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EXPLAINING
THE GENETIC
FOOTPRINTS OF
CATHOLIC AND
PROTESTANT
COLONIZERS

Shane Joshua Barter





Explaining the Genetic Footprints of Catholic and Protestant Colonizers

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Shane Joshua Barter

Soka University of America, USA

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COLONIZERS

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1

Introduction

Abstract: *Why did Catholic colonizers leave behind deep genetic footprints, while Protestant colonizers seemingly did not? This chapter outlines the book's chapters, defines some key terms, such as "genetic footprint," and provides some caveats. The Catholic/Protestant divide is not absolute—there are exceptions and grey areas, but the tendencies identified are global and enduring. One must also not attach moral significance to colonial behavior, as Catholic mixing does not suggest racial equality. We must be careful in using terms such as "mixing" and "miscegenation" that we do not pretend that races exist as biological categories. This chapter then turns to the impressive literature on colonial intimacy. Consistent with other writers, this book seeks to break down stark dichotomies of colonizers and the colonized.*

Keywords: colonialism; intimacy; intermarriage; miscegenation; race

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While observing elections on the remote western coast of Aceh, Indonesia, countless coffee shop conversations turned to the same topic—that I must visit Lamno, a village where many residents are particularly attractive Portuguese descendants. Acehnese friends had long told me of Lamno’s famed *mata biru* (blue eyes) and *mata hijau* (green eyes). Although the Portuguese presence was limited to some traders and marooned soldiers four centuries ago, its effect on the local population remains, and “one of their most enduring legacies has been their contribution to the local gene pool.”¹ Lamno’s identity is distinct from nearby Batee, where American traders dominated the pepper trade in the late eighteenth century, as well as far more substantial British influence in Bengkulu and the Dutch presence in Banda Aceh and North Sumatra, which did not produce an equivalent genetic footprint. Weeks later, I found myself in Malacca, Malaysia, where a Portuguese community remains today, but no equivalent Dutch or British communities. I began thinking of the Canadian context, of French *métis*, other mixed communities around the world, and some common linkages among them.

Throughout the colonial world, European colonizers initiated liaisons with local women and sired mixed communities, but they did so at different rates and understood it in different ways. Observers have long noted the Portuguese proclivity to produce mixed families, while Spanish and French colonizers literally spawned *métis* and *mestizo* populations. Meanwhile, the British, American, German, and Dutch colonizers worked to limit intimate contacts with the colonized in a variety of ways; although never as successful as they believed, the rate of unions and offspring with local women were comparatively low. Some scholars have explained these distinctions in broad civilizational terms, speaking of Latin and Anglo-Saxon approaches. Less noted is the fact that colonizers that did and did not mix can be grouped according to faith. To my knowledge, this global pattern has yet to be observed, let alone explained.

Why did Catholic colonizers leave behind deep genetic footprints, while Protestant colonizers seemingly did not? This study begins by providing some important caveats and definitions. It then looks to relevant academic work, supporting the claim that religious patterns of sexual encounters have somehow escaped dedicated scrutiny. This groundwork laid, Part II shows that this broad pattern of Catholic mixing and Protestant reluctance exists on a global scale. I provide regional comparisons between Catholic and Protestant colonizers first in Southeast Asia, home to

especially enduring and diverse forms of colonial rule, and then East Asia, South Asia, Africa, the Americas, and Oceania. Although I note some important exceptions, it is generally true that Catholic colonizers left behind mixed communities, as well as creole languages and cultures, whereas Protestants typically did not, instead leaving behind legacies of segregation. This section also draws out some fascinating corollaries, finding that when Protestants did mix, they tended to do so with mixed Catholic communities, and that within Protestant colonies, individual Catholics were more likely to establish local families.

After showing that this pattern generally holds across world regions, Part III assesses five potential explanations that I have found in the academic literature. The first is that the distinction is entirely religious. The Catholic faith entails a transnational identity and a Papal hierarchy, while Protestantism is more fragmented among small flocks and many are exclusivist, evident in the Calvinist concept of the elect. A second potential explanation relates to geography and historical contact. Perhaps the dominant explanation for varied civilizational patterns of mixing, Mediterranean countries are said to have longer histories of mixing with world cultures, while northern nations tend to be more isolated and exclusivist. Another potential explanation is rooted in political economy, in that native communities necessary for labor are kept apart while those with ownership of land are suitable for mixing. A fourth explanation revolves around the varied political capacities of different colonial powers, a factor that shapes the ability of colonial administrators to police interracial liaisons as well as to send European women and forestall the need to mix. A final explanation is rooted in the emergence of ideas such as nations and then race among colonial powers. Protestant communities tended to be at the forefront of these ideas, namely scientific ideas of race, whereas Catholics typically lagged behind. This best explains not only the “miscegenation” gap between Catholic and Protestant colonizers, but also temporal trends away from mixing for all colonizers.

The nation/race argument is not totally distinct from rival explanations, nor does it stand at their expense—this is not an exercise in falsification. These factors are obviously interrelated, though some are more convincing than others and their effects are felt through interaction. Elements of Catholicism mitigated the development of concepts such as nation and race, while Protestantism emerged in tandem with and embraced them. Meanwhile, more developed Protestant colonizers slowly established the political capacity to police color lines. This explains the ability to police

sexual liaisons, however identifying as a nation and race explains the will to do so.

Caveats & definitions

At the heart of this study lies the observation that Catholics mixed with colonized societies, whereas Protestants typically did not. This argument is relative, not absolute. I do not deny that Protestants created some mixed communities or pretend that Catholic colonizers did so uniformly. Below, I pay attention to exceptions such as New Zealand, early colonial experiences in southern Africa, India, and Indonesia, and late Portuguese colonialism in Angola, all of which I later use to help develop explanations. Second, I do not attach moral significance to these divergent behaviors. Catholic mixing was hardly due to a sense of racial equality—it was often a result of rape and abuses of power. Catholic colonizers developed complex racial hierarchies and were far from color-blind. In fact, some Catholic colonizers supported mixing for racist reasons, to “elevate” native gene pools. And although Protestant reluctance to raise and recognize mixed families was sometimes due to racism, it was also sometimes due to an effort not to interfere with native societies and to protect local women from European men. Following Ann Laura Stoler, “Racism is an inherent product of the colonial encounter [however] the *quality* and the *intensity* of racism have varied enormously.”² Catholic and Protestant colonizers were both racist, but in distinct ways that created enduring legacies for the colonized as well as colonizer, and that must be explained.

Third, many of the terms used in this study, such as “mixing” and “miscegenation,” are of course contested. There is no such thing as race as a biological concept. Race is an “imagined collectivity based on pigmentation” used to classify humans into discrete groups based on physical appearance, possessing qualities considered to be immutable.³ Race suggests far more than the idea that people are different, which of course we are. It suggests that discrete groups of humans have different origins, are biologically distinct, and possess innate superiorities over other types. It is unfortunate that, in using terms such as mixing or miscegenation, one may appear to reify race.⁴ I use such terms not only because they were used at the time, by the colonizer and sometimes by the colonized, but also because I wish to emphasize visual and ethnic differences between communities. Later, I will return to the importance of refusing

the concept of race, since asking why Catholics mixed presumes that they understood humanity in terms of races in the first place.

Another caveat relates to the emphasis on the colonizer rather than the colonized. This is at odds with the dominant trend in historical studies of colonialism, which rightly seeks to overcome legacies of Eurocentric research. Focusing on the colonized represents an important corrective to previous studies, but this should not come at the expense of studying patterns among the colonizers. One shortcoming in many studies of sex and empire is that colonizers are largely seen as similar, whereas this study emphasizes a wide and enduring, though not absolute, distinction between Catholic and Protestant colonizers. The literature is far better at charting changes in colonial behavior over time. Temporal changes are also crucial in my study, as all colonizers, Protestant and Catholic, slowed mixing across the colonial era, although as I hope to show, the religious divide is greater than changes over time.

Clearly, colonized societies possess preferences and social norms that shaped rates of mixing. Muslim societies tend to resist mixed unions with non-Muslims (although they applaud conversion for the sake of coupling), various Hindu and Buddhist societies may see foreigners as a polluting presence, and indigenous peoples may practice endogamy by marrying within clan systems. It has been emphasized that West African societies varied in their levels of exogamy; those with patrilineal descent led to fewer mixed offspring, who were regarded as outsiders and subsequently clung to European identity, whereas those with matrilineal descent saw mixed offspring integrating with local society.⁵ Native kinship patterns had important effects on how mixed unions and their offspring were understood. These patterns, although interesting, are not the focus of this already broad study. Although I discuss native practices to explain some specific cases, namely the complexities of cross-racial and ethnic marriages in North Sumatra and New Zealand-Maori unions, I am primarily concerned with a systematic difference toward mixed unions and offspring among Catholic and Protestant colonizers, variation that persists regardless of local societal norms. If my study looked at a small number of cases or a single world region, then host society norms would be more salient, since patterns of mixing could be falsely attributed to the colonizer instead of the colonized. However with the global focus of this study, the effects of host society norms should in part cancel each other out, since I have no reason to believe that Protestant societies systematically colonized peoples with endogamous sexual

practices. In fact, many of the regions discussed below saw multiple colonial powers over time, helping to hold native kinship patterns at least partially constant and allowing for the effects of colonial culture to be laid bare.

This leads to an important discussion of case selection. It is likely that historians will balk at the global reach of this project. Leading historical scholarship, especially those studies focusing on sex and race, tends to consist of rich, in-depth case studies, not global comparative research.⁶ This study is extremely broad, an expansiveness demanded by its core research question. The patterns I am interested in may not even be visible with a more narrow selection of cases. Even the most informative studies may falsely attribute patterns of behavior to specific circumstances because they do not look to broader, global patterns. For example, French patterns of mixing in North America have been understood in terms of demographic necessity, namely a reluctance to send French women for fear of the decline of a continental French population.⁷ To this is often added another factor: the French belief that fathers transfer the character of the child, allowing “Frenchness” to expand through paternal mixing.⁸ While interesting, these explanations cannot speak to why other Catholic colonizers resembled French patterns or why Protestant colonizers with similar demographic and cultural systems behaved differently. In another example, Anthony Marx explains deep racial tensions and segregation in the United States and South Africa, but not in Brazil, in terms of divisions among ruling whites, which prompted states to construct white nations against blacks in the first two cases, but not in the latter, where white unity enabled more relaxed racial boundaries.⁹ Although no doubt explaining the intensity of racial dynamics, this cannot explain why British colonizers maintained similar views of racial distinctiveness throughout its colonies or why Portuguese colonizers left a legacy of “miscegenation” around the world.¹⁰ The global scope of this project, while daunting, is necessary to demonstrate enduring patterns and generate broad explanations.

I should also provide some brief definitions of the ideas and groups at the core of this study. The Catholic Church is the single largest Christian church in the world, defined by its communion with the Holy See and its hierarchy of cardinals and bishops, atop of which sits the Pope. Although hardly homogenous, housing Jesuits, Franciscans, Dominicans, and other orders, the Catholic Church is relatively unified. Protestantism is much more difficult to define, encapsulating a range of churches

that developed in the Reformation against Papal Authority, and from here branched off even further. Protestantism encompasses “mainline” denominations such as Lutheran, Calvinist, Methodist, Presbyterian, Episcopalian, Baptist, Anglican,¹¹ and Reformed churches; as well as evangelicals (including Wesleyans and Pentecostals) and Charismatic groups.¹² Various Protestant groups maintained distinct attitudes toward the colonial enterprise, with Calvinists and Anglicans focusing on their own communities and showing less interest in the colonized peoples, while the evangelical awakenings of the late eighteenth century led to some of the first Protestant efforts to convert native communities. Protestant attitudes toward colonial populations varied, as did their views toward slave conversion, conquest, and hierarchy—but I suggest below that they shared a reluctance to mix sexually (or in other ways) with colonized groups.

This project divides colonial powers into Catholic and Protestant. Catholic colonial powers include Portugal, Spain, and France, as well as Belgium and Italy. Meanwhile, Protestant colonizers include the Netherlands, England, the United States, and Germany, as well as Denmark and New Zealand. This distinction is based on the adherence of the majority of persons living in the country at the time as well as the relationship between church and state. For instance, even though the Netherlands is largely nonreligious today, and the majority of its active church-goers today are actually Catholic, during the colonial era, it was mostly Protestant, with Calvinism essentially representing a state religion.¹³ The Dutch Reformed Church maintained a visible presence in Dutch colonies and colonial administration, thus one can understand the Dutch as a Protestant colonial power. Despite this dichotomous division, at several points I will note that colonial powers included a range of nationalities and other faiths.

What do I mean when I speak of a “genetic footprint?” This refers primarily to the presence of mixed offspring in colonized countries. It is distinct from the various forms of unions that may bring this about, although whether colonizers tend to take part in prostitution, concubinage, marriage, or other relationships between colonial men and colonized women will affect the rate of mixed offspring. Forms of unions also help demonstrate popular attitudes toward mixing as well as shape the cultural footprint resulting from mixed unions (i.e. if the father remains and is married to the mother, then one would expect greater cultural transmission to the offspring). The focus of this study, though, is

primarily genetic: Why did Catholics leave behind mixed communities, while Protestants seemingly did not?

Finally, given the obvious difficulties in locating evidence for such vast historical claims, I should address methodology. The following discussions incorporate a range of insights from secondary historical studies of race and colonialism. This is due to the global scope of the project as well as the unusually rich literature on the topic, which I do not believe is incorrect but has instead overlooked an important variable. Insights from leading historical scholarship are supported by a range of primary sources, such as observations from contemporary travelers, church and other historical records, and colonial census data. The latter source is both valuable and problematic. Although colonial censuses may be useful, mixed offspring were always under-reported. As I will show, Protestant colonizers tended to classify mixed offspring as nonwhite (the one-drop rule),¹⁴ while Catholic colonizers tended to record mixed offspring as European (the one-drop rule in reverse), and some created third “mixed” categories. These distinct understandings of race make racial statistics difficult to compare.

To provide some primary data, I also conducted some fieldwork in Western Canada and Southeast Asia, where I interviewed church officials and mixed-race community associations as well as explored church and colonial archives. Other useful indicators include legal decisions, languages, surnames, and self-identification of mixed communities. Even the vocabulary used to describe the phenomenon already suggests Catholic parentage. Métis, paulista, creole, mestizo, mestiço, and mulatto, as well as zambo, mameluco, caboclo, cariço, and demi, are far more common than the English “half-caste” or Dutch “baster” (bastard). Fieldwork, contemporary observations, census data, population policies, and vocabulary, as well as urban planning, policies of social segregation, and societal models such as the plural society all point in a similar direction—toward Catholic racial fusion and Protestant racial division.

Studying race, religion, & colonialism

This study looks at something that many scholars may already know, but to my knowledge, has yet to be addressed directly or adequately explained. I recognize that claiming such a massive pattern in colonial history as something not yet studied is a sizable assertion. Upon hearing me suggest that nobody has studied this pattern, one expert suggested

that Charles Boxer would be “turning in his grave.” I responded by scouring Professor Boxer’s numerous books, but in vain. He indeed explored civilizational differences, but stopped short of considering religion as a dividing line or factor in various rates of segregation and mixing.¹⁵ Boxer’s invaluable work focuses on only a handful of colonizers and their “national characters.” While scholars have noted that the countries I am discussing varied with one another in terms of efforts to police racial borders, none have noted a religious pattern. I have simply been unable to find authors who identify a religious line between colonizers and mixed unions, even among earlier studies.¹⁶

While not observing religious patterns, numerous studies have observed and explained distinct approaches to sex across color lines in the colonial era. Most contrast a handful of colonial powers in a given regional context. Dennis McGilvray contrasts Dutch and Portuguese practices in Sri Lanka: “from the outset, the Portuguese conquests in Africa, Brazil, and India were accompanied by widespread and frequent sexual relationships between Portuguese men and local women, causing a rapid growth of racially mixed populations in virtually every Portuguese settlement.”¹⁷ Writers acknowledge that “Spanish and Portuguese colonization tolerated racial miscegenation to a degree unimaginable in the British (and to a lesser extent, French) worlds.”¹⁸ There were “fundamentally different attitudes towards people of color manifested by the Portuguese and Spaniards in Africa, Asia, and the Americas, as compared to those displayed by the Englishmen and other Western Europeans in these areas.”¹⁹ In North America, the Spanish and French left mixed communities, whereas “miscegenation between Northern Europeans and Indians was negligible.”²⁰ In Southeast Asia, in contrast to Iberian colonizers, “the Dutch and English East India Companies were less forthright in promoting the growth of overseas communities through sexual unions between European fathers and local mothers.”²¹ Countless writers have made similar observations, noting that Portuguese, Spanish, and French rulers encouraged mixing, while British, American, German, and Dutch colonizers discouraged it, but without noting larger patterns.²² Some cast a wider, civilizational net. David Pomfret contrasts “the assimilationist possibilities of ‘Latin’ variants of imperialism” with “northern” British, Dutch, and American approaches.²³ Given that so many scholars have discovered variation among specific colonizers, it is surprising that few have explored broad religious differences between those who mixed and those who did not.

Early postcolonial studies emphasized stark disjunctures between colonizer and colonized. Today, scholars increasingly prioritize grey areas such as native allies and non-European colonizers, European resistance, internal class divisions, and intimate encounters. While prioritizing the colonizer, my study remains very much in line with this mode of inquiry, exploring how sexual liaisons did or did not blur the line between Europeans and natives. In the rich literature on intimacy and colonialism that has developed since the publication of Stoler's *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power*, authors have opened up the private worlds of colonial domination. These studies tend to be highly specific, eschewing broader patterns and generalizations for case-specific insights. Most such studies do not even mention religion. For instance, Peggy Pascoe's landmark study on miscegenation and race in the United States lacks even a single mention of Protestantism, and her sole mention of anything religious is a Catholic organization that sought to overturn anti-mixing laws on religious grounds.²⁴ Patricia Seed's *Ceremonies of Possession* notes the different ways that colonizers laid claim to new lands. While a fascinating study and a great example of global comparative history, her book does not mention mixing or marriage at all, even when discussing the French strategy of allying with native communities. Ulbe Bosma and Remco Raben's impressive study of identity in the Dutch East Indies challenges rigid racial divisions between white and native, noting class-based divides and divisions among Europeans from Europe and those born in the colony. This book notes that the Dutch mixed less than the Portuguese and more than the British, and that many Dutch preferred Eurasian Portuguese. It does not consider Catholic/Protestant divides though, despite a brief discussion of the role of the Dutch Reformed Church in resisting mixed unions.²⁵ Religion and mixing has been left out of the discussion, despite what I identify to be an enduring global phenomenon. This project thus has the ability to inform and spark debate with a variety of studies.

While I have not found a writer who emphasizes religious distinctions among sexual unions around the colonial world, but many who note distinctions between specific countries and civilizations, I have located a few studies that are at odds with my argument. Saliha Belmessous characterizes French and British colonial approaches as similarly premised on assimilation, overlooking differing racial policies to identify a common colonial logic.²⁶ Carl Nightingale suggests that "the conclusion that 'northern European' cultures were much more weary than Iberians

about cross-color sex is not supported by evidence from early Dutch or British Asia,”²⁷ a statement I find mixed support for below. For Vicki Luker, “stereotypes which characterize French, Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch colonialisms as more accepting of racial mixing [than the British] do not entirely survive scrutiny.”²⁸ Unfortunately, Luker does not provide any further comment, her footnote referring to studies suggesting otherwise, and she does not consider a potential religious divide. Historians rightly seek to explore exceptions, challenging the myth that the British, Americans, or other groups did not mix at all. In doing so, they may overreach, as the degree of mixing was simply not the same as Portuguese, French, and Spanish practices. Scholars also rightly challenge the view that mixing represented benign colonial rule or a lack of racism, as some French and Portuguese writers have suggested. I wholeheartedly agree with historians for challenging this view, but the different patterns of “mixed” offspring remain.

Focusing on global patterns of mixing between colonizer and colonized helps bring together many distinct strands of historical, ethnic, and religious scholarship. Numerous scholars have explored the phenomenon of plural societies, in which various ethnic groups exist alongside one another but do not mix, citing Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Bahamas, Honduras, Aruba, Curacao, Trinidad, and Rhodesia.²⁹ What has not been noted is that all of these were British and Dutch territories, as the plural society seems to be a distinctively Protestant phenomenon. There is also a growing literature regarding urban spatial segregation in the colonial world. One leading work is Carl Nightingale’s impressive study of segregation.³⁰ While Nightingale also looks at French urban planning in Algeria and trends in Latin America, the book’s major cases of racial segregation are Protestant, although religion is not discussed. The literature on race and colonialism, despite excellent studies by the likes of Stoler, has also been somewhat centered on the Atlantic world. This project is global in scope, with greater emphasis provided to the Pacific in an effort to provide some balance in the literature as a whole.

Some see miscegenation as an inevitable by-product of young men overseas; “for Portuguese or other European men to have acted differently in their sexual behavior would have been extraordinary.”³¹ Of course, some colonizers did act differently, an observation that forms the core of this study. Although some scholars may disagree with the specifics and more may balk at the broad scope of the project, I hope to show that, for the most part, Catholic colonizers approached sexual unions

and mixed offspring differently than did Protestant powers. Having provided some groundwork in terms of caveats, definitions, methods, and the literature, I will now provide some regional comparisons of colonial racial mixing in an effort to show that Catholics and Protestants were generally distinct. After this, I will seek to explain why.

Notes

- 1 *Associated Press*, “Indonesia’s Last Blue Eyes Close Forever” (March 3, 2005).
- 2 Ann Laura Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
- 3 George M. Fredrickson, *Racism: A Short History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 5.
- 4 This is a common lament in the literature, that in exploring the ideas and deconstructing them, authors must utilize racial language. See Kirsten Fischer, *Suspect Relations: Sex, Race, and Resistance in Colonial North Carolina* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 3; Adele Perry, *On the Edge of Empire: Gender, Race, and the Making of British Columbia, 1849–1871* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 6; Stephen Small and Rebecca C. King-O’Riain, “Global Mixed Race: An Introduction,” in *Global Mixed Race*, edited by Rebecca C. King-O’Riain, Stephen Small, Minelle Mahtani, Miri Song, and Paul Spickard (New York: New York University Press, 2014), vii.
- 5 George E. Brooks, *Eurafricans in Western Africa: Commerce, Social Status, Gender, and Religious Observance from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2003), 51–55.
- 6 Ann Morning, “Multiraciality and Census Classification in Global Perspective,” in *Global Mixed Race*, 1.
- 7 Saliha Belmessous, “Assimilation and Racialism in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century French Colonial Policy,” *The American Historical Review* 110:2 (2005), 327.
- 8 Belmessous, “Assimilation and Racialism in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century French Colonial Policy,” 333. See also Guillaume Aubert, “‘The Blood of France’: Race and Purity of Blood in the French Atlantic World,” *The William and Mary Quarterly* 61:3 (July 2004), 446.
- 9 Anthony W. Marx, “Race-Making and the Nation-State,” *World Politics* 48 (January 1996): pp. 180–208.
- 10 Marx touches on other cases in passing, noting that “Portuguese settler colonials in Africa cohabited with blacks extremely rarely,” thus making Brazil unique. His citation for this assertion is a text on race in the Americas. This is at odds with standard accounts. Below I emphasize that this was by

no means the case. Anthony Marx, *Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of South Africa, the United States, and Brazil* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 65.

- 11 I understand Anglicanism as Protestant, as it developed against Papal authority, was organized along national lines, and developed institutions that resemble other Protestant branches. For Merry Wiesner-Hanks, “eventually England adopted doctrines and institutions that were similar to those of Lutheran Germany and Scandinavia.” Merry Wiesner-Hanks, *Christianity and Sexuality in the Early Modern World: Regulating Desire, Reforming Practice* (London: Routledge, 2000), 61. Similarly, Carla Pestana notes that, while the Church of England originally maintained many Catholic traditions, it moved toward Protestantism from the reign of King Edward VI. “By the end of the sixteenth century, the Church of England was organized into England’s own variant of the Protestantism that had reshaped religion in northern Europe.” Carla Gardina Pestana, *Protestant Empire: Religion and the Making of the British Atlantic World* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 36.
- 12 There is considerable debate regarding whether or not non-Trinitarian groups that evolved from Protestants such as Mormons or Jehovah’s Witnesses can be considered Protestant or not. Because they were largely not active in colonial endeavors, I do not address the approaches of non-Trinitarian groups in this study.
- 13 Wiesner-Hanks observes that the Dutch Reformed Church, “Calvinist in its theology and Presbyterian in its organization,” was ruled by the Dutch East India Company in the colonial world. The Company allied with the church in its efforts to combat Catholicism, particularly in areas influenced by Portugal. Wiesner-Hanks, *Christianity and Sexuality in the Early Modern World*, 194.
- 14 While individual British colonies varied, they “tended to be exclusionary in their interpretations, often adopting in practice the American ‘one drop rule.’” A. J. Christopher, “Race and Census in the Commonwealth,” *Population, Space, and Place* 11 (2005), 107. pp. 103–118.
- 15 For instance, Boxer notes that the roots of apartheid were “stronger among the Dutch and the English than among their Portuguese and Spanish precursors,” as the Dutch and British worked to stand apart from natives and import European women, while Latin colonizers took local wives. C. R. Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600–1900* (New York: Penguin, 1990), 241.
- 16 One monograph suggests that “the Spaniards and Portuguese have shown great facility in fusing with the tropical races,” however the British have failed to create a hybrid group. Ulysses G. Weatherly, “Race and Marriage,” *American Journal of Sociology* 15:4 (1910), 442. The lone text I have found that emphasizes religious patterns is Madison Grant’s pseudo-scientific racist 1916 text. The author states that, “In the Catholic colonies, however,

- of New France and New Spain, if the half-breed were a good Catholic he was regarded as a Frenchman or a Spaniard... The Church of Rome has everywhere used its influence to break down racial distinctions." This was intended as a criticism. Madison Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race; Or, the Racial Basis of European History* (Ann Arbor, MI: C. Scribner's and Sons, 1919), 85.
- 17 Dennis B. McGilvray, "Dutch Burghers and Portuguese Mechanics: Eurasian Ethnicity in Sri Lanka," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 24:2 (April 1982), 27.
- 18 Andrew B. Fisher and Matthew D. O'Hara, "Introduction: Racial Identities and Their Interpreters in Colonial Latin America," in *Imperial Subjects: Race and Identity in Colonial Latin America*, edited by Andrew B. Fisher and Matthew D. O'Hara (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2009), 2.
- 19 J. L. Ribeiro Torres, "Race Relations in Mozambique," *Zambezia* (1973), 41.
- 20 Juan Francisco Maura, *Women in the Conquest of the Americas* (London: P. Lang, 1997), 11.
- 21 Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, "Interracial Marriages and the Overseas Family," in *Anthony Reid and the Study of the Southeast Asian Past*, edited by Geoff Wade and Li Tana (Singapore: ISEAS, 2012), 226.
- 22 Boxer quips that Portuguese colonizers in Africa and the Americas were about "fighting, trading, and fornicating with the local inhabitants." Charles Boxer, *Four Centuries of Portuguese Expansion, 1415–1825: A Succinct Survey* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 35. For Carl Nightingale, "unlike white men in the English-speaking world, Frenchmen were less likely to object to cross-racial sex." Carl H. Nightingale, *Segregation: A Global History of Divided Cities* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 196.
- 23 David Pomfret, "Raising Eurasian: Race, Class, and Age in French and British Colonies," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 51:2 (2009), 317.
- 24 Peggy Pascoe, *What Comes Naturally: Miscegenation Law and the Making of Race in America* (Oxford University Press, 2009).
- 25 Ulbe Bosma and Emco Raben, *Being "Dutch" in the Indies: A History of Creolisation and Empire, 1500–1920* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), 26.
- 26 Saliha Belmessous, *Assimilation & Empire: Uniformity in French and British Colonies, 1541–1954* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
- 27 Carl H. Nightingale, "Before Race Mattered: Geographies of the Color Line in Early Colonial Madras and New York," *The American Historical Review* 113:1 (2008), 68.
- 28 Vicki Luker, "The Half-Caste in Australia, New Zealand, and Western Samoa between the Wars: Different Problem, Different Places?" in *Foreign Bodies: Oceania and the Science of Race, 1750–1940*, edited by Bronwen Douglas and Chris Ballard (Canberra: ANU Press, 2008), 309.

