

Michela Summa

Spatio-temporal Intertwining

Husserl's Transcendental Aesthetic

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MICHELA SUMMA

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HUSSERL'S TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC

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*A papà, Lucio.
Con tutta la rabbia, con tutto l'amore.*

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Abbreviations

Husserl's Works

(Hua volume, page)	Edmund Husserl: <i>Husserliana. Edmund Husserls Gesammelte Werke</i> .
(Hua Mat volume, page)	Edmund Husserl: <i>Husserliana Materialien</i>
(EU, page)	Edmund Husserl. 1999. <i>Erfahrung und Urteil. Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik</i> , redigiert und herausgegeben von Ludwig Landgrebe, Hamburg: Meiner.

The D-Manuscripts and the *Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins* are currently in the process of being published. I had the opportunity to refer to the latest versions, which are now being prepared for publication. References are made to the original pagination of Husserl's manuscripts. For the manuscripts published in journals or in separate volumes, the reference is made to the published version. I quote the English translations of Husserl's works when they are available. The reference thereby is first to the page of the Husserliana edition and then to the page of the translation. For works that have not been translated into English, the translation is mine. For texts that have not been published either in English or in German, I also quote the original German passage besides my translation.

Kant's Works

Immanuel Kant: *Gesammelte Schriften*. Herausgegeben von der Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

Quotations refer to the English translations of Kant's works. I refer first to the page of the Akademie Ausgabe and then to the page of the translation.

AA Akademie Ausgabe

EEKU *Erste Einleitung in die Kritik der Urteilskraft* (AA 20)

GUGR	<i>Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume</i> (AA 02)
KrV	<i>Kritik der reinen Vernunft</i> (AA 03; AA 04)
KU	<i>Kritik der Urteilskraft</i> (AA 05)
MSI	<i>De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis</i> (AA 02)
Prol	<i>Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik</i> (AA 04)
TG	<i>Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch die Träume der Metaphysik</i> (AA 02)
WDO	<i>Was heißt sich im Denken orientieren?</i> (AA 08)

Part I

Introduction

Chapter 1

Introduction

Within the corpus of Husserl’s writings, a conspicuous amount of research is devoted to the inquiry into the phenomenology of spatial and temporal constitution. When considering such a line of research, however, it immediately becomes clear that the analyses concerning spatial constitution and those concerning temporal constitution are more often than not kept separate from one another. Considered in proportion to the analyses devoted, respectively, to spatiality or temporality, the texts in which Husserl explicitly thematizes their relationship are very few. Accordingly, it comes as no surprise that also the literature on these topics is mostly devoted to either the phenomenology of space or the phenomenology of time.¹

Yet, how shall we understand the relationship between spatiality and temporality? Are the two dimensions of experience simply parallel, or shall they rather be considered as deeply interconnected? The aim of the present study is to investigate such a relationship and to show how an account of the interplay of spatial and temporal experience impinges on the phenomenological theory of sensible experience.

In the relatively few texts where the just mentioned relationship is thematized, Husserl generally understands spatiality and temporality as belonging to two different layers of experience and focuses on the possible analogies and differences between spatial and temporal constitution. Such an approach appears to be grounded on Husserl’s “architectonic” account of experience, based on the concept of stratification, which presupposes the formal-ontological foundational relationship among parts

¹An exception to the tendency of keeping separate the phenomenological analyses of space and time is represented by Richir and Welton. From two different perspectives, both authors thematize the interweaving of lived spatiality and temporality. More precisely, Richir conceives of this interweaving as the relation between temporal affectivity and the transcendence of space in the light of what he calls “phenomenological schematism”. According to Richir (1989, 2006), the reference to spatiality avoids the aporia of a merely formal account of temporality. Welton (2002), on the other hand, stresses the co-originality of spatiality and temporality with regard to the kinesthetic and temporalizing experience of the bodily subject. His argument comes in many ways close to the one I will make in the last chapter of this book. Also, Larrabee (1989, 1994) addresses the problem of the relationship between space and time. Yet, primarily focusing on formalized space and time, her view differs from the one adopted in this book.

within a complex whole. Let's take, for the sake of clarification, the simple case of just two parts, e.g., α and μ . In a foundational relationship, one of the two parts, say α , cannot exist except within such an encompassing whole.² As such, it is a non-independent moment (as opposed to an independent piece) within a complex whole. That is to say, in order to exist, α needs to be supplemented by (or founded upon) μ . If the foundation is univocal, then this relationship is not reversible, i.e., μ can in principle exist apart from the more encompassing whole and, within such a whole, it is founding with respect to α .³ This can be extended as to encompass a plurality of parts and their respective relations.

Husserl's phenomenology notably aims at distinguishing and studying the relationship among the different kinds of experience and their intentional structures. Within such a framework, the idea of stratification allows us to describe, first, how sensible experience and predicative thought relate to each other: the latter, indeed, is considered to be founded upon the former. Secondly, it allows us to describe the relationship among different moments within both domains. Notably, within the domain of sensible experience, Husserl considers material and spatial constitution, involving transcendent perception, as grounded upon temporal constitution, which can be abstractedly considered at the level of pure immanence. This architectonic of experience can be exemplified both noematically, by referring to the three layers of intentional objects in their foundational relation (*res temporalis*; *res extensa*; *res materialis*), and noetically, by referring to acts and to the syntheses implied in the constitution of each layer. Thus, assuming the regional ontology of the “thing” as a guiding thread to explore the structure of constitution, in *Ideas I*, Husserl argues that, in the most basic sense, the thing is apperceived as *res temporalis*, i.e., as a sensible unity of duration. The apperception of the thing as *res extensa*, i.e., as an extended and localized unity, is considered to be grounded upon the constitution of *res temporalis*. Finally, the constitution of the thing as *res materialis*, or as a concrete unity which is part of causal relationships determining its possible alterations, presupposes, or is grounded upon, both previous layers.⁴ Similarly, considering the example of the perception of a violin note, in *Ideas II*, Husserl argues that the sound can be considered as a material “thing”, i.e., as causally produced by the vibration of the violin cords. As such, it has its reality, independently of my being in the same room or in another one, of my being closer to or farther from the violin, etc. Abstracting from material-causal relationships, the violin note is still given as a spatial phantom, i.e., as originating from a specific location and as spreading-out in space. Finally, apart from such spatial determinations, the sound is given as a pure sense datum, which spreads-out temporally.⁵

²Hua XIX/1, p. 267/(Husserl 2001c, p. 25).

³Hua XIX/1, p. 270/(Husserl 2001c, p. 27).

⁴Hua III/1, pp. 347–348/(Husserl 1983, pp. 360–362).

⁵Hua IV, pp. 21–24/(Husserl 1989, pp. 23–26). See also Hua XVI, pp. 341–346/(Husserl 1997, pp. 297–302).

Considering such an approach from the perspective of the noetic-noematic correlation, we can clearly see that the description of the most basic moments of experience, and particularly the analyses of spatial and temporal constitution, is made possible by the analytical distinction of different layers, aimed to shed light on their specificity. In such a stratification, the temporal syntheses (which, as we will see, entail further stratifications and are ultimately grounded on what Husserl calls the primal temporal stream or process) define the deepest level of constitution, presupposed by all further syntheses, including those implied in spatial and material constitution. Quite interestingly, however, Husserl does not only consider the constitution of *res temporalis*, namely of the most basic layer of thing constitution, apart from the other and higher layers of spatiality and materiality; he also considers the constitution of *res extensa* apart from its temporal unfolding, which, according to the stratification, should be presupposed in that very constitution.⁶ This remark, connected with the previous one concerning the meaning of the stratification as related to the formal-ontological concept of foundation, allows us to formulate one of the leading hypotheses of this work: although the singular layers and moments of experience can be abstractedly described as to their own specific features, such a description is nevertheless based upon the understanding of experience as a complex whole, the moments of which can certainly be analytically distinguished, and yet cannot be separated from one another. As we shall see, this rather general claim concretely applies to both the relationship between the sensible and the predicative order, and, within the sensible order, to the relationship between spatiality and temporality. As a consequence, besides the distinction and the description of the constitutive features of each layer or moment of experience, an analysis of their interconnection within the whole of experience is also required. Focusing on the relationship between the spatial and the temporal dimensions of sensible experience, in this book I wish to contribute to such an analysis.

Besides emphasizing the stratification, the relatively few statements Husserl makes concerning the relation between spatiality and temporality concern the parallelisms and the analogies between the constitution that is accomplished in both domains. Another leading hypothesis of this book is that, despite clarifying some crucial aspects of spatial and temporal constitution, such a parallel and analogical account falls short when it comes to describe concrete phenomena of sensible experience, such as individuation, the constitution of perceptual things on the basis of their perspectival appearance, and bodily experience. Again, despite recognizing the heuristic potential of abstractive and analytic distinctions, it seems that an adequate description of experience requires us to go beyond those distinctions and to investigate the interplay among the different moments. Specifically, regarding spatiality and temporality, it might well be that these two dimensions are not simply to be considered by virtue of their analogies, or in relation to the stratification of experience, but rather as being more deeply connected, or interwoven within the complex unity of concrete lived experience. And, as I will argue, such an intertwining of the

⁶Hua XVI, p. 66/(Husserl 1997, p. 55).

spatial and temporal dimensions may precisely allow us to shed new light on the dynamics of the interplay among the different layers of lived experience.

Precisely such an interweaving seems to be what Husserl has in mind in manuscript D 12 IV, dating back to 1931 and published in 1946 with the title *The World of the Living Present and the Constitution of the Surrounding World External to the Organism [Die Welt der lebendigen Gegenwart und die Konstitution der außerleiblichen Umwelt]*. Here, Husserl speaks about the “configurative” unity of lived spatiality and temporality, defining the elementary structure of our world such as it is given in sensible experience. Distinguishing the configurative, horizon-like unfolding of the world as a unity of intertwined non-independent moments from a mere objective unity, which contrary to the former can eventually be fragmented into independent parts, Husserl points out that the pre-objective, spatio-temporal, configuration of the world “precedes” the very distinction of space and time, considered as forms.⁷ Further developing this suggestion, Husserl stresses the crucial role of the connection between these two dimensions in making the constitution of the world in its unitary style of display possible:

The world familiar to us from our experiences, our life world, is in every present; and in every survey is found the unity of spatiotemporality, which is the unity of our experience, in the unified world which is ours. It is ours not only as flowingly present, but as our spatio-temporal world of experience. Thanks to recoverable pasts given through memory and also to expectations which predelineate the living future for us it is a thoroughly typified world. All that exists within it, whether known or unknown, is an object of experience within the form: an A, and, this A.⁸

The principal aim of the present research is to explore the implications of such an understanding of the interweaving of spatiality and temporality as a configurative unity. Considering the different places in the corpus of Husserl’s works that, from very early on, describe the concrete expression of such a configurative unity, we will see how such analyses justify even *ex ante* the claim made in the later manuscript D 12 IV. Such an approach to the configurative unity of spatiality and temporality, however, is not simply meant to question Husserl’s “architectonics” of experience. If the purpose of such an architectonics is to investigate the scope and the limits of each layer of synthetic constitution, indeed, its validity and significance are not called into question by the analyses of the interconnections of the different moments. Such a stratified structure, thus, will be here recognized. However, we will also investigate the interplay among the different layers, in order to find out whether and how this can allow us to develop a more dynamic account of experience as a whole.

This book is divided into three main parts. The first part deals with Husserl’s theory of sensible experience, or *schlichte Erfahrung*, which is progressively developed

⁷“But here we must not overlook spatiotemporal configuration [...]. It is prior to space and time themselves insofar as these are understood as identical persistent forms within which (as the form of space demands) all objects are spatial, are in their places, having a situation, by virtue of their spatial shape; as object determining, this configuration is “spatial form in situation” – and (as the form of time demands) within which all times are durations, peculiar to the objects as determinations.” (Husserl 1946, p. 337)/(Husserl 1981b, p. 246).

⁸(Husserl 1946, p. 333)/(Husserl 1981b, p. 244).

into the project of a “transcendental aesthetic” phenomenologically revisited. After having set the general framework to conceive of the relation between lived spatiality and temporality, in the second part, I discuss Husserl’s accounts of such a relationship in terms of stratifications, analogies, and parallelisms. Finally, having considered both the potentialities and the limits of such a parallel and analogical approach to spatiality and temporality, in the third part, I focus on the phenomena that bear witness to the interweaving of the spatial and the temporal dimensions of lived experience. This inquiry can be characterized as archaeological and genealogical, since it thematizes the most basic layers of lived experience as being the basis for all further layers of constitution, and nonetheless it remains constantly focused on the unitary structure of experience as a complex whole.⁹

Considering the Husserlian project of the transcendental aesthetic, in the first part, we will see how the explicit thematization of such a project, with its specific tasks and method, can be notably found in some texts written in the Twenties. Yet, in spite of this quite late thematization, we can easily observe that Husserl’s interest for those phenomena belonging to this field of inquiry is much older, dating back to his first philosophical writings, and ultimately goes through the whole development of his thought. Indeed, considering that the reference to sensibility and perception is entailed by the very notion of the transcendental aesthetic, stemming from the Greek *aisthesis*, it will not be difficult to connect this later thematization with the earlier analyses regarding the exemplary role of perception in Husserl’s analyses of intentional experience, and with the study of its specificity. As Husserl points out in one text from 1924/26, recapitulating in one sentence the basic tasks of the transcendental aesthetic:

It is a philosophical question of the greatest fundamental dignity to first highlight which essential properties are due to objects just because they can be experienced in general. Or better: which properties they necessarily have to possess in order for them to be in general and a priori experienceable in the first place. (Hua XVII, p. 455)

This transcendental question fundamentally concerns the basic layers and conditions of experience, and to the a priori correlation between the subject and the world.

Chapter two is devoted to what we can call the two pillars of Husserl’s transcendental aesthetic, namely pure experience and the concept of the world. With respect to both, Husserl explicitly refers to Avenarius’s works, constantly stressing both the affinities and the differences between the empirio-criticist and the phenomenological approach. A critical comparison of Husserl’s and Avenarius’s positions will allow us to understand the definition of the phenomenological aesthetic as an a priori and transcendental theory of pure experience and of the world in its spatial and temporal unfolding. The analysis of the programmatic writings concerning the project of the transcendental aesthetic, then, will allow us to thematize three leading questions of our further inquiries into the phenomenology of sensible experience, namely: (1) What is the scope of the constitution accomplished within the transcendental

⁹On the archaeological and genealogical character of Husserl’s inquiries, see Bégout (2000b) and Pradelle (2000).

aesthetic and how does this relate to spatiality and temporality? (2) How shall the transcendental aesthetic be understood in relation to the stratification of experience? (3) How shall we understand the relationship between the eidetic descriptions, which the transcendental aesthetic is intended to provide, and the moments of facticity, which do not seem to be possibly ignored within a theory of sensible experience?

Despite being of primal importance for the understanding of Husserl's project, the discussion of Avenarius's legacy only allows us to give a preliminary answer to these questions. Such a comparison, indeed, does not give us a complete image of the transcendental aesthetic yet, nor of the way in which it fits the overall project of phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy. The comparison of Husserl's and Kant's approaches to the transcendental aesthetic is a further indispensable step to better understand the specificity of Husserl's inquiry into sensibility, and to conceive of how it relates to the stratification of experience. In chapter three, I shall develop such a comparison by first assuming Husserl's own reading of Kant's philosophy as a guiding thread. Thereby, the relevance of such a reading with respect to Husserl's theory of sensible experience and to the relationship between sensibility and predicative thought will be thematized. This inquiry, and the resulting phenomenological redefinition of the boundaries between the aesthetic and the analytic, will bring to the fore the distinctive features of Husserl's phenomenological aesthetic. Yet, after considering Husserl's critical reading of Kant, we shall ask ourselves whether there are aspects in Kant's own theory, which might complement the phenomenological project. By considering those places in Kant's writings that challenge Husserl's phenomenological criticism, we will see how a refined understanding of the concept of stratification further enriches the philosophical and phenomenological meaning of the inquiries into the transcendental aesthetic. Moreover, considering the role of sensibility with both Husserl and Kant will allow us to understand how the transcendental aesthetic shall be integrated within a dynamic account of experience considered as a complex and stratified whole.

The discussion of Husserl's project of the transcendental aesthetic provides the background to the analyses of the phenomenology of temporality and spatiality. In the attempt to understand how these two dimensions of sensible experience relate to each other, the first question we shall ask is how Husserl himself conceives of this relation. The second part of the book tries to answer this question. As already mentioned, Husserl generally envisages this relation in terms of stratification and analogical parallelisms between two domains of lived experience. The stratification particularly emerges with respect to the foundational relation between spatial and temporal constitution; the parallelisms and the analogies with respect to some structural patterns recurring in both the phenomenological analyses of time and space.

In chapter four, the phenomenological approach to spatiality and temporality is described. Far from reducing the experience of space and time to a mere psychophysiological account of (spatial and temporal) sensations, Husserl's analyses are supposed to fulfill two basic tasks, namely: (1) to describe the a priori structure of spatial and temporal experience; and (2) to analyze the constitution of both lived and objective space and time. In this context, I shall show how both items (parallelism

and stratification) emerge in the configuration of a specific phenomenological approach to the pivotal questions concerning the intuitiveness and the constitution of time and space. To this aim, I shall first distinguish different modes of givenness and constitution of spatiality and temporality and discuss their foundational relation. This notably implies an assessment of the proper method to be adopted for such a phenomenological inquiry. This analysis will shed light on the analogies between the phenomenology of spatiality and temporality and it will bring to the fore both the potentialities and the limits of such a parallel account of spatiality and temporality. This will allow us to already introduce the necessary co-reference or interweaving of both dimensions.

Regarding both temporality and spatiality, Husserl begins his analyses from an inquiry into the constitution of the thing in its spatial and temporal determinations, and he further thematizes the constitution of objective space and time. In chapter five, the stratification and the analogies between spatiality and temporality will thus be highlighted in relation to the analysis of the constitution of the spatio-temporal thing. Particularly, I shall discuss the meaning of Husserl's claim, according to which the spatial and the temporal dimensions of lived experience are considered as "sibling".¹⁰ The stratification in this context can be retraced to the foundational relationship between the constitution of *res temporalis* and of *res extensa*. The analogies, on the other hand, concern specific aspects of the constitution of the spatial and the temporal thing. Such an inquiry is based upon an abstracting procedure that aims at isolating for the sake of description the spatial from the temporal dimension. However, considering the outcomes of such analyses will highlight once more the limits of a mere analogical and abstracting consideration. First, it appears to be questionable whether we can really consider temporal objects apart from their localization. Secondly, the constitution of the spatial thing implies temporal syntheses, so that, abstracting from temporality, we can provide only a limited description of spatial constitution. Thirdly, the abstracting procedure does not allow us to account for the constitution of space as the form of sensible appearance. Being based upon movement, the latter also requires both spatiality and temporality.

Understanding the relationship between spatiality and temporality exclusively in terms of stratifications and analogies, thus, still leaves many questions open. If we were satisfied with the acknowledgement of certain parallelisms at different levels between the phenomenology of time and space and with the foundational relation between them, we would still consider the two domains of sensible constitution as self-enclosed: in each of the two layers, constitution would be accomplished independently of what happens within the other domain. Yet, can we really assume that this is the case? The answer to this question can only be provided by concrete phenomenological analyses. For this reason, the third part of this book will concentrate more directly on what phenomenology does when it describes experience. The inquiries of this third part can be considered as topological, insofar as they investigate the experiential *topoi* that challenge the idea that time and space are two self-enclosed and reciprocally independent domains of constitution. These *topoi* are the phenomenology of individuation, of perspectival givenness, and of the lived body.

¹⁰Hua XVI, p. 65/(Husserl 1997, p. 55).

Chapter six focuses on the phenomenology of individuation. Thereby, some of the issues concerning the constitution of the thing, addressed in the second part, will be further developed. Taking departure from the analysis of the ontological and epistemological status of the individual in Husserl's phenomenology, we will see how a proper understanding of the latter requires an analysis of the processes of individuation that make the constitution of individuals for the experiencing consciousness possible. Despite the priority attributed to temporality in the process of individuation, I shall argue that, concretely considered, such a phenomenon is grounded on the intertwining of the spatial and the temporal dimensions of lived experience. Moreover, we will see how the essential feature of temporality that makes individuation possible, i.e., the irreversibility of each temporal process, reverberates on the experience of spatiality. Besides considering how the spatio-temporal intertwining of lived experience grounds the individuation of perceptual things, I shall discuss how such processes relate to the constitution of subjectivity itself as individual, or to the processes Husserl understands under the heading of the individuation of the monad. These analyses will particularly show the connection between the theory of sensibility and the phenomenology of subjective (self-)constitution and will allow us to describe the fundamental dynamism that is implied in both processes.

Chapter seven will show how the intertwining of spatiality and temporality is implied in one of the central phenomena of sensible experience, namely the constitution of things in and through their perspectival givenness. The meaning of the a priori law of perspectival givenness, according to which the thing is necessarily given as oriented with respect to our perceptual situation, shall be investigated with respect to both spatial and temporal constitution. The analysis of the perspectival appearance of perceptual things and of its implications, notably those concerning the structure of intentionality and the teleology of sensible experience, will allow us to further show how the spatio-temporal intertwining grounds the dynamic unfolding of lived experience. Moreover, such an inquiry will show how the spatio-temporal intertwining reverberates on the understanding of the status of intentionality and transcendental subjectivity. In this chapter, I shall first discuss why perspectival givenness cannot be properly understood on the basis of the mere parallelism of the spatial and the temporal dimensions. Although Husserl occasionally suggests such a parallelism, a close phenomenological analysis shows that such an approach falls short of understanding the concrete phenomenon of perspectival givenness. This phenomenon, and its implications concerning the situated and affection-related character of perspectival givenness, shall instead be more adequately described by starting from the interweaving of spatiality and temporality. Secondly, I will show how the phenomenology of perspectival givenness shall be considered in correlation to the understanding of intentionality as a tendency. Reconsidering the relationship of empty intentions and fulfillment in this light will allow us to further develop the observations regarding the dynamics of experience. Thirdly, the nexus between perspectival givenness and the different forms of teleology in spatio-temporal experience will be discussed. This articulated analysis will provide some further arguments for characterizing the open, dynamic, and relational character of sensible experience understood in the light of the spatio-tempo-

ral intertwining. The most important outcome of these remarks is the understanding of the dynamic character of experience and of intentional consciousness, which lends itself to be described as “movement” and “life”.

Chapter eight will discuss how the intertwining of spatiality and temporality is implied in the phenomenology of bodily experience. This will be done by focusing on both the role of the body as the organ of perception and what Husserl calls the “aesthetic of the lived-body”, namely the sensible self-experience of a bodily subject. The aim of this chapter, thus, is to provide a more concrete account of the aesthetic constitution and of the subjectivity that is involved in such a constitution. As I will argue, subjectivity shall indeed be understood in a fundamental sense as bodily, and bodily experience shall be considered in its spatio-temporal unfolding. The analysis will be particularly focused on the situatedness of bodily experience, on the role of bodily movement, on the dynamic and sensible self-relatedness of bodily subjectivity, and on body memory. The phenomenology of bodily experience will provide some further evidence supporting the claim that spatiality and temporality cannot be simply considered as parallel dimensions of experience, rather being originally interwoven. Such an interweaving grounds the essential and constitutive dynamism of sensible experience. This is one of the most crucial moments characterizing bodily experience: the faculty of self-movement, the implicit consciousness of bodily motility and of its rhythm, the phenomenon of self-affection and the different forms of awareness of bodily sensations are only some of the elements that testify to the dynamic character of bodily experience. Besides, the analyses concerning bodily self-experience, and particularly those referring to tactile experience, allow us to shed light on the constitutive ambiguity of the lived-body, as being on the threshold between self-affection, and hetero-affection. Eventually, considering bodily experience and its indispensable role in sensible constitution will allow us to further rephrase the question of facticity, understood as the necessity of an experiential *Faktum*, which we have encountered in the first part of this book.

The question of the relationship between spatiality and temporality, thus, will not address the phenomenological priority of the one dimension over the other. Rather, aiming to bring to the fore original co-implication of the two dimensions in the configurative unity of experience, the ultimate question will be how such a co-implication reverberates on the phenomenological understanding of experience itself and of the correlation between subjectivity and the world.

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Part II

Husserl's Transcendental Aesthetic

Chapter 2

The Phenomenological Aesthetic

The conclusion of *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, one of the later texts of Husserl's, offers one of the most concise and perspicuous outlines of the project of the transcendental aesthetic. This text has both a programmatic and a recapitulating flavor. It is programmatic, since it clearly hints to the still to be accomplished project of a new transcendental logic, conceived as the logic of the absolute science.¹ Yet, it is also recapitulating, since it implicitly refers backwards to all the studies that, at least starting from the *Logical Investigations*, have been devoted to the relationship between sensible experience and predicative thought.

The project of a new transcendental logic is here considered as equivalent to the overall project of the transcendental phenomenology. Transcendental logic, indeed, defines the logic of the world, such as it is given in and through lived experience. Consistently, it entails all material a priori disciplines, which are part of the full ontology of the world, and investigates the dynamics of the constitutive relationship between subjectivity and the world. Transcendental logic, in other words, defines an encompassing and complex theory of the different layers of experience, constitution, and cognition.

The transcendental aesthetic is located at the bottom of such a universal logic of the absolute science: it defines the most fundamental layer, the *Grundstufe*, of the transcendental-phenomenological theory of experience as a complex and unitary whole. The underlying idea in this presentation, thus, is that experience makes up a stratified unity, whereby the lower levels can be said to be founding with respect to the higher ones, since the former can subsist without the latter but not the other way around. Transcendental logic, then, has a twofold task: on the one hand, to demonstrate that between the *logos* of sensibility and the *logos* of predicative thought there is a foundational relationship, which allows us to talk about the one presupposing

¹ Hua XVII, p. 296f./Husserl 1969, p. 291f.). Cairns translates “*transzendentale Ästhetik*” with “transcendental aesthetics”. In order to not to confuse the aesthetic as theory of sensibility and the aesthetics as the branch of philosophy dealing with the nature of art, beauty and taste, I shall adopt the translation “transcendental aesthetic” to designate the theory of sensibility, in accordance with the translation of the respective chapter in Kant's first *Critique*.

the other; on the other, to show how predicative and scientific thought develops out of the basic layer of sensible experience. To fulfill this double task, one should start from a proper descriptive inquiry into the structures of that basic layer: only by uncovering its inner *logos* it will then be possible to highlight the genesis of logical thought. As it is well known, this task eventually defines Husserl's genetic approach to logic. Having said this, we can easily understand why the transcendental aesthetic is, in the following passage, described as laying the foundations for the architectonics of all a priori sciences engaged with a descriptive and transcendental inquiry into the world and its display to the experiencing subject:

"Transcendental aesthetic" – in a new sense of the phrase (which we use because of an easily apprehensible relationship to Kant's narrowly restricted transcendental aesthetic) functions as the ground level <in a world-logic>. It deals with the eidetic problem of any possible world as world given in "pure experience" and thus precedes all science in the "higher" sense; accordingly it undertakes the eidetic description of the allembracing Apriori, without which no Objects could appear unitarily in mere experience, prior to categorial actions (in our sense, which must not be confounded with the categorial in the Kantian sense), and therefore without which the unity of a Nature, the unity of a world as a passively synthetized unity could not become constituted at all. One stratum of that Apriori is the aesthetic Apriori of spatio-temporality. Naturally this logos of the aesthetic world, like the analytic logos, cannot become a genuine science without an investigation of transcendental constitution – and even from the constitutional investigation required here an exceedingly rich (and difficult) science accrues.²

This quotation from the conclusion to *Formal and Transcendental Logic* will be taken in this chapter as the guiding thread for the discussion of Husserl's project of the transcendental aesthetic. Such a choice is motivated not only because the quoted passage offers a programmatic view on the systematic place and function of the transcendental aesthetic within the overall project of transcendental logic/phenomenology, but also because it entails some elements that allow us to more concretely address the methods and the objectives of the transcendental aesthetic. Besides the references to Kant, which I will extensively discuss in the next chapter, the quoted passage contains what we can consider to be the two keystones of Husserl's transcendental aesthetic: the concept of the world and the notion of pure experience [*reine Erfahrung*].

It is not by chance that Husserl puts the latter notion in inverted commas. Taken in correlation with the concept of the world, indeed, this notion implicitly refers to one of the primal sources of Husserl's transcendental aesthetic, namely empirio-criticism, and particularly the theory of experience developed by Avenarius. In this chapter, the relevance of Husserl's appraisal of Avenarius's work for the shape given to his own transcendental aesthetic will be highlighted. In the first part, I introduce the crucial moments in Averarius's thought that are of relevance for Husserl's transcendental aesthetic and I subsequently discuss Husserl's appraisal of the theory. This will allow me, in the second part, to more directly address Husserl's own project of the transcendental aesthetic, both in continuity and in dissociation with Avenarius's theory of pure experience. Based on this discussion, three points will be

²Hua XVII, p. 297/(Husserl 1969, pp. 291–292).

finally thematized, which will be further pursued throughout this research: (1) the scope of the transcendental aesthetic and its relation to spatiality and temporality; (2) the stratification of experience; (3) the problem of facticity.

2.1 Husserl's Aesthetic Facing Empirio-Criticism

2.1.1 *Pure Experience and the Concept of the World*

The source of the passage from the conclusion of *Formal and Transcendental Logic* quoted in the introduction to this chapter is not difficult to find, assumed that Husserl is certainly familiar with Avenarius's empirio-criticism and that one of the most famous texts by Avenarius is precisely entitled *Critique of Pure Experience [Kritik der reinen Erfahrung]*.³ Clearly evoking Kant's critical enterprise, this work significantly transposes the focus of the critique from "pure reason" to "pure experience". Arguments explaining both the meaning and the implications of this conceptual change can be found in the preface of the book. Differently from Kant's first *Critique*, which explores the scope and the limits of reason's cognitive power, Avenarius's critical enterprise sets up its tribunal to establish the rights of all scientific and philosophical interpretations of experience. The judge in this tribunal is considered to be nothing but experience itself, taken in its purity. Out of metaphors, thus, such a critical enterprise shall be seen as an attempt to return to experience as to the starting point, from which all theories originate, and as the final point, in which all theory must find its legitimization. Consistently, the critique is supposed not to make reference to any philosophical or scientific explanations, but rather to directly tie up with things themselves (Avenarius 1888, pp. X; XIII). The Husserlian reader cannot but be impressed by these words, which immediately call to mind the phenomenological motto: "We must go back to the 'things themselves'".⁴ The affinity in the programmatic mottos, indeed, testifies at least to a common idea of the object of philosophy and its aims. For both Avenarius and Husserl, the basis of all philosophical inquiries has to be experience in its different manifestations. Accordingly, the primal aim of philosophy is to provide an account of experience in a straightforward way, i.e., independently of all philosophical or scientific interpretations that have progressively covered it up.

³ Husserl's copies of Avenarius's two main writings [*Kritik der reinen Erfahrung* and *Der menschliche Weltbegriff*] are still preserved in his library at the Archives in Leuven. Both of them show a large number of margin notes. Although the relationship between empirio-criticism and Husserl's phenomenology has been already discussed in the literature, it seems to me that there are still questions to be considered with respect to the impact of Avenarius's philosophy on the Husserlian project of the transcendental aesthetic. In this respect, see, notably, Costa (2008); Kern (1973, pp. XXXIIIff.); Depraz (2001, pp. 212f.); Lübbe (1960), Patočka (1976, pp. 13–21; 1988, pp. 17f., 50–124); Rang (1990, pp. 274f., 339f., 382f., 390); Scrimieri (1967, pp. 38f.); Sommer (1985).

⁴ Hua XIX/1, p. 10/(Husserl 2001b, p. 168).

Consistently with this fundamental assumption, Avenarius formulates the two axioms of empirio-criticism: (1) as opposed to the presumptive original truths of philosophical and metaphysical claims, the first axiom purports the necessity to return to the primal experience that every individual has of his/her surrounding [*Umgebung*]; (2) as opposed to the presumptive superiority of the natural sciences in giving access to truth, the second axiom assumes such scientific theories as being nothing but further elaborations of pre-scientific experiential knowledge (Avenarius 1888, p. VII). As Sommer points out, these two axioms are crucial to understand Husserl's appeal to Avenarius's concept of pure experience, for they bear witness to a shared longing for immediacy and directedness, before all metaphysical or scientific interpretation of experience itself.⁵ Yet, before turning to Husserl's appraisal, let us consider in further detail some central issues in Avenarius's theory.

The first point to be discussed is, precisely, the notion of pure experience, which is addressed in the introduction to the *Critique of Pure Experience*. Here, both a synthetic and an analytic definition of pure experience are proposed. According to the former, experience can be said to be pure if, in all its components, it only presupposes the constitutive parts of our surrounding (Avenarius 1888, p. 4). According to the latter, pure experience is exclusively made up of experiential moments, i.e., there is nothing in it that would not be itself an experience (Avenarius 1888, p. 5). Through these definitions, one of the central claims in the *Critique* is made: pure experience does not designate one specific kind of experience, but rather experience as such. That is to say, pure experience is the most comprehensive concept of experience, which entails all the others. Taking up these characterizations, a descriptive enterprise is set up, which does not aim to give shape to a new metaphysical theory, but rather to provide a faithful account of the experiential field, which is presupposed by all theories (Avenarius 1888, pp. 21–22). One of the most important claims made in this context concerns language. Indeed, one may think that pure experience needs not to be structured linguistically. Yet, Avenarius is quite resolute in stating the indispensable nexus between pre-linguistic and linguistic experience. For him, this nexus should be seen as a reciprocal implication. On the one hand, linguistic experience certainly presupposes pre-linguistic (perceptual and non-conceptual) experience; on the other hand, however, pre-linguistic experience can be posited as being such only through language (Avenarius 1888, pp. 8–9). From this perspective, an experience that cannot be verbalized represents a *contradiccio in adjecto*, since the meaningfulness of experience eventually refers to its being, at least potentially, linguistically expressed. In this sense, the basic layer of pre-linguistic experience can only be considered retrospectively and by means of a fundamental co-implication with the higher, linguistically informed, level.

⁵ Sommer traces the affinities between the two philosophers back to four main points: (1) the mentioned longing for immediate givenness; (2) the descriptive method; (3) the anti-Cartesianism related to the contention against the metaphysical dualism of *res cogitans* and *res extensa*; and (4) a new account of evidence, which privileges the moment of clarity rather than the moment of distinction (Sommer 1985, pp. 11–12).

Yet, historical languages, and the traditional philosophical language in particular, are considered to be misleading as they bear the metaphysical presuppositions that empirio-criticism aims to suspend. This is the reason why, in his description of experience, Avenarius coins a new quasi-formal language. In his vocabulary, the different moments of experience are defined as “values that are accessible to description” [*der Beschreibung zugängliche Werte*] (Avenarius 1888, pp. 14f.), and comprehend both the constitutive moments of our surrounding, which are called R-values [*R-Werte*] (Avenarius 1888, pp. 12–15), and the contents of the assertions of other subjects concerning their sensible experience of the surrounding, i.e., the E-values [*E-Werte*] (Avenarius 1888, p. 15). These two orders of “values” are complementary and, together, they encompass all possible givenness, so that there can be no experiential moment that does not fall under one of the two categories. The totality of R-values coincides with the surrounding as such, which entails all functionally determined alterations: the R-system (Avenarius 1888, pp. 25–26). Embracing all the R-values that make up the surrounding, the R-system is also the condition for the E-values to be given and preserved, which, in Avenarius’s view, mainly happens on the basis of the economic laws of thriftiness. This relation of dependence is an indirect one, as it is mediated by the so-called C-System (which eventually, and not unproblematically, coincides with the nervous system) (Avenarius 1888, pp. 34f.).

As it emerges from these rather formal statements, Avenarius’s theory of experience is strictly related to his own theory of knowledge, which is based upon a distinctive understanding of apperception as an expression of economic laws. Apperception – which entails the processes of subsuming objects under categories, of apprehending something *as* something, and of understanding what is new in light of previously formed concepts – is something that the subject (conceived as organism) does in order to save energies and forces (Sommer 1985, pp. 37f.). Moreover, as the reference to the C-System, or the nervous system, reveals, Avenarius’s theory of knowledge is based on naturalistic assumptions, which somehow conflict from the very start with a phenomenological theory of experience. Thus, we can subscribe to Patočka’s (1976) remarks, according to which, despite the claims on the absence of metaphysical or scientific prejudices, Avenarius’s entire system is eventually based upon unquestioned, objectivating and naturalistic presuppositions, which should instead remain alien to a proper phenomenological approach. Nevertheless, as it will be shown, there are still elements in this theory that can be further developed in phenomenological terms.

Yet, before looking at these elements, another central point in Avenarius’s empirio-criticism shall be discussed, namely his account of the concept of the world. The latter is presented in the second volume of the *Critique of Pure Experience*, where it comes into play in order to rejoin the synthetic and the analytic definition of pure experience. In this context, the concept of the world coincides with the concept of a “multiponible of the highest thinkable order” [*Multiponible denkbar höchster Ordnung*] (Avenarius 1890, pp. 375–376). Accordingly, the concept of the world should give an answer to the question: “What is everything?”. In other words, it should cover the totality of what can be given and apperceived in pure experience. Moreover, Avenarius believes that such a definition of the concept of the world comes at the end of a historical process, contemplating a set of subordinate

and bound concepts of the world [*Beibegriffe*], each per se unable to adequately describe the totality of world-experience (Avenarius 1890, pp. 376f.).

The second main text by Avenarius, *The Human Concept of the World [Der menschliche Weltbegriff]*, further develops these remarks concerning the concept of the world. In this work, Avenarius sets himself two fundamental tasks: (1) to offer a more explicit explanation of his own philosophical point of view regarding pure experience (Avenarius 1905, p. VII), and (2) to specify the actual content of the concept of the world (Avenarius 1905, pp. XI–XII). In order to fulfill these tasks, he begins by distinguishing the natural concept of the world [*natürlicher Weltbegriff*] from the human concept of the world [*menschlicher Weltbegriff*]. Whereas the former is the correlate of original (natural) experience, the latter has a larger extension, comprehending both the natural world and its (philosophical, scientific, cultural, etc.) variations. Approaching the natural concept of the world from the first-person perspective, as “my initial concept of the world” [*mein anfänglicher Weltbegriff*], Avenarius describes the most basic experience of finding oneself within a given surrounding together with fellow human beings [*Mitmensch*], who also partake in one’s own surrounding (Avenarius 1905, p. 5). As he tries instead to determine the actual content of this concept of the world (and still resorting to the same formal language of the *Critique*), Avenarius develops his idea of an empirio-critical principal-coordination [*empirio-kritische Prinzipialkoordination*], the two polarities of which are the Ego (the center of experience) and its surrounding (everything that is in front of the Ego).

Thus, the experience that I am willing to describe always embraces what is referred to as Ego and its surroundings. The Ego is always experienced as something being surrounded, and the tree always as being vis-à-vis the Ego. (Avenarius 1905, p. 82)

From this perspective, the principal-coordination, and not one or the other of the two poles, is what defines the most fundamental structure of experience. In such a constitutive relationship, the Ego and its surrounding are considered to be “on the same line”, which means that there is no priority of the one over the other. Moreover, the difference in the experience of the two polarities is considered to be only a difference of degree, and not a difference in nature:

Certainly, a counterpart and sundries are experienced in the Ego and in the components of the surroundings. However, they are not experienced differently and not separately from each other, if they are experienced at all. The Ego arguably differs from the components of its surrounding due to a greater richness and diversity (for instance due to its spatio-temporal relation to thought). But it does not differ in the general way in which the constitutive parts of the Ego and those of the surroundings are experienced. (Avenarius 1905, pp. 82–83)

As we shall see, a critical reading of these claims will play a major role in Husserl’s account of pure experience and the concept of the world (cf. Sommer 1985, p. 67). Yet, before moving on to this inquiry, let us conclude with a short remark regarding the experience of other subjects. The fellow human being [*Mitmensch*] is also considered to be part of one’s own surrounding. Yet, he/she is not experienced as an object, but rather as an “Ego”, whose experience, however, is not accessible to me in the same way that my own experience is. Thus, the binary structure of the principal-coordination is further complicated: given that I only have access to other subjects’ expressions, my experience of them is necessarily mediated by some sort

of interpretation [*Deutung*]. Regrettably, the text does not go any further in explaining the meaning and function of such an interpretation, albeit the latter is explicitly opposed to mere introjection [*Introjektion*]. As a justification for this opposition, Avenarius seems here to be satisfied with the remarks concerning the uncanny [*unheimlich*] and somehow spooky [*gespenstisch*] idea according to which the others are given as particularly complex mechanisms, in which we literally introject, some sort of psychic experience. However, he does not provide a thorough analysis of what “interpretation” would alternatively represent. Eventually, he simply considers more consistent with his theory of experience to admit the “fundamental empirio-critical assumption of human equality”, which would allow us to immediately see the other as another subject (Avenarius 1905, pp. 8–9).

The critique to introjection has a central role not only in what concerns the experience of other subjects, but also with respect to the concept of the world. Indeed, the very decay [*Verfallen*] of the unity of the pre-theoretical concept of the world into a multiplicity of subordinate concepts, which Avenarius understands historically by going through the development of dualistic thought, is ultimately considered as the consequence of the processes of attribution [*Beilegung*], injection [*Einlegung*], and introjections of psychic experiences to bodies conceived as mere mechanisms (Avenarius 1905, p. 9, 27). By means of his critique of such decay, Avenarius believes that it is ideally possible to re-obtain the original concept of the world by overcoming all accessory concepts and eventually to re-establish the coincidence [*Zusammenfall*] of the natural and the universal concept of the world (Avenarius 1905, pp. 115, 63f.).

2.1.2 *Husserl's Reading of Avenarius*

In order to assess to what extent Avenarius's philosophy has been of relevance to Husserl's project of the transcendental aesthetic, we shall now consider the texts in which Husserl explicitly comments upon the central theses in empirio-criticism. As regarding many other thinkers, Husserl's appraisal of Avenarius and of empirio-criticism, often considered as a kind of positivism, cannot be univocally defined as positive or negative. Thus, in his *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, despite holding in great esteem some aspects of Mach's and Avenarius's thought, Husserl raises bitter objections to the assumption of the so-called economy of thought [*Denkökonomie*] as a foundation for pure logic.⁶ Notwithstanding the never withdrawn critique of the economy of thought, in other texts he recognizes the heritage of positivism and empirio-criticism.⁷ Such a revised appraisal is probably most developed in the

⁶Hua XVIII, pp. 196–213/(Husserl 2001b, pp. 123–133).

⁷In *Ideas I*, for instance, after repeating the critique raised in the Prolegomena, Husserl proposes to “translate” the very notion of positivism in phenomenological terms, as to signify a totally presuppositionless theory of experience. If positivism is taken to have this meaning, then phenomenology shall be considered as its most authentic expression. Cf. Hua III/1, p. 45/(Husserl 1983, pp. 38–39).

1910/11 lecture course on *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*.⁸ In this lecture course, Husserl goes as far as to recognize the project of the critique of pure experience as a precursor of the phenomenological analyses.⁹ This positive assessment is primarily related to Avenarius's crusade against the metaphysical presuppositions of philosophical and speculative thinking and the universalistic claims of sciences. Against the excess of thoughts [*Überschuss von Gedanken*] that characterizes the scientific and the traditional philosophical approach to the world, empirio-criticism admirably engages in a critical enterprise and endorses the claim concerning the foundational primacy of pre-theoretical experience.¹⁰ More concretely, it is the connection between the analyses of pure experience and the concept of the world that seems to work as an input for Husserl's own account of the world as the correlate of the natural attitude, and eventually for the genesis of the key concept of his later philosophy, namely the concept of the life-world.¹¹ Indeed, it is not by coincidence that the reference to Avenarius comes to the fore precisely in the sections of the *Basic Problems* devoted to the description of the natural attitude and of the world that is correlated to such an attitude. Almost rephrasing passages from Avenarius's work, Husserl concisely defines the natural attitude, as the attitude in which each of us finds him/herself as the center of a given surrounding:

Each of us says “I” and knows himself speaking in this way as an I. It is as such that he finds himself, and he finds himself at all times as a center of a surrounding (*Umgebung*).¹²

By adopting the very same terminology as Avenarius, and more specifically by referring to the “finding of oneself” [*vorfinden*] in given “surrounding” [*Umgebung*], Husserl proposes his basic description of our primal experience of the world in the natural attitude as preceding all theoretical or scientific accounts of such experience.¹³ The finding of oneself in the natural attitude is related to bodily experience, since my body is the thing I come upon as the constantly central member of the surrounding.¹⁴ This characterization comes again very close to Avenarius's reference to each individual as the central member [*Zentralglied*] of what he calls the empirio-critical

⁸ Significantly, Husserl often refers to this lecture course as “Lectures on the natural concept of the world” [*Vorlesungen über den natürlichen Weltbegriff*]. Hua XIII, p. 245, footnote. See also Kern (1973, pp. XXXVI–XXXVII). The importance of this lecture course for the understanding of Husserl's reading of Avenarius has been emphasized by Costa (2008), Patočka (1988, pp. 84f.), Sommer (1985, pp. 265f.).

⁹ An analogous appreciation is formulated years later in the *Crisis*. In this later text, however, Husserl also stresses that Avenarius failed in reaching a proper transcendental approach to experience and to the world. Cf. Hua VI, p. 198/(Husserl 1970, p. 195).

¹⁰ Hua XIII, pp. 135, 196/(Husserl 2006, pp. 25, 106).

¹¹ Cf. Held (1986, pp. 51–52), Landgrebe (1949, pp. 41f.), Patočka (1988).

¹² Hua XIII, p. 112/(Husserl 2006, p. 2). Quite a similar description of the natural world is to be found in the introduction to *Thing and Space*. Hua XVI, p. 4f./ (Husserl 1997, p. 1, f.).

¹³ See, for instance, Avenarius (1905, pp. 3f.). On the meaning of the verb *vorfinden* in the *Basic Problems*, see Hart and Farin (2006, p. XXXIII).

¹⁴ Hua XIII, p. 114/(Husserl 2006, p. 4).

principal-coordination with all the elements of the surrounding.¹⁵ Consistently, Avenarius's principal-coordination, in which the two polarities of the bodily subject and the components of the surrounding necessarily refer to one another, may have its analogon in Husserl's correlative account of our experience of the world. However, precisely regarding the interpretation of this correlation and the centrality of the bodily subject, some important divergences in Husserl's and Avenarius's respective positions emerge. Whereas for Avenarius the difference subsisting between the subjective and the objective pole of the principal-coordination is only a matter of degree, since he considers both as ultimately experienced in the very same way (Avenarius 1905, pp. 83f.), for Husserl this distinction is a substantial one. This clearly comes out from one straightforward remark in the *Basic Problems*:

Although the I finds itself as the one having, in various ways, all those stated predicates, the I does not find itself as of the same kind as that which is had.¹⁶

Even within the field of the natural attitude, the experience I make of myself is something totally different from both the experience of the objects I come upon and the experience I make of other subjects. This divergence between Husserl's and Avenarius's positions ultimately implies a different characterization of the very concept of the world. In fact, even if both conceive of the world as a unitary totality, which cannot be reduced to the sum of the singular objects, they do not agree on the concrete determination of the mode of givenness of the world. Indeed, conceiving the progressive loss of the natural world in objective temporal terms, Avenarius believes that the factual present incapacity of approaching the world as a totality is due to the inheritance of the metaphysical dualism based upon introjection. However, he eventually appeals to the possibility to overcome this dualistic deception by recognizing its derivativeness, and thus to return to the lost original approach to the world. Things are quite different in Husserl's view. According to him, indeed, the alternative to the natural attitude, i.e., the phenomenological attitude, cannot be conceived as a loss of our original experience of the world, nor can we say that there is an objective temporal gap between the natural and the phenomenological attitude. On the contrary, Husserl maintains that the very structures of the natural world are never properly abandoned and that they are reflectively uncovered in the phenomenological attitude.

Commenting upon this divergence, Sommer (1985, pp. 275f.) suggests that Husserl's approach to the natural world bears witness to an inner tension in his thought, namely the tension between the empirio-critical and the Cartesian heritage. Although he aims to describe experience as a unitary whole, Husserl apparently seems unable to completely depart from Cartesian dualism and this would be explicit in his characterization of the lived-body as double reality (material and psychic) and

¹⁵ "I call the human individual, understood as the (relatively) constant member of an empirio-critical principal-coordination, as the central member of this coordination. And I call the component of the surrounding – be that another human being, a tree, or the like – as the counter-member." (Avenarius 1905, p. 84).

¹⁶ Hua XIII, pp. 112–113/(Husserl 2006, p. 2).

in his approach to constitution, based on the apprehension-content schema and resorting to notions such as “animating” [*Beseelung*] or “animating apprehension” [*beseelende Auffassung*]. As to the body, Sommer considers its double reality to be ultimately based on what Avenarius calls introjection.¹⁷ Yet, even if Husserl does indeed refer to introjection in some passages of *Thing and Space*,¹⁸ his analyses concerning the body do not ultimately lend themselves to be read in the dualistic terms that are implied by the notion of introjection. This clearly emerges in *Ideas II*, where the self-experience and the constitution of the lived-body are precisely at stake, and where the interweaving, as opposed to the split, of the psychic and material reality is constantly stressed. Thus, it comes as no surprise that, when talking about introjection, Husserl is particularly keen to alert against possible misunderstandings related to this term. The material and the psychic reality of the body, as we will see in more detail in the third part of this book, cannot be considered as simply juxtaposed, but rather define the interwoven moments of a unitary whole. This is why the notion of introjection only makes sense if it is adopted to express this unity of the material and the psychic side of the body.¹⁹ Also, regarding Husserl’s theory of perception, and the apprehension-content schema, the label of metaphysical dualism is not appropriate, despite the whole semantics of *Beseelung*. In fact, it is to such a dualism that Husserl opposes his theory of constitution, based on the correlation between the subject and the world and progressively developed into a noematic approach. Moreover, Cartesian dualism can hardly be reconciled with Husserl’s approach to subjectivity, which prevents every reduction of the subject to a mere *res*.²⁰ Thus, we can consider the following critique of dualism expressed in the *Basic Problems* as fully consistent with Husserl’s philosophy:

And the unified quintessential concept is nature, or rather, as it becomes manifest on closer consideration, the law-governed unified whole of all spatial-temporal existence, hence of all that which has place and extension in the one space and which has position or duration in the one time. This whole we call the world or all-nature. In this world, there are not two separate worlds, called things and souls. Experience knows only one world, insofar as souls are souls of lived bodies, and insofar as the world is the world of experience, which, as such, refers back to I’s, which in turn, like all other I’s, experientially fit into the world.²¹

Having said this, I still agree with Sommer that Husserl’s theory of constitution and correlation cannot be so easily reconciled with Avenarius’s version of the

¹⁷ According to Kern (1973, p. XXXVIII), on the contrary, Husserl’s and Avenarius’s positions converge precisely regarding the consistent critique of introjection.

¹⁸ Hua XVI, pp. 161f./Husserl 1997, pp. 137f.).

¹⁹ Hua IV, p. 176/(Husserl 1989, p. 185).

²⁰ In this sense, see for instance Husserl’s critique to Descartes’s characterization of the *Ego cogito*, which ultimately reduces the subject to a little tag-end of the world [*Endchen der Welt*], Hua I, p. 63/(Husserl 1960, p. 24). Also, the notion of substance, which Sommer (1985, pp. 281f.) adopts to define Husserl’s approach to subjectivity, should not be interpreted as referring to a mere *res*. Certainly, the Ego is the pole that remains identical through the temporal flux of experiences. Nevertheless, the Ego dynamically individuates or temporalizes itself in the singular experiences. In this respect, see Summa (2013).

²¹ Hua XIII, p. 124/(Husserl 2006, p. 15).

monism. What we cannot find in Avenarius's inquiry, indeed, is the step that leads from the description of our experience of the world in the natural attitude to the inquiry into the transcendental constitution of the world. As it is well known, what allows Husserl to make such a step is the phenomenological reduction, based upon the bracketing of the natural attitude and on the return to subjectivity as the source of world constitution. With respect to the reduction, Sommer (1985, p. 277) goes as far as to recognize a certain analogy with Avenarius's introjection. This is based on the remark that both introjection and the reduction eventually make the very distancing from the natural experience of the world and consequently the formation of a proper concept of the world possible. Yet, the differences between the two procedures, which Sommer does not omit to recognize, seem to me strong enough to call into question the very analogy. For Avenarius, indeed, introspection is responsible for the modification of our natural concept of the world that opens up the way to the deception into the dualistic subordinate concepts [*Beibegriffe*] and eventually to the overcoming of this deception through the final coincidence of the natural and the human concept of the world. For Husserl, instead, the reduction opens up the way to a transcendental inquiry into the dynamics of world constitution. Such a phenomenological and transcendental approach to the constitution of the world is alien to Avenarius's account of experience. This can be easily shown if we consider that the only concept that Avenarius preserves in his purification of the concept of world is the concept of being as existence, which he considers to be coincident with the concept of the world. Yet, from a phenomenological perspective, the being or existence of things in the world cannot be naively assumed, as Avenarius ultimately does. In phenomenology, the naive assumption of such existence shall indeed be bracketed in order to transcendentally reformulate the very problem of the world in terms of its constitution for subjectivity. Thus, although this might be seen as conflicting with the previously discussed appreciation, Husserl's later characterization of phenomenology as the reversal [*Umkehrung*] of Avenarius's philosophy (Hua IX, p. 474) is eventually consistent with his overall reading of empirio-criticism. Even apart from the lack of a proper transcendental stance, the problematic nature of Avenarius's thought is already evoked in the *Basic Problems* and in the Appendix XV to the main text. Here, Husserl also emphasizes Avenarius's merely empirical account of the world, which does not recognize its peculiar a priori nature,²² and consequently remarks the lack of a proper account of phenomenological constitution in his theory. Both shortcomings condemn empirio-criticism to remain anchored to some sort of naturalism.²³

Having considered in general terms Husserl's positive and negative appraisal of Avenarius's theory, we shall now more specifically address the meaning of the reactivation of concept of the world and pure experience within Husserl's project of the transcendental aesthetic.

²² Hua XIII, pp. 135–136/(Husserl 2006, p. 25).

²³ Hua XIII, pp. 198–199/(Husserl 2006, pp. 109–110).

2.2 An Eidetic and Transcendental Theory of the Experienced World as Such²⁴

From the previous comparison between Husserl and Avenarius, we can gather that phenomenological aesthetic aims to elaborate a transcendental inquiry into the world as the all-embracing correlate of pure experience. In this sense, we can also say that Husserl tries to accomplish, in eidetic and transcendental terms, the project of unveiling the domain of pure experience, which, in Avenarius, was constrained within the boundaries of a naturalistic approach. Arguments supporting these statements can be found in the texts that Husserl explicitly devotes to the definition of his transcendental aesthetic. More precisely, this matter is developed in the 1919 lectures on *Nature and Spirit*; in the already mentioned conclusion of *Formal and Transcendental Logic* as well as in the supplementary texts of the Husserliana edition; in the unpublished manuscripts A VII 14 (1920–1926), A VII 19 (1927), and D 2 (1933). The following considerations are based on these texts.

In his 1919 lecture course on *Nature and Spirit*, which was also labeled *Transcendental Aesthetic*,²⁵ Husserl provides quite a detailed account of his transcendental aesthetic, carefully presenting its aims and its method. Introducing in this text the tasks of the transcendental aesthetic, Husserl writes:

The first task is therefore this primal-ontological one. We can also classify it as a task of a pure and original description of the idea of a physical world in general, namely as a world of mere experience. The physical world is presented in pure intuitiveness and considered before all theory. And now, first among all theorizations, the eidetic description is accomplished. All essential constituents, all absolutely necessary real components in the essence of a physical nature in general, are singled out and expressed in pure and completely faithfully suiting concepts. (Hua Mat IV, p. 151).

The claim that the primary task of the transcendental aesthetic is that of a descriptive ontology is repeated several times in the 1919 lecture course.²⁶ The meaning of this claim is best rendered by the notion of primal ontology [*Ur-Ontologie*]. Thereby, ontology clearly refers to an inquiry into the kinds of beings belonging to the region of the world given in pure experience, whereas the prefix *ur-* refers to the primal or fundamental character of that sphere of experience and, consistently, of the beings under consideration. Such a descriptive, primal ontology clearly echoes certain aspects in Avenarius's philosophy, and particularly the urgent task of returning to the world of pure experience, considered independently of all subsequent theoretical

²⁴ See Manuscript A VII 14/29 a-b.

²⁵ See, Weiler (2002, p. X). In the following semester (winter semester 1919/1920), Husserl also held a seminar on *Philosophische Übungen über transzendentale Ästhetik und transzendentalen Idealismus*. Cf. Schuhmann (1977, p. 236). The 1920/1921 lecture course also had a section devoted to the transcendental aesthetic (Hua XVII, pp. 454–458, 505–510).

²⁶ The same claim also return in other texts, such as manuscript A VII 14, where Husserl concisely writes: “The problem of the transcendental aesthetic – the ontology of the world of experience in its pure being-experienced” “Das Problem der transzendentalen Ästhetik – der Ontologie der Erfahrungswelt in ihrer reinen Erfahrenheit.” A VII 14/2a.

speculation. However, far from being limited to the inquiry into the empirical relationship between the human experience and the world, Husserl's primal ontology aims at providing an eidetic description. That is, rather than appealing to the real world with its contingent relationships, it aims at uncovering the necessary structures of the world as a correlate of all possible (sensible) experience. And indeed, after exposing the hypothesis of two possible lines of phenomenological research, one empirical and one eidetic or a priori,²⁷ in the 1919 lectures, Husserl eventually considers only the latter to be plausible as a transcendental theory:

By transcendental phenomenology we exclusively understand the a priori science of pure consciousness. We therefore also request the exclusion of each and every claim concerning what the phenomenologist experiences de facto in his pure consciousness. (Hua Mat VI, pp. 85–86)²⁸

In manuscript A VII 14, Husserl does not omit to emphasize that such an eidetic ontological description of the world is itself an accomplishment of “thought”, which presupposes and somehow goes beyond that basic level of experience:

A description of the world of experience, a general, typological description that uncovers the world in its constant typological structures, is certainly an accomplishment of thought. However, what I am accomplishing thereby and what I am taking in the higher level to a new self-givenness: concepts and propositions about nature and eventually, in the eidetic stance, the essential lawfulness of a world in general, *formaliter spectata*. All this is just pure description on the basis of possible pure experience.²⁹

However, it is precisely through the reflective distancing from the immediateness of experience, which is also part of the shift from the natural to the phenomenological attitude, that the descriptive inquiry into the world of pure experience can be said to be scientific in a rigorous sense. Only thanks to such a reflective distancing can knowledge, as a kind of “mental possession” [*geistiger Besitz*], be possible in general; and this holds true even if such knowledge is directed toward the sensible layers of experience:

Knowing creates a kind of mental possession, on the basis of which the course of possible experience and of the experienceable can anytime be reconstructed, namely according to its invariant constituents, its permanent structural types of reality, types of forms, of changes, etc.

²⁷ Regarding the equivalence of a priori and eidetic inquiry, see Hua II, pp. 51–52/(Husserl 1999, pp. 39–40); Hua XVII, p. 255/(Husserl 1969, p. 248) footnote.

²⁸ The same hypothesis is already formulated in the *Basic Problems*, where Husserl asks himself whether a phenomenology might be possible, which would not be an eidetic science, cf. Hua XIII, p. 111/(Husserl 2006, p. 1), footnote. Yet, the question remains, in that context, unanswered. The possibility remains open that the question has been taken over in the second part of the lecture course, for which, however, Husserl did not use any written texts or notes. Cf. Kern (1973, p. XXXIV).

²⁹ “Eine Beschreibung der Erfahrungswelt, eine allgemeine, typisierende Beschreibung, die mir die Welt nach ihren durchgehenden typischen Strukturen enthüllt, ist natürlich eine Leistung des Denkens. Aber was ich dabei leiste und in der höheren Stufe zu neuartiger Selbstgegebenheit bringe: Begriffe und Sätze über die Natur, schließlich in eidetischer Betrachtung die Wesensgesetzmäßigkeit einer Welt überhaupt – *formaliter spectata* –, das ist eben reine Beschreibung auf dem Grunde möglicher reiner Erfahrung.” A VII 14/4a.” A VII 14/4 a.

It is thus a separate great task to accomplish the universal description, which is only meaningful as a general description of forms, and thus to bring to knowledge what is proper to a world of experience as such.³⁰

Yet, in order to be phenomenologically legitimated, science certainly needs to be experientially grounded, and cannot lose its fundamental binding with the world of concrete lived experience. Primal ontology as the basic task of the transcendental aesthetic, therefore, must include the description of the region of being entailing all that which is originally given to us in sensible experience, and leave aside all attributions (be they cultural or scientific) constituted on a higher level. Accordingly, this encompasses the inquiry into what makes up the irreducible specificity of the region of sensible being, and what justifies its foundational character with respect to other regions.³¹

I will return to this issue in the next chapter by problematizing the foundational relationship that underlies the stratifications of experience. Yet, before doing this we shall go some step further in characterizing Husserl's project of the transcendental aesthetic. For the eidetic primal ontology of the experienced world is not only to be conceived as an end in itself. On the contrary, descriptive primal ontology also prepares, as it were, the second moment of the transcendental aesthetic, namely the transcendental and constitutive analyses. The latter must turn to the structures of consciousness, for which the world originally display itself (Hua Mat IV, p. 152). In other words, primal ontology is assumed as a guiding thread to phenomenologically investigate the constitution of things in the world and of the world itself as correlates of pure experience, i.e., to investigate experience in terms of the noetic-noematic correlation (Hua Mat IV, p. 119).³² In this sense, the descriptive ontology of the world of pure experience and the transcendental inquiry into its constitution necessarily refer to one another. If, on the one hand, the transcendental inquiry assumes the primal ontology as a guiding thread, on the other hand, primal ontology would still remain phenomenologically incomplete without the transcendental inquiry. Precisely this essential co-implication of the ontological description and the transcendental-constitutive analyses characterizes the transcendental aesthetic in the “most complete and indispensable sense” [*im vollständigen unentbehrlichen Sinn*] (Hua Mat IV, 152).

³⁰“Das Erkennen schafft eine Art von geistigem Besitz, aus dem hinterher der Lauf der möglichen Erfahrung und des Erfahrbaren jederzeit rekonstruiert werden kann, und zwar nach seinen invarianten Beständen, seinen bleibenden strukturellen Realitätstypen, Typen von Formen, von Veränderungen usw. Es ist also eine eigene große Aufgabe, die universale Deskription, die nur sinnvoll als generelle Formdeskription ist, durchzuführen und damit zur Erkenntnis zu bringen, was einer Erfahrungswelt überhaupt als solcher eignet.” A VII 14/4a-b.

³¹This foundational relationship has been notably challenged by Heidegger, who claims that our primal encounter with the world does not happen on the theoretical, but rather on the practical level. Consistently, the experience of things as presence-at-hand [*Vorhandenheit*] is subordinated and derivative with respect to our experience of the thing as ready-to-hand [*Zuhandensein*]. Heidegger (1977, pp. 71–84, 90–97, 254–261; 1979, pp. 90–91). Pradelle (2000, pp. 182f., 193f., 322f.) also endorses the same criticism with regard to Husserl's transcendental aesthetic.

³²This approach is rather consistent throughout Husserl's work. Cf. Hua III/1, pp. 344–348 (Husserl 1983, pp. 355–359); Hua VI, pp. 175f./Husserl 1970, pp. 175f.).

2.3 Conclusions

Can we possibly be satisfied with this distinction of Husserl's and Avenarius's agendas and with the programmatic presentation of the aims and the methods of the phenomenological aesthetic? As a matter of fact, these considerations do not seem to add much new to what everyone familiar with phenomenology already knows, namely that the latter is based on a radical change of the natural attitude and that, thanks to this change, it can develop an eidetic and transcendental approach to experience. It consistently follows from this point that the transcendental aesthetic is a branch of this a priori and transcendental science, namely the branch devoted to the sphere of sensibility.

Nevertheless, there are still three points regarding the presented approach that need to be more thoroughly discussed. (1) The first point concerns the scope of such a theory of sensible experience: which kind of objects can be considered to be constituted within this sphere of experience? (2) The second point is related to the already mentioned stratification: what does the previous discussion regarding the transcendental aesthetic tell us about such stratification? (3) The third point hints at the relationship between the characterization of the transcendental aesthetic as an eidetic theory and the problem of facticity: can an eidetic science bypass facticity if it is supposed to address the issue of sensibility, which seems precisely to make up the factual moment of experience? Of course, I am not aiming to give a definitive answer to these questions right now. However, I believe that a concise thematization of these three key points, considered here as problems with reference to the previous discussion, will be fruitful to introduce the guiding motives for the next chapters of this inquiry.

1. *What is the scope of the phenomenological aesthetic?*

We can preliminarily answer this question by referring to Husserl's systematic definition of the transcendental aesthetic in his 1919 lecture course. Indeed, besides the previous general sketch of the project, Husserl provides here a more specific one too, which hints at a more precise determination of the scope of the aesthetic. Accordingly, the transcendental aesthetic in the most incisive sense is meant to coincide with the ontology and the constitution of the phantom, which is also introduced as the “thing of the transcendental aesthetic” (Hua Mat IV, pp. 172f.).³³

³³ See also manuscript A VII 14/14 a-b, where Husserl also proposes a distinction between aesthetic in a broader sense, i.e., the eidetic theory of concrete intuitive objectuality in opposition to formal ontology, and aesthetic in a narrower sense, i.e., the eidetic theory of sensible objectuality. As Kern (1964, pp. 253f.) points out, the transcendental aesthetic has three shades of meaning in Husserl's writings, since it refers to the inquiries: (1) into the domain of perceptual experience in contrast to predicative experience; (2) into the specific constitution of the *res extensa* or phantom, that is the thing considered apart from the causal nexus; and (3) into primordial constitution, i.e., apart from the intersubjective constitution of the objective world. However, it would be incorrect to interpret this distinction as indicating three totally different and disjointed projects. It is much more consistent with Husserl's approach to read this distinction as referring to the plurality of tasks that nonetheless converge in a unitary and complex project of the science of pure experience.

As it will be shown later, the phantom is a sensible unity, which can be both considered negatively, through the abstraction from the causal relationships of the material world, and positively, as a spatial (but, as I will argue, also temporal) schema originally filled with sensible qualities. Considering the phantom as the thing of the transcendental aesthetic, Husserl clearly believes that its constitution as the pure spatio-temporal schema is the distinctive accomplishment of sensibility. Yet, in doing so, he also finds his own way to connect spatiality and temporality to the transcendental aesthetic. This, together with the very terminological choice, prompts us to address the relationship between Kant's transcendental aesthetic, where space and time are presented as the forms of sensibility and as pure intuitions, and Husserl's aesthetic. For, although the differences in Husserl's and Kant's overall projects may legitimate the claim that Kant was much less of inspiration for Husserl's aesthetic than Avenarius, I believe that a thoughtful comparison with Kant can bring some new insights into the challenges of a phenomenological theory of sensibility. Among these challenges, which I shall address in detail in the next chapter, there is the one concerning the stratification of experience. In noematic terms, this stratification is also mirrored by the definition of the phantom as the a priori necessary basic layer of the experienced thing (Hua Mat IV, p. 174).

2. How to conceive of the stratification of experience?

As it clearly emerges from the conclusion of *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, which I referred to at the very beginning of this chapter, the project of the transcendental aesthetic shall be considered in light of a stratified account of lived experience in its relation to the world. Accordingly, the sensible constitution of the thing, and then of nature as the horizon of all sensible givenness, provides the ground for the constitution of higher order objectivities, i.e., logical, scientific, and more generally cultural. Consistently, this stratified structure shall be mirrored by the phenomenological inquiries, which are supposed to begin from the bottom in order to show how higher order levels of constitution are progressively developed out of the most basic, i.e., sensible, levels. Methodologically, this implies a procedure that starts from the simple and progressively focuses on what is more complex: a procedure that starts from the foundational levels and moves up to the founded. This methodological approach is thus considered to be legitimated by the very structure of the world display. As Husserl writes in his 1919 lecture course:

This typology of the world, however, is constructed from bottom to top. Evidently, it is necessary to follow up this structure, which has its own internal order of foundation, i.e., to start with the lowest level and to proceed upwards, since the originally giving consciousness will obviously get the more complicated, the more we climb up to higher levels. For instance, the consciousness of mental accomplishments naturally presupposes the consciousness in which realities originally give themselves. (Hua Mat IV, p. 143)³⁴

³⁴The same claim is repeated some pages later with more explicit reference to constitution: "The world has its a priori layered structure and it is manifestly necessary to follow this structure along the ontic aspects within the phenomenological constitutive examination, i.e., to begin with the lowest level and to then follow the layered levels. Of course, the originally giving consciousness of a founded objectivity is more complicated than the consciousness of the founding one." Hua Mat IV, p. 150.

This stratification, conceived as a foundational relationship, is what Husserl refers to when he claims that one of the main results of phenomenological inquiry is to have shown that “insightful thought is impossible without intuition”.³⁵ If we consider intuition as based on the givenness “in the flesh”, and as fulfilling merely signitive intentions, this claim certainly represent a phenomenological truth. Yet, it would be dangerous to conceive of the foundational relationship of experience as contemplating a set of layers that are simply piled one upon the other, without considering that not only the lower ones must have an impact on the higher (since the latter are founded upon the former), but that there might also be some sort of “retroaction” of the higher layers upon the lower. In a critical argument, this danger has been highlighted by Pradelle (2000), with particular reference to the difference in Husserl’s and Kant’s approach to sensibility. Again, I will return on some aspects of this argument in the next chapter. Yet, its most challenging point is worth being mentioned right now. In short, Pradelle argues that, in spite of the foundational claim made, for instance, in the previous quote – according to which a genuine phenomenological inquiry shall follow the stratified order of constitution, thus beginning from the bottom or from the basic layers of experience – Husserl’s own descriptions often prove to be guided from the top. That is to say, Husserl’s inquiries into sensible experience seem to entail some abstracting and idealizing presuppositions, which derive from the interest to legitimate higher-order, scientific thought. This, according to Pradelle, apparently challenges the validity of the pure phenomenological description of sensible experience.

I believe that the strength of this critique might be already diminished if we consider the descriptive focusing on the specificity of the singular layers of experience as a form of dismantling. In this sense, it is certainly true that the phenomenological analyses shall first highlight the inner structure of the layers that are more fundamental. However, the starting point to arrive at focusing on those layers is necessarily full-fledged experience, whereby intuition and thought are both given and necessarily refer to one another. This does not necessarily mean that the autonomy of sensible experience is called into question. Since the isolating and dismantling method is precisely meant to bring to the fore the extent and the limits of such autonomous organization. Accordingly, the question as to whether in the description of the lower levels of experience there might be influences from the higher levels is certainly legitimate. Husserl himself seems to be ready to admit that there might be such influences and interconnections between the phenomenological aesthetic and the analytic, and that the foundational nexus might not exhaust the relationship between the two.³⁶ This, however, does not mean to reject the stratification

³⁵ “A possible Ego, insightfully cognizing any world estimated as real, is necessarily a primarily intuiting and then theoretically determining Ego. One of the results of formal phenomenology is that insightful thought is impossible without intuition [...].” Hua Mat IV, p. 143.

³⁶ For instance with regard to the presumptive consciousness of the infinite in the perception of the thing: “Does not everything that stands out here as explorations, referring to the eidetic correlations between experienced object and possible experience – in one word: does the “transcendental aesthetic” not require a transcendental analytic as a higher level? What we investigated in the transcendental aesthetic is the idea of the experience that originally constitutes the identical existence

of experience *tout court*. For it certainly makes sense to address the sensible domain in abstraction from the higher order domains of constitution and to highlight both its inner constitutive potential and its limits. This potential and these limits can only be uncovered by assuming experience as a structured whole, and by dismantling the higher layers of constitution in order to uncover how far the autonomy of the lower layers reaches. Despite recognizing a certain amount of autonomy in the organization of the sensible level, thus, we shall also consider how the different moments are connected and how their interplay concretely shapes experience.

3. Can an eidetic science of sensibility bypass facticity?

In order to better formulate this question, which again will be further discussed throughout this book, let me refer once more to some remarks in Husserl's 1919 lecture course. After the already mentioned presentation of the transcendental aesthetic, Husserl somehow regretfully observes that the whole discussion remains incomplete and only has an only conditioned validity, because one essential dimension has been ignored. Yet, which dimension? "The fact of corporeality" [*Die Tatsache der Leiblichkeit*], which, however, is supposed to play a major role in sensible experience (Hua Mat IV, p. 182). This is Husserl's answer. The lived-body is here approached with respect to both the ontological-descriptive and the constitutive moment of the transcendental aesthetic. First, the lived-body is considered to belong to an absolutely particular region of being. Indeed, the lived-body has a constitutively ambiguous ontological status, being equally a part of material nature and the subjective organ of perception and movement. Secondly, and precisely because it is the organ of perception and movement, the lived-body plays an important role in the constitution of the sensible thing (Hua Mat IV, pp. 182–183). A more detailed discussion of the ambiguity of the lived-body and of its constitutive role will be the object of one of the final chapter of this study. Yet, what is quite important to stress right now is how Husserl introduces the question of the lived-body in the 1919 lecture course as fact of corporeality. How can this "fact" be legitimately part of a theory that claims to be a priori? This is one central question the transcendental aesthetic is supposed to answer. For, given that phenomenology is fundamentally a science of the a priori structures of consciousness, one might be tempted to consider the latter as disembodied, i.e., as merely accidentally related,

of an object as well as the whole of nature: an idea that thus entails multiple infinities in itself. In experience the thing itself is given in the flesh, yet it is presumptively given evermore and *in infinitum*. Its determining substance is an idea and itself, as the being of this substance, is an idea, as are all the subjective relations. Each of the individual typical layers of the substance are ideas and entail infinities." "Fordert nicht das alles, was hier an Untersuchungen abgezeichnet ist, bezogen auf Wesenskorrelationen von Erfahrungsobjekt und möglicher Erfahrung, mit einem Wort: fordert die "transzendentale Ästhetik" nicht als höheres Stockwerk eine transzendentale Analytik? Was wir in der transzendentalen Ästhetik untersuchten, ist die Idee der identisches Dasein eines Dinges und der die ganze Natur ursprünglich konstituierenden Erfahrung: eine Idee, die also vielfache Unendlichkeiten in sich schließt. In der Erfahrung ist das Ding selbst zwar leibhaft gegeben, aber immerfort und ins Unendliche präsumtiv gegeben, sein Bestimmungsgehalt ist eine Idee, und es selbst als Seiendes dieses Gehalts ist eine Idee, und all die subjektiven Relationen; alle einzelnen typischen Schichten derselben sind Ideen und bergen Unendlichkeiten." A VII 14/48 b.

or linked, to a body.³⁷ Let us here preliminarily consider two main implications of this claim, corresponding to, respectively, its endorsement and its refusal. Both of them are relevant at this point, because they allow us to better formulate the question of facticity. If we endorse the claim of a disembodied consciousness, then the very problem of the transcendental aesthetic would get lost. Since the latter is a theory of sensible constitution, one will eventually be confronted with the necessary role of sensations, and with their irreducibility to spontaneous formations of consciousness. Thus, sensations inevitably confront phenomenology with the problem of facticity. Yet, how can sensations be given and how can sensible things consequently manifest themselves to consciousness, were it not for the lived-body? If we reject that claim, as I think we need to do if we take seriously the project of the transcendental aesthetic, then we will be faced with the question as to the reconciliation of facticity with the a priori. Does not such an irreducible facticity eventually contradict the a priori claims of the transcendental aesthetic? Shall the latter be considered as a mere empirical science, thus more in line with Avenarius? A hint to answer this question is provided by the very idea of a disembodied consciousness. As I mentioned, if one endorses this idea, then the relation between consciousness and the body would be merely accidental. Conversely, however, if one rejects it, one will have to understand such a relationship as not being merely accidental, that is as being itself necessary. If this is the case, then the very facticity of sensation and the lived-body does not merely coincide with some sort of fortuitousness, since there would be no world of experience at all without the mediation of the lived-body as the organ of perception. On the contrary, this facticity has its own essential necessity. In this sense, it might be more appropriate to think about this facticity not as a *Tatsache* but rather as a *Faktum*, thereby indicating precisely that distinctive necessity. This eventually implies the re-consideration of the a priori as designating the immanent structures of the experienced world, which cannot in principle be considered apart from the concreteness of lived experience.³⁸

I assume the three just presented questions as strictly interrelated. In the following chapters, we shall return on them by considering how spatiality and temporality relate to each other within Husserl's transcendental aesthetic.

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³⁷This is the claim Husserl makes in the *Basic Problems*, Hua XIII, pp. 142–144/(Husserl 2006, pp. 32–33). In the following, and particularly in the last chapter of this book, I will consider several arguments that go against such a claim.

³⁸In this respect, aiming to reconcile the eidetic approach with the priority granted by phenomenology to the structure of the world of factual experience, Landgrebe (1949, 1982) refers to phenomenology as transcendental empiricism. This characterization has been re-proposed by Depraz (2001).

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Chapter 3

The Transcendental Aesthetic: Husserl and Kant

Considering Husserl's project of the transcendental aesthetic in relation to the legacy of Avenarius has allowed us to discuss the connection between the phenomenological aesthetic, pure experience, and the concept of the world. However, the discussion in the previous chapter has neither provided a satisfying description of that project, nor of its position within the Husserlian understanding of phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy. Particularly, the question of the stratifications of experience, which allows us to better define that position, needs to be further investigated. This will be done, in this chapter, through the comparison of Husserl's and Kant's approach to sensibility. Indeed, the notion of the transcendental aesthetic, which Husserl adopts to designate his theory of sensible experience, is clearly borrowed from Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Thus, a closer investigation regarding the meaning of the reactivation of Kant's terminology within the phenomenological theory of experience is required. The adoption of Kant's terminology has implications that go far beyond the reference to the theory of sensibility and eventually concern the definition of phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy. The aim of this chapter, however, is not to provide a philological reconstruction of the developments in Husserl's reading of Kant.¹ Rather, by systematically focusing on some specific theoretical questions, the aim is first to circumscribe Husserl's project of the transcendental aesthetic with its distinctive feature, and secondly to highlight how the comparison with Kant, even beyond Husserl's own intentions, uncovers what is at stake with the phenomenological theory of sensible experience and how the latter reverberates upon the phenomenological account of experience in general. In a way, what I propose here is a reflection that grows between Husserl and Kant, aiming to show how both thinkers contribute in shaping an approach to sensibility that remains faithful to the complexity of experience.

¹Different authors have discussed the relationship between Kant's and Husserl's philosophies. For the topics addressed in this chapter, see, notably: Bégout (2000a), Bisin (2006), De Palma (2001), Gallagher (1972), Hoche (1964), Kern (1964), Lohmar (1998), Mohanty (1996), Pradelle (2000, 2012), Ricœur (1987), Rinofner-Kreidl (2000, pp. 206–246), Rotenstreich (1998), and Snyder (1995).

The first part of the chapter discusses Husserl's critique to the *Transcendental Aesthetic* in Kant's first *Critique*. This will allow me to highlight Husserl's explicit purposes in giving shape to his own transcendental aesthetic and to discuss its specific method. Yet, besides being often oriented towards the determination *a contrario* of the phenomenological aesthetic, Husserl's criticism enters in tension with certain aspects of Kant's philosophy. The second part of the chapter examines such tensions. The aim of this return to Kant is to assess whether some moments in his philosophy (notably related to the relationship between sensibility and the understanding) may have a more positive impact in giving shape to the phenomenological aesthetic, considered in connection with the theory of experience as a whole. Thus, in a back and forth movement, this chapter reads Kant through the glasses of Husserl and Husserl through the glasses of Kant, thereby maintaining the questioning oriented toward the thing itself, namely the transcendental theory of sensible experience in its spatio-temporal unfolding.

3.1 Husserl's Reading of Kant

One passage in the *Cartesian Meditations* is particularly representative of Husserl's critical appropriation of Kant's concept of the transcendental aesthetic. Observing that the space and time arguments in the first *Critique* implicitly lead to the noematic a priori of sensible intuition, Husserl stresses that this happens nonetheless only according to very restricted and unclear circumstances. For this reason, he considers Kant's theory of sensible experience to be in need of phenomenological supplements, which he would possibly incorporate within a larger theory of constitution.² Consistently, in manuscript A VII 14, Husserl highlights the scope of the phenomenological theory of sensible experience and contrasts it with the much more "meager" *Transcendental Aesthetic* in the first *Critique*, the shortcomings of which can be detected with respect to both its methodological approach and its arrangement in principle:

Accordingly, you can already foresee how enormously the essential problems of a complete transcendental aesthetic will increase if we shift the focus towards perception, in all its possible essential directions and correlations. And you will realize how meager and, with regard to its principal configuration and method, unsolved the original Kantian transcendental aesthetic was.³

²Hua I, p. 174/(Husserl 1960, p. 146).

³"Danach sehen Sie schon voraus, wie ungeheuer sich die Wesensproblematik einer vollen transzendentalen Ästhetik erweitert, wenn wir die Wahrnehmung nach allen möglichen Wesensrichtungen und – korrelationen zum Thema machen. Und Sie ersehen, wie mager und hinsichtlich der prinzipiellen Anordnung und Methode ungeklärt die ursprüngliche kantische transzendentale Ästhetik war." A VII 14/92 b. See also manuscript A VII 14/89 a; Hua VII, pp. 357f., 381f.

Considering these critical remarks, it should come as no surprise that, whenever Husserl adopts Kant's terminology in his own theory of sensibility, he also insists on the distance that separates Kant's approach from the phenomenological one. For Husserl, in other words, the need for a transcendental theory of sensible experience can only be fulfilled by phenomenology with its distinctive method and conceptualization.⁴ Thus, the phenomenological reactivation of the concept of transcendental aesthetic necessarily implies a transformation of the meaning that this concept has for Kant. This transformation is parallel to the different approaches to experience adopted by, respectively, Kant and Husserl.

The conception of experience that underlies Kant's *Transcendental Aesthetic*, and to which Husserl's criticism is addressed, is condensed in the following famous passage from the *System of the Principles of Pure Understanding*:

Now experience rests on the synthetic unity of appearances, i.e., on a synthesis according to concepts of the object of appearances in general, without which it would not even be cognition but rather a rhapsody of perceptions, which would not fit together in any context in accordance with rules of a thoroughly connected (possible) consciousness, thus not into the transcendental and necessary unity of apperception.⁵

According to this quite explicit claim, sensible experience, despite being one of the sources of our cognition,⁶ is not sufficiently organized to make cognition possible: to this end, the synthesis of the understanding is also required. As we can read from the well-known passage just quoted, without the synthetic unity of appearances, which is a synthesis according to the concepts, we would be left with a mere rhapsody of perceptions deprived of inner lawfulness and thus we could not arrive at any kind of cognition. In other words, the rules that make it possible for sensible intuitions to be assumed within the realm of possible cognition are of a conceptual order. Synthesis, therefore, is what gives rise to cognition according to a rule; more precisely, it is what gives a lawful unity to experience by putting together different representations and by comprehending their manifoldness.⁷ This unity cannot be achieved within sensibility alone; it rather requires the power of the imagination, to accomplish the synthesis of the given manifold, and the understanding, to bring such a synthesis to concepts and thus to give rise to proper cognition.⁸

⁴ "When Kant defines the transcendental aesthetic as a transcendental theory of the senses, as a transcendental consideration of sensibility, I can very well accept this, yet in the modified approach of phenomenology and in its *eo ipso* essentially modified conceptualization" "Wenn Kant die transzendentale Ästhetik als eine transzendentale Sinnenlehre definiert, als eine transzendentale Erwägung der Sinnlichkeit, so kann ich das in der geänderten Betrachtungsweise der Phänomenologie und in ihrer *eo ipso* wesentlich geänderten Begriffsbildung sehr wohl akzeptieren." A VII 14/89a.

⁵ KrV, B 195/A 156/(Kant 1998, p. 282).

⁶ KrV, B 74/A 50/(Kant 1998, p. 193).

⁷ KrV, B 103/A 77/(Kant 1998, pp. 210–211).

⁸ KrV, B 103/A 78/(Kant 1998, p. 211). Kant's observations concerning the necessary but not sufficient character of sensibility for cognition and therefore the inevitable references to the complementarity of sensibility and the understanding are conspicuous. Besides the one I mentioned, see notably KrV, A 107, A 111–112/(Kant 1998, pp. 232, 234–235); Prol. AA 04, pp. 320f./ (Kant 2002, pp. 112f.). On this topic, see also Marcucci (2003, pp. 58–60); Scaravelli (1968, pp. 57f.);

Husserl endorses the claim that, for both experience and cognition to be possible, the sensible contents must be subject to a rule. This certainly is not intended to mean that sensibility alone is the source of cognition, since the latter also require the sphere of judgment. What it is meant is rather that, at the most basic level, cognition needs to be grounded upon sensible lawfulness and that there must be no conflict between what is judged and what is given in and through sensibility. With respect to Kant, thus, Husserl also modifies the mentioned claim in one of its central points: contrary to what follows from the quoted passage in the first *Critique*, for Husserl, synthesis is immanent to the very sphere of sensibility. This is why sensibility can properly be addressed as the primal layer of constitution, phenomenologically intended in light of the correlation between the subject and the world, being therefore indispensable for higher order forms of cognition. Yet, to understand the meaning of this reformulation regarding the synthetic moment of experience, we shall consider the context in which it emerges, namely Husserl's critical appraisal of some other pivotal concepts in Kant's philosophy, such as the concepts of the transcendental and the a priori.

3.1.1 Two Meanings of the Transcendental and the A Priori

In one text dated 1908 and published as Appendix XX in Hua VII, Husserl extensively discusses the issue of the transcendental. Thereby, he critically addresses Kant's view on the transcendental, though clearly having the Neo-Kantian interpretation thereof in his mind. Notably, Husserl dwells here on the double meaning of the notion of transcendental, i.e., what he considers to be a disturbing ambiguity, which mirrors the two senses in which this notion is taken up respectively in Kant's (and the Neo-Kantian's) philosophy and in phenomenology (Hua VII, p. 385). As we can read in the heading of this text, the different senses are traced back to the distinction between Husserl's own transcendental-phenomenological method and Kant's transcendental-logical method (Hua VII, pp. 382, 461). Yet, what makes up the similarity of the two methods, which allows us to qualify both of them as transcendental? And which are the differences that make the transcendental assume a different meaning according to the relevant context?

For both Husserl and Kant, the qualification of transcendental is proper to an investigation that aims at determining the a priori conditions for possible cognition, the latter being a subjective accomplishment and yet directed toward something transcending subjectivity.⁹ Moreover, what makes the specificity of the phenomenological transcendental method is for Husserl a twofold return to the origins of knowledge: first, a return to the logical and a priori origins of all possible cognition and science; and second, a return to transcendental subjectivity, as the ultimate

Snyder (1995, pp. 47–108). In the second part of this chapter, I will discuss whether in Kant this claim really implies a lack of autonomous organization of the sensible sphere.

⁹ See, respectively, KrV, B 25f./A 11f./Kant 1998, pp. 132f.) and Hua VII, p. 386.

source for the constitution of each kind of objectivity. Precisely this transcendental inquiry into the origins, as Husserl trenchantly remarks, has been neglected by Kant and by his philosophical inheritors (Hua VII, p. 382).

Some further clues to understand this twofold return to the origins of knowledge, which is supposed to mark the difference between Husserl's and Kant's transcendental enterprises, can be found at paragraph 100 of *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, a text written some 20 years after the aforementioned Appendix XX. As Husserl writes in this text, the questions raised in Kant's transcendental philosophy are immediately set on too high a level, i.e., on the level of conceptual thinking. This entails a number of hindrances, obscurities, and difficulties related to Kant's failure to recognize the transcendental problem of logic as located on a much lower level, i.e., on the level of sensible experience. Yet, it is precisely from this lower level of experience that a proper transcendental inquiry into constitution shall take departure. And this not only with the aim of describing the inner structural articulation of sensible experience, but also of showing how the higher and more complex levels relate to it (Hua XVII, p. 271).

Basing his remarks more on the interpretation of the transcendental given by the Marburg School rather than on the original definition by Kant,¹⁰ Husserl suggests that the lack of a proper inquiry into the transcendental function of sensibility is due to a set of unquestioned presuppositions inherited from the philosophical and scientific tradition and responsible for a distinctive transcendental *naiveté*.¹¹ In both *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and the Appendices in Hua VII, this *naiveté* is traced back to two sets of presuppositions: those related to the assumptions of traditional formal logic and those related to the natural sciences (in particular, Newtonian physics). The former set of presuppositions is specifically required in Kant's reference to the table of the logical functions of judgments to derive the table of the categories. Criticizing such a reference, Husserl refers to Hume and claims that a truly radical transcendental inquiry should rather critically address logic as well and test the validity of what is traditionally assumed as a logical truth.¹² The latter set of presuppositions, which is more explicitly thematized in the first part of Husserl's lecture course on *First Philosophy* and in the Appendix XVIII to this text, is connected to the regressive and constructive approach of Kantian and Neo-Kantian philosophy. According to Husserl, these philosophical projects set themselves quite a clear epistemological goal, namely the philosophical legitimization of physical theories, which are, however, naively assumed as an undisputed datum (Hua VII,

¹⁰ Of course, it would also be wrong to level out the different position within the Neo-Kantian tradition. A more adequate assessment of the different positions clearly goes beyond the scope of this research. Husserl's criticism, however, seems to be particularly addressed toward Cohen's (1987, pp. 97–100) discussion of the role of philosophy with respect to the physical and mathematical sciences. With some exceptions, this approach is endorsed by most of the philosophers of the Marburg school. For a thorough discussion of the theoretical differences within Neo-Kantianism, see Orth (1994).

¹¹ With regard to such *naiveté*, see Henrich (1958), Kern (1964, pp. 85–88), and Snyder (1995, pp. 156f.).

¹² Hua XVII, pp. 271f./Husserl 1969, pp. 264f.).

p. 370).¹³ Yet, being always already oriented toward the legitimization of physics, the (Neo-)Kantian regressive-transcendental questioning is unable to properly formulate the phenomenological-transcendental problem of constitution:

And yet, it is a constructive process of thinking, followed by complying intuition rather than a gradually ascending from the bottom, from exhibition to exhibition intuitively proceeding process of understanding of the constitutive accomplishments of consciousness, with all perspectives available for reflection. The somehow most intimate aspects of the constituting consciousness are, in general, hardly touched by Kant. The sensible phenomena he is engaged with are already constituted units of a superabundant intentional structure that never undergoes any systematic analysis. (Hua VII, pp. 197–198)

Husserl's evaluation of the philosophical implications of Kant's presuppositions can be detected already in the *Logical Investigations*, where the question of the transcendental is not yet explicitly formulated. These implications concern central aspects in both Husserl's and Kant's philosophy, namely the definition of the a priori and the distinction between intuitions and concepts. Reviewing his analyses of categorial intuition, at paragraph 66 of the *Sixth Logical Investigation*, Husserl criticizes Kant for having failed to achieve the fundamental extension of the concept of perception and intuition over the categorial realm. Accordingly, this implies that Kant does not appreciate the deep difference between intuition and signification,¹⁴ that he does not properly address the relation between inadequate and adequate adaptation of meaning to intuition; and moreover, that he does not distinguish the different meanings of the word “concept”: (1) as meaning of words, (2) as species of authentic universal presentation, and (3) as universal object correlate to intuitive acts. The unsuitability of Kant's approach to intuition and concepts is traced back to the above mentioned presuppositions, particularly to the attempt of philosophically and critically saving the mathematical science of nature. Consistently with the overall approach of the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl argues that the emancipation from these presuppositions can only be attained by tracing the primitive logical concepts and laws back to their phenomenological sources and by eidetically describing the different intentional acts in which pre-logical objectification and logical thought are performed. Further developing this point in a note added in the second edition of the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl contends that, failing to understand ideation in phenomenological terms and neglecting an appropriate survey of conceptual essences and of the universal laws rooted therein, Kant eventually lacks the phenomenologically correct concept of a priori.¹⁵

Regardless the philological correctness of this interpretation, which may be contended with respect to Kant's supposed unquestioned assumption of both

¹³ See also Hua VII, pp. 197f. Precisely with respect to the presuppositions related to the natural sciences, in Husserl's assessment, Kant's approach seems to collapse with the Neo-Kantian of the Marburg School. See Kern (1964, pp. 321f.) and Luft (2006). According to Wieland (2001, p. 29), however, mathematics and physics only provide a methodological orientation to Kant's inquiries. The latter, thus, are not to be intended as an attempt to philosophically ground two factually existing disciplines.

¹⁴ Hua XIX/2, pp. 731–732/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 318–319).

¹⁵ Hua XIX/2, p. 732, footnote/(Husserl 2001c, p. 319).

traditional formal logic and physics, it remains true that Husserl believes it necessary to present his own transcendental method in opposition to these assumptions. From what just said, it clearly emerges that both the alleged *terminus a quo* of Kant's inquiry (namely the unquestioned assumption of traditional logic and physics), and its correlative *terminus ad quem* (the philosophical legitimization of physics as the mathematical science of nature against skepticism) cannot be reconciled with phenomenological philosophy, i.e., with a philosophy that is precisely based on the bracketing of all naive positing, including those made by science.

Yet, the remarks concerning the inadequateness of Kant's notions of the transcendental and the a priori are not only connected with these averred constructive presuppositions. They are also strictly linked to the inquiry into the subjectivity of experience. And, as I now wish to show, the discussion regarding the nexus between subjectivity, the a priori, and the transcendental in Kant's philosophy have crucial implications for the phenomenological theory of sensibility.

3.1.2 Experience and Subjectivity

Besides the just discussed presuppositions of Kant's transcendental questioning, allegedly bound to the factual existence of sciences and logic, Husserl has to define the transcendental in light of the twofold return to the origins of knowledge, i.e., to its logical and to its subjective origins (Hua VII, p. 382). Regarding the definition of the transcendental in terms of the a priori conditions of objective knowledge, insofar as the latter is subjectively accomplished, Husserl never tires to acknowledge his intellectual debt to Kant.¹⁶ Up to this point, as we can read in the Appendix XX in Hua VII, there is a substantial agreement between Husserl and Kant. Nevertheless, an immediate specification of Husserl's qualifies this statement significantly. Since, he admits, we do need to determine subjectivity phenomenologically (Hua VII, p. 386). Thus, the agreement with Kant risks here to be only superficial or external, since there is no convergence as to the determination of subjectivity and the intentional correlation between subjectivity and the world (Hua VII, p. 386). Almost 20 years later, in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Husserl reasserts this claim and suggests that, in order to uncover the genuine transcendental questions, one shall begin from the primal ground of phenomenological subjectivity. Once a proper phenomenological approach to subjectivity has been assumed, the set of all possible transcendental questions is also attained.¹⁷ Consistently, we can retrace a parallelism between the delineation of the phenomenological transcendental method and

¹⁶This recognition is explicitly formulated in the text Husserl wrote on occasion of the Freiburg celebrations of Kant's 200th birthday in 1924, Hua VII, p. 230. A revised version of the paper should have appeared on the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, yet eventually could only be published posthumous in Hua VII.

