Revolutionary Totalitarianism, Pragmatic Socialism, Transition

VOLUME ONE, TITO'S YUGOSLAVIA, STORIES UNTOLD

Edited by Gorana Ognjenović & Jasna Jozelić



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In dedication to my grandma, Anka Balaško Špoljar, who might have lost a battle but won the war.

The Uniqueness and Non-uniqueness of Josip Broz Tito: A Foreword

This volume, ably assembled by Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić, tells the story of the man who led socialist Yugoslavia for more than three decades and constructed a system that was not entirely "of the East", while clearly not "of the West" either. The range of topics covered in this volume is impressive, ranging from the Tito regime's controlling the destinies of the internees from Yugoslavia in Nazi camps in Norway after World War II, to the annual Tito birthday celebrations, Partisan films, and more traditional but no less interesting subjects such as non-alignment, brotherhood and unity, and the suppression of the multiparty system immediately after World War II. And, as these chapters show, socialist Yugoslavia had some unique features.

Josip Broz Tito was and remains unique in some politically telling ways. First, he is the only Eastern European communist leader of the immediate post–World War II generation who continues to command a certain amount of adulation in parts of what once was socialist Yugoslavia. Whether one thinks of Hungary's Mátyás Rákosi or Poland's Bolesław Bierut or Albania's Enver Hoxha, or any of the other communists who came to power in Central and South Eastern Europe at the end of World War II, none of them attracts particular interest, let alone a following. Yet in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia, Tito is still remembered with respect—at least in some circles. Croatia's capital city even boasts a public square named after the long-time Yugoslav president, while in Serbia in late 2009, Tito's grandson, Josip Joška Broz, was elected head of a newly forming communist party. In Bosnia, one may find Café Tito in

downtown Sarajevo, and Tito mugs, adorned with his likeness, continue to be on sale, alongside other Tito paraphernalia.

Tito was unique in a second respect. Where the communists holding leadership positions in the Soviet bloc based their claim to legitimacy on the promise of economic equality and full employment, commitment to a full welfare state (anti-capitalism), and proletarian internationalism (translated as subservience to the Soviet Union), Tito and his immediate successors based their claims on an entirely different triad. Two of the elements of this triad—self-management and non-alignment—were devised specifically to legitimise Yugoslavia's independent path, eventually accepted by the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in 1955. Self-management, or so the Yugoslav communists proclaimed at their Seventh Congress in 1958, was no less than a higher stage of socialism that the Soviets had achieved, while non-alignment provided a rationale for the repudiation of proletarian internationalism. To these, the Yugoslavs added the concept of brotherhood and unity, in effect a claim to inter-ethnic harmony. Tito himself would claim, in 1979, that the Yugoslav "national question" had been solved *in principle,* and, by "in principle" he meant that it had not yet been solved *in practice.*

What is striking about the legitimising schemes of both the Soviet bloc states and socialist Yugoslavia is that neither scheme referred to political succession as such and, as Guglielmo Ferrero noted more than 70 years ago,[1] agreement on the rules and procedures of political succession is central to achieving political legitimacy. Thus, dynastic monarchies, whether absolute or constitutional, have justified succession by the rule of primogeniture, or some variation thereof. Systems of representative government have justified political succession by professing to honour the rule that the candidate or political party that gains the greatest number of votes is entitled to take the reins of government. Both of these schemes are open to subversion—by imposters (such as the two False Dimitrys in early seventeenth-century Russia) in the case of dynastic succession and by electoral fraud in the case of representative systems. But what they have in common—the justification and the disqualification of voters of incumbency according to a rule of succession—distinguishes both of them from communist systems. The latter, whether explicitly (as in the case of Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin or Romania's Nicolae Ceauşescu) or implicitly, ultimately laid claim to office on the basis of their superior understanding of the principles of governance—de facto appealing to a principle reminiscent, up to a point, of Plato's *Republic.*

Tito was unique in yet a third respect, namely in erecting a system of collective leadership that was supposed to take charge after his death. The widespread slogan in summer 1980—"after Tito, Tito"—already suggested that the system hung on the symbolic power of a leader who was no longer among the living. The brief era of collective leadership in the post-Stalin USSR is not comparable for two reasons. First, the eight members of the Yugoslav collective presidency represented the eight federal units comprising the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and were organized as a formal body. The post-Stalin collective leadership in the Soviet Union was not a formal body, even though it was made up of the strongest members of the Politburo, and, with the exception of Anastas Mikoyan, consisted entirely of Russians. And second, the chairmanship of the Yugoslav collective presidency rotated each year—in a system that lasted for a decade. In the Soviet case, by contrast, Khrushchev immediately took the post of First Secretary for himself, while Georgi Malenkov occupied the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers until he was replaced in 1955 by Nikolai Bulganin, who, in turn, had to surrender the post three years later to Khrushchev. And finally, Tito was more generous than other communist leaders in allowing various associations to function outside party control. These included a music guild for young people, a technical council, film clubs, and mountain-climbing associations.

To be sure, there are also ways in which Tito was *not* unique. To begin with, in Yugoslavia as elsewhere in the communist world, the Communist Party exercised a monopoly of power and did not permit other parties to compete in the political arena. Second, as elsewhere, the system that Tito and his associates set up involved systematic efforts to penetrate or influence the churches—whether (as in the early days) through the establishment of regime-friendly priests' associations or through the recruitment of clergy as informers.[2] Third, one may recall the brutal way in which Tito dealt with political opposition in the early years, first driving non-communist politicians such as Milan Grol and Dragoljub Jovanović from power and then rounding up pro-Stalin communists after June 1948, and sending them to Goli Otok (Bare Island), the notorious prison camp. Fourth, Tito established a system of control over and censorship of the media and publishing, which was typical of communist countries. And fifth, the cult of the leadership was itself a typical feature in the communist world, even if the details differed from country to country.[3]

Many commentators have commented that Tito was larger than life. Thus, in her chapter for this two-volume book, Latinka Perović quotes

Serb novelist Dobrica Ćosić, describing Tito as having "an unusual, impressive personality" and of exuding "strength, health, manly beauty, simplicity, and superiority." Fitzroy Maclean, who met Tito during the Partisan War (or, the People's Liberation War, as it was officially termed), would later recall the Yugoslav leader's "never-failing sense of humor; his unashamed delight in minor pleasures of life; a natural diffidence in human relationships, giving way to a natural friendliness…; a violent temper…; a considerateness and generosity constantly made manifest in small ways; [and] a surprising readiness to see both sides of a question."[4] Above all, there was the strength of his personality, so that David Binder could comment, in the film *Tito and the Power of Resistance* (1978), that, upon entering a room, Tito's presence would fill the entire space.

Tito displayed a firm determination to win at politics, and a readiness to resort to ruthless means to do so. This ruthlessness was clearly shown in the speedy suppression of the re-emergent multiparty system at the end of World War II, as Zdenko Radelić shows, as well as in the treatment of suspected Soviet sympathizers—Cominformists as recorded in Tvrtko Jakovina's contribution to this set. And when Fidel Castro tried to divert the non-aligned movement into a "progressive", i.e., pro-Soviet direction, Tito travelled to Havana, at the age of 88, in order to do battle with the Cuban leader and keep the movement equidistant between the blocs. Although as Zachary Irwin notes, "the aspirations of the [non-aligned] movement could not prevent serious conflict among its members," it remained symbolically and perhaps also politically important for more than two decades—until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 demonstrated the impotence of that movement in the face of military muscle.

Tito and his coterie had come to power as a result of their victory in 1944–1945, and they made the most of the Partisan myth in an effort to legitimate their rule. This entailed silence about Partisan atrocities, as well as about atrocities committed by Chetniks who crossed over to Partisan ranks. But the Partisan myth also involved active propaganda and here, as Jurica Pavičić's chapter shows, the genre of Partisan films played a vital role, even spawning subgenres such as Partisan thrillers, Partisan comedies, Partisan spy films, and of course Partisan epics, such as the 1973 film, *Sutjeska*, in which Richard Burton, who had played the role of Leon Trotsky in a film released just the previous year, was cast as Tito.

Elected eventually as "president without termination of mandate"—rather than merely "president for life"—Tito seemed larger than life even in death. After lingering for four months between life and death in the

Ljubljana Medical Centre, Tito succumbed on 4 May 1980. His funeral, rehearsed and re-rehearsed for weeks on end, was staged as a mass spectacle, with representatives from 128 countries, including 31 presidents, 22 prime ministers, 4 kings, 6 princes, and 47 foreign ministers. Hundreds of thousands of Yugoslavs lined the streets of Belgrade to watch the funeral procession, while Yugoslavs in Dubrovnik, Split, and elsewhere huddled wherever there was a television, in order to witness the end of an era. For weeks after the funeral, Yugoslavs gathered at railway stations and other public places to sing the patriotic song "Jugoslavijo" and the old Partisan song "Comrade Tito, we pledge to you that we shall not deviate from your path". As time would tell, it took less than a decade for certain Yugoslavs in high places to deviate from Tito's path and to set the country on the road to fragmentation, collapse, and war.

Sabrina P. Ramet

Tito's Yugoslavia, *Stories Untold* Preface

As the disintegration of Tito's Yugoslavia into its successor states proceeded, the power also decentralized and therefore much previously unknown information became available to the public. Today, it is possible to search in archives for documents and earlier unknown information that can result in further development of knowledge about Tito's Yugoslavia. As a result, a more detailed and nuanced picture of what Yugoslavia was all about is slowly emerging throughout the academic research literature. After reading most of the literature published on the theme, we came to a conclusion that this volume needs to be organised in order to meet some mishaps and flaws in already existing descriptions, followed by a serious lack of detail and nuance in certain aspects of the descriptions already made. For example, some important details were still untold, some aspects of the narrative were selectively told, and some descriptions of what we knew about who we were and what happened in the end were simply wrong. Our aim by producing this volume is to challenge decades of some superficial and selective rhetoric that came from different sides/political interests, foreign as well as domestic. In other words, our contributions are meant to fill in some of those black holes that unfortunately got to see daylight and lived long and prosperous lives determining the idea of what Tito's Yugoslavia was, for longer than should have been the case. What we are hoping to achieve is a more detailed picture, which might surprise those who thought they knew it all, and we are hoping to inspire others to read more about this historically social experiment that, against all odds, actually did exist and prospered for a while, in the midst of the spiderwebs

of the global political chaos that even today does not seem to be on its way to reach the equilibrium of global peace that is actually practically possible.

Why is the study of *Tito's Yugoslavia* relevant today?

Neither the rise nor the fall of Tito's Yugoslavia occurred in a political vacuum.

In the end, for various reasons, it vanished more or less overnight in one of the worst bloodsheds ever seen in Europe, a bloodshed that, despite all international expectations and demands, seems not to be easy to forget or forgive, especially in those areas of the formal Republic devastated by the conflict. All reconciliation studies show that the process of healing needs honesty about crimes committed and systematic positive action, which would provide conditions necessary for wounds to heal, of which, unfortunately, there is not much to be seen as yet.

Since Tito's Yugoslavia physically no longer exists, one would think that the task of retrospectively reflecting on it as a phenomenon would be easier, but, as we all know, appearances can be deceiving.

In these two volumes we take up a series of questions that deeply affected the politics, which belonged to the core definition of the political dialectics between the former Yugoslav republics. These questions and answers we present have a key role in understanding the art of fine balancing between the communist (revolutionary) totalitarian regime and socialist republic as its antidote, the result of which was pulling a great number of the population as active participators into Tito's idealist project. The fact that "we" as (citizens of Yugoslavia) at some point actually surpassed the republic borders. This is why repeating some of these questions in the light of the newly gained information based on documented facts are of great importance for the Yugoslav successor states in their current state of political independence from one another.

In these two volumes, by *Tito's Yugoslavia* we mean the time period of that country's existence (1945–1990); therefore, essays will not in the same degree refer to Tito's person as a key answer to the countries rule as such. In various degrees, the essays refer to Tito's persona as the key ruler of the country in its totalitarian and the consequent socialist edition.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić

One of the results of greater access to archive sources after the fall of Yugoslavia is the ongoing debate as to whether Tito's Yugoslavia was either "totalitarian" or "socialist", and it came to a point where the two interpretations are seen as two periods in Tito's terms of power: they relate to each other as linear sequences or two stages of development. In that respect, the following analysis reflects on certain recent developments within latest research from both phases, by first focusing on details around the end of the revolution and establishment of Tito's Yugoslavia and then focusing on details around the making of socialism and some of its important aspects.

What makes the period of transition from revolution into totalitarianism worth re-examining is the fact that amongst other things it uncovers that the plan to have a single party rule over the new state was there all along. It was the practical political finalising of the original plan only, which took place between 1944 and 1948 because it was important to ensure, before the war was over, that there were no alternative candidates to the throne in the new Yugoslavia. Let us not forget that the final political reckoning with the Fifth Column members was a reality in other European countries, after their liberation from the Nazi occupation and the terror of the local

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collaborators. However, Tito's Yugoslavia was exceptional because of two particular aspects:

1. This final political stage in its revolutionary project or, one could say, the process of redefinition of the premises for setting up the new state, was unprecedented in Europe, due to the intensity of violence and the number victims it had claimed. The systematically induced violence was happening on a general plan, across Tito's Yugoslavia with Department for the Protection of the People (Odjeljenje zaštite naroda, Odjeljenje za zaštitu naroda [OZNA]) named Directorate for State Security (Uprava državne bezbjednosti [UDBA]), after the war as practical enforcers of this political cleanup.[1] Even though in this present volume the detailed analysis of this process of introducing the totalitarian or one-party political rule is based on a case study of Croatia, its effects can be seen as a blueprint for a description for what was going on across former Yugoslavia from 1944 until 1953. The final reckoning with its potential enemies (including anti-Communist guerrillas) and retaliation against their supporters was also a reality in Serbia as well as in all other former republics. For example a recent exhibition in Belgrade ("In the name of the people! Political oppression in Serbia 1944–1953" by Srđan Cvetković)[2] documented that around 50,000 individuals, either Četniks, their supporters or civilians only suspected of collaboration with the Axis were killed on the Serbian territory between 1944 and 1953.
2. An unexpected exception to the blueprint, which was uncovered only recently, reflected the difference between how the same historic period (1944–1953) and events that took place in that period were not only perceived differently by the different sides of Tito's Yugoslavia, but were also denoted by two different categories. In addition, as it turns out, this exception, based in difference in understanding of a historic period, was vital to the total perception of who took part in the liberation of the country from the Axis forces and their collaborators. They were the two very different explanatory approaches towards an understanding of the period, depending on from where one was looking at the same period of the common Yugoslav historic World War II narrative. This difference in categorising the same event (1944–1953) nevertheless was also vital for a general perception of the wars during the 1990s, despite research resources that had been invested in attempting to understand the sad course of events which had taken place so long ago. We were sur-

> prised to discover that the terms used (referring to the same period) did not even resemble one another: what had been referred to as the "final cleanup" or "the final countdown", between Tito's Partisans and Fifth Column members on the territory of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the very same historic period, was and is referred to in Serbia as a civil war (*Bratoubilački rat*).[3] How come?

Even though the general immunity that Tito offered to Fifth Column members in 1944 and 1945 resulted in a number of desertions from the various collaborators, whereby they changed sides and joined Tito's Partisans, these numbers were not even close to the numbers of Četniks who after the King's order in 1944 changed sides and joined Tito's Partisans. The order from the King was clear: Četniks were to abandon Dražo Mihajlović and join Tito's Partisans in order to finalise the liberation of the country from the Axis and its collaborators. From that point on, the battles between Tito's Partisans and Četniks that lasted until 1953 in Serbia were referred to as a civil war.

Accordingly, one of the main side effects of this shift was systematic blurring of the political picture of who was who once the war was over. This "shifting sides" was so politically loaded that it managed to suppress for a very long time the fact that Serbia was the only former Yugoslav republic where the German's had strong collaboration partners even before the occupation of Yugoslavia by the Axis in April 1941.[4] Consequently, this was also why the War Crimes Commission, after the war was over, carried out only a selective analysis as to who were the victims of the war crimes across the country. Thousands of victims of Partisan and Četnik crimes were simply not registered because by the time the crimes commission came to register these crimes, the individuals who had committed these crimes were already highly positioned in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) and Yugoslav Army. They were protected and therefore any possibility of investigations being carried out and people being tried for their crimes was blocked. For example the victims' fear of losing even more members of the family to the "new" administration[5] resulted in the "culture of silence", around the civil Bošnjak victims in Eastern Bosnia.[6]

In the case of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, this "difference in categorising" in the after-war period was combined with a sense of *collective responsibility* assigned to Croats and Bošnjaks for the genocide carried out by the Ustaša separatist rule of the Independent State of Croatia towards Orthodox population (1941–1945). This collective responsibility was primarily based on the fact of the existence of the Independent State

of Croatia, and on ignorance of the fact that the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH) was a marionette state, as well as ignorance of the fact that Ustaša were not democratically elected but appointed by the Axis as a system of terror over the entire population on its territory. Whoever was not directly involved with the NOP (National Liberation Movement) or NOB (National Liberation Struggle Front) was guilty as charged and by this general condemnation of the vast numbers of civilian population, another historiographic distinction was conveniently erased, together with all of its political and moral consequences. One should also keep in mind that during this horrific period of revolutionary totalitarianism (1944–1953), a factor of the "privatization of politics"[7] where private scores were getting settled in an opportunistic manner by accusing the first neighbours of cooperation with Nazis just to settle a private score, was not a rare occurrence. In addition, a very frequent occurrence was plundering of the property, for example in Syrmia where the well-off families not associated with any of the sides during the war became victims of vicious Partisan crimes overnight, while the rest of the country was celebrating the end of the war. One should mention that the dealings with the Croat and Bošnjak civilian population and assigning to them a collective responsibility did not get out of hand as much as did dealing with the German minority (Volkedeutsche). They were assigned the group responsibility, placed in camps and expelled from the country and their property was confiscated by the new state. In the case of Croats and Bošnjaks, the retribution target was clear and the project of punishment without trial, in the form of physical abuse, killings and rape of civilians, lasted in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, right up to 1948.

Parallel to these events, another violation was being carried out. The redefinition of the relationships between the ethnic groups, which supposedly ended up on the opposite sides of the war, claimed the differential treatment of their civilian victims as well as the civilian non-associated organised help carried out by individuals politically or military non-aligned. One of these civilian or humane actions, which resulted in saving thousands of children (victims of the Ustasa genocide), as in the case of Diana Budisavljević, was condemned with the rest of them.[8] While Oscar Schindler received a postmortem recognition of being "Righteous amongst men" for saving 1200 people, thanks to the political sabotage carried out by the administration of Tito's Yugoslavia. Diana's bravery, which resulted in saving 12,000 children from Stara Gradiška Ustaša concentration camp, has only recently begun to claim the recognition it deserved.

An explanation for how all these unaccounted civilian victims and civilian heroes never gained recognition for their bravery was to be found in another historic category: the Union of Fighters of the People's Liberation War, known as SUBNOR (Savez udruženja boraca Narodnooslobodilačkog rata), created by the Communist regime (1947). A powerful organization of Partisan veterans, which sought to cultivate and protect the memory of those who were killed fighting for the Partisan cause,[9] defined a category of "Fallen fighters" or "Victims of Fascist Terror". "Fallen fighters" were those killed while fighting as Partisans during 1941–1945, while "Victims of Fascist Terror" were those killed during the war as non-combatants, either at the hands of the foreign armies or the various factions the Communist authorities grouped under the heading "domestic traitors", meaning the Fifth Column, the Četniks, Ustaša, and others.[10] The Union of Fighters of the People's Liberation War decided who was to be classified into which category, and it issued certificates to the families of those killed. The certificate entitled them to benefits and special treatment as regarded schooling, housing, and employment.[11]

Only recently, information concerning another group of civilian victims, whose faith was politicized in a reverse manner by SUBNOR, came to the fore in connection with the forced labour prisoners from Yugoslavia in camps in Norway (1942–1945): the internees, civilians who were deported from Jasenovac are still today listed in the memorial system as Tito's Partisans. On the other hand, this newly discovery information proves that treatment of the civilian victims was pragmatic since it did not always have an ethnic background: the memory of these civilian victims with various ethnic backgrounds, a mixture of Orthodox population, as genocide victims, members of resistance movement and other chance victims of Ustaša terror, remains an error.[12] This is an especially intense politically loaded error, since there is no guarantee that internees would have appreciated being categorised as Tito's Partisans after all the political manipulation of the Jasenovac tragedy, for which Tito's rule of Yugoslavia was responsible.

Leaving the USSR in 1948 meant having to find one's own way to survive. This eventually opened up a whole new set of possibilities for a country as small as Tito's Yugoslavia. It meant having to cash in everything related to the country's position in a world divided between two political blocs. The final ideological divorce from the Soviet model was introduced by a law on self-management,[13] where the means of production belong to the workers so that the workers control the means of production and the distribution of the final products. Even though businesses

were still subject to state ownership, this reform gave intense and immediate results by cutting through a lot of unnecessary red tape. As a result, the massive use of the term "socialism" starts, as a sign that socialism had come to stay in Tito's Yugoslavia. From 1954, peasants' unions, as group owners of the land, did not exist any more. In 1954 the law for health insurance of workers and bureaucrats (preventive health protection) was introduced. Special laws for the regulation of pension funds (1957) and invalidity pensions (1958) played a huge role in pleasing the crowds and legitimising the socialist system. The realization of the first five-year plan (petoljetka) and the intense industrialization of the country, by the development of natural resources and transport, dominated the end of 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s. During the 1960s there was an increase in Yugoslavia's openness towards the West by stopping the use of tourist visas for foreigners and liberating the politics of issuing passports to all Yugoslavs (1962), including allowing the possibility to work in foreign countries (from 1961). During the 1960s, more aspects of the rule that would possibly characterise Tito's Yugoslavia as totalitarian fell away, eliminated by different reforms.[14] For example, millions of religious materials were published every year, and businesses no longer functioned within state-run plans. Also, the political system, which officially was a one-party system, where republics (from 1971 also autonomous entities Kosovo and Vojvodina) functioned as autonomous political systems, where each took care of their political interests. Even though Tito was still proclaimed as a lifelong president and there was Tito's cult, Tito's power was limited and contradicted by the federal character of the state organization.[15]

An intense tempo of development of this kind would not have been possible if, after the departure from USSR in 1948, Tito's Yugoslavia did not opt for developing already established relations with the USA. Doing what was until that point in time "ideologically unthinkable" meant winning over US sympathies, despite the ideological differences, and despite the continuous use of totalitarian methods, such as those used against the Stalin followers (1948) by creating gulags such as the one on Bare Island. The final confirmation of the political victory against Stalin's iron grip with the help of US friendship was finally confirmed in February 1951 at the meeting of the USA National Security Council, when it was made clear in the council's statement that the independency of Yugoslavia can only be supported by supporting its Communist rule.

However, the further development of relations with the USA implied a different set of ground rules, where political pragmatism was considered a

virtue. Political pragmatism included learning from and cooperating with one's ideological opposites as a means of survival. Learning how to gain advantage over the smoother protagonist demanded a paradigmatic transition of political strategies as a means of reaching the desired destination. It was no secret that the USA was hoping that a further development of the Yugoslav syndrome across the Eastern bloc would weaken the Soviet bloc. It was also no secret that Yugoslavia was dependent on financial help to push through the reforms necessary in order to raise the country up on its own feet again. This convenient "marriage arrangement" appeared to be made in heaven for Tito's Yugoslavia, which otherwise would never have been able to gain such a powerful relation, considering its size, wealth and position. But, was it so simple?

There is no doubt that Tito's Yugoslavia[16] was trying to remain independent while benefiting from the Cold War conflict between the political blocks. Tito was determined to be his own boss,[17] and in an American context this meant having a better political relationship with the Republicans then with the Democrats. The relationship with the US was a guarantee for Yugoslavia's independence, right up to the end of the Cold War. If the relationship between Moscow and Washington and their respective blocks had not been determined by the Cold war, a peripheral European state, as Tito's Yugoslavia was from 1945 and especially in 1948, would not have had an important strategic and political role. Unmistakenly, it is primarily the continuous financial credit form the US which financed the social reforms the Yugoslav soil. Without the support of the US, it would be hard to imagine that Tito's Yugoslavia would have lasted as long as it did. Once more, it was the USA at the end of the day which held the key to saving Tito's Yugoslavia from going under economically by the end of the 1980s. Unfortunately at this time the US politicians decided not to act according to its decade long political strategy, and instead changed the course, leaving Yugoslavia to the mercy of the European member states and their local political and economic interests.

By the mid-1950s the political leadership of Tito's Yugoslavia's was well-rehearsed in its brand new US-made pragmatic coat and decided that there was no reason for not applying their newly gained knowledge of working together with ideological opposites in other parts of the globe. In 1956, together with Gamal Abdel Nasser and Jawaharlal Nehru, Tito organised the Non-Aligned Movement (the former colonies in Africa and Asia), which had its first congress in Belgrade in 1961, where the presidents of 25 states took part. The point of the movement, as stated in

the Havana Agreement from 1979, was to ensure national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and insurance of the independent states in their battle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid and racism, and all other forms of aggression, occupation, domineering, disturbing hegemonies and bloc politics. Taking part in the organisation of the Non-Aligned gave Tito's Yugoslavia international recognition and strong political prestige. At first, establishing the league of the Non-Aligned on the global level, seemed a sustainable political move. Non-Aligned seemed to be politically a very progressive global movement ready to take up the challenge to the bloc politics and neo-colonialist economic and political issues. After a while, however, the problems within the Non-Aligned grew on number of levels.[18] After being reconciled with Russia after Stalin's death, it appeared as if Russia had much to say about the events taking place amongst the Non-Aligned. Yugoslavia's administration had a tendency to understand itself as the self-appointed leader of the movement. Even though many, who these days oppose the global economy, mention the Non-aligned as a viable model of resistance towards the global West's neo-colonialisation, they are mistaken. As recent research discoveries show, the practice of political pressure and conflicts within the Non-Aligned were a daily occurrence. The conflicts were accompanied by the conscious use of the Non-Aligned as part of its foreign policy for the sole benefit of promoting Yugoslavia's interests.

The last two unexpected tests of time that Tito's Yugoslavia's still managed to stand against all odds came in 1968. The first was the student uproar of 1968, inspired by similar movements in Europe and the USA at the time. The centres of the student demonstrations were universities, dominated by the philosophy faculties at the University of Zagreb and University of Belgrade. Student demonstrators were supported by the philosophical journal *Praxis,*[19] whose opinion was that Tito's Yugoslavia was at that point in time controlled by bureaucratic powers and that the politics of "self management" were a subject of manipulation. Students were demonstrating against the differential treatment of individuals, party monopoly, unemployment and "the new capitalism". The significance of the student uproar was due to its being the first-ever youth uproar against the party forum (Savez Komunista Jugoslavije [SKJ]). The demonstrations sent a clear message to the leadership: not only did they have the ability to have their own opinions, which were not in keeping with the party politics, they were not afraid of expressing them publically. What student demonstrators did not know was that they were dealing with a

leader who was able to cleverly survive and benefit from a social crisis on a world scale.[20] In a sophisticated public address, Tito managed to calm the student protests while at the same time keeping the real drama well under control and reinforcing his own position. However, in order to please the crowd, a great increase in freedom of the media, and political and artistic freedom followed the end of the protests. The second test of time followed some months after the student demonstrations, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. This event brought a lot of bad feeling back since for Tito's Yugoslavia's it represented a déjà vu of 1948. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was seen as a threat against itself, and the Yugoslav Army was in no shape to defend the entire country against potential aggression on a day's notice. As a result, the national defence, "armed people", was established. This was a territorial defence system divided by republics, in contrast to Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija (JNA).[21] It meant that amongst other measures, even the youth in high schools were taught a subject called "General national defence and social self protection" (ONO i DSZ), which included practical training in handling different types of weapons in case of a possible invasion by a foreign force. This was just another proof of Yugoslavia's decision to keep Yugoslav socialism and developing it further on its own premises.

The tests of time, described above, were probably only just early alarms as to what was coming in the near future. The next test of time was during Tito's life, the Croatian Spring in 1971, during which Tito's Yugoslavia did not stand as it could have. The handling of the Croatian Spring only increased the hostility between nations, even though the Croatian leadership was not taken off after the problems with the youth and not because it started up discussions about national rights. The situation simply got out of control.[22] This is true enough for all kinds of questioning of national relationships that result in a situation getting out of control.

The very last test of time was the fall of the Berlin Wall and the consequences that historic event had for the global political and economic situation. The demise of the Cold War and bloc politics conflict turned out to be the demise of Tito's Yugoslavia, as we knew it until the beginning of the 1990s and the resulting horror of its demise.

Notes

1. Zdenko Radelić—*The Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Abolition of the Multi-party System: The Case of Croatia.*

2. *"U ime naroda! Politička represija u Srbiji 1944–1953."* autor Srđan Cvetković.
3. Civil war in Serbian is *Bratoubilački rat,* the literary translation being "killing amongst brothers". See Max Bergholz, *When All Could Not Longer Be Equal in Death: A Local Community's Struggle to Remember Its Fallen Soldiers in the Shadow of Serbia's Civil War, 1955–1956* (Carl Beck Papers in Russian & Eastern European Studies, Number 2008, University of Pittsburgh, 2010).
4. Sabrina Ramet and Ole Listhaug (eds.), *Serbia and the Serbs in World War Two* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
5. Max Bergholz, *The Strange Silence: Explaining the Absence of Monuments for Muslim Civilians Killed in Bosnia during the Second World War.*
6. On Četnik war crimes against non-Serbs, see Vladimir Dedijer and Antun Miletić, *Genocid nad Muslimanima, 1941–1945*: zbornik dokumenata i svjedočenja (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1990); Šemso Tucaković, *Srpski zločini nad Bošnjacima-Muslimanima: 1941–1945* (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 1995); Safet Bandžović, *Ratna Tragedija Muslimana* (Novi Pazar: Sandžački odbor za zaštitu ljudskih prava i sloboda-Udruženje pisaca Sandžaka, 1993).
7. See Jan Gross, *Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia* (1988; repr., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).
8. Nataša Mataušić, *Diana Budisavljević, The SilentTruth* (see this volume).
9. AJ, fond 297, SUBNOR J, inv. I, f-1, Osnivački kongres Saveza udruženja boraca Narodno-oslobodilačkog rata, 29–30 October 1947, speeches by Tito, 3–10, Aleksandar Ranković, 11–15, and Ivan Gosnjak, 17–32.
10. See Arhiv Bosne i Hercegovine (ABIH), fond Republički odbor Saveza udruženja boraca Narodnooslobodilačkog rata Bosne i Hercegovine (SUBNOR BiH), Uputstvo za prikupljanje podataka o poginulim i preživjelim borcima Narodnooslobodilačkog rata of 1941–1945 i poginulim žrtvama fašističkog terora, undated document, 9–16.
11. Danko Fučak in Vojna encklopedija (Beograd: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1967), 9: p. 92.
12. Gorana Ognjenović, *Blood Road Reassessed* (see this volume).
13. Zakon o upravljaju državnim privrednim preduzećima i višim privrednim udruženjima od strane radnih kolektiva (Zakon o radničkom samoupravljanju), 27. lipanj 1950.
14. Sergej Flere, *Da li je Titova država bila totalitarna?*, Političke perspektive Časopis za istraživanje politike Originalni naučni rad UDC 316.334.3:321(497.1) 316.46:929 Tito, pp. 14–15.
15. Ibid., 7.
16. Tvrtko Jakovina, *It's Either Tito or the Soviet Aparatchik, Tito's Yugoslavia and the United States of America (1945–1991)* (see this volume).

17. Sabrina P. Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias: Building and Legitimation, 1918–2005* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, and Bloomington: Indiana University Press; annotated ed., 2006), p. 232.
18. Zachary Irwin, *The Untold Story of Yugoslavia and Nonalignment* (see this volume).
19. The journal *Praxis* was published for the first time in 1964 and founders of the journal were university professors of sociology and philosophy, Gajo Petrovic and Jürgen Habermas, due to the movement's association with the New Left or Marxists in the West.
20. Hrvoje Klasić, *Tito's 1968 Reinforcing Position* (see this volume).
21. Sergej Flere, *Da li je Titova država bila totalitarna?*, Političke perspektive Časopis za istraživanje politike Originalni naučni rad UDC 316.334.3:321(497.1) 316.46:929 Tito, p. 16.
22. Sergej Flere, *Da li je Titova država bila totalitarna?*, Političke perspektive Časopis za istraživanje politike Originalni naučni rad UDC 316.334.3:321(497.1) 316.46:929 Tito, p. 11.

CHAPTER 2

The Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Abolition of the Multi-party System: The Case of Croatia

Zdenko Radelić

Three factors were crucial in the creation of Yugoslavia in 1918. First, unification of most of the small South Slavic peoples into a single state for the purpose of defending themselves against their larger neighbors' imperialist aspirations. Second, the Serbian state sought to expand its territory and influence through unification with other South Slavic peoples. Third, the similarity of language and culture were not only the basis for the unification, but had also often caused conflicts among South Slavs, especially in areas with populations which were ethnically and religiously mixed, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and the parts of Croatia bordering Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, the idea of a "Yugoslav" state stemmed from the desire for national security, economic progress, and stronger cultural links among the nations united in a multi-national state. However, from the beginning differences in the understanding of the political concept of Yugoslavianism were apparent. Serbian leaders were in favor of a politically unified state with a strong central government, where all Serbs would be gathered and dominate, as both the most numerous and the most influential nation. But most Croatians imagined Yugoslavia as an entity where their national freedom and identity would be preserved.[1]

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Apart from the fact that the founders of Yugoslavia were convinced that it was the best solution to the Croatian, Slovenian, and Serbian issues, the new state was also meant to serve the strategic needs of the great powers. However, its founders lacked an original Yugoslav nation, so in order to realize their goals, the Yugoslav political elite needed to overcome the deep religious, national, cultural, and economic differences among the peoples who made up their state. Unlike the model of the nation-state, where the nation was created after the state, Yugoslavia is a characteristic example where nations created states, and this difference would have a decisive effect on later developments.

The leading idea among Serbs was to create Yugoslavia to be as centralized as possible, with Serbs playing the dominant role in the government and the military. The alternative would have been an independent Serbian state that would encompass all those areas where the Serb population represented a majority of the local population, as well as those areas for which they claimed a historical right. Two ideas also dominated Croatian thinking—the idea of an independent Croatian state, which would be based on a combination of national and historical rights, or a sovereign Croatian state within a federal or confederal Yugoslavia.

Communists believed that they had the idea of absolute good, of a just and a sensible social, political, and economic order. They inherited the never-ending attempts of idealists throughout history to build a society on their particularly ideal principles. They believed that the material prosperity of the mankind and the unavoidable clash of classes would lead to the logical victory of the working class, either peacefully or more likely by force, which would then, led by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), build a just and classless society of equal individuals, free of poverty, exploitation, and irrational behavior. Communism uses the deeply rooted idea of equality, especially in poor societies, representing a just distribution of production and an end to unfair competition and social stratification. The fundamental subject was the people, not the individual, and the goal of avoiding social stratification was widely accepted by Communists and their supporters. A patriarchal mentality made state socialism possible, and state socialism in turn institutionalized the fundamental values of a patriarchal society—collectivism, egalitarism, isolation from one's surroundings, and the cult of the leader.[2]

Having successfully prosecuted a war of liberation and a civil war, the CPY took power into its own hands and carried out its revolutionary goal of reorganizing society according to the experience of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). A necessary consequence of the Communist revolution was the abolition of the multi-party system.

Through systematic action and the subjugation of the entire society under its control, by the early 1950s the CPY had eliminated anti-Communist parties and all traces of non-Communist parties from the political stage in Yugoslavia and Croatia. These parties continued their public existence in emigration, but at home they were disorganized, weak, and completely passive. These parties remained disunited in emigration, as they were divided into Ustaša supporters, Croatian Peasant Party supporters, and pro-Yugoslav elements, some of which were pro-regime, while others called for a restoration of the Kingdom. Meanwhile, the previously unified Communist Party was gradually becoming polarized along republican and national lines, which would much later on prove to be the undoing of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

In fact, from its very inception Yugoslavia was characterized by a division among its supporters between centralist and federalist conceptions of a common state. Centralism was mostly appealing to parties with Serb majorities, while federalism was appealing to parties in which members of other nationalities were predominant, namely Croats. The major political movements contained their radical strains with unitaristic and separatist tendencies. The strongest separatist movement was the Ustaša movement which advocated for an independent Croatian state. Shortly after founding the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH), the Ustašas set out persecuting the Roma and Jewish population on the basis of racial laws, but they also denied the national and religious identity of the Serb population, which they considered the main enemy of the Croatian state due to its ties to Serbia and Yugoslavia. During the first year of the NDH's existence, the Serbs were physically persecuted, denationalized, forcibly converted to Catholicism, expelled to Serbia, and completely marginalized in the belief that this was important for strengthening the Croatian state, especially after many Serbs joined the Partisan and Chetnik movements in support of the restoration of Yugoslavia.

The Communist Party of Yugoslavia

The CPY acted illegally with the aim of executing a revolution on the basis of Marxist doctrine and establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat, that is, its own dictatorship. Following the destruction of Yugoslavia by the Axis and the invasion of the Soviet Union, the CPY organized a Partisan movement. In fact, particularly within the territory of Croatia, the CPY directed resistance to the Ustaša terror against opponents of the

NDH (especially the Serbs), the Serb rejection of Croatian statehood, as well as the racist persecution of the Roma and the Jews and the general anti-Italian and anti-German sentiment toward its revolutionary goals. The struggle for the re-creation of Yugoslavia and the solution of the national question was for the Communists a means in the struggle for power and the setting in motion of vast social change. By organizing the Partisan movement they put in place their military and political monopoly. Systematically, though often covertly, they suppressed every expression of political pluralism occupying the most influential positions in the movement for themselves.

By September 1941 the CPY had introduced Communist commissars into Partisan units as well as the People's Liberation Committees and bodies of the new government. They created these under the pretext that the old government collaborated with the occupier or that it had not served the people. According to the directives of the Central Committee of the CPY and Josip Broz Tito, the party organizations were necessary for preventing "the reactionary bourgeois elements from exploiting the fruits of the national struggle for their anti-national purposes". Also, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia insisted that the People's Liberation Committees had to be led and monitored by Communists. Besides this, Tito believed that Partisan units had to be "transmitters of our Party to the masses" and the "armed force of the Party". Through the People's Liberation Committees the "national masses" had to realize their "revolutionary democratic government under the leadership of the Party". Yet, contrary to previous caution in concealing their goals, on 21 December 1941, the birthday of Joseph Stalin, the First Proletarian Brigade was formed, "in fact as the armed force of the Party".[3] But due to revolutionary terror the uprising fizzled, so the emphasis was shifted to the national liberation aspect of the struggle. Thus, in February 1942 Tito announced that the kulaks had to be "liquidated" not because they were kulaks, but because they were "fifth columnists" or traitors.[4] With this he spelled out the formula by which the CPY was to cover its revolutionary intentions. Thus, it was emphasized that rivals and enemies of the Communists were in fact collaborators of the occupiers.

In its public declarations the CPY continuously emphasized the pluralism of the Partisan movement and its liberationist aims, even though many of its moves spoke to its revolutionary struggle. It is evident that on 4 July 1941 the CPY called not for an uprising of the proletariat of Yugoslavia, but on the people of Yugoslavia as a whole. In the "Statement of the Supreme

Headquarters of the National Liberation Army and the Partisan detachments of Yugoslavia and the Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia" from 8 February 1943 and the "Statement of objectives and principles of the National Liberation struggle of the Initiative Committee of the National Antifascist National Liberation Council of Croatia and the General Staff of the National Liberation Army and the Partisan detachments of Croatia" of 26 May 1943, the Partisan leadership emphasized that the National Liberation Movement was a general popular movement without regard to party, social, or religious affiliations and that it recognizes private property.[5] It pledged not to introduce any radical changes and to respect the authority of popular representatives on all matters, which seemed to indicate a respect for a multi-party state structure.

Meanwhile, many members of the CPY openly expressed their antagonism toward the Western Allies, often leaving the impression that they were referring to enemies. Since military and political necessity dictated the need for an alliance with them, Tito reacted with a circular in January 1944 requiring that the Partisan press avoid sectarian attitudes toward Great Britain and the USA. It should be mentioned that following the meeting between Tito and Churchill in August 1944, the Communists were relieved by the news that the Allies would not be landing on the eastern shores of the Adriatic.[6] Although this was contrary to good military logic, the lack of an Allied landing meant it was not only more likely that the Partisans would expand the territory of Yugoslavia to Istria and the Slovenian littoral, but also that they would have a freer hand in carrying out their revolutionary ambitions.

However, the agreement reached between Tito, the president of the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia and Ivan Šubašić, former Ban of the Banovina of Croatia and now president of the Ministerial Council of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, that is, the government in exile, signed on 16 June 1944 with later additions, was no longer that clear. Namely, Tito committed to not raising the question of the monarchy and the final constitution of the state during the war, but leaving it "to the people after liberation". Yet, it was agreed that democratic freedoms would be guaranteed, especially property rights and private initiatives.[7]

However, to Churchill's direct question about allowing personal freedoms, Tito replied on 12 August 1944 that "democracy and individual freedom" are "our basic principle". Through diplomatic representatives he communicated to Churchill on 21 December 1944 that "our only desire is to" respect the principle of "genuine democracy" and that every

party will be allowed freedom of activity, except those that are guilty of "treasonous or criminal activity".[8]

The CPY Assumes All Important Positions in the Government

In 1946 members of the CPY and the Young Communist League of Yugoslavia accounted for 42 percent of the personnel of the Yugoslav Army, including soldiers. Already in 1948, 90 percent of the officers of the Yugoslav Army were members of Communist Party. One could not get above the rank of colonel without being a member of the Communist Party. In the Department for the Protection of the People (Odjeljenje zaštite naroda, OZNA), the security, intelligence, and counterintelligence service of the Yugoslav Communist government, almost everyone was a member of the Communist Party. In fact, OZNA was created to prevent oppositional activities against the Communist government. OZNA was reorganized in March 1946, when the section responsible for civilian counterintelligence grew into the Directorate for State Security (Uprava državne bezbjednosti, UDBA) and passed from the control of the Ministry of National Defense to the Ministry of the Interior. At the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia in July 1945, it was stated that the OZNA was an auxiliary body of the CPY. Aleksandar Ranković, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPY and one-time chief of OZNA, proclaimed in 1949 that the state security apparatus was the sword of the revolution that destroyed the "devious plans" of the internal and external "reaction". Affiliation to the CPY was proclaimed by Tito, a requirement for obtaining a position in OZNA in 1945, when he declared that the UDBA grew out of liberation struggle and the CPY.[9]

Retaliation Against Wartime Opponents and Reckoning with Potential Enemies

Retaliation against members of the defeated army and state already gained strength in 1944, and in large part depended on the amount of territorial control exercised by the Partisans. Retaliation was a response to the losses suffered by the victors, but in terms of the large number of people who disappeared without undergoing proper criminal proceedings, it was

certainly influenced by the intent of the CPY to reckon with its opponents and enemies. The revenge-revolutionary approach was most clearly shaped in Slavonia.

> Without many scruples we must liquidate all those who we know tomorrow will be our enemies and who will be against us.[10]

Thus, besides retaliation, which by definition was based on collective responsibility, the Communists were led by a fear that the members of the defeated armies could potentially soon form an anti-Communist army in a potential war between the democratic West and the Communist East. Similarly, the danger existed that the onetime military opponents could become the base force for anti-Communist political opponents, which would impede one-party government, that is, the dictatorship of the CPY, and, thereby, the renewal of Yugoslavia.

Anti-Communist Guerrillas

Many adherents of the defeated armies hid from fear of repression or conscription into the Yugoslavian Army. In the meantime, many continued to resist by force. In Croatia they organized themselves into groups called crusaders.[11] They were anti-Communist and anti-Yugoslav in orientation, wanting to restore the NDH. They believed that war between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union was inevitable and that they had to survive and hold out long enough to join the USA and Great Britain in a struggle against the Communists. After 1947 the remaining "crusader" units were fighting for mere survival. It is important to note that the Communist government often accused its political opponents of being Ustaša, crusaders, and Chetniks. These types of accusations enabled a more effective reckoning with them. This is especially true with respect to the Croat Peasant Party and the Catholic Church who threatened the CPY's ideological monopoly, an important foundation for one-party rule.

The Activity of the Opposition in Croatia

The absolute rule of the CPY was jeopardized by pressure from the Allies, Great Britain in particular, which insisted that the Communists reach an agreement with the royal government of Yugoslavia. The British imposed this agreement on the king and Great Serbian forces, as well

as on the Partisans. They believed that with this agreement they had guaranteed the interests of the Yugoslav Monarchy and inhibited the dictatorship of the CPY. Tito accepted a royal governor representing Peter II Karađorđević and a common government formed from members of the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia and the royal government out of tactical reasons. Besides this, he agreed that the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (Antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije, AVNOJ) be carried over to form the Provisional National Assembly and that elections be held three months after the conclusion of the war. Nevertheless, a handful of representatives from the bourgeois parties in the Communist-Royal coalition government could not prevent the CPY from completely controlling state politics.

In August 1945, AVNOJ was broadened to include so-called uncompromised representatives of the National Assembly of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia on the basis of Allied proposals made at the Yalta Conference (4–11 February 1945). But the Allied proposals were modified by interpreting the elections to the 1938 National Assembly as having occurred in undemocratic circumstances. There were no discussions of this topic in Yalta. With such a reduction in the number of prewar representatives, AVNOJ was expanded by members of certain political parties and groups and prominent public figures. Indeed, the main aim was that the Provisional National Assembly, which was preparing elections for a new Constituent Assembly, be stacked with as many sympathizers of the Communist Party as possible. Thus, when the Provisional National Assembly began to sit in August 1945, it included, according to some estimates, as few as 17 opponents out of 486 representatives. There were a total of 37 non-Communists among the representatives from Croatia. However, a portion of these representatives belonged to the Croatian Peasant Party (CPP), a group linked with Ivan Šubašić, who was inclined to cooperate with the Popular Front, while another portion belonged to the Croatian Republican Peasant Party (CRPP), a political organisation completely under the influence of the CPY.[12]

Despite serious infringements of civil rights, the Potsdam Conference (17 July–2 August 1945) did not put pressure on the CPY to adhere to the Tito-Šubašić Agreement. The disunited Allies lacked the power to reverse the dilution of democracy. In fact, Churchill warned that democratic freedoms, property rights, and private initiatives were not being respected and that free elections had not been held, but he was opposed by

Stalin. US President Harry S. Truman remained neutral, thus the Potsdam Conference did not help support the opposition in Yugoslavia.

That same month King Peter II Karađorđević revoked the right of representation from his appointed governors, while Milan Grol, a Democratic Party member and the vice-president of the government, also resigned. In September the leaders of the Serbian bourgeois parties, who remained in emigration for fear of persecution, similar to Vladko Maček and Juraj Krnjević, president and secretary of the CPP respectively, who directed memorandum to the Conference of Foreign Ministers in London outlining charges against the Yugoslavian government, and the Conference of Bishops of Yugoslavia published a pastoral letter in which it spoke of abuses against the Catholic Church. When Šubašić, the minister of foreign affairs, and Juraj Šutej, a member of the CPP and a minister without portfolio, resigned on 8 October 1945, this marked the end of the period of coalition rule.

The opposition parties, including the CPP, boycotted the elections. A group of CPP members under the influence of party vice-president August Košutić, who the Communists had jailed, organized around the newspaper *Narodni glas čovječnosti, pravice i slobode* (*National Herald of Humanism, Justice and Freedom*). The most active was Košutić's wife, Mira Košutić, the daughter of Stjepan Radić, and Marija Radić, her mother and the widow of Stjepan Radić. In the one and only issue of *Narodni glas* dated 20 October 1945 they railed against the official registration of the party and participation in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY). In the article "Zašto ne idemo na izbore" (Why we are not participating in the elections), they admonished that in any political activity the main criteria was freedom, and that these elections would not be able to express the free will of the people.[13]

Ivan Bernardić, the main and responsible editor, wrote in his article "Za nepatvorenu demokraciju i suverenitet hrvatskog naroda" (For genuine democracy and the sovereignty of the Croatian people) about the basic principles of democracy. Moreover, Bernardić emphasized that for the people in power the ideal was class dictatorship, which in practice meant the dictatorship of their party. The Communists proclaimed their political opponents were fascists, reactionaries, and national enemies, and they alleged that Maček was a traitor. Due to international relations, the regime was reluctant to openly acknowledge its one-party rule. With the help of dissenters, that is the CRPP, they stressed Bernardić that they were

attempting to destroy the CPP. Besides a lack of political freedom and the security of private property, the federal units, including Croatia, lacked actual competence.

Distribution of the first issue was banned on charges that it harangued against the achievements of the National Liberation struggle, causing national hatred and promoting the work of the enemy. Given that work was proceeding on the second issue, it seems the Communist authorities threatened the printers and succeeded in getting them to refuse to print the second issue. Thus, according to an official statement, the workers of the National Press refused to print *Narodni glas* because it was reactionary.

After Young Communists attacked the Radić bookstore in Zagreb on 22 August 1945, which was a kind of clubhouse for the supporters of Košutić, and destroyed pictures of Radić and Maček, the bomb, which exploded in front of the bookstore on 13 November 1945, was yet another serious warning. The editorial board desisted from further publication of the *Narodni glas*.[14]

CPY and Revolution

Tito admitted that revolutionary goals were hidden during and immediately after the war at the Fifth Congress of the CPY in 1948. He said that it was a matter of tactics that when he as president of the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia he stated that the only goal of the National Liberation Movement was a struggle against the occupiers and their servants for the establishment of a democratic federal Yugoslavia, and not the introduction of communism.[15] It should be remembered that during the war the Partisan leadership rejected these charges on the grounds that they were the fruit of enemy propaganda. Indeed, it was only after the Informbiro of 1948 that the Yugoslav Communists began to call daily on socialism and to indicate the leading role of the CPY, in defense against attacks that they were abandoning rejecting communism. Besides this, they increasingly emphasized the thesis that the revolution was carried out during the war.

The metamorphosis of public positions of the Communist leadership concerning multi-party democracy laid bare the pronouncements of Tito, who was simultaneously president of the government, the high commander of the Yugoslav Army, the general secretary of the CPY and the president of Yugoslavia, concerning multi-party democracy. During the war he attempted to show that other parties had joined the CPY in a struggle against the enemy.

He rejected the claim that the CPY was creating a one-party system, while at the same time he openly spoke that the old parties would not be restored. In 1946 he spoke only against a non-constructive opposition, while in 1947 he spoke against all opposition. At the Second Congress of the Popular Front (PF) of Yugoslavia in September 1947, Tito clearly rejected a multi-party structure.

> Not only the political, but also the economic structure of our land excludes the possibility of numerous political parties existing with antiquated programmes and old beliefs.[16]

So, at the end of 1947 the dictatorship of the Communist Party was made public. For the occasion of the 1950 election, Tito decreed that only those who conformed to the Communist vision of socialism could participate. *Naprijed* (*Forward*), the organ of the Communist Party of Croatia, published Tito's threat in February 1950:

> Revolution is a harsh thing. We desire to bring it about with as little victims as possible, with as little difficulty as possible, but if something is placed in our path, this must be made to obey, to disappear.[17]

The Popular Front also experienced a sweeping change in a few years. At the First Congress of the Popular Front of Croatia in 1946 there was discussion that the Popular Front was "an all-national anti-fascist democratic movement". At the Second Congress in 1949 the Popular Front of Croatia was declared to be an organization that was bringing up the "masses for socialism". A statute from 1949 defined the Popular Front of Yugoslavia as a unified all-national political organization under the leadership of the Komunistička partija (KP) (Communist Party).[18]

Tito's thesis that the multi-party system was an impediment to the development of Yugoslavia was simplified by activists to its central purpose: the CPY was the leading and sole party.[19]

An interesting fact was the relationship between the Communists and the non-Communists at the Second Congress of the Popular Front of Croatia, held in 1949. In the Executive Committee of the Main Committee of the Popular Front of Croatia, if we round the exact numbers, 70% were members of the Communist Party, 20% were members of the CRPP, and 11% were non-party members. But, to reiterate, among the members

of the Executive Committee CRPP and among its supporters there were many who were also members of the CPY![20]

The Activity of OZNA and UDBA

Since the CPY intended to impose a dictatorship, the concept of enemy was not confined to those who took up arms against its aims. From the beginning of 1944 onward, the security centers of National Liberation Movement compiled lists of enemies, a task that was later enlarged by the Department of National Security (OZNA). This was a security service that was based on the aim of discovering war crimes, supporters and fellow-travelers of defeated armies, "enemies of the people", that is to say, enemies of the CPY. It grouped enemies into numerous categories. Among them were Ustaša, *škripari*, Chetniks, active Germans, CPP members, clerical fascists, priests, Yugoslavian nationalists, masons, and anglophiles.

Besides a lack of cordiality toward the Partisan movement displayed by "enemies of the people" a common attitude was expressed for the wealthy. For the most part, these were owners of factories, workshops, stores, hotels, inns, drugstores, and dental offices.

OZNA oversaw all state institutions and political organizations. Actually, it investigated all "unfriendly appearances" in "all areas of social, economic, political, and cultural life", other than in the organizations of the CPY. It prepared files for everyone that was employed. It is interesting to note that the "file for anti-national elements" contained information on individuals who previously were active "members of reactionary parties and associations".

The activity of UDBA, which came into existence following the reorganization of OZNA in March 1946, sheds most light on the organization as a whole. Thus, there existed sections for bourgeois parties, emigration, foreign press and propaganda, control of the post, as well as several sections that controlled state institutions, public institutions, and mass organizations, such as youth organizations.[21]

As far as foreign powers are concerned, the Communist government felt it was particularly vulnerable to Great Britain, especially to its Intelligence Service (IS). OZNA assessed that it wanted to put "Maček's clique" into power. At the beginning of 1945 OZNA emphasized that the IS appears as the "organizer" of all the forces directed against "the success of its struggle".[22] Similar assessments appeared later on too, for instance, in February 1945.