- 29 J. S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India* (New York: New York University Press, 1956); L. H. Gann, *The Birth of a Plural Society: The Development of North Rhodesia under the British South Africa Company, 1894–1914* (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1958); M. G. Smith, *The Plural Society in the British West Indies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965).
- 30 Nightingale, *Segregation*.
- 31 Gerald J. Bender, *Angola under the Portuguese: The Myth and Reality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 34.

2

Exploring the Religious Divide

Abstract: *This chapter seeks to demonstrate an enduring, global pattern of Catholic colonizers mixing with local communities compared to Protestant colonizers. After all, before a pattern can be explained, it must first be affirmed. To do so, I move across world regions, starting with Southeast Asia and moving on to East Asia, South Asia, Africa, the Americas, and Oceania. While noting some exceptions, this chapter shows that Portuguese, Spanish, French, Italian, and Belgian colonizers often took local wives, sometimes with official support, while the Dutch, English, Germans, and Americans worked to limit contact and police racial boundaries. Colonial reality is of course complex, but there exists a strong pattern of Catholic mixing and Protestant reluctance, one that is found around the world and over time.*

Keywords: amalgamation; apartheid; mestizo, Metis; one-drop rule; segregation

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Before one can explain a given pattern, one must first reasonably demonstrate that it holds true. In an effort to show that Catholic colonizers consistently mixed more than Protestants across time and geography, this section provides an overview of colonial sexual relations by world region. It seeks to show distinct attitudes towards race and sex in Catholic and Protestant colonial powers, but also takes seriously several important exceptions to these broad global patterns. I begin in Southeast Asia, and then shift to East Asia, South Asia, Africa, the Americas, and Oceania.

Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia provides a useful starting point for this project, home to some of the most sustained, varied forms of colonial rule. From 1511 (Malacca) through 1984 (Brunei), European colonizers included the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, English, French, and Americans. Southeast Asia provides a useful starting point because many colonial possessions were ruled by multiple, successive colonizers, allowing for comparison over time. In addition, the region is home to some crucial cases, as the Dutch Indies provide a serious challenge to my observations. Some of the most important research on colonial intimacy, most notably Stoler's work, focuses on the Dutch East Indies. For this reason, I provide slightly more detail here than in other regions, including some field and archival work in Sumatran Missions. Southeast Asia is also an important region to begin with because French Indochina provides a case of late Catholic colonialism, mitigating claims that changes in sexual activities over time are greater than across faith. In Figure 2.1,¹ I have provided a basic map to help the reader navigate this complex region.

In 1511, the Portuguese were the first Europeans to arrive in Southeast Asia. They provide an extreme case of intermixing. In the seventeenth century, William Dampier (1651–1715) declared that the Portuguese “made use of the Native Women at their pleasure, whether Virgins or Married Women; such as they liked they took without control: and it is probable, they as little restrained their lust in other places; for the Breed of them is scattered all over.”² Not only did the Portuguese take local partners and produce mixed offspring, their children developed self-identified communities and creole languages that remain today. Portuguese traders left Eurasian populations throughout Southeast Asia, including Makassar, Bantam, Tonkin, Siam, and as noted,



FIGURE 2.1 *Map of Asia*

Aceh. In eighteenth-century Phuket, one visitor was greeted by a Catholic community, remarking that “most of these are mixed to the Portuguese.”³ Portuguese traders also left behind mixed communities in northern Vietnam and Java. But it was in Malacca and East Timor that the Portuguese left their most enduring regional legacies.

Between 1511 and their expulsion by the Dutch in 1641, the Portuguese developed a lasting community in Malacca on the Malaysian Peninsula. Portuguese kings actively promoted intermarriage by granting tax exemptions and providing land to any Portuguese sailor who settled with a native wife. This encouraged the creation of hundreds of Portuguese–Malay families. By 1613, Malacca was home to an estimated 7,400 Christians, and “the overwhelming majority of Portuguese men inevitably entered into either regular or else irregular unions—often enough, both—with Asian and Eurasian women.”⁴ The Dutch later captured Malacca in 1641 with the help of local allies. In a pattern that one finds around the world, a Protestant power was overlaid on a mixed Catholic community, but the

new colonizer failed to displace or duplicate the linguistic and religious foundations of its predecessor. By 1678, Malacca's 5,000 inhabitants included 148 Dutch, about 500 Malays, Indians, and Chinese, 1,607 slaves, and 1,469 "Portuguese."⁵ In 1666, the Dutch tried to ban Catholicism, leading to significant resistance among the Portuguese. Within a decade, the laws were no longer enforced, and by 1702, Dutch rulers proclaimed freedom of worship. Under Dutch rule, Malacca remained largely Catholic and continued to speak "Kristang" (Christian), a patois of Portuguese and Malay that also became an ethnic label. Kristang remained the language of commerce and governance, with Dutch and later British edicts communicated in the dialect. In 1841, France successfully lobbied the Vatican to provide Bishops to Penang and Malacca, putting the now British ports' Catholic peoples under the religious authority of French India.⁶ Over the next several decades, the Portuguese community of Malacca absorbed Irish, Chinese, and English populations, maintaining a strong Catholic identity. Today, Malacca remains home to a self-identified Kristang-speaking "Portuguese Settlement," led by a *regedor* (mayor). Whereas the Dutch ruled Malacca for 175 years and the British for 130 years, their influences, despite being more recent, are less discernable today than the more distant Portuguese presence. When Dutch and British Protestants did take local wives in Malacca, they were known to choose Portuguese *mestiças*, not native women.⁷

A similar story is found in the Lesser Sunda Islands, what are today East Timor and East Nusa Tenggara. After capturing Malacca, the Portuguese swept east in search of spices and, on the way, found wives and converts. As the Dutch arrived, displaced Portuguese families concentrated in the eastern islands of Flores, specifically in the Larantuka region, and in Timor. Dampier noted in 1699 that "they are already so mixt, that it is hard to distinguish whether they are *Portugueze* or *Indians*."⁸ Portugal dominated lucrative trades in sandalwood, waxes, and also slaves, liaisons with whom further expanded the *mestiço* population.⁹ Leonard Andaya suggests that Timor was part of a Portuguese *mestiço* "Shadow Empire," autonomous from Portuguese control.¹⁰ Timor and Larantuka were ruled by the so-called Black Portuguese, or *Topasses*, derived from the Hindu *Topi* (hat), a reference to their garish clothing. For Andaya, Topasses identity "was based on the melding of indigenous and Portuguese blood and cultural forms."¹¹ Their society was dominated by two major families: the Hornay and da Costa clans.¹² By 1729, there were some 40,000 Topasses, a group that came to rule the islands and resist

Dutch incursions (and at times, the Portuguese Crown).¹³ As East Timor became a backwater for a declining Portuguese empire, intermarriage continued apace, evident in the thoroughly *mestiço* leadership of today's Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste.

While the Portuguese left genes, faith, culture, and language in Southeast Asia like no other, Spanish forces in the Philippines also sired a sizable *mestizo* class. Concubinage was reportedly "quite common" among Spanish in the Philippines.¹⁴ In the countryside, friar estates and military legions featured considerable mixing with local women. Spanish authorities encouraged soldiers to take local wives throughout the country, a policy believed to lead to more content soldiers.¹⁵ Mixed-race communities developed some power but were soon rivaled by Spanish descendants from post-revolutionary Latin America.¹⁶ Many early Philippine nationalists were the products of *mestizo* unions, such as Antonio Luna. National hero Jose Rizal was a descendent of native, Chinese, Spanish, and Japanese ancestors. One study suggests that as many as 3.6% of the Philippines' 90 million people may have European genes.¹⁷ This said, others observe that Manila lacked a Eurasian class and the Spanish preferred European or mixed women.¹⁸ The massive "*mestizo*" class in the Philippines comprised mostly the progeny of Chinese fathers. In urban Manila, the Spanish initially worked to maintain ethnic divisions, making the *intramuros* area off-limits to non-Spanish residents. However, as in Latin America, this policy was undermined by the growth of native converts and relations with native women.¹⁹ The genetic footprint left by the Spanish in the Philippines paled in comparison to that of the Portuguese but was nonetheless substantial.

Portuguese and Spanish colonizers arrived early in the colonial era, which some might suggest explains the extent of mixed communities. The next Catholic colonizer in Southeast Asia was a later arrival. Despite France only ruling territory in Southeast Asia from 1864, one finds similarities with other Catholic colonizers. French Indochina included Cambodia, Laos, and what is now Vietnam, the latter being the major focus of French colonizers. Concubinage between French citizens and Vietnamese women was common, as were local marriages and Franco-Vietnamese families. Even prior to formal colonial rule, French advisors to the Cochin Emperor often took local wives. The daughter of one such union, Marie Vannier, later served as a cultural Ambassador to France. By 1930, one-third of all recognized French births were Eurasian, and by 1940, almost half were (to say nothing of unrecognized births).²⁰

Emmanuelle Saada describes the fascinating political debates over providing citizenship for Indochina's métis, specifically for those not recognized by European fathers. Owing to the large numbers of mixed children, Indochina became "a veritable laboratory for the métis problem," shaping French policy in Madagascar, continental Africa, and New Caledonia.²¹

Although British officials downplayed the existence of Eurasian populations, France recognized them as French, a distinction that colonial officials believed exemplified "differences between 'Anglo-Saxon' and Latin interpretations of empire building."²² A 1928 decree stated that any person believed to have a parent of the French race, even if not recognized by their father, was legally French. The result was hardly inspiring—Eurasians were taken from Asian mothers and placed in state schools to make them French.²³ French officials even planned to colonize southern Vietnam and hill stations with Eurasians, as mixed communities were seen as loyal to France while also locally rooted. French colonial policy represented an inversion of American beliefs, in that even a single drop of French blood made children French.²⁴ The French state accepted and even encouraged mixing as a tool of empire building. Despite their brief, late tenure, France maintained an inclusive view of race and mixed in ways consistent with Portugal and Spain.

Thus far, the picture I have painted is hardly revelatory—sailors, merchants, and soldiers lusted for native women. What of Dutch, British, and American colonizers in Southeast Asia? For the most part, Protestants did not mix with the colonized, although there are some exceptions, and these should be addressed up front.

Dutch colonization of what is now Indonesia provides an important challenge to the claims made in this study. Unlike the British and Americans, the Dutch presence in Southeast Asia was established early, providing more time for a Eurasian population to develop. It is difficult to estimate the number of Indies Eurasians, partly because Dutch racial classifications depended on whether or not the father recognized his offspring, which determined whether Eurasians were classified as European or native. While the official figure was about 134,000 by 1930,²⁵ estimates place the number of Eurasians in the millions.²⁶ The dominant form of unions with native women was never marriage, but instead concubinage and prostitution. Up to half of European men in the Dutch Indies were believed to have concubines.²⁷ Stoler shows that, despite church criticism, Dutch officials promoted informal liaisons, as concubines "imposed a less onerous financial burden on low-salaried staff and

helped newcomers to learn local language and customs quickly.”²⁸ The army promoted concubinage on pragmatic grounds, as soldiers could hardly afford to support a European wife and single men were taken to disorder.²⁹ During the British occupation, officials were shocked at the numerous liaisons between Dutch and native women.³⁰ Toward the end of Dutch rule, the fate of Eurasians was a pressing concern, with failed efforts to have them colonize West Papua.

I do not deny that the Dutch Indies provide a partial exception to my study, however I do wish to put it in perspective and introduce some caveats. While the East Indies had more mixing than British colonies, the scale was nowhere near Portuguese levels and was comparable to those of the Spanish and French. Despite promoting concubinage, Dutch officials hardly supported intermarriage or mixed offspring. For Bosma and Raben, Dutch society in the Indies “perceived a mixed marriage as a greater evil than concubinage.”³¹ Far from promoting mixture, concubinage was a way to control it, allowing sex with limited procreation. From 1639, men marrying native women were barred from returning to Europe, and in 1716, this was extended to any man with recognized mixed children.³² This represented an effort both to populate the colony with loyal “European blood” as well as to protect Europe from “native blood.” Both the Dutch East India Company and the Dutch government created schemes to import European women in an effort to avoid racial mixing.³³ Prominent politicians sought to ban “miscegenation” in the Indies and in 1912, concubinage was outlawed.³⁴

The Dutch Indies exception can also be qualified by looking more closely at the identities of the men and women involved. Statistics mask more diverse identities, as many Eurasians were not Dutch. The earliest Eurasians in Batavia and elsewhere in the colony were Portuguese descendants, as Dutch rule was preceded by a century of Portuguese influence.³⁵ Batavia attracted Portuguese descendants from Malacca and Macau, and the Dutch Indies later incorporated Flores, Ambon, Ternate, West Timor, and other Portuguese strongholds. Parts of Batavia and some nearby villages were entirely “Portuguese.” When Indies Eurasians established the Eurasian town of Gisting in 1918, half the population was Portuguese, and locals communicated in Kristang.³⁶ Portuguese continued to be the language of commerce and governance in Batavia throughout Dutch rule, with the Dutch content to maintain their language as one of a select ruling class, not to be taught to natives.³⁷

This leads to an important qualifier regarding the identity of the women involved in mixed unions, specifically local concubines. When the Dutch

transgressed racial boundaries, they tended to select Eurasian concubines, usually Portuguese descendants.³⁸ When writers speak of Dutch unions with native women, they often mean Portuguese *mestiças*, not indigenous women, especially in Muslim areas. While some embraced Javanese women, “a larger number of Dutchmen who were stationed in the colony married women from the local Portuguese Eurasian community.”³⁹ Boxer similarly observes a Dutch tendency to marry Luso-Asian women, something that church authorities resisted because the children were typically raised Catholic and spoke Kristang.⁴⁰ Elsewhere, Boxer notes that “the wives—or consorts—of the Dutchmen who married in Asia were thus mostly of Indo-Portuguese descent.”⁴¹ Bosma and Raben contrast the Portuguese, who regularly took native wives, with the more reluctant Dutch and British. They emphasize that, when the Dutch and British did have local partners, they were very often Portuguese Eurasians “since they were more familiar to the European newcomers than were the native women.”⁴² When Dutch men did take Javanese concubines, their daughters were eventually married off to Dutch officials, as Dutch colonizers essentially created a race of Eurasian women for comfort and breeding while limiting racial mixing.⁴³ Where Protestant colonizers did mix, they did so with mixed Catholic women. This tendency is also present in South Asia, Africa, and the Americas, discussed below.

Next, many of the European men who took native partners were Catholic, be they Dutch or from other countries. The composition of colonial society was diverse. Dutch colonial authorities, while partially linked to the Calvinist Church institutionally, were represented by a multinational array of European soldiers, traders, and planters on the ground.⁴⁴ Given persecution at home, many Dutch colonizers were Catholic (as well as Jewish). Stoler examines Deli, a North Sumatran colony established in the nineteenth century driven by a “pioneering Protestant ethic” and notable for “the absence of a large ‘mixed-blood’ (Indo) population.”⁴⁵ A Eurasian class developed nonetheless, founded by Frenchmen.⁴⁶ The diverse character of European fathers is evident among leading Indies Eurasian activists.⁴⁷

A final caveat refers to social segregation. Although the Dutch sometimes mixed with local women, European and native societies typically inhabited different neighborhoods and schools. Throughout its Asian colonies, the Dutch “remained an alien body on the fringe of Asian society, even in the regions it administered directly.”⁴⁸ According to one Eurasian leader, “the Dutch kept to themselves. They might marry a Portuguese woman, but generally they lived in separate worlds.”⁴⁹

J. S. Furnivall (1878–1960) famously referred to Dutch and British colonies in Southeast Asia as “plural societies” in which distinct ethnic groups maintain separate spheres:

In Burma, as in Java, probably the first thing that strikes the visitor is the medley of peoples—European, Chinese, Indian, and native. It is in the strictest sense a medley, for they mix but do not combine. Each group holds its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the market-place, in buying and selling. There is a plural society, with different sections of the community living side by side, but separately.⁵⁰

While writers have rightly noted some exceptions within Java’s plural society, namely early Sino-Javanese families, it remains true that Dutch colonizers worked to keep all groups apart through a barrage of colonial policies, including taxation, identification cards, pass systems, and religious identification.⁵¹ Nightingale suggests that Batavia was deeply segregated, and from its founding, the Dutch in Indonesia represented “the most thoroughgoing segregationists of their day.”⁵²

The segregationist tendency was evident among Protestant officials as well as missionaries. It is useful to look at Batak areas of North Sumatra, which represent a tough test for my study. Christianity arrived very late to the region, with German Lutheran missionaries arriving to North Tapanuli in 1870, before colonial officials, and Karo Batak did not convert until the 1960s. Here, Protestantism arrived before Catholicism, but both were late arrivals. The region also saw a limited number of European officials, soldiers, and planters. Most importantly, Batak culture is home to complex kinship patterns that make it extremely difficult not only to marry across race but also across ethnicity and clan. In the late nineteenth century, missionaries flocked to the region ahead of colonial authorities for fear of Islamicization after the Padri War in West Sumatra and Acehese Islamism further north. With Catholics barred from the area, various Protestant denominations worked to establish strongholds. Famous German missionary Ludwig Ingwer Nommensen (1834–1918) immediately applied segregationist policies, demanding that converts live separately from other natives in “peace villages” and that European missionaries reside in separate compounds.⁵³ Local historians emphasized that no missionary would ever consider taking a local wife from among converts, as it was forbidden by the mission and would contradict a sense of racial and spiritual superiority. Missionaries almost always brought wives from Europe, and when they did not, missions

would arrange marriages for them and send wives.⁵⁴ For one church historian, “missionaries could never allow marriage between Europeans and local women. Colored people, even converts, were always uncivilized, unclean. Missions sent European women to single men to avoid mixing.”⁵⁵ Another local reverend explained that Protestants did not want to disturb local culture and ethnicity, that a reluctance to mix was out of respect.⁵⁶ For another local church leader, “the Dutch were always exclusive. They felt superior to local people, pious and critical of local culture. We have had to work hard to overcome this history.”⁵⁷

The arrival of Catholics to Batak areas in the 1930s led to conflicts among missionaries. Catholics made converts by incorporating local cultural elements that Protestants viewed as animist, such as traditional marriage ceremonies, drumming, and local stories. Catholics also grew by allowing mixing. While Protestants initially forbade mixing across denominations and Batak tradition limited marriage across some clans, Catholics welcomed various unions. When Batak men and women married across denomination or clan, not only were they excommunicated, their families were as well. Many such persons then converted to Catholicism, as the Church welcomed them with open arms.⁵⁸ Catholics also promoted intermarriage with Javanese converts and some Europeans, leading to rapid growth. Today, local Catholic leaders in Karo areas estimate that two-thirds of Catholic marriages are in some way mixed; although Protestants have become more relaxed and open to various unions across clan and ethnic affiliations, their rates remain far less.⁵⁹

Protestant colonizers resisted not only sexual mixing but also economic, social, and residential intercourse, as is clearest in British colonial possessions. Racial divisions in colonial Malaysia, as well as in other plural societies, hardened with the introduction of European racial thought in the mid-1800s. Chinese, Indians, and Malays were far more likely to mix culturally and sexually early on, leading to a degree of assimilation; however, this was frozen by the colonial state seeking to categorize and separate racial groups.⁶⁰ In other words, the British limited racial mixing for their own community as well as worked to reinforce the boundaries of all groups. From 1786, British Penang was already home to a sizable Eurasian population when 200 Portuguese-Thais arrived from Kedah, later joined by others from Phuket.⁶¹ British Penang actually became a center for regional Catholicism, home to a French mission school that was “a key site in the Eurasian landscape.”⁶² Penang’s Eurasian population included Portuguese, Spanish, French, and Irish families.⁶³ The British largely lived apart from the

multinational Catholic community. According to one study, the British in Penang initially had relationships with local women, specifically Portuguese Eurasians, but soon regarded such mixing as uncivilized.⁶⁴

Singapore was designed on the basis of separate ethnic zones; while ethnic communities tend to gravitate toward their own anyway, British colonial planners formalized these divisions and developed a segregated society.⁶⁵ Nightingale frames Singapore as a pioneer in separating races in a variety of ways, as its founder Thomas Stamford Raffles (1781–1826) “made urban segregation into a sort of political philosophy.”⁶⁶ The British worked to limit mixing, with Singapore’s influential Eurasian community being primarily of Portuguese descent. In Singapore, “Eurasians were among the earliest migrants . . . coming from regions with an established European presence, such as Goa, Malacca, Macau, and Timor.”⁶⁷ The British regarded Catholic Eurasians not as a fluid community and cultural bridge, but instead as a distinct ethnic group, seeking to freeze racial lines and develop a Eurasian culture. During World War II, Japanese demands for food production and mistrust toward Eurasians led to the creation of an agricultural colony in Bahau, Negeri Sembilan. Blessed by Pope Pius XII (1876–1958), the “Bahau Roman Catholic Colony” consisted largely of Singapore Eurasians, as Eurasian identity was still inexorably linked to Catholicism. Even today, long after colonial rule, the “majority of Singapore Eurasians are of Portuguese-Malaccan descent.”⁶⁸ Experts estimate that at least 90% of Singapore’s Eurasian community is Catholic, both historically and today.⁶⁹ As Singapore’s Eurasians have mobilized to gain recognition for their community, they have promoted Portuguese Kristang as their language. Within British Southeast Asia, the little mixing that took place was predominantly Catholic.

Although often applied to Indonesia and Malaysia, Furnivall’s concept of plural societies developed from the author’s work in British Burma, another place where multiple races mingled but did not mix.⁷⁰ Like the Dutch Indies and Malaysia, colonial Burma was home to strict ethnic divides. Chie Ikeya documents debates in Burma criticizing temporary unions between Burmese women and Anglo or Indian men, mixing seen as dangerous by Burmese society as well as colonial rulers, the latter believing that such unions would blemish the “civilizational hierarchy.”⁷¹ In the nineteenth century, British authorities “issued circulars . . . prohibiting European officials from conjugal liaisons with indigenous women.”⁷² By 1910, various groups linked to Protestant churches, including American Baptists, led campaigns to abolish prostitution and establish

tough new laws.⁷³ A small Eurasian community developed nonetheless. The community contained over 6,000 persons by 1948, rooted in mixed Portuguese settlements along the coast, especially around what became Rangoon.⁷⁴ Another early Eurasian population developed among bands of French soldiers hired by the Burmese King who were awarded several Burmese wives and raised extensive families, as well as a notable Irish contingent working under British rule. Despite persecution from British authorities, but also because of it, Burma's Eurasians developed considerable social cohesion, evident in the foundation of Catholic Schools in 1842.⁷⁵ Consistent with other British colonies, the British imported or allowed the migration of Indians to Burma, which developed separate communities that did not mix with the English or Burmese. Ikeya notes widespread Burmese anger toward alleged unions between Burmese women and Indian men, as leaders in all ethnic groups sought to limit interracial liaisons and maintain separate ethnic communities.⁷⁶ Today, Burma's praetorian regime is known for its xenophobia and emphasis on maintaining pure Burmese blood, attacking democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi for her "mixed blood" offspring and foreign contamination. The regime even went so far as to write racial purity into the country's constitution, which barred from political office anyone who had mixed races.

Finally, despite a history of Spanish and Chinese mixing, Americans maintained a sense of boundary in the Philippines. The United States sought to assimilate Filipinos into a Protestant culture "without losing its racial integrity."⁷⁷ Paul Kramer argues that the US approach was very much modeled on the British system, "fulfilling Anglo-Saxon responsibilities dictated by its racial-historical character."⁷⁸ American zones such as Manila's Escolta included segregated clubs and theaters, with the American hill station of Baguio being "deliberately segregationist."⁷⁹ This said, American troops frequented Japanese and Filipina prostitutes. The US military initially responded to the spread of venereal diseases by regulating brothels; when this was discovered, a broad domestic coalition including suffragettes, church leaders, politicians, and anti-imperialists mobilized against state accommodation of vice. This "social purity movement" spoke out against racial contamination and immorality, and for the rights of young women, resulting in an executive order against colonial prostitution in the American colony.⁸⁰ In the colonial era, American rule did not leave behind a substantial genetic footprint. After World War II and Philippine independence, things changed considerably, as discussed below.