¹⁷Hua XVII, p. 271/(Husserl 1969, pp. 264–265).

the inquiry into subjectivity: to the adequateness or inadequateness of the latter corresponds the adequateness or the inadequateness of the former.

Husserl's remarks on the subjectivity or experience first tackle the aspects of formality and abstraction that can be detected in Kant's determination of the transcendental apperception as the "I think". As opposed to this formal determination, Husserl emphasizes the concreteness of subjective experience as the field of inquiry disclosed by the phenomenological reduction, which uncovers the indispensable correlation between the *Ego cogito* and the *cogitata qua cogitata*. However, the point Husserl most polemically addresses is another one, namely the anthropological presuppositions that underlie Kant's approach to subjectivity and that reverberate on his very account of the transcendental and the a priori.¹⁸

In this respect, the critique addressed to Kant reactivates the one raised against the anthropological positions of some of Husserl's contemporaries, notably Sigwart and Erdmann, in the *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*.¹⁹ Considering anthropologism as a particular kind of psychologism, Husserl challenges its foundational claims with regard to the pure eidetic sciences, such as pure logic. Thus, anthropologism is particularly blamed by virtue of the relativist and skeptical consequences that inevitably follow from the assumption of the human being as the measure of logical truth and falsity. Behind a much more refined conceptual apparatus, Husserl spots a core of anthropological assumptions also in Kant's philosophy. These assumptions, in his view, eventually menace the consistency of the very notion of the transcendental and the a priori. In a text entitled *Kant's Copernican Revolution and the Meaning of Such a Copernican Turn in General* [Kants kopernikanische Umdrehung und der Sinn einer solchen kopernikanischen Wendung überhaupt], which is actually quite generous in its recognition of the theoretical debt contracted with Kant, Husserl condenses his criticism as follows:

[...] Kant has [...] not taken the whole somatic-psycho-physical rootedness of intuitive and thinking knowledge, which he presupposes everywhere, as a transcendental theme and thus lapsed into an opalescent anthropologism with serious metaphysical consequences and which displaces from the very beginning the concept of the a priori, i.e., the transcendental concepts of the faculties, the concept of transcendental apperception, towards an unscientific darkness. In a sense, it has to be said that Kant oversimplified the problem by not yet recognizing the whole system of correlative and inseparably connected problems. And this is exactly the reason for a milieu of profound unclarity, which extends over the whole system and which nobody has brought to pure clarity up to now. (Hua VII, p. 228)

Thus, Kant's most fundamental mistake consists in tracing the a priori structures of objective knowledge back to the factual conformation of the human subject. Yet, how can we maintain that those structures are still a priori if they are ultimately founded upon something accidental? In other words, how can we conceive of the a priori both as independent of all experience (and for this reason, in Kant's view, universal and necessary) and as founded upon the empirical faculties of the human

¹⁸ For an accurate analysis of the different passages in which Husserl criticizes the anthropological presuppositions of Kant's approach to the a priori, see Kern (1964, pp. 114–134).

¹⁹ Hua XVIII, pp. 122–158/(Husserl 2001b, pp. 77–101).

subject? To answer these questions, we shall discuss the difference between Kant's and Husserl's appreciation of the relation between universality, necessity, and objective validity. Distinguishing the objective validity of judgments of experience from the only subjective validity of judgments of perception, in his *Prolegomena* Kant holds that:

Objective validity and necessary universal validity (for everyone) are therefore interchangeable concepts, and although we do not know the object in itself, nonetheless, if we regard a judgment as universally valid and hence necessary, objective validity is understood to be included.²⁰

Husserl seems to indirectly quote this very passage in the Appendix XVI of Hua VII, playing on what we may call a reformulation of the distinction between truth of fact and truth of reason. In this text, Husserl contends that Kant eventually fails to grasp the difference between a merely factual necessity, which is nothing more than a constraint [*Zwang* or *Nötigung*], and the genuine pure necessity which is proper to the eidetic laws. Exclusively this latter kind of necessity, according to Husserl, can be adopted for the determination of the a priori.²¹ This necessity, which remains valid for all possible (and even only imaginable) subjects is synonymous of pure universality, and shall not be confused with the validity for the factually judging subjects. It is a necessity that manifests itself intuitively as the impossibility, for what conforms to the eidetic a priori laws, of being otherwise. Hence, in Husserl's reading of the quoted passage from Kant's *Prolegomena*, the accent clearly falls on the difference between (eidetic) universality and (factual) general validity, and notably upon Kant's specification of the latter expression as a validity "for everyone", which Husserl considers to be equivalent with "for every human and judging subject". By virtue of this latter specification, Kant's notions of necessity and universality reveal to be illusory, since they ultimately result form an inductive generalization, which is fully accomplished within the factual realm. Yet, here we meet again the question formulated above: Can inductive generalization be assumed as legitimating the a priori character of the experiential and then logical structures? Husserl's answer to this question is no. And this negative answer holds even if one consistently remains within Kant's philosophy. For the equivalence between universal validity and validity for everyone, established in the passage from the *Prolegomena*, is clearly in tension with the determination of the a priori as what logically precedes experience and makes it possible.²² Factual experience, which should in principle be omitted from

²⁰Prol. AA 04, p. 298/(Kant 2002, p. 93).

²¹"He [Kant] fails to notice that there is a difference between the objective necessity with which we – by the factual law of our nature – have to state a proposition, which is a constraint, and the necessity that we see as belonging to the substance [*Gehalt*] of what is judged (the "judgment") and that we have purely and simply as insight. He overlooks that such a necessity, i.e., the intuited necessity, is just another word for pure generality – not general validity for all judging individuals – and that such a generality gets lost as soon as we "explain" it by peculiarities of human intelligence, and thereby limit it, i.e., revoking generality and transforming it into a contingent one." Hua VII, p. 359.

²²See, for instance, KrV, B 2/A 2/(Kant 1998, pp. 127–128); Prol. AA 04, pp. 265–266/(Kant 2002, pp. 61–62).

the definition of the a priori, is eventually reabsorbed in this very definition thanks to the understanding of universal validity in light of an inductive generalization. Yet, this way to proceed precisely implies the loss of those characters of universality and necessity that are distinctive of the a priori: the necessity of the a priori would be turned into a contingency. Opposing his own determination of the a priori as eidetic necessity, based upon the non-imaginability of the contrary,²³ to inductive generalization, Husserl insists that such non-imaginability is not a mere factual incapability to mentally elaborate counter-examples to the eidetic laws. This, indeed, would leave open the possibility of the existence of other subjects, for whom that kind of elaboration or mental representation is possible. Thus, the impossibility of imagining the contrary of eidetic necessary laws is impossibility in principle, based upon the inevitable contradiction in which all different assumptions incur.²⁴

If we now consider Husserl's texts more closely, we can observe that his anthropologism critique is strongly linked to three central and reciprocally interconnected issues in Kant's philosophy: the theory of the faculties, of the thing in itself, and of the *intellectus archetipus*. Let us now consider this critique more closely.²⁵

In the first part of his lecture course on *First Philosophy*, Husserl considers Kant's reference to mythical transcendental faculties as responsible for the enigmatic atmosphere in which his characterizations of subjectivity, cognition, and the a priori structure of experience eventually remain suspended (Hua VII, p. 198). As a matter of fact, if we consider the introduction to the *Transcendental Logic* of the first *Critique*, we can remark that the distinction of the two essential sources of all possible cognition, intuition and concept, is based upon the theory of the faculties.²⁶ Accordingly, the distinction between the *Transcendental Aesthetic* and the *Transcendental Logic* is traced back to the distinction of human faculties: whereas

²³ Although one can detect this equivalence also in the pages I am commenting here, its most explicit formulation can be found in a footnote in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*: "Accordingly, the concept eidos is also given a maximally broad sense, which comprehends likewise all syntactical objectivities. At the same time, this sense defines the only concept belonging to the multisignificant expression, a priori, that I recognize philosophically. That concept alone is meant whenever the locution a priori occurs in my writings." Hua XVII, p. 255 footnote/(Husserl 1969, p. 248). A similar statement can be found in Hua II, pp. 51–52/(Husserl 1999, pp. 39–40). The scientific model on the background of this equivalence is mathematics as a pure science. Yet, different from this science, which operates with the so-called exact concepts, phenomenology is a pure science that operates with morphological concepts (I will return on this issue in the second section). The reference to mathematics for the phenomenological determination of the a priori can be found in Hua III/1, pp. 153–158/(Husserl 1983, pp. 164–171); Hua XXVII, pp. 13f. See also Bernet et al. (1989, pp. 107f.) and Sowa (2007).

²⁴ "I however have an insight into necessity, and evidence does not imply – as in Kant, who occasionally uses this word as well – that I have an intuition of pure space, i.e., of space arising from this original subjectivity. Rather, evidence implies insight into necessity, as the inconceivability of the opposite. The inconceivability does not mean the incapacity to generate a deviating intuition, i.e., a contingent incapacity. It rather means an essential impossibility, like it is an essential and intuitible impossibility that red is a sound and that color is not something other than love." Hua VII, pp. 357–358.

²⁵ On Husserl's critique of Kant's Copernican revolution and his attempt to clarify the essence of transcendental subjectivity without referring to its alleged faculties, see Pradelle (2012).

²⁶ KrV B 74–88/A 50–64/(Kant 1998, pp. 193–200).

the former is devoted to the general structure of sensibility, the latter refers to the general laws of the understanding and reason. Besides, the *Transcendental Logic* is further articulated into (a) the *Transcendental Analytic*, which resolves the whole formal procedure of the understanding and reason in its elements and thereby exhibits these elements as the principles of all logical criticism of our cognition,²⁷ and (b) the *Transcendental Dialectic*, the task of which is a critique of the understanding and reason as to their hyperphysical employment.²⁸ The theory of the faculties of *Gemütt* is therefore parallel to the distinction between intuitions and concepts and it seems to be presupposed by Kant's claim that none of the two can be considered as self-sufficient, since thoughts without contents are empty, and intuitions without concepts are blind.²⁹ Yet, the assumption of the human faculties as the basis for the distinction of the experiential access to the object – through sensibility the object is given to us, whereas through the understanding it is thought³⁰ – risks ending up in a relativization of the very considerations on the a priori conditions of cognition and experience proposed in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Indeed, the a priori character of these structures seems to hold only for the experience of a subject, who happens to be de facto equipped with the two complementary faculties of sensibility and the understanding, both equally original and irreducible to one another. That is to say, these conditions eventually hold for the experience of the human subject. Both this conclusion and the premises that lead hereto are clearly unacceptable for Husserl. And this precisely for the equivalence of the a priori and the eidetic laws that he endorses. Thus, it comes as no surprise that Husserl rejects the theory of the faculties of *Gemütt* and labels it as dogmatic (Hua VII, pp. 379, 401).

Husserl considers the notions of the thing in itself and of *intellectus archetypus* as strictly connected. Thereby he does not hesitate in labeling them as absurdities (Hua VII, p. 364) and as related to a groundless metaphysics (Hua VII, p. 362). This parallel consideration is legitimated by the reference to the positive meaning of the thing in itself: accordingly, the thing in itself is not only approached as that which withdraws from possible (human) intuition and cognition, but also as the object of possible (non-human) intellectual intuition.³¹ Indeed, following Kant's argumentation, Husserl points out that the a priori cognition of things as they are in themselves is

²⁷ KrV B 85/A 60/(Kant 1998, p. 198). With regard to this point, see also Marcucci (2003, pp. 58–60).

²⁸ KrV B 88/A 63/(Kant 1998, pp. 199–200).

²⁹ KrV, B 75/A 51/(Kant 1998, pp. 193–194).

³⁰ KrV B 74/A 50/(Kant 1998, p. 193).

³¹ In this sense, the thing in itself is considered as equivalent to the *noumenon*. KrV, B 310/A 254/(Kant 1998, p. 350). And of the *noumenon* Kant provides the positive and the negative definition I am referring to. KrV, B 307f./A 249f./ (Kant 1998, p. 347f.) The notion of the *intellectus archetypus* does not appear in this context; however, we can find here the reference to a subject capable of intellectual intuition. Instead, the notion of the *intellectus archetypus* is explicitly thematized in the *Critique of Judgment* in opposition to the *intellectus ectypus*, which is discursive and image-dependent [*der Bilder bedürftig*]. See KU, AA 05, pp. 405–410/(Kant 2000, pp. 274–279). Besides Husserl's critique to this positive notion of the thing in itself as the correlate of an intuitive understanding, Kern (1964, pp. 120f.) also mentions his critique to the realist interpretation of the thing in itself (particularly in Riehl's view) and to the characterization of the thing in itself as the unknown cause of the phenomenon.

precluded to us, since we are not archetypal intellects, whereas God the creator knows every being in itself a priori, because his thought precedes the very being of things (Hua VII, p. 361).³²

Mutatis mutandis, with regard to the *intellectus archetipus* and to the thing in itself we find a critique analogous to the one raised against the faculties of *Gemiit*. Also, in this case, the notion of the a priori is challenged. Indeed, from what just said it becomes clear that the distinction between appearances and things in themselves, are determined on the basis of the characteristics of the subject: human in the first case, and divine in the second. According to Husserl, this way of reasoning is somehow paradoxical, since, against Kant's own claims, the a priori laws of experience are eventually inferred from the factual characteristics of the experiencing or knowing subject. In opposition to all kinds of anthropologism, Husserl defines the a priori in relation to the eidetic laws determining the structures of experience and the peculiar modes of givenness of objects belonging to the different regions of being. These laws must be valid for each and every possible and even only thinkable subject. Thus, even if one would admit the possibility of an *intellectus archetipus*, the creative power of this divine understanding would be limited to the factual domain, and could not, in principle, be extended to the domain of eidetic a priori laws (Hua VII, p. 363).

However, problems emerge even if one sticks to the negative meaning of the thing in itself, namely as that which is in principle beyond the domain of possible cognition. Thus defined, the thing in itself is clearly in conflict with the principle of the phenomenological reduction, and with its disclosing the field of consciousness as *Ego-cogito-cogitata qua cogitata*. If all being is conceived in light of its displaying for consciousness,³³ and if the intentional correlation makes up the universal field within which a science of such displaying is possible in general, then no place is left for a thing in itself, as that which withdraws from all possible displaying.

In light of such an line of reasoning, the phenomenological account of the a priori obtains a sharper connotation. Indeed, it has become clear that the eidetic status of the a priori is strictly related to the correlation between being and displaying, which eventually can be translated into the equivalence between being "in itself" and being "for all possible or imaginable subjects". In this sense, the a priori of experience eidetically defines the structures of objective displaying, the modes of givenness that structurally belong to a certain ontological region (perceptual thing, ideal object, cultural object, etc.) in its specificity, and that are again valid for all possible or imaginable subject. Subtracted from the dependency to the factual conformation of the subject, the distinction between a priori and a posteriori is itself eidetically determined, for it belongs to the eidetic laws that rule the sphere of experience and cognition in general.

³²Although Husserl in this passage speaks about the knowledge of things as they are in themselves, we should observe that for Kant it is more appropriate to speak about the intuition of the thing in itself for the *intellectus archetipus*, which is something different from discursive knowledge.

³³This, however, does not imply the reduction of all being to mere appearance, in a way proposing a form of "dogmatic" idealism like Berkley's.

3.1.3 *The Boundaries Between Aesthetic and Analytic*

For my present analysis, it is now essential to assess how the previous remarks concerning the approach to the a priori and the meaning of the transcendental impinge on Husserl's project of the transcendental aesthetic. This becomes clear if we go a step further in following Husserl's critique to Kant. Indeed, it is precisely in the chapter of the first *Critique* devoted to the *Transcendental Aesthetic* that Husserl detects the most explicit expression of the anthropological implications of Kant's Copernican revolution and the consequent misunderstandings regarding the transcendental and the a priori.³⁴ Yet, Husserl's criticism toward the *Transcendental Aesthetic* in the *Critique of Pure Reason* not only concerns the relativization of the a priori laws of experience to the human subject, but also what he considers to be a brusque opposition of sensibility and the understanding put forward in this text.³⁵ Moreover, the lack of a proper consideration of the intentional correlation and its transcendental meaning, as well as the brusque opposition of sensibility and the understanding, imply what Husserl considers to be the misleading account of time and space as forms of, respectively, our inner and outer sense.

Given the previously discussed arguments in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, it comes as no surprise that the theory of sensibility proposed in the *Transcendental Aesthetic* can only hold for the human subject.³⁶ Hence, even if both Husserl and Kant share the claim that time and space shall be transcendently considered in relation to subjective experience, they disagree when it comes to the meaning of this relatedness. For Kant, the reference to subjective experience eventually entails the thesis that time and space are neither properties of things, nor are they relationships among things. Rather, they are defined as the a priori forms of the (human) subject's sensible intuition.³⁷ Thus, the necessity of the spatial and temporal structures of appearances is traced back to the universality of space and time as

³⁴ It shall be noticed that Husserl criticizes only what he considers to be anthropological or proto-psychological implications of Kant's Copernican revolution, and by no means underestimates its relevance. On the contrary, he considers phenomenology itself as the philosophy that can carry out such revolution, or turn to a proper understanding of the subjectivity of experience in its relatedness to the world, in an adequate way. Cf. Hua XVII, pp. 456–457.

³⁵ Cf. Hua VI, pp. 420f. As Kern (1964, p. 62) points out, such a brusque opposition is not compatible with Husserl's own claims, according to which sensibility and understanding are two aspects of a more profound experiential unity. An analogous statement is made by Henrich (1958) and by Snyder (1995, pp. 169f.).

³⁶ “We humans ascribe to ourselves the faculty of sensation and intuition – in one word, sensibility – but also of understanding. We have the faculty to form concepts and to judge by means of them. Since sensibility is the faculty to be affected, and since affection is something accidental, Kant conceives of sensibility as non-essential faculty of the Ego-subject. For Kant, sensibility, together with the lawfulness of spatio-temporal formation, only belongs to the factual endowment of human subjectivity, but not to subjectivity in general”. Hua VII, p. 397. See also Hua VII, pp. 357f.

³⁷ KrV, B 37–66/A 22–49/(Kant 1998, pp. 157–171). More exactly, regarding space: KrV, B 42/A 26/(Kant 1998, p. 159); regarding time: KrV, B 50/A 33/(Kant 1998, pp. 163–164). The reference to the human subject is explicitly made at KrV, B 51/A 35/(Kant 1998, p. 164).

being, respectively, the form of the outer and inner sense. Thereby, again, universality means their being proper to all receptive subjects.³⁸ For Husserl, the reference to the subjective experience of space and time does not imply a denial of their peculiar objective character. Indeed, conceiving of the object as the noematic correlate of subjective experience, Husserl maintains that, far from being the non-objectifiable forms of subjective intuition, space and time are the necessary forms of all sensible configurations, of the perceived as such.³⁹ As I will argue later on, there are reasons to reassess Kant's definition of time and space as subjective forms and to claim that such a definition does not per se imply the non-intuitive character of time and space. However, if one sticks to the reading Husserl endorses, it is quite clear why, from his point of view, Kant's *Transcendental Aesthetic* entails a misleading conception of the a priori. In fact, the definition of space and time as forms of (human) intuition involves a sort of *contradictio in adjecto*, since the very a priori (i.e., universal and necessary) forms are eventually considered as proper to a specific subject *de facto*. Thus considered, space and time cannot be the necessary and universal forms of the perceived as such, but only the forms of the possible representations for a finite (human) subject.

Yet, even apart from the question of anthropologism, the distance concerning the a priori character of time and space also becomes manifest in different interpretations of the relationship between form, matter, and the a priori. Kant's distinction of a priori and a posteriori lends itself to be read in light of the distinction between matter and form. From this, one can draw the conclusion that sensations, i.e., the a posteriori matter of sensibility, are deprived of an internal principle of order.⁴⁰ In fact, such a principle cannot be itself a posteriori, nor can it be identified with the matter of sensations. It must be rather a priori and thus formal:

³⁸ Here two quotations regarding, respectively, space and time: "We can accordingly speak of space, extended beings, and so on, only from the human standpoint. If we depart from the subjective condition under which alone we can acquire outer intuition, namely that through which we may be affected by objects, then the representation of space signifies nothing at all. This predicate is attributed to things only insofar as they appear to us, i.e., are objects of sensibility." KrV, B 42–43/A 26–27/(Kant 1998, p. 159). "If we abstract from our way of internally intuiting ourselves and by means of this intuition also dealing with all outer intuitions in the power of representation, and thus take objects as they may be in themselves, then time is nothing. It is only of objective validity in regard to appearances, because these are already things that we take as objects of our senses; but it is no longer objective if one abstracts from the sensibility of our intuition, thus from that kind of representation that is peculiar to us, and speaks of things in general. Time is therefore merely a subjective condition of our (human) intuition (which is always sensible, i.e., insofar as we are affected by objects), and in itself, outside the subject, is nothing." KrV, B 51/A 34–35/(Kant 1998, p. 164).

³⁹ See Hua XVI, p. 43/(Husserl 1997, p. 37) and Hua Mat IV, p. 121. These texts define respectively space and time as the form of the objective correlate of experience. Thereby Husserl explicitly criticizes Kant's understanding of space and time as forms of (human) sensibility.

⁴⁰ This has been done, for instance, by De Palma (2001, pp. 41–59) and Pradelle (2000, p. 49). In the second section of this chapter, I will argue that the relationship between form and matter also deserves to be more closely thematized and that the being informed of matter is indeed a principle of order, which can be distinguished, yet not separated from matter itself.

I call that in the appearance which corresponds to sensation its matter, but that which allows the manifold of appearance to be intuited as ordered in certain relations I call the form of appearance. Since that within which the sensations can alone be ordered and placed in a certain form cannot itself be in turn sensation, the matter of all appearance is only given to us a posteriori, but its form must all lie ready for it in the mind a priori, and can therefore be considered separately from all sensation.⁴¹

Accordingly, Kant maintains that there is an equivalence between, on the one hand, form and the a priori and, on the other hand, matter and the a posteriori. Thus, according to the crossed distinction of pure/empirical and of intuition/concept, we can have: (1) pure and empirical intuitions, and (2) pure and empirical concepts, whereby in both cases only the former (i.e., the “pure” ones) can be properly defined as a priori.⁴² This identification of the a priori with the form involves the exclusion of the a priori from the realm of possible objectification: the a priori is namely the non-objective condition of objectification. This specifically holds for time and space, as the a priori forms of sensible intuition.

From his part, Husserl explicitly denies the equivalence of the a priori with the form: according to him, there are indeed a priori and material laws that organize sensibility in its qualitative and concrete aspects. Failing to consider these material laws of sensibility, Kant's *Transcendental Aesthetic* cannot be considered as an exhaustive theory of perception in a phenomenological sense. Indeed, as we will see, precisely these are the laws that allow us to noematically describe time and space as the forms of the perceived as such.

In spite of all critique of anthropologism and formalism, however, Husserl does not reject the distinction between aesthetic and analytic *tout court*. Rather, he considers it as one of the most imposing of Kant's discoveries (Hua VII, p. 404). Consistently, he appropriates this distinction, yet not without some emendations. These are motivated by the different agenda of Husserl's theory of experience and reverberate on the concrete determination of the phenomena belonging to both the aesthetic and the analytic domain. Whereas in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the distinction between Aesthetic and the Analytic is parallel to the distinction of the two roots of the human cognition (i.e., sensibility and the understanding),⁴³ Husserl adopts a different criterion for his own distinction. This is clearly stated in manuscript A VII 14:

Accordingly, the universal a priori itself possesses a radical stratification, namely the one between “transcendental-aesthetical a priori” and “transcendental-analytical a priori”. The latter yields the “analytical” structure of the world, i.e., the structure of mathematical infinite analysis; the structure that, in certain abstraction, has the character of a mathematical manifold, of an ideal-definite one. The former a priori is the universal a priori of the world as a world of pure experience and contains within itself, concerning nature, nature as experienced nature, in the a priori typology, in which alone mere experience, singular and general experience, knows nature.⁴⁴

⁴¹ KrV, B 34/A 20/(Kant 1998, pp. 155–156).

⁴² KrV, B 74–75/A 50–51/(Kant 1998, p. 193).

⁴³ KrV, B 29/A 15; B 74–88/A 50–64/(Kant 1998, pp. 151, 193–200).

⁴⁴ “Danach hat das universale Apriori selbst eine radikale Schichtung. Es ist die zwischen ‘transzendent-alästhetischem Apriori’ und ‘transzendent-analytischem Apriori’”. Das letztere

Once more, Husserl's employ of Kant's terminology should not conceal the shift in its meaning. Indeed, neither of the two layers of the so-called universal a priori properly coincides with Kant's homonymous. For Husserl, the analytic a priori mirrors the mathematical structure of the world, i.e., it belongs to the ideal domain and to the ideal objects that are constituted in categorial acts. It is on the basis of this analytic a priori that the mathematics and the mathematical sciences of nature are possible. However, consistent with the position Husserl holds since the *Logical Investigations*, this analytic a priori is founded upon an aesthetic a priori. That is to say, it is founded upon the a priori of the world of pure, primarily perceptual, experience. Different from the exact concepts of the analytic a priori, the concepts that describe the aesthetic a priori of the world are morphological; as such they properly render the typological structure of the concrete world of lived experience.⁴⁵ Far from referring to the faculties of the subject, the phenomenological criterion for the distinction between aesthetic and analytic a priori is rather related to the different modes of experience and to the different kinds of objectivity (sensible or ideal) that correspond to the different domains.

Both the criticism toward Kant's reference to the subjective faculties as grounding the difference between the *Aesthetic* and the *Analytic*, and the criticism toward Kant's restriction of the a priori to pure form are essential to understand Husserl's own theory of sensibility. Nevertheless, we can still ask ourselves if these differences really exhaust the theoretical questions related to the relationship between Husserl's and Kant's respective approaches to sensibility. To answer this question, it is necessary to more closely address some other aspects in Kant's theory of experience and to assess whether and how they might be phenomenologically relevant. Thus, the attempt will be made to reverse the path followed up to now, and read Husserl through the glasses of Kant.

3.2 Sensibility and Stratifications: Between Kant and Husserl

Husserl's critique to Kant has allowed us to better circumscribe the phenomenological project of the transcendental aesthetic. A closer reading of Kant's texts, however, reveals that his account of sensibility and the pre-conceptual domain does not lend

ergibt die “analytische” Struktur der Welt, die Struktur der mathematischen infiniten Analysis, die Struktur, die in einer gewissen Abstraktion den Charakter einer mathematischen Mannigfaltigkeit, ja einer ideal-definiten hat. Das erstere Apriori ist das universale Apriori der Welt als Welt purer Erfahrung und enthält in sich hinsichtlich der Natur die Natur eben als erfahrene Natur, in der apriorischen Typik, in der bloße Erfahrung, singuläre und allgemeine Erfahrung, Natur allein kennt.” A VII 14/13 b.

⁴⁵ For the distinction between exact and morphological concepts, see Hua XIX/1, pp. 248–252/ (Husserl 2001c, pp. 15–17) and Hua III/1, pp. 149–158/(Husserl 1983, pp. 161–164). See also Sowa (2007). For the characterization of time and space as morphological idealities, see Claesges (1964, pp. 45f.).

itself to be univocally read within the framework of the previously analyzed Husserlian criticism. Without completely subscribing to Heidegger's ontological interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and to his unequivocal privileging of the faculty of the imagination, I nevertheless agree with him when he claims that, considered per se, the initial chapter of the *Critique* devoted to the *Transcendental Aesthetic* is unintelligible.⁴⁶ Therefore, in order to understand the meaning of this chapter, we need to consider it as embedded in the overall argument of the first *Critique*, aimed at highlighting the relationship between the different moments that make cognition possible.

In recent years, the transcendental role of pre-predicative experience has been increasingly recognized by both Husserl's and Kant's scholars. For instance, Lohmar (1998, pp. 156f.) discusses the analogies between the phenomenological account of the pre-predicative syntheses and some central moments in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, arguing that the application of the categories to experience mediated by the schematism shall be seen as a synthesis that belongs to the pre-predicative sphere. Although Kant does not draw the phenomenological consequences from his own arguments, Lohmar submits that he also recognizes, at least implicitly, some lawfulness immanent to the pre-predicative sphere, which makes the mediation of intuitions and concepts possible. Notably, such lawfulness can be traced back to the conditions of applicability of the schemas and to the figurative synthesis of the imagination.⁴⁷ To the latter, Kant himself attributed in the first edition of the *Critique* a decisive transcendental function in making cognition possible (Lohmar 1998, pp. 72f.).⁴⁸ Further developing a similar claim in his investigation, aimed at characterizing phenomenology itself as a critique of reason, Bisin (2006) argues that Kant's distinction between sensibility and the understanding, as well as the parallel distinction between *Aesthetic* and *Analytic*, should be considered in the

⁴⁶ Notably, for Heidegger (1973, pp. 141–146), this chapter has a preparatory character in view of the theory of the schematism and presupposes the primacy of the faculty of the imagination.

⁴⁷ This finds a confirmation in the Kantian scholarship. For instance, according to La Rocca (1989), in light of the schematism as “application” of the categories to experience, the forms of intuitions can be characterized as horizons of meaning [*Sinnenhorizonte*]. That is to say, they designate the primal field of sensible self-organization, which the unifying activity of the imagination is based upon.

⁴⁸ The synthesis of the imagination is not the only pre-categorial experience that has such a transcendental cognitive function. Besides it and the schematism, Lohmar also mentions the perceptual judgments [*Wahrnehmungsurteile*] as opposed to the experiential judgments [*Erfahrungsurteile*] at paragraph 18 of the *Prolegomena*. Prol. AA 04, pp. 297–298/(Kant 2002, pp. 92–93). The analysis of the stratification and the sedimentation of experience in the process of formation of the schemata would also be relevant in this respect. The latter, however, is not adequately developed in the first *Critique*. The pre-categorial formation of the schemata of empirical concepts, presupposing the process of habitualization, has been further developed in a more recent book by Lohmar (2008, pp. 103–132). In this context, the author shows the affinities between Kant's schemas and Husserl's *Typoi*. With regard to the relationship between Kant's and Husserl's notion of synthesis, see also Lohmar (1993). Regarding the relation between intuition and concept, and the mediating role of both productive and receptive imagination, see also Borutti (2006). Drawing not only from the philosophical tradition, but also from literature and figurative arts, the author convincingly argues for the sensible root proper to all thinking.

light of a complex approach to reason, whereby the two domains define two different but interwoven moments of objective synthesis and world-constitution (Bisin 2006, p. 245). Thus, the crucial question for Bisin concerns not only the functions that are respectively distinctive of sensibility and the understanding, but also the constitutive limits of each of them. And to highlight these limits means to highlight the necessary relation and interplay between the two moments.

In Kant's scholarship, the re-evaluation of the pre-predicative syntheses is mostly accomplished by means of a joint consideration of the first *Critique* and the third *Critique*. Pilot (1990), for instance, considers the schematism in the first *Critique* in relation to the free play of the imagination and the understanding in the third *Critique* and shows that the autonomy of judgment is grounded upon a schematism without concepts, which is the ultimate condition for all empirical knowledge. Proposing a reassessment of the notion of synthesis as unifying action [*Handlung*],⁴⁹ Gigliotti (1995) resorts to the distinction between the understanding as *Vermögen* (i.e., *potentia*) and judgment as *Kraft* (i.e., *actus*). This allows her to show that synthesis is not a mere assembling operation, but rather defines a lawfulness based on sensibility. Consistently, conceiving of the a priori of sensibility as "form", Kant does not refer to something abstract or deprived of any relationship to content. The notion of form shall rather be understood as referring to the self-organizing order of sensibility. Even more explicitly, in one later text, Gigliotti (2001) argues that Kant's distinction between sensibility and the understanding does not simply coincide with the distinction between passivity (or receptivity) and spontaneity. Indeed, if it is true that the synthesis unifying the manifold given in sensible experience is accomplished by the imagination and that it is brought to the concept by the understanding, this does not yet exclude (and on the contrary implies) an already established figurative order immanent to sensible experience. Thus, again, the notion of form in Kant shall not be conceived as deriving from of the pure logical or mathematical process of formalization, namely from the abstraction of all content and the substitution of the concrete concept referring to the object with a symbol or a variable *salva veritate*.⁵⁰ The notion of form, particularly when it is applied to intuition, shall rather be considered as referring to a configurative unity, which delineates a primal structure of sensible organization. In line with these arguments, we can also read both Gambazzi's (1981) analyses, which particularly emphasize the role of the imagination as a pre-predicative synthesis and its connection to sensibility, and Nuzzo's (2005, 2008) works, where a new reading of the three *Critiques* is developed. Nuzzo's reading aims at showing how the three *Critiques* contribute to Kant's account of the unity of reason and at re-establishing the primacy of sensibility in light of the notion of ideal embodiment. Thereby, embodiment is not considered as something accidental but rather as a transcendental and a priori (universal and necessary) condition of experience in general.

⁴⁹ Cf. KrV B 103–104/A 77–78/(Kant 1998, pp. 210–211).

⁵⁰This is how Husserl understands formalization. Cf. Hua XIX/1, pp. 255–262/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 19–22), Hua III/1, pp. 31–33/(Husserl 1983, pp. 26–27).

Even remaining only within the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which was certainly more familiar to Husserl than the *Critique of Judgment*, we can easily list the places that support these readings. I am particularly thinking about the synthesis of apprehension in intuition (KrV A 98–100) and about the reproductive synthesis of the imagination (KrV A 100–102) as the condition for all possible cognition, which are presupposed by the synthesis of recognition in the concept (KrV A 103–110).⁵¹ Moreover, I am thinking about the synopsis operating within sensibility, apart from the intervention of the imagination and the understanding.⁵² Given the previous remarks, it shall come as no surprise that Husserl himself explicitly appreciates the phenomenological relevance of these Kantian arguments regarding pre-predicative experience. Such an appreciation probably finds its clearest expression in the characterization of the productive synthesis of the imagination as a precursor of the phenomenology of passive constitution.⁵³

Yet, what is left of the previous criticism, given this re-evaluation of the role of pre-predicative experience in Kant's philosophy? Having discussed the central aspects of Husserl's critique to Kant's *Transcendental Aesthetic*, we shall now ask whether the phenomenological approach to the pre-predicative sphere, integrated in the larger problem of the theory of experience, is really in such a deep contrast with Kant's view. This question shall not be read as a mere philological exercise aimed at determining the correctness of Husserl's reading. Nor shall it be taken as an attempt to make of Kant a proto-phenomenologist. Rather, it shall be assumed as an occasion to address more closely some aspects in Kant's philosophy in dialogue with Husserl's, thereby aiming at understanding the role of the (primarily spatio-temporal) organization of sensibility in its relation to the higher levels of experience. This inquiry can fruitfully contribute to offer new phenomenological insights into the complex dynamics of experience, which may even go beyond Husserl's

⁵¹ See also KrV, A 77/(Kant 1998, p. 210), where Kant claims that, for cognition to be possible, the manifold shall be first gone through, taken up, and combined [*durchgegangen, aufgenommen, verbunden*], thereby most likely referring to, respectively, the synopsis of sensibility (gone through), the synthesis of the imagination (taken up), and the unity of the understanding (combined). Cf. Marcucci (2003, p. 82); Scaravelli (1968, p. 228).

⁵² “There are, however, three original sources (capacities or faculties of the soul), which contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience, and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind namely sense, imagination, and apperception. On these are grounded (1) the synopsis of the manifold a priori through sense; (2) the synthesis of this manifold through the imagination; finally (3) the unity of this synthesis through original apperception. In addition to their empirical use, all of these faculties have a transcendental one, which is concerned solely with form, and which is possible a priori.” KrV, A 95/(Kant 1998, p. 225).

⁵³ Hua XI, pp. 275–276/(Husserl 2001a, pp. 410–411). See also Hua XI, pp. 125–126, 164/(Husserl 2001a, pp. 170–171, 212). In all these cases, however, Husserl specifies that, given his different background, Kant did not (and could not) go far enough in his phenomenological discoveries. This Husserlian reading has been discussed by Bégot (2000a) as revealing an ambiguous Kantian heritage in Husserl's thinking. Ricoeur (1987, pp. 228f.), on the other hand, goes even farther than Husserl in identifying an “implicit phenomenology” in Kant's *Transcendental Analytic*. This particularly concerns temporality, which in the schematism chapter is approached in a more fundamental way than in the *Transcendental Aesthetic*.

explicit statements. Eventually, it can also allow us to more properly understand what it means to recognize an immanent lawfulness in sensible experience.

Talking about “experience”, I am clearly adopting the Husserlian understanding of the concept also in my reading of Kant. Thereby, I am perfectly aware of the philological risks of such an enterprise, since for Kant experience is explicitly said to be a posteriori. Nevertheless, I believe that a thoughtful discussion of Husserl’s and Kant’s positions regarding specific issues, guided by the phenomenological account of experience, and notably of its a priori laws, may help us to gain new theoretical insights on precisely the necessary structures of experience itself, or its a priori. The discussion I propose in the following, thus, is clearly phenomenologically oriented. Yet, it aims to show the contribution that Kant’s distinctions and arguments may offer to the phenomenological project of a theory of experience considered as a complex and stratified whole. To this aim, I will address here four moments in Kant’s philosophy and their respective Husserlian interpretations: (1) the question as to the intuitive givenness of form; (2) the synthesis of apprehension in relation to the formal intuition of space; (3) the hypothesis of the chaos of sensible contents; (4) the subjectivity of experience and the system of the faculties.

3.2.1 Intuition: Form and Matter

Consistently with his more general assessment of Kant’s *Transcendental Aesthetic*, Husserl is also critical of the metaphysical and transcendental expositions on time and space.⁵⁴ This criticism is related to both the restricted and anthropological theory of sensibility and the definition of space and time as forms of sensibility.⁵⁵ Since Husserl remarks are primarily concerned with space, I will also discuss here the problem with respect to space. Arguably, the following arguments hold for time as well.

Husserl’s criticism of the understanding of space as form of intuition is very much inspired by Stumpf. In the first chapter of his *On the Psychological Origin of the Representation of Space* [*Über den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung*], Stumpf develops a critique concerning the isolating procedure that grounds the definition of space as the form of the outer sense (Stumpf 1873, pp. 15f.). Such a procedure can be found in the second argument of the *Metaphysical Exposition* concerning the a priori character of space. Whereas it is possible to imagine space without any object, it is not possible to exclude space from our representations. The isolation or abstraction Kant accomplishes here, thus, concerns the objects that fill space.⁵⁶ This, however, should not be too problematic. For we could indeed imagine to be a

⁵⁴ Hua VII, pp. 240f., 357, 386, 395f.; Hua XVI, p. 43/(Husserl 1997, p. 37), Hua Mat IV, p. 121.

⁵⁵ KrV, B 42/A 26; B 50/A 33; B 51/A 35/(Kant 1998, pp. 159, 163–164).

⁵⁶ “One can never represent that there is no space, although one can very well think that there are no objects to be encountered in it. It is therefore to be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, not as a determination dependent on them, and is an a priori representation that necessarily grounds outer appearances.” KrV, B 38–39/A 24/(Kant 1998, p. 158).

room or in an open space without any objects and thereby still have the representation of space as filled by sensible qualities. Thus, more appropriately, Stumpf's criticism concerns the argument made in the introduction to the *Transcendental Aesthetic*, where the abstractive and isolating procedure concerns sensations. In this passage, indeed, Kant suggests a sort of mental experiment, in which we separate all intellectual determinations (substance, force, divisibility, etc.), as well as all sensible determinations (impenetrability, hardness, color, etc.) from our representations. After performing such an abstractive experiment, we would still be left with empty spatial extension and figure [*Gestalt*], which belong to the pure form [*Form*] of sensibility.⁵⁷ Thus, whereas the formulation in the *Metaphysical Deduction* could still be plausible for Stumpf, the formulation in the introduction to the *Transcendental Aesthetic* is not. For even in an empty space (i.e., in a space without any objects), our sensible fields would still be filled with sensible qualities. What Stumpf cannot accept of this claim, in other words, is the idea of space without qualities:

The stated difference does de facto not exist. One can by no means represent space without quality, e.g., not without color with the visual sense, not without contact-feelings with the sense of touch. One cannot represent it in general separated from all senses. Anyone who really tries to perform Kant's experiment by eliminating all qualities, and particularly all colors, even black and grey, will be left not with space, but with nothingness. (Stumpf 1873, pp. 19–20)

Stumpf's criticism mainly addresses two aspects in Kant's argument, namely the definition of space as a form that can be separated from content, and the characterization of sensations as unstructured matter.⁵⁸ As opposed to this, Stumpf believes that spatial extension is not a mere form of sensible intuitions, rather being itself a positive "content" of representation. This critique is based upon the distinction Stumpf makes between the "being represented together" of partial contents and that of independent contents. Whereas in the latter case the togetherness of contents is arbitrary and accidental, because it is effectively possible to represent the different contents apart from each other, in the former case the togetherness of contents is necessary, because the single contents cannot be represented apart from each other but can only

⁵⁷ "So if I separate from the representation of a body that which the understanding thinks about it, such as substance, force, divisibility, etc., as well as that which belongs to sensation, such as impenetrability, hardness, color, etc., something from this empirical intuition is still left for me, namely extension and form. These belong to the pure intuition, which occurs a priori, even without an actual object of the senses or sensation, as a mere form of sensibility in the mind." KrV, B 35/A 20–21/(Kant 1998, p. 156).

⁵⁸ Of a certain importance is also Stumpf's position regarding the first argument in Kant's *Metaphysical Deduction*, namely that the form of space must be presupposed by the representation of different places, and therefore by localization. KrV, B 38/A 23/(Kant 1998, p. 157). The question concerns, in this case, the representation of the *Zwischenräume*, i.e., of the space in-between two definite places occupied by objects. According to Kant, the representation of such intermediate space cannot derive from the relation between external appearances, rather being presupposed by each and every appearance. Stumpf's response to this argument is based on the distinction between the representation of two places and the distance that separates them. According to him, the representation of two places, and thus the localization of things, does not require the representation of the intermediate space. Such a representation of the intermediate space is instead necessary if one wishes to measure the distance between the two places (Stumpf 1873, p. 17).

be abstractedly distinguished.⁵⁹ Spatial extension and visual sensible qualities (e.g., color) belong to this second class: they are partial contents within the more original unity of representation. Thus, Stumpf seemingly overturns Kant's position on the problem. The problem for him is not to understand how sensible qualities are organized into spatial forms, but rather to conceive of how, given the whole of spatially structured qualities, it is possible to distinguish the different moments as partial contents. This argument is then adopted to legitimate the claim that space itself is sensed [*empfunden*] in the very same way as the sensible qualities are.⁶⁰

Husserl's own remarks mirror Stumpf's in several ways. They are first introduced in mereological terms in the 1894 seminal article entitled *Psychological Studies for Elementary Logic* [*Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik*] to be further developed in the *Third Logical Investigation*. In the first section of the *Psychological Studies*, Husserl explicitly refers to Stumpf's distinction between partial and independent contents, restating it as the distinction between dependent and independent contents.⁶¹ Evoking some of Stumpf's examples, and notably the connection of color and extension, Husserl characterizes the relation of dependence/independence in light of his notion of evidence:

A content, in regard to which we have the evidence that the alteration or suppression of at least one of the contents given with it (but not comprised in it) must alter or suppress the content itself, we call "dependent"; a content for which this is not the case we call "independent". For the latter, the thought that the suppression of all simultaneous contents leaves it untouched does not contain any absurdity. With contents of the first kind, one could also say, we have the evidence that they, as they are, are only conceivable as parts of more inclusive wholes, while with contents of the second kind this evidence is lacking.⁶²

Consistently with this view, in the *Third Logical Investigation*, the distinction of dependent and independent contents is presented in the context of the part-whole study, and of the analyses regarding the material a priori. Proposing an analogous definition of the dependence and independence relation as the one provided in the *Psychological Studies*,⁶³ Husserl adds here an important gloss, which insists on the a priori necessity of the relation of non-independent moments.⁶⁴ In our case, this means that the relation of spatial extension and visual qualities is an a priori one: the possibility of being

⁵⁹ "We divide the contents regarding the joint representation with regard to their affiliation into two main classes, independent contents and partial contents, and specify as definition and criterion of the difference: independent contents are given when the elements of a complex of representations can by their nature also be represented separately. Partial contents are given when this is not the case. [...] one cannot represent a color quality without any intensity, a movement without any speed, for this would contradict their nature. In this case, a connection is therefore necessary by nature, as opposed to the first class" (Stumpf 1873, p. 109). See also ibid. pp. 112ff., 273–274.

⁶⁰ "Space [is] sensed in the very same way [...], as the sensible qualities. Yet, it needs more training than they do. A training that however also proceeds along the usual ways, the ways of association and of reprocessing through fantasy and reflection" (Stumpf 1873, p. 307). See also ibid., p. 292.

⁶¹ Hua XXII, pp. 92f./(*Husserl 1981a*).

⁶² Hua XXII, p. 95/(*Husserl 1981a*, p. 127). Translation modified.

⁶³ Hua XIX/1, p. 233/(*Husserl 2001c*, p. 6).

⁶⁴ Hua XIX/1, p. 237/(*Husserl 2001c*, p. 8).

otherwise is essentially excluded, since, if one of the two moments were missing, the other the other moment could not be given as well. Moreover, it is a material a priori relation, because it cannot be traced back to formal variables *salva veritate*.⁶⁵

In the 1907 lecture on *Thing and Space*, these mereological laws are more explicitly applied to the intuition of space by means of the distinction between *materia prima* and *materia secunda*. Remarking that different sensible qualities belong to the spatial thing with different degrees of necessity, Husserl emphasizes that only those qualities that are non-independently related to spatial extension are necessary and sufficient determinations of the perceptual thing. These materializing [*materialisierende*] spatial determinations (the visual and the tactile qualities), are the so-called *materia prima*, or primal matter [*Urmaterie*]: they are necessary and sufficient to have a concrete spatially filled unity. The further sensible determinations, which are not necessarily bound to spatial extension but only accidentally adherent [*anhängend*], belong to the so-called *materia secunda*. As such, they presuppose the constitution of the object as concretum of extension and *materia prima*. Accordingly, space can only be intuited in and through those qualitatively filled unities of extension:

Materializing determinations fill up the spatial form as its *materia prima* and thus create, since spatial form is and can be in itself nothing, the thing as a *concretum* in the fundamental sense.⁶⁶

And this is clearly connected with a claim previously formulated in the text, namely:

Space is a necessary form of things and is not a form of lived experience, specifically not of “sensuous” lived experiences. “Form of intuition” is a fundamentally false expression and implies, even in Kant, a fatally erroneous position.⁶⁷

Yet, both Stumpf’s criticism and Husserl’s emphasis on Kant’s “fatally erroneous position” might somehow be excessively one-sided, because they seem to neglect that space and time in the *Transcendental Aesthetic* are not only designated as the forms of, respectively, outer and inner sense, but also as pure intuitions.⁶⁸ How shall such a pure intuition be understood?

⁶⁵ Hua XIX/1, pp. 259–260/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 20–22). Husserl defines the material a priori also as synthetic, opposing it to the formal (analytic) a priori. Nevertheless, we shall observe that this definition does not coincide with Kant’s. In both cases the definition of synthetic a priori is obtained a contrario, moving from the analytic a priori. However, precisely the latter has a different meaning in the two cases. For Kant an analytic a priori judgment is a judgment in which the predicate is entailed in the concept of the subject; for Husserl, an analytic a priori law is a law that can be completely formalized (i.e., substituted with functions) *salva veritate*. Consequently, for Kant the synthetic judgments (a priori or a posteriori) are the ones in which the predicate is not entailed in the concept of the subject; whereas for Husserl the synthetic a priori is necessarily related to some content that cannot be formalized. Cf. KrV, B 10–14/A 7–13; Prol. AA 04, pp. 266–269/(Kant 2002, pp. 62–64). On this matter, see also Benoist (1999), Gallagher (1972), Kern (1964, pp. 135f.), and Piana (1977).

⁶⁶ Hua XVI, p. 67/(Husserl 1997, p. 56).

⁶⁷ Hua XVI, p. 43/(Husserl 1997, p. 35).

⁶⁸ KrV, B 34/A 20/(Kant 1998, pp. 155–156).

The appearance [*Erscheinung*], which for Kant coincides with the undetermined object of empirical intuition, indeed, necessarily contains both: matter and form. Thereby, matter is certainly a posteriori, whereas form is a priori. However, such an indeterminate object can only result from the connection between the two.⁶⁹ Consistently, we can follow Graubner's insight and consider form and matter as moments of the appearance, which can be abstractedly distinguished, yet not effectively divided. Even if Graubner does not seem to have Husserl's distinction between pieces and moments in his mind,⁷⁰ and rather refers to Lange's dissertation in order to define the notion of moment, his account seems to be fully consistent with Husserl's. For moments are defined according to the following three criteria: (1) the distinction of one moment can only be accomplished with regard to the others; (2) moments belong to a concretely given unity, which means that they cannot be given as isolated, but can only be thought as distinguished from each other; (3) the unity would be broken if only one of its moments would be removed, which means that the absence of one moment in such a complex whole would compromise the unity as well as all other moments.⁷¹ Accordingly, if the intuition of the indeterminate object has to be possible in general, only the connection of pure form with this or that matter or sensation is empirical, but not the fact that there must be a connection in general. This connection, instead, defines a necessary law: form must be filled with some matter, since form is precisely the order of matter.

In light of the co-belonging of form and matter as moments, we should also read the definition of space as *ens imaginarium* (i.e., as form of intuition, and not as object), in Kant's discussion of the concept of nothingness later in the *Critique*.⁷² Here, indeed, we can find a statement that comes much closer to Stumpf's and Husserl's accounts:

If light were not given to the senses, then one would also not be able to represent darkness, and if extended beings were not perceived, one would not be able to represent space.⁷³

In other words, the intuitive representation of empty space can only be accomplished *a contrario*, i.e., by abstracting from what is effectively given as a unity of extended matter. This abstraction is imaginative, and therefore space is considered *ens imaginarium*. However, as Fichant (1997) points out criticizing Longuenesse (1993, p. 302), this does not mean that space as pure intuition is the product of the power of the imagination.⁷⁴ For, being space an originally given intuition, it cannot be at the same time the product of spontaneity. Accordingly, the attribute *imaginarium*, which Kant refers

⁶⁹ KrV, B 34/A 20/(Kant 1998, pp. 155–156).

⁷⁰ Hua XIX/1, pp. 231f./Husserl 2001c, pp. 4f.).

⁷¹ See, Graubner (1972, p. 96 footnote). The reference is to the unpublished work of Otto Lange, *Materie und Form als Reflexionsbegriffe bei Kant*.

⁷² KrV, B 346f./A 290f./Kant 1998, p. 382f.).

⁷³ KrV, B 349/292/(Kant 1998, p. 383).

⁷⁴ Longuenesse's interpretation is somehow in line with Heidegger's, who takes the characterization of space as *ens imaginarium* to support the claim that pure intuition is essentially nothing else than pure imagination (Heidegger 1973, p. 143).

here to the space of the *Aesthetic*, as well as the role of the imagination in this context must be related to the abstractive process that, in pure intuition, isolates the sensible matter from the pure form. This process, and thus the way in which Kant arrives at considering space and time as pure intuitions, seems to come close to the phenomenological variation. It is by varying the empirical matter that we arrive at the intuition of both the pure form and of the co-belonging of form and matter as moments of a whole.

Thus, to restrict the definition of space to the form of the outer sense, i.e., to the formal condition of experience, might well be misleading, since such a restriction seems to imply that form as such cannot be intuited. However, one should not forget that this characterization presupposes the co-givenness of both form and matter in the appearance. The abstraction of the form, consequently, is not to be seen as an effective separation from the content, but rather as the isolating distinction. This argument allows us to substantiate Nuzzo's (2005, p. 33) claim that the transcendental ideality of space and time is due to their being the forms of appearances (and not only of the human sensibility), "i.e. forms of things as they are given to our sensibility". Accordingly, to say that space and time do not really exist outside of the subjective condition of sensible intuition does not mean they can be reduced to not-intuitive subjective forms. As forms of what sensibly appears to us, they can be intuited themselves. In this sense, I consider Kant's definition of space (and time) as pure intuitions to have a phenomenological legitimacy.

3.2.2 *Synthesis and the Unity before All Concepts*

The just presented line of thought can be further developed by establishing a connection between the above mentioned Husserlian account of the stratification of the aesthetic and analytic a priori (A VII 14/13b) and the pre-predicative, or non-conceptual, syntheses that we can find in both Husserl and Kant. In this respect, we can basically assume two positions: we can either show, following for instance Ricœur (1987, p. 232) and Pradelle (2000, pp. 66f.), that the *Transcendental Aesthetic* is the section of the first *Critique* that is most distant from the phenomenological approach; or we can follow the suggestions made by Ferrarin (2006) and Fichant (1997) concerning the intuitiveness of space in Kant and further develop them with regard to synthesis and the stratifications of experience. In the present paragraph, I shall take the second option. Thereby, I assume Kant's and Husserl's distinctions regarding spatiality as a guiding thread to further investigate how these distinctions can contribute to account for the stratifications of experience.

As we will see in more detail in the next part of this book, the distinction of different kinds of spatiality soon becomes a *Leitmotiv* in Husserl's phenomenology of space. Indeed, such a distinction is repeatedly formulated already in the texts written in the 1890s for the *Raumbuch*, which would have to follow the publication of the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (Hua XXI, pp. 262–266, 270f., 301–303, 404). In brief, the most relevant point for my present argument concerns the distinction and the foundational relation between intuited space [*Anschauungsraum*] and the space of both pure

and applied geometry. I submit that this distinction corresponds to the one between the aesthetic and the analytic a priori: intuitive space is indeed part of the former, whereas geometric space belongs to the latter. Despite all discussed differences, Husserl and Kant do agree on at least one point, namely that the space of geometry belongs to the analytic a priori. For Kant, indeed, geometric space is subordinated to the categories of the understanding.⁷⁵ For Husserl, it is a “conceptual formation” [*begriffliches Gebilde*] (Hua XXI, p. 271), resulting from a process of idealization. Some tension, though, occurs with respect to intuitive space. Husserl considers that Kant’s definition of time and space as forms of intuition does not say enough about their intuitive givenness. As I have argued in the previous paragraph, this critique seems to neglect that what Kant intends by characterizing time and space as pure intuitions may come close to the phenomenology of intuited time and space. Yet, the distinction of intuitive and geometric space also reverberates on the architectonics of experience. Thereby, the problem is not only to see in what sense intuitive and geometric space correspond to the different layers of experience, but also to understand how these layers are related to one another. Again, in what follows, I wish to address this question to both Kant and Husserl. To do this, I will begin by discussing the important note regarding space that Kant adds to paragraph 26 of the *Transcendental Deduction* in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant writes:

Space, represented as object (as is really required in geometry), contains more than the mere form of intuition, namely the comprehension of the manifold given in accordance with the form of sensibility in an intuitive representation, so that the form of intuition merely gives the manifold, but the formal intuition gives unity of the representation. In the Aesthetic I ascribed this unity merely to sensibility, only in order to note that it precedes all concepts, though to be sure it presupposes a synthesis, which does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible. For since through it (as the understanding determines the sensibility) space or time are first given as intuitions, the unity of this a priori intuition belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of the understanding.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ Notably, the concept of *quantum* and the geometric shapes as the object of thought, KrV, B 180f./A 140f.; B 202f./A 161f. (Kant 1998, pp. 273f., 286f.); ProL AA 04, pp. 320–322 (Kant 2002, pp. 112–114). According to a well-established reading, one may claim that the space of the *Transcendental Aesthetic* is completely determined by Euclidian geometry, i.e., that the latter is eventually presupposed and the task of the aesthetic is to provide its philosophical-transcendental legitimation. Even if this is not alien to Kant’s approach, I believe one should not confound the different levels of his arguments. For, in accordance with the structure of the first *Critique*, the space of the *Aesthetic* must be given before all concepts, i.e., also before geometric concepts such as that of *quantum* and figure as the limit of extension. The space of the *Transcendental Aesthetic*, thus, is not the product of the understanding’s activity, it is instead already given “before” this activity. Moreover, the *Aesthetic* alone cannot provide any transcendental legitimation of Euclidian space, which is instead to be found in the *Transcendental Analytic* with the concept of *quantum*; KrV, B 202–207/A 162–166 (Kant 1998, pp. 286–289); in the two first *Antinomies* in the *Dialectics* with the problem of the magnitude of a *quantum*, the totality, and the infinite KrV, B 448–471/A 426–443; B 544–560/A 516–532 (Kant 1998, pp. 467–483, 524–546); and in the *Transcendental Doctrine of Method* with methodological arguments, KrV, B 740–766/A 712–738 (Kant 1998, pp. 630–643). See Fichant (2004).

⁷⁶ KrV, B 161 (Kant 1998, p. 261).

This very famous and dense passage has given rise to different interpretations in the Kantian scholarship, particularly dwelling on the relationship between what is here presented as “formal intuition” and the “form of intuition” discussed in the *Transcendental Aesthetic*. It is not my intention here to take a position in this interpretative quarrel. Instead, I will read this quotation phenomenologically and, on the basis of this reading, reassess the question concerning the stratification of experience.⁷⁷ In the cited passage, indeed, Kant refers to space in three senses: (1) to space as form of intuition; (2) to the concepts of space; and (3) to space “represented as an object”. The first sense refers to the space as the form of sensibility of the *Transcendental Aesthetic*. The second sense refers to the geometrical concepts of space, (notably *quantum* and figure), which through the activity of the understanding lawfully determine the unique space.⁷⁸ The third sense, finally, refers to the still intuitive representation space as a unity, which results from a synthesis of the manifold given to sensibility. It is important to emphasize that, with this distinction, Kant does not mean to say that there are effectively three spaces. On the contrary, Kant is quite resolute in his claim that there cannot but be one space, which has for him geometric (Euclidian) properties. Yet, this unique space can be differently apprehended: (1) as the form of intuition; (2) through geometric concepts; and (3) as the object of a formal intuition.

Precisely this distinction may shed new light on how the idea of the stratification is also implied in Kant’s account of space. The space as form of intuition (space 1) belongs to the lower layer of sensibility, whereas geometrical space is constructed through to the higher layer of the understanding (space 2). Thus, the space represented as object in formal intuition (space 3) must be located between the two former: it belongs to a *Zwischenreich*. On the one hand, indeed, it entails something more than the form of intuition, i.e., the synthesis of the manifold, which, for Kant, cannot be accomplished by sensibility alone. On the other hand, however, it is itself pre-conceptual and intuitive. Therefore it comes “before” the space of geometry, which necessarily refers to concepts and presupposes that intuitive and synthetic representation of space as object. This *Zwischenreich* cannot but correspond to the faculty of the imagination. The latter, indeed, accomplishes the synthesis of the manifold, from which the representation of space as object is obtained. And, although Kant clearly states that this synthesis does not belong to the senses, he also admits that it is not conceptual either.⁷⁹ The function of such a synthesis is thus to unify the multiplicity given in pure intuition in one unitary and still intuitive representation. Consistently, the space as object given in such a formal intuition has the

⁷⁷In many ways, this reading converges with the one proposed by Fichant (1997, 2004). However, my intention here is primarily to discuss the phenomenological relevance of such a reading. The phenomenological implications of this interpretation are further developed in Summa (2014).

⁷⁸KrV, B 202f/A 163f.; B 606/A 578; B 751/A 723/(Kant 1998, pp. 286f., 557, 635); Prol. AA 04, pp. 320–322/(Kant 2002, pp. 112–114).

⁷⁹KrV, B 103/A 78/(Kant 1998, pp. 201–211). On this intermediate role of the imagination, see also Gambazzi (1981).

quasi-paradoxical status of an “object without a concept”. This is quasi-paradoxical, because in the first *Critique* Kant is quite clear in claiming that there are two the necessary conditions for the cognition and the experience of an object: intuition and concept.⁸⁰ And the second here is missing. Can phenomenology help us in better understanding the status of such an “object without concept”? In what follows, I wish to provide a possible answer to this question by commenting on some of Husserl’s observations.

As we can infer from the emphasis added to his own copy of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Husserl is familiar with Kant’s remark added to paragraph 26 in the second edition.⁸¹ What I believe he particularly appreciates in this passage is exactly the reference to the representation of space as object, which is not to be found in the *Transcendental Aesthetic* and which is made possible by a pre-conceptual synthesis. From a phenomenological standpoint, this is particularly relevant because space represented as object, which results from a synthesis of the given manifold, is not given independently of the sensible content. Consistently, it is immune from Stumpf’s and Husserl’s criticism presented previously. Thus, I would claim that, in the Appendix XXI of Hua VII, Husserl is precisely referring to Kant’s remark to paragraph 26 of the *Deduction* in the second edition. Here he writes the following:

Kant does not fail to notice that synthesis already belongs to the unity of the phantom intuitions and to the unity of each immanent object. Yet, he only asserts this subsequently and in contradiction to the *Transcendental Aesthetic*. (Hua VII, p. 404)

This passage fits the more general context of the Appendix XXI, where Husserl, after having criticized Kant in line with the previously discussed topics, eventually slows down the rhythm of his criticism in favor of a more positive recognition of Kant’s legacy. Through this strategy, the aim is to highlight the proto-phenomenological aspects in Kant’s philosophy as opposed to what Husserl considers to be its latent and unfounded metaphysical presuppositions. In the case in point, those proto-phenomenological aspects precisely concern the stratification of experience, i.e., the different levels of synthesis (Hua VII, p. 405), or the intentionality which constitutes itself through these levels (Hua VII, p. 404). Thereby, Husserl wishes to highlight the role of the non-intellectual syntheses making up the unity of an object without concepts. Hence, my suggestion here is that what Husserl calls phantom-intuitions [*Phantomanschauung*] may correspond to Kant’s object without a concept. Accordingly, the unity of the phantom intuitions in Husserl’s passage would correspond to the unity of space represented as an object in Kant.

As I will show in more detail in the next part of this book, Husserl conceives of the phantom as of the “thing of the transcendental aesthetic” (Hua Mat IV, p. 172).

⁸⁰ KrV, B 125f./A 92f./(*Kant* 1998, pp. 224f.).

⁸¹ These emphases are added to the Reclam edition of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1878), which is now collected at the Husserl Archives in Leuven with the signature BQ 217. Husserl’s familiarity with this passage is erroneously questioned by Rotenstreich (1998, pp. 10f., 70f.), who also provides a different interpretation of Kant’s remark. Accordingly, and still problematically, the space as object of formal intuition would not be determined differently than in the *Metaphysical Deduction*.

Moreover, he provides both a negative and a positive definition of this concept. Negatively, the phantom coincides with the material thing minus its causal determinations. Positively, it is determined as *res extensa*, i.e., as the complex of qualities plus spatial extension that makes up the thing considered apart from its materiality. Keeping in mind the previous discussion concerning the connection between extension and quality, we clearly see that the phantom eventually coincides with the extension filled with *materia prima*, and therefore with the concretum of the thing [*Dingkonkretum*] in the most fundamental sense.⁸² This understanding of the phantom fits Husserl's account of the stratifications of experience:

Phantoms, and among them schemata, are thus in fact concrete unities of experience. And they form an a priori necessary sub-layer in each external experience of things. (Hua Mat IV, p. 174)

Following the parallel with Kant, we can therefore consider the phantom as the “object without a concept” within Husserl's phenomenology. And even if – different from the space represented as an object in Kant – the phantom is synthetically constituted within the domain of the aesthetic, it also belongs to a *Zwischenreich*. For, being a noematic perceptual unity, it entails something more than pure sensible contents and something less than the concept.

What still remains to be discussed in Husserl's remark from the Appendix XXI of Hua VII is the claim that Kant's recognition of the syntheses making up the unity of the phantom intuitions (i.e., of the space represented as an object) contradicts the argument made in the *Transcendental Aesthetic*. This is certainly consistent with Husserl's general approach to the first *Critique* and with his undoubtedly preference for the *Transcendental Analytic* over the *Aesthetic*. Nevertheless, we still can ask whether the just discussed passages may open up the way for another reading of the relationship between *Aesthetic* and *Analytic*, which would also imply another reading of the stratification of experience. Let us try to give shape to this reading by considering another passage of Husserl's. This passage is taken from *Ideas III* and precisely addresses the relationship between aesthetic and analytic by making reference to the phantom:

If freely ruling phantasy breaks through these [causal M.S.] organizations in an unbridled manner, then not only is an individual schema transformed into a “mere phantom”, but the whole world becomes a flow of mere phantoms; it is therefore no longer nature. But it is not for that reason completely lawless. In his singular genius Kant foresaw that and it is expressed in his works in the distinction between transcendental aesthetic and analytic. For the mere phantom-world the pure theory of time and pure geometry still hold; it is however a world without any physics. Also with regard to the sensuous fullness of phantom-extension there exist regularities, but the sensuous fullness authenticates no material properties.⁸³

Kant's genius, in this passage, is considered to be related to the insight that the “pure theory of time” and “pure geometry” would still hold true for the “world of phantoms”, even apart from physics. This implies that phantoms as sensible unities

⁸² Hua XVI, p. 67/(Husserl 1997, p. 56).

⁸³ Hua V, p. 30/(Husserl 1980, p. 27).

are ruled by an inner lawfulness which is, eventually, that of the pure theory of time and pure geometry. The reference to pure geometry and pure theory of time might first appear somewhat puzzling in this context. For geometry and the pure theory of time do not belong to the domain of sensibility, but rather – Husserl and Kant would agree on that – require higher idealizing, that is intellectual, functions. Accordingly, they should presuppose the morphological givenness of a “world of phantoms”. Yet, more closely considered, the statement Husserl makes here is not in contradiction with the stratification of experience. For such stratification is not meant to challenge the uniqueness of space, but rather to show how the one space can be differently given at different levels of experience. For Kant things are even clearer. Indeed, in spite of the aforementioned distinction between space as the form of intuition, space as pure intuition, and space as constructed through the concept, Kant is quite clear in claiming that such a distinction does not refer to ontologically different spaces. Such a distinction, or stratification of spatial “constructions”, does not challenge the unity and the uniqueness of space. We can construct geometrical space only insofar as our sensible experience is already structured according to geometrical laws, although these laws are certainly not experienced through sensibility. Accordingly, for Kant, our experience of space contains nothing in contrast with the laws of geometry.⁸⁴ The same space that is experienced in intuition (through perception and kinesthetic experience in Husserl and through pure intuition, formal intuition, and the synthesis of the imagination in Kant) can be structurally reflected upon and become the object of thought (through the process of idealization in Husserl and through its subsumption under the concepts of the understanding in Kant). Consistently, for both Kant and Husserl, the stratification of spatial constitution or construction does not contradict the unity and the uniqueness of space, but rather provides some more evidence to that unity and uniqueness. One can arrive at geometrical thinking only because the structures of geometrical space are already implied within the space of intuition. And this is true even if, to use Husserl’s terminology, in intuition these structures are given morphologically and still require idealization to reach the exactness of geometry. Accordingly, what conflicts with Husserl’s claim regarding the contradiction between Kant’s *Aesthetic* and *Analytic* is precisely the consistency between the other claim in the quoted passage – namely that the same spatial laws (e.g., isomorphism and congruence) must be valid in both the material world and the world of pure phantoms – and Kant’s own position. For both Husserl and Kant, in fact, the lawfulness of intuition is not in conflict with the conceptual determinations of geometry. Rather, we are confronted here with a stratification that concerns the modes of givenness of the one and unique space. If this is true, then the thesis of the contradiction between the *Aesthetic* and the *Analytic* needs to be better qualified.

The reason why Husserl emphasizes this alleged contradiction can be pointedly formulated as follows. Since no synthesis is at play in the *Transcendental Aesthetic*, the latter is an incomplete theory of sensible experience; consistently, only the *Transcendental Analytic* is a genuine theory of the constitution of nature through synthesis (Hua VII, p. 404). Yet, this emphasis corresponds to a very specific reading

⁸⁴ Prol. AA 04, pp. 287–288/(Kant 2002, pp. 82–83).

of the first *Critique*, which is guided by the criticism toward the theory of the faculties of *Gemütt*, considered as anthropological invariants that respectively ground different forms of objective experience. Certainly, as we have seen, there are passages in Kant that legitimate such a reading. For Kant, indeed, the faculties are irreducible to one another in their respective accomplishments. Nevertheless, the reflections proposed here also allow us to emphasize the constitutive potential of the interplay between the faculties and the layers of experiences, which both Kant and Husserl recognize, instead of their separation. Such interplay seems to happen in what I have called a *Zwischenreich*, between sensibility and the understanding. The previous remarks, thus, impinge upon the very idea of a stratification of experience. Even maintaining the autonomy, i.e., the irreducible specific lawfulness of each domain of experience, such stratification cannot be conceived as a static structure of self-enclosed layers that are simply piled one on the top of the other. It rather entails connections between the different levels. In this sense, the *Aesthetic* and the *Analytic* respectively isolate specific moments of experience as a whole. However, for Kant, no less than for Husserl, the *Analytic* and the *Aesthetic* shall not be only distinguished from each other; they shall also be studied in their interconnection, which makes both experience and cognition possible. This claim is certainly not intended to discard the foundational relation between the sensible and the predicative order, but rather to assume it in genuinely “abstracting” terms, which allows us to show both the potentialities and the limits of each experiential layer. That is to say, by distinguishing the different layers of experience without separating them, we can see why each layer cannot but necessarily refer to the others in order for experience as a whole to be possible. Yet, going beyond the descriptive abstraction, the previous analyses support the claim that the complexity of experience cannot be fully understood either *von oben* or *von unten* alone. Full faithfulness to the complexity of experience rather requires a thorough inquiry into the *Zwischen*, i.e., the junctions and the interplay, between the different layers.

3.2.3 Chaos and Order in Sensibility

The question regarding the opposition between Husserl’s foundation of cognition *von unten* versus Kant’s legitimization *von oben* can be further tackled with respect to the hypothesis of chaos of sensible contents.⁸⁵

Let us first discuss Kant’s observations regarding chaos and order. Being part of an argument that aims to highlight what are the a priori conditions of cognition, in the *Critique of Pure Reason* the hypothesis of chaos is strictly connected with Kant’s account of synthesis. Indeed, if synthesis is the principle of order, then chaos must be what remains in the absence of synthesis. Discussing Kant’s remarks

⁸⁵ Here, I propose an interpretation of the hypothesis of chaos based on the argument Kant makes in the first *Critique*. For an inquiry into the relationship between the hypothesis of chaos and the concept of nature in the third *Critique*, see, Feloj (2013).

about chaos, I will connect them to the three forms of synthesis (apprehension, reproduction, and recognition), which are distinguished in the *Deduction* in the first edition of the *Critique*. In this context, Kant first notices that, in order for cognition to be possible, the singular representations cannot be given as totally isolated and separated from each other. For cognition is a whole of interconnected representations. Accordingly, there must be a synthesis that corresponds to the synopsis of sensibility. That is to say, it is only from the connection of receptivity and spontaneity that cognition becomes possible. Spontaneity, then, is considered to be the ground for a threefold synthesis, which is necessarily found in all of our cognitions: the apprehension of representations, as modification of the mind in intuition; the reproduction of representations in the imagination; and their recognition in the concept.⁸⁶ The first synthesis, i.e., apprehension, is necessarily required to make a unitary intuition out of the given manifold. Apprehension consists in “running through” [*Durchlaufen*] and “taking together” [*Zusammennehmung*] the sensible manifold as to make the unity of an intuitive representation.⁸⁷ The synthesis of reproduction is first considered in relation to the empirical law of association between representations. Such an associative connection, which concerns for instance those representations that often accompany or follow one another, would be accomplished through reproduction even in the absence of one of such representations. For, according to an empirical rule of stability, we would associate the present representation with the absent one. The a priori ground of such an empirical law of reproduction is the pure transcendental synthesis of the imagination.⁸⁸ Finally, the synthesis of recognition makes the knowledge and the determination of the object through the unity of the concept possible.⁸⁹ The different forms of chaos can now be considered in relation to this threefold account of synthesis. Although such a connection is not so explicitly made by Kant himself, I consider it fruitful to show how the hypothesis of different forms of chaos reverberates on the understanding of the lawfulness in sensible experience.

The first occurrence of the hypothesis of chaos I wish to consider is presented in paragraph 13 of the *Deduction* with regard to the relationship between the categories and the objects given in intuition. Accordingly, this form of chaos results from the lack of the third synthesis, namely recognition. In this context, Kant first observes that there is a discrepancy between the way the a priori forms of intuition (space and time) and the categories are respectively related to objects. Since space and time are the necessary conditions for all intuitions, the demonstration of their applicability *de jure* to the experience of objects is not per se problematic. This, instead, is not the case for the categories. Since the latter are not the conditions according to which objects are intuited, it might well be that objects appear without any reference to them:

⁸⁶ KrV, A 97/(Kant 1998, p. 228).

⁸⁷ KrV, A 99/(Kant 1998, p. 229).

⁸⁸ KrV, A 100–102/(Kant 1998, pp. 229–230).

⁸⁹ KrV, A 103f./ (Kant 1998, p. 230f.).

The categories of the understanding, on the contrary, do not represent to us the conditions under which objects are given in intuition at all, hence objects can indeed appear to us without necessarily having to be related to functions of the understanding, and therefore without the understanding containing their a priori conditions.⁹⁰

Few lines later, Kant reasserts this idea by exemplarily considering the category of causality. Admittedly, as Kant points out, appearances are not necessarily consistent with the conditions of unity prescribed by the understanding. If such inconsistency happened to be the case, everything would be in such confusion [*Verwirrung*] as to make impossible to recognize a synthetic rule (e.g., causality) in the succession of appearances. That is to say, the concepts of cause and consequence would remain empty or meaningless. Yet, Kant also emphasizes that, even if appearances were not ruled by the conditions of conceptual unification set out by the understanding, they would still present “objects” to our intuition.⁹¹

Certainly, we shall not be too rapid in drawing phenomenological conclusions from what just said. The previous passage, indeed, needs to be contextualized in the overall argument of the *Critique*. As Scaravelli points out, the claim made in paragraph 13 is somehow at variance with the complex of the theses presented in the *Transcendental Deduction*. This particularly concerns the quoted statement, according to which, even without the functions of the understanding, we would still have a representation of objects. Attributing this claim to a certain archaism in some passages of the *Critique*, namely to the latent persistence of the position Kant held in his 1770 *Dissertatio*, Scaravelli (1968, p. 247) suggests not to take them as an overestimation of the cognitive power of sensibility. Cognition can only result from the unifying synthesis of the understanding on the basis of the categories. Even exempting ourselves from a discussion concerning the archaism of paragraph 13, we shall observe that, despite admitting that objects would be given in intuition even apart from the categories, in this very text Kant also argues that the conditions of unity of objective cognition remain those prescribed by the understanding. Sensibility alone – and I believe Husserl would agree with that – is not yet cognition in the proper sense. This, however, does not prevent us from taking the Kantian claim seriously and trying to understand what the “object” given apart from the intellectual functions corresponds to. In this respect, I would follow Fichant’s (1997, pp. 22–23) understanding of this “object” as corresponding to the “indeterminate object” of intuition, or to the appearance [*Erscheinung*] Kant talks about at the beginning of the *Transcendental Aesthetic*.⁹² This, according to Fichant, is the “objected” correlate of an intuition, which, however, is not yet objectified and determined as the meaning of a concept. Thus, although the claim that we would still experience indeterminate objects, or appearances, without any intellectual functions is consistent with the general argument of the *Critique*, one shall not forget that this experience would not be sufficient for the cognition of the object.

⁹⁰ KrV, B 122/A 89/(Kant 1998, p. 222).

⁹¹ KrV, B 123/A 90–91 (Kant 1998, p. 223).

⁹² “The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called appearance.” KrV, B 34/A 20/(Kant 1998, p. 172).

The previous argument entails two claims that are apparently in tension with each other. On the one hand, Kant argues that, without the unity prescribed by the categories, we would be confronted with a chaotic agglomerate of appearances. Everything, as Kant writes, would lay in confusion [*Verwirrung*]. On the other hand, however, this state of confusion would not prevent us from intuiting objects. For intuition by no means needs the functions of thought:

Appearances would nonetheless offer objects to our intuition, for intuition by no means requires the functions of thinking.⁹³

Certainly, as we have just seen, the “object” Kant is talking about here cannot be properly known yet, since cognition of objects necessarily requires both intuition and the concept.⁹⁴ However, doesn’t the intuitive appearance of objects also require a basic form of lawfulness? If this is true, as it is seemingly implied by Kant’s statements, then in this case we cannot properly talk about a generalized chaos. Even apart from the unitary order prescribed by the understanding, we would necessarily have at least a minimal kind of order necessary for the intuition of indeterminate objects. Accordingly, Kant seems to recognize some inner lawfulness and autonomy in the domain of sensibility. Before further developing this point, let us consider another passage of the first *Critique*, where Kant further explores the hypothesis of chaos of the sensible contents.

The second hypothesis of chaos I wish to consider is presented after the distinction of the three syntheses in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Particularly, it occurs in relation to the second synthesis, namely to the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination. More precisely, it concerns the precondition for such a reproduction, namely that appearances are given as interconnected according to a rule.⁹⁵ Kant explains this by referring, among others, to the regularities in our experience of the cinnabar as the condition for association. If there was no regularity in the appearance of the cinnabar – if we perceived it sometimes as red and sometimes as black, sometimes as light and sometimes as heavy – the empirical imagination could not associate, for instance, the representation of red with the heaviness of the cinnabar.⁹⁶ Accordingly, a basic lawfulness in the succession and the connection of appearances is the condition for the synthesis of reproduction. More precisely, as we can further read in the third section of the *Deduction*, the regularity of association is the empirical and subjective ground of reproduction. Without such lawfulness, we would only have a mere “bunch” [*regelloses Haufen*] of representations:

Since, however, if representations reproduced one another without distinction, just as they fell together, there would in turn be no determinate connection but merely unruly heaps of them, and no cognition at all would arise, their reproduction must thus have a rule in accordance with which a representation enters into combination in the imagination with one representation rather than with any others. This subjective and empirical ground of reproduction in accordance with rules is called the association of representations.⁹⁷

⁹³ KrV, B 123/A 90–91/(Kant 1998, p. 223).

⁹⁴ KrV, B 125f./A 92f.//(Kant 1998, pp. 224f.).

⁹⁵ KrV, A 100/(Kant 1998, p. 229).

⁹⁶ KrV, A 100–101/(Kant 1998, pp. 229–230).

⁹⁷ KrV, A 121/(Kant 1998, p. 239).

Yet, besides the empirical and subjective ground of association, reproduction also needs an objective and a priori ground. The latter consists in the affinity of appearances and is granted by the unity of apperception.⁹⁸

In light of the just considered passages, we can now discuss how the hypothesis of chaos impinges upon the question as to the possibility of both experience and cognition. These passages also seem to imply a stratified account of experience. As we have seen, a basic lawfulness within sensibility is required in order for intuition and association to be possible. These, on the other hand, can be accomplished even apart from higher intellectual functions. The complex synthetic order that grounds cognition in the proper sense is grounded by the threefold synthesis of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition. The relationship among these three syntheses can be understood, in Husserlian terms, as foundational. For without a basic unity of apprehension, no reproduction and no recognition would be possible.

Accordingly, the hypothesis of chaos can be declined with respect to each of the three syntheses. First, at the most basic level, without the synthesis of apprehension, we would have a generalized chaos of sensations. If this was the case, no intuition of objects or appearances (as indeterminate objects) at all would be possible. Apparently, Kant does not concretely consider such a hypothesis. This is probably due to the epistemological priorities of the arguments made in the first *Critique*. Indeed, as we have seen, for cognition to be possible, receptivity must always be connected with some form of spontaneity.⁹⁹ Secondly, without the reproductive synthesis of the imagination, we would have chaos concerning association and reproduction (such as in the case of the cinnabar). Thirdly, without the synthesis of recognition, we would have a more “limited” kind of chaos, since we would still have the experience of indeterminate objects, but we would not be able to subsume them under a concept, or to determine them through such a concept. This would be the case of the succession of appearances considered apart from the category of causality, which Kant discusses in paragraph 13 of the *Deduction*. For the purposes of the present argument, the outcome of these Kantian analyses can be summed up as follows: even apart from the unifying activity of the understanding, or without the synthesis of recognition, a primal sensible lawfulness, which entails both the synopsis of intuition and the synthesis of the imagination,¹⁰⁰ must be given in order for representation to be possible. Nevertheless, Kant’s explanatory strategy concerning the sensible order of appearances also testifies to the complex interplay of the faculties within the unity of reason, or to the necessary co-reference between higher and lower moments. When declaring to begin from the bottom [*von unten*], indeed, Kant means to consider matter as empirical.¹⁰¹ However, he eventually recognizes the necessity of an order within this empirical or factual domain and shows how such an order is grounded upon the unity of apperception with regard to all possible

⁹⁸ KrV, A 122/(Kant 1998, p. 240).

⁹⁹ KrV, A 97/(Kant 1998, p. 228).

¹⁰⁰ As Kant points out, indeed, the synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of reproduction are indissolubly bound [*unzertrennlich verbunden*]. Cf. KrV, A 102/(Kant 1998, p. 230).

¹⁰¹ KrV, A 119/(Kant 1998, p. 238).

cognition.¹⁰² In phenomenological terms, we are faced again with a necessary co-reference between layers of experience: the sensible order is certainly the basic condition of both experience and cognition (*von unten*); yet, the principle that legitimates experience with respect to possible cognition must be determined a priori, as the unity of transcendental apperception (*von oben*).

Husserl explicitly formulates the hypothesis of chaos in several texts, including the conclusion of *Thing and Space* and the Appendix XX in Hua VII. This latter text is particularly relevant in our context, since it develops the hypothesis of chaos in dialogue with Kant. Particularly, such a hypothesis is introduced in connection with the two fundamental “*a posteriori* questions of a transcendental kind” (Hua VII, p. 383), which Husserl seems to attribute to Kant. These two opposite and complementary questions are: (1) How shall the world be structured in order to be accessible to human cognition? And: (2) How shall cognition be structured in order for the world to be knowable in and through it? These questions are *a posteriori* for two reasons. First, they take the fact of the givenness of the world as a starting point to investigate the conditions of possibility of world-cognition. Secondly, and here we can detect even more clearly the implicit reference to the anthropological presuppositions Husserl criticizes in Kant, they do not address the pure possibility of cognition for every imaginable subject, but rather refer only to the human being and human cognition (Hua VII, p. 383). The idea of chaos of sensible contents is mentioned in relation to the second of the aforementioned questions, and it appears to be strictly related to such anthropological presuppositions. As Husserl writes:

If man were for example a jellyfish, he would not have any science. If we only had dull merging sensations, feelings, and so on, i.e., a chaos without any particular articulation, without the intellectual distinctions of consciousness as we know them from our life, etc. – well, in that case, the world would still exist, but it would not be for us jellyfish-humans. (Hua VII, p. 383)

Husserl further explores this hypothesis with respect to the different sensory fields and examines the reverberations that the chaos of sensible contents would have on our experience of the world. If our visual field was chaotically filled by the color red, we could not see any visual differentiations in what is given. Even in the presence of some differentiations, we could still have an orderless succession of light spots, which would make the apprehension of objects impossible. Again, suppose that different sensations would present themselves without any structural interconnection, e.g., that visual and tactile sensations would simply follow one another or present themselves contemporarily, but without any regularity in the reciprocal reference. In this case, we would not be able to associate the tactile experience of roughness or smoothness to certain visual qualities and, accordingly, we would have no ground to attribute different qualities (here visual and tactile) to one and the same thing. To be true, we would not be able to apprehend the thing as being one and the same, since we would only have a flow of unconnected sensations. Therefore, we could not properly synthesize our impressions and become aware of the objects in front of us. In short: if chaos in these different forms would be the case, we could not have any experience of the world and of the different things in the world.

¹⁰² KrV, A 122/(Kant 1998, p. 240).

These hypotheses are clearly a posteriori unacceptable, since they conflict with our experience of the world (cf. Hua VII, p. 384). Yet, as Husserl further observes, although these considerations at first appear to be only empirical, at a closer look they also entail something a priori. Indeed, we can say that what first appears as a factual occurrence of sensible lawfulness is eventually an exemplification of structural laws of experience, or its a priori.¹⁰³ If something like experience of the world shall be possible in general, the sensible contents cannot present themselves as chaotic. Immediately after the previous remarks on the hypothesis of chaos we can read the following statement, which is particularly clear in emphasizing the a priori necessity of some lawfulness immanent to sensibility:

On the other hand, however, phenomenology teaches us essential properties of knowledge and, in correlation, the world which constitutes itself in and through them. If one knows these correlations and if one has studied the related essential interconnections, one can also obtain absolutely certain statements for empirical-transcendental considerations (and genuinely transcendental ones), and a transference from the a priori to the empirical. For instance, that objects in the natural sense would not be knowable without a sensibility that fulfills certain conditions, without sensible groups of content of the visual, tactile and motoric kind and occurring in discrete prominences, and again in continuous mediations of the kind that we find in phenomenological reflection [...]. That, I say, these conditions have to be fulfilled as conditions for the possibility of the givenness of the thing, is a priori conceivable, as it depends on essential reasons, which are due to the correlation of perceptual knowledge [*Wahrnehmungserkenntnis*] and the objectivity of the thing and which are only transferred to the empirical fact of human knowledge. (Hua VII, p. 385)

Accordingly, experience as a whole would collapse, were it not for the essential lawfulness in the articulation of the sensible contents. Such lawfulness in the manifestation of the sensible contents is an a priori condition in order for experience and cognition to be possible.¹⁰⁴

Notice, however, that Husserl herewith does not claim that the chaos of sensible contents is something unthinkable. Instead, as we can read in the conclusion of *Thing and Space*, the dissolution of all sensation in a mere “tumult of sensations” [*Gewühl von Empfindungen*] is at least imaginable as a possibility. Yet, if realized, such a possibility would imply the dissolution of our world-experience, including ourselves and the other subjects as persons in the world.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, considering the hypothesis of the annihilation of the world, which Husserl formulates some years later in his *Ideas I*, we can argue that the imaginability of such “annihilation” is strictly connected with the chaos of sensible contents.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ “Yet, in such empirical reflections there is also something a priori, which one gets to see as soon as one has gained the point of view of transcendental phenomenology.” Hua VII, p. 384.

¹⁰⁴ Costa (1998, 1999) particularly insists on the role of this inner lawfulness to define the distinctiveness of Husserl’s transcendental aesthetic. Pradelle (2000, pp. 54f.) interprets Husserl’s statements similarly, yet within a different agenda. According to him, these Husserlian claims are eventually contradicted by the “retroaction” of the predicative order within the sensible. Hence, the alleged interest of a *phenomeno*-logy that moves *von unten* eventually turn out to be the ones of a theoretical project (i.e., a *phenomeno*-*log*y) that moved *von oben*.

¹⁰⁵ Hua XVI, p. 288/(Husserl 1997, p. 249).

¹⁰⁶ Hua III/1, pp. 103f./ (Husserl 1983, pp. 109f.).

Concretely speaking, and limiting ourselves to sight, the chaos of sensible contents would correspond to what Noë (2004, pp. 3f.) calls “experiential blindness”, meaning a form of blindness that does not result from somatic impairments, but from a disturbance connected with the integration (or the synthesis) of sensation. Such experiential blindness occurs, for instance, when congenitally blind patients undergo an operation to restore sight. These patients, as Noë shows, in the first instance do not regain sight, but only visual sensations, which are not properly organized as to make sight possible. What congenitally blind patients see after the operation is, according to their own statements, a “blur” or a chaos of visual sensations without interconnection. Accordingly, experiential blindness is not due to the absence of sensation of sensitivity, but rather to the lack of integration of these sensations.¹⁰⁷ Such a lack of integration or lack of structure and synthesis makes the experience of the (visual) world impossible. In this sense, it concretely exemplifies the hypothesis of chaos with its experiential consequences. Consistently, the chaos of sensible contents is thinkable and in certain cases it may even be realized. Yet, this would have as a consequence the annihilation of the experience of the world.

Despite admitting the possibility of a chaotic flow of sensible contents, in Appendix XX of Hua VII, Husserl is also quite clear in arguing that this could not amount to admitting the possibility of sensible contents that, in principle, could not be apprehended. Excluding even the possibility of apprehension would be nonsense, since this would deny the very nature of consciousness (Hua VII, p. 389).

In the terminology of the *Logical Investigations*, the hypothesis of chaos could be phrased by considering the reduction to the real components [*reelle Bestände*] of the act. The meaning of such a reduction and its relation to the phenomenological reduction in *Ideas I* have been thematized by Lohmar (2002, 2012).¹⁰⁸ As Lohmar argues, the aim of the reduction to the real components is to provide a legitimation of cognition. Indeed, the real components are essential in determining the content of intentional apprehension (the matter of the act). Moreover, they are indispensable to determine the kind of apprehension that is accomplished (intuitive, signitive-imaginative, and signitive-symbolical). Finally, also the quality of the act (e.g., positing or neutral) depends upon the real components. None of these three moments of the act (matter, quality, and the kind of apprehension) can be determined apart from the sensible contents. Besides, such a determination cannot be incompatible with the particular components of the given act. The reduction to the real components of the act is described as a “regressive” and “de-synthesizing” operation, namely as the dismantling of the synthetic accomplishments of apprehension by means of a “return” (or reduction) to the materials from which all apprehension takes and must

¹⁰⁷ Noë (2004) understands such integration in terms of thought and bodily movement. The form of “thought” implied here comes quite close to what Husserl understand with the apprehension of the sensible contents. Also, with respect to bodily movement and to the co-implication of kinesthetic sensations and presenting sensation, we can find similarities between Husserl’s and Noë’s approach. On this matter, see Summa (*forthcoming*).

¹⁰⁸ As Lohmar points out, the term “reduction to the real components” was retrospectively chosen by Husserl in the second edition of the *Logical Investigations*. Cf. Hua XIX/1, pp. 368, 411, 413 footnote.

take departure.¹⁰⁹ According to Lohmar, the chaos of sensible contents would result from such a dismantling: accomplishing such a reduction would leave us with a flow of real components in all sensible fields. In the ideal case, indeed, there would be no trace of objectual apprehension and the sensations would chaotically sweep [*rauschen*] in us, so that it would even be impossible to distinguish presenting sensations (e.g., color sensations) from non-presenting sensations (e.g., pain sensations).¹¹⁰

Lohmar discusses two main problems that are implied in such a reduction to the real components of the act. Both will be overcome with what he calls a more “moderate” kind of reduction, such as the one accomplished in *Ideas I*. The first problem concerns the limitation to the present components of the present act, that is to say, the abstraction from the intertwining and cross-references among the different experiences. The quest for a universal reduction in *Ideas I* can be seen as a result of Husserl’s overcoming of this limitation. Yet, a more serious problem emerges if one takes seriously the hypothesis of chaos such as Lohmar describes it. For, as he correctly points out, excluding regularity and all possibility to sort presenting (i.e., object-related) contents from non-presenting contents implies that such a reduction necessarily fall short of its aim, namely the legitimization of apprehension and synthetic constitution on the basis of sensibility. To avoid such a problem, a less impoverishing kind of reduction is required, allowing us to fulfill the aim of legitimization. Particularly, according to Lohmar, the problem would be bypassed by enlarging the “legitimizing field” to the matter of the act. Its exclusion is considered to be nonsense, since it is precisely what makes the reduction to the real contents fall short of its legitimating aim.

Yet, if we consider what just said with respect to the reduction to the real components of the act in connection with the previous analysis of the hypothesis of chaos in the Appendix XX of Hua VII, we can try to rephrase the very question of legitimization. For, as we have seen and as we will show in more detail throughout the following chapters, the sphere of sensibility for Husserl is not to be considered as fully chaotic. Generalized chaos that excludes even the possibility of apprehension, as we have seen, can only be assumed as an ideal possibility. Instead, the experience of some “weaker” chaos of sensible contents remains, as we have seen, a factual possibility. This chaos cannot “absolute”.¹¹¹ A minimal, at least spatio-temporal and associative, form of organization of the sensible contents must be given. Such a primal organization would certainly not be enough to make cognition possible, yet it would still remain a pre-condition for all cognition and objective constitution.

¹⁰⁹ Accordingly, Lohmar (2012) seems to exclusively count the sensible contents (the hyle, in the terminology of *Ideas I*) as real components of the act. This, however, may be questionable already in the *Logical Investigations*, where apprehensions (the noesis in the terminology of *Ideas I*) are also considered to belong to “real” [reell] immanence. If we accept this, then also the hypothesis of chaos shall be revisited in a way that, as I will show, will make it more compatible with the claims made in the Appendix XX of Hua VII.

¹¹⁰ Lohmar (2012) understands such a reduction in the *Logical Investigations* as being still very much empirically inspired. Accordingly, the real components of the act would simply be the present sensible impressions.

¹¹¹ Hua XVI, p. 289/(Husserl 1997, p. 250).

With respect to the relationship between layers of experience, the hypothesis of chaos has the following implications, which allow us to draw again a parallel between Husserl and Kant. First, a basic spatio-temporal and configurative articulation of the sensible contents must be presupposed in order for apprehension, apperception, and world-experience to be possible. Without such a basic order, we would have a generalized chaos of sensation, which would preclude the very possibility of experience. If we pursue the parallelism with Kant, we can say that this basic level or regularity corresponds to the synopsis of sensibility and the correlated synthesis of apprehension. In this sense, it is correct to talk about the grounding *von unten* of both experience and cognition. Secondly, such a basic order alone does not grant the possibility of object constitution. To this aim, the higher form of synthesis of apperception is also required. This is not a predicative or conceptual synthesis yet, and may be considered as corresponding to the synthesis of reproduction Kant attributes to the imagination. For Husserl, such a synthesis belongs to the transcendental aesthetic and is responsible of the constitution of an identical object in and through the changes in its appearance. Thirdly, to reach the level of proper cognition, a still higher synthetic accomplishment is required. For Husserl, this is obtained through predication, generalization, and idealization. *Mutatis mutandis*, this would correspond to Kant's synthesis of recognition. These differentiations confirm that the idea of a stratification of experience can be found in both Husserl and Kant. Moreover, they show that between the purely intellectual and the purely sensible domain there are "intermediate" forms of synthesis, which are pre-conceptual and nevertheless go beyond the sphere of the spatio-temporal articulation of the sensible contents. These syntheses can still be said to belong to the aesthetic in the Husserlian sense, and yet they also seem to function as "bridge" for higher order thought.