> In our future work we will always have to be led by one incontrovertible fact, that all of the organized struggle against our young state will be led directly or indirectly from one centre of international reaction, the IS. It is clear that we have come to a point in the line of development where not only various 'socialist,' 'democratic,' 'liberal,' 'peasant,' and other similar parties with their obviously contrary programmes touch on each other, but in today's political development their interests coincide with those of all other open fascist and Nazi groups.[23]

The Croatian Peasant Party

The Croatian Peasant Party was the strongest Croatian party between the two world wars. Its president, Vladko Maček, supported any solution that would allow Yugoslavia to avoid war. After Yugoslavia was attacked he called for discipline to be maintained within the armed forces of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. However, with the Ustaša coming to power on 10 April 1941, he called on cooperation with the new governing "nationalist movement," though he did so with restraint aiming only to avoid violence. Thus, his previous policy of avoiding war was transformed into a policy of waiting and keeping an equal distance from the Ustaša and the Communists.[24] He rejected collaboration with the Ustaša government hoping to preserve the CPP in an uncompromised position until the end of the war. It was clear to him that the CPY would utilize the liberation struggle to create a government and impose a dictatorship.

The CPY sought to attract the masses of the CPP to the Partisans in order to bolster the ranks of the National Liberation Movement with a large number of Croats, who for the first two years were relatively restrained toward the Partisans. However, at the same time the CPY wanted to form up a new leadership cadre from among the lower officials of the CPP to be used in the struggle for power and put at the disposal of the program set out for the Popular Front (NF), which was in fact the CPY's disguised revolutionary program. To succeed in this intent the leadership of the CPP had to be portrayed as traitors of the Croatian people and of the party's founder, Stjepan Radić.

The fight the Communists envisioned against the CPP and tactics to be used against it is shown by the words of Edvard Kardelj, a member of the Politburo of Central Committee of the CPY, from the summer of 1944:

> The reactionary CPP has to be exposed as collaborators and agents of the occupiers or the Ustaša.[25]

Indeed, a group of lower officials of the CPP, among whom there was not a single leader of the party, formed a new executive, that is, the so-called Executive Committee of the CPP, which in June 1945 was renamed the Executive Committee of the Croatian Republican Peasant Party (CRPP). Maček was accused of betraying the core principles of the party, and they proclaimed themselves the true leadership of the CPP.

With regard to the fact that a large number of CPP supporters joined either the Ustaša or the Partisans, and that the Western Allies, especially Great Britain, made its support conditional upon an active struggle of the CPP against the Germans, at the end of the war the leadership of the CPP abandoned its policy of waiting and political passivity. Following talks in 1943 and 1944 with the Ustaša and the Communists aimed at outmaneuvering both movements and waiting for a favorable conclusion to the war enabling a return of the CPP to power, in the end they placed all their hope in talks with the Communists. Košutić, after the unsuccessful Vokić-Lorković putsch, correctly estimated the final outcome of the war, fled to territory under the control of the Partisans, and initiated discussions.[26] But in November 1944 the Communists put him under arrest, unwilling to give the CPP an equal place in the Partisan movement. Face to face with the dictatorial intentions of the CPY, Košutić had no other choice than to return to the initial position of the party: Maček's passive policy of waiting until the end of the war.

What happened to Maček? The government of the NDH first kept him under house arrest then later interned him at a camp in Jasenovac for a lengthy time. The arrest of Košutić at the end of 1944 and his branding as a traitor in the Partisan press were clear messages to Maček. These developments were reported in *Vjesnik*, the organ of the United Popular Liberation Front of Croatia, and soon thereafter the splinter group around the Executive Committee CRPP further explored this topic. Maček left Croatia together with the Ustaša leadership.[27]

From emigration Maček sent secret messages opposing the legalization of the CPP, because this would indicate recognition of the legitimacy of the Communist government, as would participation in the elections for the Constituent Assembly of the FPRY. In an interview for the *New York Times* on 23 July 1945, he confirmed his view concerning the dictatorial

nature of the Communist regime.[28] He sent messages to Ivan Šubašić and Juraj Šutej, members of the Yugoslavian government with a Communist majority, that he did not support them, especially since he estimated that the CPP was the main enemy of the new regime in Croatia.

The Croatian Republican Peasant Party

The Executive Committee CRPP took part in government, but it was fully under the control of the CPY. The CRPP was in fact transformed into an instrument of the CPY, which used it to break up the CPP, but likewise to replace the multi-party parliamentary system. The CRPP was supposed to serve the Communists as evidence of the existence of a thriving multi-party democracy. Similarly, a pro-Communist CRPP could direct supporters of the CPP and their demands for a renewal of the party and collect them under the wing of the CPY. Thus the Communists used the CRPP for the purposes of their election campaign for the Constituent Assembly of the FPRY, as well as for the Constituent Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia in 1946. In a word, until the Communist government was strengthened by the creation of a repressive apparatus and full international recognition, it supported the CRPP, which had very little public support.

Ivan Šubašić, the CPP and the CRPP

As was already mentioned, Šubašić supported a merger between the CPP and the CRPP, following which their representatives in the Provisional National Assembly would act jointly. Discussions along these lines continued with the leadership of the CRPP until September 1945. However, the Executive Committee CRPP, most certainly by dictate from the CPY, excluded the leadership of the CPP. Instead of uniting, the Executive Committee CRPP proposed attaching the members of the CPP to the CRPP, within, naturally, the Popular Front (PF). Clearly, if this happened, the fate of the CPP would pass completely into the hands of the CPY, which wanted to prevent the revival of the CPP, or, more to the point, to abolish and put in its place the CRPP, or rather, the CPY's section for the Croatian peasantry.

Interestingly enough, Šubašić imagined the Popular Front as an "association of parties". However, Tito explained to him that the Popular Front would be "an association of individuals" and not of political parties.[29] Of course, this could only mean one thing: the disappearance of all parties in

the Popular Front, except the vanguard CPY, which would retain its own special organization.

The Resignations of Šubašić and Šutej from the Government of Tito

Šubašić called a party conference in the Esplanade Hotel in Zagreb on 2 September 1945, which was to determine the future course of action. All CPP representatives and presidents of district organizations of the CPP who were not compromised by wartime activities were invited.

The majority endorsed the resignation of Šubašić and Šutej from their posts in the government. They opposed entering the elections jointly with the CRPP, let alone within the framework of the Popular Front. They demanded that the CPP join the ranks of the opposition. A minority supported cooperation with the Popular Front. The conclusion was accepted that Šubašić visit Maček in Paris, that Košutić be made aware of all proceedings, and that every effort be made to get him out of jail.

The British provided Šubašić with an airplane. However, the day before he was to travel, 10 September 1945, the vice-president of the government, Kardelj, informed Šubašić that the government would not allow him to leave the country. That same night Šubašić suffered a stroke. Isolated from the government and without the support of his party, he accepted that he and Šutej resign their posts in Tito's government on 8 October 1945.[30]

Interestingly, the reactions from the US and Great Britain were muted. They were afraid to provoke a counter-reaction from the Communist regime that would push Yugoslavia fully into the USSR's sphere of influence. So they sent notes on 6 November 1945 mildly expressing disapproval for contravention of the agreement. Following elections for the Constituent Assembly, on 17 November 1945, Tito replied. He dismissed the complaints of the great powers, claiming that all the points of the agreement were met. He stressed that after the resignations and the election victory of the Popular Front, "the Allied governments were released from the obligations they felt they owed to the Yugoslavian people".[31]

The CPY, the CPP, and Parliamentary Elections

Elections to the Constituent Assembly were supposed to be critical in establishing democracy and the constitution of Yugoslavia. According to Western observers, in truly free elections the CPY would not have received more than 30% of the vote. Maček was even more optimistic; he believed that the Communists would garner less than 10% of the vote in Croatia and Serbia.[32]

Thus, all the political activity of the CPY and the weak bourgeois opposition was concentrated in this direction, especially through legislative activity. Of special importance was the law on election of deputies (*Zakon o izboru narodnih poslanika*) and the law on voter lists (*Zakon o biračkim spiskovima*) issued by the Provisional National Assembly in the summer of 1945. The law concerning voter lists stated that "members of military formations belonging to the occupiers and the local collaborators who persistently and actively fought against the National Liberation Army, the Yugoslav Army, or armies of the allies of Yugoslavia" had no right to vote. At the same time, the size of the electorate doubled compared to prewar levels by the inclusion of soldiers and women. Especially problematic was the provision under which Yugoslav Army soldiers were enfranchised regardless of age, thus individuals younger than 18 could vote, as well as the provision that a soldier could vote in the region where he was located on election day, regardless of whether he was registered on the electoral list.[33]

The British ambassador, Ralph Stevenson, reported that the Communists replaced the struggle against the occupiers with a struggle against the opposition, and that the freedom of political organization had been reduced to merely a phrase on paper. The opposition possessed none of the preconditions for carrying out an election campaign, neither their own press nor their own campaign funds. The requisite electoral machinery was entirely in the hands of the regime. In addition, based on these two laws, many voters were deleted from voter lists on the charge of collaboration with the occupiers.

In terms of Croatia, this meant that the right to vote could be taken away from the large number of men who had served in the armed force of the NDH. Indeed, on the basis of this law the electorate was being selected according to the political needs of the CPY. Thus, according to initial decisions, 7.38% of the electorate in Croatia was disqualified; in the district of Bjelovar this included over 25% of the voters. It was clear that

the criteria were too harsh, so the number of disqualified voters was gradually reduced. In the end, 69,109 out of 2,034,628 Croatian voters were disqualified, or 3.28% in Croatia. The highest percentage of disqualified voters was in the districts of Bjelovar and Osijek, as much as 14%, and least in the Dalmatian districts: in the electoral district of Central Dalmatia only 0.8% lost the right to vote.[34]

The largest proportion of disenfranchisement among all the federal units occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where it amounted to 3.46%. Altogether 194,158 individuals were removed from the list of electors in Yugoslavia that was 2.4% of the eligible electors.

The elections were held 11 November 1945. To the boycott of the opposition parties the government replied by introducing ballot boxes without lists, in order to at least formally offer the possibility of choosing a ballot box beside that of the Popular Front. Considering the conditions in which the elections took place and the fact that the government used coercion to force people to the ballot boxes, the number of people who did not come out to vote is indicative of the mood of opposition. Of course, the attitude shown by who put the ball into a box without a list is unmistakable. Poor turnout was especially noted in the northern areas of Croatia. In the district of Varaždin no more than 20% of those eligible voted, while 15% of those who put their vote in the ballot boxes without lists; in Bjelovar only 17% came out to vote, and of these 15% selected the box without a list.[35]

The Popular Front won a resounding 90% of the votes of those who turned out. Of course, the official results are dubious given the conditions in which the election was carried out. The election campaign was completely in the hands of the CPY, which controlled the unions, state enterprises, the press, and radio. Along with this, it controlled the polling stations, the electoral commissions, the registration of the voters' lists, the counting of votes, without monitoring from the opposition. The Army and other representatives of government coerced those who were reluctant to vote. Those who did not want to take part were threatened with loss of ration cards, pensions, apartments, and even life. The ballot boxes without lists were labeled "Ustaša boxes" or "black boxes". Many boxes had narrow openings, so the rubber pellets could be heard dropping. Elections were carried out with rubber pellets due to the high illiteracy rates of the population. This meant that secrecy of ballot was not guaranteed. There were also cases of transferring pellets from boxes without lists to the boxes of the Popular Front. In polling stations where insufficient numbers of

voters turned out prior to 7 p.m., the closing time was legally extended as needed. Later reports reveal the degree to which secret balloting was in reality public. Those who voted for the "black box" became victims of open or covert state repression. Many were sent to "various jobs". [36]

Table: Election Results for Croatia for the Constituent Assembly of the FPRY, 1945[37]:

Voters	*Federal assembly*		*Assembly of the people*	
	Number	*%*	*Number*	*%*
Registered	2076.091	100,00	2076.091	100,00
Voted	1905.429	91,77	1903.033	91,66
Did not vote	170.662	8,22	173.058	8,33
For the popular front	1743.797	91,52	1698.417	89,25
For ballot boxes without lists	161.632	8,48	204.616	10,75

Source: *Vjesnik*, glasilo Narodne fronte Hrvatske, Zagreb, 24. 11. 1945.

Out of 524 representatives in the bicameral Constituent Assembly of the FPRY, which consisted of a Federal Assembly and a National Assembly, 404 or 77% were members of the CPY, and 120 were not.

In the Federal Assembly, out of 86 Croatian representatives, 56 were members of the CPY, 26 were members of the CRPP, 3 were members of the SDS, and 1 was an independent. Among the 25 members of the National Assembly of the FPRY, 14 were members of the CPY, 6 were members of the CRPP, and 5 were independents. Therefore, collectively, out of 111 members of the Constituent Assembly from Croatia, 70 were members of the CPY, 32 were members of the CRPP, 3 were members of the SDS, and 6 were independents.

Besides completely dominating the Constituent Assembly, the Communists held a big majority among the 25 member government of the FPRY. In addition, it is still unclear how many non-Communist representatives and members of the government entered the CPY in the future.

The demands of the victorious powers, the US and Britain, that multiparty elections had to be held in a formal sense were realized. On 22 December 1945, both states recognised the Yugoslav election results, and their ambassadors became formally accredited representatives of their countries.[38]

The following year, on 10 November 1946, elections were carried out for the Constituent Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia. 176 representatives were elected, 150 or 78% were members of the CPY and 41 or 22% were from other parties. Moreover, all non-Communist members belonged to the Popular Front. Among 30 who were known to have been CPP adherents, according to current information, no less than 17 were members of the CPY or would join the CPY immediately after the election. There were 8 members of the Communist Party in the government of the People's Republic of Croatia, 5 were members of the CRPP, of who 3 were also members of the CPY, and 3 were independents.

The data on the members of the CPY on the executive of district and municipal people's committees in Croatia speak to a formal acceptance of parliamentarianism. In district and municipal committees in 1948, 27% of the members belonged to the CPY, but in the executives of these committees, as much as 89% were members of the CPY. In addition, as many as 80% of the directors of the Republic's enterprises were members of the CPY. In the Republican apparatus, of "the deputy ministers, the vice presidents of committees, the department chiefs, the directors and officials equal in rank", 89% were members of the CPY.[39]

Following the federal elections, it remained for the Communists to establish themselves on the level of the republics. The law for election of people's representatives to the Constituent Assembly of the Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia expressed some particularities in relation to the principles of the federal law. The biggest difference in relation to federal elections was the absence of a box without lists, because elections at the level of the republic did not highlight lists, but individuals.[40] Election registers listed 2,045,740 citizens, and out of this number, 1,859,444 voted on 10 November 1946, which was a turnout of about 90%. Results reported according to districts revealed great discrepancies between individual regions. Thus, the turnout in the Lika district was 99.91%, in Varaždin 94.27%, in Brod 80%.[41]

What preceded the elections to the Constituent Assembly of the People's Republic of Croatia is little known. But, according to the report of the District Committee of CPY/CPH Split from 3 December 1946, we can imagine the fate of those who did not go out to vote:

> The slogans applied to those who did not come out to vote, that they are enemies of the current government, that they are not sons of the PF and as such they should not count on the support of this government, has raised the revolutionary consciousness of the masses, so that after the election a

> general phenomenon has taken place throughout the district, a fight against those who did not vote.[42]

Ninety-four percent of the electorate took part in elections for the People's Committees in May and June 1947: 94.52 % voted for candidates of the Popular Front and 5.48% of voters cast their ballots into boxes without lists.[43]

The possibility of losing voting rights according to the legislation enacted in 1945 remained in effect until 1951, after which time this right could be limited, but not completely taken away. Whereas previously the right to vote could be taken away by arbitrary judgment, now it could be returned on the basis of an assessment of patriotic behavior. In practice, this meant participation in voluntary work, or, at least, 'favorable comments' on the activities of the government. Yet the 'improper and enemies' continued to be jailed preceding elections, for example, on the eve of local elections on the Pelješac peninsula. At elections for local office in May and June 1945, some counties introduced a system of interrogation of 'hostile elements' and those who had not voted in past elections. Some of them were arrested and punished by administrative measures.[44]

The second elections for the National Assembly of the FPRY were held on 26 March 1950. Meanwhile, despite the fact that, according to the reports of British diplomats, a large proportion of the population supported the CPY and the Popular Front of Yugoslavia, the authorities again intimidated the voters. In an analysis of elections prepared for the Politburo of the Central Committee of the KPH there was mention of methods employed by wishy-washy elements who tied themselves to the Communists.

> Alongside this in the majority of districts measures were taken against enemy elements such as arrest, interrogation, administrative penalties, dispatch to collective work actions (Zagreb area) disclosing in front of the masses who destroyed the enemy in one part of the village and thus the people were liberated from fear of them and these wishy-washy elements were tied to us.[45]

At the meeting of the Executive Committee (EC) of the Popular Front of Croatia on 11 May 1951 the means by which the Popular Front obtained more than 90% of the vote was openly stated:

> This is something we have perfected by means of coercion and compulsion, and so even if the elections were rather democratic (we did not beat anyone) yet there are a series of ways you can win an election.[46]

Actually, the government fought to obtain the support of the people by two means: voluntary and involuntary, but in both cases, successfully.

The British learned that the failure to vote could result in ejection from an apartment.

The list of registered voters in Croatia numbered 2,565,800 citizens. Of these, 2,321,780 or 90.4%voted. 2.14% or 49,629 citizens opted for the boxes without lists.[47] The elections results were almost close to the ideal of 100% of voters turning out to vote and 100% of the votes cast for the Popular Front.

Despite these good results, the CPY was not satisfied, so they also "tuned" them. According to the data of the Commission for the People's Government of the Central Committee of the KPH, the need to "tune" the results was not exclusive to districts in Dalmatia, Rijeka, and the city of Zagreb. The greatest discrepancy between real results and the published results, according to data presented by the Commission, was in the districts of Bjelovar, Osijek, and Zagreb. Thus, according to published results, in the district of Zagreb 6% of the voters had casts their ballots into boxes without lists, while in reality the vote was 15%. In Jastrebarsko the box without lists got as much as 24.1% of the vote, with 17% of voters abstaining. Moreover, voter turnout was also falsely exaggerated, for example in Krapina from 59% to 91.65%.[48]

In the district of Dalmatia, according to the report of the OK KPH for Dalmatia, UDBA was quite active in the election campaign.

> There was political pressure—more or less—everywhere. From UDBA we came to know that some fanatics were making an appearance, so UDBA invited over 200 of them to interviews, which for the most part produced good results.[49]

However, it seems that the dissatisfaction of the population could be more openly expressed than in 1945. On election day, the people of some villages left in large numbers for the "surrounding hills" and "forests, vineyards, and fields" in order to escape pressure, and besides tearing down posters and cutting telephone lines, there were numerous instances of physical attacks on the activists of the Popular Front. An

original method of passive resistance was shown by the citizens of the Križevci district where some got so drunk they were incapable of going to the polls.[50]

For the elections to the Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia on 5 October 1950, the Republic's electoral laws were brought into line with the federal electoral law, particularly regulations concerning exclusively individual candidates being eliminated from ballot boxes without lists, which were labeled "black boxes" by the authorities.[51] These were also the last elections for the Parliament in Croatia using rubber pellets because in 1952 paper ballots were introduced.

As distinct from the National Assembly of the FPRY, there were no positions in the Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia opposing the Popular Front. The only two exceptions were the protests of two representatives in 1946 who were priests; they wrote letters of protest against the speeches of some of the other representatives directed at the priests regarding some "miracles" that were then occurring in the People's Republic of Croatia.[52]

The electoral results have to be approached with reservation. However, the falsifiers of electoral results had to at least pay attention to make sure that their falsifications were partly in line with reality in order to ensure they were believable. Sadly, the real degree of popular support for the government and opposition in this period of harshest Communist repression and misrepresentation of the will of the people can never be expressed in numbers.

All that can be said for certain is that the CPY, despite formal concessions, preserved its dictatorship; moreover, by using formalist parliamentary means, it even affirmed it.

The Dispute in the CPP Around Registering the Party

At the time of the elections to the Constituent Assembly of the FPRY, and afterward as well, the fundamental issue facing the CPP was whether or not to register the party. By the *Zakon o udruženjima, zborovima i drugim javnim skupovima* (law on associations, assemblies, and other public gatherings) of 25 August 1945, parties that sought to resume their activities had to be registered. There were two ways to register a party: making a declaration of accession to the Popular Front or filing a request with the Ministry of the Interior, including the party's programs and statutes.[53]

Given conflicting concepts, a party conference convened in Zagreb on 15 November 1945. Participants had to decide whether to register the party or not. The majority came out in favor of registering the CPP because they felt legalization was paramount for undertaking public action, and furthermore, it would enable contact with foreign diplomats. Besides, if the CPP operated illegally, some delegates to the conference felt, the government might equate the CPP to the Ustaša or the Chetniks. Opponents of legalization argued that such an important issue could only be decided by Košutić and Maček. Indeed, Košutić soon sent a secret letter vigorously opposing registering the CPP.

Cooperation Among the Croatian, Slovenian, and Serbian Opposition

While the Provisional National Assembly sat in August 1945, many representatives of the Yugoslavian opposition parties supported the notion of a common stand. The representatives of the CPP were keen on the idea of cooperation among the peasant parties (the CRPP, the CPP, the People's Peasant Party, and the Alliance of Agricultural Workers). However, two propositions presented themselves: the creation of a peasant-socialist bloc (the CPP, Alliance of Agricultural Workers, and Socialist Party) or a peasant-democratic bloc (the CPP, Democratic Party, Radical Party, Slovene People's Party, Socialist Party and the Alliance of Agricultural Workers), and this outside of the Popular Front.

In the spring of 1946 an initiative to form a club of peasant representatives in the National Assembly of the FPRY was launched, with the intention of forming a peasant bloc in fact. In May 1946 Imro Filaković, a representative of the CRPP, was included in this initiative, as well as Don Ante Salacan, a so-called independent representative of the Executive Committee CRPP, they were looking to make contact with the group around Šubašić and Šutej. However, none of the other CRPP representatives wanted to sign the declaration to join the peasant club.

During the session of the National Assembly of the FPRY in July 1946, Filaković, Salacan, and Dragoljub Jovanović and his People's Peasant Party spoke about forming a peasant club and a peasant bloc (the CPP, Peasant Party, People's Peasant Party, Alliance of Agricultural Workers, Slovene People's Party, and a group of peasant representatives from Macedonia). But, due to divisions within the party and Communist repression, the idea

was not realised. Occasional contacts among the leaders of the parties took place until the beginning of 1947.[54]

Vladko Maček's Message

Maček communicated with the CPP in Croatia through secret channels. In the spring of 1946 Šutej prepared a written report that was sent to Maček in Paris with the help of the French consul or the American vice-consul in Zagreb. In July 1946, Franjo Gaži, through an official in the Yugoslavian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, sent a message to Maček, with the consent of Tome Jančiković and Šutej.[55] He warned him that the CPP must be activated forthwith, as time was running against the party. Likewise, he said that the CPP could not operate with its leadership in exile and in prison. He requested that Maček accede to the formation of a new interim leadership of the CPP.

Maček's replies finally arrived in July and September of 1946. He said that the CPP should not register itself or cooperate with the CPY. Also, he advised that the party should ally with the other peasant parties in the country in the future peasant bloc. He tried to encourage his party comrades with the idea that this situation was temporary and that the US and Great Britain will provide support to democratic forces.

The Communist Government Releases August Košutić from Prison

Through OZNA, the Communist government, with whom some of the leaders of the CPP were cooperating, controlled all contacts among the leadership of the CPP, including those with Maček. It knew about the attempts of Šutej, Gaži, and Jančiković to form a party. Indeed, it knew about Košutić's views concerning the elections and his opposition to the CPP running in the elections. Given that there was a danger that Šutej's concept would prevail and that CPP would participate in the elections for the Constituent Parliament of Croatia in 1946, the government agreed to release Košutić from prison. While he represented an active politics, the government was afraid of his influence, and now, conversely, his policy of waiting played into its hands.

He was released 6 September 1946 and immediately took over the leadership of the party. He held firm to his and Maček's decision to not

register the party and to disengage from active politics because he knew that an active politics would call out repression. He believed that time was on the side of the CPP and that the Croat people would again stand behind the CPP in the upcoming changes.

Božidar Magovac and His Conception of the Politics of the CPP

Božidar Magovac was in fact the founder of the Executive Committee CPP, from which he was ejected after a pro-Communist leadership was installed under Franjo Gaži because he insisted on equality between the CPY and the CPP. In the spring and summer of 1944, Magovac was removed from all party and higher government duties, and so also from the position of vice-president of National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia; he was interned on the island of Vis.

Yet after the war he decided to re-activate his political life. From the summer of 1946 onward he met with Šubašić at least once a month. Dissatisfied with the passive politics of the CPP, he insisted on renewing talks with the CPY and that, this time, as distinct from the elections to the Constituent Assembly of the FPRY in 1945, it entered the elections for the Constituent Assembly of the People's Republic of Croatia in 1946. But instead of the CPP entering, a party unacceptable to the CPY, he suggested that a handful of prominent individuals run for office. With this aim Magovac produced a "plan" on 5 October 1946 in which he briefly outlined his ideas. He felt that the CPY should recognize the right to change laws according to "parliamentary-democratic" methods in order to, as he concisely portrayed, avoid a civil war.[56] This "plan" was accepted by Košutić, who figured that if Magovac and Šubašić succeeded, the CPP could take advantage of this, but he insisted that the party not involve itself. With Magovac's "plan" in hand, Šubašić visited Vladimir Bakarić and Ivan Krajačić Stevo, members of the Croatian government and the Politburo of the Central Committee of the KPH in October 1946. But they resolutely rejected the suggestion.

The opposition activities of the CPP worried the Communist leadership. A meeting of the Central Committee of the CPY was held in 1947, where it was decided that strong measures would be taken. Arrests and trials of active CPP leaders followed, for example Tomo Baburić, Franjo

Gaži, T. Jančiković, Andrija Papa, Andrija Pavlić, Ivan Štefanac, Dr. Karlo Žunjević, and a larger group of CPP students.

But this did not demoralize Magovac and Šubašić. They launched a new initiative in July 1947. The wanted to suggest to the Communist Party that Šubašić be appointed the "president of the Presidium" of the Parliament or as the "Prime Minister of Croatia", and that Magovac would be appointed a minister in the federal cabinet. They intended to request an amnesty and abolition of capital punishment, the end to state terror, and free elections. Košutić, who continued to believe that the CPP should boycott the regime, accepted Magovac's initiative, even if now, as in 1946, he emphasized that Magovac and Šubašić do this exclusively in their name. However, Magovac was arrested in August 1947, and sentenced to six years in prison in 1948.

In fact, the Communist government used many trials with trumped up charges and other forms of repression in 1947 and 1948 to completely destroy the CPP. The party continued to be active in emigration.

The CPY Abandons and Terminates the CRPP

At the beginning of 1947, the Central Committee of the KPH determined that the CRPP, despite the best efforts of the Communists, had not developed into a revolutionary peasant organization. In fact, the CRPP was created and sustained by Communists, while former adherents of the CPP had never accepted it. Even organizations that had been established by the CRPP were in great danger of being exploited by supporters of "Maček for nefarious purposes".[57] The Central Committee of the KPH, however, despite negative evaluations, felt that retention of the organization of the CRPP was still important:

> Still it is important that they continue to exist because through them we have countered the attempt of Maček's followers to revitalize the CPP.[58]

Although following the elections the emphasis was on engaging the peasant organisations through education, the KPH nevertheless wanted to maximize their political results. Of course, everything was in line with the directives of the CK CPY, which on 3 January 1947 advised the KPH of the continued importance of the CRPP, claiming that it would be a mistake to abolish it:

> Conclusions: not to take the course of liquidating the CRPP, rather, to work with it and support it, so that through it unity and democracy of the peasant masses is strengthened, today we cannot yet grasp the whole of the village in Croatia.[59]

Though the CPY did not succeed in transforming the CRPP into its peasant section, it was still important to maintain the CRPP in order to be able to counter the demands for renewing the CPP.

Given this evolution in the state of affairs, the Executive Committee CRPP never actually met. After the Third Plenary Session, held on 29 and 30 June 1945, right until 1950, there were no meetings at all. However, on 2 July 1947 an extraordinary meeting of the members of the Executive Committee CRPP was held, together with representatives of the People's Republic of Croatia. A debate was held to discuss promotion of the state's agricultural policies, particularly those related to purchasing free surpluses.

The name CRPP disappeared from the public press, so it was hard to come across it even in the *Slobodni dom*. The leadership of the CRPP was increasingly brought into a compromising situation. In the spring of 1948, Gaži explained the overlap in Popular Front and CRPP programmes to a foreign journalist. He claimed that in all districts with Croatian population there were district committees of the CRPP. This claim was valid only on paper. As public manifestations of the CRPP' role died away, the destruction of its symbols began as they were key symbols of the identity of the party. Thus, in the issue of *Slobodni dom* published 1 January 1948, the slogan "Faith in God and peasant unity" was removed from the magazine's header. The same was true in terms of the observance of religious holidays.[60]

To those who were demanding autonomy for the party in 1949, Stjepan Prvčić, member of the Executive Committee CRPP, warned:

> They have to know that Comrade Tito, the Party, and the people are one and indivisible.[61]

The power of the CPY was unquestionable, and the Popular Front could show itself for what it really was—a Communist entity. Covert revolutionary maneuvers, such as confiscating property on the basis of charges for collaboration with the Ustaša regime or the occupying powers, and openly revolutionary actions, such as nationalization or collectivization, as well as complete control over society, became the basis of the power of the CPY.

It was a very long road from 1945. The way taken was one of fierce condemnation of "reactionaries" who said that what was at stake was the immediate introduction of a Communist regime, which would immanently confiscate peasant land and create collective farms. In March 1949 the president of the CRPP, Gaži, demanded the collectivization of land in support of the decrees of the Second Plenum of the CPY.

> Certainly industry and commerce are very important means of production but it is beyond any doubt that the full realization of a socialist system is totally impossible with collectivization of the biggest and most powerful means of production—the land.[62]

Nonetheless, due to economic and political problems the CPY after a long period of passivity attempted to revitalize the CRPP in 1950. Food shortages, the threat of invasion from the East, the elections slated for that year, and the general dissatisfaction of the peasantry all contributed to a brief revival of the CRPP. During the summer of 1950 many consultation sessions of CRPP supporters were held. But its leadership did not explain why the organization had faded away or why it was being revived at that point in time.

To cap off all of the consultation meetings the Fourth Plenum of the Executive Committee CRPP was held in Zagreb on 11 October 1950. Franjo Gaži stated that the Executive Committee CRPP was the sole legitimate expression of the ideology of the Radić brothers, and not Maček and "his clique". The peasantry could not be allowed to become the tool of the enemy. Thus, cultural and educational activity among the peasantry had to be developed. He called for a fraternal alliance with the workers of the CPY, and he termed a split from the Popular Front as a crime and a betrayal. He warned against, as he called them, "improper procedures," that is the violence the regime employed in work campaigns, the mobilization of the workforce, the purchase of peasant production, and the formation and taxation of peasant cooperatives, but at the same time, he expressed wonder and disbelief that such procedures should ever have occurred. He also mentioned elections to the Parliament, called for 5 November 1950, stressing that the names of the candidate and their party affiliation (CRPP or CPY) were not important, but rather whether the candidates were men of word and deed.

The Fourth Plenum of the Executive Committee CRPP clearly showed that fear of the CPP and peasant dissatisfaction due to the agrarian policy

remained, especially with respect to the Informbiro and the Korean War. However, there was no word about a fundamental change in the CPY's politics. Following the Plenum, it was business as usual. Other than on the occasion of the birth and death of the Radić brothers, greetings on Tito's birthday, and the anniversary of the establishment of the Executive Committee CRPP, the name of the party was not mentioned in public, and even disappeared from the pages of *Slobodni dom*.

The leaders of the CRPP, which in the press presented themselves exclusively as representatives, and not members of the party, constantly preformed their basic task: attacking the "old leadership" of the CPP and warning about the danger inherent in a multi-party system and the importance of the leadership of the CPY and Tito.

The CRPP was quickly abandoned and forgotten by all, even its own creators—the CPY, which was concerned with only one aim: how to destroy the CPP, and to do this as painlessly, effectively, and quickly as possible. The CRPP indeed played a role in this but then quickly disappeared forever from the Croatian historical scene, the peasantry never having accepted it.

Imro Filaković: The Last Voice of Opposition in Parliament

Some members of the Executive Committee CRPP cooperated with the CPY but did not give up on the autonomy of the CRPP.[63] For this the regime categorized them "reactionaries" and "Mačekovites", which was a synonym for enemies of the people.

A special place among these was held by Imro Filaković, a member of the District Committee of the JNOF for Slavonia and one of the 13 members of the CRPP who joined the expanded AVNOJ. He was elected as one of the representatives to the Constituent Assembly of the FPRY. Dissatisfied with the Executive Committee CRPP, he joined the group around Šubašić and Šutej. He accused the Executive Committee CRPP of being Communist. He said that revolutionary change should give way to evolutionary development, and that all the important positions in the state had been taken by members of the CPY. He revealed the systematic penetration of the CRPP by the Communists, assisted by the leaders of the CRPP themselves:

> At the session of the Executive Committee of our CRPP—Imro Filaković informed the deputies—our president, vice-president, and second secretary said that a member of the Executive Committee could also be a member of the Communist Party and that is why it could happen that persons who are one and the other could be placed and everything would be okay.[64]

Filaković defended the right of the party to retain its individuality within the Popular which, according to him, the CRPP had already lost. On 30 July 1946, the Presidium of the Executive Committee CRPP, under allegations that he was introducing a split in the ranks of the CRPP and fanning chauvinism between Croats and Serbs and thus breaking down the unity of the workers and the peasants, unanimously expelled him from the CRPP.

At the sessions of the National Assembly of the FPRY he was ridiculed and attacked as an Ustaša. Along with Salacan, he was a rare voice of opposition from Croatia. According to Gaži's account, Filaković contacted Košutić, who advised him to take part in the debate on the budget. At the third regular session on 29 March 1947, Filaković protested against the size of the budget and the formation of "scissor prices", which would fall on the backs of the peasants.[65] He held the budget to be too high and that the Republics were sovereign states:

> We are a federal people's republic and we have six people's states with full sovereign rights. The budgets of the peoples' states need to be higher than that of the all-state budget.[66]

In other words, Filaković claimed that the federal budget was proof that the sovereignty of the republics was merely formal. He was also opposed to excessive expenditure on industrialization and electrification, demanding that more be spent on reconstruction and agriculture. He warned about the violence associated with the purchase of excess peasant produce. He argued that the public prosecutors were "too powerful" and that the inspectors of the control commissions were recruited from only one party, that is, the CPY. He protested against the practice of attacking opposing opinions as anti-national. The concept of government and people, he said, cannot be equated. Due to a strong reaction from the Communists, the session was on the verge of breaking down. Stjepan Prvčić accused him of being in the pay of the "foreign and domestic reaction".[67]

In Osijek he attacked the delegates of *Seljačka sloga* saying that they were not its true representatives, because they were not elected, but appointed, and he told delegate Nikola Rubčić, that because he was a member of the CK KPH, he had no right to speak in the name of *Seljačka sloga*. In 1947, Filaković lost his mandate a representative of the District Assembly in Osijek.[68]

In 1948 he demonstrated against the manner in which the government of the FPRY planned to implement an amnesty. He wrote a letter of protest to the session of the Federal Council of the National Assembly of the FPRY, which was held 29 September 1948. He believed that the amnesty retroactive to 1 January 1945 should be moved back to the day of the liberation in order that the amnesty could be extended to all members of enemy armies, with the exception of war criminals. This would achieve equality among republics, peoples, and regions of the land.[69]

On 21 January 1950, Filaković attended a session of the National Assembly of the FPRY for the last time, when he again opposed the introduction of ballot boxes without lists. He considered the suggestion of a ballot box without a list as undemocratic and he wanted the opposition to present its own list. Again, the representatives in the Assembly's benches harangued him with the call "this is not an Ustaša state", while Filaković replied that a better future can be expected only "in the garden called freedom".[70] This was his last oppositional stance in the National Assembly of the FPRY. He was not elected at the next elections.

Notes

1. Sources and literature are cited primarily when I use direct quotations as majority of this article is based on my works: *Hrvatska seljačka stranka 1941–1950.* (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 1996); *Božidar Magovac, S Radićem između Mačeka i Hebranga* (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, Dom i svijet, 1999; *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji. Od zajedništva do razlaza*, *1945–1991.* (Zagreb: Školska knjiga & Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2006).
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10. *Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944–1946: Dokumenti*, *knjiga 1*, editor Mate Rupić (Slavonski Brod: Hrvatski institut za povijest—Podružnica za povijest Slavonije, Srijema i Baranje, 2005), p. 54; *Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944–1946: Dokumenti*, Slavonija, Srijem, Baranja, editor Vladimir Geiger (Slavonski Brod: Hrvatski institut za povijest—Podružnica za povijest Slavonije, Srijema i Baranje, 2006), p. 103; Josip Jurčević, *Bleiburg : Jugoslavenski poratni zločini nad Hrvatima* (Zagreb: 2005), p. 334.
11. Zdenko Radelić, *Križari—gerila u Hrvatskoj* (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest & Dom i svijet, 2002).
12. Branko Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije 1918–1988. godine* (Beograd: Nolit, 1988), p. 388.
13. *Narodni glas*, "Zašto ne idemo na izbore" (20 October 1945).
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15. Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji. Od zajedništva do razlaza*, *1945–1991*, p. 57; *V. kongres Komunističke partije Jugoslavije. 21–28. jula 1948. Stenografske bilješke* (Zagreb: Kultura, 1949), p. 96.
16. Katarina Spehnjak, *Javnost i propaganda. Narodna fronta u politici i kulturi Hrvatske 1945–1952.* (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2002), p. 67.
17. Ibid., p. 114.
18. *Treći kongres Narodnog fronta Jugoslavije* (Beograd: Savezni odbor Narodnog fronta, 1949), p. 96; Spehnjak, *Javnost i propaganda. Narodna fronta u politici i kulturi Hrvatske 1945–1952*, p. 66, 68; *Yugoslavia*, *East-Central Europe Under the Communists*, ed. Robert F. Byrnes (New York & London: Mid-European Studies Center of the Free Europe Committee: Atlantis Books, no date), p. 128.
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26. Radelić, *Hrvatska seljačka stranka 1941–1950*, p. 28.
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28. *New York Times*, 'Maček prorokuje diktaturu Tita. Izjavljuje da je u Jugoslaviji komunistički režim siguran, ali Hrvati će se tome oduprijeti' (23 July 1945), see Dinko Šuljak, *Tražio sam Radićevu Hrvatsku* (Barcelona & München, Knjižnica *Hrvatske revije*, 1988), p. 409.
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30. Radelić, *Hrvatska seljačka stranka 1941–1950*, pp. 54–60; also 'Konferencija prvaka HSS-a u hotelu Esplanade u Zagrebu 1945,' *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, Zagreb, 1993, 2–3, pp. 149–164.
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34. Which period these percentages are referring to remains unclear, before or after reducing to 3.28%? See Spehnjak, *Javnost i propaganda*, 131; Vodušek Starič, *Prevzem oblasti 1944–1946*, 344; Dušan Bilandžić, *Hrvatska moderna povijest* (Zagreb: Golden Marketing, 1999), p. 220.
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37. Radelić, *Hrvatska seljačka stranka 1941–1950*, p. 89.
38. Jože Pirjevec, *Jugoslavija 1918–1992—Nastanek, razvoj ter raspad Karadjordjevićeve in Titove Jugoslavije* (Koper: Založba Lipa, 1995), p. 165; Katarina Spehnjak, 'Britanski parlamentarci 1945. godine u Zagrebu', *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, Zagreb, 2003, 2, pp. 489–512, 510.
39. Spehnjak, *Javnost i propaganda*, p. 147; *Drugi kongres Komunističke partije Hrvatske*, p. 130.
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41. Spehnjak, *Javnost i propaganda*, p. 136, 137.
42. Ibid., p. 140.
43. *Drugi kongres Komunističke partije Hrvatske*, Zagreb, 1949, p. 184, 185, Dušan Brkić, *Izvještaj o izgradnji narodne vlasti i socijalističke privrede u NR Hrvatskoj.*
44. Spehnjak, *Javnost i propaganda*, p. 142, 145.
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49. Ibid., p. 150.
50. Spehnjak, *Javnost i propaganda*, p. 150, 151, 152; HDA, CK SKH, Politbiro CK KPH, Izvještaj o izborima za saveznu skupštinu, održani dne 26 marta o. g., 13. 6. 1950., inv. br. 2151.
51. Spehnjak, *Javnost i propaganda,* 152; Ivo Perić, *Hrvatski državni sabor 1848–2000. Treći svezak: 1918–2000.* (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest & Dom i svijet, 2000), p. 229.
52. Spehnjak, *Javnost i propaganda*, p. 49.
53. Momčilo Pavlović, 'Politički programi Demokratske, Narodne radikalne, Jugoslovenske republikanske demokratske, Socijalističke i Socijaldemokratske stranke Jugoslavije iz 1945. Godine', *Istorija XX veka*, Beograd, 1985, 1, pp. 119–155.
54. Radelić, *Hrvatska seljačka stranka 1941–1950*, pp. 178–182; Ibid., 'Izvršni odbor Hrvatske republikanske seljačke stranke i njegovi otpadnici (1945–1948)'; *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* (Zagreb, 1992), 2, pp. 59–81, 64.

55. Ing. Franjo Gaži should not be confused with Franjo Gaži, peasant and member of the Executive Committee CRPP.
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57. Radelić, *Hrvatska seljačka stranka 1941–1950*, p. 165.
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66. *Treće redovno zasedanje Saveznog veća i Veća naroda, 26 mart–26 April 1947 godine*, *stenografske beleške* (Beograd: Prezidijum Narodne skupštine FNRJ, bez g. izd.), p. 141.
67. Ibid., p. 144, 145, 174.
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70. Radelić, *Hrvatska seljačka stranka 1941–1950*, pp. 178–182; Ibid., 'Izvršni odbor Hrvatske republikanske seljačke stranke i njegovi otpadnici (1945–1948)', *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, Zagreb, 1992, 2, pp. 59–81, 64; *Peto vanredno zasedanje Veća naroda i Saveznog veća, 20–21 januara 1950 godine, stenografske beleške* (Beograd: Prezidijum Narodne skupštine FNRJ, no date), pp. 85–87.

CHAPTER 3

Diana Budisavljević: The Silent Truth

Nataša Mataušić

The Diary of Diana Budisavljević[1] was published in Zagreb in 2004. Through diary entries made from 23 October 1941 to 7 February 1947, the Austrian, Diana Budisavljević, wife of a prominent Zagreb doctor, Julije Budisavljević, describes her personal commitment and the involvement of her co-workers in organizing and providing assistance to Serbian Orthodox women and children detained in the Ustaša concentration camps in an operation called the "Action of Diana Budisavljević".[2] Words of empathy describe the dramatic events in which she directly participated, her co-workers are described in a moderate and unambiguous way, and when she talks about herself and her family members, she does so with restraint. The diary is a remarkable historical document of a short but brutal period in Croatian history, written from the perspective of a woman who found the strength and courage to think freely, act freely and provide an active civil resistance to the fascist Ustaša regime in extremely difficult war conditions. Her resistance has all the characteristics of being heroic and progressive, and it should have a place in Croatia's positive historical heritage.

But quite the opposite is true. The silent truth about this brave woman surprised and angered not only the professional but also the general public recognition.[3] In previous professional and scientific literature, just like in journalism, which deals with the suffering of children during the

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Second World War in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, her name is rarely mentioned or not at all, and when it is mentioned, it is usually not accorded appropriate importance. Nobody teaches about her "Action" in schools, and her name is not mentioned in history textbooks, encyclopedias, lexicons, or museum exhibitions. It was only in May 2012 that the City Council of Zagreb named a park after her.

In October 1941, she began to help "the persecuted members of the Serb-Orthodox religion". The initial intention, to give monthly contributions to the persecuted by involving a large number of co-workers, grew very quickly into the largest campaign to help the Serbian Orthodox population, primarily women and children in the area of the Croatian Independent State.

According to *The Diary*, all the activity of Diana and her co-workers may be divided into several periods. In the first period, from 27 October 1941 to 27 February 1942, the activity took place in secret, without the permission of the Ustaša government, and was known only to "the loop". At that time there was no organization (association, board, campaign) to help the persecuted members of the Orthodox religion. At the time Diana had no intention to organize something similar because she had never worked in a charity, she had never been a member of an association and thought that she would not be "the right person for the job". She was ready to make contributions to the persecuted, but once she realized that no one would organize the help campaign as required, "it went without saying that with the help of my two co-workers I would take over that task."[4] The number of people involved quickly increased thanks to her idea of using "the system of snowballs", according to which "everyone shall inform their friends, if they are completely trustworthy, and let them send a message on to their acquaintances."[5] Packages of clothing and footwear started to arrive at her apartment on the Svačić Square, and her two daughters and their friends sewed warm clothes from velvet curtains. As mainly anonymous cash contributions began to arrive (she kept detailed records), they bought bags for mattresses, blankets (on cards), and shoes. On 6 November 1941, the first packages were delivered to "the camp care providers" of the Jewish religious community, which made a commitment, for a fee, to forward packages for Orthodox women and children in the camp Lobor grad, where a number of Jewish women with children were detained.[6] Despite the danger, she went to Lobor grad in order to "find the best way to organize help" on the spot".[7]

During this period, she uncompromisingly visited influential people: starting with the Archbishop of Zagreb Alojzije Stepinac, then the representatives of the Red Cross and Dr. Savo Besarović, all the way to the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Croatian Independent State, Andrija Artuković seeking assistance and official permission for her work.[8] In February, 1942, she met Kamilo Bresler, head of the Department for Family and Children Welfare of the General Directorate for Associations and Social Welfare, "a person who she would often contact asking for help and who she could not thank enough for all that he had done for the persecuted Serb-Orthodox children and for all the children in general that were in trouble, even at the risk of his own life. In the most difficult circumstances that occurred during the summer of 1942, he always found a way to help and, if no solution could be found, it was because of the horrible circumstances, and never a lack of good will and self-sacrifice on his part."[9]

On February 27, 1942, after repeated requests, Diana finally received a written "Permission" from the Ustaša Police Head Office of the Croatian Independent State—Jewish Department, which allowed her to collect (along with the Jewish religious community) food and clothing, and to send help to the concentration camps for all the Serb-Orthodox detainees. The permission was signed by Dr.Vinko Künhel, head of the Jewish department in the Ustaša Police Head Office, who warned her that his permission would not be accepted by all the Ustaša institutions.[10] After obtaining permission, despite the objection of Diana's husband, she decided to continue the "Action", "since all my co-workers said that they would like to continue working. On several occasions I had already talked to my co-workers, especially to Dr. Vidaković, about who should act as a responsible manager of the "Action"… But he and the other co-workers always resolutely refused, fearing that they would be persecuted if they officially showed in public. This is why I was responsible for the entire 'Action' from the beginning; everything was done under my name and at my risk. It is understandable that my husband feared for me and himself, and he disagreed with my work. But I wanted to help as much as possible. Since no one wanted to take the risk, I had no other choice but to take all the responsibility."[11]

Liability in a totalitarian, fascist, and racist, intolerant Croatian Independent State was extremely high. This was confirmed by the fact that only two days before obtaining permission, Ustaša detectives belonging to the political police and later the economic police, ransacked her

apartment, because "It seems to me someone notified the police that on the previous day I sent a truck full of goods to partisans through one of the local shipping companies. Besides, they were looking for a secret radio station."[12]

The period from 27 February to July, 1942, is the second stage of the "Action". Diana took over responsibility for the work of the entire "Action", and the scope of activities was expanding. Packages with food, clothing, and medicine were sent not only to Lobor grad but also to camps in Gornja Rijeka and Đakovo "where recently Orthodox prisoners can be found as well, and there are children among them."[13] She traveled again to Lobor grad in order to take over the children of Serb-Orthodox women who were sent to forced labor camps in Germany. Every day she visited them at the Institute for Mute and Deaf Children, and she took part in organizing the transportation for women who were leaving Lobor grad to go to Serbia, and for men who were sent to forced labor camps in Germany. At the station, in March 1942, while helping to distribute food, she met a nurse, Dragica Habazin, who was a volunteer nurse with the Red Cross. That day, just as any other day when she needed her later on, Dragica showed "great helpfulness and willingness to help. Diana appreciated her great kindness, generosity and willingness to assist in future work. During the war years, this nurse devoted her life to helping those who needed it the most, those who were the most persecuted. She always worked where it was the most dangerous, either because of the danger of persecution or because of the risk of infection. She ignored everything and was not afraid of anything when she had to help."[14]

In April 1942, Diana learned about the persecution of the Serbian Orthodox population in Kordun from Dr. Branko Kesić, who organized health care in the Medical Headquarters of State Employees. "My gracious lady! … the entire population of this region whether Orthodox or Catholic, rather Orthodox, has been evacuated to the camp. The evacuation began on the route Glina-Petrinja-Sunja. In my calculation about 3000 people, women, children and men have already been transferred to the camp. The evacuation is done so quickly that people fail to bring along any necessities, children are leaving in light clothing, barefoot and half-naked … Apparently they are all transported to Jasenovac … All the food, livestock and furniture are evacuated and transported from the village, so villages remain deserted … The health condition of these people is quite poor… I do not know what they plan to do with these people. The situation is desperate … ", he wrote to her in a letter dated 22 May

1942. After this she visited many officials, including the Archbishop of Zagreb, Alojzije Stepinac, to find out where these children ended up and to organize help.[15]

Diana obtained the first information about children in the Ustaša camp Stara Gradiška at the Zagreb West Station on the night of 8–9 June 1942, from women who were sent from the camp into forced labor in Germany along with their children. "… I am told that they come from the camp in Gradiška, that there are still lots of children there, many of them orphans because their mothers were either already transported previously or died. They think that there are more than a thousand children and it became clear that these are the children they have been looking for, children exiled from Kordun and other areas and that she must »take all the measures in order to save those children."[16]

A report of the German First Lieutenant, Schmidt Zabierow from the Office of the German Air Force attaché, who visited the camp in Stara Gradiška on 12 June 1942, together with the official appointed by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Peterson, to find labor force, mentions in what state the children were in the camp Stara Gradiška: "The detainees in the joint camp Stara Gradiška were recruited from the Orthodox, Jews and communists. The camp administration gave me no exact data on their number, but I heard from the commissioners who were active there for a long time that there were several thousand detainees in that camp. Delivering Jews as a labor force was out of the question because there were not many of them left since the most of them were executed. So, it meant only gathering the Orthodox and mainly women. Most of the families were sent to the camp with lots of children but without men and they were transported to Germany to work in agriculture. By 12 June 1942, about 2500 people were transported to Germany. Since the assignees could send only families with older children, small children were left to the Croatian state care. So, the inevitable consequence of all this was separation. There was a yard where I saw hundreds of children already separated from their mothers and they were pushed in a crowd in an inhuman way awaiting what would happen next. There were no sanitary facilities, so the children were lying in the yard in the open, crying for water and food".[17]

Since children from the camp could be taken only legally (with the permission of the competent Ustaša authorities), Diana found a way to obtain the permission. Her Austrian background, knowledge of the German language, and previous work with the law certainly helped her.

The third stage covers the period from 7 July 1942, that is, from obtaining permission to retrieve the children from the camp, until autumn 1942. During this period the 'Action' in its scope, the number of participants and the number of children rescued from the Ustaša camps grew into one of the most complex and undoubtedly the most humane action of its kind in the NDH and the entire occupied Europe.

Obtaining permission to retrieve the children was her greatest personal success. If she had not, the figure of more than 19,000 children under the age of 14 who were the victims of concentration camps Jasenovac and Stara Gradiška would certainly have been much higher.[18]

After the Battle on Kozara (from June to July 1942), many Serbian Orthodox civilians were expelled from their houses and homes. According to the estimates of NDH health services, around 68,500 refugees were located in assembly centers and camps.[19] Some of the refugees (mostly women with children) from the collection centers and refugee camps were deployed in villages in Slavonia, Moslavina and Bilogora, and some of them were transported to the Jasenovac and Stara Gradiška concentration camps and to the near-by camp economies (Uštica, Jablanac, Mlaka) that were organized in the villages of the forcibly evicted Serbian Orthodox population.[20] Men and women of working age were separated and taken to forced labor camps in Germany and Norway. A large number of children, from infants to 14-year-olds remained without any protection in the Stara Gradiška camp and at the economies.[21]

On 9 July 1942, Diana traveled to Stara Gradiška camp for the first time, along with 15 Red Cross nurses and the nurse Dragica Habazin. The children were in a deplorable state, starving, naked, and barefoot, ill. "Some of them died there, and some of them died after we took them with us, like so many of these little martyrs, as unknown nameless children. And each of them had a mother who cried for him, had his home, his clothes, and now he was buried naked in a mass grave. Carried nine months, born in pain, delightfully welcomed, lovingly cared for and brought up, and then—Hitler needs workers, bring women, and take their children away, let them fail; what immense grief, what a pain" she wrote in the *Diary* on 10 July 1942.[22] The first group of 700 transported children arrived at Zagreb Main Station on 11 July 1942. Throughout the trip from Okučani to Zagreb, Diana was alone with 62 children "who were lying on the wooden floor, without straw, in the cattle cars without food and drink. The children were hungry and thirsty…The trip was terrible. All night moaning and wailing could be heard. The train was often

stopping, driving slowly, on occasion even returning. The road to Zagreb seemed endless."[23] The next trip to remove children from the camps took place on 13 July, in Stara Gradiška (650 children), the unsuccessful re-route to Stara Gradiška (July 15) and Okučani, where they were told that the children were gone.