Southeast Asia's long, varied experiences with colonialism make it a good starting point for comparing Catholic and Protestant rule. I have shown that all Catholic colonizers, especially the Portuguese, openly mixed with native women and produced Eurasian communities. Meanwhile, British and American colonizers did so far less, enforcing segregation and limiting mixing. Although the magnitude of mixing is more of a spectrum—from Portugal, to France and Spain, the Netherlands, and then Britain and the United States—the religious divide is strong. Already, I have hinted at several important implications, such as segregation, plural societies, contemporary policies, and post-independence national identities. Having shown that mixed communities track closely with faith in one region, I will now move on to demonstrate it elsewhere.

East Asia

Varied approaches to intermixing were especially stark in East Asia, where the Portuguese and British displayed radically different behaviors.

As in Southeast Asia, Portuguese rule in East Asia was based on mixed unions and their offspring. For Portuguese outposts in Japan, Taiwan, and Macau, “miscegenation was officially hailed as a positive step towards social harmony” and the absorption of Portuguese ideals.⁸¹ Contemporary observers noted widespread Portuguese relations with Japanese women in Nagasaki in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, something that later Dutch traders worked to limit.⁸² Early Portuguese traders in southern Japan often took native wives and sired local families, and by 1571 when Nagasaki became a regular Portuguese outpost, “such relationships became common.”⁸³ As Jesuits succeeded in making Japanese converts in the late sixteenth century, female converts often married Portuguese traders. Eurasian offspring were not looked kindly upon in Japanese society, with suspected cases of infanticide and Japanese scholars suggesting that mixed offspring could not survive past ten years old due to the mismatch between “the element ‘metal’ in the West and the pliant physical principal of the element ‘wood’ in the East.”⁸⁴ As a result of local persecution, Eurasian offspring were often raised in Macau. By 1639, Japanese authorities expelled all Portuguese inhabitants, and the fleeing Portuguese brought Japanese converts with them to Macau,

including Japanese wives and Eurasian families.⁸⁵ After the Portuguese fled, the Dutch remained for several decades, but their relations with local women were extremely different. The Portuguese experience may have led to new rules that “no Japanese could live in a Dutchman’s house with the exception of ‘public’ women.”⁸⁶ Japanese authorities carefully selected prostitutes for Dutch traders, seeking to limit European contact with natives and forestall lasting relationships. Portugal’s brief, precarious presence in southern Japan immediately produced a sizable Eurasian population, while the Dutch took part in informal relationships and did not develop a large Eurasian community.

The most sustained contact between the Portuguese and East Asia, and the most substantial mixing, was of course in Macau. Initially, Macau’s Portuguese brought wives from Malacca, Goa, and Japan, also finding some among local Tanka minorities, as Chinese communities imposed some level of segregation. The Portuguese would soon adopt Chinese orphan girls through the Church, raise them as Catholics, and they would marry Portuguese men. The outcome was, again, a fusion of blood as well as culture and language, despite local resistance. Linguistically, Macanese developed alongside Kristang in Southeast Asia; indeed, Macau and Malacca inhabited a shared world.⁸⁷ One expert notes that Macau’s Eurasians represent “generations of intermarriage between Portuguese and Asian peoples extending back almost to the beginning of Macau’s history.”⁸⁸ Today, despite mainland migration and Macanese outmigration leading to the Chinese takeover in 1999, 7.5% of Macau’s 550,000 people identify as mixed Portuguese.⁸⁹ In Macau, the Portuguese again left a lasting footprint.

Despite being comparable in a number of ways, neighboring British Hong Kong could not have been more different. The contrasting sexual practices between Portuguese Macau and British Hong Kong have been noted by a variety of experts. In contrast to Macau, colonial Hong Kong “had quite the opposite view of marriages or unions with native women,” developing “a society based on segregation.”⁹⁰ Pomfret describes Hong Kong as “the epitome of the anti-assimilative Anglo-Saxon presence in Asia.”⁹¹ For João de Pina-Cabral, “Contrary to the Portuguese in Macao [*sic*], the British in Hong Kong were unwilling to accept their children by native women as part of their own community.”⁹² In Hong Kong, mixing was limited, and when it did occur, Eurasians were classified as Chinese.⁹³ Hong Kong had no formal law against liaisons with local women, although local legislators proposed precisely this. Instead, racial

boundaries were enforced socially and professionally. Government jobs demanded that employees sign contracts vowing not to marry Chinese or Eurasian women, or even to take one as a concubine.⁹⁴

Segregation in Hong Kong went beyond companionship, extending to social clubs, sports teams, hospitals, businesses, and residences. Dance halls in Shanghai and Hong Kong did not allow dancing among different races, and even cemeteries were segregated. Despite the small number of European residents, “Hong Kong introduced legalized segregation.”⁹⁵ The peak residences overlooking Hong Kong, accessible by tram, were white flight neighborhoods with legally enforced segregation. Of course, segregation was never complete. As in Southeast Asia, British men seeking local lovers typically looked to Portuguese Eurasian women.⁹⁶ Although Hong Kong developed a small non-Portuguese Eurasian population, many of the European fathers were Irish.⁹⁷ All told though, British Hong Kong was remarkably intolerant of mixing between whites and Asians, a dramatic contrast with neighboring Macau.

The patterns found in Hong Kong were replicated in other colonial possessions in China, namely Shanghai. Formal segregation measures were absent from Shanghai, which instead featured a system of “self-imposed segregation” between racially conscious Europeans and increasingly nationalist ethnic Chinese.⁹⁸ In terms of residential segregation, European and Chinese authorities laid out very separate spaces.⁹⁹ One early study explained that, despite the fact that “each of the ethnic groups...has tended to remain socially somewhat isolated from the other,” some mixed communities formed nonetheless.¹⁰⁰ The author explains the low rate of mixing and the severe prejudice against mixed persons in terms of British colonial attitudes and Chinese internalization of racial categories, limiting mixed communities from serving as bridges between the two cultures.

Moving beyond the Portuguese and British cases in East Asia, the Spanish established a small northern fort in Taiwan in 1626. They immediately took local partners, encouraged by the Dominican Order, which hoped to accelerate native conversion.¹⁰¹ When they were forced out by the Dutch, Spanish soldiers took their wives with them to the Philippines. The Dutch, meanwhile, ruled the southwest of the island until 1662. Instead of taking local wives, they encouraged Chinese migrants to do so, allowing the Dutch to build kinship alliances with natives from a distance.¹⁰² Finally, in the German possession of Qingdao, China, colonial authorities followed the British example and maintained segregated, European-only areas. The European town had German street names and even cemeteries,

demarcated by a “cordon sanitaire” apart from the “Chinesen stadt.”¹⁰³ German officials did not tolerate marriage with local women and tightly regulated prostitution, creating separate brothels for European and non-European men, as well as importing Russian women to serve German men.¹⁰⁴ In Japan, China, and Taiwan, we see stark evidence that Catholics mixed and Protestants refrained in East Asia.

South Asia

South Asian societies are notably endogamous compared to East and especially Southeast Asian communities, where women are more likely to marry out and mix with other groups. Despite this cultural norm among many colonized peoples of South Asia, Catholic and Protestant colonizers again mixed with native women in divergent degrees.

In Portuguese colonies, we see the same story as in Malacca and Macau, as these three ports developed a shared Luso-Asian world. Upon capturing Goa in 1510, Afonso de Albuquerque (1453–1515) immediately promoted “marriages between the Portuguese and the women of the country.”¹⁰⁵ Albuquerque, who maintained a considerable personal harem, defended this on the grounds that “Moslem and high-caste Hindu girls were more or less white.”¹⁰⁶ Widespread marriages led to large mixed communities, as did other forms of unions with local women. Portuguese slaveholding led to extensive *mestiço* populations, as female slaves became domestic servants, “which usually meant concubines and mistresses as well.”¹⁰⁷ Residing in Goa in the 1580s, one Dutch observer criticized “rampant” Portuguese mixing for producing sickly offspring and contaminating the European race.¹⁰⁸ This is an early example of biological arguments against miscegenation, what would become a major theme for Protestant colonizers and a perennial criticism of Catholic colonizers.

To avoid focusing too much on the Portuguese as representative of all Catholic colonizers, it is useful to look at the subcontinent’s five small French *comptoirs* (posts). For the French, marrying a local woman was acceptable provided she converted to Catholicism, a transmutation that created Catholic souls and French bodies.¹⁰⁹ As the children of French men and Indian women, *métis* were automatically granted French citizenship, as in Indochina. Again, this was hardly progressive, as colonial authorities demanded that mixed children be raised as Europeans, by Europeans. One scholar suggests that “there was no color prejudice

among the French” in India, as even leading officials married local women.¹¹⁰ Although this goes too far, French attitudes contrasted a great deal with British views, in that “racial etymologies and distinctions were more elastic in French India than in British India,” as the “vast majority” of people living in French India’s European enclaves “were *métis* or *topas* in origin.”¹¹¹ Again, Protestant observers were critical of what they saw. One British visitor to Pondichéry disparaged its “tawny-faced Frenchmen and their families.”¹¹² Catholicism connected Portuguese and French Eurasian communities in South Asia, making for multinational and multiracial kinship networks.

Largely owing to earlier rule and expansive territory, British India was not as segregated as Singapore or Hong Kong. India thus represents a partial outlier, standing out as unique in British colonialism. But unlike Goa, British India “never did become a major settler colony or, indeed, produce a significant population of mixed Indo-Anglican descent.”¹¹³ In the late colonial age, British India was notable for extensive segregation and other efforts to remain apart from Indian societies.

Early British colonial rule in India was relatively tolerant of interracial unions. Kenneth Ballhatchet suggests that “In the seventeenth century the East India Company encouraged the growth of a Eurasian community as a support for English activities.”¹¹⁴ British subjects could not marry local women, but many established lasting relationships with concubines and raised local families. By the twentieth century, the colonial census counted 170,000 Europeans and 89,000 Eurasians.

Like the Dutch East Indies, these exceptions must be admitted, but also partially qualified. Many Eurasians in British India were of Portuguese descent. Early British ports such as Madras were previously sites of Portuguese rule, which already produced a “substantial mixed-race population.”¹¹⁵ Next, many British subjects (especially soldiers) who took local partners were Catholic, often Irish. And when the British did cross racial boundaries, they often did so with Catholic Eurasians instead of full natives.¹¹⁶ Several writers have noted that many Englishmen “found wives amongst the Portuguese Eurasian women,” which was cause for great alarm among Protestant clergy, as the offspring were typically “baptized as Catholics.”¹¹⁷ For others, “Eurasian women appealed to Englishmen...they were even considered eminently nubile.”¹¹⁸ Creole Portuguese remained the language of commerce and diplomacy in British India, as offspring were raised by their mothers, so British culture was not passed on even when genes were. Work by David Veevers on the British in

seventeenth-century India shows that interracial relationships “facilitated the establishment of colonial trade, politics, and rule in Asia,”¹¹⁹ although he also notes that many “local” women marrying British Company officials were Portuguese and that the British “never attributed anything like the Portuguese degree of interracial configuration.”¹²⁰ In fact, his study paints a picture of remarkably strong European kinship networks, with British, Irish, French, and Portuguese families intermarrying and helping to establish an early colonial state. Like the early Dutch East Indies, early British India provides a partial exception and Protestant colonizers indeed sired a mixed-race community, although its scale did not approach Portuguese levels and was largely founded upon earlier Catholic mixing.

Late British colonialism was far more segregated and sexual boundaries were circumscribed. Colonial authorities regulated mixing between the races, sexually and socially, and mounted intense campaigns against mixed communities. In the late eighteenth century, colonial authorities expelled Eurasian doctors, clerks, and soldiers, who were now seen as racially degenerative. The British not only purged Anglo-Indians from the civil service, they also punished persons marrying anyone with any native blood. As Rudyard Kipling (1865–1936) quipped, “Marriage in India does not concern the individual but the Government he serves.”¹²¹ This does not mean that sexual mixing stopped altogether. To police liaisons, British officials established what some called “State-Licensed Harlotry”—brothels intended to serve soldiers and limit the spread of genes and disease, usually staffed by Portuguese Eurasian women.¹²² Such efforts raised criticisms from church officials as well as from the growing numbers of European women living throughout the British Empire. Prostitution and concubinage would later be outlawed, making all forms of sexual intercourse across color lines illegal.

Restricting interracial unions was part of a larger pattern of colonial segregation in the subcontinent. British Indian towns developed as “dual cities,” with a European enclave located alongside separate native communities. This is illustrated by urban zoning in colonial Madras, a town organized around two distinct neighborhoods: White Town and Black Town, divided by thick stone walls. Originating around Fort St. George, White Town was originally known as Christian Town, which for a time included Portuguese and Armenians. Over time, non-Protestant groups were pushed out,¹²³ and Christian Town became known as White Town, where buildings were plastered with crushed shells so they were literally white. Nightingale shows how British officials regulated residency,

forcing Englishmen to sell their homes only to other English and enforcing laws against natives entering white zones.¹²⁴ Like Hong Kong, British Madras featured spatial segregation between the British, natives, and other groups, reflecting a desire to construct and police racial divisions. Calcutta and New Delhi were organized similarly. By 1702, the village of Calcutta became known as “the White Town,” distinguished from the neighboring settlement, which became known as “the Black Town.”¹²⁵ After a Muslim uprising, the British rebuilt Calcutta, tearing down native houses to create exclusive white suburbs. These efforts to remain separate in terms of residence reflected a desire to live in separate worlds.

It is useful to take a broader look at Protestant colonizers in South Asia. Danish colonies in India and nearby islands show colonial lives directed by zealous Protestant missions, home to minimal mixing. Danish India was home to a substantial mixed Portuguese population, “the children of European fathers and native mothers.”¹²⁶ Lutheran authorities in Tranquebar worked to limit marriages with native women and refused to baptize mixed offspring from illegitimate unions, pushing outcast mixed offspring toward the Portuguese Catholic Church.¹²⁷ More has been said about the Dutch in South Asia, known to have been more racially tolerant than the British in India. While Eurasians were purged from Indian colonial ranks, in Ceylon (modern-day Sri Lanka), mixed-race Burghers were far more accepted.¹²⁸ What is today Sri Lanka has a rich Eurasian history, although again, they stemmed largely from Indo-Portuguese communities. In 1796, the British estimated that Ceylon was home to 5,000 Portuguese and 900 Dutch.¹²⁹ The Dutch East India Company allowed mixed marriages, but only with light-skinned native women, meaning Portuguese Eurasians. Most Dutch Burghers “found wives, not among the caste-conscious Sinhalese and Tamils, but among the existing population of mixed Portuguese.”¹³⁰ Dutch officials stated that the daughters of these unions should marry Dutchmen, “so that our race will degenerate as little as possible.”¹³¹ This early seventeenth century concern with racial purity essentially made Eurasian women a race of breeders for European men in the coming decades. Within a few decades, Dutch rulers worked to limit mixing even with Eurasians, with the stated goal of limiting racial degeneracy.¹³² British rule was even more segregated, though never as strict as in India owing to the large number of mixed persons on the island. As in Malaysia and Singapore, the British could regard Eurasians as their own ethnic group, freezing them as a separate people instead of viewing them as a bridge. Sri Lanka provides yet another case through which temporal variation in the same territory reveals early Catholic mixing and, later, Protestant restraint.

Africa

Despite much of European colonialism in Africa being relatively late, with the “scramble for Africa” taking place between 1881 and 1914, the continent nevertheless saw considerable “mixing” under colonial powers. Again, patterns generally follow a religious divide. It is useful to begin with Protestant colonizers, which, in Africa, created some of the most racially segregated societies the world has ever known. This contrasts with distinct patterns among Catholic colonizers, early as well as late in the colonial era (Figure 2.2).



FIGURE 2.2 *Map of Colonial Africa*

It is well-known that British rule engendered extreme divisions in South Africa, Namibia, Rhodesia, Zambia, as well as Sudan, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and elsewhere. In Kenya, British South African migrants worked to build a “white man’s country.”¹³³ In Sierra Leone, the British did not typically mix with Africans, nor did returned slaves from the Americas, for that matter.¹³⁴ English merchants who raised families with African women were necessarily defectors, renegades who left British society and went into business for themselves (and often converted to Catholicism).¹³⁵ In Western Africa, some Anglo-African communities indeed developed in the seventeenth century. As in Asia, when the British mixed with local women, they “cohabited with Luso-African, rather than African, women.”¹³⁶ In early Zambia, British traders sometimes tried to wed the Eurafian mothers of their local children, but typically, mixed persons were pushed to define themselves as African, an effort to contain racial “contagion.”¹³⁷ This was also true of French and Dutch explorers, as the earlier Portuguese presence created a mixed native population from which they could find sexual partners. Explaining why they preferred Luso-African women, Brooks suggests that “Protestant Europeans may have rationalized that it was more appropriate and seemly to establish affiliations with Luso-Africans who professed Catholicism as opposed to African ‘pagans.’”¹³⁸

Further south, the *Basters* (Dutch: Bastards, also known as *Griqua*) were the offspring of Dutch and German Protestant settlers and African women in the eighteenth century. Although refusing to mix with natives in part because the offspring were considered inferior, Protestant colonizers were ironically attracted to mixed women. In 1906, German colonial officials banned marriages with mulattas, fearing that “German men were particularly attracted to Baster women.”¹³⁹ In German East Africa (modern Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania), officials banned mixed marriages after one man tried to marry an African woman, a situation never considered in German Southwest Africa (Namibia). One author explains that the ban on intermarriage was supported by colonists as well as missionaries, “who might have been expected to prefer marriage to cohabitation,” but actually worked against unions between Germans and local converts.¹⁴⁰

Racial policies among Protestant colonizers in Africa were reinforced by residential segregation. In German Cameroon, the city of Duala was home to a massive removal of native communities and a large buffer area between German and African zones.¹⁴¹ German and British African

cities witnessed strict segregation and limited rural–urban migration through elaborate pass systems. Colonial authorities created white-only hill stations in Sierra Leone, as well as European residential zones surrounded by large empty border zones in northern Nigeria. Colonial authorities would fine Africans or Europeans discovered in each other’s communities. In Nairobi, separate zones were created for Europeans, Asians, and Africans, and with time, Africans were relocated to a totally separate town.¹⁴²

Of course, twentieth century South Africa represented the zenith of racial segregation. Early South African colonialism was not as segregated as one might think. Settlement “consisted primarily of single males who manifested little color consciousness in their choice of concubines or wives.”¹⁴³ This era produced many of the persons later known as “colored,” although many colored persons were mestiços from earlier interactions, nearby Portuguese ports, and labor migrants from Asia. With further Dutch migration and then British colonial control, mixing slowed considerably. Formal segregation began with “the establishment of a separate congregation for the indigenes by the London Missionary Society in 1825.”¹⁴⁴ By 1847, authorities set aside separate “native locations” just outside of town, with natives forbidden to reside outside of this area unless exempted by employers. These separate native towns became extremely crowded, leading authorities to continually develop new sites, with blacks removed as the white population expanded. The result was a highly segregated landscape, with white (British and Dutch), black, and colored (Indian, Chinese, and Malay) settlements maintaining physical and social distance between the races. In the 1920s, South Africa criminalized liaisons between whites and other races, proceeding to lay out separate residences for racial groups.¹⁴⁵ Soon, laws would separate races in churches, transit, libraries, swimming pools, sports, unions, and even cemeteries. A series of South African laws led to the 1949 Mixed Marriage Act and the Apartheid system. Although Apartheid developed into a uniquely pernicious system of racial segregation, this system did not come out of nowhere, paralleling similar patterns of Dutch, German, and British colonialism in Africa and elsewhere.¹⁴⁶

Meanwhile, Catholic colonizers in Africa were more mixed and far less segregated. In terms of residency, “While French colonial cities welcomed mixed populations, offering free access to land, the British masters imposed a more strictly divided vision of urban space, best symbolized

by separate residential areas.”¹⁴⁷ And while the English rejected mixed offspring, the French and Portuguese did not. For Torres, “nowhere, except possibly in some of France’s West African colonies, was it possible for such coloureds . . . to be as easily accepted socially as has always been the case, and still is, in Portugal, and her overseas possessions.”¹⁴⁸ Once again, Africa saw a distinctive Catholic approach to social and sexual mixing, evident in early Portuguese and French colonialism as well as later Belgian and Italian rule.

As noted, there existed an extensive population of Luso-Africans in Western Africa by the seventeenth century, groups that would merge into Dutch, British, and French rule. Early on, the Portuguese regularly took “native girls for breeding.”¹⁴⁹ The Portuguese did not simply impregnate native women—they also afforded some status to mixed offspring. Dr. David Livingstone (1813–1873) observed that unlike British colonies, where “half-caste children are abandoned,” the Portuguese recognized and raised them.¹⁵⁰ The Portuguese encouraged mixed children to attend integrated schools and gain administrative positions.¹⁵¹ Off the western coast of Africa, Cape Verde has been referred to as “the mulatto colony *par excellence*.”¹⁵² Upon their arrival in the 1450s, Portuguese men took African wives, concubines, and slaves, creating an entire class of *brancos da terra* (whites of the land). Africa’s western islands provide an extreme case of mixing, where “uninhibited sexual intercourse between Black and White [resulted] in the creation of a thoroughly Portuguese Mulatto population.”¹⁵³ Mid-twentieth-century colonial censuses suggest that Cape Verde was home to 46 mestiços per one European, São Tomé and Príncipe had a 4:1 ratio, and Guinea 2:1.¹⁵⁴ In Elmina, Southern Ghana, Portuguese traders and African women “sprouted a substantial cadre of Euro-Africans.”¹⁵⁵ Again, mixing is hardly a sign of racial equality, as Portuguese in Africa were deeply involved in the slave trade while they literally took black wives. Mozambique and Angola stand out for the least amount of mixing in the Portuguese colonial world. Early colonial forays into Mozambique were led by “Afro-Portuguese and Afro-Indian *muzangos*,” who established independent chiefdoms.¹⁵⁶ By the 1950s, Portugal worked to send European women and establish white colonies, a marked departure from earlier practice. Writers have attributed this to South African influence—of missionaries, traders, and officials.¹⁵⁷ Despite such changes in official policy, Portuguese men continued to take local wives, simply at a reduced rate.¹⁵⁸

Owing to the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas with Portugal, a document that divided the world between the Spanish and Portuguese, the Spanish possessed few African colonies. They did, however, arrive in the Canary Islands in the fifteenth century and immediately warred with and enslaved the inhabitants. The Catholic Church criticized this, though, and intervened to have the Canary Islanders freed. The Church led a campaign to convert the islanders, who were then “successfully assimilated through intermarriage.”¹⁵⁹

In French Africa, mixing was part of colonial policy. Officials suggested that, in the face of heat and disease, “it is by creating mulatto races that we will most easily Gallicize West Africa.”¹⁶⁰ French mixing was most widespread in Saint Louis and Gorée, small islands at the mouth of the Senegal River where local métis dominated the local economy. The African women involved in such unions were referred to as *signares*, from *senhoras*, evidence of Portuguese foundations. Portuguese Eurafricans tended to identify with the French through a common faith and greater acceptance.¹⁶¹ By the seventeenth century, Franco-Portuguese-African offspring dominated local trade, becoming important allies to local kings.¹⁶² Colonial officials saw many advantages in concubinage, as young men tended to drink less, eat better, and remain healthier when they had local partners, who also provided access to trade and language skills.¹⁶³ Like the British and Dutch, French traders often married Luso-African women; however, unlike Protestant colonizers, the French also took African wives. The métis children of French-African unions developed to become a powerful trading class in Senegal. Frenchmen in Senegal regularly kept *signares* throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but by the early nineteenth century, an assertive métis class demanded an end to concubinage and insisted on formal marriages.¹⁶⁴ As in Indochina and South Asia, French officials took great interest in children who were “abandoned” (by their fathers), initially through the Catholic Church and later through state-run “orphanages” tasked with abducting and educating the métis.¹⁶⁵ Persons with any French ancestry were defined as European, the opposite of British colonial practice, where any trace of African blood made persons African. Once again, disruptions in colonial rule are telling, as Britain’s brief control of Senegal was marked by outspoken criticisms of interracial French families.¹⁶⁶

Even in later colonial projects, as in Madagascar, French West Africa, and French Equatorial Africa, French soldiers and officials sired a mixed community in relatively short time.¹⁶⁷ In Madagascar, the French

Governor General from 1896 to 1905 “envisioned the formation of a Franco-Malagasy race,” and early settlers were mostly creoles from Mauritius.¹⁶⁸ This said, French authorities became part of trends toward segregation in the early twentieth century. In Senegal’s capital of Dakar, although segregation was complicated by a large number of métis communities, there were nevertheless several initiatives to forcibly resettle Africans beyond the city’s core.¹⁶⁹

Africa provides an opportunity to examine diverse colonial powers, ensuring that the patterns described are not simply derived from Portugal, Spain, and France versus the Netherlands and Britain. I already noted German segregation in southern Africa. On the Catholic side, Belgium and Italy demonstrate a marked Catholic approach. For the Catholic Belgians in the Congo, concubinage was more or less accepted by the state and by colonial society.¹⁷⁰ By the 1940s, observers noted that “mixing still goes on freely in West Africa between the Europeans, especially the French and the Belgians, and the native black women.”¹⁷¹ Although there were differences between French and Belgian approaches—the French claimed mixed offspring as French, whereas the Belgians created a third “mixed” category—the scale was similar. Contemporary writers noted that Belgian relations with black women were comparatively open, especially compared to the situation in British colonies, where unions were less common and more secretive.¹⁷²

Another colonial power I have yet to address is Italy, which ruled Eritrea, Somalia, Libya, and parts of Ethiopia. Despite a brief, late colonial experience (1880–1940), Italy left a deep genetic footprint. In Eritrea, there was an “unusual level of intermixing...practiced by Italians of all walks of life.”¹⁷³ In the Horn of Africa, Italy sent tens of thousands of young men, many of whom took local concubines (*madamato*). This practice was tolerated by the government, apparently because Abyssinian women’s “Semitic ancestry” helped them to “easily mate with Italian men.”¹⁷⁴ Here, we see rulers attempting to justify mixing with local women post hoc by imagining common racial origins. Italy’s colonial experience was in part motivated by eroticism, as recruitment campaigns for settlers emphasized the open sexuality of “black venuses.”¹⁷⁵ The degree of mixing became a concern under Mussolini (1883–1945), who banned miscegenation in 1936 and sent ships of Italian prostitutes. The laws, though, were hardly enforced because “all Italian occupiers, military generals included, were eager to ‘mix blood’ with the Ethiopians, despite Fascist efforts to ban ‘mixed’ unions.”¹⁷⁶ After World War II, thousands

of Italian men remained in Ethiopia and raised families. Consistent with other Catholic colonizers, children of unions between white men and native women, even outside of marriage, were considered legitimate in law and faith. In a short amount of time, Italy showed a marked drive to take African partners and mix.