In light of the analysis of Husserl's and Kant's positions concerning the hypothesis of chaos, we can now tackle more directly three interconnected questions, which have repeatedly emerged in the previous discussion: (1) the problem of the relationship between the empirical and the a priori, (2) the problem of the subjective versus the objective institution of order, and (3) the problem of the relationship between the lower and the higher levels of experience, or between the aesthetic and the analytic. If considered superficially, these three points seem to bear witness to the distance between Husserl's and Kant's theories of experience, which we have already considered in detail via the reconstruction of Husserl's critical assessments. Yet, a deeper inquiry seems to open up the space for a more fruitful theoretical exchange between the two positions.

- (1) With respect to the relationship between the empirical and the a priori, both Husserl and Kant repeatedly remark that the description of the sensible regularity is primarily an empirical one. It concerns the observation of an order given in our factual experience. Yet, even if Husserl is more explicit than Kant in recognizing a structural (i.e., a priori) lawfulness hidden behind what might appear as merely empirical regularity, I believe that also for Kant the sensible regularity entails a structural moment, which allows him to assume that lawfulness as a necessary condition of experience. Thus, in this case, we are measured

with a necessity that concerns the co-implication of the eidetic or structural and the empirical or factual order.

- (2) As to the opposition regarding the subjective versus the objective ground of the lawfulness of experience, we are apparently confronted with an unbridgeable gap between Husserl's and Kant's positions.¹¹² Whereas the former insists that there is an immanent lawfulness in the givenness of the sensible contents, the latter maintains that the regularity of association of the sensible contents is nothing but the empirical and subjective ground for reproduction. Although Kant does not develop the idea of a material *a priori*, he nevertheless recognizes that a certain order must be immanent to the successive presentation of matter (the qualities of the cinnabar), and that this order cannot be traced back to the synthetic functions of the understanding. Yet, most importantly, the exclusive emphasis of Husserl's reference to the lawfulness of experience *a parte objecti*, played against Kant's claim of the subjective ground, risks failing to grasp some central aspects in Husserl's argument. This particularly emerges from the previously quoted passage in the Appendix XX of Hua VII. In this passage, Husserl states that the essential reasons that define the regularity of sensible displaying are not to be found in either the object or the subject alone. Rather, they can only be given by the fundamental correlation of perceptual cognition [*Wahrnehmungserkenntnis*] and its objective correlate (Hua VII, p. 385). This means that there can be no experience that does not begin with this correlation, so that the laws that rule the contents cannot be considered apart from the subjective ones and vice versa.
- (3) Finally, the discussion concerning the possible chaos of sensible contents gives us a further argument to reassess the supposed opposition between Kant's idea of a legitimization of experience *von oben* and Husserl's approach to the stratifications of experience *von unten*. Again, this opposition might not be necessarily as drastic as Husserl sees it. Certainly, the starting point and the aim of Husserl's and Kant's inquiries, as I have shown, are in several ways different. However, since Kant seems to be ready to recognize an inner lawfulness of sensibility, independently of the functions of the understanding, we can argue that he would also recognize that sensibility has some kind of autonomous organization, which is certainly not enough to make cognition possible, and nevertheless grounds *von unten* the possibility of experience at its different layers. Moreover, both Kant and Husserl recognize intermediate forms of synthesis between the two extremities of the purely synoptic or sensible and the purely intellectual or predicative order. These syntheses seem to bridge the purely sensible and the purely predicative sphere. Accordingly, the different layers of experience shall not only be distinguished and analyzed with respect to their internal lawfulness. Rather, they shall also be considered in their interplay and as shaping experience in its complexity precisely through such interplay.

¹¹² De Palma (2001) and Pradelle (2012) particularly insist on this gap between what he considers to be a foundation of experience *a parte objecti* (Husserl) and *a parte subjecti* (Kant).

3.2.4 *Da Capo: Experience and Subjectivity, between Wesen and Faktum*

In the first part of this chapter, I have argued that the critique of Kant's approach to the relationship between the *Aesthetic* and the *Analytic* is strictly related to other central nodes of Husserl's criticism, notably the question of subjectivity. Having reassessed that relationship in both Husserl and Kant by proposing a more complex and dynamic account of the stratification of experience, we are now in the position to ask whether this also has some reverberations on the problem of subjectivity. Particularly, the previous discussion prompts us to return to Husserl's critique of anthropologism. Indeed, besides being directed toward the determination of the transcendental apperception as "I think", which is considered to be too formal and abstract, Husserl's criticism concerns the more concrete characterization of subjectivity in connection with the faculties of *Gemüt*. In brief, the theory of the faculties would show that, once the characterization of subjectivity is made more concrete, Kant risks proposing an anthropological view of the laws of experience and cognition. That is to say, the theory of the faculties would end up founding the a priori structures of experience upon the conformation *de facto* of the empirical subject. Yet, also in this case, things might be more complicated than they first appear. An evidence for this complexity is provided by a passage from the Prague conference (1935), where Husserl expressly distances himself from the anthropological labeling:

Kant's transcendental subjectivity, the one of transcendental acts and faculties, which makes up the entire topic of Kantian philosophy, is absolutely not the supposed human or animalistic soul, nor is it the one that psychology has been trying to know in a scientific spirit since Locke. If one qualifies Kant's philosophy as subjectivistic or immanent and thinks of the human soul as a psychophysical topic, then one has not understood a single word of Kant's. Since it is exactly Kant's enterprise to uproot such psychologism forever. (Hua XXIX, p. 114)

Of course, one should be careful in taking this remark as a self-critical stance. For in other texts written in the same years Husserl still re-proposes his old view concerning the anthropological implications in Kant's philosophy. Nevertheless, the just quoted passage may be taken as an occasion to go deeper in the considerations regarding the subjectivity of experience. More precisely, taking Husserl's words seriously, we shall ask what would prevent us from recognizing in Kant a sustainer of a proto-anthropologism or proto-psychologism. I believe this question shall be answered by means of a more careful analysis of Kant's theory of the faculties.

If one goes beyond what first appears as the reference to the empirical subject, one could retrace in this theory some relevant aspects also for the phenomenological characterization of subjectivity. Thus, in a way, the passage from the Prague conference invites us to rethink this connection, because it seems to reveal that Husserl himself was well aware of the richness and the complexity of Kant's system of the faculties. This system, as it has been shown,¹¹³ cannot be understood as a form of

¹¹³ See, notably, Bisin (2006), Gigliotti (1995, 2001), and Nuzzo (2005, 2008).

anthropologism or psychologism *ante litteram*. Kant's "psychology", or the theory of the faculties, shall rather be considered transcendentally. And this particularly emerges from its systematic presentation in the third *Critique*.

The *First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment* already goes in this direction, particularly arguing that experience cannot be considered as a mere aggregate [*Aggregat*], but rather defines a system, ruled by an internal and transcendental lawfulness.¹¹⁴ However, with respect to the faculties of *Gemütt*, I consider the table at the end of the published introduction to the third *Critique* to be most instructive. In this table, the cognitive faculty [*Erkenntnisvermögen*] appears twice: first, it appears on the empirical level, as one of the faculties of the soul (besides the feeling of pleasure and displeasure and the faculty of desire); secondly, it appears on the transcendental level, where it is more generally intended as to include the faculties of the understanding, judgment, and reason.¹¹⁵ This double occurrence and the discrepancy between the two levels – empirically considered, the cognitive faculty is an *Unterbegriff*, subordinated to the totality of the faculties of *Gemütt*, whereas, transcendently considered, it is an *Oberbegriff*, comprehending the three above mentioned faculties – indicates that there is not a strict parallelism between the empirical faculties of *Gemütt* and the transcendental faculties of cognition, in spite of what Husserl's criticism gives us to think. And even considering only the faculties of *Gemütt*, one can wonder whether they shall really be conceived as being exclusively empirical. In other words, one can attempt a phenomenological reading of this classification of the faculties of *Gemütt* and consider it as the result of a description, which certainly takes departure from the factual domain, and yet is oriented toward the structural or eidetic moments in it. Even though the a priori or eidetic laws of experience are to be considered valid independently of the empirical order, they nevertheless acquire their full sense only if they absolve the function of the supporting structure, holding and regulating the dynamics proper to the empirical or factual dimension. Thus, the displaced co-reference between the faculties of *Gemütt* and the transcendental faculties of cognition may also be understood in the light of this necessary co-implication of the a priori and the a posteriori in the concrete unfolding of experience.

If we now turn to the passage from the Prague conference, we can say that, on an interpretative level, it clearly reflects Husserl's somewhat ambiguous approach to Kant's philosophy. Accordingly, Kant is considered, on the one hand, as the first discoverer of transcendental philosophy and therefore as the precursor of transcendental phenomenology (cf. Hua VII, pp. 230–287). On the other hand, however, this recognition is qualified by the remark that Kant is actually unable to completely emancipate from the scientific and metaphysical presuppositions of his time, which eventually have a problematic impact upon his entire philosophical architectonic. Yet, on a more genuinely theoretical level, that passage calls into question the critique to the system of faculties and more radically invites us to rethink the question of facticity in relation to the transcendental and the a priori.

¹¹⁴ EEKU AA 20, pp. 208–211/(Kant 2000, pp. 13–15).

¹¹⁵ KU AA 05, p. 197/(Kant 2000, p. 83).

Whereas eidetic necessity and universality certainly hold for every possible, and even only imaginable, subject (i.e., not only for the human subject), they do manifest themselves in concrete individual, factual relationships. Thus, the very givenness of these structural laws within factual experience reveals the co-implication of the eidetic and the factual domain. This is particularly true for what concerns the transcendental aesthetic. For no theory of sensibility can fully abstract from that factual dimension. Hence, as I will show more concretely in the last part of this book, facticity shall not be considered in opposition, but rather in relation with the transcendental and the *a priori*.

3.3 Conclusions

Discussing Kant's and Husserl's approaches to sensibility, I have shown how, despite all distinctions, their respective views may also complement each other. On the one hand, as we have seen while discussing Husserl's criticism, one of the shortcomings in Kant's theory of sensibility concerns its incompleteness and its subordination to the faculty of the understanding. Nevertheless, the overview concerning the role of the pre-predicative syntheses in the second part of this chapter provides good reasons for claiming that an inner and basic organization of sensibility shall also be recognized in Kant's philosophy. On the other hand, Husserl's phenomenological inquiries certainly show that synthetic constitution is primarily accomplished within the field of sensibility. In this sense, sensibility has a foundational role with respect to predicative thought. Nevertheless, these phenomenological investigations, which have been correctly characterized as genealogical (Bégout 2000b), also reveal to be somehow motivated (*von oben*) by the quest for the legitimization and the genesis of higher order cognition.¹¹⁶ Does this actually challenge the phenomenological attempt to do justice to the autonomy and self-organization of sensibility, considered as grounding with respect to cognition? I believe the answer to this question should be no. Somehow, Husserl's genealogical approach seems to be the complementary reverse of Kant's re-evaluation of the pre-predicative syntheses. In other words, if there is a form of motivation of the phenomenological inquiries that is related to the legitimization of higher order cognition, then the account of the relationship between the different moments of experience needs to be further articulated. Besides the distinction between the sensible and the predicative sphere and the recognition of the inner lawfulness of the sensible domain, we also need to investigate the interplay of both moments in concrete phenomena. As we have seen by considering some of these phenomena, the "opposition" between Kant's idea of a legitimization of experience *von oben* and Husserl's idea of its foundation *von unten* does not seem to be a real opposition once we show how the different moments are interrelated. This, as I have argued, requires a more dynamic account of how the sensible and the predicative order complement each other.

¹¹⁶This is the basis for the critical arguments against Husserl's transcendental aesthetic to be found in Pradelle (2000).

Finally, considering both the hypothesis of chaos of sensible contents and the attenuation of the anthropologism-critique, we could further thematize the relationship between the a priori structures of experience and the irreducible moment of facticity. These analyses call into question the understanding of facticity in a too strict opposition to the eidetic laws and, consequently, the strict dichotomy between facts and essences. If we endorse such a dichotomy and still admit that the reference to the facticity is something inevitable within the sphere of sensible experience, it follows that a theory of sensible experience can only be an empirical one. This, of course, would challenge Husserl's own understanding of the transcendental aesthetic as an eidetic theory of the structures of sensible experience, which has been outlined throughout the previous inquiries. Yet, does the inevitable reference to facticity imply that the transcendental aesthetic is turned into some sort of empiricism, psychologism, or anthropologism? To answer this question we shall more closely qualify the concepts of facticity and fact and its implications, notably for the theory of sensible experience. What is particularly important in our context is that, besides the understanding of facticity based upon the concept of *Tatsache* (and therefore as opposed to *eidos*), there is an idea of facticity that is more properly grounded upon the concept of *Faktum*. Different from the former, the latter has a specific kind of necessity.¹¹⁷ In *Ideas I*, this is particularly referred to the apodicticity of each singular actual experience. Although the latter is not the specification of an eidetic law, it cannot be equalized to mere contingency either. As opposed to the in principle presumptive reality [*präsumptive Wirklichkeit*] of what belongs to the world of transcendent things, I myself and the present phase of my mental process are absolute and unconditional realities. Different from the accidental nature of the existence of everything that happens in the world, the fact that we are experiencing, and the inner consciousness thereof, is something apodictically and necessarily given. In *Ideas I*, thus, the necessity of the *Faktum* of inner experience fits the idea of the possibility in principle of the annihilation of the world. Yet, is the necessity of a *Faktum* really limited to inner experience? And what about the experience of the world, once all naive positing has been bracketed? What about, for instance, the kind of necessity that prevents us from accepting the hypothesis of a complete chaos of sensible contents as a real possibility?

As I have mentioned, in the conclusions of *Thing and Space*, Husserl restates the idea of the annihilation of the world as a result of the dissolution of the sensations in a mere chaos. Here, however, Husserl is quite clear in claiming that this does not possibly mean the dissolution of all being into nothingness, or the dissolution of perception in a mere fiction. For pretention, fiction, and the very idea of nothingness presuppose something like being and reality. Admitting the dissolution of all being into a mere fiction, thus, would amount to a non-sense.¹¹⁸ It is within this framework

¹¹⁷ Hua III/1, p. 98/(Husserl 1983, pp. 102–103).

¹¹⁸ “If, in this way, not-being, as the term already might suggest, takes its measure from Being, and if it is only the conflict against pre-given Being that makes possible a pretension as mere pretension, which forfeits its claim and manifests its pretended Being as a fiction, then we could say that it is countersensical to maintain that absolutely nothing is, that each and every appearing being is mere fiction and thus is imaginary, hallucination, dream.” Hua XVI, p. 287/(Husserl 1997, p. 249).

that Husserl first claims that the existence of the world and its “being so and so” shall be considered a posteriori as an “irrational”, or inexplicable, *Faktum*.¹¹⁹ Besides such an a posteriori claim, which, to rephrase the conceptual distinction made in *Ideas I*, would seem to imply the understanding of the being of the world as a accidental *Tatsache* rather than as a *Faktum*, in a footnote to the quoted passage Husserl makes a more radical claim. Here, he suggests that it is not the existence of the world, but rather the “rationality” of the lawfulness of world appearance, i.e., the structure of world display for the experiencing subject, which shall be conceived as a *Faktum*:

Or the rationality residing in the actual and possible nexus of appearance and making possible the steadfast unity of the thing and of the world – this rationality would be an irrational fact.¹²⁰

Although the hypothesis of a dissolution of the meaningfulness of experience, based on the chaos of sensible contents, remains thinkable, its realization not only conflicts a posteriori with the accidental fact of the existence of the world, but also a priori with the necessary fact that consciousness as such is apprehending and world-experiencing, and that there is lawfulness in such an experiencing. Accordingly, that there is a basic lawfulness in sensible experience, and that such lawfulness determines the way we subjectively relate to the world, is something that cannot be further explicated, and therefore can be assumed as the necessity of a *Faktum*. In this sense, the transcendental aesthetic brings precisely to the fore the constitutive interplay between the facticity of experience and its structural articulation. Such interplay and the meaning of the necessity of a *Faktum* of experience will be further thematized in the next two parts.

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¹¹⁹ Hua XVI, pp. 289–290/(Husserl 1997, pp. 250–251).

¹²⁰ Hua XVI, p. 289/(Husserl 1997, p. 250).

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Part III
Parallelisms,
Stratifications, and Beyond

Chapter 4

Intuitiveness, Constitution, and Idealization: Modes of Spatial and Temporal Experience

After presenting Husserl's project of the transcendental aesthetic, we shall now discuss why the inquiries into temporal and spatial constitution primarily belong to this project. Certainly, Husserl's appeal to Kant's notion of the transcendental aesthetic already provides a partial answer to this question, since Kant precisely tells us that space and time are the forms of sensibility. However, Husserl has his own way to arrive to the point. And indeed, as we have seen, he does not simply endorse Kant's understanding of space and time as the forms of the outer and the inner sense. Nor does Husserl's approach to temporality and spatiality refer back to a theory of the faculties of the human subject – even if this Kantian theory has been proven not to be merely anthropological, but rather transcendental. It rather takes departure from the correlative structure of experience, which implies at least a partial emendation of Kant's definition of time and space as the forms of sensibility. Understood in relation to the a priori of correlation, time and space are defined noematically as the forms of the “appearing as such”.¹ However, once it has been shown that time and space are the essential structures of display, which presupposes the a priori of correlation between the subject and the world, we still have to assess in what sense they primarily belong to the domain of sensible experience. That is to say, we shall distinguish time and space as the forms of what is given in sensible experience from objective time and space and idealized time and space (i.e. as object of the exact sciences). Moreover, we shall ask whether, besides being the forms of sensible appearances, time and space can be intuited by themselves, and what this intuition amounts to. In order to answer these questions, in this chapter and in the following one, I shall present more specifically the phenomenological approach to time and space. More precisely, this chapter is devoted to methodological issues and to the fundamental differentiations, thereby preparing the field for the following chapter, which further explores the question of the intuitive givenness of time and space.

¹ Cf. Hua XVI, p. 43/(Husserl 1997, p. 37); Hua Mat IV, p. 121.

Besides answering the question as to the sensible and intuitive nature of spatial and temporal experience, addressing Husserl's methodological remarks and preliminary differentiations will allow us to detect how Husserl conceives of the parallelisms or the analogies between the phenomenology of time and space. Yet, the question we shall keep in mind throughout the discussions proposed in the present and the next chapter is whether such parallelisms and analogies can really tell the whole story concerning the relation between temporality and spatiality.

The suggestion concerning the structural and methodological analogy in the phenomenology of time and space is explicitly presented in the introduction to Husserl's 1905 lecture course on the phenomenology of inner time consciousness.² Particularly, Husserl focuses here on the parallel distinction between, on the one hand, objective versus intuitive time and, on the other hand, objective versus intuitive space. This remark is placed in the context of the discussion of the proper phenomenological method to approach time; a discussion that, *mutatis mutandis*, is supposed to hold for the phenomenology of space as well. In both cases, Husserl aims to circumscribe the phenomenological inquiry by differentiating it from every objectivating theory of time and space, be it scientific or philosophical. This evidently reactivates the entire discussion of pure experience that was previously examined. Notably, Husserl's target is here a particular kind of naturalistic inquiry into time and space, well spread in the psychology of his times (and still flourishing in many contemporary studies), which empirically subsumes our experience under natural laws and relations, thereby considering time and space themselves as objectively given and measurable.

In what sense is phenomenology alternative to such an approach? What, exactly, is wrong with it? The reasons for Husserl's critique are not connected to some sort of metaphysical prejudice against the objectivity of time and space. They rather derive from the observation that, like any other objective science, a science of objective time and space would hang in the air without a proper phenomenological inquiry into the experiential givenness of time and space. Only such an inquiry, indeed, can provide a proper foundation for all objective claims regarding time and space. Accordingly, this is why the phenomenological analyses shall begin by bracketing the received ideas of objective time and space and subsequently investigate their constitution.

These methodological remarks deserve our attention. Far from being extrinsic, indeed, they reverberate on the thing itself, namely on the concrete description of spatial and temporal constitution at the different levels of experience. The phenomenological method, in fact, allows Husserl to reformulate the pivotal philosophical questions concerning the nature or the essence of time and space by turning them into the transcendental-constitutive questions concerning their mode of experiential givenness and constitution. Addressing time and space by means of a descriptive and structural analysis of experience, phenomenology turns the question as to *what* time and space are into the other question as to *how* they display to the experiencing subject.

²Hua X, pp. 4f./[\(Husserl 1991, pp. 4f.\)](#).

Nevertheless, Husserl is not satisfied with the simple distinction between intuitive time/space versus objective time/space. And this is true especially if the motivation that underlies the emphasis on this distinction is a foundational and transcendental one (a *quaestio juris* in Kant's sense). Consistently, the step that follows the descriptive analysis of our experience of time and space will necessarily be to show how the latter makes the constitution of objective time and space possible. Thus, the objectivity of time and space is not simply neglected by the bracketing. It is rather assumed as something that needs to be properly grounded.

Besides the distinction and the relationship between objective and phenomenological time/space, another analogy concerns the relation between the phenomenology of intuitive time and space and the exact sciences dealing with time and space as idealizations. Clearly, what Husserl has in mind here is geometry as the pure and exact science of spatiality. Its pendant concerning temporality would be a pure chronology, the analysis of which, however, is not as developed as the one concerning geometry.³ Again, the relation is a foundational one, since idealization is made possible by the process of limit passage, which takes departure from (and thus presupposes) the morphological structures of experience.

Therefore, regarding both time and space, Husserl's purpose is to give a phenomenological account of the different layers of constitution and their foundational relations. Aiming to shed light on the significance of the analogy of the phenomenological approach to spatiality and temporality, in this chapter, I concentrate on the meaning of the aforementioned differentiations, and examine their reverberations on the descriptions of the mode of givenness of phenomenological space and time, which will be further developed in the following chapters. Following Husserl in the attempt to keep the analyses of temporality and of spatiality separated from one another, however, we will be already confronted at different points not only with the potentialities, but also with the limits of such analogical and parallel considerations. Highlighting these limits, particularly in what concerns the intuitive givenness of time and space, we will begin to see in what sense the two dimensions of sensible experience cannot but refer to one another.

4.1 The Intuitiveness of Time

In his introduction to the 1905 lectures on inner time consciousness, Husserl conceives of the bracketing of objective time as the first and necessary step toward the phenomenological inquiry into the different layers of temporal experience. Accomplishing this pre-form of the phenomenological *epoché* allows Husserl to formulate the two cardinal tasks of the phenomenology of time: (1) the description of the structures of inner time consciousness, and (2) the analysis of the constitution of

³ “Chronology [is] here understood [...] as analogon or parallel to pure geometry, as pure ‘theory of time’” “Chronologie [ist] hier verstanden [...] als Analogon oder Parallele der reinen Geometrie, als reine ‘Zeitlehre’.” D 8/40 a.

objective time. Manifestly giving priority to the former task, probably due to the lack of the necessary descriptive tools to provide an experiential foundation to the constitution of objective time, the analyses conducted in the 1905 lecture course particularly focus on the a priori of inner time and on its intuitive givenness. In what follows, I shall mainly concentrate on the first task.

The very formulation of these two tasks reveals us that the bracketing of objective time cannot be conceived as a mere introspective turn to inner subjective experience; i.e., it is not a procedure that, in accordance with a well-established distinction in the philosophical tradition, simply opposes subjective and objective time.⁴ Quite to the contrary, according to Husserl, the two domains of constitution are strictly related, in such a way that the analyses concerning the immanent structure of experience offer the basis for the analyses concerning the constitution of objective time. Thus, it being understood that the bracketing of objective time does not per se coincide with the phenomenological reduction, which will also play a decisive role in the analyses of time written after 1907, we shall also observe that the underlying principle and the motivation that steer this bracketing are not so distant from the ones connected to the phenomenological reduction. Indeed, in both cases the *epoché* of all positings with regard to the existence of the world is meant to conceive of the meaning of the world as a correlate of consciousness.

Insisting on the apriority of phenomenological time, Husserl differentiates his own inquiry not only from physics, which is concerned with the real time of nature, but also from all research devoted to the psychological or physiological origins of our experience of time. Particularly, he has in mind certain trends in current psychology, whereby the latter somehow becomes the natural science of the soul.⁵ Bearing in mind Husserl's notorious sharp critique of psychologism in the *Prolegomena*, we can easily guess why a certain psychological approach is again the main target of this new criticism focused on time. In spite of the specificity of each author's position, Husserl considers the approach of his contemporaries in psychology as generally vitiated by a certain reductionist attitude as well as by a set of naturalistic presuppositions. Accordingly, the question concerning the origins of time is supposed to find its answer in either the physiological inquiry into our sensations (merely conceived as physiological or neural stimuli) or, in the best case, in a psycho-genetic, yet still naturalistic or behavioristic, research. In his critical assessment, Husserl somehow reformulates the central problems in the controversy between nativism and empiricism, which was mainly concerned with the question of the origin of our representation of space, in connection with the question of the

⁴ At the origins of such a distinction are, notably, Aristotle's characterization of objective time as the measure of movement in Book IV of the *Physics* (Aristotle 1936, pp. 208a–224b) and St. Augustine's approach to the time of the soul in Book XI of the *Confessions* (Augustine 1998, pp. 221–245). With regard to this, see Ricoeur (1985, pp. 21–109) and Bernet (1985). Ricoeur mainly stresses the filiation of Husserl's approach to time from Augustine's, whereas Bernet shows that both the subjective and the objective account are to be found in Husserl's analyses.

⁵ Hua X, p. 369/(Husserl 1991, p. 380).

origins of our representation of time.⁶ Notwithstanding their opposed claims regarding the innate versus the acquired character of our space-time representations, both nativism and empiricism share the same naturalistic presuppositions. From both perspectives, the experience of time and space can be traced back to relationships of succession or coexistence between our (mostly physiologically considered) sensible impressions. These presuppositions are implied by the very key question of the debate, namely the question as to the origin of our representation of time and space. Being eminently focused on either the innate material source of our spatial and temporal representations or their empirical genesis, this debate eventually neglects the question regarding the a priori structure of temporal experience. In Husserl's view this should be instead the primary task of phenomenology, which by means of description is precisely supposed to disclose the a priori temporal laws that essentially belong to the specific contents and acts. The preliminary bracketing of objective time, therefore, implies that temporal experiences are not to be considered as to their actual existence, but rather described as to their a priori immanent structure. These structures make up the immanent configuration of experience, holding for each possible experiencing subject. This is also the meaning of Husserl's statement, formulated towards the end of his introduction to the 1905 lectures, that the a priori of time can only be disclosed by means of the description of consciousness, with its intentional contents and act characters.⁷

Still, this is not the only implication of the bracketing of objective time. For Husserl's argument is not limited to the claim that the temporal laws cannot be reduced to the empirical order of experience since they make up instead its a priori structure. Husserl's challenge is also to show that these very temporal a priori structures are themselves intuitively grasped. In other words, the phenomenology of inner time consciousness is not only concerned with the intuitive givenness of temporal objects; it is also interested in determining how duration, i.e., time as the form of display, is experientially given. The self-manifesting time [*erscheinende Zeit*] is considered to be an absolute and apodictic givenness: all doubting in this respect would simply be meaningless [*sinnlos*].⁸ As we can detect from the supplementary text 19 in Hua X (1904), once the bracketing is accomplished, the intuition of time is co-implied by the givenness of the temporal objects and by the temporal unfolding

⁶Hua X, p. 9/(Husserl 1991, p. 9). See also Hua X, pp. 187–189/(Husserl 1991, pp. 193–195). Even if Husserl does not mention any specific exponent of the two factions here, it is plausible that he has Helmholtz's theory particularly in mind. In his *Handbuch der physiologische Optik*, indeed, Helmholtz reduces the perception of temporal succession to the objective succession of our sensible impressions: “The only relation in which a real conformity of our perception with reality can occur is the temporal succession of events with their different characteristics. Simultaneity, succession, the regular recurrence of simultaneity or succession can equally occur in sensations as in the events. The external events, like their perceptions, take place in time. Thus, the temporal relations of the latter can also be the accurate image of the temporal relations of the former.” (Helmholtz 1910, p. 21). According to Husserl, as we will see, the succession of impressions is by no means sufficient to have a consciousness of this succession.

⁷Hua X, p. 10/(Husserl 1991, p. 10).

⁸Hua X, p. 5/(Husserl 1991, p. 5).

of experiences.⁹ Yet, this Husserlian claim is not without problems. The assertion concerning the apodictic givenness and intuitiveness of time cannot be simply assumed as an axiomatic statement; it is rather in need of phenomenological legitimation. How can we intuit time, if we admit that time is not a thing among others but rather the immanent articulation of all our experiences? Shall we then consider time as a property, which we may intuitively single out from objects and experiences? Has time an independent reality, which is somehow superimposed to experiences and their correlates? Clearly, if we stick to the definition of time as the form of what is sensibly experienced, the two latter questions shall be answered negatively. But how, then, can we sensibly intuit a form? To answer these questions, I consider it fruitful to return to a comparison of Husserl's and Kant's positions, maintaining the focus upon the question of the intuitiveness of time.

As a guiding thread for such a comparison, I wish to refer to the argument developed by Ricœur in the third volume of his *Time and Narrative*. In the second chapter of this volume, Ricœur discusses what he considers to be the inevitable shortcomings in the positions of both Husserl and Kant, in order to argue for the inescapable aporetic character of all philosophy of time. Without going into Ricœur's own complex answer to this aporeticity,¹⁰ I consider his critical assessment particularly suitable to discuss how the intuitiveness of time, but also of space, should be understood. Certainly, Ricœur's agenda in confronting Husserl with Kant consists in showing that neither the phenomenological nor the Kantian perspective are self-sufficient, and quasi paradoxically refer to each other by means of their respective exclusion. This leads to what Ricœur considers to be the first aporia to which all philosophy of time is doomed, namely the aporia concerning the impossibility to bring time to the concept, or to philosophically legitimate and exhaust the question of the heterogeneity of subjective and objective time. Even besides Ricœur's own alternative suggestions based on narrative time, these observations allow us to assess the central question as to the connection of temporal and spatial display. Yet, in order to arrive at this point, we first need to grasp what Ricœur considers to be the core of Husserl's and Kant's positions concerning the intuitiveness of time.

⁹Hua X, pp. 188–189/(Husserl 1991, pp. 193–195).

¹⁰On this topic, see Römer (2010). The author develops her reading of Husserl's and Heidegger's philosophies of time in light of Ricœur's threefold thesis concerning the aporetic character of all philosophy of time (first aporia: the distinction between objective and subjective time cannot be either consistently held or conceptually expressed, because the definition of each of them inevitably refer to the other; second aporia: the philosophical claim concerning the unity and the uniqueness of time cannot be conceptually, i.e., philosophically, grounded; third aporia: all philosophical thought of temporality is doomed to failure, because the origin of time withdraws, in principle, from all conceptual grasping). Römer's main theoretical purpose is to show how the aporias implied by the phenomenology of time do not block the philosophical questioning. Distinguishing the *Aporizität* of time, as the quality to be *aporetic*, from the Aporetik, as the way of philosophically engaging with that aporeticity, Römer defends the thesis that the latter opens up the way for another questioning of time, which gives up univocity in favor of pluralization. Eventually, the answer to this new questioning cannot but be of practical nature.

Beginning his discussion with Husserl,¹¹ Ricœur (1985, p. 43) argues that the phenomenological analyses reveal themselves as aporetic precisely in their attempt to account for the intuitive givenness of time. The bracketing of objective time and the return to the pure self-manifestation of inner time as the source of all temporal constitution (included the constitution of objective time), then, fall short of their goal, since the alleged autonomy and self-sufficiency of inner time with respect to objective time does not seem to hold in the way Husserl describes it. The very descriptions that are supposed to render the self-givenness of inner time cannot but constantly draw their conceptual apparatus from the descriptions of objective time and of the givenness of spatio-temporal objects. To support this claim, the reference is made to Husserl's recourse to the vocabulary and metaphors stemming from the descriptions of objective time and of the world. In Ricœur's view, the homonymies between the analyses of inner time, those concerned with objective time, and those dealing with the spatial structure of the object's manifestation are detectors of a vicious circularity in the phenomenological approach. Were it not for its constant borrowing from the higher levels of objective time and the spatial order, the analysis of inner time would not be possible at all (Ricœur 1985, p. 46). Ricœur (1985, p. 49) certainly recognizes the two fundamental discoveries of Husserl's lecture course on inner time consciousness: the description of retention and protention as belonging to each and every act, and the distinction of both from, respectively, recollection and expectation. However, he does not consider the turn from the givenness of the temporal object to the self-sufficient givenness of duration as phenomenologically legitimated. The problems with such a description are twofold. On the one hand, they concern the metaphorical language of the description, which cannot but draw from the higher objective order. On the other hand – and Husserl constant reference to the givenness of the tone are there to prove this – the temporal analyses need to be supported by the reference to the givenness of objects, even if the range of these objects is limited to the temporal ones. Without such a reference, indeed, they would be doomed to silence (Ricœur 1985, p. 51). For these two reasons, no pure description of inner time as such, considered apart from objective space-time, can in principle be successful (Ricœur 1985, p. 89). Apart from the validity of the singular claims of Ricœur's,¹² what is most important to keep in mind for the present line of reasoning is the question as to the possibility of the intuitive manifestation of the form of inner time without the reference to a more concrete spatio-temporal order. What I would like to emphasize at this point is that the conceptual apparatus employed for the description of phenomenological time not only draws from the order of objective time (e.g., the notion of succession), but also and most crucially from our full-blown, spatio-temporal, experience of the world. Thus, the concepts and metaphors adopted for the phenomenological inquiry into inner time are also related to space and

¹¹ Ricœur's discussion is restricted to Husserl's lectures *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*. The supplementary texts in Hua X, the *Bernau Manuscripts* and the *C-Manuscripts*, instead, are not taken into consideration.

¹² For a detailed comparison of Husserl's phenomenology with the singular critiques raised by Ricœur, see Römer (2010, pp. 17–116, 237–283).

concrete perceptual experience (e.g., the metaphor of the flow). Yet, instead of considering this double bind between inner time and the world's spatio-temporal givenness as the index of the failure of the phenomenological analyses based on the stratifications of experience, I consider it as something that does not block, but rather may enhance the phenomenological inquiries. And I think that this movement can be done, within the transcendental aesthetic, by highlighting how space and time are originally interwoven. Certainly, this is not always the way in which Husserl explicitly sees the relation between spatiality and temporality. However, as I will show in more detail in the next part, this interweaving is what his own concrete phenomenological analyses, perhaps pre-thematically, reveal us.

A first step in this direction can be done by following Ricoeur in his discussion of Kant as the counterpart to Husserl. Seeking an alternative that may avert the impasse encountered in the phenomenology of inner time, Ricoeur appeals to Kant's definition of time as the form of the inner sense. Even if one might be tempted to see in Kant's Copernican revolution and particularly in his definition of time as the form of the inner sense the precursor of the turn to subjective, inner time, Ricoeur argues that the critical arguments of the first *Critique* suggest that Kant's theory is much closer to the theory of natural or objective time.

According to Ricoeur (1985, pp. 90–100), the discrepancy between Kant and Husserl does not concern primarily the phenomenological descriptions of the structure of inner time. It concerns, instead, the claim that these analyses proceed completely independent of an inquiry into objective time. According to Kant, indeed, the turn to time as the form of the inner sense necessarily requires a *detour* through the experience of the outer, spatio-temporal, world. Being the form of the inner sense, time is the condition of all appearance; as such, it can only be represented indirectly and analogically. This already emerges in the *Transcendental Aesthetic*, and more exactly in the *Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Time* in the second edition, which seems to be largely modeled upon the corresponding *Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space*. However, Kant's position regarding the impossibility of a direct intuition of time culminates in the *Transcendental Analytic*. Particularly, the impossibility of a direct intuition of time, independently of the objects in nature, emerges from the three *Analogy of Experience*, whereby the temporal relations are reinvested within an argument aimed at defining the conditions for objectively representing and discursively determining the schemata of substance (first analogy), cause (second analogy), and community (third analogy).¹³ Indeed, the schema of the category of substance determines what endures [*das Beharrliche*] throughout time and space. Causality, too, cannot be exclusively referred to the interiority of the soul or to inner sense, rather being the schematization of cause-effect relationships of what is given in intuition, e.g., movements in space, according to the unitary principle of thought. Finally, community immediately refers to spatiality as it provides the principle of co-existence. Thus, in all three analogies, time is certainly a condition for the representation of objects in space, although it is not represented itself.

¹³ KrV, B 218–274/A 177–226/(Kant 1998, pp. 295–326).

Even more explicitly, the same conviction can be found in the appendix to paragraph 24, dedicated to self-affection, and in the *Refutation of Idealism*, both added in the second edition of the *Critique*. In both texts, Kant is confronted with a problem that occupies him at least since his 1766 essay *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics*, namely the problem of the presence of the soul in space (and, consistently, of the very transcendental validity of the concept of the soul). In the *Transcendental Analytic* of the first *Critique*, this problem is turned into the question as to the relation between time (or the form of the inner sense) and space (or the form of the outer sense).¹⁴ This discussion, then, opens up the way to the *Transcendental Dialectic*, reassessing the entire question of the reality of the soul in rational psychology.

Sticking to the point, I will only consider here the relation between inner and outer sense as it is presented in the two mentioned passages from the *Transcendental Analytic* in the second edition. In the appendix on self-affection, Kant explicitly claims that we cannot have a direct intuition of time. Instead, he suggests that we can only represent time indirectly by drawing a straight line. Thus temporal succession and temporal order can only be represented spatially, as the succession and the order of the points of a line. This parallelism leads to the necessity of self-affection for our self-consciousness: such as we can only know objects insofar as we are externally affected by them, we can intuit ourselves only insofar as we are internally affected.¹⁵

In the *Refutation of Idealism*,¹⁶ the question of the relation between outer and inner sense is displayed within the context of the confutation of “material idealism”, in both Descartes’s problematic version and Berkley’s dogmatic version. Whereas for the former the existence of objects in space is doubtful and not apodictically demonstrable, for the latter it is considered to be false. Evidently, Kant needs to refute both forms of idealism, since both would challenge the entire theory of knowledge developed in the *Critique*. Barkley’s version, however, does not entail such an issue. And to discredit it Kant simply refers back to the definition of space in the *Transcendental Aesthetic*: dogmatic idealism can only hold if space is considered as a property of things in themselves, yet it reveals itself untenable if one considers things only as *phenomena*, and therefore space as the form of outer intuition. Descartes’s version of the idealism is more complex, being based on the claim that

¹⁴TG AA 02, pp. 315–374/(Kant 1992b, pp. 301–360). A very inspiring reading of this problem, fitting into a more general argument aimed at showing the transcendental character of the body in Kant’s critical works, is developed by Nuzzo (2008, pp. 45–68). As Nuzzo shows, in response to the ‘spirit seer’ Swedenborg, Kant assumes Wolff’s notion of space as the field of reciprocal interactions and coexistence of substance to show how this notion opens up the way to the empty speculations of rational psychology. The assumption of the presence of spiritual substances in space does not contradict that notion of space, even if the spatial presence of something immaterial cannot be experienced and therefore cannot ground any empirical concept. The failure of rational psychology in the *Dreams* represents the first step not only for the *Paralogisms* on the idea of the soul in the *Transcendental Dialectic*, but also for the transcendental inquiry into the relation of space and time.

¹⁵KrV, B 153–156/(Kant 1998, pp. 257–259).

¹⁶KrV, B 274–279/(Kant 1998, pp. 326–329).

any existence outside my own cannot be intuitively proved through immediate experience. Against this claim, Kant's purpose is to demonstrate the theorem saying that we do experience outer things in space and that, contrary to what Descartes believes, this experience is not subject to doubt. Kant contends that even our inner experience is possible only insofar as it presupposes the experience of outer things in space. Reinvesting the argumentation on the permanence of substance in the *First Analogy*, Kant maintains that the experience of ourselves as enduring in temporal change presupposes our experience of something persistent in space. With this argument, Kant's eventually dismisses the cornerstone of Descartes's idealism, namely the idea that the intuitiveness of inner experience can be considered apart from exteriority. Through the *Refutation of Idealism*, Kant seems to overturn the priority order in the relation between inner and outer sense. Indeed, in the 1770 *Dissertatio* and in some passages of the *Transcendental Aesthetic*, he still attributes a certain priority to time over space, by considering time as the form of all appearance in general and space only as the mediate form of outer appearance.¹⁷ Now, instead, the claim is made that the consciousness of my own existence is immediately the consciousness of the existence of things outside me,¹⁸ and even that the former consciousness eventually presupposes the latter.

Returning now to the parallel with Husserl, and to Ricoeur's interpretation thereof, we can certainly agree that the idea of an immediate intuition of time is directly challenged by these Kantian observations: it is only thanks to the mediation of spatial configurations that time can be indirectly represented (Ricoeur 1985, pp. 105–106). Nevertheless, Ricoeur does not believe that these references to the exteriority of space are the outcome of a spatialized account of duration in Bergson's (2001, pp. 68f.) terms. They rather refer to the impossibility of giving a descriptive account of our direct intuition of time as such, which eventually coincides with the task of the phenomenology of time. However, Ricoeur (1985, pp. 88–89) does believe that the just presented Kantian claims are not self-sufficient either, rather being based upon an implicit phenomenology, which becomes clear in those texts where Kant is concerned with the descriptive account of temporal relations.¹⁹ Notably, Ricoeur refers to paragraph 14 of Kant's 1677 *Dissertatio*. In spite of being already close to the positions assumed in the first *Critique*, Kant's argumentation in this text seems to dissemble the idea of an intuitive givenness of time. Particularly, the latter is implied by the thesis according to which it is not the order of simultaneity and succession that brings about our concept of time and that, on the contrary, such an order appeals to the already given idea of time.²⁰ Again, the intuitiveness of time is grounded on its uniqueness, which derives from a kind of coordination that precedes sensation and is itself intuitive.²¹ Even in the *Transcendental Aesthetic*,

¹⁷ KrV, B 50/A 34/(Kant 1998, pp. 180–181).

¹⁸ KrV, B 276–277/(Kant 1998, pp. 327–328).

¹⁹ Regarding the implicit phenomenology that tacitly operates in Kant's philosophy, see also Ricoeur (1987, pp. 227–250).

²⁰ MSI, AA 02, p. 398/(Kant 1992c, p. 391).

²¹ MSI, AA 02, p. 399/(Kant 1992c, p. 392).

although the text is already oriented toward the claim of the indirect intuition of time, Ricœur spots the traces of Kant's implicit phenomenology. Particularly, these traces concern the infinity of time: since the concept only entails partial representations, our representation of time as infinite cannot but stem from an immediate intuition.²²

In light of this comparison, we can now return to the questions raised above. Can we properly talk about the intuitive givenness of time? And, in case of affirmative answer, how does intuition occur once it is admitted that time is neither an object nor a real property of objects? According to Ricœur, as we have seen, the setback of Husserl's claims concerning the intuitiveness of inner time resides in the inevitable reference to objective time and to the spatio-temporal order. Despite the differences emphasized by Ricœur, this reference is present in both Husserl's and Kant's account of time. Still, I would not go as far as Ricœur in denouncing the aporetic character of the philosophy, and notably of the phenomenology, of time. The co-complication of the different layers of experience (inner time consciousness and objective time, as well as time and space), which we can find in both Husserl and Kant, may open up the field for rethinking the peculiar givenness of time within the transcendental aesthetic, or the theory of intuitive, sensible experience. Ricœur's (1985, pp. 59, 69–70) remarks, I submit, reveal themselves as based upon a too "formal" interpretation Husserl's time analyses, whereby the notion of form is narrowly considered in terms of the mathematical idealization of our full-blown experience, or as a construction. Nevertheless, as I have suggested in the first part, the notion of form, when adopted to define space and time, shall not be assumed with such a narrow meaning. Rather, it refers to a configurative unity, which, at the very level of sensibility, delineates a primal self-organization of experience. Therefore, if we do not assume here such a narrow understanding of the form (which, of course, still remains valid in the discourse on mathematical or logical formalization) and instead we take seriously the stratifications of temporality from the perspective of full-blown experience, we may even go as far as to understand the recourse to metaphors related to spatiality and to the objective time of the world as an expression of the very concreteness of the phenomenological analyses of time. In other words: the usage of spatial metaphors does not exclusively lend itself to be interpreted either *à la* Bergson (i.e., as related to the quantitative spatialization of qualitative time), or *à la* Ricœur (i.e., as a vicious circularity). This conceptual overlapping may also be conceived otherwise, that is, as referring to a particular kind of intuitiveness. Time is intuitively given only on the basis of full-fledged, spatio-temporal, experience. Such an interweaving of spatiality and temporality certainly does not prevent one from focusing on either space or time, just to show the features that distinctively characterize the one or the other. However, if the aim is the description of our full-fledged sensible experience, one would not go that far in such a description without being confronted with the implications of that most original intertwining. My effort in this work is precisely to shed light on these implications, which have here begun to emerge with regard to the question of the intuitiveness of time.

²² KrV, B 50/A 33/(Kant 1998, p. 180).

4.2 Space Between Intuition, Idealization, and Constitution

Discussing the phenomenological approach to spatiality, we have to keep in mind the outcomes of the previous remarks and ask whether there are elements testifying not only to the analogies and parallelisms, but also to its interweaving with temporality. Yet, in order to do this, we shall first follow Husserl's distinctions, showing why phenomenology shall be primarily confronted with the space of the transcendental aesthetic, namely with space such as it is given in sensible intuition. As I have mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the mathematician Husserl cannot neglect the question of the constitution of space in geometry, which adds a further dimension to the stratification with respect to temporality. Certainly, as we have seen, Husserl occasionally talks about a pure chronology that would restore the parallelism between space and time, apparently mined by the introduction of geometric space. Yet, it is evident that this pure chronology does not play the same role as geometry in Husserl's architectonic considerations. This may well be due to the fact that pure chronology as an eidetic and axiomatic science does not exist in the same way as geometry does. The mathematization of physical time may thus be the candidate to fill the gap of pure chronology. Nevertheless, if physics is considered as an applied and empirical (even though exact) science, time as the object of physical measurement does not simply coincide with the eidetic time of pure chronology as a pure axiomatic science. Thus, it is no surprise that geometry plays a central role in the analysis of space, whereas this is not the case for pure chronology and time.

The distinction of different layers of spatiality precisely emerges in strict connection with Husserl's project of a new philosophy of geometry, which he contemplated in a sketched *Raumbuch* to be published after the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*. And even if this publication eventually never happened, the manuscripts collected in view of this project are there to tell us how Husserl, already before the *Logical Investigations* and the lectures on time, conceived of the stratification of (spatial) experience.

In one of the texts written for the *Raumbuch* and dating back to 1892 or 1893, Husserl explicitly distinguishes four types of space: (1) lived space, or the space that we get to know pre-theoretically in every-day life; (2) the space of pure geometry; (3) the space of applied geometry or natural science; and (4) the space of metaphysics, i.e., possible transcendent space (Hua XXI, p. 270). A further and related distinction, formulated in the same years, more specifically concerns the different issues that a philosophy of space is supposed to deal with. These can be traced back to three main research domains: (1) the domain of the psychological inquiries into the structure of spatial representations and their genesis; (2) the domain of the logical inquiries, which integrate the problem of spatial intuition within the theory of knowledge and methodologically focus on the relation between intuitive and geometric space; and (3) the domain of the metaphysical inquiries, which, presupposing both of the two preceding research fields, investigate the ontological status of space, the relation between merely represented and real transcendent space, etc. (Hua XXI, p. 404).²³

²³ See also Hua XXI, pp. 262–266, 301–303.

We shall immediately observe that the former distinction of the four concepts of space is far from designating a mere conceptual ambiguity. Rather, it refers to the actual relation subsisting among the different experiences of space. It is a relation designated as a “genetic hierarchy” [*genetische Stufenfolge*] of spatial formations, wherein the most basic level, presupposed by all the others, is the one of intuitive space (Hua XXI, p. 270). Hence, already in these early texts, Husserl believes that the particular questions regarding the structures of complex forms of spatiality can be properly addressed only within a more comprehensive account of the stratifications that are implied in our experience of space.²⁴ Consequently, phenomenological inquiry is supposed to account for both the specificity of each layer of spatial experience and the relations subsisting among them.

Out of the aforementioned four concepts of space, Husserl’s analyses clearly privilege the first two, which primarily address the questions related to intuitive and to geometric space. Both the distinction and the relation between them are among the central concerns of the phenomenology of space throughout the development of Husserl’s thought. Indeed, the distinction and the relatedness between intuitive and geometric space mirror the larger problem of the distinction and relatedness between the analytic and the aesthetic *a priori*. Consistently, the distinction between intuitive and geometric space is parallel to the distinction between intuition and concept, or between authentic representation and inauthentic or symbolic representation.²⁵ As opposed to intuitive space, the space of geometry is a conceptual formation [*ein begriffliches Gebilde*] resulting from a logical processing of the pre-scientifically given spatiality of sensible experience. Different from intuitive space, geometric space cannot be intuited; it can rather be exclusively conceptually thought. This conceptual representation of geometric space symbolically refers to an intuition that, in principle, cannot be accomplished (Hua XXI, p. 271). Thus, the idea of geometric intuition, well spread in geometry, only concerns the figurative representation or the schematic drawing of a space that remains *per se* unrepresentable (Hua XXI, pp. 271–272). Intuitive space, instead, is the space of our every-day experience, i.e., the space that everyone – child or adult, learned or lay person – finds before him/herself in perception and fantasy. This space is always and inevitably pervaded by sensible qualities (Hua XXI, p. 271).²⁶

Yet, after having presented how Husserl conceives of the distinction between intuitive and geometric space, we shall consider more closely how the two relate to

²⁴ For further discussion on this topic, see Costa (1996) and Strohmeyer (1983).

²⁵ Hua XXI, pp. 270f. See also Sommer (1990), who correctly points out that the notion of geometric intuition that Husserl adopts in this text shall be qualified in relation to the categorial formation, and indeed construction, of geometric space. Thus, “geometric intuition” is certainly not to be equalized to sensible intuition.

²⁶ With regard to the intuitiveness of space, Husserl also expresses here a *reservatio mentis*, related to the impossibility of intuiting space as a universal whole, as “space of all spaces” [*Raum der Räume*] or as “extension of all extensions” [*Ausdehnung der Ausdehnungen*]. Cf. Hua XXI, pp. 276, 283. However, this statement does not seem to question the intuitiveness of lived space as such but only to stress the finite scope of this intuition, which does not embrace at once the world-space as a whole.

each other. This question, indeed, brings us back again to some issues raised in the first part regarding the stratification of experience. As I mentioned, the distinction between phenomenological and geometric space can be considered as a particular expression of the more general distinction between intuition and concept. This implies that, whereas the former domain is characterized by an inner and autonomous self-organization, the latter is heteronomous in a twofold sense: first, with respect to the object of experience, and secondly, with respect to the experience of the object.²⁷ This means that the laws making up the structure of intuitive space are both the starting point for the idealizing constructions of geometry, and the final point of confrontation to test their validity and plausibility. Like in all scientific theory, the laws of geometry cannot contradict the essential laws that are immanent to pre-scientific experience. They rather need to embrace them on the higher level of idealization and generalization. Such as for Kant, thus, the difference here does not seem to concern ontologically different spaces. Rather, it is a difference that concerns the mode of experiencing or apprehending the one space. The crucial step leading from the space of lived experience to the construction of geometric figures and geometric space is the idealization of the morphological figures of intuitive space, obtained by means of mathematical limit passages. Thanks to this process, it is possible to turn the vague and imprecise spatial figures that are perceptually given into exact geometric forms.²⁸

The process of idealization, thus, is connected with a twofold distinction formulated in the *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas I*: the distinction between formalization and generalization, and the distinction between exact and descriptive sciences.²⁹ As Husserl points out, generalization shall not be confused with formalization. The former, obtained by means of the so-called “ideating abstraction”,³⁰ is a particular kind of categorial intuition, which is fulfilled by the identity of the *Gattungswesen* in the variation of individuals. The latter, instead, is the result of the gradual abstraction of content, which is made possible, at different levels, by the substitution of the concrete object with formal variables.³¹ Consistently, with respect to the mathematization of space, in *Ideas I*, Husserl writes that the turn from lived space to geometric space as Euclidean manifold is not a generalization [*Generalisierung*] in the proper sense, but

²⁷ Regarding this twofold heteronomy of sciences, and particularly geometry, with respect to sensible experience, see Pradelle (2000, pp. 293f.).

²⁸ With regard to idealization as a process of limit passage, see Boi (2004, 2007); Giorello and Sinigaglia (2007); Lohmar (1989, pp. 136f.); Pradelle (2000, pp. 195–301); Sinigaglia (2000, p. 112).

²⁹ Hua XIX/1, pp. 248–252/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 13–19); Hua XIX/2, pp. 690f./ (Husserl 2001c, pp. 292f.); Hua III/1, pp. 10–38 and 145–157/(Husserl 1983, pp. 5–32, 157–170).

³⁰ Hua XIX/2, pp. 690f./ (Husserl 2001c, pp. 292f.).

³¹ Hua III/1, pp. 31f./ (Husserl 1983, pp. 26f.). See also Lohmar (1989, pp. 128f.). As we will see in the first chapter of the next section, the problem of the relation between individual and essence still needs some specification. That the emphasis on the process of ideating abstraction eventually neglects the epistemological function of the individual has been exhaustively shown by Rizzoli (2008, pp. 58f.).

rather a formal universalization [*formale Verallgemeinerung*].³² Nonetheless, the level of geometric formalization is not the same as the one of pure algebraic functions. Consistently, Husserl does not consider it possible to substitute the basic concepts of geometry (e.g., line, point, angle, etc.) with formal algebraic symbols *salva veritate*, i.e., without losing something essential to geometry itself. This is why he considers geometry as a material mathematical science.³³ Despite being a material eidetic science, geometry is not descriptive but rather axiomatic: starting with the primitive axioms or the essential indemonstrable laws that define geometric space it is possible to derive, by means of a purely formal and deductive processing, all the ideally possible spatial forms. According to its axiomatic definition, geometric space is considered as a “definite manifold” [*definit Mannigfaltigkeit*] or a “mathematical manifold in the incisive sense” [*mathematische Mannigfaltigkeit im prägnanten Sinne*].³⁴ Here, the notion of a definite manifold is based upon the so-called criterion of semantic completeness, according to which, out of a given set of axioms (in the case of geometry, the primitive eidetic laws on basic geometric formations), it is possible to derive the totality of all possible formations in a theory (Lohmar 1989, pp. 186–187).

Accordingly, the distinction between intuitive and geometric space also lends itself to be conceived in light of the distinction between an exact material eidetic science (geometry) and a descriptive material eidetic science (phenomenology). Whereas the former operates with exact concepts, correlates of “ideal essences”, the latter operates with descriptive and in this sense “inexact” concepts, correlates of morphological essences.³⁵ The reference to inexact concepts, of course, is not meant to underestimate the epistemological status of phenomenology with respect to geometry. In Husserl’s view, despite its descriptive nature, phenomenology is methodologically as rigorous as geometry. And indeed, one of the merits of phenomenology is precisely the elaboration of a proper scientific method to enhance the epistemological status of description. Hence, the morphological character of phenomenology as a descriptive science is not to be conceived as a lack of exactness; it is rather the index of its being embedded in the domain of lived experience.³⁶

³² Hua III/1, p. 32/(Husserl 1983, p. 27). Husserl takes a clear position regarding Euclidian space as an idealization of intuitive space already in his *Studien zur Arithmetik und Geometrie*. Here, he criticizes the empiricist claim regarding the plurality of possible structures of intuitive space (Helmholtz). In some later texts, he recognizes the possibility of different kinds of idealization of intuitive space (referring to non-Euclidian geometries), though without subscribing the thesis of Empiricism, since he conceives of the possibility of other idealizations not as grounded on factual experience, but rather on eidetic variation. Hua XXI, pp. 304–310, 345f., 399 and 410f. See also De Palma (2007).

³³ Hua III/1, pp. 149f./ (Husserl 1983, pp. 161f.).

³⁴ Hua III/1, p. 151/(Husserl 1983, p. 163).

³⁵ Hua III/1, p. 155/(Husserl 1983, p. 166).

³⁶ With regard to this distinction, see Drummond (1984); Lohmar (1989, p. 130); Sokolowski (1974, pp. 57–86); Sowa (2007). Becker (1923) has a different view on the topic. He suggests that morphological essences are indeed characterized by the lack of exactness and the tendency to approximate it on the model of mathematical concepts. Outside the phenomenological scholarship, the relevance of morphological essences has been acutely emphasized by Deleuze (1979) in a section of his 1974 *Cours Vincennes*. Deleuze notably considers the notion of morphological or

Husserl will maintain this distinction between intuitive and geometric space until his later texts. The more refined analyses of idealization and the re-interpretation of the process of the idealization of lived space within the genealogical approach to the history of philosophical and scientific thought (for instance in the *Crisis* and in the Appendix III to the main text, on the origin of geometry) represent the final result of some important developments of this initial position.³⁷

Husserl's understanding of the relationship between intuitive and geometric space has been challenged from different perspectives. Here, I would like to briefly assess the positions of Pradelle and Boi. This will help me to add a new piece to the discussion regarding the stratification of lived experience, and especially its spatiality. Although both criticisms share some of their central aspects, the agendas of the two scholars eventually differ from one another. Pradelle's claim is consistent with his overall suspicion regarding Husserl's transcendental aesthetic. Having shown how the constitution of geometric space through idealization and limit passages remains a *Leitmotiv* in Husserl's phenomenology of spatial constitution, Pradelle (2000, pp. 268f.) wonders whether this approach remains faithful to the principles of phenomenology. In his view, by conceiving of the ideal geometric figures as the result of a process of limit passage that begins in lived experience, Husserl misses the inner meaning of the "inexactness" in the sensible world. The latter, as it were, is always addressed in view of the idealizations and conceptualization belonging to the higher forms of scientific cognition. This, again, fits the more general claim that the laws of the transcendental aesthetic after all presuppose the very conceptual formations they are supposed to found. For his part, Boi develops Husserl's analyses concerning intuitive space in relation to manifold theory and to the mereology. Thereby, he claims that, in spite of not explicitly recognizing the possibility of mathematizing the phenomenal field of spatial perception, Husserl has operatively shown that those mathematical structures are ultimately immanent in the phenomenological space. Hence, Boi (2004, 2007) suggests that perceived space has itself a geometric structure, which can be described in terms of Riemann's theory of manifold (which Husserl did not assume, rather referring to Cantor's set-theory definition). Consequently, he also criticizes the strict opposition of exact and inexact concepts.

Regardless their different priorities, both claims bring us back again to the question concerning the stratification and the unity of experience. For, on the one hand, Pradelle – in a way analogous to what Ricoeur claims with regard to time – believes that, through the reference to geometric or proto-geometric conceptualization in the sphere of sensible experience, Husserl neglects the specificity of such experience, and eventually conceives of the aesthetic only in the service of the analytic. On the other hand, Boi suggests that the geometric or proto-geometric structure is immanent

vague essence as a *mot sublime*, since it designates a sort of tertium beyond the empirical and the formal. Deleuze recognizes how this notion is connected to the embodied character of lived experience and further considers the very process of "becoming an essence" as embodied.

³⁷ See, notably, Hua VII, pp. 357f.; Hua III/1, pp. 154–156/(Husserl 1983, pp. 166–167); Hua VI, pp. 20–60 and 349–386/(Husserl 1970, pp. 23–59, 343–378); EU, pp. 426–428/(Husserl 1973, pp. 352–354).

to perceptual space itself.³⁸ Thus, both the partial convergence and the partial divergence of Pradelle's and Boi's claims provide further evidence for the complexity of the stratification of experience. Certainly, the differences between sensibility and thought cannot be leveled out, in favor of an understanding of experience as an undifferentiated whole. Accordingly, it remains legitimate to single out the different moments of experience and cognition and to describe them as to their inner specificity. What is specific of sensible perception is a morphological intuition of space and what is specific to geometrical thought is the idealization of these structures. The fact, however, that such a scientific idealization is possible in principle, and that the laws of geometry do not contradict the laws of intuitive space, shows that the two are complementary ways of apprehending one unique space. Accordingly, the very descriptive and structural distinctions between the modalities of apprehending space shall be understood in light of an approach to experience as a unitary and complex whole, which entails the moment of intuition as well as the moment of idealization. These moments are not something given apart from the totality, but rather obtain their meaning only as they participate in the overall dynamics of constitution.

Although Husserl occasionally hints at the analogy between the space of geometry and the time of pure chronology, he does not develop it in detail. Thus, the only conclusion we can draw from the preceding remarks is that the same categorical distinction valid for geometry shall hold for pure chronology too. Yet, the analogy between space and time re-presents itself more explicitly in connection with the distinction between phenomenological and objective space. And indeed, such a distinction is often thematized by means of an explicit parallelism with time. Besides the aforementioned introduction to the lectures on inner time consciousness, this happens, for instance, in the supplementary text 19 of Hua X (1904), and in paragraph 81 of *Ideas I*.

In the supplementary text 19, the distinction between lived and objective space is traced back to the distinction between the visual sensible field and visual objective space. As Husserl writes in this text, even a new-born baby, who does not have any objective representation of space yet, nonetheless has a visual field, i.e., he/she sees extended figures that are positioned with respect to one another. Despite not recognizing yet something as something, i.e., notwithstanding the lack of objective apprehension of the extended figures in the visual field, the baby is faced with a sphere of pure phenomenal manifestation of extension and sensible qualities. Should we abstract from all our objective apprehensions of the perceived spatial world, then we would be left with the same pre-objective visual field the new-born baby has. Again, this is certainly an abstraction, which nevertheless hints at the difference and the relationship between the proto-spatiality of the sensible fields and objective space. This abstracting procedure is called in this text the “reduction” to the visual sensible field and is meant to give an account of the structure of its proto-spatiality, apart from the apprehension making the constitution of objective space possible.³⁹

At paragraph 81 of *Ideas I*, this suggestion is developed in relation to the introduction of the *epoché* or the bracketing of all our naïve assumptions in the natural attitude. One of these assumptions concerns the obviousness of objective and

³⁸ Such a view is further developed in Boi (2013).

³⁹ Hua X, pp. 187–188/(Husserl 1991, pp. 193–194).

measurable space and time. Consistently, in order to transcendently uncover the laws of phenomenological constitution, this latter assumption must be bracketed too. Also, in this text, the structure of Husserl's reasoning is analogical and concerns, on the one hand, the relationship between cosmic and phenomenological time and, on the other hand, the spreading-out [*Ausbreitung*] that belongs to the immanent essence of a concrete sensible content and the objective spatial extension [*Ausdehnung*]. Such as it would be a nonsensical categorical mistake to consider sensible contents, e.g., our sensation of color and its spreading-out, as belonging to the same genus as the color and the extension of the thing itself, it would also be nonsense to consider phenomenological time and the objective time of the world as belonging to one and the same ontological region.⁴⁰ In accordance with the epistemological model developed in the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl conceives here of the constitution of objective space-time in light of the apprehension-content schema: the sensible contents with their phenomenological and pre-objective spatiality and temporality are apprehended in the constitution of objective time and space. Yet, this does not imply a relapse in the image theory of perception already criticized in the Appendix to the paragraphs 11–20 of the *Fifth Investigation*.⁴¹ Indeed, it would be wrong to consider the spatio-temporal spreading-out [*Ausbreitung*] of the sensible contents as the “image” of the spatio-temporal extension [*Ausdehnung*] of objects. Certainly, in our experience, objective space and time do manifest themselves through sensible contents. The latter, however, are not images of the former, nor do both stay in a mere similarity relationship. This, particularly, would imply that objective time and space are always already given, and there would be no need for a theory of constitution. Yet, for Husserl, the relationship between pre-objective and objective space and time is a genuinely constitutive one. This claim clearly implies the rejection of all psychological and, a fortiori, physiological reductionist approaches, which would make objective space and time into a mere projection of our sensible experience. By addressing space and time within in his phenomenology of intentional constitution, phenomenology aims to give an account of both the subjective spatio-temporal structure of lived experience and the objective constitution of space and time (and of spatial and temporal objects) without ever reducing the one to the other.

The central point in this approach to the constitution of objective space-time, thus, is the analogy between (1) the distinction of the spreading-out [*Ausbreitung*] of sensible contents and objective extension [*Ausdehnung*] and (2) the distinction between lived duration and objectively measurable temporal extension. In both cases, we find the distinction of sensible (spatio-temporal) experience, as it is given from the first-person perspective, and the objective structures, whereby spatial and temporal extension is objectively measurable and as such accessible to everyone. Moreover, in both cases the former element of the distinction (i.e., the one related to subjective lived-experience) is presupposed for the constitution of the latter; which means that the bracketing of all objective positing regarding objective time and space is meant to properly address their phenomenological constitution.

⁴⁰ Hua III/1, p. 181/(Husserl 1983, p. 193).

⁴¹ Hua XIX/1, pp. 436–440/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 125–128).

4.3 Conclusions

My aim in this preliminary inquiry into the different layers of our temporal and spatial experience was to begin to shed light on both the potentialities and the limits of Husserl's parallel account of space and time. On the one hand, this account uncovers important analogies, for instance regarding the distinction between intuited space/time, objective space/time, and idealized space/time. On the other hand, however, a close consideration of both temporality and spatiality also reveals us that the two dimensions refer to each other in a fundamental sense. With respect to temporality, this emerges from the very description of phenomenological time, which cannot but refer to the vocabulary and the metaphors borrowed from our full-fledged spatio-temporal experience. With respect to spatiality, however, the reference to temporality has not clearly emerged yet. Does this mean that the experience of space can be considered apart from temporality? This seems to be in clear contradiction with the architectonic of experience: as we have seen, temporality defines the most basic layer of experience, which is presupposed by all others, spatiality included. But what I am up to in this brief concluding remark to this chapter is to argue that the trace of the temporal unfolding of experience is also implied by the preceding discussion on the layers of spatial experience. First, with regard to the process of idealization that makes the constitution of geometrical space possible, we shall not forget that, besides being a mathematical procedure, the limit passage is an operational process of thought, which has its temporal structure. This process is possible only on the basis of a temporal synthesis. This further implies that, even if Husserl alternatively speaks about omitemporality and supratemporality of essences, the latter (be them exact or morphological) cannot be considered as being simply beyond time, or even outside time. On the contrary, as the later Husserl explicitly recognizes, making up the infrastructure of the experienced world, essences have a peculiar temporality which eventually allows them to be in relation with the temporality and the spatiality of the world of experience.⁴² Secondly, with respect to objective space: the reference to the temporality of experience is implied (although not thematized) by the distinction of extension, as the juxtaposition of extended independent parts or pieces, and spreading-out, as the interweaving of experiential moments. For the givenness of phenomenological space in the form of a spreading-out also requires the temporal synthesis, with the interweaving of the retention of previous experience and the protention into the future.

Before further inquiring into the different moments of such a spatio-temporal intertwining, we shall further follow Husserl in the attempt to retrace analogies and parallelisms between spatial and temporal experience, notably with respect to the phenomenology of thing constitution. Further examining both the potentialities and the pitfalls of such a parallel account, we will be finally confronted with the necessity to investigate more closely the interconnections of lived spatiality and temporality.

⁴² EU, pp. 309–314/(Husserl 1973, pp. 258–261).

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Chapter 5

The Thing of the Transcendental Aesthetic: Spatial and Temporal Constitution

If we make ourselves blind for causality, something of the thing – constantly merely considered as the correlate of originally giving experience – remains – actually, something concrete remains: the thing of the transcendental aesthetic in a narrower sense, the pure sense-thing. (Hua Mat IV, p. 172)

With these words Husserl glosses his considerations regarding the a priori structure of perception in his 1919 lecture course on *Nature and Spirit*. This passage aims to define the scope of the transcendental aesthetic from a noematic point of view, i.e., to determine what is the correlate of experience at this sensible level: the “thing of the transcendental aesthetic”. In accordance with the stratified account of the experience of things, which I have briefly discussed in the introduction to this book,¹ in the quoted passage, the “pure sense-thing” coincides with the material thing minus its causal determinations. If we bear in mind what we have discovered in the first part about Husserl’s transcendental aesthetic, we can easily understand why the so conceived thing has to be assumed as the starting point to develop a phenomenological theory of sensible experience. First, as we have seen by introducing the project of the transcendental aesthetic in the 1919 lecture course on *Nature and Spirit*, this theory must begin with a primal ontology. And the most general and original region of being for such an ontology is that of the thing (Hua III/1, p. 25). Secondly, against Kant’s too subjective and formal account of time and space as forms of the inner and outer sense, Husserl considers them as the forms of the sensible givenness, i.e., of what is given as such (Hua XVI, p. 43; Hua Mat IV, p. 121). Thereby, space and time can be properly addressed only by starting from the correlative structure of display. Accordingly, it comes as no surprise that the phenomenological constitution of both time and space is developed from the inquiry into the concrete experience of temporal and spatial things. For this experience renders the a priori of correlation in the sphere of sensibility paradigmatically manifest.

The latter claim is clearly not intended to suggest that there is no relation between space, time, and subjectivity, or that this relation is a secondary one.

¹ Hua III/1, pp. 347–348/(Husserl 1983, pp. 358–359); Hua IV, p. 22/(Husserl 1989, pp. 23–24).

Quite to the contrary: as it is well known, one of the central questions in Husserl's analyses of time, and probably also the starting one, concerns the temporal structure of the act. This question asks whether the perception of a temporal object is itself temporal or not. In the development of the answer to this question, moreover, it becomes quite early clear that temporality structures each and every act and eventually defines the most original mode of being of transcendental subjectivity. Also, spatiality is constitutive of the concrete experience of a the subject, if the latter is considered as a bodily subject, even if this may be challenged by referring to some of Husserl's own statements regarding the fundamental difference between the mode of givenness of consciousness and the mode of givenness of things.² However, and this is very much in line with Husserl's programmatic claims, according to which the primal ontology of the sensible thing is preparatory for a proper transcendental inquiry into constitution, one needs to begin with the description of the direct perceptual experience of things in order to retrace and uncover the subjective structures that make such an experience possible and in order to open up the way for a constitutive phenomenological account of it. This, I submit, is just another way to say that the phenomenological inquiry is neither directed toward the object nor toward the subject exclusively, but rather needs to consider both the by starting from the a priori of correlation.

Thus, assuming the region of the sensible thing as a guiding thread for the constitutive analyses, we shall first ask what corresponds, in positive terms, to the “negative” definition of the thing of the transcendental aesthetic as the material thing minus its causal determinations. To provide such a positive account, in the texts written around the 1910s, Husserl coins the concept of phantom [*Phantom*]. In manuscript A IV 5 he defines the meaning of this concept as “what is aesthetic in the material thing”.³ Thus, if we consider this definition in connection with the already mentioned stratification of the thing presented in *Ideas I* and *II*, we can say that the phantom or the thing of the transcendental aesthetic coincides with the *res extensa*. And indeed, as we can read in manuscript D 8 (1918):

If we move within the sphere of intuitive givenness, then we have to take only “aesthetic” spatial objects in the spatial-objectual sphere as well, extensions filled with sensible qualities.⁴

Accordingly, the sensible thing is primarily considered as coincident with spatial extension filled with qualitative determinations. Yet, what about temporality? Is

²Cf. e.g. Hua III/1, pp. 91f./Husserl 1983, pp. 94f.) See, for instance, De Warren (2009, p. 44). Arguing for this position, I of course do not mean to simply equalize the mode of givenness of subjectivity with the mode of givenness of material things, but rather to phenomenologically address the question as to the embodiment of subjectivity. I will make my point clearer in the last chapter of this book, by distinguishing the notion of embodied subjectivity from the notion of bodily subjectivity.

³“[...] das Ästhetische des körperlichen Dinges [...],” A IV 5/63 b. See also, D 13 III/196a ff.; A VII 14/18 b.

⁴“Bewegen wir uns in der Sphäre der anschaulichen Gegebenheiten, so haben wir auch in der raumgegenständlichen Sphäre nur “ästhetische” Raumgegenstände zu nehmen, mit sinnlichen Qualitäten erfüllte Ausdehnungen.” D 8/40b.

such a filled spatial extension also temporally determined? Certainly, Husserl answers in manuscript D 13 II, since the phantom itself is doubtless and essentially a unity of duration [*Dauereinheit*], too.⁵ Accordingly, we can see again in what sense space and time are noematically considered as the forms of sensible givenness. Yet, how should we conceive, more precisely, of the relation between the spatial and the temporal dimensions of the sensible thing? How are the spatial and the temporal forms of what is sensibly experienced connected with the unfolding of subjective experience? In other words, how do space and time, noematically considered, refer to the noetic side of the correlation? And how are spatio-temporal things constituted in and through this correlation? As we can easily guess, by considering this relation, we cannot talk about a mere isomorphism between, for instance, the spatio-temporal extension of the thing and the spatio-temporal unfolding of perception. In this chapter, I shall provide a first answer to these questions by following Husserl's arguments regarding the relationship between space and time in the transcendental aesthetic.

These arguments are often guided by the idea of the stratification. Accordingly, the constitution of the *res temporalis* is considered to be more fundamental than the constitution of the *res extensa*. Thus, again, Husserl's inquiries regarding spatial and temporal constitution mostly proceed on parallel paths, since they aim to highlight what is distinctive to each of the two layers of constitution. This becomes quite clear in some passages from *Thing and Space*. In one of them, Husserl considers the temporal extension [*Extension*] of things as sibling [*verschwistert*] with the spatial.⁶ Employing the sibling metaphor, he seems to be mostly interested in highlighting both the similarities and the differences between spatial and temporal extension: such as siblings, they do belong to the same family and thus share some traits; yet, this does not mean that they are the same, or that they share all the same structures and features. This is the reason why, even if we shall consider both spatiality and temporality in the constitution of the thing, up to a certain point it will be possible to accomplish the analyses regarding spatial and temporal constitution independently of one another. This can be easily shown with regard to temporality and the constitution of the temporal object, which in Husserl's analyses of time is accomplished apart from the spatial determination. Consistently with the idea of a univocal foundational relationship between the temporal and the spatial layers of the sensible thing, a pure *Zeitobjekt* can in principle subsist apart from the spatial determination. Yet, Husserl considers that also spatial extension can in principle be considered independently of temporality, by isolating one temporal point out of the

⁵ “[...] of course, the phantom is a unity of duration, and if I apprehend the thing as lasting from “yesterday” until today, as just individually the same, then the phantom as well is the same in the same sense. It has endured further.” “[...] natürlich das Phantom ist eine Dauereinheit, und wenn ich das Ding als von” gestern “bis heute dauernd auffasse, als individuell dasselbe eben, so ist auch das Phantom in demselben Sinn dasselbe; es hat noch weiter fortgedauert.” D 13 II/167 b. See also, Hua XVI, pp. 345–346/(Husserl 1997, pp. 301–302), where Husserl refers to the object of pure experience as to the spatio-temporal schema plus sensible fullness.

⁶ Hua XVI, p. 65/(Husserl 1997, p. 55).

unity of duration.⁷ However, the isolation of the spatial dimension from the temporal cannot but be the result of an abstracting procedure, since, as we have seen, spatial objects are also unities of duration, and therefore their constitution presupposes, or is univocally founded upon, temporal constitution. In spite of being consistent with the idea of the stratification, however, I believe that also the constitution of the temporal object apart from spatiality needs further thematization. For, even if this might be true at a certain level of abstraction, we can easily notice that the set of temporal objects that can be determined without any reference to spatiality is quite a limited one. And maybe these objects are not even actually experienced as such, since they shall rather be taken abstractedly as non-independent layers of that which is effectively perceived. Concretely speaking, even Husserl's favorite examples, the melody and the single note, do belong to a more complex unfolding of experience, which is spatio-temporal. Melodies and tones are also perceived as spatially localized, however undetermined their localization might be.⁸

Accordingly, it makes sense to argue that the abstracting or isolating analyses, and consequently the attempt to consider spatial and temporal constitution as proceeding upon parallel and respectively independent paths, are possible only up to a certain point. That is to say, this isolating approach certainly has its legitimacy insofar as it allows us to highlight what is distinctive to, respectively, the constitution of the spatial and the temporal layers of the sensible thing. Abstraction and isolation, therefore, shall be assumed as methodological devices, adopted in order to give an account of the distinctive structures of the spatial and temporal dimensions of sensible experience. However, in following this independent analysis we shall take good care in not endorsing the somewhat misleading idea of a mere parallelism between the spatial and the temporal dimension of lived experience. This parallelism is insofar misleading, as spatiality and temporality, different from two parallel lines, do "encounter" in lived experience. Together, and only together, they make up the structure of concrete sensible display. It is precisely their togetherness that grounds the unfolding of sensible experience, because only in their interconnection can the spatial and temporal moments shape the "concrete schema" of the thing (Hua Mat IV, pp. 172–173). In other words, the parallel and isolating description of spatial and temporal constitution cannot say *how* the two dimensions belong together. Consistently, a theory of constitution exclusively based upon such a parallel and independent consideration is necessarily incomplete.

In this chapter, I intend to argue for this claim by following Husserl's approach to temporal and spatial constitution. Particularly, I will be focusing on the distinction of spatial and temporal "extension" and "spreading-out". Highlighting both

⁷"If we abstract from time and extract a point of the thing's duration, then to the time-filling content of the thing there belongs the thing's spatial extension" Hua XVI, p. 66/(Husserl 1997, p. 55). Translation modified. See also D 13 II/167 b.

⁸Thus, I agree with Zahavi (1999, p. 92), when he points out that listening to a string quartet by Schubert, for instance, implies a reference to my bodily location with respect to the orchestra. Consistently, we can even go a step further and argue, as Schapp (1976, pp. 26–32) does, that there is a specific constitution of the so-called *Tonraum*.

the potentialities and the limits of the abstracting or isolating approach to temporal and spatial constitution will allow us to understand why each of the two dimensions of sensible constitution cannot but refer to the other. Moreover, I will also show the elements, intrinsic to the very isolating or parallel consideration of the temporal and the spatial dimension, which already hint at their co-belonging. This, I believe, might be seen as another way to fruitfully understand the metaphor of spatiality and temporality as sibling dimensions, which will be further developed in the third part of this book.

5.1 *Res Temporalis* and Temporal Constitution

Husserl's previously quoted siblings metaphor touches on a quite precise aspect of the relationship between space and time, namely extension, and more precisely the extension of the appearances, or of the spatio-temporal correlates of perception. As I mentioned toward the end of the preceding chapter, in accordance with the formal-ontological distinctions, the notion of extension can be understood in two ways, even if Husserl is not always very clear and consistent as to their differentiation. These two senses are expressed by the two German words *Ausdehnung* and *Ausbreitung*, which can be rendered in English respectively as extension (in a narrow sense) and spreading-out. *Ausdehnung*, or extension understood in the narrow sense, refers to the relationship among independent and juxtaposed parts (*partes extra partes*). Such an understanding of extension entails the reference to the possibility of fragmentation of a whole [*Zerstückbarkeit*]. More precisely, fragmentation [*Zerstückung*] is the division of a whole into a plurality of mutually exclusive pieces.⁹ *Ausbreitung*, instead, refers to the extension of a whole made up of non-independent and intertwined moments. Such moments cannot be separated from each other and from the whole, but only abstractedly distinguished.¹⁰ Mutually exclusive pieces, as Husserl further points out, can either be isolated [*getrennt*], if they do not share any identical moment, or they can share one identical moment as boundary and thus be parts of a divided [*eingeteilt*] continuum.¹¹ This notion of divided continuum, as Husserl admits, is related to an extensive whole, whereby extension is intended as *Ausdehnung*. In this passage from the *Logical Investigations*, spatial and temporal stretches are considered to be extensive wholes in the here defined sense. As such they can be fragmented into smaller spatial and temporal stretches. Yet, can we really assume that spatial and temporal extension is exclusively to be understood as *Ausdehnung* or as a relationship among independent pieces? Let us consider temporality first. The understanding of extension as a relation among independent pieces seems to make sense with respect to some kind of constituted temporal objects (take, for instance, a complex

⁹ Hua XIX/1, p. 273/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 28–29).

¹⁰ Cf. Hua XIX/1, pp. 272–274/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 28–30); Hua III/1, p. 181/(Husserl 1983, p. 193).

¹¹ Hua XIX/1, p. 273/(Husserl 2001c, p. 29).

piece of music, which is normally compounded of different melodic themes, e.g., A, B, and C: each of them belongs to the musical piece as a whole, and yet has its own independence). However, this does not seem to hold for every kind of temporal object. The single note, for instance, does not seem to allow for such a fragmentation.

Things are even more complicated if we consider the extension of our perception of such an object. In some passages from *Thing and Space*, however, Husserl argues in favor of the just presented view of temporal extension also with respect to perception. These passages are particularly meaningful since they do not only refer to objective time (as one may still suspect in reading the mentioned passage from the *Logical Investigations*), but also to the pre-phenomenal time of perception:

In every perception of things we find therefore a pre-phenomenal whole, which, in the sense of pre-phenomenal temporality, is again divisible into perceptions. Perception can be fragmented into perceptions. The perception of a thing, although an unbroken unity, is a continuous unity of pieces of perception, phases of perception, which themselves have the character of perceptions and thereby contain in themselves all the moments we have distinguished in perception.¹²

What I consider to be most challenging in the quoted passage is the problem of how to combine the idea that temporal perception is a continuous unity of “pieces of perception”, which is consistent with the idea of a divided continuum in the *Logical Investigations*, with Husserl’s own phenomenology of time consciousness. In the quoted passage, Husserl may still have the noematic side in his mind, and with respect to the extension of the temporal noema one may still argue that a form of “fragmentation” is possible in the previously defined sense. If we take the example of the musical piece, it is certainly true that each theme considered independently of the other does not give us the sense of the unitary pieces. Yet, it is also true that each of them has in itself the unity of a *Gestalt*, and can be thus considered independently of the others. However, the reference to perception and its possible fragmentation into “pieces of perception” shall not be misunderstood as to imply that perception itself is a sum or juxtaposition of pieces coming one after the other, or rather the series of respectively independent now-points. Indeed, as Husserl repeatedly stresses, in the unfolding of perception, the now is the boundary of two temporal stretches. And precisely as boundary it cannot be considered as an independent piece. Thus, it cannot be given as separated from the stretches and from the unitary whole of perception. Rather, it can only be abstractedly singled out.¹³ Accordingly, if we consider perception and its temporal extension from a noetic point of view, i.e., if we consider the temporal unfolding of the acts, a more suitable account can be provided by assuming extension as spreading-out [*Ausbreitung*] in the previously defined sense, i.e., as a relationship among non-independent parts or moments. This, again, is consistent with what Husserl claims in paragraph 81 of *Ideas I* and with the analyses of time, which I am now going to consider in more detail. At the end of this chapter, after having discussed Husserl’s approach to spatial extension, we shall ask ourselves

¹²Hua XVI, p. 62/(Husserl 1997, p. 52).

¹³Cf. Hua X, pp. 70, 280/(Husserl 1991, pp. 72–73, 190).

whether such an account of extension as spreading-out also reverberates upon the description of the unfolding of spatio-temporal perception. As I shall argue, this will require the overcoming of the abstracting and isolating approach to spatial and temporal experience as proceeding on two parallel paths.

5.1.1 *The Temporal Object and the Spreading-Out of the Now*

As it has been largely discussed in the literature, in his 1905 lecture course on the phenomenology of inner time consciousness, Husserl develops his own account of the temporal structure of experience in dialogue with the contemporary debate in psychology. The main issue at stake in this debate concerns the temporal structure of the experience of temporally extended objects. Husserl also calls the latter “temporal objects” [*Zeitobjekt*], thereby initially considering the distinction between changing (e.g., a melody) and unchanging (e.g., a note) objects as irrelevant.¹⁴ Asking whether the perception of a temporally extended object shall be considered itself as temporally extended, these inquiries are principally focused on the noetic side of perception. It is not my intention here to go through all the different issues of this debate. Rather, I wish to focus on those aspects that can allow us to lay bare the idea of the specificity of the temporal extension of experience as spreading-out. To this aim, I will particularly focus on Husserl’s reading of Brentano and the position he assumed in the Stern-Meinong debate, which, in my view, can best highlight how he arrives at describing the phenomenon of duration and temporal extension as spreading-out.¹⁵

In the first section of his 1905 lectures, Husserl refers to Brentano’s earlier position on time,¹⁶ the most salient elements of which are summed up by Stumpf in his

¹⁴Hua X, p. 23/(Husserl 1991, p. 24). Assuming one distinction already formulated by Granel (1968, pp. 44–53), Schnell (1996, pp. 81–83) insists on the distinction between the temporal objects [*zeitliche Objekte* or *zeitliche Gegenstände*] and the so-called tempo-objects [*Zeitobjekt* or *Zeitgegenstand*]. Whereas the former designate temporal constituted unities, such as the note, the latter refer to duration itself. Husserl’s approach to the intuitiveness of time is considered to be based upon this distinction. As I have already suggested in the previous chapters and as I will now further show, however, I do not consider that the intuition of duration as such can be accomplished apart from the intuition of temporal objects; rather, the former can happen only in and through the latter.

¹⁵I will not consider here other relevant authors for development of Husserl’s time analyses, such as James and Strong. More on Husserl’s reading of these authors can be found in Gallagher (1998, pp. 17–69) and Kortooms (2002, pp. 47–54).

¹⁶Husserl might refer to the 1873 lecture course he personally attended or to a third person’s report. Brentano later developed his position on time, and changed his mind on some relevant aspects (Cf. Brentano 1976). However, Husserl did not modify his critique in the 1928 edition of his lectures, even if by that time he should have been aware of these developments. Kraus (1930) polemically addresses this lack of consideration for the developments in Brentano’s account of time in the 1928 edition. For the discussion of these developments in Brentano’s analyses of time, see Chrudzimski (1998/99). For further discussion of Husserl’s relationship to Brentano regarding

1919 article, written in memory of Brentano. Accordingly, the early Brentano considered time as a determination of the identical content: in each moment of inner and outer perception, we would have a representation of the perceptual content [*Wahrnehmungsmaterial*] that remains qualitatively identical to itself, although it undergoes a temporal modification (Stumpf 1919, p. 136). Such a modification is considered to be dependent on the laws and the structures of consciousness, and to stem from original association understood as a form of imagination.¹⁷ Two aspects of Brentano's theory are particularly emphasized in Husserl's reading: (1) the understanding of time as a modification of content; and (2) the reference to original association as responsible for such a modification. Husserl substantially agrees with Brentano insofar as the first point is concerned. Indeed, both refuse to reduce our experience of time to the objective duration of sensations.¹⁸ In other words, assuming temporality as a determination of content, Brentano is on the right path, for he thereby assumes intentional experience as the field of his inquiry. The disagreements, instead, touch the second point, particularly in what concerns the role attributed to fantasy in making consciousness of the past possible. In his criticism, Husserl clearly has in mind the results of the third part of his 1904/05 course *Important Points from the Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge* [*Hauptstücke aus der Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis*], of which, as it is well known, the lectures on inner time consciousness are the fourth part. The third part of the course is precisely devoted to imagination as fantasy [*Phantasie*] and as image consciousness [*Bildbewusstsein*]. One important achievement of the lectures on imagination is the distinction between the two. Image consciousness is a complex experience, which entails a moment of conflict between the physical image that is given in perception [*physiches Bild*] and its being given as an image [*Bildobjekt*] of something else [*Bildsujet*.¹⁹ Two realities, we can say, come together in the image: the reality of the perceived thing, and the reality the image refers to or represents. The distinctive "conflicting" nature of the image is precisely related to this coming together of two realities in one and the same experience. Thus, we can say that image consciousness is founded upon the perception of the image as a thing, which, however, is not the primary focus of the act. The act, indeed, is not primarily oriented toward the image-thing as the object of perception, but rather to the image as an image, i.e., as depicting something else. Only by reflecting upon the structure of the act can we become aware of the threefold distinction in the givenness of the image and of the mentioned conflict. Fantasy, instead, is a different kind of intentional act. It is not based upon the apprehension of a thing as an image of something else, which is presentified in the image, and does not have the same layered structure

time, see Benoit (2008); Bernet (1985); De Warren (2009, pp. 50–140); Kortooms (2002, pp. 28–38); Rinofner-Kreidl (2000, pp. 345–376).

¹⁷ For a thorough analysis of the understanding of original association as imagination see notably De Warren (2009, pp. 50–140).

¹⁸ See Hua X, pp. 11–12/(Husserl 1991, pp. 11–13). As I mentioned earlier, the target of this critique is most probably Helmholtz.

¹⁹ Hua XXIII, pp. 43–48, 63f./Husserl 2005, pp. 47–52, 69f.).

image consciousness has. Fantasy shall rather be considered, such as perception, as an act of simple [*schlicht*] presentation. It remains, however, different from perception because of its apprehensional character and act-quality: whereas perception is a positing act, fantasy is non-positing or neutral. This eventually means that there cannot be a continuous transition of perception into fantasy, since they respectively refer to two different fields, or better, worlds.²⁰ Accordingly, fantasy cannot be considered responsible for the temporal modification of the experienced content. For this would mean to mix up real and unreal (fantasized) contents and “worlds” of experience, and thereby to misconceive the continuous character of temporal modification. As a consequence, it would be impossible to distinguish between real past experience and fantasized experience.²¹ Moreover, Brentano’s account implies the restriction of perception to the discrete succession of instant-points, which ultimately makes the very experience of temporal objects and events impossible.²² To make a step further in the direction of Husserl’s positive response, let us consider now the position he assumed in the Meinong-Stern debate.²³

In his assessment of Meinong’s position, Husserl refers to the 1899 essay entitled *On Objects of Higher Order and their Relation to Inner Perception* [*Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältnis zur inneren Wahrnehmung*].²⁴ Three main distinctions in this text are relevant for Husserl’s argument regarding the temporal structure of perception: (1) the distinction between elementary or inferior objects [*Inferiora*] and the superior or founded object [*Superius*] (Meinong 1971, p. 386); (2) the distinction between the time of the act, the time of the content (converging in the time of the representation), and the time of the object (Meinong 1971, p. 442); and (3) the distinction between temporally distributed objects, i.e., objects unfolding themselves in a temporal fraction, and temporally undistributed objects, i.e., objects that present themselves in one unique moment in time (Meinong 1971, pp. 443–444). On the basis of this threefold differentiation, the question Meinong aims to answer is whether the representation of a temporally distributed object is itself temporally distributed, or rather undistributed (Meinong 1971, p. 444). Challenging the coincidence between the time of the object and the time of representation, Meinong clearly goes for the second option, claiming that temporally distributed objects are also presented in a temporal cross-section [*zeitlicher Querschnitt*], thanks to an instantaneous act holding in itself simultaneously all the contents of preceding representations (Meinong 1971, p. 450). Let us apply this

²⁰ Hua XXIII, p. 49/(Husserl 2005, p. 53).

²¹ According to Benoist (2008), this is the central point of Husserl’s critique to Brentano and, at the same time, the point that makes the originality of the lectures on inner time consciousness. Brentano’s idea of a determining modification of the temporal contents eventually implies the negation of their reality, which is precisely what Husserl aims to maintain.

²² Hua X, p. 13/(Husserl 1991, pp. 13–14).

²³ Regarding Husserl’s position in the Meinong-Stern debate, see Bernet (1985); De Warren (2005); Iocco (2013, pp. 113f.); Kortooms (2002, pp. 39–46); Rinofner-Kreidl (2000, pp. 311–344).

²⁴ Originally, the essay was published in volume XXI of the *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*. Here, I will refer only to the reprinted version in Meinong’s collected works (Meinong 1971).

claim to the melody example. If Meinong's claim is correct, then the apprehension of a melody as a founded object (*Superius*) can only happen within a momentary synthetic act coming at the end of the reverberation of the single notes (*Inferiora*). Gathering together the single notes that have been echoing, this apprehension gives shape to a synthetic unity of a higher order. Yet, denying that the perception of distributed objects is itself temporally distributed implies a strong limitation of the synthetic potential of perception. Reduced to a punctuated instant, perception cannot synthetically unify the singular contents into one apperception. To this aim a further and higher order act of representation is required. Yet, if this is the case, can we still talk about the perception of temporally distributed objects? If the synthesis that unifies the instantaneous moments, which are supposedly experienced perceptually, is attributed to a higher order act of representation, then we are faced with the risk of considering the synthesis that gives the unity to a temporally distributed object as a mere construction, which would certainly go beyond the perceptual experience. The togetherness of the *Inferiora* in forming the *Superius*, in other words, would not be experienced perceptually, but only retrospectively constructed. However, this account cannot explain how it is possible that, as it actually happens, we immediately perceive a complex object as unitary *Gestalt* and not as a sum of pieces. Moreover, sticking to the musical examples, on the basis of Meinong's model, we would not be able to distinguish the perception of a succession of notes (melody) from the perception of their simultaneity (accord). These problems clearly hint at the difficulties of Meinong's account from the perspective of a theory of knowledge based upon the inner lawfulness of sensibility. These difficulties can be further spelled out by confronting Meinong's view with Stern's.

Indeed, the position Meinong expresses in the previously commented essay is his response to Stern's article entitled *Psychic Presence-Time [Psychische Präsenzzeit]* (Stern 1897). From his part, in this text, Stern addresses his criticism toward the dogma of simultaneity already formulated by Meinong in one previous text,²⁵ according to which only those contents that can be simultaneously present to consciousness can belong to a conscious whole. In other words, he tackles the claim that an ideal cross-section [*idealer Querschnitt*] at any given instant of psychic life contains in itself all preceding moments of consciousness (Stern 1897, pp. 325–326). As opposed to this view, Stern suggests that a mental event [*psychisches Geschehen*] unfolding for a certain temporal stretch can form a unified and complex act of consciousness, regardless of the non-simultaneity of the single parts. Stern calls presence-time [*Präsenzzeit*] the temporal stretch in which such a mental event unfolds (Stern 1897, p. 327). Developing his remarks, he further defines the present [*Gegenwart*] as the *Inbegriff* of the spatio-temporal relations that can become the object of a direct perception. As such, the present shall be considered both spatially (as here) and temporally (as now). In both senses, the present is not punctuated; it rather has a certain distinctive extension. The extended presence-space [*Präsenzraum*], which unfolds on the sagittal axis (left-right) and in the immediate proximity, corresponds to the extended

²⁵ Stern's article, indeed, is itself a critical response to Meinong's, "Beiträge zur Theorie der psychischen Analyse", published in *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane* VI (1894), reprint: (Meinong 1969).

presence-time [*Presenzzzeit*], which entails the reference to before and after in the above defined sense. In both cases, however, one shall carefully distinguish the spreading-out of the here/now in the immediate before-after or left-right from what is effectively past-future or spatially absent from the spatial field (Stern 1897, p. 333). However, Stern's account of presence-time shall not be conceived in merely quantitative terms, as if it were possible to measure the extent of the present. Indeed, Stern explicitly criticizes such a view and thus differentiates his account of presence-time from James's account of the specious present.²⁶ Rather, he endorses a "qualitative" approach to presence-time, which may allow us to establish the optimal values of presence-time according to the given circumstances and situations (Stern 1897, pp. 342f.). Consistently, Stern also provides another distinction that will be further elaborated by Husserl, namely the distinction between primary memory and what he calls authentic memory [*eigentliches Gedächtnis*].²⁷ Whereas the former presupposes a continuous merging of temporal moments, the latter entails some sort of discontinuity between present and past events (Stern 1897, pp. 337–339).