Along with the written approval of the German Major Wilhelm Knehe from German Feldkommandature (which she obtained personally) to retrieve children and pregnant women from the camp, further trips followed on 28 July, to Mlaka and Jablanac (850 children), then again on 2 August, to Mlaka (906 children), and on 4 August to Mlaka and Košutarica (1200 children).[24]

Upon the arrival of the children in Zagreb and Sisak, many health professionals were involved in child-care activities (doctors and nurses, Red Cross volunteer nurses, students at the school for educators), as were citizens of all social groups. Several members of the Communist Party, the Anti-fascist Front of Women and the National Liberation Movement supporters were among them.[25] Those with whom she worked and contacted almost every day included Dr. Marko Vidaković; ĐuroVukosavljević; Ljubica Becić, the wife of the painter Vladimir Becić; and their two daughters, Mira and Vera, then Vera Černe and Dragica Habazin are distinguished by her *Diary* as her closest co-workers.[26] At the main station Dr. Eugen Pusić, a reserve home defense officer, was of great help. Many activists had no direct contact with Diana, many of them she even did not know about. Some participants of the action were arrested and mistreated by police due to their involvement in the rescue of children.[27]

In Zagreb, the children were admitted to hospitals and shelters, where they were given all the care available in extremely difficult conditions of war, occupation, and scarcity.[28] As the children kept coming, full capacity for taking the children by families in Zagreb was reached. From then on the children were transferred to Jastebarsko due to the devotion of Kamilo Bresler, where at the end of August 1941, a national children's home for girls was started, with experienced health workers, nuns, and students of the school for educators in kindergarten schools from Rude led by Tatjana Marinić, who was taking care of them.[29] Most of the children transported on 29 July 1942 stayed in Sisak and were placed in the "Reception Center for Children".[30]

Despite the care, many children, especially small children and infants, died from malnutrition, disease, and exhaustion, or from the consequences of their earlier stay in the camps.

From 10 August 1942, Diana and Kamilo Bresler were considering the idea of colonization (placement in families) as the only possible solution to save such a large number of children. As her co-workers were unable to get permission to travel to the villages because they were "mainly of Serb-Orthodox religion", Diana proposed seeking help from the Archbishop because "each municipality has a priest who is in contact with the municipal inhabitants, and through the existing church organization the colonization could be conducted in the fastest way."[31] The Ustaša authorities initially refused, until on 23 August 1942, the Ministry of Associations brought a *Provision for deployment of refugee children*, according to which the "refugee children", "taken from concentration camps" could "be placed", respectively "sent for upbringing" to parents or charity guardians "in Croatian and Catholic, peasant and middle-class families."[32] Kamilo Bresler was responsible for "the placement of refugee children", which was to be carried out in cooperation with Caritas belonging to the Zagreb Archdiocese and the Croatian Red Cross.[33] "This is how about 5000 Orthodox children were colonized from Zagreb alone. In late autumn, children, who because of hunger came from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and later refugees from all across the country, were colonized. Finally, the same thing happened with the returnees from Italy."[34]

Since the autumn of 1942, a new phase in the work of the "Action" began and lasted until March, 1944. During this time, she continued to take care of children deployed in various institutions, collecting donations and contributions in food, clothing, and medicine, and sending them to camp detainees with the help of the Red Cross. "Driven by a statement given by the director Dumić that some mothers cannot get their children back due to extreme poverty, meaning they are not able to accommodate their children and care for them", in December 1942, she decided to start with Caritas a fund called "A child back to his mother", and as initial capital she deposited "100,000 kuna and 100 pairs of shoes taken from the Action."[35] This money was to provide accommodation and food to those mothers who had lost their home in the war. From January 1943, she tried to protect children who were in the area of German military operations and sought help from the Archbishop of Zagreb Alojzije Stepinac and from Captain Gustav von Koczian. Stepinac accepted it without hesitation while Koczian was convincing her that "children will not be taken away to concentration camps, but they will be directly sent from the field to care providers."[36] As of September 1942, she had a new co-worker, the wife of Ragnar Wohlin, the Swedish Consul in Zagreb. Not only did she provide

care for children in the children's hospital in Josipovac, she also provided 100 crates of milk for them with the help of Sweden.

In March, 1944, her closest co-worker Dr. Marko Vidaković separated and organized his own action. "He was getting more and more engaged with adults while Diana wanted her work and the work of the "Action" to be limited to helping children."[37]

Concurrently with charitable activities, almost from the beginning of the "Action", and in particular from September 1942, Diana started working on the list (files) of children who were taken from the camps and placed in various hospitals and shelters, or with foster families.[38] In July 1942, during the first trip to retrieve children from the camp Stara Gradiška, they found "a store and purchased paper, pencils, thin rope and small cardboard as they are used to tag prices on fabrics".[39] They needed paper and pencils to create a list of children by their names (transport lists), and thin rope and cardboard to mark them according to their number from the lists. Numbers from the list were put around the children's neck so they could be identified upon arrival. "During every transport of the children I tried to collect as accurate personal information about them as possible, and gradually from this data, files were created about children originating from Kozara."[40]

Files with the list of 12,000 registered children and which should have been used after the war by parents and/or relatives to identify and retrieve children, were taken away from her as a private person (and as such unsuitable one) immediately after the liberation in May 1945, at the request of the Ministry for Social Policy. On 7 February 1947, upon the request of the Street Committee of the Anti-fascist Women's Front, she wrote and submitted a report on her work entitled: "The review of the work of the "Action Diana Budisavljević' for the period of occupation from October, 1941, til June, 1945."[41]After that she stopped working and withdrew from public life.

The "Action Diana Budisavljević" has no analogy in the history of Europe at that time. It is unique in the number of contributors and participants, in the results achieved, and in the number of children rescued, that it took place in Zagreb which at that time had the most important German offices and the administrative apparatus of the Independent Croatian State. The Action is unique for its founder and organiser remained unrevealed.

Despite the published "Diary of Diana Budisavljević" and recent theoretical and critical works on the respective topic, many questions about her activities are still unanswered. Who was this woman? How was the

permission to take children from the camp obtained? How many children were rescued from the Ustaša camps? What was the role of the Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac in saving the children? Why were all the data files on children taken away from her and, finally, where and why did it end? Why did others take credit for her work?

Zagreb, February 1942

At the end of a long and extremely cold winter, the state of war, in which the country was, showed its true face in the capital of the Independent Croatian State.

At the very beginning of the war a seemingly monolithic urban community was already divided into three basic, significantly opposed groups: the established ruling group and their unconditional followers, the illegal Partisans of Zagreb, and a large section of people without an explicit or permanent political opinion who had no information about the events into which they were simply "pushed", or who were simply not able to judge this information.

In February 1942, many Zagreb Jews no longer lived at their old addresses. In accordance with the proclaimed racist laws of the ISC they were excommunicated from all fields of public life, their houses and property were taken away. They were transported to concentration camps through the Zagreb collection center in Zavrtnica and in the area of today's Student Center. The majority never returned.[42]

In April 1942, in his expose before the Croatian Parliament, and for the occasion of the first anniversary of the ISC, the Interior Minister of ISC Andrija Artuković said: "The Croatian people, recovering their national Independent State of Croatia, could not otherwise proceed to cleanse their body of toxic pest and ravenous parasites: Jews, Communists and Freemasons. … The Independent State of Croatia as an Ustaša state, finding itself in a state of defence against these insatiable and poisonous pests–resolved the so-called Jewish question by a vigorous and healthy procedure to preserve not only itself and its people but also to preserve what is the most beautiful and noble in the Croatian people."[43]

By July–August 1941, the Ustaša terror against the Serbian Orthodox population showed its true character: with the arrests of individuals, primarily representatives of the prewar political parties, of Orthodox priests and intellectuals, executions by firing squad as retaliation, mass arrests, and internment to camps, immigration, religious conversions, and mass

murders in areas predominantly inhabited by Serb-Orthodox population. The Serb-Orthodox population according to the Ustaša were responsible (as a collective) for the suffering of Croats in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and was an obstacle to achieving a free Croatian state. Therefore, the Ustaša government, with strong political propaganda, passed a range of laws and legal provisions according to which along with racial ethnic exclusivity, religious intolerance was introduced.[44]

A lack of basic food products and consumer goods, firewood, poverty and hunger became a daily routine for most of inhabitants. As of April 1941, the distribution of "coupons" or "remittances" was introduced for certain products (milk, bread, flour, soap) in order to rationalize procurement and consumption.[45] To prevent smuggling of goods and the illegal setting of product prices, the commercial police was established within the Directorate for Public Order and Safety (Ravnateljstvo za javni red i sigurnost) by order of the Minister of Internal Affairs on 8 January 1942.[46]

Freedom of movement was also limited. At all city's entrances and exits there were ramps as checkpoints where the Ustašas examined all those who were entering into or coming out of the city as well as their luggage. Passes for free movement in and out of the city of Zagreb were issued from July 1941, by the Police Directorate.[47] According to the provision given by the Police District HQ for the city of Zagreb, all persons "who come from the province to Zagreb—either permanently or temporarily" were to apply for passes.[48] This Provision required the registration of data such as name, date, month and year of birth, occupation, religion, citizenship, native district, permanent residence with the name of a district and a parish, name of parents, wife and children, where the person came from, when they arrived, what was the purpose, and which district authorities issued the passport, and what the passport number was. Starting from October 1941, immigration and the ability to stay in the city were limited, and they were connected to the right to have a meal in the city and the release of coupons for bread and other food products. Non-native persons and those who did not have permanent residency could stay in the city for a maximum of ten days (except for those who were sent to the hospital for health reasons). The City Council could grant exceptions for a longer stay or for permanent settlement in the city.[49]

A curfew was introduced on 16 May 1941. Under the provision of the Police Directorate in Zagreb "starting from today, May 16, 1941, until further notice every movement and delayed stay in the streets is prohibited and in public places as well, from 10 p.m. until 5 a.m. All public

restaurants, cinemas, theaters, etc. are to be closed no later than 10 p.m. All public performances, concerts, lectures, etc. are to be finished in a timely manner. All permits to move freely in the city that were previously issued by the Police Directorate except for official personnel, shall be revoked until further notice. Anyone who is to be found in the street or in a bar after this time will be caught by the police and strictly punished."[50]

Zagreb was full of police of different colors and names, of various agents and spies. In addition to existing prisons in Petrinjska and Đorđićeva streets and Savska Road, new prisons were established in Zvonimirova, Račkoga 9, Trg no. 10, Heinzlova and Runjaninova street. All police institutions could arrest, try and implement death sentences. The forests Stupnički dol and Dotršćina became locations for individual, group, and mass executions of hostages, and this is where the most mass graves in the modern history of Zagreb are located.[51]

The German occupational authorities had a number of agencies and offices in Zagreb. Edmund Gleise von Horstenau was appointed as the representative of the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces at the Government of the Independent State of Croatia on 14 April 1941.[52] Together with him, there was also the German legation headed by Sigreied Kasche, who was in charge of the German occupational supervisory board. The Headquarters of the Gestapo (Geheime Statsspolizei), the German secret police for the Independent State of Croatia called *Einsatzkommando Sicherheitpolizei und Sicherheitsdienst—Agram* (Active command of the security police and security services—Zagreb) headed by SS Obersturmbannfürer (Lt. Col. SS) Wilhelm Beissner occupied an entire city block on the Square of Petar Krešimir IV.[53]

Until September 1943, the Italians had two intelligence services in the territory of the Independent State of Croatia: OVRA (Opera vigilianza repressione antifascista), the Italian political police, and SIM (Servizio informazioni militare), the military intelligence service of the Italian Army Headquarters.[54]

The Abbot Giuseppe Ramiro Marcone, a delegate of Vatican at the Croatian Catholic episcopate, stayed in Zagreb from the summer 1941. He was treated by ISC authorities as a diplomatic representative, which he was not.

Children and families were seen as the basis of "the international community" and as the carrier "of all its values."[55] Within the Department of Social Insurance, Protection and Care, the Department for Family and Child Welfare was established, and it included the social care of children

and adolescents. "To preserve a family hearth for children" meant "to provide them the highest possible social protection" because "a child nourished and brought up outside the family remains mentally lamed and impoverished throughout life" and a struggle "to reduce mortality with our children is the subject of our constant concern".[56]

As of 10 June 1941, according to the law on the prohibition and punishment of miscarriage and terminating pregnancy, the death penalty was prescribed for such an offense without no mitigating circumstances, while for all other offenses there was the possibility of mitigation.[57] Proclaimed protection and care of children and families and legislation was intended to reflect a community that cares about its citizens, especially the youngest ones. However, the reality was quite different: hundreds of destroyed homes and families, thousands of children orphaned and without any care in the camps.

First Question: Who Was Diana Budisavljević?

She was born in Innsbruck, Austria, in 1891, into the merchant family Obexer. Her mother Anna (nee Roese), was an American of German descent. She inherited forcefulness, meticulousness, and a sense of responsibility to herself and others from her parents. As a young girl she was a passionate hunter, and listened to the music of Richard Wagner. She met her husband, Dr. Julije Budisavljević, in her granddaughter's words (Silvija Szabo), probably while she was taking a course for nurses (Pflegekurs) just before the start of World War I in a hospital in Innsbruck, where Dr. Budisavljević worked as an assistant in a surgical hospital. They got married in 1917, and left Austria for Zagreb in 1919. That same year, Dr. Budisavljević was appointed as professor of surgery at the newly established Faculty of Medicine in Zagreb.

During World War II, she was already the mother of two adult daughters with their own families. But as a real housewife, she dedicated all her time to her husband and family. Although a member of the upper class, her social life was modest. She never worked for charity events, nor was she a member of any association, not even the Red Cross (where she was often working as a charity sister) and had very few acquaintances. From the *Diary* introduction we learn that her seamstress was Slovene, her dressmaker Jewish (and her husband an Orthodox Serb), which indicates that she had no prejudice against people of different nationalities and different religious beliefs, even when such an attitude was not in line with the proclaimed policy of the State in which she lived.

She entered entered her fifties at the beginning of the war. Her health was already deteriorated. She had a thyroid problem (Basedow disease) and a heart condition, in addition to mentally and physically exhausting work on a daily basis while gathering donations for the prison camp prisoners, and the huge responsibility that she took over as the head of the "Action". What she saw and experienced led to a further deterioration of her health. After returning from the camp in Jablanac on 4 August 1942, she recorded in her *Diary*: "It was an extremely exhausting day, full of terrible impressions, misery and despair, impressions that haunted me a long time thereafter and this sad knowledge was probably the cause of my long-term morbidity, which began with this transport."[58]

In May 1945, when the files and other documents were taken away from her, she could not hide the pain and bitterness. In February, 1947, she submitted a report on the work of the "Action" to the street committee of the Anti-fascist Women's Front, and neatly stored all the remaining documents in a large wooden crate and locked it. She never spoke of the "Action" again.

Always inclined to help people, even after the war she continued with humanitarian work. When in 1953, the first S.O.S. Children's Village was established near Innsbruck, Diana financially supported it every year, although she did not have much money. In 1972, she returned to her hometown Innsbruck with her husband, where she died in 1978.

> It is understandable that my husband was afraid for me and hisself, and did not agree with my work. But I wanted to help as much as was possible. Since no one else wanted to take the risk, I had no choice but to take all the responsibility by myself. My point of view was that my life is not any more valuable than the life of innocently persecuted people and if I am able to help others, here I am primarily thinking of children, my life was so rich that I would have to take the life events as they will be.[59]

Only extraordinary people can give themselves in the name of a just and humane cause, and this is what she did.

Second Question: How Was the Permission to Retrieve Children from the Camp Obtained?

During the late hours of 8 June 1942, while waiting for the women and children transported from the Stara Gradiška camp at the South (today's West) station, Diana became acquainted with Hecker, who

was the head of transport for Germany. The next day she visited him in his Office in the German Ministry for the Creation of New Jobs (Deutsches Ministerium für Arbeitsbeschaffung), on the Trg no. 3 (today's Square of Victims of Fascism). There she met von Kotzian, the key figure in obtaining the permission to take children from the camp, who was a captain in the German army. A few days later, Dr. Vidaković and Diana visited Kotzian in the Hotel Esplanade in Zagreb where he was staying. On that occasion he told them that he "had negotiated with his acquaintance, Marshal Kvaternik about releasing the children", and that he "had directed him to turn to his son [Eugen Dido Kvaternik]".[60] At that time, Eugen Dido Kvaternik was "the almighty commander of all police, intelligence and security agencies serving to ISC", and he was the real master of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (not the Minister of Internal Affairs, Andrija Artuković, who he bypassed in all his decisions and reports).[61] Many high-level government officials tried to influence the release of prisoners from camps while Eugen Dido Kvaternik was in power, sometimes even the Poglavnik Pavelić himself, but usually with no success.[62]

On 7 July 1942 Diana wrote in her *Diary*: "Captain von Kotzian called me and asked me to go to Hecker's office. That was where I heard the eagerly awaited news that the head Kvaternik gave the permission that we could take the children from the concentration camps."[63] In current literature (since there was no real scientific notation) obtaining permission to take the children from Ustaša camps was described in different ways, as well as Diana's role, which, in most cases, was incorrectly evaluated.

Jana Koch was a writer and an active participant in saving children, and a member of the Anti-fascist Front of Women. She was a woman who, due to her educational background and indirect involvement in the events, had to know who and how obtained city permits. In her memories she says: "…my hardest work was to save the partisan children from Kozara, who had been dragged to the children's concentration camps by the Ustaša. This action, the largest of all, required our superhuman strength, self-sacrifice, courage and denial. This action was organised and led by Ivo Marinković. As a member of CK KPH (Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia) through the Party he got in touch with the prof. Kamilo Brössler (Bresler never mentioned him in his memoires)…and Ivo Marinković who organized the action of saving the children, in a way that due to his work, the Ministry of Social Care and the Red Cross as institutions succeeded in

getting the permission from the Ustaša authorities to save the children legally.…" Diana (as Dijana) is mentioned only as one of the sisters of the Red Cross, but out of 15 of them she is the only one mentioned by name, and she is one of those who went to the concentration camp Stara Gradiška to get the children and is mentioned as the organizer of the 'Action to help the Serbian families in the concentration camps' although this kind of action never existed.[64]

Slava Ogrizović, a writer and a participant of NOP (People's Liberation Movement) gives a different description: "Children from the camp could be taken out only legally. All illegal actions of the Communist Party were done quickly and efficiently…, but it was only the Red Cross that could get to the children in a legal way". It was necessary "to save the children as soon as possible and to provide them accommodation in Zagreb at the same time, and this kind of action could have been "organized only by the Party, especially with the help of the Anti-fascist Women's Front." As it seemed impossible to get to the children "Dijana [again wrong name] Budisavljević…decided to take the matter into her hands". Her husband, Prof. Dr. Budisavljević, was one of the best surgeons, so the Ustašas left him alone, although he was a Serb. Stating incorrectly that she was working for the Red Cross, she explains further that "as a born Austrian she took the advantage of her Vienna acquaintances to introduce her to highly positioned German military officers" and announce herself to General Wiecek, who was a commander of all German military troops in the ISC and who, after talking to Diana, put pressure on Pavelić who immediately "signed a decree according to which—firstly –exempted the children from the competence of the Ustaša Supervisory Office (Ustaška nadzorna služba) which ran the camps. … Secondly, it was absolutely permitted by this decree that the Red Cross and the representatives of the Ministry of Associations were allowed to enter the camp and, thirdly, to take the children with them."[65] The Pavelić decree came to the Ministry of Associations on 7 July 1942. Diana was not a native of Vienna, but Edmund Glaise von Horstenau was Viennese, and probably the remark about Viennese acquaintances refers to him. Diana mentioned him twice in her *Diary*, but one does not get the impression that she knew him personally. General Wiecek (Maksimilijan von Weichs) who Ogrizović mentioned as a liaison, was not mentioned by Diana at all. The interesting thing about her presentation lies in the fact that she describes the content of the decree very thoroughly as if she had the chance to see and read it in its original form. The original decree was

not preserved, and we still did not get the chance to register it. In May 1945, Slava Ogrizović was working in the Ministry of Social Care in the People's Republic of Croatia, which inherited the offices and documentation from the ISC's Ministry of Associations. It was in her hands that the photo albums of children, taken away from Diana, were last seen. The only original documents connected to the children taken out of the camps that were preserved were the travel orders of the Red Cross HQ for Dragica Habazin and Diana Budisavljević, but dated as of July 28, 1942 and issued "In accordance with the announcement given by the Ministry of Associations", which confirmed that "the decree" came to the Ministry of Associations first.[66]

A similar description given by Dr. Nikola Nikolić states that General Gleise von Horstenau played the leading role in decree-issuing. In his recollection, "Mrs Diana Budisavljević as an Austrian" "succeeded in having the Armerkommandant Horstanau" meet with Kamilo Bresler, and to issue her "a permission for the Stara Gradiška camp."[67] During the conversation with Bresler, Horstenau called someone and gave the order to release the children from the camp and give them to "the Red Cross representatives". That is rather interesting because Kamilo Bresler in his notes does not mention any sort of conversation with Horstenau. Even Aleksa Benigar, a biographer of Stepinac, confirmed that Horstenau was ready to help those who were persecuted: "Glaise was an Austrian, old-school soldier…Stepinac got in touch with Glaise several times" but only because he wanted to intervene on the behalf of the persecuted people, no matter if it was by Ustaša or by the Germans. These interventions were mostly successful. In Zagreb there are Communists who are still alive thanks to "Glaise's intervention."[68]

There are some doubts that Eugen Dido Kvaternik issued the decree to take the children, and these doubts are expressed in a document on the colonization of children dated 28 August 1942, issued by the Ministry for Associations. According to this document, "In accordance with the guidelines given by the Perfect, and by agreement with the Office III. (Ustaša Supervisory Office) the minister in charge of all camps, determines where the refugee children, who 'by order of the Leader were taken over from concentration camps to children's shelter'…, were to be accommodated".[69] The similar phrase, "by order of the Leader the former Ministry of Associations took over the refugee children from concentration camps…", was repeated in the number of documents on the adoption of a boy, Ivan (Bresler), from 1943.[70]

The Third Question: How Many Children Were Saved? How Many of Them Died?

The German industrialist Oskar Schindler saved 1200 Czech and Polish Jews; Irena Sendlerowa, a social worker from Poland saved 2500 Jewish children from the Warsaw ghetto; Giovani Platucci, an Italian police officer in Rijeka, saved several thousand Jews.

According to Diana, the "Action Diana Budisavljević" was active "after releasing the Orthodox women and children from Lobor grad"…"mainly on behalf of children, so it succeeded in" saving about 10,000 children from concentration camps.[71]

The figure of 12,000 saved children, which has been used so uncritically in today's media when talking about the number of children who were saved by Diana and her "Action", refers to the number of children listed in the "Files".[72] But every discussion on the number of saved children is unnecessary. One thought that has been written in the ancient Jewish Talmud: 'Who saves one life, has saved the whole world' devalues every attempt to find the exact number of saved children, even though it is important, but not as a fact that evaluates her 'Action' and Diana herself.

Diana would have never been able to save that many children by herself, but this does not diminish her merits. She organized the "Action", she obtained the permission to take the children out of the camp, she personally traveled to the Ustaša camps repeatedly to get the children and accompanied them; she personally encouraged the "colonization" of children and ensured their protection and a decent life during the entire war. Child mortality in some shelters and hospitals was a different question, and depended on the health of certain groups of children (transport) as well as on the diligence and dedication of doctors, nurses, and competence of people in charge.

The highest infant mortality rate was in the state children's shelters in Sisak and Gornja Rijeka, and the lowest in the state Children's Home in Jastrebarsko and Donja Reka. "So, for example, in 1942, in a shelter in Sisak there were 2272 children, 1700 of them died, i.e. 74%. In 1942, Jastrebarsko shelter accommodated 2997 children, only 499 of them died, i.e. 17%, although the most seriously ill children were sent there. In the children's shelter at the Institute for upbringing of deaf and mute children in Zagreb in the year 1942, 5612 children were accommodated, and 157 of them died, i.e. about 30%, while 237 children, i.e. 4% were transferred to hospitals in Zagreb."[73]

According to the archives of the Department of Infectious Diseases, Fran Mihaljević Hospital (during the ISC it was called "City Hospital for Infectious Diseases under the Administration of ISC"), of the 162 children admitted to the hospital in 1942, 145 of them died.[74] These children were brought from "Children's shelter" in Sisak, and from "The Institute for health care of mothers and infants" in Josipovac.

Fourth Question: What Was the Role of the Archbishop of Zagreb Alojzije Stepinac in Rescuing the Children?

In several places in the *Diary,* Diana describes her encounters with the Zagreb Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac. Diana's first encounter with Stepinac took place on 3 December 1941 and was associated with obtaining permission to go to the camp and distribute food to the detainees. The Archbishop distanced himself by saying that he "has no impact on the government" and that "nothing can be obtained."[75] In May 1942, she was received by Stepinac again. And then he was "very restrained" and did not want to take any interest. "I told him that I came to ask him to save an entire nation, and he told me a story about the apartment of a Jewish woman. Then he began to criticise the Germans, Nazism, and Hitler, saying that they were to be blamed. I told him that the German bishops showed great interest in their believers and they opposed Hitler. Many of the persecuted here converted to the Catholic religion, and it was his duty to stand up for them. … In the end, he promised to advocate for them. Nevertheless, I do not believe it very much."[76]

The Archbishop, however, became interested and at the third meeting, "he informed them that he had a meeting with the Minister of Associations and that both of them would stand up for saving deported children… We were completely stunned by promises we were given (but they were not fulfilled)."[77]

In July 1942, after her arrival from Stara Gradiška with the first transportation of 700 children, she asked for help again: "It was extremely difficult to provide accommodation for the children. All the conversations that I had in the Ministry of Health and with the Archbishop were fruitless."[78]

Finally, on 18 July 1942, upon the arrival of the children transported from Stara Gradiška (a transport of 1080 children who were brought to

the Zagreb Main Railway Station by the Ustaša soldiers), Dr. Vidaković in agreement with the Archbishop succeeded in making Jeronim's Hall available for the older children.[79]

Almost simultaneously with the legal provisions on the colonization of children, by the Ministry of Associations (August 23, 1942) "the Provision of His Eminence Archbishop Dr. Alojzije Stepinac Croatian metropolit", in agreement with the Ministry of Associations, was issued. Caritas of the Archdiocese of Zagreb took over the deployment in villages and towns of those children who, due to the present war situation, had become orphans and homeless. "He sent a letter to all parish offices to assist Caritas Archdiocese of Zagreb in their work."[80] "Thanks to their [the vicars'] efforts" up until December 1942, Caritas placed 5124 children.[81]

Just before Christmas in 1942, and "at the moment of greatest distress and concern for the life of those small children, the Lord Archbishop of Zagreb, offered help by giving his large flower garden to be arranged as a shelter for children and he thus saved the lives of many orphans. In this flower garden, with a central heating system, children could rest and prepare for placement in the villages."[82]

In the flower garden (the greenhouse), there were "Orthodox children from the camp, Catholic and Muslim children were brought directly from the location, as well as adults whose homes were destroyed… Caritas invited us to a Christmas party. The Archbishop gave all the children packages prepared by Caritas."[83] (from the voluntary contributions of citizens, author's note).

"The most beautiful act of the Archbishop's love was rescuing innocent children", writes Stepinac's biographer Aleksa Benigar, "who lost their homes and their parents during the war interventions in Kozara in 1942". On August 25, the archbishop sent a letter to all parish offices which said that his Caritas took on a noble task, to accommodate poor children in the houses of the faithful believers, so they could have food and he also asked vicars and parish administrators in their parishes *most urgently* to find as many of these good believers who were willing to take in the children. Among the children there were infants who needed special care. 600 kuna per month would be paid for each child… Previously the children were temporarily placed in Jasenovac and Sisak camps and their surroundings. After lengthy negotiations and with the help of the Archbishop all these children were entrusted to the care of Caritas Archdiocese of Zagreb and were gradually transported to Zagreb, sent to children's homes, cleaned and handed over to the care and education of the families who accepted

them voluntarily… The Archbishop placed about 80 abandoned children of every religion from all over Croatia in Brezovica castle and the sisters of Our Lady took care of them. The children were fond of him, and he visited frequently. When they saw him coming, they would gather around him. He never came empty-handed. These meetings were physically demanding because the children threw themselves around his neck, pulled him by his coat, tugging back and forth…

That is how 6717 children were rescued from starvation and death and taken care of. From 1942 to 1944, there were about 6000 children whose parents were Serb-Orthodox or were the partisans' … "It is known that the archbishop made a large greenhouse within the park available to the refugee children, with whom he occasionally liked to talk."[84]

Stjepan Dumić, the director of Caritas does not share the opinion of Benigar: "In regard to the work and attitude of the archbishop and his Kaptol Dumić said: The Archbishop had 110 dairy cows, but partisan children were not given any milk … Zagreb is full of canonical manors. Not a single clergyman, nor the Archbishop himself put any of the rooms at the children's disposal. Therefore children were placed in the bishop's palm tree garden. Dumić says about the Archbishop's palace in Brezovica the following: The bishop felt that the Ustaša wanted to seize the castle, so he turned it into a partisan home for children in a hurry, just to keep the castle for himself. It was done in a great hurry. On Wednesday the castle was designed as a children's home, and by Saturday the children had to move in".[85]

In late January 1943, Diana visited the Archbishop again. She asked for help in the rescue mission of children and mothers, "at least those with small children as well as pregnant women" in the areas where German and Ustaša units were active, and the Archbishop immediately accepted it without a second thought. "It was not at question whether we would help or not, but how would we organize it."[86]

Initially, Stepinac was not interested in providing any help to Diana and her "Action" and he was completely insensitive to her applications (and moral lectures), then he made promises that he did not keep, then starting from August 1942 (colonization), especially from January 1943, he helped in rescuing and providing housing for the children. Stepinac's biographer, Benigar, gave him credit for colonizing children (through Caritas), which would later be used by a lot of people as a platitude, that it was Stepinac who saved 7000 Orthodox children. When referring to the relationship and the role of Caritas, Diana says: "Caritas has nothing to do

with my Action. This is our private business and Caritas thus should not be applauded. I want to preserve the independence of my Action and turn to the Caritas when we need their help, that is, when we can help them."[87]

Question Five: The Files

Work on the "Files" of the children began after 14 August 1942, and at the request of Kamilo Bresler "that he could do the filling in for the Ministry as well."[88] Until then (as well as later on), every institution that accommodated the children kept their own separate files on the children, and there were also transportation lists where the children were listed in numerical order (the same order as they were marked). All these lists from various institutions had to be unified, and matched to the transportation numbers; any inaccurate information was to be corrected and the new ones added, if they had not already been added. "This was how a great work started, and it lasted for several months", cards were rewritten in a nearby office, and "very often I did it myself often up to 12 or 1 o'clock at night," she wrote in her *Diary*, after having received permission to get the cards from the Institute for Deaf and Mute Children where most of the children spent at least some time.[89] From the Ministry of Associations she obtained the transport lists of the children taken over by then, from Caritas she got the file records for the Jeronimska Hall and the Archbishop's Greenhouse and later all their files with the data on colonized children, she rewrote children's names from the register in Josipovac, made a list of children younger than six, children with special labels, lists of children who were looking for their parents … All known data: (Full Name, Date of birth, Place of residence, Municipality, Father's name, Mother's name and Note) was recorded on printed cards of size 12 × 9 cm.[90]

In April 1942, after the removal of Bresler from the post of Chief of the Ministry of Associations, she feared that they would search her apartment and seize the files and they decided to rewrite all the files. Mrs. Đakula did it. "We bought large notebooks in which we could insert pages, so that it could be rewritten by a machine." When the first notebook was done, "Dr. Vidaković took it to the Archbishop. The Archbishop locked the notebook in the vault in front of Dr. Vidaković."[91]

In a letter of the Central Committee of the Croatian Red Cross addressed to the Embassy of the International Committee of the Red Cross for the ISC in Zagreb on the actions taken regarding the search of children affected by war, from 1 December 1943, in which the

arrangements and institutions that could provide information about the children were specified. The instruction in the letter was that if the child could not be found in Red Cross files and database of the General Directorate for Associations and Social Welfare, Department of Family and Home Care, then one should turn to "the following institutions that take care about the war affected children and have also files on them, and these are the Caritas, the Institute for Deaf and Mute Children and Mrs. Diana Budisavljević",[92] During the war the "Action" co-workers responded to 3000–4000 inquiries from Germany, and it was the Red Cross in Zagreb that asked Diana and her "Action" to provide information on 1500 children approximately.[93]

In May 1945, Zagreb was liberated. Most of the Ustaša and the representatives of the Ustaša authorities left Zagreb retreating towards Slovenia and the Austrian border. Partisans took control of the city.

In the Ministry of Associations at the time the Ministry of Social Affairs of the National Croatian government, instead of Kamilo Bresler, Tatjana Marinić was appointed the head of the section for protection and welfare. She was a prewar Communist activist and a participant in the People's Liberation War.[94] Diana's "Action" saved the children of her boss, Jurica Draušnik, the Minister of Social Policy from the Stara Gradiška camp.[95]

On May 28, 1945, Tatjana Marinić signed a document addressed to Diana Budisavljević in which she wrote "that since she had the files and other records on the movement of partisan children, brought from various camps and deployed by institutions and private families, there was no purpose to keep these in private hands." Therefore she "was asked to hand it over immediately to the Representative of this Ministry, which would ensure that they were delivered and stored at the Ministry, and she would get a confirmation on the documents that had been taken over." "The whole File was taken over (a cabinet with 25 drawers), 5 books containing searches of unknown children, 1 registry of photographs of children, 1 notebook-register of children with labels."[96] "And now there was a big pain, mine and Mrs. Džakula's, that all our work on our files was taken away so suddenly and that it was made impossible for us to accomplish our mission." (to return children to their mothers, author's note) "All the time I had to control myself to the maximum, in order not to droop. It was terribly difficult for me that my long-lasting work was taken away just like that. Not so much because of the handing over of the files—we were always aware of the fact that it would be delivered to the Red Cross or some other organization—but because of the inability of many parents to

be reunited with their children."[97]A few days earlier, albums with photos of children were taken away from her as well, and "copies of files that were stored with the archbishop" were also taken away from Mrs. Đakula.[98]

No one knows the answer to the question about where Diana's "Files" are now and whether they are preserved or not. According to Ogrizović, "When the Ustaša fled from Zagreb, a few days before the liberation, they remembered the database on Kozara children. They burned it convinced that they would cover every trace of these children and make it impossible to detect whose children they were. But they failed. What the Ustaša did not know was that Dr. Budisavljević made double files. She had hidden the duplicates and when Zagreb was liberated she brought them to Tatjana Marinić, who was the head of the child care then, where professor Brössler also worked."[99] Ogrizović obviously mixed "the files" (the filing cards) with her transcript in the notebook. After all, 25 drawers with 12,000 filing cards could not be personally brought to Tatjana Marinić.

"The Kaptol Caritas began compiling a list of the children. One member of the "illegal" committee (especially Diana Budisavljević) transcribed the list in two books, bound in leather. On the eve of the liberation, Dr. Vidaković handed over the books to the head of Kaptol for safekeeping and, after the liberation, these books, untouched, were given to the national authorities." Nikola Nikolić writes again incorrectly, and in the note 2 he adds: "These books are probably in the archives of the Military Museum in Belgrade."[100]

The books, which were not bound in leather, Dr. Vidaković took over from the Secretariat of the Archdiocese and upon the "written request" gave them to Diana. But these "volumes contain only a small fraction of files, because the copying of files at the Institute for Deaf-Mutes, and Caritas, etc. came only later."[101]

Dragoje Lukić saw the "Files" of Diana Budisavljević personally (cards in format 9×13 cm), with 8016 cards of children "that (in 1976) were kept in the Republic Secretariat for Public Health and Social Welfare of Croatia."[102]

In 1987, the "Files" which were located at the Council for Public Health and Social Policy SRH (formerly the Ministry of Social Welfare), were taken over by the Croatian State Archives in Zagreb, but analysis showed that these were not Diana's "Files" (different cards, several types of handwriting, the cards had the names of children placed in homes after the war).

What we can be certain of is that the "Files" of the "Action of Diana Budisavljević" were last seen in the Ministry of Social Policy, and some new people were working there who did not know a thing about the fate of those children. "At the meeting on July 26, we have already found out that the files were wrong, which was inevitable after having incompetent people handling them."[103]

Zagreb, May 1945

The Yugoslav Army troops entered Zagreb during the early morning of 8 May 1945, with little sign of struggle.

Around 1 p.m. the Zagreb radio station released a statement that the city was liberated.

The German army troops and the Croatian Armed Forces (HOS) began their withdrawal on 6 May, and continued on 7 May 1945. Military convoys were joined by the masses of civilian refugees: the Ustasha officials' and the Croatian Armed Forces soldiers' family members, citizens, and residents of surrounding villages who, for various reasons, did not want to wait for partisan troops. On 6 May, Poglavnik Ante Pavelić with the members of the Government also left the city. The city was spared of material destruction and major casualties when the military troops departed.

In May and June 1945, city administration affairs were temporarily taken over by the Command of the City of Zagreb (as a background military institution) with Colonel Većeslav Holjevac. The command was supposed to establish the normalization of life in the city, and to keep peace and order. It was quickly able to provide the conditions for normal living for most of the people with the help of socio-political organizations created during the war. All this was also favored by the fact that the activity of most of the public services was not interrupted in any way (electricity and water supply, gas supply, telephone communications, public transport). The Anti-fascist Council of National Liberation of Croatia (ZAVNOH) as the supreme body of the new Partisan government, formed in May 1943 in Otočac, and the National Government of Croatia, proclaimed a liberated split on 14 April 1945, moved to Zagreb on 20 May. That is how Zagreb became the capital of the Federal State of Croatia, which was formed during the war. A temporary City National Committee as the new revolutionary, Communist authority began with its work on 27 May 1945.

At the end of 1944, and particularly during the first few months after the war ended, the Communist revolution was put into practice by KPJ (the Communist Party of Yugoslavia) and KPH (the Communist Party of Croatia) with victorious and vengeful enthusiasm. The revolution included the systematic intention of removing all military, political, and class enemies, getting even with actual and potential ideological and political enemies, war criminals, and all "public enemies" in an intransigent and brutal way. Executions were carried out on the basis of a court sentence or without it, done summarily, all this "in the name of the people", confiscation of property along with the loss of all civil rights, evictions from apartments, prison camps for war prisoners and ideological opponents, and various other forms of repression became a part of everyday life to the residents of Zagreb during the first days after the city was liberated.

On 24 May 1944, the Chief Commander of NOV (the National Liberation Army) and POJ (Liberation Movement in Yugoslavia), the Marshal of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, issued the "Decree on military courts and the organization and jurisdiction of military courts". Among other things, it defined the difference between "war criminals" and a "public enemy". According to this ecree, " initiators, organizers, those who give orders, those assisting and the direct perpetrators of mass killings, torture, forced evictions, taking the population to forced labor camps, then arson, destruction, and looting of public and state property; every individual who is in possession of a property and an enterprise in Yugoslavia, occupying or other countries exploiting the workforce of people taken away to forced labor; officials belonging to the terrorist apparatus and terrorist armed formations of the occupiers and local officials at the service of the occupiers; those who exercised mobilization of our people to the army of the enemy are to be considered war criminals, whether they are citizens of Yugoslavia, of occupying or any other countries."

"Public enemies" included: "all active Ustašas, Chetniks and members of other armed formations serving the enemy …" " in all forms—as spies, messengers, couriers, agitators and similar;" as well as all those who "betrayed the national cause and were conspiring with the occupiers; all those who have rebelled against public authorities and are working against it; all those who are destroying the national army or were otherwise helping and still are helping the occupiers; all those who commit serious cases of murder, robbery and alike."[104] Since this decree was related to military courts, it was to be applicable to military personnel only, but nevertheless, it applied to civilians as well. Lots of individuals

were put in social isolation because of a real or a fictitious collaboration with " public enemies", whereas the very notion of cooperation was interpreted in a very broad and diverse sense.

According to *the Report of the 4th section of OZNA (Odjel za zaštitu naroda—Department for the Protection of the People) for the territory of Zagreb to the 4th section of OZNA for Croatia* on 12 April 1945, in Zagreb, data for 8141 criminals were collected, while in the "military records" there were 6441 such individuals.[105] Verdicts against those who stayed in Zagreb and collaborated with the ISC government, brought by the military court under the City command and the military court of the Army II, were published in May 1945, in the Zagreb newspapers on a daily basis. The highest ISC government representatives, who were extradited to Yugoslavia by the British government, were brought to trial in June 1945 in Zagreb. They were brought before the military court of II Army territory that sentenced seven ministers to death while the others were sentenced to long-term imprisonment, were deprived of their civil rights, and had their property confiscated.

The representatives of religious groups were inculpated for "war crimes" as well. Philipp Popp, the Bishop of the German Evangelical Church in ISC, whom Diana mentioned in her *Diary* as well, was accused of criminal offenses like "serving the occupier" and "plunder of public property", and was brought to trial and sentenced to " execution by a firing squad, to permanent loss of civil rights and property confiscation". The sentence was carried out regardless of numerous people intervening on his behalf.[106]

Except Popp, the Military court of the Zagreb City Command sentenced Ismet Muftić, the Zagreb Mufti. and Gregorije Ivanovič Maksimov—Germogen, the Metropolitan Bishop of the Croatian Orthodox Church, to death.

Getting even with the representatives of the Catholic Church and the clergy was particularly brutal. The Catholic Church was considered to be the strongest ideological enemy. Attacking the church seemed justified due to its collaboration with the Ustaša regime, anti-communism, and its dependence on the Vatican.[107] The Zagreb Archbishop, Alojzije Stepinac, was sentenced at a staged trial to " imprisonment with forced labor for a term of 16 years and he lost his political and civil rights for a term of five years."[108]

Dr. Antun Najžer, who was the manager of the Children's Reception center in Sisak, was sentenced on 8 September 1946 by the Supreme Court in Zagreb to execution by a firing squad because of the crimes he had committed in the center.[109]

The situation was especially difficult for the members of the German national minority, Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans), who according to the decision made by the Presidency of AVNOJ (the Anti-fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia) as of 21 November 1944, were declared collectively guilty.[110] "It was a period of time when each German, who was a citizen of Yugoslavia, was a suspect and a war criminal unless proven othewise."[111] At the beginning of 1945, according to the Report of the Third Reich's Embassy in Zagreb, 110,000 members of the German national group were evacuated from ISC because there was a risk of retaliation. Many of them left their homes by themselves by the time the war ended and fled to countries close by, and many of them were evicted from their homes. They were all forbidden to return to the country, while the majority of those who stayed ended up in prison camps (men as well as women and children).[112] "Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans), i.e. Germans and Austrians in Yugoslavia and Croatia had only two options: move out as soon as possible or to assimilate. The majority chose the first option and every next census in Yugoslavia and Croatia showed that there were less and less of them."[113]

Conclusion and Other Questions

How did Diana Budisavljević fit in into that sort of socio-political climate? From the perspective of the authorities at the time, she was "a bourgeois" from a high civil society, an Austrian, a co-worker and "a friend" with the enemy that occupied the country, and she didn't refrain from cooperation with the Zagreb Archdiocese "Caritas" and the Archbishop Stepinac himself who she visited very often as some other German officials did as well. At the same time, she was not a member of the Anti-fascist Women's Front nor any other illegal NOP (National Liberation Movement) organizations in Zagreb. The new government was suspicious of her in every way. Yet they didn't arrest her as they did with her co-worker Dr. Marko Vidaković, nor did they question her, nor was she summoned to give a statement to the Land Commission for Determination of Crimes committed by the Occupiers and Their Supporters, regarding her work on taking over the children and caring for them as many of her co-workers were.

On 9 May 1945 a personal vehicle was taken away from the family Budisavljević. On 25 May, in the early morning hours, on the same day when their phone line was disconnected, "two men who were sent by Ministry of Social policy (but actually sent by OZNA)" came to her

apartment and demanded her to hand over the albums with the photos of the children."[114] Kamilo Bresler was relieved of duty by a CEO in the Ministry of Social Policy of the People's Republic of Croatia (new government, new people, new name of the ministry), and he sent her a letter on the very same day, warning her that "her file is probably to be destroyed." On 26 May, she was unsuccessfully waiting to meet a new chief of the Protection and Care Department in the Ministry of Social Policy, Tatjana Marinić, who took Bresler's place. Due to a warrant signed by her, she handed over the File on 28 May. The albums and the file were last seen at the Ministry of Social Policy where Tatjana was a chief. Many years later the albums were found. They were thrown away from the attic of the School for Social Work where Tatjana used to work as well. Who was that woman? Unlike Diana, a certain school and a kindergarten were named after her as well as a prestigious prize for social workers.

Tatjana Marinić, her real name Josipa, became a member of the Social-Democratic Labour Party of Yugoslavia (Communists) in 1919. Due to her political involvement she was arrested several times and tortured by the police in the era of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and ISC as well. A Croatian poet and her great love, Antun Branko Šimić (who gave her the name Tatjana), died in 1925. Her husband, Đuka Cvijić, one of the founders of KPJ (Communist Party of Yugoslavia) disappeared during the period of the Stalin purges in the USSR in 1938. Both of these losses have left deep marks on her. Immediately after ISC was established, she was arrested again. After she was released from prison in May 1941, she went to the village Rude close to Zagreb where she was educating kindergarten teachers. Upon Bresler's invitation, she came to Jastrebarsko and Donja Reka with her students and she did everything that was in her power to help the children. After being arrested and interrogated by the police again, in the summer of 1943, she joined the Partisans and the majority of her students did the same. She was working very successfully on the organization of children's homes for war-affected children in the areas of Banija, Lika, and Kordun, which were free of occupiers.

On 15 October 1944, she filed charges against the director of the Chidren's Home in Jastrebarsko, a nun, Pulherija Barta, and a manager of estate, also a nun, Gaudencija. These charges were filed at the Land Commission for the Determination of Crimes Committed by the Occupiers and Their Supporters. She accused them of murder and abuse and of taking the life of an unidentified number of partisan and Serbian children.[115] Pulherija Barta, a nun and a relative of Mile Budak, the Ustaša

Minister of Religion and Education, was the only nun who fled from Croatia to Austria before the war ended. But, nevertheless, a request for her extradition was never set nor was she declared a war criminal. The nun Gaudencija stayed in the Children's Home even after the war finished and, after some time, she went to Ljubljana. Nor was she ever declared a war criminal. Tatjana Marinić, the chief prosecutor of nuns (she was a clerk for Social Protection and Care at the Department of Social Policy of ZAVNOH (the Land Anti-fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia, at the time) gave a statement on 15–16 November 1944. It was given to the Land Commission for the Determination of Crimes Committed by the Occupiers and Their Supporters and this became the basis for the generally accepted extremely negative view of the role of nuns in rescuing children.[116]

In 1955, she was one of the editors of the book *Žene Hrvatske u NOB-i (Croatian Women in NOB-the People's Liberation Struggle)*. She worked on the part of the book that dealt with "fascist atrocities against children in the infamous ISC"… "nuns monsters in children's camps, about thousands and thousands of children who had been killed". All "this required knowledge of the situation and careful documents and data selection" because "from the first days of the occupation she organized the rescue of children from fascist claws, and continued to work on the childcare in the liberated territory."[117] Diana Budisavljević is mentioned in this part of the book only as one of the "women comrades" who were actively involved in children rescue while Tatjana is described as someone who after leaving Jaska "was working on the colonization of children and was organizing the rescue of children in all camps."[118] (sic!)

The book *Children of Croatia and the People's Liberation Struggle* was printed in the same year when the book *Žene Hrvatske u NOB-i (Croatian Women in NOBthe People's Liberation Struggle)* came out (in 1955). The book contains an excerpt from the book by Tatjana Marinić printed in English on the occasion of the World Congress on Child Protection, which took place in Zagreb in 1954. Among others, it says: "for the purpose of "taking care" of the Partisan children, concentration camps for children were organized. Within a month 10,000 children, of the age from a few days up to 14 years, were moved from mixed camps to new camps at such places and with such conditions that they were facing certain death". The social services—a society of the Quisling government—were involved in certain processes of this removal of children, then the Red Cross also as a camouflage in front of their mothers and the general public. "As far as the

Fascists were concerned, the aim of this removal of children, as the results showed, was clear—it was easier to kill children if they were separated from their mothers".[119]

Tatjana Marinić was also against publishing the book of Dr. Nikola Nikolić *Kozaračka djeca, Jasenovački logor (The Kozara children—The Jasenovac camp)*, so it was published in Ljubljana first (in 1975) and in Zagreb only in 1979. The reason for this was allegedly because Nikolić was writing "about the positive role of nuns, of the Caritas and some Catholic priests in the rescue of the children from Kozara".[120]

This is how Professor Božidar Skeleđija, a principal of the School for Social Work, which was founded in 1952, from 1972 to 1974 and its dean from 1980 to 1983, describes Tatjana Marinić and Kamilo Bresler after they got back together as lecturers on the same subject (social work methods) in the same school: "The teachers Tatjana Marinić and Kamilo Bresler were very different in regard to their life experience, their orientation and values. Tatjana Marinić was committed to the Marxist concept and membership in the Communist Party from her adolescence to death. Very consistent, irreconcilable, without compromise she defended their beliefs. Very consistent in her private life, very chaste, hardworking, educated and very modest, did not accept any benefits, privileges, not for herself nor for others.… Even those who disagreed with her political beliefs respected her as a person. Kamilo Bresler, a teacher had completely different life beliefs and was of different behavior. Equally well-read, very hardworking, committed, and very honest and humble, old-school liberal who set an example with everything he did, not only in the field of social work and the first study of social work but with his overall attitude to life—an example that hardly can be repeated. We owe him much."[121]

Tatiana could not stand the bourgeois. Ksenija Bralić-Švarcer, a social worker, said: "I was labeled that I was a bourgeois child." "… as for some personal remarks made by T. Marinić, they did not demotivate me to study, even though I felt uneasy. For example, when we had to do the practice in the municipalities of Zagreb, I was sent to Zaprešić. Zaprešić was far away, and I had to take the train… She quickly changed the mood and rhetoric with no particular reason. Post-traumatic reactions considering her life and work."[122]

As an Orthodox Communist, she despised the Church and everything connected to it, she despised the bourgeoisie as a relic of the time against which she struggled all her life. She was in a position to make important decisions, but whether she was ready (and able) to destroy the documents

taken over from Diana that were so important in returning children to their parents and their identification, is yet to be found out.

The Republic of Croatia in a new Yugoslavia was blamed for the collapse of the old state, it was labeled as being a collaborator with the occupying forces and with the Ustaša regime and by a guilt complex because of the crimes committed against fellow countrymen. All the time it had to prove its "genuine faith" in the name of the proclaimed brotherhood and unity. It was necessary to forget about the civil war victims as soon as possible, especially a large number of children injured or killed. Their suffering and trauma were used in articles about crimes of a defeated party, mainly for propaganda purposes.

The action of children rescue was, however, too important to be completely forgotten. Only its leaders and organizers, as well as the participants, became solely members of KP (the Communist Party), AFŽ (Anti-fascist Women's Front), and illegal members of NOP (National Liberation Movement). All the things that didn't go in favor with this picture were to be kept secret and hidden.

But as Antoine de Rivarol says: "Being smart means to distinguish the truth that has to be told from the one that should be withheld."

Notes

1. *Dnevnik Diane Budisavljević* (Zagreb: Hrvatski državni arhiv i Javna ustanova Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 2004). Prof. Silvia Szabo, the granddaughter of Diana Budisavljević translated the text of the diary from the Austrian version of German and prepared it for printing. Diana began to work on the text of the *Dnevnik* (or the *Diary*) that she called "*Report on Work of the Action of Diana Budisavljević*" ("*Izvještaj o radu Akcije Diana Budisavljević*") in May1945, during the war, based on almost daily guided stenographic notes. Unfortunately, in the introductory part of the book that is not highlighted, so the assessment of some events that are clearly written later on, after the date mentioned in them, is a bit confusing. Some of these parts talk about family life, and disagreements with some of the participants of the action were omitted from the *Diary.* Due to a lack of funds, the printing of the entire German text did not go ahead, and the book is just a short presentation of the most important parts of the "Action" in German. The statement of Dragoje Lukić in the book *Bili su samo deca, Jasenovac grobnica 19.432 devojčica i dečaka, book 1–2*, (Beograd: Muzej žrtava genocida, 2000), on page 99 (note74) is wrong when it states: "The Diary of Diana Budisavljević in German, 388 diary entries on

163 densely typed pages translated by professor Silvia Szabo, Diana's granddaughter, was prepared for the press in the National Park Kozara in Prijedor and Jasenovac Memorial Site but it has not been published due to the war activities in 1992" is incorrect. Milan Koljanin has the same argument in his article "Akcija Diane Budisavljevic" in *Tokovi istorije*, no. 3 (2007), p. 191. The truth is that Dragoje Lukić got the text of the *Diary* from Ana Požar, the former director of the Jasenovac Memorial Site, and it is completely unauthorized, Silvija Szabo gave no permission and was never even consulted on the matter of the diary being published in 1992.

2. Dr. Julije Budisavljević (Požega, 1882–Innsbruck, 1981), a physician and university professor, studied medicine in Innsbruck, and from 1919 was a professor of surgery at the Medical Faculty in Zagreb and became the first head of the Department of Surgery. In 1936 he became a dean of the School of Medicine. In the period of the Independent State of Croatia (ISC) he was retired, and was re-activated after the war (until 1952). In 1972, together with Diana, he moved to Innsbruck. According to the recollections of Silvija Szabo, he was fully dedicated to work and medicine. Even during the war, after 1944, when he was retired, he was running his practice from his apartment on the Svačić Square in Zagreb. In the court proceedings against Alojzije Stepinac, he was one of 35 witnesses proposed by defense attorneys, "but the court had let in only seven. In the lobby university professors of Orthodox religion, Dr. Julije Budisavljević, Dragišić … were waiting for hours and hours" Aleksa Benigar, *Alojzije Stepinac—Croatian cardinal* (Zagreb: Glas Koncila, 1993), p. 544.
3. Journalist Nataša Koprivnjak in her presentation of the *Diary* in the biweekly *Zarez*, no.128, 22 April 2004 writes: "It is a book that reveals the unknown to the general public about saving thousands of children from Ustaša camps and collection centers organized by a woman whose name was not recorded in any history textbook nor in a street that was named after her, who was not given any public recognition." Serbian writer Svetlana Velmar Janković stated: "… the activity of Mrs. Diana Budisavljević and her co-workers to assist women in the camps in front of the whole of Zagreb and Ustaša authorities during the years1941 and 1942 are among those paradoxes, or better to say wonders why human behavior, as well as life itself, remain the biggest secret", *Lagum*, (Beograd: Stubovi kulture, 2006), p. 155. Doctor of psychology Marina Ajduković comments: "The writing style is more focused on the facts and description of events and less on personal perspective and reflection. It is precisely this style that contributes to the powerful message of this book about the suffering of people in war and selfless social activists who, at the cost of their personal health and safety, persisted in their work. "Djelovanje

Diane Budisavljević: Rad s djecom stradalom u 2. svjetskom ratu", in *Ljetopis socijalnog rada,* vol. 13, no. 1, (2006), pp. 101–114.

