction," in *Being There: New Perspectives on Phenomenology and the Analysis of Culture*, edited by Jonas Frykman and Nils Gilje (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2003), pp. 7–51.
3. Ilana Bet-El, "Unimagined Communities: the Power of Memory and the Conflict in Former Yugoslavia," in *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe. Studies in the Presence of the Past*, edited by Jan-Werner Müller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 206–222.
4. Edward Casey, "How to Get From Space to Place in a Fairly Short Stretch of Time: Phenomenological Prolegomena" in *Senses of Place*, edited by Steven Feld and Keith H. Basso (Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 1996), pp. 19–46.
5. The term SuperStar(i) is a wordplay, which on the one hand points to Tito's status in popular culture and to his lifestyle, while on the other hand it refers to Tito's nickname used in Kumrovec: Stari—the Old Mate.
6. Gustav Krklec, "Djetinjstvo Josipa Broza," in *Naš Tito* (Zagreb and Rijeka–Opatija: Spektar and Otokar Keršovani, 1980), p. 13.
7. *Vjesnik*, 25/5/1980, *Vjesnik*, daily paper, organ SSRNH, Zagreb; Stefanović, Momčilo, *Titova štafeta mladosti* (Belgrade: NIRO mladost, 1988), pp. 30–32.
8. Ivan Čolović, "On models and batons," in *VlasTito iskustvo past present*, edited by Radonja Leposavić (Belgrade: Samizdat B92, 2004), p. 149.
9. *Vjesnik*, 23/5/1965, *Vjesnik*, daily paper, organ SSRNH, Zagreb; cf. Radovani, Ivana, "Izvještavanje o Danu mladosti. Medijska poruka u povijesnoj perspektivi," in *O Titu kao mitu: Proslava Dana mladosti u Kumrovcu*, edited by Nevena Škrbić Alempijević and Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl (Zagreb: Srednja Europa and FF Press, 2006), p. 425.
10. Ivana Radovani "Izvještavanje o Danu mladosti. Medijska poruka u povijesnoj perspektivi," in *O Titu kao mitu: Proslava Dana mladosti u Kumrovcu*, edited by Nevena Škrbić Alempijević and Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl (Zagreb: Srednja Europa and FF Press, 2006), pp. 425–426.
11. Momčilo Stefanović, *Titova štafeta mladosti* (Belgrade: NIRO mladost, 1988), p. 31.
12. Ivana Radovani, "Izvještavanje o Danu mladosti. Medijska poruka u povijesnoj perspektivi," in *O Titu kao mitu: Proslava Dana mladosti u Kumrovcu*, edited by Nevena Škrbić Alempijević and Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl (Zagreb: Srednja Europa and FF Press, 2006), pp. 419–444.
13. Svetolik Mitić, *Memorial-Park Kumrovec* (Kumrovec and Beograd: BIBZ, 1982).

14. Marijana Gušić, *The Personal Fund of Marijana Gušić,* no. 2428, signature 21/1986, box 4 (Zagreb: Croatian State Archives, 1986), pp. 1–2.
15. Svetolik Mitić, *Memorial-Park Kumrovec* (Kumrovec and Belgrade: BIBZ, 1982), p. 20.
16. Ibid., p. 21.
17. *Vjesnik*, 24 May 1965, p. 1, *Vjesnik*, daily paper, organ SSRNH, Zagreb.
18. Ivana Radovani, "Izvještavanje o Danu mladosti. Medijska poruka u povijesnoj perspektivi," in *O Titu kao mitu: Proslava Dana mladosti u Kumrovcu*, edited by Nevena Škrbić Alempijević and Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl (Zagreb: Srednja Europa and FF Press, 2006), p. 427.
19. Tvrtko Jakovina, "Tito je mladost, mladost je radost," in *O Titu kao mitu: Proslava Dana mladosti u Kumrovcu*, edited by Nevena Škrbić Alempijević and Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl (Zagreb: Srednja Europa and FF Press, 2006), p. 168.
20. Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl, "Slijedeći neke od Titovih putešestvija. Interpretacije transformacija," in *O Titu kao mitu: Proslava Dana mladosti u Kumrovcu*, edited by Nevena Škrbić Alempijević and Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl (Zagreb: Srednja Europa and FF Press, 2006), pp. 49–74.
21. Ibid., pp. 55–56.
22. Marijeta Rajković, "Uspon i pad jednog političkog mjesta iz perspektive lokalnog stanovništva," in *O Titu kao mitu: Proslava Dana mladosti u Kumrovcu*, edited by Nevena Škrbić Alempijević and Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl (Zagreb: Srednja Europa and FF Press, 2006), pp. 121–145.
23. Michael Jackson, "Knowledge of the Body," *Man* (N.S, 18, 1983); Jonas Frykman and Nils Gilje, "Being There: An Introduction," in *Being There: New Perspectives on Phenomenology and the Analysis of Culture*, edited by Jonas Frykman and Nils Gilje (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2003), pp. 7–51.
24. Clifford Geertz, "Thick description: toward an interpretive theory of culture," in *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*, edited by Clifford Geertz (New York: Basic Books, 1972), pp. 3–30; Michael Jackson, "Knowledge of the Body," *Man* (N.S), 18, 1983; Ulf Hannerz, "Being There. … and There. … and There! Reflections on Multi-site Ethnography," *Ethnography* 4 (2003), pp. 229–244.
25. Michael Jackson, "Introduction: Phenomenology, Radical Empiricism, and Anthropological Critique," in *Things As They Are. New Directions in Phenomenological Anthropology*, edited by Michael Jackson (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 1–50; Cecilie B. Neumann and Iver B. Neumann. *Forskeren i forskningsprosessen: en metodebok om situering* (Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk, 2012).
26. Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl and Nevena Škrbić Alempijević, "Uvod. Politička mjesta u transformaciji," in *O Titu kao mitu: Proslava Dana*

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28. Jasna Dasović, "Kreiranje identiteta mjesta" in *O Titu kao mitu: Proslava Dana mladosti u Kumrovcu*, edited by Nevena Škrbić Alempijević and Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl (Zagreb: Srednja Europa and FF Press, 2006), pp. 257–275.
29. Marijana Belaj, "Tito poslije Tita. Kip Josipa Broza kao žarište obrednog ponašanja," in *O Titu kao mitu: Proslava Dana mladosti u Kumrovcu*, edited by Nevena Škrbić Alempijević and Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl (Zagreb: Srednja Europa and FF Press, 2006), pp. 201–219.
30. Petra Kelemen, "'Tko će dobiti bitku na ovim stranicama?' Tekstovi iz knjige utisaka u Titovoj rodnoj kući," in *O Titu kao mitu: Proslava Dana mladosti u Kumrovcu*, edited by Nevena Škrbić Alempijević and Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl (Zagreb: Srednja Europa and FF Press, 2006), pp. 399–418.
31. Nevena Škrbić Alempijević, "'Mi smo folklor.' Kumrovečki pioniri i druge preobrazbe na proslavi Titova 112. Rođendana," in *O Titu kao mitu: Proslava Dana mladosti u Kumrovcu*, edited by Nevena Škrbić Alempijević and Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl (Zagreb: Srednja Europa and FF Press, 2006), pp. 177–199.
32. Tihana Petrović Leš, "Kumrovec, nošnje i Marijana Gušić," in *O Titu kao mitu: Proslava Dana mladosti u Kumrovcu*, edited by Nevena Škrbić Alempijević and Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl (Zagreb: Srednja Europa and FF Press, 2006), pp. 247–255.
33. Robert Šešerko, "'Zar je zbilja Dan mladosti?' Školski glasovi u Kumrovcu," in *O Titu kao mitu: Proslava Dana mladosti u Kumrovcu*, edited by Nevena Škrbić Alempijević and Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl (Zagreb: Srednja Europa and FF Press, 2006), pp. 303–315.
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36. Nenad Kovačić, "Petorica mladih Hrvata putuju u 'dobra stara vremena,'" in *O Titu kao mitu: Proslava Dana mladosti u Kumrovcu*, edited by Nevena Škrbić Alempijević and Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl (Zagreb: Srednja Europa and FF Press, 2006), pp. 317–342.
37. Danijela Birt, "O važnosti mjesta. Odakle svi ti ljudi na Danu mladosti? ," in *O Titu kao mitu: Proslava Dana mladosti u Kumrovcu*, edited by Nevena Škrbić Alempijević and Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl (Zagreb: Srednja Europa and FF Press, 2006), pp. 343–362.
38. Marijeta Rajković, "Uspon i pad jednog političkog mjesta iz perspektive lokalnog stanovništva," in *O Titu kao mitu: Proslava Dana mladosti u Kumrovcu*, edited by Nevena Škrbić Alempijević and Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl (Zagreb: Srednja Europa and FF Press, 2006), pp. 121–145.
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40. Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl, "Slijedeći neke od Titovih putešestvija. Interpretacije transformacija," in *O Titu kao mitu: Proslava Dana mladosti u Kumrovcu*, edited by Nevena Škrbić Alempijević and Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl (Zagreb: Srednja Europa and FF Press, 2006), pp. 49–74.
41. Ivana Radovani, "Izvještavanje o Danu mladosti. Medijska poruka u povijesnoj perspektivi," in *O Titu kao mitu: Proslava Dana mladosti u Kumrovcu*, edited by Nevena Škrbić Alempijević and Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl (Zagreb: Srednja Europa and FF Press, 2006), pp. 419–444.
42. Aleksandra Vlatković, "Tito u Baranji. Dvorac Tikveš, tajnovitost i stvaranje mita," in *O Titu kao mitu: Proslava Dana mladosti u Kumrovcu*, edited by Nevena Škrbić Alempijević and Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl (Zagreb: Srednja Europa and FF Press, 2006), pp. 75–94.
43. Sanja Potkonjak, "Tko želi saslušati? Iskustva sa snimanja i prikazivanja dokumentarnog filma Borovi i jele. Sjećanje žena na život u socijalizmu," in *O Titu kao mitu: Proslava Dana mladosti u Kumrovcu*, edited by Nevena Škrbić Alempijević and Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl (Zagreb: Srednja Europa and FF Press, 2006), pp. 445–468.
44. Tvrtko Jakovina, "Tito je mladost, mladost je radost," in *O Titu kao mitu: Proslava Dana mladosti u Kumrovcu*, edited by Nevena Škrbić Alempijević and Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl (Zagreb: Srednja Europa and FF Press, 2006), pp. 165–176.
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46. Nevena Škrbić Alempijević, "'Mi smo folklor.' Kumrovečki pioniri i druge preobrazbe na proslavi Titova 112. Rođendana," in *O Titu kao mitu: Proslava Dana mladosti u Kumrovcu*, edited by Nevena Škrbić Alempijević and Kirsti Mathiesen Hjemdahl (Zagreb: Srednja Europa and FF Press, 2006), pp. 177–199.
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54. Dubravka Ugrešić, *The Culture of Lies: Antipolitical Essays.* (London: Phoenix, 1999), p. 133.
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Resić and Barbara Törnquist-Plewa (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2002) p. 205.

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CHAPTER 7

"Yugo-vintage?"—Preserving and Creating Memory Through Clothing

Mitja Velikonja

Pioneer uniforms in music videos. Partisan apparel on concert stages. Tito on teenagers' T-shirts. Protesters wrapped in socialist banners. A red five-pointed star on a wide brim cowboy hat. A military medic bag over a hipster's shoulder. Performers in popular entertainment shows dressed in old construction worker blue overalls. Newly sewn "Triglavka" partisan caps at state celebrations. Slovenia in 1975? No, in 2013. This is precisely what I am going to focus on in this study: frequently recurring phenomena from contemporary Slovene clothing culture that are, in various ways and in different circumstances, related to socialist Yugoslavia.[1] As such, the study falls under my broader research interest in post-socialist nostalgia in its both sentimental and emancipatory aspect, and global retro aesthetics. So, I am not going to focus on reconsidering Yugoslav socialist decades—I am leaving that important task to historians. Instead, my ambition is to track and analyse "untold stories" from those times as they appear and develop here and now, in post-Yugoslav and post-socialist transition. As in other cases of imposed amnesia and demonization of the past, its missing parts soon start to pop out in fields of popular and consumer culture, in art and design, but also on the alternative and in the oppositional political discourses.

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In my case, part of the delicate past that is "untold" in contemporary political discourses is actually worn. In other words, I have decided to address the issue, why wearing clothes, or merely particular items of clothing, bearing clear, unambiguous associations to former socialist and Yugoslav times, occurs. Why is it that younger, post-Yugoslav generations today, also, or even primarily, wear clothes that used to be part of compulsory apparel (e.g. pioneer and military uniforms) on their own accord? What are the cultural specifics of this contemporary "Yugo-style," and, first and foremost, what is its ideological meaning and political relevance today, reaching from its pure entertainment potential to clear-cut critique of contemporary society? Are we dealing with mere pop-cultural travesty or "tolerated subversion," or with an actual, radical political gesture? Or maybe even both, together? If fashion is about "visualization of the self," what is the self that "Yugo-vintage," as I name them, clothes create/express?

I have decided to scrutinize, from the perspective of cultural studies, all clothes, in one way or another related to political signifiers of *those times*. Collecting relevant material was no trouble, as it is fairly standard: military, partisan and pioneer uniforms (from caps and bags to tall socks/woollen partisan socks and white pioneer knee-socks), construction worker overalls, sports uniforms of the Yugoslav national teams or of the main (mainly soccer) clubs, SFRY or Socialist Republic of Slovenia flags, T-shirts featuring Tito, the Yugoslav herald or the red star, "fashion accessories" (red stars, medals, pioneer badges, brooches), clothes worn by Tito (and Jovanka's) impersonators, slippers with hammer and sickle motifs sewn onto them, socks with pictures of Tito, and so on. Often, they appear together with other elements characteristic of that era, such as hairstyles (pioneer, military, those from pop culture or sports tracks, e.g. from the 1970s), dances (*kolo*), and appearances (marching, saluting, military formation, leaders' addressing crowds). I followed their appearances in the media (print, electronic; articles, interviews, statements, photographs, videos), examined promotional material of Yugo-nostalgic bands and various invitations. I was also interested in gatherings and celebrations, attended by people dressed in such fashion (from concert halls to protests). I have, intensively and systematically, been collecting material for this study for the past three or four years, and numerous older items have also been included.

Similarly to my previous studies of collective memory and nostalgias, I analyse the material of this study by applying two interrelated

methodological approaches: "top-down" analysis, that is (materialized) discourses of producers and advocates of this dressing style, and "bottom-up" mentality patterns and convictions of Yugo-vintage wearers. To do so, I approached the subject matter in several ways: with visual (semiotic analysis of visual discourse), and "barefoot" cultural studies methods (participant observation at concerts, demonstrations, as well as in mundane circumstances, on the streets[2]), and discourse analysis of this type of clothing producers', consumers', and commentators' statements. I focused on the style's presence in Slovenia, but have also compared it to that in other regions of the former federation.

I conceive of Yugoslavia-related fashion and have researched it in three main, tightly interwoven contexts: culturo-aesthetic, politico-ideological, and performative. First, it is undoubtedly an aspect of global fashion and designer trends of retro and vintage cultures, various revivals, and also—in post-socialist Eastern Europe—"red nostalgia," that is, bittersweet remembrance of *the good old times under socialism*. Beside its sentimental, introverted, fatalistic, and mimetic sides, we can speak also about its active, engaged, subversive, and emancipatory sides. As a rule, nostalgia always functions as a severe critique of the present-day state of affairs.[3]

Second, I also conceive of and research it in its broader current political and ideological context: life in the Slovene nation-state with dominant neoliberal and nationalist ideologies, and no longer in the Yugoslav federation with its multicultural and socialist ideology. And third, such a clothing style cannot be analysed regardless of a whole spectre of performative activities and occasions that it is practiced on nostalgic celebration of formerly common holidays, Yu-rock concerts, entertainment shows, anti-governmental protests, certain official state celebrations and partisan festivities, carnivals, and smaller subversions on the level of everyday life.

Theoretical Starting Points

I approached the topic from three theoretical premises: Bauman's theory of cloakroom communities, vintage culture researches, and the theory of new modernism, or "metamodernism." Let us proceed in that order.