Belgium and Italy represent important cases because they were late colonizers, speaking against a potential counterargument that mixing is a product of early colonialism. One may suggest that the earliest colonizers just happened to be Catholic, namely Portugal and Spain, and late colonizers happened to be Protestant, namely Britain, the United States, and Germany. These examples suggest that religious patterns of mixing are stronger than temporal ones.

The Americas

Compared to Africa, much more has been said of colonial “miscegenation” in the New World. In the Americas and the Caribbean, Catholic colonizers are again known for mixing with native as well as slave populations, producing racially mixed Brazil, Spanish mestizos and mulattos, and French métis. Meanwhile, Protestant colonizers from England, the Netherlands, and later the United States and Canada enforced racial boundaries, known more for the Indian Act (Canada, 1876) and Jim Crow Laws (USA, 1890–1965), which separated races and barred unions across the color line (Figure 2.3).

Brazil’s substantial racial mixing has become national ideology (*mestiçagem*). It has been described as “metaracial,” as almost half the country identifies as mixed race.¹⁷⁷ This “racial democracy” is said to be rooted in “a Portuguese predisposition to cultural and biological mixing.”¹⁷⁸ During early Portuguese rule in Brazil, slave masters sired an extensive mixed class with African women, especially in the north of the country, which was home to more slaves than anywhere else in the Americas. In the south, where fewer slaves were imported, mixing was more limited, which writers have attributed to European immigration, primarily from Germany.¹⁷⁹ Portuguese mixed not only with slaves, creating mulatto populations, but also with indigenous peoples, their offspring known as paulistas. Often seen as “the equivalent of the French Canadian métis,” Brazil’s often rebellious paulista population once dominated the country’s highlands.¹⁸⁰ All told, racial lines in Brazil



FIGURE 2.3 *Map of the Colonial Americas*

were very much blurred by the mixing of various populations. This said, it is true that Brazil's "racial democracy" has been exaggerated, and its illiberal effects demand criticism. Although bronzed and mixed are idealized, black and indigenous are not.¹⁸¹ As a state ideology, *mestiçagem* is intended to whitewash historical exclusion and downplay the brutality of Brazilian slavery. A national identity based on mixture may be seen as assimilationist, denying the mosaic for a melting pot. These criticisms aside, substantial "racial mixing," predominantly among Portuguese males and indigenous or slave women, remains an historical fact in Brazil.

Another criticism of Portuguese exceptionalism is offered by Bender, who suggests that Brazilian mixing tends to be exaggerated compared to other Latin American countries. He suggests that mestizos also comprise over half the population in many former Spanish colonies.¹⁸² Although Spanish mixing challenges Portuguese exceptionalism, it is consistent with a theory of Catholic mixing. In the seventeenth century, "mixed-marriages between Spanish men and Christianized Indian women were encouraged by the crown," although this policy changed with fears of an emerging mulatto class.¹⁸³ Mexico saw similar patterns of Spanish-native unions. Racial mixing represents "an integral part of Mexican history, society, and ideology," as post-revolutionary efforts to unify the country entailed promoting it as national ideology, leading to up to 90% of the population identifying as mestizo.¹⁸⁴ In addition to their own mixing, Spanish colonies also attracted mulatto outcasts from Anglo colonies because "Spanish laws were more lenient concerning race, miscegenation, and slavery than those of the British colonizers or, later, the United States."¹⁸⁵ Cuba witnessed considerable racial mixing, with a third of the population defined as mulatto in early censuses.¹⁸⁶ Some Spanish colonies witnessed the genetic assimilation of African communities. Never home to widespread slavery, the black population of Costa Rica remained under 200 persons, although there were thousands of mulattos by 1801. The subsequent decline of Costa Rica's mulattos "was a result of mixing with other, larger ethnic populations."¹⁸⁷ The Costa Rican example is interesting because mixing occurred due to the limited number of Africans, the opposite of Brazil, whose racial mixing tends to be attributed to the large numbers of Africans and small number of European planters.

Of course, Latin America's experiences with race are far from uniform. Argentina, home to substantial European migration, saw relatively little mixing. And again, mixing should not be taken as a sign

of openness. The Spanish maintained a belief in pure blood, a culture of masculinity and control over indigenous and black women while also generating “a huge multiracial population.”¹⁸⁸ While mixed populations expanded, Spanish America remained obsessed with racial categories and sanguine fractions. Much has been said of the *las castas* paintings of various racial mixtures. The images in these paintings demonstrate a clear interest in racial mixing and racial hierarchies. While illustrating hierarchy and inequality, they also demonstrate that mixing among the Spanish, natives, and Africans was widespread, as Latin Americans were “eager to advertise the remarkable blending of races as virtually the signature of Spain’s conquest of the southern half of the Americas.”¹⁸⁹ The paintings, which also included white Spanish women with men of color, were intended to show a European audience that this was “the natural human mingling that occurred when three worlds met.”¹⁹⁰ Meanwhile, “in British American colonies, we can find no such pictures acknowledging racially mixed families . . . Indeed, artists and publishers of such caste paintings would probably have been expelled from colonial towns,” as mixing races was, for the British, “ideologically repugnant.”¹⁹¹

French colonialism in the Americas is similarly known for racial and cultural intermixture, producing creoles in the Caribbean as well as métis in North America. Authors have noted that, compared to Anglo-American colonizers, “The French confrontation with race and race mixture . . . was more ambiguous and complicated.”¹⁹² Historians contend that the French, unlike the British, demonstrated little prejudice based on race, leading to “racially fluid” societies where mixing was sometimes encouraged.¹⁹³ Authors observe a Spanish tendency to mix blood in Latin America, while the French, “with their practical attitude toward such matters,” did the same in North America, although “the English were oddly reticent about their early relations with Indian women.”¹⁹⁴ Belmessous argues that the French utilized mixing strategically throughout the Americas—from Maranhão in Brazil, to Illinois, Florida, Detroit, Louisiana, and Canada.¹⁹⁵ The 1685 *Code Noir*, decreed by Louis XIV, exemplifies a distinct French approach to colonialism. The Code specified that all slaves must be baptized within eight days of their arrival in the Americas, demanded that all observe the Sabbath, and guaranteed that all slaves had the right to marry. This led to mass, forced conversion at a time when most Protestant sects resisted the possibility of African conversions.

The *Code Noir* also criticized concubinage between French men and African women, demanding formalized Catholic marriages. In the Caribbean, Saint-Domingue (Haiti), Guadeloupe, and Martinique witnessed considerable early concubinage, a frequent topic of priestly reports to France and the Vatican. The *Code Noir* demanded that single men who fathered children with African women must by law enter into marriage, a ruling unthinkable in Protestant societies.¹⁹⁶ Catholic and Protestant church officials were similarly offended by concubinage, but Catholics typically responded by promoting marriage, whereas Protestants responded with laws to limit interactions between European and native. By the nineteenth century, the mulatto ruling classes of the French Indies—many of whom owned slaves—became eligible to vote and stand for elections. Toward the end of the colonial era, officials in France began to criticize racial mixing, but even then, miscegenation “was condoned or even encouraged . . . much more than in British colonies.”¹⁹⁷

In French North America, mixing with natives was the rule from day one, with the Crown “encouraging and rewarding bi-racial marriage.”¹⁹⁸ Authors have noted cultural patterns among the indigenous peoples of North America that facilitated mixing. Chiefs sometimes demanded that European traders take native partners before they would trade with them and were offended if this was refused.¹⁹⁹ These native cultural factors were constant for both Catholic and Protestant colonizers, with different outcomes. It is well-known that the French in North America partnered with native women and formed new mixed communities, languages, cultures, and bodies. Meanwhile, Protestant traders were less likely to take native wives and produce mixed communities. Some authors provide a different perspective. Thomas Ingersoll argues that the degree is exaggerated, as mixing was never acceptable in French society and “English traders were no less likely to have liaisons with Indian women.”²⁰⁰ This said, he later notes that métis were mainly French and that many of the English examples he cites are Irish Catholics.²⁰¹ While Ingersoll is correct to point out that Scottish and Anglo traders also mixed with native women, the degree of French mixing was far greater, something emphasized by nearly every study on the topic.²⁰²

Samuel de Champlain (1574–1635), the founder of Québec, is said to have explained to natives that “our men will marry your daughters, and we shall become one people.”²⁰³ This sentiment was echoed by French Finance Minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619–1683), who instructed the French government to pay the dowries for native girls marrying French

men.²⁰⁴ Writers typically agree that, for French authorities, “miscegenation was not only a colonial strategy of peopling based on metropolitan gender order; it was also conceived as an instrument of empire.”²⁰⁵ By the early seventeenth century, there were few Acadian families that did *not* have indigenous ancestry. In many ways, liaisons were necessary for survival, connecting French trappers to native societies. With westward expansion, large mixed communities were created of French trappers and native wives.

In his multivolume study, Marcel Giraud notes that “interbreeding between white and red peoples” was a fact in French Canada.²⁰⁶ By 1870, there were up to 750,000 métis around the Great Lakes.²⁰⁷ Giraud documents two groups of métis: the southern Francophone group of Northwest Company settlements and a smaller community formed in the wake of the Anglophone Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC). Against French practice, the British HBC restricted its employees from taking native wives or concubines,²⁰⁸ leading Giraud to suggest that HBC practice was a “Protestant Crusade” as much as it was a business.²⁰⁹ As the Lakes were trapped out and settled, many métis left for Manitoba, where they established a rebellious presence in Red River. The métis remain a self-identified nation today, although their power declined with British rule—“in Canada, anti-miscegenation discourses became more influential as it became a British colony.”²¹⁰ Canada’s Indian Acts of 1869 and 1876 stripped native women of their indigenous status if they married white men, reducing European-indigenous partnerships considerably.

I do not want to suggest that Protestant settlers never took native wives—they simply did so less often, and their offspring were treated differently. Inter-marriage with native women, based on native customs, “incorporated French, and to a lesser extent, English men into indigenous kin and trading networks.”²¹¹ Scottish and English men who took native partners produced early communities of “black Scots” and “country-born.” Anglo-native families tended to live alongside French métis and were absorbed into them; this means that the number of French-speaking métis is not necessarily a receipt of French mixing. Again, exceptional cases are illustrative. When Protestant colonizers took local wives, there was a marked preference for “mixed-blood spouses,” as English traders wed métis women.²¹² Generally, Protestant Canadians did not take natives wives, and the Anglo Canadian government worked to limit mixing.

In British Columbia, “mixed-race relationships and their children” were “inimical to the establishment of a respectable white settler colony.”²¹³ BC’s Colonial Governor James Douglas (1803–1877), himself born to a creole woman in Guyana and married to Irish-Cree Amelia Connolly, maintained exceptional power and was criticized on explicitly racial grounds by Canadian businessmen and Protestant clergy.²¹⁴ Protestant missions in BC’s hinterland worked to police racially plural frontiers, ensuring that errant Englishmen did not diminish their racial status and go native. While some Protestant churches resisted white-native concubinage by promoting formal weddings, most struggled to end mixed relationships in any form, rejecting such couples as “suitable candidates for Christian marriage.”²¹⁵ In a petition to BC’s Attorney General, Methodist Church officials lamented “unlawful unions” and troublesome half-breeds who represented “the worst qualities of each people,” demanding a new law “prohibiting White men from cohabiting with Indian women.”²¹⁶ A smallpox epidemic in the 1860s—seen by some priests as divine punishment for racial mixing—provided the impetus to segregate BC towns along racial lines, barring nonwhite persons from being in urban areas after dark as well as white persons from being in nonwhite communities.²¹⁷ The Protestant impulse to maintain racial barriers was also evident in the efforts of Methodist, Anglican, and Presbyterian leaders to resist Asian immigration. Despite some missions sympathizing with Asian communities, Protestant flocks were generally driven by “ethnocentric nationalism.”²¹⁸ One Presbyterian leader, the first moderator of the United Church, stated his sympathy with violence against East Asians, South Asians, and African Americans: “to have had the province dominated by such a medley of races would have been fatal. . . we never could have had a homogenous population.”²¹⁹ Supported by Protestant churches, BC’s push to segregate urban space, resist immigration, and limit interracial unions was consistent with patterns throughout the British Empire.

The turbulent history of race relations in the United States is well-known. Contrasting with early settlers elsewhere, the Puritans lived separately from natives, whose “women were unacceptable as spouses.”²²⁰ The 13 colonies discouraged mixing with natives as well as Africans later on. Examples such as John Rolfe (1585–1622) marrying Pocahontas (1595–1617), and efforts to convert natives, “were both extremely rare.”²²¹ Early American colonies were exclusivist, living separately from natives and later, from African slaves. Although the term “miscegenation”

was not invented until 1863, when it appeared in a New York political campaign, earlier voices spoke of the dangers of racial “amalgamation.” As early as 1662, states punished racial mixing, and from 1691, most states criminalized it—41 would ban white–black unions and several extended this to American Indians and Asians.²²² Even with the formal end of slavery, segregation and hostility toward miscegenation continued, leading to Jim Crow laws. Although other polities claimed mixed offspring as European or created third categories, the United States followed a “One-Drop rule,” or hypodescent, in which any African blood defined individuals as black. Even whites defending black equality tended to demand separate but equal communities, and many blacks felt similarly.²²³ Attitudes against mixing were strong even in the northern states that resisted slavery. Leslie Harris provides an interesting glimpse into racial life in New York in the 1830s, showing a deep concern among leading families for sexual impropriety and mixing. She also notes that Irish immigrants were seen as a danger in part because they intermingled alongside African-Americans, diminishing the status of white skin. Despite competing with them for jobs and housing (and clashing with them in riots), Irish and Africans mixed in dance halls, some Irish gangs protected black businesses, and they even formed interracial unions.²²⁴ Such behavior reinforced Anglo attitudes toward the Catholic Irish as a simian race, “white negroes” whose racial degeneracy put them literally “beyond the pale.”²²⁵

The tendency of Irish communities to mix with others is important for a number of reasons. As noted below, many writers explain mixing among Portuguese to their darker skins and proximity to Africa, while England and Germany are more remote. The tendency of Irish mixing complicates this explanation, demonstrating that religious patterns are stronger than geographical ones and are not based on the shade of skin. Above, I noted that many men in the British Empire who took native wives were in fact Irish, and in the Americas, the Irish were criticized for mixing with black communities. A similar story exists regarding early Eurasian populations in the United States, although here, the sexes are reversed. Restrictive immigration policies led to severe sex imbalances among Chinese communities, and sensitivity toward racial mixing limited the ability of Asian man to find partners. When Chinese migrants in the United States did mix, there was a strong tendency to find wives among Irish immigrant communities.²²⁶ Between the 1850s and 1870s, Chinese–Irish intermarriage “was recognized as a growing

phenomenon in the city” and became the subject of public curiosity.²²⁷ Before Chinatown, Chinese communities shared the Fourth Ward with the Irish and soon produced mixed families, the subject of intense media fascination. In newspaper comics and articles, one “endlessly reproduced image was that of the Chinese man partnered with the Irishwoman.”²²⁸ One report emphasized the frequency of such partnerships, but also seemed sympathetic: “These Chinamen have a peculiar fancy for wives of Celtic origin; we do not recollect seeing one woman among these many families that belonged to any other nationality. The great marvel is that these little domestic arrangements seldom give rise to disturbances.”²²⁹

On the other side of the continent, early Japanese male migrants to California, while typically refraining from taking non-Japanese wives, often partnered with Hispanic women.²³⁰ Over time, though, the American public became less sympathetic, opposing Chinese immigration and claiming the Irish as more or less white. The Asiatic Exclusion League, while largely seeking to protect American labor, also featured biological arguments against migration on the grounds that Asian migrants would mix and “pollute” American blood, with separation “required by a decree of the Father,” evoking a religious argument against mixing.²³¹ By the 1910s, 15 states had banned mixed marriages, and the white women who did cross the color line were often stripped of their citizenship.

Gary Nash’s influential work illuminates the “hidden mestizo roots” of America (meaning the United States), whose borders were settled by mixed communities: French trappers, escaped slaves in Native American communities, and Hispanic California planters.²³² What he does not note is that the vast majority of this mixing in the US periphery was Catholic. In what are now the Dakotas, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, and Michigan, French *métis* established founding communities. In Green Bay, 81% of male households included native or *métisse* wives prior to 1795, and almost all were Catholic. Even with American migration, 78% of households “were *métis* on the eve of Green Bay’s Americanization.”²³³ A great deal of Western exploration took place through French-native unions and their offspring. Sacagawea (1788–1812), whose marriage to a French trapper and extended kinship network helped save Lewis and Clark, is a more representative figure than Pocahontas.

Despite sizable *métis* communities surrounding the 13 colonies, “no separate mestizo or *métis* category really developed” in the US imagination.²³⁴ Just as French *métis* helped Americans explore the West, Spanish mestizos served as explorers, traders, and in missions in the

southwest. Many leading Spanish families in Texas, California, New Mexico, and Florida were the products of Spanish unions with African and indigenous women.²³⁵ New Orleans was also home to considerable mixing between French men and African women, developing a system of concubinage known as *plaçage*.²³⁶ Owing to extensive informal French relationships with native and African women, French officials promoted Christian marriages, denying racial segregation for religious solemnization. During their brief rule, Spanish officials in New Orleans actively promoted “the acceptance of sexual relations between white Europeans and persons of African descent.”²³⁷ The result was a mulatto community that, entitled to education and inheritance, developed considerable power. American officials later abhorred what they found, introducing laws forbidding contact between the races in theaters, trains, cemeteries, gambling dens, pubs, and brothels.²³⁸ The United States’ mixed periphery was quickly brought into line with national practice.²³⁹

Protestant colonizers in Central America and the Caribbean provide some exceptions to the global tendencies described in this study. Some authors suggest that, in the British Caribbean, concubinage with African women was “an integral part of island life.”²⁴⁰ In Dutch Suriname, despite efforts to maintain racial boundaries, many officials took African mistresses, leading to a population in which one-fourth of all persons define themselves as mixed.²⁴¹ This said, as in Asia, Protestant colonizers preferred mixed women, many mixed communities were Catholic, and there was less mixing compared to their Catholic neighbors. Mixing in the Caribbean’s Protestant colonies was most pronounced where their rule was transposed on Catholic colonialism, providing an interesting contrast. Today, in Protestant-majority former British colonies such as Jamaica, Saint Kitts, and Barbados, 2–6% of the population identifies as mixed, compared to 12–22% in the Catholic, then British, colonies of Saint Lucia, Granada, the Dominican Republic, and Trinidad and Tobago.²⁴²

Bermuda represents the quintessential British Caribbean colony, isolated and with little Catholic influence. Early on, it was considered a white colony, as Europeans maintained numerical majorities, in part due to the use of Scots and Irish as domestic servants instead of Africans or Indians. Anglicanism was essentially an official state religion, with other Protestant sects making conversions among slaves and servants. Pestana notes an interesting event in which the Church of England decided to shift toward formal exclusion, tending to “their own intragroup needs

without regard for those beyond their boundaries.” The island’s Anglican Ministers “quit serving the island’s population but instead gathered an exclusive church...against the wishes of a majority of settlers.”²⁴³ In other words, the Church of England excluded not only nonwhites, but also the lower classes and non-English, thereby “de-churching” other groups. According to the 2010 Census, 54% of the island identifies as black, 31% as white, and only 8% as mixed.²⁴⁴ Of course, many persons reporting as black or white no doubt possess mixed backgrounds, but the number is relatively low, and importantly, they feel the desire to self-report as an exclusive group. Barbados also stands out for its relative lack of Catholic influence, and today, almost 75% of the island identifies as Protestant, with only 3.5% Catholic. According to the 2010 Census, 92% of the island’s 226,000 persons identify themselves as black, with only 3% claiming mixed ancestry.²⁴⁵

In contrast to Caribbean islands colonized by only the British, colonies in which British rule was transposed upon Spanish or French rule are decidedly more mixed.²⁴⁶ In Guyana, Spanish cultural influence and “the numerical dominance of the mixed mestizo population” created major problems for British rulers working to categorize and regulate the colony.²⁴⁷ Whereas very few persons in Bermuda or Barbados identify as mixed race today, 17% of Guyanese define themselves as multiracial. In Trinidad, early Spanish rule witnessed widespread mixing, which slowed when it became a British colony. Crucially, one community resisting amalgamation was the South Asians, a group arriving under the British in the 1840s and which considers itself to be “ethnically pure.”²⁴⁸ The British imported not only an ethnic community but also an idea of separate races, leading Trinidad to mix elements of a creole Caribbean society and a plural British colonial system. A similar trend is found where Dutch colonial rule was transposed upon Catholic rule. In New Holland, the territory taken from Brazil by the Dutch between 1630 and 1654, Brazilian creoles “found their bibulous Protestant conquerors little to their liking.”²⁴⁹ The Dutch felt the same way, resenting widespread miscegenation. When Dutch colonizers in New Holland did take local wives, again, they selected Portuguese mestiças.²⁵⁰ Reminiscent of Malacca, while some Dutch married Portuguese mestiças and many “accepted the religion and customs of their wives,” there was neither settlement nor “miscegenation on a sufficient scale” to allow Dutch society to take root.²⁵¹

Although British and Dutch Caribbean colonies were and are ethnically diverse, they were not necessarily mixed. Applying Furnivall’s classic

formulation from Southeast Asia, M. G. Smith refers to the British West Indies as “Plural Societies,” in which ethnic groups maintain distinct faiths, cultures, languages, economic roles, and families, meeting only in the marketplace. Smith suggests that such systems of multiple, separate cultures are less evident in French and Spanish colonies.²⁵² This said, Smith admits that his model is less useful in the Jamaican context, where “the norm of concubinage of white males and free coloured females” was “well established.”²⁵³ Below, I hope to use such exceptions to help explain varying patterns of colonial mixing.

Oceania²⁵⁴

Completing our journey around the world, it is useful to look at various patterns in Oceania, home to a range of colonizers and some unique cases (Figure 2.4). Oceanic colonies typically saw intermittent early contact with European prisoners, beachcombers, drifters, and traders, and afterward were controlled by Protestant missionary societies, often well before the arrival of colonial states. The tensions between sporadic early contact and then missionary rule lay bare some of the tensions of Protestant empire.

Extending the above discussion of settler societies such as Canada and the United States, Australia is similarly known for creating reserves for indigenous persons, limiting nonwhite immigration, and restricting interracial unions. Many early European settlers in Australia were British convicts, almost all male. We might expect, then, that mixing with aboriginal women would be considerable, and indeed Australian settlers did sometimes take aboriginal wives and forged a community of “half-castes.” This relatively small community came to play important roles in rural economies, linking colonial and aboriginal communities. The mixed community remained relatively small, but was the subject of great political concern as authorities came to speak of a “half-caste problem” by the late nineteenth century. Australian authorities and missionaries enacted regulations against white men “interfering” with native women to stem abuse and halt the growth of mixed communities.²⁵⁵ One leading nineteenth-century scientist suggested that, while the “ugliness and dirty habits” of aboriginal women were not enough to deter European men, the low numbers of half-castes must be explained in terms of a “dysgenic




FIGURE 2.4 *Map of Colonial Oceania*

match,” with European and aboriginal races being so biologically distant that procreation was difficult.²⁵⁶

While half-caste men were seen as beyond saving, many saw half-caste women as “tragically alluring,” tempting the white man while bringing him “to social and racial ruin.”²⁵⁷ In 1886, Australia passed the Half-Caste Act, designed to control this community. Some Australian leaders suggested that, in response to the aboriginals being a “doomed race,” that half-castes could be absorbed into the Australian population without threatening the white race.²⁵⁸ In plans to “blanche out” the aboriginals through mixing, authorities debated what to do about half-caste males, who could never be allowed to marry European women, but the plan would not work if they married aboriginal women; the solution was to ship the men to another territory, keeping only half-caste women to do their “biological duty.”²⁵⁹ Often forgotten in historical discussions of Australian half-castes is that many were Catholic. While historical records are incomplete, and most early settlers were of Protestant backgrounds, many were Catholic, especially Irish, and it seems that these men were more likely to pass on their religion to their offspring.²⁶⁰ Daisy Bates, a prominent Irish Catholic journalist in Australia, quipped that half-castes “represented part of a Roman Catholic plan to dominate the nation.”²⁶¹ As officials worked to protect racial categories within Australian borders, they simultaneously did the same externally. By 1901, Australia worked to protect a European racial order through 70 years of “White Australia” immigration policies, banning Asian and Pacific Islander immigrants from entering the territory.

New Zealand represents an outlier in this study. Whereas Australian segregation fits global patterns, authorities in New Zealand never outlawed mixing with Maori communities, with a significant number of European Catholics as well as Protestants marrying into Maori families. Early on in New Zealand’s colonial rule, many Europeans came to live among the Maori, settlers known as *Pakeha*, and many such men took native wives.²⁶² By the nineteenth century, several coastal Maori villages were 30–60% mixed, creating new interracial communities not unlike the *métis* in Canada.²⁶³ Although British authorities in New Zealand never encouraged mixing, and sought to regulate marriage in ways to discourage it, there were never any laws against it, and authorities even courted the loyalties of mixed communities, in stark contrast to British rulers elsewhere.²⁶⁴ The rate of mixing between natives and Europeans in this British colony was considerable, with officials touting a policy of

amalgamation.²⁶⁵ While many who “went native” were Catholic, such as John Mamon, the son of an Irish convict who fathered a large family and helped establish early Catholic missions in the area,²⁶⁶ there is no clear religious pattern. It seems that mixing with Maori women was common among both Protestant and Catholic settlers, especially in the nineteenth century. Today, “there are high levels of intermarriage among Maori and non-Maori in New Zealand,” with nearly half of Maori identifying in terms of multiple ethnicities.²⁶⁷

Why was mixing relatively common in New Zealand? Some explain this in terms of a high regard for the “Polynesian race.” Many British believed that, while natives elsewhere should remain separate, “New Zealanders were regarded as vastly superior to other natives,” enabling amalgamation with white settlers.²⁶⁸ Exploring why Australian authorities disparaged mixed communities, whereas half-castes maintained a uniquely high profile in New Zealand, Vicki Luker looks to racial theories that Polynesians were actually Aryan, a more “advanced race” than dark-skinned Australian aborigines.²⁶⁹ Early racial theorist J. F. Blumenbach categorized and ranked the world’s races, placing Malay-Polynesian people below Europeans but above Ethiopians (Africans) and Mongoloids (Asians).²⁷⁰ Peter Buck, a New Zealand scientist of mixed Maori descent, theorized that Polynesians had descended from Aryan tribes in northern India and had continued to evolve favorably in the robust Pacific Islands.²⁷¹ Explaining the uniqueness of New Zealand in terms of seeing Maori as an Aryan race is not entirely satisfying, as it does not explain why Europeans felt the need to do so. The far-fetched racial genealogies of Polynesians were post-hoc justifications, so were hardly causal forces driving colonial liaisons. Another part of the answer is a marked tendency for Maori chiefs to offer wives as a way of cementing military alliances in a context of incessant tribal feuding.²⁷² This practice of offering wives to forge alliances was not always well accepted by some Protestant colonizers.²⁷³ During the bloody Musket Wars among competing Maori tribes, chiefs worked to draw in European allies through marriage, a particularly strong native impulse to mix that helps to explain this outlier among Protestant colonizers.