On the basis of some remarks on the non-punctuated character of the present autonomously developed,²⁸ Husserl takes a stand in the Stern-Meinong debate by clearly supporting the former.²⁹ To be sure, Husserl agrees with Meinong's claim concerning the irreducibility of the perception of a succession or a sequence to the succession of perceptions. However, at variance with Meinong, he does not believe that the perception of a temporally distributed object happens in a single punctuated now. Qualifying as ambiguous Meinong's notion of the "time of perception", Husserl distinguishes between the "extensive perception" [*extensive Wahrnehmung*], which unfolds temporally, and "accomplished perception" [*vollendete Wahrnehmung*], which comes at the end of the process of perception of a temporal object. Yet, according to Husserl, the latter is nothing but an idealizing fiction, such as the ideal of a mathematical temporal point.³⁰ Consistently, Husserl's description of the temporality of perception is clearly opposed to Meinong's:

It is evident that to perceive the extended object <means> to perceive each point of this extension; and since evidently perception and what is perceived are phenomenally simultaneous (it is not a question of objective simultaneity), it follows that the perception of a

²⁶ According to James (1981, pp. 605–619), the objective duration of the specious present can be objectively measured in an interval of around 12 s (James 1981, p. 613). Other differences between Stern's presence-time and James's specious present are discussed by Gallagher (1998, pp. 17–69), who suggests that that Husserl's approach to time is much closer to Stern's presence-time than to James's specious present.

²⁷ The notion of primary memory was coined by Exner in order to indicate the process of maintaining the immediate past into mind. See Stern (1897, p. 338), who refers to Ludimar Hermann's *Handbuch der Physiologie*.

²⁸ Bernet (1985, pp. XXI–XXII) points out that Husserl most probably knew Stern's text only indirectly, through the references in Meinong's essay. Indeed, as it is shown in the texts collected in part B of Hua X, Husserl's critique to the idea of the punctuated present precedes his acquaintance with Stern's text (which must not have been earlier than 1904). Cf. Hua X, pp. 167–170, 173–176/ (Husserl 1991, pp. 171–174, 178–182).

²⁹ See, notably, Hua X, pp. 19–23, 216–234/(Husserl 1991, pp. 21–25, 223–242).

³⁰ Hua X, pp. 224–225/(Husserl 1991, pp. 231–233).

temporal object must be a temporal object and that both coincide as far as their phenomenal extension is concerned.³¹

Husserl's substantial critique is thus related to the assumption that an idealizing fiction such as the one of the instantaneous present is assumed as something concrete and independent, namely as an act that holds in itself all preceding moments of the perception of the object. Such an assumption, indeed, calls into question the very possibility of perception, since the latter is reduced to a mere series of discontinuous points, the connection of which is only established through the recourse to a further act, which cannot be properly considered as perceptual.³² Accordingly, the co-belonging of the different moments within a unitary whole would not be necessary, but rather accidental. As opposed to that, Husserl adduces arguments for the description of the a priori temporal nature of perceptual consciousness:³³ perception is essentially characterized by temporal extension [*zeitliche Extension*], being itself necessarily a “changing object” [*Veränderungsobjekt*], independently of the changing or unchanging character of the perceived object.³⁴

Developing the issue of the temporal unfolding of perception, Husserl focuses on the intuitive givenness of the immediate past, i.e., on the so-called primary or fresh memory which he will later develop into the concept of retention.³⁵ Different from reproductive recollection, also called secondary memory [*sekundäre Erinnerung*], primary memory does not presentify past experience, objects, or events. Rather, it is a moment of the actual presenting experience: there is no need, in this case, to presentify the object, because the latter is still given in the actual, unitary perception. To put it otherwise, the idea of the perception of the past, so difficult and seemingly self-contradictory as it may be,³⁶ is one of the most basic structures of our experience. It makes up its distinctive temporal spreading-out. Indeed, we could not have a perception of any unitary temporal object, had we not an actual intuitive awareness of both the present and the preceding notes. It is certainly true that we can abstractedly pick out the individual notes, and focus our attention to one single moment of perception. However, this presupposes the continuous and unitary temporal unfolding of perception as nexus of apprehension [*Auffassungszusammenhang*] of streaming contents.³⁷ A complex object given as the unity of a *Gestalt*, such as a melody, is thus properly perceived as a unity in each temporal moment, and not constructed at the end by means of a unifying act of synthesis. Consistently, the punctuated now is nothing but an ideal limit, which can be abstractedly singled out from the continuum of temporal apprehensions, and yet can never be concretely

³¹ Hua X, p. 226/(Husserl 1991, p. 233).

³² Hua X, p. 227/(Husserl 1991, pp. 234–235).

³³ Hua X, pp. 19–23/(Husserl 1991, pp. 21–25).

³⁴ Hua X, p. 232/(Husserl 1991, pp. 239–240).

³⁵ As Kortooms (2002, p. 111) observes, the first occurrence of the notion of “retention” is the one contained in text number 51 of Husserliana X.

³⁶ As Husserl writes, the “perception of the past” at first sounds like “wooden iron” Hua X, p. 415.

³⁷ Hua X, p. 38/(Husserl 1991, p. 40) As to the pointing function of attention, see Hua XXIII, p. 24/(Husserl 2005, p. 25) and Kortooms (2002, pp. 64–66).

experienced as such. The “ideal now”, conceived as the limit [*Grenze*] of a continuous temporal flow, is not something *toto coelo* different from the “not-now”. There is, rather, a continuous mediation between the “now” and the “not-now”, which correspond to the continuous transition of perception (here conceived in a narrow sense as equivalent with impression, or the consciousness of the pure now) into primary memory.³⁸ Thus, conceived in a larger sense, perception as a unitary whole embraces both the impression and primary memory as its moments.

To sum up the results of this discussion, what is central in Husserl’s critique to Brentano’s earlier position on time is the idea that fantasy would play a role in making the consciousness of the past possible. This would imply the negation of a continuous modification of present consciousness into past consciousness. Further developing his ideas, against Meinong and with Stern, Husserl argues that the perception of temporal objects must be itself temporally extended, so that no further, instantaneous act of synthesis that unifies the past and the present contents is required. Yet, what kind of extension is here at stake? The previous description, according to which each now is an ideal limit, which can only be intuited together with the continuum of perception (in the large sense, embracing both the now and the immediate past) to which it belongs, seems to be incompatible with the idea of a fragmentation of perception into pieces of perception, which corresponds to the understanding of extension as *Ausdehnung*. Each of the parts that make up the temporal continuum of perception necessarily requires the others in order to be given. The temporal extension of perception, particularly if one focuses on the noetic side, refers to the interwoven co-belonging of non-independent parts or moments, and shall not be conceived as *Ausdehnung*, but rather as *Ausbreitung*, spreading-out. Further evidence for this claim, also in relation to the noematic account, can be provided by considering the developments of Husserl’s analyses on time consciousness after the introduction of the phenomenological reduction. Explicitly endorsing a transcendental and constitutive perspective, these developments substantially contribute to the inquiry into the constitution of the thing of the transcendental aesthetic.

5.1.2 *The Phenomenological Reduction and Temporal Constitution*

The introduction of the method of the phenomenological reduction generally represents a crucial step to turn the descriptive analyses into transcendental-constitutive ones. And particularly, this holds true for the analyses of time consciousness.³⁹ Such

³⁸ Hua X, 40/(Husserl 1991, p. 42).

³⁹ In one note to the *Seefeld Manuscripts* (1905), Husserl retrospectively finds in these texts the “concept and the correct use” of the phenomenological reduction. However, we observe the texts effectively dating back to the Seefeld stay do not properly provide transcendental-constitutive

constitutive analyses allow us to more precisely determine the kind of consciousness of the past in primary memory or retention, and to enhance the inquiry into the most fundamental layer of time consciousness, which Husserl indicates as absolute consciousness. On both fronts, Husserl is not only interested in the constitution of temporal objects, but also in the self-constitution of consciousness. In the following, I will highlight the relevance of these developments in Husserl's phenomenology of time. This will add some further argument to the previous determination of temporal extension as spreading-out.

Let us begin with the notion of absolute consciousness, which Husserl introduces in the sections of his 1906/07 lecture course *Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge* [*Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie*], devoted to the most basic forms of objectification.⁴⁰ At paragraph 42 in the Husserliana edition of this course, three concepts of consciousness are distinguished: (1) consciousness as experience [*Erlebnis*]; (2) consciousness as intentional consciousness; and (3) consciousness as position taking or attentive consciousness.⁴¹ Here, the absolute consciousness coincides with the first of these concepts, designating the pre-phenomenal and pre-objective being experienced [*erlebt*] of the pure sensible components of perception, apart from their being apprehended as presenting objective qualities. Thus, the question as to the status of these contents with respect to perception of things immediately emerges: how can these contents be conscious [*bewusst*] without necessarily being apprehended?⁴² In the attempt to answer this question, Husserl points out that absolute consciousness embraces everything that is *datum* or *dabile* as extended in phenomenological time. The temporality of extension [*Zeitlichkeit der Extension*], thus, necessarily belongs to the essence of pre-phenomenal being and to its mode of givenness:

Absolute consciousness is a stream of time, and acts of immanent perceiving are constituted in it that circumscribe the individual moments and parts belonging to absolute consciousness itself and transform them into givens.⁴³

These remarks are further developed in Husserl's 1909 lecture course, *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Knowledge* [*Einführung in die Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis*], and more precisely in the texts published as numbers 39 and 51 in Hua X.⁴⁴ The descriptions in both texts are consistently accomplished in accordance with the phenomenological reduction, and this enables Husserl to give a more adequate

analyses, particularly regarding their main topic (individuation and consciousness of identity). Such analyses, instead, were added later to the convolute, and date back to 1917. See Hua X, 237f./ (Husserl 1991, pp. 245f.) and Bernet (1985, p. XXXII).

⁴⁰ I am referring to the third section of the course, chapter VII in the Husserliana edition, entitled *The Lower Forms of Objectification*, Hua XXIV, pp. 243–274/(Husserl 2008, pp. 241–271). Regarding the manuscript of the lecture course, see Melle (1984, p. XLI) and Hua XXIV, pp. 414ff, 490.

⁴¹ Hua XXIV, pp. 243–250/(Husserl 2008, pp. 241–248).

⁴² Hua XXIV, 243/(Husserl 2008, p. 241).

⁴³ Hua XXIV, p. 246/(Husserl 2008, p. 243).

⁴⁴ Hua X, pp. 269–286 and 335–353/(Husserl 1991, pp. 279–297, 347–364). Boehm, the editor of Hua X, dates text 39 back to the 1906/07 lecture course. However, there is both theoretical and

account of the intuitive consciousness of the past than the one provided in the 1905 lecture course. To understand this claim, it is fruitful to preliminarily rehearse the discussion concerning immanence and transcendence in Husserl's 1907 lectures on *The Idea of Phenomenology* in strict connection with the method of the phenomenological reduction. The latter is considered to be necessary in order to uncover the field of intentional consciousness as an a priori correlation. Husserl distinguishes two kinds of immanence in this lecture: the immanence of the real [*reell*] moments of consciousness (experiences), and the immanence of the objective intentional correlate, considered as "self-givenness in the absolute sense" [*Selbstgegebenheit im absoluten Sinne*].⁴⁵ Thanks to the reduction, thus, we discover that the field of apodictic and absolute givenness entails more than the real moments of consciousness, since it also embraces in a very distinctive sense the intentional correlates of consciousness. As Husserl will write some 20 years later in the *Cartesian Meditations*, the field of absolute givenness refers to the interplay and the correlation of *Ego cogito-cogitata qua cogitata*.⁴⁶

In texts number 39 and 51 of Hua X, we can find a restating of this distinction with an explicit reference to temporal consciousness. In text number 39, Husserl claims that the immanence of the temporal object in each of its phases shall not be conceived as real [*reell*] immanence.⁴⁷ Indeed, also in the domain of time consciousness it is possible to distinguish the real immanence of the temporal adumbrations from the intentional immanence of the objectual temporal correlate:

Here we see what a marvellous thing the apparently simplest perception – the perception of an immanent sound – is. And at the same time, we see that this immanence of the identical temporal object, the sound, must surely be distinguished from the immanence of the adumbrations of the sound and the apprehensions of these adumbrations, which make up the consciousness of the givenness of the sound. What is given as unity, and, as we presuppose here, given adequately as individual and consequently temporal being, is not really and immanently given in the final and absolute sense – that is to say, not given as a component of the absolute consciousness. Immanent can signify the antithesis of transcendent, and then the temporal thing, the sound, is immanent; but it can also signify what exists in the sense or absolute consciousness, and then the sound is not immanent.⁴⁸

Thanks to the introduction of the phenomenological reduction, which permits to uncover a non-real [*reell*] kind of immanence, we can understand how the intuitive consciousness of the past is possible in general. The intuitive givenness of the "thing in time" [*Zeitding*], indeed, comprehends not only the real moments that are momentarily present to consciousness; it rather intentionally embraces the previous phases, precisely as being past, i.e., as temporal modifications.⁴⁹

historical evidence that allow us to consider the text as part of the 1909 lecture course. See Hua X, p. 492 and Bernet (1985, p. XXXVI).

⁴⁵ Hua II, p. 35/(Husserl 1999, pp. 27–28).

⁴⁶ Hua I, pp. 70f./Husserl 1960, pp. 31f.).

⁴⁷ Hua X, pp. 279f./Husserl 1991, p. 289f.).

⁴⁸ Hua X, pp. 283–284/Husserl 1991, pp. 293–294).

⁴⁹ Hua X, p. 275/Husserl 1991, p. 285).

In text number 51 of Hua X, the connection between the phenomenological reduction, the constitution of temporal objects, and the givenness of the past is further developed. Pointing out that the reduction enables not only a noetic, but also a noematic account of temporal consciousness, Husserl is still concerned with the determination of the effective extent of phenomenological givenness. More precisely, he wonders whether the consciousness of the past, i.e., both retained and recollected past, can be properly considered as phenomenological givenness.⁵⁰ To begin with retention, it clearly appears that the exclusion of the past from the sphere of actual intuitive givenness entails the same shortcomings that Husserl criticizes in Brentano's and Meinong's approaches, and undermines the very phenomenological approach to perception. Thus, if we consider the mode of givenness of the correlate of consciousness, the restriction to a punctuated now of perception is a mere fiction, an abstract construction, which amounts to saying that:

[...] the phases of the just elapsed now, dying away in the apprehension of the duration, have not vanished; and obviously it must be claimed as something absolutely given itself that a retention, in which what is just past in its unity with the now and the always new now comes to absolute itself-givenness, already inheres in the perception.⁵¹

The issue of the apodicticity of recollection is somewhat more complex. In what sense, indeed, can we consider recollection as an apodictic phenomenological givenness, if its correlate is not actually present, not even in the retentional fading-away? Moreover, how can we talk about apodicticity if we consider the fallibility of memory in reproducing the past? Certainly, the present act of recollection is an absolute givenness, which is not limited to the *cogitatio*, but also embraces the *cogitatum*, i.e., my past experience. Nevertheless, recollection alone does not seem to allow us to apodictically claim that what we presently recollect effectively coincides with what we have once perceptually experienced.⁵² In other texts written almost at the same time of the ones considered up to this point, Husserl appeals to the reduction and to the continuous retentional synthesis of absolute consciousness to account for the apodicticity of recollection. It is namely thanks to the transcendental reduction that we are able to reflectively shed light on the a priori co-belonging of the act of recollection and its intentional correlate. This further implies the recognition of a double intentionality at work in recollection. On the one hand, recollection entails the actual reproducing intention referred to our past experience. On the other hand, it also entails our past intention toward the once present object, which is presently reproduced in recollection with its correlate.⁵³ Both intentionalities, in their interconnection, are necessary to recollection: they are the constitutive moments of a complex and still intuitive act, the correlate of which, nevertheless, is not given as present. Yet, the most fundamental condition of possibility of recollection is again absolute consciousness, as a unitary

⁵⁰ Hua X, p. 339/(Husserl 1991, pp. 350–351).

⁵¹ Hua X, p. 343/(Husserl 1991, p. 355).

⁵² Hua X, p. 340/(Husserl 1991, p. 352).

⁵³ Hua X, pp. 53–54, 297–310/(Husserl 1991, pp. 54–55, 308–322). See also Hua XIII, pp. 177–179, and Hua XXIII, pp. 184–187/(Husserl 2005, pp. 221–223), where Husserl also refers to a double reduction as correlated to this double intentionality.

process of retentionalization.⁵⁴ This process of retentionalization is the condition of possibility for recollection for two reasons: (1) it makes the constant “sinking away” of experience into the past and its preservation in retentional consciousness; and (2) given its unitary character, it potentially makes the reproduction of past experience possible. In other words, since the stream of the absolute consciousness is unitary and unfolds itself in a continuous process of transition, each and every experience can, in principle, be presently re-activated through recollection. Each and every experience, indeed, is considered to remain potentially accessible within the unitary stream of the absolute consciousness; it remains, as it were, virtually conscious and presentifyable despite its “distance” from the intuitive present.⁵⁵

As I previously mentioned, the transcendental turn in the analyses on temporality not only implies some developments regarding the analyses of the constitution of temporal objects. It also allows to properly raise the question as to the self-constitution of temporal consciousness for itself. This is certainly one of the most controversial problems in Husserl’s analyses of time consciousness.⁵⁶ The most original and theoretically fruitful solution offered by Husserl in these years can be found in text number 54 of Hua X, most probably dating back to 1911.⁵⁷ Here, Husserl aims to give a precise account of the constitution of the unitary stream of consciousness, which does not incur the risk of an infinite regress of foundation.

⁵⁴Hua X, p. 326f./*(Husserl 1991, pp. 338f.)* The difference between the intentionality of retention and recollection, and the foundational relationship between the two, has been insightfully treated by Fink (1966, pp. 19f.), who coins the notion of de-presencing [*Entgegenwärtigung*] to designate the process of retentionalization. I shall return more extensively on the dynamics of this process in the next section.

⁵⁵As Bernet (1985, p. XLII) points out, this may be problematic, since such a view does not allow to account for the forgetfulness of that which is inaccessible to consciousness (e.g. traumas) and history. In the texts written in the Twenties and in the Thirties, Husserl will be confronted with some of these problems. Against Bernet, and referring to Husserl’s later lectures on transcendental logic (Hua XI), Mishara (1990) argues that Husserl’s account of retentional consciousness, association, and affection is apt to describe the process of forgetting. Thereby he refers to Husserl’s metaphor of the “night of the unconscious”, and to the characterization of process of retentionalization as a process of forgetting. Cf. Hua XI, p. 154/*(Husserl 2001a, pp. 201–202)*. His argument, however, does not seem to challenge Bernet’s point, since, in Husserl’s view, all that which has retentionally sedimented can, in principle, be awaken and presentified in recollection. In this sense, the unconscious is not the realm of a radical forgetfulness or alienness, because this would imply the impossibility, in principle, to appropriate the past in recollection. For a thorough inquiry into the unconscious in light of the phenomenology of alienness, see Waldenfels (2002, pp. 286–359). The question as to the apodicticity of recollection will be further developed by Husserl in the text published as Appendix VIII in Hua XI, pp. 365–383/*(Husserl 2001a, pp. 451–473)*. In this text, Husserl claims that recollection has indeed an apodictic character in spite of the possibility of error. This claim is grounded, on the one hand, on the correlation between the double intentionality of recollection and a double reduction. On the other hand, it refers to the unitary structure of the temporal stream of consciousness and to the Ego as the identical pole of the stream of experiences.

⁵⁶For further discussion, see notably, Bernet (1983, 1985, pp. LII–LVI, 1994, pp. 198–296), Brough (1972), De Warren (2009, pp. 97–208), Kortooms (2000, 2002, pp. 83–91, 149f.), Schnell (2004, pp. 143f., 2008), Zahavi (1998, 1999, pp. 70f.), and Zippel (2007, pp. 137f.).

⁵⁷Hua X, pp. 368–382/*(Husserl 1991, pp. 379–394)*.

As a matter of fact, such a risk is ineluctable if one conceives of this unitary constitution as made possible by another underlying or apprehending consciousness, since the same problem of constitution also emerges with regard to the latter consciousness and so on in infinitum. Thus, in this text, Husserl conceives of the stream of consciousness as being the source of two modes of temporal constitution, i.e., of both the constitution of immanent temporal objects, which is made possible by transverse intentionality [*Querintentionalität*], and of the self-constitution of the temporal stream, thanks to the horizontal intentionality [*Längsintentionalität*]. Not being directed towards an object, this latter intentionality rather designates a rhythmical and self-related movement which goes through the whole stream of consciousness and allows its unitary constitution.⁵⁸ Moreover, since it does not make reference to any further constituting consciousness, the self-referential dynamics of horizontal intentionality is not subject to the risk of infinite regress.

I shall return to some developments regarding the self-constitution of temporal consciousness in the next part. Yet, for the present argument, two issues in this description of the self-constitution of consciousness shall be particularly kept in mind: first, this description refers to a dynamic and complex self-organization of temporal constituting consciousness, which is based upon the spreading-out of the present and the continuous process of retentialization; and secondly, the intentionality of this consciousness designates a form of pre-reflective self-awareness, which cannot be conceived as objectification, and yet makes all forms of object constitution possible.

5.1.3 *The Temporal Fringe and the Future*

The immanent temporal object – this immanent tone-content for example – is what it is only insofar as during its actually present duration it points ahead to a future and points back to a past.⁵⁹

This characterization of the temporal object, stemming from one text written between 1907 and 1909, refers to one almost neglected element in the texts we have considered up to now. As we can read in this short passage, not only does the presently given temporal object point back [*zurückweist*] to the past, but it also points ahead to the future [*vorweist*]. As is well known, in the first stage of his analyses of time consciousness, Husserl manifestly privileges the analyses concerning the consciousness of the past (primary memory or retention and recollection), mainly considering the consciousness of the future as somehow mirroring the former.⁶⁰ As we will see, more detailed analyses regarding the specificity of future-consciousness will be developed in the later writings, and particularly in the

⁵⁸ Hua X, p. 380/(Husserl 1991, p. 392).

⁵⁹ Hua X, p. 297/(Husserl 1991, p. 308).

⁶⁰ Hua X, pp. 55–57/(Husserl 1991, pp. 56–59).

Bernau Manuscripts. However, in some of these earlier texts we can already find some important remarks concerning the distinctiveness of future-directed intentionality. Thus, as early as in 1893, Husserl refers to the future intention as a constitutive moment of each and every perception. Moreover, thematizing the aesthetic feelings that are called forth while listening to a melody, in this text he also understands future intentions as a kind of striving for the complete givenness of that which manifests itself as incomplete, thus implicitly pointing to what we may call, anticipating to what has yet to come, the affective call of the perceptual thing, which invites us into the process of perception.⁶¹

In another text from the same period, Husserl further develops his analyses concerning the consciousness of the future by distinguishing the so-called intuitive expectation [*anschauliche Erinnerung*] from reproductive expectation [*reproduktive Erwartung*]. As we can easily see, this distinction is very much conceived in analogy with the one between primary memory and recollection. In both cases, indeed, the criteria for the distinction are the same: they concern the relationship past or future consciousness has with present perception. In the case of primary memory and intuitive expectation, this relation is that of non-independent parts or moments that co-belong to a unitary “temporal fringe” [*Zeithof*], which, as Husserl remarks, also has a future.⁶² In the unitary whole of the temporally extended, past, present, and future moments are interwoven and continuously merge into one another. Such continuous merging grounds the unity of the stream of consciousness. This, I submit, is the specific meaning of extension as spreading-out. Reproductive expectation and recollection, instead, are acts grounded upon that continuous merging. Both are intuitive and presentifying acts, the correlate of which, as I have argued with respect to recollection, is presently absent.⁶³ Thus, such as all acts, they do also unfold temporally, i.e., they also entail the moments of present, immediate past, and immediate future. In some later texts, probably written between 1906 and 1909, parallel to the notion of retention Husserl introduces the term “protention” to designate the consciousness of the future belonging to the unitary whole of the present perception.⁶⁴ In spite of emphasizing the analogies between retention and protention, with the aim of distinguishing them from, respectively, recollection and expectation, in these texts Husserl also warns against the risk of merely identifying retention and protention: whereas the latter is bound to past givenness, the former is essentially open and indeterminate.⁶⁵ Again, the relevance of such indeterminacy and consequently the form of openness that is distinctive to all consciousness of the future will be further in the *Bernau Manuscripts*, to which I shall return in the third part of this book.

⁶¹ Hua X, pp. 137f./(*Husserl 1991*, pp. 141f.). A more precise characterization of this phenomenon is provided in the texts written around the Twenties, starting with the *Bernau Manuscripts*. I shall discuss the theoretical impact of these developments in the third section.

⁶² Hua X, p. 167/(*Husserl 1991*, p. 172).

⁶³ Hua X, p. 169/(*Husserl 1991*, pp. 173–174).

⁶⁴ Hua X, p. 297/(*Husserl 1991*, p. 308).

⁶⁵ Hua X, p. 297/(*Husserl 1991*, p. 309), footnote.

5.2 *Res Extensa* and Spatial Constitution

Like temporality, spatiality pertains to the essence of the appearing thing. The appearing thing, whether changing or unchanging, endures and fills a time; furthermore, it fills a space, its space, even if this may be different at different points of time.⁶⁶

The quoted passage from *Thing and Space* is again quite clearly stating the complementarity of temporality and spatiality as essential moments of the appearance of the sensible thing. Arguing that the thing fills time and space, the passage clearly hints at their noematic definition as the forms of the appearing thing. As the discussion of Husserl's critique to Kant's understanding of time and space as forms of the inner and outer sense has revealed to us, such a noematic account is considered to be the source of legitimation for their intuitiveness. As forms of everything that is intuitively given, time and space are themselves intuitively given in and through the appearance of things and their respective relations. As we have seen, regarding time, it is by starting with the description of the experience of the temporal object that we arrive at highlighting the intuitiveness of temporal duration. Yet, if this may still be challenged regarding temporality, since the analyses of time consciousness do indeed take departure from a very particular kind of object (the purely temporal object) in order to focus as a matter of fact on the noetic structures of consciousness making that very temporal givenness possible, this claim certainly becomes much more evident when spatiality is considered. In fact, it is by addressing the mode of givenness of the spatial thing that Husserl arrives at highlighting the intuitiveness of what he calls "phenomenal space" [*phänomenaler Raum*].⁶⁷

Differently from time, with regard to intuitive space it would be of little use to compare the analyses that precede the route to the phenomenological reduction with the subsequent ones. Indeed, the earliest inquiries into the structure of intuitive space are mainly programmatic and do not reach the thoroughness of the ensuing ones. The shortcomings of the early inquiries are recognized by Husserl himself in his *Personal Chronicles* from 1906/08, as he points out that, in spite of being sketched as early as 1894, the questions related to the constitution of space remained a desideratum until the lectures on *Thing and Space* (1907), and that they were not even treated in the 1904/05 course *Important Points from the Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge*, even belonging to the very same realm of questions raised in these lectures (Husserl 1956).

Why does Husserl believe that the research on space dating back to 1894 does not contain anything of great use for the problem of the constitution of spatial things and of space? What was the reason for leaving aside these problems from the 1904/05 lecture course, to which they would thematically belong? And what is the new element in the 1907 lecture course, which allows Husserl to eventually address these problems in an appropriate way? In his introduction to the Husserliana edition

⁶⁶Hua XVI, p. 66/(Husserl 1997, p. 55).

⁶⁷This notion is particularly present in Husserl's discussion of Hering's and Hofmann's positions in manuscript D 13 III/201a f. to which I shall return later in this chapter.

of *Thing and Space*, Claesges (1973, pp. XVI. f.) plausibly answers these questions by suggesting that the sketchy character of the early analyses of space should be precisely related to the lack of the proper phenomenological method in the inquiry into spatial constitution. Indeed, the lectures on *Thing and Space* are part of a more comprehensive course entitled *Important Points from Phenomenology and the Critique of Reason* [*Hauptstücke aus der Phänomenologie und Kritik der Vernunft*], the five introductory lectures of which are precisely one of the first texts in which the method of the phenomenological reduction is explicitly thematized. Providing suitable ground for the analyses of constitution and uncovering the a priori laws of noetic-noematic correlation, the reduction also allows a proper consideration of spatial constitution. The importance of the reduction for the phenomenology of space reveals itself at least with regard to two aspects: (1) it allows us to describe the phenomenological givenness and evidence of spatial things considered as intentional correlates of consciousness; and (2) by bracketing all positings regarding the factual existence of things, or sensible contents as psychic or physiological data, it prevents us from every reductionist or naturalistic account of sensible and perceptive experience, and rather addresses the latter right from the start as intentional. For these reasons, the introduction of the method of the reduction opens up the way for both the programmatic claims regarding the constitution of space that we can find in *Ideas I*,⁶⁸ and the effective inquiry into the constitution of the spatial thing and of space, which are to be found in the lecture course on *Thing and Space*, in its systematic re-elaboration dating back to 1916, *Systematic Constitution of Space*, and later revised by Stein,⁶⁹ and in many of the D-Manuscripts.

As I mentioned, the sibling metaphor that Husserl adopts in *Thing and Space* to indicate both the co-belonging and the analogies in the spatial and the temporal constitution of the thing is primarily based upon a specific understanding of the notion of extension. In that context, indeed, Husserl seems to assume extension as the trait d'union between the spatial and the temporal dimensions of the thing, thereby privileging the idea of extension as a relation of juxtaposed, independent parts, i.e., as *Ausdehnung*. The previous analyses of temporality have shown that this understanding of extension only covers a limited set of phenomena. For instance, it is not suitable to address the temporal unfolding of experience. As we take seriously into account the concrete unfolding of lived experience as spreading-out, we realize that the extension of perception is grounded upon a unity of interwoven moments, which can be abstractedly distinguished, yet not effectively separated from one another. Does the latter claim hold also true with respect to spatiality? Apparently, this does not seem to be the case, if we think that the notion of extension as *Ausdehnung* stems from the description of objective spatial relationships. A surface, i.e., a portion of bi-dimensional space, for example, can be clearly considered as extended [*ausgedehnt*]. As a limited piece of space, it can be represented as independent, and can be juxtaposed to other pieces of space. Moreover, we can cut such a surface and still obtain smaller surfaces, i.e., independent pieces.

⁶⁸ Hua III/1, pp. 348–352/(Husserl 1983, pp. 363–366).

⁶⁹ Hua XVI, pp. 297–336/(Husserl 1997, pp. 257–288).

Nevertheless, if we do not consider extension only with respect to the constituted spatial objects, but rather take into account the process of their synthetic constitution, this understanding of extension as *Ausdehnung* will not be properly applicable any longer. As Husserl argues in paragraph 81 of *Ideas I*,⁷⁰ if we consider the process of constitution of objective space from the bottom, i.e., if we begin by considering the “extension” of visual and tactile sensations, we shall first notice that such “extension” cannot be conceived as *Ausdehnung* or as a relation of independent parts. Extension as *Ausdehnung* is itself constituted on the basis of a more original kind of extension as spreading-out. Moreover, within a noematic inquiry, if we take the “thing of the transcendental aesthetic” as the unitary correlate of sensible spatial experience, there are reasons to challenge the appropriateness of the notion of *Ausdehnung* to define its extended character. As I shall argue by addressing the stratified constitution of the phantom, although the notion of extension as *Ausdehnung* may well be suitable to describe the relation among parts of material objects in space, it is not appropriate to render the togetherness of the moments of appearance of the thing as the correlate of lived experience. Yet, such an understanding implies a re-qualification of the relationship between the spatial and the temporal dimensions of experience, which goes beyond the idea of a mere parallelism. The application of the paradigm of objective extension as *Ausdehnung* to the experience of spatiality would amount to provide a description of the latter that does not take into account how the previously discussed temporal unfolding of experience concretely impinges upon our perception of spatial things. For this reason, I consider this description to be an abstracting one.

In what follows, I will first provide further arguments for the claim that extension, and therefore the spatial form, can only be given intuitively in connection with filling content. Moreover, I will show how such an understanding is connected with a stratified approach to the constitution of the phantom as the thing of the transcendental aesthetic. Thereby, we will be confronted with both the potentialities and the limits of the abstracting approach to extension considered merely as a relation of independent parts. Even recognizing the legitimacy of such an abstracting approach to shed light on some distinctive structures of space, we will be finally confronted with questions that inevitably hint at a more concrete account of perceptual experience as spatio-temporal intertwining. This will open up the way to the third part of this book.

5.2.1 *The Debate on the Origin of the Representation of Space*

Such as we have seen by discussing Husserl’s position concerning time consciousness the contemporary debate in psychology concerning the origin of the representation of space can also provide a good access to Husserl’s own position. Deeply influenced by the discoveries made in physiology, and notably the physiology of

⁷⁰Hua III/1, p. 181/(Husserl 1983, pp. 192–193).

vision, this debate gives birth to the so-called “new psychology” in the German tradition (cf. Stumpf 1894). Among the leading figures involved in this debate, Stumpf is certainly one important reference for the development of Husserl’s own positions.⁷¹ Re-activating his critique toward Kant’s account of space, which I have discussed in the first part of this book, in his *On the Psychological Origin of the Representation of Space*, Stumpf takes a stand within the contemporary debate regarding the representation of space. In brief, the main protagonists of this debate are the supporters of the so-called “nativist” or “innatist” view of spatial representation and the supporters of the “empiricist” view. The two fathers of the debate between empiricists and nativists are, respectively, Helmholtz and Hering. Mainly referring to the former, empiricists claim that our representation of space, notably realized through spatial extension and localization, is the result of learning processes and of empirical laws of associations among sensations. On the contrary, inspired by Hering, nativists claim that the representation of space, spatial extension, and localization is innate.⁷²

More precisely, following Stumpf, we can further specify this distinction and identify four positions regarding the origin of the representation of space within the broader distinction between nativists and empiricists. Two of these positions are clearly empiricist. The first is inspired by Herbart and Bain, who consider the representation of space as resulting from the association of sensations (Stumpf 1873, pp. 30–72). The second is inspired by Helmholtz and Wundt, who still conceive of the representation of space as an associative process, however involving not only sensations but also the so-called “local signs”. The latter notion, first introduced by Lotze, is aimed at designating the vehicle of the reconstruction of the transcendent spatial order by means of our experience of the extension of the visual field (Stumpf 1873, pp. 154f.). The third position in the debate, as it is reconstructed by Stumpf, is the one endorsed by Lotze himself. It cannot be univocally considered as either purely empiricist or nativist. Indeed, Lotze refuses to conceive of space-representation as stemming from a kind of empirical association of sensations, and rather argues that the original perception of spatial qualities is made possible by the local signs (i.e., the spatial extension of the visual fields) as well as the connection between oculomotor reflexes and sensations of movement (Stumpf 1873, pp. 86–106).⁷³ Finally, the fourth position is that of Hering’s physiological nativism. According to Hering, the experience of spatial localization and extension is made possible by the physiological mechanisms and the “spatial values” of height, length and depth that are innate insofar as they belong to the structure of our retina (Stumpf

⁷¹ For a comparative discussion of Husserl’s and Stumpf’s position on the experience of space, see Costa (1996) and Pradelle (2000, pp. 126–153). For a more general account of the relation between the two thinkers, see Rollinger (1999, pp. 83–123).

⁷² Regarding this debate see Helmholtz (1910, pp. 10f.). More specifically regarding the Hering-Helmholtz debate, see Fisette (2006, pp. 38f.); Heidelberger (1993); Turner (1993, 1994).

⁷³ See also Lotze’s (1873) own comments, which are published as an appendix in Stumpf’s *Raumbuch*. On the influence of Lotze’s theory of the local signs on contemporary debate, see Fisette (2006, pp. 38–43) and Woodward (1978).

[1873](#), pp. 166–168).⁷⁴ Stumpf does not properly align himself with any of the former positions, but rather defends a psychological kind of nativism, which, differently from Hering's, does not resort to physiology, but rather to the psychological laws of spatial experience, which make the representation of space itself possible.

It is precisely this line of thought that, as we have partially already seen, will be taken over and developed in Husserl's own account of spatial experience. For the core of Stumpf's argument is precisely entailed in his critical discussion of Kant's definition of space as the form of the outer sense. What we shall retain in this context from the critique Stumpf raises against Kant's account of space (leaving aside the question as to the shortcomings of this interpretation, which I have previously discussed) is that for Stumpf, and for Husserl, the spatial form cannot be given, nor imagined, apart from spatial content, i.e., what Stumpf calls partial content [*Theilinhalt*] (Stumpf [1873](#), p. 109) and Husserl *materia prima* or primal matter [*Urmaterie*.]⁷⁵ Certainly, such content needs not being determined as this or that content. We can imagine, for instance, a spatial figure as being filled with different colors. And it is precisely thanks to the possible variation of the color independently from the figure that we can arrive at an intuition of the figure itself. Yet, we cannot imagine a spatial figure as deprived of any sensible content whatsoever. Accordingly, we can argue that, for Husserl as well as for Stumpf, the spatial form can be the object of intuition. More precisely, the spatial form is intuited in and through the representation of spatial content. Even though form cannot be given apart from some primal content (or *Urmaterie*), this does not mean that the distinction between spatial form and content simply collapses. Rather, although the two cannot be effectively separated, they can and must be distinguished. And this distinction is itself intuitively grounded. Thus, the intuition of the spatial form cannot be derived empirically from physiological or psychological associations among sensations, being rather based upon a priori and structural laws of experience.

In *Thing and Space*, Husserl believes that such a necessary connection between extension and the sensible quality also applies to the peculiar “pre-phenomenal” extension of presenting sensations.⁷⁶ Yet, this reference to the pre-phenomenal spatiality of sensations entails a somewhat problematic claim as to the possible fragmentation [*Zerstückbarkeit*] of sensible data. Accordingly, the proto-spatiality of sensation seems to be modeled on the notion of extension as *Ausdehnung, partes extra partes*, that is to say, on the relation of reciprocal exteriority or juxtaposition among independent parts. Yet, are sensations effectively organized in this way? As we have seen, in *Ideas I*, Husserl expresses a different opinion on this subject (cf. Hua III/1, p. 181). There, he rather describes this proto-spatiality of the sensible contents in terms of spreading-out, referring to the intertwining and overlapping of

⁷⁴ See also, Fisette ([2006](#)); Heidelberger ([1993](#), pp. 3–6).

⁷⁵ Hua XVI, pp. 72f./Husserl [1997](#), pp. 60f.).

⁷⁶ “These contents of sensation, e.g., the sensations of color which present the appearing coloration, have in themselves an extension and are fragmented along with the fragmentation of the total appearance. The color-data are not dispersed and without connection; they have a rigorous unity and a rigorous form, the form of pre-phenomenal spatiality. The same applies to all sense-data which pertain to properly space-filling qualities as presentational contents.” Hua XVI, p. 69/ (Husserl [1997](#), p. 57).

the different moments, and not in terms of extension, which precisely indicated the relation of juxtaposition and exteriority of independent parts. The position endorsed in *Ideas I* seems to be much more consistent with the result of the temporal analyses presented above. The proto-spatiality of the sensible contents does not lend itself to be “cut into pieces”: there are not independent spatial pieces or points of sensation apart from their participating into the unitary, not only proto-spatial but also prototemporal, unfolding of experience. Thus, whereas the account of the extension of the sensible contents presented in *Thing and Space* seems to be based upon an isolating approach to space and time, the one proposed in *Ideas I* offers a more appropriate description of the spatio-temporal intertwining that makes up the most basic structure of sensibility.

With respect to bi-dimensional space, Husserl’s approach to the relation of quality and extension mainly converge with Stumpf’s. Regarding tridimensional space, though, we find an important distinction between the two positions. As it has been pointed out in an article by Costa (1996), Husserl’s comments on the section entitled *Direct Proof of the Original Representation of Depth [Direchter Nachweis der ursprünglichen Tiefenvorstellung]* in his copy of Stumpf’s Raumbuch provide clear evidence for his divergent approach to tridimensional space (Stumpf 1873, pp. 176–183).⁷⁷ Stumpf believes that the third dimension is necessarily co-represented together with the bi-dimensional surface, being implied as “partial content” in each and every visual representation.⁷⁸ Husserl, instead, distinguishes the structure of the visual field as bi-dimensional representation from the structure of tridimensional space as two different layers of spatial constitution. The aim of phenomenological inquiry, in this sense, is to show how the structure of tridimensional space is constituted in relation to the structure of the bi-dimensional field, and to the constitution of the perceptual thing.⁷⁹ As we will see in the last chapter of this book, movement in its spatio-temporal unfolding will play a major role in such a constitution of space.

5.2.2 *Space and the Spatial Thing*

The law of the necessary connection between extension and the sensible qualities that make up the so-called *materia prima* is crucial for the development of Husserl’s phenomenology of spatial constitution. This law is the basis for the ontological description and the inquiry into the constitution of the so-called thing of the transcendental aesthetic (Hua Mat IV, p. 172). The notion of phantom is precisely

⁷⁷ Many notes of Husserl’s are reported and commented on in Costa (1996, pp. 181–185).

⁷⁸ “Insofar as two dimensions are represented, the third dimension is also co-represented” And further: “Accordingly, a pure representation of surface is just as impossible as a pure representation of lines or points, and as impossible as a representation of quality without space. Every visual content necessarily already includes the third dimension. And this is just as inherent to its nature as the fact that it is represented in a quality of colors.” (Stumpf 1873, p. 182).

⁷⁹ “The great task here would be to penetrate as deeply as possible into the phenomenological “creation” of three-dimensional spatiality, i.e., into the phenomenological constitution of the identical corporeal thing in the manifold of its appearances” Hua XVI, p. 154/(Husserl 1997, p. 131).

introduced to designate such a thing. Already present in the lecture course on *Thing and Space*,⁸⁰ the neologism “phantom” progressively assumes a more precise meaning in the manuscripts written between 1907 and 1910, and with this meaning the term is assumed in later texts, such as *Ideas II*⁸¹ and the 1919 lecture course on *Nature and Spirit* (e.g., Hua Mat IV, p. 172). Also, for the definition of the concept of phantom, the contemporary debate on the theory of perception, and particularly the one proposed by Hering, is of great importance for Husserl’s work. Even more than with Hering’s own writings, however, Husserl engages in a discussion with Hofmann’s positions, which somehow integrate Hering’s physiological considerations within a phenomenological theory of spatial perception.

After having attended both Husserl’s 1904/05 lecture course on *Important Points from the Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge* and the 1907 lecture course on *Thing and Space*, in 1909, Hofmann submits his dissertation under Husserl’s supervision.⁸² The reading of this work has probably represented for Husserl an occasion to further elaborate his theory of spatial constitution and to better define the notions of phantom and of the sensible, extended thing.

Explicitly inspired by Husserl’s “stratified” description of experience, in his research, Hofmann particularly focuses on the status of sensations in visual perception (Hofmann 1913, p. 100). Assuming the description of the perspectival display of the sensible thing, Hofmann understands the notion of sensation in noematic, rather than noetic, terms: sensations, in other words, are not simply assumed as real moments of an act, but rather as moments of the appearing thing as such (Costa 2007, pp. 77–108). In doing this, he takes over some elements of Hering’s research, and particularly the notion of visual thing [*Sehding*], yet transposing them from the psycho-physiological analyses of vision into what he calls a “philosophy of psychology”, that is to say, a philosophical enterprise concerned with the boundary line between psychological and natural-scientific research (Hofmann 1913, p. 1). The first distinction Hofmann proposes in his work is the one between the sense-thing [*Sinnending*] and the atom-thing [*Atomding*]. Whereas the latter notion designates the object of the positive sciences and eventually coincides with a theoretical construct detached from experience, the former designates the thing such as it is given in pure, sensible experience (Hofmann 1913, pp. 52–56). Inspired by phenomenology, Hofmann philosophical inquiries are clearly concentrated on the sense-thing and are aimed to highlight the fundamental structures of its experiential givenness. Despite admitting that the thing is, or can be, experienced through different senses, in the following Hofmann limits his research to the visual sensible thing [*visuelles Sinnending* or *Sehding*], thus abstracting from all other sensible

⁸⁰E.g. Hua XVI, p. 78/(Husserl 1997, p. 65).

⁸¹E.g. Hua IV, p. 22/(Husserl 1989, p. 24).

⁸²The dissertation will then be published in 1913 in the *Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie* (Hofmann 1913). See also, Schuhmann (1977, p. 123). Husserl comments on this text can be found in manuscripts D 13 III/196a-243b; D 13 III/244a, 246b. Husserl’s interest in Hering’s theory of vision is aroused by his reading of Hofmann. Comments on this theory can be found in manuscript D 13 III/200b-226a; D 13 III/259f.

qualities, and justifies this approach by resorting to the descriptive purposes of his research. Besides claiming that the visual world is in itself an extremely rich field for descriptive inquiry, he also questions the accessibility of the nexus between the tactile and the visual moments of manifestation to a purely descriptive approach, since this nexus may well be the result of an associative, i.e., empirically causal, process (Hofmann 1913, pp. 54–55). Once this restriction has been made, the “visual sensible thing” is defined as the unitary object of visual perception, which embraces all the sensible properties of the thing (Hofmann 1913, pp. 53, 56).⁸³ This unity, however, is itself a structured one. Thus, Hofmann distinguishes three layers in the givenness of such a unity: (1) the layer of thing-appearance [*Dingerscheinung*], (2) the layer of sensible intuitions [*sinnliche Anschauungen*], and (3) the layer of sensible experiences [*sinnliche Erlebnisse*].

The thing-appearance corresponds to the “surface” [*Fläche*] of the visual thing, its shape and color, as they appear to us in the given actual circumstances (Hofmann 1913, p. 91). Here, Hofmann points out that relationship between the different thing-appearances and the one identical visual thing is not a part-whole one. Rather, the unity and the identity of the visual thing, given through the different appearances, must be the result of a process of synthetic constitution.⁸⁴ Hofmann’s mentioned remarks are deeply influenced by Husserl’s own studies on the synthetic constitution of the identical thing in and through its different appearances, which can be found already in the *Logical Investigations*,⁸⁵ and are subsequently developed in *Thing and Space* with a more explicit reference to spatial perception.⁸⁶ Such an account of the unity of the correlate of experience as synthetically constituted, and as opposed to the unity made up of juxtaposed parts, already challenges the idea of a univocal understanding of spatial extension, as *partes extra partes*.

On a more basic level, an analogous relationship is recognized between one thing-appearance, as a complex of different qualities, and the so-called “sensible intuitions” or “thing intuitions” [*sinnliche Anschauung*, *Dinganschauungen*], i.e., the moments that make up a unitary thing-appearance, for instance color or shape (Hofmann 1913, p. 96). To understand this relationship between thing-appearance and thing-intuition [*Dinganschauung*], we may refer to the example Hofmann offers. If we are in a room, and observe one of its corners, the thing-appearance

⁸³ Even resorting to Hering’s (1879, 1920) concept of visual thing, Hofmann explicitly distances himself from the latter’s position. As Mattens (2006) points out, this difference is related to the general frame work of the two researches. Hering’s distinction of visual thing [*Sehding*] and real thing [*wirkliches Ding*] belongs to a psycho-physiological theory of vision. Hofmann’s account of the visual sensible-thing, instead, is assumed within a phenomenological theory of the constitution of the sensible thing.

⁸⁴ “The relationship of the visual thing to the respective “thing-appearances” is thus not necessarily the relationship of the whole to its parts. The “thing-appearances” are not simple pieces of the visual thing. Rather, we have to quasi create the visual thing through a specific process of choice and synthesis, out of the manifold of the continuously merging “thing-appearances”.” (Hofmann 1913, p. 85).

⁸⁵ Hua XIX/2, pp. 566–570/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 206–209).

⁸⁶ Hua XVI, pp. 85–105/(Husserl 1997, pp. 73–88).

given in such an observation is not itself a simple representation. It is rather made up by different qualitative moments, which are certainly given together as to form a *Gestalt*, and yet can be picked out from the unitary representation by focusing our attention on each of them (Hofmann 1913, pp. 97–98).⁸⁷ Each of these qualitatively different moments in a unitary thing-appearance is a thing-intuition.

Thing-intuitions, however, do not coincide with the sensible quality as simply experienced [*das schlechthin erlebte Sinnliche*] (Hofmann 1913, p. 98). It is rather itself a synthetic unity of the multiplicity of such purely sensible qualities. Thus, a further step in the analysis shall be taken to uncover the most basic layer in this account of thing constitution: the so-called sensible experiences [*sinnliche Erlebnisse*], namely the pure sensible contents of intuition. The constitutive moments of this most fundamental sensible layer cannot be further singled out. Such a domain, for Hofmann, cannot even be properly described, as it can only be approached indirectly and through abstraction.

In some of the D-Manuscripts, Husserl comments on Hofmann's research, particularly focusing his attention to the analyses of the visual thing in its stratification. These analyses contribute to give shape to Husserl's own concept of the phantom. Indeed, one initial analogy between Hofmann's concept of the visual thing and Husserl's concept of the phantom can be detected in their negative definition. Distinguishing the visual thing from the real thing, Hofmann points out that, differently from the latter, the former has neither real properties, nor corporeal-material existence (Hofmann 1913, p. 59). Husserl's own negative definition of the phantom, which can be found already in some texts dating back to 1909, is also quite close to this claim. As we can read in manuscript D 13 II:

We can build the concept of the phantom, from which all causality is kept away: the visual thing, which constitutes itself as spatial purely in the sensible manifold, the pure extended thing, which is however not a true thing, since it does not possess any nature, any interweaving with the world of causality.⁸⁸

In search of a more positive definition of the phantom, Husserl distances himself in part from Hofmann's positions and rather resorts to Hering's analyses. This happens, particularly, in manuscript D 13 III, where Husserl explicitly refers to both.⁸⁹ Criticizing some lack of clarity in Hofmann's claims, Husserl resorts to

⁸⁷ Regarding attention, Hofmann explicitly refers to Husserl 1904/05 course. Cf. Hua XXXVIII, pp. 68–122.

⁸⁸ “Wir können den Begriff des Phantoms bilden, von dem alle Kausalität ferngehalten ist, das Sehding, das rein sich in der sinnlichen Mannigfaltigkeit konstituiert als das räumliche; das reine ausgedehnte Ding: das aber kein wahres Ding ist, weil es keine Natur hat, keine Verflechtung in eine Welt der Kausalität.” D 13 II/166 b.

⁸⁹ We shall emphasize that this positive definition is also an abstracting one. In our full-blown experience, we do not perceive phantoms but things, and phantoms are only a layer thereof. Husserl nonetheless occasionally refers to some examples of phantom perception, such as the rainbow, the blue sky, stars, planets, the sun, and the moon. See, for instance, Hua IV, pp. 36–37/ (Husserl 1989, pp. 39–40), and manuscript D 13 III/202 a-220 b. The moon was also taken up by Hering (1879, pp. 343f.) in order to exemplify the notion of *Sehding*. Regarding this topic, see also Sokolowski (1974, pp. 95f.). Even if the reference to something immaterial seems intuitively

Hering's definition of the visual thing as "a thing-surface colored so and so" [*eine so und so gefärbte Dingoberfläche*], considering it more appropriate than Hofmann concept of the thing-appearance to describe the visual phantom.

This description [Hofmann's M.S.] is not clear. "What is sensibly presented of the sphere", what does sensibly mean here? Besides, one could say, what it presented is the profile of the sphere, in the way as and to the extent that it "falls within appearance". There is the "shell of the sphere" in some distance from me. This appearing profile is for instance the same whether I keep my eyes in rest or move them. Moreover, it does not need to be a true "appearance". Maybe it is an illusion, as in the example with the moon. Anyway, I see this and that, that is, a surface of the thing in such and such color. This should be called the visual thing in the right sense, as Hering basically described it. Regardless of the question how far the real thing matches it, i.e., here, how far the thing, which is "perceived" as having this profile, actually exists at all. This visual thing as appearing profile of the thing, seen in that sense, should be contrasted with the manifold of "appearances" in which it appears, which are seen in another sense. Every movement of the eye ends with another, direct seeing, indirect seeing. One "appearance" corresponds to each phase.⁹⁰

Thus, the appeal to Hering helps Husserl to restate the claim regarding the co-belonging of extension and color (as belonging to the *materia prima*), which instead was questioned by Hofmann (1913, pp. 122–127). And, indeed, extending these considerations from pure vision to spatial perception in general (which involves, at least, also tactile moments), we can see in what sense the distinction of *materia prima* and *materia secunda* plays a role in the positive definition of the phantom. The pregnant or pure concept of the phantom, indeed, refers to the extension filled by the *materia prima*, which, for Husserl, embraces both the visual and the tactile moments. Differently from the negative definition of the phantom, which is based on

implied by the previous examples, we shall observe that, if we define materiality in relation to the causal laws, then all the previous examples can also be conceived as "material". The rainbow, for instance, is an optical effect connected to the physical phenomenon of water leakage and of the refraction of sunlight on water drops. Moreover, these phenomena also lend themselves to be conceived in the light of an intuitive kind of causality, related to habits, so that we can expect to see the rainbow if the sun shines immediately after a storm. Thus, I believe that the appropriate definition of phantom shall be an abstracting one, related to the stratifications in the concrete thing. Consistently, I agree with Pradelle (2000, pp. 143–144), regarding the impossibility of conceiving the phantom as a concrete correlate of perception. For Drummond (1983), instead, the rainbow would be a good example of perceived phantom.

⁹⁰"Diese Beschreibung [Hofmann's M.S.] ist nicht klar. "Was sich von der Kugel sinnlich darbiert" was heißt da sinnlich? Ferner, was sich darbietet, könnte man sagen, ist die Seite der Kugel, so wie und soweit sie eben "in die Erscheinung fällt". Das ist die "Kugelschale" in der und der Entfernung von mir. Diese erscheinende Seite ist z.B. dieselbe, ob ich die Augen ruhen habe oder die Augen bewege. Ferner, sie braucht nicht richtige "Erscheinung" zu sein. Vielleicht liegt eine Illusion vor, wie beim Mondbeispiel. Jedenfalls sehe ich das und das, und zwar eine so und so gefärbte Dingoberfläche. Das wäre im richtigen Sinn das Sehding zu nennen, so wie es im Grunde auch Hering beschrieben hat. Unabhängig von der Frage, inwieweit ihm das wirkliche Ding entspricht, d.h. hier, inwieweit das Ding, das als diese Seite habende "perzipiert" wird, überhaupt existiert. Diesem Sehding als erscheinende Dingseite, gesehen in dem einen Sinn, ist gegenüberzustellen die Mannigfaltigkeit von "Erscheinungen", in denen es erscheint: die in anderem Sinn gesehen werden. Jede Bewegung des Auges endet mit einem anderen, direktes Sehen, indirektes Sehen. Jeder Phase entspricht eine "Erscheinung".'" D 13 III/214a-b.

an ontological account of the layers of the sensible thing (time, space, and materiality), this positive account is more explicitly grounded on a phenomenological description of experience and constitution. As we can read in manuscript D 13 III:

[...] the pure phantom is the visual thing and the tactile thing, the complex of originally extensional properties before materiality.⁹¹

Consistently, Husserl distances himself from Hofmann's claim that the relationship between the tactile and the visual qualities of the thing is grounded upon a merely empirical association. Somehow, we can "see" that a surface is coarse or rather smooth, and such an apprehension is not merely grounded on association. In this sense, in *Thing and Space*, he refers to the "interpenetration" [*Durchdringung* and *Zwischensetzen*] of the visual and the tactile modes of sensible display of the thing. Such an interpenetration of different sensible qualities in the constitution of one identical sensible thing, however, is not considered to stem from sensations alone, but rather depends on the moment of apprehension in the act of perception.

The co-belonging of the sensible qualities that make up the *materia prima* and the spatial extension shall not be misunderstood as a collapsing of the distinction between matter and form. As I have already mentioned, the law stating that certain material contents cannot be separated from the spatial form does not mean that form and content cannot be abstractedly distinguished. On the contrary, given the possibility of varying the sensible contents by leaving the form untouched and vice versa, we can see that such a distinction is itself of intuitive nature, and that we can also have an intuition of the form.⁹² In accordance with the previous remark regarding the interpenetration of different sensible qualities, in manuscript D 13 II, Husserl writes that the intuitive givenness of space, and notably of the spatiality of the sensible thing as extension and figure, is "inter-sensorial". Spatial extension and figure, thus, are *aistheta koina*, intuited in and through the perception of the sensible thing as a unity of form and matter:

One also calls extension-features, i.e. spatial features (figure features), which are inseparable from the qualitative, sensibly perceived: they are "*aistheta koina*", i.e., they are perceived by "several senses" at once.⁹³

⁹¹ "[...] das pure Phantom ist das Sehding und Tastding, der Komplex ursprünglich extensionaler Eigenschaften vor der Materialität." (D 13 III/133a). We find a similar claim in *Thing and Space*: "They [the determinations that pertain to the body of the thing (phantom) and those that pertain to its filling matter] form either a unique, self-coherent unity or many such unities. And they are articulated into the appearing visual side and the appearing tactile side. [...]. What is important is that the side is a filled extension, specifically an extension of a surface, which delimits the three-dimensionally filled body." Hua XVI, p. 78/(Husserl 1997, p. 65). Translation modified.

⁹² As I have argued in the first section, on the basis of this distinction, which is not a separation, a new reading of Kant's second argument in the *Metaphysical Deduction* can be proposed. On the basis of this reading, Husserl's and Kant's position as to the intuitiveness of space do not seem to be so far from each other, even if Husserl would not reduce space to the form of our outer sense, and rather considers it noematically as the form of the appearing things.

⁹³ "Man nennt auch Ausdehnungsmerkmale, die räumlichen (Gestaltmerkmale), die untrennbar sind von den qualitativen, sinnlich wahrgenommen: sie sind "*aistheta koina*", sie werden von" mehreren Sinnen "zugleich wahrgenommen." (D 13 II/166 b).

Notwithstanding all divergences, Husserl is generally sympathetic with Hofmann's stratified account of thing constitution, and presents his own description thereof. More precisely, referring to vision, Husserl first distinguishes the thing as the object of sciences (i.e., an epistemological construct corresponding to Hofmann's atom-thing) from the material or real thing given in perception (corresponding to Hofmann's sense-thing). As layers of (1) the real thing, namely of the perceived thing as a whole, Husserl further distinguishes (2) the visual thing (corresponding to Hofmann's visual sense-thing or visual thing); (3) the relief of the visual thing (which encompasses both Hofmann's thing-appearance and thing-intuition); and (4) the immanent adumbrations (corresponding to Hofmann's sensible experience).

Accordingly, this also results in different concepts of appearance: 1) the real thing in the sense of the normal perceptual apprehension, the colored, shiny thing, etc.; in it, the real thing, in the sense of sciences, "appears". 2) The visual thing [...] as "appearance" of the normal perceptual thing, of the thing of normal, correct perception. 3) The relief of the visual thing as "appearance" of the visual thing (visual thing in the second sense, which corresponds to the second concept of visual space). 4) The immanent adumbration (from the manifold that belongs to the relief of the visual thing) as appearance of the relief of the visual thing.⁹⁴

Mutatis mutandis, these distinctions are supposed to be valid for tactile perception as well. With respect to Hofmann's stratification, we can see that one layer is failing. Indeed, the thing-appearance and the thing-intuition are absorbed in the relief of the thing [*Dingrelief*]. Thus, consistent with his view concerning the co-belonging of spatial form and qualities, Husserl is not willing to separate the givenness of the thing's surface (extension) from the givenness of its qualities. Yet, such as for Hofmann, the relationship between these layers is not simply that of the connection of independent parts in a whole. Instead, Husserl reconsiders this stratification in the light of his own theory of constitution, assuming each of the lower layers as an appearance [*Erscheinung*] of the immediately higher. Accordingly, the different layers of the thing cannot be conceived as independent, juxtaposed parts or pieces of the thing. They are rather non-independent moments in its constitution as a synthetic unity. These layers cannot be properly separated from one another, nor do they come before as independent unities to be then assembled to constitute the thing. Rather, they can only be analytically, abstractedly, and retrospectively distinguished, since they are only given in and through the unitary appearance of the thing as a whole. Thus, the synthesis making up such a unitary appearance of the thing shall not be conceived as a constructive assemblage, but rather as a continuous pre-reflective power that allows us to see wholes. As Husserl puts it in *Thing and Space*:

The total appearance lies at the foundation; the fixation and separate perception do not disrupt it. But the prominent separate apprehension, which remains in continuity with the

⁹⁴“Das gibt also auch verschiedene Begriffe von Erscheinung: (1) das wirkliche Ding im Sinn der normalen Wahrnehmungsauffassung, das farbige, glänzende Ding etc.; in ihm “erscheint” das wirkliche Ding im Sinn der Wissenschaft. (2) Das Sehding [...] als “Erscheinung” des normalen Wahrnehmungsdinges, des Dinges der normalen, richtigen Wahrnehmung. (3) Das Sehdingrelief als “Erscheinung” des Sehdinges (Sehding im zweiten Sinn, entsprechend zweiter Begriff von Sehraum). (4) Die immanente Abschattung (aus der Mannigfaltigkeit, die zum Sehdingrelief gehört) als Erscheinung des Sehding-Reliefs.” D 13 III/223 b.

underlying total apprehension, is brought along with the latter into the synthetic unity of the consciousness of identity.⁹⁵

The description of such a synthetic givenness, which is presupposed by the abstracting distinction of its parts, together with the idea of the non-independent nature of these parts, calls again into question the univocal understanding of extension as *Ausdehnung*, or as a relationship of *partes extra partes*. This notion of extension is certainly apt to describe the relationship among material things and their respective parts in objective space. Yet, it is not appropriate to qualify the extension of the unity of the phantom as constituted in and through a continuous synthesis. Considered as a unity of non-independent moments, the phantom as appearing thing cannot be properly cut into pieces. Nevertheless, how this unity of pre-reflective synthesis can be accomplished has not emerged yet from the just presented analytic distinction of the layers of the perceptual thing. To this aim, indeed, the isolating, parallel consideration of spatial and temporal constitution shall be overcome in favor of an inquiry into their interrelations.

5.3 Conclusions

We are now in the position to return to the problems formulated in the introduction to this chapter regarding the parallel account of spatial and temporal constitution. This can be done by taking into account the different meanings of extension we have encountered throughout the previous remarks. Throughout this chapter, I have repeatedly argued against the idea that extension of pre-objective time and space shall be understood on the basis of the relationship among independent and juxtaposed parts. Whereas this account of extension as *Ausdehnung* is apt to describe the relationship of reciprocal exteriority and contiguity among material things in objective space and time, it does not seem to properly account for either the distinctive temporal “extension” characterizing our perception and constitution of things, or the spatio-temporal unfolding of sensations and sensible appearances.

In the first part of the chapter, it has been shown that considering spatio-temporal extension only in the just presented terms overlooks the decisive results of the phenomenological analyses on time and the distinctive mode of co-belonging of the three dimensions of present, immediate past, and immediate future (presentation, retention, and protention) in the unitary act. Thus, if we consider perception as the paradigmatic act in the field of the transcendental aesthetic, the description developed in *Thing and Space* regarding the possible fragmentation [*Zerstückbarkeit*] of perception into independent pieces of perceptions needs some emendation. Having shown that the temporal extension of the act shall be considered as *Ausbreitung* rather than *Ausdehnung*, we can now legitimately claim that the fragmentation to which Husserl refers in the mentioned passage results from an analytic approach to

⁹⁵ Hua XVI, p. 90/(Husserl 1997, p. 77).

perception. This nonetheless presupposes the most fundamental unity of continuous synthesis, which cannot be reduced to a sum of independent parts but rather makes up an interwoven unity. And indeed, in the very same paragraph of *Thing and Space* Husserl himself arrives at such emendation, suggesting that fragmentation and abstraction are grounded on a more original continuous and unbroken unity:

The temporal form of perception gives unity, and in particular the unity of a continuous series, to the content of sensation of all the phases and likewise to the phases of the apprehension. This unity is, I repeat, continuous and thus unbroken unity. Pieces and abstract phases are distinguishable in it, but the phases and pieces do not exist for themselves, nor are they bound together through subsequent syntheses. On the contrary, the unity is primary. Perception is at any time, and necessarily, continuous unity. In its essence is grounded the possibility of differentiation as fragmentation and as abstraction into phases, but this is precisely a mere possibility.⁹⁶

The reason why Husserl still argues for at least the possibility of fragmentation seems to be the wish to recognize a perceptual nature to each phase of perception. Still, I would consider it more consistent to talk about an abstracting distinction of the phases, which, however, cannot be considered as independent from one another and from the whole. Nevertheless, it remains clear that, if by pieces we intend the dimensions of present, past, and future, then the unity of a perceptual act cannot in principle be cut into pieces. These temporal dimensions can be certainly distinguished through abstraction and described as to their specificity. Nevertheless, they cannot be separated from the concretum of the unitary act, in which they are always already given as interwoven. This interweaving, I submit, is distinctive of extension as spreading-out [*Ausbreitung*]. Yet, since temporality is considered to be the most basic layer of constitutive consciousness, this distinctive mode of temporal extension must also impinge on the whole of spatio-temporal perception.

Indeed, considering spatiality, in the second part, I have argued for the necessary co-belonging of form and content, which makes the intuitiveness of the spatial form possible. Moreover, I have also shown that the unity of the thing in and through its different layers is the result of a continuous synthesis. Yet, the concrete accomplishment of these unitary syntheses cannot be accounted for by exclusively referring to the analytic distinction of the layers of the perceptual thing. Its possibility would also be questionable if these layers were understood as independent pieces. Such a distinction, I suggest, is based on an abstracting method, which leaves aside the analyses regarding the temporal unfolding of experience, and notably regarding the synthetic constitution of the spatial thing.

Thus, having shown the potential of such an abstracting or parallel account of spatiality and temporality in making analytical distinctions within the two domains possible, we can now also clearly recognize its limits. Concerning the experience of the sensible thing, these limits eventually consist in the impossibility, on the basis of this abstracting procedure, to properly account for its primal givenness as a unitary whole, and for the operative synthesis that makes such a unitary givenness possible. As I will argue more extensively in the next part, such an account

⁹⁶ Hua XVI, p. 64/(Husserl 1997, pp. 53–54).

can only be grounded on the spatio-temporal intertwining in perception. Yet, not only the abstraction from the temporal unfolding makes it impossible to properly account for the synthesis that constitutes the unitary thing as a correlate of perception, it also prevents us from further inquiring into the constitution of space as the form of sensible appearance. For the intuition of form and extension in and through the pre-given unity of extension and content does certainly not exhaust our experience of space. A more encompassing account of the constitution of bi-dimensional and tridimensional space can only be provided by taking kinesthesia and the connected syntheses into account. Yet, kinesthesia and movement cannot be considered apart from their temporal unfolding. Thus, also in this case, we will be confronted with an irreducible spatio-temporal intertwining as the ground of the transcendental aesthetic.

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Part IV

Spatio-temporal Intertwining: The

Dynamics of Experience

Chapter 6

Individuation, Irreversibility, and the Spatio-temporal Intertwining

Toward the end of the previous part, while discussing the multilayered structure of the sensible thing and its synthetic constitution, I have suggested that, in order to properly account for the possibility of such a synthetic constitution, we have to go beyond the mere parallelism of the spatial and the temporal dimensions of experience and rather focus on their interconnection. This, apparently, does not sound as a revolutionary claim, although it contrasts certain assumptions regarding the parallelism between spatiality and temporality, which have been previously discussed. Thus, we cannot be satisfied with the claim that spatial constitution and temporal constitution are somehow connected. We shall rather ask ourselves how this interconnection is structured and how it manifests itself in lived experience. And, most importantly, we shall ask what implications this has for the transcendental aesthetic. The three chapters in this final part will focus on what I consider to be the *loci* that best exemplify the meaning of the spatio-temporal intertwining and its relevance for a phenomenological theory of sensible experience: the phenomenology of individuation, of perspectival givenness, and of the lived-body.

The present chapter focuses on the phenomenology of individuation. In a certain sense, part of the argument I make here is a further development of what has been discussed in the previous chapter with respect to the constitution of the thing of the transcendental aesthetic. For, as I shall argue, the experience of things is, primarily, the experience of individual things, here and now. Yet, how can we understand such an experience within the Husserlian framework? And in what sense does the phenomenology of individuation contribute to our inquiry regarding the relationship between spatiality and temporality? The analyses in this chapter are aimed to answer these questions. Particularly, regarding the second one, it will be shown that a parallel assessment of spatiality and temporality is insufficient to account for the constitution of the individuals.

The analyses regarding the ontological and epistemological status of the individual and the phenomenology of individuation pervade Husserl's entire philosophical project, from formal ontology to the theory of meaning, and from the phenomenology of time and space to the self-constitution of subjectivity. Yet, the phenomenology

of individuation primarily fits into the project of Husserl's transcendental logic, which, in the conclusion of *Formal and Transcendental Logic* is considered to be coincident with the logic of the experienced world [*Welt-Logik*]. The transcendental aesthetic, concerned with the eidetic inquiry into the modes of givenness of the world in and through sensibility, lies at the basis of such a transcendental logic.¹ In what follows, I wish to show that the phenomenology of individuation plays a crucial role within the project of a phenomenological critique of reason that begins from the most basic layers of sensible experience. The first section of this chapter concerns the position of the individual in Husserl's theory of knowledge. The second section focuses on the formal ontological definition of the individual. Choosing to approach the phenomenology of individuation *von oben*, that is, starting with the discussion of its epistemological and ontological relevance, I wish to show that these epistemological and ontological remarks need to be grounded *von unten*, namely within the transcendental aesthetic. This will be done in the third section of this chapter, where I try to complement the previous account of the individual with the constitutive analyses of the processes of individuation in sensible experience. Following Husserl's analyses, we will eventually see that subjectivity, and notably the temporal stream of consciousness, is the ultimate ground of individuation. Yet, a further question will be then to determine how subjectivity individuates itself. In the fourth section, I shall answer this question by discussing the difference and the relationship between the individuation of experiences with their noematic correlates and the individuation of subjectivity. Throughout these analyses, I shall argue that what keeps together the different aspects of Husserl's phenomenology of individuation can be understood by referring to the concept of irreversibility and to the interweaving of the spatial and the temporal dimensions of lived experience. Thus, even if some of the remarks proposed in this chapter might appear to go beyond the sphere of sensible experience, the aim will be to show that all of them are grounded upon such a basic sphere understood as spatio-temporal intertwining.

6.1 Individual and Meaning in the Phenomenological Theory of Knowledge

Husserl's phenomenology is an eidetic science of the structures of experience. If we assume this definition, then the question concerning the epistemological function of the individual in such a philosophical project at first appears to be quite puzzling. Do individuals play a role in such an eidetic science? And is the knowledge of individuals possible within this framework? These problems are somewhat latent in the *Logical Investigations*, yet they remain mostly unsolved in this work. Here, the concepts belonging to the semantic area of individuality (e.g., individual being, individuum, etc.) occur against the background of quite a stark opposition

¹ Hua XVII, pp. 296–297/(Husserl 1969, pp. 291–292).

between the realm of empirical reality, which is spatio-temporally determined, and the eidetic realm, which is supra-temporal and not spatially localized. If one endorses such an opposition between reality and ideality, the individual, which is precisely determined by its “here and now”, certainly belongs to the domain of empirical reality. As Husserl formulates it, within the conceptual unity of being or objectivity in general, there is a fundamental categorial distinction to be made between real and ideal being. And this distinction is eventually equivalent to the distinction of being as individual and being as species.² Given such a stark opposition, little space seems to be left for recognizing something like the knowledge of individuals. However, in later texts Husserl partially revises the position held in the *Logical Investigations* by loosening such a strict opposition between being as individual and being as species, and by revising the formal ontological relationship between individual and species. This opens up the way to a more refined approach to the individual in both the theory of meaning and formal ontology. Let us consider these developments in more detail.

In the *Logical Investigations* the question concerning the possible knowledge of individuals is particularly related to the theory of meaning developed in this work.³ For the sake of the present argument, I will only focus on the points that allow us to understand how the questions concerning the meaning of individual expressions and the knowledge of individuals are related to the spatio-temporal determination of the individual, and discuss why such a determination needs to be grounded within experience.

From the opposition between the real and the ideal realm, which Husserl advocates in the *Logical Investigations*, it apparently follows that cognition is properly concerned only with general essences and not with individual beings. This emerges, particularly, from the theory of ideation developed in the *Second Investigation*. Here, Husserl endorses a view he will criticize in *Ideas I*, namely that the individual shall be conceived as the instantiation of a species. If two individuals share some identical aspects, this must be traced back to the ideality of the species to which both of them belong. Ideation, thus, is not the result of the inductive generalization of empirical data. Rather, the same experientially given concretum is the presentative basis [*Vorstellungsgrundlage*] for two intentional acts: the act of individual reference directed to the individual [*Akt individuellen Meinens*], and the act of conception and reference directed to the species, [*Akt spezialisierenden Meinens*].⁴ In the former case, we intend the object or one of its particular features as being here and now; in the latter, we intend the ideal “content” of the object.⁵

²Hua XIX/1, p. 130/(Husserl 2001b, p. 249). See also Hua XIX/1, pp. 104–108; 218f./ (Husserl 2001b, pp. 229–233; 308f.).

³See, notably, Benoist (1997, 2002); Rizzoli (2008).

⁴Hua XIX/1, p. 114/(Husserl 2001b, p. 239).

⁵A similar position is still defended at paragraph 2 of *Ideas I*, where Husserl distinguishes the factuality of the individual from its “stock of essential predicables”. Hua III/1, pp. 12–13/ (Husserl 1983, p. 7).

Thus, what Husserl calls ideating abstraction consists in grasping the ideal content in the individual givenness:⁶

[...] while the thing appears, or rather the feature in the thing, it is not this objective feature, this feature here and now, that we mean. We mean its content, its ‘Idea’; we mean, not this aspect of red in the house, but Red as such.⁷

Accordingly, the act directed to the individual seems to be deprived of any epistemological value. If we want to know the object we have in front of us, or to recognize some of its features, the only intention that matters is the one directed to the ideal content. Thus, assuming the epistemological priority of the ideal content, the individual determinations are reduced to mere accidents and do not play any role in cognition.⁸ Moreover, Husserl’s remarks here are not concerned with the precise determination of the intention directed to individuals. To be true, within the framework of the *Logical Investigations*, little space seems to be left for a proper account of the consciousness of the individual. This also reverberates on the theory of meaning proposed in this work, and notably on the understanding of the meaning of proper names and occasional expressions. In both cases, indeed, we have to do with expressions that refer to something individual, i.e., spatio-temporally determined.

In this respect, the developments in Husserl’s account of the meaning of proper names are particularly relevant to our argument. Proper names, indeed, can be considered as the grammatical pendant of the formal-ontological category of the individual: such as the individual is defined as formless substrate, the meaning of proper names is also considered to be formless.⁹ What is characteristic of proper names is that they directly refer to the object without any conceptual mediation. However, since they can assume different grammatical functions within a sentence,¹⁰ proper names are not reducible to mere indications [*Anzeigen*], and shall rather be still considered as expressions [*Ausdrücke*]. If this is the case, we are in need to clarify what their ideal meaning, which is what makes of the sign an expression, consists in, once the reference to a conceptual mediation is excluded.¹¹ The meaning of proper names cannot coincide with the objectual reference either, since this would contrast to Husserl’s theory of meaning as a whole.¹² Thus, to maintain the ideality of meaning, the only solution is to consider the meaning of proper names as independent of the singular intuition (here and now), but rather as related to the infinite possible intuitions of the same object.¹³ Yet, if this is the case,

⁶ As Rizzoli points out, this theory risks being not fully consistent with the claim that ideation does not result from empirical generalization. See Rizzoli (2008, pp. 58f.).

⁷ Hua XIX/1, p. 114/(Husserl 2001b, pp. 239–240).

⁸ Similar difficulties are implied by the notion of the act-matter in the *Fifth Investigation*. Grounding the intention toward something as something, the matter alone cannot explain how it is possible that we experience this individual object in its uniqueness. Cf. Rizzoli (2008, pp. 97f.).

⁹ Hua XIX/2, p. 658/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 271–272); Hua III/1, pp. 31–33/(Husserl 1983, pp. 26–27).

¹⁰ Hua XIX/1, p. 64/(Husserl 2001b, p. 204).

¹¹ Hua XIX/2, p. 659/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 272–273).

¹² Hua XIX/1, p. 52/(Husserl 2001b, p. 197).

¹³ Hua XIX/2, p. 563/(Husserl 2001c, p. 204).

proper names do not seem to express the consciousness of individuals as being here and now. The meaning of proper names, instead, refers to a more fundamental identity that logically precedes the individual determinations and is maintained throughout their changing:

Does an individual proper name also implicitly name individuating determinations, those, e.g., of time and place? Here is my friend Hans and I call him 'Hans'. He is no doubt individually determined, he is always at a particular point in space and time. If these determinations were, however, concurrently meant, the name 'Hans' would change its meaning with every step that my friend takes, on every occasion that I address him by name.¹⁴

This discussion points out an issue that, as I will argue, concerns the entire phenomenology of individuation, namely the problem of reconciling identity (the "what" of the given object) with change and becoming, which are related to the spatio-temporal and sensible determinations of the individual. To properly address such an issue, however, we need a transcendental inquiry into the structural conditions and the constitutive dynamics that make the experience of the individual as such possible.

Before developing such a transcendental inquiry, however, we shall notice that the *Logical Investigations* do not say the last word on the subject of the knowledge of the individual and neither on the subject of the meaning of proper names. Indeed, in the texts written around 1908 – the year of the lecture course on the theory of meaning, published in Hua XXVI – Husserl revises his approach to the meaning of proper names. Against the position held in the *Logical Investigations*, in these texts Husserl suggests that the individuating moments (the spatio-temporal determinations and sensible fullness) are also included in the meaning of proper names. Hence, the meaning of proper names is not purely ideal or conceptual; it also necessarily entails the moment of sensible intuition, which fulfills the meaning (Hua XXVI, pp. 202f.). Accordingly, proper names are semi-conceptual meaningful unities; they are complex or mixed, because the nucleus of the ideal component is constantly enriched by the experiential determinations of this individual.¹⁵ If this is true, then the spatio-temporal determinations cannot be reduced to mere factual and accidental indexes either. On the contrary, they are the conditions for both the consciousness of the individual as it is designated by the proper name and for the constitution of the individual as identical, throughout different times and places. The identity of the individual, indeed, is only constituted as a synthetic unity of different, individual phases. Such a synthesis can be continuous, in a single perception, or discontinuous, when it also involves recollection (Hua XXVI, p. 181). Accordingly, the identity of an individual is constituted in and through the change of fullness and cannot be considered to be exclusively grounded upon the matter of the act.¹⁶ This implies that identification is not a state of complete coincidence based upon an already given ideal unity. It rather designates an essentially open and

¹⁴ Hua XIX/1, p. 162/(Husserl 2001b, p. 271).

¹⁵ On this aspect, see also Rizzoli (2008, pp. 223f.).

¹⁶ This is the position held in the *Logical Investigations*. See Hua XIX/2, p. 679/(Husserl 2001c, p. 285).

dynamic process (Hua XXVI, pp. 179–180). Such openness, as I will argue in the following two paragraphs, also presupposes the spatio-temporal unfolding of experience. The identity of an individual, thus, cannot be considered as already given, rather being itself constituted within an open process of becoming. Reconciling the open dynamics of the process of constitution and the stability of the identity that is constituted is the main challenge for the phenomenology of individuation. Before addressing this challenge in relation to the interweaving of spatiality and temporality, we still need to take a closer look at the formal ontology of the individual.

6.2 *Individuum* in Formal Ontology

The questions concerning the meaning of individual expressions and those concerning the experience of individuals are strictly connected with the formal ontological definition of the individual, and the determination of its *locus* within the formal ontological classification of being in general.¹⁷

The formal ontology of the individual is particularly developed in *Ideas I* and in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. In both texts, Husserl revises some aspects of his account of the individual in the *Logical Investigations*, notably by reconsidering how the category of the individual, as the ultimate substrate of predication, shall be defined within the context of an eidetic science. Particularly, these developments touch on the distinction, formulated in the *Third Logical Investigation*, between *concretum* and *abstractum*. The latter notion refers to a non-independent part (or a moment) of an object considered as a whole; the former, instead, refers to an independent part (or a piece), which can be considered itself to be an object even independently of the whole it is a part of.¹⁸ Besides these two notions, in *Ideas I*, the category of the “*individuum*” is introduced. Discussing the hierarchic distinction between genus and species, Husserl remarks that such a distinction is entirely accomplished within the eidetic domain. Accordingly, such a distinction extends between the superior limit of the highest genus [*oberste Gattung*] and the inferior limit of the eidetic singularity [*eidetische Singularität*]. The relations between the different levels of specification are understood in terms of containedness

¹⁷ In this respect, see Lobo (2008). Focusing on the developments of the formal ontological account of the individual, Lobo considers the theory of spatio-temporal individuation as naïf. In my view, this assessment overlooks the potential of a transcendental inquiry into the phenomenon of individuation, namely an inquiry regarding the conditions for the experiential givenness of individuals as such. Accordingly, Lobo seems to consider spatio-temporality exclusively in objective terms (but then the question as to the phenomenological space and time remains open), and to neglect the transcendental relevance of the aesthetic constitution of the individual, which is based on the phenomenology of spatial and temporal experience.

¹⁸ Hua XIX/1, pp. 272–274/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 28–29). More precisely, Husserl distinguishes the relative concretum (i.e., the object with respect to its abstract moments) from the absolute concretum (an object that is not abstract in any sense). However, since all independent content has some abstract parts, the two concepts eventually have the same extension.

[*Enthaltensein*]: the more general essence is either immediately or mediately (i.e., through other intermediate essences) contained in the more particular essence. Belonging to the lowest level of particularity, eidetic singularities “contain” their respective genera and their specification.¹⁹

The difference between the just described specification of an essence and individuation is based upon the difference between generalization and formalization. Generalization concerns the different levels of specifications: from the generalization of eidetic singularities we obtain essences of a higher order, or having a larger extension. Formalization, instead, is the typically algebraic operation of “emptying” [*Entfüllung*] of what is experientially given, notably as individual. Accordingly, formal ontological essences are not “contained” in the individual in the same way as the higher general species are contained in the lower eidetic singularities. The individual does not result from the specification of a more general essence. Rather, it shall be considered as resulting from the so-called filling-out [*Ausfüllung*] or de-formalization [*Entformalisierung*] of formal ontological categories, namely from the reciprocal of formalization.²⁰ Consistently, Husserl further distinguishes the empty substrates, i.e., the modification of the empty “something”, and materially filled substrates, as the core of all syntactical formations. The latter entail both materially filled ultimate essences [*letzte sachhaltige Wesen*] and the *tode ti*, i.e., the pure and formless [*formlos*] single particular. The *tode ti* is not yet the individual in the strict sense, since it is not indivisible.²¹ Rather, as Husserl will more explicitly declare in one of the later *Bernau Manuscripts*, while addressing the conceptualization developed in *Ideas I*, the *tode ti* is what individuates a concretum or eidetic singularity as its *principium individuationis*:

The *tode ti* is what individually instantiates the specific, i.e., the most inferior species, which cannot be further differentiated specifically, the *principium individuationis*. It has itself its generalities, a general form that particularizes itself. Yet, this particularization is individual instantiation and not specific particularization. (Hua XXXIII, p. 300)

At paragraph 15 of *Ideas I*, the individual in the strict sense is defined in relation to the distinction between concretum and abstractum. Eidetic singularities can be either concrete or abstract, depending on their being, respectively, independent or not-independent essences. Accordingly, we shall distinguish a *tode ti*, the essence of which is an abstractum, and a *tode ti*, the essence of which is a concretum.²² Only in the latter case one can properly talk about individuals as indivisible, singular beings. Thus, strictly speaking, the individual is a *tode ti*, the material essence of which is a concretum.²³ As such, the individual is the primal object required by pure logic and the source for all logical variants.

¹⁹ Hua III/1, pp. 30–31/(Husserl 1983, pp. 24–25).

²⁰ Hua III/1, pp. 31–33/(Husserl 1983, pp. 26–27).

²¹ Hua III/1, p. 33/(Husserl 1983, p. 28).

²² Hua III/1, pp. 34–35/(Husserl 1983, pp. 28–30); see also Hua XXXIII, p. 304.

²³ Hua III/1, p. 35/(Husserl 1983, p. 29).

In the later manuscript D 8 (1918), Husserl further explains the ontological locus of the individual in relation to its own individual essence, or to its concretum as eidetic singularity. In this text, he emphasizes that what makes the individual an individual is its individuating position [*Lage*], which, again, is not an essence.

The individual differentiation of a self-individualizing essence (i.e., its parting in a manifold of individual differences) “co-” differentiates (requires a parting in particularizations) also for the interwoven essences. And if these are already differentiated in the most inferior way, we obtain a multiplicity of individuals, and, specifically: a multiplicity of individuals identical in their qualities (i.e., being qualitatively of one and the same lowest difference), which differentiate themselves only through position. Every individual has its individual essence, which includes the individualizing position. If we understand under “essence” that which is eidetically common, then we can only understand under “essence of an individual” (and in this sense individual essence) precisely that which is “common”, generic and specific, according to exactly all these components. The position (the individual difference of extension) is then not a moment of essence.²⁴

This passage introduces quite an important distinction, namely the distinction between *individuum* in the strict sense and the individual essence [*individuelles Wesen*]. The latter designates what remains identical over different times and places (i.e., the identical “what” or “substance”). Such identical “what” is not determined as here and now, but rather extends over time and space (D 8/61a). However, and here we come to the individual in the strict sense, what we experience is not only specifically determined as to its “what”. It is rather primarily given as individually determined by its position, here and now. Such a position defines the “individual differentiation of extension” [*individuelle Ausdehnungsbesonderung*] (D18/28b).²⁵

Consistently, Husserl further distinguishes two ways through which the concrete essences differentiate themselves: (1) with respect to the “*quale*” (qualitative differentiation) and (2) with respect to the spatio-temporal “extension”, in which

²⁴“Die individuelle Differenzierung eines sich individualisierenden Wesens (also ihr Auseinandergehen in eine Mannigfaltigkeit individueller Differenzen) differenziert “mit” (bedingt ein Auseinandergehen in Besonderungen) auch für die mitverflochtenen Wesen; und sind diese schon in niederster Weise differenziert, so gewinnen wir eine Vielheit von Individuen, und speziell: eine Vielheit von qualitätsidentischen (das ist, qualitativ von einer und derselben niedersten Differenz segenden) Individuen, die sich nur durch Lage unterscheiden. Jedes Individuum hat sein individuelles Wesen, und zu diesem gehört die individualisierende Lage. Verstehen wir unter “Wesen” das eidetisch Gemeinsame, so dürfen wir unter Wesen eines Individuums (und in diesem Sinne individuelles Wesen) nur verstehen eben das “Allgemeine”, Generische und Spezifische, nach allen seinen ebensolchen Komponenten. Dann ist die Lage (die individuelle Differenz der Extension) kein Wesensmoment.” D 8/28b–29a.

²⁵This reading can be again translated in formal ontological terms, yet introducing a genetic consideration of formal ontology. This, I believe, is what Husserl does in a passage from his 1922/23 lecture course, *Introduction to Philosophy* [*Einleitung in die Philosophie*], where he claims that the apprehension of the individual as individual is more original than the apprehension of the concretum. The apprehension of the concretum, of the “what”, is the result of a constitutive synthesis that implies previous experiences, whereas this is not the case for the individual: “We contrast the concretum with the concrete individual, i.e., the individual that can be experienced independently. More precisely: the individual that comes to original experience in such a way that its experiential apprehension does not depend on some other’s preceding apprehension.” Hua XXXV, p. 216.

the quality spreads-out (individual differentiation). The former differentiation is fully accomplished within the eidetic realm and coincides with the specification of qualities, the final level being eidetic singularities. The latter differentiation, instead, is not a specification. It is rather a differentiation of the singular individuals with respect to their position.

Our research has now provided some clarity. It has shown that the individualising is not something that uniformly concerns the concrete essence, but rather that it displays a peculiar structure of individuals, according to which the concrete essence falls into two sides: into a *quale*, which differentiates itself specifically and only specifically, and into an extension over which the quale extends itself and which differentiates itself not only specifically, but rather individually.²⁶

By virtue of its spatio-temporal position, an intentional correlate is not only given “as something”. That is to say, it is not only given according to its qualitative meaning or as representative of a certain ontological region. It rather presents itself as *hic et nunc*. Considering the previous passages, moreover, we can see that distinction between individual and qualitative differentiation is parallel to the distinction between the individual and its individual essence, or to the one between individuality and identity, which we have already found when discussing some issues in the theory of meaning. Yet, once assumed the differentiation between the identity core and the changing individual determinations, the problem as to the relation between the two terms still remains. As I will show in the next two paragraphs, in order to disentangle this problem we need to go beyond the formal-ontological assessment and consider the modes of givenness and the constitution of individuals in lived experience.

The formal ontological account of the individual is further developed in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. Here, the category of the individual is located on the threshold between the logic of consequence and the logic of truth.²⁷ In the purely analytical terms of the logic of consequence, indeed, there is no possibility to say anything concerning the essential structure of the individual, not even that it has a temporal form.²⁸ To this aim, the shift toward the logic of truth, i.e., the logic of the “something in general”, is required.²⁹ Despite abstracting from the material aspects,

²⁶ “Unsere Untersuchung hat nun aber hier Klarheit geschaffen. Sie hat gezeigt, dass das Individuierende nicht etwas ist, das in uniformer Weise das konkrete Wesen angeht, sondern dass es eine eigentümliche Struktur der Individuen anzeigt, wonach das konkrete Wesen zerfällt in zwei Seiten, in ein Quale, das sich spezifisch und nur spezifisch differenziert, und eine Extension, über die sich das Quale ausdehnt und die sich nicht nur spezifisch, sondern individuell differenziert.” D 8/29b.

²⁷ Hua XVII, pp. 209f.; 396; 423/(Husserl 1969, pp. 202f.). As it is well known, in the 1929 Husserl distinguishes three layers of formal logic: (1) the pure theory of forms [*reine Formenlehre*]; (2) the logic of consequence, and (3) the logic of truth. Only the last one can be considered as formal ontology, since it establishes a reference to the object as something in general [*etwas überhaupt*].

²⁸ Hua XVII, pp. 211, 427/(Husserl 1969, p. 203).

²⁹ In the complementary text number VII (1926), Husserl argues for the modalization of the category of the individual as “possible” individual, and accordingly for the modalization of the logic of truth. The latter, thus, is no more presented as the science of the something in general but rather as the

the formal ontological laws structure the concrete material ontology of nature, whereby the spatio-temporal form of the *tode ti* is individuation through the “here and now” (Hua XXXIII, pp. 300f.). In other words, every account of the individual within the formal ontology of nature must be consistent with the laws of formal logic and with the formal-ontological determination of the category of the individual. Considering the world as the universal field of possible application of formal logic, the assessment of the modal character of the individual, thus, allows us to underscore the nexus between formal and material ontology. The individual, as I mentioned, is on the threshold: despite being defined in purely formal ontological terms, it designates a full and concrete entity. Accordingly, the claim that eidetic formal laws precede and univocally found spatio-temporal individuation needs some further qualification. Those laws are certainly not reducible to factual relations. Nor do they belong, however, to a totally detached realm of ideas. Rather, they make up the intrinsic structure of the world of experience. And since they can be obtained only by means of formalization or emptying, their own givenness presupposes the full concreteness of experience in its spatio-temporal unfolding.

Assuming that the uniqueness the spatio-temporal position is the basis to understand the process of individuation, we can argue that the formal ontological account of the individual needs to be complemented with the analysis of the process of individuation in relation to the spatio-temporality of lived experience. Husserl refers to these spatio-temporal structures, to their peculiar ideality intertwined with experience, when commenting upon the nexus between individual and essential relations:

Individual relations stand under eidetic laws. We must say: essentially, all *tode-ti-determinations* build a unitary form, a totality determined and closed in itself, which has its relational eidetic laws by which it is determined as such a totality. The axioms of space and time are these eidetic laws, and according to them, space and time are totalities. (Hua XXXIII, p. 301)³⁰

6.3 The Transcendental Aesthetic and Spatio-temporal Individuation

Despite showing that individuals are differentiated through their unique position, and that such a differentiation is something completely different from the specification of essences, formal ontology cannot tell us how individuality is constituted for consciousness. How is it possible to experience something as a unique individual?

science of the possible something. Cf. Hua XVII, pp. 427–428. This, according to Lobo (2008), implies the modalization of the very notion of “form”.

³⁰ As it clearly emerges from the following quote, here Husserl does not have geometric space in his mind: “[...] geometry does not talk about any individually determined spatial and temporal points, but only, in general discourses, of possible and “certain” determined spatial and temporal points in general.” Hua XXXIII, p. 300.

Is the experience of individuals more original than the apprehension of “something as something”, of an object as “object of a certain type”? Imagine to be surprised by the appearance of something you have never experienced. Certainly, you will try to categorize that something as belonging to a certain familiar type of object. Yet, such a categorization comes after the surprising encounter with this unique individual. Moreover, apprehending an object as an exemplar of this or that type, we bracket precisely those aspects that make the uniqueness of the object we have in front of us. Accordingly, to adopt the terminology of the *Logical Investigations*, the act of individual reference seems indeed to be presupposed by the act of specific reference. Yet, how is such an individual reference established? In other words, what is the structure of our consciousness of individuals? And what are the processes that ground individuation?