Sociology classic Zygmunt Bauman categorizes "cloakroom" (or "carnival") communities as "explosive communities"; just like new identities, these communities are "volatile, transient and single-aspect or single-purpose"[4] and should be understood in the context of isolated existence of individuals in "liquid modernity." He foregrounds their compensatory

and escapist nature: as such, they "offer temporary respite from the agonies of daily solitary struggles, from the tiresome condition of individuals *de jure* persuaded or forced to pull themselves out of their troublesome problems by their own bootstraps" and "allow the revellers better to endure the routine to which they must return the moment the frolicking is over."[5] In contemporary society, we encounter periodic following of strictly defined dress codes, which differ from everyday ones, practically on every step: from Halloween festivities, various theme parties (rockabilly, Goth, or pyjama parties) and celebrations (military, religious, or party events) to subcultural events.[6]

Second, vintage culture links and interweaves three aesthetic principles: originality, retro, and repro. In contrast to second-hand culture (and shops), which is explicitly non-selective and takes anything from the past, vintage is more fastidious, demanding, complex and, in consequence, more expensive: It only agrees to selected items, which have already acquired cult status in the time of their emergence, and either preserves them as they are, that is, old (originality), or reproduces them (repro), or develops them (retro). Vintage culture in interior design, furniture, food and drink packaging, graphic design, and, of course, fashion, picks out only certain aesthetic trends or products (e.g. floral structures from the hippie era, leather from the rock subculture, or torn up cloths from punk). Everything is focused around certain old elements, regardless of whether they come out as original, newly made, or upgraded in this vintage culture.

Let me explain these three principles in more detail. Contemporary design researcher Elizabeth Guffey describes retro as a "non-historical way of knowing the past," which, as such, perceives idealized images of the past, which are engrained in nostalgic yearnings, "with a heavy dose of cynicism or detachment"; according to her, it has "non-serious and subversive instincts."[7] New York connoisseur of various "retromanias" Stephen Reynolds categorizes the main traits of retro in the following way: (1) "is always about the relatively immediate past," (2) "involves an element of exact recall" this past, (3) "generally involves the artifacts of popular culture," and (4) "it tends neither to idealise nor sentimentalise the past, but seeks to be amused and charmed by it."[8] Fruzsina Müller, researcher of Hungarian retro trademarks, particularly Tizsa sports footwear, originating from socialist times, also distinguishes retro from nostalgia: "while retro stands for a kind of fashion trend, the concept of nostalgia signs a personal feeling."[9] The repro principle is present in replicas of old

products, which attempt to follow the originals as much as possible: it is about "reproducing the old pretty much as it was, albeit meanings may have changed in the meantime."[10] Then there are also old, original items, that is, well-preserved things from the old times, which have survived in dusty closets or are available at flea markets, in antique shops, and online.

In terms of aesthetics, it is of course retro that is the most propulsive. It takes the past merely as a creative starting point, and upgrades it with new techniques and elements. In contrast to repro, which I define as "old new," and originals, which are simply "old," retro is "new old": former aesthetics is discernible, but reformed, upgraded, renewed.[11] Retro's aesthetic and ideological guideline is irony: for Guffey, "half-ironic, half-longing, 'retro' considers the recent past with an unsentimental nostalgia"[12]; and for Reynolds, its approach "is not scholarly and purist but ironic and eclectic."[13] It is also necessary to point to retro aesthetics' quiet politicality. It emerges in circumstances when it seems that the "better future" has already passed.[14] It never refers to some faraway past, but to the near (early) modern one. It returns and wittily transforms aesthetics from the times of progress and modernization, equipped with a future, recognition, charge. In our case, we are naturally speaking of the times of socialism and Yugoslavia. Where this "past with a future"—as is the case in post-socialism—is a politically delicate topic, retro aesthetics benefits even more, as it is bound not to go unnoticed.

And of the third theoretical premise, I am convinced that, over the past two decades, it has become impossible to comprehend contemporary Western culture merely with the theory of postmodernism. The fall of the Berlin Wall, the unexpected boom of contemporary communications, terrorist threats and ecological catastrophes, global poverty, corporatism of contemporary societies, new socialities and cyberworlds, and various *ends* (of history, ideology, the nation, the subject, art, society) call for a new theoretical grapple. Young Dutch cultural studies scholars Timotheus Vermeulen and Robin van den Akker have coined an appropriate term: "metamodernism," which can be characterized as an "oscillation between a typically modern commitment and a markedly postmodern detachment": it "oscillates between a modern enthusiasm and a postmodern irony, between hope and melancholy, between naiveté and knowingness, empathy and apathy, unity and plurality, totality and fragmentation, purity and ambiguity."[15] Metamodernist discourse is "inspired by a modern naiveté yet informed by postmodern skepticism," it hence "commits itself to an impossible possibility."[16]

Their lucid conceptualisation and derivation, however, remain slightly unfinished: They define metamodernism as an oscillation, an intermediate state, a tension *between* the extremes of modernism and postmodernism. Only once do they note that it is about a connection, "a double-bind."[17] It is precisely at this point that I would like to upgrade their theory—the point of connection between one *and* the other. Metamodernist aesthetics and culture in general, to my mind, unite the first *and* the second, modernism *and* postmodernism. Various aforementioned aspects of contemporary vintage culture demonstrate series of pairs of extremes, pointed to by the authors—projection and perception, form and formlessness, coherence and chaos, viciousness and innocence, permanence and passage, past and future, sincerity and indifference, existential anxiety and hedonistic ecstasy, engagement and resignation, unity and plurality, technological automatism and human autonomy, *ends* of history, ideology, and so on and their beginnings, which are all innovatively united into new artefacts. In my view, we are therefore not only looking at oscillations, "an unsuccessful negotiation, between two opposite poles,"[18] at an impossibility to connect them. Quite the opposite: The cases under scrutiny demonstrate how their connections, synergies, seemingly incompatible creation of new-on-old foundations, obsession with creative repetition, and upgrading something that already existed once emerge.[19] Metamodernist aesthetics has the face of the ancient Roman god Janus, gazing into both the past and future. But it is only possible to tell which of his gazes—backward or forward—is more resolute, once he is actually contextualized within the structures of domination or resistance.

Yugo-Vintage—Characteristics and Classification

Let us begin with some introductory characteristics of this fashion style. Its *origins* are very diverse: some of it is original (old uniforms, flags, honours) yet new, repro or retro items are much more frequent. The latter may either be mass-produced ready-made clothes sold by industrious salesmen,[20] online or at street stands (e.g. T-shirts, plastic brooches with the contours of SFRY, metal ones with pictures of Tito and the herald), or part of campaigns of certain groups (such as students of Velenje who printed the star and the slogan *Titovo Velenje*/Tito's Velenje/onto a series of T-shirts, or students from Ljubljana whose T-shirts bore the words *A smo se za to boril?*/Is this what we fought for?/and a picture of a partisan soldier), or costumes for public performances (choirs, Tito's

impersonators, Yugo-nostalgic bands, starlets), or DIY clothes (embroideries featuring socialist signs) or even improvisations (such as wrapping oneself in a banner). Furthermore, the style is gender, socially, and generationally *undetermined*: the examples demonstrate that such clothes are, for various reasons and on varying occasions, worn by the elderly and by the young, by females and males, pop performers and anonymous agents, posers and subverters. Yugo-vintage is *not a totalizing* style: perfect reproduction or wearing full original outfits (as is the case at partisan celebrations where midshipmen are in *full military uniform*) is very rare. In most cases, it is materialized in one clothing item, a detail, an accessory, a badge or something similar, which makes it fairly discreet, yet at the same time notable enough. It is hence guided by the principle of eclecticism, rather than by that of mimesis, by partiality rather than totality. Further, *performative nature* is another distinguishing characteristic of the style: "visitors to a spectacle dress for the occasion, abiding by a sartorial code distinct from those codes they follow daily."[21] This dressing style can be noticed at official events (festivities, marches) and at unofficial events (demonstrations), in popular culture (concerts, videos, entertainment shows), in consumer culture (advertisements, invitations), at parties (carnivals, nostalgic, or trade union parties), and, to a lesser extent, also as a perfectly everyday street outfit (e.g. wearing "cult" medic bags of the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA), T-shirts with ex-Yugoslav themes) At certain events, it is the preferred dress code.[22]

I shall continue with a short description and classification of Yugo-vintage clothes, based on the distinction between original/retro/repro aesthetic principles outlined above. Let us begin with *original items*, that is, those from the old days. Parts of preserved partisan uniforms may be seen at various partisan celebrations and anniversaries or at protest gatherings, and are worn by partisan veterans. Clothes from the near past are much more frequent: parts of Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) uniforms, pioneer caps and scarves were also noted at Yugo-nostalgic celebrations, anti-system demonstrations in 2012 and 2013, at parties, in the outfits of retro music bands, and so on. They are worn by both old partisans and young partygoers, by the leftists and children, brought along by their (grand)parents and equipped with pioneer caps and scarves. A few protesters at the above-mentioned demonstrations were dressed in flags of socialist Yugoslavia and socialist Slovenia, with the red five-pointed star. Aside from those wearing such clothes, the latter are also of interest to salesmen of antiques and era-enthusiasts.[23]

Original items are much rarer than *repro items*, "original reproductions," new editions of old clothes. As it goes for all simulacra, these copies are "better," "more perfect," "more authentic" than the originals themselves. New "Triglavka" caps—caps with three tips, traditionally worn by Slovene partisans—are sewn anew for celebrations like the aforementioned. Some are faithful reproductions of the originals, with a red star, while others add the Slovene tricolour to it. New-old worker outfits, overalls, also appear in certain skits and music videos where *the good old times* are hailed in a *lumpenproletariat* way.[24] Various impersonators of Tito—actor Ivo Godnič being the most famous one—wear replicas of his Marshal clothes, most often the white uniform, honours, and sunglasses. Their female companions, "Jovankas," also wear clothes as Jovanka used to wear.

What prevails, however, are of course *retro* clothes, mixing the most typical elements of former uniforms and signifiers of the former state and system with those from contemporary popular cultures, fashion trends, and erotics. Here, highly contrasting red and black is the most frequently used colour combination. T-shirts featuring Tito[25] or statements such as *Moj nono je bil partizan* (My grandpa was a partisan), *Vstajenje Primorske* (The Rising of Primorska region), *SFRJ* (SFRY), *Titovo Velenje* (Tito's Velenje), and various proletarian motives are a typical example, worn by certain musicians, and youngsters on the street alike. Carmina Slovenica choir members held performances wearing indefinable combinations of pioneer and partisan uniforms.[26] On the streets of Ljubljana, I noticed a biker wearing a black *stahlhelm*—which has cult status in this subculture—that is, a German helmet worn in the two world wars, but with a red star drawn at the front. A student of design in fairly hipster apparel that I also encountered on the streets had a deliberately awkward tribute to Tito sewn to the front of her long black shirt with a bold red thread.[27] To quote Jenss, "new bodies and new technologies give old styles a new look."[28]

The retro principle is also evident from unselective mixes of dressing elements from the times of the partisans and the Yugoslav army to the army-look style.[29] The Rock Partyzans band featured elements of Russian and US uniforms, and not "their" partisan ones, at their performance the Slovene Eurovision candidates contest, Ema, in 2011. Two of the most Yu-rock bands in Slovenia—the above-mentioned Rock Partyzans and Zakloniščе prepeva—split the partisan look into rock'n'roll attires at their concerts, as well as in videos and promotional material: the "partisan" has a guitar instead of a gun, the rocker looks Cheguevaresque (with a barrette, free long hair, a star), and the "pioneer girl" wears a red tar-

tan skirt or erotic rubberwear.[30] Erotic fetishization of women in military uniforms reminiscent of the YPA (e.g. at last year's "hat picnic" of *Lady* magazine, in a blog post for *Republic Day*—naturally, as it was celebrated in former Yugoslavia,[31] or at an invitation to a student *authentic Yu-rock party* in Companeros club in autumn 2012). Complete sexualisation of female "pioneers" and "soldiers" is often the end result.[32]

Yugo-vintage clothing culture that connects these three aesthetic principles is hence centred around the most basic political signifiers of former socialist Yugoslavia, such as its uniforms, symbols, and colours (and, to a lesser extent, around cuts, patterns, clothes colours, or hairstyles from those times). As such, it has distinct ideological and political dimensions: It is not surprising that many Yugo-nostalgic events are often immediately categorized as "vintage."[33]

Analysis and Interpretation

Yugo-vintage is both a fashion and a political phenomenon, but is it at the same time neither the first nor the second entirely. It can be explained through several interwoven levels and perspectives: clothing culture, fashion trends, gender roles, and, finally, ideology.

From the point of view of clothing culture, it appears that we are dealing with a distinct and focused style, consisting of an array of partisan, pioneer, military and worker elements of dress that are mixed with those from contemporary popular culture and subcultures. A fashion style is a relatively stable way of dressing, marked by strictly defined signifiers (e.g. the Western/film/style, punk or heavy-metal, art *nouveau* styles). "Styles exist independent of fashion," argue fashion researchers Marilyn J. Horn and Lois M. Gurel, "they may be very unfashionable, seen perhaps only in history books."[34] Trieste art critic and theorist Gillo Dorfles defines style as an "idea movement (and not simply a design or figurative aspect), which is actualised in a certain artistic structure and also suits strictly defined socio-economic and cultural reasons."[35]

Thus, style is a relatively static mode of dressing, which resists the insane pace of fashion trends. Fashion, on the other hand, is volatile: it "represents the popular, accepted, prevailing style at any given time," and is "further characterized by its cyclical nature, that is, the gradual rise, high point, and eventual decline in the popular acceptance of a style."[36] Certainly, fashion styles are not monolithic or invariable; they endure upgrades and updates, get replayed, hybridized, caught into sense and

meaning revaluations, and eclectic "anything goes" practices. Jenss uses youth retro cultures to tellingly explain, how "they combine elements from the past with the contemporary, and (maybe unconsciously) they tend to focus on the eye-catching, 'groovy' fashions."[37] Yugo-style is then where pioneer white shirts meet erotic underwear, old YPA uniforms face guitars, socialist flags act as mantles for those holding anti-governmental posters in their hands, fashion accessories such as the US flag go hand in hand with partisan songs, worker overalls, and metal leather bracelets with metallic rivets stand by the side of red Hello Kitty bows in Tito's hair on a T-shirt that says "Hello Titto."

Yugo-vintage links two main fashion tendencies into a double, social, and aesthetic loop. Social in the sense of "unification and segregation": According to sociology classic Georg Simmel, "fashion represents nothing more than one of the many forms of life by the aid of which we seek to combine in uniform spheres of activity the tendency toward social equalization with the desire for individual differentiation and change."[38] As for aesthetic tendencies, it touches upon fashion's aesthetic variability and conservativeness: Dorfles argues that fashion "continuously reconstructs its canons (if I may call them so) and its structures," and at the same time typically "it supports everything that has been already institutionalized."[39] The Yugo-clothing style erodes and challenges dominant dressing discourses (e.g. global fashion trends, national costumes, yuppie outfits, *petit bourgeois chic*, and middle class *prêt-à-porter*); on the other hand, it efficiently incorporates itself into them as yet another possible dressing niche, as a part of alternative vintage fashion. The reason for dressing in such fashion remains the same: because most people do not.

Yugo-vintage is also unique *from the point of view of current fashion trends*. Its use of emphatic political signifiers distinguishes it from vintage fashion, popular today, and such aesthetics in general.[40] The latter is, in fact, one of the two aesthetic foundations of hipster culture, popular today.[41] The regular vintage look in Slovenia typically draws from old times, affirming wardrobe elements from, for example the seventies or eighties, which are, however, not necessarily related to Yugoslavia,[42] but often to then popular Western fashion trends, which Yugoslav trends also adhered to. Furthermore, Yugoslav vintage that we analyse here, also differs from contemporary *čefur* (pejorative term used for immigrants from other republics of ex-Yugoslavia) fashion in Slovenia, reaching from Pink TV aesthetics to tracksuit culture (in Slovenian chauvinist discourse, "tracksuit" is one of the symbols of čefurs). It expresses its political stance unambiguously

and directly, with symbols (the star, the herald), colours (red, blue, white, *GOC*[43]), and cuts (uniform): its commitment to Yugoslavia, socialism, and the partisan times. We are hence dealing with more than merely a new version of politically neutral vintage style: these clothes immediately reveal that one is a "partisan," a "pioneer girl," "Tito," and so on. Whether the stance is serious or just for fun is another question, which shall be addressed in the conclusion.