Milan Koljanin, a Serbian historian, stated: "The publishing of the Diary of Diana Budisavljević is extremely valuable for those who explore issues of suffering in ISC, especially Serbs and Serbian children in the camps, and for the general public as well. Thanks to this diary we learned many new facts about one of the largest humanitarian actions on the territory of Yugoslavia during World War II, and one of the largest actions of this kind Europe-wide." "Akcija Diana Budisavljević" in *Tokovi istorije*, no. 3 (2007), p. 191.

4. *Dnevnik Diane Budisavljević* (Zagreb: Hrvatski državni arhiv i Javna ustanova Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 2004), pp. 14–15.
5. Ibid., p. 15.
6. The Lobor grad camp was close to Zlatar, and it was located in the castle of the Keglević family where, before the war, there was a nursing home. The camp commander was Karl Heger, a watchmaker from Zagreb, who was a member of the German national group (Volksdeutsche). The first female detainees and their children were transported to this camp on 5–6 October 1941, from the Kruščica camp near Travnik. The majority of these women were Jewish, then about 370 Serbian women from Bihać, Sarajevo, Mostar, and Stolac. Although the camp had a capacity of 800 people, there were 1700 women with children living in terrible conditions. Due to non-hygienic living conditions and spotted typhus and other infectious diseases, hunger and physical exhaustion, according to published data, around 200 women and children died. The camp was closed in August 1942, when all Jewish women and children were transported to Auschwitz where they all died. A group of Orthodox women was sent to forced labor to Germany, the other group was transported to Belgrade, and only a small number were released. The Jewish religious community in Zagreb had to fully support the camps in Lobor grad and Đakovo, and help the detainees in the camp at Jasenovac.
7. *Dnevnik Diane Budisavljević* (Zagreb: Hrvatski državni arhiv i Javna ustanova Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 2004), p. 17.
8. Dr. Savo Besarović, a prominent lawyer from Sarajevo, was appointed to the ISC government in October 1943 as a minister with no portfolio. He was a member of this government until it failed, and he was the only one from the government who, during the days of the government failing, decided to stay in the country no matter what.
9. *Dnevnik Diane Budisavljević* (Zagreb: Hrvatski državni arhiv i Javna ustanova Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 2004), p. 28. Kamilo Bresler (Mrkonjić Grad, 17 July 1901—Zagreb, 1 November), a teacher of pedagogy and a social worker. (Many people misspell his name as Bressler

or Brössler. In all the documents, he always signed himself as Bresler). He finished pedagogy at the Faculty of Arts in Zagreb. Due to a heart condition he was not required to serve in the army. From 1928 to 1940 he worked as a teacher at the School of Public Health in Zagreb, where he became a significant author of scientific-educational and documentary films. During the period of the ISC he was head of the Department for Family and Children Welfare of the General Directorate for Associations and Social Welfare, which operated under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. As an experienced social worker who had already worked with many health care professionals, heads of nursing schools and educators, as well as placing orphans in foster families, he had the ability and power to organize transportation, accommodation, food and medicine and other things necessary for children's shelters and homes where children, taken out of the camps, were accommodated. Due to his cooperation with the "Action" and care for the Serbian Orthodox children, on 3 April 1943, the Poglavnik of the Independent State of Croatia, Ante Pavelić, in accordance with his provision brought on 26 March 1943, dismissed him from being a member of the Central Management Board of the Croatian Red Cross, and a few days later, on 5 April 1942, he was also relieved of duty as a head of the Department for Family and Children Welfare. After that he was transferred to work at the International Red Cross. He continued to work with Diana until the end of the war. His writings and statements to the Land Commission for the Determination of the Crimes Committed by the Occupiers and their Supporters were an invaluable source for all researchers dealing with the topic of the suffering of children during World War II. In February 1947, he wrote a touching testimony, "Rescuing the Kozara children 1942", which was first published by Ćiril Petešić in his book *Dječji dom u Jastrebarskom. Dokumenti (1939.1947)* (Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašnjost, 1990), pp. 108–129. One copy of the text Bresler, with sincere and deep respect, dedicated to Lady Diana Budisavljević, who was the initiator of the salvation of Kozara children in warm memories of rainy days in 1942. He described the meeting with Diana (who he refered to as "Mrs. D.") in the following words: "One day a lady enters my office. She introduces herself and I reckon she must be a wife of one of our prominent scientists. She asks me if I have any detailed information about hundreds and thousands and even more children in the camps from Stara Gradiška to Jasenovac who are doomed to die unless something is done in order to save them… Thousand thoughts running through my head: In the entire ISC there are barely 4000 already occupied beds for children, and here we are talking about thousands of new children…I wish there was only a roof over their heads…and the staff! Sick children… how many people are

needed?…and the transportation and the escort? Where do we get the supplies, dishes, food? I need a month's time to make preparations—but at that point there will no longer be any children. The big, dark and reasonable eyes of the lady are silently examining my face—asking, begging and requesting." Ćiril Petešić, *Dječji dom u Jastrebarskom Dokumenti (1939.1947)* (Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašnjost, 1990), pp. 108–129. The original document, owned by Silvija Szabo.

10. The orginal document owned by Silvija Szabo.
11. *Dnevnik Diane Budisavljević* (Zagreb: Hrvatski državni arhiv i Javna ustanova Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 2004), p. 15.
12. I bid., p. 31.
13. Ibid., p. 43. The camp Gornja Rijeka, close to Križevci, was founded in November 1941. The first detainees were elderly Jewish women and Serbian Orthodox women with children, who were transported from the close-by Lobor grad. There were about 200–400 women detainees in the camp. At the end of May 1942, the women's camp was closed down, and starting from June 1942, the "Children's home for refugee children" was located there. The camp Đakovo was organized in December 1941, in the facilities of the former mill called "Cereale". The first detainees were Jewish women (1870) and around 50 Orthodox women. By the time their numbers increased to 3000, mostly because of the poor hygienic conditions, a scrub typhus epidemic spread in the camp and it was brought by the infected women detainees transported from Stara Gradiška. Apparently due to the typhus epidemic, the camp was closed down, and the women detainees were transferred to the camp Jasenovac, where they were all probably killed.
14. Ibid., p. 35. Dragica Habazin, a volunteer nurse from the Red Cross. In her statement to the Land Commission for the Determination of the Crimes Committed by the Occupiers and their Supporters immediately after the war, she calls Diana "Mrs.", a title not commonly used in the postwar period among "comrades". Jana Koch describes Dragica Habazin in these words: "Most of the credit for all these connections" (with train drivers, conductors, station police, author's note) "deserves the nurse Dragica Habazin, who was in charge of these stations. She was tireless, dedicated and truly brave. She was known as "Mother". She really deserved that name." Jana Koch, "Many of our children were saved" in *Zbornik sjećanja 1941–1945* (Zagreb: Gradska konferencija SSRNH, Institut za historiju radničkog pokreta, Školska knjiga, 1984), p. 278. There is not a single word about Dragica Habazin in the Croatian Encyclopedia either.
15. *Dnevnik Diane Budisavljević* (Zagreb: Hrvatski državni arhiv i Javna ustanova Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 2004), Annex no. 28, pp. 200–201.

16. Ibid., p. 58.
17. *Otpor u žicama, sećanja zatočenika*, Knjiga I (Beograd: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1969), p. 529.
18. According to the list of names of the victims in concentration camps at Jasenovac and Stara Gradiška 19 911 children under the age of 14 were killed. See: http://www.jusp-jasenovac.hr
19. *Battle on Kozara, Kozara epopee, Third enemy offensive, Operation West Bosnia* (19 June–15 July 1942), in order to destroy the partisan forces completely (4000 Partisans of the First and the Second Military Border National Liberation Partisan Unit and the First Military Border Brigade of the National Liberation Army–NOV–of Yugoslavia) in the area of west Bosnia where they controlled cities such as Bosanski Petrovac, Drvar, Glamoč, and Prijedor, and where, due to the commando actions, they endangered the safety of the main communication towards the Eastern Balkans and the nearby iron mine Ljubija, Paul Bader, a military commander in Serbia gave the order to organize combat groups in «West Bosnia» and a military action in order to completely destroy the Partisan forces in the wider area of Kozara. Eleven thousand soldiers of Wermacht took part in this action, and around 18,000 members of the Ustaša-defence forces and 20,000 Chetniks of Draža Mihailović. The concentrated attack began on June 1, 1942, from all garrisons in order to surround the whole area and to form barriers that the Partisan forces could not break through if they wanted to withdraw. On 3 July 1942, after an extensive fight, the members of the Second Military Border Unit succeeded in breaking the military circle in the southwest part of Kozara Mountain, taking with them some civilians, while the majority remained in the circle, and all efforts to help them proved unsuccessful. At dawn, the circle was closed again. In the next two weeks "cleansing" took place in Kozara and the adjacent area from the remaining Partisan forces and civilians depriving them of the base and giving them no possibility to survive. The way they treated the civilians was especially brutal. Some of them were killed on the spot, and the great majority were transported to reception and detention camps. According to the estimates of ISC Health Services in Bosanska Dubica (railway station at Cerovljani) there were 26,000, in Jasenovac 8400, in Mlaka 7000, on Jablanac 4000, in Prijedor 14,000, in Stara Gradiška 1 300 and Novska 7 300 people, mostly old men and women with children. Dragoje Lukić, Zločini okupatora i njegovih suradnika nad decom Kozarskog područja 1941–1945. godine, in *Kozara u NOB-i i socijalističkoj revoluciji* (Prijedor: Nacionalni park Kozara, 1980), pp. 269–289.
20. The concentration camp Jasenovac was founded near the place with the same name in August 1941, as a work camp and a camp for execution,

mainly of the Serbian Orthodox population, then Jews and Romanies' population due to race laws of discrimination against these populations. Many people who opposed the Ustaša regime, Communists and antifascists, were killed there. It was open until April 1945, when the last male detainees escaped. It was the biggest Ustaša camp both in land area and in the number of victims who had died there. This is why it became a symbol of the Ustaša regime. Until the summer of 1944, it was a camp for men only, while women who were to be transported to a camp at that time were executed or transported to the camp Stara Gradiška. By the end of 1941, the penitentiary in Stara Gradiška, near Jasenovac, was used by the Ustaša authorities as a penitentiary and as a concentration camp. The first groups of detainees, mainly Serbs and Jews, were brought in May 1941 from Slavonski Brod and Bosanska Gradiška and Nova Gradiška. *By the Law on the Suppression of the Penitentiary and the Institute for Hard Labour in Stara Gradiška*, as of 19 February 1942, the former penitentiary was converted into a multi-purpose concentration camp. The main difference, when compared to the camp in Jasenovac, was that in this camp, there were many anti-fascists, Communists and party members, members and co-workers of the National Liberation Movement from all parts of Croatia and Bosnia, and Herzegovina, women (Croatian women, Jewish women. and Serbian women), and from June, 1942, children as well, mostly of Serbian nationality. The camp ceased to exist in April 1945. See Nataša Mataušić, *Jasenovac 1941–1945. Logor smrti i radni logor* (Zagreb: Spomen područje Jasenovac, 2003).

21. According to the report of Mihajlo Komunicki, an employee of the Ministry of Associations (social care), on 25 July 1942, in the Ustaša collection camps Mlaka, Jablanac, Novska, Prijedor, and Uštica, there were 23,858 women with children, with a note, "that this overview is not half so correct." Hrvatski državni arhiv (HAD), AFŽ-log.-23/32.
22. *Dnevnik Diane Budisavljević* (Zagreb: Hrvatski državni arhiv i Javna ustanova Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 2004), p. 72.
23. Ibid., p. 74.
24. Diana calls this camp the "Temporary women's camp". She came across it while going through the camp Jasenovac (Camp III), and she was given an approval by Jozo Matijević, who was the camp commander. Vehicles between Jasenovac and villages Mlaka i Jablanac (where camp farms were located) used the road by the river Sava, which passed through Camp III. To pass through the camp, it was necessary to have a special permit given by the camp commander (see Annex 36 of the *Diary*, p. 208). When leaving the camp, the first visible village was Košutarica, after that, Mlaka, then Jablanac (all three by the Sava River). That it was not Mlaka in question, confirms the description that says that a vehicle and people

she came with to the camp "were in a great hurry to get back to Mlaka" because "the commander promised them that they could go back to their village" (Ibid., p. 90). She writes that she went to Mlaka three times. The fact that it was the village Košutarica is confirmed in the Annex 39 of the *Diary:* "Transportation of children who arrived to Sisak on August 6, 1942, from the camps in Mlaka and Kostarica…"(Košutarica, author's note, Ibid., p. 211).

25. Anti-fascist Women's Front (AWF), a political organization of women within the anti-fascist movement, established on 6 December 1942, in Bosanski Petrovac, in order to organize and conscript women in helping the units of the National Liberation army and the new Partisan authorities, but also to participate in commando attacks. The committees of the AWF were also involved in collecting food and clothes for the fighters, taking care of children and the wounded fighters. After the war, they were focused on restoration and the reconstruction of the country, and the improvement of women's position in society. From 1953, it became a conference for women's social activities.
26. "Except for the members of my family, main co-workers in this work were Đuro Vukosavljević, the architect Dr. Marko Vidaković, the engineer Vasilić, the teacher Stana Radosavljević, Ljuba Becić, Vera Černe, the nurse Dragica Habazin, the medical student Verenka Kogoj, Mirjana Lacković, Dr. Branko Kesić, the representative of the illegal Slovenian Red Cross Colner, the lieutenant-colonel Nikola Gajić, Olga Pokrajac, Dr. Desanka Ristović-Štampar, Dr. Janko Pajaš, who made it possible for me to visit Lobor grad…, then Gajo Omčikus who along with Dr. Mira Meleda and Anto Bojanić from autumn 1942 ran a parallel separate action. From January, 1944, Dr. Marko Vidaković did not cooperate with my action any more…" Diana Budisavljević: "Prikaz rada "Akcije Diane Budisavljević" during the occupation period from October, 1941, to June, 1945", p. 1.
27. Dr. Juraj Zrinščak from the city hospital was arrested and released, Jana Koch was arrested and abused by the police.
28. In Zagreb: The Institute for the Upbringing of Deaf and Mute Children, Institute of St. Jeronim, the so-called Jeronimus's Hall, the city hospital for infectious diseases under the jurisdiction of ISC, the home for mothers and children in Josipovac.
29. Tatjana (Josipa) Marinić (Slavonska Požega, 1897—Zagreb, 1966), a teacher, a social worker, and a member of the Workers Party of Yugoslavia (Communists) since 1919. In the period before World War II she worked on the tasks given by the Party, working with women and factory activists. During the period of the ISC she was a headmistress of the School for Educators in Rude. At the initiative of Kamilo Bresler, in the summer of

1942, together with her students, she went to Jastrebarsko and helped organize accommodation and care for children. In 1943, she joined the Partisans. From the beginning of 1944, she worked in the social political section of the National Anti-fascist Council of the National Liberation of Croatia (ZAVNOH) on providing care for partisan children in liberated areas, and organizing children's homes. Immediately after liberation, she became head of the Section for Protection and Care with the Ministry of Social Politics. From 1952, she taught social methodology at the professional school for social workers in Zagreb. *Žene Hrvatske u Narodno-oslobodilačkoj borbi,* (Zagreb: Glavni odbor ženskih društava Hrvatske, 1955), p. 474; Melita Richer-Malabotta, "Život i vrijeme Tatjane Marinić one of the founders of social work studies in Croatia" in *Ljetopis socijalnog rada*, vol. 13, no. 1 (2006), pp. 143–158.

30. State "Reception Centre for Children" in Sisak, started working on 3 August 1942, when the first children from Mlaka arrived. The children were accommodated at several different locations in the town. Other than children from the Ustaša camps, there were children taken from their mothers from the Ustaša-German collection camp that was situated in Sisak as well. Women were sent to hard labour in Germany, and their children were left "to be taken care of "by the Croatian state. At the end of September 1942, in the Reception Centerthere were 4720 children. Very poor health, hygiene, and accommodation conditions, and lack of care caused a high mortality rate for the children. The Centre closed in 1943.
31. *Dnevnik Diane Budisavljević* (Zagreb: Hrvatski državni arhiv i Javna ustanova Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 2004), p. 99.
32. That is how, according to a decision of the municipality administration in Sunja in the period from 5–15 September 1942, 50 children were returned to their mothers (HDA, AFŽ-log 23/22, 14 i 15). Constant care was provided for all colonized children. They received clothes, shoes, and necessary medications from their carers (HDA, ZKRZ, GUZ, kut. 7, no. 1338/45). Families who were in a poor financial state were getting 500 kuna of help per child monthly (HDA, AFŽ-log. 23/2).
33. *Žene Hrvatske u Narodno-oslobodilačkoj borbi* (Zagreb: Glavni odbor saveza ženskih društava Hrvatske, 1955), p. 377. Caritas of the Zagreb Archdiocese was founded by Archbishop Antun Bauer in 1931 as a charity organization with the aim of taking care of people, strengthening and spreading the spirit of good faith and love to loved ones. During World War II, the main supervisor of Caritas, whose manager was Stjepan Dumić, was the Zagreb Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac.
34. *Dnevnik Diane Budisavljević* (Zagreb: Hrvatski državni arhiv i Javna ustanova Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 2004), p. 99.

35. Ibid., p. 114.
36. Ibid., p. 117, 120–121.
37. Ibid., p. 159. When the war finished, Dr. Vidaković made a statement on the activities of the charity organization, which he called "Internal Yugoslavian front", and which allegedly was active "within the Zagreb Archdiocese Caritas and with the moral and financial support of the Archbishop Stepinac". Diana's reaction to this statement was sharp and she made "corrections" to all the incorrect parts of the statement, among others wrongfully claiming success regarding her "Action" (HDA, R.O., manuscript legacy) Budisavljević.
38. In Marina Ajduković's opinion, her work on organizing and keeping the files on children means that "in the full meaning of that word, she was a pioneer of all important aspects related to the Convention on children's rights when it comes to children in war, which was brought many years later." Marina Ajduković, "The Activities of Diana Budisavljević: Working with children who suffered in the Second World War," in *Ljetopis socijalnog rada,* vol. 13, no. 1 (2006), pp. 101–114.
39. *Dnevnik Diane Budisavljević* (Zagreb: Hrvatski državni arhiv i Javna ustanova Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 2004), p. 71.
40. "Prikaz rada "Akcije Dine Budisavljević" during the period of occupation from October 1941, to June 1945" concisely outlines the activities of the "Action" by describing its most important components. From "initiating the action of contribution for exiled Serbian families in concentration camps", through rescuing the Kozara children and work on the files (from autumn 1942 when "it was no longer possible to pull the children out of the camps") to sending food, clothes, and medicine to the camps, children's homes, even through secret channels to Kordun. In the annex to the Report there is a list of all purchased items and financial contributions spent on these, and the list of things sent to Lobor grad and Gornja Rijeka. The transcript of the document is with Silvija Szabo, p. 2.
41. Ibid.
42. Solving "the question of Jews" from April 1941 to August 1942, was left to the ISC authorities to deal with. Out of 39,000 Jews living in the area of ISC around 24,000 were killed in the Ustaša camps and places of execution. SS troops with the help of Ustaša in the summer of 1942 and in the spring of 1943 transported about 7000 Jews to various Nazi camps, mostly to Auschwitz. Only 8000–9000 Jews survived out of all of them, mostly in the areas under Italian jurisdiction and where the Partisan units were located.
43. *Spomen knjiga prve obljetnice NDH* (Zagreb: 1942.), p. 84.
44. *The Decree-law banning the Cyrillic alphabet* (*Zakonska odredba o zabrani ćirilice*), dating from 25 April 1942, which prohibited the use of the Cyrillic alphabet "in public and private life" throughout the ICS. *The*

Decree-law on the transition from one religion to another (*Zakonska odredba o prelazu s jedne vjere na drugu*), dating from 3 May 1942, as a legal document in which all previous legislation on how to make transition from one religion to another was abolished. District and city authorities became responsible for the approval of transitions. This decree-law made the transition of the Orthodox Serbs to Catholicism a part of the official state policy, and was a direct interference of the state in the affairs under the authority of the Catholic Church. An *Order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the ISC* from 10 May 1941, stated that all Serbians and Serbs who moved to the ICS after 1 January 1900, should be dismissed from public services; on 7 June, the *Order on Obligatory Registration of Serbians* to municipal and city administrations was issued. It referred to those "Serbians" "who moved to the area of the Independent State of Croatia after 1 January 1900, as well as their descendants, "regardless of their social status". Those who do not answer the summons within ten days from the date of the Order's publication "will be considered prisoners of war, and will be taken to a prisoner's camp."

See: (*Zakoni i zakonske odredbe proglašene od 11. travnja do 26. svibnja 1941.*) Knjiga I (vols. 1–10), Tisak i naklada knjižare St. Kugli, Zagreb, (without marking the year), *Zakoni zakonske odredbe i naredbe proglašene od 27. svibnja do 30. lipnja 1941.* Knjiga II. (Svezak 11–20.) Tisak i naklada knjižare St. Kugli, Zagreb (without marking the year).

45. "We were running out of everything. Even soap: at the beginning of May, in the same year" (1945, author's note) "it was published: Soap for infants up to one year old 200 grams a month, children from one to two years old 100 grams for two months and is sold for coupons." Slava Ogrizović, *Zagreb se bori* (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1977), p. 17.
46. Spomen knjiga prve obljetnice Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (Zagreb: 1942), p. 231.
47. Ivo Goldstein, *Zagreb 1941–1945* (Zagreb: Novi Liber, 2011), p. 106. HDA, fond 223, MUP NDH, kut. 25.
48. *"Nova Hrvatska"*, No. 132 (9 June 1942).
49. Državni arhiv Zagreb (DAZ), fond 24. Gradska administracija Zagreb (1941–1945).
50. DAZ, Kotarska oblast Zagreb, sig. 4. At the beginning of August, these measures were more strict, and the curfew started at 9 p.m.
51. Nataša Mataušić, *Spomen park Dotršćina* at http://www.dotrscina.hr/
52. This former Austrian officer and general in Wermacht, until 1 November 1942, had the title of "a German general in Zagreb", and from then "authorized general in Zagreb". Davor Kovačić, *Redarstveno—obavještajni sustav Nezavisne Države Hrvatske od 1941. do 1945. godine* (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2009), p. 22.

53. Ibid., p. 23. The German Secret State Police was founded in April 1933, when Hitler came to power from a section of the political police in the Weimar Republic, with a task to fight against all opponents of the Nazi regime. He had no legal restrictions in his work. It was the Gestapo and SS (Schultz Staffel = Protection units or squads) that were running the concentration camps in the whole area of the Third Reich.
54. Ibid., p. 34. Head of OVRE, equivalent of the German Gestapo, he was a police envoy of the Embassy in Zagreb Ciro Verdiani, and in SIM the general Mario Roatta (part time).
55. *Spomen knjiga prve obljetnice NDH*, (Zagreb: 1942), p. 336.
56. Ibid.
57. Narodne novine No. 49, (1941).
58. *Dnevnik Diane Budisavljević* (Zagreb: Hrvatski državni arhiv i Javna ustanova Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 2004), p. 92.
59. Ibid. 32.
60. Eugen Dido Kvaternik, son of a miltary leader Slavko Kvaternik and Olga Kvaternik, (nee Frank) in Zagreb in 1910, was a close associate of Ante Pavelić. From May 1934, he was an aide in the administrative headquarters of the Ustaša movement in Italy. He was an organizer of the assassination of King Aleksandar I Karađorđević. In February 1937, he was appointed a camp commander in Lipari. He came to Zagreb on 15 April 1941, when he was appointed a commissioner for public order and safety, and on 18 April of the same year he became a chief of the Headquarters for Public Order and Safety in ISC. After establishing the Ustaša Surveillance Agency on 23 August 1941, he was appointed the Ustaša surveillance commander. In a very short period of time he organized the police force, which terrorized people in IS, which became a symbol of the Ustaša terror. He was working on cooperation with Chetniks against Partisans (Communists) who, in his opinion, were the greatest enemy of the Croatian country. He was dismissed of all his duties in October 1942. At the end of February 1943, he left with his family to Slovakia, then to Austria and Italy, and in June 1947, he moved to Argentina and stayed there permanently. He died in a car accident in March 1962. *Tko je tko u NDH* (Zagreb: Minerva, 1997), pp. 223–225.
61. Davor Kovačić, *Redarstveno-obavještajni sustav u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj od 1941. do 1945. godine* (Zagreb:Hrvatski institute za povijest, 2009), p. 73.
62. Ibid., p. 75.
63. Wermacht Captain Albert von Kotzian. Hecker (unidentified name), chief transport organizer for Germany. Diana met him for the first time at the West (South Railway Station then) on 8 June 1942, while waiting for the late night transportation of women with children.

64. Jana Koch, "Spašena su mnogobrojna naša djeca," in *Zbornik sjećanja, Zagreb 1941–1945*, Knjiga 3, (Zagreb: Gradska konferencija SSRNH, Institut za historiju radničkog pokreta, Školska knjiga, 1984), p. 280. Jana Koch (Zagreb, 1905; Zagreb, 1986), a writer and a social worker, a member of the Society for Women's Education (revoked in 1941), worked in the Croatian Red Cross helping to organize the youth. In 1943, she was dismissed from the Red Cross, and in 1944, was arrested and abused. From a transport that arrived to Zagreb on 17 August 1942, she took a ten-month-old girl and named her Duška. Duška is still alive.
65. Slava Ogrizović, "Kozaračka djeca", in *Zbornik sjećanja, Zagreb 1941–1945*, Knjiga 3, (Zagreb: Gradska konferencija SSRNH, Institut za historiju radničkog pokreta, Školska knjiga, 1984), pp. 293–294. Slava Ogrizović (Zvornik, 1907;.Zagreb, 1976) was a writer, and before World War II, she was a member of the Association of Educated Women with university degree, a member of the Society of Croatian Women Writers, and a chairman of the Society for Women's Education. In 1936, she married Bogdan Ogrizović. She was a member of the Croatian Communist Party and a member of the Initiative Board of the Anti-fascist Women's Front in Croatia. In 1944, after her husband was arrested and hanged, she left Zagreb and joined the Partisans. After the war, she worked as a manager in the Ministry of Social Care, then she was a bank manager, and a secretary of the "Yugoslav book" in establishment. She published several books on the topic of the National-Liberation combat.
66. *Žene Hrvatske u Narodno-oslobodilačkoj borbi,* (Zagreb: Glavni odbor ženskih društava Hrvatske, 1955), p. 370. (Travel order issued to Dragica Habazin), *Dnevnik Diane Budisavljević* (Zagreb: Hrvatski državni arhiv i Javna ustanova Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 2004), p. 208. (Travel order issued to Diana Budisavljević).
67. Nikola Nikolić, *Kozaračka djeca* (Zagreb: Stvarnost, 1979), pp. 88–90.
68. Aleksa Benigar, *Alojzije Stepinac—hrvatski kardinal*, (Zagreb: Glas Koncila, 1993), p. 562.
69. *Žene Hrvatske u Narodno-oslobodilačkoj borbi* (Zagreb: Glavni odbor ženskih društava Hrvatske, 1955), p. 377.
70. Documents are with Branka Brossler, the wife of Ivan Brossler. Ivan Brossler was adopted by Kamilo's sister Danica.
71. Diana Budisavljević, "Correction of the Report made by Dr. of engineering, Marko Vidaković as of May 15, 1945, about The Internal Yugoslav front (UJF), HDA, Zagreb RO Diana Budisavljević.
72. In the files, there was a list of a number of children colonized by the Caritas of the Zagreb Archdiocese. There were not only children brought from the camps among them, but also brought from poor and devastated areas of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Muslim and Catholic children).

73. Kamilo Bresler, *Spašavanje kozaračke djece godine 1942*, p. 14. According to the List of "Children from Kozara who died", attached to the Report of Mihajlo Komunicki about visiting the camps from 9 August 1942, in Sisak 1631 out of 3165 children died, in Zagreb 716 out of 6403, and in Jaska (Jastrebarsko, author's note) 449 out of 2997 children died; in other words, out of 12,623 children taken over from the Ustaša camps 2854 of them died. HDA, AFŽ-log.-23/32.
74. DAZ, G-238.
75. *Dnevnik Diane Budisavljević* (Zagreb: Hrvatski državni arhiv i Javna ustanova Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 2004), p. 20.
76. Ibid., p. 54.
77. Ibid., p. 55.
78. Ibid., p. 75.
79. Ibid., p. 95. Institute of St. Jeronimus, the-so-called Jeronim's Hall on Tomislav Square 19 (today's Theater of Puppets) was owned by the Caritas of the Zagreb Archdiocese and it was used as a temporary accommodation for abandoned and poor children. On 18 July 1942, some of the older children were accommodated there. But it was in a terrible state. In one corner of the hall there was straw. Children sank into that straw so deeply, that they could hardly be seen. The toilets were clogged and spilled all over the hall and mixed with the straw where children were lying. It stank: the hall, the children, and the straw. *Žene Hrvatske u Narodno-oslobodilačkoj borbi,* (Zagreb: Glavni odbor ženskih društava Hrvatske, 1955), Knjiga I, p. 372. From the statement given by Dragica Habazin to the Land Commission for the Determination of Crimes Committed by the Occupiers and their Supporters. Conditions of the accommodation improved when at the beginning of 1943, the Institute was taken over by "the Board of private benefactors" run by Zagreb industrialists and merchants (Prpić, Bizjak, Badovinac). In the summer 1944, all the children were transferred to a new children's home in Brestovac. "to avoid moving in or confiscation, the Archbishop decided to give the existing facilities to a children's home. He did not support the home with food or financially." *Dnevnik Diane Budisavljević*, (Zagreb: Hrvatski državni arhiv i Javna ustanova Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 2004), p. 159.
80. Godišnjak Karitasa za 1942. godinu. Also, *Žene Hrvatske u Narodno-oslobodilačkoj borbi* (Zagreb: Glavni odbor ženskih društava Hrvatske, 1955), p. 377.
81. Bilten "Karitas nadbiskupije Zagrebačke" uoči Božića 1942, pp. 6–7. According to the list of parishes with the number of colonized children, most children were adopted in Nova Gradiška 350, in Križ 220, in Kutina 225… and in Zagreb 162.

82. Ibid., pp. 6–7.
83. *Dnevnik Diane Budisavljević* (Zagreb: Hrvatski državni arhiv i Javna ustanova Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 2004) p. 115. "It was cold and drafty in the Greenhouse." The same, date December 31, 1942, p. 115.
84. Aleksa Benigar, *Alojzije Stepinac—hrvatski kardinal* (Zagreb: Glas Koncila, 1993), pp. 368–371.
85. A note regarding the discussion with the pensioner Dumić, the transcript authorized with the stamp of the Land Commission for the Determination of Crimes Committed by the Occupiers and their Supporters. in Zagreb on 19 December 1945. HDA, AFŽ-log, 23/29. Dumić's statement was used at the trial of Stepinac, although the unidentified writer of the note said in the end: "All these statements given by Dumić should be taken with reservation. According to certain information, Dumić himself sinned against our children. But he was in argument with the people from Kaptol because he had been rejected by them. This statement of his could also be an act of revenge. Nevertheless, there is for sure a lot of truth in all of it, so it should be checked by all means."
86. Ibid., p. 117.
87. *Dnevnik Diane Budisavljević*, (Zagreb: Hrvatski državni arhiv i Javna ustanova Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 2004), p. 148.
88. Ibid., p. 94.
89. Ibid., pp. 106–107.
90. Ibid., According to the Annex 41 of the *Diary*, 213. The invoice of the Bookshop and Stationery St. Kugli from Zagreb from 24 August 1942, for the delivery of filing papers with print dim, 12/9 cm.
91. Ibid., p. 126. "In the legacy of Diana Budisavljević there are 2 transcript notebooks of the files containing data for about 10,500 children. They most likely include transcripts of files given to the Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac in May 1943, so that he could keep them. According to the data on the first pages of the copies given to the Archbishop, the copies contained 318 pages. The existing transcript in these two notebooks contains 407 pages, which means that the file was rewritten after May 1943, but it is impossible to say until when, that is what part of the file submitted on 28 May 1945, was rewritten." Silvija Szabo, *Kartoteka sastavljena u okviru „Akcije Diane Budisavljević"*, mail is with the author herself.
92. Mario Kevo, *Veze međunarodnog odbora Crvenog križa Nezavisne Države Hrvatske, Dokumenti* (Zagreb-Jasenovac: Hrvatski državni arhiv, Javna ustanova Spomen područje Jasenovac, 2009), Knjiga I., p. 157.
93. Diana Budisavljević: "Prikaz rada "Akcije Diane Budisavljević" during the occupation period from October 1941 to June 1945", p. 2.
94. The Ministry was established on the basis of the Decision on the National Government of Croatia in 1945, (Narodne novine –NN- 2/1945). By

the Constitution of the National Republic of Croatia dated 18 January 1947, the Ministry of Social Politics changed its name to the Ministry of Social Care. The Ministry was abolished, based on the Decision of the Government Reorganization on 27 April 1951, (NN 27/1951). According to the decree on implementing the decision made by the Parliament on reorganizing the Government of the National Republic of Croatia as of 15 May 1951, the Ministry tasks were transferred to the Council for National Health and Social Politics.

95. *Dnevnik Diane Budisavljević*, (Zagreb: Hrvatski državni arhiv i Javna ustanova Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 2004), p. 167.
96. Ibid., p. 257. Annex 78.
97. Ibid., p. 169.
98. Ibid., p. 166. Photo albums were documented in almost a detective-like way in unprocessed photo material in the former Museum of Revolution of the Croatian People, today's Croatian Historical Museum in Zagreb. They were found in the attic of the social workers high school with a pile of discarded and dusty photos of children, and were donated to the museum. It was only when the handwriting on the back of the photos was analysed that it turned out that these were "the lost" albums of Diana Budisavljević. Who put them there and why is unclear.
99. Slava Ogrizović, *Zagreb se bori* ((Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1977), p. 153.
100. Nikola Nikolić, *Kozaračka djeca* (Zagreb: Stvarnost, 1979), p. 85.
101. *Dnevnik Diane Budisavljević*, (Zagreb: Hrvatski državni arhiv i Javna ustanova Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 2004), p. 171.
102. Dragoje Lukić, *Bili su samo djeca*, *Jasenovac grobnica 1,9432 devojčica i dečaka,* Knjiga 1–2, (Beograd: Muzej žrtava genocida, 2000), p. 174. The Secretariat for National Health and Social Security did the administrative work in the area of organizing the health services and prevention, public hygiene recovery, social protection of children and adults, protection of war and civilian military invalids, and the care services. His statement that these are Diana's Files is false and arbitrary.
103. *Dnevnik Diane Budisavljević*, (Zagreb: Hrvatski državni arhiv i Javna ustanova Spomen-područje Jasenovac, 2004), p. 171.
104. Josip Broz Tito, *Sabrana dela*, (Beograd: Izdavački centar "Komunist", Beogradski izdavačko-grafički zavod, Zagreb: Izdavačko knjižarsko poduzeće "Naprijed", 1984), Tom 20, pp. 235–236. "Uredba o vojnim sudovima i ustrojstvo i nadležnost vojnih sudova".
105. HDA, OZNA Hrvatske, 30/4.0.6.1., Izvještaj 4. odsjeka OZNE za Zagrebačku oblast 4. odsjeku OZNE za Hrvatsku. Members of the army of Wermacht and Croatian armed forces were probably registered in "the military records".

106. Vladimir Geiger, "Sudski procesi u Hrvatskoj 1945. godine. Smrtna presuda evangelističkom biskupu Dr. Philippu Poppu" in *Časopis za suvremenu povijest,* vol. 27, no. 1 (1995), pp. 157–166. Diana paid Popp "a visit as well because of his "significant influence with the Volksdeutsche' (ethnic Germans) organizations" which was very important since the camp commander and the sentries" [in the camp Lobor grad, author's note] "belonged to the formation of Volksdeutsche". When Diana asked him for help "he became very reserved" but he promised her a recommendation for the audience with the Archbishop. *Dnevnik Diane Budisavljević* (Zagreb: Hrvatski državni arhiv i Javna ustanova Spomen područje Jasenovac, 2003), pp. 19–20.
107. According to the data of the State Commission for Religious Relations, 271 priests, seminarians, and nuns of different religious communities were convicted in the period from 1944 to 1951 in Croatia, and 236 of them belonged to the Catholic Church. HDA, fond 310. Komisija za odnose s vjerskim zajednicama Izvršnog vijeća Sabora SRH.
108. Aleksije Benigar, *Alojzije Stepinac—hrvatski kardinal* (Zagreb: Glas Koncila, 1993), p. 582.
109. The sentence was carried out immediately. HDA, Kartoteka ratnih zločinaca, no. 422.
110. "O dluka o prijelazu u državno vlasništvo neprijateljske imovine, o državnoj upravi nad imovinom neprisutnih osoba i o sekvestru nad imovinom koju su okupatorske vlasti prisilno otuđile", *Službeni list Demokratske Federativne Jugoslavije*, Br.. 1 (1 February 1945), p. 4. This decision defined the status of Volksdeutsche. See: Vladimir Geiger, "Folksdojčeri u Hrvatskoj 1945." in *1945.—razdjelnica hrvatske povijesti, Zbornik* (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2006), pp. 271–289.
111. Ibid., p. 275.
112. According to the data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs FNRJ (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) as of 18 January 1946, at the time there were 10,600 Volksdeutsche, namely 3000 men, 4500 women, and 3100 children in camps on Croatian territory, and 2000 were free (700 men, 1000 women, and 300 children). A.J. Beograd, 50-35-73, *Tabelarni pregled logorisanih i nelogorisanih Nemaca na teritoriji Jugoslavije*.
113. Vladimir Geiger, "Folksdojčeri u Hrvatskoj 1945." in *1945—razdjelnica hrvatske povijesti, Zbornik* (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2006), pp. 271–289, 286.
114. *Dnevnik*, 166.
115. HDA, AFŽ-log 23/48.
116. HDA, AFŽ-log 23/47.
117. *Žene Hrvatske u Narodno-oslobodilačkoj borbi,* (Zagreb: Glavni odbor ženskih društava Hrvatske, 1955), p. 506.

118. Ibid, p. 386.
119. *Djeca Hrvatske i narodno-oslobodilačka borba* (Zagreb: Gradski odbor Saveza ratnih vojnih invalida—Zagreb, 1955), p. 23.
120. Ćiril Petešić, *Dječji dom u Jastrebarskom, Dokumenti (1939–1947)* (Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašnjost, 1990), p. 68.
121. Marina Ajduković: "Intervju: Rad Više škole za socijalne radnike—osobna perspektiva prof. Božidara Skeleđije" in *Ljetopis socijalnog rada* (2006), 13, no. 1, pp. 133–141.
122. Marina Ajduković, "Intervju s Ksenijom Bralić-Švarcer: Moj radni vijek socijalne radnice," in *Ljetopis socijalnog rada* (2007) 14, no.1, pp. 223–224.

CHAPTER 4

It's Either Tito or the Soviet Aparatchik

Tito's Yugoslavia and the United States of America (1945–1991)

Tvrtko Jakovina

The leitmotif of this text is the relationship of one superpower to a small peripheral European country with an opposite ideology that had an atypically important role in international relations. The main idea was to show how small countries in the world divided into different blocs may have an important role, along with benevolent superpowers. Relations between Tito's Yugoslavia and the USA were surely far more important for understanding the politics of Belgrade. But there were moments when the US diplomats were eager to show themselves in a more favorable light in front of hosts that were less sophisticated than they were. They were actually trying to hide their own internal political constraints especially in relation to other races because it made the blade of the American criticism blunt and intensified the Yugoslav propaganda. Yugoslavia was a country that had a highly visible place in the Western media but was also a country where often American first-order diplomats served. This was obvious during the presidential campaigns of Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford in 1977, but also at the moment when Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) fell apart, when along with President George H.W. Bush there were two main experts for foreign affairs who were experts for south-east

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Europe but also diplomats incapable of imposing this topic on the US administration. An important objective of this chapter is the reverse influence of expecially small countries on the USA, which has been neglected for too long. *Why is the USA important to Yugoslavia (and vice versa)?*

The socialist, republican, or Tito's Yugoslavia, short names for the state renewed after a disaster caused by World War II in 1945, fell apart after a series of wars at the end of the Cold War, beginning in the 1990s. During the Cold War, Yugoslavia had a special relationship with two political powers, Moscow and Washington. The Federative People's Republic (FNRJ), and from 1963 the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ), was the state on the edge of Europe. It was surrounded by states that were still "unfinished": Austria became a sovereign state in 1955, Italy did not solve the border problem with Yugoslavia until 1954, the civil war in Greece lasted till 1949, while other neighboring countries, being Soviet satellites, were mostly semi-sovereign. During the Cold War, the seemingly stable but certainly most revolutionary Tito's state took up a position that enabled it to have a greater influence and conspicuity in the international arena than would be possible in regard to its size, wealth, and position. If the relationship between Moscow and Washington and their respective blocs had not been determined by the Cold War, a peripheral European state, as Tito's Yugoslavia was from 1945 and especially in 1948, wouldn't have had an important strategic and political role.

During the Cold War every country had to be determined in accordance with the politics of Washington and Moscow. If the Cold War was to be regarded as a "pericentric" model, where small countries often could be the initiators or the catalysts of events, the relationship between Washington and Belgrade (or Moscow and Belgrade) would gain special importance. Since Tito's Yugoslavia played a central role globally in international relations, certainly at least once, after the expulsion of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia from the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties in 1948, it is possible to prove the same in some events that took place later (when the Balkan Pact was formed, its role in the Third World with the Non-Aligned Movement, at the time of death of Josip Broz Tito), it is clear that understanding the relations of FNRJ/SFRJ towards the superpowers is important, visible, and quite significant for international relations.[1] Likewise, the USA was the key to the survival plan, the key to Tito's government, and the key to the hopes of the vast numbers of those who were expecting democratization or a change of the existing Communist nomenclature. Thus, understanding that the rela-

tionship between the two countries is full of different meanings and possible different understanding, it remains controversial, a part of the current political debates even decades after the state collapsed. As there was only a small number of those who were not satisfied with the situation in SFRJ and who dreamed of re-establishing closer relations with the USSR, the relations between Belgrade and the United States were, I believe, more important than the relations between Belgrade and Moscow.

It is natural that a country, which started to live the alternative of the Soviet satellites in 1948, became useful and interesting to the USA. Until the very end of the Cold War and all the quick changes that occurred in Eastern Europe, Washington deliberately turned a blind eye to moves by the Belgrade nomenclature, of which Washington didn't fully approve, and they kept an eye on the direction to which Yugoslav politics were heading. The USA was often Yugoslavia's "dearest enemy"; regardless of some oscillation, they were on good terms most of the time. SFRJ became very dependent on the West in terms of economy. Poor relations with the West or with Washington did not mean that the "pendulum" of Yugoslav politics would always swing to the other side in the Cold War. Extremely tense relations with Moscow in 1953 did not prevent or ease the escalation of relations with the West because of the Trieste crisis and the unsolved border issue between Yugoslavia and Italy. Similar was the fear after the Soviets intervened in Afghanistan, when SFRJ was afraid that a similar scenario would happen after the Non-Aligned Movement was asked to condemn this intervention. Nevertheless, SFRJ didn't have any second thoughts, not in a single moment, about for example boycotting the Olympic Games in Moscow in 1980.

The text that follows has emphasized most of the crucial events in regard to the relations between the USA and Yugoslavia. It tries to show their importance in the overall relations between the two countries and the whole dynamics of the Cold War. In the Cold War these small and peripheral states were sometimes relevant for the politics created in the White House and Foggy Bottom, surely more relevant than they would be today. Documents and sources used here were mainly from different US and other archives from the territory of ex-Yugoslavia. No summaries on the relations between Tito's Yugoslavia and the USA are to be found in languages of the countries that once formed SFRJ. Nevertheless, only if one can understand the correlation between the USA and Tito's country, may one then understand all other phenomena. That is why there are a lot of historians who are more familiar, at least partially, with the relations between SFRJ and the USA than with any other country.

Chronologically, older events have been described in the text on the basis of literature and sources that are new or not so well-known, while some crucial events from the 1970s or 1980s have been put in the broader context of the Cold War narrative for the first time. The intention was to point out the elements that were important in the relations between the two countries—such as non-alignment during the late 1970s—and later they were less evident in literature.

It is also a fact that the Yugoslav authorities had an excellent understanding with the Republican administration in Washington, which was less tense than the understanding with the Democrats. This is a fact that has recently been forgotten in the post–Cold War literature, partly because of the ideological and simplified interpretation of the Cold War era relations given by the historians' from the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Tito's Yugoslavia has been put in the same box with the "Lager" countries. The things and facts were distorted, and this was motivated by actual political conflicts in several states that were formed after SFRJ had collapsed.

As Churchill and Stalin agreed in Moscow in 1944, Tito unintentionally brought Yugoslavia into a position that was suitable for a fifty-fifty division: it was completely a Communist country but it didn't take the Russian side, and had numerous parallels with the "Finnish model" of Helsinki. Yugoslavia could have been an attractive model for other countries of Eastern Europe just as the Yugoslav socialist experiments with self-government and a liberal reading of Marx were an inspiration to numerous left-wing intellectuals in the West. One of the long-lasting characteristics of Yugoslav politics was ambition. It was reflected in taking over a role of the first country in the Soviet part of Europe, then, after 1948, in becoming a special socialist country and then a pioneer of the Third World. Ambition and a notion of being special made Tito attractive in international relations. Eventually, it became clear that the Cold War as well as the fight for peace was the most stable framework for the survival of his country. This country was searching from the inside for a solution that could be at least partly as successful as the Yugoslav diplomats were.

From Jajce to Bucharest (1943–1948)

When Colonel Ellery Channing Huntington, a head of the American Mission to Yugoslav Partisans, which was, as he put it, "in essence" a military intelligence unit, came to Tito's headquarters on the island of Vis in summer 1944, he "knew little or nothing of the Balkans, in general, or

of Yugoslavia in particular". When he saw Marshal Tito for the first time in the crowd, he "seemed a somber, uncommunicative figure … cold and unresponsive almost to the point of rudeness … appeared suspicious both of people and event".[2]

Several months later, in liberated Belgrade, during the first official reception organized for the foreign military missions held in what used to be the Royal Palace, Tito was in "excellent humour". He had addressed Huntington in German, then in English. "The end of a long struggle was in sight … before him lay power, prestige, an opportunity for leadership unparalleled in the turbulent history of his country", wrote the American.[3] Although impressed by the partisan fight, and Tito's ability to get his government established in Jajce in 1943, and recognized as a representative of Yugoslavia,[4] Huntington was no Communist nor was he supportive of the regime that was about to be established in the southeastern part of Europe. However, he showed interest in the region, especially since the Yugoslav break with the Soviet leader Josif Visarionovich Stalin. In early 1951 he had made a three-day-trip to Yugoslavia and met Marshal Tito again. The Yugoslav split with the Soviets had opened a plethora of possibilities for the West. Tito's main worries then were individuals who were resisting the new Yugoslav policy that they had considered a "swing to the right". No one during that, or many other meetings, had mentioned prisoners on Bare Island, where Yugoslavs had built a gulag for the Stalinists. "Tito welcomes US interests and influence", Huntington reported, saying how "the US can look forward to increasing cooperation beyond American expectations", a conclusion that was enough for the moment.[5]

Budimir Lončar was a young diplomat in the Yugoslav Consulate General in New York City in the early 1950s, when Huntington introduced him to General William Joseph Donovan, a founder of American intelligence. In 1980 Lončar was performing a duty of the Yugoslav ambassador to the United States. It was early May, Tito had just passed away, and a book of condolence was opened in the embassy. Huntington came with his wife unannounced. He saluted in front of the photograph, touched his eyes, and turned to Ambassador Lončar: "These are general tears for the great Marshal".[6] A similar occurrence was in New York City, where, without bodyguards, Nelson Rockefeller went to the Yugoslav Consulate and signed the book.[7]

These episodes illustrate a fascinating evolution of US policy towards Tito's Yugoslavia, from a far away, semi-wild land where people have drunk a lot of "rakija" and lived life "which most Americans are completely

unfamiliar" with, to a land that "if not yet an integral part of the USSR, was, at least, an excellent Chinese Copy", as Huntington wrote shortly after the Cold War, but which soon turned out to be the first Communist dissident and then, at least for a while, an "American Communist Ally".[8] Huntington, as well as the rest of the Western World, had changed their opinion about Yugoslavia considerably since the greatest event since V-J day (Victory over Japan) in summer 1948, when Tito declined to go to Bucharest to participate at the meeting of the Informational Bureau of Communist Parties. No Soviets behind Tito made him, despite a huge democratic deficit, a friend, the best choice for Yugoslavia and the West in the context of the Cold War.

John Cabot, who was in charge of the US Embassy in Belgrade during the first half of 1947, stated anyhow that the "unlikely event of a violent overturn" might be "engineered from within the government, not by opposition elements, despite their numerical strength".[9] Charles McVicker, the American Consul in Zagreb, after months of conversations with politicians of the Croatian Peasant Party, then forbidden but once the strongest party in Croatia, in the changed environment of the Tito-Stalin split, came to the same conclusion: a multi-party government would be a catastrophe for Yugoslavia. Yugoslav unity and stability were essential. To take it as close to the West as possible, but not to destroy the established Cold War order, especially not to disintegrate Yugoslavia, was the second main goal. Tito was the man for that task. It was either him or a Soviet stooge, the American diplomat had written.[10] Therefore, it was the task of the American diplomacy to observe, as a British diplomat wrote in the mid 1970s, whether the Yugoslav train was on track or not. What was to be the destiny of Yugoslavia without Tito was on everyone's mind from the beginning. The Americans were constantly reevaluating this, asking what chances Yugoslavia had to survive a biological departure from the pinnacle of the regime. Mao Zedong, for example, had expressed his worries to US President Ford in 1975, saying that Yugoslavia "is made up of so many former states".[11] The fact that Greece and Turkey were mending broken fences in the late 1970s was explained by a possible unrest in Yugoslavia after Tito's death, unknown moves the Bulgarians and the Soviets might make after Tito's departure.[12] Tito was more important than the country he was leading. Internationally, he was a stronger brand than the Federation he had created.

An uneasy start between the USA and Yugoslavia almost turned to open hatred. Incidents were common. The most serious one was the

shooting down of a US airplane on 19 August 1946 while another one was forced to land.[13] Although even top American officials were aware of the fact that some of these "reconnaissance" flights were "just to bait the Yugoslavs", the negative effect of the incident was huge.[14] When former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill came to Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March 1946, to give one of his most important speeches, Tito was already regarded as the most notorious of Stalin's collaborators. Churchill had mentioned him, together with Stalin, in his famous "Iron Curtain Speech".[15] Yugoslavia was following the Soviet Union so eagerly, that the first US ambassador, Richard Patterson, far from the most competent one, was not able to do more than show his displeasure. His replacement, as chargé d'affaires, was John Cabot, who was posted to Belgrade after his tour of duty in Argentina. Cabot was sent to Belgrade partially to detect and prevent the channels by which the Yugoslav Nazi war criminals were leaving via Italy to Argentina.[16] "Belgrade is a very depressing place …The town is drab, dingy, and dirty … There is practically nothing of beauty and little enough of interest in it" he wrote in a letter soon upon arrival. Diplomats were isolated, people, afraid to communicate with foreigners. The regime was oppressive, there was ingratitude to the USA in connection with UNRRA help, but, at the same time, not everything the Americans were doing was honest. In order to get information, the US military attaché sent a small quantity of arms to the Chetniks that were still at large in some parts of Yugoslavia; the group was destroyed and a public trial was staged in Belgrade.[17] The Yugoslavs were using "every smear device" against the USA, and Washington did not have any means to answer the accusations. In a country where Tito had "very substantial public support" and America was "thoroughly indignant at Yugoslavia", life for the US representative was not easy.[18]

Cabot, being a true professional and a shrewd observer, explained in his last report from Belgrade and a lecture at the War College how Yugoslav Communists were "by no means hermit-like" as Russians. They were ready to debate, he said, and some of his contacts and high party members had "some basic motivations as other humans—in other words they responded to sincerity and courtesy".[19] Naked aggression seems not to be the logic of world communism; therefore one should hope that "Communism itself may change". Months before the split, Cabot had publicly stated that the "conflict of interest had arisen and will continue to arise between Yugoslavia and Russia". However, Washington was not ready for the change. Expulsion from the Informational Bureau of the

Communist Parties, an organization with headquarters in Belgrade, therefore came as a shock to everyone.[20]

George Kennan, who was the head of the Policy Planning Staff, together with the colleagues from the State Department, ignored numerous signs that Yugoslavs and Soviets were departing.[21] What had been ignored for months was now recognized and dealt with during the course of several hours. A document produced by Kennan in two days became PPS/35 ("The Attitude of This Government toward Events in Yugoslavia"), defining American policy vis-à-vis Tito for the rest of the Cold War.[22] It took awhile for the Yugoslavs to come to terms with the political earthquake of this magnitude. Transformation from the closest Soviet ally to the US Communist ally was, nevertheless rather quick. The Yugoslavia regime was worthy of support, at least up to the level to keep it afloat. For as long as Yugoslavia remained independent, its internal regime was not the problem for Washington, just as was the case for so many right-wing regimes in Latin America, southern Europe, and later in the Middle East and Africa. Although not everyone in the US administration was in favor of aiding Titoism, strategical advancement for the West, and the security of Italy and Greece, for example, was huge. The possibility of driving a wedge into the Communist monolith was another advantage that Yugoslavia found for itself on the side or in-between sides, taking a position that was full of opportunities for Belgrade, too. Some were taken in full.

The largest steps in the direction of the West were taken during Stalin's life. While the rest of the Communist Lager was becoming more like the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia was moving in the opposite direction: the country remained a Communist one, Tito was an absolute leader, but other things were changing, decentralizing if not fully democratizing. The Communist Party became the League of Communists just to stress the advisors, not the leading characters of the organization. English was becoming the first language of instruction in Yugoslav schools, American movies were everywhere in the theatres, American military and economical help became essential for the very survival of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia, despite the Soviet opposition, remained a candidate for the non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in spite of Czechoslovak attempts to take that place. Yugoslavia was playing a much more visible role than it normally would, and its standard of life was growing more rapidly than was the case in other East European states.