Luker suggests that New Zealand mixing was all the more puzzling, given clear restrictions among interracial unions in Samoa under a New Zealand mandate.²⁷⁴ Early on, Samoa resembled patterns found throughout Oceania, in which European beachcombers and explorers took local concubines and wives, developing a new community of *afakasi*

(two-blooded) people. During the nineteenth century, “interethnic unions were common and acceptable in Samoa,” leading to a large mixed-race population. However, “successive German and New Zealand regimes regulated, restricted and banned interethnic unions,” as Samoa developed “the most discriminatory policies against its ‘mixed race’ group” among all Pacific Island colonies.²⁷⁵ The shift occurred with the arrival not of colonial states, but instead Protestant missionaries. Lacking a colonial government, missionaries were the primary force “in regulating sexual conduct” among Europeans and natives.²⁷⁶ Along with opposing concubinage and polygyny, the London Missionary Society discouraged marriage between Samoans and Europeans, mostly on the grounds that European men were transitory and uninterested in establishing lasting unions. In 1900, Samoa became a more traditional colony under German control. As in Africa, German colonizers tended to bring their wives and restrict mixing. They also brought with them a belief in a German race, enacting a law banning mixed marriages in 1910, which cited American anti-miscegenation laws as precedents.²⁷⁷ The architect of this law, Willhelm Solf, a noted Anglophile, “emulated what he identified as the British policy on separating colonizer and colonized.”²⁷⁸ German authorities went on to ban interracial sex in 1913 and soon passed laws banning Chinese laborers from being in contact with Samoan women as well. As New Zealand took control of Samoa after World War I, officials were encouraged to marry only white women, whereas those with native partners “were denied promotions,” shunned at social gatherings, and many were removed from service for having racially “lowered” themselves.²⁷⁹ New Zealand perpetuated German colonial policies in Samoa, including bans on Chinese/native unions, despite being relatively tolerant in New Zealand itself.

Fiji provides an interesting temporal comparison of Catholic mixing and Protestant restraint. Before British rule in 1874, early beachcombers such as Charlie Pickering and Paddy Connel mixed prodigiously with the native population, producing a class of *kailomas*. Pickering was known as the “Catholic Polygamist,” developing a reputation among Fijian chiefs as a strategist and gun-runner, with chiefs showing their appreciation and allegiance through marriages. Pickering would establish a “harem of wives” and one of the largest clans in the country.²⁸⁰ Connel, also an Irish Catholic, allegedly produced 48 children during his time in Fiji.²⁸¹ Such patterns were suppressed as British authorities came to control the island; “British colonial personnel serving in Fiji were under strict

orders to ensure that there was no intermarriage or co-habitation with the indigenous community and harsh penalties were imposed for such breaches.”²⁸² In contrast to New Zealand but consistent with Australia, British authorities saw mixed-race persons as outcasts, denying them social standing and encouraging natives to do similarly.²⁸³ The British went on to develop a plural society along the lines of their Southeast Asian and Caribbean colonies, importing large numbers of Indian laborers to the island and working to maintain neat divisions between all groups. Fiji’s colonial governors worked “to separate Europeans from Fijians and Indians” and were hostile toward relations that “disrupted that ideology.”²⁸⁴ Postcolonial Fiji continues to suffer from sharp ethnic divides akin to those found in other former British colonies, as Indians and Polynesians remain separate societies.

Mixing in Tonga mirrors dynamics in Fiji. After sporadic early contacts with European drifters and considerable mixing, Tonga became home to a strong Protestant mission, with Wesleyans essentially serving as the colonial government. Missionaries worked to limit mixed relationships between Tongan women and beachcombers, going so far as to frame such unions as inherently sinful. The result was that Tonga witnessed the lowest percentage of mixed relationships in Oceania.²⁸⁵

Patterns in Samoa, Fiji, and Tonga can be contrasted with those in French Tahiti, home to a sizable métis community known as “demi.”²⁸⁶ Early European contacts in Tahiti consisted of explorers, mutineers, and whalers settling among natives. The offspring of sailors from all corners of the earth and Tahitian mothers would develop important mixed communities in Britain’s Pitcairn Islands. Tahiti’s population was decimated by venereal disease during the eighteenth century, suggesting considerable sexual activity on the part of European arrivals. At the end of the eighteenth century, the London Missionary Society arrived, and after converting the dynastic leader of the island, the entire population converted to Protestantism by decree in 1820, resulting in Catholic priests being expelled from the island. Under British rule, Chinese laborers were imported, constituting a new, distinct group, and interethnic relationships were restricted. Tahiti is an especially interesting case because unlike so many other colonies that changed over time from Catholic to Protestant rule, it demonstrates temporal dynamics in the other direction. After decades of Anglo-French war, the French proved victorious and changed the sexual dynamics of the colony considerably. There are few colonies better known for the sexualization of native

women. Characterizations of Tahiti as a sexual paradise by Rousseau and by then Gauguin led many Frenchmen to settle in Tahiti and take native partners. Tahitian women were fetishized in French culture, as the remote island was and remains portrayed as a sexual paradise.²⁸⁷ Today, Tahiti's contemporary population consists of 15% of people identified as *demi*, alongside 70% Polynesian, 10% European, and 5% Chinese.²⁸⁸

In his early comparative study, Ernest Beaglehole suggests that mixing in Oceania follows a spectrum, from the Germans, to the British, and then the French, whose Oceanic colonies saw "the widest tolerance being granted to offspring of interracial marriages."²⁸⁹ Whereas New Zealand represents a major outlier, Oceania generally conforms to global trends, with more mixing in Catholic colonies and less in Protestant. Where mixing did occur under Protestant colonial rule, it often involved Catholic men, and when Protestants mixed, they typically preferred mixed women.²⁹⁰ It seems that all world regions bear out a general but imperfect pattern of Catholic mixing and Protestant restraint.

Catholics left a far greater genetic footprint in their colonies than Protestants did in theirs. Sometimes this was colonial policy, seeking to develop a mixed community with local roots. Not only did Catholic colonizers leave genes, they also left culture, producing mixed languages and communities that identify as mixed. Catholic priests responded to informal liaisons with efforts to sanctify them through marriage. Even the vocabulary used to address racial mixing derived from Portuguese, Spanish, and French. Meanwhile, Protestants were less likely to mix with non-European women. They tended to bring their wives and families, segregate urban areas, and persecute the products of mixed unions. When Protestants did cross the color line, they tended to take mixed Catholic mistresses. Protestant missionaries often responded to concubinage and prostitution with puritanical efforts to separate European and other communities, not to sanctify illicit relationships as their Catholic counterparts did. Although some Protestant colonies maintained a 1% rule, in which being partly nonwhite made a person not white, Catholic colonizers often presented the opposite, forcing mixed offspring to become European.²⁹¹ These patterns endure more or less around the world and over time, evident regardless of the cultures of the colonized and whether or not the nonwhite group is indigenous, slave, or migrant.

Clearly, the above examples are far from exhaustive. Case and area experts will rightfully find these discussions brief, but I doubt that they

will find them inaccurate. There are some exceptions to the general rule of Protestant restraint, such as New Zealand, as well as early British and Dutch India. And in part, large Catholic mixed communities were a product of a sorting mechanism, in which mixed Protestant offspring were shunned at home and joined Catholic communities (although this consistent shaming of mixed communities among Protestant societies demands explanation). Still, I hope to have shown that there is a global, enduring, and important division between Catholic and Protestant attitudes and behavior. In some ways, there appears to be more of a spectrum, with Portugal's "sexual cosmopolitanism"²⁹² at one end and racially conscious Anglo-Saxons at the other. While there is internal variation among Catholic and Protestant colonizers, the line between faiths remains significant. What remains is to explore why. Why did Catholic colonizers leave behind a significant genetic footprint, whereas Protestant colonizers did not?

Notes

- 1 This and subsequent maps were created by the author based on open-source Wikipedia images. Where multiple colonizers were present in the same territory, I have emphasized the most prominent colonial ruler and that which this study discusses the most.
- 2 William Dampier, "Chapter Eight (1688)," *Voyages and Descriptions Vol. 4* (London: James Knapton, 1705), 161.
- 3 G. E. Gerini, *Old Phuket: Historical Retrospective of Junkceylon Island* (Bangkok: Siam Society, 1986).
- 4 C. R. Boxer, *Four Centuries of Portuguese Expansion, 1415–1825: A Succinct Survey* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 59.
- 5 Ronald Daus, *Portuguese Eurasian Communities in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 1989), 9.
- 6 Daus, *Portuguese Eurasian Communities in Southeast Asia*, 15.
- 7 During the Dutch era, Dampier observed that "Malacca is a pretty large Town, of about 2 or 300 Families of Dutch and Portuguese, many of which are a mixt breed between those Nations." Dampier, *Voyages and Descriptions*, 160.
- 8 William Dampier, "Chapter Eight (1688)," *Voyages and Descriptions Vol. 3* (London: James Knapton, 1705), 174.
- 9 George Bryan Souza, *The Survival of Empire: Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea 1630–1754* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 15, 32.

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- 15 U. G. Weatherly, "Race and Marriage," *American Journal of Sociology* 15:4 (1910), 442.
- 16 Paul A. Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 66, 92.
- 17 Cristian Capelli et al., "A Predominantly Indigenous Paternal Heritage for the Austronesia-Speaking Peoples of Insular Southeast Asia and Oceania," *The American Journal of Human Genetics* 68:2 (February 2001), 434.
- 18 Doran, "Spanish and Mestizo Women of Manila," 272.
- 19 Nightingale C. H., "Before Race Mattered: Geographies of the Color Line in Early Colonial Madras and New York," *The American Historical Review* 113:1 (2008), 52, 57.
- 20 D. Pomfret, "Raising Eurasian: Race, Class, and Age in French and British Colonies," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 51:2 (2009), 339.
- 21 Emmanuelle Saada, *Empire's Children: Race, Filiation, and Citizenship in the French Colonies*, translated by Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 23.
- 22 Pomfret, "Raising Eurasian," 317.
- 23 Christina E. Firpo, "Lost Boys: 'Abandoned' Eurasian Children and the Management of the Racial Topography in Colonial Indochina, 1939–1945," *French Colonial History* 8 (2007), pp. 203–221.
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- 25 Paul W. van der Veur, "The Eurasians of Indonesia: Castaways of Colonialism," *Pacific Affairs* 27:2 (June 1954), 125.
- 26 Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Eurasian Minority in Indonesia," *American Sociological Review* 18:5 (October 1953), 484.
- 27 A. L. Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 48.
- 28 Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power*, 29.

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- 30 Jean Gelman Taylor, *The Social World of Batavia: Europeans and Eurasians in Colonial Indonesia* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 96.
- 31 U. Bosma and E. Raben, *Being "Dutch" in the Indies: A History of Creolisation and Empire, 1500–1920* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), 227.
- 32 Taylor, *The Social World of Batavia*, 29.
- 33 Taylor, *The Social World of Batavia*, 12.
- 34 Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power*, 132.
- 35 Van der Kroef, "The Eurasian Minority in Indonesia," 485.
- 36 Jan Sihar Aritionang and Karel Steenbrink, *A History of Christianity in Indonesia* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 632. As in Malacca, speaking Kristang was a necessity for early Dutch rulers in commerce, diplomacy, and even in the household. Taylor, *The Social World of Batavia*, 18.
- 37 Daus, *Portuguese Eurasian Communities in Southeast Asia*, 2, 28.
- 38 Taylor, *The Social World of Batavia*, 17.
- 39 Dennis de Witt, "Enemies, Friends, and Relations: Portuguese Eurasians during Malacca's Dutch Era and Beyond," in *Culture and Identity in the Luso-Asian World: Tenacities and Plasticities*, edited by Laura Jarnagin (Singapore: ISEAS, 2012), 267.
- 40 Boxer, *Four Centuries of Portuguese Expansion*, 62. Wiesner-Hanks cites Boxer in emphasizing the Anglo-Dutch tendency to take Luso-Asian women as prostitutes, concubines, and wives, a tendency that helped to limit racial degeneration for the British and Dutch. M. Wiesner-Hanks, *Christianity and Sexuality in the Early Modern World: Regulating Desire, Reforming Practice* (London: Routledge, 2000), 205.
- 41 Boxer C. R., *The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600–1900* (New York: Penguin, 1990), 251.
- 42 Bosma and Raben, *Being "Dutch" in the Indies*, 23.
- 43 Around Samosir Island in North Sumatra, Dutch planters and soldiers brought concubines from Java. Most were Eurasian, many the daughters of earlier Dutch-Javanese unions. Church leaders even criticized the tendency to marry off young mixed girls to Dutch men. Interview with Pastor Leo Joosten Ginting, Berestagi North Sumatra (July 1, 2014).
- 44 Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire*, 80, 90.
- 45 Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power*, 27–28.
- 46 Kirsty Walker, "Intimate Interactions: Eurasian Family Histories in Colonial Penang," *Modern Asian Studies* 46:2 (March 2012), 314, pp. 303–329.
- 47 Frans Hendrik Karel Zaalberg was Jewish, Edgar du Perron's father was a French Catholic, and even Eurasian leader ED Dekker converted to Catholicism. Robert Nieuwenhuys, *Mirror of the Indies: A History of Dutch Colonial Literature*, translated by EM Beekman (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), 77.

- 48 Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire*, 217.
- 49 Interview with Burton Westerhout, Eurasian Society of Singapore (June 26, 2014).
- 50 J. S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India*, (New York: New York University Press, 1956), 304.
- 51 Charles A. Coppel, "Revisiting Furnivall's 'Plural Society': Colonial Java as a Mestizo Society?" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 20:3 (July 1997), pp. 562–579.
- 52 C. H. Nightingale, *Segregation: A Global History of Divided Cities* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 59.
- 53 Interview with Reverends Firman Sibarani, Harlen Simangsan, and Monang Siregar, HKI, Siantar North Sumatra (July 4, 2014).
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- 55 Interview with Reverend Juandaha Raya P. Dasuha, GKPS, Siantar North Sumatra (July 5, 2014).
- 56 Interview with Reverend Luther Lase, GKPS, Medan North Sumatra (June 30, 2014).
- 57 Interview with Reverend Lincoln Hutasoit, Angkola Batak Church, Binjai North Sumatra (July 2, 2014).
- 58 Interview with Reverend Juandaha Raya P. Dasuha, GKPS, Siantar North Sumatra (July 5, 2014).
- 59 Interview with Pastor Moses Elias Situmorong, Berestagi North Sumatra (July 1, 2014).
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- 61 Walker, "Intimate Interactions: Eurasian Family Histories in Colonial Penang," 309.
- 62 Walker, "Intimate Interactions: Eurasian Family Histories in Colonial Penang," 315.
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- 64 Walker, "Intimate Interactions: Eurasian Family Histories in Colonial Penang."
- 65 Brenda S. A. Yeoh, *Contesting Space in Colonial Singapore: Power Relations and the Urban Built Environment* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2003).
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- 75 Koop, *The Eurasian Population of Burma*, 18.
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- 77 Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 6.
- 78 Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, 11.
- 79 Nightingale, *Segregation*, 301.
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- 84 Fritz Vos, “Forgotten Foibles—Love and the Dutch at Dejima (1641-1854),” *East Asian History* 39 (December 2014), 148.
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- 142 Nightingale, *Segregation*, 178–182.
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- 163 White, *Children of the French Empire*, 8.
- 164 Hilary Jones, "From Marriage à la Mode to Weddings at Town Hall: Marriage, Colonialism, and Mixed-Race Society in Nineteenth-Century Senegal," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 38:1 (2005), pp. 27–48.
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- 166 Hilary Jones, *The Métis of Senegal: Urban Life and Politics in French West Africa* (Indiana University Press, 2013), 37. Similarly, in Mauritius early French colonialism had left a massive mixed population among Europeans, Indians, and Africans. This led to British criticism and problems for British census-takers. See A. J. Christopher, "Ethnicity, Community, and the Census in Mauritius, 1830–1990," *The Geographical Journal* 158:1 (1992), pp. 57–64.
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- 184 Christina A. Sue, "Negotiating Identity Narratives among Mexico's Cosmic Race," in *Global Mixed Race*, edited by R. C. King-O'Riain, S. Small, M. Mahtani, M. Song, and P. Spickard (New York: New York University Press, 2014), 145.
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- 188 Sarah England, "Mixed and Multiracial Trinidad and Honduras: Rethinking Mixed-Race Identities in Latin America and the Caribbean," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 33:2 (2010), 199, pp. 195–213.
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- 191 Nash, "The Hidden History of Mestizo America," 18.
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- 194 Walter O'Meara, *Daughters of the Country: The Women of the Fur Traders and Mountain Men* (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1968), 14–15.
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- 198 Jacqueline Peterson, "Prelude to Red River: A Social Portrait of the Great Lakes Metis," *Ethnohistory* 25:1 (1978), 47.
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- 200 Thomas M. Ingersoll, *To Intermix with our White Brothers: Indian Mixed Bloods in the United States from Earliest Times to the Indian Removal* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005), 70.
- 201 Ingersoll, *To Intermix with our White Brothers*, 97, 150. Some of the "English" colonizers who mixed with natives include names such as Maccarty and Doherty. Ingersoll, *To Intermix with our White Brothers*, 71.
- 202 Writers at the time note French "affinity" for natives, alongside Anglo-American "repulsion". This is echoed in Alexis de Tocqueville's observations that French Americans intermarry with Indians, while Anglo-Americans "despised" the idea. Cited in Elise Lemire, "Miscegenation": *Making Race in*

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- 203 Cited in Aubert, “‘The Blood of France,’” 452; see also O’Meara, *Daughters of the Country*, 15.
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3

Explaining the Religious Divide

Abstract: *I organize dominant explanations for varied genetic footprints into five major groups, although I acknowledge that they interrelate. The first explanation is that patterns are actually based on religion, as varied teachings and institutions led to divergent outcomes. A second explanation is geohistorical contact: Catholic countries are more Mediterranean, with a long history of mixing and exposure to other parts of the world, while Protestants are more isolated. Third, I look to political economy, namely the need for land versus labor among colonized peoples. Fourth, political capacity refers to the ability of colonial rulers to enforce sexual rules and to encourage the migration of European women. Finally, I look to changing ideas of nation and race that first emerged in Protestant countries but were slower to take hold among Catholics.*

Keywords: Calvinist elect; catholicism; nationalism; scientific racism

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One of the greatest difficulties in classifying man is his perverse predisposition to mismatch.¹

Reality has long frustrated efforts to classify humankind into discrete categories, although, as I have shown, some “mismatch” more than others. What explains varied patterns of mixing between Catholic and Protestant colonizers? There is no simple, singular explanation. Urs Bitterli notes that while “the astonishingly positive Portuguese attitude to the inter-mixing of races [is] an historical fact . . . the tangle of independent causes makes it very hard to offer a final explanation.”² In British North America, the rarity of English mixing “begs for explanation . . . In contrast to both the Spanish and the French, who married native peoples and worked for their conversion, the English seemed at first almost completely uninterested in either creating marital alliances or with bringing native peoples into the Christian fold.”³ Despite the crucial importance of this distinction for the development of colonial societies, this divergence “has not been very well explained.” If patterns for single cases and regions defy easy explanation, understanding colonial patterns around the world presents an even greater challenge.

It is possible that the genetic footprint of mixed offspring could be distinct from sexual acts. Perhaps Protestant colonizers had just as much sex with native women as Catholic colonizers but did not leave behind children. Catholic officials promoted marriage with native women, whereas Protestants preferred more casual encounters. Marriages are more likely to result in children, while prostitution is more likely to involve birth control and incentives to abort pregnancies. Concubinage represents an in-between category, with the link between sex and offspring depending on time horizons, local culture, and the degree of institutionalization. The distinction between sex and genetic footprint, though, cannot explain why Protestant colonizers were so opposed to marrying and building mixed families compared to Catholic colonizers. It is not clear what drives these varied patterns of cohabitation. This also would not explain why mixed families and individuals were received so poorly in Protestant societies.

Below, I evaluate five potential explanations for varied genetic footprints that I have found in the academic literature: religion, geohistorical contact, political economy, political capacity, as well nation and race. Of course, these explanations are not independent of one another. Indeed,

later I will reconnect them to show how they worked together to produce the broad patterns I am interested in. However it is analytically useful to separate various causes because some of them, despite being prominent in various studies, are far less convincing than others.

For each of the above explanations, I emphasize the Protestant side more than the Catholic side. Too often, studies do the opposite, explaining why Portuguese, Spanish, and French colonizers so readily mixed. While elements of Catholicism shaped attitudes and behavior, and show why Catholics were slow to follow ideas emerging from Protestant countries, exploring why Catholics mix may be somewhat of a red herring. One hardly needs to explain why sailors and traders would cavort with local women.

Catholic colonizers appear consistent with traders and explorers of other faiths and creeds.⁴ Russian Orthodox colonizers in Alaska, for instance, frequently mixed with native women, many of whom were initially taken as hostages. By 1862, creoles in Russian America outnumbered ethnic Russians three to one.⁵ The governor of Siberia soon promoted proper Orthodox marriages, leading to large mixed communities that continue to thrive today in Sitka.⁶ Russians also took native women and sired mixed communities in Hawaii as well as China,⁷ and the Soviet Union would later officially encourage intermarriage in Central Asia, leading to 25% of local families being mixed.⁸ Similarly, Armenians in Southeast Asia mixed with Asians as well as various Europeans.⁹ Moving beyond Christian examples, Southeast Asia again provides a laboratory of sorts, with Arab, Indian, and Chinese merchants taking wives in trade ports. This study began with an anecdote from Aceh, whose extensive history of trade and mixing leads locals to joke that “Aceh” is an acronym: Arab, Chinese, European, and Hindu. Throughout the Malay world, Indians, Arabs, and Chinese have long mixed with local Muslim communities.¹⁰ In Malacca, Chinese intermarriage with Malays fostered Peranakan communities, the Chinese parallel of Portuguese Eurasians, who developed their own creole Sino-Malay language.¹¹ Chinese writers have noted large-scale intermarriage wherever Chinese have settled, noting “the relative infrequency of intermarriage” in the United States, Canada, and Australia to be an aberration, explained “by white racial prejudice.”¹² In Latin America, Zambo and Garifuna (“Black Carib”) communities formed between African and indigenous communities,¹³ and free blacks also took indigenous wives in North America. Chinese men in the Caribbean formed unions with indigenous and African women.¹⁴

Polynesian populations brought to western North America and Australia for labor in the nineteenth century often married indigenous women and assimilated into native communities.

What requires explanation is why young men working abroad would *not* wish to establish relationships with local women as well as why colonial authorities would expend scarce resources on policing sexual relations and limiting the growth of the colonial population. Protestant reluctance is more puzzling than Catholic indulgence. Persons far from their homes, transplanted into foreign communities, should be expected to mix with the host community. We find broad discontinuities only in Protestant colonies, where authorities resisted amalgamation and fostered the creation of plural societies. More than explaining why Catholics reproduced with colonized women, it is more satisfying to explore the Protestant reluctance to do so, although elements in Catholicism may have served as a brake on similar practices.

Religion

In the voluminous literature on intimacy and colonialism, many studies engage with racial mixing, but surprisingly few discuss faith. One of the few exceptions is Bosma and Raben's study of identity in the Dutch East Indies, where the authors explain stark European/native divisions in terms of a "racial-biblical way of thinking." Despite noting that the Portuguese often mixed, while only the British and Dutch maintained such categories, they unfortunately do not explore the Catholic/Protestant divide.¹⁵ Bitterli notes that "Catholicism seems to have assisted racial integration through its tendency to see the non-European as a potential Christian, in stark contrast with Calvinism with its concept of the elect."¹⁶ These exceptions aside, few historians interested in colonial intimacy really engage with religious explanations. While authors may refer to Anglo-Saxon and Latin behavior, religious links are often missing. This is particularly surprising, considering that many colonizers justified rules against mixing in terms of faith. In early seventeenth-century Virginia, a white man found guilty of relations with a black woman would have been sentenced to capital punishment for "abusing himself to the dishonor of God and shame of Christians, by defiling his body in lying with a Negro."¹⁷ And as noted above, religious patterns are strong and enduring, though imperfect. Can varied approaches to racial

mixing be explained by faith? In other words, is it endogenous to religion? How can faith explain the divergent genetic footprints of Catholic and Protestant colonizers?

Potential explanations could be linked to theological or institutional factors, as “religion” provides a rather broad umbrella. The core teachings of Catholicism and Protestantism are roughly similar. All persons possess souls, presumably allowing the colonized to become part of a Christian humanity. As one seventeenth-century Jesuit Father writes in reference to native-European unions, “all souls are made from the same stock.”¹⁸ The Bible portrays all people as having been made by a common creator and descended from common ancestors, with race essentially absent from the Old or New Testament. Below, I note some divergent Protestant teachings, departures best understood by institutional factors. Core religious teachings cannot easily explain varied patterns of behavior toward sex and race, although the interplay of institutions and the modification of teachings can.

Catholicism is more cohesive and multinational in character than fragmented Protestant churches. This includes a firm hierarchy anchored in the Vatican. In 1537, Pope Paul III declared in Papal Bull *Sublimus Dei* that American natives are rational beings with souls and reason, speaking against enslavement and for conversion, effectively recognizing a common humanity. In the Americas, Spanish and French colonizers were more likely to baptize slaves, something that Protestant colonizers were less willing to do.¹⁹ Conversion placed the world’s peoples in a common humanity, and in many colonies, citizenship followed in ways not found in Protestant colonies.²⁰ For better or for worse, Papal hierarchy promoted bringing colonized peoples into the fold of a common, Catholic humanity.