This dressing style (old items, repro, retro) is original, autochthonous, authentic: it does not exist anywhere outside of post-socialist societies. It therefore contributes to the wearers' sense of self-worth: they feel they possess something that only belongs to them, which is unique; something, they can hold proud in the world of uniform super-brands of fashion multinational corporations—regardless of delicate political connotations it bears.[44] This is particularly evident from the practice of wearing (parts of) former uniforms, which, in the terms of researcher Bill Dunn, are by definition a "dress to impress": They "helped to engender a feeling of pride in one's country and one's cause."[45] With a bit of irony, one could say that this clothing style is thus of "our controlled origin."

But let's return to retro. What is more important than its nostalgic gaze into the past is its transformation into something new, original, something that only we possess, into a welcome local novelty amidst the globalized world. The emphasis thus lies in creating something new, not merely reawakening the old: in the times of Yugoslavia, soldiers did not go rock 'n' roll crazy, female pioneers did not pose for men's magazines or websites half naked, and Tito did not do guest appearances on entertainment TV shows. It is a replica of something that one would obviously like to have seen in the past, a fabrication of the old, in no way related to the actual state of affairs back then. In the words of postmodernism critic Fredric Jameson, it is "the identical copy for which no original has ever existed"[46]; in Jenss' view, it is "retrofake."[47] In this particular case, memory is not dressed; rather, dress is used to create memory.

From the viewpoint of gender roles, this new Yugo-style is pronouncedly conservative. If one considers innovation according to gender, a dichotomy, present elsewhere, surfaces: female clothes demonstrate much greater variation, audacity, and hybridity than male. Representations of femininity and masculinity are even more telling: contemporary "partisan girls" have now been turned into beauties, stripped of much of their clothes, and the same goes for "pioneer girls" (once girls aged from 7 to 14—those of today are more reminiscent of a Yugo-nostalgic version

of US cheerleaders or Japanese so called *Lolita* girl subculture). It is in this typically patriarchal manner that they are represented in videos, at concerts (as beautifully dressed background to the male protagonist, so as his decorative accessory), and on various invitations (as seductive hostesses or companions). The following statement of the Rock Partyzans' ex-singer fits into this spirit: *If my boyfriend wanted me to wear underwear and a partisan cap, why not?*[48] The distinction between modestly dressed men and (completely) sexualised women is part of new traditional and Balkanist patriarchal discourse of *tough men and comely women*.[49] In brief, uniforms and the generally unisex dressing patterns, practiced in the times of the partisans and Yugoslavia, and then synonymic of female emancipation and their escape from traditional, submissive definitions of femininity, are eroticised with provocative cuts and fetishist attire. Yugo-style (un) dressed girls are mostly passivized, and hence turned into mere objects of masculine desire. Naked aesthetization or eroticisation triumphs over original, revolutionary contents.

The most difficult question is then, of course, how does this dressing mode, explicitly linked to Yugoslavia, to be understood *from the angle of ideology*. Is it a critique of the current state of affairs or is it its extra legitimation? The answer should account for the inherent ambivalence of such discourses, as elaborated by the theory of metamodernism. The ideology of these clothes is broad and multi-layered, their meaning dependent on the context, as well as on their production and reception, that is, on the connotations, inscribed into them by the producers and those wearing them, as well as on the denotations, deciphered by the audience. To me, they offer strong symbolic expression of opposition to contemporary neoliberal and nationalist culture (partisan uniforms at celebrations, flags with the five-pointed star at protests, proletarian and Yugoslav symbols, embroidered, sewn onto, drawn, printed or attached onto clothes, and so on—they were not displayed in public since the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia), as well as acceptance of it, its corporative logic of accommodating all opposites (Yugo-vintage as merely a new, "pop-revolutionary" fashion niche, e.g. for Slovene Yu-rock bands or Tito impersonators), as well as its new patriarchy ("playgirls" might as well wear pioneer and partisan uniforms, too).

On the one hand, we are hence dealing with neutralization of Yugoslav, partisan, socialist symbolism—and, consequently, ideas–its commercial and ideological incorporation. Stars, Triglavka caps, and uniforms are totally aestheticized or even eroticised, and thence reduced to slightly

controversial—and hence ever more attractive—difference. Instead of functioning as symbolic opposition to discourses of power, they supplement them, become their approved extension: to put it in direct terms, the existent state of affairs is supported through domesticated oppositions. Yugo-vintage is therefore reduced to merely a mode of retro-chic, a sort of pleasant, painless provocation. The spectacle these cloakroom communities need, according to Bauman, "do not fuse and blend individual concerns into 'group interest'; by being added up, the concerns in question do not acquire a new quality, and the illusion of sharing that the spectacle may generate would not last much longer than the excitement of the performance."[50]

Everything is thus reduced to mild, painless, relaxing, commoditised provocation that arouses a fake sentiment of revolutionarity, and in the end merely reproduces domination of neoliberal and nationalist ideologies and their institutions (which are generated precisely through incorporating differences and tolerated subversions). Yugo-vintage adds a Yu- note to the existing system, which then loses ground and axis through irony, sexualisation, spectacularization, and clear limitation to spheres of culture, clothing, and fashion only. In other words: everything is allowed, as long as it remains limited to the stage, videos, or celebrations. Such clothes are usually not worn every day: it is really more about "cloakroom communities," which "derive power not from their expected duration, but, paradoxically, from their precariousness and uncertain future, from the vigilance and emotional investment that their brittle existence vociferously demands."[51] New revolutionaries, on the other hand, have a different taste—they express their credo with different clothes.

It is the "transitional Left," which is ever keener on the style—a colourful bunch of Slovene liberals, and, according only to their name, "social democrats"—in their performative ideological confrontations with their political opposition from the Right (with which they actually share their ideological background of neoliberalism and nationalism). Namely, they show up at ever more popular events, commemorating the times of the partisans and socialism, wearing either shades of red (skirts, ties, scarves),[52] or clothes with political signifiers of those times (e.g. on T-shirts). In this regard, Yugo-clothes are an aspect of their political populism.

On the other hand—parallel to this ideological, popular cultural, and commercial suction into dominant discourses and practices—emancipatory effects that wearing such clothes or accessories, and not merely on specific occasions, dedicated to anti-governmental critique

(demonstrations, partisan celebrations), should not be ignored. To put it bluntly, it is not all just about playing dress up. Yugo-vintage expresses different standpoints and values from those dominant today. It affirms a historical period and values that dominant discourses mostly evaluate in negative terms (anti-fascism, social justice, equal rights): the more these values are attempted to be compromised and demonized, the more often these clothes appear in public. The style establishes analogies with the past at points where it looks better than the present (the rebelliousness of the partisans and rock 'n' roll, female sexual emancipation in socialism, resistance to conventional worldviews and fashion). In the world of raging individualism and competitiveness, they once again foreground communitarianism, that is, a sense of belonging (for Dunn "nothing sums up the power of 'us' better than a uniform").[53] And, last but not least, they offer a dose of emancipatory humour: parody imitations of the past (in) directly criticize the present. It is, therefore, not just about harmless fun, but about performative and spectacular use of particular, ideologically strongly "contaminated" signs that irritate the authorities. Indeed, it is very different to "dress up" as a partisan than a cowboy, a vampire, or a hippie. Conceiving of Yugo-style in the critical manner that I developed in previous paragraphs, it is necessary to be aware of its inherent multitude of meanings, and various, even radically opposing, socio-critical potentials and effects.

This same travesty is a sort of—to use a phrase, particularly fortunate in relation to this context—a "red cloth" over dominant discourses and institutions, symbolizing their opposite. They represent a clear and decisive critique of the present condition from the standpoint of the superior past—in this case, Yugoslav and socialist. Subversive elements and, at the same moment, emancipative potentials of Yugo-nostalgia cannot be ignored also in other spheres of contemporary popular culture, for example in music.[54] It is therefore not surprising that clothes and accessories, related to Yugoslavia, the partisans, and socialism, have become part of the visual appearance of certain protesters at the last demonstrations against the ruling system that took place from autumn 2012 to spring 2013 (and at many others, e.g. student, workers' and anti-fascist ones[55]): dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs was also expressed by wearing T-shirts with Yugoslav and revolutionary motives, partisan and pioneer caps, wrapping up in former banners, and attaching red five-pointed stars to clothes.

Conclusion: Fashion's Political (Im)potency

Let me conclude by answering the introductory questions: What are the cultural breadth and ideological depth of these, Yugoslavia-related clothes? Do they take more of an apologetic or a critical stance regarding the current situation, or both? Are they consumer and popular cultural resistance—and/or resistance against consumerism, popular culture, and dominant ideologies? A question of ethics or aesthetics?

In a symbolic sense, Yugo-vintage erodes dominant fashion concepts and practices trying to cling onto remaining within the field of aesthetics, and not politics. If someone publicly wears a red five-pointed star or part of the YPA's uniform, it is simply impossible to keep pretending it is "just clothes" and that the gesture is politically neutral—whether the items' producers and wearers are aware of it or not, willing to admit it or not, having fun or being serious. In any case, it is no longer just a fashion challenge, as the challenge, in a way, becomes political. Doubtless, political connotation inhibits aesthetic distance.[56] It is not just a "different" way of dressing, nor is it merely a phenomenon of transtemporal "sampling" of cultures, aesthetics, and fashion styles. It is, rather, a strong and very direct symbolic sign of opposition to the existing state of affairs, first and foremost the ideologies and practices of nationalism and neoliberalism. The extra pleasure in wearing these clothes derives precisely from their impossible position: Yugo-vintage is too political for fashion, and too fashionable for politics.

The broader significance of the style lies between the extremes of pop-leftism or the tolerated, entertaining transgression, and radical symbolic opposition to the politics and ideology in power today. In itself, it is neither revolutionary nor conservative: as a purely aesthetic—in this case, fashion—form, it does not destroy or strengthen the situation. Taking it as such would leave me at the level of metamodern interrelated duality of painless simulation, and, at the same time, profound provocation, a state, which is "a bit of a joke, yet also slightly serious," or, in Rancière's words, "equivalence between parody *as* critique and parody *of* critique."[57] An undefinable "both," that is. Personally, I consider the subversive/apologetic attitude of this mode of dressing to be dependent on which form (the dominance of aesthetic form or political contents), in which contexts (popular culture or protests against the system), in which way (as passive décor or an active call for action), with which purpose (commercial or political profit, or not), and within which structures (dominant or

marginal) it appears. It depends whether it serves the powers in authority or the powers resisting this authority; submission or emancipation; statics or dynamics; pure aesthetization of the situation or its (aesthetic) critique. Whether it is about spectacle, mesmerizing the crowds, providing them with aesthetic and/or nostalgic pleasure (and of course an extra profit for its producers), or a different kind of spectacle—one that uses emancipatory shock and exhibitionism to criticize the current situation and develop alternatives. In other words: a red five-pointed star, a rebel's uniform, or a proletarian banner only really become subversive when—or if—their carriers step down from the concert stage, out of Yugo-nostalgic videos, retro parties, partisan celebrations, tolerated, and even encouraged provocations of everyday fashion, into the real political arena. There, clothes themselves then lose all importance.

Notes

1. Slovenian version of the text is published in a book about fashion in Slovenia, edited by Elena Fajt and Maruša Pušnik, in 2014.
2. At times, this resulted in quasi-comical situations, such as racing after someone dressed in this style, to take a useful photo, or approaching people on the street to find out their motives for wearing a certain piece of clothing.
3. For the results of my fieldwork on emancipatory Yugo-nostalgia in Bosnia-Herzegovina, see "Between Collective Memory and Political Action: Yugonostalgia in Bosnia-Herzegovina," in *Bosnia-Herzegovina Since Dayton: Civic and Uncivic Values*, eds. Ola Listhaug and Sabrina P. Ramet (Ravenna: Longo Editore, 2013a), pp. 351–368.
4. Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press and Blackwell Publishing, 2000), p. 199.
5. Ibid., p. 201.
6. In the narrower centres of subcultures, this phenomenon is mockingly labelled *weekending*, that is, only adhering to a subculture *on the weekends*, *for kicks*, *to maintain an appearance*.
7. Elizabeth Guffey, *Retro—The Culture of Revival* (London: Reaktion Books, 2006), pp. 14, 20.
8. Stephen Reynolds, *Retromania—Pop Culture's Addiction to Its Own Past* (London: Faber and Faber, 2011), p. xxx.
9. Fruzsina Müller, "Retro Fashion, Nostalgia and National Consciousness—Success of a Revived Shoe Brand from Socialist Hungary," in *N/Osztalgia—Ways of Revisting the Socialist Past*, ed. Isabella Willinger (Budapest, Berlin: Anthropolis, Rejs e.V, 2007), p. 36.

10. Stephen Brown, "Retro-marketing: Yesterday's Tomorrows, Today!" *Marketing Intelligence & Planning*, vol. 17, no. 7 (1999): p. 365.
11. Let me demonstrate the difference between these three principles and products by an example from the automobile industry, with the cult Volkswagen *Beetle*: it is possible to encounter renovated old specimens from the 1950s (originals), replicas of these old cars, constructed by the crafty hands of mechanics and polishers (repro), and, as of 1997, its new derivatives, *new Beetles* (retro).
12. Elizabeth Guffey, *Retro—The Culture of Revival* (London: Reaktion Books, 2006), pp. 10, 11.
13. Stephen Reynolds, *Retromania—Pop Culture's Addiction to Its Own Past* (London: Faber and Faber, 2011), pp. xxx, xxxi.
14. Guffey states that "retro past is also implicitly linked with loss of faith in the future" (*Retro*, p. 22), and German retro fashion researcher Jenss maintains that retro is to be understood as "a consequence as well as a compensation of modernization" ("Dressed in History: Retro Styles and the Construction of Authenticity in Youth Culture," *Fashion Theory*, letn. 8, št. 4/2004/: p. 398).
15. Timotheus Vermeulen and Robin van den Akker, "Notes on Metamodernism," *Journal of Aesthetics and Culture*, no. 2 (2010): pp. 2, 5,6.
16. Most of the authors' examples come from the world of contemporary visual arts. However, the theory of metamodernism reaches to various fields of contemporary production and existence, from architecture, art, music, film, television, to literature, fashion, Internet cultures, economics, politics, and theory. See: http://www.metamodernism.com/category/theory/.
17. "The metamodern is constituted by the tension, no, the double-bind, of a modern desire for sense and a postmodern doubt about the sense of it all" (Vermeulen, Van den Akker, "Notes on Metamodernism," p. 6). Here, let me point out that I am very well aware of the lack of theoretical clarity of the very concepts of modernism and postmodernism: practically every researcher touching upon them conceptualizes and defines them in (slightly) different terms. Yet, it is possible to discern several basic premises from these definitions—common denominators for one and the other, which Vermeulen and Van der Akker's metamodernist theoretical upgrade refers to as well.
18. Timotheus Vermeulen and Robin van den Akker, "Notes on Metamodernism," *Journal of Aesthetics and Culture*, no. 2, (2010): p. 7.
19. For instance, look at the hyperinflation of re- terms in contemporary societies: recycling, remake, retro, repro, revival, return, reproduction, reconstruction, retrospective, reinterpretation, reinvention, renovation,

rearticulation, *reunion*, revision, recreation, *reconnection* (a healing technique), retrogardism, reaccreditation, *re-enactments*, *re-issue*, revitalization, reanimation, and so on. Reynolds (*Retromania,* p. xi) calls the previous decade the "'Re'-decade."