Let us begin by considering some early texts of Husserl’s, and notably the 1904/05 lecture course on inner time consciousness and the 1905 *Seefeld Manuscripts* on individuation. In these texts, Husserl somewhat oscillates between the analysis of the constitution of the identity of individuals over time and space, and the remarks concerning their uniqueness, due to their appearing here and now. Indeed, in some passages, he understands the individual as what persists, das *Beharrliche*, namely as individual substance or individual essence. Take, for instance, the following passage from the *Seefeld Manuscripts*:

The individual is indeed that which is identical in time and is therefore the unity that the temporal filling grounds independently of temporal extension. What is constitutive of the individual is therefore inherent in what is identical in the temporal filling, and consequently there emerges the concept of the species belonging to the constitutive determinations that different individuals can have in common in the same or in different extents of time.³¹

Nevertheless, in other passages written in the same years, the uniqueness [*Einmaligkeit*] of the individual, which is basically grounded upon the singularity and the uniqueness of the moment of the individual presentation, is emphasized. This implies that the temporal form of the original presentation should be first considered as “individual”: it is the temporal form of the sensation belonging to the current now-point, and only to it.³² Accordingly, a distinction shall be made between the individual substance, i.e., the individual considered as identical at different moments in time, and the individuating moment that first constitutes such an individual object as unique. Such a distinction is related to the two moments in the apprehension of temporal objects, which, consistently with the argument made in the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl distinguishes in the 1904/05 lecture course on the phenomenology of inner time consciousness. The first moment of apprehension constitutes the object in its temporal determination, namely as given here and now; the second moment constitutes the extra-temporal determinations, the temporal material [*Zeitmaterie*]³³ or more clearly extra-temporal material [*außerzeitliche*

³¹ Hua X, p. 250/(Husserl 1991, p. 258).

³² Hua X, p. 67/(Husserl 1991, p. 69).

³³ Hua X, pp. 63f./ (Husserl 1991, p. 65f.).

Materie.³⁴ When describing the givenness of individuals, thus, we cannot abstract from the temporal determinations in our apprehension of the object. This means that the singularity of each moment of presentation within the temporal stream is a necessary condition for the constitution of individuals. This is true not only for temporal contents that change throughout time, but also for the unchanging contents, such as a single note, with no qualitative or intensity alterations. In this case too, there is a constant process of differentiation of the singular “now-points”:

The objectivation of the temporal object therefore rests on the following moments: the content of sensation that belongs to the different actually present now-points of the object can remain absolutely unchanged in quality, yet still not possess true identity in this identity of content, however far it may extend. The same sensation now and in a different now possesses a difference – specifically, a phenomenological difference – that corresponds to the absolute temporal position; this difference is the primal source of the individuality of the “this”, and thereby of the absolute temporal position.³⁵

The original impression of temporal position [*ursprüngliche Zeitstellenimpression*] is the individuating moment within the temporal stream:

What distinguishes primal impression from primal impression is the individualizing moment of the impression of the original temporal position, which is something fundamentally different from the quality and other material moments of the content of sensation.³⁶

In the *Bernau Manuscripts* (1917/18), Husserl further pursues this line of thought by developing an inquiry into the individuation of the singular temporal position in more dynamic terms, namely by understanding individuation within the primal temporal process. The dynamic account of temporal constitution, included individuation, is mirrored by some terminological changes with respect to the previous texts on inner time consciousness. Besides definitely substituting the previous notions of fresh or primary memory [*primäre/frische Erinnerung*] and intuitive expectation [*anschauliche Erwartung*] with, respectively, retention and protention, in these texts Husserl also introduces a completely new terminology. Four of these terminological variations are particularly worth mentioning for the sake of the present argument: (1) the adoption of the notions of primal stream [*Urstrom*] and primal process [*Urprozess*] to indicate the most fundamental layer of temporal constitution, which was previously addressed as absolute consciousness; (2) the substitution of the terms primal impression [*Urimpression*]³⁷ and primal sensation [*Urempfindung*]³⁸ with primal presentation [*Urpräsentation*], in order to indicate the now-consciousness or the moment of the primal presentation of a temporal object; (3) the adoption of the concept of event [*Ereignis*] to indicate what happens in such a primal presentation, namely the constitution of an immanent sensation-content as a temporal object in

³⁴Hua X, p. 65/(Husserl 1991, p. 67).

³⁵Hua X, p. 66/(Husserl 1991, p. 68).

³⁶Hua X, pp. 67–68/(Husserl 1991, p. 70).

³⁷E.g., Hua XXIV, p. 268/(Husserl 2008, p. 265). The translator chooses “primitive impression” to translate *Urimpression*. In this text I adopt Brough’s translation of *Urimpression* as “primal impression”.

³⁸E.g., Hua X, pp. 368f./ (Husserl 1991, pp. 379f.).

the primal stream; and (4) the assumption of the notion of fading-away [*Abklang*] to designate the constant sinking of temporal events. Given their shared reference to a dynamic description of temporal consciousness, these lexical changes cannot be considered as arbitrary. Understanding processuality as the most original mode of being of consciousness (as primal process), in which primal presentation [*Urpräsentation*] is the experience of the now, already hints at the dynamics of temporal consciousness. Moreover, such a dynamics is implied when we conceive of temporal objects constituted in original time as events happening within the temporal process and when we address the process of fading-away [*Abklang*] of temporal objects and events.

Considering the phenomenology of individuation against the background of such a dynamic account of temporal constitution, in what follows, I will particularly focus on one essential feature of the temporal process, namely its irreversibility. More precisely, I wish to argue that irreversibility makes the experience of individuals possible and that such an experience implies the interweaving of spatiality and temporality. These suggestions might seem to be at variance with one of Husserl's major claims, clearly defended in the *Bernau Manuscripts*, namely the claim that temporality, and not spatiality, is the ultimate ground of individuation.³⁹ Yet, as I will argue, there are reasons to be drawn from Husserl's own phenomenological inquiries that allow us to further qualify the phenomenon of individuation in light of the spatio-temporal intertwining. Let us focus on the point Husserl makes in the *Bernau Manuscripts*.

In these texts, Husserl maintains that the constitution of the individual object with its unique temporal position is grounded on its primal presentation, or the now-moment of its original appearance in the temporal stream (Hua XXXIII, p. 292). The individual temporal moment of primal presentation defines a primal establishment [*Urstiftung*] that makes the constitution of the individual object possible. Such an individual primal establishment, then, is presupposed for the synthetic constitution of the object as identical in and through the temporal modifications:

[...] every new positing (now-positing) posits its content in form of a new temporal point. This means that the individual difference of the temporal point is correlated to a certain primal establishment through a mode of givenness, which, in the continuous mutation of the retentions belonging to the new now, through all change, obtains an identical correlate. A continuous alteration of the orientation corresponds to the change itself, as change of the mode of givenness of the identical. (Hua XXXIII, p. 291)

Accordingly, the noematic individuation of the temporal object is correlative to the uniqueness of the present experience or to the event of its manifestation. Yet, emphasizing the now-position, Husserl does not question his own understanding of the temporal stream as constant retentional-protentional modification. Quite to the contrary: the now as source-point [*Quellpunkt*] of individual emergence is itself a moment of the “infinite continuum” of the primal stream (Hua XXXIII, p. 293).

³⁹In this respect, see Bernet (2004, 2010). Regarding Husserl's earlier theory of individuation see also Iocco (2013, pp. 181f.).

Throughout such a continuum, the synthesis of identification that constitutes the identity of the individual is further accomplished.

As the word primal establishment [*Urstiftung*] suggests, the consciousness of the primal presentation of the object has some grounding or instituting power. It initiates the process of constitution of something unique. This, however, shall not be misunderstood as to imply that individuation results from an active positing. It is rather a passive intentional accomplishment of the temporal stream of consciousness, as it becomes clear, for instance, in the phenomenon of being surprised by something new (Bernet 2004). If this is true, then the individuating temporal position cannot be neutrally defined. Rather, it shall be properly considered as the original source that initiates the process of individuation or the constitution of the individual in its *haecceitas*. The temporal event of the primal presentation produces a change in the concrete dynamics of the stream. Such an emergence may become the reference point for the temporal localization of events in the stream. In other words, such primal establishment of the original temporal position has an individuating power also because it marks the difference between what was before and what will come after in the stream of consciousness. This, however, may still appear quite a formal description, according to which all temporal positions in the stream are ultimately considered as equivalent, since all of them can in principle have an individuating power. Yet, this formal reading can only be an abstract one. Concretely speaking, the different temporal positions in the stream are always filled with a “primary objective content” (Hua XXXIII, p. 282), which means that the primal impressions are not interchangeable in any exclusively formal sense. The different nows, concretely considered as hyletic primal impressions, are not reciprocally equivalent, even if each now is formally unique in the temporal stream. The now that marks the beginning of an individuation process rather has some differentiating power that others lack (or that others only potentially have). As primal establishment, we can also say, it must have more affective force, as it attracts the Ego to the new individual emergence and thus generates an irreversible change in the dynamics of the stream. Precisely the uniqueness of the now as origin or as primal establishment of something new within the irreversible stream of consciousness is the source of the individuation of experiences and their intentional correlates. The uniqueness of the primal presence-point [*Urgegenwartspunkt*], thus, is marked by the unrepeatability of the singular experiences and of temporal events. This, of course, does not exclude but rather implies the possibility to retrospectively turn to the moment of primal establishment through an act of recollection and, for instance, re-identify a given temporal correlate that endures beyond its primal presentation or presentifies a past temporal event. Besides, as Lohmar has shown, the possibility of re-identification and presentification through recollection is the basis for the constitution of temporal succession and therefore of objective time.⁴⁰ Identification, thus,

⁴⁰ As Lohmar (2010) argues, the basis of the understanding of the constitution of objective time is the co-operation of individuation and recollection. Partially formulated already in the 1904/05 lecture course, this idea is further developed in the *Bernau Manuscripts*. However, to attain a proper understanding of the constitution of objective time, an account of intersubjective constitution

can be accomplished through the continuous temporal process, when one and the same object is constituted as identical throughout the different phases of an act (e.g., perception), or rather it can be accomplished discontinuously, when the object we previously perceived is re-identified through recollection. Yet, the constitution of the individual as identical substratum, which, in both cases, is based on the synthesis of identification through time, presupposes its original givenness as a self-differentiating event in its unique temporal position.

As I have argued, individuation is fundamentally grounded upon the structure and the dynamics of inner time consciousness. Accordingly, the privileged (because most fundamental) kind of individuation concerns the immanent temporal object, namely sensations in their original temporal position. Such a privilege is fundamentally due to the immediateness of the givenness of immanent objects and therefore to the coincidence between the time of the object and the time of its experiential givenness (Bernet 2004). Such a coincidence, instead, is missing in the case of the individuation of transcendent objects, which are “mediately” constituted through the apprehension of sensible contents. In the *Bernau Manuscripts*, Husserl conceives of the individuation of transcendent objects mostly by referring to the unity of the time of the world, which is itself constituted on the basis of the unity of the subjective stream of temporal consciousness. Transcendent objects are individuated by their unique position in the constituted objective time. Within this framework, thus, spatiality seems to play no particular role in the phenomenology of individuation. Yet, is this really the case? I believe the answer to this question should be no. And this for two reasons. First, when it comes to considering the individuation of transcendent objects, their spatial determination, i.e., their being “here” and not only “now”, cannot be properly neglected. Secondly, as the notion of temporal position already indicates, the phenomenon of individuation seems to imply a peculiar “spatialization” of temporality, or, as I prefer to say, an interconnection of spatiality and temporality, which shall be considered more closely. Let us discuss both points more closely.

(1) In the previous chapter, we have seen that the *res extensa* shall be considered as a unitary whole made up of the two moments of spatial extension or figure [*Gestalt*] and the filling qualities of the so-called *materia prima*. Nevertheless, there is yet another moment that determines the *res extensa*, namely its position. Abstracting from the fullness of *materia prima*, the unity of form and position designates the spatial “schema”.⁴¹ Thus, the concrete unity of the *res extensa* contemplates the three following moments: figure, fullness, and position. The latter moment, namely the position in the spatial field, is what properly makes the individuality of this *res extensa*. Indeed, the individuality of the thing cannot be related to either its figure or its material qualities alone. Two identical qualities (but also two identical figures) can only exist as such in different places or positions. What differentiates them individually, thus, is their location. For locations or spatial

is also required. In his later *C-Manuscripts*, Husserl will provide such an intersubjective account of the constitution of the time of the world. In this respect, see also Rodemeyer (2006).

⁴¹ Hua XVI, p. 342/(Husserl 1997, p. 298); D 8/41a.

positions are constitutively different, whereas identical qualities and forms are only mediately differentiated on the basis of their position.⁴² Quite a similar position is already defended in the *Seefeld Manuscripts*. With respect to spatial individuation, Husserl argues here that the place [*Ort*] is what makes the infima species into an individual quality, and that, accordingly, place is the “determination that determines individually”.⁴³ However, analogously to what we have seen with regard to temporal individuation, besides being individualized by its position here and now, the spatial individuum also maintains its identity in different places:

The spatial individual is that which remains identical while the place varies, that which is identical in the change of place [...]. The individual is that which is always determined as specifically the same and that which changes its absolute location. There is, of course, no qualitative individual; the possibility of the spatial individual depends on the peculiarities of space and time.⁴⁴

Again, we are faced with the distinction between the source of individuation in the experience of the object as here and now, and the identity of the object throughout different times and places. As we have seen, one way to understand this distinction is to differentiate an identity core, the individual essence, which is preserved in and through different times and places, and its individualizing spatio-temporal determinations in concrete lived experience. With regard to the spatial thing, this view is defended more than 10 years after the *Seefeld Manuscripts*, in manuscript D 8. Here, the claim is precisely that the identity of one individual in different times and places refers to the *Wesen* of that individual, namely to its individual essence, which corresponds to the Husserlian reformulation of Kant’s category of substance as das *Beharrliche*.⁴⁵ As we can read in manuscript D 8:

Every thing has its individual essence. Each is, as something spatial, in every temporal point “qualitatively” filled materiality. As something temporal, each is a poising substrate for duration, to each belongs filled duration as process. It seems that the concrete fullness (spatial fullness), namely of each moment of duration, could be in every spatial position, and that in the same way, the temporal fullness could be “the process” in every temporal position.⁴⁶

Toward the end of the same manuscript, we can find the claim that specific qualitative identity of the individual is not spatio-temporally determined, for spatio-temporal change or *kinesis* does not imply qualitative modification, or *alloiosis*:

With the “where” and “when”, the individual does not obtain any determination of what it is in a “specific” “essential” sense. The spatial thing is the same in its movements and

⁴² Hua XVI, p. 185/(Husserl 1997, pp. 155–156).

⁴³ Hua X, p. 251/(Husserl 1991, p. 259).

⁴⁴ Hua X, p. 252/(Husserl 1991, p. 260).

⁴⁵ KrV, B 224/A182f./Kant 1998, p. 299.

⁴⁶ “Jedes Ding hat sein individuelles Wesen. Jedes ist als Räumliches in jedem Zeitpunkt “qualitativ” erfüllte Körperlichkeit. Jedes ist als Zeitliches verharrendes Substrat für eine Dauer, zu jedem gehört als Vorgang erfüllte Dauer. Es scheint, dass die konkrete Fülle (Raumfülle), und zwar eines jeden Moments der Dauer, in jeder Raumlage sein könnte, und dass ebenso die Zeitfülle “der Vorgang” in jeder Zeitlege sein könnte.” D 8/12a–b. See also D 8/28b–29a; 60b and Hua XXXIII, pp. 290, 304, 314, 296, 312.

unaltered the same, as long as it merely moves. This way, it maintains its essence and only changes the position: mere *kinesis* is not *alloiosis*.⁴⁷

The source of the individuation of the thing is its original givenness *hic et nunc*. Thus, in order to give an account of the individuation of the thing of the transcendental aesthetic, both space and time as individualizing forms are required. Regarding time, indeed, individuation is related to the specific temporal position, which defines the immanent “proto-localization” of temporal events or the primal presentation of temporal objects in the stream of consciousness. Regarding space, on the other hand, the “absolute place” has an individualizing function only in temporal co-existence (as a matter of fact, two individuals could be in the same absolute place at different times). Moreover, the very possibility of identifying one spatial thing as the same according to its individual essence, namely as being identical also beyond the *hic et nunc*, presupposes both spatial and temporal constitution. In manuscript D 8, Husserl refers to the complementarity of space, as the form of individuation in simultaneousness, and time, as the form of individuation in becoming, for the individuation of the sensible thing as spatio-temporal concretum within the complex unity of a spatio-temporal world:

Tode ti of succession, *tode ti* of in coexistence. 1) Necessary condition of the possibility of a *tode ti* for a concretum (the possibility of its individuation): temporal position. In coexistence, the temporal position does not reproduce itself, each exists only once in coexistence. No essence. 2) Necessary condition of the possibility for individuation of coexistence: spatial position. Every position, every figure absolutely determined by its position exists only once. It does not reproduce itself in succession and, thus, does not yield a positional essence, which would endure in succession. It is individually enduring. The condition of the possibility of the individuation of a concretum becomes the condition of the possibility of individual temporal fulfillment = 1) + 2).⁴⁸

The emphasis on the complementarity of time, as the form of individuation in becoming, and space, as the form of individuation in simultaneity, already hints at the understanding of individuation in light of the intertwining of the spatial and temporal dimensions of experience. However, such an understanding still needs some closer qualification.

⁴⁷ “Mit dem Wo und Wann erhält das Individuum keine Bestimmung dessen, was es im ‘spezifischen’ ‘wesentlichen’ Sinne ist. Das Raumding ist dasselbe in seinen Bewegungen und unverändert dasselbe, wenn es sich bloß bewegt. Es behält dann sein Wesen und ändert bloß die Lage: bloße *kinesis* ist keine *alloiosis*.” D 8/61a.

⁴⁸ “*Tode ti* der Sukzession, *tode ti* der Koexistenz. (1) notwendige Bedingung der Möglichkeit eines *tode ti* für ein Konkretum (die Möglichkeit seiner Individuation): Zeitlage. In der Koexistenz vervielfältigt sich die Zeitlage nicht; jede ist in der Koexistenz nur einmal da. Kein Wesen. (2) Notwendige Bedingung der Möglichkeit für die Individuation der Koexistenz: Raumlage. Jede Lage, jede absolut lagenmäßig bestimmte Figur ist nur einmal da; sie vervielfältigt sich nicht in der Sukzession, sie ergibt also kein Lagenwesen, das in der Sukzession das Bleibende wäre. Sie ist individuell bleibend. Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Individuation eines Konkretum wird zur Bedingung der Möglichkeit individueller Zeiterfüllung = 1) + 2).” (D 8/50a). Although less explicitly, Husserl makes a similar claim concerning the complementarity of space and time for individuation in simultaneousness and succession in manuscript D 18. See Husserl (1940, p. 28).

(2) Against this emphasis on the interweaving of time and space in the phenomenology of individuation, one could object by appealing to the originality of temporal individuation. Pursuing an inquiry into the processes of individuation *von unten*, the temporal structure of consciousness, independently of spatiality, grounds all processes of individuation. The individuation of transcendent objects, and notably of spatial things, is necessarily mediated by this most original source of individuation. Yet, besides considering that the restriction to temporality only provides an abstract account of individuation that does not comprehend for instance the full individuation of a concrete perceptual thing, there are further reasons to consider individuation as based upon the interweaving of lived space and time. Indeed, individuation is made possible by the peculiar spatialization of temporality and temporalization of spatiality, which I shall now make more explicit by resorting to the concept of irreversibility. I borrow the concept of irreversibility from Paci,⁴⁹ whose “relationist phenomenology” is particularly focused on the processual and temporal dynamics of consciousness. In this framework, temporality is not only considered in connection with the genesis of subjectivity, but also as essentially interwoven with the experience of the life-world, included its spatial unfolding. The category of relation, in this sense, is not something superimposed to two or more already given (individual) entities. It is rather what makes their very emergence and constitution possible, for such entities would not exist as such apart from their relationship.

The concept of irreversibility can be considered as the bridge between relationism and phenomenology, notably the phenomenology of space, time, and the life-world. Inspired by thermodynamics,⁵⁰ Paci’s concept of irreversibility refers to the oriented or directional character of each and every process and to the a priori impossibility of its reversal, which prevents us from establishing a full identity between spatio-temporal events.⁵¹ The principle of irreversibility is the “logical consequence” of the spatio-temporally oriented or directional character of each relation (Paci 1954, p. 234). Nothing that has already happened can happen anew, nothing can be repeated in a spatio-temporal situation that is fully identical with

⁴⁹In his 1950s and 1960s writings, Paci develops an original reading of Husserl’s thought, conjugating phenomenology and relationism, the latter being the philosophical approach he was developing in those years, notably in dialogue with Whitehead’s process philosophy. Concerning Whitehead’s legacy in Paci’s philosophy, see Vanzago (2006).

⁵⁰For Paci (1951, p. 11, 1954, pp. 3f.), irreversibility is not assumed to explain physical phenomena, as it is the case for physics. It is rather an ontological category that applies to reality as such and derives from a critique (understood in the Kantian sense) of the category of relation.

⁵¹One might be tempted here to oppose Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of “reversibility”, notably in *The Visible and the Invisible* (Merleau-Ponty 1964) to Paci’s principle of irreversibility. This opposition, however, is unfruitful as it risks neglecting, on a pure terminological basis, what is ultimately at stake for both philosophers, namely the relational dynamics of the world and of experience in their becoming. In this sense, Merleau-Ponty’s reversibility might be well read following Paci’s relational terms. And such a reading, which of course entails the irreversibility principle, is not inconsistent with Merleau-Ponty’s own position as testified, for instance, by the claim that reversibility, in principle, can never be complete, i.e., that there is no full coincidence between two phenomena or processes. An interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s account of temporality inspired by Paci’s relationism has been proposed by Vanzago (2001).

a preceding one. These are logical laws to be understood dynamically, namely as the logical structure of temporality and of the life-world in its spatio-temporal display (Paci 1954, p. 7).

Nothing can happen twice in the very same spatio-temporal situation. This apparently trivial formulation of the principle of irreversibility is, however, dense of phenomenological and ontological implications, including the critique of pure simultaneity and coexistence, in favor of what I call the dynamics of the spatio-temporal intertwining. Space is not to be considered as the static form of coexistence. Spatiality, instead, is in itself taken into the process of becoming and thus it is temporally determined. Such a temporal becoming grounds the uniqueness of each spatial situation and its unrepeatability. Conversely, the possibility of simultaneous events in time and the very introduction of the notion of temporal position, which Husserl adopts to describe temporal individuation, indicate a peculiar “spatialization” of temporality. The temporal positions, however, are not simply following one another as independent parts. They rather overlap and are reciprocally intertwined as moments of a whole (Paci 1951, pp. 11–17). Such spatialization, thus, shall not be conceived in light of mere extension, *partes extra partes*, because this would be subjected to the critiques we have raised in the previous chapter against such a restricted understanding of spatio-temporal extension. Yet, the overlapping of temporal phases and the order of succession of temporal phases and events, which can be phenomenologically described, indicate that there are other ways of considering the spatialization of temporality. The spatialization of temporality and the temporalization of spatiality are complementary:

Non-simultaneity and irreversibility make a rhythm possible, following which everything that happens always has the same form. An event happens here-now when the other, in the here-now, comes to an end. The form of irreversibility requires the spatialization of times and the temporalization of places. (Paci 1951, p. 17)

The irreversible dynamics of non-coincidence resulting from this spatio-temporal interweaving, thus, defines the relational field that makes the emergence and the experiential givenness of new individuals possible (Paci 1954, 1961).

Thus understood, irreversibility can shed new light on Husserl’s account of individuation. What makes the temporal position the ultimate ground of individuation is precisely in its unrepeatability. The position, as Husserl writes, is absolutely unrepeatable [*das absolute Nicht-Wiederholbare*]; and what occupies such a position becomes itself unique and unrepeatable (Hua XXXIII, p. 331). Individuation is precisely grounded upon such unrepeatability, which again presupposes that positions are not interchangeable and that the process within which individuation occurs is irreversible in the previously defined sense.⁵² In such an

⁵² According to Richir (2006, pp. 134f.), Husserl has not been consistent enough in conceiving of the irreversibility of time. To reach such consistency, he would have had to go beyond the assumption of irreversibility as a *Faktum* and more radically think the co-belonging of present and death, or the “cadaverous” moment of the present. One could further pursue this line of thought, and then one shall ask if death and this “cadaverous” moment of the present that is implied by irreversibility are something we can phenomenologically describe. A thorough discussion of this point goes

irreversible stream, each new emerging now is unique [*einmalig*], and as such it is individuated. Such givenness shall also be considered in processual and relational terms. The presentation and the constitution of the individual in the uniqueness of its original temporal position are only possible in relation with other individuals and other here-nows in the complex irreversible dynamics of experience. The individuation of the spatio-temporal position, in other words, is only possible within a relational process of differentiation. Accordingly, considered with respect to the processual and irreversible unfolding of consciousness, the primal establishment [*Urstiftung*] of the individual has an event-like structure, which implies the consciousness of novelty related to the “factual” difference, or to the existence of what is individually given:

Here is the point of origin of individuality, factuality, of difference in existence. The original possessing, or apprehending, of a content as fact and of a differenced content as a differenced fact [...] is accomplished in the actuality of the original presentation and accomplishes <itself> in the consciousness of the originary presence of the content. (Hua XXXIII, p. 292)

6.4 Individuation and Subjectivity

In this paragraph, I wish to discuss the relationship between the individuation of experiences with their noematic correlates and the individuation of the experiencing subject. Such a relationship can again be understood in the light of the irreversibility principle with its processual and relational implications (Paci 1961, pp. 166f.). Having shown how the individuation of experiences and their intentional correlates implies processual and relational dynamics, we shall ask whether this dynamics also characterizes the individuation of subjectivity, and how both processes relate to each other. In a passage from manuscript D 7, we can find some clues to answer these questions:

A sensible, originally present, consciousness of content A can appear in the stream of consciousness only once – in its full individuality – the correlate of which is the individual with the content A. In the stream of consciousness, several sensible, originally present consciousnesses can appear, which, besides being originally present, also have the same content A. However, in every moment of the stream, only one of them is possible. This lawfulness belongs to the essence of the primal stream of consciousness. And the correlate of this lawfulness is the law that, in the constituted, a point of primal present of phenomenological time cannot be occupied twice with completely the same immanent objectuality. We can also say: the Ego has its stream. This stream of the Ego as its stream of life cannot be thought of as doubled, and one can probably say that there cannot be two completely identical streams of life, not two Egos with a fully identical life. They would then be

beyond the scope of the present argument. Yet, the criticism deserved to be mentioned because it also hints at the relationship between irreversibility and the alienness of something that is given through its own withdrawal.

one Ego. [...]. The stream of life of the Ego has its absolute individuality, which is the source of all constituted individualities.⁵³

Without mentioning the concept of irreversibility, this passage nevertheless shows that the principle irreversibility grounds the relationship between the individuation of experiences with their correlates and the individuation of consciousness. Precisely because the primal temporal stream is irreversible in the previously defined sense, each primal presentation is unique and unrepeatable. This also implies that, consistently with Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles, there cannot be two completely identical streams of life, or two Egos with one and the same stream of life. Accordingly, the ultimate source for the individuation of the intentional correlates, due to the uniqueness of their temporal position, or of the moment of their primal presentation, is the uniqueness or the absolute individuality of the irreversible stream of consciousness, with the Ego as its pole. Yet, how shall we conceive, more precisely, of the individuation of the stream of consciousness? And how does subjective individuation relate to the individuation of the intentional correlates?

The first conclusion we can draw from the previous remarks is that the individuation of temporal objects and events presupposes the irreversibility of the stream. Yet, another condition for such individuation is the unity of the temporal stream. This becomes clear, as Bernet (2004, 2010) shows, if we consider the individuation of real objects and events in conjunction with the individuation of fantasy objects. Despite the structural analogy, according to which, in both cases, individuation is related to a given spatio-temporal order (respectively, the real or the possible world with their real or possible temporal narratives), there are obvious differences between real and imaginary individuation. Besides the positing quality of real perception versus the "as if" quality of fantasy, the crucial difference concerns the unitary order presupposed by individuation. The unity of the real world, indeed, is constituted throughout the whole intentional stream of consciousness and it is correlated to the experience of the real Ego. The latter endures throughout the whole temporal stream. The unity of one world of fantasy, instead, is correlated to the experience of what Husserl calls the "fantasy-Ego" [*Phantasie-Ich*] (Hua XXXIII, p. 350). Different from the real Ego, the fantasy-Ego and its fictive world only endure as long as the specific fantasy endures. Each world of fantasy, and

⁵³ "Ein sinnliches urgegenwärtigendes Bewusstsein des Inhalts A kann im Bewusstseinsfluss nur einmal auftreten – in seiner vollen Individualität – deren Korrelat das Individuum des Inhalts A ist. Es können um Bewusstseinsfluss viele sinnliche urgegenwärtigende Bewusstseine auftreten, die, außer dass sie urgegenwärtigend sind, auch den gleichen Inhalt A haben. Aber in jedem Moment des Flusses ist nur eines möglich. Zum Wesen des Urbewusstseinsflusses gehört diese Gesetzmäßigkeit, deren Korrelat das Gesetz ist, dass im Konstituierten ein Urgegenwartspunkt der phänomenologischen Zeit nicht doppelt mit völlig gleichem immanentem Gegenständlichen besetzt sein kann. Wir können auch sagen: Das Ich hat seinen Fluss. Dieser Fluss des Ich als sein Lebensstrom kann nicht verdoppelt gedacht werden, und man kann wohl überhaupt sagen, es kann nicht zwei völlig gleiche Lebensströme geben, nicht zwei Ich mit völlig gleichem Leben. Sie wären beide dann ein Ich. [...] Der Lebensstrom des Ich hat seine absolute Individualität, die die Quelle aller konstituierten Individualitäten ist." D 7/16a–b.

correlatively each fantasy-Ego, thus, is only given for a limited duration. This implies that the real world and the worlds of fantasy are mutually exclusive, and the same is true for two or more different worlds of fantasy (Hua XXXIII, pp. 336, 351). However, both perception and fantasy are acts accomplished within the one and unique stream of consciousness, and the latter is the ultimate ground for individuation in both the real and the fantasized world. Consequently, the unitary stream is also the source for the experiential difference between the real world and the worlds of fantasy, with their respective individuals, and for the experiential difference between the real and the fantasy-Ego.

In what sense can the self-differentiating unity of the temporal stream of consciousness be considered as individual? The previous remarks only offer a partial answer to this question. What we can draw from them is that, since both the fantasy-Ego and the real Ego are moments of the one primal temporal process, the primal process itself is an individual, i.e., an undivided and indivisible, unity. Yet, for Husserl, individuation does not only mean indivisibility, but also uniqueness. Were it not for its uniqueness and unrepeatability, the stream of consciousness might indeed still be considered as a formal unitary structure, which, against the claim made in manuscript D 7, could in principle be replicated. From what we have seen, however, the criteria for such uniqueness have not clearly emerged yet.

The question to be answered, therefore, is how the temporal stream constitutes itself as unique. The uniqueness of the temporal stream, however, cannot be grounded upon the temporal position, as it is the case for temporal objects. Otherwise, indeed, we could not consider subjective individuation as independent in the previously indicated sense. Rather, we should refer to yet another stream of consciousness, for which the unique temporal position constitutes itself, and thus fall into an infinite regress. Accordingly, the individuation of subjectivity must have a different principle, a different primal establishment [*Urstiftung*], than the individuation of experiences and their spatio-temporal correlates, which are individuated for the subject.

Husserl's distinction between independent and non-independent individuation can be reformulated, as Hart (2009, pp. IX; 270f.) does, in terms of the distinction between individuation *per se* and *per accidens*. An object can be said to be individuated *per accidens*, since the principle of its individuation, the unique temporal position of their primal presentation, does not belong to its essential properties and does not depend on the object alone, rather being grounded on the structure of the temporal stream. Subjectivity, instead, is individuated *per se*, since it has an immanent principle of individuation that does not depend upon anything else. The individuation of subjectivity is made possible by the immanent “surplus” of the sense of mineness, which goes beyond all possible set of properties, no matter how rich it is. Basing on this distinction, Hart argues that the experience of “being oneself” is eventually grounded upon the non-sortal and propertyless Ego as the empty pole of all possible experience. Resorting to Husserl's formal-ontological distinctions, Hart further argues that the Ego is, at the same time, an individuum and a concretum or an individual essence. Based on the formal ontology of the thing, indeed, we shall admit the possible existence of two or more individuals

that share exactly the same properties. These individuals would be informed by the same individual essence or concretum, namely by what we may consider the most complete definite description of the object under consideration. These individuals, however, would still be numerically different due to their respectively unique spatio-temporal position. In his 1922/23 lecture course *Introduction to Philosophy*, Husserl explains this as follows:

The concretum is the general, arising through the mere “repetition” of the individual, which can be experienced independently. Every individual object can be thought repetitively; a second, fully identical one, is thinkable. Every individual is individually singular with respect to its concretum, it is a concrete individual. (Hua XXXV, p. 216)

This, however, is not the case for the Ego. As we can read further in the same lecture course:

The Ego cannot be repeated as a chain of purely possible, coexistent, and absolutely identical Egos. And as much as its singular moments are repeatable, but then distributed to individually different Egos, the total complex of corresponding eidetic moments offered by an Ego is not repeatable. This implies that the Ego has the remarkable property that in it, absolute concretum and individuum coincide, that the lowest concrete generality individuates itself. (Hua XXXV, p. 262)⁵⁴

Accordingly, the central difference between the individuation of objects and the individuation of subjectivity concerns the possibility of replication, in different spatio-temporal individuals, of the totality of the same properties that the concretum has as individual essence. Whereas this replication is in principle possible as far as objects are concerned, this is not the case for the subject. The Ego, thus, cannot be simply considered as the analogon to what eidetic singularities are with respect to individual objects, namely as entailing the most complete possible set of properties that can be shared by two or more spatio-temporal individuals. This is why the Ego is rather defined as a propertyless pole, i.e., as the pole that marks the experience of mineness. And for this reason, as Husserl writes in the just quoted passage, in the case of the Ego, the individual and the concretum eventually coincide. As Hart claims, regarding the Ego, the relationship of concretum and individual is of a profoundly different order as with respect to objects, because the Ego as eidetic singularity cannot be separated from the Ego as this unique individual (Hart 2009, p. 283). Because of this coincidence, the concretum Ego cannot be considered as the lowest specification of a more general essence (deriving from qualitative differentiation), nor is it simply indexed by the *tode ti* (deriving from individual differentiation). Rather, the Ego is a “self-contained, non-teleological individual hyper-essence” (Hart 2009, p. 293). It is neither an individual fact nor a species, and this is why Hart eventually talks about the “meontology” of the I. As Hart admits, however, what just said is exclusively true for the Ego as the empty pole of consciousness and certainly not for full-fledged subjectivity, which Husserl calls the monad. In manuscript D 8, Husserl makes a

⁵⁴ See also Hua XIV, pp. 22–23.

similar claim concerning the coincidence between concretum and individuum. Yet, this time not only with reference to the Ego, but also to the world:

An absolute concretum, which is a totality: the cosmos. Here, individuum and concretum coincide [...]. A world can exist only once. There cannot be two coexisting worlds. Likewise, the totality of the Ego [...]; in it, the concrete essence individuates itself in such a way that its concrete essence is at the same time the individual.⁵⁵

The coincidence between concretum and individual, thus, holds for what Husserl calls here two correlative “totalities”: the world and the Ego. For both, it would make no sense to think about two individuals, which have exactly the same properties, and are still numerically different.

Yet, the problem concerning the relation between the Ego as empty pole and the individuation of the concrete stream of consciousness remains to be discussed. Indeed, the presented account of the *per se* character of subjective individuation and the understanding of the individual Ego as a concretum or hyper-essence could be misinterpreted. One may argue, for instance, that the individuality of subjectivity is something always already given, as determined by the *eidos* Ego. Or, possibly, one could wonder whether the individual subject is ultimately self-enclosed, as the notion of “self-contained hyper-essence” might seem to imply. I consider these inferences to be wrong.

The first aspect to be kept in mind, indeed, is that the Ego as a self-contained hyper-essence is a non-independent moment of concrete subjectivity. The Ego is certainly the pole of all active and passive experiences, and as such it is the necessary and apodictic reference-point of all possible experiences. Yet, it is an empty pole. Thus, having said that, in the *eidos* Ego, concretum and individual coincide, and even without addressing the problem of the individuality of the subject as person, we shall keep in mind the passage from manuscript D 7, quoted at the beginning of this paragraph, where Husserl is concerned with the individuation of the concrete subjective stream of consciousness, and not with the Ego as empty pole.

As it is well known, in the Twenties, Husserl adopts the Leibnizian concept of the monad to indicate subjectivity in its concreteness, namely as entailing the totality of passive and active experiences, and the Ego as the pole or reference-point for all such experiences.⁵⁶ The problem of subjective individuation, in these years, is precisely related to Husserl’s monadic understanding of subjectivity. The adoption of Leibniz’s concept of the monad is particularly suitable because it indicates that consciousness is not individuated as things in the world are.⁵⁷ Indeed, in one text

⁵⁵ “Ein absolutes Konkretum, das eine Totalität ist: das Weltall. Hier fallen Individuum und Konkretum zusammen, [...]. Eine Welt kann nur einmal sein; es kann nicht zwei koexistierende Welten geben. Ebenso die Totalität des Ego [...]; in ihm individualisiert sich das konkrete Wesen, derart, dass sein konkretes Wesen zugleich Individuum ist.” D 8/2a.

⁵⁶ On the understanding of the Ego-pole as the principle of unity of consciousness in Husserl’s later work and on the introduction of the concept of the monad to characterize concrete subjectivity, see Altobrando (2010, 2011) and Marbach (1974, pp. 283f.).

⁵⁷ On Leibniz’ theory of individuation and of the monad as individual substance, see Bibitol-Hespériès (1991), Cover and O’Leary Hawthorne (1999), and Di Bella (2005).

dating 1921, Husserl makes a claim that echoes to the one made in the previously quoted manuscript D 7, namely the claim that only the monad is “independently” individual, whereas immanent (and even more so transcendent) objects are only “non-independently” individual. The latter, indeed, are constituted unities that shall be considered as founded with respect to the constituting unity of the individual monadic consciousness (Hua XIV, p. 37).

Thus, we can see that there is another way of reading Husserl’s claim that concretum and individuum fall together in the Ego, namely that the concretum in this case is necessarily individuated, i.e., that the essence cannot be considered apart from the facticity of existence.⁵⁸ And such existence shall be precisely considered as a process of relating to something other than the Ego. Even if it is not bound to the empirical space and time, subjective individuation, thus, certainly implies temporalization, in and through experiences, as well as spatialization, through the lived-body. Indeed, not only my temporal stream of consciousness is necessarily individuated, but also my lived-body. And this is one of the crucial implications of understanding the body “absolute here” or the zero-point: there is no other body but mine that can function for me as this unique source of spatialization.

Accordingly, the Ego pole may well be considered as a “hyper-essence”, or as individual “substance”, since it is the principle of identity of the monad. As we can read in one of the already quoted manuscripts on monadic individuation:

The monad is a “simple” non-fragmentable essence, which is what it is, namely as continuously becoming in time, and everything that belongs to it is at some point of this continuous becoming and has its being as temporal fullness in this immanently filled time. And it is nothing by itself, since this fulfillment is continuous and related to one and the same identical Ego-pole. (Hua XIV, pp. 35–36)⁵⁹

Nevertheless, the remarks concerning the Ego as identity core and as empty pole of experience are not exhaustive to properly address the problem of the individuation of concrete monadic subjectivity, which has the Ego as its pole. Considered independently of its experiences, the Ego is not individuated yet. The Ego receives all its determinations from its experiences, and it would remain indeterminate and not-determinable without such experiences (Altobrando 2010, p. 266). Yet, how shall we more exactly understand the process of individuation of concrete monadic subjectivity?

Occasionally, Husserl specifies the claim that concrete subjective individuation is accomplished through the relation between the Ego and its experiences by insisting on the capacity of decision or taking a stance, i.e., on the active behavior of the Ego (Hua XIV, pp. 11–42).⁶⁰ In doing so, Husserl explicitly denies that the subject can be individuated exclusively by drives, sensations, and passive experiences

⁵⁸ Hart (2009, pp. 411f.) suggests that this idea comes close to the Anselmian ontological argument concerning the existence of God: in the very essence, existence is also implied.

⁵⁹ See also Hua XIV, p. 14.

⁶⁰ As Jacobs (2010) shows, here is also the core of Husserl theory of personhood and personal identity. The latter is a dynamic process, accomplished through the subject constant appropriation of previous position-takings.

(Hua XIV, pp. 20, 31).⁶¹ Thus, the passive modifications of the stream alone are not considered to be sufficient to account for the process of subjective individuation (Hua XIV, p. 34). These passive processes, considered apart from the Egoic moment, could still be considered as something that can be experienced by more than one subject and therefore they cannot ground the individuality of this unique stream of subjective experience. What makes them part of an individual stream is the unique Egoic response to them. Yet, again, we shall be careful in reading these Husserlian claims. Indeed, it would be wrong to understand these statements an overemphasizing of the Egoic position-taking, considered as a spontaneous and deliberative act that, as it were, comes from nowhere. Rather, I would suggest reading these claims of Husserl's in relational terms, notably in the light of the a priori of correlation. Indeed, even staying within the abstracting reduction to pure consciousness and to the living present, the Ego is always given within the relational whole of the stream of consciousness. This whole is essentially articulated by two polarities: the Ego and the hyle, which is alien to the Ego [*ichfremd*].⁶² And as we can read in one text from the early Twenties devoted to the individuation of the monad:

To every monad belongs the unity of an Ego, an identity of the Ego which extends throughout the whole temporal duration, with all that which is egoic, and also that which is alien to the Ego and nevertheless "subjective", a necessary domain of the monad alien to the Ego. (Hua XIV, p. 14).

The individuation of the monad as concrete subjectivity, thus, must concern both the Egoic and the non-Egoic moments taken in their relationship. More exactly, concrete subjective individuation shall be considered as an open process through which the stream of subjective consciousness constitutes itself as individual. A central individualizing moment of the stream of consciousness is the unique mode of Egoic responding to the affections originating from the *hyle*, as alienness to the Ego [*Ichfremdes*] that announces itself within the primal process. And this unique mode of responding to affections genetically grounds all Egoic decision or position-taking.

Thus, the claim that the individuation of the monad is *per se*, i.e., that it does not require any further consciousness or external principle, does not mean that consciousness is self-enclosed. Rather, subjectivity individuates itself in and through the constant and irreversible process of becoming, in and through its singular experiences in such an irreversible process. Such a process of self-individuation is relational, since it necessarily presupposes the fundamental openness of monadic subjectivity towards the world. The individuality of monadic consciousness, thus,

⁶¹ "Individuality does not express itself in the passive *doxa*, in which a sensible datum stands there as being in the present or in the character of having been, e.g., in perception or in reproduction. Neither [does it express itself M.S.] in the passive play of appearances and presumptions, but rather in the active doxic contemplation and decision, in active thinking and all intellectual activities with their active position-takings of the Ego, which decides according to "reasons"." Hua XIV, p. 20.

⁶² This is particularly emphasized in Husserl's later texts, notably the C-Manuscripts. However, in this regard these texts make explicit something that was already entailed in the previous analyses on temporal constitution. See, notably, Hua Mat VIII, pp. 90f., 102, 189, 203f., 352.

properly defines a genetically constituted, dynamic and relational unity of becoming: “the monad is, insofar as it becomes” (Hua XIV, p. 38).

Conceiving of the process of subjective individuation in relational terms, i.e., showing that this process is based on the unique way of responding distinctive of an Ego, prevents us from conceiving the future becoming of the subject as pre-determined by an already given individual essence.⁶³ Monadic being is essentially “being in becoming” [*Sein im Werden*], and this becoming necessarily implies openness to otherness, indetermination, and the possibility of being surprised by something new and unexpected. The faculty of responding to the unexpected in a unique and not univocally pre-determinate way is the basis for the individuation of consciousness.

6.5 Conclusions

The remarks concerning the individuation of monadic subjectivity are relevant in the context of the present inquiry because they reveal the connection between the theory of sensibility and the phenomenology of constitution, not only of the sensible world, but also of subjectivity as experiencing this world. Understanding subjective individuation with respect to the primal stream of consciousness has given us some insights into the interrelation of the sensible constitution and the self-constitution of subjectivity. Further aspects of this interrelation will come to the fore in both the two following chapters.

To conclude this chapter, let us recapitulate the points that allow us to understand individuation as a crucial phenomenon in Husserl’s transcendental aesthetic, thereby highlighting why the phenomenology of individuation bears witness to the intertwining of the spatial and the temporal dimension. This can be done by considering individuation in dynamical and relational terms, and particularly in the light of what we have called the irreversibility principle. Throughout the different facets of Husserl’s theory of individuation, indeed, we have seen that the individual shall not be assumed as already given and univocally determined according to an externally pre-defined principle. Neither shall it be considered as the final moment in the genus-species classification. Rather, the individual is constituted within a spatio-temporal process of differentiation and self-differentiation, which is essentially relational.

The remarks concerning the individual in Husserl’s theory of knowledge and formal ontology have allowed us to highlight the increasing centrality of the individual in both domains. In both domains, however, the category of the individual

⁶³ “Now, insofar as the ‘inwards’ or ‘proper essence’ of an individual, everything of it that can be intuitively given and specified, can be eidetically grasped, we have to say that for no individual does its essence univocally and in full determination prescribe its future becoming, the future essential constituents, rationally and in eidetic necessity. And the question is whether it prescribes anything at all for a future in this respect.” Hua XIV, p. 14.

remains in need of an experiential foundation, which has been highlighted discussing the process of temporal and spatial individuation of intentional objects and the process of subjective individuation.

As to the individuation of experiences and their noematic correlates, we have seen that the individualizing temporal position occurs within a dynamic and irreversible process of differentiation. Retrospectively, it is certainly possible to re-identify that unique position as individuating and to establish a temporal order that will lead to the constitution of objective time. Yet, before all synthesis of identity and identification, the individual correlates are given as events that emerge within the unitary and irreversible stream of consciousness. Concerning subjective individuation, we have particularly seen how the abstracting characterization of the Ego as a concretum or as an individual substance accounts for the identity of the subject, but this is not enough to account for the individuation of concrete subjectivity. Subjective individuation coincides, instead, with the full dynamics of monadic life. This life is itself an irreversible process of temporalization and spatialization, which happens in and through the singular experiences, i.e., in and through the unique way to respond to and interact with the world and with other subjects. Such a relational account of individuation seems to challenge the static understanding of subjectivity as absolute substance, or self-enclosed unity. Although Husserl, as it is well known, also defends such an understanding of absolute consciousness *quod nulla re indiget ad existendum*,⁶⁴ this claim should be more closely qualified with respect to the concrete analyses he develops. With respect to the present argument, we have seen that, although subjectivity is individuated *per se*, i.e., not on the basis of some external principle, this does not mean that the individuation of subjectivity does not require the relation to something other than itself. Understood in light of the spatio-temporal intertwining, thus, the process of individuation bears witness to the essential co-belonging of subjectivity and the world.

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⁶⁴E.g. Hua III/1, pp. 103f.

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Chapter 7

Perspectival Givenness

The present chapter focuses on the phenomenology of perspectival givenness, which, as I will argue, offers us a privileged access to investigate the modalities of the spatio-temporal intertwining. Considering spatiality and temporality simply as parallel, indeed, provides a limited and in many ways unsatisfactory understanding of perspectival givenness. The limits of such an understanding can instead be overcome if we move from the interrelation of the spatial and the temporal unfolding of experience. Yet, another reason for choosing to thoroughly discuss the phenomenology of perspectival givenness is that, by unfolding its implications, we can shed new light on some fundamental aspects of Husserl's phenomenology, notably the structure and dynamics of lived experience and the status of transcendental subjectivity.

Accordingly, this chapter will disentangle the fundamental implications of the phenomenon of perspectival givenness considered in light of the intertwining of the spatial and the temporal dimensions. In the first section, I address Husserl's analyses of both temporal and spatial perspective and show why perspectival display shall be considered as a spatio-temporal phenomenon. This will contribute to highlight the situated, affection-related, and dynamic character of sensible experience. In the second section, I consider perspectival givenness in the light of Husserl's theory of constitution. This will allow me to further pursue the observations concerning the dynamics of experience that grounds both perspectival appearance and the perception of things in and through such appearance. Finally, in the third section, I shall discuss the nexus between perspectival givenness and the teleology of spatial and temporal experience. The three sections will converge in providing some important clues to understand how the interweaving of spatiality and temporality eventually expresses the concrete dynamics of subjective experience as life.

7.1 Spatial and Temporal Perspective. Parallelism or Intertwining?

In this first section, the phenomenology of perspectival givenness will be introduced along the lines traced in the last chapter of the second section, while considering the constitution of the sensible thing. As we will see, examining the relation between spatial and temporal perspective, Husserl oscillates between what I have called a parallel and analogy based consideration of both (particularly when he tries to understand temporal perspective upon the model of spatial perspective), and a discussion of how spatial and temporal perspective come together in the concrete configuration of lived experience. In the first paragraph, I show how Husserl's understanding of the stratified constitution of the phantom implicitly refers to its perspectival givenness, and how the latter, to be properly understood, requires an account not only of spatiality but also of temporality. In the second paragraph, I first discuss in what sense it is legitimate to talk about temporal perspective. Thereby, I critically assess the understanding of temporal perspective in analogy with spatial perspective. The third paragraph provides a different account of temporal perspective by following some insights of Husserl's and reconsiders perspective in relation to the phenomenon of affection. Finally, in the last paragraph, such a refined view of temporal perspective, in connection with the phenomenon of affection, will allow us to return to some questions previously phrased with respect to spatial perspective and to highlight the meaning of the spatio-temporal intertwining that underlies perspectival givenness.

7.1.1 *The Perspectival Givenness of the Spatial Thing*

As it is well known, one of the major points in Husserl's theory of perception concerns the inadequate appearance of the sensible things. In principle, things cannot but appear perspectively, i.e., they cannot display all of their aspects and profiles at once. In general terms, this phenomenon refers to the structural inadequateness of the perception of transcendent things. Such inadequateness is not dependent on the empirical conformation of the perceiving subject, rather being grounded upon the correlation between subjectivity and the world. Accordingly, it is the type of objective correlate that prescribes and regulates the modes of its own givenness: transcendent objects, and notably tridimensional things, cannot *a priori* but appear perspectively. This is an eidetic material law, which applies to the perception of every possible subject, and even to God's, i.e., to the ideal representative of absolute knowledge, in case such a subject may at all be considered as a perceiving one.¹ Noematically considered, perspectival givenness is strictly connected with the complex and stratified constitution of the perceptual thing.

¹Hua III/1, pp. 350–351/(Husserl 1983, pp. 361–362).

To describe such a constitution, in manuscript D 13 I Husserl further refines the distinctions he made in his earlier texts, which have been previously discussed, and introduces a partially new terminology. In this manuscript, three moments in the stratified structure of the phantom are distinguished: the profile [*Seite*], the aspect [*Aspekt*], and the appearance [*Apparens*].²

The profile is the side of the phantom that properly manifests itself at a given moment. The same profile, however, intuitively appears as constantly different in relation to the different circumstances (e.g., light, spatial distance). This is why Husserl introduces the notion of aspect: to designate the profile in its particular and situation related mode of givenness. The aspect corresponds to the intuitive “perspective” [*anschauliche Perspektive*]³ of the phantom:

This phantom is given in singular profiles, and if the profile is the visible piece of the phantom, then this is itself given in and through different modes of givenness. And we define: what is intuitively given of the phantom, and the way it is given, is the aspect. The phantom and every profile of the phantom are given through aspects, such that to each profile, in its momentary givenness, necessarily belongs a respective aspect as aspect of the profile. Profile in the strict sense is what is momentarily given of the phantom, and in the momentary mode of givenness it is called aspect in the incisive sense (aspect of the profile).⁴

Finally, the concept of appearance is introduced in relation to the continuous interconnection of different aspects: in the process of perception, indeed, the different profiles of the phantom do not manifest themselves only through one singular and momentary aspect, but rather throughout a continuum of aspects, or modes of appearance, merging into one another. Thus, each profile alludes to the totality of continuously merging profiles.⁵ The manifestation of these continua is what Husserl calls the appearance of the phantom:

²This distinction clearly privileges a noematic account of perceptual givenness. This is particularly confirmed by the absence of the concept of adumbration [*Abschattung*], which in other texts is adopted to provide an account of perspectival and inadequate givenness. The concept of adumbration, however, remains quite ambiguous, since it sometimes refers to a real [*reell*] moment of consciousness and therefore to the hyletic component, and some other times it refers to the noematic correlate. See Hua XIX/2, pp. 589–592/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 220–222); Hua XVI, pp. 44, 93, 101–109, 116, 124, 144–149, 189, 270/(Husserl 1997, pp. 39, 79, 85–91, 97, 103–104, 121–125, 159, 232). In other passages of manuscript D 13 I, and also in some later texts, Husserl still resorts to the concept of adumbration. This testifies that he does not consider the noematic approach endorsed in these texts as incompatible with this notion. See manuscript D 13 I/6a, 22a; Hua XI, p. 3/(Husserl 2001a, p. 39).

³“[...] the aspect is the intuitive “perspective” of the phantom itself [...]” “[...] der Aspekt ist die anschauliche “Perspektive” des Phantoms selbst [...].” D 13 I/3b.

⁴“Dieses Phantom ist gegeben in einzelnen Seiten; und ist Seite das sichtbare Stück des Phantoms, so ist dieses selbst in verschiedenen Gegebenheitsweisen gegeben. Und wir fixieren: Was anschaulich vom Phantom gegeben ist und wie es da gegeben ist, ist Aspekt. Das Phantom und jede Seite des Phantomes ist durch Aspekte gegeben, und zwar gehört jeder Seite in ihrer momentanen Gegebenheit notwendig ein jeweiliger Aspekt als Seitenaspekt zu. Seite im strengen Sinne ist das momentan vom Phantom Gegebene, und in der momentanen Gegebenheitsweise heißt es im prägnanten Sinne Aspekt (Seitenaspekt).” D 13 I/2b.

⁵“In perception, the profile points to the complementing continuity of profiles, the aspect [points to M.S.] the appearance – to any appearance, in which the continuity of profiles proceeds and the

Every phantom is given as a profile or as many profiles and then as a continuum of merging aspects. And eventually, a universe of profiles and universally all-round modes of givenness ideally belong to every phantom. Each continuum of aspects, which join each other in an ensemble of appearance of the phantom, insofar as every profile only reaches givenness once, is called the appearance of the phantom.⁶

This description of the moments making up the phantom in its perspectival, and yet unitary, givenness has two main implications for our present inquiry: first, it already brings to the fore the interweaving of spatial and temporal determinations in each of the distinguished moments; secondly, it hints at the relationship between perspective and the oriented character of spatiality. Both presuppose a dynamic account of perception. Let us flesh out these implications.

If we closely consider the previous definitions of profile, aspect, and appearance, we can observe that they refer not only to the spatial determinations of the thing, but also to the temporal ones. Indeed, the profile is also defined as what is momentarily given of the phantom [*das momentan vom Phantom Gegebene*], namely what is given through the aspects at a certain temporal moment. Accordingly, the profile is given as “here and now”, in this perceptual situation. Moreover, the aspect, i.e., the profile in its actual mode of givenness, is defined by virtue of its uniqueness [*Einmaligkeit*], namely of its individuality, which, as we have seen in the previous chapter, necessarily implies a temporal determination. Finally, the appearance of the phantom hints at the temporal unfolding of perceptual experience. Thus, both situatedness, which characterizes the givenness of profiles and aspects, and continuity, which is implied by the appearance, are based on the interconnection of the spatial and the temporal moments in sensible experience. Accordingly, the description of the different moments of the phantom and their synthetic unity cannot be accomplished by exclusively referring to spatial extension and localization. It rather requires a proper account of what Husserl, in one manuscript written in the Thirties, calls phantom-time [*Phantomzeit*]:

The style of the perspectives, including spatial and then qualitative perspectives, is already constituted in spatiotemporality, which is the form of realities, indeed of realities as they are intrinsically; we have there already a difference between “immanent time”, the “time of the perspectival progressions”, and the “phantom-time of the perspectively appearing unities”.⁷

What Husserl calls here phantom-time, then, is the time of the unities manifesting themselves perspectively, and again presupposes the syntheses of inner time as the time of perspectival processes of appearing. One major concern in the argument

phantom would be given” “In der Wahrnehmung weist die Seite auf die ergänzende Seitenkontinuität hin, der Aspekt auf die Apparenz – auf irgend eine Apparenz, in der die Seitenkontinuität abläuft und das Phantom gegeben wäre.” D 13 I/4b.

⁶ “Jedes Phantom ist gegeben als eine Seite oder vielseitig und dann als Kontinuum ineinanderübergehender Aspekte. Und schließlich gehört ideell zu jedem Phantom ein Universum von Seiten und universal allseitigen Gegebenheitsweisen. Jedes Kontinuum von Aspekten, die sich zu einem Erscheinungsganzen des Phantoms zusammenschließen, indem jede Seite und jede nur einmal zur Gegebenheit kommt, nennen wir eine Apparenz des Phantoms.” D 13 I/2b–3a.

⁷ (Husserl 1946, p. 236)/(Husserl 1981b, p. 240)

of the next paragraph on temporal perspective will be precisely to understand how the syntheses of inner time consciousness necessarily contribute in making up the “style” of perspectival display.

The second implication concerns the oriented character of lived spatiality. Leaving aside, for the moment, the question as to the relationship between orientation and subjective bodily situatedness, we shall notice that such orientation is strictly related to the configuration of lived spatiality according to relations of proximity and remoteness. This becomes particularly evident at paragraph 64 of *Thing and Space*, with regard to both the perception of things and the constitution of space. Remoteness [*Entfernung*] is not equivalent with measurable distance [*Abstand*]. Whereas the latter results from the abstraction of the subjective point of view, the former is precisely bound to such a point of view. Thus, measurable objective distance is constructed by means of abstraction of some essential experiential features. Remoteness, instead, designates the way I originally experience spatial relations among things, and between things and myself, from this particular perspective. Yet, remoteness is not perceived in the same way as spatial things are; it is rather mostly experienced implicitly while we are perceptually focused on things. Nevertheless, the descriptive analysis of perception shows that precisely such an implicit and non-objectivating awareness of remoteness (and proximity) is a constitutive moment of the perception of spatial things and of the constitution of space.⁸ Accordingly, the claim that Husserl’s account of spatial constitution is exclusively drawn upon the perceptual experience of material things needs some qualifications. For the experience of things is always correlated and mediated by the pre-reflective awareness of relationships of proximity and remoteness among things, as well as between the perceived thing and myself.

The non-objectivating experience of remoteness and proximity deserves our attention particularly insofar as it refers to the interweaving of spatiality and temporality. Such an experience can be described in light of the correlation between “here” and “there”. As Husserl points out in manuscript D 13 II, highlighting such a fundamental correlation between here and there allows us to understand the oriented and perspectival display of the thing in function of its remoteness from here. This, as we can read between the lines of the following quote and as we will better see in the next chapter, is one of the implications of the situatedness of perception.⁹

From each standpoint (“here”), a determined complex of thing-determinations belongs to the same thing. These make up the whole visible profile viewed from this here. And this complex, in a complex unitary perception, comes to givenness in relation to the here, univocally, according to all its moments. This “profile” can only be given in this perception, if we also include to the profile the relation to the here. From my determined standpoint, I see a determined “profile of the thing”, namely as being in a certain way “remote” from

⁸Hua XVI, pp. 227–229/(Husserl 1997, pp. 193–194). See also D 13III/217a–219b.

⁹Regarding the connection between the phenomenological account of remoteness and the situatedness of perception, see Spinicci (2000, pp. 50–82).

this standpoint, and oriented towards it in a certain way. This “remote” is a relative “determination of the here”. This “remote” must not be confused with distance.¹⁰

In the later manuscript D 19, dating back to 1922–1926, Husserl returns to the relations of proximity and remoteness as grounding the structure of perceptual orientation. Thereby, he emphasizes again the relationship between the so-conceived orientation and objective display:

Orientation is the difference between closeness and remoteness. The now and here are the zero of temporal and spatial closeness. How does this relate to the adumbrating presentation? Both are correlative. The object given in the mode of some spatio-temporal orientation (belonging to a system) and this is in a constant change (in a necessary change with respect to temporality).¹¹

As we can clearly see from this latter passage, proximity and remoteness, and correlatively orientation, are not to be exclusively conceived in light of spatial determinations. They rather refer to the spatio-temporal configuration of experience. More precisely, both the just quoted passages imply the interweaving of spatiality and temporality with respect to two moments: (1) the correlation between remoteness, proximity, and perspectival givenness; and (2) the distinctive mode of givenness of remoteness itself, as distinguished from objective distance.

At this stage, however, we are not in the position to further argue for these claims. Indeed, with respect to both points, we need to flesh out what such an interweaving precisely consists in and how it concretely shapes our experience. To this aim, and to understand why such an interconnection requires a more dynamic account of sensible experience, we first need to consider how Husserl conceives of temporal perspective. On the basis of these remarks on temporal perspective, we will be able to adequately develop the implications of the just listed points.

7.1.2 Abklangsphänomen and Temporal Perspective

Discussing the difference between the givenness of immanent experiences and the givenness of transcendent things, and stressing herewith the difference between the being of consciousness and of transcendent reality, at paragraph 42 of *Ideas I*,

¹⁰“Zu demselben Ding gehört von jedem Standpunkt (“Hier”) aus ein bestimmter Komplex von dinglichen Bestimmungen, die die ganze von diesem Hier sichtbare Seite ausmachen, und dieser Komplex kommt nach allen seinen Momenten in einer komplexen einheitlichen Wahrnehmung zur Gegebenheit in Bezug auf das Hier und zwar eindeutig. Diese “Seite” kann nur in dieser Wahrnehmung gegeben sein, wenn wir zur Seite auch rechnen die Beziehung zum Hier. Von meinem bestimmten Standpunkt aus sehe ich eine bestimmte “Dingseite” und zwar als von diesem Standpunkt <aus> so und so weit “entfernt”, gegen ihn so und so orientiert. Dieses “entfernt” ist eine relative “Hierbestimmung”. Dieses “entfernt” ist nicht zu verwechseln mit Abstand.” D 13 II/210a–b.

¹¹“Orientierung ist der Unterschied von Nähe und Ferne. Das Jetzt und Hier ist das Null der zeitlichen und räumlichen Nähe. Wie hängt das zusammen mit abschattender Darstellung? Beides ist korrelativ. Das Objekt im Modus irgendeiner (einem System zugehörigen) zeit-räumlichen Orientierung gegeben und diese ist in beständigem Wandel (in notwendigem Wandel hinsichtlich der Zeitlichkeit).” D 19/122b–123a.

Husserl argues that it would make no sense to talk about perspectival appearance regarding non-spatial being (Hua III/1, 88). Consistently, establishing an equivalence between, on the one hand, spatial and transcendent being and, on the other hand, temporal and immanent being, Husserl cannot but neglect the phenomenon of temporal perspective. Indeed, such a phenomenon does not seem to be plausible in that framework. Still, as it is well known, in his analyses on inner time consciousness, Husserl recognizes that there is something like temporal perspective. And this in spite of maintaining the difference between immanent and transcendent experience. Yet, in what sense can the discourse on temporal perspective be legitimate, if it is not meant to remove the difference between immanent and transcendent experience? To answer this question, and to understand how temporal perspective may then be related to spatial perspective, I wish to address more closely the developments in the texts that are confronted with this problem.

At paragraph 9 of the 1928 edition of the lectures on inner time consciousness, which results from the re-elaboration of one text written in 1911 (text number 53 in Hua X), Husserl considers an analogy regarding the perspectival givenness of spatial and temporal objects:

But the further we move from the now, the greater the fusion and compression that manifests itself. A reflective penetration of the unity of a many-membered process lets us observe that an articulated part of the process “contracts” as it sinks back into the past – a sort of temporal perspective (within the original temporal appearance) as an analogue of the spatial perspective. In receding into the past, the temporal object contracts and in the process also becomes obscure.¹²

Developing such a position, the arguments in text number 53 reveal that this analogy does not only concern the givenness of temporal objects but also their duration:

The points of the temporal duration recede for my consciousness in a manner analogous to that in which the points of an object stationary in space recede for my consciousness, for my appearing, when “I” remove “myself” from the object.¹³

Yet, can we be satisfied with such an analogical thinking? Does not the argument made in *Ideas I* precisely warn us against the understanding of temporal givenness in analogy with spatial givenness? Regretfully, in either of the mentioned texts, Husserl does not develop the implications of this analogy in detail. However, if we want to understand what temporal perspective is and to avoid the contradiction with the distinction between immanent and transcendent givenness, we shall spell out the implications of this analogy, its descriptive potentialities, but also its pitfalls. This will eventually bring us to show in what sense only a joint consideration of spatiality and temporality makes a proper description of the phenomenon of perspective in the transcendental aesthetic possible.

Let us first clarify the context of the previous quotations. In both texts, and most explicitly in the supplementary text 53, Husserl clearly distinguishes three moments in the givenness of the temporal object: the object, the object in its modes of

¹² Hua X, p. 26/(Husserl 1991, p. 28).

¹³ Hua X, p. 361/(Husserl 1991, p. 371).

appearance, and the consciousness intending the object.¹⁴ Temporal perspective concerns the second of these moments, namely the temporal object in the mode or way of its givenness [*in der Weise wie*], that is to say, in the different modes of appearance corresponding to the increasing remoteness of its temporal position with respect to the actual now.¹⁵ Hence, just like spatial perspective, also temporal perspective shall be considered from a noematic point of view.¹⁶ Temporal perspective, therefore, refers to modes of givenness of the immanent object. To designate them, Husserl talks about running-off modes [*Ablaufmodi*], and modes of temporal orientation [*Modi der zeitlichen Orientierung*].¹⁷ Yet, how shall we conceive of this temporal orientation, once all reference to objective space-time has been bracketed?

The texts considered up to now do not offer a completely satisfactory answer to this question. They simply suggest that every new actual now is the necessary reference point of temporal remoteness [*Ferne*], and consequently it is indispensable for the phenomenon of temporal perspective. Temporal orientation, therefore, primarily refers to the givenness of temporal objects in relation to each new now-point, the “zero-point” of temporal orientation. Despite this important implication, the account of temporal perspective provided in the texts collected within Hua X is not exhaustive for two main reasons. First, an adequate description of the constitution of the one identical object, in and through the perspectival changing of its appearances, is still lacking. Secondly, the consciousness of temporal remoteness from the actual now is not further thematized, so that one may still suspect that such remoteness is nothing else but (proto-)objective distance. The remarks on temporal perspective developed in the *Bernau Manuscripts* and in *Analyses Concerning Active and Passive Synthesis* allow us to go some step further to overcome these difficulties.

Indeed, there seems to be a relationship between the dynamics of the temporal process and the phenomenon of temporal perspective. Such a relationship particularly emerges with respect to the conceptual constellation related to the notion of fading-away, *Abklang* (e.g., *Abklangphänomen*, *Modifikation des Abklingens*).

¹⁴ Hua X, p. 362/(Husserl 1991, p. 373).

¹⁵ Hua X, p. 361/(Husserl 1991, pp. 371–372).

¹⁶ In *Ideas I*, Husserl defines the noema both as “the perceived as such” [*das Wahrgenommene als solches*] and as “the object in the How of its determinations” [*Gegenstand im Wie seiner Bestimmtheiten*], Hua III/1, pp. 205 and 299–303/(Husserl 1983, pp. 216, 311–313). However, the difference between “intended object” and “object in its mode of givenness” precedes the noematic approach, being already adopted in the act-oriented descriptions of the *Logical Investigations*. Cf. Hua XIX/1, pp. 414–416/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 112–115). One passage of number 53 of Hua X, though, is quite clear in confirming that temporal perspective – which, as we will see, is connected to the phenomenon of running-off, and it shall be considered noematically: “Every temporal being (if we are conscious of it at all) “appears” in some running-off mode that changes continuously, and in this change the “object in its mode of running off” is always and ever a different object. And yet we continue to say that the object and each point of its time and this time itself are one and the same. We will not be able to term this appearance – the “object in its mode of running off” – “consciousness”, any more than we will give the name “consciousness” to the spatial phenomenon, to the corporeal appearance understood as the body in its way of appearing “from this side” or “that side”, from near or far.” Hua X, p. 363/(Husserl 1991, p. 374).

¹⁷ Hua X, p. 364/(Husserl 1991, p. 375).

This becomes clear in text number 4 in the edition of the *Bernau Manuscripts*, where the phenomenon of fading-away is defined as follows:

The fading-away is a constant impoverishment, a constant diminishment in the “fullness”, in correspondence to which we speak of “intuitiveness” and degrees of intuitiveness; thus, a continuous diminishment of intuitiveness with zero as limit, at which point we cannot speak about intuitiveness any longer. (Hua XXXIII, p. 66)

The first important point in this definition is the reference to the intuitive fullness of the temporal event. Still focusing on the noematic side of experience, Husserl describes the phenomenon of fading-away in the light of the distinction between pure sense and fullness.¹⁸ The pure sense is what remains identical in the givenness of the temporal objet (Hua XXXIII, pp. 67f.),¹⁹ whereas the intuitive fullness is subject to temporal modification.²⁰ In text number 8, Husserl also addresses the problem of temporal perspective, notably referring the so-called aspects of the temporal object [*zeitgegenständliche Aspekte*] as the perspectively given “facets” of the temporal object (Hua XXXIII, pp. 151f.). According to both texts, thus, the perspectival givenness of temporal objects is related to the interplay of identity and difference: in the phenomenon of fading-away, the temporal object can be re-identified as such, since its sense is preserved as identical; however, this identical object is also experienced as different, namely with respect to its fullness. Fullness, i.e., what makes the intuitiveness of the object or the event as present in the flesh, progressively fades-away and asymptotically tends towards the zero of an empty sense.²¹ This description has three main implications for our inquiry.

The first implication concerns the characterization of temporality as form. The previous analyses, indeed, allow us to further qualify the relationship between temporal form and content in the light of the noematic account of temporal perspective. As the form of noematic givenness, temporality cannot be considered apart from temporal content. The concept of form, thus, applies to temporality insofar as the temporal structures, despite being necessarily related to temporal content, are still independent of the specificity of this or that content. All what is given, is given in

¹⁸ “Every [modality] is an intentional experience [*Erlebnis*] (in punctuated abstraction) and it has its intentional [*ihr Intentionales*] as such. And here we distinguish noematically between the pure sense and the fullness as moments that are different from each other” Hua XXXIII, pp. 66–67.

¹⁹ Husserl refers to the sense [*Sinn*] as to what remains identical [*überall gleich, ja identisch*] throughout temporal modifications, or as unchanged and empty [*unverändert leer*]. This clearly evokes the definition or the structure of the noema in *Ideas I*. See Hua III/1, p. 303/(Husserl 1983, p. 315), and Hua XI, p. 5/(Husserl 2001a, p. 41).

²⁰ In the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl mainly considers fullness as a moment of the act, and notably of its “epistemic essence” [*erkenntnismäßigen Wesen*]. Hua XIX/2, 606f., 626/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 233f., 246). Here, instead the reference is made to the fullness of the temporal object in its mode of givenness. However, already in the *Logical Investigations* the moment of fullness shall be considered as related to the intuitive givenness of the object, which may already hint at the noematic developments regarding this notion, see Piazza (2001, pp. 85–96).

²¹ “Fullness asymptotically approximates its zero point, and then we have unchanged empty sense.” Hua XXXIII, p. 69.

and through time.²² However, this does not mean that time consciousness as such is only an empty form, nor that it can be completely formalized *salva veritate*.²³ It is precisely the relationship between temporal form and content, as it emerges for instance in the phenomenon of fading-away, which needs to be investigated in order to highlight the role of temporality in the transcendental aesthetic. Yet, Husserl is also quite explicit in stating that the temporal form shall not be considered in light of the container metaphor, in which some content is poured:

This does not mean that the modification, [...] in accordance with the image of the form, is a container or a pot in which more or less content is poured. Rather, “fullness” is an essential moment in the concretion of the described modalities, namely belonging precisely to the side that does not concern the modalities as forms, i.e., as identical system of moments in the arbitrary change of “content” and, thus, of fullness. (Hua XXXIII, p. 66)

Consistently, fullness is not something that can or cannot be present, as if consciousness was a container that might be filled in or emptied with content.²⁴ Temporal form and content, rather, are necessarily co-belonging within the unitary whole of experience. Such a co-belonging is thematized again in text number 15, although in a different context, namely the discussion of the correlation between Ego and hyle in original time consciousness. However, Husserl’s remark also fits our present considerations regarding temporal perspective and the phenomenon of fading-away. As Husserl writes:

Hyle necessarily belongs to the non-reflected surroundings, and we can speak of a hyletic surrounding that belongs to the necessary essential form of inwardness as an unconditional first necessity. No point in immanent time without this first objective substance [*Gehalt*]; in the oriented immanent time, no now without hyletic original impression, which then leads to the modification (retentionally and protentionally) of the necessary life that constitutes hyletic temporal objects. (Hua XXXIII, p. 282).

As in text number 4 and text number 8, Husserl argues here for the necessary co-belonging of temporal form and content. Precisely on the basis of such co-belonging, as I have argued in the previous chapters, the intuition of time as such is possible. Temporal form is only given as the form of some (albeit indeterminate) content, and it is intuited as form of the given content. Conversely, this means that sensible content is always already organized in temporal configurations, and that it can only be given as temporally shaped.

The second implication of the descriptions of the phenomenon of fading-away concerns the definition of the now as the reference point for the fading-away of

²²A different position is defended by Penna (2007, pp. 21f.), who criticizes the approach to temporality as form as deriving from the failure of the attempt to reduce everything to the immanence of consciousness. In my view, this critique does not hold if one takes into account the noematic approach to temporal constitution and its implications.

²³In this sense, I agree with Micali (2008, pp. 218f.), who thoroughly shows how, within this unitary and universal form, a plurality of experiences of time (e.g., in insomnia) shall be distinguished. I consider this possibility related to the necessary relationship between temporal form and content.

²⁴This would imply quite a narrow and problematic understanding of consciousness as lack. Such lacking would be merely understood as a need that has to be satisfied and may emerge anew when the satisfaction is gone. For a critique of this account of the “structural lacking” [*Mangelstruktur*] of consciousness, see Waldenfels (2002, pp. 48f.). I will return on this problem later in this chapter.

temporal events. Developing an insight already expressed in some texts of Hua X, in text number 4 of Hua XXXIII, Husserl is quite clear in describing the phenomenon under consideration as fading-away of the present [*Abklang der Gegenwart*], thus as something that concerns the present. One way to read this description would be to argue, following Derrida (1967, pp. 3f.; 27; 111f.),²⁵ for the persistence of the metaphysics of presence also in Husserl's later analyses on temporality. Yet, endorsing such a position would amount to opposing the two terms of the previous phrase, *Abklang* and *Gegenwart*, and to arguing that Husserl univocally privileges one of them, namely *Gegenwart*. What is presently given loses its fullness in the process of fading-away, therefore the measure of intuitive givenness remains the present. Instead of immediately taking this way, I wish to reflect for a moment on the complete expression *Abklang der Gegenwart* and consider the phenomenon designated by this expression as entailing both the constant process of temporal becoming and the constitution of temporal identity throughout temporal modifications. If we endorse this reading, we will see how the phenomenon of fading-away impinges on the phenomenological account of consciousness. As we can read in one passage from text number 4:

This modification of the modification shall be designated as the liveliness of consciousness. Consciousness is life, and all life, according to its particular life-pulsation, is life in elapsing, in the continuous expiring [*dahingehen*] of life. And all concrete life of the stream of life is a unity of ever new life-pulsations, which, for their part, “appear” and “pass”, vanish. (Hua XXXIII, p. 69)

Thus, the phenomenon of the fading-away of temporal objects and their constitution as events in the primal stream is grounded upon the unity of consciousness. This unity is itself a unity of becoming and is better described as life. Accordingly, the very notion of present assumes a dynamic character, since it is part of the constant process of becoming. As Husserl writes in text number 8:

The original consciousness of a temporal object, the streaming life in which we are aware of it as originally given, perceived (attentively considered or not attentively considered, thematically considered or not considered), can be indicated as a stream of continuous “modification”. The “modification” indicates then quasi the operation, which proceeds in a constantly identical sense. (Hua XXXIII, pp. 143–144)

This constitutive accomplishment of temporal consciousness is thus the concretization of its “vitality”.²⁶ Considering that the now is also described as streaming and welling-up, we can argue that its assumption as zero-point of temporal orientation by no

²⁵A reconsideration of Husserl's analyses of temporality which takes this critique into account is presented by Bernet (1983), who not only argues that Husserl approach cannot univocally be reduced to the metaphysics of presence, but also shows the metaphysical presuppositions implied by that very criticism.

²⁶In this respect I agree with the conclusions regarding the life of consciousness De Warren (2009, pp. 250f.) draws from his own analyses on time consciousness and with Micali's (2008, pp. 183–184) argument regarding the co-implication and interweaving of primal impression, retention, and protention. To be sure, such a co-implication was already thematized by Derrida (1990), who sees in it an element supporting his claim regarding the necessary contamination of the origin. The interpretation of the *Abklangsphänomen* I propose here, instead, differs from the one presented by

means implies a static account of consciousness. On the contrary, the phenomenological account of temporal orientation and temporal perspective is precisely grounded upon the dynamics of consciousness as life (Hua XXXIII, p. 90).²⁷ We will see in the next two sections of this chapter how this finds confirmation in the description of intentionality as tendency and in the teleology of spatial and temporal constitution.

The third implication is the most relevant for the present argument, since it concerns the relationship between spatial and temporal perspective. Again, discussing this relationship, we will be confronted with the limits of a merely analogical understanding of spatial and temporal perspective. In text number 4, Husserl is quite clear in remarking that the process of fading-away is supposed to explain the otherwise obscure phenomenon of temporal perspective:

This does not yet explain the essential problem of perspective, which has not been regarded so far, namely in its most original form, in which it is already an inherent essence in the original stream of fading-away. For this phenomenon relates to the “apparent size” of one and the same filled duration in different extents of its fading-away, and not to the size of the extents of the fading-away itself. (Hua XXXIII, p. 69)

Such an understanding of temporal perspective and of the process of fading-away, however, is not without problems. These become clear if we consider Husserl’s attempt to describe a possible graphical representation of the just presented account by means of one new temporal diagram,²⁸ which is supposed to reproduce the temporal “shrinking” of the past phases. The diagram is based on the analogy between spatial and temporal perspective. Such as in the case of spatial objects, which appear smaller if seen from increasing distance, the appearance of temporal objects shrinks, as it were, in proportion to the distance of these objects from the actual now. This analogy, though, has some presuppositions that need to be further thematized. First, what the diagrammatic representation reproduces is only one aspect of temporality, namely its being a form and having as such certain rigidity.²⁹ Yet, as Held has remarkably shown considering Husserl’s later C-manuscripts, *Stehen* is only one side of the original temporal consciousness, the other being *Strömen* (Held 1966). I believe the same can be said with respect to the primal process in the *Bernau Manuscripts*. Accordingly, the challenge for the phenomenology of time is precisely to think these two sides together. Secondly, and

Henry (2008, pp. 13–60), who suggests that insisting on the role of retentional consciousness, Husserl eventually neglects to properly account for the primacy of primal impression.

²⁷ Lévinas (2001, pp. 201f.) proposes some insightful remarks concerning the characterization of primal impression as primally welling-up [*urquellend*] and primally creating [*urschöpfend*], which precisely hint at the co-belonging of temporal form and content.

²⁸ Hua XXXIII, p. 77. For a graphical representation, made in accordance with Husserl’s descriptions in this text, see Kortooms (2002, pp. 172f.) and Schnell (1996).

²⁹ Differently from Larrabee (1989, 1994), thus, I do not consider that the temporal diagrams best exemplify the relationship between temporality and spatiality. In this case, indeed, we would restrict ourselves to geometric space. This implies that the represented time shall also be considered as the result of an idealization. Yet, this is not what Husserl is describing in these texts. Therefore, I do not think that Larrabee’s alternative diagrams, supposed to better reproduce the dynamic character of time, would overcome the main difficulties in diagrammatic representation either.

most importantly, the analogy with spatial perspective is apparently based on the notion of quasi-objective distance, which is still in need of phenomenological legitimation. Talking about a progressive shrinking of the temporal phases in proportion with their increasing distance from the now point risks collapsing into a merely quantitative, and even quasi-mechanical, model of description. Yet, is this description adequate to the phenomenon of perspective? I think there are reasons to be skeptical about this. As I have argued considering spatiality, such objective distance is derivative with respect to the primal experience of remoteness. Whereas objective distance results from a de-centering and might be considered from the third-person perspective, remoteness refers to my actual and situated experience of far objects and, in the case of temporality, events. Accordingly, before being addressed in objective terms, both spatial and temporal perspective shall be considered as related to the situatedness of lived experience. In this sense, we shall be careful with the diagrammatic representation of temporal experience, since such a representation might give the misleading idea of a possible quantification or measurability of phenomena that are essentially and irreducibly qualitative. The situatedness of experience, we can anticipate, cannot be formally understood, because "being here", in this perceptual situation, also means being attracted by something, or neglect something else. This, as I will immediately argue, is related to the phenomenon of affection. And such affective component characterizing experience from its basic layers does not lend itself to formalization.

Moreover, one can wonder whether the analogy with spatiality and spatial perspective, in this respect, can hold in principle. If we consider visual experience, the proportional relationship between the shrinking of appearance and the increasing distance from the here-now might well be something that can be tested and eventually measured. This, however, would already imply a de-centering from lived experience and the assumption of a third-personal, objectivating account. Yet, can we really say that such an objectivating and formalizing account is possible in the case of temporal perspective? Can we establish a proportion between temporal distance and the shrinking of temporal phases? The fundamentals of Husserl's phenomenology of time allow us to answer this question negatively, since they exactly prevent us from conceiving of the temporal remoteness of past events from the now as objective or even measurable distance. Rather than insisting on the formal aspects of the progressive shrinking of the temporal extent [*Strecke*] that sinks back in the past (e.g., Hua XXXIII, p. 78), which might be read in terms of a quasi-mechanical and quasi-quantitative characterization of time consciousness, I suggest to follow another insight of Husserl's, based on the relationship between temporal perspective and the phenomenon of affection. To be sure, this way of considering the phenomenon of temporal perspective is not exempt from problems similar to the ones signaled above. Indeed, Husserl sometimes re-proposes the model of a proportional change also in this context. However, if we reflect on the implications of the connection between affection and temporal perspective, we may also propose a different interpretation, which is more faithful to the concrete unfolding of lived experience.

7.1.3 *Affective Perspective*

The relationship between temporal perspective and affection comes to the fore in the lectures on transcendental logic, published in Hua XI. Here, Husserl emphasizes the connection between temporal perspective, the phenomenon of fading-away, and the affective pull of the temporal object. Again, the description concerns the noematic side: although the noematic sense remains identical in and through the temporal modifications, these temporal modifications do impinge on its affective force and its qualitative differentiations.³⁰ Eventually, as Husserl points out, temporal perspective shall be considered as an “affective phenomenon”:

It is especially a matter here of the perspectival phenomenon proper to the living present and to its retentional streaming itself. We understand it not as a phenomenon of an actual loss of differentiations within the object, but in the first place, affectively: The perspective is an affective perspective.³¹

This quote suggests that temporal perspective shall be addressed in relation to the progressive weakening of the affective force corresponding to the progressive retentional sinking of the temporal object or event. Apparently, thus, the process of fading-away (and consequently the phenomenon of temporal perspective) is also conceived in proportional terms: the more a temporal event gets distant from the actual now, the more its affective force weakens. Indeed, there are other passages in this section of the lecture course that hint at such a proportional relationship, for instance, arguing for an increasing obfuscation, or diminishment of internal differentiations, the more the temporal object or event sinks back into the past.³² This would amount to saying that the more a temporal object or event is far from the present experience, the less it affects us; and the more it is far from the actual now, the less we are consciously aware of its qualities, structures, and internal differentiations. Yet, this conclusion is somehow problematic, since it would bring us back to the quantitative and quasi-mechanical model of description we have criticized above. Accordingly, the claim concerning the affective power of the present or what is immediately past needs some further qualification, particularly if we go beyond the field of immediate perceptual givenness and consider the power of memory and recollection. Indeed, there are significant events in our remote past that are certainly more “present” to us (both as their affective force and their mode of givenness are concerned) than less significant events in the closer past. I am much better aware of many details concerning my experiences on the day of my Ph.D. defense 4 years ago than of what I was thinking about this morning while having breakfast. The former event still has a strong affective force, and the givenness of its many details is not obfuscated just because it is farther in time. This is why we can say that it is more “present” to me. Accordingly, the way past events are presently given to us, and the power of their affection, cannot only depend on the formal moment

³⁰ Hua XI, pp. 170–171/(Husserl 2001a, pp. 218–220).

³¹ Hua XI, p. 172/(Husserl 2001a, pp. 220–221).

³² See Hua XI, pp. 168f./ (Husserl 2001a, pp. 216f.).

of temporal distance. Rather, an irreducible qualitative moment is implied, which eventually relates the meaningfulness of certain events in our life. I believe that the phenomenon of affective perspective, if not univocally considered in the previously mentioned sense of a progressive obfuscation, may precisely render the irreducibility of the qualitative moment in temporal givenness.

In order to test the plausibility of this claim, we shall consider more closely the relationship between affection and temporal perspective. This can be done by expanding on Husserl's claim that the original source of all affection can only be found in the primal impression, and its greater or lesser affectivity.³³ From this, it follows that the retentional modification and the phenomenon of fading-away entail a diminishment of affection, i.e., an obfuscation that tends to the zero-stage [*Nullstadium*] of indistinct affection.³⁴ Certainly, when we say that experiences fade-away from the immediate presence, we are implicitly arguing that they are not so vividly given to us as they were in primal impression, or that, as I have argued, their vividness has assumed a different character in presentification. In this sense, there is an unquestionable "affective primacy" of the primal impression: we are always immersed in the perceptual world, as it is presently given to us. From this statement, however, it does not follow that the obfuscation and the diminishment of the affective force are directly proportional to the increasing distance from the primal impression. This, indeed, would still amount to a somewhat mechanical understanding of the temporal givenness. Yet, this does not seem to be the way affection works. First, as Husserl points out, there are competing affections and prominences [*Abhebungen*],³⁵ and the strength in this competition cannot be considered as merely related to the distance from the present impression. Secondly, affection may give rise to an associative process that awakens particular images from the past, or to what Husserl calls occurring memories, i.e., memories that pop into our mind [*einfallende Erinnerungen*]. The affective power of such images may sometimes be even stronger than the affective power of what is presently perceived in perception.

These occurring memories can be compared to what Aristotle in his short treatise *On Memory and Reminiscence* calls memory [*mnēmē*] as distinguished from reminiscence [*anamnēsis*]. What is essential to both memory and reminiscence is their relatedness to the past. However, reminiscence entails an active process of search through which something that happened or was experienced in the past is regained. Such an active search, as Aristotle argues, is a movement that retraces the movements we once made, until we attain the past experience we were looking for (Aristotle 1931, 451b). Memory, instead, is properly defined as affection [*pathos*]. We happen to remember something on a certain occasion or in a certain situation that recalls the previous one. In this case, according to Aristotle, a past thought or sensation affects us anew, yet without being experienced as a present thought or as a present sensation (Aristotle 1931, 449b). What Husserl calls occurring memories shares with Aristotle's memory the moment of pathos. These memories, indeed, are one form of what we

³³ Hua XI, p. 168/(Husserl 2001a, p. 217).

³⁴ Hua XI, p. 171/(Husserl 2001a, p. 220).

³⁵ Hua XI, p. 148f./Husserl 2001a, pp. 196f.).

can call implicit memory, grounded on the affective force presently exercised by past events, and shall be distinguished from both explicit recollections and retention.³⁶ Different from recollections, memories that pop into our minds do not stem from an explicitly and sometimes even voluntarily accomplished act that presently reproduces the past and they do not immediately fit the complex interconnection of memories that make up one's life history. Rather, they emerge associatively, triggered by something that affects us in the present situation. And they first emerge as vague "images", which also affect our present experience despite not being properly part of it. Different from retentions, which can also be considered as a form (and eventually as the most basic form) of implicit memory, occurring memories are nonetheless presentifications of past events and do not belong to the present act of perception as one of its moments. As Husserl writes in this text, "memories emerge by themselves" (Hua XXXIII, 362), and this "spontaneous", associative emerging is due to the distinctive affective force of past events:

Now, a recollection can also have the character of emerging from the obscure horizon of the past. It emerges as something stationary and enduring, it functions as a secondary sensibility, produces an allure to the spontaneous turning-to and then further, when we "delve" into this intention, to the production of a once more constituting memory, as a renewal of perception in the modification of the recollecting revived-consciousness, in which the event constitutes itself again quasi originally as unity of something enduring. And therefore, a chain of obscure, dead memories that springs anew into mind, can have a unitary allure and pass into a chain of constituting recollections. (Hua XXXIII, p. 364)

One example of such memories can be found in Hua XI. Here, Husserl refers to the experience of being distracted from a conversational situation by the sudden and spontaneous presentification of the image of a wonderful seascape. This image does not immediately fit the situation, and rather provokes a certain feeling of strangeness. The emergence of such a vague image may become an affordance to further pursue it, to explore its inner details and to make it less vague. And this somehow "interrupts" the unfolding of experience.³⁷ Pursuing this image and its internal qualitative differentiations, we can also become aware of the source for its emergence, for its coming to mind spontaneously. We may thus explicitly realize its associative and affective nature. For instance, such an image might have been triggered by a similar topic that was discussed in the present conversation and in one conversation held some time before at the seaside.³⁸ Or again, it might be triggered by a sensible experience (e.g., a smell) that presently affects me and implicitly recalls the past

³⁶I will return on the distinction between implicit and explicit memory in the next chapter, since this will allow me to better highlight the relationship between memory and the bodily subject.

³⁷As it has been thoughtfully explored by Waldenfels (2002, pp. 99f.) in the context of his responsive phenomenology, the relationship between affection and affordance is one of the fundamental traits of the experience of the alien. After all, affection always confronts us with something we cannot completely master and allow us to provide a meaningful response. This response, however, is necessarily "displaced" [*verschoben*] with respect to the affordance. On the phenomenology of temporal and spatial "displacement" [*Verschiebung*], see Waldenfels (2003, 2009). On the temporality of affection, see Micali (2008, pp. 62f.).

³⁸Hua XI, p. 174/(Husserl 2001a, p. 223).

situation. As the example shows, in some cases, past events, in spite of being distant from the actual now, may be re-awakened by a present affection and exert such a strong affective power as to predominate even in the present.

Considering the different modes of givenness of nearer and more remote past in relation to the phenomenon of affection might offer a different view on temporal perspective. The latter cannot be formally reduced to the result of a quasi-mechanical process. It rather refers to the particular view I presently have on my past experience. This view is not perspectival because of the quasi-objective distance between my present and past experience. It is perspectival because I do recollect or re-experience past events from a certain angle, that is to say, from my present situation. From my present perspective, I “see” those facets of the things or those moments of the event that are significant to me in this particular situation. In other words, experience, in its different modalities, is not a view from nowhere. It is rather situated, selective, interested, and therefore perspectival. Moreover, considered in relation to the affective force of memory (particularly of the memories that pop into our minds), the phenomena of fading-away and temporal perspective shed light on the concrete relation of the present, past and future phases of consciousness.³⁹ Indeed, memories can be actualized only by virtue of the associative relation between past and present, and by virtue of the affection of past experience on the present, which is always already protentionally projected into the future.

Accordingly, temporal perspective shall not be too strictly considered in analogy with the spatial phenomenon of perspectival manifestation, if by this phenomenon we mean the display of objects in a measurable distance. Temporal perspective refers instead to the oriented and situated appearance of objects and events, to their fading-away from the immediate presence, and nevertheless possibly affecting us in the present situation. Yet, doesn’t this account of temporal perspective also impinge on the characterization of spatial perspective?

7.1.4 *Interconnections: Perspective, Proximity, and Remoteness*

The previous discussion has shown in what sense the analogical reasoning is not fully appropriate to understand the relationship between spatial and temporal perspective. Yet, such a relationship may also be addressed in a different way.

³⁹The emergence of such images from the past presupposes and is founded upon the operativeness of what Husserl calls “far retentions” [*Fernretentionen*]. Cf. Hua XI, p. 288/(Husserl 2001a, pp. 422–423). These are not a presentifying consciousness of the past, nor are they moments of my perceptual experience, retaining the immediate past, such as near retentions are. Far retentions are rather the operative syntheses that make the preservation of past experiences for consciousness possible in and through the process of fading-away, and the partial modification of content. One could further complement this account by considering the openness to the future of the temporal stream, and thus not only near, but also far protentions. See De Warren (2009, pp. 177f.) and Rodemeyer (2006, pp. 86–92).

This can be done by considering perspective as a spatio-temporal phenomenon. Indeed, only integrating the remarks on spatial and temporal perspective can we properly understand the questions regarding the relationship between remoteness and perspectival givenness, which have been raised above with respect to spatiality. Concluding the paragraph on spatial perspective, I argued that the meaning of remoteness could not become fully evident without a proper account of temporality. Considering the interconnection of the spatial and the temporal dimensions, it is now possible to (1) clarify the meaning of the relationship between remoteness and perspectival givenness; and (2) determine the distinctive mode of experiencing remoteness as distinguished from objective distance. These two points converge in the characterization of perspective as an affective phenomenon.

As to the first point, the relationship between perspectival givenness and remoteness cannot be understood in merely quantitative or proportional terms (the more an object or event is remote, the more its intuitive fullness decreases or the more its internal differentiations fade-away). Rather, this relationship shall be understood qualitatively, as related to the experience of a spatio-temporally situated subject. Besides, the link between remoteness and perspectival givenness shall be conceived in relation to the interplay of the determinations “here”, “there”, “now”, “before” and “later”. These are not simply formal determinations. They shall rather be considered in relation to the phenomenon of affection: I experience the remoteness of an object that affects me presently and I may wish to come closer to it and perceive it more clearly. Considering temporal perspective, I experience the remoteness of a temporal event that pops into my mind, I may pursue my recollection and try in this way to come somehow “closer” to my previous experience. Accordingly, as to the second point, the qualitative experience of remoteness shall be distinguished from the construction of objective measurable distance. Different from the latter, the former cannot be formalized or quantified. Such an irreducible qualitative character of remoteness is related to the situatedness of lived experience, here and now. Concretely considered, such situatedness implies that perception is selectively guided by particular affective affordances, awakening the interests of the perceiving subject.