Catholic hierarchy also provides cohesion, housing a single church. In Catholicism, colonizer and colonized, rich and poor, follow the same clergymen (although they may be forgiven at different rates).²¹ While Catholic hierarchy helped form a single community, its flexibility also made it somewhat inclusive. Incorporating various saints allowed local deities and beliefs to persist through Catholic worship throughout the colonial world, often to the chagrin of church officials, who frowned upon the establishment of “micro-Catholicisms.”²² Indigenous communities could sometimes make use of other Saints for their own purposes. For instance, African slaves in Brazil favored specific saints, forming brotherhoods dedicated to figures such as Our Lady of the Rosary.²³ The

organization of the Catholic Church, centralized on top but accommodating on the ground, likely played some role in facilitating mixing.

A related factor is the global nature of the Catholic Church. Catholicism transcends the nation–state and global networks facilitated a transnational identity beyond any single nation. Indeed, “Catholicism was understood as a universal church, which was supposed to unite all the peoples of the world.”²⁴ Catholic transnationalism helped encourage a Catholic universalism and downplayed national as well as racial differences. It is useful to look to a more recent example of Catholicism’s role in racial bridging. Pascoe’s landmark study of miscegenation laws lacks discussions of religion, save one of the most important efforts to overthrow such laws, the case of a Hispanic woman who wanted to marry her black partner, something prohibited under Californian law in the 1940s. The woman turned to an Irish lawyer she knew through her church who was also the head of a Catholic Interracial Council, whose ranks included whites, blacks, Hispanics, Filipinos, and other “races” of the same faith. Catholic Irish lawyers argued that anti-miscegenation laws violated freedom of religion; because Catholics considered marriage a sacrament and did not recognize racial boundaries, anti-miscegenation laws impeded the couple’s religious lives.²⁵ The Catholic lawyers considered state laws to violate natural rights. Their case was eventually successful—the couple was allowed to marry and in 1948 the California Supreme Court struck down laws against interracial unions. This victory prompted African-American civil rights organizations, which did not want to tackle this issue previously, to campaign against anti-miscegenation laws. This demonstrates a Catholic religious argument that not only challenged anti-miscegenation laws, but indeed, that such unions are not mixing at all (provided the couple shared the same faith).

Another institutional factor was the presence of missionaries in Catholicism, something that early Protestantism lacked. Pestana offers a brief aside to explain the lack of English mixing in the Americas, noting that “the Protestant faith of the English may have made them less willing or able” to marry or convert natives, as Protestantism did not include “the priests or friars that could be sent to work for the conversion of the natives.”²⁶ They lacked the personnel or institutions to support outreach. She adds another religious factor to explain a lack of mixing; Protestantism’s high bar for scriptural knowledge to become part of the community made conversion especially difficult. Pestana’s explanation is largely convincing, although it should also be asked why Protestant

faiths initially lacked missionaries and did not seek to develop them until the Great Awakening. This is rooted in distinct historical circumstances, as Catholics sought to regain the numerical advantage lost in the Reformation as Protestant groups worked to solidify gains and build new institutions, looking inwards more than outwards. Some Iberian Catholic colonizers actually saw their imperialism in religious terms, driving Satan out of the Americas and saving the souls of its inhabitants, an experience rooted in battles against the Moors.²⁷ Because the colonial calling was in part God's work, Missionaries were conspicuous under Catholic colonizers and were largely concerned with native communities. Meanwhile, Protestant colonizers rarely sought to convert natives. Pestana notes failed Anglican efforts to create missionary societies, which did not really work and were criticized by Anglican society for debasing the faith.²⁸ The absence of missionaries no doubt contributed to a lack of conversion, but we must consider why there was so little support to create such institutions and why when natives did convert and study, they were still excluded from Protestant societies.

That Catholicism worked against racial logics should not suggest that it was a tolerant faith. It hardly promoted racial or gender equality around the world, accepting the institution of slavery for centuries. And despite some views to the contrary, namely the so-called Tannenbaum thesis, Portuguese slave masters were no less benign than British or other masters.²⁹ Catholicism hardly followed through on the promise of equality in fostering the creation of a common Catholic humanity, as this humanity contained gender, class, and ethnic inequalities. Although nonwhites could join the Catholic hierarchy, there were clear limits to climbing it.³⁰ And Catholics were famously intolerant of other faiths, especially Abrahamic rivals. In some ways, indigenous converts to Christianity were favored compared to European "New Christians," Muslim or Jewish converts from the Inquisition. For George Fredrickson: "It is a paradox to find that Spain and Portugal were at the forefront of European racism in their discrimination against converted Jews and Muslims, but that the Iberian colonies manifested a greater acceptance of intermarriage and more fluidity of racial categories and identities than the colonies of other European nations."³¹ Catholic colonizers observed fairly strict religious divisions but did not understand humanity in terms of distinct races, allowing colonizers to mix with local communities, provided that they convert.

A religious explanation for Catholic mixing has much to offer. Again, though, it is the Protestant tendency not to mix that must be explained.

In some ways, Protestant colonizers should see more mixing, since unlike Catholic counterparts, church leaders are allowed to marry. One would expect this to encourage local families; however, clergymen typically brought wives from home, as described previously. And though Catholics allowed saint worship, some Protestant communities maintained similar practices. Baptist and Methodist services often include singing, dancing, and even spiritual possession, which writers have suggested is consistent with the traditional faiths of many African slaves.³²

This said, some elements of Protestant faiths worked against conversion and mixing. Although the religious teachings of Catholics and Protestants are similar, there are some distinctions. The clearest example is the Calvinist concept of unconditional election, in which certain peoples are chosen by God.³³ Here, some people (Calvinists) are preordained, as demonstrated by their advanced status, while poverty signifies cosmological disfavor. If this-worldly success signifies godly support, non-European peoples' powerlessness was understood to communicate spiritual inferiority. Early New Englanders saw themselves as Christian knights who resisted Satanic lures and sexual temptation from Amerindians, framing their struggle in biblical terms, "leading the elect against Babylon."³⁴ A related point is that, as relatively new faiths, some Protestant groups placed a high emphasis on religious knowledge as a sign of favor. In British Columbia, Anglican leaders argued that indigenous knowledge of religion was so limited that one could not trust the value of their conversion, leading toward an argument that, as native converts are still not full Christians, mixed-race relationships were "beyond Christendom."³⁵ Such beliefs, though, are hardly located in scripture, a departure from classical Christian views that, as I suggest below, was enabled by decentralized institutional structures.

Several writers have noted how Protestant groups were less involved in the colonial project than were Catholics, who saw colonialism as a means to spread their faith. In the Dutch case, Calvinism did not drive empire, as there were few efforts to spread Protestantism to non-Europeans.³⁶ Protestant church officials were far more concerned with behavior within their flocks and with rival Protestant sects challenging their teachings. It seems that, whereas Catholic leaders looked outside of their ranks for spiritual power, Protestants looked within. There were few Protestant clergymen in the colonial world compared to Catholics. Those who were abroad only remained a handful of years, often did not speak local languages, and focused more on the behavior of Europeans instead

of native converts. Boxer quips that Protestant converts in Dutch Brazil “were as rare as hen’s teeth,” as the church officials focused more on policing Dutch behavior and battling the Catholicism growing in the homes of Dutch men married to Portuguese *mestiças*.³⁷ The only sustained Dutch Calvinist efforts to convert natives were in Ceylon, Formosa, and Indonesia, with the latter alone maintaining strong Calvinist communities in Ambon and perhaps North Sumatra through the independence era. Although Catholics were known to convert slaves, Protestant slave owners “prevented slaves from seeking Baptism because they feared that profession of Christian faith might bring with it emancipation.”³⁸ Studies have highlighted Protestant hostility toward the conversion of slaves until the Great Awakening of the mid-eighteenth century.³⁹ Even after slaves were baptized, Baptist churches were separated by color and different “races” created separate churches, speaking to the importance of Protestantism’s decentralized nature.⁴⁰ That Catholics were interested in spreading their faith to natives, while Protestants focused more on Europeans, communicates extremely different audiences and distinct racial priorities.

Institutionally, “Protestantism” is fragmented among many churches whose flocks tend to be drawn from narrow slices of various communities. This may dampen mixing, as colonizer and colonized may attend different churches and emphasize different teachings. Protestants based their churches on various vernacular languages and often organized along national lines, reflected in many of their names, such as the Dutch Reformed Church, the Church of England, and the Church of Sweden, to name a few. Translated into colonial contexts, this meant that even when the colonized were converted, they typically attended distinct churches from Europeans as well as other colonial ethnic groups. In Indonesia, Protestant churches are typically organized along exclusionary ethnic lines, whereas Catholic churches were more inclusive. North Sumatra’s Karo Batak Protestant Church (GBKP) has been described as “an explicitly ethnic church,” not connected to other Batak groups.⁴¹ In the United States, even after the mass Baptist and Methodist conversion of slaves after the Great Awakening, there were still few mixed congregations. As slaves converted, they “usually sat in galleries or in back pews,” then churches began offering blacks separate services, and finally many whites opted to form their own churches or blacks formed African Baptist churches.⁴² The branching off of new Baptist and other churches along racial lines was made possible by “their denomination’s tradition

of guarding congressional independence.⁴³ This institutional ability to break off and form new churches is far less likely under the more cohesive Catholic Church. By organizing around national and ethnic groups, Protestant churches are able to build a strong sense of community, but at the expense of reaching across ethnic divisions.

With the Great Awakening, evangelical Protestant groups witnessed new efforts to reform society and reach into the colonial world. Evangelicals are known to be extremely puritanical, committed to chastity and social propriety, norms propelled through voluntarist organizations. Some Protestant flocks featured the extensive regulation of sexual matters, dictating sexual positions and marriage rites, and viewing unmarried women as potential threats.⁴⁴ Protestant groups resisted intermarriage between different denominations and with Catholics, let alone with non-Christians. Ballhatchet emphasizes the effects of “the evangelical revival” in British India and the subsequent Social Purity Movement in limiting sexual unions.⁴⁵ Because distinct racial groups could not marry, crackdowns on vice necessarily targeted mixed unions. Similarly, Caplan explains the “increasingly rigid divide between the British and Eurasians in India” in terms of “the growing influence of the evangelicals, and in part by the flowering of European racist philosophy.”⁴⁶ Puritanical strains of Protestantism played important roles in attacking concubinage and prostitution, limiting sexual unions with the colonized. For Protestant purity movements, mixed races were evidence of sin, literally marking the offspring, which challenged the central concept of Protestants as a distinct, favored people.

Although Protestant beliefs and institutions affected the tendency not to mix, they cannot alone explain it. There is little in Catholic or Protestant teachings that divide humanity into discrete races, so we must be cautious of other-worldly explanations for this-worldly racism. Protestant colonizers restricted mixing, but they struggled to do so on religious grounds. Invariably, they invoked race, an idea inimical to biblical teachings, and this “racism had to be emancipated from Christian Universalism.”⁴⁷ The permissive institutional organization of Protestantism, though, allowed leaders to modify their religion to suit new ends—in this case, sanctifying racial distinctions. Some focused on the “Curse of Ham” (Genesis 9:18–27), in which Noah was observed naked by his son Ham, so cursed Ham’s youngest son Canaan. Protestant writers argued that Ham’s dark-skinned descendants are cursed to slavery and racial hierarchy,⁴⁸ even if it was Canaan and not Ham who was

cursed, three of Ham's sons were not cursed, the curse was given by a drunken Noah and not God, and the Canaanites resided in the Middle East, not Africa.⁴⁹ Other passages cited in favor of segregation include the Tower of Babel (which was about language, not race), Corinthians 6:14 on not being "unequally yoked together with unbelievers" and light not coexisting with darkness, and Leviticus 19:19, commanding that one must not mix seeds in farming.⁵⁰

Another example of religious teachings contaminated by racism is polygenesis, in which Europeans were said to be chosen people, the Adamites, meanwhile nonwhite peoples were created separately, descending from earlier humans.⁵¹ Most popular in Germany and the United States,⁵² polygenesis thus shifted from common human origins, which naturalized all human unions, to God-given divisions that made amalgamation unnatural. Instead of God creating man, He was now said to have created several types of men, therefore mixing would undo his designs. Again, such ideas originated outside of Christian scripture, Catholic or Protestant. For Robert Young, "although polygenism clearly went against the Biblical account of the descent of all mankind from Adam and Eve, various ingenious ways were found around this problem."⁵³ Protestant institutions were in some ways a permissive condition, as incorporating such beliefs was easier in a decentralized Protestantism than in a centralized Catholicism. It is not Protestantism, as a faith, that caused segregation and racism. This was an "infected Christianity"⁵⁴ in which faith was used to support a racial order.⁵⁵

Religion clearly shaped patterns of racial mixing. Catholic beliefs and institutions worked as a brake on ideas of nation and race, emphasizing universalism, meanwhile Protestant institutions permitted adaptations to suit new trends in thought. However, faith alone cannot explain these patterns. Protestant puritanism cannot explain the opposition to marriage between European men and native women—like Catholics, one would expect that Puritans would promote formal Christian unions, not bans on them. Religion cannot explain why Protestant colonizers, when they took local wives, preferred mixed-race women, who were often Catholic. Next, religion alone cannot explain instances when popular practices actually clashed with religious edicts. In the early United States, for example, many Protestant church leaders promoted the conversion of indigenous and slave communities, directives that were met with hostility from the public, with slave owners suggesting that blacks were incapable of instruction because of racial differences. Protestant church

officials complained that many whites saw blacks as “creatures from another species,” but worked to convince their flocks that “blacks were equal to whites in the sight of God.”⁵⁶

Although few church leaders accepted racial mixing, they nonetheless promoted a racial equality that the public refused to accept, suggesting that faith alone cannot explain behavior. Finally, a purely religious explanation cannot adequately explain changes over time. Above, I noted that Protestants were more likely to mix early on, but boundaries became firmer over time. This is also true of Catholic colonizers. Returning to North Sumatra, religious leaders emphasized that attitudes toward mixing have changed dramatically since the 1960s; “we cannot say it is religion that made German and Dutch missionaries so exclusive. It is not in the Bible. Today, we are still Lutheran, but are more relaxed. What has changed is that European ideas and arrogance have gone away.”⁵⁷ It is not that the religions changed, but instead that trends in the faiths correlated with socioeconomic changes. The importance of religious institutions, and perhaps religious teachings, in shaping distinctive genetic footprints is substantial, but religion cannot stand alone. I offer four potential explanations that are exogenous to faith: Geography, political economy, political capacity, and national/racial identity.

Geohistorical contact

Another potential explanation, one favored by a range of prominent scholars, is geographical and historical. Catholic colonizers are located along the Mediterranean, possessing significant experiences with other groups and faiths, while Protestant communities happen to be more remote and less accustomed to foreign contact. With this, some have argued, comes a history of sexual mixing and of being mixed in Mediterranean countries and a sense of homogeneity in northern Protestant ones. This explanation has been cited by a great variety of experts to explain national variation in “miscegenation.” Fredrickson notes that France explicitly rejected Anglo-Saxon concepts of purity due to their historical experiences: “The concept of the French as a mixed race whose Latin, Celtic, and Germanic elements were being blended to make a greater whole came into currency and can of course be contrasted with the German concept of a single-strain blood-based nationalism.”⁵⁸ Gilberto Freyre (1900–1987) has suggested that Brazilian

mixing is partly based on Portugal's long historical ties with northern Africa.⁵⁹ Influential writers such as Freyre as well as Frank Tannenbaum (1893–1969) promoted a view that Latin American mixing is rooted in “the previous Iberian experience with dark peoples.”⁶⁰ Boxer emphasizes that Iberian peoples were best suited to early colonialism due to “certain racial characteristics” rooted in historical Muslim rule—namely, that the darker Moor is “a social superior” and “the brown Moorish woman” is particularly attractive.⁶¹ This is said to have allowed Portuguese and Spanish rulers to dispense with the color bar. Bitterli suggests that, in addition to Catholic universalism, varied attitudes toward mixing are historical: “The Portuguese were themselves a mixed race, having absorbed Phoenician, Jewish, Roman, African, Arab, and Moorish blood over the centuries, and had thus been unable to develop racial awareness or racial prejudice.”⁶² Nash compares the English view that mixing is “ideologically repugnant” with a Spanish open-mindedness based on “incessant contact with dark-skinned Muslims over centuries of Islamic expansion.”⁶³ Catholic countries have always been exposed to global influences, whereas Protestant countries were more isolated, possessing a stronger sense of homogeneity and lacking experiences with other societies.

Geohistorical contact is probably the dominant explanation for varied patterns of civilizational mixing, often used to explain Portuguese, Spanish, and French acceptance alongside Anglo-Saxon reluctance. For several reasons, I do not find this to be a satisfying explanation. For one, this approach treats southern European mixing as something to be explained, rather than northern reluctance. It is not as if resisting sexual attraction to other groups represents a natural human condition, and mixing is something learned, as this explanation assumes. Second, this explanation exaggerates different historical origins, simplifying the backgrounds of northern countries. While France was built from various groups, Britain was an amalgamation of Celts, Normans, Anglos, and Saxons, and the United States represents a “melting pot” of (European) peoples. Third, Catholic experience with the Muslim world hardly produced tolerance—it produced the inquisition and an obsession with rooting out crypto-Muslims and Jews.⁶⁴ Fourth, not all Catholics were Mediterranean, but mixed at high rates nonetheless. Many of the early French colonizers who mixed so readily in Canada were from the north of France, not the Mediterranean. As noted above, the Irish were known to mix across the world, and were looked down upon by the English for

doing so, despite being even “whiter” and more remote than England. Belgium is hardly Mediterranean but followed French and other Catholic patterns closely. Among Protestants, it seems that the Scottish mixed more than the English, despite being more remote.⁶⁵ Failing geographically, this explanation also fails temporally. If Protestants were less likely to mix due to a lack of historical contact, we should expect mixing to increase over time. Of course, the opposite is true—mixing diminished across the board throughout the colonial age. There is little reason to believe that the genetic footprint can be explained in terms of geohistorical contact. Although my aim is not necessarily to falsify rival explanations, we can safely reject this one.

Political economy

Varied patterns of sexual relations have also been explained in terms of political economy. Part of an economic explanation relates to class. Protestant colonizers tended to be more developed and its people more educated, which meant that there was greater difference between them and colonized peoples. It is thus possible that Catholics had an easier time identifying with colonized peoples because they were from less developed, less educated regions, and were typically earlier colonizers. This has been referred to in terms of “social distance,” with mixing explained by gaps in culture and class among the colonizer and with the colonized.⁶⁶ Although this might have played some role, the importance of social distance is likely minimal, as one sees persons from similar backgrounds, such as Dutch Catholics and Protestants, displaying divergent behavior. Another problem is that Protestant colonizers were not more amenable to mixing with the elites of colonized societies, despite having less social distance from them. As some natives gained access to European education at the end of the colonial age, they were still not deemed suitable partners.

A separate point related to political economy is different understandings of property, with Spanish colonizers laying claim to broad swaths of land (and the people living there), whereas the British understood possession in terms of the specific areas they inhabited.⁶⁷ Again, this may have played some role, but it is not clear why different understandings of territory would track with religion. Further, when the British began to claim larger chunks of territory in the late colonial age, their behavior

did not change. And most importantly, early colonialism outside of the Americas did not consist of claiming territory. The French and Portuguese developed strings of ports cut off from mainland areas, such as St. Louis and Gorée in Senegal, and Portuguese Goa, Malacca, and Macau, places where we see the deepest genetic footprints.

More convincing political economic explanations are neo-Marxian, in which writers have suggested that relations with subservient non-European groups were determined by what Europeans needed from them. In one influential article, Patrick Wolfe explains rates of colonial racial mixing in a handful of cases in terms of land versus labor. For Wolfe, Anglo-Americans and Anglo-Australians sought to absorb indigenous peoples biologically or culturally because they wanted their land, whereas Americans created stark divisions with Africans because they required only their labor.⁶⁸ This helps to explain why Africans were not seen as suitable partners by Anglo-American officials, who were somewhat more flexible toward Native Americans. Here, mixture is a strategy to accumulate property, while segregation is a strategy to exploit racialized labor. Wolfe's theory, though, explains variation within cases (i.e. mixing with indigenous versus African Americans) better than variation between them. Australian and American settlers did not mix with indigenous populations on a scale comparable to Catholic colonizers, although all wanted land. Surprisingly, Wolfe considers absorbing aboriginals into white society as the "Australian solution."⁶⁹ Although this is true of efforts to absorb a supposedly "doomed race," reservations and relocations, the most prominent strategies for controlling aboriginals, are premised on exclusion. In Canada, the loss of indigenous status for native women marrying whites was, in part, an effort to halt racial mixing and maintain segregation. French and English settlers each wanted access to land, not labor, but they approached native liaisons totally differently. And Latin America seems to deviate from the rule that labor minorities are not subject to mixing; however, Wolfe argues that Brazilian officials did not require African labor as much as America did and that the small number of Portuguese made segregation difficult and miscegenation practical, thus explaining state support for mixing.⁷⁰ This caveat cannot explain several southern African colonies, also home to ruling European minorities, but with strong racial divides.

Although Wolfe's theory is interesting, it does not explain the religious divide. Many Catholic colonizers sought labor and mixed, whereas many Protestant colonizers sought land and did not. This theory could not

explain Catholic efforts to baptize slaves, nor initial Protestant reluctance to baptize natives. We cannot dismiss this approach entirely though. It is true that the colonizers who imported new communities to provide labor, be they slaves or coolies, were less likely to mix with other groups than colonizers that did not, especially because labor minorities were mostly male. In Southeast Asia, the British brought Indian and Chinese laborers, developing a plural society and enforcing racial boundaries. Meanwhile, Portuguese, Spanish, and French colonizers did not import labor to nearly the same extent, providing for more fluid social boundaries in which groups were not so characterized by their economic roles. This said, there are important reasons that the British, and to some extent the Dutch, imported labor whereas Catholic colonizers did not. Protestant colonizers developed far more sophisticated, centralized plantation economies and possessed the capacity to import new ethnic groups, resting on a level of power, which is prior to the presence of these groups.

Political capacity

A more persuasive nonreligious explanation is political capacity—the power to implement policies and ensure that social forces conform accordingly. State capacity also entails establishing security and regulating trade. Put simply, Catholic colonizers were less powerful than Protestants, especially because many expanded earlier, whereas Protestant colonizers expanded later with the benefit of modern corporations, new forms of governance, and new technologies in shipping, agriculture, and war. Catholic colonizers were typically earlier and colonial authorities were typically less centralized and less institutionalized than their Protestant counterparts. Although one should not exaggerate the power of Protestant colonial institutions, it is clear that they benefitted from access to superior financial resources (through shareholders and taxation), relatively more centralized rule, more developed home states, and later, more industrialized domestic economies.⁷¹ In his institutionalist approach to state capacity, Douglass North outlines the British and Spanish colonial paths, in which the former developed effective systems of taxation while the latter, while possessing detailed records to give the impression of authority, constantly faced principal-agent problems and states with limited reach.⁷² Unlike previous explanations, capacity helps

to explain temporal variation, as earlier colonies were weaker and mixed more, while later colonies were stronger so were able to limit this. The degree of political capacity possessed by various colonizers is crucial in terms of explaining racial mixing, as it shapes the strategic logic of establishing local families, the ability of rulers to police liaisons, and the likelihood that colonizers would bring European women.

First, political capacity shaped the strategic logic of mixing. Whereas Catholics often used unions to become part of kinship-based trading networks and survive in far-flung places, Protestant colonizers often sought to rewrite trading networks and gain monopolies. Kinship provided Catholic colonizers not only with trading networks but also security, while Protestant colonizers were more likely to organize armed forces. Accounts of French Canadian trappers and the Portuguese in Africa and Asia, the peak of racial mixing, often note that this was necessary for survival and prosperity. This is illustrated in Veevers's study of nascent British rule in India. While not speaking in terms of Catholic or Protestant, Veevers notes that early Portuguese traders encountered powerful local trading networks organized through family guilds, so married into these families to gain security and access to trade. By the late seventeenth century, however, "Europeans were developing their own extensive kinship networks to both compete with and eventually dominate those of their Asian and European rivals."⁷³ From here, Veevers deftly illustrates how these British kinship networks laid the foundation for a highly institutionalized British colonial state. Since many Catholic colonizers possessed comparatively limited political capacity, entering into local kinship groups provided manpower as well as access to trade and security. The logic was different for Protestant colonizers, typically later and more powerful colonial powers that sought to overwrite local networks instead of joining them.

Second, colonial states varied in their capacity to enforce rules, sexual or otherwise. Catholic officials sometimes worked to limit concubinage and mixing, but failed. Earlier, I noted examples from French and Italian Africa of colonial bans on mixing, which were simply ignored on the ground, as administrators lacked the power to police their ranks. French administrators in Western Africa actually tried to ban mixing with local women in the late seventeenth century, not on racial grounds, but instead because concubines encouraged employees to become involved in private trading. Despite announcing a ban on taking local concubines, the directives of French authorities "were flouted by employees of every

rank and by soldiers and sailors as well.⁷⁴ Meanwhile, British and Dutch officials were able to effectively enforce their policies through professional and social sanction, especially as monopolies were realized and the Company was the only game in town, so to speak. British companies fired employees with native mistresses, and British society shunned them. The Dutch did not allow men with Asian wives and children to return home, effectively exiling any Dutch employee who crossed the color line in an effort to populate the colony and protect the homeland.⁷⁵ The superior organization of British, American, and to some extent Dutch colonizers enabled them to control the behavior of their agents and employees, something less likely among many Catholic colonizers.