20. It is, for instance, possible to order a "Triglav" or a Tito partisan cap by post for 19.90 EUR (naturally, with a discount available for greater quantities) from some firm located in Logatec, and the Rock Partyzans'Born in Yu' T-shirt, an appropriate cap, and their CD with Yugoslav hits are available for 10 EUR.
21. Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press and Blackwell Publishing, 2000), p. 200.
22. At student festivities on an old Yugoslav holiday called Youth Day (May 25), a *red garment or at least a pioneer cap* are recommended; see: http://www.lokalpatriot.si/dogodki/2012/may/25/dan-mladosti/or http://www.studentarija.net/event/yu-rock-cirkus/, accessed: 23. 6. 2013.
23. See example: http://zbiralci.com/forum/viewtopic.php?p=55916, accessed: 15. 1. 2013.
24. For example, *Delavski bugi* (Workers' Boogie) by the Rock Partyzans, with the band members acting as male workers, and seductive dancers as female workers.
25. For example, the guitarist of Niet at their last concert in Tivoli, where they performed as a support band. Over the past years, I have counted around 50 T-shirts bearing just his *name and figure*. In July 2013, US ambassador Joseph Mussomeli also wore a T-shirt with Tito's portrait and rebellious text at an unofficial event organized by the Slovene president Borut Pahor.
26. Similar clothing "red retro" also glares from the cover of German electro-industrial performer *:wumpscut:* (Fuckit, 2009) or New York-Russian-Jewish singer Regina Spector, tellingly titled *Soviet Kitsch* (2004).
27. Everything resembled the aesthetics of those smaller white tablecloths with household or rural motifs and sayings (such as Home, Sweet Home), which kitchens of farmer and worker households used to be decorated with up until a few decades ago.
28. Heike Jenss, Dressed in History: The Construction of Authenticity in Youth Culture, *Fashion Theory*, Vol. 8 (4), December 2004 p. 394.
29. It was, in fact, retrogardist band Laibach who was first in Slovenia to have its image start flirting with uniforms of (right) totalitarianisms in the early 1980s.
30. See also: http://www.6yka.com/novost/1727/aleksandar-trifunovic-zbogom-jugoslavijo, accessed: 6.1.2013. Similar may be found in some videos and at performances of Ali En, the Tris trio, Lepi Dasa, Macedonian singer Orhideja Dukova, as well as Tijana Todeska Dapčević.

31. http://seks.blog.siol.net/2006/11/29/29-november, accessed: 6.1.2013.
32. For example, http://www.index.hr/hot/clanak/karlovcanka-drazena-gabric-za-playboy-pozirala-kao-titova-pionirka/614592.aspx or http://old.obala.net/agora/messages/index.php?scope=agora&agora=21.1904172&bodies=1, accessed: 6. 1. 2013. See also the inner side of the album cover of the Rock Partyzans' album *Vedno na pravi strani* (Always on the right side) (2010—a female behind in provocative red underwear with a red star printed on it), or *Dan zmage* (Victory Day) (2008—a star on deeply cleavage female breasts).
33. See thoughts on *Vintage vikendu* (Vintage weekend) or *Vintage sejmu mladosti* (Vintage youth fair) on *Youth day*, 25 May 2013: http://www.lublana.si/blog/ljubljana/2013/05/21/je-dan-mladosti-vintage/and http://www.24ur.com/ekskluziv/domaca-scena/nostalgiki-praznovali-modni-dan-mladosti.html, accessed: 23. 6. 2013.
34. Marilyn J. Horn and Lois M. Gurel, *The Second Skin—An Interdisciplinary Study of Clothing*, 3rd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981), pp. 217, 218.
35. Gillo Dorfles, *Moda* (Novi Sad: Bratstvo jedinstvo, 1986), p. 51.
36. Marilyn J. Horn and Lois M. Gurel, *The Second Skin*, 3rd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981), p. 218.
37. Jenss, "Dressed in History," p. 392.
38. Georg Simmel, "Fashion." In *International Quarterly* 10 (1904), pp. 130–155. It is therefore about conforming and rebelling, collectivity and individuality, similarity to others and being different, at the same time: "fashion is the imitation of a given example and satisfies the demand for social adaptation," while it also "satisfies in no less degree the need of differentiation, the tendency towards dissimilarity, the desire for change and contrast" (Ibid., p. 134).
39. Gillo Dorfles, *Moda* (Novi Sad: Bratstvo jedinstvo, 1986), p. 41.
40. See typical retro, 1950s, 1960s, 1970s images in ads for Cockta, Špas teater, Coca Cola, or Sola lemonade (all from 2012 and 2013). All are ideologically neutral: Yugoslav tricolour or military uniforms are not to be found.
41. Stephen Reynolds (*Retromania*, p. xxxii) reasonably argues that many "retro is twinned with hipster, another identity that almost nobody embraces voluntarily, even when they outwardly appear to fit the profile completely."
42. Old Yugoslav sportswear, such as Yassa, Toper, or Startas, or female worker shoes Borosana would be an exception.
43. Distinct grey-olive colour of YPA uniforms.

44. Hungarian businessman László Vidák thought along similar lines in 2002, when he succeeded in reviving local sports brand Tisza, today mostly worn by the younger generations: "He wanted to create a Hungarian product with a Hungarian name, because he trusted in the fact that '*most people no longer think that Hungarian products are tacky*'" (Fruzsina Müller, "Retro Fashion," in *N/Osztalgia—Ways of Revisting the Socialist Past*, ed. Isabella Willinger, Budapest: Anthropolis, Rejs e.V, 2007, p. 36).
45. Bill Dunn, *Uniforms* (London: Laurence King Publishing, 2009), p. 12.
46. Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (London, New York: Verso, 1991), p. 66.
47. Jenss, "Dressed in History," p. 397. Guffey also clearly shows—be it using examples from different environments, times and aesthetic preferences—how retro is "unconcerned with the sanctity of tradition or reinforcing social values: indeed, it often insinuates a form of subversion while sidestepping historical accuracy." See Elizabeth Guffey, *Retro—The Culture of Revival* (London: Reaktion Books, 2006), p. 11.
48. In an interview with the Rock Partyzans "*Za domovino s Partyzani!*" (For the homeland with the Partyzans!) (Ljubljana: Stop, 16. 1. 2008), p. 22.
49. It is hence, in my opinion, no coincidence, that "pioneer boys," that is, men dressed as former pioneers, are almost non-existent, just as *Chippendales* do not perform dressed in uniforms of the partisans or of the YPA. To an extent, this took place in the 1990s, when it was YPA uniform-dressed erotic dancers who were the most sought for to appear at bachelorette parties or March 8 celebrations (correspondence with Svetlana Slapšak, 24. 6. 2013).
50. Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press and Blackwell Publishing, 2000), p. 200.
51. Ibid., pp. 199–200.
52. For instance, at a concert for the 40th anniversary of the Trieste Partisan Pinko Tomažič Choir on 27 April 2013, in a packed concert hall in Stožice, Ljubljana.
53. Bill Dunn, *Uniforms* (London: Laurence King Publishing, 2009), p. 6..
54. For the study of musical reconsideration and reconstruction of socialist Yugoslavia, see my book *Rock'n'Retro—New Yugoslavism in Contemporary Popular Music in Slovenia* (Ljubljana: Sophia, 2013b).
55. For example, those entitled "Death to Fascism—For the Freedom of the World!," organized by the Front for World Freedom on 27 April 2009.
56. The aesthetic reasoning behind these clothes clashes with the ethical. At this point, it seems useful to draw a parallel between the dilemmas regarding accounting for Yugo-vintage, and Rancière's distinction between the aesthetic and ethical regimes in art. The aesthetic regime "makes art into *an autonomous form of life* and thereby sets down, at one and the same

time, the autonomy of art and its identification with a moment in life's process of self-formation" (Jacques Rancière, *The Politics of Aesthetics*, London, New York: Continuum, 2004, p. 26). He also states that aesthetic efficacy is "based on an indifference and radical subtraction or withdrawal" (Jacques Rancière, "The Paradoxes of Political Art," in *Dissensus*: *On Politics and Aesthetics*, New York: Continuum, pp. 134–149). Art does not represent anything outside of itself, has no purpose. On the other hand, that in the ethical regime always relates to someone or something: "'art' is not identified as such but is subsumed under the question of images," these images "are the object of a twofold question—the question of their origin (and consequently their truth content) and the question of their end or purpose, the uses they are put to and the effects they result in" (Rancière, *The Politics of Aesthetics*, p. 20). The case of Yugo-vintage also demonstrates the presence of, to use the words of this French philosopher, both an "aesthetic separation" and "ethical continuity" (Rancière, "The Paradoxes of Political Art," p. 142).

57. Jacques Rancière, "The Paradoxes of Political Art," p. 144.

CHAPTER 8

Brotherhood and Unity Goes Multiculturalism: Legacy as a Leading Path toward Implementations of New European Multiculturalism

Nena Močnik

Analysis of Yugoslav everyday life should be very interesting in the multicultural studies. Yugoslavia was a synonym of coexistence and multicultural tolerance that ended in a morbid massacre. The time when the war broke out and Yugoslavia was falling apart, the decades of Brotherhood and Unity were not much help in the prevention of hatred and violent political direction that simultaneously burst out. However, the whole phenomena of successful multicultural coexistence followed by radical violence and war should be of great importance in researching how tolerant and multicultural politics function. Since bringing the debates of the European Union (EU) enlargement back to the Balkans, former republics have to revive multicultural ideas to a greater extent. Actual and imported ideas of multiculturalism, spreading its aims on a European and global level, share many common perspectives with the former Brotherhood and Unity concept.

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However, studies, books, and analyzes[1] have focused on conflicts and war and no contribution on the successful multiculturalism that has been practiced for more than 50 years can be found. Critical and theoretical scholarship on Yugoslavism and Tito's leadership focus on its totalitaristic and dictatorship analytical dimensions, what has devalorized the importance of Brotherhood and Unity as an attempt of multicultural politics or at least its paradigms that could be employed not only in the region, today recognized as the Western Balkans, but in a broader European space. Analyzing Brotherhood and Unity in comparison with other multicultural politics is basically non-existing and an untold story; mostly because Titoism itself was a controversial democracy-opposing and autocratically oriented politic that has been criticized by numbers of authors. Thus, contemporary collective memories in the region and the knowledge production focus on *Titoism* as totalitarian dictatorship where open and legal violence was used to maintain the control and unanimous devotion to the leading political body. Regardless of the extent of how Tito's dogmatic autocracies is analyzed and criticized, he managed to stop—or one could say "to freeze"—the historical legacy of an ongoing conflict between Croats and Serbs. At the same time, Brotherhood and Unity, despite being successfully practiced over three and a half decades, did not stop the country from being ultimately disintegrated in the civil war in the 1990s; and the bloody inter-ethnic conflict just has become the other side of the coin in order to prove formalized, strategic, and ideologically biased youth education for society that artificially coexisted in peace and that Tito's skills for multicultural unification were more incidental by-products of his reluctance toward nationalism as bourgeois ideology.[2]

The following text re-focuses the interest from the usual dictatorship-criticism perspective on the experience and the idea of Brotherhood and Unity in comparison with the contemporary multiculturalism, in order to break the stigma and stereotype of primordial and violent imaginary on the Balkans and supposedly imposed suppression of inter-ethnic and inter-religious similarities by the autocratic leadership that shifted and started to be perceived as crucial differences.

The case of Yugoslav coexistence is to be observed in the frame of specific ideology, distributed and presented by the political body and elites and then further domesticated in everyday life by people. Anyhow, the political and social context of former Yugoslavia has been different on many levels, but the idea of multiculturalism in both eras might be seen as practically the same—at least from the point of the main goal: living

together peacefully and in a tolerant environment. Both of those ideologies in different periods and under different political systems encourage multicultural practices. When approaching toward the EU, the Western Balkans, partly as legacy of former Yugoslavia, keeps the image of a violent region, covered by constant multi-ethnic struggles; former positive coexistent practices are ignored. Implementing new multiculturalism, in the new context, new period, and new political systems, however, might also take into consideration former experiences, lasting for a few long decades and working in a direction as does today's multiculturalism. The comparative analysis of both Brotherhood and Unity and contemporary multiculturalism may show the potential danger and traps that can be avoided in the future steps.

Working in the field with youngsters all over the Western Balkans has brought the impression that it was always the same: permanently presenting a bunch of ironical perspectives on the possibilities of peaceful coexistence after all traumatic events that have happened; radical absence of positivism and hope of future developments in the countries; no desire to invest in youth's creativity, efforts and energy to the future peace building. The coat of war memories simply cannot be uncloaked and, even worse, it is inherited by younger generations and therefore prevents any other possibility toward newly established multicultural coexistence. From that point of view, it is important to redirect the broader interest from the war and conflict toward the positive multicultural coexistence practices and take inspirations from it: observing them, researching and reviving through new processes of European multiculturalism implementations, and encouraging living them again.

This chapter is an analytical summary of ideological discourse on the Brotherhood and Unity and, at the same time, the sum-up of broader research on perceptions of younger post-Yugoslav generations that have missed the Brotherhood and Unity era but is facing the approaching of the Western Balkans toward EU and potentials of official multicultural politics coming aside. The first part is based on the discursive analysis of important Yugoslav analytics, authors, ideologists and establishers[3] of the idea and ideology of Brotherhood and Unity. In the second part, the historical thesis is accompanied by the complementary perspectives of different youth workers, multicultural activists, pedagogues and participants (ages 17–28) from countries of former Yugoslavia that are these days involved into the education of youth on the field of tolerant society, peace building and a new understanding of European multiculturalism. The method-

ological approaches in the second part of the text consist of a combination of personal correspondence (PC), interviews (I), and observations with participation (OP), and were mostly gathered through my intensive work with youngsters in the last few years (and especially in 2010–2011) and done in different workshops, seminars and training courses, mostly under the umbrella of the *Youth in Action Program* (European Commission), that focuses on the non-formal learning of multiculturalism, anti-discrimination and tolerant society in European space.

Epistemological Frame: Multiculturalism as Ideology

In order to avoid later misunderstandings or misinterpretations, a few words on ideologies and multiculturalism must be written down in the very beginning. Although ideology by Louis Althusser should be understood through its materialization, where "ideas or other images do not have spiritual existence, but the material one,"[4] the research considers it only to a certain extent; by Althusser, ideology on its practical level can be manifested in many ways, what bring us to the great variety of practices where *Brotherhood and Unity*, as a unique multicultural ideology of former Yugoslavia, was celebrated by both the leading political body and the people themselves. Althusser believes that every ideology has its historical path, and therefore it is difficult to define a sequence of ideologies as the original spiritual or material instances. Probably both existed at the same time: from one side Yugoslav multiculturalism as it was understood by civil society, out of the ruling elites, on from the other side the multiculturalism that was referred by various institutions, documents, schoolbooks or/and governing groups. The main focus of this text is to define a space and a moment, where and when the specific ideology is given a special emphasis in the political arena and, as said by Althusser, the moment before it becomes manifested in the material world. It is particularly crucial when we try to interpret failures of former multicultural attempts in Yugoslavia and, even more when introducing new multicultural practices to new generations.

Ideologies of multicultural coexistence practice a great number of mechanisms to link individual cultural groups. After William Connolly, in one moment, "the idea of a planned multicultural communities must be filled by assumptions and beliefs that are not proven, but accepted 'with confidence'"[5] of the participating groups. In order to introduce people

into an alternative, coexisting way of cooperation, multicultural ideologies have to put all efforts to ensure the important interests of particular members and group participating in the process. It often means nothing but covering the real social conditions and situations; it may "distort and obscure inconvenient reality and at the same time highlight particular appropriate factors that would convince participants about the opposite."[6] After Connolly the task of ideological apparatus of the state is to show the reality in the way that suits the hegemonic political orientation. Inside of the set of multicultural studies,[7] the two similar categorizations of Andrew Heywood[8] and Marina Lukšič-Hacin[9] offer perhaps the most suitable answers when trying to actualize the historical Brotherhood and Unity and categorize it into the modern understanding of the phenomena. From their list of (1) conservative, (2) liberal, (3) left-liberal, (4) critical, (5) pluralistic, and (6) cosmopolitan type of multiculturalism, Brotherhood and Unity, as it is to be shown with the concrete cases later in this text, would be explained inside of the last two points: pluralistic and cosmopolitan multiculturalism.

Pluralistic multiculturalism is in some way related to the left-liberal type since it also emphasizes the importance of cultural differences. Based on the values of pluralism and developed by Isaac Berlin, it supports the belief how there are no single and dominant definitions of the concept of the good life. It is about the *live-and-let-live* concept, where only the respect of individual freedom and people's autonomy can fully fill up the demands of cultural pluralism.