Truman (After the Split), Eisenhower, and Johnson (1949–1968)

At the time of the Stalin-Tito split, the Yugoslav ambassador in Washington, Savica Kosanović, was non-Communist but strongly pro-Yugoslav. Now, in a situation when Edvard Kardelj, Tito's closest collaborator, was taking over the position of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Vladimir Popović, a former general and a member of the Central Committee, a Montenegrin, became the Yugoslav ambassador in the USA in April 1950. After his service in Moscow during the Cominform split between Belgrade and Moscow, despite his stiff character and dogmatism, Popović was sent to Washington.[23] American assistance to Yugoslavia was continued after the change in the White House in 1953. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, despite his Cold War rhetoric and vitriolic anti-communism, was advertising the establishment of good relations with Yugoslavia.[24] As President Ford had underlined many years later, Dulles told him "of the excellent relations we had with Yugoslavia in terms of arms sales". Already in 1950 the CIA warned how, "*In case of an attack on Yugoslavia, the United States must be prepared to give a military support eventually participating with its own forces in the hypothetical military conflict*".[25] The Eastern bloc countries used Yugoslav heresy to purge those who were real or imagined Titoists, while Belgrade was in certain aspects moving towards the West. Yugoslavia forged the Balkan Pact in 1953 with two NATO members—Greece and Turkey. Political alliance became military in 1954. The move was logical since Yugoslavia had already signed the Mutual Defense Aid Program (MDAP) on 14 November 1951, but not very comfortable since the country had not changed its ideology and basic orientation. However, fear of the Soviets was real; it became even stronger after the North Korean attack on South Korea. Stalin's death in 1953 eased the tensions only psychologically; the Yugoslavs were waiting for tangible changes in Moscow, while trying to solve the border question with Italy at the same time.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, after the first post-war meeting of the Big Four in Geneva in 1955, came to the Brijuni Islands on 6 October 1955. One day with Tito turned out to be "one of the most interesting and enjoyable days" he had ever had.[26] Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev, was in his Canossa-like visit to Belgrade in May 1955. It seemed that Yugoslavia nailed the wedge in the Communist world, and

it was finally giving visible results. The USA was interested in weakening Moscow's domination; Belgrade was hoping for Yugoslav-like developments in Eastern Europe. The final goal for Washington and Belgrade differed but, up to that moment, they coincided. Hopes were high in Belgrade after Khrushchev's secret speech and condemnation of Stalin in 1956.[27] Changes in Poland and Hungary were implying that the Yugoslav model, possibly, might be emulated. Yugoslavia was now minimizing its relations with the West. As reported by the Operations Coordinating Board in March 1956, the Yugoslavs were trying to "benefit as much as possible from each side".[28] Yugoslavia wanted to adopt an "in between" position, for the time being still in Europe, still being interested in the European Communist world.

The results were only partially satisfactory. Hungary in 1956 showed what the limits of harsh anti-Communist rhetoric from Washington were, and how far the willingness went to intervene in the backyard of the other superpower. The Eastern Bloc was shaken for sure, but the Yugoslav wedge did not penetrate deep enough. Yugoslavia, by overplaying its role in Hungary, learned its limits too. Yugoslavia was not going to spread the virus of socialist self-management and national roads to socialism to its neighbors further than allowed by Moscow. Khruschev, let alone others in the Soviet leadership, was not ready to allow it. But despite numerous attempts—between May and November 1956—he and Tito met four times—and was not strong enough to take Yugoslavia back. Dulles, in the light of Soviet intervention in Hungary, gave security assurances to Tito. Therefore, Yugoslavia remained what it was, but in a changed Europe. Dulles did not want to let Yugoslavia move further to the East; he had tried to organize Tito's trip to the USA in 1957. The trip never materialized. The Catholic and the right-wing opposition to the Yugoslav dictator, saying that Titoism was better than the Soviet communism but not a goal in itself, were too strong.[29] The West was interested in a substantial change in Eastern Europe since no one wanted war; segments of Western public opinion were much more radical than their governments'; Tito was not ready to change his, although partially modified, Communist ideology. That was, in the end, not in the interest of the West. To stay on the periphery of Europe in Albania, as a position, was also not an option.

Yugoslavia was therefore looking for a new purpose, a different place in a changing world. Although later taken as the beginning of the Non-Alignment Movement, the meeting of the Big three—Tito, Nasser, and Nehru—on Brijuni in the summer of 1956 was not the real beginning of

the movement that was to encompass the Third World countries. Tito was already touring the world, discovering countries with similar views as Yugoslavia on the superpowers and division of the world, not only ideologically, but in terms of material.

Partial coolness in the relations with the Soviets during the second half of the 1950s was another sign that Yugoslavia was not going back to Lager. Some analysts were implying that Tito was jealous of changes in Hungary, which were rapidly going further than the achieved level of changes in Yugoslavia. Tito was not interested in losing his uniqueness. Such interpretation is probably not true. Yugoslavia was anyhow not intending to return to the Soviets under the Moscow rules. After the Soviet intervention in Hungary, the limits of Khrushchev's thaw also became visible. Therefore, Tito went further with the policy that was soon named Non-aligned. Before his historical 72-day trip around Africa from 14 February 1961, all over the country the Yugoslavs were demonstrating over the crisis in the Congo and the US intervention in Vietnam. Before departure, Tito had received the US Ambassador Karl Rankin. The motive of Tito's trip was to ease tensions in the world, nothing else. "Congo and similar countries were too primitive and backward to justify trying to persuade them to accept any particular ideology", Tito said to the American diplomat.[30] Yugoslavia was not as revolutionary and naïve as a decade ago. Although Yugoslav intentions were not only pragmatic, Rankin concluded how Tito's "statements and actions were likely to be influenced by considerations other than concern for the welfare of the Africans". The CIA analysts were well aware of the fact that the idea of "small states with little influence by themselves but with pretensions to broader leadership" wanted to create a "block of states which agree on general foreign policy" and might express the views "collectively", was tempting to Yugoslavia.[31] For as long as there were tensions between the USSR and the USA, there was a "golden opportunity for smaller countries, Yugoslavia for instance, to fish in muddy waters", wrote George Kennan, who became President John F. Kennedy's ambassador to Yugoslavia in 1961.[32] The new foreign policy orientation of Yugoslavia became "an avenue of escape" both for the country and Tito. He was now able to play the role of "histrionic leadership".

When the first summit of the Third World countries was convened in Belgrade in September 1961, Washington could only wait for the "natural processes of disintegration", Kennan wrote in the Memo for the President.[33] He had advised to send "Negro journalists" on the spot, to

try to spread the US version on different issues. Tito's speech at the conference, in which he expressed understanding for Soviet resumption of nuclear tests, enraged Kennan personally. As was often the case, when the Democrats were in the White House, relations between Yugoslavia and the USA were tenser than with the Republicans. Change was visible right after the conference in Belgrade. Policy before that became history, Veljko Mićunović, newly appointed Yugoslav ambassador in Washington, stated early in 1962.[34]

In his report to the Yugoslav officials in 1963, Mićunović stated how relations between the two countries were at a low level, subjectively even worse than the US-Polish relations. Yugoslavia lost the status of most-favored-country, and many politicians in Congress were showing their anti-communism by punishing Yugoslavia.[35] There were more attacks in the press, unfriendly moves, even attempts by the "extreme emigration" to attack Yugoslav diplomatic missions. The platform on which US-Yugoslav relations were based was worn out; the new model was not yet found. Similar things happened to Soviet-US relations, a Yugoslav diplomat thought, and since Yugoslavia was moving closer to Moscow, Washington's relations with Belgrade suffering accordingly. Although the top circles in the Kennedy administration were disinterested and cold, overall the USA was still supportive, as in GATT, with the West Germans, in giving material help. The The Yugoslav position was changing. It was becoming more active among the "non-aligned" and closer to the USSR. Certain moves, even small-scale cooperation in the military sphere with Moscow, might be acceptable; any direct support to the Soviets in Berlin might jeopardise overall relations between the USA and Yugoslavia. Mićunović was advising to stabilize relations with the USA as soon as possible, before the next presidential elections for the re-election of President Kennedy in order to avoid right-wingers to use a Yugoslav card during the campaign. It was in Yugoslav interest, among other things, to improve relations with Washington because the US relations had been improved with many Third World countries. Mićunović had supported a quick signing of the Fulbright Program treaty, as well as an exchange of personal letters between the two presidents.[36] Contacts on the highest level were now necessary to explain the new Yugoslav position, especially in light of the weakening position of Moscow and ever-closer contacts between the USSR and Belgrade. The Americans saw the changes in Yugoslavia correctly. The National Intelligence estimates were less worried than the average politician in Washington as to whether Tito was going to the bloc

again: "present leadership in Belgrade is determined not to pass once again under the discipline and control of Moscow". Even after Tito's death, such a move, although possible, was "unlikely".[37]

Tito finally went to the USA at the end of his Latin American tour. Kennedy, although a great host in the White House—since Tito's chopper was late, returned to the White House lawn with his son, little John. Jovanka befriended with him quickly—while other things were not so encouraging. Tito was housed in colonial Williamsburg, not in Washington. The situation there was much better than in New York, where huge demonstrations were held and a group of Chetniks tried to assassinate Tito. Jakša Petrić, who was traveling with the Yugoslav president, confirmed that the Americans were interested in Yugoslav independence, a country that was a constructive player on the international scene. Koča Popović, the Yugoslav state secretary for foreign relations, held a meeting with journalists, which was highly represented in the media. Two days later, the German prime minister was fully bypassed by the press.[38]

The US financial support for Yugoslav independence in various programs amounted to $2.9 billion from 1949 to 1965 (Mićunović in 1963 was talking about $2,396 billion worth of assistance, $700 million of which was military).[39] In October 1966, the US news magazine *Newsweek* printed a leading story on Yugoslavia, with a cover photo of Tito with the headline "A Radical Communist". The article was entitled "Tito's Yugoslavia: Is it Communism?". In Yugoslavia, the first-ever in any Communist country, a beauty contest was held for Miss Yugoslavia.[40] Yugoslavia was going through changes. Aleksandar Ranković, omnipotent state secretary of the interior, the strongest Serb in the administration, allegedly No. 2 (or 3) in the country, was sacked. The Republic became more independent; Yugoslavia was becoming more federalized. Tito was described as an "elder statesman", who would "win any free election in present-day Yugoslavia", who rules like a "chairman of a major US corporation".[41] The critics of communism were fully aware of impossibilities Yugoslavs were facing. But less than a year later, the CIA and other US agencies were painting an equally rosy picture. "Yugoslavia is a Communist state in name and theory".[42] Warnings from the ambassador Mićunović's analysis were partially solved. Yugoslavia got the status of the most-favored-nation again in 1964, the same year the Fulbright-Hays Agreement for Scientific Cooperation was signed. The most ambitious set of reforms in any socialist country was giving partial results. Like in so many different situations, the country lacked breath to keep up with them to the end.

What looked to be a negative trend, with the exception of cultural cooperation and strong US influence in different fields,[43] was suddenly changed with the intervention of the Warsaw Pact countries (without Romania) in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Yugoslavia did two important things in the second half of the 1960s. First, after the Israeli-Arab Six-Day War, Belgrade closed the embassy in Tel Aviv, and Tito even participated at the meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries which were looking for ways to assist the Egyptians. Nasser was his closest friend, the leader of an important non-aligned country. Israelis were too fast for this story, which was sharply criticized in certain circles as having deeper implications. Then, just a year later, after the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia became outraged. Afraid of possible Soviet intervention, afraid for the future of communism, Yugoslavs were sharply criticizing the Soviet move. The Soviet presence on the Adriatic "was of vital concern to the entire Western world" said Dean Rusk, the US secretary of state. As the US ambassador, Bruce Elbrick, said in Belgrade after a conversation with President Lyndon Johnson, the tradition of assistance to Yugoslavia was long, and it was still there. The USA was interested in Yugoslav independence, and it was ready to guarantee it in the same way as it was guaranteeing it to all NATO countries. The Soviet intervention in the south was not to be, and Yugoslavia once again leaned to the West. Economical reform was in trouble, but political changes with young, fresh, educated politicians in different Yugoslav republics, were gaining strength.[44]

Detente and the End of It: What After Tito: Again

President Richard Nixon came to Yugoslavia, the second socialist country to be visited by a US president, in early autumn of 1970. Romania was the first to be visited—Nixon went there in the summer of 1969—but that was not a sign that Yugoslavia had been passed over. On the contrary, as Helmut Sonnenfeldt from the National Security Council had explained to ambassador Bogdan Crnobrnja, the US administration was preparing a more ambitious plan for Yugoslavia. Nixon, together with his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and Secretary of State William P. Rogers, came to Belgrade in late September 1970 (from 30 September to 2 October). A few hours before his scheduled arrival in Belgrade, while on board the Sixth Fleet's flagship in Naples, it was reported that President Nasser of Egypt had died. Despite his closeness with the Egyptian, as it was reported from Belgrade, Tito prefered the

company of the living, not the dead. Therefore, the marshal of Yugoslavia stayed in Belgrade and accompanied Nixon to Zagreb and to Tito's birth place Kumrovec. Previous to that, no foreign statesman had spent more time with a US president. The decision to visit Kumrovec was basically an homage to the Yugoslav leader, something that he appreciated, something that was flattering. To keep Tito independent or sufficiantly independent from Moscow, was the goal of the US visit to Yugoslavia. Another one was to strengthen US influence in the northern flank of the eastern Mediterranean. Warren Nutter, the US deputy secretary of defense, was in Kupari near Dubrovnik just a few weeks before President Nixon's arrival; councillor to the president and later secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld a few months before that. Contacts of that kind had continued and intensified with the visits of Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Ellsworth in 1974, when direct cooperation of the Yugoslav People's Army and the US military was established, when the US Secretary of the Air Force, General John L. McLucas, came to Yugoslavia in 1975.[45] The growing importance of the wider Mediterranean area, in light of the Soviet presence in Egypt and Syria, but also the instability of Greece under the colonels and pro-Chinese Albania, was making Yugoslavia more important for both sides in the Cold War. The Soviets were if not afraid then annoyed by propaganda that was stressing how three Communist countries in Southeast Europe might look for another ideological sponsor, i.e. Mao's China. Although it was hardly possible, a fully independent Yugoslavia and Albania and semi-independent Romania, at least in the foreign policy domain, were complicating things for Moscow in the Balkans. One year later, Tito paid his highly publicized trip to the States, the first visit that was without significant incidents. Unlike nine years ago, this time Tito was placed in the Blair House, near the White House.[46]

As in the cases of Hungary and Czechoslovakia earlier, the importance of keeping Europe calm, especially preserving Yugoslavia as it was, might partially explain why there were no protests when Tito had started his "anti-liberal crusade," which had spread from Croatia to Serbia, and then touched Macedonia and Slovenia.[47] The leading British weekly "*The Economist*" wrote that "Mr. Brezhnev will be a happpier man" after the changes in Yugoslavia, suppressing the Croatian Spring and replacing the Liberals in Serbia. Washington, nevertheless, remained calm. Yugoslavia was not changing sides, the country was still more liberal than any other in Eastern Europe. Interest in having Yugoslavia as a buffer was still there. Queen Elizabeth, after all, came to Yugoslavia in October 1972, being the

first British monarch ever to visit a Communist country.[48] With detente between Moscow and Washington, at least in Europe, the Yugoslav position became relatively secure, as long as there were no major disturbances. In a just over a decade, there were four US presidential and vice-presidential visits to Belgrade. The Cold War in Europe was changing; wars and conflicts were moving to the Third World, to the countries that were non-aligned, and that's where Yugoslavia was present and visible.

At the very end of 1975, counselor of the Department of State Helmut Sonnenfeldt held a meeting with the US ambassadors in Europe. It was the day after Henry Kissinger's briefing, when Hal Sonnenfeldt held an informal gathering during which he underlined that the Soviet Union finally emerged as a superpower on a global scale. Moscow was to be heard no matter what Washington did.[49] Overly provocative behavior for Moscow in the East European satellites, as was seen several times after episodes of unrest in Prague, Budapest, may lead to the eruption of instability. The USA had to continue responding to the tendencies of autonomy but within the context of a "strong Soviet geopolitical influence". "So it must be our policy to strive for an evolution that makes the relationship between Eastern Europeans and the Soviet Union an organic one", as was written later in a summary that was leaked to the press.[50] Since the Soviets were unable to create an *organic* relationship with Eastern Europe, and their influence there was primarily military, it was in the interest of Washington to mend fences there, Sonnenfeldt said.[51]

Sonnenfeldt's views on Europe were made public by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak in the *Washington Post*. The article "A Soviet-East Europe Organic Union" caused a great stir. The official Yugoslav circles became especially nervous, less with the interpretation that the Soviets conceded a sphere of influence in the Eastern Europe, and more with the Yugoslav inclusion on the list of countries the Soviets should control. The immigrants from different East European countries were outraged.[52] President Ford as well as Kissinger had denounced Sonnenfeldt's interpretation several times as published by the media. Marshal Tito was asked to comment on it while on a state visit to Sweden. Yugoslavia was strong, united, at the crucial intersection in Europe. "No statements, including this one by Sonnenfeldt can scare us, or reroute us….", Tito added.[53]

What became known as the Sonnenfeldt doctrine did not exist. If there were truly a new doctrine of this administation, it would not be named after Sonnenfeldt, Kissinger wrote in his memoirs. It would be called the Kissinger Doctrine then, the former secretary of state said to Tito and

to the Yugoslav diplomat Budimir Lončar, some time later.[54] Although the Americans were encouraging trends towards greater autonomy among the Soviet satellites, they were not too zealous to make the Soviets nervous, since there were no plans to intervene.[55] The goal was, and that was just more explicitly stated this time, to push all of Eastern Europe in the Yugoslav direction, to make regimes independent but still acceptable to Moscow. The independence of Yugoslavia was, however, not only in the interest of, but "borders on the vital" for the USA but also for Western Europe as well as Eastern Europe. Any shift back to the Soviet orbit by the Yugoslavs would "represent a major strategic setback for the West", Henry Kissinger wrote in a letter to all US ambassadors in Europe on 1 February 1976.[56]

Voices in the USA that were critical of Yugoslavia were not few, nevertheless. Daniel Patric Moynihan, the US ambassador to the United Nations in January 1976 had criticized circles in the US administration, especially the State Department, for being too soft vis-à-vis the non-aligned. They should be shushed, Moynihan wrote to US ambassadors abroad.[57] Moynihan was more hawkish than Kissinger, but, being aware of the Yugoslav displeasure, he commented: "…we would like them to be less obnoxious", adding how Yugoslavs should be "disabused" "of any notion that our interest in their relative independence is greater than their own".[58]

President Ford's summer trip to Finland in 1975, where he was about to sign the Helsinki Final Act, was sharply criticized among conservatives in America, immigrants from Eastern Europe, and even some East European politicians who were not sure that the treaty went far enough to exclude the Soviet intervention. Many were accusing the Republican administration of selling Eastern Europe to the Soviets for good. Ford's trip to Europe was to include Germany as well as three capitals in Eastern Europe, countries chosen because their governments had "strongest record of seeking freedom of action vis-a-vis the Soviet Union". The goal of Gerald Ford's visit to Yugoslavia, second US president to do so, as well as Poland and Romania, was a symbol of the US "commitment to freedom in Eastern Europe", stated Kissinger while briefing Ford in October 1976.[59]

Upon arrival to Belgrade, Ford was very cautious while stepping down from the airplane, attempting not to slip and fall as he did a few weeks before while visiting Austria. Tito was at the Surčin Airport waiting for the

guest. In early August, Belgrade was rather empty but not deserted. While walking down Terazije in central Belgrade, Ford was shaking hands with people, waving, introducing his family, the sons and the wife, to everyone.[60] That very day a group of pro-Soviet conspirators led by Dušan Brkić was arrested in Belgrade. Brkić, until 1948 the vice president of the government of the People's Republic of Croatia, was sacked for his Cominform inclinations. His love with Moscow had obviously remained the same.[61] The overlapping of two incidents was somehow too neat.

Americans were interested in the Yugoslav views on the Mediterranean, especially the Middle East and Cyprus.[62] After a leftist coup in Portugal, a partial NATO withdrawal from Greece, and instability in Italy, there were fears that the southern flank of the Western Alliance was weakened. The Yugoslavs were to host to the second meeting of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CECS), so the trip was more than just a bilateral one. Ford had congratulated Tito on his "speech and presiding at Helsinki". "I think our bilateral relations are good" Tito started. International topics were covered in Helsinki. Therefore, two statesmen were dwelling on the Middle East and, a bit less, on the non-aligned. "It's the biggest block now", Kissinger commented, but Tito laughed, saying that it was not a block. Taking into account what Kissinger was saying on the Non-aligned movement (NAM) before and later (in 1978 when Tito came to the USA again, he stated how he was not appreciating NAM as a "real factor in the world policy"), Kissinger was exaggerating a bit, just to please Tito.[63] Yugoslavia was wondering how to establish contact between NAM and the States.[64] Gerald Ford had promised that the Yugoslav request for arms, which was buried by bureaucracy, would get his personal attention. Edvard Kardelj openly asked for encouragement from US private investors: "In industry, agriculture, technology, know-how, we would like to get more from the United States". More important, the Yugoslavs were getting US military help. Presidential visits were to encourage the creation of more Yugoslavias in Eastern Europe.[65] Ford was encouraging Communist regimes in Eastern Europe to become braver, to maneuver as freely as possible, short of provoking Soviet intervention. Peace, stability, independence, full equality of independent states, the UN Charter and respect of individual ideologies, all this was included in the final draft of the joint statement by two presidents. Independent, integrated, non-aligned Yugoslavia was in the permanent interest of the USA. Ford had acknowledged the Yugoslav role in the Non-aligned Movement, and Kissinger "warned" his Yugoslav

counterpart Miloš Minić to "act good" in Lima, where a ministerial meeting of the NAM countries was to be held later that month.

After the Helsinki Final Act, Europe, where the Cold War started, was pacified. The importance of the Third World was growing, and the Soviets were technically capable of assisting groups in Africa and Latin America, even when the idea to intervene originated in Havana, Cuba.[66] The Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, while in Belgrade on 15 November 1976, repeated requests for military installations on the Adriatic, rights of the Soviet airplanes to fly over the Yugoslav territory, even re-establishment of Soviet-Yugoslav societies. The Yugoslavs were not to jeopardize their neutral position, but pressure on Belgrade, in the light of Tito's age, was growing.[67]

As it is usually the case in political campaigns, marginal issues are often stressed, so the same was during the Carter-Ford campaign. The so-called Sonnenfeldt Doctrine was overly exploited by Ford opponents, first during the primaries in the Republican Party, then by the Democrats and their nominee Jimmy Carter. In early September 1976 Carter himself had stated how the USA was to support Yugoslavia to remain stabile vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. During the second presidential debate on foreign policy in San Francisco on 6 October 1976, although well briefed, Ford made a fatal mistake. Explaining what the Helsinki Final Act was all about, stressing how even the Holy See had signed the agreement, Ford had stated that "There is no Soviet dominance over Eastern Europe and there never will be under a Ford administration".[68] The moderator, the *New York Times* journalist Max Frankel was puzzled, asking for clarification. "I understand you to say, Sir, that the Russians are not using Eastern Europe as their own sphere of influence in occupying most of the countries there and in—and making sure with their troops that it's a—that it's a Communist zone, whereas on our side of the line the Italians and the French are still flirting with the possibility of Communism?".[69] Ford had underlined his argument: "I don't believe, Mr. Frankel that the Yugoslavians consider themselves dominated by the Soviet Union. I don't believe that the Romanians consider themselves dominated … Each of those countries is independent, autonomous: it has its own territorial integrity and the United States does not concede that those countries are under the domination of the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, I visited Poland, Yugoslavia and Romania to make certain that the people of those countries understood that the president of the United States and the people of the United States are dedicated to their independence, their autonomy and their freedom".[70]

Carter reiterated mentioning the so-called Sonnenfeldt document, which apparently Mr. Ford has just endorsed, which said that there's an organic linkage between the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union".[71]

Ford remained silent. He was not understood, but conservative circles were becoming more and more disillusioned with his campaign. One week later Governor Carter stated how he "would not go to war in Yugoslavia, even if the Soviet Union sent in troops."[72] Yugoslavia therefore was mentioned again in the last presidential debate between Ford and Carter. Tito "is old and sick and there are divisions in his country", asked Joseph Kraft. "Doesn't it discourage the Yugoslavs who might be tempted to resist? And wouldn't it have been wiser on your part to say nothing and to keep the Russians in the dark as President Ford did, and as I think every President has done since President Truman?", he asked. Carter, although successfully beating Ford on this very subject in the second debate, now, accused of similar, was on the defensive. Averell Harriman, who was advising Carter on foreign policy issues, was in Yugoslavia at the end of September 1976. He had conversations with Miloš Minić and Edvard Kardelj. Carter based his views on Yugoslavia and his reports.[73] "I think it's accurate to say that there is no prospect, in their opinion, of the Soviet Union invading Yugoslavia should Mr. Tito pass away. The present leadership there is fairly uniform in their purpose. I think it's a close-knit group, and I think it would be unwise for us to say that we will go to war in Yugoslavia if the Soviets should invade, which I think would be an extremely unlikely thing."[74] There was no need for the USA to go to war if no US interests were directly threatened. The Soviet interevention in Yugoslavia, although in Carter's view improbable, would not threaten US security. Ford used the opportunity to attack Carter. "It's unwise for a President to signal in advance what options he might exercise" to any prospective enemy.

The attention that Yugoslavia received in the debates of these two allegedly, weakest postwar presidents, went hand in hand with terrorist issues. The group of Zvonko Bušić had kidnapped an airplane and made news around the world. The gesture did not, for sure, help the Croatians, especially after a police officer trying to dismantle a bomb they planted, was killed in the process. After that, all Yugoslav extreme groups were put under harsher scrutiny.[75] Another problem was being caused by the US ambassador in Belgrade, Laurence H. Silberman, who was criticizing the Yugoslavs for their human rights record. On 26 July 1976 Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, and President Ford were talking about Silberman's differences with the East European desk. "He wants to stage another Moynihan",

Kissinger said. "You know our policy on Yugoslavia: They are shits but we may have a fight when Tito dies, and if we blacken them now, we will be in a poor public position to support them."[76] Silberman was replaced upon his resignation on 17 November 1976. The new US ambassador to Yugoslavia was Lawrence S. Eagleberger (from June 1977), who was already serving in Belgrade. The strategical importance of Yugoslavia had not changed, and no internal issue in that country was important enough to influence the American policy for as long as the situation in Europe remained as it was. Carter was to follow, even to fine-tune, such an approach.

The presidential debate Ford—Carter, and repeated references to Yugoslavia, on one side were unpleasant to the Yugoslavs but also feeding pride of those who thought that Belgrade was playing an extremely important role in world politics. Even during his first presidential press conference, Carter was asked about the possiblity of Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia and the American response. This time his response was more cautious, smarter, more ambiguous. The American response to such an event would be determined by concrete conditions. Non-alignment which was never important per se, was visible in the international arena for the activities of Yugoslav diplomacy. Being always the best pupil in the class, Yugoslavia was eager to organize, coordinate, draft, invite, not only because that was the only way to keep the Movement present and active but also for Belgrade to remain present on the international scene, to be valorized more and treated better.[77] As Cuba was becoming more and more involved in African affairs, planning to take the Movement closer to the Soviets, gave to the role of Yugoslavia in the NAM an importance.

What seemed as a rather shaky beginning was soon to become probably the closest relation Tito ever had with any US president. Carter and Tito had exchanged a series of letters. Military cooperation was growing, and the Yugoslav officers were regularly visiting the highest defense institutions in the USA.[78] The aircraft carrier USS *John F. Kennedy* paid a visit to Dubrovnik in March 1977. Vice President Walter Mondale came to Belgrade in May. Edvard Kardelj, Tito's number 2, spent seven days in Washington in September and October. Mondale agreed to sell a Westinghouse nuclear reactor and technology to Yugoslavia. Senator George McGovernwent to Belgrade in August 1977, and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown went to Yugoslavia in October 1977. That's when the deal to establish a joint commission for technical, scientific, and military cooperation was established, when the Yugoslav and the US military had

established closer relations. In 1985 an agreement was reached to work together on a modern airplane engine (PW-1120 or F-404), although certain equipment, like the Harpoon rockets, was not shared.[79]

Tito was received at the White House by Jimmy Carter on 7 March 1978.[80] On 20 February, reports of those who were traveling to the USA before Tito were received, as well as the draft of the answers to the questions of two most important journalists who were to interview Tito, Walter Cronkite and James Reston. What to say to the media was essential. "With Blažo Mandić working on the questions the President got from Reston (written part) … Once more to read answers of the President on the Questions by Reston—check notes for the oral answers. Who is going to be with PR during the interview?", were notes written by Tito's chief of staff, General Badurina.[81] Reston was first received by the Federal Secretary of Foreign Relations Josip Vrhovec for lunch. He had expressed his deep appreciation for the President but announced that he had intentions to ask several more questions in addition to those already sent. "I have informed B. Mandić on this. He, as usual, started to dramatize", wrote Tito's chief of staff in his diary. Reston and Tito met on 28 February at 11.00 "It all went well", wrote Badurina, but it was far from over. As President Carter noted himself, the press contingent in the White House when Tito arrived "was the largest …since I've been president".[82]

On Monday, 6 March, at 900, Tito went to Batajnica airport and then to the USA. One day later, on the White House lawn, conversation was partialy held in English: "When Germans in 1944 had invaded Drvar…, he was explaining."[83] Reminiscences of the Second World War were constant. In the host address on 7 March 1978, Carter repeated the story of an airplane navigated by George McGovern, then US Senator from North Dakota, who had crashed in a vineyard next to Tito's headquarters on the island of Vis. Carter was appeasing, kind, ans had mentioned nonalignment several times and Tito's great role in the world affairs. "He's an amazing man… vigorous, very confident of himself… helpul with advice concerning the Soviets, Ethiopia, Somalia, Korea, Egypt, and Eastern European countries", Carter wrote in his diary.[84] Tito was put in Blair House, received the keys to Washington DC, had a conversation with Vice President Walter Monale, Henry Kissinger, and Averell Harriman. He was interviewed by Walter Cronkite.[85]

Human rights should not be used to cause world stir. No one should neglect them, Tito said, but they are a part of human development, no one should use it to interfere in the internal matters of other states, Tito

was rather direct.[86] The Yugoslavs liked Carter, and they were hoping that US policy was finally accepting Yugoslav ideas, non-aligned, becoming more rational, tolerant. In 1978 Carter had mailed Tito eight times, in 1979 seven times. Tito had, for example, informed Carter on the elements of the North Korean policy; encouraging Carter during the Iranian hostage crisis.[87] Although the interest that Carter was showing for Yugoslavia was exceptional, Yugoslavia was not more important than before. The non-aligned were gaining in importance, especially since Cuba was trying to overtake the movement, attempts which were more or less prevented during the Sixth Conference of the Movement of the Non-Aligned in Havana.[88]

Finally, in the material prepared for Averell Harriman, who was representing the USA at the funeral of Yugoslav no. 2 Edvard Kardelj in Ljubljana in 1979, Yugoslavia and Tito were described as "a maverick in Communist theory and practice…", a leader of a country that "no longer comes close to the totalitarian communist stereotype of a highly centralized command system characterized by the suppression of individual rights". Yugoslavia was not a democracy but mechanisms created by self-management, federalization, and decentralization, created mechanisms that were enabling representative bodies to be much more active than in any other Communist country. The banking system was "semi-Western". Tito was a self-proclaimed leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, but so active in seeking the role of a mediator and a spokesman.[89] Sometimes not in tune with US interests, but in the late 1970s as the Cubans were radicalizing their policy in the Third World, the Yugoslav position was becoming more moderate. Therefore, Yugoslavia was probably to keep its importance in the world, which was far greater than its nominal place in the world.[90]

The Sixth Conference of the Movement of the Non-Aligned in Havana (September 1979) proved that Yugoslavia, after all, was very useful. Since Castro did not have his way, that was at least one defeat less for the Carter Administration. To remain dedicated to the original ideas of the non-aligned, Tito was weakening Cuban and Soviet influence in the Third World.[91]

Justified Fear: The Death of Tito: End of Yugoslavia

US appreciation of the Yugoslav moves in Havana was visible during the first official visit of newly appointed ambassador to Washington, Budimir Lončar. On 12 January 1980 Lončar was received by Cyrus Vance,

together with all the top officials of the State Department. Also, the Yugoslav position on the Iranian Hostage crisis, assistance provided to Washington, even the semi-hesitant, condemnation of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (December 1979), in light of improved relations between China and Belgrade, all showed that the Yugoslav position was useful to the White House.[92]

Carter did not go to Tito's funeral. He was not ready at that time to meet with Brezhnev anyhow.[93] His mother, Vivian, went instead, as did Vice President Walter Mondale and many others.[94] The President himself came less than two months later, after the summit of the G7 in Venice.[95] No joint communiqué was issued, the trip was hardly mentioned even in Carter's diary.[96] What was important was said by Carter at the Surčin airport. Carter gave a homage to Tito and Yugoslav independence and territorial integrity but also specifics of the Yugoslav internal formation and non-alignment. Immigrants to the USA who were opposing Yugoslavia were one of the problems that were to be dealt with. A different approach to the Croatian immigrants especially was visible even during the presidential visit. With Carter, those who were opposing Tito were not allowed anywhere close to him.[97]

Carter's first two years as president were more or less in tune with detente; the second part of his term was rather bellicose, no so unlike Ronald Reagan's. Without Tito and with a falling economic situation, with a complicated state structure, and no strong leaders, Yugoslavia was even more than before sensitive to verbal offensive neocons from the White House.[98] Although relations between the Republicans and the Yugoslavs have always been excellent, now there was a fear of destabilizing the world situation. It all started rather clumsily, as with Carter. Ronald Reagan was signed on as a contributor to the Croatian émigré paper saying how Yugoslavia was an artificial state, soon to dissolve. Yugoslav authorities were horrified. Reagan quickly apologized and proceeded with standard US policy vis-à-vis Yugoslavia.[99] America was changing its approach to other countries but the Yugoslavs were on the safe side. Relations between the two countries during the first Reagan administration were, as judged by the Yugoslav circles, improved.[100] The crisis that eventually led to the end of Yugoslavia was anyhow homemade. The weakening influence of the Soviet Union, and after that the reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev, were at a moment welcomed, showing that the role of Yugoslavia was positive, that Yugoslavia was, after all, an irritant for the conservative Communist circles around the world. Although the last top level visitor from the USA to Yugoslavia, before the

crisis erupted, was the Vice President George H.W. Bush, who came to Belgrade on 18 September 1983. Many top level Yugoslavs were traveling to Washington, though, prime ministers, members of the Collective Sovereign, Presidency of Yugoslavia. The President of the Presidency, Mika Špiljak, went to Washington on 1 February 1984, as did Milka Planinc, the first female prime minister in any Communist country in 1985,[101] and the member of the Presidency Josip Vrhovec on 6 May 1988.

Upon starting the conversation with Vrhovec, Ronald Reagan thanked the Yugoslavs for help in catching a group of Colonel Hawari, Abdulah Haibib, whose terrorists had kidnapped a TWA airplane flying from Rome to Athens. Yugoslavia had helped the Americans, showing once more that the role of Belgrade in the NAM was sometimes beneficial to Washington. This had a very positive effect on the conversation in the White House in general. The independence of Yugoslavia was still important, but changes in Eastern Europe were quickly surpassing the level of the Yugoslav development. Therefore, formation of the Forum for Human Rights within the Socialist Union of the Working People was greeted by the US government. The Yugoslav side was ensured that the law proposals to put Yugoslavia on the spot for the human rights of Albanians in Kosovo "will not go further than sub-committees".[102] Human rights as a major component in US foreign policy were not in focus for too long, as D. Fascel, the president of the Foreign Policy Committee in the US House of Representatives stressed to his Yugoslav counterpart. After Chile, South Korea, and Turkey, the USA is obliged to continue with that approach but his understanding of Yugoslav particularities was sufficient, no economical sanctions were envisaged for Yugoslavia. Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz were "not ideologized", and they remained very interested in the events in the USSR, especially in light of Gorbachev's visit to Belgrade and Brijuni Islands in 1988. Every instance of power in the USA was stressing that "good relations with Yugoslavia were in the national interest of the USA". Big US-Yugoslav business projects with Yugo-America were still operational, so emphasis was on economic cooperation. The Yugoslav–American exchange in 1987 was worth $1.5 billion with small sufficiency on the Yugoslav side. Certain Yugoslav industrial sectors were growing more than significantly in the US market, more than 22% per year, but in absolute numbers it was all more than modest. Zagreb enterprise "Ingra" had managed to sign a contract to build a power plant and deliver energy equipment for several plants.[103] The US market was huge, open, with potential for Yugoslavia—only if companies

managed to organize, approach it together, front continuous campaigns in the US market—possibilities were great.[104] However, knowing that the overall Yugoslav export to the USA in 1983, for example, was 0.1 % of all US import, made all this rather depressing.[105]

Probably more indicative for the falling reputation of Yugoslavia was the arrest for money laundering of the Yugoslav Counselor General Bahrudin Bijedić in Chicago, in front of the cameras in 1988. The event was not crucial, the US side in the end was wrong, the counselor was let go free of charges, but all this was a manifestation of the changing world. Change, much more visible, came with the final extradition of Andrija Artuković to Yugoslavia in 1986.[106] Although it was far from only reminiscence of the Second World War in Yugoslavia, now World War II was back in the political arena. Artuković, who was the minister of interior of the pro-Nazi Independent State of Croatia, was sentenced to death in the court in Zagreb. Extradition of the half-blind and senile Ustasha war criminal had refreshed memories from the previous war, refreshed historical debates that never became history.

When Warren Zimmerman came to Yugoslavia in June 1988, and as it turned out to be the last US ambassador, he had repeated US interest in integrity and unity but now things that were sidelined for years, like human rights, the position of the Albanian minority in Kosovo, the democratic deficit, were gaining in importance for the USA. The Yugoslav socialist neighbors, for decades more conservative, unfree, and official allies of the Soviet Union, were changing rapidly now, opening new possibilities for the USA. For as long as the structure of the Cold War was firm, the benefits of supporting the dissident position of Yugoslavia were stronger than the critics of its democracy deficits. Also, Yugoslavia was a counter-balance for those within the administration who were advocating closer relations with the right-wing dictatorships like Spain and Greece or Portugal. When traveling to Yugoslavia, US presidents were always stopping in Madrid. But with the waning of the Cold War, with its transformation, Yugoslavia was quickly losing its extraordinary position, transforming into a just-regular peripheral European state.[107]

When the crisis started, this country that was for years supported without too many questions asked, was now on the C list of US national security concerns.[108] When Yugoslavia was dissolving, two Yugoslav specialists, sometimes called “the Yugoslav mob”, were occupying the most senior positions in Washington. Lawrence S. Eagleberger, the former US ambassador in Belgrade, was the undersecretary of state, and then the Secretary of

State in the George H.W. Bush administration. General Brent Scowcroft, who was an assistant Air Force attaché in Belgrade from 1959 to 1961, became a new national security advisor. All this did not transmit especially effective policy towards Yugoslavia. George Bush was concentrated on problems elsewhere, and his two senior politicians could not believe that Yugoslavia was to break up. The administration was supporting the introduction of a multi-party system but growing nationalism was developing much faster. In October 1989 Ante Marković, the last of the Yugoslav prime ministers, did not achieve much during his visit to the White House. The USA was interested in an independent, united, sovereign Yugoslavia, the market orientation of the new government, and pluralistic democratic reforms were praised; but that was all. The Federal authorities were given no cash, which was badly needed for reforms, Marković's requests were significant but not as promising as the changes in the Eastern Europe.[109]

In the Foreign Policy sphere Budimir Lončar, the first professional ever to become the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had managed to bring the Ninth Conference of the Non-Aligned to Yugoslavia (4–7 September 1989). Critics of such a decision were numerous, some coming from the standard critics of Third-Worldism and the allegedly anti-European policy of Yugoslavia. Others knew that this was the only way to remain on the world scene, and to play some important role for the next three years. Some politicians even thought that this was the last possibility to show "New Pluralism". Another more logical candidate for the host country was Sandinist Nicaragua. Managua, supported by the Cubans, was radical for the changing world, for Gorbachev's Soviet Union, for global balance.[110]

It was all in vain. Foreign policy activity was always important but could not be a savior of unity. In February 1990, when Deputy Secretary of State Eagleberger came to Yugoslavia, he had repeated that the unity of Yugoslavia was of great importance. It was in the interest of Europe, but far from being the only goal for the US establishment. Yugoslavia was the only Communist country with the potential to conduct reforms and solve its economical situation. Secretary of State James Baker came to Belgrade on 21 June 1991, only to conclude that Yugoslavia was like a full can of worms.[111] The unity of Yugoslavia was still a priority. One embassy was less expensive than six or more, commerce was much easier in one big market than a series of small countries, potential costs of wars and destruction were huge. But the choice between democracy and unity this time was different than it had been for the past several decades. Unity was not to be at the

expense of democracy this time, but the message of James Baker was seen differently in different parts of Yugoslavia. The Slovenians and the Croats had proclaimed their independence on 25 June 1991 (for the first time). In a short war that followed in Slovenia, and then a much more brutal one in Croatia, the USA was not playing an important role, especially not at the beginning. It was the task of Europe to solve the crisis. Europe failed. "Empire by invitation" was American but not before the mid 1990s.

Notes

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CHAPTER 5

The Untold Stories of Yugoslavia and Nonalignment

Zachary Irwin

The title of this chapter poses a mild paradox, for it presumes an "untold story" in an area of policy whose political significance pleads to "tell all" as a distinctive approach to foreign policy. However, the source material from the Non-Aligned Movement may be promising. "Untold stories" may lurk in places not yet properly examined or appreciated. Thus, a recently declassified collection of US intelligence estimates concerning Yugoslavia offers some promise of new information. Similarly, the memoirs of statesmen reveal a good deal of anecdotal information that may revise such standard works as Alvin Rubinstein's *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World*.[1] This book and ones written about 40 years ago form the basis of our understanding of nonalignment as a historic movement. It is likely that this literature and the voluminous public material produced by the movement's supporters like Yugoslavia can prompt reconsideration. Indeed, any reexamination of Socialist Yugoslavia more than 20 years after its collapse is likely to create a different perspective on the relatively complex diplomatic questions that constitute "nonalignment" as we understand it. Nevertheless, there seems little doubt about the Non-Aligned Movement's commitment to a novel system of diplomacy. Unlike ideas of national interest and security based on a nuanced and calculated ambiguity,

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nonaligned statesmen proclaimed adherence to collective goals adopted periodically at multilateral conferences. At its apogee from 1956 through 1979, the movement left little to the imagination. Diverse countries and leaderships sought to avoid the subordination and imperatives of the Cold War and to maintain freedom of developmental choice. At its height, the idea of nonalignment attracted serious theorists that considered nonalignment a kind of template for transformation of the entire international system, and a "relevant response to the conditions of the nuclear age". [2] We shall return to the idea of "relevance" shortly. For many observers the chasm between the movement's principles and practice eclipsed relevance.

Surely, the reality of the movement fell short of the idealistic claims of its spokesmen. The most frequent complaint about the movement was its identification with "socialist" diplomatic goals, especially after the 1979 Havana Conference. Writing in 1985, one Indian commentator noted that the effectiveness and credibility of the movement had reached its "nadir" and, more explicitly, that the movement should seek "cooperation rather than confrontation with the West, and coexistence rather than cooptation with the Soviet Union".[3] For individual members, nonaligned goals never trumped pressing national security concerns, regardless of "bloc politics". For example, India's 1962 conflict with China brought Prime Minister Nehru to seek US military assistance, and when not forthcoming, to turn to the Soviet Union. The nonaligned states could not devote resources needed for security comparable to those of European neutrals like Sweden and Switzerland. Yugoslavia's "All-peoples Defense" was one of the few defense establishments with the security potential implied by a nonaligned foreign policy, a sad fact demonstrated by the 1979 Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Nonaligned states were as prone to various conflicts among themselves. Collective aspirations lent no basis to mediate conflict. Conflicts, such as that between Somalia and Ethiopia, involved intractable disputes that long preceded the 1961 Belgrade Conference. Haile Selassie's presence at the 1955 Bandung meeting or Somalia's place in Belgrade six years later could not address the complex problems of territory, ethnicity and status in East Africa or elsewhere. Finally, the movement vigorously defended membership rights of countries whose regimes saw no need to proclaim some internal counterpart to nonaligned ideals. North Korea, Cuba, and Nicaragua at one point claimed an honored place in the movement. For "self-managing socialist" Yugoslavia, the pluralistic "socialism" of these regimes may have been well worth the cost of recognizing them as nonaligned. More upsetting to Belgrade were the objections of Western

critics, who looked beyond the internal regime to their argument, advanced at the 1979 Havana Summit, that the Soviet Union was a "natural ally" of the nonaligned. Surely, this version of nonalignment was at variance with socialist Yugoslavia's experience. The movement's economic goals might have presented an alternative to the emerging neo-liberal "Washington Consensus" of the 1980s.

Universalizing Relevance: If Not Untold, Surely Underappreciated

The idea of nonaligned states in Burton's sense was undermined both by the unexpected denouement of the Cold War and the contradictory limitations within the movement itself. A narrow sense of "relevance" is more durable, if it is restricted to the immediate needs of the movement's founders. The founding members of the nonaligned movement (Yugoslavia, India, and Egypt) notably brought a diversity of motives that the movement might satisfy. Nonalignment addressed Yugoslavia's position between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The geopolitical position is both of regional and policy significance in the Balkans. Andrew Wachtel observed that Yugoslavia followed a "classic Balkan in-between position and its leadership role in the international nonaligned movement only added to its credibility."[4] This description implies a whole theory about Europe and its regions, an enduring interpretation of nonalignment's "relevance" emerging from historical experience in place of the earlier literature's norm of historical transformation. Wachtel holds that Belgrade's 1955 reconciliation with the Soviet Union enabled the country to avoid dependence on the West and alternatively to increase its diplomatic value to both. Again a durable and agile "relevance" emerges from a geopolitical dimension. The policy of nonalignment redeems a traditionally peripheral area through its relevance to the Cold War and to the interests of the developing world. This process was twofold and mutually reinforcing. Because of Yugoslavia's centrality in the Balkans, its strategic value was enhanced through the nonalignment. The movement's initial success consisted in universalizing its relevance beyond the constraints of its membership. Thus, Yugoslavia used the purposes of nonalignment as an accompaniment to the claims of "authentic" self-managing socialism. In this respect, Yugoslavia's understanding of "nonalignment" differed from that of other nonaligned nations. Yugoslavia considered nonalignment

as constitutive to its foreign policy and definitive of its regime. The policy created certain self-regulating boundaries in relations with the "blocs" and their leadership. By contrast, nations such as India, Cuba, or Ethiopia viewed nonalignment as a declaratory element of overall policy that was compatible with various bilateral commitments. Of course, no nonaligned state was likely to join NATO or the Warsaw Pact. Yet disagreement about constitutive and declaratory senses of nonalignment were present in episodic debate about the movement's "original principles", Burma's 1979 withdrawal, or efforts to expel Egypt from the movement after the Camp David Accords.

For Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, nonalignment offered a distinctive rationale of foreign policy. A recent work on Nehru's choices refers to his "personal" preference for an "ideational" foreign policy. Nehru hoped to add a normative approach to foreign policy that might complement India's history as a former colony and one that would tie together India's anti-colonial history, its claims to non-violence, and its need for an adaptable approach to the superpowers. For Gamal Abdel Nasser, the nonaligned movement was an entirely different experience of domestic exigency. British withdrawal from Egypt in 1954 prompted Washington's interest in a US-sponsored Middle East alliance. For Nasser, the situation prompted several intersecting imperatives. The core problem was domestic criticism of any agreement that could perpetuate British involvement in Egypt and more decisively the rivalry that evolved with Iraq's adherence to a treaty with Turkey and Pakistan. The treaty was seen as a crude effort to "cripple" Egypt's position in the Arab world and exert pressure in delicate negotiations that had been in progress since 1953.[5] Refusing to join the alliance meant that a customary ally declined to provide weapons in the face of Israel's 1955 raid on Fedayeen bases in Gaza. Egypt's 1948 military humiliation by Israel had been an explicit motive for Nasser's 1952 Free Officers Coup. As a possible source of weapons, Nasser decided to recognize the Peoples Republic of China. Washington responded by withholding aid for the High Aswan Dam. Arguably, the 1954 uprising in Syria became an example to Nasser of his own destiny without armaments or development.[6] Nonalignment became a convenient choice confirmed by the 1956 Suez crisis. Nothing is really "untold" about this sequence of events, but the emergence of "nonalignment" before the 1961 conference is a testimony to the various uses of the movement for its members.

The Emergence of the Nonaligned Movement and the Belgrade Conference

Between 1956 and 1961, the idea of a general conference of the nonaligned took shape in tandem with the sharpening tensions of the Cold War. By 1961, Cuba, Berlin, and the nuclear issue foreshadowed a general extension of Soviet-US rivalry throughout the newly independent states of Africa. Were sheer numbers of independent states to register the significance of nonalignment, one would look to Nairobi rather than Bandung. By the early 1960s, Soviet-Chinese competition in the developing world further complicated a situation that made nonalignment a more convenient and relevant response for all parties. The "cold war" did not spare the "Camp of Socialism". Robert Rakove has determined that "nonaligned" became a "key battleground in the Sino-Soviet ideological battle … mirrored by a similar contest between China and India."[7] The choice of Belgrade for the first nonaligned conference allowed a compromise that enabled Yugoslavia to redeem the diplomatic value of the 1956 Brioni Declaration and to pose a convenient way for Belgrade to exclude the Chinese from a "second Bandung," as a logical successor meeting to the first. Sino-Soviet polemics reached its apogee in an arcane and repetitive debate about the errors of "revisionism" and "dogmatism" in Marxist thought. Khrushchev and Mao had made Yugoslav communism an uncomfortable proxy for Mao's attack on "revisionism." The Belgrade Conference offered a respite for Yugoslavia's involuntary inclusion in Sino-Soviet "bloc politics," while it allowed New Delhi an authentic category for its foreign policy that bettered Beijing and offered Cairo an inoffensive way to distance itself from an emerging dependence on Moscow.

Political horizons are necessarily truncated, but in 1961 nonalignment offered its supporters a nice solution to differing foreign policy problems. First, it permitted the rhetoric of a legitimate foreign policy allowing individual members to borrow one another's prestige. Second, it provided the collective membership with a diplomatic salience they could not have enjoyed individually. Finally, by providing a broad and rather vacuous set of policy positions, it avoided destabilizing domestic debate about "national interests". The short-term success of these purposes was evident in the efforts of the socialist world to co-opt the movement diplomatically, and in the concern of the USA to influence the outcome of its summits. The relational nature of nonaligned "power" depended on the consensus of its members and perceptions of the two "blocs". Any enduring consensus

within the movement was difficult enough without the influence of the "socialist" members who advocated a "natural alliance" of the nonaligned and the Soviet Union. That debate and the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan crippled the movement's claim to "non-bloc" integrity and revealed its diplomatic weakness. Cuba's thesis of a "natural alliance" bridged the divide between Soviet socialism and the nonalignment movement, an intolerable situation for Yugoslavia's "non-bloc" European status. The interesting aspect of the Havana Conference consists less in the inevitability of Moscow's conquest than in the apparent presence in 1961 of those elements that made it possible. From the outset of the movement, its purpose became an object of political rivalry.

The Belgrade Conference: An Albanian Perspective

At a time when Albania, China's "beachhead in Europe," acted as a paladin against Yugoslav "revisionism", Tirana sought to win over nonaligned states for the "camp of socialism." In his address to the Fourth Congress of the Albanian Workers Party early in 1961, Enver Hoxha distinguished Yugoslavia from the other nonaligned states. "This 'neutrality' and 'extra-military bloc' attitude of the Yugoslav state bears no resemblance whatsoever to such neutral states as the United Arab Republic, India, Indonesia….[P]resent-day Yugoslavia participates in the aggressive NATO bloc through the Balkan Pact."[8] The speech gave prominence to a recently signed Cuban-Albanian "economic and cultural agreement" and the "heroic and revolutionary struggle of the Cuban people". Otherwise, Hoxha made every effort to identify Albania as a "loyal member of the socialist camp". This important clarification was intended to privilege Albanian communication with other socialist states, while it condemned Yugoslav and Soviet "revisionism." Promoting "anti-imperialism" through the nonaligned conference may have had little impact in view of China's and Albania's absence from the Belgrade conference, but Tirana's diplomatic correspondence exposed a troubling challenge to Yugoslav nonalignment that only became more aggravating.

Albania's ambassador in Cairo identified three groups at the conference: the "rightists" (India and Yugoslavia), the centrists (UAR, Ghana), and the "leftists" (Cuba, Guinea, Somalia).[9] Clearly, the object was for Cuba to mobilize the conference in order to identify nonalignment with its notions of "anti-imperialism" and "peaceful coexistence." At the preparatory conference in June, the Cuban delegate, Raul Roa, had "hesitated" to take

part in any conference meeting in Belgrade, "but later he [Roa] decided to participate in order to promote a 'left-wing' group with an 'anti-imperialist' character. He received the encouragement for the creation for this group from the Chinese, Soviet, and Czech delegations."[10] Co-opting nonalignment for "socialism" was apparently a common objective for Beijing and Moscow. Their success threatened a diplomatic catastrophe, at least for Belgrade and India. However, the eventual "Declaration of the Nonaligned" condemned "colonialism and imperialism"; otherwise any "balance" between the blocs was problematic Although there was no mention of NATO or the USA, the communique avoided particular condemnation of Soviet nuclear testing, and mentioned the "acute aggravation" of the Berlin situation, an oblique criticism of NATO[11] The nuclear testing issue was particularly critical for Moscow, since Khrushchev had abrogated a prolonged moratorium the day before the Conference opened, culminating in the largest atmospheric test to date (57 megatons) on 30 October.[12] The distinction between Yugoslavia and her allies and the "leftists" involved more than a communique. If the movement were co-opted by the "leftists", it would be useless for Yugoslav's "non-bloc" foreign policy.