Third, the capacity of colonial rulers also allowed Protestant colonizers to send European women, enabling men to find sexual partners and raise families without crossing racial boundaries, as well as introducing European women who were sometimes at the forefront of regulating social norms and policing racial boundaries. That mixing is a consequence of the absence of European women has been noted by a variety of authors.⁷⁶ Boxer attributes mixing in part not only to the “Lusitanian Libido,” but also “the perennial shortage of white women,” noting a common saying of the time: “Necessity is the mother of invention and the father of a Eurasian.”⁷⁷ Writers have found that “intermarriage in the English colonies was nearly nonexistent, due largely to racial prejudice and early balanced sex ratios.”⁷⁸ Sex ratios represent the primary explanation for mixing races in several sociological studies.⁷⁹ Bender frames such ratios as determinative: “the frequency of miscegenation is associated with a sexual imbalance among whites; furthermore, miscegenation will continue until that ratio is stabilized.”⁸⁰ Several authors explain racial mixing in Brazil solely in terms of sex ratios: “The scarcity of Portuguese women gave rise to miscegenation between White men and women of African descent as had been the case with Native American women. Historically, these relationships were largely consummated through coercion and violence... The shortage of White women limited not only any collective outcry against these relationships but also opposition from the lawful wives.”⁸¹ Anthony Marx criticizes geohistorical explanations for “dramatic” Portuguese mixing in Brazil, arguing that this “was a result of historical circumstances, not cultural predilections... with sexual preferences shaped by necessity.”⁸² Brazil is said to have lacked European women, whereas in British North America and South Africa, European women were not only present, but actively policed racial

boundaries. Ingersoll suggests that differences in racial mixing do not follow the nationality of the colonizers, but instead, depend on whether or not a “white core society” had developed that included women.⁸³ Far more mixing took place among frontier societies, away from white social norms and white women. Cited by a wide range of authors, sex ratios rival geohistorical contact in the literature to explain varied patterns of sexual mixing in the colonial world.

The presence of European women is clearly important in determining rates of mixing, and we should expect a strong correlation. With European women present in colonies, men were able to find white partners, women were able to police male behavior and enforce social boundaries, and colonial states further reinforced race by seeking to protect white women, as there was now a new threat of European females crossing the color line. The presence of European women should not be seen as an independent variable, though, but instead as an intermediate one. We must see this as a function of capacity. Stoler emphasizes capacity when she observes that “European women followed men only *after* specific colonial regions were made politically, medically, and physically safe.”⁸⁴ Only strong colonial powers could afford to send women, keep them comfortable, pay men enough to maintain a European family, and attract women to want to live in colonies. While it has not always been framed in terms of capacity but instead taken as a given, as if some European countries lacked balance among the sexes and sent out excess males, the presence or absence of European women is a dominant explanation for varied patterns of colonial racial mixing.

There is much to afford capacity-based explanations for varied rates of mixing. Unlike religious, geohistorical, or political economy explanations, capacity explains temporal variation extremely well. Early Protestant colonizers were more likely to mix with natives, as noted in the Dutch East Indies and British India, and with early castaways in the Pacific Islands. As colonial governments developed the capacity to monitor and socialize its men, as well as import women, mixing declined. In the Dutch East Indies, officials did not actually approve of concubinage, but initially turned a blind eye due to the resources necessary to confront it. By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, plantations were more prosperous, so companies were finally able “to support European families in a fitting matter.”⁸⁵ Meanwhile, Catholic colonialism generally began earlier and Catholic states, colonial and European, typically remained less developed. In the Americas, Spain

tried to force all married men arriving in the Americas to import their wives; “however, these laws were very difficult to enforce” and were later dropped.⁸⁶ Colonizers such as Portugal promoted liaisons with native women strategically, to make up for a lack of manpower. It was only very late in Portuguese colonialism, in Angola and Mozambique, that mixing diminished and European women arrived in large numbers. That capacity explains a great deal of Catholic/Protestant variation in colonial genetic footprints is beyond doubt. But it cannot stand alone, and some of the arguments noted above must be qualified.

This explanation does not match perfectly with the historical record, as weaker Protestant colonizers still policed mixing, meanwhile stronger Catholic colonizers embraced it. Returning to South Asia, it is puzzling that Danish colonizers would excommunicate mixed couples given their limited manpower, especially because this resulted in the growth of Catholic Portuguese communities. Denmark represented a weak colonizer that chose to sacrifice power for purity. Again, early British and Dutch colonizers shunned mixing, despite a lack of capacity. Another problem related to the capacity argument is that France represents a Catholic colonizer with significant power, as late, post-Revolution France can hardly be described as a weak state. As noted, in Africa and Indochina, colonial authorities defined any children of French fathers as French, to the point that they took them away from their mothers in an effort to make mixed children “French.” Stoler documents the concern for “abandoned” mixed children in French colonies, with state intrusion into family spheres in order to make French citizens and groom marriageable mixed women.⁸⁷ Here, a Catholic colonizer used its capacity to reach into native society and shape mixed communities. French colonial policy in Vietnam was hardly unique, as these policies were replicated in the French Pacific and French Africa.⁸⁸ When Catholic colonizers developed capacity, they used it in a different way than did Protestant colonizers, seeking to mobilize mixed communities instead of shun them. So it is not just that Catholic colonizers were unable to police their ranks—they used the power they had to shape race relations in distinctive, though equally authoritarian, ways.

The popular argument that mixing is a result of the unwillingness or inability of colonial powers to send European women also falls short in a few respects. First and foremost, even where Protestant colonizers did not bring European women, they still refrained from mixing. Returning to the example at the beginning of the study, the Portuguese did not

bring European women to Sumatra, but neither did nearby Americans and British, who despite their more extensive presence, abstained from taking local mistresses. For Bitterli, “The lack of European women is not an adequate explanation, for other colonial powers felt the same lack yet abstained almost entirely from racial mixing.”⁸⁹ In South Asia, “Despite a shortage of women in the early English settlements... male colonists were reluctant to take Indian women as wives.”⁹⁰ Early British American colonies were home to severe sex imbalances, but nonetheless policed relations with natives.⁹¹ Perry offers a fascinating account of “homosocial culture” in British Columbia, as popular attitudes against mixing with native women, while not enough to stop it, led to male-only households, all male dances, and homosexual relations.⁹² She suggests that “fears of miscegenation could eclipse fears of homosexuality,” especially in British colonies, because homosexuality did not cross racial boundaries or produce mixed offspring. Furthermore, capacity and the presence of European women cannot explain the strong preference of Protestant colonizers for mixed local women, a preference evident throughout early Protestant colonialism.⁹³

Another problem with the capacity argument is that it suggests that colonizers only took native wives out of demographic necessity, overlooking the many benefits of native unions as well as the eroticization of native women. Brooks notes an “ill-conceived” 1702 initiative to import European women to Western Africa. The policy failed not only because of the health challenges that would face European women in the area, but also because they would lack the linguistic skills and “the kinship affiliations that made Eurafican and African women invaluable.”⁹⁴ Men very much preferred African women to European women in Africa. Local women provided access to trade, kinship networks, and were more knowledgeable of local foods than were European women. They were also considered attractive. Although otherwise approving of the “lack of white women” hypothesis, Boxer suggests that “even when white women were available, the Portuguese frequently preferred to live with a mulata or with a Negress,” with many men leaving their Portuguese wives for young mulattas.⁹⁵ In India, leading figures such as Elihu Yale sent their European wives home to spend more time with their Eurasian mistresses.⁹⁶ In Africa, the hyper-sexualization of black women was a core aspect of colonial rule, with popular images of the Black Venus found in Italy, France, and Portugal.⁹⁷ Women in Asia, Africa, and the Americas were not simply substitutes for white women; for some, they were preferable. We cannot simply assume that European men preferred European

women as partners in the colonial world and only mixed out of necessity, as this explanation is premised on the idea that women of color were deemed less attractive than European women, internalizing the same racialized, sexualized hierarchies that we are seeking to explain.

A final shortcoming of capacity-driven arguments is that they overlook potential prior variables. What motivated Protestant colonizers to utilize their capacity to police sexual unions and send European women? The British and Dutch worked to send white women to their colonies long before they possessed significant capacity. In early Virginia, instead of taking native wives, colonists endeavored to import “marriageable women.”⁹⁸ Both gender ratios and capacity should be understood not as independent variables, but as intermediate ones. We still need to understand why some colonizers worked to develop and utilize the capacity to maintain racial boundaries in the first place. Capacity is clearly important in explaining the genetic footprint, enabling will to translate into action. But the will to utilize capacity to segregate, or not to do so, remains unexplained.

Nation & race

The most convincing explanation for Catholicism’s deep genetic footprint and Protestantism’s lighter indent is rooted in emerging forms of identity, namely nation and race, which for reasons discussed below established themselves more firmly in Protestant countries. Religion explains different forms of unions and religious institutions shaped changing identities. Political capacity explains the ability to police men and send European women. But it is different views of nation and then race that explain the desire to remain “pure” in the first place. Asking why Catholic colonizers were so amenable to racial mixing presupposes a belief in race, a construct that did not take hold in Catholic countries as early or as quickly as it did in Protestant ones. The invention of nations emerged in tandem with the development of Protestantism, creating a new way to order territory and people.⁹⁹ From the idea of nation would spring race, as new forms of education and science furthered the impetus to categorize. Without the invention of race, asking why some colonizers’ mixed races would be about as sensible as exploring why persons with different hair colors or blood types interbreed—we know that such differences exist, but they are hardly salient when choosing a partner. It is that Protestant and Catholic colonizers possessed distinct ontologies, with Protestants

dividing people by nation and race, meanwhile Catholics were slow to see humanity in terms of distinct types.

The growing literature on race and colonialism tends to emphasize the evolution of quasi-scientific ideas of race to explain policies against racial mixing. Just as geohistorical arguments dominate explanations for Catholic behavior, racial science tends to be cited as the primary explanation for the behavior of British and other Protestant colonizers, and as I noted above, it is reluctance that demands explanation.¹⁰⁰ Writers cite racial science in explaining colonial intimacy in a variety of cases. Although North Carolina saw some early mixing, this ended by the eighteenth century, as colonizers came to believe that “race was inherent to the body and visible in physical traits that in turn revealed the moral and intellectual capacities of the individual.”¹⁰¹ After continued wars with indigenous peoples, the idea of race became widespread, and interracial unions waned. Nightingale traces the shift from identifying in terms of faith, to skin color, to race in British colonial rule by the eighteenth century, linked to trends toward urban segregation.¹⁰²

Racial thought has also been used to explain the policies of some Catholic colonizers. Belmessous argues that French colonizers did not perceive racial lines early on, but as assimilation failed and global trends progressed, ideas linked to race slowed previous patterns of mixing.¹⁰³ Several scholars emphasize how new ideas about race led to a reduction in mixed unions and offspring, and in this, my emphasis on this factor is hardly revelatory.¹⁰⁴ This said, scholars tend to focus on concepts of race, overlooking prior concepts of nations that laid the foundations for racial thinking. Most importantly, they do not put these ideas in the context of religion, failing to observe the Catholic/Protestant distinction in racial mixing and the varied rates in which racial thinking took root in these different religious communities. For reasons linked to faith and development, Catholics were slower to identify as nations and races than were Protestants, and this largely explains varied patterns of genetic footprints in the colonial world.

Some writers identify a shift toward racial classification to colonial Protestant missions. Discussing Oceania, one historian suggests that: “With the coming of the evangelicals to the South Pacific in the early nineteenth century firmer ideas were advanced as to the ethnic origin” of Polynesian people, including racial subtypes and hierarchies in relation to Europeans.¹⁰⁵ Earlier, I mentioned similar statements regarding British India, where evangelical revivals limited mixing,¹⁰⁶ and Caplan,

who explains segregation in terms of Evangelicalism and the growth of European racial theories.¹⁰⁷ In North America, Fischer connects racial theories in passing to religion, as North Carolina's "Anglican-dominated government set out to clarify the racial and social status of the region's inhabitants and to regulate their interactions."¹⁰⁸

The link between Protestantism and racial thought has been noted in passing by a range of experts, and I discovered the same in my fieldwork. In North Sumatra, religious leaders emphasized that it was not their faith, but instead contemporary ideas embedded within it that led to exclusivity and racism. For one local church historian, "the Dutch felt chosen by God, they were a chosen people who demanded to be called *tuan* (lord). This was against their religion. They liked to classify things by race and class, and then believed that some were better than others."¹⁰⁹ It is crucial that, as Protestant churches in North Sumatra and elsewhere have come to be ruled by natives, separation in terms of race, ethnicity, and clan have become less prominent, and today, Protestantism does not look totally different than Catholicism. In other words, religion is relatively constant, but the reduction of European racial thought has caused segregation to decline on the ground.

European countries that remained Catholic—those outside of the Reformation—did not necessarily identify as nations, let alone races. Transnational ties to the Vatican, a multinational clergy, and vernacular Latin slowed the development of Catholic people as distinct nations. This was also tied to the development of Catholic states, whose nation-building efforts were less successful than those of their more developed Protestant neighbors. Benedict Anderson argues that nations developed from "the coalition between Protestantism and print capitalism," which was fueled by vernacular publishing, while Catholic countries clung to Latin and banned printing presses.¹¹⁰ Anderson's famous work connects Protestantism and technology to early nationalism, observing that Catholic identification as distinct nations lagged behind. Anthony Marx has shown that the emergence of nationalism in Spain was comparatively limited, labeling it a case of "faith without nation," due to the absence of deep religious cleavages created by the Reformation, which he sees as sparking the development of nationhood.¹¹¹ Stein Rokkan has suggested that the Catholic Church worked against early nation-builders, leading toward fewer ethnic divisions in Europe's Catholic countries. Meanwhile, in Protestant countries, state churches allied with nation-builders early on, constructing a sense of distinct national identity.¹¹² It is not that

Catholics were without prejudice or some national identity but instead that the most meaningful divisions followed religious lines. Catholic countries typically possessed weaker armies, states, and systems of education, so were not at the forefront of emerging nationalisms and were poorly equipped to undergo nation-building. As a consequence, Catholics were slower to perceive themselves in terms of nations and races compared to Protestant communities.

While the Catholic view was dominated by religious divisions, the polities that would embrace Protestantism were also those that believed that they constituted a nation. This was partly rooted in economic growth, as development caused Protestantism as much as Protestantism created a capitalist ethic. Free from Papal authority, Protestant countries developed identities as discrete nations, including vernacular bibles and churches. Many Protestant churches organized along national lines, and some Protestant congregations effectively became part of the state, which in turn began to promote new forms of education. Nation-building came first to industrialized Protestant countries. Scientific advancement made great strides in classifying the world's species and other matter, and it was not long until this desire to categorize led to new understandings of humanity. The idea of race was borrowed from animal husbandry, a far cry from either Christian or Enlightenment concepts of humanity. The invention of race sprang from "Enlightenment Science," as the "white race" was created in 1684, followed by pseudo-biological species such as *Homo europaeus* and in the late eighteenth century, the "Caucasian race."¹¹³ The Caucasian race, which in some circles stems from Europeans originating from Noah landing at Mount Ararat in Armenia, remains a widely used pseudo-scientific term even today. For Fredrickson, "the scientific thought of the Enlightenment was a precondition for the growth of a modern racism based on physical typology."¹¹⁴ European scientists were involved in more than just categorization, using racial classifications to naturalize European colonial domination and Darwinian competition. If European rule was owed to racial superiority, mixing blood threatened colonial rule and the future of European races. Some British officials actually viewed miscegenation as the cause of Portugal's decline, vowing that this would never happen to the British Empire.¹¹⁵ Common criticisms of Latin America focused on tropical mixing as causing racial decay, part of new movements toward eugenics.¹¹⁶

Racism was nothing new of course, but racial science lent much older attitudes among British and Dutch nations an air of legitimacy.

For Stoler, “Eugenics provides not so much a new vocabulary as a new biological idiom” for colonial prestige and segregation.¹¹⁷ Above all, this explanation is convincing because Protestant colonizers actually articulated that mixing with local women was wrong in racial terms. Numerous examples cited above attest to concerns for maintaining purity. In the Dutch East Indies, concubinage was outlawed on expressed grounds of racial purity.¹¹⁸ As early as the 1670s, Ceylon Governor General Rijckloff van Goens stipulated that Dutch men should only limit lighter-skinned natives or Portuguese Eurasians, and that daughters of local Dutch marriages should then be married to other Dutchmen, “so that our race may degenerate as little as possible.”¹¹⁹ From very early in the colonial era, there were seeds of racial logic in Protestant colonial powers. This also explains why many Protestant colonizers preferred mixed women, limiting racial contagion, as colonial officials justified such unions.

The primary racial theorists were British, German, American, as well as French (Protestant and Catholic).¹²⁰ France was the most developed of the Catholic colonizers, providing a crucial case, especially because French thinkers shared the forefront of racial thinking and segregationist urban planning. France is said to have had two colonial empires. The first was home to intense mixing in the Americas, Senegal, and India, usually with official sanction. Early French colonialism bore a magnitude of racial mixing that rivaled that of the Portuguese. In North America, French colonizers recognized differences between themselves and natives as cultural, due to upbringing and diet, and were slower to develop an emphasis on biological differences than British colonizers.¹²¹ This era ended with the French Revolution, from which a nation emerged. But was France a civic or an ethnic nation? This tension was overcome with a civilizing mission, to spread French culture around the world to all peoples, as one could become part of the French nation through assimilation. The second French Colonial Empire (1830–1960) witnessed less mixing and an end to official support for it. While the French in Indochina sired a sizable Eurasian community, it was nowhere near the size of métis communities in North America or the Caribbean. Late in French rule in Louisiana, a 1724 legal code actually prohibited marriage between French and Africans, a stark reversal of previous policy, echoing the belief that “Negroes are a species of men.”¹²² As France came to identify as a nation, mixing partially declined, and as racial theories became fashionable, officials worked to limit sexual liaisons.

The fact that considerable racial thinking germinated in France can be partially explained in terms of religion. Post-revolutionary France, especially among elite circles, is known for its secularism. The decline of Catholicism as a social force parallels a rise in nationalist and racial thought. The connection between faith and race, as well as how shifts in French politics affected French views of nation and race, are brought together in an interesting article by Sebastian Normandin.¹²³ Although France moved away from religion and toward racial science, Québec remained more religious and resisted racial thinking within Canada during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Normandin shows that French Canadian theologians, intellectuals, and the general public resisted the eugenics movement that held sway in Canada's Anglo-Saxon provinces and in France. He suggests several reasons for this resistance: the sterilization that was part of eugenics was seen as a form of birth control, Catholic ideas of human souls and equality clashed with ideas of scientific racism, and French Canadians as a relatively poor group would have been disproportionately hurt by such policies. After an initial period of equivocation, the Catholic Church came to resist extreme ideas of race in religious terms in Québec, while less Catholic France understood humanity more in terms of races.

As noted above though, mixing did continue into late French colonialism. And although France was home to considerable interest in the new "racial science," with leading polygenesists such as Paul Broca (1824–1880), France was also home to rival eugenic visions. Jean Luis Armand de Quatrefages (1810–1892), a dedicated monogenesist and critic of Broca, emphasized the desirability of mixing to allow colonial authorities to endure local climates. Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744–1829) was notable for the idea that an organism can pass on traits acquired during its lifetime to its offspring. In the colonial context, "neo-Lamarckian" views still focused on improving the race through selective breeding but emphasized race far less and also featured environmental factors. In French colonial policy, this meant removing mixed children from their native mothers and environments to raise them as Europeans, in essence to activate French genes at the expense of native DNA.¹²⁴ France was a leading force in alternative, less racialized eugenics, an influence that would be felt across the Catholic world.

Catholic countries often resisted the racial science of the United States, Britain, and Germany, or at least developed their own theories, which framed mixing as creating a superior species. In contrast to theories of racial

degeneration through mixing dominant in Anglo-American worlds, we find theories of “constructive miscegenation” when we look to “French colonial debates” and “Latin American eugenics.”¹²⁵ Nancy Stepan demands attention to understandings of eugenics and race beyond Anglo-Saxon contexts, noting distinct views in Latin America that were more in line with the intellectual circles in Italy and France. In place of explicitly racial, radical eugenics found in English, Scandinavian, German, and American circles, the Latin world embraced neo-Lamarckian eugenics, which emphasized environmental factors in causing biological ascension or decline, and was “inherently antiracist.”¹²⁶ While also noting varied approaches within Latin America, namely pro-amalgamation Mexico and Brazil contrasted with the more European Argentina, Latin American countries rejected sterilization and birth control, demanding a “Christian eugenics.”¹²⁷ In this, Stepan takes seriously the ways that religion influenced racial science. Although lacking in neither racism nor hierarchy, the Catholic Church “opposed an extreme reproductive eugenics,” and in this opposition, Catholicism was “alone of the major institutions of the West.”¹²⁸ Stepan cites a 1930 Papal Bull against eugenics and the opposition of Catholics living within Protestant countries to racialized eugenics programs.

As Anglo-Saxon racial theorists continued to criticize tropical decay and racial hybridity in Latin America, local scholars soon produced counter-narratives of hybridization as superior and as forming new races.¹²⁹ Illustrative here is Mexican writer José Vasconcelos (1882–1959), who developed a competing racial science. In his controversial text, *The Cosmic Race*, Vasconcelos argued that the races of the Americas, Europe, Asia, and Africa would come together in Latin America and produce a superior race of humans, a fifth race of men. He criticized Northern Europeans for wrongly believing that their race represents “the sublime culmination of human evolution,” therefore opposing mixing races.¹³⁰ Citing Darwinist principles, he suggested that mixed offspring were superior to “purebloods” given their access to wider gene pools. The text still showed a preference for whiteness though—against German theories that mixing leads to a gradual darkening of skin, Vasconcelos suggested that mixed offspring would gradually lighten through natural selection. In Québec, Italy, France, and Latin America, we see Catholic communities challenging racial science in favor of mixing, sometimes using their mixed reality to construct oppositional pseudo-science. Catholic thinkers embraced neo-Lamarckian eugenics against the more racialized eugenics found in Protestant countries.

Explaining patterns of colonial mixing in terms of the ideas of nations and races is also useful because it explains widespread attitudes and behavior. While political capacity provides a top-down model, concepts of group identity are more bottom-up. This helps explain why individual men in Protestant colonial systems refrained from doing what they were inclined to do, as colonial societies were partly self-policing because people were socialized to believe in race. This also explains the interest of home audiences in policing sexual unions. No other explanation can reveal why home populations in Europe criticized the specter of racial mixing in the colonies, especially the idea of mixed progeny coming to Europe. This fear led the Dutch colonial government to bar Europeans with mixed families from returning to the Netherlands, an effort to protect the metropole from degeneration.¹³¹ In Africa, British officials worked to define mixed offspring as African and deny European parentage in part to avoid African blood from residing in Britain.¹³² It was not simply in the interest of colonial administrations to enforce segregation—it was in the interest of the entire nation and race that boundaries should not be crossed. Along with capacity, identity speaks to changes over time, as attitudes shifted with the solidification of national identities and the expansion of national discourse toward pseudo-scientific racism. All told, faith, capacity, and identity all shaped the varied patterns of genetic fusion and fission described above.

National and racial identities also help to explain changes in the post-colonial era. Protestant countries, despite evolving greater capacity, have largely changed their views of mixing,¹³³ while Catholic countries have become somewhat less open to interracial unions. This is precisely what Thomas Skidmore notes, that the long-standing distinction between Brazil's racial democracy and American racism is losing its value, especially as American racism diminishes (but of course remains).¹³⁴ While not mixing with the Philippine population during the colonial era, American men have demonstrated a new attitude toward Asian women since the Cold War. American base camps in the Philippines, Korea, Japan, South Vietnam, and Thailand have led to thousands of mixed offspring, some embraced and others abandoned. In 1982, President Reagan passed the "Amerasian Act," granting citizenship to mixed offspring in ways reminiscent of French colonial policy.¹³⁵ In Hong Kong, after decades of strict segregation, interracial unions have become increasingly common.¹³⁶ Sex tourism, perhaps the contemporary equivalent of colonial liaisons, is largely associated with Germany, Scandinavia,

Britain, Australia, and the United States, countries that a generation ago would have been more concerned with racial boundaries. This example again serves as another reminder that acceptance of interracial unions is hardly a sign of equality or progress. Within Protestant-majority countries, interracial unions have become increasingly common. Today, over 1 in 12 marriages in the United States are between census-defined “races,” compared to 1 in 15 in 2000 and 1 in 23 in 1990, as miscegenation represents a “fading taboo.”¹³⁷ There seems to be some level of convergence between Protestant and Catholic societies in recent decades. This cannot be adduced to faith, geography, political economy, or political capacity, but instead to changes in perceived identity as nations and races.¹³⁸

It seems that views toward racial identity changed a great deal by the end of the colonial age. This may be due to the atrocities of Nazism and anti-Semitism, as racial science showed its true colors during World War II and discredited the field.¹³⁹ Scientific racism was also undermined by developments from within scientific communities. While scientists such as Franz Boas had long argued against theories of racial separation, such as the children of interracial unions being sterile or otherwise degenerative, evidence against such theories became better documented, invalidating rival theories.¹⁴⁰

What explains the varied genetic footprints left by Catholic and Protestant colonizers? The core explanatory factor is changing identity, with Protestant powers developing concepts of nation and race before most Catholic powers, ideas that deepened over time. Religious factors affected this shift, as Protestant institutions were more permissive than hierarchical Catholic institutions, allowing for new thoughts to enter into the faith, sometimes for better, but in this case, for worse, meanwhile Catholic hierarchy and multinationalism resisted seeing humanity in terms of nations and races. Capacity was necessary to enforce new ideas of racial distinctions, monitoring European men and sending European women. Above all, though, it is that Protestant colonizers were more likely to see the world in terms of categories of different races of people, while Catholics were slow to adopt these ideas that best explain their varied genetic footprints.

Notes

- 1 M. Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race: Or, the Racial Basis of European History* (Ann Arbor, MI: C. Scribner’s and Sons, 1919), 22.