Cosmopolitan multiculturalism supports the idea of global consciousness and culture, but in a different way than a conservative type. It literally celebrates the diversity of cultures and the possibility given to the every culture if mixed with another: to learn from each other. It promotes cultural exchange and mixing of individual cultural goods, knowledge, ideas, values, materials, and so on (by the principle of "pick and mix"). Yugoslavia was a great example of it, and Europe nowadays, however, with its Yoga classes, Chinese restaurants, and Tango festivals has not yet succeeded to make a step further and deeper. In the cosmopolitan type of multiculturalism, rather than fixed and historically predisposed group identity, culture is perceived as a fluid and changeable instance. It is rather a melting pot of different ideas, values, and traditions, than a cultural mosaic of different and distinct ethnic and religious groups. After Andrew Heywood[10] it aims to create one common world. In fact, this type of multiculturalism wears a hypocritical mask; Asian girls in Benetton advertisements still wear

Western-designed clothes; food in Indian restaurants is not hot at all; and Roma bands playing in nice concert halls for thousands are always neat and clothed in freshly washed and ironed clothes. Cosmopolitan multiculturalism is perhaps less political and the most illusional type in Heywood's categorization.

The term "European multiculturalism" that is to be used in the following text refers to the different documentations of the European Union, where multicultural politics as philosophy, institution, and ideology of equal relations among all cultures living in the territory of the EU is described as an official principle of respect for cultural diversity under the EU, one that promotes cultural cooperation among all EU members and the rest of the world, the exchange of knowledge of cultural history and the protection of cultural heritage.[11] Although multiculturalism was originally developed and set up for the purpose of managing migration processes, that is, enculturation and re-socialization of immigrants,[12] in the region of former Yugoslavia, it continues to aim toward other purposes. Acceptance of official multicultural policies, as declared and understood by the EU representatives, documentations and institutions, is one of the demands in EU in approaching the Western Balkans. But there, the same ideas are used to establish permanent stability, tolerance among different ethnic and religious groups living in the region for centuries.

Multicultural Character of Brotherhood and Unity

The phenomenon of Brotherhood and Unity nowadays is covered by memories, either positive or negative, and nostalgic recovering of the imagined history. But this Chap. 8 particular aims to analyze pure ideological interpretations and argumentations, even though it might seem more prosaic and unattractive as the study of everyday Yugoslav life would be. Since materialization of ideology after Althusser in this context would provoke memories and perhaps exaggerated subjectifications of the phenomena, the personal experiences and comparisons between Brotherhood and Unity and multiculturalism will be framed later in the Chap. 8 only after the discursive analysis of the Yugoslav official documents as follows in the next lines.

The complex and diverse Yugoslav multicultural reality was theoretically framed by Branka Magaš, and the four main points are exposed: (1) The state of Republic of Yugoslavia is multinational,[13] but any of the included nations is superior, which means that Yugoslavia is composed of seven

nations, where only one (Albanians) is of non-Slavic origins.[14] There is no common language, although the majority (70%) speaks Serbo-Croatian and the same language is written in two fonts: Cyrillic and Latin).[15] (2) Nations are mainly geographically dislocated, but the community as a whole gives to every federal unity a multinational character. The level of ethnic heterogeneity varies from area to area, but the presence of ethnic minorities should encourage the importance of coexistence among all parts of Yugoslavia. (3) Yugoslav nations are separated also internally by historical background; the ethnic map is therefore even more complex when taking into account its historical borders. (4) The future of common Yugoslavia is questionable since it was established when every certain national identity was already recognized and accepted by its members.[16] On the basis of the Magaš's summary, Brotherhood and Unity is to be observed from three points: the first one refers to the motives of unification of cultures; the second is on the arguments of the ideology of equality; the last one questions the arguments of the ideology of differences. All three premises are based on analysis of different texts, regulations, and official documents,[17] explaining the Yugoslav idea of nationalities, the national question of Yugoslavia and an understanding of the cultural diversity regulated as Brotherhood and Unity is in general.

1. *Different cultural groups are united due to better protection against those who are defined as common "other" or outsiders, conquerors. Alliance is built up on the cultural similarities, and cultural borders are set to clearly divide Yugoslavs from others.*

Brotherhood and unity never aimed to unite one, nationally defined Yugoslavia, but was on to "unification of a big family, built up on very similar ethnical origins (…)". Vlaisavljević in its romanticized narration continues as: "It was multi-ethnic union, not a community."[18] It was not only the union of different individuals, but the union of certain and established cultural groups: "Slogan orders you to act as brothers to everyone who seems to be your relative! And at the same time it warns: do not forget the solidarity, coined during the last war."[19] The idea rides on the preceding unification plans, established in the nineteenth century and bursting out in the form of Ilyrism and Yugoslavism, and was a side consequence of the common struggle toward freedom of South Slavs. The interwar national liberation group passion was a kind of substitute for the development of Brotherhood and Unity. For Matić,[20] the anti-

fascist movement and the liberation struggle played the main role in later Yugoslavia and Brotherhood and Unity building. Paradoxically, the real "liberation" has never come: defeated occupational forces (and domestic collaborationist groups) presenting a non-democratic body was replaced by another one: the kingdom of Yugoslavia was transformed to the one-party rule under the Communist Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the liberation struggle presented the ideological mantra as well as in constitution the new Yugoslavia, where different cultural groups were united mostly under the common Slavic origins. Although among Slavs, also Albanians, Jews, Roma, Hungarians and other non-Slavic communities were settled, those differences were ignored until the idea was upgraded to the connections among Yugoslav nations and nationalities that include everyone who lived under the umbrella of the newly established republic of Yugoslavia.

As contemporary multiculturalism, Brotherhood and Unity as well has visibly limited its multicultural openness. Theoretically, in Europe multiculturalism should be opened to all people regardless to the ethnic, religious, and racial or other group origins[21]; but concerning the assimilation and re-socialization processes in most of European states, one can easily find the border and all the limitations. In Europe, multicultural society usually consists of one, historically defined culture, possessing the hegemonic patterns since its putative authentic roots, and smaller, joined, or minority communities. In order to coexist, the newcomers or minorities are expected to take over at least basic cultural, social and political rules and patterns of this hegemonic culture; even though it is "just" a language. On the contrary, Yugoslav multiculturalism never regulated relations among one, existing culture and newcomers; all cultures, more or less, were perceived as ancient, living in the region for centuries. Though different, individuals were mixed and the place was possessed by all of them on more or less equal basis. Still, entrance fee was paid by South-Slavic origins and few exceptions.

2. *The equality is defined on the level of the group not the individual member. Economic equality is of a prime importance and helps to prevent inequality on all other levels* (*religious affiliation, language,* and so on).

With the constitution of SFR Yugoslavia, all preceding ideas on a united South-Slavs country were gathered and the working class power was emphasized. It was the working class identity that was aiming to dom-

inate all others; "the unique interests of the working class"[22] were to unite Yugoslavs and open possibilities of equality on all other levels.

> It is not about if the constitution of the new country was needed or, with other words, if the unification of South-Slavs was needed. On the contrary, the need of unification of South Slavs was always there; it was the idea of the very progressive group of people, living in countries titled as Yugoslavic. However, we worked out on principles of this unification; we worked out to establish the relation where one nation would never prevail others (…). We created the hundred years old dreams of nations that defeated Austro-Hungarian aggressors and oppression in order to live equally and free in our new country.[23]

Class stratification had very negative connotations, while all other cultural differences were perceived as bricks forming the beauty and diversity of Yugoslavia in a positive perspective. Equality based on the economic capital was a consequence of the former political formation, where the class stratification was argued as the main reason for the social and intercultural disputes. Such a shift in ideological perspective—from cultural or/and religious differences to the social class—was very unique and therefore distinctive for Yugoslav multiculturalism. The establishment of such Yugoslav community, claims Magaš,[24] was a consequence of the common desire to unite smaller and already recognized nations, connected by the vision of the importance of the working class. In fact, Brotherhood and Unity was the remake of Marx's famous parole "Workers of all countries, unite!" adding the component of colorful religious and cultural structure of the region of Yugoslavia.

Group identities of either workers or certain ethnicities were always strongly intertwined, although hierarchy was settled between those: individuals who were first identified as workers and then as members of certain nations, ethnic groups or/and religions. Working status was a cohesive bond, the identity equalizing individuals who differ from each other regarding their religious or ethnic background. Even the basic principle of the Constitution of SFR Yugoslavia on the first level equalizes citizens as workers and then as the people of different ethnic origins.[25]

Liberation as discussed above thus combined the freedom in terms of nationality and the formation of the country of South Slavs, as well as the liberation on the level of proletarian revolution, as a resistance to the capitalist exploiters; both arose and existed in interdependence. Ideologists

of Brotherhood and Unity believed that the working class of all countries would unite people only if they would be offered autonomy and equality. By Yugoslav sociologists, including Vesna Pesić,[26] equality was often interpreted in correlation with the possession of private property. After Pesić,[27] economic inequalities are essential for potential conflicts, since the monopoly over means of production may cause social stratification, which basically determines the inequality in general.[28]

This approach is based on the idea of a socialist society that idealized transparent social relations: individual objectives must overlap with those of the whole group; the gap between society and the state is thus deleted. The main difference between today's liberalistic and the former socialist approach is on the emphasis the first gives to the equality among individuals as citizens, while the latter argues that the elimination of unequal positions in the sphere of labor/production is the factor that allows individual freedom in other areas of his/her life.[29]

The Yugoslav concept of equality has relied on the ideas of Marx's philosophy, where all other forms of social inequality disappear in the moment when the society frees itself of class stratification. But even though present-day multiculturalism has revealed that the establishment of any relations of power, not only in social class, leads to inequality; that, in turn means nothing but the failure of intercultural policies and ideologies. The question at this point is whether the equality, without such or other power relations in the current social order in Europe is really possible. Although formally considered as equality before the law, it should be questioned whether or not in reality this would mean complete anarchy. The idea of equality before the law is of course more than welcome and well-intentioned start, but its realization is a bit lame. Probably it would take years of practicing multiculturalism, in order to develop fully non-hierarchical society. First of all, to make this goal not merely a utopian idea, the existing social order should be completely restructured, especially in nationally organized Europe, where the rules of coexistence and what appeared to be determined by "laws" are established by the hegemonic and ruling cultural group. According to a new global joint venture, a completely new platform is to be set in the first step.

3. *Diversity is positively emphasized and not ignored. Cultural pluralism could lead to conflict, but the ideology itself made a great effort in the promotion of the mutual cultural enrichment.*

The concept of diversity in Yugoslav multicultural ideology on many levels links to the theories of pluralist multiculturalism. In official documents as well as in the whole body of ideological apparatus of the republic, the interculturality always played an important role. It was exactly the celebration of cultural pluralism that enriched natural diversity of Yugoslavia[30]; by emphasizing folklore, variety in cuisine, arts, languages, traditions, mass culture, sport, and everyday life in general. Yugoslav multiculturalism became closer even to the modern concept of the cosmopolitan type of multiculturalism. But, in the beginning Brotherhood and Unity was created and practiced by generation that understood the whole idea as a goal of liberation fight, and the unification of Yugoslavs as its manifestation. Only then, with the new generations, the idea gained some characteristics of cosmopolitan multiculturalism: through working brigades,[31] pioneering, Youth day as part of a planned education action toward multiculturalism and as well as through mass culture, sports and travel, which took place spontaneously. Youth was raised in a new common ideology of the multicultural Federal Republic. Kids of Tito's Yugoslavia were as

> pupils involved in the path of Brotherhood and Unity, and as communist pioneers, participants of civil defense exercises, they were attending school trips in other parts of Yugoslavia. In all levels of Yugoslav educational system, a strong emphasis on multicultural and multiethnic Yugoslavia was given. Indeed mostly exaggerated, its diversity was presented, described and created through singing, poetry, literature, theater and school curriculum.[32]

Since 1945, such an institutionalized multicultural component has become part of everyday life, and Brotherhood and Unity is not just a slogan anymore: it has become part of the official ideology, deliberately created and precisely implemented into society. It was manifested, as previously, through everyday practices, and generations, who grew up in socialist Yugoslavia since 1945, fully associate this period with the Brotherhood and Unity, which means Yugoslav multiculturalism, multilingualism and common supranational Yugoslav culture.[33]

Maja Weiss in her documentary notes that many former Yugoslavs still believe that Brotherhood and Unity in reality never has come to life, as it was imposed upon people[34]; such views are also mentioned by some of my respondents later in this text. Some authors[35] continue that manner of thinking and explaining events of the last Balkan Wars (1991–1999), by transferring the blame on the former ruling political elite. After those

scholars imposed the idea of seemingly tolerant and multicultural policies, they created false feelings of harmony among ethnic and religious plural groups. Perhaps political elites are to blame, but not the ideas themselves. "The holy mantra,"[36] constantly repeated, and chanting of Brotherhood and Unity slogans, later became "a pot of a black humor"[37] denying itself, claim those authors. Their main argument is based on the fact, that the idea of the United Yugoslavs arose from disagreement among all involved sides and it is how it was finished as well. Half of the Yugoslavs during World War II were killed by other Yugoslavs, and the fact that they remained together and practiced mutual tolerance, demanded a special effort from everybody, claims Zimmermann.[38] Nevertheless, every cohabitation would probably require "special efforts" and from this perspective Yugoslav multiculturalism was not to be mythicized (or even balkanized!). Most of multicultural policies become part of the institutional practice when existing community encounters a conflict with newcomers (or, as in Yugoslavia with the existing mix of different cultures) and as such every new situation needs to be adopted, and diligently regulate.

SFR Yugoslavia led an official policy for inter-ethnic relations (which also created the slogan), that promoted the idea of six nations of Yugoslavia—Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, Macedonians, Slovenes and Montenegrins—including nationalities and ethnic minorities—Albanians, Hungarians, Romanians, Bulgarians and others—that are equal to each other and therefore respect each other in a common Federation. By fostering their mutual similarities and interdependence of all together, they mutually support overcoming of national conflicts and intolerance. Identification by nationality would later raise separatist tendencies, served as a performance in favor of particular interests and not the interests of the Federation as a whole unit. But how would it be possible to provide even more positive multicultural policies in favor of a common country? Even if we accept the idea of the imposed or forced implementation (and leaving aside the skepticism, if any policy at all is ever freely chosen by the people), Brotherhood and Unity, for sure at least in its theoretical background, was created and aimed toward peoples' interests. The *forced* way of its implementation was just one of the attempts of how to ensure optimum conditions for the coexistence of as many individuals in the already existing multicultural reality of certain territory. Moreover, despite the fact that the Yugoslav multicultural policy at the same time advocated two apparently contradictory positions—the importance, uniqueness, equality and autonomy of each nation/nationality and at the same time unified

and fraternal Yugoslav community—it has functioned very successfully for more than 40 years. Problematic national question, "occupying the head of the ruling political body of Yugoslavia through all historical preceding"[39] was responded by 40 years of peaceful political life in a multinational and multicultural country. This is probably the success that today's Europe is not able to record. For that reason, this concrete historical practice could be more often and in vehement manner used by former Yugoslav countries in further development and organization of current multicultural reality.

Analytical Comparison of Field Research Findings: Brotherhood and Unity Versus Multiculturalism

As with every other political ideology, Brotherhood and Unity shall be framed into the chronological, cultural and political context, so what would be the first step in comparison of the contemporary multiculturalism and Yugoslav attempts. Second, definitions and understanding of the equality and/or difference in one and another ideology will be compared; and finally the ideological basis, that is, the ideological core, reasons, intentions and objectives of Brotherhood and Unity on the one side and multiculturalism on the other will be taken into consideration too. The idea of the chapter is to develop an actualization of the Brotherhood and Unity in the context of the new European multiculturalism and to explore if youth and multiculturalism advocates may apply the old, but verified, ideology into the new social structures and multicultural issues or conflict in the region of ex-Yugoslavia.