If all this is true, the experience of remoteness and proximity is itself based upon the intertwining of the spatial and the temporal dimensions of experience. Perceiving something as spatially remote immediately has a temporal determination too, referring for instance to the time I would need to reach that something or to explore it. Moreover, the qualitative character of affection is not only proper to the givenness of temporal events. Also, the spatial givenness of things has a distinctive affective character: the perspectival appearance of a certain object in a certain location may become an affective affordance for us, for instance to further explore the object or to get closer to it. The aspect of the object that is presently given may “call” our attention, invite us, as it were, to uncover further and further determinations, or to find the best position to perceive it properly. In addition, remoteness itself is affectively connoted, in its being advantageous or adverse to the proper appearance of the thing. Thus, reconsidering spatio-temporal perspectival givenness in the light

of the phenomenon of affection, we can see a clear reference to the pathos of experience, arising from something that “calls” and awakens the subject.⁴⁰ This clearly emerges from Husserl’s notorious definition of affection:

By affection we understand the allure given to consciousness, the peculiar pull that an object given to consciousness exercises on the ego; it is a pull that is relaxed when the ego turns toward it attentively, and progresses from here, striving toward self-giving intuition, disclosing more and more of the self of the object, thus, striving toward an acquisition of knowledge, toward a more precise view of the object.⁴¹

This account of perspectival givenness, however, remains incomplete as long as the intentional structures that underlie perspectival givenness and the constitution of sensible things in and through their perspectival appearance are not explored. As we will see in the next section, the previous discussion of spatial and temporal perspective from a noematic point of view has important reverberations on the developments of Husserl’s theory of intentionality and sensible experience.

7.2 Perspectival Givenness and Intentionality

In the philosophy of mind, the problem of perspectival givenness is often phrased by referring to the “duality of content” characteristic of perception.⁴² On the one hand, we perceive things. That is to say, we see a round table or a cube. Yet, on the other hand, the way in which these things are given to us is precisely bound to a certain perspective. From this perspective, the surface of the table appears as elliptical and we do actually see only three faces of the cube, which are not perfect squares but rather parallelograms. Of course, what we are explicitly aware of are the things themselves, in their effective shape, and not their perspectival appearances. And yet, even if we normally do not reflect upon the difference between the shape of the thing and the shape as it appears to us, we are implicitly familiar with perspectival properties. Although Husserl states the problem in partially different terms, he is also concerned in showing how such a “duality of content” is possible in general, that is to say, how it is possible that we perceive things even though we only have a perspectival view on them. Husserl’s answer to such a problem is based on the inquiry concerning the intentional structures that are correlated to perspectival display.

Describing the perspectival display of sensible things, Husserl notably distinguishes between the proper [*eigentliche*] givenness of the manifest profiles and the improper [*uneigentliche*] givenness of the hidden ones. One may suppose that Husserl is herewith simply rephrasing a central problem in the empiricist theory of perception. Most theories of perception in classical empiricism, indeed, distinguish a proper

⁴⁰Regarding the understanding of affection as pathos see Montavont (1994, 1999, pp. 222–229), Waldenfels (2002, pp. 98f.).

⁴¹Hua XI, pp. 148–149/(Husserl 2001a, p. 196).

⁴²E.g., Noë (2004, pp. 163f.). In partially different terms, the same issue is also phrased by Costa (2007). In this respect see also, Summa (*forthcoming*).

and an improper meaning of the verb “perceiving”. The proper meaning refers to the sensible data. When the verb “perceiving” indicates our consciousness of things, instead, its meaning is improper, since it results from a process of linguistic construction and is mediated by habits (Spinicci 1997, pp. 54–55). Certainly, for Husserl, we do not perceive the *aistheta idia* specific to each of our senses and subsequently synthesize them as belonging to one thing. In perceiving, we are not intentionally directed toward sense data, but rather toward objects.⁴³ However, one may still suspect that the empiricist distinction is simply transposed within his noematic account of perception and perspectival givenness. In other words, does Husserl’s distinction between proper and improper givenness imply that we perceive the singular profiles of the thing as independent parts, which are only subsequently synthesized as to construct the unity of one thing? Does our perception of the thing, and the constitution of its identity, merely result from the sum of our perceptions of the singular parts? A positive answer to these questions is problematic for many reasons. For instance, we could not explain how it is possible that we experience things as unitary and made up of different profiles even when we have access to only a limited number of such profiles. Moreover, we could not say what the perception of a profile or of an aspect of the thing amounts to. However, Husserl’s distinction between proper and improper manifestation of profiles does not imply such an account of perception as the sum of independent parts. Throughout the developments of his theory of perception, indeed, he repeatedly argues that we immediately perceive things as unitary wholes, which, however, manifest themselves in and through different appearances. To understand how this is possible, a noetic analysis of the kind of awareness we have of the manifest and the hidden profiles of the thing is required. This point will be the focus of the next paragraph. On the basis of such analyses, we will subsequently be prompted to reconsider the process of perceptual fulfillment and its reverberation on the description of intentional consciousness as a dynamic tendency.

7.2.1 *The Givenness of the Hidden Profiles*

Already in his earliest texts on perception, Husserl struggles with the problem of clarifying how we can perceive the thing as a unity, once it is admitted that, in a strict sense, we properly see only some of its profiles. The hidden profiles, indeed, are not given “in the flesh” [*leibhaft*] and do not have an intuitive substance [*Gehalt*.⁴⁴ One early solution to this problem is developed in the *Sixth Logical Investigation*, and in the lectures concerning perception in the 1904/05 course on *Important Points from the Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge*.

⁴³ Hua XIX/1, p. 80/(Husserl 2001b, p. 214); Hua XIX/1, p. 396/(Husserl 2001c, p. 104).

⁴⁴ Hua XIX/2, pp. 608–610/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 234–235). See also, among others, Hua XXII, pp. 269–302; Hua III/1, pp. 91f., 225f./ (Husserl 1983, pp. 94f., 236f.).

In the *Sixth Logical Investigation*, Husserl aims to solve that problem by resorting to the distinction between intuitive and signitive apprehension.⁴⁵ Clearly inspired by the phenomenological analyses of the consciousness of signs developed in the *First Investigation*, Husserl applies the same model to perceptual experience, thereby considering the hidden profiles as the correlate of a signitive intention. Although they do not belong to the intuitive substance of perception, these profiles are co-intended in the present perception, insofar as they are signitively indicated by the actually appearing profiles.⁴⁶ Accordingly, the perception of the thing as a whole would have a composite mode of apprehension, entailing both intuitive and signitive apprehension.

Even more explicitly, an analogous claim is made in the first part of Husserl's 1904/05 lecture course, entitled *On Perception* [*Über Wahrnehmung*]. Referring to what he calls the improperly perceived determinations of the thing and their improper presentation (Hua XXXVIII, pp. 26f.), Husserl argues that:

Besides its original apprehensional character, the character of direct presentation, a further apprehensional character attaches itself to sensation, a completely novel one, whereby the sensation does not only serve as real presentation [*Präsentant*] for a determination, which really makes it appear as present. Rather, it also imprints in the directly presented determination quasi the character of a sign for an associated determination that is objectually intertwined with it, although not really presented. (Hua XXXVIII, pp. 35–36)

Accordingly, the sensible contents of the present act would have a twofold function, depending on how they are respectively apprehended: they can be either immediately apprehended as presenting, namely with respect to the properly appearing profiles or determinations of the object, or mediately apprehended as signs indicating the profiles that do not presently appear. Yet, as early as in 1898 (Hua XXXVIII, pp. 155–156), Husserl expresses some perplexities regarding such an understanding of the composite structure of the act. The distinction of different forms of apprehension in the one intuitive act shall not be misunderstood as to signify that the latter is a bundle or a sum of singular intentions. On the contrary, the act has one singular intention directed toward the object. Yet, it remains to be explained how such an intention is determined with respect to the manifest and the hidden profiles. Other perplexities, more directly related to the idea of a composite form of apprehension (intuitive and signitive), are expressed in texts coeval to the lecture course on perception (Hua XXXVIII, pp. 208–209, 36, footnote). The consequences of these perplexities will be explicitly drawn, among others, at paragraph 43 of *Ideas I*, where Husserl claims that intuitive givenness does not entail depictive-symbolic nor signitive-symbolic moments. This, indeed, would imply both the non-phenomenological admission of a thing in itself, which is in

⁴⁵ Cf. Hua XIX/2, p. 624/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 244–245).

⁴⁶ On Husserl's theory of sign and signitive intention, see Hua XIX/1, pp. 30f./Husserl 2001b, pp. 283f.). On its application to perception, see Hua XIX/2, pp. 586–592/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 218–222). On the difference between intuitive and signitive substance [*Gehalt*], see Hua XIX/2, pp. 610–614/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 235–238).

principle inaccessible to perception⁴⁷ and a relapse into the image theory of perception, criticized in the *Fifth Logical Investigation* (cf. Bernet 1994, pp. 126f).

What is the alternative to this approach? One first answer to this question is given in the *Dingvorlesung*, where Husserl argues that we do have a direct consciousness of these profiles, although an empty one.⁴⁸ Such an empty representation of the hidden profiles is something completely different from both signitive and imaginative representations. Accordingly, the hidden profiles of the thing, or the parts that appear improperly, are not “presented” [*dargestellt*] in any way.⁴⁹ Rather, they are emptily co-intended, in our perception of the whole thing. What Husserl calls empty consciousness [*Leerbewusstsein*], thus, is a specific kind of direct consciousness, namely the consciousness of what is hidden, or what is both present and absent at the same time. More properly, Husserl refers in this respect to empty components of apprehension [*leere Auffassungskomponente*], as to indicate that, in this case, apprehension is not bound to any specific sensible content. Consequently, as he points out:

Perception is [...] a complex of full and empty intentions (rays of apprehension). The full intentions or full apprehensions are the properly presentational ones; the empty are precisely empty of any presentational material. They actually bring nothing to presentation, although they have their direction toward the relevant moments of the object.⁵⁰

Empty intentions, however, shall not be confused with obscure or undetermined representations. The distinction between empty and fulfilled representation rather crosses the distinction between determinate and indeterminate representations, so that we can have, for instance, an empty but determinate representation (such as in the case of well-known, familiar things), or instead indeterminate. Conversely, we can have both a determined and an indeterminate fulfilled intention, for instance in accordance with the atmospheric circumstances in which our perception takes place: in daylight we are most likely to have a determinate perception, in darkness an indeterminate one.⁵¹

When perceiving a tridimensional thing, thus, we co-intend the hidden profiles in an empty way. Nevertheless, this emptiness does not seem to properly amount to a total lack of intuitiveness. For, even if we do not have a fulfilled consciousness of the hidden profiles, we effectively intuit their presence and even some of their determinations. For instance, if we are looking at a tridimensional thing, we intend the back side as made up of an indeterminate number of (no matter how) colored surfaces, and we can even intuit the possible range of their extension (they cannot be bigger than the manifest profiles if we do not see them). Accordingly, intuitiveness cannot be exclusively grounded upon the proper givenness of presenting sensible data. There is, instead, a specific kind of intuition also in the absence of presenting

⁴⁷ Hua III/1, pp. 89–91/(Husserl 1983, pp. 92–94).

⁴⁸ Hua XVI, pp. 55f./Husserl 1997, pp. 46f.).

⁴⁹ Hua XVI, p. 57/(Husserl 1997, p. 48).

⁵⁰ Hua XVI, p. 57/(Husserl 1997, p. 48).

⁵¹ Hua XVI, p. 58/(Husserl 1997, p. 49).

sensible data. As I will argue later on, this specific kind of perceptual intuition is strictly related to the structure of time consciousness, and particularly the intuitive character of retentions and protentions.

The particular kind of intuitiveness of the hidden profiles is more explicitly addressed in some of the texts written in 1913 for the revision of the *Sixth Logical Investigation*.⁵² Here, Husserl explores in more detail the structure of the act that make such an intuitive, yet empty, consciousness possible. In his *Umarbeitung*, Husserl is, among others, engaged in the complex distinction of the different modes of empty consciousness, thereby stressing once more the analogies and the differences between empty and signitive representations. Signitive and empty representations are analogous because, in both cases, the intention directed toward what is presently manifested (e.g., the sign and the properly given profile of the object) is accompanied by a co-intention, directed toward something that does not properly manifest itself (respectively: what is indicated by the sign and the hidden profile of the object). However, the modes of being co-intended are profoundly different in the two cases. In the case of the signitive intention, the relation of *signum* and *designatum* is extrinsic and concerns two different entities. On the contrary, the relation between fulfilled and empty intentions in the perception of the thing is intrinsic to the intuitive act considered as a whole; both intentions are not directed toward two different entities, but rather toward two aspects of the one thing (Hua XX/1, p. 91). Thus, in intuitive acts (both perceptual and imaginative), fulfilled and empty intentions are deeply interwoven: the latter can be designated as the halo [*Hof*] or the irradiation [*Strahlenkranz*] of the former (Hua XX/1, p. 90). Hence, every intuitive intention is a whole made up of fulfilled and empty intentions as non-independent moments. Husserl goes even further in his argument, claiming that a specific intuitiveness belongs to empty consciousness [*Leerbewusstsein*].⁵³ Such a claim makes more explicit what was already implicit in the considerations proposed in *Thing and Space*. We do “see” that there is a hidden profile, and we can anticipate some of its features, even if this profile is not presented to us by sensible contents. According to Husserl, such intuitiveness results from the pointing ahead [*Fortweisungen*] of the proper appearances of the thing towards the improper. More precisely, he distinguishes two modes of such pointing ahead: on the one hand, it concerns the different appearances of one and the same profile (for instance considered in a different orientation or in different circumstances), and this is called pointing into [*Hineinweisen*] (Hua XX/1, pp. 91–92); on the other hand, it concerns the co-reference between different profiles by means of contiguity associations, and this is called pointing beyond [*Hinausweisen*] (Hua XX/1, p. 92). Thus, correlative to the noematic pointing

⁵²More precisely, I am referring to chapters 2–4 (Hua XX/1, Text Nr. 3) and to the appendixes V and VI. Given the thematic unity of these texts, Edith Stein proposed to collect these texts in a publication entitled *Die Leermodifikation*. See Melle (2002, p. XXX).

⁵³In this respect, I do not agree with Barbaras (1999, pp. 50f.), when he claims that emptiness is only determined negatively, i.e., as non-givenness [*non-donation*], and that this is related to Husserl’s disregard for the constitutive dimension of emptiness within perception.

ahead, a synthesis of association is at work in thing constitution.⁵⁴ And this is what makes the specific kind of intuitiveness of the hidden profiles. Albeit Husserl refers here only to contiguity, I believe that the syntheses of resemblance should be also implied in this pointing ahead. The correlate of the empty consciousness, indeed, must be similar in certain respects to the correlate of the fulfilled intention. For instance, in the perception of a spatial thing, it is certainly another extended profile, and cannot be a sound or something else. In some later texts, Husserl will also call the consciousness of the hidden profiles an “appresentation”⁵⁵. This account of thing constitution implies a dynamic understanding of synthesis and intentionality, which, as Melle points out, is clearly shaped at least from the *Dingvorlesung*.⁵⁶ Perception cannot be reduced to a static staring at things, but rather unfolds as a process of progressive uncovering of profiles and aspects along the lines of the just described interplay of fulfilled and empty intentions. In the next paragraph, we shall consider the implications of this account of perception in further detail.

7.2.2 *Tendency and the Process of Fulfillment*

After the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl’s remarks concerning empty consciousness become increasingly related to a new formulation of the theory of fulfillment. This reformulation concerns not only perceptual acts, but also meaning giving acts and volitional acts.⁵⁷ Regarding all these acts, and notwithstanding the essential differences among them, Husserl gets to the description of the process of fulfillment as a tendency [*Tendenz*]. More precisely, however, since such a tendency apparently goes through all intentional experiences, we may even go as far as to consider it the

⁵⁴ See Holenstein (1972, pp. 42–43). Husserl distinguishes here these associations from the retentional modifications as a non-associative empty consciousness. Hua XX/1, pp. 94–96. See also, Hua XI, pp. 75–78/(Husserl 2001a, pp. 117–121).

⁵⁵ With this meaning the notion is adopted for instance in manuscript D 13 III/217b–218a; Hua XIII, pp. 21f., Hua XI, p. 202/(Husserl 2001a, p. 253), and Hua I, pp. 149f./ (Husserl 1960, p. 120f.) As it is well known, the notion of appresentation is also adopted to describe my experience of other subjects, Hua XIII, pp. 374–375, 378; Hua IV, pp. 162f./ (Husserl 1989, p. 170f.). I cannot discuss here the meaning of this analogy. Let us only stress that, in both cases, the appresentation refers to the direct and intuitive consciousness I have of something that is not fully given (the hidden profiles of the thing and the other’s inner life). Of course, the two forms of awareness are also distinguished. Thus, for instance, the non-appearing profiles are defined as determinable indeterminacy [*bestimmbare Unbestimmtheit*], Hua XI, p. 6/(Husserl 2001a, p. 42). On the other hand, the inner life of the other is somehow directly manifest to me, e.g., through his/her expressions, and I do not need to infer it by means of some intellectual reasoning. Yet, since I will never have full access to the experiences of the other, there is a sense in which his/her inner life necessarily remains in many ways indeterminate and inaccessible to me. This is what makes the alienness [*Fremdheit*] of the other. Cf. Hua I, p. 144/(Husserl 1960, p. 114); Hua XV, p. 631.

⁵⁶ See, notably, Hua XVI, pp. 105–139/(Husserl 1997, pp. 89–115) and Melle (1983, pp. 101f.).

⁵⁷ See Hua XX/2, pp. 131–224 and Melle (2005, pp. XXXII–XXXVII).

very mode of being of intentional consciousness.⁵⁸ For the present argument, I shall focus only on how such an understanding of intentionality as tendency reverberates upon the description of sensible experience.

To this aim, we shall first consider how the system of implications characterizing the perception of things is related to such an understanding of intentionality as a tendency. We can find some clues to the answer of this question in the lecture courses on transcendental logic Husserl held in the Twenties. Describing, as an example, the perception of a table, Husserl restates the claim concerning the specific form of intuitive awareness of the hidden profiles. These are given to consciousness in the form of an empty pointing ahead [*Leervorweisen*].⁵⁹ Noematically, as Husserl writes few lines before, this means that the objective sense, or the identity-core of the thing, is not only the substratum of the properly appearing profiles, but also of a form of indicating [*Hinweisen*] toward moments not yet appearing. Yet, such “indications” are at the same time “tendencies” that push us towards the uncovering of profiles that are not presently given. More precisely, they are not isolated indications; they rather make up “indicative systems”, i.e., “systems of rays” that point toward corresponding systems of appearances.⁶⁰ Such a characterization of perception as a system of indications and tendencies is connected with the affection that, as we have seen previously, irradiates from what we perceive perspectively. What just said appears to be strictly connected to the characterization of intentionality as tendency. Accordingly, we can already say that tendency is both referred to activity (I am affectively attracted by something and I tend to follow this something in its diverse appearances), and to passivity (affection itself is a tendency to awaken the Ego).⁶¹

Yet, in order to better understand the meaning of these claims, we shall emphasize how the inquiry into empty consciousness impinges upon the description of intentionality as a tendency and upon the determination of the syntheses that are operative in perception. Let us make, then, a step backward and consider again the *Umarbeitung* of the *Sixth Logical Investigation*. At paragraph 17, which is completely new with respect to the published version of the book, Husserl describes the perceptual act as follows:

Through the character of elementary intentions, the character of the respective concrete entire acts that are to be formed out of them, whose unity is essentially produced by the syntheses of fulfillment that dominate between these elements, is then determined. Similarly, the possible forms of fulfillment, which essentially belong to the concrete acts of such types, are also determined. The production of the concrete act is obviously not a mere additive connection of independent elements, but rather a very peculiar unity, in which the overall intention is quasi acted out [*sich auslebt*] in the elementary intentions, yet, with regard to them, it constitutes the concrete overall object, which is founded upon their intentional correlates. In the continuous transition of intrinsically related acts of one and the same phenomenological type, which continuously fulfill themselves, the concrete appearing object

⁵⁸ A thorough inquiry into the characterization of intentionality as tendency has been developed by Deodati (2011).

⁵⁹ Hua XI, p. 6/(Husserl 2001a, p. 42).

⁶⁰ Hua XI, p. 5/(Husserl 2001a, pp. 41–42).

⁶¹ In this respect, see Hua XI, pp. 166f./ (Husserl 2001a, pp. 214f.) and Montavont (1999).

as such constantly coincides with itself. It is in its multiple unitary modes of appearance consistently conscious [*bewusst*] as the same and as self-given. (Hua XX/1, p. 93)

In this dense passage, Husserl recapitulates his theory of fulfillment, dating back to the *Logical Investigations* and partially revisited in the *Umarbeitung*. Particularly, in the quoted passage, Husserl stresses the continuous character of the synthesis of perceptual fulfillment making the constitution of identical things possible. Perception, accordingly, is a complex intentional unity, which is not reducible to the mere sum of independent parts, the so-called elementary intentions. Such elementary intentions are rather interwoven moments, and in each of these moments the overall intention of the act “is acted out” [*sich auslebt*], or find its expression. Accordingly, perception is a continuous process of fulfillment.⁶²

This account of perception as a continuous synthesis of fulfillment is a development of some ideas already exposed in the *Sixth Logical Investigation*.⁶³ In this text, indeed, we can find two descriptions of the process of fulfillment of objectivating acts. In the first one, fulfillment is said to have the character of a “unity of identification” [*Identifizierungseinheit*] or, in a narrower sense, of a “unity of cognition” [*Erkenntnisseinheit*], which corresponds to the identity of the intentional object.⁶⁴ Schematically, we can say that the synthesis of fulfillment is thus based upon three moments: (1) an empty intention; (2) the fulfillment of this empty intention; and (3) the synthesis of identification or coincidence of (1) what was empty-intended and (2) the intuitive fulfillment. Accordingly, the constitution of an identical object is made by an act of synthesis (i.e., the synthesis of identification), which effectively establishes the coincidence of the other two moments.⁶⁵ This model, stemming from the analyses of fulfillment of meaning intentions in meaning giving acts,⁶⁶ is not the only one that can be found in the *Sixth Logical Investigation*. In fact, in some passages, Husserl also refers to a continuous synthesis when describing the fulfillment of perceptual acts, without resorting to any act of synthesis, i.e., to the third moment in the aforementioned schema, besides empty intention and fulfillment.⁶⁷ According to

⁶²As we will see when considering the temporal unfolding of this process, a process of emptying corresponds to the process of fulfilling empty intentions.

⁶³According to Kortooms (2002, pp. 158–168), it is only in the *Bernau Manuscripts*, with respect to the development of the phenomenology of time, that the continuous synthesis of fulfillment replaces the model of the synthetic act of the *Logical Investigations*. Yet, I believe that Kortooms’s account should be integrated in two respects. First, some remarks concerning continuous synthesis can be found already in the *Sixth Logical Investigation*, and certainly in the 1913 revision. Secondly, continuous synthesis is not only related to temporal constitution, but also to the perceptual constitution of spatial things.

⁶⁴Hua XIX/2, p. 584/(Husserl 2001c, p. 217).

⁶⁵Cf. Hua XIX/2, pp. 560–581/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 202–215).

⁶⁶In the *Umarbeitung*, this model of fulfillment is revisited also regarding meaning giving acts. Synthetically, this revision can be presented as follows. The verbal sound [*Wortlauf*] is bearer of a tendency [*Hinweistendenz*] assuming a meaning function, to which both a fulfilled and an empty act can correspond. Also, in this case, no reference is apparently made to a third act of synthesis any more. See Hua XX/2, pp. 119–177.

⁶⁷Hua XIX/2, pp. 614f./ (Husserl 2001c, pp. 238f.).

this view, thus, the constitution of the perceptual thing results from the gradual increase of fulfillment, which does not require the third act of the synthesis of identification. Distinguishing these two ways of understanding the synthesis of fulfillment, I am not suggesting that there is a latent inconsistency in the argument made in the *Sixth Logical Investigation*. As a matter of fact, the two descriptions corresponds to two quite different theoretical concerns and, eventually, to two different phenomena. On the one hand, Husserl is interested in the constitution of the identical object as a unity of cognition, and in this case the third synthesis of identification is required. On the other hand, he is interested in describing the process of fulfillment in perception, which, despite being required for cognition, does not yet provide cognition in a stronger sense. To explicitly recognize an object as such, it is not sufficient that my intentions toward this particular object are intuitively fulfilled, I also need to explicitly identify the object as fulfilling my empty intention; in other words, I need to test whether what is given as the correlate of the fulfilled intention actually coincides with what was emptily intended.

In the following, I wish to argue that the characterization of intentionality as a tendency is strictly connected with the developments in the description of the continuous synthesis of fulfillment in perceptual acts. This becomes particularly clear in some of the manuscripts collected by Landgrebe as *Studies Concerning the Structure of Consciousness [Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins]*.⁶⁸ In one of these texts, Husserl describes perception as follows:

Every thing-perception, I meant, is a “complex of intentional rays”, that is, a complex of “tendencies”, distinguished by their “sense”, their direction, and at occurrence full or empty. They fuse into unities, in which the unity of sense, of the objective direction, prevails.⁶⁹

Perceiving, thus, entails a constant tendency of transition from what is given to constantly new appearances, throughout the continuous series of fulfillment that makes up the unity of a perceptual object.⁷⁰ It follows that:

⁶⁸ Husserl wrote these texts mainly in the Göttingen period. In 1927, Landgrebe was assigned the task to edit these texts for publication. Landgrebe collected them in four groups, with the following titles: (1) *Aktivität und Passivität*; (2) *Wertkonstitution, Gemüt, Wille*; (3) *Modalität und Tendenz*. These texts are now in the process of being published by the Husserl Archives. Regarding the genesis of these manuscripts and some of the topics they deal with see Bernet (2006), Deodati (2011), Melle (2012), and Vongehr (2004).

⁶⁹ “Jede Dingwahrnehmung, meinte ich, ist ein “Komplex von intentionalen Strahlen”, das wäre ein Komplex von “Tendenzen”, unterschieden durch ihren “Sinn”, ihre Richtung, und je nachdem voll und leer. Sie verschmelzen zu Einheiten, in denen Einheit des Sinnes, der gegenständlichen Richtung waltet.” A VI 12 I/114b.

⁷⁰ “To pay attention to an object, to observe a thing: tendency of the transition from appearance to ever new appearance, from apprehension to ever new apprehension within the series of fulfillment of perception (unity of the appearing object)” “Auf ein Gegenständliches aufmerken, ein Ding betrachten: Tendenz des Übergangs von Erscheinung zu immer neuer Erscheinung, von Erfassung zu immer neuer Erfassung innerhalb der Serie der Erfüllungen der Wahrnehmung (Einheit des erscheinenden Gegenstands).” A VI 12 I/206b.

Perception is animated by perceptual tendencies, tendencies of the continuous transition of apperceptions into new apperceptions, tendencies to go through the manifold of sense data and, thus, to get the “images” running-off.⁷¹

From these quotations, we can see that the tendency that animates perception through and through is a movement of discovery. In perception, we tend to see more aspects of the thing, to uncover its hidden profiles, to make what is given confusedly clearer. This amounts to saying that we seek a richer and richer intuitive fulfillment. Thus, the phenomenological approach to perception is not limited to the descriptions of the structural moments of an intentional act, but it rather entails the analyses of intentionality as a movement tending towards its completion [*Vollzug*]. In this sense, Husserl also characterizes the different, both active and passive, moments of perceptual consciousness as “activities” [*Tun* or *Tätigkeit*], whereby activity does not necessarily result out of an Egoic voluntary resolution.

I thus have the distinction of a “doing”, which is not an “I-doing”, from the “I-do”. I have “allures” for the egoless doing and allures for the attentional doing and observing. Just as I have a perceiving before the “I am perceiving”, I certainly have – and established in that – a traversing before the “I am traversing”.⁷²

Therefore, tendency operates at different layers of sensible experience: from the layer of the interplay of the motivating multiplicities of sensations [*motivierenden Empfindungsmannigfaltigkeiten*], which give rise to tendencies that do not require an explicit Egoic participation, up to the apperceptions that are explicitly accomplished by the Ego.

As we said, to external perception essentially belongs the play of motivating manifolds of sensations, which in their courses have the character of active courses. They are courses in the sense of tendencies that relax, of “activities” [...]. These apperceptive courses as active courses are possible without “turning-to” of the Ego. On the other hand, accomplishing the apperception in the turning-to of the Ego as the “I am perceiving”, “I traverse observing”, makes the object into my object, object of my observing, and the observing itself, the traversing of all sense data of the eyes, the motivated running-off of “appearances” is “my” traversing, my observing-the-object-through-the-images.⁷³

⁷¹“Das Wahrnehmen ist belebt von Wahrnehmungstendenzen, Tendenzen des kontinuierlichen Übergehens von Apperzeptionen in neue Apperzeptionen, Tendenzen, die Sinnesdatenmannigfaltigkeiten zu durchlaufen und dadurch die “Bilder” zum Ablauf zu bringen.” A VI 12 I/20b

⁷²“Ich habe also den Unterschied eines “Tuns”, das nicht ein “Ich-Tun” ist, von dem “Ich-tue”. Ich habe “Reize” für das ichlose Tun und Reize für das aufmerkende Tun und Betrachten. Wie ich ein Wahrnehmen habe vor dem “Ich nehme wahr”, so habe ich natürlich – und darin beschlossen – ein Durchlaufen vor dem “Ich durchlaufe”[...].” A VI 12 I/21a.

⁷³“Zur äußereren Wahrnehmung gehört wesentlich, sagten wir, das Spiel der motivierenden Empfindungsmannigfaltigkeiten, die in ihren Verläufen den Charakter von tätigen Verläufen haben, es sind Abläufe im Sinn von Tendenzen, die sich entspannen, von “Tätigkeiten”. [...] Diese apperzeptiven Verläufe als tätige Verläufe sind möglich ohne “Zuwendung” des Ich. Andererseits, die Apperzeption<zu>vollziehen in der Zuwendung des Ich als das “Ich nehme wahr”, “Ich durchlaufe betrachtend”, macht es, dass das Objekt mein Objekt, Objekt meines Betrachtens ist, und das Betrachten selbst, das Durchlaufen der Augenempfindungsdaten, das motiviert Ablauenlassen der “Erscheinungen” ist “mein” Durchlaufen, mein Durch-die-Bilder-hindurch-das-Gegenständliche-Betrachten.” A VI 12 I, 20b–21a.

These layers are interconnected, for the passive tendencies are also the ones that awaken the Ego, and motivate the perceptual exploration of further and further aspects of the thing. The “latent” intentionality of passive tendencies is, indeed, presupposed as the basis for the so-called “patent” intentionality of Egoic acts.⁷⁴ Such a constant perceptual tendency going through the life of consciousness unfolds temporally. Therefore, the temporality of consciousness defines a unitary system of becoming:

Passive intentionality with passive fusions of continuous synthesis goes through monadic conscious life. In a steady stream, it transforms itself and thereby through the unity of the consciousness that is connected as continuous coincidence in the continuous synthesis. Thus, immanent time and the constantly expanding substance [*Gehalt*] of immanent becoming is a title for a system of becoming, consisting of constituted unities, being in their passive concordance [*Einstimmigkeit*] or coincidence, and being in the necessary temporal form.⁷⁵

Yet, the nexus between the intentional tendency and temporality needs to be explored in more detail. Particularly, we shall now consider more attentively the temporal modes of the continuous synthesis of fulfillment. The analysis of the temporal dynamics implied in the synthesis of fulfillment will allow us to understand why fulfillment shall be understood as a continuous incremental relation [*Steigerungsrelation*].⁷⁶ Moreover, such an inquiry will show more clearly in what sense the constant movement of transition is not only required for the constitution of the intentional correlate, but also for the unity of the intentional act.

7.2.3 *Temporal Constitution and the Process of Fulfillment*

In the *Bernau Manuscripts*, Husserl especially dwells on the understanding of fulfillment as a temporal process. In agreement with the general approach to temporality developed throughout these manuscripts, and also retraceable in some of the previous texts (e.g., text number 54 in Hua X), the analyses concerning empty consciousness and its fulfillment concern both the constitution of temporal events and the self-constitution of the stream of consciousness. Parallel to such a twofold temporal constitution, in text number 2 of Hua XXXIII, Husserl talks about a double meaning of fulfillment. He calls what happens in the constitution of temporal

⁷⁴“Latent intentionality is the prerequisite and the foundation for all patent intentionality, i.e., for all proper egoic acts. Die latente Intentionalität ist die Voraussetzung und Unterlage für alle patente Intentionalität, d.i. für alle eigentliche Ichakte.” A VI 27/6a

⁷⁵“Durch das monadische Bewusstseinsleben hindurch geht passive Intentionalität mit passiven Verschmelzungen kontinuierlicher Synthese, in beständigem Fortströmen sich abwandelnd und dabei durch Einheit des in der kontinuierlichen Synthese als kontinuierlicher Deckung verbundenen Bewusstseins. So ist immanente Zeit und der fortgesetzt sich erweiternde Gehalt des immanenten Werdens ein Titel für ein Werdenssystem aus konstituierten Einheiten, in ihrer passiven Einstimmigkeit oder Deckung seiend und in der notwendigen Zeitform seiend.” A VI 27/9a

⁷⁶Hua XIX/2, p. 596/(Husserl 2001c, p. 226), Hua XX/1, pp. 100f.

objects “particular fulfillment”. Conversely, “general fulfillment” is what makes the self-constitution of the temporal stream possible. Such a double meaning is further considered as related to retentions and protentions. Not only fulfillment (i.e., the moment of primal presentation) shall be considered both in relation to the temporal event and to the self-constitution of consciousness, but also what we may call, following Fink, the de-presencing intentionalities of time consciousness, namely retention and protention.⁷⁷ General fulfillment and particular fulfillment are not two reciprocally independent processes. On the contrary, they are two interrelated modes of temporal constitution in one and the same stream. On the one hand, indeed, no constitution of temporal objects would be possible without a pre-reflexive, and in itself temporal, self-consciousness.⁷⁸ On the other hand, no self-constitution of consciousness would be possible without the constitution of temporal objects and events, to which consciousness is intentionally related. In perfect correspondence to such chiasmatic interdependence between the constitution of temporal events and the self-constitution of the stream of consciousness, also the processes of particular and general fulfillment shall be considered as interrelated. In both cases, fulfillment is based on the interweaving of the three moments of temporal consciousness, namely primal impression, retention and protention.

Concerning general fulfillment, Husserl particularly insists on the interweaving of the two types of empty temporal consciousness, namely retention and protention, and consequently characterizes the temporal stream as merging [*Ineinander*] of protention and retention.⁷⁹ With this expression, Husserl wants to indicate the complex structure of every phase of the continuum of temporal consciousness, as being at once: (1) retention of the preceding moments; (2) retention of the protentions entailed by the preceding moments; (3) fulfillment of the preceding protentional empty intentions; and (4) protention with respect to the future. On the basis of such an interweaving, Husserl provides a dynamic description of the synthesis of general fulfillment, thereby particularly emphasizing the role of protention. Each new protention modifies, as it were, the preceding ones, which are still retentionally entwined with the present temporal phase:

The new phase is thus not only a transformation of retention in a retention of the next level, which, in its mediated intentionality, contains the previous one consciously as modified, and it is not only a transformation of the intertwined protention, but also a retention of the previous protention.[...] The new protention is new and modification of the previous, which, however, is itself conscious through a moment of interwoven retential consciousness. And it is precisely for this reason that the fulfilling coincidence arises in momentary consciousness itself. (Hua XXXIII, pp. 26–27)

⁷⁷ Hua XXXIII, p. 29. See also Fink (1966, p. 22).

⁷⁸ Regarding pre-reflexive self-awareness, and notably its temporal character, see Zahavi (1999, pp. 63–90, 2003, 2005, pp. 49–72). Considering more specifically the *Bernau Manuscripts*, Zahavi (2004) has argued that, in these texts, Husserl fails to give a proper account of pre-reflexive self-awareness, rather assimilating conscious acts and consciousness itself to objects. I consider the argument made here regarding the dynamical unfolding of temporal constitution and its relationship to the characterization of intentionality as tendency as contrasting with Zahavi’s view.

⁷⁹ See, notably, Hua XXXIII, pp. 3–15, 15–20, 21–49, 65–90, and 142–159.

Let us focus on the last sentence of this passage: the coincidence actualizes itself in the actual momentary consciousness. With respect to the previous remarks, we can say that the synthesis of fulfillment Husserl is considering here does not require any extra act of synthesis besides the primal process. Accordingly, we can consider this as a continuous process of fulfillment. Moreover, from the previous passage we can also understand why protention (in its merging with retention) plays such an important role in the analyses of the *Bernau Manuscripts*. The protentional openness towards the future, indeed, underlies the very dynamic and continuous process of fulfillment. As Husserl writes, the potentiality of a continuous fulfillment essentially belongs to temporal consciousness; and consequently, each new fulfillment also entails empty intentions directed toward new fulfillment.⁸⁰ This, I submit, is nothing but the description of the temporal unfolding of intentionality as tendency:

The original process is an infinite “protentional” process, i.e., a process that constantly passes from the described U_x continua to ever new U . And in each phase U_x , it is a conscious tendency of transition to a new phase, and every occurring phase is in itself in accordance with the previous tendency. And this continuously. Fulfillment here means “to come in the sense of a tendency”. Namely, tendency here is a mode of consciousness, and what comes, what arises in the sense of the tendency, is as such conscious in consciousness itself, and it is in turn tendency to “something to come”. As such, every phase is intention and fulfillment into infinity. (Hua XXXIII, pp. 30–31).⁸¹

Understanding the process as infinite seems to be a logical consequence of its being constantly striving for new fulfillment. I will return to the meaning of this characterization in the next section, while discussing teleology. What is now important to highlight from the just quoted passage is that tendency goes throughout the whole stream of temporal consciousness in its complex unity, and throughout each of its moments. Otherwise stated, both the constitution of the temporal stream in general fulfillment and the constitution of temporal events are based upon tendencies. And, indeed, after having described the process of general fulfillment as merging of retention and protention, Husserl addresses particular fulfillment in the constitution of temporal events. In this respect, it becomes clear that the temporal tendency refers not only to the protentional directedness toward fulfillment, but also, and conversely, to the retentional stream of progressive emptying. In each phase of the temporal process (itself comprehending primal presentation, retention and protention), one moment, namely primal presentation, is characterized as culmination point [*Kulminationspunkt*], i.e., as the point of fulfillment [*Erfüllungspunkt*] of protentional intentions.⁸² Also, regarding particular fulfillment, Husserl emphasizes the progressive and continuous character of synthesis: in every phase of the primal stream, the

⁸⁰“It lies in the essence of this consciousness that it can be constantly fulfilled in such a way that all fulfillment is at the same time intention for a new fulfillment, etc.” Hua XXXIII, p. 24.

⁸¹ U indicates *Urprozess* and U_x indicates one phase thereof.

⁸²“In the U_x , the phases of the phenomenological original process, we find a distinguished point x . How shall this point be characterized? Or how shall it be characterized as a culmination point of the whole prior extent of $U \dots U_x$, as a point of “fulfillment” of this extent, and how does such a fulfillment distinguish itself from the general fulfillment, in which the entire extents U appear in the process according to all their points?” Hua XXXIII, p. 29.

temporal event is intuitively given with a particular intuitive fullness. Such an intuitive givenness is the source for protentional and retentional tendencies, respectively oriented towards the maximum of fullness or of emptiness (Hua XXXIII, p. 30). Husserl calls the two “halves” of the primal process (the fulfilling and the emptying one) respectively *Oberprozess* and *Unterprozess*. However, this distinction by no means implies a split in the primal process. On the contrary, it designates the complementarity of the fulfilling and of the emptying phases in the unitary process, to which progressive fulfillment or emptying respectively correspond.

There are three points in this description that I wish to discuss to conclude this paragraph. First, describing the retentional and protentional phases of the primal stream in relation to the process of fulfillment, these observations clearly contrast all merely formal approaches to time constitution. Despite abstracting from the specificity of this or that content, temporal constitution is always related to a given content, no matter how indeterminate it actually is. As we have repeatedly seen, the characterization of time as form does not imply its separation from content. Secondly, the characterization of fulfillment as increase of fulfillment [*Erfüllungssteigerung*] reconfirms the claim concerning the continuity of the synthesis of fulfillment. In the constitution accomplished within the temporal stream, fulfillment does not require a superimposed act of synthesis. The synthesis is rather constantly actualized in the very network of the temporal process, namely thanks to the constant repetition of the dynamics of increasing and decreasing [*Steigen und Sinken*] that sets the rhythm in the dynamics of temporal process.⁸³ Thirdly, tendency is not only implied in the descriptions of general fulfillment but also of particular fulfillment. Indeed, with respect to the latter process, we see that every moment tends towards the maximal point and to its *terminus ad quem*. Moreover, the intentional increasing of each phase can be properly defined as continuum of moments, which strive for the future maximal point. And this maximal “point” is the “aim” [*Ziel*] of the very tendency animating each phase (Hua XXXIII, pp. 34–35). This reference to the aim of the tendency towards fulfillment is not only characteristic to temporal constitution. Indeed, the previous description of the tendency underlying both temporal and spatial constitution prompt us now to more specifically inquire their teleological character.

7.3 Modes of Teleology

The previous descriptions of intentionality as a tendency, which, as we have seen, are strictly connected with the phenomenological analyses concerning both spatial and temporal perspective, already entail several implicit references to the teleology of the intentional process. Describing intentionality as a tendency, in other words,

⁸³Hua XXXIII, pp. 34f. In these pages, Husserl also describes a new graphic representation of the primal process (however he does not draw it himself), which is supposed to better let appear its dynamic character. The interpretation of this description of the diagram, also providing a graphical sketch thereof, can be found in Dodd (2005), Kortooms (2002, pp. 167–168), and Schnell (1996, 2002).

alludes, at least implicitly, to a *terminus ad quem*. Against the background of Husserl's transcendental aesthetic, within perception, such a *terminus ad quem* must have something to do with the processes of fulfillment and the achievement of an intentional act. Yet, when it comes to more specifically describe what such a fulfillment and such an achievement amount to, Husserl's account of the teleology of sensible experience becomes more complicated. At a closer look, indeed, the teleology of sensible experience does not lend itself to be described in univocal terms. In the following, I will discuss what I consider to be the "modes of teleology" implied in Husserl's account of sensible, spatio-temporal experience and highlight their relationship. More precisely, the focus will be first on the modes of teleology implied in the perception of spatial things. Subsequently, I will show how these modes of teleology are connected to the understanding of intentionality as a tendency. Finally, the relation of teleology and temporal constitution will be discussed. These considerations will allow me to further emphasize how perspectival display can be considered as a key phenomenon to shed light on the phenomenological theory of experience, as well as on the status of transcendental subjectivity.

7.3.1 *The Teleology of Perception: Optimum and Adequateness*

Let us begin with the teleology of the perception of a spatial thing. As Husserl recognizes at the beginning of his lectures on transcendental logic (*Analyses Concerning Active and Passive Synthesis*), there seems to be a contradiction that characterizes perception insofar as its teleology is concerned:⁸⁴

External perception is a constant pretension to accomplish something that, by its very nature, it is not in a position to accomplish. Thus, it harbors an essential contradiction, as it were. My meaning will soon become clear to you once you intuitively grasp how the objective sense exhibits itself as unity <in> the unending manifolds of possible appearances; and seen upon closer inspection, how the continual synthesis, as a unity of coinciding, allows the same sense to appear, and how a consciousness of ever new possibilities of appearance constantly persists over against the factual, limited courses of appearance, transcending them.⁸⁵

As this passage states, the objective sense is constituted as a unity through the coincidence of an "infinite manifold" of possible appearances. In each perceptual phase, only a limited number of these possibilities can, in principle, be actualized. Yet, in each of such phases, we are also aware of further and further possibilities of manifestation. All this, considered what we have discussed previously, is not per se contradictory. Granted that perception has the structure I have just described, what appears to be contradictory is rather its pretension to grasp the totality of the profiles

⁸⁴The recognition of such a tension is not a novelty in these lecture course. It rather dates back to Husserl's earlier texts, such as the essay *Intuition and Representation. Intention and Fulfillment and the Logical Investigations*. Cf. Hua XXII, pp. 269f.; Hua XIX/1, pp. 365–367/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 86–87); Hua XIX/2, pp. 589–592, 646–650/(Husserl 2001c, pp. 220–222, 259–262).

⁸⁵Hua XI, p. 3/(Husserl 2001a, p. 39).

and appearances of the object at once. In other words, the contradiction Husserl is pointing at is grounded on the incompatibility of the a priori law of perspectival givenness with the striving for adequate givenness of the object. To be true, however, we would have a contradiction only if we would claim that adequateness can be effectively reached within a phase of perception. Indeed, if the ideal of adequateness means that we actually have all the possible appearances of the thing at once, then the contradiction is unavoidable. Such a contradiction eventually implies that the *telos* of perception consists in the dissolution of perception itself: what we would have if we could grasp all the possible appearances of the thing at once would not be a perception anymore.⁸⁶ Accordingly, we can say that all the different perspectival manifestations of the thing are not “compossible” within a singular appearance, if by compossibility we mean the possibility of their proper givenness at once.⁸⁷ Yet, does also the pretension or the striving for adequateness imply such a contradiction?⁸⁸ And if not, why should it make sense to admit that perception is striving for something that is in principle impossible (at least within perception itself)? In what follows, I will try to answer both questions.

Arguably, Husserl’s commitment to the teleology of adequateness has to do with the theoretical priority of his phenomenology of perception, namely to show in what sense perception is a pre-form of cognition. This has been thoroughly shown by Pradelle (2000, pp. 173f.), in his discussion of the distinction of the so-called finite and the infinite teleology of perception.⁸⁹ Infinite teleology is the teleology of adequateness. Pradelle considers such teleology as grounded upon a quantitative

⁸⁶Cubism can be considered as an attempt of composing different perspectives (but not all perspectives), as to make them available at once. Yet, this precisely highlights *a contrario* that, in each moment, our visual perception is necessarily bound to one perspective.

⁸⁷A more encompassing critical discussion of the idea of compossibility of perspectives can be found in Waldenfels (2009, pp. 105f.). For an assessment of Husserl’s analysis of perspectival givenness in relation to the problem of compossibility, see Summa (2011b).

⁸⁸Granel (1968, pp. 228f.) would undoubtedly answer this question affirmatively. For him, the concept of inadequateness is indeed misleading and contradictory if applied to perception, since it eventually refers to the ideal of adequateness, which is something we cannot find in perception. Barbaras (1999) takes over this criticism and further argues that the idea of adequateness derives from the “subjectivization” of experience and is completely modeled upon the adequate givenness of inner experiences. Yet, as I have previously argued and as we will see again with regard to the teleology of the temporal process, such an idea of adequateness of inner experience is challenged by Husserl’s own remarks concerning temporal perspective. Moreover, I do not agree with the critique of “subjectivization” the author raises. A careful analysis of perception as a process, and of the role the idea of adequateness plays within such a process, clearly shows that Husserl’s understanding of the intentional correlation in perception does not lend itself to be understood as subjectivism, if by subjectivism we mean the subordination of the laws of appearing to the structures of subjective experience. As we have seen by discussing Husserl’s reading of Kant, it is the object, or better said the eidetic type of the object, which prescribes the structures of its subjective appearance.

⁸⁹Rather than infinite and finite teleology, I prefer to use the notion of “teleology of adequateness” and “teleology of optimal givenness” and, correlatively to talk about infinite or finite teleological processes. Terminologically, indeed, the concept of infinite teleology might be misleading. To be true, indeed, it is not the teleology itself which is infinite or finite, but rather the teleological process, according to its specific *telos*.

principle, namely as tending toward the infinite multiplication of the possible perspectives in and through which the thing can appear. Such teleology is said to be infinite because there can be no end to that multiplication, and accordingly the aim of perception cannot be attained within the finite process of perception itself. Finite teleology, instead, is qualitative: it tends toward the optimal appearance of singular profiles, or of a limited number of profiles. Such teleology is finite, since the aim of the process of perception can be actually attained within perception itself. Consistently with his reading of Husserl's transcendental aesthetic, Pradelle argues that only the latter can be properly considered as the teleology of perception. The former, instead, derives from the theoretical interests of the phenomenologist, who assumes perception as the ground for the process of cognition, and more precisely of exact cognition. Claiming that perception strives for adequate givenness ultimately implies the projection of the idealizing interests of scientific thought upon perception. Again, the idea of the foundation of all experience *von unten* turns out to be contaminated by theoretical priorities and interests *von oben*.

I believe there is some truth in Pradelle's argument. I agree, for instance, that the optimal givenness fully corresponds to the aims of our finite practical interests in perception and that the emphasis on the teleology of adequateness is related to Husserl's attempt to ground his phenomenological theory of cognition upon perception. However, I would not go as far as Pradelle in claiming that Husserl's account of perception as an infinite teleological process exclusively results from imposing upon perception the interest of scientific (mostly mathematical) knowledge grounded on idealization. Instead, I would argue that we may find the basis to understand such teleology also within the transcendental aesthetic, i.e., independently of the interests of higher order physical-mathematical thought. In other words, I would argue that the theoretical interests in grasping all the possible appearances of the thing may be grounded upon the structure of perception as an open process. This, however, presupposes that we consider the spatio-temporal, dynamic unfolding of perceptual experience, and do not begin from a snapshot of momentary perception. I will now consider more closely how Husserl distinguishes the teleology of optimal givenness from the teleology of adequateness. Thereby, I will show how both teleologies contribute to shed light on some essential features of perception, and particularly on its dynamics.⁹⁰ This will allow me to highlight how the understanding

⁹⁰ Referring to Husserl's earliest texts on perception (published in Hua XXXVIII), Benoist (2009, pp. 15–51) discusses what we may consider the precursor of the distinction between the teleology of adequateness and the teleology of optimal givenness. Particularly, he focuses on Husserl's references to the maximal point of intentional fulfillment, namely to the point beyond which no better perception of the thing is possible. I consider this to be the precursor of what Husserl will later call the optimum of perceptual appearance. Differently from Husserl, however, Benoist apparently considers the teleology of optimal givenness and the teleology of adequateness as reciprocally exclusive and not compatible. Eventually, they would respectively refer to two different descriptive models of perception. The teleology of maximal fulfillment (or optimal givenness) presupposes that what is intended [*gemeint*] in perception coincides or may coincide with what is effectively given. The teleology of adequateness, instead, presupposes what Benoist calls an economic or dynamic account of perception wherein such a coincidence is not attained, for the perceptual intention is a guided by the interest in uncovering further aspects of the perceptual thing.

of perception as an infinite teleological process can be grounded within the transcendental aesthetic. Eventually, following Pradelle in understanding the ideal of adequateness as something that lies beyond perception, and yet recognizing that the openness toward the infinite determinations of the perceptual thing is grounded within perception itself, we will again be facing the claim concerning the strict opposition of a foundation of experience von unten and its being guided by theoretical interests, i.e., *von oben*.

Let us start with the teleology of optimal givenness and its distinction from the teleology of adequateness. An early account of the former can be found in the 1893 essay on *Intuition and Representation, Intention and Fulfillment [Anschauung und Repräsentation, Intention und Erfüllung]*:

For every part and every feature of the thing, there is a standpoint from which we can apprehend it “the best”, i.e.: in the continuum of changes, which every moment of intuition passes upon a change of standpoint, there is a respective phase in which the moment satisfies our interest the most. (Hua XXII, pp. 273–274)

This quote entails the two fundamental points for the definition the teleology of optimal givenness: on the one hand, the reference to the interests that animate my actual perception; on the other hand, the reference to the particular circumstances in which the optimal givenness, satisfying those interests, is realized. This lays the basis for all further developments concerning the teleology of optimal givenness. A more detailed account of the difference between the latter and the teleology of adequateness can be found in manuscript D 13 I. Within his noematic analysis, Husserl distinguishes here two possible ways of understanding the concept of the phantom and its givenness as the *telos* of perception. First, we have the idea of the “true phantom”, as the ideal correlate of an infinite process:

Phantom can mean the idea of the “true” phantom, i.e., of the identical, which would be given in an ideal infinity – or, more correctly, in an unlimited manifold of possible all-round givenness, possible appearances – in concordant validation, closer determination, ameliorating determination (changed determination). Or, which would be the same: the identical, which in all possible changes of position, in all possible continuous progressions, would prove itself as being in concordance.⁹¹

According to this description, fulfillment corresponds to the satisfaction of the tension and the interests animating perception, and for this reason it is called economic. Benoist considers that only the former description, where the coincidence between what is intended and what is given is attained, as a suitable description of perception. In the following, I will try to show why I do not believe that the two accounts are incompatible, and why I still believe that the dynamic description of perception, included the reference to interests which are also part of the teleology of optimal givenness, has a phenomenological legitimization.

⁹¹ “Phantom kann heißen die Idee des “wahren” Phantoms, das ist des identischen, das in einer ideellen Unendlichkeit – oder sagen wir korrekter, in einer unbegrenzten Mannigfaltigkeit möglicher allseitiger Gegebenheiten, möglicher Apparenzen – in einstimmiger Bestätigung, Näherbestimmung, bessernden Bestimmung (Umbestimmung) gegeben wäre; oder, was dasselbe, das Identische, das bei allen möglichen Stellungswechseln in allen möglichen kontinuierlichen Progressionen sich in Einstimmigkeit herausstellen würde.” D 13 I/4b.

Such an understanding of the concept of the phantom is clearly modeled upon the idea of adequate givenness: the “true phantom” is the identical phantom constituted throughout the infinite multiplicity of possible appearances. Yet, being the all-round givenness of the thing in principle excluded by the a priori law of perspectival manifestation, the “true phantom” cannot be considered as the proper correlate of perception.⁹² Thus, a second concept of the phantom needs to be introduced. This concept designates what is optimally given throughout a limited continuity of profiles:

Phantom can also mean a closed continuity of profiles, in which I go through the thing according to its uniform shape and its qualities, such as this continuity comes to givenness to me in a for me distinguished continuity of positions. Or, since I only see one profile, the seen “image” can refer to a determined relation, to a determined “full image” with corresponding continuous change of positions, which is correspondingly apperceptively distinguished.⁹³

The *telos* of perception, in this sense, consists in the optimal appearance of a limited set of accessible profiles, i.e., in the appearance that best corresponds to my interests in the present perception. Remarkably, Husserl conceives of this second concept of the phantom as the authentic [*echt*] one (D 13 I/5a). Accordingly, we can understand the difference between the teleology of adequateness and the teleology of optimal givenness also in light of the distinction between the true and the authentic phantom. The true phantom may be considered as the *telos* of perception only if the latter is guided by purely theoretical interests. Instead, the authentic phantom, i.e., a limited continuity of profiles given in the optimal way, may perfectly satisfy the interests of a practically oriented cognition, grounded upon perception. It is then sufficient to provide that kind of practical cognition we mostly need in every day

⁹²That is to say, it is certainly excluded for the singular perceiving subject and would rather be the correlate of infinite points of view on the same thing. In this sense, we can agree with Zahavi (1996, pp. 32f.) in considering the thing, in the totality of its possible manifestations, as the correlate of an “open intersubjectivity” (cf. Hua XIV, p. 289). Yet, from some of Zahavi’s arguments, one might also draw that, while perspectively perceiving a thing and thus being aware that some of its profiles are inaccessible to me at a given moment, I am also aware of such an open intersubjectivity. I consider this inference to be misleading. In other words, the claim that the actualization of all the possible appearances of the thing is necessarily correlated to the understanding of transcendental subjectivity as open intersubjectivity is valid. However, this is a claim made by the phenomenologist who reflectively accounts for experience and its structures and does not necessarily mirror what the experiencing subject is aware of. As I have previously shown discussing empty intentions and their specific kind of intuitiveness, while perceiving a thing, we are aware of the partiality of what is properly given and we have also a specific kind of awareness of the hidden profiles. And this seems to hold also irrespective of our actual awareness of possible others, who would see the same thing from other perspectives. Conversely, the consciousness of possible others needs to be grounded upon the actual encounter with real others. It cannot be grounded upon the perception of a spatial thing alone.

⁹³“Phantom kann auch heißen eine geschlossene Seitenkontinuität, in der ich das Ding nach seiner einheitlichen Gestalt und seinen Qualifizierungen durchlaufe, so wie sie mir in einer irgend für mich ausgezeichneten Stellungskontinuität zur Gegebenheit kommt. Oder es kann, weil ich nur eine Seite sehe, das gesehene „Bild“ verweisen auf einen bestimmten Zusammenhang, auf ein bestimmtes „Vollbild“ mit entsprechend kontinuierlichem Stellungswechsel, der eben entsprechend apperzeptiv ausgezeichnet ist.” D 13 I/4b–5a.

experience. Just to make a trivial example: if I want to know whether the object I see is something I may use to pour water in, I do not need to explore it in all its possible appearances, and certainly I do not need to grasp all its possible appearances at once. It will suffice that the object is given in the suitable conditions (e.g., light, distance, etc.) as to make me see its shape, its material, etc. The teleology of optimal givenness, thus, is related to the finite interests of practically oriented cognition, which also embraces the empirical knowledge of the applicative sciences. Hence, the *telos* of perception according to these practical interests coincides with the richest manifestation of the thing within the realm of concrete possibilities. Such richness and authenticity, however, are not determined once and for all. Concretely speaking, they may vary in accordance with the more specific determination of the interests at play. Thus, following one of Husserl's examples, the interests in the perception of a flower will not be the same for the man in the street and for the botanist, although, in both cases, the interests that guide perception belong to the realm of finite practical cognition. For the man in the street such a knowledge may be related to the cultural and aesthetic determinations of the flower (if, for instance, it must be suitable as a present), whereas the knowledge the botanist is striving for is biological and taxonomic. Accordingly, the perceptual optima that are suitable to reach the respective kinds of knowledge will also be different in both cases.⁹⁴ Considering perception as guided by the finite interest of practical cognition prevents us from reducing it to mere receptivity. While perceiving, we implicitly try to actualize the circumstances that are suitable to the optimal givenness of the thing. Rather than being merely static receptivity, perception is a dynamic, selective, and motivated active process. This is recognized by Husserl, who goes as far as to consider the finite interest in the perceptual optimum as motivating the specific form of "will" that animates perception⁹⁵:

The interest for the relevant optimum motivates the intention of the will, which, as every intention of the will, is directed towards its aim by a "way" leading to this aim, by a "subjectively" characterized process, which terminates in the optimal aim.⁹⁶

Can we consider such an understanding of the teleology of perception as fully convincing? Yes and no. Yes, if we consider perception as being only guided by the finite interest of practical knowledge. No, if we, like Husserl, consider perception also as the basis for another kind of knowledge, namely purely theoretical knowledge. This is one of the reasons why, even recognizing that there is teleology of optimal givenness and that the latter could be attained within the process of perception, Husserl remains committed to the understanding of perception as an infinite

⁹⁴Cf. Hua XVI, p. 128/(Husserl 1997, pp. 106f.).

⁹⁵I do not think that "will" here refers to a specific, deliberative, volitional intention. I would rather be inclined to consider what Husserl here calls "will" as convergent with what we have previously indicated as tendency. In the next section, I will provide some more arguments to support this interpretation.

⁹⁶"Das Interesse für das jeweilige Optimum motiviert die Willensintention, die wie jede Willensintention auf das Ziel gerichtet ist durch einen hinführenden "Weg", durch einen als "subjektiv" charakterisierten Prozess, der im optimalen Ziel terminiert." D 13 I/65a.

teleological process. This is certainly related to the ideal of adequate givenness, and therefore apparently implies the contradiction Husserl points out in his course on transcendental logic. Yet, in order to understand what the contradiction consists in, and whether we are facing a real contradiction, we shall consider the teleology of adequateness and the understanding of perception as an infinite teleological process in more detail.

As I mentioned earlier, in order to properly understand the teleology of perception, we need to take the discussion concerning its continuous synthesis seriously. The processual dynamics of continuous synthesis needs to be presupposed by all our inquiries into perception, and this shall prevent us from beginning such inquiries (particularly those related to the teleology, i.e., to what a certain movement tries to attain), from a snapshot of perception. Accordingly, we shall privilege the Husserlian descriptions that focus on the processual dynamics of perception. This is the case, for instance, in some passages in the *Dingvorlesung*. Here, Husserl mentions the continuous synthesis of perception, thereby implicitly hinting at what I call spatio-temporal intertwining, namely at the profound interconnection of the temporal and spatial unfolding of sensible constitution. Spatial perception, which Husserl describes here, also entails the temporal dynamics of fulfillment and emptying. These processes shall not be considered as independent, rather being moments of the whole process of perception.⁹⁷ Moreover, the ideal of a “harmonious” fulfillment is challenged by the remark that either fulfillment or disappointment may correspond to a more or less determinate expectation regarding some content.⁹⁸ Thus, in these passages from *Thing and Space*, Husserl considers perception as a multidimensional process, which is rhythmically characterized as a constant increasing and decreasing of intuitive fulfillment. And this is certainly not unrelated to the temporal rhythm of increasing and decreasing that, as we have seen, will be thoroughly described some 10 years later in the *Bernau Manuscripts*. Assuming that the dynamics of increase and diminishment shall be considered in light of the interconnection of spatiality and temporality, we can understand the two following features of perception: first, that the proper appearance of some profiles corresponds to the “concealment” of others; and secondly, that the qualitative enrichment in the perceptual givenness of some profiles corresponds to the impoverishment of others. The ideal of adequate givenness contrasts both these features: such an ideal implies that no profile is concealed and that all profiles are given in the best possible appearance. In other words, such an ideal corresponds to completely fulfilled

⁹⁷“As a whole, however, the continuous synthesis is at any time, as it were, a braid of partial syntheses of increase and decrease, in which, to be sure, the individual strands of the braid have and can have no autonomy. In the progress from more complete to less complete givennesses, the continuous synthesis has the character of emptying or lessening of the fullness of givenness. In the other direction we have the unitary form of fulfillment. The unity is accompanied on the one side by an empty or unsaturated and on the other side by a full and (at least relatively) saturated consciousness of givenness. The appearances have a moment of increase, of relative saturation, of relative fullness or emptiness, specifically with respect to the manner in which they bring the object to givenness.” Hua XVI, p. 113/(Husserl 1997, p. 95).

⁹⁸Hua XVI, pp. 95f./ (Husserl 1997, pp. 80f.); Hua XX/1, pp. 50–52.

intentions, which are not coupled with empty intentions any more. Clearly, since the interplay of fulfilled and empty intentions is not accidental, but rather defines an essential feature of perception, the attainment of such an ideal of adequate givenness would amount to the dissolution of perception. This, as I mentioned, is the meaning of the contradiction Husserl refers to in his lecture course on transcendental logic. Yet, if the ideal of adequate givenness contradicts the very nature of perception, can we maintain that it corresponds to the *telos* of perception, or to what perception strives for? In order to answer this question, we shall more thoroughly consider what both teleology and the ideal of adequateness amount to. Perception, as we have seen, shall be properly considered as a movement, as a process of fulfillment of empty intentions. This process is complemented by the process of progressive emptying. The teleology of perception, thus, must correspond to the accomplishment or to the perfection of such a process. If the interests that animate such a process are finite, as we have seen, the accomplishment of the perceptual movement is reached once those finite interests are satisfied, no matter if there is still more to discover of the object at this point. Yet, if perception is not only guided by the finite interests of practical cognition, but also by the infinite interests of purely theoretical cognition, then no finite optimum can satisfy these interests any more. The accomplishment of perception would amount to the satisfaction of all these infinite interests and thus precisely correspond to the ideal of adequateness. Adequateness, thus, is the ultimate accomplishment, or the absolute perfection, of the process of perception guided by the interests of pure theoretical cognition. Such an accomplishment, as we have seen, cannot in principle be reached within perception itself: if this was the case, we would not have perception anymore. Accordingly, adequateness is a regulative idea:

But perfect givenness is nevertheless predesignated as “Idea” (in the Kantian sense) – as a system which, in its eidetic type, is an absolutely determined system of endless processes of continuous appearings, or as a field of these processes, an *a priori* determined continuum of appearances with different, but determined, dimensions, and governed throughout by a fixed set of eidetic laws.⁹⁹

Clearly, to understand the meaning of this passage we need to understand “perfect givenness” [*vollkommene Gegebenheit*] as an idea in the Kantian sense. When referring to the idea in the Kantian sense, I do not think that Husserl has one specific idea of reason in his mind. Rather, I would argue that he adopts this expression exclusively to indicate the regulative, yet unattainable, nature of perceptual perfection. For Kant, the ideas of reason have no constitutive use, since they do not provide any concept to the understanding. However, they do have an excellent and necessary [*vortrefflichen und unentbehrlich notwendigen*] regulative function, which consists in orienting the understanding toward a certain aim. This ideal aim, as *focus imaginarius*, is beyond all possible experience, and therefore cannot be the source of concepts. Nevertheless, it is necessary to give to these concepts the greatest unity

⁹⁹ Hua III/1, p. 331/(Husserl 1983, p. 342).

and the greatest extension.¹⁰⁰ Analogously, and leaving aside the many differences regarding the context in which regulative ideas are considered to play a role, Husserl's ideal of perfect givenness is something that lies beyond all possible perception. Yet, it is also something that, despite being unattainable, orients perception. Better said, such an ideal of perfect givenness sets the rules for the proper unfolding of the process of perception. At a closer look, thus, the regulative character of the ideality of perfection implies a dynamization of perceptual experience. Not being in principle the correlate of any possible experience, the idea of adequate givenness of the thing is the rule for the dynamic unfolding of experience. Such a dynamic unfolding of experience is, in fact, quite clearly evoked also in the aforementioned passage from *Ideas I*. There, indeed, the ideal of adequate manifestation properly coincides with the “system of infinite phenomenal processes” (emphasis mine).

In this respect, Tengelyi (2007, pp. 65–82) suggests that Husserl does not drastically split finite experience from the infinite, as Kant does. Whereas the latter is only ready to admit the potential infinite, as going beyond the totality of successive syntheses, the former also admits the actual infinite as entailed in the very perception of the thing, namely as the ideal totality of its possible appearances.¹⁰¹ However, Tengelyi's reference to the actual infinite might also raise some problems. If the ideal of perceptual perfection (i.e., of a perception embracing the totality of all possible appearances) is a regulative one, then it cannot become, in principle, a correlate of actual experience. It can only be “anticipated”, as *focus imaginarius*. Therefore, I would be more incline to further pursue the analogy Husserl makes with Kant's regulative function of the ideas of reasons and draw the consequences from this analogy. Besides showing that adequate givenness, as *focus imaginarius*, orients and sets the rules for the unfolding of perception, the analogy with Kant's regulative function of the transcendental ideas also suggests that the idea of adequate givenness exhibits the limit of possible experience and knowledge. Accordingly, far from overcoming the tension between the finite and the infinite in

¹⁰⁰“On the contrary, however, they [the transcendental ideas M.S.] have an excellent and indispensably necessary regulative use, namely that of directing the understanding to a certain goal respecting which the lines of direction of all its rules converge at one point which, although it is only an idea (*focus imaginarius*) – i.e., a point from which the concepts of the understanding do not really proceed, since it lies entirely outside the bounds of possible experience – nonetheless still serves to obtain for these concepts the greatest unity alongside the greatest extension.” KrV, B 672/A 644/ (Kant 1998, p. 591).

¹⁰¹According to Tengelyi, Husserl must have been influenced by Cantor's notion of transfinite in his own conception of the infinite in perception. A different reading of the infinite in Husserl's phenomenology is given by Melandri (1960), who also refers to Husserl's mathematical background, however interpreting Husserl's references in terms of potential infinite. It is not my intention here to further discuss whether in the context of his analysis of perception Husserl is making reference to the actual or the potential infinite. Even recognizing the importance of Husserl's mathematical background, I would suggest that the reference to the infinite in the domain of transcendental aesthetic shall find its legitimation within the transcendental aesthetic itself. For a systematic research concerning the aesthetic, epistemological, and ontological valence of the infinite in Husserl's phenomenology, see Altobrando (2013).

perceptual experience, this formulation rather reaffirms it. Such a tension between the structural incompleteness and the anticipation of an unreachable infinite totality of possible appearances animates the dynamics of the perceptual process.¹⁰²

To be true, the teleology of optimal givenness and the teleology of adequateness are not considered as mutually exclusive, but rather as different and yet in a way complementary.¹⁰³ Such a complementarity mirrors the double nature of the interests animating perception: the practical and the theoretical interests. This becomes quite clear in the later manuscript D 1. Here, Husserl first insists on the situated character of all interests, both practical and theoretical. On the one hand, the finite optimum changes according to the different situations of interest [*Interessensituationen*] (Hua XXXIX, p. 204). On the other hand, and even if the optimum in this case would be absolute, also the theoretical interest, i.e., the interest in being per se [*das Interesse am Seiende schlechthin*] (Hua XXXIX, p. 204), is a situated one.¹⁰⁴ Thus, both practical or finite and theoretical or infinite interests are situated. Yet, if situatedness characterizes the *terminus a quo* of both practical and theoretical interest, in the former case it also characterizes the *terminus ad quem* of the process itself. The optimum that satisfies the practical interests, as we have seen, is also relative to the situation, namely to the concrete experiential conditions that are given here and now and to my present point of view. Clearly, Husserl establishes a hierarchy between the practical and the theoretical interests, recognizing a higher value to the latter.¹⁰⁵ Accordingly, the finite optima are considered as “anticipations”, or finite and precarious manifestations of the absolute optimum.¹⁰⁶ Besides satisfying the finite interest of practical cognition grounded in perception, the finite optimum is also reabsorbed in the process oriented towards the absolute optimum as the regulative idea.

Let us return, now, to the problem phrased by Pradelle. As I repeatedly stressed, the teleology of adequateness is related to the theoretical interest in the fullest intuitive determination of the thing. Pradelle considers this as a challenge to Husserl’s attempt to provide a foundation to all experience and cognition *von unten*.

¹⁰²The finitude of perception is not intended here as merely factual. Perception is as such structurally incomplete or finite, and this would remain true also for a supposedly infinite subject, cf. Hua III/1, pp. 350–351/(Husserl 1983, pp. 361–362). Regarding the interplay between the finite and the infinite in perception, see Bernet (1979, 1994, pp. 121–138).

¹⁰³Cf. Hua XVI, p. 135/(Husserl 1997, pp. 112f.); D 13 I/4b–5a.

¹⁰⁴“Yet, the concept of situation does not need to be brought into relation to practical interests. Even as theoretically interested Ego, I am apperceiving the world in a particular situation, central point of orientation for the world that is pre-given to me as oriented, a world that appears as oriented. And, in the same way, every We is central point of orientation for its surroundings” Hua XXXIX, p. 205

¹⁰⁵In the next section, I will show that such subordination is related to the understanding of the two kinds of knowledge as different kinds of activity, namely activities that have their aim beyond themselves, and activities that have their aims in themselves.

¹⁰⁶“Cognizance-taking the theoretical interest as bringing to cognizance what simply is, this is a systematic going through the appearances under the guidance of their anticipated relative optima till the absolute optimum, which presents itself in the relative ones (as “appearance” of a new sense) in constant provisionality” Hua XXXIX, pp. 204–205.

Theoretical interests are not immanent to perception; they are rather superimposed to perception from the outside. I believe there are at least two reasons to question this reading. First, can the finite interests that underlie the teleology of optimal givenness be properly considered to be immanent to perception alone? Indeed, they also seem to be related to the understanding of perception as the source of cognition, although of a different kind. They are, indeed, the interests of practical and empirical cognition, which, although considered by Husserl as subordinate to theoretical cognition, still go beyond pure perception. Secondly, although it might be inappropriate to talk about perception itself as “interested” in any of the mentioned sense, it seems that perception, given its structure, can be the source from which both the interests of practical cognition and the interests of pure theoretical cognition arise.

This somehow overturns the problem phrased by Pradelle. Considering that perception is animated by the interests of some kind of cognition, no matter whether it is theoretical or practical, we do certainly refer to something that lies beyond pure perception itself. In other words, we show that perception is a fundamental moment of the larger, overarching whole of experience, which entails all our theoretical, practical, and aesthetic interests. Yet, the point is whether those interests are simply superimposed to perception or rather if they originate from perception itself. Endorsing the description of perception as a spatio-temporal process of increasing and decreasing of fulfillment, I would argue that the second option is true. And it is true not only for the finite interests of practical cognition, but also for the infinite interests of theoretical cognition. It is because we are aware that there are more and more possible appearances of the thing and that the latter has more and more qualities which we can uncover, that something like the theoretical interest in the complete determination of those appearances and qualities arises. More precisely, as we will see more clearly in the next section, I contend that the openness that characterizes this teleological movement has an instinctual basis and that it is grounded upon the dynamics of the temporal stream. It is only because, at each finite phase of perception, we implicitly “believe” that we can continue to experience the thing further and further (no matter whether such a belief turns out to be factually wrong) that we have an implicit awareness of the possibly infinite appearances, and that we strive for grasping all such infinite possibilities.

Accordingly, the strict opposition between being guided *von oben* and being grounded *von unten* totters again. Yet, maybe, it is the alternative between these two options to be wrong, and maybe we do not really need it, if we consider perception as integrated in the all-encompassing whole of experience. In other words, if the source for our cognitive interests in a better and better determination is to be found in the structural incompleteness of perception, it may well be that, once they are established, those interests retroact upon the concrete unfolding of perception itself. This might be a way to understand the regulative nature of the ideal of adequateness. We can form such an ideal only on the basis of the structural incompleteness of our perception. Yet, once this ideal is “given” (precisely as unattainable *focus imaginarius*), it guides, as it were retrospectively, the concrete unfolding of perception, which can be thus properly described as an “infinite” teleological process aiming at perceiving more and more clearly, at grasping more and more differentiations, etc. This seems

to be how Husserl understands perception as an infinite teleological process in the *Crisis*. The ideal of adequateness reverberates on the understanding of perception as a process striving for a richer and richer givenness in conformity with the sense [*Sinn*] of the perceptual thing. It is an open process of enrichment of meaning [*Sinnbereicherung*] and continuing development of meaning [*Sinnvorblldung*], which entails the constant and progressive unfolding of the inner and outer horizons of the thing.¹⁰⁷ Such an understanding of the movement of perception as the source for both practical and theoretical interests shall become clearer in connection with the characterization of perceptual intentionality as a tendency.

7.3.2 *Intentionality as Tendency and Its Teleology*

The previous discussion concerning the teleology of perception has mostly privileged the noematic side, notably focusing on what the aim of perception consists in. In the following, we shall reconsider what previously said in relation to the noetic side, and particularly focus on the intentionality of perception as a teleological movement. Understanding perception as a teleological process eventually amounts to understanding the nature of such a tendency. From this perspective, we can see that yet another tension emerges with regard to the teleological unfolding of perception, namely a tension that concerns the modes of “achievement” of the tendency. On the one hand, indeed, achievement may coincide with the state of accomplishment of perceptual experience. On the other hand, however, it may also coincide with the very dynamics of the perceptual unfolding. This distinction could be interpreted as parallel to the distinction between Aristotle’s *entelecheia*, which refers to the realization as to the status of accomplishment, and *energeia*, which refers to the process of actualization, or to the activity itself, as self-completion.¹⁰⁸ Both understandings of achievement can be found in Husserl’s analyses of perception. Particularly, it seems that we can understand the achievement of perception as a status of accomplishment or appeasement (*entelecheia*) if we consider perception as animated by finite interests. Once these interests are satisfied, indeed, perception has reached its goal, and there would be in principle no need to explore the perceptual correlate in more details. However, this is only a partial understanding of perception. Perception, indeed, is also guided by the interests of theoretical cognition, which do not find their satisfaction in any finite optimum. Animated by such theoretical interests, perception is a process aiming to uncover more and more qualities and aspects of the intentional correlate. Yet, since the complete determination

¹⁰⁷ Hua VI, pp. 159f./Husserl 1970, pp. 158f.).

¹⁰⁸ It is not my intention here to assess the debate concerning the teleology in Aristotle’s work. Yet, I shall refer to some of Aristotle’s differentiations, since I consider them to be very fruitful to clarify the problems I am discussing in Husserl’s philosophy. A discussion of the different meaning of *energeia* and the distinction/relation of *energeia* and *entelecheia* that support my reading can be found in Chen (1956, 1958).

of the correlate is something in principle impossible, the *telos* of perception shall be more properly understood as a process of constant enrichment and development of meaning. If this is true, the aim of the perceptual movement may not really consist in reaching a state of appeasement. Rather, perception may be considered as an autotelic movement, i.e., as an activity that has its aim in the activity itself. In Aristotelian terms, thus, we can consider both the perception guided by the interests in practical cognition and the perception guided by the interests in pure theoretical cognition as activities, yet of a different kind. The former is an activity understood as *dynamis*, which has its aim beyond itself; the latter, instead, is an autotelic activity accomplished as *energeia*, namely an activity that is an aim in itself (Aristotle 1928, IX, 1048b–1049a.). If we assume, like Husserl, that the finite interests are ultimately subordinated to the infinite, we can also argue that the dynamic understanding of the accomplishment of perception and its tendency as *energeia* is the dominant one. A further argument to support this claim is based upon the remarks concerning the pleasure or the joy that accompany the achievement of the perceptual tendency. Again, the question is whether such a pleasure is something that comes at the end of the perceptual process, i.e., once the aim is reached, or whether it is something that goes through such a process in its different phases. In what follows, I will argue for the understanding of perceptual activity as *energeia* in relation to both the mentioned issues, namely the interplay of finite and infinite interests in perception and the question of the pleasure and joy in perceiving. In so doing, I will also emphasize in what sense Husserl believes that the theoretical interest is not simply superimposed on perception from the higher level of cognition. Genetically considered, indeed, such an interest rather stems from the unfolding of perception as a tendency toward fulfillment. Eventually, this description will reverberate on the understanding of intentional consciousness as life, and on what we can call a structural “lack”.

Semantically considered, the notion of tendency bears reference to an end. Thus, there is no surprise that, while introducing this term, Husserl constantly makes reference to concepts related to the semantic area of “aim” or “goal-directedness”, such as *Ziel*, *Erzielung*, *Abzielung*, *terminus ad quem*, *telos*. A tendency, indeed, is a process directed at something, it is a form of aiming at something [*Abzielen*] that is fulfilled in the attainment of the goal itself [*Erzielung*]. Recognizing that this movement is what characterizes the intentionality of perception, we can see how the latter bears in itself the source of our theoretical interests. Such theoretical interests are not simply imposed upon perception from the outside, but rather arise within perception itself. To be true, in Husserl’s view, perception shall be considered not only as a pre-condition, but also as the pre-form or the source of cognition. It is an activity of progressively “cognizance-taking” [*Kenntnisnahme*]. And the dynamics of such an activity, as we have seen, is the other side of the structural incompleteness of each singular perceptual phase. Accordingly, as Husserl claims:

Knowing is a goal-directed action of the Ego. Thus, already a simple perceiving, accomplished as an activity of progressive cognizance-taking, is knowing of the lowest level. Its constantly enriching outcome, namely what is achieved thereby, is precisely the cognizance

of the object. Its always richer self-givenness, its self-existence realizes itself in perceptual activity. And this is the aim here.¹⁰⁹

The question I previously phrased, concerning the teleological nature of the perceptual tendency, already emerges between the lines of this passage. The fulfillment of the perceptual tendency, here, is clearly stated as an activity of progressive discovery, which generates the interest in cognition and in further and further exploration. Yet, our problem now is to understand what the aim of the so described perceptual activity is. More precisely, we shall ask whether it is an external aim, the achievement of which would put an end to the process of perception, or whether it is an aim immanent to the process of perception itself. In other words, we shall ask whether the tendency that animates perception shall be conceived as a teleological, or rather as an autotelic process. At first reading, Husserl's reference to the knowledge of the object as the aim of perceptual acts seems to refer to an accomplishment that puts an end to the very activity: the attainment of such knowledge would coincide with the end of our perceptual tendency. However, things might be more complicated if we consider what just said in relation with the distinction between the teleology of optimal givenness and the teleology of adequateness. As we have seen, these two modes of teleology are related to, respectively, the interests of practical and theoretical cognition that are operative in perception.

The above quoted passage bears witness to the complication deriving from considering the teleology of perception as achievement of the intentional tendency in connection with what we have previously argued concerning optimal givenness and adequateness. Indeed, only if we consider perception as uniquely guided by the finite interests of practically oriented cognition, we can assume that the perceptual tendency is achieved once the optimal appearance, granting such cognition, is reached. Yet, in this case, the knowledge we have is knowledge for the sake of something else. We need to see whether the recipient is not broken in order to know whether we can pour some water into it. However, this cannot be said to be the complete knowledge of the object. If we wanted, that is, if we were motivated by the interests of theoretical cognition, we could go on and on in uncovering the aspects and the qualities of the thing we have in front of us. In this case, the process of cognition, grounded upon perception, would be accomplished for its own sake. If it is true that the *telos* of perception coincides with the self-appearance of the thing, it must nonetheless be stressed that this self-givenness is not accomplished once and for all. Quite to the contrary: this self-givenness is a result of the process of progressive cognizance-taking. This, as Husserl writes in the quoted passage, is a "result" that gets progressively richer and richer. In other words, despite the identification of the *telos* of perception with the self-manifestation of the thing, Husserl does not assume this self-givenness as an achieved accomplishment. No matter how rich the

¹⁰⁹ "Erkennen ist eine zielgerichtete Ichaktion. So ist schon ein schlichtes Wahrnehmen, vollzogen als eine Tätigkeit fortschreitender Kenntnisnahme, ein Erkennen niederster Stufe. Ihr fortschreitend sich bereicherndes Ergebnis, das was dabei erzielt wird, ist eben die Kenntnis des Gegenstandes; seine immer reichere Selbstgegebenheit, sein Selbstdasein realisiert sich im wahrnehmenden Tun. Und das ist hier das Ziel." A VI 27/22a.

self-manifestation is; for the reasons discussed above, perception will always be open towards further and further determinations. All this seems to imply that the perceptual tendency does not find its final achievement in the status of *Erzielung*, i.e., in the attainment of the goal, but rather reproduces itself as a constant “desire” to perceive more differences. This is what we can draw from the following passage:

[...] through what is already given as the thing itself, the constant intention towards it likewise passes through in a better and always better self-possession, such that the intentional aiming, instead of terminating in the relevant substance of the experience [Erlebnisgehalt], incessantly passes through it.¹¹⁰

The perceptual tendency strives for a better and better givenness. Accordingly, the process does not terminate when a certain mode of givenness, maybe the optimal in this particular situation, is attained. The intentional “aiming at” or “striving for” goes through the attained givenness, and reproduces itself again and again throughout the entire process. In this sense, thus, the *telos* of such a perceptual tendency may well consist in this very reproduction, in the actualization of the intentional process as *ergeia*. Such a claim can be further validated if we consider the tendency to perceive more and more differences in genetic terms, that is to say, if we consider such a perceptual tendency in relation to what Husserl calls the theoretical interest and its emergence. This interest finds its source within the perceptual tendency. Yet, once established, it retroacts, as it were, on perception and guides its unfolding. In Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, the basic tendency to perceive, and to grasp more and more aspects of the perceived thing, is understood as “curiosity”.

Curiosity is described as the interest in the unknown, as an attracting force that motivates us to get to know the object and to explore it further and further.¹¹¹ In some passages, Husserl also considers curiosity to be fundamentally equivalent with the theoretical interest.¹¹² In this respect, however, I agree with Deodati (2011, pp. 69f.) in maintaining a difference between the two and rather considering curiosity as the motivating source of the theoretical interest, which is based upon a clearer representation of its own goal and upon the awareness of the openness of the perceptual process.¹¹³ Curiosity guides what Husserl calls the drive to turn our regard toward something [Zuwendungstrieb].¹¹⁴ Such a drive to turn toward something can be

¹¹⁰“[...] durch das als Sache selbst schon Gegebene geht zugleich die beständige Intention auf sie selbst in einer besseren und immer wieder besseren Selbsthabe hindurch, sodass die intentionale Zielung immerzu, statt im jeweiligen Erlebnisgehalt zu terminieren, durch ihn hindurchgeht.” A VI 26/15b.

¹¹¹“Curiosity as the interest in the unknown, in what comes to cognizance, has the Ego adhere to the object. It is an attracting force, which motivates to hold on and which can, however, be prevailed by other allures.” “Neugier als Interesse am Unbekannten, zur Kenntnis kommenden lässt das Ich am Gegensande haften, ist eine anziehende, Festhalten motivierende Kraft, die durch andere Reize aber überwogen werden kann.” A VI 26/61a.

¹¹²“The theoretical interest is in any case related or entirely identical with curiosity” “Das theoretische Interesse ist jedenfalls verwandt oder im Ganzen identisch mit der Neugierde.” A VI 12 I/128b.

¹¹³ See, also, Depraz (1994).

¹¹⁴“Genetically originally, one can say that the drive to turn toward something is guided by curiosity” “Genetisch ursprünglich kann man sagen, dass der Zuwendungstrieb von der Neugier geleitet sei.” A VI, 26/61b. See also, Hua Mat VIII, pp. 323–325. Such a characterization of the “turning of

considered as the primal response to the affection originating from something that emerges out of a background. Being connected to such a drive to turn the regard and being itself affectively motivated, curiosity may then turn into what Husserl calls the theoretical interest, coinciding with the “motive of active objectivation” [*Triebkraft der aktiven Objektivierung*].¹¹⁵ As Deodati further argues, the theoretical interest can be seen as a form of habitualization of curiosity. Curiosity and the theoretical interest would correspond to, respectively, the attitude of discovery of the child and of the scientist: whereas the former is attracted by what strikes him/her as something new that has to be discovered and explored, the latter has interiorized such a being attracted as a habitual attitude. Yet, besides such habitualization, the theoretical interest also results from the overcoming of a certain *naïveté*, which is still implied by the original instinct of curiosity. There seems to be more implicit awareness of the openness of the perceptual and cognitive processes that underlies the theoretical interest than there is in curiosity. Moved by the theoretical interest, we are at least implicitly aware that the process of cognition is in principle never ending, whereas this may not be the case for curiosity.¹¹⁶ Reconsidering the original instinct of objectivation in relation to the experience of the world, the most basic level of which is that of the transcendental aesthetic, in one of his later manuscripts, Husserl defines it as a “transcendental instinct”, as a universal tendency that goes through Egoic intentionality, and further as a constant universal teleology.¹¹⁷ This instinct is transcendental, since it establishes the conditions of both experience

regard” as a drive further elicits the question as to the Egoic or rather non-Egoic character of drives. In the *C-Manuscripts*, where this issue is explicitly thematized, Husserl does not seem to conceive the question as an *aut aut*. Hence, instincts and drives assume a hybrid characterization and an in-between position within the framework of the distinction between Egoic and non-Egoic processes. In their striving for fulfillment, instincts should in fact be conceived as intentional, therefore belonging to the realm of subjective phenomena. Nevertheless, they clearly fall outside the domain of active and aware involvement of the Ego; they are neither explicitly conscious, nor volitional acts. Moreover, referring to the tendency of temporal consciousness as a process of striving for fulfillment, Husserl defines the very relation of activity and passivity as belonging to a unitary dynamic and gradual process, which is itself teleologically oriented. Affection and action, as Husserl stresses, are not separated by an unbridgeable gap, since affection is a pre-mode of action; it tends towards action as its *telos*. Cf. Hua Mat VIII, pp. 350f.

¹¹⁵ Hua XXXI, p. 17/(Husserl 2001a, p. 290). See also Hua Mat VIII, pp. 257–258, 321, 332.

¹¹⁶ Considering curiosity as the source of the theoretical interest, and considering the theoretical interest itself as a drive, Husserl’s position regarding curiosity profoundly differs from Heidegger’s (1977, pp. 221f.). This, eventually, expresses a more fundamental difference regarding Husserl’s and Heidegger’s respective approach to truth and cognition. Whereas for Husserl the theoretical interest aims at “truth” understood as the fullest and richest determination of the object, or to the completest fulfillment that confirms empty intentions, for Heidegger such an approach is derivative and overlooks the most authentic meaning of “truth” as unconcealment, related to the *Seinsfrage*. As it is well known, Heidegger considers curiosity as one of the three existential modes of *Dasein*, the other two being idle talk [*Gerede*] and ambiguity [*Zweideutigkeit*], which testify to the fundamental mode of being there as falling [*Verfallen*].

¹¹⁷ “Transcendental instinct – in a sense, the universal tendency going through the totality of the intentionality of the Ego – the constant universal teleology” Hua Mat VIII, p. 260. See also Hua Mat VIII, pp. 248f.

and cognition. It is considered to be the source for our being interested in knowing the world, in grasping more and more of its determinations. And the teleology of such a drive is universal, since it goes through all layers of experience and constitution. In its dynamic unfolding, this universal instinct can be considered as the propulsive movement that expands at each level of constitution.¹¹⁸ Both curiosity and the theoretical interest, however, seem to be accompanied by a form of pleasure or joy connected to the movement of discovery itself.¹¹⁹ Let us consider this point more closely.

As Husserl points out in his texts from the Twenties and the Thirties, the fulfillment of a tendency is accompanied by the progressive relieving [*Entspannung*], or release of tension,¹²⁰ which generates pleasure. Displeasure and pleasure, thus, emerge in relation to the affective rhythms of tension-relaxing, emptiness-fulfillment, and the tempo of bodily movement. In this sense, the tendency striving for fulfillment is understood as life:

Life is striving in a manifold of forms and substances of intention and fulfillment. In fulfillment in the largest sense as pleasure, in the unfulfillment tending towards pleasure as purely desiring striving or as relieving striving in the fulfilling realization, and accomplishing itself in the process of realization of the in itself relieved form of life of pleasure.¹²¹

And further:

Every striving, tending, which accomplishes itself, has in its relieving and accomplishment (attainment) the character of satisfaction, which imposes a character of pleasure, a general one, on the way and the end.¹²²

We shall emphasize this latter point: the achievement of the tendency and its release produce satisfaction, and this again enjoins the character of pleasure not only to the moment of accomplishment [*Ende*], but also to the path leading towards it [*Weg*]. From this reference to the progressive relieving in coming closer to the perceptual aim, we can see how Husserl relates the issue of the teleology of perception to the issue of pleasure or joy in perceiving, thus legitimating the reference to a

¹¹⁸Cf. Hua XXXI, p. 17/(Husserl 2001a, p. 290). With regard to the relationship between instinct and rationality, see notably Mensch (1998). In his recent book, Mensch (2010) further develops such a view and proposes an understanding of Husserl's phenomenology of time as grounded on the phenomenology of instincts.

¹¹⁹“Connected to this is a distinctive feeling, the joy in this enrichment, and in relation to this horizon of expanding and increasing enrichment, a striving to get “closer and closer” to the object, to appropriate the self [of the object] even more completely.” Hua XXXI, p. 17/(Husserl 2001a, p. 290).

¹²⁰“The tendency relieves itself in the attainment; it is uptight in the aiming.” “Die Tendenz entspannt sich in der Erzielung; sie ist unentspannt in der Abzielung.” A VI 12 I/19a.

¹²¹“Leben ist Streben in mannigfaltigen Formen und Gehalten der Intention und Erfüllung; in der Erfüllung im weitesten Sinne Lust, in der Unerfülltheit Hintendieren auf Lust als rein begehrendes Streben oder als sich im erfüllenden Realisieren entspannendes Streben und sich erzielend im Prozess der Realisierung der in sich entspannten Lebensform der Lust.” A VI 26/42b.

¹²²“Jedes sich vollendende Streben, Tendieren, hat in seiner Entspannung und Vollendung (Erzielung) den Charakter der Befriedigung, der dem Weg und Ende einen Lustcharakter, einen allgemeinen, auferlegt.” A VI 27/20a.

“drive-intentionality” that underlies perception.¹²³ Precisely in this sense we shall consider not only the perceptual tendency as a “desire” to see, to perceive more and more,¹²⁴ but also the “freedom” of going through the different moments of perceptual givenness and of progressively explicating what is given as implicit.

Here, there is a freedom of traversing, as long as the object endures, in such a way that I move the eyes, I move the head, change my bodily posture, walk around, the gaze directed toward the object, touch, etc. All these are processes of tendencies, they are “activities”, although not voluntary actions.¹²⁵

In another of his later manuscripts, Husserl himself refers to Aristotle, claiming that in the phenomenological analyses regarding the nexus of the original instinct, objectification, tendency, and pleasure, the incipit of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, “All men by nature desire to know” and to see more and more differences (Aristotle 1928, I, 980a), finds its phenomenological truth (Hua Mat VIII, p. 321).

Reconsidering now these arguments with respect to the distinction of the absolute optimum represented by the ideal of adequateness and the relative or situational optima, we can say that perception constantly anticipates an absolute satisfaction or joy regarding the most complete and rich givenness, but also concretely actualizes the relative satisfaction with regard to the particular optima, within a process that is constantly open to further and further developments. It is precisely along these lines that we should read the reference to the “joy” we experience in the acquisition of knowledge:

Now, it differentiates itself. Curiosity, or rather the joy of the possession of knowledge in its original acquisition: the object in the mode of progressive appropriation is the theme of joy and a drive of curiosity arises, the drive of the knowledge-interest (theoretical interest).¹²⁶

It being understood that the *telos* of the theoretical interest is the richest givenness of the thing in its process-like unfolding, we also notice that perception is nonetheless animated by another kind of joy (or, to better say, pleasure),¹²⁷ related to the very unfolding of the perceptual process. Precisely in this sense, we can say that

¹²³ Concerning Husserl’s theory of instincts and drives and their role in the phenomenological analysis of constitution, see, notably, Bernet (2006), Lee (1993), Mensch (1998, 2010), Montavont (1999), and Pugliese (2009).

¹²⁴ Cf. Hua XXXI, p. 17/(Husserl 2001a, p. 290); EU, p. 92/(Husserl 1973, pp. 85–86).

¹²⁵ “Es gibt hier eine Freiheit des Durchlaufens, wenn das Objekt nur dauert, derart, dass ich <die> Augen bewege, den Kopf bewege, meine Körperhaltung wechsle, herum gehe, den Blick auf das Objekt gerichtet, betaste usw. Das alles sind Abläufe von Tendenzen, es sind ‘Tätigkeiten’, obschon nicht willkürliche Handlungen.” A VI 12 I/20a.

¹²⁶ “Es differenziert sich nun: Neugier, oder vielmehr Freude am Erkenntnisbesitz in seiner ursprünglichen Erwerbung: Der Gegenstand im Modus der fortschreitenden Zueignung ist das Freuden-Thema und es erwächst ein Trieb der Neugier, der Trieb des Erkenntnisinteresses (theoretisches Interesse).” A VI 26/64a.