- 2 Urs Bitterli, *Cultures in Conflict: Encounters between European and Non-European Cultures, 1492–1800*, translated by Ritchie Robertson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 68.
- 3 Carla Gardina Pestana, *Protestant Empire: Religion and the Making of the British Atlantic World* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 71.
- 4 Garrett Hellenthal et al., “A Genetic Atlas of Human Admixture History,” *Science* 343 (2014), pp. 747–751.
- 5 T. M. Ingersoll, *To Intermix with our White Brothers: Indian Mixed Bloods in the United States from Earliest Times to the Indian Removal* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005), 21–22.
- 6 Gwenn A. Miller, “The Perfect Mistress of Russian Economy: Sighting the Intimate on a Colonial Alaskan Terrain, 1784–1821,” in *Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American History*, edited by A. L. Stoler (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), pp. 297–323.
- 7 Mark Gamsa, “Mixed Marriages in Russian-Chinese Manchuria,” in *Entangled Histories: The Transcultural Past of Northeast China*, edited by Dan Ben-Canaan, Frank Grüner, and Ines Prodöhl (London: Springer, 2014); pp. 47–58.
- 8 State efforts to encourage mixing were officially based on efforts to overcome the racism inherent in capitalism and efforts to build a new communist humanity, but were more rooted in responses to Nazi racial categories and an effort to assimilate peripheral minorities. Saule K. Ualiyeva and Adrienne L. Edgar, “In the Laboratory of People’s Friendship: Mixed People in Kazakhstan from the Soviet Era to the Present,” in *Global Mixed Race*, edited by R. C. King-O’Riain, S. Small, M. Mahtani, M. Song, and P. Spickard (New York: New York University Press, 2014), 70.
- 9 Nadia H. Wright, *Respected Citizens: The History of Armenians in Singapore and Malaysia* (Victoria, Australia: Amassia Publishing, 2003).
- 10 J. M. van der Kroef, “The Indonesian Arabs,” *Civilisations* 5:1 (1955), pp. 15–24.
- 11 Coppel, “Revisiting Furnivall’s ‘Plural Society’: Colonial Java as a Mestizo Society?” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 20:3 (1997); John U. Wolff, “Peranakan Chinese Speech and Identity,” *Indonesia* 64 (October 1997), pp. 29–44.
- 12 E. Teng, *Eurasian: Mixed Identities in the United States, China, and Hong Kong, 1842–1943* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), 142.
- 13 Mark Anderson, *Black and Indigenous: Garifuna Activism and Consumer Culture in Honduras* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009).
- 14 Rhoda Reddock, “‘Split Me in Two’: Gender, Identity, and ‘Race-Mixing’ in the Trinidad and Tobago Nation,” in *Global Mixed Race*, edited by R. C. King-O’Riain, S. Small, M. Mahtani, M. Song, and P. Spickard (New York: New York University Press, 2014), 53.
- 15 U. Bosma and E. Raben, *Being “Dutch” in the Indies: A History of Creolisation and Empire, 1500–1920* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), 24.
- 16 Bitterli, *Cultures in Conflict*, 68.

- 17 Minelle Mahtani, Dani Kwan-Lafond, and Leanne Taylor, “Ex[porting the Mixed Race Nation: Mixed-Race Identities in the Canadian Context,” in *Global Mixed Race*, edited by R. C. King-O’Riain, S. Small, M. Mahtani, M. Song, and P. Spickard, New York: New York University Press, 2014, 238–239.
- 18 Cited in Bitterli, *Cultures in Conflict*, 97.
- 19 M. Wiesner-Hanks, *Christianity and Sexuality in the Early Modern World* (London: Routledge, 2000) 220. See also John Thornton, *Africa and the Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400–1800*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 269.
- 20 S. Belmessous, *Assimilation and Empire: Uniformity in French and British Colonies, 1541–1954* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 30.
- 21 Costa Rican *pardos* comprised much of the local military and established a local church housing a black Virgin Mary, signifying that black and white are both children of God. M. D. Olien, “Black and Part-Black Populations in Colonial Costa Rica: Ethnohistorical Resources and Problems,” *Ethnohistory* 27:1 (1980), 17.
- 22 Albert J. Raboteau, *Slave Religion: The ‘Invisible Institution’ in the Antebellum South* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 27.
- 23 C. R. Boxer, *The Golden Age of Brazil, 1695–1750: Growing Pains of a Colonial Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), 23.
- 24 Pestana, *Protestant Empire*, 71.
- 25 P. Pascoe, *What Comes Naturally: Miscegenation Law and the Making of Race in America* (London: Oxford University Press, 2009), 211.
- 26 Pestana, *Protestant Empire*, 71.
- 27 Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, *Puritan Conquistadors: Iberianizing the Atlantic, 1550–1700* (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 5. Cañizares-Esguerra finds similarities between New England Puritans and Peru’s conquistadors in terms of their religious zeal. Their views of natives, however, contrasted, with Puritans seeing Indians as Satan’s minions, while Catholics tended to view Indians as in need of divine grace.
- 28 Pestana, *Protestant Empire*, 69.
- 29 Some have suggested that Iberian slavery was less intense because it “filtered through the Catholic Church,” while Protestants lacked an institution to moderate behavior. Freyre, cited in Wolfe, “Land, Labor, and Difference,” *The American Historical Review* 106:3 (2001), 895. A. W. Marx, “Race-Making and the Nation-State,” *World Politics* 48 (1996), 183.
- 30 Against this, members of the Jesuit order pushed for nonwhite church officials. C. R. Boxer, *Four Centuries of Portuguese Expansion, 1415–1825: A Succinct Survey* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 42.
- 31 G. M. Fredrickson, *Racism: A Short History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 39.
- 32 Raboteau, *Slave Religion*, 57–65.

- 33 Bitterli, *Cultures in Conflict*, 68.
- 34 Cañizares-Esguerra, *Puritan Conquistadors*, 12.
- 35 A. Perry, *On the Edge of Empire: Gender, Race, and the Making of British Columbia, 1849–1871* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 106–107.
- 36 C. R. Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600–1900* (New York: Penguin, 1990), 126, 148.
- 37 Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire*, 167.
- 38 David M. Whitford, *The Curse of Ham in the Early Modern Era: The Bible & Justifications for Slavery* (London: Ashgate, 2009), 138–139.
- 39 Raboteau, *Slave Religion*, 97.
- 40 Whitford, *The Curse of Ham in the Early Modern Era*, 138. Early black converts tended to be buried in separate graveyards from white believers, as black Protestants were not even seen as equal in the afterlife. Raboteau, *Slave Religion*, 108.
- 41 Rita Smith Kipp, “Conversion by Affiliation: The History of the Karo Batak Protestant Church,” *American Ethnologist* 22:4 (1995), pp. 868–882.
- 42 Raboteau, *Slave Religion*, 137.
- 43 Raboteau, *Slave Religion*, 194.
- 44 Wiesner-Hanks, *Christianity and Sexuality in the Early Modern World*, 60–93.
- 45 K. Ballhatchet, *Race, Sex, and Class under the Raj: Imperial Attitudes and Policies and Their Critics, 1793–1905* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980), 4–5.
- 46 L. Caplan, “Creole World, Purist Rhetoric: Anglo-Indian Cultural Debates in Colonial and Contemporary Madras,” *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 1:4 (1995), 748.
- 47 Fredrickson, *Racism: A Short History*, 47.
- 48 As early as 1623, English travelers to western Africa explained the black skin and sexual appetites of local inhabitants in terms of the Curse of Ham. Kathleen M. Brown, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs: Gender, Race, and Power in Colonial Virginia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 110.
- 49 J. Daniel Hays, *From Every People and Nation: A Biblical Theology of Race* (Westmont, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2003), 51. See also Fredrickson, *Racism: A Short History*, 42.
- 50 Everett Tilson, *Segregation and the Bible* (Madison, WI: Abingdon Press, 1958), 19–29.
- 51 Alan T. Davies, *Infected Christianity: A Study of Modern Racism* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s, 1988), 14.
- 52 Philippa Levine, “Anthropology, Colonialism, and Eugenics,” in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Eugenics*, edited by Alison Bashford and Philippa Levine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 56–57.
- 53 Robert J. C. Young, *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture, and Race* (London: Routledge, 2005), 8.

- 54 George L. Mosse, cited in Davies, *Infected Christianity*.
- 55 The most extreme case was found in Nazi Germany, where the Third Reich organized Protestant Institutes to cleanse Christianity of Jewish elements, creating an Aryan, masculine Jesus, which served racial ideology. Susannah Heschel, *The Aryan Jesus: Christian Theologians and the Bible in Nazi Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
- 56 Raboteau, *Slave Religion*, 100. Some frustrated Protestant leaders even demanded that Protestants must live up to the example of Catholics, whose views toward conversion were more open. Raboteau, *Slave Religion*, 111.
- 57 Interview with Reverend Darwin Lumbantobing, HKBP, Siantar North Sumatra (July 5, 2014).
- 58 G. M. Fredrickson, “Mulattoes and *Métis*: Attitudes toward Miscegenation in the United States and France since the Seventeenth Century,” *International Social Science Journal* 57:183 (2005), 107.
- 59 Freyre, cited in Wolfe, “Land, Labor, and Difference,” 895.
- 60 Thomas E. Skidmore, “Racial Ideas and Social Policy in Brazil, 1870–1940,” in *The Idea of Race in Latin America, 1870–1940*, edited by Richard Graham (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010), 8.
- 61 Boxer, *Four Centuries of Portuguese Expansion*, 3.
- 62 Bitterli, *Cultures in Conflict*, 68.
- 63 Gary Nash, “The Hidden History of Mestizo America,” *The Journal of American History* 82:3 (December 1995), 951.
- 64 Marx criticizes the dominant view that Brazilian mixing is rooted in early contact with Africa on precisely these grounds, noting the extreme intolerance Portugal displayed toward Muslims in northern Africa. A. W. Marx, *Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of South Africa, the United States, and Brazil* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 30.
- 65 Above, I noted the presence of “Black Scots” in Canada. In the Caribbean, Scottish settlers created mixed families and supported their offspring at higher rates than British settlers. Daniel Livesay, “Extended Families: Mixed-Race Children and Scottish Experience, 1770–1820,” *International Journal of Scottish Literature* 4 (Summer 2008), pp. 1–18.
- 66 Spickard, *Mixed Blood*, 8.
- 67 Cañizares-Esguerra, *Puritan Conquistadors*, 14.
- 68 Wolfe, “Land, Labor, and Difference.”
- 69 Wolfe, “Land, Labor, and Difference,” 874. Interestingly, the examples Wolfe provides of various racial ratios are mostly Irish-native children.
- 70 Wolfe, “Land, Labor, and Difference,” 866.
- 71 Marx suggests the opposite, noting that the Brazilian state entailed “greater bureaucratic capability than the decentralized capitalism imported by Britain and Holland.” While Brazil was certainly a more centralized state, the idea

that it was a stronger state than the United States does not seem plausible, and is very much at odds with the state/society literature. Colonial Latin American states were centralized but wielded less power, compared to more decentralized but also more powerful British and Dutch states. Marx, *Making Race and Nation*, 159, 164.

- 72 Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 103.
- 73 D. Veevers, “‘Inhabitants of the Universe’: Global Families, Kinship Networks, and the Formation of the Early Modern Colonial State in Asia,” *Journal of Global History* 10 (2015), 108.
- 74 G. E. Brooks, *Eurafricans in Western Africa: Commerce, Social Status, Gender, and Religious Observance from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2003), 210.
- 75 This policy seems to have been well enforced, and “few very exceptions were made.” Wiesner-Hanks, *Christianity and Sexuality in the Early Modern World*, 206.
- 76 Fredrickson, “Mulattoes and *Métis*,” 103; Fredrickson, *Racism: A Short History*, 39; Jordan, “American Chiaroscuro,” 647; Perry, *On the Edge of Empire*, 17. Authors explain variation in the Americas on the grounds that “Portuguese migration to Brazil was primarily male, while migration to the United States was largely families.” E. E. Telles, *Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 174. Several authors “stress the demographic context, arguing that the relative shortage of whites left the planter class no choice but to allow and even facilitate the emergence of a free class of mixed bloods to serve as artisans and cattle herders.” Skidmore, “Racial Ideas and Social Policy in Brazil, 1870–1940,” 8.
- 77 Boxer, *The Golden Age of Brazil*, 165. See also 322.
- 78 James Axtell, *The Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures in Colonial North America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 304.
- 79 Spickard, *Mixed Blood*, 6.
- 80 G. J. Bender, *Angola under the Portuguese: The Myth and Reality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 50.
- 81 G. Reginald Daniel and Andrew Michael Lee, “Competing Narratives: Race and Multiraciality in the Brazilian Racial Order,” in *Global Mixed Race*, edited by R. C. King-O’Riain, S. Small, M. Mahtani, M. Song, and P. Spickard (New York: New York University Press, 2014), 92–93.
- 82 Marx, *Making Race and Nation*, 65–66.
- 83 Ingersoll, *To Intermix with our White Brothers*, 52.
- 84 A. L. Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 2.
- 85 Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power*, 30.
- 86 Wiesner-Hanks, *Christianity and Sexuality in the Early Modern World*, 150.

- 87 Ann Stoler, "Sexual Affronts and Racial Frontiers: European Identities and the Cultural Politics of Exclusion in Colonial Southeast Asia," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 34:4 9 (1992), 528.
- 88 E. Saada, *Empire's Children: Race, Filiation, and Citizenship in the French Colonies*, translated by A. Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 30.
- 89 Bitterli, *Cultures in Conflict*, 68.
- 90 Reasons for abstaining ranged from ideological to pragmatic, with the dominant factor being "biblical injunctions against marriage to non-Christians and English disdain for the Indians' 'barbaric' way of life." Richard Godbeer, "Eroticizing the Middle Ground: Anglo-Indian Sexual Relations along the Eighteenth-Century Frontier," in *Sex, Love, Race: Crossing Boundaries in North American History*, edited by M. Hodes (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 92.
- 91 Brown, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs*, 82.
- 92 Perry, *On the Edge of Empire*, 20–30.
- 93 Of several examples from North America, the story of Daniel Williams Harmon provides an illustrative case. He criticized European-native marriages, but after several years out West, was finally convinced to take a local wife. He courted and married Elizabeth Laval, a French métis girl, with whom he fathered many offspring. This example shows a remote, low-capacity settler with a lack of European women debating racial logics and selecting a mixed native partner. Similar biographical details, such as David Thompson's marriage to a young mixed girl, are found in G. Goulet and T. Goulet, *The Métis of British Columbia: From Fur Trade Outpost to Colony* (Calgary: FabJob Publishers, 2008).
- 94 Brooks, *Eurafricans in Western Africa*, 196.
- 95 Boxer, *The Golden Age of Brazil*, 165, 16.
- 96 C. H. Nightingale, *Segregation: A Global History of Divided Cities* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 86–87.
- 97 T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting, *Black Venus: Sexualized Savages, Primal Fears, and Primitive Natives in French* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999).
- 98 Bitterli, *Cultures in Conflict*, 30.
- 99 "Nation" refers here to an imagined community through which peoples believe in common descent, culture, and values, often housed within a common polity.
- 100 Carl Degler's study reverses the causal arrow, suggesting that miscegenation caused a lack of racial theory. While he does not consider religious patterns, he sees Brazilian racial inclusion as a consequence of mixing, while American divisions are caused by a lack of it. This seems like an instance of multicollinearity, as the two processes are hardly independent of one another—a lack of belief in race also causes "mixing." But as I note above,

there are several early racial explanations for not mixing, and nations are slightly older concepts, which suggests that identity is at least partially independent of behavior. Carl N. Degler, *Neither Black, nor White: Slavery & Race Relations in Brazil and the United States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1971).

- 101 K. Fischer, *Suspect Relations: Sex, Race, and Resistance in Colonial North Carolina* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 1–2.
- 102 C. H. Nightingale, “Before Race Mattered: Geographies of the Color Line in Early Colonial Madras and New York,” *The American Historical Review* 113:1 (2008), 60; Nightingale, *Segregation*, 83. He also links this to faith, as attacks on the Nabobs in the eighteenth century were based partly on racial mixing, a point emphasized by evangelical leaders in Britain who condemned British life in India as home to sinful liaisons with dark-skinned women. Nightingale, *Segregation*, 87.
- 103 Belmessous, *Assimilation and Empire*, 26, 57.
- 104 See also Ingersoll, *To Intermix with our White Brothers*, 165.
- 105 M. P. K. Sorrenson, *Maori Origins and Migrations: The Genesis of Some Pakeha Myths and Legends* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2013), 8.
- 106 Ballhatchet, *Race, Sex, and Class under the Raj*, 4–5.
- 107 Caplan, “Creole World, Purist Rhetoric,” 748.
- 108 Fischer, *Suspect Relations*, 85.
- 109 Interview with Reverend Juandaha Raya P. Dasuha, GKPS, Siantar North Sumatra (July 5, 2014).
- 110 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006), 40.
- 111 Anthony W. Marx, *Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Ethnic Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 184.
- 112 Peter Flora, editor, *State Formation, Nation-Building, and Mass Politics in Europe: The Theory of Stein Rokkan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 40–44.
- 113 Bruce Baum, *The Rise and Fall of the Caucasian Race: A Political History of Racial Identity* (New York: NYU Press, 2006), 58–59.
- 114 Fredrickson, *Racism: A Short History*, 56.
- 115 D. Pomfret, “Raising Eurasian: Race, Class, and Age in French and British Colonies,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 51:2 (2009), 321.
- 116 Nancy Leys Stepan, *The Hour of Eugenics: Race, Gender, and Nation in Latin America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
- 117 Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power*, 63.
- 118 H. Ming, “Barracks Concubinage in the Indies, 1887–1920,” *Indonesia* 35 (1983), 86.
- 119 Cited in Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire*, 248.

- 120 Many leading physical anthropologists were French Protestants, such as Paul Broca. Authors have noted the ideas of French racial theorists found greater audiences in British and German societies. For Pomfret, “Though more influential in Anglophone contexts, these studies retained currency in France.” Pomfret, “Raising Eurasian,” 317.
- 121 S. Belmessous, “Assimilation and Racialism in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century French Colonial Policy,” *The American Historical Review* 110:2 (2005), 325.
- 122 G. Aubert, “‘The Blood of France’: Race and Purity of Blood in the French Atlantic World,” *The William and Mary Quarterly* 61:3 (2004), pp. 473–477.
- 123 Sebastian Normandin, “Eugenics, McGill, and the Catholic Church in Montreal and Quebec: 1890–1942,” *Canadian Society for the History of Medicine* 15 (1998), pp. 59–86.
- 124 Saada, *Empire’s Children*, 78–80.
- 125 Teng, *Eurasian*, 96, 136.
- 126 Stepan, *The Hour of Eugenics*, 80.
- 127 Stepan, *The Hour of Eugenics*, 102.
- 128 Stepan, *The Hour of Eugenics*, 111.
- 129 Stepan, *The Hour of Eugenics*, 137.
- 130 José Vasconcelos, *The Cosmic Race/La Raza Cosmica* (Los Angeles: California State University, 1979), 33.
- 131 Stoler, “Sexual Affronts and Racial Frontiers,” pp. 514–551.
- 132 Milner-Thornton, “‘Rider of Two Horses’: Euraficans in Zambia,” in *Global Mixed Race*, edited by R. C. King-O’Riain, S. Small, M. Mahtani, M. Song, and P. Spickard (New York: New York University Press, 2014), 18.
- 133 William Julius Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). The edited volume *Global Mixed Race* documents the rapid growth of persons identifying as mixed race in Canada, the United States, New Zealand, Australia, Britain, Germany, and Japan.
- 134 Thomas E. Skidmore, “Bi-Racial U.S.A. vs. Multi-Racial Brazil: Is the Contrast Still Valid?” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 25:2 (May 1993), pp. 373–386.
- 135 Sue-Je Lee Gage, “The Amerasian Problem: Blood, Duty, and Race,” *International Relations* 21:1 (2007), 98.
- 136 V. Lee, *Being Eurasian: Memories Across Racial Divides* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004), 1–2.
- 137 Paul Taylor et al., “The Rise of Intermarriage: Rates, Characteristics Vary by Race and Gender,” *Pew Research Center* (February 2012).
- 138 Identity-based explanations also explain changing attitudes and behavior beyond Christian worlds. It seems that Chinese and Muslims have slowed mixing over time as ideas of distinct nations and endogamy have taken hold.

139 Marx, *Making Race and Nation*, 3.

140 Warwick Anderson provides a fascinating study of the sea-change in racial anthropology. In the 1930s, academics viewed Hawaii as a “Boasian racial laboratory” to test early theories. Advances made in Hawaii helped to discredit scientific racism in western academic circles, as the field of physical anthropology was overtaken by the field of human biology, providing “scientific validation” of liberal attitudes toward mixing. Warwick Anderson, “Racial Hybridity, Physical Anthropology, and Human Biology in the Colonial Laboratories of the United States,” *Current Anthropology* 53:5 (2012), pp. S95–S107.

4

Implications

Abstract: *This chapter discusses some of the many implications of Catholic mixing and Protestant restraint. More research is required on a variety of topics. This book has only scratched the surface of the Protestant tendency to court mixed Catholic women when they did seek local partners. There is a clear need for studies of colonial intimacy to consider religious factors. Another pressing issue relates to other faiths. How do Orthodox Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, and other faiths understand racial mixing during the colonial age and beyond? Former Protestant colonies tend to be more fragmented, plural societies, while former Catholic colonies tend to be more homogenous. Each has seen varied forms of armed conflicts, but former Protestant colonies see more ethnic conflict, whereas former Catholic colonies see more class-based conflict.*

Keywords: identity; mixed-race; postcolonial development

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I hope that the above discussion will spark debate and spur new research on the links between religion, sex, and colonial behavior. This study has tackled an immensely broad topic, which spans all of colonial history and the entire world. Historians may not be comfortable with the project's scale, but it was necessary to depict a global phenomenon and locate underlying causes. I hope to have shown that, generally speaking, Catholic colonizers left a deeper genetic footprint in their colonies than Protestants did in theirs. Catholics were more willing to enter into relationships with women around the world, generating new mixed communities and cultures. Meanwhile, Protestant colonizers typically avoided doing so, policing boundaries in an effort to remain homogenous. This is roughly true across a range of colonizers of both faiths, across world regions, across diverse native and slave societies, and over time, although there are some exceptions and all colonizers mixed less as the age of colonialism progressed. What explains this consistent, though imperfect variation between Catholic and Protestant colonizers? Although factors endogenous to the faiths explain the forms of unions, I have suggested that religion played more of a supporting role, shaping the emergence of new forms of identity such as nation and race. Rejecting geohistorical and political economy arguments, political capacity and national/racial identity combined to produce the ability to police racial boundaries and the desire to do so. A belief in race is required to criticize racial mixing, and Protestant countries happened upon such ideas first.

Along the way, this project has touched on a number of interesting ancillary points. Although further research is in order, it seems that when Protestants found local wives, they preferred mixed race women around the world. When faced with the absence of European women and a need to integrate into local societies, Protestant colonizers were more likely to establish relations with mixed-race women, and this strong preference is not simply some natural product of an earlier Catholic presence. A related issue that requires further research is the divergent behavior of individual Catholic men within Protestant colonial empires, such as the Irish in British possessions and Dutch Catholics in the Indies, who seemingly operated with distinct rules for sexual relations. Another important finding relates to Protestant tendencies to exclude mixed-race couples and offspring, leading to the growth of Catholic communities, which expanded by absorbing Protestants that crossed the color line. Again, this phenomenon both cautions against seeing the raw number of mixed Catholic communities as evidence of an absolute religious divide,

but also emphasizes distinct religious attitudes toward the products of mixed unions. In terms of the research on urban planning, I noted that efforts to segregate urban spaces developed primarily among Protestant colonizers, though Catholics were by no means immune from this trend, a shift that developed hand in hand with racial thinking and bans on mixing.

The links between religion and race across world regions and over time have the potential to spur a range of new studies. It would be fruitful for Religious Studies scholars to explore religious views of race in the colonial age as well as for historians to better appreciate religious factors in colonial encounters. While several gifted authors have looked at colonial sexual relations in the Dutch East Indies and British India, it would be useful to look explicitly at the role of religious lines in microlevel case research. The literatures do not seem to be speaking to one another, as historians have not taken religion seriously as a factor in colonial intimacy. The case-driven literature on colonial intimacy rightly looks to racial science, but has largely overlooked religious dimensions as well as political capacity. Instead of seeing the presence of European women as a causal force, I have suggested that capacity represents a prior variable, something overlooked in previous studies.

It would also be useful to provide a fuller treatment of how other cultures and faiths approach racial mixing, affirming or challenging my contention that this is largely linked to Protestantism. I briefly noted mixed communities forming from Orthodox, Muslim, and Chinese abroad, as this is an area that demands more study. It seems that Islam may be very similar to Catholicism, in that marriage across color lines is not problematic, provided that conversion has already occurred. Like Catholics, the Muslim *ummah* represents a transnational community, explicitly rejecting race, while affirming religious divides. This said, South Asian communities seem more reluctant to mix, although it is not clear how much we can attribute this to cultural preferences and how much we can attribute this to the influence of British colonizers. The ways that colonized peoples internalized racial distinctions, sustaining plural societies into the postcolonial age, as well as how they have resisted doing so, stands out as an important site of study. What happens to Protestant ideas of separation after national independence—do communities continue to remain apart after colonial departures, as in Malaysia and Singapore? And have countries leaving Catholic colonial rule become more segregationist or less? It is possible that former Protestant colonies

are home to greater multiculturalism, while former Catholic colonies are more unified. It is also possible that there is less racism in former Catholic colonies, although writers here must be careful not to confuse the blurring of racial categories with a sense of equality.

A related avenue for research could be in the study of armed conflict. Writers have long noted the potential for ethnic strife in plural societies. I have suggested here that plural societies tend to be former Protestant colonies. If colonial Protestantism recognized and reified racial lines, it may correlate with ethnic and secessionist conflicts today, as communities perceive of themselves as separate from others. Without clear racial and ethnic lines, it is possible that former Catholic colonies may see more class-based conflict. This seems roughly true, as Latin America and Catholic African countries, such as Angola and Mozambique, have witnessed communist insurgencies, although Nigeria, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia see identity-based conflicts. If true, religious divisions may be surprisingly, but of course not totally, path-dependent, shaping contemporary sociopolitical contexts in interesting ways.

I have emphasized not only long histories of racial mixing around the world, but also religious perspectives that deny the existence of race in the first place. Trends in Western countries point toward a new era of “miscegenation.” It is indeed fortunate that some of the early literature and the terms used in this study seem dated, although it is important to point out also that terms such as “Caucasian” and “mixed race” remain widely used, even politically correct manifestations of outdated racial thought. But it remains true that racial mixing represents a fading taboo, at least in Protestant-majority countries, where the taboo was especially strong to begin with. It is important to downplay the novelty of contemporary trends given the long history of intermarriage and “mixed offspring.” Increasingly, studies of new trends toward mixed-race children take the language of race as given, even in efforts to challenge racial concepts. Instead of emphasizing biracial identities and granting hyphens, a more open, fluid idea of a common humanity may point to a better way forward, one with a deeper, more complex history than we generally acknowledge.

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