European understanding of multiculturalism has been implemented and materialized there in the last few years, which may provide the space for the transformation or any other form of actualization of the former Yugoslav multicultural politic: to make introspection in its rises and falls and therefore to present a constitutive part of the educational processes of the new multicultural-oriented implementation attempts. Here the research moves from the pure analysis of the discourse, to the experience of people who are nowadays actively engaged in the projects, implementations and revivals of the multicultural practices and system all around the former Yugoslav territory. The rest of the chapter unites the synthesis listed above and analyzes the field notes, gathered in 2010–2011.

Chronological, Cultural, and Political Context

Brotherhood and Unity, as well as multicultural practices have succeeded the conflict and/or long-term war period, but it does not explain the motive for implementation of tolerant politics in order to prevent further struggles at all. Yet, Brotherhood and Unity was strongly established after World War II, in order to unite and empower all South Slavs, but the idea itself has been nesting in the region since the nineteenth century. Likewise, multiculturalism is resettled from the central European nests toward the former Balkan's war epicenters. But it is practically the only common historical point; on the contrary, contextual establishment of both derives from different ideas: the first one has been settled since after World War II and stimulates Yugoslavs to unite again. On the other hand, multiculturalism conquers the space and time of once-united Yugoslavs and now strictly divides into smaller countries, cultures, political orientations, and so on. However, the objective of new multiculturalism does not emphasize the intensity of the coexistence of South Slavs; in here it functions more in the role of reconciliation and permanent stability.

As mentioned above, Brotherhood and Unity has been exclusive: it balanced relationships among a limited number and diversities of cultural groups. New multiculturalism defends coexistence among all people regardless of their cultural, ethnical, religious or other group identity's background. It aims to prevent not to intervene: claiming that cultural plurality might bring conflicts and issues, it educates and alarms in advance. It is important not to dismiss how Brotherhood and Unity has been framed into the one common country that was not based on national, but multinational ideas. Due to the wars, newly established former Yugoslav countries adopted new political systems and strict, sometimes even radical, ideas of nationalism, what is a unique historical switch: from multinational country, a mainstream and hegemonic political culture that ran the war for four long years to reconcile in another, alternative multi-oriented politic, multiculturalism. After the war, national identities have reached their peak in practically every ex-Yugoslav country and few of my correspondents see it like a trap:

> The most important difference among Brotherhood and Unity and actual multiculturalism is, that we, nations of the former Yugoslavia, have become traditionalist, sometimes in fanatic way of thinking, and we Croats and Serb are nationalist, much worst then other nations of Europe. After the war, we have become obsessed by tradition, cultural origins, religion and cultural heritage.[40]

> In my opinion, people from ex-Yugoslavia do not have much interest in multiculturalism. Currently, the national (and along with it the cultural) identity is too important, to leave it behind in order to change the perspective to a European multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is the written fact, used to gain financial support out of EU resources. Probably, next generation will be less nationalistic. Thanks Gosh, there is no such name as Euroslav or Euromir.[41]

After Ivaylo Ditchev, contemporary European multiculturalism as European seed on the Balkan's soil is "a sponsor and donor contribution"[42] toward limitation of different strengths of nationalisms, since the last wars covered by taboos. In the Western Balkans it has a form of subversive ignorance: it is supposed to be implemented regardless of the strong historical testimony of very similar ideologies. When imposing multiculturalism to Western Balkans, EU representatives[43] often use the discourse of putative nationalistic sympathies, raised among the regional political bodies after the war that has to be rescued by the external enlightened forces. At the same time, the historical development of nation states in Europe and its long path (still lasting) toward an intercultural mixture is completely ignored. European history is for the last 200 years overloaded by different nation-state, monocultural projects, constructed by the support of values and symbols emphasizing homogeneity of citizens or those who have been eligible to become citizens. In years, specific group characteristics have been developed to distinguish one group from another, and those cultural differences were usually of the most important indicators. European society established a monocultural social system centuries ago, and in later years, due to the growing globalization processes and mass mobilizations, transformed it into the more suitable multiculturalism. From that point of view, Yugoslav idea of institutionalization of culturally mixed population has overtaken the liberal European-Western societies[44] for almost five decades.

> Of course, Yugoslav multiculturalism has not been copied by European Union! But it would be good to know if they at least know for it! But, probably, no one is interested in it. They are interested in their positions. In meanwhile, they figured out, how there are plenty nations living in EU! Namely, they had to invent something to stick this mixture together, to explain and argument the sense of it. Something to support the basic idea of EU in order to keep it alive.[45]

Blaming the Balkans for nationalism, or so-called *balkanization of nationalism,* as it has never happened in other parts of the world, espe-

cially in Europe, is controversial and pervert. Sometimes implementation of multiculturalism in the Balkans is posed as impossible since the radical nationalistic-orientation during the war have lasted until; today. But it should mean then, that multiculturalism might be planted only in the non-nationalistic soil. How it comes to be presented as successfully run in other parts of Europe, if they are (still) one by one national states? When approaching the European Union, member states are never asked to deny their national identities in order to succeed in broader, multicultural European society, although EU encourages its members to open not only their physical borders but their symbolic and mental barriers as well. But still, identifying by national affiliation is of a great objection when discussing potentials of multicultural future in the ex-Yugoslav region. Exactly the presupposed nationalistic character of ex-Yugoslav countries has led to the final breakup to "feed specific national, ethnical and cultural passions."[46] After Muhić,[47] the names of countries covered by the common name of "Yugoslavia" have shown from the very beginning that the identification by the ethnicity and nation has been important since ever, what by her words consequently led to such definite breakup. But, if this thesis can be justified, how then could all the countries of European Union, all based on nationalism for centuries, from a certain moment all together live under the one, multicultural, coexistent umbrella and, even more, would proudly promote it? What is the ideological difference in the nationalistic background of central and West European countries and former Yugoslavia except in the historical sequence where nationalistic struggles and cleansings happened back into history and in the Balkans the memories are still alive? In the discourse on multiculturalism, national regulation has never presented such a barrier in relation to multiculturalism as it is lately presented in the case of the Balkans. However, if the fact of nationalism would affect in any way the implementation of multiculturalism, then the whole European Union would be unable to even start working on it.

The political context of one and another ideology is probably the biggest boundary, but at the same time is of great importance in the process of their formations. Brotherhood and Unity was established in the autocratic or totalitaristic system and this could be the simple explanation as to why it came to life in practically one night. But the respondent in the movie of Maja Weiss, *The Road of Brotherhood and Unity,* claims how the idea has never came to life spontaneously, since it was forced on people.

Forced implementation of Brotherhood and Unity was also mentioned a few times by my correspondents: comparing it to the new multiculturalism, Brotherhood and Unity is said to be more aggressively imposed by the political body then multiculturalism, which, at least symbolically, seems to be rather a choice than an obligation.

> I assume the ideology of Brotherhood and Unity as artificially produced, distributed and forced among Yugoslavs. If it would be true and intrinsic, coming from people, the conflict, and such conflict would never reach our region; it would result in such enormous expression of differences of those "equals." This fact equals Brotherhood and Unity with nowadays multiculturalism: it is the artificial formation of "equality" and at the same time negotiation of cultural and traditional differences among nations.[48]
>
> I would classify multiculturalism to the bullshit bingo vocabulary (for more info: http://bullshitbingo.net/cards/bullshit/). If it is not there yet, it should be set up in there. Brotherhood and Unity was merely the part of ideology. But I have to admit, this part of ideology makes me convinced, how ideology might be positive phenomena, with positive connotations. In fact, everything what surround us, is ideology. Everybody has her or his little ideology to live for. When we talk, when we exchange the ideas, we exchange ideology. But there is something else to be emphasized: how strong, aggressive and violent we transfer this ideology. We were not asked, not even one time, if we want or not the Brotherhood and Unity. It just appeared, as the package you receive by post. Even if you were refusing this idea, you had to live it. Everybody lived it. And I would not say that Europe does it in the same way, to press me so strong with multiculturalism as the former system did. It truly doesn't.[49]
>
> Multiculturalism appears in a much smoothly way in comparison with Brotherhood and Unity. I did not live in times of former Yugoslavia and therefore I have no clear idea, what happened to individuals if they were loudly stating for the nationalism, I don't know, for instance, Serbs. I am aware how people were detained, but I've never read on details so I am not aware if it is connected with the hegemonic ideology. But I surely know that today, you are not captured if you don't support multiculturalism.[50]
>
> In Europe, nowadays, we all have agreed on the common idea of reciprocal respect, probably due to the historical issue of Jewish extermination during the Nazi occupation, and perhaps, also due to the tortures that happened lately to us, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It happened to me, how French people are convinced that there is still war in BiH, today on 15 April 2011. Due to the tortures, mass killings and war crimes people all around the Europe probably realized how it is about the time to finish mutual ostra-

> cism. I think it is senseless to think about forced or spontaneously implemented tolerant politics: for me, it is important that it functions. However, I am not sure, if we, people, could ever live in peace. At least in Bosnia I don't think so.[51]

The question that should be posed at this point is whether any political ideology is about the spontaneous and intrinsic people's creation. Democratic and liberal discourse on modern Europe functions as super emancipated, but the practice shows also the other side: for the applicants, emphasized multicultural dimension in the *Youth in Action Program*[52] means additional points and consequently additional financial support. Saying with other words: in order to realize projects under the umbrella of this particular EU program, multiculturalism is "imposed" as well.

Brotherhood and Unity, although introduced by the governing political body, has been harmonized by the broader idea of Yugoslav socialistic regulations; it has come to life in the society that has generally valued collective mind (deriving from the idea of communism) and has rejected the individuals' possessions or property. Yugoslav socialism as such was fraternally oriented and the idea of coexistence was therefore just a part of it. On the other hand, speaking on multiculturalism uncovers completely different circumstances that capitalism has offered to the certain individual. Autocratic system and socialistic social formation on the one side and strict capitalism and the power given to the individual on the other may clearly explain why multiculturalism gives the impression of a project's and occasionally distributed ideology. The 49-year-old correspondent from Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, leads her organization for the promotion of multicultural dialogue for five years now and sees the binaries of everyday coexisting and occasional meetings of the main difference between former and current multicultural directions as follows:

> European youth programs may encourage people with different cultural backgrounds to meet and interact, but in a different way as Brotherhood and Unity did: those youngsters can meet and then safely return back to their countries. They do not aim to live together on the everyday basis.[53]

European multiculturalism is, however, for now built up on short-term projects, events, and growing mobility among European citizens, mainly through the *Erasmus Mundus Program* and a variety of youth programs such as *Youth in Action* or *Europe for Citizens*. Workshops held by and

for youngsters from former Yugoslavia have often given the impression of ineffectiveness; they lasted for not more than ten days each time, and it is a question of the effect comparing it to the free time, formal education, the influence of the everyday environments and media that all surround those participating youngsters regularly.

Besides, it happened quite often that multiculturalism was understood only in the frame of migration questions as an issue concerning the relation among *black and white*, and the relation among *Middle-East Muslim and North-American or West European Christian*. It is, as expressed by participating youth, not the matter of the Balkans. The case, showing the way of thinking, explains it concretely: it happened during the youth exchange in March 2011, inviting youngsters from West European countries and the Balkans: Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia and BiH, aged 19–25. The topic was discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity and religion. After ten days of educating on multiculturalism and tolerance, the big rush among Serbian and Croatian participants arose, starting with the discussion on the war events in Vukovar in 1992. The debate became aggressive and hot, and we were about to stop it for a while and then to continue the activity after the break. In between, the participant from Bosnia-Herzegovina commented how one particular discotheque in Vukovar continues to have separated parties in place, bordered by a simple wooden wall; on the one side you can dance on Croatian pop songs and on another on Serbian *turbofolk*. Dancers are strictly divided by nationalities and there is no exception. At another occasion, at the same type of multicultural education, the participants presenting the group from Greece had to "message something" to their fellows from Macedonia. At the end it turned out, there were verbal threats toward their fellows on the topic of Macedonian-Greek political issue of the name "Macedonia."

Both cases challenged proper reactions and the setting of the theoretical and pedagogical cases, which were mainly imaginative and adapted to the learning processes that they as students went through. However, it turned out many times, how for those youngsters multiculturalism meant the abstract and fictional idea of immigration politics that were established and posed by countries with visible immigration challenges, Spain, Germany and France, and not the former Yugoslavia, where even the local population has fled from the region. During the training, participants were constructive and positively oriented, sometimes giving the impression how they are overloaded by the multiculturalism lessons, but their

reactions still have shown how concrete regional cases on multiculturalism are the necessity in the youth education.

In general, those two events may display two obstacles: first, the events and opportunities for youth to learn about multiculturalism are shortened to a few days training courses or one year *Erasmus Program* (which sometimes present the only multicultural/mobility-oriented program youngsters are aware of) and second, many youngsters have never heard of, or even think of the multi-layered discussion of multiculturalism, intercultural tolerance, and so on in the level of their formal education. If they have any prior knowledge, it is usually based on the stereotypes or the very superficial attitudes, never deeply questioned or deconstructed, let alone to get familiar on how to contextualize them. What does the multiculturalism mean in practice is a total riddle for most of them. To check the situation in Slovenian elementary schools, I led a discussion with the young teacher in Ljubljana, figuring out how multiculturalism, speaking in percentages, is hardly detectable in the school curriculum when comparing it with math, physics and biology, maternal and foreign language. It hardly gets a place in some humanistic subjects as geography and sociology. Furthermore, the teacher herself has claimed how they, as important bridges in the multicultural processes, are mainly not capable to face more and more culturally mixed classes and how to tackle the differences among children. Even worse, they are not educated in multiculturalism at all.[54]

Since settling of the multiculturalism spread slowly, sometimes invisible and non-systematically approaches compared to the former Brotherhood and Unity, turn out as more rational, even non-ideological attempts:

> The idea of modern multiculturalism is not the ideology in its core; people are not massively enthusiastic about it, and it is about historical moment that is different. Contemporary multiculturalism is much more rational as Brotherhood and Unity was. It focuses on advantages and arguments for the implementation and distribution among people. Brotherhood and Unity on the other hand, did not have any clear direction; it was imposed without any analyze.[55]

Generally, the approaches were different, in accordance to the social reality. More important to focus on is the idea and its intention. In fact, both ideologies were in its aims and directions more similar than it appears at first sight.

Definition of Equality and Difference

Although emphasizing different points and details, definition and argumentation of equality and diversity hold an important place in both analyzed ideologies. After Bianchini,[56] the Yugoslav definition of equality justifies discrimination: "members of one community are separated among good and bad members of Communist Party, or, among good members of Communist Party and all others."[57] In contemporary multiculturalism those *more equal* are usually representatives of hegemonic culture, and *the equal ones* are representatives of immigrants or newcomers. Discrimination and/or superiority are no longer defined by social class, but by ethnic and cultural origins: members of community have to share common cultural values to benefit all rights.[58] It is very usual for multiculturalism to use slogans as *equal in diversity* or *all different, all equal*, but it is not the case in everyday practices. Cultural diversity is celebrated in frames of folklore traditions, language preservation for *inner practice* (inside of the community).

Yugoslav equality could be compared with the French revolution's slogan of *egalité,* meaning "equality of citizens in their rights, obligations and opportunities in individual potentials."[59] In Yugoslavia, the equality was meant in community, united in federative republic and political unity—unity of agreements, measures and goals, reflecting the general image of Yugoslavia as a social community. By its ideologist, equality among people is achieved by economic balance; thus, if the material property is equally distributed among all members of society, they will be automatically equal. For multiculturalism advocates, other dimensions of people's capital should be accomplished and balanced as equality in personal development and welfare (education, health-care, and so on). The core is equality before the law, but yet the quick overview of different national laws may show how equality is defined by the governing social group and consequently how the official legislation often depends on these regulations.

Neither definition of Brotherhood and Unity nor multiculturalism explains the relationship among dominant/majority and minority cultures.[60] The latter is about the coexistence among different cultures, with the right of preserving the identity of ethnic/cultural origins but with the clear demand of integration or assimilation of newcomers and/or immigrants into the dominant cultural group. Those processes do not automatically mean enculturation, understood as transformation into new, different culture. Since equality usually derives from and is defined by the

hegemonic culture, its success is measured by the indicators of successful integration. It does not completely satisfy the original ideology of multiculturalism, but still it settles the question if a newly coined image of Europe will be able to "protect and ensure the continuity of difference and heterogeneity."[61] Either cultural similarities or differences may present an advantage or a trap, depending on a viewpoint.