Regardless of Albania's condemnation of ideological pluralism within the "camp of socialism", Tirana was quite interested in the nonaligned movement. Albania's minister in Beijing reported an exchange with a Cuban official in which Albania greeted "any initiative which aims to help the struggle against imperialism and colonialism…" [13] With the same apparent objective, Albania's vice-minister for foreign affairs wrote the Albanian ambassador in Belgrade that the government was attempting to coordinate "the same stance" among the socialist states towards the Belgrade Conference. Albanian success was unlikely in view of Khrushchev's excoriating the Albanian leadership at the 22nd CPSU Party Congress in October 1961.[14] There was no common attitude towards the Belgrade Conference among other socialist countries. Warsaw commended the conference's anti-imperialist importance; Moscow demanded that it adopt the Soviet viewpoint towards the Berlin Conflict; China simply "soft-pedaled" its role.[15] Beijing had been excluded. Albanian diplomatic correspondence revealed that both India and the UAR, among others, had opposed China's involvement in the conference. Although the government in Budapest "did not approve" of the nonaligned conference, it wished to "exploit the divisions among the non-aligned bloc, in order to change the character of the conference to one of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism."[16]

Cuba's membership among the nonaligned would remain significant. The Albanian source reported that when Osvaldo Dorticós, the Cuban president, "began unmasking American imperialism, the diplomats from relatively pro-Western countries simply left the conference".[17] No outcome could have been more embarrassing to Tito, and apparently his intervention salvaged the conference's outcome. The response from Tahmaz Beqari, Albania's ambassador in Belgrade, condemned Tito's "revisionist spirit," dismissed the "unimportant" conference conclusions, and revealed Albania's efforts to enlist other socialist countries. The note confirmed that the Hungarian government did not "approve" of the conference's preparatory documents, but considered that the divisions among the nonaligned countries should be exploited by the socialist bloc in order to change the character of the conference to one of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. Albanian and Hungarian objectives coincided.[18] Despite their failure to influence the 1961 conference, Albania and Cuba sought to organize a second nonaligned "progressive" conference in Bandung.[19] Concurrently, India's vice minister of foreign affairs met with Tito and Nasser to initiate preparatory talks in Colombo for a 1964 Cairo Conference. Their effort succeeded in representing a larger and more diverse group of nonaligned states. The Cairo nonaligned Conference diminished "progressive" influence by increasing the number of participants from 26 to 47. "Albania's interest in nonalignment did not preclude addressing more specific concern to Nasser in 1968, a time after the 1967 Middle East War as well as one of Egypt's growing dependence on Moscow and the threatening "Brezhnev Doctrine" of limited sovereignty following the Czechoslovak invasion. Haxhi Lleshi, Albania's prime minister, focused on the "insecure" situation in the Mediterranean created by Soviet-US rivalry and the "belligerent" Soviet fleet enjoying privileges in "various sea bases" in Egypt. Lleshi expressed his "confidence" that "freedom-loving" Egypt "would not allow the use of its ports for aggressive actions against the People's Republic of Albania.[20]

A Different Problem: Nonalignment and the United States

The first nonaligned conference's indirect criticism of the USA appeared to leave relations intact with Yugoslavia. The question of nonalignment and bilateral relations was first set forth in National Security Council document NSC 5601 that "Yugoslav 'neutralism' tends to undercut U.S.

policies." Yet the document also recognized that Belgrade's distinctive position in Eastern Europe created a greater value for the USA than the negative impact of nonalignment or Tito's state (1955) and party (1956) reconciliation with the USSR. Briefly, because Yugoslav communism "differed in many material respects" in its policies from the rest of the communist world, "… no review of policy was called for at the present".[21] The rationale for this policy was inadvertently implied by the warning that "denial of U.S loan and grant assistance in the military and economic fields [would] tend to force Yugoslavia to turn further to the USSR as the only available alternative source [and] … may come to threaten Yugoslav independence." The memorandum seems to have wholly overlooked nonalignment as a challenge to Soviet policies. Instead, the Yugoslav "neutralist" stance was "unpleasant and irritating to the West" because of its "identity" with many Soviet policies and because it "sets an example for other countries that is contrary to U.S. interests." The rationale for improving Yugoslav relations was a relatively simple matter. Belgrade was "neither the cause of 'neutralism' nor the major factor in its spread in the world." However, its "formidable political and ideological role in the Soviet bloc of states [was] all out of proportion to its size and intrinsic importance",[22] Perceiving a distinction between Yugoslavia's place in Eastern Europe and the nonaligned world was basic to US policy, but would prove increasingly difficult to maintain. For the US President and the Department of State maintaining normal relations required that Yugoslavia remain outside of the Warsaw Pact and that Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement be qualified. However, supporting Belgrade required congressional assent. The military relationship had ended in 1958, but commercial preference and non-military assistance required congressional assent.

The US Congress objected that "independent and nonaligned" Yugoslavia remained "neutral" towards the USSR and Third World critics of the USA. There was "little domestic support for a subtle and flexible Yugoslav policy which focuses on Yugoslavia's role *vis-a vis* the Soviet orbit." Thus, there was a tone of relief in Yugoslavia's decision not to enter into any further discussion on armaments. For John Foster Dulles, Tito represented the possibility of "breaking up the Soviet empire without war," so any general perception of Tito as an "orthodox" Marxist-Leninist was preferred. According to the US scholar H. W. Brands, the "latitudinarianism" of the Eisenhower administration regarding Tito's communism confronted a political environment in which support for any Communist regime "could shorten a legislator's career". Critics asked

if the administration were intent on stopping communism, "what made Tito's communism so much than Stalin's?" A kind of political "double jeopardy" emerged in Roman Catholic congressional districts where the memory of Archbishop Stepinac's trial remained fresh.[23]

Emphasis on Tito's position in the Communist bloc remained a dominant concern, especially before the Soviet invasion of Hungary would deal a mortal blow to the appeal of "Titoism"in Eastern Europe. Ironically, more conservative Soviet Communists believed that Khrushchev's approval of Tito implied the same threatening "neutralism" sought by Imre Nagy in Hungary. During the Hungarian crisis late in September 1956, the National Security Council revealed a "flood of intelligence material alleging new and serious rifts [within the Soviet leadership] over the Yugoslav problem," indicating that Khrushchev's "liberal" engagement of Tito at the level of the two Communist parties in 1956 left the Soviet leader "completely isolated."[24] It would be about a year before the Soviet leader dealt with the "anti-party" opposition within the Politburo, the certain source of opposition to the reconciliation with Tito.[25] For its part, the US Congress agreed implicitly with Tito's Soviet opponents in forbidding any military assistance to Belgrade after 1958. Encouraging Titoism and, unavoidably, encouraging nonalignment was bad and inconsistent policy.

Supporters of the past US policy towards Yugoslavia didn't accept the presumption that nonalignment could express a distinctive orientation that occupied a political space outside of the international system shaped by the Cold War. While divergent interests might lead many states to disagree with the USA, the impact of Yugoslavia's action provided diplomatic support to the Soviet policy. Indeed, the anti-Western rhetoric of the Belgrade Conference multiplied evidence of why Tito's communism did not deserve US support. George Kennan had been the Kennedy administration's ambassador in Belgrade since March 1961, and remained so through July 1963. Unlike most ambassadors, Kennan enjoyed the right of a personal audience with President Kennedy. Kennan was troubled by the anti-American slant of the conference, and rightly so, since Tito had personally assured Kennan that he would conduct the conference in an "impartial manner" and neither he nor the correspondence between Kennan and Foy Kohler, assistant secretary of state for European affairs, laid bare the ambiguity and increasing cost of diplomatic gain in supporting Tito.

Prior to the Conference, Kennan's relationship with Tito had been positive and open. In June 1961, he had briefed Tito about the Kennedy-Khrushchev

talks in Vienna, and Tito had expressed his opposition to the Soviet plan for a "troika" to replace the UN Secretary-General.[26] Tito had personally assured Kennan that Yugoslav management of the Belgrade Conference would be done in an "impartial manner."[27] However, Tito's behavior at the conference evoked "deep disappointment" from Kennan. The reasons included Tito's statements on Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany (offensive references to "fascist and revanchist conceptions and tendencies"); Tito's refusal to criticize Soviet resumption of atmospheric nuclear testing, and the overall absence of criticism of Soviet policy.[28] Kohler's letter to Kennan of 12 October 1961 acknowledged a difficult situation. He stated that established policy "would undergo a searching challenge … as a consequence of Yugoslav actions at the Belgrade Conference".[29] Neither Kohler nor Kennan supported a fundamental change in policy. Kennan sought to blunt US retaliation and implicitly supported a viewpoint privately expressed to him by Yugoslav officials. More exactly, Kennan endorsed the idea that Tito's speech was prompted by a need to support Khrushchev against his anti-Yugoslav opponents in the Soviet leadership and against the militancy of the Chinese.[30] More generally, Kennan conveyed the "strong impression" of Yugoslav concern that the Belgrade Conference "may seriously damage their bilateral relations with the US, and impair prospects for aid projects at levels they have counted upon." Two months after the Belgrade Conference, Kennan reported Tito's public remarks exaggerated Washington's "pressure" on Yugoslavia. The ambassador cited a speech of Tito's in November 1961 that accused the USA of refusing to sell wheat to Yugoslavia, among other measures, creating a situation in which any US response would appear as a Yugoslav victory. "If we now go ahead and simply express readiness to conclude a contract for further surplus wheat, we create the erroneous impression that, shamed by Tito's logic and sobered by threatening reference to bitterness of Yugoslav people, we have yielded to pressure and agreed to do what were unwilling to do before he spoke."[31]

Assistant Secretary Foy Kohler expressed the State Department's viewpoint to Kennan. Kohler acknowledged that supporting Yugoslavia amounted to a "calculated risk in the many basic aspects of our policy …. [admitting] we may fail increasingly in that policy as time goes on," recognizing that a fundamental change in US policy raised the "risk" of moving Yugoslavia towards Moscow and "ultimately under Soviet domination." Kohler's reasons had nothing to do with any relative difference between the rhetoric of the Communist bloc and the nonaligned conclusions, but with the consequences of the loss of US aid. The nonaligned movement could

rupture and cease to have a durable political impact, but a US-initiated breach in relations with Yugoslavia could permanently damage US interests. Skepticism about nonalignment's future was credible in 1961.

A detailed CIA report on the Belgrade Conference had little to say about the USA and much about the internal contradictions of the nonaligned movement. The report detailed the unexpectedly long Cairo preparatory meeting in June 1961 concerning who was to be invited to Belgrade. The "radicals," including Cuba, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, wished to restrict the invitees and to create a "formal bloc" of states. India and others wished to make the meeting more inclusive at the expense of specific agreements. Assuming that Kohler was aware of the report, Tito's speech at the conference should not have come as a shock. [32] Clearly, Tito sought to soften the impact of the conference. Kennan met with Mijalko Todorović, one of Tito's four senior deputies. Todorović expressed his dismay at the "recent deterioration" in bilateral relations and more exactly the "unfriendly" attitude of the US press towards Yugoslavia and the "hindrance" in economic relations. Kennan replied somewhat defensively in citing the clarity of official statements on bilateral relations. As a matter for the Department of State, Foy Kohler indicated that the United States would not alter a viewpoint that had remained unaltered since 1948 in its "basic aspects". That included "a course that would bring the United States maximum benefit from the significant role of Yugoslavia as an independent socialist state …". Nevertheless, the overall impact of the Belgrade Conference had been to complicate and worsen bilateral relations.

In early 1962, President Kennedy asked Kennan to return to Washington for a review of overall Yugoslav policy. The result of the meeting was a commitment to existing commercial relations with Yugoslavia and to "non-Soviet bloc status," a designation effectively equivalent to most-favored-nation (MFN) status.[33] Notwithstanding Kennedy's and Kennan's personal warning to congressional leadership about diminished trade status for Yugoslavia, Senator William Proxmire and Representative Wilbur Mills included an amendment to the 1962 Trade Expansion Act that denied MFN status to all "countries or areas dominated by communism." Kennan tendered his resignation as ambassador, a move that Secretary Dean Rusk refused to accept.[34] The following year, the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, enacted in 1963, was amended to allow maintenance of existing MFN status for any country by the president's determination that prior commercial relations were in America's "national interest". Yugoslavia's commercial status was restored in 1964,[35] but overall relations never attained the

level of familiarity they had enjoyed before the Belgrade Conference. In a lengthy review of the situation in 1962, "Kennan noted that relations had endured a whole series of spontaneous harassments at the hands of private circles in our country: boycotts and withdrawals of existing orders for their goods, public burning of Yugoslav products … impairment of facilities for obtaining commercial credit, [and] refusal of their vessels for unloading at US ports."[36] Events like the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia or the 1973 Arab-Israeli war would create periods of consultation, but no sustainable change. The situation was stabilized by early 1962 in a statement by Secretary Dean Rusk, in which he said that the Department had "established no information that would in any way cast doubt on Yugoslavia's independence or which would suggest Yugoslav participation in such international Communist programs".[37] In late September 1970, shortly after the Lusaka Nonaligned Summit, President Nixon, Secretary of State William Rogers, and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger met with Tito, Foreign Minister Mirko Tepavac, and Prime Minister Mitja Ribičič. A "stenographic" record of the meeting in Yugoslav archives, omits any discussion about Lusaka on the US part.[38] The Havana Conference and the invasion of Afghanistan demonstrated that any sustainable change in relations was unlikely, whether the nonaligned movement was perceived as incidental to American interests, or Belgrade too weak to affect its decisions.

Beyond Nonalignment: The Road to Havana

Yugoslav-US relations survived the Belgrade Conference, although the level of familiarity between Tito and the the US ambassador never approached the level attained during Kennan's incumbency. Meanwhile, the Soviet approach to nonalignment presented a very different viewpoint from Washington's. Khrushchev's speech at the XXth Communist Party Congress initiated the idea of "peaceful coexistence" as a permanent strategy of Soviet foreign policy, a development made possible by the power of the socialist bloc and evolution of a "zone of peace," the "neutralist" nations of the Third World. In fact, the Soviet approach was a combination of co-optation and rivalry. Tito's 1956 meeting with Nehru and Nasser at Brionihad sought to create a monopoly to represent multilateral anti-imperialism, but by December 1957 Moscow had assembled the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference (AAPSO) in Cairo, consisting of a diverse group of "social organizations" from 45 countries. Unfortunately

for Moscow, by the mid-1960s the Chinese proved equally adept in creating their own rival version of the same organization.[39] Sino-Soviet rivalry coupled with violent overthrow of leftist stalwarts in Algeria and Indonesia ended the movement. The "solidarity" conferences paid little heed to the idea of nonalignment; for unlike the nonaligned conferences, they did not claim to represent governments. The differences between Belgrade's and Moscow's approach to the movement has been nicely expressed by Roy Allison. The Yugoslavs tended to see the movement as composed of "national entities seeking an independent existence like [the Yugoslavs] themselves; whereas Soviet leaders have perceived them as a potential 'reserve' for the socialist community within the national liberation movement or the 'zone of peace'".[40] Soviet-Yugoslav differences amounted to more than identification with Soviet policy goals and embraced certain theoretical positions, such as the consequences of military "blocs" for the probability of war and whether a state could be both nonaligned and socialist. Differences about "socialism" persisted through the 1976 Brezhnev-Tito Summit.[41]

"The 1973 Algiers Summit emphasized the place of "imperialism" [as] still the greatest obstacle on the road towards emancipation and progress of developing countries".[42] With respect to the USA, episodes such as the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the October 1973 Middle East War yielded serious consultations, but no lasting change in relations. Soviet and Cuban involvement in the Third World had dramatized the challenge to the earlier idea of nonalignment. By the late 1970s, Soviet Third World policy confronted Yugoslavia with a de facto change in nonalignment. Cuban intervention in Ethiopia and Angola along with "Marxist" regimes Nicaragua and Yemen began to shape the movement. At subsequent meetings, Cuba consistently argued for the identity of Soviet and nonaligned political objectives, and as Cuba became more prominent in the movement, the Yugoslav concept of nonalignment became defensive. Brezhnev and Tito would meet, and broadly share a vocabulary about anti-imperialism and nonalignment, but Cuba insisted on a practical version of anti-imperialism that sharply defined Soviet preferences. A larger nonaligned movement might have benefitted Yugoslavia's viewpoint in the 1960s, but a decade later that outcome was less certain. Cuban intervention was symptomatic of a deeper crisis, reflecting a change in the character of the movement. Late in 1979, Foud Ajami wrote about the "erosion" of nonalignment evident in

> the recent drift towards fundamentalism…the attempts by the mighty to carve out spheres of influence throughout much of the third world, the scramble by the poor to find a patron who will shore up a weak regime or or help one state subdue its neighbor, the eagerness to be deputized by a distant power.[43]

Ajami's description of the quest for a specious "authenticity" by Third World political leadership meant the abandonment of broader principles that had animated both the Bandung and Belgrade conferences. Ajami was among the first intellectuals who were sympathetic to Western values and perceived the behavior of leaderships in developing countries as threatening the broader fabric of global democratic values.[44] Although generalizations about so broad a group of states may be suspect, the movement's utility for Yugoslavia's purposes was fundamentally compromised. The situation was evident in the muted response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. At Havana, the moderates were especially disappointed. The Burmese foreign minister considered that the final statement had not recognized the "principles" of the movement, which were "not merely dim…but dying". [45] Burma would formally withdraw from the movement. Moreover, the overall lack of a political consensus and growing polarization was partially reflected in Egypt's suspension after the Camp David Accords and the ouster of the pro-Chinese Cambodian regime. The absence of any reference to the "natural alliance" between socialism and nonalignment in the final communique was anti-climactic.

The attitude of the United States before Havana remained relatively unchanged since 1962. A document drafted by Yugoslav intelligence in mid-1975 demonstrates just how matters had changed from the initial familiarity between Kennan and Tito. Secretary of State Kissinger was judged to be "personally and adversely opposed" to the movement and remained "constantly in confrontation with [the nonaligned] on all important questions", owing both to "conflicts of interest" in economic and political questions and because a coincidence of Soviet and nonaligned positions embraced a common "anti-Americanism",[46] Declassified discussions between President Tito and Presidents Nixon and Ford confirm that other issues occluded discussion about nonalignment. Apparently neither US president considered the issue of sufficient interest. However, a report by the CIA shortly before the Havana Conference registered a somewhat different viewpoint. The American intelligence agency concluded that Yugoslav and Indian opposition to Cuba's strategy was central to the

movement, and that "a large majority" of nonaligned members "strongly believe that the draft does not represent the Non-Aligned Movement's principles or their interests". Correctly, the report held that Cuba would not press its viewpoint and "risk a splintering of the movement." More interesting was that the majority of members were opposed to "institutionalizing" decision making, for example, by means of a majority vote, since "more restrictive procedures would paralyze the movement."[47] If we able to assume that the report had shaped American policy, we might also conclude that the absence of American interest at the meeting with Tito were less a question of Kissinger's hostility to the movement than to skepticism about Tito's influence.

Tito invested his failing strength at Havana in opposing Castro and his allies; he had helped to prevent final adoption of the "natural allies" thesis. However, in a few months the movement confronted its most serious challenge independently of any summit meeting. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December and Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea shredded the assumption that non-alignment could provide a modicum of additional security to Yugoslavia's position in the Balkans. Politburo member Raif Dizdarević, President of Bosnia-Herzegovia's executive and future Foreign Minister, reported on a meeting with the Defense Minister, Nikola Ljubičić, whose "pessimism" about Yugoslav security dominated the proceedings and more exactly that a "grave situation of Tito's illness and the euphoria of the Soviet Union owing to the easy occupation of Afghanistan, the possibility could not be excluded of a comparison with our situation."[48] The death of Tito in May 1980 and the sheer uncertain effectiveness of Yugoslavia's new political institutions gave way to a persistent doubt about the value of non-alignment, especially the question of identification with varied financial and commercial initiatives adopted by the nonaligned countries, such as the renunciation of increasing debt to developed countries and lending institutions.

The Challenge of Consensus in the Post-Tito Era

Tito's death in May also did away with the privileged status of Yugoslav foreign policy in overall decision making. His successors might agree that the country should remain nonaligned, but its meaning in practice was less obvious. Issues concerning development became increasingly relevant both in Yugoslavia and in the nonaligned movement as a whole. The idea of seeking a "new international economic order"

favorable to developing countries was first raised at the 1973 Algiers Summit and were most clearly articulated in the 1976 Columbo Nonaligned Summit's "Economic Action Program." The Program featured objectives of "South-South" economic cooperation. Yugoslavia joined eight of seventeen functional subcommittees created to implement the movement's plans for cooperation among its members.[49] These committees discussed various aspects of economic, commercial and financial cooperation. However, Yugoslavia was less able to act as a single sovereign entity as its economy entered a period of growing state intervention, expressed through a series of negotiated "multi-regional bargaining initiatives" whose result aggravated regional differences.[50] Increasing interest rates and the "oil shocks" of 1974 and 1979 further complicated the economic situation. The combined consequence of increased energy costs and conflicting regional priorities became associated with higher levels of inflation, stagnancy and external debt in the Yugoslav economy. During the 1980s, an external debt of $21 billion would be repeatedly "restructured" as the IMF and the World Bank exerted increasing influence on Yugoslavia's policy choices through its "enhanced surveillance procedure".[51] In order to improve the balance of payments, the currency was devalued, a change that reduced consumption and increased the price of imported components in manufacturing. The results unevenly affected those republics more dependent on imports while concurrently increasing inflation. Conversely, successive devaluations improved the earnings of republics that relied on exports, tourism and foreign remittances.

Tito's death in May 1980 exposed the country's leadership to a gap between programmatic nonaligned goals and the reality of Yugoslavia's economic situation. More exactly, collective nonaligned summits might recommend an attitude of defiance (the Havana Conference had rejected outright the idea of conditionality[52]), while members like Yugoslavia had no choice but to negotiate with international creditors as best they could. Budgetary austerity had a direct impact on foreign policy. In October 1981, *Tanjug* announced that in accordance with the "stabilization policy", a version of austerity, the Federal Executive Council had decreed the closing of "ten diplomatic-counselor missions" and personnel reductions at others.[53]

Croatian party leader Vladimir Bakarić was the first to question the congruence of nonaligned rhetoric and the Yugoslav economy. He enjoyed the prestige of having been closely associated with Tito, and

in a wide-ranging interview he explained that he did not object to the idea of economic cooperation among the nonaligned, but that no such approach could substitute for a fundamental change in the country's overall economic policy. "[I]rrespective of Havana," the relevant policy implied the necessity of Yugoslavia's adaption to "a new role in the world" that would require "sacrifices…higher productivity, [and] more efficient economic operations". For Bakarić, there was "only one international market," and the purpose of economic policy should be to make Yugoslavia into a "more active factor in the world's division of labor". Bakarić concluded, "If we fail to achieve that [e.g., more growth], then all our crying for more cooperation with the developing countries will be in vain because our system will not suit them".[54] In short, he argued that the policy demands for economic cooperation with the developed or the developing countries was as indivisible as the market itself, and the idea of denouncing the capitalist West and its lenders was fatuous. Moreover, Bakarić recognized that the movement had become "polarized" since some members had found their security "in bowing to a bloc" and engaged in "disputes which have their roots in the old division of spheres of interests". On its face, the former Foreign Minister and Serbian Party leader Miloš Minić made a comparable distinction between the "original principles" of the nonaligned and the movement's present character. Briefly, the result had been the "stirring up of a kind of campaign…aimed at redefining the policy of nonalignment and reorienting the nonaligned movement."[55] Minić was more enamored with the "indispensable" role of the movement for Yugoslavia and the "exceptionally great significance for nonaligned cooperation." The speech was made at a conference on nonalignment in Yugoslavia that Minić organized on the 20th anniversary of the Belgrade Conference and shortly after Bakarić's remarks. The timing and measured words were indicative of the classic style of policy conflict in Communist states. The difference in emphasis did not mean that Yugoslavia would withdraw from the movement, but the clear implication was that cooperation with international debtors was compatible with "nonaligned principles" in the same way that relations with the Soviet Union were for Cuba.

Soviet objectives were not confined to a Cuban proxy. In 1981, Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic undertook a diplomatic offensive to bind nonaligned "progressives" to the two East European countries. For example, Marcelino dos Santos, a member of

the Mozambique Frelimo Central Committee, visited Sofia and Berlin in order to sign commercial agreements with the two socialist states.[56] In the course of 1981, Bulgaria entertained more than a dozen "progressive" nonaligned states.[57] A joint communique with the Democratic Republic of the Congo "highly appraised the African States participation in the Nonaligned movement …in the struggle against imperialism, racism and apartheid, for defending world peace and for a new just international economic order…".[58] It is likely the Yugoslav officials would have objected to the joint communique signed by the Bulgaria and Vietnam party secretaries shortly after the Havana Conference. Vietnam's Party Secretary Le Duan praised Bulgaria's "role in creating an atmosphere of mutual trust, good neighborliness and mutual benefit in the Balkans".[59] Support for Bulgaria's "peace policy" in the Balkans implied support for Sofia in the long-running dispute with Yugoslavia about "recognition" of the Macedonian nationality.[60] Of course, the character of Soviet-Bulgarian relations, especially in the early 1980s, suggested to the Yugoslavs that Bulgarian, or East German, foreign policy had been approved by Moscow.

We have mentioned Yugoslavia's increasing indebtedness to the West. Ironically, as the level of the country's debt increased so did its share of trade with other socialist countries in the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). In 1981, Yugoslav exports to CMEA increased 11% for a total of 49%, while exports to market economies declined from 37% to 32.5%.[61] Veselin Djuranović, president of the Federal Executive Council provided percentages of the decline in republican trade with the "convertible area", emphasizing that the multiple consequences of this fact for the country as a whole.[62] Again the Bosnian Party leader Nijaz Didarević warned that

> [E]conomic relations with foreign countries may grievously damage Yugoslavia's overall international economic situation and its resistance to various forms of pressure that could be used against our country [and] the regional distribution of exports and imports[which] is directly and immediately linked with our independence and our role ithe world. We are far too dependent on exports to one region and in our indebtedness and deficit to the other.[63]

In a similar way, Mitja Ribičič, president of the LCY Presidium, warned about the consequences of indebtedness, the "artificial fronts and

divisions between developed and underdeveloped and poor nations… [adding] This is also a question of our sovereignty of preserving the principles of self-managing socialism and our membership in the great nonaligned movement."[64] Reference to nonalignment could have been an implicit warning, that is, concerning a danger both from the commercial dependence and from the financial restructuring, yet the the danger represented by Western lending organizations was negotiated, painful and transparent. The consequences of commercial dependence on the USSR differed.

One description of a 1981 trade agreement with the Soviet Union detailed a rather complex barter agreement in which Yugoslavia was assured of several years to end a deficit of Yugoslav manufactured goods for Soviet petroleum. Instead, "none of this [the agreement] occurred"; the period for ending the deficit was reduced to a single year, and, rather than receiving Yugoslav industrial equipment, Moscow demanded "an increase in food products and consumer goods," while the promised petroleum and derivatives were reduced by 25%. The article insisted that Moscow had not reduced petroleum deliveries in that year to any other country.[65] Such behavior could be understood as pressure. Plausibly, Tito's 1981 meeting with Soviet General A.A. Yepishev, head of the Main Political Directorate, raised the possibility of more permanent arrangements for a Soviet naval presence in the Adriatic or contingency plans for Montenegro's Bay of Kotor.[66] Tito had granted Soviet landing rights during the 1973 October War.[67]

Meanwhile, in preparation for the Seventh Nonaligned Summit in 1983, Yugoslavia embarked on a diplomatic offensive on behalf of the movement's "Original Principles". The effort involved both bilateral meetings with the Indian and Egyptian foreign ministers in advance of the meeting of the Coordinating Bureau.[68] Clearly, Egypt hoped (successfully) to realize its readmission to the movement. A meeting with President Sergej Kraigher and Egypt's Foreign Minister Boutrus-Ghali sought to help realize "the readiness of the Arab Republic of Egypt to make a contribution to the movement of the nonaligned".[69] Overall, the summit was a relative success from Yugoslavia's viewpoint in avoiding the polarization of the previous conference.[70] Yugoslav efforts to promote "Mediterranean Security" among the nonaligned amounted to a relevant response for the movement, but not one likely to win the attention of powers most able to affect it. Attention to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinians were eclipsed by the Iran-Iraq War.

Yugoslavia and Nonalignment: An Inescapable Problem

One might wish to conclude with a striking "untold story" concerning Yugoslavia and the nonaligned. Perhaps the least understood "story" is more general and concerns the character of international power, Tito and the the Cold War. Ultimately, the significance of nonalignment and its perception were inseparable from nonaligned leadership. The Serbian historian and politician Latinka Perović, historian and secretary of the Serbian Communist Party from 1968 to 1972, considers that Tito was "recognized" by the nonaligned world as its leader.

> [A]nd they knew he was respected in the West, had been respected in the East, even in Russia itself, at the time of the Informbiro. … The fact is that Tito was a figure of balance in a country located between two opposing blocs, characterized by economic and social contradictions, national heterogeneity, and religious diversity. And he was an instinctual leader. All of that was condensed in his personality.[71]

Nonaligned Yugoslavia was able to win the attention of the major powers because Tito was considered significant for their interests. The exchange between Tito and George Kennan and the high level review accorded relations with Belgrade by the Kennedy administration were emblematic of this power. Ironically, the power depended less on the nonaligned states and more on the centrality of Eastern Europe in the Cold War. Tito's success consisted in transferring that power from the first arena of world politics, foreign policy. The importance of nonalignment depended on preserving that consensus within Yugoslavia. Consensus declined in the face of three distinct challenges: the Soviet-Cuban attack on Tito's leadership; the death of Tito; and the decline of the Yugoslav economy. By the 1980s, partisans of "nonalignment" or a more "Eurocentric" foreign policy were a persistent element in the country's political life.[72] The debate was perceived as inseparable from the country's economic and political destiny.

One data-rich study has explained the problems of inflation, the trade deficit and the decline in industrial productivity in the context of Yugoslav regional differences. "In the 1980s the internal and external problems of the economy amalgamated to produce a situation which was no longer tolerated by the constituent republics, particularly the better

off ones".[73] Eventual independence seemed a way to resolve economic problems, but to realize non-Communist ideals of cultural and political destiny. The assumption was that fundamental change in relations with the European Union offered an alternative to the destructive nationalism that convulsed the country. Opposition parties, emerging in 1989–1990, like Slovenia's *Demos,* made no reference to nonalignment, but instead envisioned a "confederation as a temporary solution to help the Slovenian state join the European Community."[74] Nonalignment was simply irrelevant. Consideration of the reasons for Yugoslavia's collapse has been studied exhaustively. The idea of an alternative to nonalignment was implicit, if distantly so, in amendments to the 1963 Constitution and in Article 271 of the 1974 Constitution, creating a "federal clause" requiring concurrent action by the Republics and authorizing "cooperation" between the federal units and foreign states.[75] Foreign Secretary Budimir Lonchar noted the growth of "regional circles" such as the "Alps-Adriatic" and the "Pentagonal" associations involving Yugoslav federal units and neighboring states.[76] Loncar spoke approvingly of these connections, but it is doubtful he would have approved of those between Albania and Kosovo. Serbia's Milosevic was hostile to Slovenia's and Croatia's "European orientation". He remarked that he was "sorry to see that in some of our republics representatives of foreign states are supervising and 'guarding' democracy and freedom."[77] Apparently, Serbian interest in Greece and Romania did not entail such interference. No province or republic was denied foreign economic experience. As of September 1984, according to *Tanjug,* some 1267 "enterprises" had been authorized to conduct foreign trade, despite the fact that only 350 accounted for 83% of the country's exports.[78] In view of the economic situation, it is not surprising that legislation was introduced to reduce the number drastically.

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CHAPTER 6

Tito's 1968 Reinforcing Position

Hrvoje Klasić

Among other things stated in her letter to Karl Jaspers in June 1968, Hannah Arendt wrote the following: "It seems to me that the children of the next century will once learn about 1968 the way we learned about 1848."[1] While the general public deemed 1968 as any other year, the intellectuals rendered it a year of great significance. In part it was due to the events that were already under way, and even more so because of unexpected consequences. The key role in creating the feeling of "uniqueness" for 1968 was held by the student demonstrations and changes in Czechoslovakia. By displaying their dissatisfaction with the world they lived in, the students initiated a rebellion that was a place where social and political messages and demands supplemented each other. The fact that the student demonstrations were taking place almost at the same time in the most developed and underdeveloped countries, in all continents and political systems, was what made the rebellion a global phenomenon. On the other hand, socio-political changes in Czechoslovakia brought a short-lived glimpse of hope that a change for the better could happen in Eastern Europe as well. Unfortunately, what the "brotherly countries" of the Warsaw Pact did served to refute that quickly and demonstrate yet again the incompatibility between socialist practice and "human character". Apart from the consequences for the Czechoslovakian society, the military intervention proved to be one of the key events in the Cold War period. The fear of a possible spread of war threatened and slowed down

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the process of détente, and for a second the focus of security and political activities shifted from Asia to Europe.

In the case of Yugoslavia, 1968 still remained mostly an untold story. During socialism, the student movement and the intervention of Czechoslovakia were not the subjects of objective studies. Despite the open criticism of the aggression, immediately after the "normalisation" of the situation in Czechoslovakia, the Yugoslavian politicians decided to place more importance on the good relationship with the Soviet Union than the event. Consequently, any questioning of the justification for the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty was no longer a topic of public (and scholarly) interest. As for the student movement, if there was any spoken or written discussion of it, it was mostly conducted in order to demonstrate its hostility. Despite the numerous differences between the Yugoslav and other Eastern European regimes, or the difference between the level of political and economic freedoms between the societies, not one of the Communist parties was sympathetic to the criticism. By indicating the flaws and irregularities of the society, the student movements in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia voiced a loud and severe criticism against the ruling oligarchies. Most importantly, all sides to the conflict were aware of the justification behind the protests and demands. Further studies and analyses would only serve to affirm this realisation and make the existing antagonisms in the society more severe. That was why the governments in the socialist countries did what democratic governments could not. By declaring the student movements an enemy activity, any objective approach to the problem was beforehand enabled or made difficult at the very least. The best example of such writing was a book that through its title alone, *Liberalizam od Đilasa do danas. Pokušaj likvidacije Saveza komunista Jugoslavije i "nova levica"* (*Liberalism from Đilas to Date: Attempt at Eliminating the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the "New Left"*), tried to place the participants of the 1968 demonstrations in the same rank as "internal enemies" and declare the student movement a part of an organised and counter-revolutionary campaign.[2]

Apart from being important for the understanding of the Yugoslavian society, the events of 1968 are excellent material for the analysis of the governing and diplomatic skills of the Yugoslavian President, Josip Broz Tito. A welcomed guest to the Kremlin and White House, loved by most of his countrymen, Tito was perceived as a key element for the viability and stability of the complex Yugoslav federation as well as an essential

political factor on the global political scene. Because of that, the possibility of jeopardising Tito's position attracted great domestic and international public interest. After 1948 and the confrontation with Stalin, over the following 20 years Tito's authority became more and more resilient to all forms of pressure and his position in the country was indisputable. Hardly anyone could have foreseen how a few events in 1968 could have disturbed this ideal picture. President Tito entered the new year of 1968 full of faith and hope that it would be better than the previous year. The first editions of the national press of 1968 published pictures of a smiling and relaxed Tito in the premises of the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Serbia as he danced with the famous Yugoslavian opera diva Radmila Bakočević. The event was described in the renowned British weekly *The Economist* in an article that describes Yugoslavia as "one place where the right things manage to happen", along with a picture of the smiling Tito with a New Year's hat on his head. However, the coming year would prove to be one of the most turbulent in the history of socialist Yugoslavia. A series of adverse domestic and foreign political circumstances would rock the political elite as well as the general public. The development of events did not leave the Yugoslavian president indifferent either. Yet, despite the fact that, at one point in time, his presidency was at stake, Tito would once more succeed in turning the situation to his advantage. By the end of the year, his position was not only indisputable, but also strengthened. Tito's political experience as well as his skills in manipulation would particularly come to the fore during two events that marked the year of 1968—the student demonstrations and the intervention of Czechoslovakia.

Demonstrations

The "Lipanjska gibanja" ("June Turmoil") in Yugoslavian universities were the first postwar mass expression of dissatisfaction with the state of society, where participants did not hesitate, amongst other things, to also challenge the responsibility of the highest political leaders in the country. In fact, the demonstrations were not anti-socialist but quite the reverse, an attempt to resist "the entropy of the social revolution".[3] It did not concern a well-organised political movement with the intention of taking over the government and changing the socio-political system. It was a spontaneous uprising by young, discontented, believers in socialism, who may not have known exactly what they wanted, but made it clear what they did not want.

Bearing in mind the fundamentals of social values, the Yugoslavian students' aim, unlike their counterparts in the West, was not the destruction of the system but rather its repair. The wave of student dissatisfaction, which within one week engulfed almost all of the universities in Yugoslavia, was only one in a series of warnings that the country was encountering a serious crisis.

At the time of the student demonstrations, Tito was staying on the Brijuni Islands. Contrary to all expectations, and particularly after two very rough incidents in Novi Beograd, Tito decided not to return to the capital city. More importantly, for the next seven days Tito avoided any public declaration in connection with the unfolding situation. Such an approach would prove valid, but at that time opened a series of questions and dilemmas for which no one had any solid answers. This related primarily to the politicians who in similar situations had always counted on Tito's adjudication. Several factors influenced Tito's particular behaviour. First of all, the situation in Belgrade was for everyone, even for him, completely unexpected. Everyone knew that the students were dissatisfied, but nobody could have ever imagined that they would express their dissatisfaction in such a way. This new experience required from the government and then from Tito himself as well, a new approach to resolving problems. Besides that, Tito repeatedly assured himself that success did not depend solely on what to say but also when and how to say it. In this exact case he decided to wait for the situation to mature. He estimated that it was not necessary to make a rash decision, and especially not to react impulsively. So whilst the leaders on the ground tried to restore control at the insurgent universities, Tito watched and waited for the right moment to take action. Rather worried, but by remaining on the Brijuni Islands, he tried to create the complete opposite impression. He did not run (like Charles de Gaulle), but continued his regular political activities. His priorities were foreign political affairs, whilst he left the resolution of the student problem to the Serbian and Belgrade leadership. So, instead of a telegram to the students, Tito sent a telegram of condolence to the widow of Robert Kennedy, and instead of student representatives, who had asked to see him, he hosted the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the British Ambassador to Yugoslavia and the Dean of the College of Cardinals in the Vatican.[4] Due to a lack of any public announcements, it may have been possible to get the impression that Tito was indifferent, however, he received constant updates about the situation in Belgrade (and other university centres) while staying on the Brijuni Islands. In fact,

the amount of information and number of informants are the best proof that the Yugoslavian president took the emerging situation very seriously.[5]

Inasmuch as he pondered on how to react, on the basis of all the available information, Tito also looked for the best moment to act. He did not want to react when the public expected him to, or when the politicians were hoping for him to react, or even when the students asked him to return to Belgrade and lead them in "the struggle against bureaucratic-statist deformation of conservative and reactionary power in society, in the struggle against common enemies…"[6] Choosing the method and moment to make a declaration were part of an overall strategy, which would afford him a kind of "deus ex machina" effect, with which he had assumed the role of arbitrator and saviour many times before. The fact that the student euphoria had begun to weaken by the end of that week, and that on Monday 10 June he had to welcome the Indian President, Tito decided this was the right time for action. He returned from the Brijuni Islands on 8 June. According to the account of Marko Vrhunec,[7] Tito got off the airplane frowning and in a bad mood. Jovanka's question, "Will they throw stones at us too?", probably partly expressed his fears too.[8] Before his address to the students and the general public, Tito also decided to contact most of the political leadership. Comparing these two "addresses" creates the impression that they did not come from the same person, and certainly not on the same day.

At the meeting of the Extended Bureau of the Presidency CK SKJ (Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia)[9] (8 June), and especially at the joint sitting of the Presidency and IK (Executive Committee) CK (9 June), Tito acted and sounded very nervous and worried.[10] The causes and consequences of the current events equally concerned him. He pointed out that student unrest was a culmination of the atmosphere of dissatisfaction, for which the Yugoslavian political leadership was largely to blame—"this revolt is in a great part the consequence of our hesitation, our dithering, our weakness, a consequence of the disunity, the non-implementation of the decisions of the Eighth Congress of the SKJ at which we very clearly specified the requirements which we must solve, and concerning the student youth, and the youth in general, as for example with the question of employment and a whole series of other things… We have in the meantime wrangled between ourselves, we have not got along… Let me say that I am more and more coming to the belief that, with such gatherings as we have now, we will not solve these problems. We are incapable of solving them. And the people knew

this".[11] The student demonstrations represented a problem, but Tito saw in them an important warning for the potential of a much greater problem—workers coming out onto the streets.[12] Emphasising the importance of unity in his own (party) ranks, he sharply criticised the actions of individuals whose unity was brought into question even during the student demonstrations.[13] Tito accepted most of the students' demands as justified. However, contrary to what he would say publicly, he set out clear distinctions between justified demands and the student movement as a whole to party officials. According to Tito, the movement was organised and led by hostile elements who had tried to use the students to achieve their own aims. In accordance with the mentioned reports and security assessments, his arguments for such a stance were also very inconclusive and unsound. But this obviously was not of concern. Aware of their own responsibility, the politicians, without much critical deliberation, decided to accept the possibility that there also existed an even greater culprit. Using various assessments of the student movement, depending on the audience he addressed, Tito showed his exceptional skill at manipulating people and events. The tone with which he addressed the Yugoslavian public on the small screen, that of a concerned father, as well as conciliatory, sounded completely different from the tone with which he addressed the political leadership several hours earlier. He criticised his collaborators for their dithering and laxity, whilst for the students he used very sharp and rough words: "In our socialist autonomous society illegal groups cannot be negotiated with… From the first moment I was against this, that various gangs are ordering that there must be some victims, to replace this or that from the militia… That is deception, not refraining from using any means, disinformation, lies, defamation and so on."[14] Tito did not accept criticism on account of the excessive aggressiveness in the enforcement of order. On the contrary, he considered it was the threat of force that had prevented the strengthening of the student movement as well as in other areas too. Instead of demands for resignations, he gave full support to secretaries on city, republic and federal levels and the secretary of internal affairs. On the other hand, he was very critical of the behaviour of certain professors about whom he said: "These people will need to be gradually cleared from the universities. Because if we leave them and they remain in these places and they teach and poison then it doesn't make sense…"[15]

After Tito's return to Belgrade, everyone expected his public address. Nobody knew how or when he would make it or even what he planned to say. At the sitting of the Extended Bureau, a debate about the form of his

address was held. Proposals ranged from dialogues with students during studies, interviews, to recording statements, which would then be broadcast. The final version of the decision was chosen. The day after the meeting of the Extended Bureau, on Sunday, 9 June, at 9 a.m., the Joint Sitting of the Presidency and IK CK SKJ began. Sometime around 4 p.m., Tito left the sitting in order to give a statement to Zdravko Vuković, the director of RTB (Radio Television Belgrade), which would be broadcast that day at 8 p.m. on all radio and television stations in the country.[16] At that moment nobody present at the sitting knew what Tito had exactly said, and nobody asked him upon his return either. Everybody assumed that the contents and tone were not significantly different from that of the previous two days. However, the difference was great. Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo describes his surprise at Tito's address in his memoirs: "It was already late—about 9 p.m. I hurried home because I was considerably late for dinner with old comrades. At home I found the gathered company. They greeted me with thunderous cheers: Victory! The students have won! Tito approved! But no—I said—that's not right! I've just arrived from the sitting. Tito in his opening address quite strongly condemned the student demonstrations… Then they told me that over the television Tito had accepted most of the students' demands".[17] Since it was Tito, nobody dared to analyse the outcome, which came about from such a shift in rhetoric. What's more is that the statement made a direct impact on the calming of the situation and the ending of the student strikes.

What was the intrinsic difference between Tito's public statement and the address to the Yugoslavian political leadership? First, in the tone. This time he sounded more like a benevolent father concerned for his own children, rather than a potentate worried about his own position. Tito was full of understanding for the students' dissatisfaction and their demands, at the same time condemning the political leadership for their dawdling and disunity in solving the problems in society. The qualifications of the protesters were also significantly different. They were no longer referred to as "illegal gangs", "street", "deceptive", but "mature socialist youths".[18] Although for one week he had turned a deaf ear to the invites of the students for him to return to Belgrade, and their request that he accept them on the Brijuni Islands, over the television screens he sent word "whenever there is anything unclear to them, when something needs to be explained, let them come to me, let them send a delegation".[19] In his address to the public, the possibility of closing faculties, the dismissal of rebellious professors or the arrest of radical students were no longer mentioned. He also

looked upon the incidents in the underpass in a different way.[20] Only a couple of hours before giving his statement, Tito strongly condemned the students' violent behaviour and justified the police's handling of the matter. He gave support to the key people in the SUP (Secretariat of Internal Affairs) and excluded any possibility for the resignation of any official.[21] However, since the request for the investigation into the police's accountability was one of the students' main conditions to end the strike, Tito also acted on this pragmatically. Knowing exactly what would appease the students, he publicly announced that "if any one man from whichever side breaks the law, or does not fulfil his duty or has abused his duty, he must be held accountable, regardless of who he is".[22] The highlight of Tito's manipulation of the students and general public is represented by his pathetic "threat" of his own resignation saying,— "Furthermore, if I am not able to resolve these issues then I no longer need to be in this place".[23] Of course Tito did not consider submitting his resignation because of the student demonstrations. It was simply to do with his evaluation that at the given moment it would be more politically opportune to express "sincere" self-criticism than to assume the image of the infallible ruler.

From the content of the statement, it is obvious that the students provided a good reason to address the general public. The students' demonstrations, despite all the negative aspects, were used by Tito as to prevent potentially greater quakes in society. This primarily related to the workers. Their eventual coming-out onto the streets would bring into question the role and point of the Party as the vanguard of the working class, but also the existence of Yugoslavia as a socialist federal community of working people.[24] It was no surprise that Tito demonstrated his slickness, and even injected flattery into the address to the workers.[25] In that context, his statement "because I must say here today that I am happy that we have such a working class" sounds more like a declaration of honest relief than a common political phrase.

In contrast to the students and workers, Tito showed much less understanding towards "disobedient" politicians. According to Tito, the accumulated problems in society were largely just the result of the disunity in leadership and the inconsistency in the implementation of agreed decisions. Similarly, as in a speech given in Split in 1962, with the airing of "dirty laundry" in public, Tito wanted to emphasise his determination to fight against these phenomena. "And those amongst us who would not agree with that, who would eventually after this decision go in a different direction and express some of their own views instead of being fully

committed to the implementation of our decisions—for them there will be no place amongst us".[26] Precisely due to this, Tito's threat of "others", resignations sounded much more serious and honest than the threat of his own resignation: "I do not think that any of our old communists, whoever, who has the communist consciousness, should not insist on this that they must remain where they are, but they should give space to those people who are able to solve the problems."[27]

Ultimately, Tito used the form of public declaration as a method of direct and personal communication with the wider masses. In the following week, whilst the atmosphere was still "hot", he did not want to comment or commit himself, let alone allow someone to object to his statements. When he finally decided to react he acted from the position of a high judge, who takes nobody's side, but makes decisions that are in the general interest. Primarily taking into account his personal authority and legitimacy, Tito was in a position to say whatever he thought in public at that moment was useful. This was regardless of how much it sometimes sounded contradictory. So, for example, in his statement he criticised the political leadership, although he was in fact the head of it, and simultaneously he praised the maturity of the students, who he had heavily criticised in front of the leadership. Tito was the state president and president of the Communist Party. However, he would not withdraw now from any of those functions for anyone. On the contrary, he even used the animosity, which the students had created against the politicians, so he could strengthen his own position as arbitrator and conciliator. In public, Tito consciously left the impression that he did not believe in the ability of the political leadership when he said "this time I promise the students that I will comprehensively plead for a solution and for this the students need to help me".[28] That was one more message, whose final target was not the students but those whose leadership and administration of Yugoslavia did not coincide with Tito's course. That this self-confidence, as well as the warnings, were not unfounded would be shown by the students' and the general public's reactions to Tito's speech. Latinka Perović says that, "Tito did not gain such plebiscitary support from the liberation of the country. There was nothing which at the time he could not do".[29] However, once more Tito's unerring political instinct came to the fore, and Perović continues, "he economised his power. He was more wary than those who invited him to use it".[30]

The speech that Tito gave to the public on 9 June 1968 was not the only factor, but it was probably a deciding factor in the ending of the student

strike. The students were already exhausted from the day and night polemics, and the immediate goals of the student movement had all but lost their clarity and meaning. The most radical core—the students and professors of the Philosophy Faculty—had lost its cohesive power, which it had at the very beginning. The movement had begun to lose it homogeneity and mass, which were probably its most important trump cards in negotiations with the regime. They were all expecting something to happen that would mark the end, but in a way that neither side would feel defeated. It was just the atmosphere Tito had wished for, and to which he then adapted his public appearance. By analysing the content of the speech, it is obvious that at that moment the fact of who was speaking was more important than what he was saying. Tito had said nothing new, which in the previous days the students and all the other politicians were not told. Tito did not promise anything concrete. On the contrary, the laws that were proposed in accordance with the students' demands were full of concrete solutions from the phrases that he used. In other words, if he had given such a speech on the first or second day of the strike, he would most likely have been booed like the other speakers. However, as enthusiasm dwindled and as the students became aware that in the given circumstances they would not gain more than they had already achieved, they expected from Tito just what he had given them—a sense of security and optimism. In this context, even Tito's final call about studying and the setting of examinations, unlike few calls of that kind, evoked so much delight and relief.[31] It would not take long to show that what Tito had said publicly and promised would not always be identical to that which he honestly thought and intended to do.

Although the student strike ended peacefully, along with several laws whose adoption was welcomed by everyone, nobody was able to say they had come out a winner. Not one politician gained any additional popularity through their involvement, and the students and professors would very quickly pay dearly. The exception in the whole story was Tito, who showed once again his exceptional skill in making the right decision at the right time.

With his speech Tito achieved everything he had planned. First and foremost, the students had ended their strike and expressed their unreserved support for him. After the students, support also began to arrive from all other sides. Tito's possibly greatest victory was that in his monologue of an authoritarian leader, the public saw it as a wish for sincere dialogue. Instead of rocking, the student demonstrations actually reinforced his authority. Telegrams of support began to arrive from all over Yugoslavia.

Over 17 days (10–26 June 1968) the cabinet office of Tito received 1220 telegrams in total.[32]

However, the moment the image of the Yugoslav president left the television screen, all the inconsistencies and vagueness of Tito's speech became apparent. The political leaders, especially those who since the beginning of the student strike had been in contact with Tito, were from the outset confused over the contents of his public address. However, very quickly he informed them that they need not worry. Tito did not withdraw from his position, but due to the unfolding situation, he had to react as such. "This was just his tactical move so he could pacify the students" explained Edvard Kardelj a day later to Milentije Popović about the discrepancies between what Tito said at the sitting and what he stated on television.[33] Several days later, Latinka Perović in a conversation with the directors of *Borba, Politika* and RTB, Tito's explanation was transmitted that he "in the heated atmosphere had the intention to appease and that due to a number of international circumstances he was not able to talk about what was attached and carried out in the background".[34] Tito's inconsistency and unpredictability also implied a political-media scandal. An editorial article under the title "*Mlado žito and kukolj*" ("*Young wheat and the chaff*") was published in *Borba* on 10 June 1968, the content and tone of which contrasted with Tito's speech.[35] In it, amongst other appeals to students that they draw advice from experience they gained, "that they distinguish justified demands from inappropriate slogans, normal autonomous activities from loud-mouth demonstrations, genuine political engagement from false pathos, constructive stepping-out from diversionary ventures, democratic debates from destructive disputes, socialist platforms from anti-socialist positions, open speech from underground provocation, political reality from demagoguery, honest motives from hostile moves, truth from falsehood". Besides the criticism of students, the actions of individual politicians whose behaviour at the time of the demonstrations was evaluated as "tribunal—demagogic" is also criticised. The article caused stormy reactions in the public. All who emphasised the dissatisfaction with the editorial stressed that it was about the disavowal of Tito's attitudes, as well as the intensification of the conflict within the political leadership. The article itself was created on 9 June whilst the Ninth Sitting of the Presidency and the IK CK SKJ was still being held. Its initiator was Moma Marković, the director of *Borba* and a member of the CK SKJ. On the basis of information about Tito's opening speech at the sitting, he decided that the editorial would have a critical tone towards the students. After printing the issue in which

two differing articles appeared on the same page (Tito's speech and "*Young wheat and the chaff*"), panic broke out in the *Borba* editorial department. One suggestion was to destroy the entire circulation and prepare a new edition, of course without the editorial.[36] After a brief (political) consultation it was decided not to change anything. Whether the consultations were conducted with Tito himself was difficult to confirm with certainty. However, the lack of response to the accusations that the article opposed his attitudes, as well as the statements given to the tight circle of associates, do suggest that possibility. Namely, at the aforementioned meeting with the heads of media, Latinka Perović stressed that Tito did not rate the editorial of *Borba* as negative.[37] And that it was not even possible for him to rate negatively, because he intrinsically agreed with everything written. Regardless of his own opinions, Tito at the same time did not positively rate *Borba's* editorial. The sole reason was the decidedly negative perception of the article taken by the public. It was one example that perfectly illustrated the method of Tito's rule. Although he always had at his disposal a wide spectrum of autocratic solutions, he tried to give the impression of a good ruler who does not dictate, but converses with his people and they listen to him. Precisely because of this, in public he would very often not say what he personally thought, but more what the people wanted to hear.