¹²⁷ Bernet (2006) stresses that *Trieblust*, namely the pleasure that explicates itself in the rhythm of activity, should be distinguished from joy [*Freude*] and satisfaction [*Wohlgefallen*], which are connected to the givenness of the object, or to the end of the process. However, in the passages I am commenting here, Husserl sometimes adopts the notion of joy [*Freude*] also to describe the pleasure or joy that explicates itself in the very movement.

the perceptual process is an autotelic movement. Besides being related to the fulfillment of empty intentions and the synthesis of coincidence (or in overcoming false beliefs concerning the object, if the empty intentions are disappointed rather than fulfilled),¹²⁸ the *telos* of the perceptual process is also related to the very activity of perceiving:

When certain aims with multiple relative intermediate aims, which require multiform activities, are dear to me, i.e., bringing joy through their attainment (be it joy for the sake of itself or for the sake of something else), then the successful striving and doing also bring joy on their own, the joy in such activities (play), and this joy can even be much bigger than the joy of the aim. After all, an aim as such can be indifferent and only obtains its value due to the fact that skillfulness is required to reach it (thus only joy in the skillfulness to reach what is not easy to reach, etc.). Now, there is certainly also an immense joy that accrues from the exercise of research, as joy in the “play” of researching, quasi joy in research as a kind of sport, but this is not theoretical interest. Rather, the theoretical interest and the theoretical will of the aim are precisely the interest or the will in the “theoretical”.¹²⁹

In this passage, Husserl considers the activities moved by theoretical interests (i.e., researching, perceiving, looking for better and better differentiations) as “playful” activities, namely as activities that generate pleasure precisely in and through the process of their accomplishment, and even independently of an external aim. The *telos* of such playful activities does not properly coincide with an external aim; it is rather an immanent *telos* with respect to the very activity and to its cyclical unfolding. Of course, as Husserl makes clear in the final sentence, the joy that these activities generate is not to be confused with the proper satisfaction of the theoretical interest. Nevertheless, this remark also indicates that the activities guided by such interest may have at least teleological orientations: one directed to the satisfaction of the theoretical interest and coinciding with the proper knowledge of the object, and one directed to the activity itself. Apart from the activity of pure research done for its own sake, among playful activities we can also mention the bodily movements (independently of their motivational role in perception), fantasy activities, or the ones related to aesthetic pleasure. In this sense, we can read for instance the following passage, referring to the pleasure in maintaining and reproducing the conditions in which the *Lustwert* of one object is given:

¹²⁸ “Knowing is the activity that accomplishes itself in belief; its aim is the truth that confirms the belief or rather revokes it in its refutation.” “Das Erkennen ist die im Glauben sich vollziehende Tätigkeit, deren Ziel den Glauben bestätigende oder in der Widerlegung ihn aufhebende Wahrheit ist.” A VI 27/22b.

¹²⁹ “Wenn gewisse, vielgestaltige Tätigkeitenfordernde Ziele mit mannigfaltig entsprechenden Zwischenzielen mir lieb sind, also in der Erzielung Freude bringen (sei es Freude um ihrer selbst willen, sei es um eines anderen willen), so bringt das gelingende Streben und Tun noch selbst eine Freude, die Freude an derartiger Tätigkeit (Spiel), und diese Freude kann sogar viel größer sein als die Freude an dem Ziel. Schließlich kann ein Ziel an sich gleichgültig sein und nur Wert bekommen dadurch, dass es, <um es> zu erreichen, Geschicklichkeit fordert (also nur Freude an der Geschicklichkeit, um zu erreichen, was nicht leicht zu erreichen ist etc.). Nun gibt es sicherlich auch eine starke, aus der Übung der Forschung erwachsende Freude als Freude an dem “Spiel” des Forschens, sozusagen Freude an der Forschung als eine Art Sport, aber das ist nichts weniger als theoretisches Interesse. Vielmehr ist das theoretische Interesse und ist der theoretische Zielwille eben das Interesse bzw. der Wille am “Theoretischen.”” A VI 12 I/134a–b.

And now this pleasure is not quasi the “formal” pleasure in the turning out and in what turns out to be such and such, but rather pleasure which belongs in a particular way to the relevant feature and to the object displaying this feature. Must we not say now that this is a new character, not a feature, but something in the feature, and now this moment of “pleasure” affects us and allures in a particular way to “enjoy”, not to go further in getting to know the object, but rather to preserve the new moment in the maintenance of the perceiving apprehension. Possibly, in traversing certain modes of appearance of the object, certain profiles, in certain positions, to reproduce over and over the value of pleasure, which emerges from these course and their constitutive unity of the “profile”.¹³⁰

Such as in the aforementioned case, where Husserl refers to the effort required to do research, in all these cases, the *telos* is not reached in a final state [*Endzustand*], in a status that puts an end to the activity, but rather unfolds itself within the process of constant repetition.¹³¹

Besides shedding light on the dynamics of the process of perception, these remarks concerning the teleology of the perceptual tendency also reverberate on the phenomenological account of the perceiving subject. To be true, the interplay of empty intention/fulfillment, the movement of intentionality as a tendency, and its being moved by affection (let’s keep in mind here the previous discussion on the affective character of temporal perspective) bear witness to what we may call a structural lack that characterizes consciousness. There is always something more to perceive and, exploring the perceptual thing, we are at least implicitly aware of missing that something. Yet, this something cannot be determined once and for all and there is no fulfillment that would overcome such a fundamental openness. Thus, what I called structural lack shall not be understood according to the metaphor of a container in which content is poured in.¹³² Emptiness and fulfillment are two interwoven structural moments of a unitary whole, which is experience: there is no fulfillment that can remove all empty intentions. This is why fulfillment necessarily remains an open task: there will always be empty moments and the correlative striving for fulfillment. Based on the spatio-temporal unfolding of perception, the process of fulfillment is in principle never concluded. Moreover, such a process is not completely without interruptions, rather being characterized by the dynamic interplay of concordance and lack of concordance for which we seek a correction. To further explore how these descriptions of the perceptual process, and particularly

¹³⁰ “Und nun ist diese Lust nicht sozusagen “formale” Lust an der Herausstellung und dem sich Herausstellenden als solchen, sondern Lust, die in besonderer Weise zu dem betreffenden Merkmal und dem Gegenstand als dem dieses Merkmals gehört. Muss man nun nicht sagen, das ist ein neuer Charakter, nicht ein Merkmal, sondern etwas am Merkmal, und nun affiziert dieses Moment der “Lust” und zieht in besonderer Weise an zu “genießen”, nicht in der Kenntnisnahme des Gegenstands weiterzugehen, sondern in der Erhaltung der wahrnehmenden Erfassung das neue Moment zu erhalten; eventuell im Durchlaufen gewisser Erscheinungsweisen des Gegenstands, gewisser Seiten, in gewissen Stellungen den Lustwert immer wieder herzustellen, der an diesen Abläufen und ihrer konstitutiven Einheit der “Seite” ersteht.” A VI 27/19b.

¹³¹ Husserl states this quite clearly in Hua Mat VIII, 328. I will return to this topic in dealing with bodily movement in the next chapter.

¹³² For a critique of such an understanding of the structural lack, or *Mangelstruktur*, of experience, see Waldenfels (2002, pp. 48f.).

of the perceptual tendency toward fulfillment, reverberate upon the status of subjectivity, we shall now more closely consider the teleology of such a tendency with respect to temporality.

7.3.3 *Teleology and Inner Time Consciousness*

Throughout the previous sections, we have seen that the teleology of perception can only be understood in light of the interweaving of the spatial and the temporal dimension. Yet, up to now, we have only argued that temporality plays an essential role in the teleology of perception, without explicitly thematizing how. In this paragraph, thus, we shall explore more closely the relationship between teleology and temporality. More precisely, I will address this relation from two perspectives: first, I will highlight the specific temporal unfolding of perception according to the different modes of teleology discussed thus far; and secondly, I will consider in what sense the very temporal stream can be considered as a teleological process.

With respect to the first point, we can see that all the modalities in which the perceptual tendency toward fulfillment explicates itself have a specific temporal unfolding. Let us begin by addressing the teleology of optimal givenness. In this case, perception is animated by the finite interests of practically oriented cognition. The aim of perception is thus reached once we have the best possible appearance that satisfies these interests. Yet, which is the temporality of this optimal appearance? Even if this is not explicitly thematized by Husserl in these terms, his account of optimal givenness entails the reference to what we may call situative temporality. This is a situation-related temporal determination, which has to do with the qualitative moments of this particular experience, with its own interests, and taking place in these particular circumstances. Accordingly, it cannot be described in purely formal terms and apart from the spatial determination of a lived situation. Indeed, far from being reducible to mere formal relationships, and far from being representable *salva veritate* by means of a Cartesian plane, the “here-now” coordinates in which the optimal appearance is attained rather refer to some irreducible qualitative and content-related moments. In other words, there is not an optimal “here and now” that is determined once and for all. Such a determination, rather, is always and necessarily context related. Thus, optimal givenness can be characterized as an event, which happens within the network of temporal becoming. Moreover, the temporality of such an event can be properly described by means of the Greek concept of *kairos*, which refers to the most appropriate and suitable moment in relation to practical cognition and action.¹³³ In the case of the perception guided by the finite interests of practical cognition, the “propitiousness” of one particular moment or *kairos* is determined in relation to the specific perceptual context, to the

¹³³ See, for instance, Aristotle (1925, 1104a). Here, Aristotle considers the ability to recognize the *kairos*, the right moment in which general knowledge shall be applied to the particular situation, of crucial importance for medical science.

appropriateness of the given circumstances in order to actualize the optimal appearance, which satisfies the interests of the perceiver in this particular perception.

Instead, considering perception as an infinite teleological process, guided by the interests in purely theoretical cognition and by the regulative ideal of adequate givenness, we are confronted with the temporality of an open temporal process. More precisely, it is the temporality of an open tendency oriented toward the future, which, as we have seen, Husserl thematizes in the developments of his analyses concerning the role of protention in temporal constitution. Indeed, the open dynamics of temporality, in its constant tension towards fulfillment, guided by the ideal of complete fullness, is presupposed by all intentional tendencies of a higher order, and particularly by the tendency of perceiving more and more differences, grounding the theoretical interest.

Finally, also the relation between the perceptual tendency and pleasure or joy shall be addressed as a temporal process. More precisely, if we consider the joy connected with the achievement of a perceptual aim (such as in the case of optimal givenness), we will temporally describe the process tending toward such an achievement as a protentional tendency toward the maximum of intuitive fullness. the concrete dynamics of increasing and decreasing underlie this very teleology, as it is connected with the progressive “release of tension” in the process of coming closer to the maximum point of fulfillment (Hua XXXIII, p. 230). On the other hand, what in the *Bernau Manuscripts* is described as a constant process of increasing and decreasing (Hua XXXIII, pp. 34ff.) designates the temporal rhythm of the cyclic repetition of activity, which has an end in itself. These different modes of temporal unfolding of perceptual teleology further contribute to the definition of consciousness as life and self-generating movement, which dynamically explicates itself as an activity, starting from its most basic layers.

The second point, regarding the teleology of the temporal stream of consciousness independently of its role in perception, is more complex. To be true, indeed, Husserl thematizes the teleology of the temporal stream in relation to different aspects of temporal constitution, such as the phenomenology of recollection, and the self-reflection upon the temporal process and its inner dynamics. One way to retrace a common thread throughout these analyses regarding the teleology of time consciousness is again to ask whether the achievement of the temporal process consists in reaching its aim, and with it a status of appeasement that would put an end to the very temporal movement, or rather whether we shall conceive of the temporal process as an autotelic movement, the aim of which eventually coincides with its own reproduction. As I will show in the following, considering respectively the teleology of recollection and the teleology of self-reflection of the temporal stream, with respect to temporality we can find the same oscillation regarding these two understandings of the teleology, which we have found by considering spatial perception. Again, as we will see, this is based upon the idea of complete or adequate manifestation.

Despite Husserl’s well known claims concerning the adequateness of inner experience, once the structural unfolding of such an experience is taken into account, such claims do not seem to hold any longer. As we have seen considering the

phenomenon of temporal perspective, there is, indeed, a constitutive incompleteness that characterizes inner temporal experience. And this is mirrored within the analyses concerning the teleology of temporal constitution. Somehow, this seems to overturn the claim that the teleology of adequateness in perception is modeled upon the adequateness of inner experience, and that this ultimately implies a subjectivization of perception (cf. Barbaras 1999, pp. 31f.). Nevertheless, Husserl's remarks concerning the inadequateness of temporal givenness and the teleology of temporal consciousness are not simply modeled upon those concerning spatial perception either. And, accordingly, there is not a mere parallelism between the process of spatial and temporal constitution. Certainly, both can be considered as to their specific features. However, they are necessarily joined within lived experience. Thus, if it still makes sense to consider temporal constitution by abstracting from its role in spatial experience, as I will partially do in the following, we shall keep in mind that such remarks have their full meaning only once they are reabsorbed within a more articulated account of sensible experience, grounded on the interweaving of the spatial and the temporal dimensions. Let us now try to support these claim by considering the teleology of temporality, with particular regard to recollection, self-reflection and self-constitution.

The Teleology of Recollection

The most accurate analyses regarding the teleology of recollection¹³⁴ are to be found in the *Bernau Manuscripts* (Hua XXXIII, pp. 378–388) and in the *Analyses Concerning Active and Passive Synthesis*.¹³⁵ In the former text, the teleology of recollection is connected with the descriptions of the intentional tendency, explicating itself in both passive and active syntheses. On the one hand, recollection is motivated by a passive tendency and by an associative “popping into mind” or occurrence of thoughts [*Einfall*], which asks for further determinations; on the other hand, explicit recollection is itself characterized as an egoic tendency, aiming at the reproduction of the past (Hua XXXIII, pp. 385–386). Also, with regard to the teleology of this recollecting tendency, Husserl is confronted with the idea of adequateness. The *telos* of active recollection would coincide with the perfect reproduction of the experienced

¹³⁴ Quite surprisingly, Husserl does not properly develop an account of the teleology of expectation, i.e., of the explicit anticipation of something to come in the future. This may be due to the asymmetry between recollection and expectation and to the constitutive indeterminacy of the latter. Being essentially indeterminate, expectation cannot in principle have the same teleological orientation as the former, which aims at the complete reproduction of something that has already been. However, this does not exclude that there is a pre-delineation in expectation, as we will see, which is motivated by the very past experience. The *telos* of this pre-delineation would eventually coincide with the constant enrichment of experience, which, in the best case, confirms my expectations. This leaves in any case open the possibility of disappointment, which might turn out to be itself a further progress in the process of a more appropriate determination of the intended correlate. In this respect, see. Hua XI, pp. 211–217/(Husserl 2001a, pp. 263–269); Hua XXXIII, pp. 275–277.

¹³⁵ Hua XI, pp. 200–217/(Husserl 2001a, pp. 252–269).

past, i.e., with the reproduction of the object or the event such as they were previously experienced and of our original experience thereof. Yet, this coincidence of the present reproduction with the past experience is also considered as an idea, namely as something that is in principle unattainable according to the law of temporal perspective. In this sense, adequateness, here intended as the full coincidence between the past experiences and present recollections, functions as *focus imaginarius* also in immanent experience, namely as something that orients and guides the explication of the implicit horizon in temporal appearances:

The true feature, the true object, the object such as it really was, as it has been really perceived, is an “idea” [...] (Hua XXXIII, pp. 379–380)¹³⁶

Also, in the case of recollection, we may be satisfied with the optimum of the best possible presentification, related to the particular interest that motivates our act of recalling past experience. If I do not find my keys and try to recollect where I put them, my interests in this recollection will be satisfied when I eventually come to presentify, for instance, the moment when I put my keys in my jacket's pocket. To this aim, however, I do not need to recollect everything I was co-experiencing while putting the keys in the pocket or how the keys or the jacket precisely look like. Thus, whereas the ideal of the fullest recollection of experiences, objects and events such as they were originally experienced in perception is the *telos* of the “theoretical” interest aiming at the clearest and most distinct appearance, the optimal givenness of the recollected object or event satisfies a “practical” interest, for instance the interest in finding the keys. In the latter case, in other words, we do not need to actually reproduce all the determinations of the recollected object or event, nor to be aware of all aspects of our previous experience. We only need to recollect those determinations that respond to our particular present interests.¹³⁷ Also, the appearance of the finite optimum of recollection has a situated character, as it refers to the particular circumstances that motivate my actual effort in recollection, and most often also to the affective and associative emergence of occurring memories [*einfallende Erinnerungen*]. Analogous to the relative or finite optima of spatial perception, the relative optima of recollection also have a double function: they are an end in themselves (since they respond to one particular and finite interest), but they are also integrated within the process tending towards the absolute optimum. Given this distinction and correlation of relative optima and absolute optimum.

¹³⁶ See also, Hua XXXIII, pp. 381, 384, 385, 386.

¹³⁷ “Remembering is consciousness of an “object”, of the once perceived one, and living-in-such-remembering [...] is being-directed-toward-the-object. Thereby, the object is the aim of this directedness. It, the object itself, the real object, is an idea, the correlate of the idea of a complete attainment. Yet, shouldn't we distinguish the practical attitude from the exact one? The former aims at the object as a practical idea, i.e., as practical *telos* (residing in every memory as practical *dynamis*, tied to it as its practical *entelecheia*), the latter, however, aims at the object in “strict”, “exact”, “ultimate” truth, as idea in the Kantian sense. As practically interested, I am not directed toward what is exact; as exactly interested, not toward what practically identical” Hua XXXIII, p. 386.

optimum, we can understand the meaning of Husserl's reference to the gradualness in the actualization of intuitive recollection:

We can qualify empty memory as a mere potentiality (*dynamis*), which has in intuitive recollection its gradualness of actualization, and thereby has in itself the recollected as a relative *energeia* on. Yet, what was truly and really in itself is the *energeia* on in the absolute sense, as idea. (Hua XXXIII, p. 381)

Besides insisting on the necessity to supplement perception with recollection for the constitution of an identical object throughout time,¹³⁸ and besides stressing again the ideal and regulative character of adequate recollection,¹³⁹ in his *Analyses Concerning Active and Passive Synthesis*, Husserl particularly addresses the teleology of recollection in relation to the self-givenness and self-constitution of the temporal stream of consciousness. In this text Husserl not only refers to the ideal of adequate givenness of one correlate, but also of the very stream of consciousness as a whole:

The stream of consciousness lives with streaming, and simultaneously becomes object-like, objective for its Ego; the stream of consciousness becomes an object as the transcendent self that comes to incomplete and approximate self-giving in rememberings and in syntheses of remembering of a particular present. For the Ego it corresponds to the idea of a true self, to the idea of the true past of consciousness, as the idea of complete self-giving.¹⁴⁰

Thus, the stream of temporal consciousness essentially exceeds the domain of possible actual recollections; it is not accessible as a whole to an all-embracing act of presentification, being, almost paradoxically, the first “transcendent in the manner of a primordial source” [*der erste urquellmäßige Transzendenten*].¹⁴¹ With this claim, Husserl seems to recognize that the dynamics of consciousness is a dynamics of constant withdrawing from complete accessibility. No intentional act, no recollection, can in principle embrace the totality of conscious experiences. And this is precisely due to the temporal unfolding of consciousness. Yet, it remains true that, even in this case, the idea of a complete and perfect self-givenness has the regulative power of orienting our recollecting activity.

The Teleology of Self-Reflection and the Primal Stream

The previous account of recollection and of the inaccessibility of the temporal stream as a whole seems to rephrase some motives characterizing Husserl's account of the givenness of the original temporal process in reflection. Eventually, the *telos* of such a reflection would also coincide with the ideal of an actual givenness of the temporal process in all its moments, included the very moment of self-reflection. At first view, this sounds quite paradoxical, since reflection is constitutively

¹³⁸ Hua XI, p. 203/(Husserl 2001a, p. 254).

¹³⁹ Hua XI, pp. 201–204/(Husserl 2001a, pp. 252–255).

¹⁴⁰ Hua XI, p. 204/(Husserl 2001a, p. 256). Husserl clearly states the regulative character of this ideality at paragraph 45. See Hua XI, pp. 210–211/(Husserl 2001a, pp. 261–262).

¹⁴¹ Hua XI, p. 204/(Husserl 2001a, p. 256). Translation modified.

nachträglich: there cannot be in principle a reflective act that grasps itself in the act of reflecting. As we will immediately see, this paradox is inevitable if we assume that the *telos* of self-reflection consists in the effective grasping of consciousness in all its determinations. Again, the recognition of the ideality of such a *telos* will allow us to reformulate the very question regarding the teleology of self-reflection with respect to the dynamic unfolding of the temporal stream.

In one passage from text number 2 in Hua XXXIII, Husserl seems precisely to hint at this key issue, referring to the hypothesis of an “omniscient” actual consciousness. In this quite controversial passage, we can find two accounts of what we may call a “teleology of omniscience”, parallel to the distinction between actual and potential infinity. As Husserl points out, the living present could in principle also be considered as an omniscient consciousness, since it potentially embraces the consciousness of all the determinations of the stream itself. Yet, these infinite determinations are only potentially entailed as explicit consciousness in the living present. This is quite consistent with the characterization of consciousness as a tendency towards a richer and richer self-manifestation, which is guided by the ideal limit of the most complete self-givenness. For this self-manifestation is eventually the actualization of the potentialities of self-consciousness that are entailed by the living present. However, Husserl also makes a step further and perhaps even a risky one, when he qualifies the limits of actual self-appearances as “accidental” [*zufällig*]. These limits, in other words, would be proper to the experience of a finite consciousness, which still leaves fully open the possibility of a “divine” omniscient consciousness, which would actually have be the consciousness of all its own infinite determinations at once:

The present is all-encompassing, quasi omniscient consciousness of itself and of all its intentional components. Potentially, its structure holds in itself the omniscience of the world, namely as ideal possibility, whereby we only take into account that the horizon of darkness, in which past and future of consciousness become blurred [*verschwimmen*], and which limits the completeness of self-perception of consciousness, is a fortuitous limit [*eine zufällige Schranke*]. This can be extended in infinitum, in such a way that an omniscient “divine” consciousness, encompassing itself in full clarity, arises as an “idea”. “Finite” consciousness is also omniscient; its intentionality too encompasses its whole past and future, but only partially clearly, in all other respects [it embraces them] in an obscurity, which is a potentiality for clarities and recollections. (Hua XXXIII, pp. 45–46)

Yet, how should we read the reference to this actually omniscient “divine” consciousness? And are the limits of conscious self-manifestation really accidental or fortuitous, as Husserl suggests here? Basing on the analyses developed throughout this chapter, I believe that the answer to this latter question should be no. Consequently, the actually omniscient consciousness can exclusively be the result of a process of idealization, of an infinite series of limit passages. Indeed, the opposite would imply some relevant problems, which I now wish to discuss in order to better characterize the teleology of the immanent stream by referring to openness and potentiality.

Let us start by considering the alleged accidental nature of the limits of the actual conscious experience. If this was the case, we would have to face here the same objections that Husserl formulated towards Kant’s restricted notion of the a priori. Such an account would ultimately limit the validity of the a priori laws of temporal

constitution, temporal perspective, etc. to a particular consciousness, namely to finite consciousness. Thus, following Husserl's own argument, those laws could not be considered as a priori any longer, for they would not hold for every possible experiencing subject but only for subjects with determinate characteristics. Yet, this is certainly not Husserl's intention. And if the validity of the temporal laws is not accidental, how can he consistently maintain the claims suggesting an actually omniscient consciousness? I believe that the only way to avoid such a contradiction is to consider such an omniscient consciousness as the result of an idealizing process, which certainly goes beyond both the realm of sensible experience and the reflective descriptions we can give of such an experience. Indeed, the actually omniscient consciousness would not be a temporalizing and temporal one. It would constitute neither temporal events nor itself in a process of becoming; it would rather be a static consciousness, which always already has all its correlates in pure actuality and fullness. Yet, the temporal laws of consciousness are by no means a accidental *Tatsache*. They rather define an inexplicable and yet necessary *Faktum*. Thus, among the necessary laws of temporal consciousness, we need to count also the law concerning the impossibility of a complete conscious and actual self-presence.

Drawing the consequences from Husserl's suggestions regarding omniscient consciousness in the *Bernau Manuscripts* allows us to further grasp the tension implied by the reflection on the living present, which will be central in the later developments of the analyses of time. This tension, again, is strictly related to the teleology of reflection and has been very incisively described by Held. As he points out, the *telos* of radical reflection on the living present would be to grasp the totality of the temporal stream, included the present itself, and accordingly to experience the ultimate unity of intentional life. Yet, if this aim would be reached, then the very movement of intentional life would come to an end. The very teleology, or the motor of protentional intentionality, would be arrested. Accordingly, phenomenological reflection seems to face a paradoxical situation, for it tries to overcome its own essential dynamics (Held 1966, p. 133).¹⁴² Such as in the case of perception and the *telos* of adequate givenness, if reflection was successful in grasping the totality of intentional life, this would imply the dissolution of intentional life (and with it of the possibility of reflective consciousness). Admitting that complete self-presence cannot but be an ideal limit, the effective accomplishment of which would deprive consciousness of its essential temporal dynamics and liveliness [*Lebendigkeit*], we shall ask whether this also reverberates on the understanding of the teleological dynamics of the stream of consciousness. In perception, the limit idea of adequacy has a regulative function. We can assume that the idea of a full and complete self-givenness in reflection also has a similar regulative function in guiding and orienting the unfolding of the temporal process, included the moment of self-reflection. Accordingly, the teleology of temporal becoming shall be understood in light of the

¹⁴²In a preceding section, Held (1966, p. 43) considers this teleology of protention with regard to the constitution of the world.

constitutive openness of the temporal stream.¹⁴³ Such openness manifests itself in both the increasing [*Steigerung*] of progressive fulfillment relative to the “striving” of each phase of the temporal process toward the point of maximal fullness, and in the rhythm of increasing and decreasing [*Steigen und Sinken*] that constantly repeats itself throughout the entire the temporal process.¹⁴⁴ These observations bring us back again to the question regarding the distinction between a teleological movement that has its end in itself and a movement that tends toward something else. Again, if it has to maintain its essential character of liveliness, the living present cannot find its definitive accomplishment in the status of reached fullness. Yet, if accomplishment is an ideal limit, then the very teleology of the living present explicates itself in the self-repetition of the movement tending towards the progressive surpassing of the actual now-phase.

7.4 Conclusions

Beginning with the description of perspectival appearance as a spatio-temporal phenomenon, in this chapter, I have highlighted the implications of Husserl’s understanding of perspectival givenness for the theory of sensible experience. Particularly, on the basis of a noematic account of perspectival appearance, I have first shown how this phenomenon implies a situated account of perception, which entails a specific kind of implicit and non-objectivating awareness of proximity and remoteness. Considering the phenomenon of perspectival givenness in the light of the spatio-temporal intertwining allows us to understand this specific kind of awareness in relation to the phenomenon of affection.

Further exploring the noetic side of the perceptual act, the mode of awareness of the hidden profiles of the thing has been discussed. This has brought to the fore the associative syntheses that are operative in perception, as well as a specific kind of intuitive but unfulfilled consciousness, namely empty consciousness. The latter designates the intuitive awareness of something that is “present in and through its absence”. Moreover, the interplay between empty intentions and fulfillment has lead us to determine the intentionality of perceptual experience as a tendency. Further exploring the implications of such a determination with respect to the interweaving of spatial and temporal experience, we have arrived at understanding the dynamics of consciousness as life.

¹⁴³ Husserl presents this “infinite openness” in texts 2 and 11 of Hua XXXIII, pp. 45f., 226f. Thereby, he distinguishes this infinity from the “bad” infinity of the regress of foundation. The latter, particularly regarding the constitution of the primal stream, is already critically addressed in Husserl’s earlier texts and further in the later ones. See Hua X, pp. 285f., 332–334 (Husserl 1991, pp. 295f., 342–344); Hua XXXIII, pp. 184–189, 221–232, 243f. See also, Bernet (1985, pp. XXXVIIff.), Bernet and Lohmar (2001, pp. XXXII–XLIV), and Kortooms (2002, pp. 128f., 140f., 169f.).

¹⁴⁴ Hua XXXIII, pp. 38–41. With a different terminology, the distinction between the saturation [*Sättigung*] of each particular phase and the absolute saturation of the living present is formulated in manuscript C 5. In this case too, absolute fulfillment is defined as an ideal-limit. Hua XXXIV, pp. 165f.

Finally, the emphasis on the dynamics of perceptual experience and constitution has prompted us to investigate the teleology of such a dynamics. To be true, as we have seen, the teleology of sensible experience and constitution cannot be understood univocally, and for this reason I have rather spoken of different modes of teleology in the most basic fields of experience. Distinguishing the teleology of the finite optimum from the teleology of adequateness, and understanding the latter as a regulative idea, we could return to one point discussed in the two previous parts of this book, namely the relationship between the interests that animate perception – therefore considered immanent to the transcendental aesthetic – and those stemming from cognition. Despite admitting that the interest in the adequate givenness of the perceptual thing belongs to cognition, we have seen in what sense such an interest is grounded upon the very dynamic, spatio-temporal, unfolding of the perceptual tendency. Thematizing the teleology of the perceptual tendency, I have further shown how the latter can be conceived both as a teleological and as an autotelic movement. Thereby, I have argued that the former understanding is subordinated to the latter. Finally, discussing the teleology of the primal temporal stream and showing how the latter can never be fully grasped in complete self-presence has allowed us to further develop the insights obtained in the previous chapter regarding subjectivity as a principally open and relational process of becoming.

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Chapter 8

The Transcendental Aesthetic and the Lived-Body

In our *eidos* “world”, our lived-body plays and, to put it more clearly, for every knowing subject having in front of itself an intuitive and shaped physical world, its body plays a distinguished role, essentially determining the *eidos* of this world. (Hua Mat IV, p. 182)

Once more, the 1919 lecture course on *Nature and Spirit* gives us some important clues to start our survey. The claim made by Husserl in the quoted passage is rather strong: the lived-body plays an indispensable role in the aesthetic constitution of the world; it essentially determines the *eidos* of the world, insofar as the latter is given to us in sensible experience. Yet, how shall we understand this claim? How does Husserl conceive, more precisely, of the role of the body in the constitution of the world? Let us turn again to the 1919 lecture course. Here, Husserl provides an answer to these questions by referring to three main features of bodily experience: (1) my lived-body is always implicitly co-perceived whenever I perceive something else;¹ (2) among all things I can experience, my lived-body has the unique feature of “carrying” sensations and sensible fields, notably tactile sensations;² (3) although it can, like all other material things, be moved mechanically, the lived-body is also the source of its own movement, be that voluntary or involuntary.³ Considering these three prerogatives of bodily experience in relation with his transcendental aesthetic, Husserl eventually claims that the phenomenology of the constitution of the physical thing is always intertwined with the phenomenology of the lived-body, and that the latter is the basis for the phenomenology of the psychic sphere.⁴

¹ “[...] if a thing is perceived in general, then my lived-body is also there [...]” Hua Mat IV, p. 183.

² “Among all experienced and experienceable things, only my lived-body is carrier of sense-fields that are perceivable on it. For instance, only my lived-body has in my perception a touch-sense-field, phenomenally spread out over its own whole appearing shape.” Hua Mat IV, p. 183.

³ “Every other thing immediately has only mechanical movements. My lived-body can also be moved mechanically [...]. Yet, an “I move myself” is a completely different situation, and indeed regardless whether voluntarily or involuntarily.” Hua Mat IV, p. 184.

⁴ “[...] and thus the phenomenology of physical materiality [*Dinglichkeit*] intertwines itself from the very beginning with the phenomenology of corporeality [*Leiblichkeit*]; the latter is then itself the

The claim made by Husserl in the 1919 lecture course seems to imply that transcendental subjectivity, insofar as it is world constituting, and insofar as such constitution primarily happens in and through sensibility, is necessarily bodily. However, this conclusion might not be that immediately evident. Husserl's phenomenology, indeed, is primarily a theory of the structures and the dynamics of consciousness, and we have considered some of these structures in the previous chapters, showing how they are dynamically operative within the transcendental aesthetic. Yet, how do these structures relate to bodily experience? To better phrase this question, we can resort to the conceptual distinction introduced by Legrand (2006) between the philosophical understanding of subjectivity as embodied and as bodily. In the former case, the subject is generally conceived as consciousness, or as a "soul", which accidentally happens also to have a body, hence the question is how these respectively "independent" entities belong together. In the latter case, subjective experience is considered to be necessarily mediated by and bound to the body. The subject, in this case, does not merely have a body [*Körper*] but is incarnated in his/her lived-body [*Leib*]. The phenomenology of the body we are going to address in this chapter will allow us to understand whether Husserl's analyses support the former or the latter understanding of subjectivity.

For the moment, we can already notice that the claims we have made regarding the spatio-temporal intertwining in sensible experience has remained incomplete and somehow abstract. This allows us to formulate the hypothesis that Husserl would rather endorse an understanding of subjectivity as bodily. How can, indeed, sensibility and spatial constitution be conceived apart from the experience of a bodily subject? What makes the incompleteness of our previous analyses on the spatio-temporal intertwining in sensible experience seems precisely to be the abstraction from the phenomenology of bodily experience. This appears to be quite intuitive insofar as spatiality is concerned. Being spatiality primarily constituted in and through perception, such a constitution necessarily involves bodily experience. Yet, what about temporality? Can we legitimately argue that also the temporal structures of experience necessarily refer to the experience of a bodily subject? Considering Husserl's stratified architectonics of experience, this does not seem to be the case. Yet, in line with the argument I have been making throughout this work, I would suggest that this foundational relationship shall be considered in the light of the concept of abstraction, and more precisely of the ontological concept of "abstract" or "non-independent" contents, as it is presented in the *Third Logical Investigation*. Abstraction, in this sense, refers to the distinction of a non-independent content from the other contents of a whole. That is to say, such content cannot actually be separated from the others and from the whole, and yet it can become the object of an isolating representation.⁵ It is precisely in this sense that the phenomenology of time consciousness can be considered as abstracting.⁶ In other words, the

fundamental lower level for the phenomenology of the psychic sphere." Hua Mat IV, pp. 185–186. See also Hua IV, pp. 94, 237.

⁵Hua XIX/1, p. 222/(Husserl 2001b, p. 310).

⁶Cf. Hua XI, pp. 125–128/(Husserl 2001a, pp. 170–174).

phenomenology of inner time consciousness is meant to shed light on the temporal structures and dynamics that must hold for all possible contents. However, considering these structures in abstraction from the particular sensible contents does not mean that the relationship between the temporal form and the sensible contents is something like a merely additive relation. On the contrary, and this is clearly stated in the *Bernau Manuscripts*, temporal form and sensible content are necessarily connected as moments of a whole: there is no single temporal “point” in immanent time without primal sensible impression (Hua XXXIII, p. 282). Form and content necessarily belong together. Yet, could hyletic temporal objects, and the primal sensible impressions, be conceived apart from the experience of a bodily subject? My preliminary answer to this question is no. And the argument I wish to make in this chapter is aimed to support this claim.

Devoting this final chapter to the phenomenology of the lived-body, I thus aim to provide a more concrete account of aesthetic constitution. Particularly, I will focus on those moments of bodily experience that make clear how the latter arises from the interweaving of the spatial and the temporal dimension. In doing this, I mainly follow Husserl’s approach and consider bodily experience primarily from the first-person perspective. However, some references to intersubjective experience will also be made regarding the aspects which cannot be accounted for without a reference to intersubjectivity. Indeed, it must be stressed right now that this approach does not imply any kind of ontological solipsism. On the contrary, by reflexively inquiring into the modes of experience of my lived-body and of my bodily activity from the first-person perspective, these analyses shed light not only on the scope, but also on the limits of the first-personal account. They clearly show, for instance, that through such an experience I cannot, in principle, completely objectify my own body, nor I can constitute it as a material thing.⁷ Only thanks to intersubjective experience, to the “interiorization” of the gaze of the other on my lived-body, the latter can be constituted as a material thing. Moreover, other phenomena related to bodily experience, such as expressivity and normality/abnormality, can be properly addressed only on the level of intersubjective experience.⁸ The chapter is divided into two main parts. In the first part, the spatio-temporality of the lived-body considered as organ of perception will be elucidated. Particularly, the concept of situation will be assumed as a guiding thread to concretely investigate

⁷ See Hua IV, p. 159/(Husserl 1989, p. 167), where Husserl refers to the lived-body as to a “remarkably imperfectly constituted thing”, and Hua IV, p. 161/(Husserl 1989, pp. 168–169), where the limits of solipsistic experience are clearly pointed out. See also Hua XV, pp. 268–269, where Husserl refers to the incomplete givenness of one’s own lived-body as experienced from the first-person perspective and therefore to the impossibility of constituting the body as a material thing within a solipsistic approach.

⁸ This implies further complications in the experience of the ambiguity of the body. On the one hand, the materiality of my lived-body can be constituted only through the mediation of the other. On the other hand, I can have a direct and intimate experience only of my own lived-body, i.e., I can constitute the lived-body of the other only by means of appresentation and syntheses of association. See Hua IV, pp. 242f./ (Husserl 1989, p. 254f.). See also Bernet (2008); Depraz (1995, pp. 125f.); Yamaguchi (1982).

how the body is involved in sensible perception. Notably, the concepts of situation and situational spatio-temporality will allow us to clarify the characterization of the body as the zero-point of orientation, the law of psycho-physical conditionality that rules bodily perception, and the role of bodily movement in sensible constitution. The second part focuses on bodily self-experience, or what Husserl calls the aesthetic of the lived-body. Addressing the property of sensitivity [*Empfindsamkeit*], the experience of bodily movement as mediator of bodily consciousness, and the phenomenon of body memory, I shall argue that these forms of bodily experience and self-experience are also grounded on the intertwining of lived spatiality and temporality. In the two sections, such an intertwining of lived spatiality and temporality mirrors the double meaning of the notion of “organ” applied to the lived-body: respectively, as “instrument” of perception⁹ and as referring to the complex and dynamic unity of an “organism”.¹⁰

On the basis of the analyses of the interweaving of spatio-temporality in bodily experience, we will eventually consider whether the claim made in the 1919 lecture course concerning the essential role of the body within the transcendental aesthetic, and accordingly also the claim concerning the bodily character of subjectivity, can be considered as consistent.

8.1 Situational Spatio-temporality of the Body as Organ of Perception

Every present is a situation, however much change has taken place in it – kinesthetic and directional changes, changes in perspective, rest and movement, qualitative alteration and nonalteration. And it retains unity during and despite all the change in this present. Not only is the unity of the spatiotemporal thing as “the same, that thereby moves itself” experienced, etc., but even the entire situation has unity; or rather what is coexistently experienced in the unity of a living present has a unity, that of the situation.¹¹

This passage from manuscript D 12 IV introduces an important concept to understand the interrelatedness of spatiality and temporality: the concept of

⁹Hua IV, pp. 56, 144, 247/(Husserl 1989, pp. 61, 152, 259).

¹⁰Hua IV, pp. 161, 247/(Husserl 1989, pp. 168–169, 259). See also Ms. D 2: “The whole lived-body is a whole of organs and is itself a unitary organ, constantly moved as a whole. Thereby, the non-egoic being-moved, the non-being-active is itself a mode of being-active [...] a unitary being-moved or non-being-moved constantly belongs to the aesthetic body [*Körperleib*] in this double layer, in such a way that it distributes itself both to the moving and to the moved organs.” “Der ganze Leib ist ein Ganzes von Organen und selbst einheitliches Organ, ständig als ganzer bewegt; dabei ist das nicht-ichliche Bewegtwerden, das Nichttätigsein selbst ein Modus des Tätigseins [...] ständig gehört zum ästhetischen Körperleib mit ein einheitliches Bewegtsein oder Nichtbewegtsein in dieser Doppelschicht, derart dass es sich zugleich verteilt auf die beweglichen bzw. bewegten Organe.” D 2/3b.

¹¹(Husserl 1946, p. 334)/(Husserl 1981b, p. 245).

situation. The meaning of this concept and its relevance for the transcendental aesthetic shall be understood in relation to bodily experience. A situation, indeed, defines the configurative unity I am bodily inhabiting in the present, here and now. To say that the unity of a situation is configurative hints at the co-belonging of the spatio-temporal form of situated presence and its content, namely its specific qualitative and sensible moments. Conversely, each configurative, spatio-temporal present is a situation. Accordingly, there would be no situation if such an experiential present configuration was not bodily experienced. The presence that makes up a situation is bodily, spatio-temporal and sensibly experienced. Yet, the lived-body is not outside of the situation; it rather constitutes the unity of a situation from within. Accordingly, the spatio-temporality of bodily experience shall also be considered as situational. In order to better understand the meaning of these claims, a more precise thematization of the concept of situation within the transcendental aesthetic is first required. To this aim, let us consider Buytendijk's concise but incisive characterization of the concept of situation and Merleau-Ponty's distinction between situational and positional spatiality.

Discussing the meaning of the concept of situation in everyday discourse from a philosophical-anthropological perspective, and thereby also referring to the unexpectedness and extraordinariness of specific situations, Buytendijk (1954, p. 7) argues that situatedness brings to the fore some central aspects of the relationship between the human subject and the world. Particularly, the concept of situation entails the two moments of inevitability [*fatalité*] and impulse [*élan*]. The givenness of a situation, with its qualitative and configurative determinations, results from the convergence of a set of circumstances which are not under our control, and for this reason we can speak of *fatalité*. However, we respond to the affordances of such a situation, and for this reason the latter is also the source of possible activity, *élan*. Thus, the concept of situation refers to the factually given field of possible actions. Human situated experience entails both the moment of facticity, related to the given and partially unmodifiable circumstances of experience, and the moment of initiative, referring to the potential actions one can take within the given circumstances.

Such a twofold characterization of situatedness can be further developed with reference to Merleau-Ponty's (1945, pp. 116f.) distinction between spatiality of position and spatiality of situation. Spatiality of position presupposes an objective system of reference, such as a Cartesian coordinate-system, within which things are located. In such a system, positions are determined in relation to measurable distance from an established reference point. All the different positions in such a system are formally equivalent and there is uniformity in all orientations (isotropy). To use another of Merleau-Ponty's expressions, this is a spatial configuration that could be looked at *de survol*, like a view from nowhere. On the contrary, spatiality of situation is characterized by three main features: (1) it is oriented and anisotropic with respect to the singular subjective-bodily point of view, determined as "here" and therefore being simultaneously origin and part of space; (2) it is concretely bound to the given specific circumstances of experience, which cannot be abstracted *salva veritate*, and (3) it defines a field of possible actions or tasks, within the boundaries set by the first two conditions.

Although spatiality is what first comes to mind with respect to situatedness, both Merleau-Ponty's and Buytendijk's observations reveal that such a situational spatiality is far from being temporally neutral. On the contrary, the concept of situation properly alludes to the spatio-temporality of lived experience, as to the concrete "*hic et nunc*" of the actual conditions, which are themselves the result of past developments and the basis for the projection towards future actions. The "here and now" of this situation is not to be equalized to a formal system of coordinates; it rather entails the qualitative, and often affectively colored, factual circumstances of experience and the range of possible actions within such circumstances. Accordingly, the "here and now" of situational spatiality is not to be conceived statically either, rather being absorbed in a process of becoming and possible change. As Buytendijk puts it, situations are not only *fatalité*, but also *élan*. This means that situations do not simply designate a self-enclosed snapshot of experience. Being the field of possible actions, they are rather constitutively open and relational. As Waldenfels (2000, pp. 115f.) points out, rather than being determined as "here and now", the spatiality (or, to better say, the spatio-temporality) of situation is more appropriately determined as "from here" (and "from now"), namely as indicating the place and the moment from which movements, activities and more generally experiences arise.

Thus defined, the concept of situation allows us to shed new light on the spatio-temporal structure and dynamics of perceptual, bodily experience. Aiming to support this claim, in this section, I tackle three main points connected with Husserl's understanding of the situatedness of the body as the organ of perception: (1) the characterization of the lived-body as the zero-point or center of orientation; (2) the conditional relation between the given circumstances and the concrete unfolding of perception; and (3) the significance of bodily movement for the constitution of space and the sensible things.

8.1.1 The Body as Zero-Point of Orientation

One of the most famous and controversial Husserlian characterizations of the lived-body is that of zero-point of orientation [*Nullpunkt der Orientierung*]. To understand the meaning of such a characterization, and to highlight its relevance to the spatio-temporality of situation, we shall begin with a discussion of both concepts involved in the expression: "zero-point" and "orientation". Let us begin with the latter. The concept of "orientation" can be understood in a twofold sense. On the one hand, as we have largely discussed in the previous chapter, it refers to the perspectival appearance of things, which are oriented with respect to my bodily "here". On the other hand, it also refers to the fact that we "orient ourselves", from our bodily "here", in the perceptual world. Orientation, in this sense, means finding the way that leads from one place to another. It is this second meaning of orientation that Kant has in mind in his famous essay *What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?* As he writes in one famous passage:

In the proper meaning of the word, to orient oneself means to use a given direction (when we divide the horizon into four of them) in order to find the others – literally to find the

sunrise. [...] For this, however, I also need the feeling of a difference in my own subject, namely the difference between my right and left hands. I call this a feeling because these two sides outwardly display no designatable difference in intuition.¹²

Orientation, thus conceived, refers to the faculty of locating oneself within a coordination system. Such a faculty is considered by Kant to be anchored in our bodily experience, and notably in the feeling of a difference in our body between the left and the right, and thus in the capacity to distinguish what, in the world, is located on the left or on the right.¹³

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger (1977, pp. 145f.) criticizes Kant's account of orientation as being based upon a merely subjective criterion, i.e., the difference between my left and my right hand, which neglects the practical concerns that are constitutive of *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world.¹⁴ However, Kant's statement can be phenomenologically read as referring to the correlation between subjective experience and world display: based on the "feeling" of a difference between the left and the right sides of my own body and on its congruent counterparts, I can also see what in the world is on my left or rather on my right, and I can move away or approach something in this or that direction. In this sense, orientation is one of our primal experiences of space, which is based upon the awareness of our bodily "being here" and the connected capacity of immediately distinguishing what is for us left and right, above and below. Such awareness is presupposed whenever we try to find our way, from here to there.

Both meanings of orientation (orientation as perspectival appearance of things, and orientation as "finding one's way" in lived space) are certainly related to one another, since finding my way in the world implies that I perceive my surrounding world and the things in the world as oriented with respect to my "being here". The distinction of these two meanings of the concept of orientation is not explicitly thematized by Husserl. However, I consider it to be relevant to understand the situatedness of spatio-temporal experience and the characterization of the lived-body as zero-point. While experiencing things in a certain orientation, I have an implicit awareness of my bodily "being here". And since there is no other thing in the world that is always here, like my body is, such localization makes the anisotropy of lived space. This is also true with respect to the other meaning of orientation. The space we orient ourselves in is not the isotropic space that can be represented on a geographical map.¹⁵ The experience of our bodily localization, thus, is the condition

¹² WDO AA 08, pp. 134–135/(Kant 1996, p. 8).

¹³ As it is well known, the argument based upon the congruent counterparts Kant employs here to ground his account of orientation has also a key-role in the pre-critical essay *Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space*, GUGR AA 02, pp. 375f./ (Kant 1992a). In that context, the argument is employed to support the thesis of the necessity absolute space, not only to define physical movement, but also to ground geometry. Concerning this issue, see Ferrarin (2006); Scaravelli (1968, pp. 295–335).

¹⁴ See also Heidegger (1979, p. 321).

¹⁵ These maps, indeed, are useful for orientation only if they become "anisotropic", e.g., by virtually reproducing on the map your bodily location in lived space, such as it now happens on google-maps, or by indicating such a position with an arrow, like it happens on more old-fashioned maps.

for orientation in both of its meaning: it is starting from such an experienced localization as here that I perceive things as oriented and that I can try to find the way that brings me closer or farther.¹⁶ Moreover, orientation shall not be considered as static. Rather, both the oriented appearance of spatial things and the very constitution of oriented space are in function of our bodily movement.¹⁷

Assumed that orientation shall be understood according to this double meaning, we shall now see, more precisely, what the characterization of the body as zero-point of orientation, and as absolute here, means. To this aim, and to disentangle the implications of such a characterization, we shall discuss Husserl's position in relation to three possible challenges: (1) Heidegger's implicit criticism to Husserl's account of space, particularly related to the characterization of the body as "absolute here"; (2) the more explicit critical assessment of the centrality of the lived-body in perceptual experience formulated by Holenstein; (3) the challenge to the Husserlian account of the body as zero-point coming from the phenomenon of out-of-body experiences. At the end of such a "negative" analysis, we will be able to bring to the fore what are the essential features of the body as zero-point.

(1) Heidegger's discussion of the spatiality of *Dasein* seems in many ways to contrast with Husserl's account of the lived-body as zero-point of orientation and as absolute here. Although both Husserl and Heidegger emphasize the horizon-like unfolding of spatiality, they do not agree on the description of such a horizon-like structure. Husserl conceives of this structure in relation to perceptual experience and to the interweaving of intuitive givenness and empty intentions. For him, thus, such a structure primarily characterizes sensible experience and constitution. Heidegger, instead, understands the horizon-like unfolding in relation to the world as "totality of involvement" [*Bewandtnisganzheit*], which is primarily characterized in terms of practical meanings and concerns (Heidegger 1977, pp. 111–117, 147–151; 1979, pp. 231f.). From this perspective, the description of the spatiality of *Dasein* is based on what Heidegger calls the active and transitive interpretation of "removing-distance" [*Ent-fernung*], as a tendency toward proximity with respect to what is "ready to hand" (Heidegger 1977, p. 141). Taking place [*Platz-einnehmen*], i.e., the specific spatiality of *Dasein*, shall also be considered as *Ent-fernung*: it shall be considered in relation to *Dasein*'s concerns (Heidegger 1977, p. 144). Determining lived spatiality in relation to practical aims, Heidegger thus stresses the priority of the "there", i.e., of the place of what is ready to hand [*Zuhandenheit*], over the "here" of *Dasein*. Accordingly, he understands the spatiality of *Dasein* in ecstatic terms: the most fundamental spatial experience for *Dasein* is that of being "there", whereas the "here" is only subordinately and subsequently experienced as "being-towards".

If we resort to the argument made by Ströker (1977, pp. 54–135), we can understand the difference between Husserl's and Heidegger's approach to spatiality in light of the distinction between intuitive space [*Anschauungsraum*] and the space of

¹⁶Cf. Hua IV, p. 158/(Husserl 1989, pp. 165–166).

¹⁷"The orientation-praxis accomplishes itself somatically in subjective moving [...]" "Die Orientierungspraxis vollzieht sich somatisch im subjektiven Bewegen [...]." D 13 I/97a.

action [*Aktionsraum*]. Yet, the endorsement of such a distinction does not fully replace the insight provided by the comparison of the two positions with respect to the specific experience of my bodily being-here, and its relation to the being-there of everything else. In other words, it is not sufficient to associate Husserl's account of our experience of the body as "being here" to the theoretical priorities of his philosophy, and Heidegger's account of the spatiality of *Dasein* as removing-distance to his claims regarding the derivative character of all *theoria* with respect to *praxis*. Rather, the question as to whether Heidegger's account of the priority of the "there" challenges Husserl's definition of the body as being always here remains relevant in spite of the different approaches. However, the central point at stake for a phenomenology of lived space is not actually to determine which spatial determination (here or there) is prior and which is subordinate. The central point is rather the correlation between the "here" and the "there". Of course, while engaged in practical and perceptual activities, we are not primarily intending our bodily here. In this sense, Heidegger is right in claiming that the explicit consciousness of our being here is the result of reflection, whereas our primal form of spatial awareness is that of the remoteness of what we want to reach. Nevertheless, this does not exclude that, while perceiving or practically seeking to reach for something, we are also implicitly or pre-reflectively aware of our body as here, and that we can subsequently reflect on the absolute uniqueness of such a "being here". For Husserl, accordingly, we have an implicit awareness of our being-here, and the "here" defines my own place, it has a radical singularity and non-interchangeability. It is the place from which I cannot move away.¹⁸

Moreover, as Husserl argues in his later texts, the experience of the uniqueness of my bodily being-here is a relational one, since it is necessarily interconnected to the experience of the life-world and of the Earth as "ground" of all our practical and theoretical activities.¹⁹ To be true, the metaphor of the ground is something that connects our awareness of the Earth and of the life-world: both the Earth and the world designate the basic field from and within which our bodily situated experience takes place. Thus, the *tertium comparationis* between world, Earth, and ground is their unquestioned primal givenness: both the life-world and the Earth are always already given as the basis for our experience, as the field or matrix within which such experience takes place.²⁰ As such, they are not primarily represented as objects, being rather originally experienced in a pre-thematic way. However, whereas the

¹⁸ "This pure Ego has its surrounding world, has its Here and Now in relation to which its physicalness is oriented, and this Here and Now is related to a physical thing appearing in a distinctive manner to the pure Ego, i.e., its animate organism, in a way similar to that in which my Here and Now is related to my animate organism. If I could "remove from myself" my animate organism, which in actual fact continually has my center of orientation in it, that is to say, continually accompanies my pure Ego and appears to it, then it would present all the series of appearances that other physical things present; it is in itself a physical thing like any other, except that it cannot be removed and can therefore appear only in limited groups of appearances." Hua V, p. 109/(Husserl 1980, pp. 94–95).

¹⁹ See Leoni (2005, pp. 31–55), Neri (1991), Piana (1988), Sommer (1998).

²⁰ In this respect, see Merleau-Ponty (1960, p. 294, 1964, pp. 306–307, 1965, 1994, pp. 102f.).

life-world is not only the spatio-temporal horizon of our perceptual experience, but also entails the totality of cultural and historical sedimentations, the Earth as ground is more strictly related to the spatio-temporality of our bodily experience.

As bodily subjects we are necessarily anchored to the ground (Husserl 1940a, p. 311).²¹ Our experience of the body as zero-point, thus, is fundamentally connected to our experience of the Earth as ground. Such a co-belonging legitimates the analogy between the “being always here” of my lived-body and of the Earth: in both cases, indeed, we are confronted with the source of reference for every possible experience. Analogously to the being always here of the lived-body, the idea that the Earth does not move means that we cannot take distance or “escape” from it (Husserl 1940a, p. 307). However, such as the experience of the lived-body as zero-point does not exclude, but rather implies, movement, the dynamics of spatialization and temporalization is also entailed in the experience of the ground. And this is what makes the constitution of the most basic aesthetic unities possible. Indeed, emphasizing the nexus between the spatio-temporal unfolding of the world as the total horizon of subjective and intersubjective experience, and the Earth as the ground of experience, at paragraph 38 of *Experience and Judgment*, Husserl explicitly refers to the constitution of the ground itself within the temporal unity of the living present, in its own temporalizing rhythm.²² As a matrix, or as basic spatio-temporal configuration, the experience of the ground and its bodily relatedness virtually entails all the possible forms of concrete spatialization and temporalization (1940a, p. 309).²³ The original co-belonging between the bodily subject and the ground of experience, thus, has a spatio-temporal virtual configuration, which is constantly actualized in the different forms of experience that we have analyzed throughout this study.

Before addressing the phenomenon of out-of-body experiences, which apparently challenges the claim concerning the being always here of the lived-body and its anchoring to the earth as ground, we shall consider another criticism to Husserl’s account of the body as zero-point, namely the one raised by Holenstein.

(2) Holenstein (1985, pp. 14, 50–55) suggests that the characterization of the lived-body as zero-point results from the equalization of the starting point of perception [*Ausgangspunkt der Wahrnehmung*] with the central point of what is perceived [*Mittelpunkt des Wahrgenommenen*]. Thereby, the concept of zero-point seems to be employed noematically to indicate the latter, i.e., the center in what is perceived, rather than to indicate the source of perception. Accordingly, Husserl’s position is considered to be vitiated by a form of egocentrism, which eventually

²¹ As Sommer (1998) points out, on the basis of such interrelatedness, the ground can be considered as a “prolongation” and “expansion” of the body, and the body as a sort of “contraction” and “detaching” of ground thus rendered moveable.

²² EU, 188–194/(Husserl 1973, pp. 162–167). See also Derrida (1962, pp. 178f.). It is significant that Husserl addresses the living present itself as ground of all possible experience. Hua Mat VIII, pp. 35 footnote; 40–41.

²³ Stating that the Earth does not move, Husserl means to add a further argument to the irreducibility of the Earth to a physical object in cosmic space: the objective determination of motion and rest are not suitable to describe how we originally experience the ground.

makes his understanding of lived spatiality, and notably of spatial orientation, inadequate. Orientation, for Holenstein, cannot be described by referring to the body as the one source of perception. Rather, it shall be understood as a labile phenomenon, which varies in relation to different objects we assume as orientating points in the perceptual field. Such orientating points, thus, are the noematic *foci* that can capture our attention within a perceptual field, and it is only by referring to them that we can eventually orient ourselves in such a field.

Certainly, particular objects in the perceptual field are assumed as reference points to orient ourselves in the world – think for instance of what the pole star meant for sailors. However, it shall be asked whether Holenstein’s criticism really affects the core of Husserl’s account of the lived-body as zero-point of orientation. At a closer look, such a criticism does not seem to be fully justified. For Husserl does not confuse the source of perception and the center of the perceptual field. Simply, he considers them to be two different phenomena and, addressing the lived-body as zero-point, he is interested in describing the former. To be true, Holenstein seems to share Heidegger’s view that our experience of something as being there (for Holenstein, in the center of the perceptual field) is what primarily counts for the phenomenon of orientation. However, as we have already seen by discussing Heidegger’s position, such a “there” can only be determined in correlative terms through the reference to my “being here”.

The fact that Husserl and Holenstein refer to two different phenomena when they talk about the zero-point or the center of orientation becomes even clearer if we consider the criteria Holenstein assumes to define the centrality of the zero-point. These criteria, exemplified by a number of examples taken from both psychological studies and everyday life, can be traced back to the common denominator of “dominance” [*Mächtigkeit*]: the center coincides with the dominating perceptual structures [*Wahrnehmungsgefüge*]. Such dominance can either be due to *Gestalt*-factors, for instance size or solidness, or to meaning-factors, related to the affective and practical relevance of the given structure (Holenstein 1985, pp. 17f.). As we can see, Holenstein’s criterion may well be suitable to describe the centrality of a reference point within the perceptual field, such as a column or an avenue.²⁴ Yet, this is certainly not the criterion Husserl adopts to describe the centrality of the lived-body as zero-point of orientation. And the metaphorical expression “zero-point” already suggests that we are not dealing here with a dominant element in the perceptual field, but rather with the source of perception, which is not itself the object of perception. As the source of perception, the lived-body is certainly experienced, yet it is not primarily constituted as an object. Only subsequently can we focus our attention on our body, or some of its parts, and constitute them perceptually as objects. Yet, as “bearer of the Ego”,²⁵ and by virtue of its perceptual and constitutive accomplishments, the lived-body constitutively has an “exceptional position”

²⁴These are Holenstein’s (1985, p. 18) examples.

²⁵Hua XVI, p. 162/(Husserl 1997, p. 137).

[*konstitutive Ausnahmestellung*],²⁶ which is not comparable to the position occupied by any other thing, albeit dominant in a perceptual field.

The experienced centrality of the body cannot therefore be determined *a parte objecti*, as the dominant element in a perceptual field; it is not comparable to the centrality of any observed object. On the contrary, centrality reveals in what sense the body is the source for movement and perception, and thus for the experience of spatio-temporality. Centrality, thus, shall be understood, as “situational” in the previously defined sense, as it refers to both the possibilities and the limits of my bodily experience: on the one hand, it discloses a field for possible actions, movements, or perceptions and, on the other, it reveals the impossibility of my body being somewhere else *but here*.²⁷ Thus, if we consider centrality exclusively according to Holenstein’s criterion, namely as the centrality of what objectively appears, then my lived-body, as “bearer of the Ego”, is neither the center nor the periphery of the field; it is rather its own blind-spot. Moreover, centrality shall be understood in relational terms, namely with respect to the spatio-temporal situation: the situation in which things manifest themselves perspectively and may capture my attention.²⁸ Both the anisotropy and the non-homogeneity of perceptual space are therefore connected with the exceptional position [*Ausnahmestellung*] of my lived-body: was it not for the peculiar centrality of my body, for its being the source of my actions and perceptions, lived-space would not be different from objective and homogeneous space, like the one that can be represented on a geographical map. In such objective space, however, my body would not find itself in a lived situation, but could exclusively be considered from an external point of view, as a thing occupying a position among others.

Another aspect of Holenstein’s critique is related to Husserl’s understanding of the body as the unique center of orientation. Again, this criticism is connected with the understanding of centrality *a parte objecti*, whereas Husserl, in this context, is interested in the centrality *a parte subjecti*. However, the question remains as to whether the constitutive exceptional position of my lived-body as the zero-point excludes a “multicentric” organization of spatiality. In other words, in his noematic account of orientation and centrality, Holenstein is right in considering that more than one element can dominate the perceptual field, and that we can orient ourselves with respect to more than one perceptual object. Yet, is this also the case if we understand, as Husserl does with respect to the zero-point, orientation by referring to its subjective source? Husserl seems to suggest that something like a multicentric spatial organization is possible while referring to intersubjective orientation. To be true, Husserl talks about intersubjective orientation as we-orientation, thereby referring to one’s self-recognition as a member of a larger community (Hua XXXIX, pp. 148f., 260). The center of such orientation, thus, is again subjectivity, although subjectivity of higher order, namely “we” or the community. Nevertheless, we shall be careful in not understanding the

²⁶(Husserl 1946, p. 341)/(Husserl 1981b, p. 249).

²⁷Hua XVI, p. 280/(Husserl 1997, p. 241).

²⁸Hua XVI, p. 131/(Husserl 1997, p. 109).

subjectivity of the “we-orientation” as something that removes the uniqueness of individual bodily orientation. While recognizing myself as a member of a community, I do not give up my individual point of view. That is to say, the individuality of each subject is not canceled when the latter recognizes him/herself also as a belonging to a social community. Within the transcendental aesthetic, this is grounded again upon our bodily experience. The possibility to de-centralize, i.e., to bracket one’s bodily perspective and to ideally assume the perspective of the other and possibly of generalized others, is the ground for intersubjective communication and sociality. However, this does not mean that assuming the perspective of the other I give up the exclusiveness of my first-personal perspective. In this sense, also the centrality of the lived-body is individual.²⁹

In one manuscript, Husserl further argues that we can properly consider only spatio-temporal orientation as intersubjective. For what we actually share with other subjects in such an intersubjective orientation is the temporal present of world-time, whereas the spatial perspective, grounded upon the “here”, is unique for each subject:

The spatio-temporal orientation, then, is intersubjective in its unity. With respect to time, however, and in contrast to spatial terms, we all have one and the same present, whereas the real, which is present, has a different spatial orientation for everyone.³⁰

As we have seen when discussing spatio-temporal individuation, the bodily subject cannot occupy two “here” at the same time, and the same spatial point cannot be occupied by two bodily subjects at the same time. This implies that my being-here and the oriented manifestation of spatiality that is disclosed from here cannot be fully shared with other subjects.³¹ The irrevocability of the individual perspective, thus, allows us to legitimately talk not only about a new center of orientation, the “we” as plural subjectivity, but also about a multicentric orientation, whereby the formation of a “we-perspective” does not cancel the singularity of each subjective perspective.

(3) The third challenge to Husserl’s account of the lived-body as the zero-point of orientation concerns the necessity of anchoring our spatio-temporal subjective perspective on the experience of the lived-body as here. Is such an anchoring necessary for orientation and perceptual experience? Or can we think of a disembodied

²⁹Cf. Behnke (1996), Fuchs (2000b, pp. 296f.), Schütz (1962, pp. 1–12, 147, 315–316), Yamaguchi (1982, pp. 84f., 94f.).

³⁰“Intersubjektiv ist dann in Einheit die raumzeitliche Orientierung; in zeitlicher Hinsicht aber und im Unterschied von der räumlichen <ist es> so, dass wir alle eine und dieselbe Gegenwart haben, während das Reale, das gegenwärtig ist, für jeden eine andere räumliche Orientierung hat.” D 13 I/99a.

³¹Differently from Husserl, Holenstein (1985) argues that there is something like a transindividual centralization of space. He refers, notably, to a couple walking together or to a column of soldiers. In these cases, according to Holenstein, the subjective centers would be, respectively, the couple or the column, and not the individual subjects involved. Husserl, from his part, would maintain that each subject walking in couple or marching in column maintains his/her own singular perspective and that the latter does not merge in a homogeneous intersubjective perspective. See Hua I, pp. 145–146/ (Husserl 1960, pp. 116–117), Hua IV, p. 202/Husserl 1989, pp. 212–213), Hua XIII, pp. 268, 279f., Hua XIV, pp. 498, 520f., Hua XV, pp. 16f., 259f.

subjective point of view? To address this question, I wish to consider here one concrete neuropsychological phenomenon, which has been recently discussed also in phenomenological terms:³² the so-called out-of-body experiences.

Out-of-body experiences are one form of anomalous autoscopic phenomena. In general, autoscopic phenomena are complex experiences of reduplication of one's own body in the perceived space, often associated with pathologies of sensations of position, movement, and self-perception. On the basis of neuropsychological studies, it has been argued that autoscopic phenomena have two pathological conditions. On the one hand, they result from the disintegration of personal-bodily space, due to the lack of integration of proprioceptive, tactile, and visual information. On the other hand, they result from the conflict between the awareness of personal-bodily space and of outer extra-personal space.³³ Leaving aside a closer consideration of the neurological basis of such disturbances, their phenomenological implications interest us in the present context.

Based on how subjects describe their experiences, and notably on how they perceive their bodies, different classifications or autoscopic phenomena have been proposed in the literature.³⁴ Notably, a distinction has been made between autosity, heautoscopy and out-of-body experiences. During autosity, the subject has an implicit awareness of him/herself as perceiving from within the boundaries of his/her physical body, yet he/she also sees his/her body also as an object in front of him/herself. During out-of-body experiences, instead, the subject sees his/her body from a location outside the body itself. Finally, heautoscopy is considered to be an intermediate phenomenon between the previous two. In this case, subjects declare to see their body in extra-personal space. However, they are mostly uncertain as to the localization of the source of their perception, or their Ego: they cannot say whether it coincides or not with their perceived body. For the sake of the present argument, I will mainly stay with the consideration of one autoscopic phenomenon, namely out-of-body experiences, since it apparently represents a more direct counter-example that possibly challenges the structural characterization of the lived-body as zero-point or as absolute here.

In out-of-body experiences, the subject sees his/her body and the world from a location outside the physical body, mostly from an elevated position. It has been suggested that out-of-body experiences are defined by three main characteristics: “disembodiment”, or the location of the self outside the body; the impression of seeing the world from a distant and elevated visual-spatial perspective, which still

³² See Legrand (2010), Mishara (2010). From a representationalist perspective, Metzinger (2003, pp. 461–521; 2005) considers out-of-body experiences as entailing a reduplication of what he calls the “self-model”. In his view, this would be the origin of the western concept of the soul. In the present context, I cannot compare different philosophical interpretations of out-of-body experiences, which eventually reverberate on the understanding of the mind-body problem. For the sake of the present argument, I will rather stick to the phenomenological analysis of such experiences and show how they can help us to shed light on the Husserlian understanding of embodiment.

³³ Notably, Blanke et al. (2004) localized the relevant brain lesion and dysfunction at the temporo-parietal junction.

³⁴ See Blanke et al. (2004, 2008), Mishara (2010).

remains egocentric; and the impression of seeing one's own body from such an elevated perspective (Blanke and Arzy 2005). The reason why such a phenomenon, at first glance, challenges the understanding of the lived-body as zero-point should appear quite clearly from these three features. Indeed, we are confronted with the experience of seeing one's own body in a position (mostly frontal) that does not coincide with the subjective source of perception. In other words, subjects apparently feel that the "center of their experience", or their Ego, is located outside of their material body. Conversely, the body does not seem to be the "bearer of the Ego", nor the source of perception and orientation anymore.³⁵ It is rather the "object" the Ego is looking at. Importantly, however, the body is not seen as an object among others, but rather recognized as one's own body. Yet, how shall we understand the zero-point of orientation in such cases? Is the subject, or the source of perception, disembodied? Does this amount to saying that there can be some form of self-consciousness that is not bodily?

In order to phenomenologically describe what happens in out-of-body experiences, it is helpful to more closely thematize the distinction between the awareness of our body as subject and as object.³⁶ Such a distinction has already emerged between the lines of our discussion of Holenstein's position and can be now further clarified by referring to the lexical distinction of the German words *Leib* and *Körper*. The former indicates the lived-body, namely the body as subject of experience or as bearer of the Ego. The latter indicates the material body, or the body as an object of perception.³⁷ It shall be stressed right now that this is not an ontological distinction, but rather a distinction concerning the modes of experiencing one and the same body, namely the unique body we perceive as ours. And this is why what we call the "body as object" cannot be simply equalized to an object whatsoever, not even to an object that happens to belong to me, since it is the only object that, in principle, is always and necessarily qualified as uniquely mine. As we have previously seen, considered as the subject of perception, the lived-body [*Leib*] is the blind spot of our perceptual field. As such, it is transparent: as subject, it falls out of our perception, since we perceive through it. Husserl's paradigmatic example to describe such a transparency of the lived-body as perceiving is the eye,

³⁵ In autoscopy, instead, bodily experience appears to be doubled. For, simultaneously, the body is experienced as the center of orientation (the zero-point of orientation in Husserl's sense), and as the center of the perceptual field (which comes close to what Holenstein understands as the center of orientation, based on the criteria of dominance in *Gestalt-* or sense-factors).

³⁶ This distinction, as we will see throughout the whole chapter, is crucial to the understanding of Husserl's phenomenology of the body. Here, I endorse Legrand's phenomenological interpretation of out-of-body experiences, based precisely on the distinction between body as subject and body as object, in order to show why I do not believe that such a phenomenon eventually requires the revision of the characterization of the body as zero-point of orientation. See Legrand (2010).

³⁷ *Körper* also indicates for Husserl the body as an object of the natural sciences. The experience of the body as object, however, is not necessarily coincident with the objectification made by the natural sciences. Rather, such an objectification is grounded on the experience of the body as object, which Husserl also calls *Körper*.

which, in principle, does not appear to itself visually.³⁸ However, this implies neither that we have no awareness at all of our body as subject of experience, nor that we cannot make the body (or some of its parts) into the object of perception. As to the first point, we do have a non-thematic, implicit awareness of our body as subject, i.e., functioning as the organ of perception, while we are intentionally directed toward other things. As to the second point, we can reflect on our bodily experience, thematically focus our attention on our body, and thus make it into the object of perception. As we shall see later, besides distinguishing these two modalities of bodily self-experience, Husserl also aims to account for the constitution of the material body on the basis of the experience of the lived-body. In the present context, however, this distinction is of relevance to better understand the implications of Husserl's account of the zero-point of orientation, particularly with respect to anomalous out-of-body experiences.

As it has partially emerged from the previous discussion, Husserl's account of the lived-body as the zero-point of orientation stems from a reflective, phenomenological description of what happens in our primal experience of the body as subject. In *Thing and Space*, moreover, Husserl points out that the characterization of lived-body as zero-point fundamentally refers to the impossibility to take distance from my body as a whole, to move away from it or to get closer to it.³⁹ In one manuscript written almost around the same years, Husserl makes a similar point, arguing that, as long as the lived-body is functioning as an organ of perception, it (or some of its parts) cannot escape me:

That my hand is pushed away in any amplitude, that it flies away and the like – or that my head, my foot flies away. As long as it should be an operative organ of the lived-body, all this is impossible, just as [it is impossible] that my lived-body flies away, and thereby becomes experienced in the same way as another body flying away in the “I stay quiet”. For all spatial-corporeal experience is constitutively related to the lived-body, and in such a way that the lived-body must be constituted as the centre of orientation.⁴⁰

My lived-body is necessarily the locus where my subjective perspective is anchored. Yet, one could claim that such an “escape” of the body is exactly what happens in out-of-body experiences. However, I would argue that these experiences do not contradict Husserl's claim, since the material body, which is perceived as a detached object in out-of-body experiences, precisely ceases to function as subject or as the organ of perception.

What is characteristic of out-of-body experiences, indeed, is that they do remain perspectival and Ego-centric experiences, even though the subject is intentionally

³⁸ Hua IV, pp. 147f./*(Husserl 1989*, pp. 155f.).

³⁹ Hua XVI, p. 280/*(Husserl 1997*, p. 241).

⁴⁰ “Dass meine Hand fortgestoßen wird in beliebige Weiten, fortfliegt und dergleichen, oder mein Kopf, mein Fuß <fortfliegt>, solange er fungierendes Organ des Leibes sein soll, ist unmöglich, ebenso dass mein Leib fortfliege und dabei so erfahren wird wie ein fortfliegender anderer Körper im “ich stehe still”; denn alle raumkörperliche Erfahrung ist auf den funktionierenden Leib konstitutiv bezogen, und so, dass der Leib als das Zentrum der Orientierung konstituiert sein muss.” D 13 III/237 b.

directed toward his/her own body and perceives it as an object from the outside. When asked, subjects spatially locate themselves where the visual perspective is anchored, that is to say, in the floating position, and declare to see their physical body from such a position (Blanke et al. 2004; Metzinger 2005). This is the position where the Ego, as the zero-point of orientation, is located. Following Merleau-Ponty (1945, p. 117), we could argue that such a “localization” of the first-person perspective would be enough to prevent us from considering the subject as disembodied. Declaring to have seen “from above”, and thus distinguishing what is above and what is below, would not make sense for a subject that was not bodily situated in the world. To rephrase Kant’s argument, orientation and the distinction of left and right need to be anchored in the “feeling” of our body. In this respect, thus, what is crucial about out-of-body experiences is that, although subjects see their material body from an external point of view, they do also feel to be located in a “phantomatic body” experienced as their own. Indeed, subjects anchor their perceptual perspective in what they often call their “elevated body”, mostly located on the ceiling of the room, and indicate their physical de-animated body (i.e., the body as the object they see from that perspective) as a second body, thus implicitly recognizing the elevated body, i.e., the center where their subjective perspective is anchored, as the first (Blanke et al. 2004).

What characterizes such experiences, thus, is a dissociation of the body as subject and the body as object, whereby the subjective perspective, or the source of perception, remains anchored to the “absolute here” of what we can call the floating “phantom” body (Legrand 2010). We could also say that these subjects make the first-personal experience of having a phantomatic body or a ghost-body [*Gespensterleib*]. Remarkably, Husserl refers to such a ghostly body in *Ideas II*.⁴¹ An animated subject [*seelisches Subjekt*], as Husserl argues, is certainly conceivable without a material body (in our case, it can even be experienced as dissociated from its material body). Yet, there cannot be any animated subject without a lived-body.⁴² A spatio-temporal perspective necessarily presupposes the bodily localization of the subject, even though such a localization may be only that of a pure spatial phantom [*räumliches Phantom*], i.e., of a lived-body without any material properties. Certainly, Husserl only considers the possibility for us of imagining a ghost, and not the experience of feeling like a ghost, which seems instead to be what happens in out-of-body experiences. However, what he describes here may also be applied to what subjects recollect of their out-of-body experiences while describing them at a later moment.

⁴¹Hua IV, pp. 94f./Husserl 1989, pp. 99f.).

⁴²“Even the ghost necessarily has its ghostly body.” Hua IV, p. 94/(Husserl 1989, p. 100). And few lines later: “In itself the case would be thinkable (and an actual ghost would result) that a psychic being would appear and be actual while lacking a material Body, a normal thing of nature as underlying the psychic determinations. But this still does not imply that a Body in every sense is lacking or could be lacking. We have indeed recognized that the specifically material determinations are founded in those that are included under the heading “pure schema” and are at the same time unilaterally separable from them. A ghost is characterized by the fact that its Body is a pure “spatial phantom” with no material properties at all [...]” Hua IV, pp. 94–95/(Husserl 1989, p. 100).

The fact that out-of-body experiences are anomalous hallucinatory phenomena shall not diminish their meaning. First, the fact that subjects experience such an illusion as veridical makes it worth of phenomenological investigation. Secondly, these experiences can give more concreteness to something that can be imagined as a pure possibility, namely the dissociation of the experience of our body as subject and as object. Despite being based upon the dissociation between the awareness of our body as subject and the perception of our body as object, these phenomena also reveal us how perceptual perspective and orientation are essentially, and not merely contingently, grounded on some of awareness of our lived-body as subject, be that only the awareness of a spatial (immaterial) phantom. Yet, what is most important to notice for our argument concerning the zero-point of orientation is that the “localization” of the Ego, or the first-person-perspective, in the body that is felt as one’s own body, seems to resist also this quite radical case of dissociation. Subjects not only recognize the body as object, i.e., the body they visually perceive, as their own, but rather always locate themselves, i.e., the zero-point, in their elevated body, a body they do feel in the out-of-body experience.

The examination of three possible challenges to Husserl’s account of the lived-body as the zero-point of orientation has provided some arguments to characterize the specific “centrality” of the lived-body in sensible experience. Particularly, the parallel discussion of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s positions regarding the spatiality of experience has revealed that the centrality of the lived-body as zero-point of orientation can only be understood in correlative terms, namely by referring to the relationship between subjectivity and the world, or between here and there. The here-there correlation, thus, shall be considered as one of the fundamental features of spatio-temporality of situation. The discussion of Holenstein’s critique to Husserl has allowed us to go deeper in the correlative understanding of the zero-point of orientation. Distinguishing two forms of centrality, *a parte objecti* (Holenstein) and *a parte subjecti* (Husserl), we have seen that they correspond to different criteria respectively, and yet can only be given in correlation. The centrality of the lived-body is not that of a part of the perceptual field, since the lived-body is rather the source from which the perceptual field as such is constituted. Accordingly, the lived-body is not an object-like center of a perceptual field, but rather its blind spot. This, and not the supposed feature of “inextension”, justifies the assumption of the metaphoric expression of “zero-point”. The “zero” is the center or the pole from which and in relation to which a perceptual field discloses itself. Finally, considering the phenomenon of out-of-body experiences we have seen that, also in such extreme empirical cases, the Ego as subjective perspective cannot be considered as disembodied. Despite the apparent reduplication or “split” of the body as object and the body as subject, and despite the transformation of the latter in a sort of “phantom-body”, out-of-body experiences reveal that a subjective perspective needs to be bodily anchored. Certainly, we shall be careful in generalizing such a claim by overemphasizing an example that remains factual. However, such concrete experiences seem to exemplify something that is necessarily proper to the very phenomena of perspective and orientation in the transcendental aesthetic, namely the bodily anchoring of subjective perspective. Accordingly, in the transcendental aesthetic,

considering pure consciousness as disembodied is the result of an abstracting description. Indeed, there would be no sensations, no perception, no individuation, and no spatio-temporal localization without a body, so that embodiment defines one of the constitutive moments of sensible experience.

8.1.2 *Psycho-physical Conditionality and Ortho-aesthetic*

The situational spatio-temporality of the lived-body can be further addressed by referring to the relation between the given circumstances and the unfolding of experience. To indicate such a relation, Husserl adopts the concepts of psycho-physical, or physio-psychic, conditionality.⁴³ Such conditionality is not a relation between the physical circumstances and the alteration of material reality. It rather designates the functional relation between the modifications of the material world (independent variable) and the correlative modifications of experience, e.g., the modes of perceptual givenness of a thing (dependent variable). This is an “if...then” relation. For instance, if we are sitting in semidarkness, things will appear differently than they usually appear by daylight. Also, the alterations that causally modify the status of my body as material reality [*Körper*] condition (although they do not properly cause) an alteration of my way of perceiving. Thus, should I wear colored glasses (i.e., a filter between the bodily organ and the perceived world), then the world itself would appear to me as colored. If my hand was burned, my tactile perception of things would be different than it is in normal conditions. Finally, should I take some drug (Husserl’s example is santonin), my way of perceiving would also be modified accordingly (ingesting santonin, everything would appear to me as yellow). Thus, either the outer physical circumstances or my body as belonging to material reality can undergo physical changes, and this would in both cases conditionally affect the way I perceive things. Despite defining, like causality, an “if...then” relationship, there are reasons to distinguish conditionality from physical causality. Discussing the reasons to make such a difference will allow us to better understand the specificity of the conditional relation and to discuss the issue of “normality” in sensible experience, i.e., what Husserl calls ortho-aesthetic [*Orthoästhesie*].

In *Ideas II*, Husserl considers causality as the relation of dependence between the physical circumstances, their modifications, and the connected modifications of material things according to their properties. A steel spring, for instance, has the material property of elasticity. However, the deformations that are connected to such a property depend on the alteration of the surrounding circumstances: the deviation of the state of rest and a certain mode of oscillation of the steel spring

⁴³Hua IV, p. 135/(Husserl 1989, pp. 142–143). Husserl distinguishes three forms of conditional relationships: psycho-physical conditionality, concerning the influence of material modifications on perception as intentional experience, idio-psychic conditionality that concerns the temporal development of psychic life, and intersubjective conditionality, concerning the influence of intersubjective experience on the unfolding of each subject’s perception.

correspond to a certain impetus (alteration of the physical circumstances); and if the circumstances remain unchanged, the status of the steel spring also remains unchanged. Causality, thus, is the strict “if...then” relationship that organizes the material world. It is a law that describes a relation of necessary dependence between physical events. As Husserl puts it: with identical circumstances, identical consequences.⁴⁴ Endorsing the Galilean and Newtonian account of causality, Husserl argues that everything that happens in physical-material nature necessarily has a cause, which is itself physical and temporally precedes the consequence. Such a concept of causality is neither appropriate to describe psychic reality, nor to give an account of the relation between physical-material and psychic reality. As Husserl writes in one later manuscript (1923), causality relations only apply to physical nature:

The physical thing is what it is in connection with other physical things. It is what it is under the associated “circumstances”, and all physical things build a unity of a physical universe: of nature. What does the closeness of physical nature consist of? In any case, it is the closeness of physical causality (natural lawfulness), according to which, indirectly or directly, all things are in physical-causal relation (thus, every thing-happening comes into consideration for the causal course of every other).⁴⁵

However, purely material nature designates a self-enclosed domain of phenomena; it is, as it were, a nature “abandoned to itself” (D 13 I/130a). That is to say, such an account of nature is based upon the abstraction of the subjective apprehension of nature itself, which is mediated by the lived-body as subjective point of view. Thus, the “axiom” of the necessary causal dependency of natural phenomena, according to which in each and every circumstance physical events have physical consequences,⁴⁶ marks at once the extent and the limits of the application field of physical causality. Describing the rules of physical nature, causality cannot apply to the sphere of psychic and intentional phenomena, *eo ipso* including those in which my lived-body is involved as the organ of perception.⁴⁷

⁴⁴Hua IV, p. 42/(Husserl 1989, p. 45). At paragraph 17, Husserl further distinguishes substantiality (or substantial reality) from materiality. The former generally refers to the causal dependence of all alterations from the alteration of the given circumstances. Besides such a dependence, the latter also entails extension, understood as the relation of *partes extra partes*. However, in the course of the argument Husserl does not always maintain such a distinction. As we will see, this might at some point be misleading, since the understanding of “reality” as “circumstance-dependence” is not limited to material or extended reality.

⁴⁵“Das physische Ding ist, was es ist, im Zusammenhang mit anderen physischen Dingen, es ist, was es ist, unter zugehörigen “Umständen”, und alle physischen Dinge bilden Einheit eines physischen Universums: der Natur. Worin besteht die Geschlossenheit der physischen Natur? In jedem Fall ist sie Geschlossenheit der physischen Kausalität (Naturgesetzmäßigkeit), wonach unmittelbar oder mittelbar alle Dinge in physisch kausaler Beziehung stehen (also jedes dingliche Geschehen für den kausalen Verlauf jedes anderen mit in Betracht kommt).” D 13 I/130a.

⁴⁶“Axiom: Under every circumstance, physical happening has physical consequences” “Axiom: Physisches Geschehen hat unter allen Umständen physische Folgen.” D 13 I/131 b.

⁴⁷Rang (1973, pp. 138f.) also stresses the irreducibility of conscious relations to causal relations. However, he does not primarily refer to psycho-physical conditionality but to the opposition between causality and motivation. The latter is not a relation between physical circumstances and

The most fundamental distinction between causality and conditionality, thus, concerns the domains they respectively apply to. Whereas cause and consequence both belong to the realm of physical nature, the conditioning circumstances and the conditioned experience belong to two different realms of reality, respectively, material nature and psychic life. This implies that, in the case of conditionality, the variations of the dependent variable (psychic experience) are not linked to the ones of the independent variable (physical circumstances) with the same kind of necessity as in the case of causal physical processes. The statement “with the same circumstances, the same consequences” does not strictly hold for the psycho-physical conditionality relations. For, even if we knew all the physical circumstances that determine a certain physical event, this would not be enough to univocally predict the psychic response to such circumstances. There may be other factors besides the physical conditions, e.g., psychic or motivational factors, which may also condition such a psychic response. Despite being conditioned by the material circumstances, psychic reality cannot in other words be considered as exclusively dependent on such circumstances. Furthermore, the cause-effect relation in the domain of physical nature can be determined by quantitative measurement. For instance, we can determine the precise temperature water needs to reach in order to evaporate. Such measurability, instead, is not applicable to psychic conditional relations. Thus, only the physical modifications concerning my body as material *Körper*, and certainly not those concerning my bodily experience, can be considered as causally determined. The consumption of drugs causally produces its effects on the functioning of the synaptic connections in my brain. Yet, it conditionally influences my behavior and the way I perceive things: if we only consider the material circumstances, there still remains space for indeterminacy in my bodily behavior or response to physical stimuli. This intertwining of physical causality (determining the reactions of my body as a material thing) and conditionality (influencing my perception and my bodily behavior) is what makes of the body a pre-eminent thing, namely the place where a system of subjective conditionality is always and necessarily interwoven with a system of causality.⁴⁸

The discussion of psycho-physical conditionality is also linked to the problem of “normality” and ortho-aesthetic. As a matter of fact, the question of how normal or abnormal perceptual conditions influence the normality or abnormality of our perception is often explicitly formulated in Husserl’s discussion of the conditionality relation.⁴⁹ The discussion of normality, of course, goes far beyond the field of the transcendental aesthetic. Nevertheless, what emerges from Husserl’s analyses of sensible experience is the attempt to ground not only the definition of normality, but also a phenomenological account of what we may call normalization-processes *von unten*. On such account, normality is not assumed as an already given state; it is rather understood “dynamically”, on

conscious experience, but rather a relation that rules the activity of consciousness in its temporal unfolding. As we will see, Husserl adopts the concept of motivation also to describe the temporal unfolding of kinesthetic experience.

⁴⁸ Hua IV, p. 64/(Husserl 1989, p. 69).

⁴⁹ See Hua IV, pp. 58f./ (Husserl 1989, pp. 63f.), Hua XIII, pp. 385–398, D 13 II.

the basis of those perceptual and bodily processes that make the establishment of a norm possible. Particularly, as we shall see, these analyses show that the concept of normality is located at the threshold between the descriptive and the normative order and that it designates a necessarily open field of experience.

In order to understand the tension between the descriptive and the normative meaning of the concept of normality, it is worthwhile considering Canguilhem's (2006, pp. 81f.) discussion of the difference between the concepts of anomaly [*anomalie*] and abnormality [*anormalité*]. Whereas the former concept stems from the Greek *an-omalous* and has a descriptive meaning, the latter stems from the Latin *ab-norma* and has a normative connotation. In other words: whereas anomaly refers to the particularity of one individual that falls out of a given factual regularity (e.g., of behavior) and therefore can also be considered as a principle of individuation, abnormality refers to the breach of a defined prescriptive norm. As Waldenfels (1998, pp. 9–18, 2005) points out, such an ambiguity in the concept of "normality" shall not be understood as an antinomy. This, indeed, would imply the neglecting of the processes of "normalization" or incarnation of norms, for instance through the development of habits, as well as of the grounding and the genesis of new norms. Accordingly, the descriptive and the normative understanding of normality shall be understood as complementary. I consider this to be true also for Husserl account of the normality in sensible experience. The idea of "normalization from the bottom" fits Husserl's stratified architectonics of experience. Restricting our remarks to the problem of normality within the transcendental aesthetic means reconsidering such a problem in relation to the constitution of the world (or, to better say, of nature) in and through sensible, bodily experience. As Husserl writes in one of his later texts:

In the first place, the normal world has as its founding layer normal nature, the realm of merely sensible experience. The normality of nature constituted by normal human sensibility (purely from "sensible experience") interpreted, this would be the ontological interpretation of the normal thing as essential form and of normal nature in general. Correlatively: interpretation of the subjective experiential givennesses of nature, of their modes of appearance for every sensible normal being, i.e., normal being meant as normally sensibly experiencing. Harmony of all normal humans with respect to their sensible experiences, their courses of appearances, thanks to which, although everyone has other appearances and at the same time not the same ones, they nevertheless see the same. (Hua XV, p. 156)

As we can clearly see from this quote, the constitution of what Husserl calls "normal nature" and "normal thing" is an intersubjective accomplishment. Yet, in order to understand what it is meant by the reference to the "harmony of all normal human beings", it is necessary to flesh out what are the criteria that define normality in general, and particularly in sensible experience, and then discuss in what sense normality cannot but eventually refer to intersubjective experience. What is certain, regarding the criteria for normality, is that Husserl does not want to simply resort to an average determination, whereby normality would be defined on the basis of some sort of empirical generalization.⁵⁰ This is quite clearly stated in one text published in the supplementary volume to the *Crisis*:

⁵⁰Cf. Dodd (1997, pp. 64–74), Steinbock (1995, pp. 138–147).

Thereby, normality in no way means mere average and a reversion turning around with the reversal of the majorities. Normality is itself a fundamental concept created from essential sources. (Hua XXIX, p. 157)

The endorsement of the average and empirical generalization as criterion for the determination of the normality or abnormality of experience would amount to defending some kind of anthropologism (based on the generalization of the empirical conformation of the majority of human beings), i.e., a position that, as we have seen, Husserl very explicitly criticizes. Thus, there must be other criteria to determine normality and anomaly. Particularly, Husserl has two criteria in mind, namely the reference to the optimal perceptual givenness and the concordance [*Einstimmigkeit*] of different experiences.

According to the first criterion, the conditions that allow us to optimally see things, to intuitively grasp as many qualitative differences as possible, can be said to be “normal”.⁵¹ Thus, the anticipation of the optimal givenness of things is the first element that establishes the ortho-aesthetic character of perception: it is the thing itself that, in each singular situation, determines which are the normal and the abnormal circumstances of perception. Here, we can clearly see that the question of normality is bound to the conditionality relation and to the situatedness of bodily experience. From our previous remarks regarding the determination of the optimum in relation to the interests of the subject in one specific perceptual situation, however, it follows that the normal or abnormal conditions cannot be determined once and for all, but rather vary in relation to the perceptual context and the perceptual interests in each situation. The normality of the conditions for the perception of a flower, for instance, will be different if such a perception is guided by aesthetic, practical, or scientific interests.⁵² Also, the criteria for determining optimal givenness are tied to the circumstances of the given situation. For this reason, Husserl considers normality as a vaguely defined sphere, connected to indeterminate and typological circumstances. Yet, he admits that such a sphere is sufficiently circumscribed when it comes to the fulfillment of our practical aims.⁵³

The second criterion for normality is the concordance [*Einstimmigkeit*] among different experiences of the same thing.⁵⁴ The first level of such concordance refers to my own experiences, either diachronically considered (my experience of the same thing at different times), or synchronically considered (the experiences mediated by two different bodily organs).⁵⁵ Again, considering bodily experience, the normality of perception is determined conditionally. For instance, if my two hands have discordant tactile perceptions of the same thing, this may certainly be related

⁵¹ Hua IV, pp. 59f./(*Husserl 1989*, pp. 64f.).

⁵² Hua XVI, p. 128/(*Husserl 1997*, p. 106).

⁵³ “The normal is a vague, sphere, related to indeterminate typical circumstances, but for practical purposes sufficiently defined” “Das Normale ist eine vage, auf unbestimmte, typische Umstände bezogene, aber für praktische Zwecke hinreichend umgrenzte Sphäre.” D 13 II/186a.

⁵⁴ “What is “normal experience” other than the lawful experience, the one that concordantly integrates itself in the relationship and holds the identity of the experienced thing?” Hua XIII, p. 364.

⁵⁵ See Hua IV, pp. 61f., 67f./(*Husserl 1989*, pp. 66f., 71f.); D 13 XII/174 b.

to some physical cause that affects my body as a material thing. However, a conditioned modification in my sensible experience and in the correlative appearance of the perceived things corresponds to such a causal modification of my body:

I see, for instance, how my hand gets burned, or I see that my hand is swollen, etc. This is possibly joined by anomalous sensations in the sense-field of the relevant organ, thus in the field of the aesthesiological corporeality [*Leiblichkeit*]. As a consequence, a change in the appearance occurs, together with further changes in the touch-field of the hand, which are still apprehended in accordance with appearances, but still only yield anomalous appearances. The normally acting sensibility yields concordant appearances, in which the same things are given and related to the normal appearing parts of the lived-body, which are also given in concordance, and to the whole lived-body.⁵⁶

In this case, the normal and normative reference for my injured hand is the healthy hand, since the latter has a tactile perception of the things that is in accordance with the perception other tactile organs have, with my previous perception of the same thing, or with the perception that other subjects have of this thing.

As already mentioned, normality, particularly when it refers to the criterion of concordance, cannot be exhaustively determined on the basis of the abstracting consideration of solipsistic experience, but rather requires an account of the intersubjective constitution of the world. For our purposes, it will suffice to consider how the intersubjective dimension relates to normality and the normalization processes happening within sensible experience. On the basis of Husserl criteria for normality, there might be tensions between the individual and the intersubjective determination of normality and its deviations. If, for instance, a certain pathological condition has become habitual for one subject, then the normal experience of this subject would be the one conditioned by such a pathological state. A colorblind subject, as Husserl writes, also has his/her own orthology: such a subject constitutes his/her phenomenal world [*Erscheinungswelt*], and the world that appears in such experience is for him/her the true world (Hua XIII, p. 379). However, such a world-appearance is anomalous if confronted with the experiences of other subjects, who are not colorblind. Each subject, accordingly, has an individual orthological system, based upon the concordance among his/her own experiences. Yet, such an individual orthological system is always confronted intersubjectively. This eventually implies, as Husserl argues in one text written in the Thirties, that intersubjective normality is grounded upon the possibility to relativize, as it were, one's own individual perspective, and to understand oneself as anybody [*Jedermann*].⁵⁷ As this example shows,

⁵⁶ "Ich sehe etwa, wie meine Hand verbrannt wird, oder ich sehe, dass meine Hand angeschwollen ist, etc.; dazu treten eventuell anomale Empfindungen im Empfindungsfeld des betreffenden Organs, also auf Seiten der aesthes*<iologischen>* Leiblichkeit auf. Als Erfolg tritt eine Erscheinungsänderung auf, in eins damit weitere Änderungen im Tastfeld der Hand, die zwar noch erscheinungsmäßig apperzipiert werden, aber eben anomale Erscheinungen ergeben; die normal fungierende Sinnlichkeit ergibt einstimmige Erscheinungen, in denen dieselben Dinge gegeben sind und bezogen auf die ebenfalls einstimmig sich gebenden, normal erscheinenden Leibesteile und den ganzen Leib." D 13 I/174b-175a.