> Sometimes I understand it [multiculturalism] as a gift, as something that we should be proud on it. On the other hand, when I remember the war and conflicts, I regret to live in such a mixed country. I wish to answer more positive, more free, but it's Bosnian reality that we continue to fight, to bring to all of us better days.[62]

However, what exactly does it mean to be successfully integrated into dominant culture and at the same time to successfully preserve your own, *original* identity? Does not integration mean just the creation of new *equality* on the basis where we were successfully adapted and certain old cultural patterns have already been removed from our lifestyle or upgraded by new ones? European multiculturalism, without pretending, is about abandoning certain parts of local cultures and applying some new; and however, in order to prepare new, plural, globalized social structures to coexist, it might be justified.

Lately, when the Western Balkans approaches the European Union, *balkanistic discourse* often supports the indicators of difference between *already-Europeans* and the *rest Others-Balkans*.[63] The history hereby repeats: as Ilirism, Panslavism, and Yugoslavism emerged in the form of transnational communities and political bodies in order to protect certain interests, now Western Balkan countries are again united under the pejorative labeling from European Union representatives. However, unification on the basis of intercultural differences remains the important factor on the level of EU, while former Yugoslav countries have found themselves again after the new name, but merely changed geopolitical structure. After Zagorka Golubović,[64] "multiculturalism represents the only common thing of the former Yugoslav countries," and we should have

> seen it as an advantage not as a threat—every Balkan country may use its diversity for its own enrichment so far we develop politics in order to protect every single cultural identity against being erased[65]

It was constantly emphasized by Yugoslav ideologists how everybody can benefit from cultural pluralism. If the successor countries of the former Yugoslavia are seen in the light of all commonalities, they thus have great potential for revived multicultural coexistence. But the question that constantly arises from the violent period is if the recent conflict and war can be by any means argued on the basis of multicultural diversity, does new multicultural attempts mean a new danger? Ideologies, listed above, may show how the idea of multiculturalism or successful coexistence of different cultural groups must always be supported by the governing political body. The answer seems simple: if multiculturalism is part of the political interest either on a national, regional or global level, it will escalate; if not, there is a little hope coming from the passionate faith of people. "I am really curious," writes my correspondent from Mostar,[66]

> if we can create multiculturalism without any help by other countries, pointing on us and teaching us what to be proud of. But at the same time, I am very skeptic if all of us, living in Bosnia, will someday just get crazy and will start the war once again as back in 1990s. No, I prefer to be optimistic. I will rather believe to better future in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Successful multiculturalism is likely to be inhibited by live memories of war, what creates common perspectives of hopeless, peaceful, and tolerant future on the Balkans. The fear, misbelief, and absence of positive visions prevail among youth as well. When attending the international conference in Canada on the topic of reconciliation processes in Yugoslav's future (yet the title was *doubtful*: political mythologies, reconciliations, and the *uncertain future* in the former Yugoslavia), the positive future of former Yugoslavia was hardly discussed even by few of recognized international scholars and lecturers. The similar responses happened at an international roundtable in Sarajevo in February 2011, where discussions were led toward extreme proposals, even thoughts of vengeance. The change of perspective, even in an academic place, should be proceeded in order to pursue a social change. Any attempts of multicultural *activism* in the place of former Yugoslavia, is a complete waste of energy, time and money until the leading political power leans on unclear war and postwar events.

> During the war, the big gap appeared; trauma continues to live in people after the war. Definitely, the multiculturalism is an ideology for Bosniaks today; it is very hard to implement it here, to make it alive again. We had

> those days of very successful multiculturalism, but we also proved that obviously it cannot last forever. And people, unfortunately remembered only the latter.[67]

The example from the praxis, showing a constructive approach of youngsters from the region, is last year's *laboratory of positive vibrations*, gathering youth from the former republics of Yugoslavia, to revive cooperation among countries, multicultural dialogue on a regional level and to create and perform activities bringing a peaceful future and anti-discriminatory society.[68]

Globalized society consists of many more cultural differences than Yugoslavia did, but Croatian writer Dubravka Ugrešić[69] emphasizes how modern multiculturalism often is nothing but ignorance toward precise knowledge of cultures, lack of contacts among social groups, and the political correctness is just nicely packed racism. Cultures respect each other on the safe distance, preserving their own imaginary about the other. After her, "European multiculturalism means buying vegetables on the Turkish market and having a dinner in Indonesian restaurant," the cosmopolitan multiculturalism, that simply cannot be compared with the mode of multiculturalism that has been practiced in former Yugoslavia.

Ideological Basis: Intentions, Aims, Visions

Contrary to the historical legacy of different attempts of Balkan multicultural societies (Ottoman Empire, Illyrian movement, Austro-Hungarian Monarchy), Brotherhood and Unity and multiculturalism have never aimed toward unitarism; the autonomy of the certain involved cultural group is respected and the unification on the basis of equal relationship among all ethnic groups living in one region or areas is promoted.

Brotherhood and Unity has always been *local* ideology; it balanced the multicultural Federation, the republic inside of it, and cultural groups that have been living there. Multiculturalism aims to establish harmony between hegemonic, ancient local residents with newcomers. The first one, therefore, presents regional, while the latter global coexisting ideology. Yugoslavism has never been the path toward cosmopolitanism on a global level, while multiculturalism is globalized from its very beginning. Brotherhood and Unity focused on the solidarity among Yugoslav nations, its only "global" dimension being the connection with the *Non-Aligned Movement*, where the brotherhood extended to the broader space, but never in a sense of European Union. Exclusivism appears in both

ideologies: Brotherhood and Unity favored a certain social class (working class) and people or ethnicities; multiculturalism, although trying very hard to deny cultural hierarchy, entangles itself with the ideological gaps and traps of cultural relativism, its limitations and controversies. The usual issue in contemporary European multiculturalism tackles (non-Christian) religious questions, its rituals, and dressing codes. However, multiculturalism aims to be the idea of balanced cultures, the representatives of European Union usually turn sideways of one-way integration.[70]

The great emphasis inside both ideologies is given to the multicultural education of youngsters and their *multiculti-activism*; while Brotherhood and Unity developed the whole process and ritual ceremonies with pioneers and all-Yugoslav's schools trips, twin towns and youth brigades; multiculturalism is pursued through very elaborate programs of *Youth in Action,* logistically and financially regulated by the EU Commission, that also carefully introspects all applied contents. The mobility of youngsters, with the intention to encourage intercultural relations and multicultural dialog learning, is in its focus.

> I believe, how contemporary multiculturalism, promoted by European Union, and directed toward the multicultural and peace building education of youths may contribute to long-term peace period and stabilization of the situation not only on Balkan but also in the broader European region. Through different activities and traveling youngsters meet other cultures, values and habits in the most interesting and for me, most appropriate way, what can furthermore contribute in breaking down the prejudices and stereotypes.[71]
>
> Since countries of former Yugoslavia have to practice multiculturalism on everyday level, the occasional projects or events are not enough. Instead of financing those little projects, EU should support annual study programs on multiculturalism and to enable more young people go and study abroad and meet people from other, completely different cultures from ours. Many young people from our country, live in very poor environments where formal (not even talk about informal trainings or seminars!) education is not positively valued at all. From my point of view, those little projects, financed by EU, are senseless and cannot change the current situation in BiH.[72]
>
> I am mostly worried about very live memories of war, torture and violence. But the majority of youth is not well aware of our history. Their perception is completely contaminated. They are not familiar with the history from books and they are too young to remember anything. Regarding the percentage of the time, they spend with us and our projects, and on the

> other hand with other people that surrounds them, it is not unusual, that radio, television, all media plus internet are unimaginable more influential. We cannot convince them to think "multicultural" on the basis of one project. If it would be a long process, a continuum, then yes. But for now, I don't think that we can achieve visible changes with that kind of European multicultural projects.[73]

Respondents, working in different NGOs in countries of former Yugoslavia, believe how change of generation would surely bring new attitudes and perspectives on multiculturalism. The respondent from Backa Palanka, Serbia, has noticed how younger generations, collaborating in their projects, are usually positively oriented toward multicultural projects; after her, they are very important in new building of long-term stability and peace in the region. The only way to ensure peace on Balkans is the approach of all former Yugoslav countries to EU, she adds and continues:

> European way of multiculturalism could become reality in those countries with the strong support of external political influences. But the most important is definitely the change of generations: elderly, those who actively live Yugoslavia, are overloaded by memories and the past. They rather think about the revenge, not the new Brotherhood and Unity. But youths, they could do it.[74]
>
> In my work, I meet mostly youth under the age of 30 and must say that they quite understand multiculturalism and why we all should practice it. But there are still a big percentage of people that dislike the idea, mostly among elderly. Unfortunately, they connect cultural diversity with the war; even more: they explained the war on the basis of cultural differences we had in Yugoslavia.[75]
>
> Many older people believe how multiculturalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina failed years ago. Therefore, we work mainly with youngsters to make them believe, how multiculturalism can be revived, within new society, new generation with new ideas.[76]
>
> Within our work we focus on education in nearby schools, on work with children and youths. We try to educate them about our culture, religion and ethics, and how important is to feel free when identifying yourself on the basis of a certain culture. But at the same time, how important is to respect also other, different cultures that surround us.[77]

Ideology of youth and power they can carry while changing the conventional social patterns, has become back to life after more than 20 years, now dressed into a more modern and more convenient European coat.

The focus is again on youngsters: to give them a space and opportunity to act, react and change traditional social patterns. The respondent from Bosnia-Herzegovina believes, how only youth, born after the Yugoslavian breakup those born even after the war, can bridge the old hatred and establish new intercultural understanding. Their parents and relatives are contaminated by the past, positively and nostalgic or negatively and hated attitudes, but both of them may inhibit a faster and successful constitution of new multiculturalism.

In spring 2011, there was a workshop for youth in Potsdam, Germany, with the topic of xenophobia, racism, and discrimination in general. Participants from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia, worked on the simulation exercise called "On train."[78] Among 20 different characters, every participant had to choose three fellow passengers to travel with and three that he or she would never even want to talk to. The young peer from Bosnia opened an interesting discussion when arguing his choices; an African woman seller of leather was his choice for the first option. A Serbian soldier was the one with whom he would never travel Out of all proposed characters, from an HIV positive patient, homeless elderly, skinhead, feminist, and prostitutes, in his eyes, this African woman sounds the most "normal" one. For the choice of Serbian soldier on the other hand, the guy commented only "there is nothing left to be discussed." To go deeper into the issue, he was challenged with a more familiar, less strange situation and he was proposed the example of two imaginary women; first one from Congo, second one from Republic of Srpska, BiH. Both of them were of similar characteristics, warm and talkative, good looking and well educated; both of them were supposed to have a lot of things in common with that guy. The only difference was the language: the African woman would speak the language the guy would not understand; the other one would speak the Serbian dialect of his language. Anyhow, he insisted to choose a girl from Africa, with hardly any argument. The discussion held after the exercise has revealed the understanding of multiculturalism among those youth: it is something that is not perceived as a part of their local environment but rather the global, distant and even exotic issue. The guy that has chosen a girl from Congo has never been in contact with any non-European; even more, the training course in Germany was his first traveling from Bosnia-Herzegovina. He lives in Ključ, where after the war mainly Muslims live and very few Serbian families. When choosing the African woman, he tried to show

how non-racist he is, but at the same time had clearly pointed out the live issue among the ethnic groups of his home country.

Furthermore, his fellows shared the opinion of the abstract, colored definitions of multiculturalism; no one connected it directly with the mixed ethnical structure that is so significant for their country. For them, multiculturalism means what they could see in Germany; people from Asia, Africa, and South America; Pakistani Sikh with the turban and Jewish children with curls. The variety of lifestyles and cultural habits coexisting in just one city. Micro-cultural differences that so intensively labeled part of their history were completely ignored by them.

It is why comparison between Brotherhood and Unity is so important to be actualized, brought back to the front and revived: it is not an abstract ideology but had its own material manifestation; billions of people have lived it, practiced it and distributed it. Understanding of Brotherhood and Unity helps to strengthen the stereotyped image of multiculturalism as balancing migrant policy toward regions, where the main challenges are not newcomers, but those who once fought for their historical territories. Historical complexity and multi-level formations of coexistential living in former socialist countries (beside Yugoslavia, Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia ran similar coexisting systems) may prove, how those countries have longer legacies on multicultural practices than some Western, mono-national democracies trying to implement the new multiculturalism. In fact, differences among old and new systems are not so dramatic: multiculturalism, however named and when-/wherever created, with different details in ideological basis and differently involved in everyday life of different groups of people, were always created with the same peace-oriented aims.

Old Ideologies, New Paths: Legacy and Actualization of (Post) Yugoslav Multicultural Experiences

In 2011 there was a conference in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the topic of Bosnian future and war's legacy.[79] Even though focus should have been on the plans for future, the majority of contributions related mainly to the past. In any case, the past in that context may not and should not be neglected while planning the future—nevertheless, this concrete text constantly emphasizes the importance of the analysis of old policies for successful implementation of new ones. Back to the conference, it was probably my post-Yugoslav youth as my main advantage (or naïve approach)

that I was the lonely case, supported by a very few nodding faces coming from the audience, that presented the future as a positive challenge rather than a negative Gordian knot that will not be solved until it will not be radically cut. I pointed out and defended the results, obtained during the research, presented and summarized in this article.

First, the research was focused on the mechanisms that ran former Yugoslav efforts toward successful coexistence in comparison with the contemporary multicultural attempts, where the importance of youth and young people in the multicultural promotion of the ideology appears visibly. Thus, Brotherhood and Unity as European multiculturalism devotes enormous financial and organizational support activities and projects that distribute, incorporate young people who are educated, learn about and implement the idea and the ideology of harmony. For the region of the former Yugoslav countries, historical and cultural contamination of adults is probably too influential to change and accept alternative ideologies in a short period of time; impacts of early socialization significantly influence subsequent behavior and understanding in later periods of life. Unfortunately, learning multiculturalism nowadays begins with the "adult" children, that is, among grown-up teenagers, and, even more, it is usually just the poor part of non-formal educational programs. The importance of educating young people particularly is very clear after a review of the programs, which the European Union is preparing for them; they are numerous in comparison to programs that educate and promote multiculturalism among adults or the elderly.

In historical sequence as happened in the Balkans, where the wave of multicultural coexistence was succeeded by fratricide, one could oppose how years of educating did not help to prevent struggles and atrocities on the religious or/and ethnic background and how it is apparently not effective. However, if investigating history, successful multicultural political orders have always called the political support, namely, they were distributed by the powerful and the leading political elites; usually they were part of the hegemonic political ideology, if one desires it or not. Since the term ideology is negatively contaminated as manipulation of people and loss of free will, it loses every positive subscription. But the multiculturalism is an ideology for sure, showing how sometimes certain social phenomena, especially as complex as cultural diverse society is, must be regulated and pressed by the "top-down" approach and how it might bring positive consequences for the certain social group.

As a follower of ideas of cultural constructivism, in which plenty of ideas and cultural phenomena are nothing but more or less vague or radical ideologies, both former and current multiculturalism are observed and investigated as one of the cultural constructs. "Managing" people toward multicultural and tolerant behavior once they adopted a particular selection-oriented pattern (as national, ethnic or religious affiliation) might be very complex and difficult. Sometimes, therefore, the positive intentions end up in destructive actions and it is where every theoretical discourse of multicultural politics has to be inspected on the field, as Althusser's materialized product as well.