Very quickly there followed the crackdown on those who were considered the main culprits of the "June events". Tito himself began the crackdowns at the Sixth Congress of the Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia in Belgrade (26–29 June 1968) in front of more than 1200 national delegates and hundreds of guests from abroad. His arrival and then speech were much more than common protocol. Encouraged by the public's reaction to his television address, Tito arrived at the Congress to acknowledge his power. The support of the working class was for him the most important legitimising factor, equally so in front of his political collaborators and political opponents. He did not select particular means to achieve it, even if it included misinformation, malicious manipulation or simple lies. As on the television, at the Congress, Tito said exactly what the public wanted to hear. He thanked the workers for their support, but also asked for their continued help, sympathised with their problems, but also insisted on their vanguard role in society. In connection with that, he also touched upon the student demonstrations, during which, according to him, that vanguard role was brought into question. Tito firstly identified the opponents—"there are individual professors, some philosophers, various Praxis movement followers and others, various dogmatists

also including those who have pursued various deformations in the State Security Administration etc.", and then he explained their hostile activity—"They now proclaim a movement at the university. It does not originate from the students, but from people who would like to create some embryo of a multi-party system, and to establish themselves as a factor, which will speak with the Assembly and others on an equal basis".[38] "Moreover", continued Tito, "they go even further: they deny the working class as the most important factor and pillar of this society… In their opinion, there should be some wise men, some technocrats who should stand on a pedestal and command with their sticks, while everyone is to be a colourless mass. The working class should toil away for them and that they subjugate themselves to their tyranny".[39] And then, for the first time since the beginning of the demonstrations, there followed a public warning and hints about what would happen to the named culprits—"They have no place even where they are now (loud applause and cheers). Should such people bring up our children in universities and schools? There is no place for them there! (loud cheers, applause)… So, we must disable such people, and disable we will if see where they are, if we decidedly avert them in their negative actions. And, in the end, sometimes it will also be necessary to undertake administrative measures (applause)".[40]

According to the reactions of those present, Tito's arrival completely fulfilled its purpose.[41] At that point nobody brought into question the authenticity of Tito's statements. To nobody in the hall was it doubtful that neither during nor after the demonstration such serious allegations were not supported by the quotations of the incriminated individuals. Tito once more gained the support of the plebiscite, this time not only for his politics but also for the confrontation with those who he declared as opponents. The hunt and punishment of "the witches" could begin.

Intervention in Czechoslovakia

The third plenum of the CK KP (Central Committee of the Communist Party) of Czechoslovakia, which was held, including a break, from October 1967 to 5 January 1968, was noteworthy due to multiple important events. As Ljubodrag Dimić points out, the importance of this plenum was not only in the change of personnel.[42] This was because the change of the position of the secretary of the CK KP of Czechoslovakia, the departure of Novotny and the arrival of Dubček, marked the beginning of comprehensive changes in Czechoslovakian society.

The developing situation in Czechoslovakia was followed with interest in various ways in Yugoslavia. The greatest interest was expressed by intellectuals hoping for the implementation of the Czechoslovakian model of the democratisation of society in their own country too. The philosopher Danko Grlić points out that it was the Yugoslav socialist experiment, which in some ways encouraged and facilitated the changes in Czechoslovakia, but at the same time also asked the very suggestive question "has the pupil surpassed the teacher?"[43] On the official level, the Yugoslav-Czechoslovak relationship was sound and not burdened with any bilateral problems. It should be noted that changes in Czechoslovakia after 5 January 1968 did not attract great interest from the Yugoslavian leadership, and this would remain so until the Soviet Union began to exert serious pressure. However, as time went on, the leadership in Belgrade began to observe more and more similarities between the situation of Yugoslavia in 1948 and those in which Czechoslovakia was finding itself in, in 1968. Consistently insisting on the rights of every country to choose its own way in building socialism actualised by Soviet efforts to strengthen and recentralise the Warsaw Pact predetermined the position of the Yugoslavian leadership in relation towards Dubček and his supporters. Support for the KPČ (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia), and sympathy towards the changes in that country, would for the first time be put to the test during Tito's stay in Moscow on 29 April 1968. A visit by the Yugoslav president to the capital city of the USSR was not anticipated in a tour of Asia that included Japan (8–15 April), Mongolia (15–21 April) and Iran (22–28 April). However, after several calls from the Kremlin, Tito decided to change his return route.[44] The level of importance attached to this almost unofficial discussion can be seen in the composition of the Soviet delega,tion. Alongside the secretary of the CK KPSS (Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) Leonid Brezhnev, present at the discussions were Nikolai Podgorny (member of the Politburo, CK KPSS and chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Alexei Kosygin (member of the Politburo, CK KPSS and chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR), G.I. Voronov (member of the Politburo and chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR), K.F. Katushev (secretary of the CK KPSS), Andrei Gromyko (member of the CK KPSS and minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR) and others. Although during the dialogue a number of themes were open to everyone there, it was clear that the main reason for the gathering was the situation in Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev was very direct in response to Tito's question about how to evaluate the situation in that

country: "We regard the situation as unfavourable and that powerful anti-socialist elements are at work".[45] In the exchange of views that followed, it was clear that neither side would deviate from its own pre-defined attitude. Tito responded to the Soviet attacks with support for the Czechoslovak leadership.[46] The Yugoslav president was particularly intrigued by the statement of the Soviet head that "help for the Communist Party of the ČSSR was necessary today more than ever before".[47] The answer that the Soviets considered provided that help was even more intriguing. Brezhnev firstly said, "it is a little difficult to answer to that", but then he began explaining: "If the process continues, which is already under way, communists will be shot there and history will be left with a question—if there is bloodshed and the reinstallation of the bourgeoisie—what did the communists of other countries do, what did the Communist Party of the USSR do?" Comparing the situation in Czechoslovakia to that of Hungary in 1956, he asked a rhetorical question: "What does it mean to intervene with internal affairs?" He gave a neutral, but very symptomatic response—"in socialist countries there are questions which are common and general".[48] Although a mutual announcement about the talks in Moscow stated that "during the consideration of international questions the accordance and closeness of the views of the two sides in the appraisal of the major problems of modern international situation are again confirmed",[49] the Soviet and Yugoslav leaderships were watching the developing events from afar with completely different expectations. While for the Yugoslavian side this was just the beginning of a more active involvement in the Czechoslovakian situation, the Soviets had already been intensively following and trying to influence the events in Prague for months. Soon after Dresden,[50] it was obvious that the "Warsaw Five" had no intention to remain passive observers of the Czechoslovakian experimentation with socialism. There only remained the question about the method of extending "brotherly help". On the other hand, the Yugoslavian administration completely misjudged the talks in Moscow as a significant contribution in stabilising the situation. The optimistic tone held for one month after Tito's return from the USSR's capital city. Regardless of Tito's stance in the mentioned talks, his charisma and influence this time were overstated. Only a few days after the departure of the Yugoslavian delegation from the USSR, it was obvious that pacification of the situation was out of the question. At the beginning of May (4–5 May) first, the Czechoslovakian leadership was called for a consultation to Moscow, and several days later (8 May) in the same city a secret meeting of the "Five" was held. Harsh words were directed towards the Action

Programme that the CK KPČ (Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia) approved at its plenary session from 1–5 April 1968. Military intervention, despite conditions from Ulbricht, Gomulka and Zhivkov, was nevertheless (once more) delayed, but the pressure on Czechoslovakia was additionally increased, this time alongside political and military means. On 20 June 1968, over the territory of Czechoslovakia, joint manoeuvres of the Warsaw Pact, without Romania, began under the code name "Šumava". Conceived initially as a warning to the "reform" and support of the "anti-reform" currents within the KPČ, these manoeuvres would serve as a key event for the successful preparation and execution of the military intervention. The presence of foreign military forces on Czechoslovak territory, as well as the gathering of Soviet troops in East Germany, Hungary and Poland was also a clear sign to the Yugoslavian leadership that they had wrongly estimated the security of the situation. In defusing the tension, Tito also tried to use his personal authority, and to the Egyptian *Al-Ahram,* he stated that he didn't believe that the USSR had such short-sighted people who would forcibly resolve the internal issues of Czechoslovakia.[51] Seeing statements from Belgrade as a clear sign of support, and seeing that they would, in the phase that followed, need every ally, the Czechoslovak leadership finally decided on the concretisation and intensification of relations with Yugoslavia. On the same day of the meeting of the Five's in Warsaw (15 July), a harsh warning letter was sent to the Czechoslovak leadership, Alexander Dubček, who also sent a letter to the Yugoslav president, inviting him to visit Prague.

Despite certain concerns regarding the further development in Czechoslovakian society, within the Yugoslav leadership there was no dilemma about providing support for the Czechoslovakian leadership, when in question was respect for the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia and state sovereignty. With this message Tito arrived in Prague on 9 August 1968. Not only did the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav media report on the triumphant welcome of the Yugoslavian president, *Time* magazine also wrote about the events: "Tito received a hero's welcome. As he stepped from his Ilyushin-18 turboprop at Prague's airport, pretty girls in Moravian and Bohemian costumes pressed bouquets of carnations into his arms. In counterpoint to a thunderous 21-gun salute, thousands of Czechoslovaks chanted "Tito! Tito! Tito!" The route through the city was packed with thousands more, waving Yugoslav flags. At Prague's Hradčany Castle, Tito's residence during his two-day visit, a huge crowd kept up a continual clamour until Tito finally appeared on a balcony.

"Long live Czechoslovak and Yugoslav friendship!" he shouted. The people roared their approval".[52] The two-day stay of the Yugoslav delegation in Prague was used in order to give yet more support to the Czechoslovak leadership and the working class of the ČSSR (Czechoslovak Socialist Republic). Dubček in talks acknowledged the existence of the "danger from the right (e.g. the organisation KAN, K-231) but pointed out that it was still not about a "counter-revolutionary situation" in the country.[53] Tito, with a more decisive struggle against all the anti-socialist forces in the country, also stressed the need to prevent a disruption in the labour movement. Allowing the establishment of a social democratic party in the ČSSR would have certainly contributed to that disruption.[54] The second day of the meeting was in a way a continuation of the talks that Tito and Novotny had had the previous year. The two delegations tried to negotiate a new model of economic cooperation, which would also include a joint entrance on to third markets.[55] London's *The Economist* judged the announced forms of cooperation as "spectacular new ventures".[56] During the two-day gathering, and especially in that part that was accessible to the public, both Czechoslovak and Yugoslav parties tried in their statements not to provoke unwanted reactions from the Soviet Union. So, for example, nowhere in the official communications does it directly mention one of the main motives of Tito's arrival, i.e., the possible military intervention by members of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia. This possibility was criticised more on a theoretical level as a practice that should generally be avoided in international relations. For the same reason, the drawing together of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in the sphere of economic relations, especially in various forms of parallel appearances on the markets of the West and Third World, was given much more media exposure in Yugoslavia than in Czechoslovakia.

Five days after Tito's actions, support for the Czechoslovak leadership came from the Romanian leader Nicolae Ceauşescu, who also arrived in Prague. During the three-day visit (15–17 August) a new Treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance between the ČSSR and Romania was signed, and in which, amongst other things, the two countries expressed their readiness "to strengthen their defensive power and to comprehensively contribute to the security of the socialist countries and world peace."[57] At the same time as the Romanian delegation's stay in Prague, a three-day convention of the Politburo of the CK KPSS was held in Moscow. On the last day of the convention (17 August), the Soviet leadership decided to provide military assistance to the KPČ and

the people of the ČSSR.[58] On the evening of 20 August, the military intervention by five Warsaw Pact countries began, and by the morning of 21 August, Czechoslovakia was occupied.

At the time of the intervention (as before at the time of the student demonstrations), the Yugoslavian president was resting at his residence on the Brijuni Islands. Aware of the seriousness of the unfolding situation, Tito immediately reacted and called the political and state heads of Yugoslavia to the Brijuni Islands. On 21 August at 8 p.m., the Eleventh Joint Sitting of the Presidency and Executive Committee of the CK SKJ began.[59] At the beginning of the sitting, Tito explained that the Sitting "was called because the events relating to the aggression towards Czechoslovakia were rapidly developing, and that it was necessary to take a stand and determine the further actions of the SKJ."[60] Assessing the situation in Czechoslovakia after his recent visit, Tito declared that there was no reason for military intervention. According to Tito, socialism in Czechoslovakia was not under threat, and its western borders were not threatened. In fact, it was these two arguments that had been used to justify the intervention. However, Tito was worried more for the future of Yugoslavia than for the future of Czechoslovakia. Tito warned, "It is not only about Czechoslovakia in fact it is also about ourselves. Because, we are actually protagonists in the resistance to the Soviet leadership with our internal development and with our tenacity so far in preventing interference in our own internal affairs. And it is clear their exerting aggression towards Czechoslovakia does not mean that they will not strike at us one day as well… So we need to aware that we cannot sleep peacefully".[61]

From the Yugoslav perspective, the military intervention in Czechoslovakia happened at a very untoward moment. Economic reforms had not delivered the expected results, and discontent and criticism were becoming more apparent. Only two months earlier, the students were protesting about the current situation and demanded the dismissal of the politicians responsible. When one takes into account all the problems Yugoslavia suffered internally, the possibility of outside danger was watched with particular interest. The state leaders had a difficult task. The country had to be militarily, politically and economically prepared for any possible aggression. Despite the increasing problems, it was necessary to re-homogenise society, restore the faith in the political leadership and restore an atmosphere of invincibility—and all of this in a way that any potential aggressor would not understand Yugoslavia's behaviour as additional provocation.

Despite its precautions, the atmosphere amongst the Yugoslav people nevertheless so intensified that the Soviets decided to react quickly. The first official expression of dissatisfaction came from the Soviet ambassador to Belgrade, Benediktov, who met with Tito on 30 August. In a very strong demarche by the Kremlin, the Yugoslav media and politicians were accused of an anti-Soviet campaign and the misinterpretation of the situation in Czechoslovakia. Tito expressed his stance against Soviet's objections by interrupting Benediktov several times with stormy expressions of disapproval whilst he read the demarche.[62] Instead of calming Yugoslav-Soviet relations, they continued to intensify, especially after the situation in Czechoslovakia began to normalise. Realising that the demarche read by the Soviet ambassador did not have the desired result, Tito decided to contact Leonid Brezhnev in person. In a letter sent on 17 October 1968, the secretary general of the CK KPSS pointed out how in the "development of Soviet-Yugoslav relations there had recently sprung up worrisome and dangerous occurrences".[63] Brezhnev blamed the Yugoslav side for the escalation in intensity, whose anti-Soviet campaign served "in distorting the essence of events" and spreading "provocative and unfounded lies".[64] Brezhnev's letter was understood seriously, but without fear. Once the government of the SFRJ became familiar with its contents, the presidency of the Federal Assembly, and leading bodies of the SKJ followed Tito's response. This did not deviate from the position taken earlier regarding the military intervention in Czechoslovakia, and Brezhnev's letter was interpreted as just another in a series of overt exertions of pressure on Yugoslavia.[65]

The satisfaction with the normalisation of conditions in Czechoslovakia alternated with fear that a similar scenario could soon be played out in Yugoslavia. This meant that words turned into acts, and concrete action began with the purpose of defending the country from possible aggression.

The possibility that Yugoslavia, along with "rebellious" Romania, could be the next target of attack had been discussed by the Yugoslav political leadership at a sitting on the Brijuni Islands on 21 August. Then, and at the Tenth Sitting of the CK SKJ in Belgrade which took place two days later, whilst surprise, confusion and even disappointment still prevailed with the developing situation, the defence of the country was mentioned more on an assertive level. However, with the phrase about "the steadfast determination to defend the independence of Yugoslavia at all costs", from the very beginning it was clear to everyone that Yugoslavia was facing a very difficult period. First of all, due to the fact that, in military terms, it

involved a much stronger opponent.[66] According to some military estimations, the JNA's (Yugoslav People's Army) resistance to an attack by forces in the Warsaw Pact could only last a few days. Besides the military, the country was not able to maintain its defence, especially if the attacks were to drag on, and nor was it economically ready. The only significant factor that inspired optimism was the unity of the people and their readiness for uncompromising resistance to any potential aggressor. For the best possible defence, the state leadership was not allowed to overestimate the positives, nor to underestimate the present negative factors.

Created during the Second World War, the JNA had with time grown into one of the largest and best-equipped armies in Europe. Its importance in Yugoslavia had surpassed merely a defence role. Along with Tito and the Party, the JNA was a homogenising factor in Yugoslav society. The heads of the military were untouchable and the army's structure was more like a "state within a state". The only person who had real and absolute control over the JNA was Josip Broz Tito, via his loyal personnel in leading positions.[67] In peaceful periods no one questioned or expressed doubts over the compatibility between the theory and practice of defending the security of the country. The intervention in Czechoslovakia and a possible attack on Yugoslavia by the Warsaw Pact forces also touched on that subject too. The findings were created: surprise and disappointment. The greatest surprise was the fact that the defensive strategy of Yugoslavia was conceived solely, and calculated on, a possible attack from the West. One of the greatest problems in possible defence would also be mobilisation. To get to a state of combat readiness with people and equipment would need several days or even a month which in the case of a sudden attack would not be of much use. On the other hand, the mobilisation itself, particularly if it would take too long in the anticipation of a possible attack, would represent a large financial expense. It had become clear that the defence of the country would require more than just units of the JNA. The defence model, which was considered to be the most effective, especially under the conditions of a military attack by a militarily more superior armed force, was the concept of a national defence force or so-called "armed people". This concept was not new in the defence system of Yugoslavia. However, despite numerous discussions and studies the Law of National Defence existed only on paper for years.

The fact that it was not enacted, not even in 1968, would not have particularly worried anyone if there was no intervention in Czechoslovakia. Despite the absence of the law, the mentioned defence model began to

be implemented in practice. The establishment of territorial units and the distribution of weapons to citizens began. Companies were allocated the means to buy weapons intended for their own protection. Preparations were put in place for the possible changeover to illegal operations such as determining the war locations of the committees, the functioning of television and radio programmes at battle locations, the establishment of mobile printers and so on.[68] Due to the student demonstrations held several months earlier, there was an enormous interest for inclusion in youth units.[69] It was made up of voluntary formations comprised of young people who had never been conscripted into the military. In cities across Yugoslavia, seminars were held on the preparation of the people for general national defence, as well as seminars in the training of commanders of territorial and youth units. The willingness to defend Yugoslavia and the undertaking of military-political activities were not only reported in local media, foreign media also showed great interest. The foreign media also demonstrated detailed knowledge of the situation in Yugoslavia in the light of a possible Soviet intervention. The American weekly *Time* in an issue on 8 November 1968 published an article entitled "Yugoslavia: In Case of Attack". The article speculates upon a possible Soviet intervention and the possible Yugoslavian response. The author of the article wrote: "Tito has massed all his army along the 800-mile frontier with his Warsaw Pact neighbours. In case of invasion, the army's mission would be simply to slow down the Red Army advance by three days or so and then slip into the mountains to join the 700,000 partisans who in the meantime would have unlimbered their weapons and formed their bands. Already, much of the army's heavy artillery and armour is cached away in the mountains… There are well-rehearsed contingency plans to transfer the country's vital government offices, bullion and important state papers to the mountains so that Tito would retain a functioning government even if the cities and lowlands were in Soviet hands".[70]

In parallel with the military, it was also necessary to carry out appropriate political preparations for the defence of the country. Disagreement arose about the question of who would run the defence in the case of any occupation. On one hand, military heads advocated that command should be taken by the army using military districts, i.e., army zones.[71] This attitude was met with disapproval by politicians who believed that this would minimise the role of the Party. Tito was also against military command, arguing that amongst other things, that if there was a breach, the military districts would lose effectiveness because the military would have to deal

more with itself. According to Tito's concept, the key to leading a general national resistance was to have a federation of Communists that would for this purpose form a military-political committee. The committees would on all levels (federal, republic, municipal) cooperate closely with the JNA so that the defence would be more effective, but also to avoid duplication in the undertaking of certain activities.[72]

Alongside analyses of defence capabilities, the foreign media also paid great attention to the Yugoslavian situation in the context of international relations. What are the chances of intervention? In the case of intervention, would Yugoslavia be forced to defend itself alone? What would be the reaction of the Western countries, NATO, and the Non-Aligned? These were some of the questions that no one had answers to. Yugoslavia's foreign affairs policy priorities did not change with the intervention in Czechoslovakia. What certainly did change was the content and intensity of these activities.

Even before the intervention, Yugoslavia was in an indirect way regarded as jointly responsible for the situation in Czechoslovakia. The disapproval of the procedures by the Warsaw Pact countries, and with the showing of support for the Czechoslovakian people and the leadership, relations drastically deteriorated between Yugoslavia and states taking part in the aggression. Strong anti-Yugoslavian campaigns followed in countries that had participated in the aggression. The only member of the Warsaw Pact that did not take part in the occupation of Czechoslovakia, and openly condemned it, was Romania. Due to such attitudes, the fate of Romania and Yugoslavia was often discussed together. Besides the compliant attitude towards Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania, a joint determination also showed how to maintain their own independence and to defend themselves at any cost, unlike the Czechs and Slovaks. In this regard, on 24 August 1968, a meeting was held between Tito and the Romanian President Ceauşescu. The meeting was held in Vršac, 15 km from the Yugoslav-Romanian border. The Yugoslavian people received information about the meeting, but no details about the discussion. Tito informed the political leadership about sitting on the Brijuni Islands on 2 September. According to Tito, the Romanians were interested in the attitude of Yugoslavia if Romania was attacked. More specifically, what would happen with the Romanian-Yugoslav border? Would Yugoslavia close the border or allow possible arms assistance. Tito answered that Yugoslavia would not close the border, but would help as muchas possible. However, there could be problems if the Romanian troops withdrew towards the

Yugoslavian border. In that case, according to international law, Yugoslavia could not authorise continued fighting on its territory but would have to disarm the Romanian units. This would of course be completely different if at the same time Yugoslavia was also attacked. At the end of the discussion, Ceauşescu sought advice on how to advance further relations with countries of the Warsaw Pact. Tito answered him: "Go towards appeasement, because it is important how the world looks on if it comes to an attack, whether you contributed to it or whether it is simply an invasion of your country, which you have not given any reason for".[73]

Although one of the principles of the programme of the Non-Aligned Movement was the policy of peaceful co-existence according to which "any attempt to impose on peoples any social or political system with force and from outside, directly threatens world peace",[74] attitudes connected to the occupation of Czechoslovakia nevertheless succeeded in dividing the movement. At the UN Security Council meeting held on 23 August 1968, it was shown that not all of the nonaligned countries shared the same standpoint on the military intervention by the Warsaw Pact. In voting for a resolution to condemn the intervention, India and Algeria abstained.[75] According to the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the nonAligned were more divided and unresponsive than ever before. The behaviour connected to the intervention in Czechoslovakia just confirmed this view. The causes of such (non)reaction were varied. From one side, it was to do with various national interests of the countries where the events in Europe were not a priority for internal and foreign political activities. From the other side, the reason was a pragmatic one, since some countries were economically and military dependant on help from the USSR. This was primarily relevant to the Arab countries, which depended on the Soviet Union as a very important ally in the war against Israel. Indifference, as well as pro-Soviet policies, was also confirmed by the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser in a conversation with the Yugoslavian Ambassador Danil Lekić in Cairo. When asked about his thoughts in relation to the situation in Czechoslovakia, Nasser answered: "the only problem for me is the occupation of one part of my country. Nothing else exists in the world except that for us right now."[76] Although several months earlier, whilst staying on the Brijuni Islands, the Egyptian president positively evaluated preparations for convening a new conference of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), now on that subject he expressed his negativity pointing out that it would provoke sharp disagreements between members of the Movement. Nasser concluded his reasons against holding the conference with a rhetorical

question: "The pro-American countries would immediately initiate the question about the ČSSR. And could we be allowed to permit the conference to take an anti-Soviet stance?"[77] Although aware of the character of Egyptian-Soviet relations, Tito nevertheless was disappointed by the lack of support from the man who also followed the same principles of peace, and with whom he had created the Non-Alignment Movement.[78] The Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi showed a little more interest in the situation in Europe. Marko Nikezić spoke to her on the eve of a session of the UN in New York. Speaking about Yugoslavia, the Prime Minister agreed with Nikezić in assessing that the Russians would move against Yugoslavia in only two cases, if they decide on war against the West or if they assess that the West would not attempt anything in the case of military action against Yugoslavia.[79] However, despite showing interest in the situation in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and awareness of the possible consequences for global security for the Indian prime minister, open criticism about the USSR's policy did not eventuate. One of the few leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement who gave unequivocal support to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and at the same time publicly condemned the Soviet aggression, was the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie. His concrete proposal was the holding of a conference not only of non-aligned countries with just one item on the agenda—the condemnation of aggression, support for Czechoslovakia and further measures for the preservation of peace.[80] According to the Emperor, the best place to hold the conference would be Belgrade. Due to the Yugoslav attitude, namely trying to avoid any possible provocation of the USSR, the holding of this conference never happened. Despite this, the emperor did visit Yugoslavia as the guest of Tito on the Brijuni Islands from 23 to 26 September 1968. The Yugoslavian media reported everyday on the talks of the two statesmen and their common belief that the problems of the world must be resolved exclusively by peaceful methods.[81] Although in a joint public announcement both pledged to strengthen the Non-Aligned Movement, in face-to-face conversations Tito and Haile Selassie agreed that the holding of a conference would nevertheless have to wait.[82] Even before the intervention in the ČSSR, the Non-Alignment Movement was in crisis. Fragmentation within the Movement was caused by various factors, one of which was relations with the USSR.[83] In such complex situations, the only thing Yugoslavia could realistically expect from the Non-Aligned Movement was moral support. However, Yugoslavia expected real help, economic, military as well as political, this time more from the West.

The possibility that the independence of the country could be threatened from the East surprised the Yugoslav state leadership. However, according to statements of almost open threats from the East from the first days after the intervention, this still did not exclude the West as a potential aggressor.[84] On the contrary, western countries were expected to use the situation for their own propaganda, and one variation of a divided Yugoslavia was even mentioned.[85] Tito especially stressed the propaganda and intelligence activities of the Italians: "Do you know that the Italian service runs continuously in Istria and that they have indicated that Yugoslavia will soon come to such a mix up that it will give them the opportunity that in a flash they will occupy the whole region and take everything. Italian officers arrive in plain clothes who then spy, bribe people, give additional pensions to employees and teachers who have lived under Italy etc."[86] With time however, it became clear that the West did not have any intention to use the situation but that it could become the most important factor for the internal and external stability of Yugoslavia. Very lively diplomatic activity towards western countries followed with particular emphasis on cooperation with their Communist, socialist and social democratic parties. First of all, it was necessary to solve the problem with Western neighbours, which in the case of intervention from a potential aggressor, could turn into a possible backup role. At the start of September 1968, just a few days after the intervention in Czechoslovakia, but also just several days after the statement about the Italian provocations, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs Giuseppe Medici received the Yugoslavian ambassador in his office in Rome. On this occasion, he conveyed the stance of the Italian government that Yugoslavia could freely transfer its military units along the Italian border and turn them towards the East, without fear of possible danger from Italy.[87] This act, taken by the Italians on their own initiative, was warmly welcomed in Yugoslavia. Using all the help from the West as a kind of pressure on the USSR, the Yugoslav state leaders decided to also inform the media about this move.[88] Good neighbourly relations were resumed and were where Yugoslavia, at that moment, needed it most—in the field of economic cooperation. Although at first glance it may seem that from the progress of these relations only the Yugoslavian people benefited, things were not so simple. Italy was very much worried about the possible intervention by Warsaw Pact forces in Yugoslavia. The occupation of Yugoslavia and the arrival of Soviet troops, ships and submarines on the Adriatic on a significant scale would also endanger the security of Italy. Yugoslavia and Austria found

themselves in a similar cause-and-effect relationship. However, in contrast to Italy, Austria was in a considerably unfavourable position. First, Austria despite the fact it was a democratic, capitalist state, orientated towards the West, did not belong to any one bloc. And this, amongst other things, meant that in the case of aggression, nobody had the duty to defend it. More importantly, there were real indications of a threat to Austrian independence. According to analysis by experts in Washington, Austrian territory was considered one of the possible routes the Soviets could use in the case of an attack on Yugoslavia.[89] One possible scenario included not only the passing through, but also the occupation of Austria by one of the Warsaw Pact countries. While the West was searching for ways to proceed in the case of a breach in the Austrian State Treaty, the Austrian President Franz Jonas came to visit his Yugoslavian colleague. From 30 September to 5 October 1968, Jonas visited Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana, Dubrovnik and the Brijuni Islands. During daily conversations, the two Presidents stressed good neighbourly relations especially in the area of economics. Besides bilateral relations, Tito and Jonas (as well as their foreign affairs ministers) spoke about the current problems in the world like the Vietnam War, the conflict in the Middle East, but also the crisis in Czechoslovakia. The final press conference confirms that these first two problems were discussed more openly and precisely, unlike the Czechoslovakian case. A reporter from the Vienna newspaper *Die Presse* asked the Yugoslav president to comment on the situation in Czechoslovakia, to which Tito replied saying that it was a "delicate issue". The reporter continued to insist on an answer adding that journalists must also place indiscreet questions. Tito only briefly answered: "I know. You have the right to ask, and it is my right not to answer."[90]

At one sitting of the Party leadership, the Yugoslavian Minister for Foreign Affairs, speaking about the situation in Europe after the intervention in Czechoslovakia said among other things: "Western Europe seems very unsettled, apart from England which is afraid at this moment even of its own shadow, appeases us and the Romanians and everything else."[91] Upon examining the documents, the British Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence, it is obvious that the British had been following the developing situation with great interest. With regard to the minister's statement, a more precise conclusion could be that the possible consequences of further Soviet movements increased caution in Britain, and not fear. In any case, an attack on Yugoslavia, for Great Britain, represented a more sensitive and far-reaching strategic problem than the attack on

Czechoslovakia and possibly on Romania. With the continuation of regular activities on the improvement of bilateral relations events connected with Czechoslovakia imposed upon British policy some new questions. First, a very specific question was asked a few days after the intervention in Czechoslovakia, to which the British did not have a concrete answer. The British Minister for Foreign Affairs, Michael Stewart, met with Ivo Sarajćić, the Yugoslav ambassador in London in his office on 27 August. In the conversation, Sarajćić asked Stewart what would be the stance of the British government in the case of aggression towards Yugoslavia. Instead of a precise answer, the minister expressed the opinion that NATO would have to define its policy in the case of an attack by the USSR on a non-bloc country.[92] A day later, on 28 August, Sarajćić also spoke with George Brown, the ex-British Minister for Foreign Affairs, who proved to be a much more concrete and open debater. He confirmed that the West could do nothing in the event of an attack on Romania. However, Brown compared the Yugoslavian situation to the Austrian situation and said: "in the case of Yugoslavia we would respond to the threat of force in the same way, i.e., with a threat of force".[93] From the conversation, Sarajćić assumed that Brown's statements were the same as some others in the government, i.e., that they represented some kind of unofficial attitude from the British government.[94] Realising that the situation was not calming down but quite the reverse, the possibility of a Soviet attack on Yugoslavia became even more serious On 6 September, a meeting was held between the British Prime Minister and the ministers for defence and foreign affairs. The central question arose about the role of NATO in the case of a USSR attack on a neutral country, such as Yugoslavia. The Minister for Defence in the non-reaction to a possible attack on Yugoslavia saw, amongst other things, the encouragement of the Soviets to carry out further similar interventions e.g., on Finland, Sweden, Iran, and even Greece and Turkey. Taking into account all the consequences of a possible occupation of Yugoslavia, the three highest British politicians agreed that NATO must reach such an agreement from which it would be clear to the Soviets that an attack on Yugoslavia would mean the same as an attack on any other member of the Atlantic Alliance.[95] Since the danger of aggression, and therefore the need for military assistance were still of a hypothetical character, the Ministry of Defence believed that in cooperation with NATO partners it would be necessary to undertake a number of activities so that it would not come to aggression. On the other hand, for moral as well as material help, the British government also decided to

continue bilateral cooperation with Yugoslavia. Above all, this pertained to good economic and political relations.

Good relations with Western European countries, if sometimes only on a declarative level, were of great importance to Yugoslavia. However, in spite of everything, in the Cold War only two superpowers existed. In the event of threat, real help could only come from one or the other. With this in mind, Yugoslavia directed the focus of its diplomatic activities towards the USA. Although it was about a small country, which was not a military nor political ally to America, the fact that the USSR with its occupation would disrupt the balance of power was enough for the USA to not stand on the sidelines. The distrust of Yugoslavian politicians towards Western countries after the intervention of Czechoslovakia was also related in part to the USA. Unlike Italy, which was "expected" to be an impending threat, the USA was suspected of a probable tactile agreement with the USSR about the non-intervention in the internal affairs of the Warsaw Pact countries. Tito tried personally to convince the American Ambassador in Belgrade, in a conversation held just two days after the intervention, that this was not the right way of thinking. From the words of Ambassador Elbrick, the attitude of the USA on this issue was clear: the invasion was considered illegal and presented a violation of the UN Charter.[96] However, whilst the intervention in Czechoslovakia was considered an act of danger for the security of the region, an intervention into Yugoslavia in the opinion of the Americans would have much greater consequences. An occupation of Yugoslavia and the appearance of the USSR on the Adriatic Sea would disrupt the balance of power in the Mediterranean and would threaten the southern and south eastern arm of the NATO Alliance. Besides its readiness to protect its interest with its own power, the USA decided to take action so that events would not develop in a direction it did not want. In this sense particularly significant was the estimated provision of military, economic and political aid to Yugoslavia.

From the Yugoslavian perspective, the threat of possible aggression was not just a military-security problem. As the danger of intervention dwindled with time, the economic situation became the main problem in the country. There were already problems connected to the implementation of economic reforms, and then there were new problems connected with the reduction of business with eastern countries and an increase in defence expenditures, and these threatened the stability of Yugoslavia. Therefore, economic assistance was a priority measure during talks with US officials.

It was with this mission that the Yugoslavian government's Vice-President Kiro Gligorov arrived in Washington at the end of September 1968. The official reasons for his visit were meetings with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. However, the main aim of the visit was talks with the most senior representatives of the US government. In one week, Gligorov met with a number of officials, culminating with a visit to US President Johnson. During talks with the US president, the continuing interest of the USA in preserving Yugoslavia's independence as well as the previous events in Czechoslovakia were highlighted. One way the Americans had tangibly expressed this interest was through over USD2.5 billion in economic and military aid, which the USA had provided to Yugoslavia since 1945.[97] At the end of the dialogue, Johnson emphasised that he would appreciate it if over the coming months, President Tito suggested to the USA what would be the best thing to say or do in order to calm the situation in Eastern Europe.[98] In mid-October (17–18 October), the US Undersecretary Nicholas Katzenbach conducted an "in return" visit to Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav president repeated his interest in the broadening economic relations with the USA and Western European countries, stressing that this was the most appropriate assistance for Yugoslavia at that moment.[99] Unlike Gligorov's visit to Washington, Katzenbach's visit to Belgrade aroused great attention in the Yugoslavian media.[100] What is more interesting is the content of the reporting on the two events. Readers of Yugoslavian newspapers, besides the general known phrases, heard nothing concrete about the contents of the discussions. This related especially to the Yugoslav requests for economic assistance. On the other hand, Katzenbach's arrival showed almost an expression of US gratitude towards Yugoslavia in preventing the destruction of the southern arm of NATO's alliance.[101] In his report to Washington immediately after carrying out talks with Tito, Katzenbach personally commented on the newspaper's coverage: "Yugoslavs naturally seeking to dramatise the importance of the visit to their own people but without saying anything specific re its significance".[102] At the beginning of 1969, the US ambassador in Belgrade put together a report on American-Yugoslav relations over the recent period, and a proposal for further US activities.[103] In his opinion, the three main objectives for US policy on Yugoslavia should be supporting independence, openness towards the West and economic reforms. Elbrick considered the last objective to be crucial for many reasons. Continuous progress in the implementation of trade reforms is vitally important for the preservation of Yugoslavian independence, plus foreign policy orientation,

as well as the development of domestic policy. Besides this, the success of the Yugoslavian reforms would also have a great impact on the other Communist countries in Europe.[104]

The intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, with all the (possible) consequences, proved to be one of the key events of the Cold War period. Fear of a possible spread of war threatened and slowed down the process of détente, and the focus on security-political activities for the moment shifted from Asia to Europe. Although at the beginning everything pointed to Yugoslavia being threatened by the intervention, time would show that this "maverick communist country"[105] drew more benefit than harm out of the whole situation. The same could be said for its President. Support for Tito in the country was indeed plebiscitary. Looking at the international political scene, with his consistency in condemning the intervention, Tito strengthened his position in the Non-Aligned Movement and gained new sympathy from the West. This can be best illustrated by the fact that in January 1969, just two days before his inauguration, Richard Nixon the new US president contacted Tito by letter. In the letter he expressed the wish to visit Yugoslavia and to become personally acquainted with the Yugoslav president.[106] Despite all indications, relations also with the East, particularly with the USSR, began to rapidly normalise. It is not irrelevant that the first concrete moves in the normalisation of diplomatic relations were in fact made by Moscow. One year after the intervention in Czechoslovakia the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko, arrived in Belgrade to talk with Tito about future relations.[107] For Yugoslavia, but above all for Tito, it was yet another (moral) victory over the great "socialist brother". Such an impression was confirmed and expressed by the British Ambassador to Yugoslavia: "The Soviet foreign minister's visit to Belgrade was a repetition in miniature of Khruschev's journey to Canossa in 1955".[108]

Events during 1968 were a confirmation, but also a warning, that internal weaknesses had a greater influence on the stability and integrity of Yugoslavia than an external threat. Most of these weaknesses were not unknown, especially not to those who ran the country. The overall development of Yugoslavian society after the introduction of economic reforms, which resulted from specific changes in the Constitution of the SFRJ and the reorganisation of the SKJ, went further in the direction of denationalisation and decentralisation. In regard to politics and economics, the federal centre's influence was weakening, whilst the position of the republic became stronger. All the mentioned changes would prove to be insufficient, amongst other things, and also because they left intact

the key position in Yugoslavia, that of Josip Broz Tito. Whilst with other institutions power became restricted, his grew. It was one of the paradoxes of Yugoslavian society that was developing, modernising and liberalising, beside the simultaneous more and more visible autocratic rule of one man. Despite his advanced years, Tito did not intend to relinquish the function he had performed since the end of the Second World War. Twenty years later he was still the state president, president of the party and commander of the armed forces. Besides this, in the atmosphere of increasingly visible disunity in the national and political elite he assumed the role of the inevitable "supranational" arbitrator. The political and social upheavals that broke out at the end of the 1960s weakened the cohesive force of the Yugoslavian community, but at the same time strengthened the authority and influence of Tito. His charisma within the country was additionally strengthened by the reputation and position that he had built on the international political stage. The development of events during 1968 was one of the best indicators of this cause and effect relation.

Notes

1. Letter from Hannah Arendt, New York, to Karl Jaspers, Basel, 26 June 1968. Arendt-Jaspers 1993, p. xvi.
2. Marković-Kržavac, *Liberalizam od Đilasa do danas* (Belgrade, 1978).
3. The term "entropy of social revolution" was used by Yugoslav philosopher Svetozar Stojanović in his article "The June student movement and social revolution in Yugoslavia", *Praxis* (international edition), 3–4, 1970.
4. On the Brijuni Islands, Tito received the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Michael Stewart, the British ambassador to Yugoslavia (outgoing) Duncan Wilson and the Dean of the College of Cardinals in the Vatican. *Borba*, 7–9.6.1968.
5. Tito received information from a variety of sources, from official (police, military intelligence and party reports) to unofficial, which were sent by his close friends and associates.
6. Letter from students, teachers, workers and officials in the Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics in Belgrade, *Dokumenti*1971. p. 165.
7. Close collaborator to Josip Broz Tito, and from 1970 to 1973 also the head of the Cabinet of the President of the Republic.
8. Marko Vrhunec, Šest let s Titom: (1967–1973), LaserPrint, 2001, p. 171.
9. At the meeting of the Extended Bureau, besides Tito, present were: Edvard Kardelj, Mijalko Todorović, Vladimir Bakarić, Petar Stambolić,

Cvijetin Mijatović, Krste Crvenkovski, Albert Jakopič, Đoko Pajković and Vladimir Popović.

10. AJ (Archives of Yugoslavia), KPR, II-3-A-1, "Minutes of the meeting of the Extended Bureau of the Presidency of the CK SKJ", 8.6.1968 and AJ, 507, II/132, "Authorised stenographic notes from the Ninth Joint Sitting of the Presidency and the Executive Committee of the CK SKJ", 9.6.1968.
11. AJ, 507, II/132, "Authorised stenographic notes from the Ninth Joint Sitting of the Presidency and the Executive Committee of the CK SKJ", 9.6.1968.
12. "We need to know: when the working class go out onto the streets, then it will be difficult for us!", Ibid.
13. This is primarily related to Miloš Minić, who has on several occasions expressed the view that due to his relationship with the student movement, he should submit his resignation. AJ, KPR, II-3-A-1, "Minutes from the meeting of the Extended Bureau of the Presidency of the CK SKJ", 8.6.1968.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Vuković in his book cites interesting details connected to Tito's statement. To Tito's question whether he suggested something special, Vuković answers: "I think it would be good and I propose that at the end of the statement you speak directly with the students and that you invite them to return to normal work at the University". Since Tito at the first "attempt" dropped this direct address to the students, the ending of the statement was subsequently recorded and inserted. Zdravko Vuković, *Od deformacija SDB do Maspoka i liberalizma (From the deformation of the SDB (State Security Service) to MASPOK and liberalism)* (Narodna knjiga, Belgrade 1989), pp. 178–179.
17. Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo, *Memoari 1966–1969 (Memoirs 1966–1969)* (Narodna knjiga, Belgrade 1985). pp. 312–313.
18. *Borba*, 10.6.1968.
19. Ibid.
20. Location in Novi Beograd where students and police clashed.
21. The day before, at the meeting of the Extended Bureau, Edvard Kardelj was very clear about this question: "If even the courier in the SUP would be replaced it would also be as though the ministry had been replaced. In this situation it has the same significance". AJ, KPR, II-3-A-1, "Minutes from the Meeting of the Extended Bureau of the Presidency of the CK SKJ" 8.6.1968.
22. *Borba*, 10.6.1968.
23. Ibid.

24. *Ustav* (*Constitution)* 1971, p. 8.
25. "It seems that the people suddenly awoke and it dawned on them, realising in their minds what could happen if the working class would not be so aware, when it would not see the difficulties that it encounters and take such steps which would not be in line with our relations in socialist society. But comrades, we must not put too much burden on the working class and expect that it waits peacefully and listens". *Borba*, 10.6.1968.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Latinka Perović, *Zatvaranje kruga: ishod političkog rascepa u SKJ 1971/1972* (*Closing the circle: the outcome of political dissidence in the SKJ 1971–1972*) (Svjetlost, Sarajevo), p. 59.
30. Ibid.
31. Tito ended his speech with the words: "It is time that you embrace education, now is the time for setting the examinations, and I wish you great success in that. Because it would be a real pity that you lose even more time". *Borba*, 10.6.1968.
32. AJ, KPR, II-4-a ("Telegrams and letters sent to comrade Tito after his statements on the radio and TV received from 10th–26th June 1968").
33. Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo, *Memoari 1966–1969 (Memoirs 1966–1969)*, p. 313.
34. Zdravko Vuković, *Od deformacija SDB do Maspoka i liberalizma (From the deformation of the SDB (State Security Service) to MASPOK and liberalism),* p. 181.
35. *Borba*, 10.6.1968.
36. Details from the editorial of *Borba* issued by its former journalist Slavoljub Đukić, in: *Šezdeset osma—lične istorije* (*Sixty eight—personal history*) 2008: 715–719.
37. Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo, *Memoari 1966–1969 (Memoirs 1966–1969),* p. 181.
38. *Šesti kongres Saveza sindikata Jugoslavije* (*Sixth Congress of the Trade Unions of Yugoslavia*), Belgrade 1968, p. 26.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., pp. 26–27.
41. Tito's entrance into the Union Hall was greeted with a standing and prolonged applause, with shouts of "Tito, Tito", "We are Tito's, Tito is ours", and then the spontaneous resounding of the song "Comrade Tito, we pledge to you that we shall not deviate from your path". After the speech there also followed long lasting applause and cheering. Ibid., 5.
42. Ljubodrag Dimić, "The view from Belgrade to Czechoslovakia in 1968", *Tokovi istorije (Currents of History)*, 3–4/2005.

43. *Praxis*, no. 1–2, 1969 ("Marginalia with Czechoslovakia and new tendencies in socialism").
44. AJ, 507, III/131, "Authorised stenographic notes from the Eighth Joint Sitting of the Presidency and IK CK SKJ", 20.5.1968.
45. AJ, KPR, I-2, USSR, "Note about the talks with the President of the SFRJ and President of the SKJ Comrade Josip Broz Tito and members of the Yugoslav state-party delegation with the Soviet party and state leaders in Moscow, 29.4.1968."
46. "I believe that the current leadership will be able to hold the situation in its own hands, they just need help and support" answered Tito to Brezhnev's words that the process that was happening in Czechoslovakia "is not healthy". Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. AJ, KPR, I-2, USSR, "Joint statement."
50. Representatives of five Warsaw Pact countries (without Romania) and Czechoslovakia met in Dresden on 23August 1968. The leaders of the "brotherly" parties, on this occasion, urged the Czechoslovakian leadership to urgently and decisively stop any "counter-revolutionary" tendencies in the country.
51. The interview was published in mid-July 1968, in: Vuković 1989, p. 202.
52. *Time*, 16.8.1968 ("World: Back to the business of reform") http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,838544,00.html (1.3.2011).

    Reporter *New York Times* Tito's welcome in Prague was described as "publicly jubilant but officially reticent". *New York Times*, 10.8.1968 ("Tito and the Czech Leaders Confer as Prague Exults; Tito and Czechs meet in Prague").
53. NA, KSČ-UV-02/1, sv. 81, 125/k, info 1, "Zprava o navšteve delegace UV SKJ vedene s J.B. Titem v ČSSR ve dnech 9–11.srpna 1968".
54. By Tito's words it would be "a dangerous precedent also for others". Ibid.
55. *Ibid*.
56. *The Economist*, 17.8.1968 ("This is how you should do it").
57. *Hronika* 1969: 1712.
58. *Prague Spring* 2008: 376–383. ("The Soviet Politburo's Resolution on the Final Decision to Intervene in Czechoslovakia, 17 August, 1968").
59. On the morning of the same day (21 August) in the Villa Brionka, a meeting was held of the so-called Extended Bureau, i.e., the tight circle of politicians around Tito. At the meetings of the Extended Bureau it was normal to coordinate views, which would later be considered at sittings of the political leadership. Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo, *Memoari 1966–1969 (Memoirs 1966–1969,* p. 347.

60. AJ, 507, III/134, Minutes of the Eleventh Joint Sitting of the Presidency and the Executive Committee CK SKJ, 21.8.1968.
61. Ibid.
62. "How dare you read such slander to my face?" was just one of the remarks that Tito interrupted Benediktov with, whilst he read the demarche. AJ, 507, III/135, Material from the Joint Sitting of the Presidency and Executive Committee of CK SKJ, 2.9.1968. (Note about the reception of the Soviet ambassador at President Tito's, 30 August 1968); *Time* magazine wrote about the atmosphere during the Tito-Benediktov meeting, in the article "Caught between the blocs", 11.10.1968.
63. AJ, 507, III/136, Letter from Leonid Brezhnev to Josip Broz Tito, 17.10.1968.
64. Ibid.
65. AJ, 507, III/136, Reply to Brezhnev's letter.
66. In *Borba* from 22 August 1968 an article was published that estimated military forces in the Warsaw Pact as: *USSR*: 3,200,000 personnel, 15,000 tanks, 10,250 aircraft, *Poland*: 270,000 personnel, 3,000 tanks, 320 aircraft, *Bulgaria*: 154,000 personnel, 2,500 tanks, 250 aircraft, *GDR*: 127,000 personnel, 1,800 tanks, 300 aircraft, *Hungary*: 102,000 people, 700 tanks, 140 aircraft, *Czechoslovakia*: 225,000 personnel, 3,200 tanks, 600 aircraft.
67. According to the Constitution from 1953, article 73, the president of the republic is the supreme commander of the armed forces. He "appoints, promotes and dismisses generals and admirals, as well as other officers and military seniors according to the law". *Ibid.*
68. AJ, 507, IV/50, Stenographic notes from the 50th Sitting of the IK CK SKJ, 24.9.1968. General Ivan Dolničar states that Radio Zagreb had conducted a successful attempt at action under war conditions. AJ, 142, 282, Stenographic notes from the Joint Sitting of the Presidency and Executive Committee Federal Conference of the SSRNJ, 4.9.1968.
69. Miko Tripalo, Secretary of the IK CK SKH, states that around 110,000 young people applied for the youth units in Croatia in just few days. *Vjesnik*, 12.10.1968 (the article "Successful defence—the whole nation in an armed resistance").
70. *Time,* 8.11.1968.
71. AJ, 507, III/135, Authorised stenographic notes from Twelfth Joint Sitting of the Presidency and IK CK SKJ, 2.9.1968. Declaration of Nikola Ljubičić, Federal Secretary for National Defence.
72. Ibid. Declaration by Josip Broz Tito.
73. AJ, 507, III/135, Authorised stenographic notes from Twelfth Joint Sitting of the Presidency and IK CK SKJ, 2.9.1968.

74. Olivera and Dragan Bogetić, *Nastanak i razvoj pokreta nesvrstanosti* (*The emergence and development of non-alignment*), Export-Press, Belgrade 1981, p. 35.
75. In a conversation led by Tito on 23 August 1968, the US ambassador to Yugoslavia Charles Elbrick cited the likely lack of instruction as a reason of restraint. AJ, 507, III/135, Conversation with the President of the Republic with the US Ambassador in SFRJ Elbrick, 23.8.1968.
76. AJ, 507, III/136, Material for the Sitting of the Presidency and IK CK SKJ (From the conversation with Nasser with Lekić), 31.10.1968.
77. Ibid.
78. *Foreign Relations of the United States 1964–1968*, vol. XVII, Eastern Europe, Washington, 1996, 513–514. (Telegram from the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State, 14.9.1968).
79. AJ, 507, III/136, Material for the Sitting of the Presidency and IK CK SKJ (From the conversation between D.S. Nikezić with I. Gandhi in New York), 31.10.1968.
80. AJ, 507, III/136, Material for the Sitting of the Presidency and IK CK SKJ, Initiative from Ethiopia to convene an extraordinary conference regarding the ČSSR (from a conversation between the Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia and the Ambassador of the SFRJ in Addis Ababa, Dimitrije Bajalica, 28.8.1968.), 31.10.1968.
81. *Borba*, 25.9.1968.
82. AJ, 507, III/136, Material for the Sitting of the Presidency and IK CK SKJ (From the conversation between President Tito with Emperor H. Selassie 25.9.1968.), 31.10.1968.
83. From the Arab countries, Tunisia formally condemned the aggression, unlike Egypt and Algeria who unofficially supported it. Among other African countries the reactions were also varied, in large part conditioned by a relationship with the Soviet Union and the other members of the Warsaw Pact. So Tanzania, Zambia, Kenya, Senegal, the Republic of Congo condemned the aggression, whilst the majority of other countries abstained. Only Mali not only supported the aggression, but also decided not to participate in the next conference of the Non-Aligned. AJ, KPR, I-5-b, ČSR, "Note on the reaction of African and Arab countries to the events related to the ČSSR and the repercussions on the conference of the Non-Aligned", 17.9.1968.
84. AJ, 507, III/134, Minutes of the Eleventh Joint Sitting of the Presidency and the Executive Committee CK SKJ, 21.8.1968.
85. General Nikola Ljubičić, Federal Secretary for National Defence mentioned the possibility of an agreement on the division of Yugoslavia between western and eastern countries at a sitting on the Brijuni Islands, 2.9.1968. AJ, 507, III/135, Authorised stenographic notes from the 12th Joint Sitting of the Presidency and IK CK SKJ, 2.9.1968.

86. AJ, 507, III/134, Minutes of the Eleventh Joint Sitting of the Presidency and the Executive Committee CK SKJ, 21.8.1968.
87. The National Archives, London, Defe 68/25, Italian-Yugoslav Relations.
88. Besides the Italian and Yugoslavian, news of the Italian act of goodwill was also carried by some American media, such as *New York Herald Tribune*. Ibid.
89. *Foreign Relations of the United States 1964–1968*, vol. XVII, Eastern Europe, Washington, 1996, 91–94 (Austrian Contingency, 30.9.1968).
90. *Vjesnik*, 6.10.1968.
91. AJ, 507, III/135, Authorised stenographic notes from the 12th Joint Sitting of the Presidency and IK CK SKJ, 2.9.1968.
92. AJ, 507, III/135, Attitudes and evaluation of the British government, "From a conversation with Ambassador Sarajčić with the ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain", 27.8.1968.
93. Ibid. "From conversation with Ambassador Sarajčić with the ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain George Brown", 28.8.1968.
94. Brown accompanied his statement with the comment "if you report to Belgrade about this conversation with me then definitely mention this, although I am no longer minister for foreign affairs". Ibid.
95. The National Archive, London, FCO 28/559, 6.9.1968.
96. AJ, 507, III/135, Discussion with the President of the Republic with the Ambassador of the USA in SRFJ Elbrick, 23.8.1968.
97. Memorandum for the President, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files 1967–1969, Political and Defence, Pol 1 Yugo, box 2840.
98. Ibid.
99. AJ, 507, III/136, "Visit of N. Katzenbach."
100. For example, regarding Gligorov's visit to the USA, *Vjesnik* published only one article ("Johnson received Gligorov", 6.10.1968), whilst in the same newspaper, Katzenbach's stay was reported on before, during and after his visit, see: *Vjesnik*, 18, 19, 20.10.1968.
101. *Vjesnik*, 18.10.1968.
102. *Foreign Relations of the United States 1964–1968*, vol. XVII, Eastern Europe, Washington, 1996, 521–523, "Telegram from the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Department of State."
103. NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files 1967–1969, Political and Defence, Pol 1 Yugo, box 2840, "U.S. Policy Assessment—Yugoslavia", 17.2.1969.
104. Ibid.
105. This term is used in the report of US Ambassador Elbrick: "To develop a deeper understanding within the Congress of the actual situation in this *maverick Communist country* (marked H.K.), senators and congressmen

should be urged to include Yugoslavia on their itineraries more frequently." See: NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files 1967–1969, Political and Defence, Pol 1 Yugo, box 2840, "U.S. Policy Assessment—Yugoslavia", 17.2.1969.

106. Dragan Bogetić, "Yugoslavian–American relations in light of the military intervention in Czechoslovakia 1968", *Istorija 20. veka*, 2/2007.

Nixon visited Yugoslavia at the end of September 1970. Although the visit coincided with the funeral of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Tito nevertheless decided to stay in Belgrade and host the US president.