The intention of the research was also to find out, if on the basis of understanding of historical multicultural mechanisms, their strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, new multicultural and tolerant politics could be designed. Brotherhood and Unity was due to a different time, cultural and political context for the Yugoslav leadership is clearly a different challenge as today's multiculturalism is for the European Union. The local multicultural Yugoslav ideology was created and adapted to the cultural environment that has not been changed in many perspectives since the beginning. Comparing it to the European multiculturalism, this was regional policy/ideology and thus was more successfully applied to the requirements and specifics of its limited region. It was primarily focused on equality of the working class and not the general equality of all people; it united mainly Yugoslavs and not, for example, Somalis, Indians, Albanians and French. That is what its advantage was about: because it was not set globally, it could work more effectively and more intensely. From this point of view, France or Spain as European countries with the largest percentage of immigrants from all over the world should certainly create a different multicultural ideology such as post-Yugoslav countries where different tensions between ethnic groups within the area are still present and harassing. One should consider the aspirations of the European Union to universalize multiculturalism; under its cover, different regions with their different requirements in multicultural regulations are in question. The Canadian concept institutionalized in the 1960s cannot be simply shipped over the ocean. As a potato brought by Christopher Columbus needs the appropriate soil to be grown in Europe, it is how melting pot ideas should adapt to the specific European cultural climate, regional conflict winters and occasionally warm summer coexistence.

Understanding of historical multicultural attempts in the Balkans is important for the following two aspects. First, because it indicates that multiculturalism is not a new invention and that it was practiced in many historical circumstances, context, regions and times. And second, because it indicates that the idea itself, although it is ideology, and regardless of the Althusser's materialization aspects, always aims to establish the best coexistence between people who have to coordinate their lives of more or less different cultural patterns. At the same time, the definition of cultural differences or equality is are very relative terms and sometimes in the context of multiculturalism mean apparently the same: they both can cause unification of people or their division; sometimes differences unite them, sometimes divide. Both can be a friendly bridge or rushing river, but if we are aware of the existence and effectiveness of past multicultural attempts, then this is probably the best motivation for researchers who develop new ideas, and especially for "field workers"—pedagogues, lecturers, workshop leaders in all countries of former Yugoslavia that make an effort in favor of better coexistence. Due to distinct cultural and political context, however, it simply cannot be implemented overnight. When finishing the presentation at the conference mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, a senior professor from the University of Sarajevo, commented on the speech: "Dear young lady, with my warm intentions I would suggest you not to lose your youth on the Balkans. Everything is too much complicated."

However, going through the wall exactly this "youth" is to be spent on the peace building and multicultural implementation at least for two reasons: since being youth, one can distance himself/herself from the contaminated and politically incorrect history—either from its exaggerated nostalgic feelings or negative revival of the ethnic struggles and war. The youth can be seen as the great advantage when thinking about new and their (our) future, about what we expect from it and, above all, what could be avoided. Since losing the time in our youth is the subject of our coexistence in our adulthood, and not far from the truth exactly, youngsters are to build the same ideology as 40 years ago; to passionately build our European project brigades and carry our European relays, following the same aim: to perceive cultural diversity as pleasant spice in our lives, to respect each other's differences and to make our lives coexisting. And for this, it is much worse to lose our youth.

Notes

1. Sabina P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the War for Kosovo* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999); Warren Zimmerman, *Origins of Catastrophe. Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers, America's Last Ambassador Tells What Happened and Why* (New York: Random House–Times Books, 1996); Misha Glenny, *The Balkans 1804–1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers* (London: Granta books, 2000); P. Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History* (New York: Picador, 2005); Paul Mojzes, *Balkan Genocides and Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011).
2. Richard West, *The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia* (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1995).
3. Jakov Blažević, *Ustav SFR Jugoslavije: ustavni zakon za provođenje Ustava SFRJ* (Zagreb: Političke teme, biblioteka suvremene političke misli, 1974); Blažo Nikolovski, *Enakopravnost, bratstvo in enotnost narodov in narodnosti v našem federativnem sistemu* (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1979); Ibrahim Bakić, *Jugoslovenstvo od ideje do ostvarenja* (Belgrade: PFV, 1985); Ivo Banac, *Nacionalno pitanje u Jugoslaviji: porijeklo, povijest, politika* (Zagreb: Globus, 1988); Vesna Pešić, *Kratki kurs o jednakosti: koncepcija jednakosti u zvaničnoj ideologiji Jugoslovenskog društva* (Belgrade: Sociološko društvo Srbije, 1988); Mladen Matić, *Bratstvo i jedinstvo naroda i narodnosti Jugoslavije* (Sarajevo: Vijeće Saveza sindikata Bosne i Hercegovine, 1989).
4. Louis Althusser, *Izbrani spisi* (Ljubljana: Založba/*cf, 2000), p. 9.
5. William Connolly, *Politične vede in ideologija* (Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 1974), p. 10.
6. Ibid., p. 66.
7. Charles Taylor, *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Ella Sohat and Robert Stam, 'Contested Histories: Eurocentrism, Multiculturalism, and the Media,' in D.T. Goldberg, ed., *Multiculturalism: A Critical Reader* (Cambridge, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
8. Andrew Heywood, *Political Ideologies: An Introduction* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
9. Marina Lukšič-Hacin, *Multikulturalizem in migracije* (Ljubljana: ZRC SAZU, 1999).
10. Andrew Heywood, *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*, pp. 322–326.

11. Maja Muhić "Multiculturalism in Central and Eastern Europe: Challenge or Threat?" *Anthropology of East Europe Review* 22 (2): 37–44 (2004); European Commission 2010.
12. Marina Lukšič-Hacin, *Multikulturalizem in migracije*.
13. Apart from several coexisting nations of Yugoslavia, 2 million people out of 22 million were either parents or children of ethnically mixed marriages. In 1991, the region with the highest rate of inter-ethnic marriages was the Vojvodina (25%), followed by Croatia (18%), Serbia and Slovenia (16%); in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where ethnic heterogeneity was higher, only less than one marriage in eight was inter-ethnic.
14. The exposure of non-Slavic origins refers to historical ideas of Yugoslavia that was to unite all South Slavs living under the umbrella of Habsburg Monarchy. The Yugoslav idea, as developed by Josip Juraj Strossmayer and Franjo Racki, referred to the heritage of the Illirian Movement, where all South Slavs—and Albanians due to their ethnic origins—were never counted in—living in the Habsburg Monarchy, united with Montenegrins and Serbians were up to become independent and united in one common state. The idea was to form one, Yugoslav nation, where Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs would be its consisting tribes. The tensions of Serbian nationalism have always presented and been perceived as an invisible and silent threat for Slovenes and Croats (more: Ivo Banac, *Nacionalno pitanje u Jugoslaviji: porijeklo, povijest, politika*, p. 94; Mitja Velikonja Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia and Herzegovina Texas: A&M University Press, 2003, p. 111).
15. After Robert D. Greenberg, language issues have always been the reflection and a catalyst for inter-ethnic relations, tensions and animosities in Balkans. After the outbreak of war in 1990s, fragmentation of the languages and implementations of "new" pure-Serbian/pure-Croatian/pure-Bosnian have shown have language was always highly emotional and politically sensitive, or even abused part of the identity of peoples of Yugoslavia. More on the topic in Robert D. Greenberg 2008 *Language and Identity in the Balkans: Serbo-Croatian and Its Disintegration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press Inc.).
16. Branka Magaš, *The destruction of Yugoslavia: tracking the break-up 1980–92* (London: Verso, 1993), p. 17.
17. Jakov Blažević, *Ustav SFR Jugoslavije: ustavni zakon za provođenje Ustava SFRJ*; Blažo Nikolovski, *Enakopravnost, bratstvo in enotnost narodov in narodnosti v našem federativnem sistemu*; Ibrahim Bakić, *Jugoslovenstvo od ideje do ostvarenja*; I. Banac, *Nacionalno pitanje u Jugoslaviji: porijeklo, povijest, politika*; Vesna Pešić, *Kratki kurs o jednakosti: koncepcija jednakosti u zvaničnoj ideologiji Jugoslovenskog društva*; Mladen Matić, *Bratstvo i jedinstvo naroda i narodnosti Jugoslavije*.

18. Ugo Vlaisavljević 'The South Slav identity and the ultimate war-reality' in D.I. Bjelić and Obrad Savić, eds. *Balkan as Metaphor: Between Globalization and Fragmentation* (London: The MIT Press, 2002), p. 204.
19. ibid, p. 205.
20. Mladen Matić, *Bratstvo i jedinstvo naroda i narodnosti Jugoslavije*, p. 12.
21. See more at Ella Sohat and Robert Stam, Contested Histories: Eurocentrism, Multiculturalism, and the Media; Zagorka Golubović, 'Multiculturalism and Minorities' Rights in the Balkans,' in Goran Bašić, ed., Demokratija i multkulturnost u jugoistočnoj Europi (Belgrade: ETNOS, 2003); Maja Muhić, "Multiculturalism in Central and Eastern Europe: Challenge or Threat?" Anthropology of East Europe Review 22 (2): 37–44.
22. Ibrahim Bakić, *Jugoslovenstvo od ideje do ostvarenja*, p. 29.
23. Josip Broz Tito, in Ibrahim Bakić, *Jugoslovenstvo od ideje do ostvarenja* p. 121.
24. Branka Magaš, *The destruction of Yugoslavia: tracking the break-up 1980–92*, p. 26.
25. Jakov Blažević, *Ustav SFR Jugoslavije: ustavni zakon za provođenje Ustava SFRJ* (Zagreb: Političke teme, biblioteka suvremene političke misli p. 39/II).
26. Vesna Pešić, *Kratki kurs o jednakosti: koncepcija jednakosti u zvaničnoj ideologiji Jugoslovenskog društva*.
27. Ibid.
28. The Program of Community Party of Yugoslavia has emphasized the main task of the party that lies in the efforts to ensure moral and political equality of the pary and the nation; equality as a term was used for the first time in 1952 during the Sixth Congress of KPJ (Communist Pary of Yugoslavia), explaining economical and national equalities and defining equal relations among all nations and nationalities living in Yugoslavia (ibid., p. 18–19).
29. Ibid.
30. Tourist advertisment from the 1990s presents cultural diversity of Yugoslavia in a very bright light; after listing all languages, religions, and ethnics of Yugoslavia, the storyteller concludes: "It is not imagined country, it is Yugoslavia" (Youtube 2007).
31. Youth brigades were mostly voluntary participation, although workers gained some working hours in working time, and for young people additional cultural and sports programs were prepared. In this way, many road, public constructions, stations were built, including the road of Brotherhood and Unity. A slogan was a driving ideological force for young people from all republics, who strengthen their relations and intercultural respect, when working for the same aim. In Rudi Supek, *Omladina na putu bratstva: psiho-sociologija radne akcije* (Belgrade: Mladost, 1963).

32. Zala Volčić, "Scenes From the Last Yugoslav Generation: The Long March from Yugo-Utopia to Nationalisms," *Cultural Dynamics* 19, no. 1 (2007): 67–89.
33. Yugoslav rock bands are one of a kind when imagining supranational Yugoslav culture. Ekatarina Velika, Prljavo Kazalište, Zabranjeno puwww-wenje, Azra, and Bijelo Dugme identified themselves first as Yugoslav bands and then as Serbian, Bosnian, and so on. Exactly that cultural products were of a main importance in the creation of one common awareness of Yugoslav diversity and positive perception of it.
34. Maja Weiss, *Cesta bratstva in enotnosti* (Ljubljana: Bela Film/RTV Slovenija, 1999).
35. **Warren Zimmerman, *Origins of Catastrophe. Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers, America's Last Ambassador Tells What happened and Why;* Misha Glenny, *The Balkans 1804–1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers*; Peter Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History* (New York: Picador, 2005).**
36. Warren Zimmerman, *Origins of Catastrophe. Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers, America's Last Ambassador Tells What Happened and Why*, p. 38.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Tito was the last Habsburg prince since he shared the same issue of this big multicultural area as his preceding ruler of the "ancient Danubian Empire." In Igor Grdina, *Brotherhood and Unity—the Poetic Phrase and the Reality* (Ljubljana: Zgodovina za vse (1), 1996).
40. PC, Croatia 2011.
41. Ibid.
42. Ivaylo Ditchev (2004) *Monoculturalism as Prevailing Culture*, http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2004-02-05-ditchev-en.html, date accessed 4 May 2011.
43. **See more in Nena Močnik, *EU Grinding of Balkan Claws: Pejorative Linguistic Connotations at EU Enlargement to Western Balkans*, http://politheor.net/nena-mocnik-eu-grinding-of-balkan-claws-pejorative-linguistic-connotations-at-eu-enlargement-to-western-balkans/. (10 September 2012). Different statements and speeches of European political representatives are analyzed there.**
44. Not concerning Canadian and USA adoption of multiculturalism; where it was institutionalized in the 1960s.
45. PC Croatia, 2011.
46. Maja Muhić, "Multiculturalism in Central and Eastern Europe: Challenge or Threat?"
47. Ibid.
48. I Croatia, 2011.

49. Ibid.
50. I Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2011.
51. Ibid.
52. More info: http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/youth/index_en.php, date accessed 22 September 2012.
53. I, Bosnia-Herzegovina 2011.
54. Written correspondence, 15 May 2011.
55. I Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2011.
56. Stefano Bianchini, *The Balkans and the Challenge of Economic Integration: Regional and European Perspective* (Ravenna: Longo, 1997), p. 73.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Igor Grdina, *Brotherhood and Unity—the Poetic Phrase and the Reality*, p. 63.
60. Not to be confused: Yugoslavia had established more or less equal status of more hegemonic cultures; the leading position was given to the nations, nationalities were in the role of minorities. The practice in monocultural Europe is different: usually one nation/ethnic group prevails, others, minorities and newcomers are to adapt to the existing system.
61. Marina Luksič-Hacin, *Multikulturalizem in migracije*, p. 70.
62. I Bosnia-Herzegovina 2011.
63. Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, *Contested Histories: Eurocentrism, Multiculturalism, and the Media*, p. 296.
64. Zagorka Golubović, *Multiculturalism and Minorities' Rights in the Balkans*, p. 187.
65. Ibid.
66. I Bosnia-Herzegovina 2010.
67. Ibid.
68. The project was financially supported by Youth in Action Program and united more the 150 youngsters from former Yugoslavia. It was held in Belgrade in May 2010 and organized by Marija Jelić.
69. Dubravka Ugrešič, *Balkans, my Balkans*. http://www.cdsee.org/pdf/crossing_perspectives_balkans.pdf, date accessed 11 January 2011, p. 4.
70. See Merkel's, Cameron's and Sarkozy's viewpoints on: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1355961/Nicolas-Sarkozy-joins-David-CameronAngela-Merkel-view-multiculturalism-failed.html, date accessed 14 July 2012.
71. I Macedonia, 2011.
72. I Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2011.
73. PC Serbia 2011.
74. Ibid.
75. I Bosnia-Herzegovina 2011.

76. Ibid.
77. I Macedonia 2010.
78. Detailed description on simulation is available in Education pack—ideas, resources, methods and activities for informal intercultural education with young people and adults, published by the European Commission and Council of Europe, *All Different, All Equal* (Strasbourg: European Commission, 2008, p. 78). Simulation games from the pack are very interesting but at the same time they would harm very easily; thus, the approach toward youth with the simulation games must be very responsible.
79. Nena Močnik, "*Count on Us—Thirty Years Later: Bosnian Multiculturalism in European Way: Youth Programs and Activities for the Preservation of Co-Living and Inter-Cultural Dialog in Bosnia-Herzegovina* was published (Časopis za kritiko znanosti, domišljijo in novo antropologijo, 2011, XXXIX (243): 145–155).

CHAPTER 9

The Turbo Social Project—Conclusion

Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić

Once more Yugoslavia is an example of a new form of a turbo social experiment on the international political scene: Within only two decades of the bloodshed for independence, the countries that used to be in a Yugoslav union are going through an unprecedented feeling of *déjá vu*. *First*, they fought against Serbia's aggression in a war for their individual independence. *Then* as successor countries, they are working hard towards the entry in another union with each other and other EU countries. Year 2013 Croatia entered the EU, and in 2004 Slovenia entered the EU. On 21 January 2014, Serbia started negotiations with the EU. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Kosovo are still waiting to be announced as candidates. From the international community it is expected that they will cooperate and assist each other in overcoming these new challenges. Ironically enough, the headquarters for decision-making, which in ex-Yugoslavia was situated in Belgrade (Central Committee of the Communist Party), is now replaced by decision-makers in Brussels. Despite the fact that today's Central Committee has many other members, it is still quite

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bizarre to see Yugoslav successor states only 20 years after the bloodshed, wanting to talk, think, and dream about entry into the EU, even though in practice this means "reunion" with all the other members of the old Central Committee of the Communist Party as well.

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