107. Gromyko arrived in Yugoslavia on 2 September 1969. The Soviets asked that the Yugoslavian Minister for Foreign Affairs should come to Moscow first, but Belgrade replied that he had already done so in 1966, and that the Soviet side had not yet returned the visit. The National Archive, London, DEFE 13/707, "Yugoslav–Soviet Relations", 22.9.1969.

108. Ibid.

CHAPTER 7

The *Blood Road* Reassessed

Gorana Ognjenović

One of the historic narratives that benefited greatly from more information being available, due to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, is the Yugoslav-Norwegian historic narrative about the internees from Yugoslavia who were sent to Nazi prison camps in Norway during World War II. The purpose of their departure to Norway was forced labor for *Organization Todt* (OT), the project of building the Atlantic Wall, a German defense line for occupied West Europe (the Third Reich) against an Allied invasion.

There are different definitions of forced labor and slavery, in this context we use a definition from Barbara N. Wiesinger, which is a well-argued and well-accepted perspective on these concepts.[1] Wiesinger defines slave labor as: labor in inhumane conditions demanded from camp prisoners, other institutions alike and ghettos. Wiesinger defines forced labor as: when a person has no influence on his place of labor or labor contracts, when one is exposed to different kinds of discrimination, when one resides in extremely poor conditions (prison camps, hunger, cold and lack of hygiene and health care), when one has no labor rights, when one does not have an opportunity to influence one's work and life conditions.

Blood Road is a road (today's Europavei 6) in northern Norway, Norland County, built during World War II by internees/forced laborers from Yugoslavia. The name comes from the fact that over 1000 internees lost their lives to hard living conditions and abuse by camp guards during their imprisonment as slave laborers.

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Forced labor was defined, at the International Tribunal for War Crimes in Nürnberg, as one of the worst war crimes committed by Nazi Germany during World War II and it was one of the three most important charges. Equally, in the IV Geneva Convention and in the Hague Tribunal of 1907, it is forbidden to force civilians to conduct labor for the purpose of the occupier's war goals. However, the forced labor was a very important part of the German war industry, especially after the quick war strategy (winter 1941/1942) and huge human atrocities on the Eastern Front. Forced labor was what, despite the circumstances, made it possible for Germany to continue the war.

So far it had been confirmed that from June 1942 until April 1943 most of the camps in northern Norway (Karasjok, Beifsjord, Korgen and Osen in Botn) were under SS command. In all these camps internees had slave status and the terror they were exposed to by the SS, by Norwegian guard-quislings, and the internees responsible for running the camps, is illustrated by the numbers of the dead. During only three months, out of 1296 prisoners, 1180 did not make it. In addition to the terror prisoners were exposed to, the extreme weather conditions, the physical labor of building roads without any tools, bad food and no hygiene were contributing factors.[2]

In April of 1943 all prison camps were taken over by regular Wehrmacht and all prisoners received a new status as prisoners of war, despite the fact that a lot of them never were soldiers. Documentation about their civilian identities is abundant. An example of such documentation is an announcement of four internees given out by OT Einsatzgruppe Wiking[3] in Trondheim January 1943, when they declare that the internees were "Serb civilian prisoners" that were shot because they ignored instructions about not carrying dynamite in the shed.[4]

There was also a difference between camps prior to the 1943 Wehrmacht takeover, depending on which command a camp was under. SS camps had extremely poor conditions while camps under OT command had somewhat better living conditions. The living conditions of the prisoners who arrived with the third transport and ended up in camps in mid-Norway were a bit better, since they were under OT camps (Austraat-Ørland, Steinvikholm, Trolla and Hasselvik). Some of the camps in northern Norway (Krokstran, Bjelønes/Bjellånes and Sandnessjøen) were also under OT command.

The untold story of this contribution refers to the contemporary effectiveness of Tito's revolutionary totalitarianism: the victims are only victims if they were active participants in the revolution. What we shall see

in this contribution to the volume is that today, 70 years after liberation day, there are still thousands of civilian internees registered in the official memorial of this common historic narrative as Tito's partisans. In addition, the total lists are erroneous and selective, thereby ignoring the true identity of the victims of this horrific crime. No one has found the answer to the question: Why were civilian victims listed as Tito's partisans, and why did not all documented Tito's partisans make it onto the official list of prisoners?

The Written Literature (Sources)

The five truly valuable monographs written by ex-internees on the theme are the following:

Cveja Jovanović, *Bekstva u slobodu: iz nacističkih logora smrti u Norveškoj*, Narodna knjiga: Republički odbor SUBNOR Srbije, Belgrade 1984. (Norwegian translation: *Flukt til friheten: Fra nazi-dødsleire i Norge [Escape to Freedom: From Nazi Death Camps in Norway],* Oslo: Gyldendal, 1985.);

Cveja Jovanović, *Krvavi put Severnog partizanskog odreda: ratni putopis*, Novo Delo, Belgrade, 1987. (Norwegian translation: *Blodveien til nordpartisanavdelingen [The Blood Road to the Northern Partisan Section],* C. Jovanović, Belgrade: 1988).

Ljubo Mlađenović, *Beisfjordska tragedija*, Dečje novine, 1988, (Norwegian translation: *Beisfjordtragedien [The Beisfjord Tragedy]*, translated by Brit Bakker. Oslo: Grøndahl, 1989.);

Ljubo Mlađenović, *Pod Šifrom Viking: život, borba i stradanja jugoslavenskih interniraca u logorima u Norveškoj 1942–1945: studijsko-dokumentarna monografija*, Belgrade, 1991. (Never translated to Norwegian)

Milorad Ašković, Blagoje Marinković, Ljubomir Petrović. *U logorima u severnoj Norveškoj*, Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1979. (Never translated to Norwegian)

Dušan Azanjac, Ivo Frol & Đorđe Nikolić, *Otpor u žicama*, Vojnoizdavački zavod, Belgrade, 1969. (Never translated to Norwegian)

The sixth significant volume published on the theme and frequently used as a research reference is an analysis of the behavior of the guards in the camps who primarily were Norwegian Nazis, a study in criminology based on interviews with camp guards written by Nils Christie, a well-known Norwegian criminology researcher.[5]

There are two other publications on the theme that are referred to at times, despite their historiographic incorrectness and ideological flaws. One example is the novel *One Hour of Freedom* by Ostoja Kovačević.[6] This novel, despite its historical incorrectness and obvious political agenda, still has a value as an historical document since so far it is the only source of a description of the OT concentration camp in Belgrade, a transit camp for the prisoners destined for OT building projects around Europe. The problem with this particular novel is that the story was told from the perspective of an ex-internee with a clear ethnic conflict agenda, and it determined the view of the Norwegian people for a very long time because it was the first one written and for a long time the only literature written on the theme. Another example is a volume by Nikola Rokić, "Jugoslavia mitt land"[7] (Yugoslavia My Country), an autobiographical text describing a perspective on this narrative from a "royalist point of view", strongly determined by its uncritical loyalty to Četnik leader Dražo Mihajlović who has been charged and punished for the enormous crimes he an his men committed against the civilan Catholic and Muslim population in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, as well as the Orthodox population, of whom his current rehabilitators considered to have been the protector. The rest of the literature published on the theme (in Norwegian) was written by amateur hobby historians, heavily reliant on language interpreters. There are also some scientific articles written on the theme, certainly very narrow in their scope and containing a systematic disinformation when it comes to facts about World War II in former Yugoslavia.

The Official Story (a Short Version)

This historic episode for the internees deported directly from Yugoslavia was set in motion by Paul Bader, military and judicial commanding officer in charge of Serbia. On 21 March 1942, Bader wrote a letter to Walter Knutz, the officer in charge of the southeast, who cooperated with higher SS Polizeifürer August Meyszner. In his letter, Bader informed Knutz that an order was issued for sending all imprisoned insurgents to the concentration camps, from where they would be sent for OT forced-labor to Norway.[8] Officers eventually agreed that only those insurgents who were not caught in a battle should be deported to Norway as laborers. Prisoners who were caught in battle were to be hanged or shot as a standard policy for dealing with insurgents prescribed at the time.[9] One can of course speculate whether this kind of prisoner selection might have been a form

of precaution or an attempt to diminish the risk of a rebellion in the labor camps once internees arrived in Norway.

The agreement resulted in thousands of internees being transported from jails, concentration camps and forms of penitentiaries in occupied Yugoslavia, to the forced labor camps in Norway during the next few years, as a part of the *Organization Todt'* building projects for building the Atlantic defense wall. The planned number of 4200 internees who were to be sent north was agreed upon between two friends, August Meyszner Polizeifürer in Nedić's Serbia[10] and Obergrupenfürer Josef Terboven who was Rikskommissær for Norway.[11] However, as internees were going to be sent from concentration camps where living conditions were very poor, the delivery of so many internees capable of hard labor was considered impossible.[12] After all, the available labor force on the territory of Serbia was exploited, OT continued its search for available forced labor on the territory of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska), primarily related to Jasenovac Concentration Camp. Prisoners in this camp were civilians from Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Symria, victims of genocide, victims of the Holocaust and many others. According to today's official numbers stated in Norway's memorial institutions[13] during the period 1942–1943, a total of 4268 individuals were taken to Norway from the territories of occupied Yugoslavia. Some time during the autumn of 1943 it was stated clearly that there would not be any more convoys of laborers coming from Belgrade (Zemun reception camp and OT camp). Illness and the physical and mental abuse they suffered in the camps from where they were to be sent and the generally poor state of the prisoners had simply taken its toll.

After World War II was over, according to official sources,[14] around 15 internees remained in Norway, for different reasons. The rest, 1530 internees, were repatriated to Yugoslavia. While waiting for their repatriation, ex-internees re-organized themselves into the "partisan brigades". Prior to their departure, in Karasjok, Beisfjord, Polarsikelen (Saltfjellet), Knutlia (Osen), Falstadskogen, Korgen and Udde Bro in Leinstrand (Trondheim), Rotvol in Øysandu, internees in cooperation with Norwegians raised monuments in memory of the internees who did not survive. Also, prior to their departure, a Norwegian-Yugoslav union was organized with its headquarters in Norway, through which they kept contact with their civilian helpers. Once internees returned to Yugoslavia the same brigade members made of ex-internees organized the so called Yugoslav–Norwegian union in Yugoslavia (in Gornji Milanovac, a rural

part of Serbia) in order to keep up the friendship between the two countries. Their friendship grew over the years. It is well documented that great efforts were made on both sides to keep up their friendship, which resulted from their cooperation during the time they experienced horrors. The trans-European friendship was a result of the empathy and help the internees received from the local civilian population during their incarceration in the labor camps. The internees established contact and were helped by the local civilian Norwegian population across the country, wherever the camps were set up during 1942–1945.[15] One of the Norwegian civilian helpers/heroes, Kirsten Elisabeth Svineng, better known as "Mama Karasjok" because of her fantastic bravery, travelled to Yugoslavia as an honored guest, and in 1965 she was awarded by Tito the highest Yugoslav revolutionary medal during his official visit to Norway.

In 1953 Norwegian authorities organized the collection of internees' dead bodies of the killed and dead internees when they found 1886 bodies.[16] The bodies were relocated and reburied in mass graves in Botn (for northern area), Moholt and Lademoen (for middle area) and Os (for southern area). In 1976 in the capital of Norway, Oslo, with King Olav V and general Kosta Nađ who represented the president of the Socialist Federative Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito, a monument was raised for all internees from Yugoslavia who lost their lives during World War II in Norway.

Until 1991 this was the official story told about this particular common historic narrative in Norway and in Yugoslavia, which brought the two countries closer together.

However a single discrepancy, that nobody seemed to have noticed, was that while the narrative taught in schools in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina claimed that Yugoslav internees were taken to camps in Norway, the school texts in Serbia and Norway told a different story, which was that Serbian internees were taken as slaves to Nazi camps in Norway. This factual discrepancy was what consequently almost brought the whole story down when the Croatian Union of ex-internees during the 1980s broke off from the main organization in Serbia. Letters of complaints were written by the Friendship Union in Croatia to the local authorities in Norway demanding that the details in the official narrative be nuanced. But due to the war that followed, the occurrence of the new information was further downplayed and quite nearly and intentionally forgotten. When the exhibition in 2012 (marking 70 years since the first internees arrived from Yugoslavia to the camps in Norway) was to be organized, the

work brought the inconsistencies of this narrative to the surface again, and the growing numbers of questions were hard to ignore.

The New Turn: 70 Years After

In complete ignorance of the complaints made by the Croatian and Bosnian-Herzegovinian part of the internees during the 1990s, preparations were started in 2011 for production of an historic exhibition to mark the 70 years since the first internees arrived at the Nazi camps in Norway. As a result, a new perspective on this common historic narrative took a serious turn.

Since the project was meant to be a cooperation between two memorial institutions (Falstad Centre in Norway and Jasenovac Memorial in Croatia), an interpretive angle was chosen for the exhibition concept that described the journey made by Jasenovac prisoners, from Jasenovac over to the Zemun reception camp (Sajmište) in Belgrade and from there up to the prison camps in Norway. In other words, the idea behind the exhibition was to describe one of many minor narratives within the main narrative. The only problem was that as this particular part of the main narrative unfolded, a number of unpredicted issues started pouring out of the original sources, spread around in archives in Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia, the USA, France as well as in Norway.[17] In addition, old original documentation was found in the National Archives of Norway in Oslo showing that this narrative was far from being as straightforward as it was first told.[18]

The troubles started when sources showed that the common narrative had been very poorly researched on either side, or almost not at all. On one hand, there were only a few published articles on the theme, and they reflected a serious lack of knowledge of the history, language and culture of ex-Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the only literature written in ex-Yugoslavia, which was also used (translated and edited or shortened) in Norway as the source of the presentation of this historic narrative, were monographs written by ex-internees. These monographs were produced in the form of biographies and were not standard research material. In addition, all the monographs referred to on this theme in Norway were written only by the Serb-Orthodox share of the former internees, even though Yugoslav individuals of all different nationalities and religious backgrounds were internees in these Nazi-camps in Norway. Some of the material published in Norway by earlier internees was excessively filled with ethnic hate while other material was dominated by the presentation of false facts.

The questioning of the official presentation of the narrative was intensified once it was discovered that on the cover of the "Beisfjord Tragedy" there was a subtitle containing a reference to *Serb-camps*.[19] Some pages later in the same book it was discovered that the ex-internees themselves wrote that the title was wrong since Serbs were not the only ethnic group from Yugoslavia in the camps, but that most of the other ethnic groups were represented amongst the internees as well.[20] As it turned out, this problem of false presentation of the facts of the case was nevertheless present throughout the memorial system of institutions, except for the one single monument raised in memory of the former internees, located in Oslo, which refers to internees from Yugoslavia as a single group, independent of their ethnic or religious background. In light of this discovery, the reasons for concern were more than crystal clear at this point in the preparatory work for the exhibition.

The Four (of Many) Problems Concerning the Common Narrative

There are a number of problems concerning the presentation of this historic narrative when it is compared with documented facts on the theme. Due to the limited space in this chapter, I shall focus only the four main issues, which are *the numbers, the use of terminology and the synonymization of concepts, the time-restricted identities and the methodology issues*. Even though all these issues are valid throughout the official description and the entire narrative, what they primarily document is the biggest issue of all: Civilian victims even today still remain written up as Tito's partisans, only confirming the contemporary effectiveness of Tito's revolutionary totalitarianism: the victims are only victims if they were active participants in the revolution.

The Numbers

The three main categories concerning numbers when analyzing this particular narrative are: *the number of camps, the number of internees*, and the *number of internees who survived*.[21]

The first major problem is *the difference in the number of camps* registered in Norway and in the Yugoslav archives. The number of the camps registered in Yugoslav sources was much lower than the number registered in Norwegian sources.[22] One of the reasons is that the Yugoslav sources

referred only to camps where internees who were repatriated to Yugoslavia had been kept. The Norwegian sources included the camps where internees from Yugoslavia were incarcerated independent of whether they were or were not repatriated to Yugoslavia in 1945. However, despite this clear discrepancy between the numbers of the camps, both sides still agreed upon one single "official" number for the prisoners kept in the camps.

The second major problem is that the category of *the official number of the Yugoslav internees* was of a quite different character than what is usually meant by "the number of internees from Yugoslavia kept in forced labor camps in Norway 1942–1945". This difference in "character" is that *the official number of the survivors* is assumed to be *the number of internees who were officially repatriated* to Tito's Yugoslavia. That is to say that the "official number of internees" is quite different from what the *total* number of internees from Yugoslavia would include. The total number should include *all* internees who were incarcerated in these camps as forced laborers for the OT during the period 1942–1945. One of the intriguing details that can be seen from the monographs written by ex-internees is their detailed description of their contact with "these others", who in the end did not officially repatriate to Tito's Yugoslavia and therefore were never included on these lists.[23] However, the contact was obviously never matched up with an open debate about why the others were never included on the official lists.

The third major problem in this category of numbers is the official number of internees from Yugoslavia killed in the camps. A *Protocoll* was found in the National Archives of Norway dated 3 February 1955. The protocol describes the procedure of moving the mass graves of internees from Yugoslavia to three different locations (mass graves) across Norway.[24] The new resting places they were moved to were in the north of Norway, in the south of Norway and in the middle of Norway. Once the official numbers of victims were compared with the numbers that the *Protocoll* contained, further problems concerning the number of dead internees from Yugoslavia occurred. The numbers of the dead internees in the *Protocoll* were fewer than the numbers reported by ex-internees in their monographs and the numbers documented in other original sources.

The Use of Terminology: Synonymization

The *terminology used* when referring to the internees in the presentation of this narrative had been proven to be inconsistent, often false and unusually flexible. In ex-Yugoslavia, and today in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina,

the internees were/are referred to in history books and textbooks in schools as "Internees from Yugoslavia in Nazi camps in Norway". At the same time, in Norway and Serbia, the same internees were referred to as "Serbian internees in Nazi camps in Norway". In addition, terms such as "Yugoslavs", "Serbians" and "partisans" were in a Norwegian context frequently used as synonyms.

Based on the monographs and in the original documents it had been proven that originally this "mistake" was a result of a simple bureaucratic error by German soldiers. All prisoners coming from the territorium of occupied Yugoslavia were automatically marked with the letter "S" on their clothes to mark them as prisoners from Serbia. This was by no means accidental since almost all internees came via different concentration camps in Belgrade, the capital of Nedić's Serbia at the time. Consequently, everything associated with the interneees from Yugoslavia got the prefix "Serb-". Norwegian Nazi guards in the camps seeing the "S" on internees uniforms referred to all internees as "Serbs". The camps were referred to as Serb-camps. The local Norwegian civilian population who helped the internees used this mistaken title when referring to internees. One of the local Norwegian civilian helpers was even nicknamed "Serbian mother" for helping the internees. Furthermore, the cabin internees built for the escape hideout when trying to cross over to Sweden was and is still today titled a "Serb-cabin". Towards the end of the war, the first information concerning the existence of these Nazi camps in Norway reached the international society only when the internees managed to escape over the border to Sweden. The international society also received the wrong information about the internees' identities from the Norwegian resistance movement who assisted internees in their escape believing that they were helping "Serbians" to escape. In this way, the term "Serb-internees" was uncritically passed on around the world, spreading the false information, misleading everyone to believe that all internees were Serbians only.

None of this is surprising due to the poor, if any, knowledge of each others' language and sporadic communication, as well as the traumatic situation created and controlled by the Nazi terror period.

At the same time, it was very surprising to see that 70 years later literally everything in reference to these camps, as part of a memorial for the internees from Yugoslavia, still had the prefix "Serb-" added to it. In addition, the fact that in their monographs internees[25] themselves many years ago wrote that not all internees were Serbs seems to have fallen on deaf ears as well.

Somehow this false presentation of the facts still remains dominant in daily language and research material, building further on misconceptions and mistaken premises in the official story about this common tragic historic narrative.[26]

The Time-Restricted Identity Question

In all newly written and published literature, research and memorial texts the *internees are presented only as "partisans"*. It is very hard to determine or have an opinion about why such mistaken use of terminology had occurred. The documented facts from all original sources including monographs show that the majority of internees were far from being "partisans" before their repatriation to Yugoslavia in 1945. However, what this mistaken use of terminology in all newly written and published literature, research and memorial texts brought about is a great number of misunderstandings about the true identities of the internees.

We also know that a lot of the political situation on the territory of Yugoslavia changed by their repatriation in 1945. King Petar II in August 1944 gave an order to all Četniks to leave the commander Dražo Mihajlović and to join Tito's partisans. This order was obeyed by thousands of Četniks. This was a moment in the history of the people of Yugoslavia that had severe consequences on the perception of the freedom fighters as anti-fascists during World War II. In addition, Tito offered amnesty to all Fifth Column members, twice, in order to motivate them to change sides and help partisans to free the country from the occupiers and the remaining local quislings.

Therefore, internees organized themselves into "partisan brigades" while getting ready for their repatriation to Yugoslavia. As a result of this historic development, a picture of who the prisoners were upon arrival in the camps had been completely changed or rather distorted.

A further question is raised, especially by the well-documented fact that some internees did and some did not take up the offer of being repatriated as part of Tito's brigades. In addition, it is very well documented that some internees wanted to be repatriated but they were rejected by Yugoslav authorities. By the time ex-internees "took up the membership in Tito's brigades" Tito's "clean-up campaign" was well on its way. A campaign that was going to eliminate all those who did not take his offer of amnesty and change sides had already been in motion for over a year.

In any case, this problematic identity reference of "partisans", which obviously has *time* or *historic limitations* for when it is or it is not correct, has been used uncritically by almost all researchers who wrote on the theme. In their blissful ignorance of such *time limitations* the intentional reinforcing of the false picture of this historic narrative unfortunately continues to this day.[27] One can of course always ask oneself: Is this a minor error? The answer to that question should nevertheless from both sides be: Not quite as small as it looks!

Anyone familiar with the history of Yugoslavia during World War II should be able to understand the fear of Tito's rising rule at the time. One has to understand the need to protect internees' identities from possible retribution upon their return home, as well as this danger being real for some years after the war was officially over. In contrast to the generally accepted false belief (that all internees were partisans), the group of Yugoslav internees consisted of Ustaša, Četniks, Domobrans, Nedić SS, criminals, as well as a large number of Jasenovac prisoners (genocide victims from NDH) and other yet unidentified groups whose lists have only recently come to the fore.[28] The original sources and monographs show clearly that the internees' background varied as to social status, political orientation, religious orientation and nationality. Jasenovac prisoners, for example were mainly strong young men that were suitable for hard labor (Orthodox victims of ethnic cleansing, Croat students, members of the resistance movement, and so on), demilitarized Ustaša, Četniks and Home Front soldiers picked up in local jails and criminals. Independent of how we look at this group of people and their sad, tormented destinies, the fact is that the majority of internees from Yugoslavia were absolutely not Tito's partisans.

Nevertheless, the need for retaining this well-known "false identity" time-limited reference had an expiration date, which came and went about the same time as the collapse of the Communist regime in Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Why this expiration date did not come into effect 70 years after remains a mystery.

What we do know is that maintaining the same praxis of using false identities can only be damaging and scientifically unforgivable. It is nevertheless extremely respectless towards all those who never made it to the official list of internees. One of the worst possible consequences of such dubious scientific practice is that it opens doors for misinterpretations: political readings by extreme forces who are always there when least expected.

Of course, one can always allow oneself to speculate even further over what else this reluctance might possibly refuse to uncover. Could it reveal a direct connection to some unfortunate ongoing horrific political processes on the territorium of ex-Yugoslavia today? Or maybe we should not speculate at all into the motives of this mistaken use of internee identities. However, one cannot help but wonder what would the view on this narrative be if this kind of mistaken use of terminology was never reapplied by those who wrote on the theme.

An example of the necessity of discussing this issue as one of many aspects of the same problem was brought about only a few years ago. In 2011 a monument was raised at Øvre Jernvann[29] by Narviks Centre and the Hugos Valentin Centre researchers on which the number of internees as well as the identities of the internees are still falsely listed by all general standards. The largest group of internees in this case were also civilian prisoners from Jasenovac prison camp. Maybe the most interesting fact is that even the internees themselves wrote in their monographs about the amnesty and the true identities of the internees even before the fall of Tito's Yugoslavia in the 1980s in order to make sure that the truth about their identities should come out before it was too late. Of course, the biggest question still remains open: If even the internees themselves have written about this problematic aspect of description of the common narrative, why do the people in charge of setting up the monument still have difficulties accepting the fact that the text on the monument written in the Serbian Cyrillic alphabet is an example of the falsification of well-documented historic facts?

The Methodology Issues

This kind of mistaken use of terminology does not come about randomly. It is usually a result of a systematic mistake in methodological approach. There are the three major methodological issues in reference to all literature written on this subject: (1) The literature written is not a clean-cut research literature, but written by ex-internees and therefore based a great deal on individual memoirs. (2) The literature written is based only on material that came from archives difficult to access due to the language as well as to the political situation in the former Yugoslavia and its successor states. Nevertheless, archives in Belgrade and in Norway are limited in their scope. (3) The literature written on this theme is not based on information from the legitimate third sources or international archives around the globe, which we know contain relevant original sources.

However, these three unfortunate circumstances are not meant as excuses for researchers to not listen to the warnings that came from the ex-internees in their monographs about all the inconsistencies that determined the view of this specific narrative. After so many years of failure to clean up the enormous amount of disinformation accumulated around the facts on this theme, it should be of no surprise that another process went on in the shadows of this dark past. This was the process of developing myths and legends that we recognize and identify in the argumentation demonstrated above. As we can see, one myth led to another, and legends grew, building a story slowly but definitely out of its real proportions.[30]

Of course, taking this particular angle on the research done on this theme begs the question: Which internees from Yugoslavs actually were these "Yugoslav internees"?

If we are to take the term "Yugoslav" literally, then national identity has taken the place of citizenship, which we know is a very unfortunate result where Yugoslavia was concerned. What we know for sure is that internees were from the territory of Yugoslavia, but they were not all Yugoslavs. Internees from Yugoslavia were of many different nationalities: Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, Bosnians, Macedonians, Montenegrians and a number of ethnic minorities. It is true that Yugoslavs were made up of many different nationalities, which in the census voluntarily declared themselves as such. But if we look at the last census (before the bloodshed of the 1990s) in 1971, only 273,077 individuals declared themselves as Yugoslavs, that is only 1.33% of the population, even though in that census the largest number of individuals ever declared themselves as such.

One must not forget of course that in Nazi camps in Norway internees from Yugoslavia were third in size in the group of prisoners beside Soviet and Polish prisoners. After World War II the internees from Yugoslavia were given very different treatment, or as some would say, given a "preferable treatment" compared to the other groups of Nazi camp internees in Norway. The difference in treatment according to the narratives after World War II was the amount of sympathy Tito gained in countries bordering on (and therefore under pressure from) the Soviet Union. Tito was a hero in the eyes of many after his 1948 manoeuvre, where he escaped Stalin's domination. His heroism was even stronger due to the fact that no other East European bloc country followed his example at any time soon after his heroic exit from the Eastern bloc.

This is probably why the story about this common Yugoslav-Norwegian historic narrative continued, as a time capsule, well intact until the 1990s, when finally Yugoslavia collapsed.

The Turnaround in 2011

For the first time there was a cooperation between a memorial institution in Norway and a Jasenovac Memorial in Croatia. This cooperation was organized due to the fact that both institutions are a part of the international network of the European memorial institutions specializing in the Holocaust and genocide studies. Jasenovac was one of the prison camp locations from which a large number of prisoners were also sent to Nazi camps in Norway. Internees, victims of genocide carried out by Ustaša sepratists, were first sent from Jasenovac to Zemun Reception Camp in Serbia (Sajmište in Belgrade) before they were sent on to the Nazi camps for forced labor in Norway.

Much of this historic episode moves in a direction where one understands that from the moment when a cooperation contract between the two institutions was signed, another part of the history of Tito's Yugoslavia is unveiled. It was as if a tight lid on this well-kept time capsule was removed, allowing questions, like the ones we listed above, to pour out and never again to be repressed into the capsule again.

In effect, the lists of the internees believed to be the "list of all internees" turned out in the end to be only a list of internees who were repatriated back to Yugoslavia.[31] This of course is not to say that there were no other lists available in the archives. In the National Archives of Norway in Oslo there were a number of other lists of names of other Yugoslav citizens who were also internees in these forced labor camps. The individuals on these lists were primarily Bosnian Muslims, some were Volksdeutsche from Croatia and Serbia and some Slovenians.

The strange fact is that these internees were *never* referred to in any other publication except for one single monograph written by an earlier internee (Cveja Jovanovic). This only intensified researchers curiosity. Who were these individuals not worthy of being mentioned even by an obscure reference even though everyone seems to have known that they were Yugoslav citizens and prisoners in camps in Norway?

Why did they not take or why did they not receive from Tito an offer of amnesty within the borders of Tito's Yugoslavia, which was otherwise given to the entire Fifth Column members?

In order to offer at least some clues as to what really happened, we had to look far outside the borders of both Norway and the former Yugoslavia.

The early calculation of the need for laborers (May 1942) showed that the need for forced labor to conduct the OT project would not be met by the labor force from the jails and prison camps around Europe alone. Therefore, the OT was forced to gather laborers elsewhere, at times within their own ex-troops and ex-collaborators. The first option were those convicted by the German National War Court (*Reichskriegsgericht*). Parallel to the transports of the internees from the prison camps from the territory of ex-Yugoslavia were other transports arriving in Norway with other forced-laborers from European soil. According to the original sources, 2600 men consisting of German military and civilian convicts (*Strafgefangene* and *häftlinge*) were transported to Norway until the end of the war.[32] They arrived in Norway in three groups. Two groups arrived in August 1942 and the third arrived in June 1943. The third group was meant to replace German prisoners that were sent back to Germany because they were not able to work any longer. These prisoners worked primarily on building roads.

Another group of laborers were the so-called "Marsh soldiers" or "Peat Bog Soldiers",[33] also forced laborers, around 2000 men, deported to Norway in 1942–1945. These forced laborers had the status of so-called "undesirable subjects" in Germany (*Rückkehr nach Deutschland unerwünschet*), which was clearly stamped in their papers. They were the ex-Wehrmacht soldiers.

Amongst different lists of prisoners' names, there are some lists that are yet to be identified. On one of the lists of internees, German military convicts (that could be either *Strafgefangene* or Marsh soldiers), that went through the Falstad camp, there were hundreds of names of Muslim Bosnians and Croats. Another list contained Slovenians and Volksdeutsche, men from ex-Yugoslavia.[34] On these lists every single one of these individuals listed different locations within ex-Yugoslavia's territorium as their place of birth. Most of them noted their citizenship as being Yugoslav.[35] The lists where their names are listed are repatriation lists that show that they departed from Norway in 1945. None of these internees are to be found on the lists of the internees from Yugoslavia. We also know that some prisoners were refused repatriation to their homeland by Yugoslav authorities.

This is one of many points where what is documented does not correspond with what ex-internees claimed in their descriptions, since,

according to Mlađenović "All together from Norway 1482 internees left for Yugoslavia".[36] This is the official repatriation number that obviously does not include any other individuals except the ones who in 1945 were repatriated to Yugoslavia.

The List of Bosnian War Prisoners

The biggest surprise amongst the newly discovered documentation was a list of (mainly) Bosniaks[37]: according to this archival document from 23 August 1945. A Yugoslav Army logistics officer, Captain Ilija Ražnatović, took charge over a group of 202 prisoners of war (POWs). On this list there is no mention of either the camp they were in or where they were sent that day. From the name number 11 on the list until the end of the list almost all the names are easily identifiable as Bosnian. In the rubric "rank" next to almost all Bosnian names it says "redov". Aside from redovs, there are some second lieutenants, lance sergeants and lance corporals. There is also a handwritten remark right next to "priv", which could mean "temporary". Which army they belonged to is also unclear from these lists. What is common for these names is that they are not found on the current official lists of prisoners from Yugoslavia in Norway 1942–1945.

At this point in time, to find so many Bosniak names on a single list could only mean a few things: they could have been internees from a concentration camp as victims of ethnic cleansing, they could have been Tito's partisan members of NOP (National Liberation Movement), or they could have been members of Waffen-SS.

So Who Could These Bosniaks Have Been?

Further investigations of various literature sources about World War II in Europe as well as the original sources showed that these were most likely Waffen-SS recruits or the so-called Rebels from Villefranche,[38] the only mutiny the SS ever suffered. The mutiny resulted in the first continental European territory freed from Nazi occupation, during the summer of 1943. These soldiers are since the end of the WW2 in France referred to as "heroes" and "Tito's partisans". Tito's diplomacy raised a monument to their honor at the location in Villefranche during the 1950s. The French named an avenue after them Avenue de Croate (Avenue of Croats, since at the time, Muslims could only declare themselves as either Croats or Serbs or remain undeclared). In the aftermath, Germans clearly blamed

the mutiny on Tito's partisans who infiltrated the division, obtained weapons, uniforms and training that was of great use later on for their partisan actions. The rebels belonged to SS-Geb. Pioneer Btl. 13 placed at Villefranche de Rouergue, which at that time also was a part of the Croatian SS-Volunteer Mountain Division (Kroatische SS-Freiwillegen Gebirgs Division).

The division was originally a mix of Bosniaks who were both volunteers and recruited by force [39] from Eastern Bosnia[40] and some Croats. Those who joined voluntarily were promised many things. Bosniaks wanted to avenge their families killed by Partisans and Četniks who slaughtered the Muslim civil population in Eastern Bosnia.[41] What recruits were told was that this division will be a stabilizing power in Bosnia. Their leaders were promised an autonomous Bosnia under Germany, in the same way as the Independent Croatia that already existed or Independent Serbia, which was going to be established with Milan Nedić as its leader, as soon as the war was over. In addition, they were promised training and weapons for their fight against Partisans and Četniks in Bosnia.[42] There were many problems with recruiting enough individuals with officer rank since the Yugoslav Royal Army was dominated by Serbians who made sure that Muslims never got high positions and thereby advanced training. When there were no volunteers left to be recruited, Germans would surround mosques in Bosnia after a Friday prayer and take men by force. Since more than half of Waffen-SS were not Germans and large numbers (25%) were recruited by force, it was strange that there were no more mutinies.[43] Another reason for the weak recruitment of volunteers that resulted in forced recruitment was a lack of adult men amongst civilans who would stay and who were able to handle weapons and defend civilians. Muslim civilians became an easy prey for Partisan, Četnik and Ustaša aggression. Muslim-German relation deteriorated further after German soldiers killed civilians, family members of those "volunteers" that were recruited to the division.[44]

The recruits were taken to France for training because of geographic similarities with Bosnian landscape. What SS "recruitment forces" did not know was that amongst the volunteers were also partisans who had as their goal infiltration of Wafen-SS for the purpose of organizing individual and group deserting and mutiny.[45] As soon as they received weapons for the first time (17 September 1943), mutiny was in motion. The mutiny was executed in cooperation with the local population and the French Resistance Movement,[46] and Yugoslav emigrants residing in Villefranche.[47]

Some recruits were killed during the mutiny, some others were killed after the fact and the mutiny was eventually stopped by SS forces taking back control over Villefranche by arresting many recruits. It is still uncertain as to how many recruits were actually killed during the mutiny. Estimates vary from 150 rebels[48] killed, to 78[49] killed or to 14 killed while 4 were captured and killed later by the end of September.[50]

What is especially interesting in our context is that the Villefranche rebels who were not killed immediately in revenge killings were 825 (mainly Bosnians) who were quickly proclaimed by the SS to be "no longer suitable" and/or "politically unsuitable", stripped of their rank and referred to as "dark elements".[51] They were sent back to Germany on 27 September and they arrived in Münich two days later. After some days in Dachau concentration camp, they were taken to Berlin, where they were told that they are from then on again "volunteer" but this time for Organization Todt. Those who refused to "volunteer" for OT, were immediately sent to Neungamme Prison Camp where they were assumed killed.[52] Since mutiny was a very embarrassing event for SS troops, nobody was ever allowed to discuss what happened in Villefranche. Radio program Free Yugoslavia (Slobodna Jugoslavija), sent from London on 25 November 1943, reported on the Villefranche event.[53]

The transport from France to Germany itself was dangerous, many prisoners were killed on their way to Neuhammer. After arrival at the concentration camp, the Gestapo tried to separate the "guilty" from the "innocent" so that after a while 300 recruits were sent to Sachsenhaussen. A witness, who had met them in October 1943, describes a group of young men in SS uniforms that were referred to as Balkan bandits.[54]

One of the witnesses described it as: "…in February 36 men were brought to the camp and 8 of the 13 men were from SS troops. All of them told that they were Croats of Islam…it is possible that amongst 99 SS soldiers which were described as "Ustasa and Muslims" which arrived to Buchenwald 9 April 1944, and amongst those 55 SS Muslims which arrived at the beginning of 1944, were rebels from Villefranche which were until then in other camps…."[55] Around 100 soldiers were kept demobilized in a camp in Berlin before they were sent back to the Balkans. From this group very few men made it back home, and most disappeared without trace.[56]

After all the surviving rebels were sent to concentration camps in Germany, the situation in Villefranche developed in an unexpected direction: by Himmler's and Hitler's personal orders court-martialing was

stopped immediately and the whole event was pushed under the carpet in the hope that it would soon be forgotten.[57]

According to some historians, effects of this rebellion in Villefranche had much to say about developments on D-day when hundreds of foreign "volunteers", especially from the Eastern Troops, surrendered over to the Allies[58]: during the first 12 weeks after D-day, 20,000 soldiers.

Tito's diplomats officially took part in commemorations in Villefranche every year and this commemoration continues today. After the war, the French raised a memorial and in 1950 Tito raised a memorial with a red star and the text, "Yugoslavs killed by Nazis far away from their homeland".[59] A few years ago a memorial park was finally built at this location where a copy of the sculpture by Vanja Radauš found its way to Villefranche in memory of the rebels of the only mutiny during the Third Reich. The monument was created a long time ago, and it was supposed to be transported to Villefranche during the 1960s but the central administration in Belgrade did not allow the "ethnification" of this historic narrative. They refused to honor the men publically by recognizing their heroism because there were only Bosnians and Croats amongst the rebels and that version of historic developments did not fit into the official version of who amongst the Yugoslav nations were on the winners' side of WWII.

It was only in 2015 that a copy of the monument made by Vanja Radauš for these men finally made it to Villefranche to honor the destiny of these rebels.

There is another problem concerning the earlier unknown internees, Bosniaks who also were Tito's partisans, from Yugoslavia. The problem is that according to the original sources, both of these groups were kept in Norway far longer then the internees from Yugoslavia who were repatriated home. The last of the Yugoslav internees left Norway in September. Other groups of internees (Russian, Polish and so on) were kept much longer and under very suspicious circumstances in the camps in Norway, which at that time were under British administration.[60] Accordingly, the Yugoslav internees from the official list of prisoners were treated better as a group so that the segregation between the prisoners from the same groups started before JNA (The Yugoslav People's Army) officers took them over from the British.

Any World War II historian who understands the classical concept of "being on the right side" during the war, can read between the lines and see that this might have been an applicable proverb in this case. Lacking information about the circumstances around certain camps and

the destinies of the internees who were German ex-army soldiers, might however have led to losing sight of details concerning this case.

Further, this begs an even more obvious questioning of the view of this mini-narrative that has been safely contained for such a long time between the two countries: Could it be that what actually transpired in this narrative was quite different from what is still generally believed?

Concluding Calculus

What do we know for sure concerning the internee transports from Yugoslavia to Norway, independent of where the transport took root?

What we know for sure is that leaving Zemun did not necessarily mean a guaranteed arrival to Norway.

The first transport (1711 internees) was sent from the Reception Camp Zemun on 25 April 1942. Internees were transported on three boats with an Hungarian crew. Internees never knew where they were being sent. They were transported first via Donau (from Zemun to Wien). Thereafter, they were transported first in trucks (from Wien to nearby concentration camps), and then by train (to Szczecin), and by boat again to Norway.

The second transport (1500 internees) was sent from the Reception Camp Semlyn on 11 May 1942. They were also transported by boats via Donau to Wien. Amongst them there were around 400 internees from Stara Gradiška camp, who «volunteered» for work in Germany in order to avoid being killed in Jasenovac. "In this transport there were also many criminals, from Belgrade and Zagreb, Sarajevo and other places in Yugoslavia."[61]

The third and fourth transports left Semlyn Reception Camp (each with 500–600 internees) on 26 and 29 May1942. "In this group there was a lot of Orthodox population arrested mainly from Slavonia, Banija and Kordun, as well as incarcerated partisans, and arrested Communists and other members of Narodno-oslobodilačkog pokreta (the Peoples' Freedom Movement) or NOP, from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, who were sent from Jasenovac and Stara Gradiska camps to Sajmiste (Semlin Reception Camp) on 19 and 22May."[62]

From May until November, Reception Camp Zemun received around 7000 internees, most of them from Kozara and villages below Kozara Mountain. Around 2000, healthier and stronger internees were separated and moved to a Todt camp, across the road from Zemun camp for a "recovery".

The fifth transport, around 500 internees from Todt camp, was sent from Zemun on 19 November 1942. Internees were transported by train from Zemun, via Zagreb and Maribor all the way to the Austrian camp Krems (Stalag XVII B), where other war prisoners from France, USSR and members of the Army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

This group was "lucky": by the end of the year they obtained the status of war prisoners (written on the lists, and they were given aluminium plates with numbers and the right to receive packages). They did not leave Krems before January 1943, over Prague, Berlin and Dresden to Stagard in today's Poland.

The sixth transport, around 800 internees from Todt Camp, left Zemun in January 1943. Only 250 arrived to Stagard, the rest of them stayed in other camps. They were registered as war prisoners in the Stagard camp (Stalag II D). In Stagard, a group of 500 internees was taken out for labor in Norway. This group was transported to Szczecin where they were transported to Norway by boat on 3 April 1943.

In total, from Zemun to Norway there were six transports with 5600 internees (amongst them a large number of civilians, around 2000 men arrested by Ustasa in Slavonia, Banija, Kordun and north-west of Bosnia). Some of internees stayed in different camps in Austria, Germany and Poland, some because of illness, others mainly because of the need for laborers where there were other labor camps.

The last transport with prisoners did not take route over Zemun. The transport was sent from Osijek (NDH) to Norway in April 1943. The transport was sent by train over Maribor all the way over Sweden to Norway. Most of the prisoners were members of Peoples Liberation movement from Slavonija, Srijem, Northern Bosnia and Northern Croatia. [63]

The Polish harbor Szczecin on the Baltic sea was the starting point for almost all transports of internees coming directly from the territory of occupied Yugoslavia to Norway. In 1942. Three transports left Szczecin for Norway:

The first transport (under the SS administration) left on 10 June 1942. Internees (893 individuals) arrrived at Bergen harbor on 13 June 1942. After 25 days in Bergen, 400 internees were transported to northern Norway, to a camp close to Karasjokk. During the transport, in Tromsø, due to "illness", 26 internees were shot dead, so that only 374 arrived at their destination. SS guards, also due to "illness", shot 30 internees from a group of 493 that stayed in Bergen. This group was later transported to the camps in Botn close to Rognan in northern Norway.

The second transport (under the SS administration) left on 15 June 1942. This transport included a much larger number of internees transported on two boats. One boat with 808 internees arrived at Trondheim on 20 June, and the second boat (900 internees) arrived at Narvik at midnight on 22 June From the group that arrived in Trondheim, six sick internees were immediately transferred to the punishment camp in Falstad, and 396 internees were transported to Osen camp and 396 were transported to Korgen. On the second boat which arrived at Narvik, there were six internees that died during the transport. All other internees were escorted on foot to the camp in Beisfjord.

The third transport (under TODT administration) left on 27 September 1942 (857 internees). One internee died on the boat while others arrived in Trondheim on 1 October 1942. They were transported further by train: 70 internees to Korgen, 170 internees to Krokstand via Botn, and 200 internees by trucks to Steinvikholm camp. Three hundred internees were transported to Trolla camp in the suburbs of Trondheim, while 156 internees were sent via Strind Camp to Austraat Camp on Ørland Peninsula.

The fourth transport (under the Wehrmacht administration, with war prisoners who were in the Nazi camps in Austria) consisting of 502 internees, left for Norway on 7 and 8 April 1943. They arrived at Drammen, close to Oslo and they were transferred to the Øysand Camp, not far from Trondheim. Four hundred internees were transported to the Botn Camp close to Rognan, 85 internees were sent to Korgen Camp, and 15 sick internees remained in Øysand.

During 1943, there were also two smaller groups of internees from Germany that arrived in Norway. In literature they are referred to as the *Fifth* (63 internees) and *Sixth* (91 internees) *transport*. All internees in these two transports had war prisoner status. Internees from both transports were transported over Øysand to the Hasselvik Camp.

If we now add the 503 rebels from Villefanche who also got their death sentence postponed by accepting the destiny of being forced laborers in Norway, the number is as high as 4616.

In the end, none of this unfortunately answers any of the two questions we had in the beginning of this essay: Why were civilian victims listed as Tito's partisans, while not all of the documented Tito's partisans made it onto the official list of the prisoners? Since that, as it turns out, is a totally different story that will have to be continued in another volume. What we know for sure is that synonymisation of Partisans=Serbs=Yugoslavs was

practiced as a a part foreign policy by the central administration in Belgrade. Fusnota (Olivera Milosavljević 2007 Potisnuta istina, Kolaboracija u Srbiji 1941-1944, Beograd. Ogledi broj 7 Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji p 7-12. However, the newly gained access to more information (additional original sources) as well as the more balanced power relations amongst the former republics after the fall of Belgrade as the central administration of Yugoslavia, has changed the premise for interpretation of this story drastically.

Notes

1. Barbara N. Wiesinger, "Iskustva i sećanja prinudnih radnika u nacionalsocijalističkoj Nemačkoj 1941–1945." *Tokovi istorije*, vol. 3, str. 64–65.
2. The *Schutzstaffel*, SS, were established by Hitler, as a protection force at Hitler's public mass meetings. The SS owed its loyalties to Hitler alone and was neither conceived as, nor permitted to become a mass movement. Heinrich Himmler was appointed *Reichsfuhrer-SS* in 1929 and from its very inception he saw the SS as an elite force, as an elite unit, the party's "Praetorian Guard," with all SS personnel selected on the principles of racial purity and unconditional loyalty to the Nazi Party. In the early days of the SS, officer candidates had to prove German ancestry back to 1750. They also were required to prove that they had no Jewish ancestors. On 6 January 1929, Adolf Hitler appointed Heinrich Himmler as the leader of the SS, and by the end of 1932, the SS had 52,000 members. By the end of the next year, it had over 209,000 members. Himmler's expansion of the SS was based on models from other groups, such as the Knights Templar and the Italian Blackshirts. According to SS-Obergruppenführer and General of the Waffen-SS, Karl Wolff, it was also based on the model from the Society of Jesus of absolute obedience to the Pope or in this case Heinrich Himmler.
3. The *Organization Todt* (OT) was a Third Reich civil and military engineering group in Germany named after its founder, Fritz Todt, an engineer and senior Nazi figure. The organization was responsible for a huge range of engineering projects in pre-World War II Germany, in Germany itself and occupied territories from France to the Soviet Union during the war. It became notorious for using forced labor for realisation of its building projects from 1942 until the end of the war, when Albert Speer succeeded Todt in office and the OT joined, renamed, absorbed and became the Ministry for Armaments and War Production. Approximately 1.4 million laborers were in the service of the OT. Overall, 1 % were Germans rejected from military service and 1.5 % were concentration camp prisoners; the rest

were prisoners of war and compulsory laborers from occupied countries. All were effectively treated as slaves.

4. Jasenovac Memorial. 770/10 D. Document was preserved by Mustafa Begić from Bosne-Hercegovine, like the killed internees, he was also an internee from Jasenovac and Stara Gradiška camp in the Independent State of Croatia.
5. Nils Christie, *Fangevokterne i konsentrasjonsleirene [Prison Guards in the Concentration Camps],* Oslo: Pax, 1973.
6. Ostoja Kovačević, *En times frihet [One Hour of Freedom],* (Oslo, 1959).
7. Nikola Rokić, *'Jugoslavia mitt land' ['Yugoslavia My country'],* publisher Frank Haakerud, 1961.
8. AVII, NA, 27-27.
9. AVII, NA, 27-27.
10. Milan Nedić was the head of the general staff of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the minister of defense. From 1941 to 1945 he was appointed by Germans as the president of the marionette state Serbia.
11. AVII, NA, 27-27.
12. AVII, NA, Reg. Br. 3/2, k. 2.
13. Falstad Centre, Norway.
14. Forsvaret, Krigsgravstjenesten RA/RAFA-2018/Da/L006, Ašković, Milorad, Marinković Blagoje, Petrović Ljubomir. *U logorima u severnoj Norveškoj,* Beograd: Srpska književna zadruga, 1979; Mlađenović, Ljubo, *Beisfjordtragedien [The Beisfjord Tragedy],* translated by Brit Bakker. Oslo: Grøndahl, 1989.
15. Cveja Jovanović, *Blodveien til nordpartisanavdelingen,* Novi Dani, Beograd: 1988. Cveja Jovanovic, *Flukt til friheten: fra nazi-dødsleire i Norge [Escape to Freedom: From Nazi Death Camps in Norway],* Oslo: Gyldendal, 1985.
16. Ašković, Blagoje Marinković, Ljubomir Petrović, *U logorima u severnoj Norveskoj,* Srpska književna zadruga, Beograd, 1979, p. 342.
17. *Thanking the People of Norway, 70th anniversary of the arrival of Yugoslav prisoners to Norway during World War Two;* Foreword and Afterword written by Gorana Ognjenović, Introduction and Exhibition text written by Nataša Mataušić.
18. Forsvaret, Krigsgravstjenesten RA/RAFA-2018/Da/L006.
19. Ljubo Mlađenović, *Beisfjordtragedien,* en rystende dokument fra en tysk fangeleir i Norge 1942 [The Beisfjord Tragedy, an earthshaking document from a German prison camp in Norway 1942], Grøndahl, 1989, trans. Brit Bakker.
20. Ljubo Mlađenović, *Beisfjordtragedien,* en rystende dokument fra en tysk fangeleir i Norge 1942 [The Beisfjord Tragedy, an earthshaking document from a German prison camp in Norway 1942], Grøndahl, 1989, trans. Brit Bakker.

21. Additional categories are the number of internees killed and the number of internees repatriated.
22. "*Thanking the People of Norway, 70th anniversary of the arrival of Yugoslav prisoners to Norway during World War Two*, Foreword and Afterword written by Gorana Ognjenović, Introduction and Exhibition text written by Nataša Mataušić.
23. Cveja Jovanović, duhan za bivše Wermacht vojnike.
24. Protokoll over sammendragning av jugoslaviske krigsgraver i Norge [Summary Protocol over Yugoslavian War Graves in Norway], FORSVARSDEP. I 000920–9. Feb. 1955.
25. Ljubo Mlađenović, *Beisfjordtragedien,* en rystende dokument fra en tysk fangeleir i Norge 1942 [The Beisfjord Tragedy, an earthshaking document from a German prison camp in Norway 1942], Bokstav og Bilde, 2013.
26. Nils Christie (2008). Serberleirene Nord-Norge. Gjensyn med en studie av fangevokterne, [The Serbian Camps of Northern Norway….] I: Bernt Hagtvet, Nik. Brandal og Dag Einar Thorsen (red.), *Folkemordenes svarte bok*. [in The Black Book of Genocide]. Universitetsforlaget. ISBN 978821501308-4. 22, pp. 461–468.
27. Tomislav Dulić, 2011. "De plågade oss som om de ville att vi skulle dö": Andra världskrigets jugoslaviska krigsfångar i Norge i ljuset av nytt källmaterial. ["They mistreated us as if they wanted us to die": WWII's Yugoslavian War Prisoners in Norway in Light of New Source Material"], *Historisk tidskrift*, 4/2011, p. 752.
28. Cveja Jovanović, *Blodveien til Nordpartisanavdelingen [Blood Road to the Northern Partisan Section]*, Novi Dani, Belgrade 1988.
29. Narvik Peace Centre Memorial, Norway & The Hugo Valentin Centre Uppsala University, Sweden.
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CHAPTER 8

Getting Lost in Transition: Conclusion

Gorana Ognjenović and Jasna Jozelić

There is no doubt that a large amount of literature is written on the subject of Tito's Yugoslavia. Most of it classifies Tito's Yugoslavia as either totalitarian or socialist mostly depending on which ideological standpoint one analyses from. The results of such analysis often give us a simplified picture of a rather complex society and a turbulent period of history.

It is of huge importance to acknowledge how such a simplification and often political misinterpretation is not only outdated but proven dangerous, especially during the 1990s when many of the important political decisions were based on the account of such simplified literature and expertise.

After the 1990s we have seen the flourishing of a "new" literature on the topic, seeking to understand "why" and to reveal "how" it was possible that this could happen. The lack of a comprehensive history and different national narratives of events that occurred during the break-up of former Yugoslavia continues to affect research literature as well.

In an attempt to understand, the reader becomes even more confused since everyone could write their own history.

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Soon afterwards, as successor states were getting closer to building up a more democratic society and their EU entry applications became real, there was a need for another kind of literature. We began to seek knowledge and to analyse former Yugoslavian successor states "in transition", which was a rather interesting topic to read.

The focus of these studies was primarily on all the change processes the successor states had to go through in order to meet the terms of their entry into EU. Some progress has been made in terms of acknowledging and addressing past wrongs, but progress towards democracy and an open society has moved slowly.

What was surprising is that almost none of the literature looks back and takes into consideration in their analyses the transition former Yugoslavia went through during Tito's rule.

The latest research and literature recognize the importance of this transition, and the impact that process had on the conflict. Nevertheless, we cannot diminish the importance the same process has had on today's "transitions" as well as to what extent each of the successor states will be able to follow up on the tradition.

The chapters in this volume give us a balanced picture of a rather complex and difficult time the state of Yugoslavia had to go through.

The connection between the two phases of Tito's rule described and analysed in these chapters demonstrates the transition between two very different periods. The actions that have been taken during those periods give us an insight into a dark and challenging time in history that without any doubt had a huge impact on later political developments.

The analysis of the context in which these actions have been taken, as well as giving different perspectives on chosen topics, contributes to bringing us closer to the truth.

Reflecting on the past and on the possible future is essential for moving forward.

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