⁵⁷ "Normal, as a human, is the one who concretely understands himself with the word "anybody", who belongs to an open human community of fellow humans, who share the same historical

the criterion of concordance shall not be understood as presupposing some sort of harmonious state. On the contrary, it refers to a situational concordance, which is itself open and subject to revision. In this sense, absolute orthology, i.e., a perception that would not be open to possible revision, is something like a limit idea, something that lies in principle beyond all possible experience.⁵⁸

The two criteria defining normality, optimal givenness and concordance, are related to one another. For instance, the experience of touching with an injured finger is abnormal both because, with the injured finger, we do not perceive the thing optimally and because such experience contrasts with the one mediated by the healthy finger. However, if we seriously consider the situatedness of experience and extend our considerations to the intersubjective domain, the definition of normality becomes more complicated, and there might even be tensions between the two criteria. Indeed, since normal conditions are different according to the interest that animates my present situated experience, it may also happen that some conditions that are “normal” according to the criterion of optimal givenness reveal themselves as “abnormal” according to the criterion of concordance, since they may generate some perceptual contrasts with previous and subsequent experiences (take, for instance, the recourse to microscopes when scientific interests are at stake, or the recourse to artificial light in order to “see better”). The contrary is also true: maintaining that there are finite interests animating perception, there can be “abnormal” experiences (i.e., contrasting with the preceding ones), which nonetheless institute a new “normality”, since they allow a richer experience of the thing, and may then ground a new concordance. This may be the case, for instance, of the recovery of an originally pathological or injured organ,⁵⁹ or of someone who is born blind and regains sight after surgery. From a solipsistic standpoint, the normal or concordant experience for a blind-born person would then exclude all visual manifestation. Yet, this person could undergo surgery, which would eventually allow him/her to see. Thus, a new kind of “normality” could be instituted:

Many deviations are not only changes, but rather diminishment in the richness of the properties of the thing that still present themselves. Thus, for pathological changes. However, if I, as blind-born, understood as solus, get operated, then for me, the substance [*Gehalt*] of

life-world, determined by the same form-structure, which is familiar to all, although not interpreted. The normal is normal in and thanks to the normal community.” Hua XV, p. 142.

⁵⁸“Absolutely speaking, orthologic would be a perception that does not experience its crossing out due to any future course of perception. This, then, would be an idea.” Hua XIII, p. 367.

⁵⁹“However, it is thinkable that the bodily change also yields “better” appearances. The one who originally had a pathological organ of sense, who accomplished his first constitution with appearances that are normal; but, in case of a subsequent recovery of the organ, a new optimal group of appearances of the same thing is constituted, and it now determines in further life “what the thing itself is”, in spite of the backwards reference to the previous norm which is necessary for the holding of the same.” “Doch ist denkbar, dass die leibliche Änderung auch” bessere “Erscheinungen ergibt. Wer ein pathologisches Sinnesorgan ursprünglich hätte, wer seine erste Konstitution mit Erscheinungen geleistet hat, die normal sind – aber bei nachträglicher Gesundung des Organs wird eine neue optimale Erscheinungsgruppe derselben Dinge konstituiert, und die bestimmt nun trotz der Rückbeziehung auf die frühere Norm, die für die Durchhaltung desselben notwendig ist, im weiteren Leben, “was das Ding selbst ist””. Ms. D 13 I/175a.

the world gets richer. The same world has more determinations than I had known: they now come to appearance. Insofar as I now obtain control over the operated eye, the system of my normal world-aspects and the idea of my normal corporeality changes, as does my optimal givenness of the world.⁶⁰

Regarding this example, we should first point out that the institution of this new kind of “normality” is by no means immediate. *De facto*, as I have mentioned in a previous chapter, blind persons do not simply regain sight, but rather experience a sort of experiential blindness, which comes close to the experience of chaos (cf. Noë 2004, pp. 3f.). However, these persons may progressively “learn” to see and thus institute a new kind of normality. As we will see later in this chapter, and as Husserl implicitly indicates by referring to the progressive development of some control [*Herrschaft*] on the healed eye, such learning is grounded upon the phenomenon of body memory. What counts here, however, is that such an operation making the acquisition of sight possible would at first generate the experience of a profound discordance [*Unstimmigkeit*] or abnormality with respect to the typological structure of previous experiences. Yet, thanks to the dynamics of learning processes, mediated by the temporal syntheses and the sedimentation of experience, and thanks to the actual effectiveness [*Wirksamkeit*] of the retained past, another kind of “normality” may be instituted, with regard to both the criterion of optimal appearance, and the criterion of subjective (with regard to the future experiences of this now sighted person) and intersubjective (with respect to other sighted persons) concordance.

We can now draw some conclusions from the previous discussion of normality in sensible experience. First, we shall emphasize that the criterion of concordance does not refer to a state of harmony. It rather implies a constant and dynamic negotiation and confrontation of normal and anomalous situations. All situated perceptual appearances are essentially open to possible conflicts, revisions, and reconfiguration. Secondly, the two criteria defining Husserl’s ortho-aesthetic hint in a way at the idea of a sensible configuration, which comes close to what Merleau-Ponty (1945, pp. 373, 376–377) addresses as *montage général*, thereby indicating that the perceived things and the world as the horizon of perception are the teleological unities that establish the “norm” for our psycho-physiological *montage*. The appearing thing and the sensible constellation it is part of are what determine optimal givenness. Such a determination is always open to possible revision with respect to the interests and circumstances of the given situation. In this sense, Husserl overturns the grounding of normality upon empirical generalization. The normality of certain conditions is not derived from a quasi-statistical calculation, nor is it merely reducible to the factual conformation of one’s body;

⁶⁰“Viele Abweichungen sind nicht nur Änderungen, sondern Minderungen im Reichtum der Dingeigenschaften, die sich noch darstellen. So bei krankhaften Änderungen. Wenn ich aber als blindegeboren operiert werde, als solus verstanden, so bereichert sich für mich der Gehalt der Welt; dieselbe Welt hat mehr Bestimmungen, als ich wusste: Sie treten jetzt in Erscheinung. Sofern ich nun Herrschaft über das operierte Auge gewinne, ändert sich das System meiner normalen Weltaspekte und die Idee meiner normalen Leiblichkeit und zugleich meine optimale Weltgegebenheit.” D 13 I/218b.

it is rather implied by the correlative structure of experience, and by the relation between the subject and the world:

The relevant appearances are not orthological because they are psycho-physically related to a certain organization of the lived-body called normal, as if the virtue of correctness of a perception would have given any reasons of correctness in the fact that it is psycho-physically conditioned by certain real processes within the real lived-body of a certain organization called normal. Rather, a world constitutes itself as true reality [*reale Wirklichkeit*] in space and time in such a way that the systems of orthological appearances are linked in a certain lawfulness, the psycho-physical one, to the co-constituted corporeality [*Leiblichkeit*], namely linked in a lawful conditionality to bodily externally-material [*außendingslich*] causal relationships, whereby a certain typical real organization of the lived-body is a prerequisite. And further that real modifications of this organization and, thus, of the conditionality inducing causality, conditionally bring with them other appearances and further consequences in the sphere of subjectivity. (Hua XIII, p. 369)

There is, accordingly, a conditional correlation between optimal appearances and the circumstances of my bodily experience. And the normality of such experience is realized whenever perception is able to render the configurative structure of the world with all perceived things. This does not exclude, but rather implies, the possibility of a revision of what was assumed to be the “normal” or optimal configuration. Despite the initial discordance that emerges whenever a presumed normal appearance enters in a conflict with another, maybe better or richer, appearance, a new “normality”, both in the sense of optimal givenness and of concordance, can be instituted.

8.1.3 *Situatedness and Bodily Movement*

Up to now, the situatedness of bodily experience has been explored with respect to the given conditions that underlie its unfolding. Commenting the positions of Merleau-Ponty and Buytendijk, however, I have suggested that the situatedness of bodily experience does not exclude, but rather implies, dynamism, change, and the openness to possible actions. These, I will now argue, are based upon the faculty of bodily movement. The situatedness of my body in perception does not refer to the location of the body in a fixed point of objective space-time. As the center of perceptual experience, the lived-body is not a static point of view on the world; it is rather the source of possible movements and actions. For Husserl, as we can read in one manuscript dating back to 1921, perception necessarily requires bodily movement. As the organ of perception, the body is necessarily a moving body:

An immobile organ could not be an organ of perception. The eye sees only as a moving eye, the tactile organ, the touching finger, the touching surface of the hand is organ of touch only in movement and in being able to move.⁶¹

⁶¹“Ein unbewegliches Organ könnte nicht Organ sein der Wahrnehmung. Das Auge sieht nur als bewegliches Auge, das Tastorgan, der tastende Finger, die tastende Handfläche ist Tastorgan nur in der Bewegung und im Bewegen-Können.” D 13 I/6a.

This implies a dynamization in the understanding of the zero-point. The “being-always-here” of my body does not indicate a fix point in space. On the contrary, the indexicality of the “here” entails its not being bound to any specific place. This, as Husserl writes in one of his later manuscripts, does not only imply a modification in spatial orientation, but also the temporalization of experience:

[...] my lived-body is constantly here, in it, haptic data and kinesthesia are localized. In going, it holds its central closeness, and only for its organs there is in touching something that is closer to or remoter from it, that of close space. In temporalization, oriented presentation continuously passes into oriented presentation, remaining identical or changing, in connection with the fact that I can stand still or “move myself”, or that the things move.⁶²

The situated phenomenon of orientation, grounded on the centrality of the here and on the faculty of bodily movement, testifies to the interweaving of lived spatiality and temporality in bodily experience. Moreover, there is a correspondence, which we now need to flesh out, between such a movement and the modes of appearance of the perceived things. Thus, considering movement as essential to perception further enriches the characterization of perception as an activity, which has been proposed in the previous chapter. Yet, how shall we understand this claim? Clearly, it does not only refer to the fact that we do move while we perceive. The claim, indeed, is more radical, since it understands movement as a structural, i.e., essential, moment of perception. Particularly, bodily movement is a necessary condition for the constitution of tridimensional space and for the perception of things as unities of appearances in movement or at rest.

Let us begin with the constitution of tridimensional space. Space, as we have seen in previous chapters, is co-constituted in the perception of sensible things. Accordingly, the constitution of intuitive space does not require a supervening act of thought. Starting with the *Dingvorlesung*, Husserl progressively develops his account of the constitution of tridimensional space in the following years. The attempt to provide a systematic account of such a constitution is notably made in the 1916 text, significantly entitled *Systematic Constitution of Space*.⁶³ Incorporating kinesthesia into his theory of perceptual constitution, Husserl writes:

A body is constituted as a sensuous schema by the sense of touch and the sense of sight, and every sense is a sense through an apperceptive conjunction of the corresponding sense-data with kinaesthetic data. We distinguish sense-fields from the one kinaesthetic field, which we do not call a sense-field.⁶⁴

⁶² “[...] mein Leib ist immerzu hier, in ihm sind die haptischen Daten und die Kinästhesen lokalisiert, im Gehen behält er seine zentrale Nähe, und nur für seine Organe gibt es tastend ein ihm Näheres und Ferneres, das des Nahraums. Orientierte Darstellung geht in der Zeitigung kontinuierlich in orientierte Darstellung über, sich gleichbleibend oder sich wandelnd, im Zusammenhang damit, dass ich stehenbleiben kann oder “mich bewegen” kann bzw. die Dinge sich bewegen.” D 12 III/32b.

⁶³ Hua XVI, pp. 297–321/(Husserl 1997, pp. 257–275). A further elaboration of Husserl’s original draft, made by Edith Stein, dates back to 1917. See Hua XVI, pp. 322–336/(Husserl 1997, pp. 258–288).

⁶⁴ Hua XVI, p. 298/(Husserl 1997, p. 357).

This passage is quite important for two reasons. First, it stresses that the so-called “kinesthetic-data”, or kinesthetic sensations, have a completely different function than the sensible data apprehended as presenting some objective qualities. As we will see in more detail later on, kinesthetic data have a specific “motivational” function with respect to presenting data, which can also be formalized as an “if...then” relation (if there is a modification regarding the kinesthetic sensations, then there will be some modification also in the correlative presenting data and appearances of the thing). Secondly, the kinesthetic system is not a system of sensations such as touch or vision are. It rather designates a system of bodily practical possibilities [*Vermöglichkeiten*], to which a “kinesthetic field” corresponds. As a portion of space, the latter can be considered as *aistheton koinon*. On the premise that spatial constitution involves both vision and touching, as the two sensory systems constituting the *materia prima* of sensible things, we should point out that Husserl’s remarks concerning the constitution of space mainly focus on visual perception. Thus, the modification of the kinesthetic system is mainly considered as far as it influences our visual presentations.⁶⁵

The correlation between my kinesthetic situation and the appearance of things plays a role in the constitution of objective movement and rest. Indeed, we perceive things as being at rest either if we do not move and our perceptual experience of the thing is unchanged, or if we repeatedly move around the thing and have the same appearance of it in the same kinesthetic situation at different times. Conversely, we perceive things in motion either if we move and have the same appearance of the thing (the movement of the perceived thing is coordinate with the movement of my body), or if the thing appears as constantly different, independently of my moving or staying, i.e., the modifications of thing appearances are neither coordinate to my movements, nor can they be cyclically restored.⁶⁶ The correlation between bodily movement and the appearances of the thing is also relevant for the constitution of tridimensional space, in relation to the levels of bodily movement that are involved.⁶⁷ Thus, the first level of space constitution, as an enclosed bi-dimensional field, is correlative to the movements of the eyes. As correlative of the system of head-movements, whereby the possibility of a 360° rotation of the head on its axis is ideally assumed, we have the constitution of a cylindrical visual field. Moreover, ideally assuming the possibility of a complete rotation of the head in different directions, we would have the constitution of a spherical visual field. Stressing the foundational relation among the different layers in the process of space constitution,

⁶⁵ Some considerations regarding the relation between tactile and visual space constitution are considered in manuscripts D 13 I; D 13 II; D III; D 12 III; and D 18 (Husserl 1940b, c). On the specificity of what Husserl calls pure tactile orientation, see Hua XIII, pp. 382–387. Here, the specificity of tactile experience is mainly related to the constitution of the lived-body. In this respect, see also Claeges (1964, pp. 90f.).

⁶⁶ Hua XVI, pp. 301, 327/(Husserl 1997, pp. 260; 281).

⁶⁷ See, notably, Hua XVI, pp. 154–255, 297–336/(Husserl 1997, 131–217, 297–288). See, also, Costa (1999, pp. 235–277), Giorello and Sinigaglia (2007), Sinigaglia (2003).

Husserl argues that in the lower oculomotor field we have an appearance of the higher field which is founded therein.⁶⁸

In all these cases, though, the third dimension of space is not constituted yet: indeed, even in the case of spherical field, we would obtain a “Riemannian bi-dimensional space”, and not yet tridimensional space.⁶⁹ Thus, Husserl claims that the constitution of tridimensional space requires the possibility of approaching and distancing, i.e., the potentiality of locomotion.⁷⁰ More precisely, the constitution of tridimensional space is made possible by the cooperation of the distancing and approaching movements in locomotion and the rotation of the visual field. Eventually, the ideal possibility for my body to change its positions leads to the constitution of objective space. However, such space is not yet the isotropic and homogeneous space. As long as it is perceptually constituted, it remains anisotropic, due to the fact that my lived-body remains the zero-point in such space, even if it can assume different positions.⁷¹ Accordingly, the idealization leading to isotropic and homogeneous space implies the abstraction from the centrality of the lived-body. Such idealization is a thought operation that goes beyond the boundaries of the transcendental aesthetic.

Tridimensional space, as we have argued, is constituted in and through movement and the perception of things. Describing perception, Husserl characterizes the relation between kinesthesia and the appearance of things as a “motivational” one. Thereby, motivation is understood as a conditional (if...then) relationship, which, however, differs from both causality and psycho-physical conditionality. Different from causality, motivational conditionality is not a relationship between the material modifications of something real and the event or the circumstances (the causes) that have generated such modifications. Moreover, kinesthesia are functions within perception: they do not precede the appearance like a cause precedes its effects. Rather, kinesthesia and the respective appearance are given in a seamless unity: every appearance is accompanied by kinesthesia and vice-versa.⁷² The motivational conditionality of kinesthesia, however, shall also be distinguished from psycho-physical conditionality, since it does not refer to the relationship between the modifications in the set of physical circumstances and perception, but rather to the functional modifications of appearances that are correlative to subjective, bodily movements. In kinesthesia, thus, motivational conditionality is related to the ambiguous status of the body as psycho-physical entity: besides being conditioned by the physical and material circumstances, our bodily experience is also organized

⁶⁸ Hua XVI, p. 309/(Husserl 1997, p. 266).

⁶⁹ Hua XVI, pp. 309–311/(Husserl 1997, pp. 266–268).

⁷⁰ In the later manuscript D 18, Husserl considers locomotion as the synthetic unification of other kinesthetic systems, which makes the constitution of tridimensionality possible (Husserl 1940b, p. 30).

⁷¹ Hua XVI, p. 318/(Husserl 1997, pp. 373–374).

⁷² Cf. Hua IX, 390. Focusing on these features of kinesthesia in spatial perception, Claesges (1964, pp. 117f.) speaks about a “kinesthetic consciousness”. In this respect, see also, Dodd (1997, pp. 62–63).

according to another, psychic, lawfulness.⁷³ As Rang (1973, p. 161) points out, thus, for Husserl kinesthesia are not primarily perceptions of movement. Rather, they are an essential moment of perception itself. As such, they allow us to consider perception itself as movement.

Such motivational conditionality can be better understood by referring to the distinction between two kinds of sensations involved in the perception of spatial things, namely presenting sensations and kinesthetic sensations. Presenting sensations are apprehended for the constitution of things.⁷⁴ Kinesthetic sensations, instead, are not apprehended as qualities of the perceived things. Rather, they are the sensations of my own bodily movement and, as such, they are pre-reflectively experienced.⁷⁵ Motivational conditionality concerns the relationship between these two kinds of sensations:

Those sensations which undergo extensional apprehension (leading to the extended features of the thing) are motivated as regards the courses they take either actually or possibly and are apperceptively related to motivating series, to systems, of kinesthetic sensations, which freely unfold in the nexus of their familiar order in such a way that if a free unfolding of one series of this system occurs (e.g., any movement of the eyes or fingers), then from the interwoven manifold as motive, the corresponding series must unfold as motivated.⁷⁶

The concept of motivation in this context might appear somewhat misleading. For, certainly, presenting sensations are not motivated by kinesthetic sensations in the same way as, for instance, my previous experience motivates me to presently act in a certain way. For this reason, I consider it more appropriate to use the expression motivational conditionality, indicating that kinesthesia contribute in setting the conditions for how things appear to us. The concept of motivation still remains legitimate in this context, because kinesthesia are also strictly related to the implicit awareness of the “I can”, namely the awareness of the faculty to initiate and direct our bodily movement on the basis of specific motives.⁷⁷ Accordingly, the normal or optimal conditions of perception also depend on the motivational conditionality of kinesthesia. The latter can contribute to the actualization of the conditions for the optimal givenness of the thing, and therefore to the satisfaction of perceptual interests:

Place is realized through kinesthesia, in which the “what” of the place is optimally experienced. This kinesthesia in the function of completed attainment, of attaining apperception, is self-presentation of the place, just as the occurring hyle is completed self-presentation of

⁷³“But organic corporeality is just a title for a new lawfulness, the one of psychic intervention.” “Aber organische Leiblichkeit ist eben ein Titel für eine neue Gesetzlichkeit, die des psychischen Eingreifens.” D 13 I/132b.

⁷⁴The apprehension-content schema has been much criticized in the literature. According to some scholars, Husserl eventually gives up such a model. Cf. Boehm (1996, pp. XXXf.), Holenstein (1972, pp. 86f.), Sokolowski (1970, pp. 177f.). Despite the introduction of the noematic account of perception and the doubts concerning the adequateness of such a schema for the constitution of inner time, he still considers it appropriate to describe the structure of perception.

⁷⁵Hua IV, pp. 57f./Husserl 1989, pp. 62f.), Hua IX, p. 390, Hua XIII, pp. 385f.

⁷⁶Hua IV, pp. 57–58/(Husserl 1989, pp. 62–63).

⁷⁷Hua XI, p. 14/(Husserl 2001a, p. 51).

the “what” of this place, of the thing itself in it [...]. In this “world”, there only exists for me one sort of realizing activity, actively related to them, namely the activity of perceptual realization, of the “going towards” what has already been experienced until I am with it.⁷⁸

And further:

In every datum as occurring in the kinesthetic situation and as co-consequence, the optimum shines through. And the optimum is constituted as the object at which all kinesthetic doing and making of co-consequences aims, as *telos*, as far as an interest that guides constitution acts out in the direction of increase and optimal increase, and remains effective as remaining habitual.⁷⁹

This, clearly, brings us back to the discussions on the teleology of perception of the previous chapter. As moments of perceptions, kinesthesia are goal-oriented movements, and their *telos* is the actualization of the optimal conditions making the best possible appearance of the thing. In this context, the tempo of movement itself has its optimum, namely a rhythm of unfolding that ensures the best possible appearance of the thing.⁸⁰ Although Husserl mainly underscores the role of kinesthesia in spatial constitution, it is clear that bodily movement shall also be considered as to its temporal unfolding. Temporalization, together with spatialization, is among the essential features of bodily experience and perception. The phenomena of orientation, situatedness and bodily movement eminently testify to the interweaving of the spatial and the temporal dimension of experience.⁸¹ The spatio-temporality that unfolds from my bodily situation has a horizon-like structure and a dynamic configuration, related to my bodily movement or rest.

⁷⁸“Der Ort ist verwirklicht durch die Kinästhesie, in der das Was des Ortes optimal erfahren ist. Diese Kinästhesie in der Funktion der vollendeten Erzielung, der erzielenden Apperzeption, ist Selbstdarstellung des Ortes, so wie die dabei auftretende Hyle vollendete Selbstdarstellung des Was ist dieses Ortes, des Dinges selbst an ihm. [...] In dieser “Welt” gibt es für mich nur eine Art verwirklichender Aktivität, auf sie tätig bezogen: nämlich die der wahrnehmenden Verwirklichung, des auf schon Erfahrenes “Hingehens” und so lange, bis ich bei ihm selbst bin.” D 10 III/24b.

⁷⁹“In jedem Datum als in der kinästhetischen Situation auftretend und auftretend als Mitfolge scheint das Optimum durch, und das Optimum ist als Objekt konstituiert, worauf all das kinästhetische Tun und Schaffen von Mitfolgen abzielt, als Telos, sofern ein die Konstitution leitendes Interesse sich in die Richtung auf Steigerung und optimale Steigerung auslebt und als bleibend habituell wirksam bleibt.” D 10 III/30a.

⁸⁰“In order to make the self-givenness complete, the tempo of kinesthetic movement, which has its own optimum, is also meaningful. And correspondingly, the possibility of a tempo of self-movement of the object, in which it shows itself excellently in all its different profiles, and at best, from all profiles.” “Bedeutsam ist wohl auch das Tempo der kinästhetischen Bewegung, das selbst sein Optimum hat, um die Selbstgegebenheit vollkommen zu machen; und dementsprechend die Möglichkeit eines Tempos der Selbstbewegung des Objektes, in dem es sich vorzüglich in seinen verschiedenen Seiten zeigt und günstigenfalls von allen Seiten.” D 12 78/b.

⁸¹“Oriented presentation passes continuously in temporalization in oriented presentation, remaining identical to itself or changing, in connection with the fact that I can stay quiet or “move myself”, namely that things can move themselves.” “Orientierte Darstellung geht in der Zeitigung kontinuierlich in orientierte Darstellung über, sich gleichbleibend oder sich wandelnd, im Zusammenhang damit, dass ich stehenbleiben kann oder “mich bewegen” kann bzw. die Dinge sich bewegen.” D 12 III/32b.

8.2 The Aesthetic of the Lived-Body

[...] on the level of surface, my lived-body has – in pure experience – a double-layered mode of experience, which no other spatial object has (the aesthetic of the lived-body leads beyond the sensible-aesthetic of every other thing). Its surface is a continuously “sensitive” one, and in it, I am operative in my perceiving, but also originally practical activity. In this operativeness, it moves – double-sided, in spatial moving and also kinesthetically-egoically. And this inner “I-move” does not have in itself anything of movement in the spatial sense. (Hua XV, p. 268)

Up to now, we mainly focused on the phenomenological approach to the body as the organ of perception. Through these analyses, however, we have already encountered some aspects that hint at the phenomenon of bodily self-awareness. For instance, we have seen that a pre-thematic consciousness of “being-always-here” of our body, as well as of the faculty of bodily movement, is implied in every act of perception. In this section, we will investigate the modes of such a form of bodily self-awareness in more detail.

Consistently with the general approach of the transcendental aesthetic, the aesthetic of the lived-body is also focused on the basic modes of bodily self-experience from the first-person-perspective. The inquiry into the “solipsistic constitution” of the body, however, is clearly an abstracting one, aiming to show both the extent and the limits of first-personal experience for the constitution of the ambiguous reality of the body. It shows the extent of such a constitution, since it lays bare the intimate consciousness of one’s own body – whereby the genitive shall be understood as subjective, namely as referring not to the consciousness of the body as object, but to the pre-thematic self-consciousness of a bodily subject. Yet, such inquiry also marks the limits of such first-personal experience, since the latter is not sufficient for the constitution of the body in its material reality.⁸² Only through intersubjective experience, and what we may call the “interiorization” of the gaze of the other and through the phenomena of expression and appresentation, can we arrive at constituting our body as an object, or, to better say, as a subjective object.⁸³ However, a thorough inquiry into first-personal bodily experience and self-constitution is precisely required to see “up to which point” we can arrive with such a constitution and thus also to understand its limits.

Following the previous quote, I will refer to bodily self-experience as to the “aesthetic of the lived-body”, thereby underscoring the sensible roots of bodily self-experience. In what sense does such an aesthetic, as Husserl writes, go beyond the aesthetic of all other sensible objects? The quoted passage offers us two clues to answer this question. What is specific of the aesthetic of the lived-body are, notably, the property of sensitivity [*Empfindsamkeit*] and the experience of one’s own bodily motility.⁸⁴ In the following, I will spell out the implications of this Husserlian

⁸² Hua IV, p. 161/(Husserl 1989, pp. 168–169).

⁸³ Hua V, p. 124/(Husserl 1980, p. 111). See Depraz (1995, pp. 125f.).

⁸⁴ Remarkable, in this sense, are the analyses carried on by Straus (1956).

claim and argue that these forms of bodily self-experience are based upon the intertwining of spatiality and temporality. Particularly, I will first discuss the modes in which sensitivity, and in particular the bodily sensations Husserl calls sensings [*Empfindnisse*] or localized sensations, grounds bodily self-experience. Secondly, I will assess how the faculty of bodily movement defines a form of bodily self-awareness. Thirdly, I will consider how the phenomenon of body memory grounds an enduring form of bodily self-awareness.

8.2.1 Sensitivity

Sensitivity [*Empfindsamkeit*] is a distinctive property of the lived-body that concretely explicates itself in a constellation of different sensible experiences, all related to the lived-body as a unity. The experience of such sensible constellation grounds the primal experience of the mineness of the lived-body and what is currently often called the bodily “sense of ownership”. Besides the so-called presenting and kinesthetic sensations, which have been already addressed above, at paragraph 39 of *Ideas II*, Husserl further distinguishes other sensations, namely the so-called sensible feelings [*sinnliche Gefühle*], such as bodily pleasure and pain, and the sensations of energetic tension and relaxation, of inner restraint, paralysis, liberation, etc. After mentioning these different groups of sensations, he points out that:

All these groups of sensations, as sensings, have an immediate Bodily localization. Thus, for every human being, they belong, in a way that is immediately intuitible, to the Body as to his particular Body, i.e., as a subjective objectivity distinguished from the Body as a mere material thing by means of this whole stratum of localized sensations.⁸⁵

The reference to the concept of “sensings” [*Empfindnisse*] in this passage needs to be thoroughly considered. The neologism *Empfindnisse* combines in one word the two concepts of *Empfindung* and *Erlebnis*, and thus designates a hybrid phenomenon, namely, as Welton puts it, “a lived experience [*Erlebnis*] that is not an experience-of [*Erfahrung*], a sensorial event [*Empfindung*] that is not a perception [*Wahrnehmen*], a finding of oneself [*sich befinden*] that is not the finding of something” (Welton 1999, p. 45). In the previously quoted passage from *Ideas II*, the concept of sensings is adopted to designate different kinds of sensations. However, in other contexts, Husserl is more explicit in limiting the extent of such a concept to those sensations that are provoked by felt bodily contact. The latter does not need to be the physical contact with a thing; it can also refer to the more diffuse bodily feeling of contact with air or water. Thus, among the senses, touch is clearly the one that better exemplifies what is meant by sensings.⁸⁶ Yet, such a sense of contact, maybe more diffuse, can be present also in other senses.

⁸⁵Hua IV, p. 153/(Husserl 1989, p. 160).

⁸⁶I will not discuss here the question as to the “priority” of touch over vision in the constitution of things, but rather focus on the specific role of tactile sensations in bodily self-experience. As we have seen in our previous analyses, Husserl often adopts a vision-based model of perception.

Adopting the narrower understanding of the concept of sensings allows us to better circumscribe the phenomenon at stake with respect to other types of bodily sensations, notably presenting sensations, kinesthetic sensations, sensible feelings, and the sensation of tension and relaxation. The criterion Husserl's adopts to differentiate sensations is basically related to their respective role within experience. And on the basis of such a criterion he also differentiates sensings from the other mentioned sensations. Thus, unlike presenting sensations, sensings are not apprehended as manifesting some qualities of the perceived thing. Unlike kinesthetic sensations, they do not have any motivational function with respect to presenting sensations. Unlike sensible feelings, they do not primarily play a role in the constitution of values. And, finally, unlike the sensations of tension and relaxation, sensings do not form the “material substrate” for the life of desire and will.⁸⁷ Since they do not accomplish any primary function within the processes of objects or values constitution, sensings are rather the vehicle of the primal and pre-objective experience of our own lived-body. This is particularly due to two fundamental features of sensings: their bodily localization;⁸⁸ and their being “effect properties” [*Wirkungseigenschaften*], which are virtually always there, but are actualized thanks to an action on the body.⁸⁹ This activating relationship between the virtual properties of our lived-body and the given circumstances is not in the realm of physical causality. It is rather, again, a conditional relation between some physical action affecting my body as a psycho-physical unity⁹⁰ and a response that is not merely physical, but rather designates a specific mode of “behavior”.⁹¹

It being understood that sensings should be conceived in the light of their specific function, namely as mediating the self-experience of the lived-body, it seems

In *Ideas II*, however, he suggests that touch is the privileged sense for the constitution of the thing, Hua IV, p. 70/(Husserl 1989, p. 75). This, notably, for two reasons, namely: the continuity of tactile experience (we are always in touch with the world and tactile sensations are the only sensations that cannot be suspended); and the bodily localization of tactile sensation, which apparently brings us in a closer contact with material reality, and allows a double apprehension of tactile sensations, namely as being both bodily and thing related, cf. Hua IV, p. 150/(Husserl 1989, pp. 157–158). However, in *Ideas II*, Husserl also claims, correctly, that talking about a priority of a sense over the others is at least misleading, for the senses have “equal rights” in lived experience. A thorough analysis of the role of visual and tactile experience in the perception of things and bodily self-experience can be found in Mattens (2008). In another paper, Mattens (2009) argues that the Husserlian distinction between visual and tactile experience tends to vanish in the contemporary research in philosophy of mind. In these studies, indeed, the phenomenology of sight seems to be assumed as a model to interpret the phenomenology of touch. Such a different approach to sight and touch, according to Mattens, grounds a different understanding of the body: as organ in Husserl's philosophy, and as template in the philosophy of mind.

⁸⁷Hua IV, pp. 152f./ (Husserl 1989, pp. 160f.).

⁸⁸Hua IV, pp. 144–147/(Husserl 1989, pp. 152–154), Hua V, pp. 118–119/(Husserl 1980, pp. 104–105).

⁸⁹Hua IV, p. 146/(Husserl 1989, p. 154).

⁹⁰Hua V, p. 118/(Husserl 1980, p. 105).

⁹¹Here I adopt Merleau-Ponty's (2002) concept of behavior, based on the understanding of bodily responses as going beyond physical reactions and rather being a mode of our inhabiting the world.

to me that their relation with other sensations still needs further elaboration. Indeed, precisely on the basis of their function, sensings are not properly to be conceived as yet another class of sensations; moreover, there might be some overlapping in the functions different sensations accomplish. Besides their primary function, presenting and kinesthetic sensations, as well as the feeling of bodily pleasure and pain and the sensations of tension and relaxation, may also be experienced as sensings, when, besides their specific function, they also play a role in the formation of our bodily self-awareness. For instance, the sensible feelings of pain mostly have a bodily localization thanks to which they function as a mode of bodily consciousness (Hua IV, p. 153). Kinesthetic sensations and the sensations of tension and relaxation may play an analogous role, too: indeed, kinesthetic sensations are also bodily localized (Hua IV, p. 151),⁹² even if such a localization mostly undetermined or diffuse, and they mediate bodily consciousness through their gradual and rhythmical unfolding.

Kinesthesia have their own gradualness, e.g., the upwards lifting of the whole arm with the hand, the character of “overcoming heaviness”, of moving under resistance in a changing gradualness. With it goes the transitions of the different direction, the differences in position, the differences of tempo, slowness and speed.⁹³

Things are somewhat more complicated with respect to presenting sensations. In fact, there are some sensations, primarily tactile sensations, that may both function as presenting sensations and as sensings; however, other presenting sensations, such as the visual ones, are not bodily localized nor do they entail bodily contact. Therefore they do not properly seem to function as sensings.⁹⁴ In other words, thus, different sensations might potentially “function” as sensings, if they bear witness to the aesthesiological character of the lived-body and bodily-reflexivity. Thus, keeping in mind this functional overlapping, the aforementioned claim made by Husserl at paragraph 39 of *Ideas II* would also find its justification.

Having said this, it is also clear that the tactile sensations, namely sensations of contact or *Berührungssempfindungen*, are the kind of sensations that best exemplify the function of sensings: touch is, in other words, the sense that more than any other mediates bodily self-awareness.⁹⁵ Re-activating within the phenomenological

⁹² Among others, see also the above quoted passage of manuscript D 12 III, where Husserl refers to the bodily localization of tactile data and kinesthetic data. D 12 III/32b.

⁹³ “Die Kinästhesen haben ihre eigenen Gradualitäten, z. B. Hebung des ganzen Armes mit der Hand aufwärts, der Charakter des “Überwinden der Schwere”, des Bewegens unter Widerstand in einer wechselnden Gradualität; damit in eins die Übergänge der verschiedenen Richtung, die Lagenunterschiede, die Unterschiede des Tempo, Langsamkeit und Schnelligkeit” D 10 IV/61b. See also manuscript D 10 III/37b f., 52a f. In this sense we can also conceive of the rhythmic unfolding of the feeling or our heartbeat [*Herzgefühl*], which Husserl describes in *Ideas II*, as a mode of bodily sensing, Hua IV, p. 165/(Husserl 1989, pp. 173–174). See also Welton (1999).

⁹⁴ Hua IV, p. 148/(Husserl 1989, p. 156).

⁹⁵ According to Ratcliffe (2008, 2013) touch is also the sense, that grounds our bodily situatedness and the sense of reality. As to the former, I believe Husserl would agree with Ratcliffe’s position. Tactile sensations situate us in the world in a most original sense. As such, they also allow us to find “our way around the world” [*zurechtfinden*] and accordingly ground the phenomenon of

analyses of the lived-body Aristotle's (1931, 413 b-414 a, 422 b-424 a, 434 a) idea, according to which touch is the most fundamental sense for animal beings, Husserl presents some thorough descriptions of tactile experience as a mode of bodily ambiguity and reflexivity.

The first aspect of the ambiguity of touch already emerges from the previous reference to the relation between presenting sensations and sensings, and may be further explicated by considering the phenomenon of the touching hand. Let us first address the case in which the hand touches a material thing. In this case, the very same tactile sensations lend themselves to a twofold apprehension: first, they can be apprehended as presenting sensation when attention is directed toward a quality of the perceived thing, e.g. its smoothness; and secondly, they can be experienced as sensings, when attention is not directed to the smoothness of a surface, but rather to my sensing such smoothness. In this latter case, the same tactile sensations that present some perceptual qualities of the thing are vehicle of bodily consciousness.⁹⁶ A further and more complicated phenomenon is when I do not touch an object, but another part of my body, in Husserl's famous example, two hands touching each other. Indeed, considering the touching hand in the "touching-touched" phenomenon, sensings are not only apprehended in a double way, they are also sensed in a double way: as tactile appearances [*Tasterscheinungen*] of the touched hand, and as localized sensations of the touching hand.⁹⁷ Shifting our attention to the touched hand, we will have the same structure of double sensations. On the threshold between self-affection and hetero-affection, the experience of the "touching-touched" hand brings to the fore the ambiguity and reflexivity of the lived-body. Despite not being reducible to a mere thing,⁹⁸ the body is the turning-point [*Umschlagspunkt*] of material and psychic relations and therefore it is called "subjective objectivity".⁹⁹ Furthermore, this experience shows why touch plays such a primal role in bodily self-experience. The specific ambiguity of touch, which supports the specific form of bodily reflexivity of the touching-touched phenomenon, is not proper to other sensations, and particularly not to sight, since the eye cannot in principle see itself. Accordingly, sight is not the vehicle of implicit bodily consciousness that touch is. As Husserl points out, a subject whose only sense was the sense of vision [*ein bloß augenhaf tes Subjekt*] could not have any appearing body at all.¹⁰⁰

bodily orientation we have described above. Cf. Hua IV, p. 70/(Husserl 1989, p. 74). However, for Husserl, tactile sensations alone are not enough for the constitution of the "reality" of the thing. As we have seen, the latter implies causality, which is not constituted by pure sensibility. What is constituted through touch, thus, is a pure tactile phantom, and not yet a material thing. In this respect, see Mattens (2008).

⁹⁶Hua IV, p. 147/(Husserl 1989, p. 155).

⁹⁷Hua IV, pp. 144–147/(Husserl 1989, pp. 152–154).

⁹⁸Hua V, pp. 117f./Husserl 1980, pp. 103f.).

⁹⁹Hua IV, p. 153, 161/(Husserl 1989, p. 160, 169), Hua V, p. 124/(Husserl 1980, p. 111).

¹⁰⁰Hua IV, p. 150/(Husserl 1989, p. 158).

As it is well known, important phenomenological and ontological implications of the touching-touched experience have been drawn by Merleau-Ponty (1964, pp. 191f.). What is particularly important in our context is Merleau-Ponty's remark that the experiences of the touching and the touched hand never fully coincide. Rather, the touching-touched experience bears witness to the profound "hiatus" [*écart*] between the two series of sensations (the ones belonging to the touching hand and the ones belonging to the touched hand), which also implies the structural incompleteness of bodily self-experience. Although Husserl does not explicitly thematize such a hiatus, his descriptions seem to converge with Merleau-Ponty's view. In order for the touched hand to become itself touching, a "switch" is needed, which means that the two experiences do not completely converge. It is precisely in this sense that the touching-touched phenomenon assumes relevance for the characterization of the lived-body as turning-point of material and psychic relations: the very same hand is both aesthesiologically constituted and somatologically constituted, testifying to the double reality of the body as *Leibkörper*.

Turning to the central question of this work, we shall now consider the spatio-temporal unfolding of sensings in relation to the spatio-temporality of bodily experience. The very concept of "localization", which defines these sensations, clearly entails the reference to a specific form of spatiality. However, I would argue that the bodily localization of sensings can be properly understood only on the basis of the intertwining of spatiality and temporality. Given the role of sensings in the process of self-constitution of the lived-body and in the primal experience of being in contact with the world, we cannot reduce their bodily localization to their objective, anatomical position on the body. Such an objective localization is something derivative, based on the apprehension of the originally felt sensations on my somatic body. The spatio-temporality of sensings, instead, fits the analyses concerning the spatio-temporality of bodily experience, which are developed at paragraphs 13 and 14 of *Ideas II*. Here, Husserl particularly stresses the irreducibility of the spatiality of the lived-body to the extension of material things. The latter can be described as a relation of independent parts, or pieces (*partes extra partes*). As we have seen, the spatiality of material things, in other words, implies the ideal possibility of fragmentation, and each of the parts of the fragmented thing belongs itself to the ontological region of the material thing.¹⁰¹ This, however, is not the case for animal beings and their sensations. The latter cannot be cut into pieces like material things can: a fragmented body would not be a lived-body any more. Against this background, we can further develop our previous remarks concerning the different meanings concept of extension. Extension as *Ausdehnung* describes the spatiality of material things as made up of independent parts. The concept of extension as "spreading-out" [*Ausbreitung*], instead, can be also adopted to describe the spatiality of the lived-body as a unity of non-independent moments. Belonging to the lived or animated body, and not being properties of the material body,¹⁰² sensings do not lend themselves to fragmentation either. Their spatiality is something completely

¹⁰¹ Hua IV, p. 30/(Husserl 1989, pp. 32–33).

¹⁰² Hua IV, p. 150/(Husserl 1989, p. 157).

different from the spatiality of material things, for sensings are not made up of independent parts of sensations, rather being interwoven qualitative unities of non-independent moments. The spreading-out of sensings, as I mentioned, does not only designate their spatial localization. Rather, the specificity of such spatial localization, distinguished from material extension, is also related to the temporal unfolding of sensings. Indeed, claiming that sensings run through the body, Husserl hints at the dynamics of their spreading-out as a pre-objective temporal and rhythmic process.¹⁰³ Being a dynamical process of spreading-out, the localization of sensings cannot be equalized to the static extension of assembled parts. The irreducibility of the spreading-out of sensings to material extension is another central manifestation of the spatio-temporal intertwining in sensible experience.

8.2.2 *Movement and Bodily Consciousness*

In the first part of this chapter, we have already seen how bodily movement plays a fundamental role in perception. More precisely, such a role is related to what Husserl describes as a “motivational” relationship between the actual and virtual kinesthetic situation and the correlative appearance of the perceived thing. Although this is the primary role Husserl ascribes to bodily movement, such movements also appear to be involved in what we have called the “aesthetic of the lived-body”, i.e., in our bodily self-experience. In the following, I wish to investigate how bodily movement contributes to bodily, pre-thematic, self-consciousness, and how this is related to the spatio-temporal intertwining.¹⁰⁴

This double function of kinesthesia clearly emerges from manuscript D 10 III (1932). Here, Husserl distinguishes what he calls “perspectivating” [*perspektivierende*] from “non-perspectivating” [*nicht-perspektivierende*] kinesthesia. The former, which can be voluntary or involuntary (an example thereof would be when I turn myself and I happen to see a thing from a particularly suitable perspective, without my movement being guided by an explicit perceptual interest), are primarily responsible for the change of a thing’s orientation and perspectival appearance according to the “motivational” relation described above. The latter, instead, are not related to the appearance of things, but rather inform the inner experience of our bodily movements. To be true, as Husserl points out, the so-called perspectivating kinesthesia, besides making the perception of the thing from different sides possible, “secondarily” mediate our bodily self-experience:

Every perspectivating kinesthesia, which passes off together with the corresponding hyletic courses, yields perception of the body in its movement and rest in a secondary sense, namely of the constantly awaked consciousness of the faculty to not only be able to activate

¹⁰³ Hua IV, p. 149/(Husserl 1989, pp. 156–157). One glaring example of such rhythm of sensings is the heartbeat, *Herzgefühl*. Cf. Hua IV, p. 165/(Husserl 1989, p. 174).

¹⁰⁴ Some seminal remarks in this sense can be found in Landgrebe (1963, pp. 111f.).

this passive course in general, but also to direct it, to change it as perspectivating course in such a way that it becomes an achieving perception.¹⁰⁵

This kind of bodily awareness, however, results from a reflection directed toward the unfolding of kinesthesia in sensible perception. Yet, in perception, we primarily intend the perceptual thing or the surrounding world (*intentio recta*); only secondarily are we able to turn our attention to the processes, and among others to the kinesthetic processes, which make perception itself possible (*intention obliqua*). Consequently, we can become aware of the partial control we have on our bodily movements and possibly direct them in such a way as to make them suitable to satisfy our perceptual interests. Nevertheless, such a reflective consciousness of “perspectivating” kinesthesia presupposes a pre-thematic consciousness of kinesthesia as “non-perspectivating”, i.e., it is founded upon the intimate experience of oneself as moving:

The apperceived, namely perceptually apperceived bodily movement of the hand is constantly accompanied and firmly associated with a non-perspectivating kinesthesia, or with its co-belonging course.¹⁰⁶

The course of non-perspectivating kinesthesia belongs to a system of possible bodily movements, which can be actively directed by the subject according to its specific emotive or dispositional interest [*Gefühlsinteresse* and *Gemütsinteresse*], for instance the interest in being in this or that bodily position. However, in this case, such an interest is not related to the appearance of the perceptual thing. Rather, it is a “practical” interest, linked to the intention to control one’s own movements. Expanding on this topic, in the same manuscript D 10 III, Husserl emphasizes the difference between the inner experience of one’s own bodily movement and the apprehension of bodily local movement in objective space. Experienced from the first-person perspective, my bodily movement is not primarily apprehended as local movement in objective space; it rather has an “internal functional sense”, related to bodily self-experience (Hua XV, p. 280). This means that the spatio-temporal unfolding of such movement is experienced differently from the movement of things we observe in objective time and space. Bodily movement stretches out and may unfold rhythmically in the pre-objective spatio-temporality of our bodily situation. The inner, first-personal experience of bodily movement is a mode of pre-reflective and pre-thematic bodily awareness: I always have an implicit consciousness of my faculty of bodily movement, of the resistance that potentially blocks it, and of the concrete possibility of accomplishing certain movements (such as walking) and not others (such as flying).

¹⁰⁵ “Jede passiv in eins mit den zugehörigen hyletischen Verläufen ablaufende perspektivierende Kinästhesie ergibt Wahrnehmung des Körpers in seiner Bewegung oder Ruhe in einem sekundären Sinn, nämlich des ständig geweckten Bewusstseins des Vermögens, diesen passiven Verlauf nicht nur überhaupt aktivieren, sondern so dirigieren, als perspektivierenden Verlauf so abwandeln zu können, dass es zum erzielenden Wahrnehmen wird.” D 10 III/44a.

¹⁰⁶ “Die apperzipierte, und zwar wahrnehmungsmäßig <apperzipierte> Körperbewegung der Hand ist ständig begleitet und fest assoziiert mit jener nicht-perspektivierenden Kinästhesie bzw. ihrem zugehörigen Verlauf.” D 10 III/44b.

Mutatis mutandis, the distinctions made in manuscript D 10 III recall the observations concerning the constitutive ambiguity of the body in *Ideas II*. In bodily movement, we can distinguish what Husserl calls a bodily-material side [*körperliche Seite*] and an egoic side [*ichliche Seite*]. In reflection or from another person's perspective, my bodily movement can certainly be apprehended as local movement in space. In this case, we apprehend movement as referring to the bodily-material side of corporeality. However, such an apprehension is not the most original experience we make of our bodily movement; it is rather grounded upon the inner experience of movement as related to the egoic side of corporeality.¹⁰⁷ The problem for Husserl is then to determine how, starting from my inner experience of bodily movement, I can apperceive my body as moving or as being moved in space. This seems to be a restating of the question of how, starting from the inner experience of my body as *Leib*, I can apperceive and constitute my body as *Körper* (Hua XV, p. 280). The answer provided in manuscript D 10 III refers to the experience of being moved without being myself the source of my movement, such as when I am carried by a vehicle. In this case, the experience of bodily movement is somehow double, and its double expression makes us aware of the two-sidedness of our bodily experience. If considered reflexively or from the third-person perspective, the movement of my body can indeed be assimilated to the movement of things. From the point of view of someone standing outside the vehicle, for instance, my body is seen as being moved in space, or as a part of the moving vehicle. Yet, this does not coincide with the inner experience of movement I make. If I am sitting still on a vehicle, I do not experience myself as moving with respect to the vehicle itself. Moreover, I do not feel that I am moving myself, even if I may feel moved by the vehicle (Hua XV, pp. 280–281). And it is only through the apprehension of change in the world outside the vehicle that I arrive at considering myself as moving with the vehicle. As we can see, the experience and the constitution of our body as an object reveals itself again to be grounded upon the basic experience of our body as subject. Moreover, such a constitution rests on the correlation between bodily self-experience and the experience of the perceptual world.

Sticking to the inner experience of bodily movement, we can observe how the latter bears witness to bodily self-consciousness in a twofold way: in relation to the "I can", and in relation to the instinctual moments of experience. Both are reminiscent of Schopenhauer's (1949, pp. 118f.) characterization of the body and bodily activity as objectivated will, i.e., as identical to will insofar as the latter becomes the object of a representation. In both cases, indeed, bodily movement is not "caused" by physical mechanisms; it is rather subjectively generated according to the motivational laws of consciousness.

¹⁰⁷ "If accordingly, the body is double-sided, if it has a purely material-bodily "side" and an egoic side, then it becomes now clear that this two-sidedness indicates itself two levels of subjective egoic accomplishment in the given foundation" "Wenn der Leib danach doppelseitig ist, eine pure körperliche "Seite" und eine ichliche Seite hat, so versteht sich nun, dass diese Zweiseitigkeit selbst zwei Stufen subjektiver ichlicher Leistung bezeichnet in der angegebenen Fundierung." D 10 III/45 a. See, also, Hua IV, pp. 151–152; 257f./Husserl 1989, pp. 158–159; 269f.) and Hua XV, p. 278.

Schopenhauer's legacy can be retraced in the argument made at paragraph 38 of *Ideas II*, where Husserl defines bodily movement as a concretization of the "I can" and the lived-body as the organ of will.¹⁰⁸ Different from material things, which can only be moved mechanically, the lived-body can be the source of its own movements, and such movements can, at least in part, be voluntarily directed and controlled by the Ego. Accordingly, the definition of the body as the organ of will is concretely exemplified precisely by the faculty of bodily movement. The "I can", thus, shall be primarily intended as "I can move myself". While moving, I can influence the way things and the surrounding world appear to me, and I can arrest my movement when I reach the optimal appearance responding to my perceptual interests. In case my movement is not guided by perceptual interests, but rather by emotive or dispositional interests [*Gemiüts-* and *Gefühlsinteressen*], I can simply enjoy my moving or rather arrest when I reach a state that responds to such interests. Furthermore, as Husserl observes in his manuscript D 3, I can freely "experiment" with the imagination of possible bodily movements, I can imagine how things would appear if I were moving in this or that direction and then find or not a confirmation of my fantasies in actual experience.

Here we have a subjective and an objective in determinate co-belonging: an "I move" or "I keep myself bodily quiet", including the "I can move myself", "I can move myself differently" than I am doing now, or I could move myself, while I am not moving right now. Thus, I can also experiment and observe. In experimenting, I acquire in how far the anticipated aspects, which are required as co-belonging, really occur, and how they determine themselves more closely in fulfillment.¹⁰⁹

And, certainly, I can also "play" with my movements independently of the actual or virtual appearance of things, thus simply activating the faculty of movement for its own sake. In any case, the will is also confronted with the "resistance" that our body, being also a material thing, may oppose to the free unfolding of movement. There must be some energy at stake in all movement, i.e., there must be an interplay of "powers and counter-powers" when the will is confronted with some material resistance.¹¹⁰ In this sense, bodily movement requires effort besides will, the effort of a constant confrontation with the given material circumstances:

In fact, every activity essentially has the property to admit differences of energy, of powerful tension starting from a zero of tension, and to be actively moved from a degree of tension, in which it passes off, to a higher or lower degree of tension, be it continuously or suddenly. At the same time, an activity of higher level, related to an activity, is thus indicated: "I exert my

¹⁰⁸ Hua IV, pp. 151f., 259/(Husserl 1989, pp. 159f., 271).

¹⁰⁹ "Da haben wir ein Subjektives und Objektives in bestimmter Zusammengehörigkeit; ein "ich bewege" oder "ich halte mich leiblich unbewegt", wozu auch gehört "ich kann mich bewegen", "mich anders bewegen" als ich es jetzt tue, oder ich könnte mich bewegen, während ich gerade eben mich nicht bewege; und so kann ich auch experimentieren und beobachten; experimentierend erwerbe ich, wie weit die antizipierten Aspekte, die als zugehörige gefordert sind, wirklich eintreten und wie sie sich in Erfüllung näher bestimmen." D 3/9a.

¹¹⁰ Hua IV, pp. 258–259/(Husserl 1989, pp. 270–271).

force,” “I make an effort”, I let my force decrease, I suddenly suspend my activity of tensing or I let it gradually decrease [...].¹¹¹

Bodily movement and the dynamic increase and diminishment of energy not only contribute to the constitution of spatial objects and objective movement. Instead, they also play a role in our bodily self-experience, both as willing bodily subjects and belonging to material nature. In such cases, thus, a peculiar tension is at stake between the inner experience of the spatio-temporal unfolding of bodily movement and the spatio-temporality of objective movement. As Husserl also writes in manuscript D 10 III, kinesthetic sensations are nothing but a “mode of activity as such”, modes of *energeia*, we could perhaps say.

Since all kinesthetic data are fully equal to all other kinesthetic data, being they immediately subordinate to egoic activities, [...] and [since] their similarity in content leaves no priority for particular modes of activity belonging to them, we must be dealing with a mode of activity as such, so that kinesthetically operative activity can experience them at any moment starting from the Ego.¹¹²

The dimensions of the extended present, the rhythmical repetition of movement, as well as the openness to the future that are characteristic of the potentiality of the “I can” make up the specific spatio-temporality of the inner experience bodily movement. Clearly, this does not coincide with the spatio-temporality of movement in objective space. And again, the fact that we can experience both, without a total overlapping, testifies to the constitutive ambiguity of our bodily self-experience.

These different modalities of bodily movement unequivocally show that, as it is stated in *Ideas II*, the bodily explication of the “I can” is far from being a merely abstract “logical possibility”: it rather designates a “practical possibility”, a *Vermöglichkeit*, the concreteness of which is primarily given by its being related not to movement in general, but only to those movements I can effectively accomplish given the ineluctable facticity and situatedness of bodily experience.¹¹³ Accordingly, the “I can” refers to the concrete unity of a bodily subject; a characterization that does not seem to be very far from Merleau-Ponty’s (1945, pp. 114–179) account of the body as virtual scheme, or as the source of action and movement.¹¹⁴ Indeed, it is precisely the

¹¹¹ “In der Tat hat nun jede Aktivität wesensmäßig die Eigenschaft, Unterschiede der Energie, der Kraftanspannung von einem Null der Anspannung aus zuzulassen und aktiv von einem Spannungsgrad aus, in dem sie verläuft, sei es kontinuierlich oder plötzlich in einen höheren oder niederen Spannungsgrad versetzt zu werden. Es ist damit zugleich eine auf eine Aktivität bezogene Aktivität höherer Stufe bezeichnet: ‘Ich spanne meine Kraft an’, ‘Ich lege mich ins Zeug’, ich lasse meine Kraft sinken, ich stelle plötzlich meine Aktivität des Anspannens ein oder ich <lasse> sie allmählich [...] sinken.” D 10 III/37 a-b.

¹¹² “Da alle kinästhetischen Daten allen anderen kinästhetischen Daten darin völlig gleich sind, dass sie unmittelbar der ichlichen Aktivität unterstehen [...] und ihre inhaltliche Gleichtartigkeit keinen Vorzug übrig lässt für besondere ihnen zugehörige Weisen der Aktivität, so muss es sich um einen Modus der Aktivität als solcher handeln, so dass kinästhetisch fungierende Aktivität sie jederzeit vom Ich her erfahren kann.” D 10 III/37 a.

¹¹³ Hua IV, pp. 258–259/(Husserl 1989, pp. 270–271).

¹¹⁴ See also Landgrebe (1967, pp. 135–147) and Sheets-Johnstone (1998). In the latter study, an analysis of the role of movement for the understanding of living beings is proposed. The discussion

fundamental dynamics of actualization of my practical possibilities [*Vermöglichkeiten*] that allows us to consider the lived-body as the “domain of primal praxis”:

In a larger sense, the Ego is constantly practical – insofar as it has any being, in larger or narrower meaning, only from activity. Being always stems from practical possibility [*Vermöglichkeit*], and practical possibility is a mode of activity. Yet, already practically changing what apperceived as being, thus acting what is pre-given for it as being, the Ego is naturally in a founded activity. Here, we would have clarified the foundation, which, at the subsoil of merely bodily being creating activity, of perspectivating activity, makes – as founded activity – the “acting” [*handelnd*] one in a sense that comes close to the common one. Namely, body limbs are what they are as organs, the most original practical objects. The body, thus, is the realm of original praxis, from which all spatial-worldly praxis derives.¹¹⁵

Such as for Schopenhauer (1949, pp. 126–142), also for Husserl the characterization of the body as the “organ of the will”, expressing itself primarily in and through movement, is not related to active decision making only. Indeed, as we read in *Ideas II*:

Prior to the will with its active thesis of the “*fiat*” lies the action as instinctive action, e.g., the involuntary “I move”, the involuntary “I reach” for my cigar; I desire it and do it “without any further ado”, something which, to be sure, is not easily distinguished from a case of voluntary willing in the narrower sense.¹¹⁶

Examples of such pre-voluntary inner motility [*innere Beweglichkeit*] are those movements that, in spite of their possibly being at least partially controlled, nonetheless occur independently of an explicit decision making, such as breathing or even scratching oneself.

Drive-oriented activity, which is not a “voluntary”, not a deliberate one. I follow tendencies without doing anything myself in the pithy sense. [...] For instance, I find the instinctive and tendentious in breathing: it is not a mere process, but rather in the course a relaxing and a newly tensing of tendencies, a blind drive.¹¹⁷

of Husserl’s position, however, is in many ways debatable. For instance, I consider the equalization of phenomenological reflection and introspection as highly problematic. Phenomenological analyses, as I have repeatedly argued, are not mere introspections related to empirical facts; they rather aim to uncover general structures of experience as such. Moreover, the book endorses quite a limited understanding of the “I can”, or the active principle of movement. Such a principle is considered to be derivative and would presuppose some kind of more diffuse movement, which precedes subjectivity itself. However, it remains questionable whether there can be some form of non-simply mechanical movement without some form of subjectivity, be that only a minimal form.

¹¹⁵“Im weiteren Sinne praktisch ist das Ich immerzu – sofern es überhaupt nur aus Aktivität Seiendes in weiteren oder engeren Bedeutungen hat. Immer ist Seiendes aus Vermöglichkeit, und Vermöglichkeit ist Modus der Aktivität. Aber praktisch schon als seiend Apperzipiertes verändernd, für es also als seiend Vorgegebenes handelndes ist das Ich natürlich in einer fundierten Aktivität. Hier hätten wir die Fundierung aufgeklärt, die auf dem Untergrund der bloß körperlich Seiendes schaffenden, der perspektivierenden Aktivität als fundierte die “handelnde” in einem dem gewöhnlichen schon sehr nahen Sinne ausmacht. Und zwar sind Leibsglieder, was sie als Organe sind, die ursprünglichsten praktischen Objekte, der Leib also das Reich der Urpraxis, von der alle raumweltliche Praxis sich ableitet.” D 10 III/45 a-b.

¹¹⁶Hua IV, p. 258/(Husserl 1989, p. 270).

¹¹⁷“Triebhaftes Tun, das kein “willkürliches”, kein absichtliches ist. Ich folge Tendenzen, ohne selbst überhaupt zu tun im prägnanten Sinn. [...] Zum Beispiel finde ich das Triebhafte Tendenziöse

Rather than originating from an explicit voluntary decision, these movements are rather spontaneous and related to the sphere of instincts and drives. To be true, however, all voluntary resolution to move in a certain way, being guided by some form of interest, seems to presuppose a more original and instinctual basis.

From a phenomenological-anthropological perspective, a thorough descriptive analysis and a classification of bodily movements have been notably developed by Buytendijk (1979). Such a classification is based on the three following criteria: modality, i.e., the immediately perceivable aspects of movement, such as rhythm, fastness or slowness, regularity, etc.; motivation, referring to the degree of freedom or rather causal binding of movements; and meaningfulness, concerning the goal-orientedness of bodily movements.

Although Husserl does not properly adopt a similar systematic view while describing bodily movements, I consider some of the distinctions made by Buytendijk to be useful to conceptualize what emerges from Husserl's own phenomenological distinctions. Particularly, from what we have previously said, we can already see how the criterion that Buytendijk calls "motivation" plays a role in Husserlian distinctions. According to such a criterion, Buytendijk distinguishes four kinds of bodily movement: (1) reflex movement, which are not considered as "subjective" movements in the proper sense, because they are entirely causally determined and as such belong to the body as material body or *Körper*; (2) spontaneous reactions, which are not voluntary movements, although they are properly subjective and not merely causal responses to the affordances of a situation; (3) unconscious movement-performances, which entail all those movement we implicitly perform within the more comprehensive unity of, for instance, an action or a perception (with respect to perception, what Husserl calls perspectivating kinesthesia may be understood as movement performances of this kind); and (4) explicit voluntary movements, which can be properly considered as embodied acts of will, since they are subjectively initiated and controlled. As we have seen, the distinction between causally versus voluntarily generated movements also plays a central role in the Husserlian analyses, as it mirrors the two-sidedness of the body. What Buytendijk shows in this respect is that there might be different forms and different degrees of spontaneity, and also different modalities in which the will can be involved in bodily movement. All this seems to be quite consistent with the idea that acts of will eventually have a bodily, instinctual grounding.

Yet, I believe that the third criterion, what Buytendijk calls the "meaning" of movement, is also of relevance to re-interpret Husserl's descriptions of bodily movement, and to connect them to what we have previously addressed as the teleology of sensible experience. Such a criterion, indeed, concerns the "final cause" of movements, as well as their subjective and intersubjective meaning in the given situation. The subcategories Buytendijk distinguishes here are: actions, expressive movements, playful movements, and representational movements. Actions entail all those movements that are directed toward an aim and can therefore be considered as

im Atmen: Es ist kein bloßer Vorgang, sondern im Ablauf ein Sich-Entspannen von Tendenzen und neu sich Anspannen, ein blinder Trieb." A VI 12/130b.

instrumental. Such movements have a “sequential” temporality, almost “linearly” representable in relation to the goal to be reached. As the name suggests, expressive movements are related to the bodily expression of “inner states”. Although they refer to something other than themselves, their meaning is not instrumental to the reaching of an external goal. Expressive movements do not have a sequential temporality, but rather unfold in what Bergson (2001, pp. 56f.) would call duration. Such movements are recognized as such in intersubjective contexts.¹¹⁸ Playful movements are also not directed toward any external aim, and rather have an aim in themselves. Indirectly, such movements may also have an expressive function. Finally, representational movements are considered to be specifically human and related to linguistic thinking. These are, for instance, meaningful gestures. Although they do not properly have an external goal, they are externally oriented, since they either indicate something or mediate meaning.

With regard to the teleology or goal-directedness of movement, we can understand the movement involved in perception as a very peculiar form of “activity”. It is not properly an action in Buytendijk’s sense (which actually recalls Aristotle’s *poiesis*), since such an activity is not aimed at producing something else, but rather at getting to know something we encounter. As we have seen, the teleology of perception might be related to the pleasure in the attainment of a goal (reaching the best possible appearance), or in the very unfolding of the perceptual process, as something that is an aim in itself. In relation to Buytendijk’s systematic differentiations, we can further develop our previous remarks on the teleology of sensible experience by expanding them as to include the teleology of bodily movements. Such teleology is also related to the feelings of pleasure and displeasure that accompanies movement or the reaching of its goals. Thus, if we consider kinesthesia primarily as participating in perception, we can observe that the *telos* is reached when the “pleasing appearance” of the object is attained.¹¹⁹ However, if we focus on the inner experience of kinesthesia themselves, even independently of such an external perceptual aim, and in particular if we consider those

¹¹⁸ In Husserlian terms, we can understand expressive movement in relation to the unity of *Innen-* and *Außenleiblichkeit* (Hua XIV, pp. 324f.). Such a relation can be considered as chiasmic in Merleau-Ponty’s sense, since the two dimensions of bodily experience are inextricably intertwined and belong to a unitary whole, yet they do not properly coincide. *Innenleiblichkeit* refers to the inner experience of sensings and movement; it is the original field of the ‘I move’, the original bearer of sensible fields and sensings. (Hua XIV, p. 327). *Außenleiblichkeit* indicates the way my body is experienced as exposed to the world and to others. Particularly, the unity of *Innen-* and *Außenleiblichkeit* becomes manifest through expressions and expressive movements. In and through such movements, what I experience becomes something more than a mere “private” experience, it becomes manifest for others as a response to a particular situation. Through expressive movements, a form of bodily communication is established, bodily expressions, as Husserl points out, are immediately “understood” by the other, they are originally experienced, cf. Hua IV, p. 328/ (Husserl 1989, p. 340). The experience of *Außenleiblichkeit* is also a necessary moment in the intersubjective constitution of the body in its constitutive ambiguity. Regarding the importance of such a distinction for the phenomenology of intersubjectivity, and also the alteration of balance between the two dimensions in melancholic experience, see Micali (2013).

¹¹⁹ Hua IV, p. 216/(Husserl 1989, p. 228).

movements that properly lack the representation of a goal (cf. Hua Mat VIII, p. 328), the *telos* will certainly be immanent to the unfolding of movement itself. It coincides with the playful and circular repetition of movement. In this latter case, pleasure is not related to the attainment of the best possible appearance of the perceived thing. It rather depends upon the rhythm of bodily movement and the development of some control on such movement, which allows us, for instance, to choose the position that “most concerns us”, because, as we have seen, it better responds to our present feelings or dispositions:

In the change of the bodily positions of the hand, in its different movements and relaxed positions, my “interest” participates, such that one position is more relevant for me than the others, since some emotional or dispositional interest would be satisfied in it. In such a way, now a striving-toward grows, with which, always originally-instinctively, a kinesthetic activity runs off. [...] Thus, with regard to the interests in the bodily position, all practical intention is directed at the control over the kinesthesia that passes in association with the bodily position of the hand. These associations are to be trained explicitly and are, corresponding to their system, also a system of control, of practical possibilities.¹²⁰

Precisely with respect to such an immanent teleology of movement we shall also understand Husserl’s remarks concerning those playful movements that are not accompanied by any explicit or implicit representation of the aim. One notorious example thereof are the so-called instinctual kicking-kinesthesia of babies. Movement, in this case, is clearly not directed toward any perceptual representation, nor does it have a practical aim related to some representation. It is rather a purely playful movement, which has its end in itself, and in such a way testifies to the constitutive dynamism of the bodily subject:

In the process, which takes place de facto, the self-repeating forms of movement stand out, and instinctually, the tendency goes toward the repetition of similar and then of the same movement, towards the re-attainment of the previous kinesthesia, and nevertheless never remaining with it as *telos*, but rather immediately departing and repeating movement, which is however structured in repetition, and thus, [the tendency eventually goes toward] exercise and control, which the available system has constituted, and which rejoices in the passing of what is long familiar and in the faculty of repeatedly gaining it. We should therefore probably say that the instinct that operates in kinesthesia, ultimately goes toward the constitution of the controlled system as unity of a practically possible accessibility, of any number of repetitions of every position. (Hua Mat VIII, p. 328).

Explicitly stressing that the pleasure connected to playful bodily movements is not attained in the final state [*Endszustand*], but rather goes through the very unfolding of movement, Husserl does not merely insist on the characteristics of the immanent

¹²⁰“In dem Wandel der Körperlagen der Hand, in ihren verschiedenen Bewegungen und Ruhelagen <ist> mein “Interesse” beteiligt, so dass mir an einer Lage mehr liegt als an den anderen, <da> in ihr irgendein Gefühlsinteresse, Gemütsinteresse sich befriedigen würde. So erwächst nun ein Hinstreben <wo> mit, stets ursprünglich-instinktiv, ein kinästhetisches Tun abläuft. [...] So geht mit Rücksicht auf die Interessen an der Körperlage alle praktische Intention auf die Herrschaft über die mit der körperlichen Lage der Hand assoziiert verlaufenden Kinästhesen. Diese Assoziationen <sind> explizit auszubilden und ihrem System entsprechend ein System der Herrschaft, der Vermöglichkeit.” D 10 III/44b-45a.

teleology of movement, he also develops a description of bodily consciousness as “desiring” its own movement.

The modes of explication of bodily movement we have considered, those related to the “I can” and those stemming from the sphere of drives, are certainly related to one another. Particularly, this seems to be implied by the reference to exercise and to the control of movement, which we can find in the previous quote. Yet, the development of such a control is itself something that presupposes the spatio-temporal intertwining of lived experience. More precisely, it presupposes the operative structure of what we shall call “body memory”.

8.2.3 *Body Memory*

In the previous analyses, we have discussed several modes of the spatio-temporal configuration of bodily experience. As the zero-point of orientation, the body is spatio-temporally situated, and bodily movement unfolds spatio-temporally. Thus, the parallel or simply analogical consideration of spatiality and temporality cannot properly account for the complex unfolding of bodily experience, which rather requires the interweaving of both dimensions. Such an interweaving of lived temporality and spatiality somehow mirrors Husserl’s understanding of the interweaving of body and soul.¹²¹ This emerges, in particular, with regard to the phenomenon we will now address as “body memory”. In fact, the latter presupposes both the laws of psycho-physical conditionality, related to the influence of material circumstances on perception and bodily experience, and the laws of idio-psychic conditionality, regarding the “soul” and the temporality of experience.¹²²

Although Husserl does not explicitly use the concept of body memory, I believe that his account of bodily experience offers some important clues to describe such a phenomenon. Yet, first of all, some clarifications concerning the very meaning of this concept are here required. The analysis of different types of memory, and particularly the distinction between implicit and explicit memory forms, is a central issue not only in phenomenology, but also in the contemporary debate in the cognitive- and neuro-sciences.¹²³ Despite some overlapping in the distinctions, however, there are important differences between the just mentioned approaches to memory and its relation to the body. Whereas phenomenology is interested in providing a typological distinction of different kinds of memory based on their specific experiential structures, the priority for cognitive- and neuro-sciences is to define the correlation between the experience of memory and the underlying sub-personal mechanisms, or sometimes even to reduce the descriptive account of

¹²¹ Hua IV, p. 94/(Husserl 1989, pp. 99–100).

¹²² Hua IV, pp. 120–125/(Husserl 1989, pp. 128–133).

¹²³ For a closer discussion of the relationship between the understanding of implicit body memory in phenomenology, in the cognitive sciences, and in the neurosciences, see Summa (2011a) and Koch et al. (2012), where essays on body memory from different approaches are collected.

memory as a first-personal experience to a third-personal account of the underlying neural mechanisms. In such a way, however, the autonomy and self-legitimation of the phenomenological descriptions, as grounded on experience and its structures, are apparently called into question. These theories, indeed, mostly aim at providing a “causal” explanation of memory phenomena, by analyzing how our brain functions while we remember.¹²⁴ Clearly, such a view is incompatible with Husserl’s anti-naturalistic account of subjective experience and in particular with his phenomenology of bodily experience. The distinction between *Leib* and *Körper* and the one between conditionality and causality, for instance, clearly prevent us from simply assuming the theory of synaptic developments or the “localization” of memory in specific brain areas (engram) as models for the phenomenological account of body memory.¹²⁵ From a phenomenological perspective, however, such a causal explanation can at most provide an account of how our brain, as part of our *Körper*, may “save” information. Nevertheless, this does not say anything yet concerning the different experiences of remembering. Paraphrasing Fuchs (2000b, pp. 316f., 2008a, pp. 16–23), thus, we can say that, like subjectivity, also memory cannot be situated in the brain, nor in any other material bodily part. Memory, and body memory in particular, is rather diffuse and manifests itself in our bodily activities and behavior.

However, the distinction between implicit and explicit memory, originally formulated in cognitive psychology, can still be fruitfully reformulated in phenomenological terms, and it allows us to contextualize our analyses of body memory. Such a distinction can be phenomenologically restated as follows. Explicit memory entails the presentifying acts of recollection, i.e., both the presentification of episodes of one’s own past experience (episodic memory), and of pieces of information (data, facts, etc.) one has previously acquired (semantic memory). Implicit memory, instead, is a form of pre-thematic and non-representative consciousness of the past. Rather than being an explicit act of recollection, it is a concrete expression of the effectiveness [*Wirksamkeit*] of retained and sedimented experience in shaping actual experience. As such, it entails both the association between present- and past-consciousness, and habits. As I wish to argue, body memory can be consistently understood as the concrete explication of implicit memory. This can be done by referring to the previously mentioned conceptual distinction between embodied versus bodily subjectivity (Legrand 2006). If we understand subjectivity as being merely embodied, memory should be understood as a psychic phenomenon correlated with some bodily (here material bodily) processes. The latter, of course, are causally determined processes and cannot be properly considered as “experiences”. Yet, if we understand subjectivity as bodily, body memory is intrinsically related to self-experience, and its study does not require any third-personal account of

¹²⁴This, for instance, emerges from the debate concerning the different memory systems. Cf. Schacter et al. (1999) and Squire (2004).

¹²⁵E.g., Schacter (1996, pp. 58f.). A phenomenological critique of such an attempt to localize “memory traces” is already developed by Straus (1960b).

underlying sub-personal processes. Let us try to make this point clearer by comparing different philosophical accounts of implicit body memory.

One of the earliest descriptions of body memory can be found in Descartes. The background of such descriptions is the dualism of body and soul. Accordingly, we can argue that Descartes would rather understand subjectivity as embodied and certainly not as bodily. Descartes notably distinguishes the so-called intellectual or spiritual memory [*mémoire intellectuelle* or *spirituelle*], which is characteristic of humans or other spiritual entities such as angels, from the so-called bodily memory [*mémoire corporelle*], which is a generally shared animal faculty. Whereas the former is an accomplishment of the soul, entailing representational acts, and does not per se relate to bodily processes, the latter is not representational, it is considered to be physically localized in the body and to give rise to practical habits. Descartes' example of such habitual body memory is the lute player, whose memory is considered to be located in the hands themselves (Descartes 1996a, p. 48). However, he also understands unconscious associations as forms of body memory, since he takes the latter to be materially caused, e.g., by the folds of our brains as the physical ground of our inclinations.¹²⁶ Accordingly, the bodily character of *mémoire corporelle* is due to its being *körperlich*, i.e., bound to the materiality of our physical body.¹²⁷

Maine De Biran's (1953) and Bergson's (2007) positions can be considered on the threshold between the understanding of subjectivity as embodied or rather as bodily. In his text on the influence of habits on thought, De Biran (1953, p. 37) distinguishes active from passive habits. Whereas the former are related to unreflected sensations, movements and the imagination, the latter are based upon reflection. Memory properly speaking requires some psychic effort and can only emerge from the second sort of habits. De Biran (1953, pp. 117f.) further distinguishes three types of memory, which are relevant for the development of language: mechanic, sensitive, and representative memory. As we can easily guess, the relationship among these forms of memory is a hierachic one, for body and soul are differently involved in the different forms of memory. Mechanic and sensitive memory are immediately bodily related, whereas representative memory refers to the "world of ideas". In this account, the body is mostly considered under its material aspects. The intellectual faculties of the soul, however, are not strictly separated from the body. Rather, they develop out of bodily faculties. For this reason, De Biran does not properly endorse a dualistic view, but rather understands the body as having an essential mediating function between the soul and the physical world (Thirion 2005).

Bergson's (2007) distinction between "image remembrance" [*souvenir-image*] and "habit memory" [*mémoire-habitude*] also comes close to the distinction between explicit and implicit memory. Different from image remembrance, which

¹²⁶ Descartes (1996c, p. 57) observes for instance that the sensible and emotional experiences (such as his own being in love with a dodgy young woman) remain impressed in the folds of our brains and therefore our habitual inclinations.

¹²⁷ See Descartes (1996b, pp. 114–115, 1996c, pp. 57–60, 1996d, 201, 418). See also Kieft (2006).

registers and reproduces the events of our life in the form of recollected images, habit memory is a non-representative form of memory, which, as Bergson (2007, p. 87) writes, is “at home” in the present, and yet oriented toward the future. Rather than being presentified, the past is enacted through such memory: the impact of past images is maintained and still operates in the present. Habit memory, thus, is an implicitly active form of memory, whereby the sedimentation of previous experience is tacitly operative in the formation of practical dispositions. Accordingly, habit memory is not only to be considered as related to the past, but also as oriented toward future actions. This description seems to testify to an understanding of habit memory as a bodily phenomenon. Nevertheless, such an understanding is somewhat weakened, since Bergson (2007, pp. 89f.) also stresses the mechanical character of habitual memory, and eventually traces it back to the activity of the brain and the nervous system.

Merleau-Ponty’s (1945, pp. 166f.) understanding of habits and the habitual body, finally, presupposes an account of subjectivity as bodily in the previously defined sense. Despite not developing a proper theory of body memory,¹²⁸ Merleau-Ponty does offer some important clues to develop such a theory. Considering the activity of a typist or of a professional instrumentalist, Merleau-Ponty (1945, p. 175) argues that bodily habits make up a form of “knowledge” that is sedimented in their hands; a knowledge the body can practically dispose of, without any objectivating, representational activity. Apparently, Merleau-Ponty uses here the same vocabulary as Descartes. However, the background has profoundly changed. Different from Descartes, Merleau-Ponty is not primarily interested in physically locating body memory in some parts of the body, or in finding its physical cause. Rather, he is interested in phenomenologically analyzing body memory as the specific form of “knowledge” and of “understanding” the bodily subject progressively develops. This is an experiential knowledge that shapes the subject’s unique style of activity, and eventually its being in the world. Such implicit “knowing”, moreover, does not lend itself to be fully made explicit in reflective thinking. Reflective explication, when possible, would even obstacle the spontaneous unfolding of the activity itself. Clearly, Merleau-Ponty does not understand bodily habits and body memory on the basis of the dualism of body and soul. He rather considers them as forms of a dynamically acquired *hexis*, a form of practical knowledge the bodily subject develops in and through experience. Thereby, the body is our “anchorage to the world” (Merleau-Ponty 1945, p. 169).

It is precisely in relation to such a description of the body as anchorage to the world that we shall read also Husserl’s account of bodily habits and his contributions to the phenomenology of body memory. In this sense, we can also understand the conceptual distinction between body memory and implicit memory. Considering implicit memory and body memory as distinct and reciprocally independent

¹²⁸In this respect, see Casey (1984), who argues that Merleau-Ponty does not develop a consistent theory of body memory. This is considered to be due to the fact that, in this work, Merleau-Ponty endorses a “realistic” understanding of body memory. However, already in this work, Merleau-Ponty does distinguish representative from non-representative memory processes.

phenomena would only make sense if we understood subjectivity as embodied, namely as accidentally happening to have a body. Such as all psychic phenomena, also memory must have physical, *körperlich*, conditions. If we understand subjectivity as bodily, i.e., if the lived-body is considered to play an essential role in subjective experience, then the distinction between implicit memory and body memory can only be based on abstraction. The lived-body is the original medium of implicit memory (cf. Waldenfels 2012, pp. 145f). Accordingly, implicit memory is a constitutively bodily phenomenon. Against such an understanding and referring to Husserl's analyses of time consciousness, one could argue that not all the forms of implicit memory, i.e., of pre-reflexive consciousness of the past, are apparently related to the body. Yet, we can respond to such an objection by precisely referring to the concepts of "abstract" or "non-independent" parts. Non-independent parts can certainly be analytically distinguished for descriptive aims. However, they cannot be cut off from the other non-independent parts and from the whole.¹²⁹ As already mentioned, it is precisely in this sense that we shall understand also the "abstracting" nature of the analyses of time consciousness.¹³⁰ Such an abstraction is necessary, for instance, to shed light on the temporal structures and dynamics, independently of the changing temporal content. Yet, the possibility to address such structures independently of the given content does not mean that the relationship between temporal form and sensible contents as such is unessential (Hua XXXIII, p. 282). How, indeed, can we conceive of the experience of temporal objects if the temporal form was not originally intertwined with sensible contents, and how can we conceive of the latter without any reference to bodily experience? Accordingly, if we take sensible experience to be a complex whole, the temporal syntheses (and among others the different forms of consciousness of the past) prove to be intertwined with bodily and spatial experience. Such a whole cannot be cut into pieces. In other words, spatiality, temporality, and bodily experience are intertwined in the unitary whole of experience. Within such experience they can certainly be distinguished, although not cut apart. For this reason, I consider that stressing the bodily character of memory, and particularly of implicit memory as a pre-reflective and not representational experience, is consistent with Husserl's architectonic of experience. Understood this way, body memory embraces the totality of our subjective and behavioral dispositions, insofar as they are sedimented and mediated by the body.

Some of Husserl's distinctions of different modes of consciousness of the past can be understood in relation to the distinction between implicit and explicit memory. However, a clearer qualification of this parallelism is needed. For instance, being retentions the non-independent parts of all acts, one might consider them as the phenomenological pendant of the so-called working-memory. At a closer look, however, the two do not properly coincide. Like working memory, retention can certainly be seen as the presently "active" moment of implicit memory (cf. Markowitsch 2009, p. 85). Yet, the assumption of objective time as a measure to determine working memory is

¹²⁹ Hua XIX/2, pp. 231f./Husserl 2001c, pp. 5f.).

¹³⁰ Hua XI, pp. 125–128/(Husserl 2001a, pp. 170–174).

certainly incompatible with the phenomenology of time, which is precisely based upon the bracketing of objective time and aims to describe how the latter is constituted for consciousness. Moreover, the extent of retentions as the intuitive consciousness of the immediate past is not limited to the present now. In a larger sense, retentions make up structure of consciousness as such. The continuous process of retential consciousness entails the totality of pre-reflexive temporal syntheses that ground the unity of past and present consciousness.¹³¹ Making up the consciousness of the immediate past, retentions continuously flow into new retentions, and they are always intertwined with protentions within the unity of consciousness. Such a complex structure of merging [*Ineinander*] of retentions and protentions is comparable to a *basso continuo*, which goes through all moments of the intentional life of consciousness. Accordingly, this primal form of consciousness of the past shall be considered as the necessary condition for all further forms of implicit and explicit memory.

Presentifying memories, on their part, also entail both explicit and implicit phenomena. Explicit are those memories, in which a conscious reproduction of a past event takes places. In such a reproduction, what is reproduced obtains the original character of “givenness anew” [*Wiedergegebenheit*], and such a character is that of something that has been actual [*der Charakter eines Wirklich-gewesenen*].¹³² Instead, the associative and affective emerging of occurring memories [*einfallende Erinnerungen*], shall be considered as a mode of implicit memory.¹³³ As we have seen, these memories are strictly related to the affective force of the allure [*Reiz*] that a past event, which spontaneously pops into our minds or implicitly influences our behavior, generates. Accordingly, this form of memory shall be distinguished from both retentions and explicit recollections. Different from retentions, occurring memories shall still be considered as presentifications. Different from explicit recollections, however, they are not voluntarily reproductive, nor are they immediately recognized as memories from one’s own past, or as fitting in one specific period of one’s own life. These memories emerge passively, as a vague and “obscure” image of the past object or situation, accompanied by a diffuse feeling of familiarity. They further emerge as a consequence of some associative motivation, i.e., without any participation of the Ego or any active striving for a proper reproduction.¹³⁴ Similar to Proust’s *mémoire involontaire*, there is something in the perceptual presence that functions, as it were, as a support for the presentification of the past.¹³⁵ Such a spontaneous and passive emerging is an evidence of the affective impact that sedimented experiences

¹³¹ In this sense, Husserl understands the self-constitution of inner time consciousness as a continuous retential-protentional synthesis. Moreover, he introduces the concept of “far retention” to indicate that the role of retential consciousness extends beyond the presently experienced now and embraces in a way the totality of the stream of consciousness. Cf. Hua XI, pp. 288f./(*Husserl 2001a*, pp. 422f.). In this respect, see also De Warren (2009, pp. 182f.), and Rodemeyer (2006, pp. 86f.).

¹³² Hua XXIII, p. 502/(*Husserl 2005*, p. 603).

¹³³ Hua X, pp. 37–38/(*Husserl 1991*, pp. 39–40), Hua XXIII, p. 554/(*Husserl 2005*, p. 667), Hua XXXIII, pp. 361–367.

¹³⁴ Hua XXIII, p. 554/(*Husserl 2005*, p. 667).

¹³⁵ Hua XI, p. 122/(*Husserl 2001a*, p. 167).

may still have on present consciousness. Rather than being an explicitly conscious reproduction of a past episode, such a passive emerging of memories is primarily experienced as a vaguely familiar image. It operates as a pre-thematic “belief”, which we immediately recognize as ours, and therefore becomes a sort of “secondary sensibility”.¹³⁶ Only successively can such a vague feeling of familiarity be possibly turned into an explicit recollection, for instance if the emerging image captures our attention and we do manage to make clear what the context and the details of the original experience were (Hua XXXIII, p. 364).

Which are the syntheses that ground such an experience of familiarity that precedes the moment of proper recollection? First, the retentional-potential continuous synthesis must be presupposed by such phenomena. Only thanks to such a synthesis both the sedimentation of experience and the potential reactivation of past experience are possible. Secondly, the associative syntheses and affection play an essential role in such phenomena. Thanks to an affective allure, past experience is “awakened”, as it were, in the present perceptual experience. Such an affection may, or may not, be strong enough to provoke a subjective “response”, for instance in the form of a reproductive recollection. In any case, it does have an impact on present experience, which concretizes itself in the form of associative consciousness (e.g., the consciousness of similarity) between present and past experience.

The impact of implicit memory, thus, presupposes what Husserl, in *Analyses Concerning Active and Passive Synthesis*, describes as the second moment of association, namely the so-called awakening that radiates back [*rückstrahlende Weckung*]. Such awakening “illuminates”, as it were, the darkened empty presentations, bringing their implicit sense affectively into relief.¹³⁷ Grounded upon such an awakening, implicit memory entails the synthesis of similarity, which noematically corresponds to the mode of something recalling something other.¹³⁸ The associatively awakened memory can either remain implicit, or be turned into an explicit recollection. In the former case, experience sediments in what Husserl calls the “realm of forgetfulness”. Such a realm, however, is not to be understood as something we have totally lost, or as a static domain. It rather entails syntheses of association, which implicitly shape our present experience.

From the original association and fusion of succession, the realm of forgetfulness emerges – the unity of the “unconscious” stream of memories, the sedimented and successive connection in continuous coincidence. Yet, it does not stand still. Far-pairings (far-associations) are built, which produce far-connections that already give the pairing character (relational character) of familiarity to every new that gets paired with the old.¹³⁹

¹³⁶ Hua XXIII, p. 554/(Husserl 2005, p. 667).

¹³⁷ Hua XI, p. 181/(Husserl 2001a p. 231). The first moment of the associative accomplishment is the so-called original association, or associative awakening, which makes up the structure of the living present. The third moment is the transition from implicit association to explicit recollection.

¹³⁸ Hua XI, p. 180/(Husserl 2001a, p. 230).

¹³⁹ “Aus der ursprünglichen Assoziation und Verschmelzung der Sukzession entspringt das Reich der Vergessenheit – die Einheit des “unbewussten” Erinnerungsstromes, der sedimentierte in kontinuierlicher Verdeckung sukzessive Zusammenhang. Aber der bleibt nicht in Ruhe. Es bilden sich

More precisely, thus, this would be the field of explicit forgetfulness, whereby, however, what we have explicitly forgotten becomes sedimented experience and as such impinges on the style of our present experience. Assuming a reflective stance, we can make associative memories, at least in some of their aspects, explicit.

Yet, essentially, the reaching out, the striving of the Ego towards the sunken, conditions something new: the possible happening of reproduction, which, operating without restraint, becomes a presentifying intuition. In it, the Ego is then “again” with the reproduced past, as it was itself and as it was for the Ego, and it was for the Ego in its “past” perceptual field.¹⁴⁰

In this sense, the explication of implicit memories operates as a kind of “reverse” intentionality, making *Ent-Sedimentierung*, the uncovering of what is sedimented, possible:

Essentially, perception occurs as source of the temporalizing transformation and sedimentation, essentially new-perception [occurs] from the awaking through awaking association of the still awake perceptual presence, and from a corresponding meaning-bestowing of the de-sedimenting, the disclosure, the reverse intentionality and as new-perception.¹⁴¹

As pointed out by Fuchs¹⁴² and Casey,¹⁴³ body memory is not a univocal phenomenon. For instance, habitual memory, which makes the acquisition of bodily capacities possible, shall be distinguished from the memory of pain or from traumatic body memory, which may even obstacle activity. Fuchs further develops a typological distinction of six forms of body memory (procedural, situational, intercorporeal, incorporative memory, memory of pain and traumatic body memory). As he argues, there are types of body memory that are more than others bound to certain situations, and others that have an intersubjective character (intercorporeal or incorporative). Without addressing the discussion concerning the specific forms of body memory, we shall notice that Husserl’s contributions are mostly focused on habitual body memory. Particularly, such contributions are relevant for both the development

Fernpaarungen (Fernassoziationen), die Fernzusammenhänge herstellen, die schon jedem Neuen, das mit Altem sich paart, den Paarungscharakter (Relationscharakter) der Bekanntheit verleihen.” D 14/53 b.

¹⁴⁰ “Aber wesensmäßig bedingt Hinwendung, Hinstreben des Ich auf das Versunkene ein Neues: das vermögliche Geschehen der Reproduktion, die, ungehemmt sich auswirkend, zur vergegenwärtigenden Anschauung wird. In ihr ist dann das Ich “wieder” beim reproduzierten Vergangenen, als wie es selbst war und für das Ich war, und es war für das Ich in seinem “damaligen” Wahrnehmungsfeld.” D 14/38 a. In principle, for Husserl, all past experience can be explicitly recollected. In this sense, he doesn’t seem to consider what Nietzsche would call an active faculty of forgetfulness or the possibility that there might be experiences that in principle withdraw from such explicit presentification.

¹⁴¹ “Wesensmäßig tritt Wahrnehmung als Quelle der zeitigenden Abwandlung und Sedimentierung auf, wesensmäßig die Wiederwahrnehmung aus Weckung durch weckende Assoziation von der noch wachen Wahrnehmungsgegenwart aus, und aus einer entsprechenden Sinngebung der Ent-Sedimentierung, der Enthüllung, der umgekehrten Intentionalität und als Wieder-Wahrnehmung”. D 14/12 b.

¹⁴² Cf. Fuchs (2000a, b, pp. 316f., 2008b, pp. 13–103, 2011, 2012).

¹⁴³ Casey (2000, pp. 146–180) distinguishes habitual, traumatic and erotic bodily memory.

of the analyses of the lived-body as the organ of perception, and for the inquiry into the genesis and structure of bodily consciousness.

The implicit memory of the body as the organ of perception plays a crucial role in both the formation of perceptual schemas, and in the development of bodily perceptual dispositions. As such, body memory testifies to the dynamics and the plasticity of bodily learning processes. The bodily subject, indeed, can maintain the acquired faculties and adapt them dynamically to the different situations. As it has been shown by some psychological and cognitive studies, testing the capacity of priming (i.e., the immediate recognition of something we have already perceived) in amnesic patients, an implicit and bodily related memory is already at work in recognizing something previously experienced. Even though these patients are unable to explicitly remember having previously perceived an object, their cognitive and perceptual faculties (and most probably their practical behavior as well) prove to be deeply influenced by those very experiences.¹⁴⁴ This phenomenon is rooted in bodily perceptual experience, namely in having already seen, heard, touched, smelled, or tasted a similar or the very same object.

The role Husserl attributes to implicit body memory in perceptual experience can be read between the lines of a passage in manuscript D 16 (1933). This passage precisely focuses on the phenomenon of recognition of the same thing in different perceptual spatio-temporal situations and on the progressive enrichment of our knowledge of the object thanks to reiterated experiences.

With respect to the passed experiences, the now present object is conscious, even without explicit recollection, as the one that has already been experienced before – it is recognized anew [...]. Constantly “recognizing” something as itself as a unity in the primitive sense is actually prior to explicit identification, to explicitly identifying recognition, to further recognition. (Hua XXXIX, p. 461)

This quote is relevant for the analysis of perceptual body memory for two main reasons. First, Husserl clearly points out that the synthesis of coincidence, which makes the constitution of an identical object in and through its different spatio-temporal modes of givenness possible, is primarily accomplished in an implicit or pre-thematic way. Secondly, this passage brings to the fore both the distinction and the foundational relationship between the implicit or passively accomplished synthesis of coincidence (what Husserl calls the phenomenon of “recognizing” [*Erkennen*] in a primitive sense) and the explicit identification of the presently perceived object with the object that was perceived in the past. In the earlier manuscript A VI 8 II, Husserl already discusses the relationship between the “familiarity” [*Bekanntheit*] of an object and implicit memory. Thereby, he considers the primary and most basic phenomenon of recognition of an identical object as a “concealed unity of coincidence” between the perceptual appearance and the obscure appearance in memory.

Recognition as well is a character that characterizes the appearance, including “identifying” or not. One probably says: When I recognize anew and a memory image of the house I previously saw emerges, then it is there as already “familiar”, not new, and what is now apprehended for the first time identifies itself with the “familiar” in a unifying coincidence,

¹⁴⁴Cf. Schacter (1996, pp. 161–191) and Summa (2011a).

not in an actual synthetic predicative coincidence. Every memory has the character “familiar”. And does “familiar” here mean anything other than the character of memory? Yet, what was seen, what was perceived, also has the character “familiar”, it has the memory character, the character “I have already seen this”. This points to a “hidden unity of coincidence” between the perceptual appearance and the dark memory appearances.¹⁴⁵

In present experience, we may encounter something familiar, and this has the character of a memory, although neither explicit recollection, nor any act of predicative thinking is properly at stake. The implicit associations of experience, then, can become the “occasion” for recollecting, for instance because it gives a “favorable associative position” [*günstige assoziative Lage*] to recollect (D 14/20 a-b). In light of these remarks, perception itself can be considered as self-givenness in the mode “anew”.

Thereby, this perception has its sense of being as self-givenness, and yet in the mode “anew”. Because the essential, ever new sedimentation and ever new possible and practically possible re-awakening and re-presentification enables and substantiates the identification of “being”.¹⁴⁶

The associative awakening that radiates back, thus, is not only related to the past, but also designates a specific kind of openness to the future and in such a way it testifies to the intertwining of the temporal dimensions: the past shapes the present experience and gets projected into the future.¹⁴⁷

This implicit and passively accomplished synthesis of coincidence can be understood as related to implicit memory. To recognize an object we have already perceived, neither the explicit recollection of the past experience or situation, nor an act of thought subsuming the individual object under a certain category are needed. The synthesis of coincidence, rather, is made possible by the implicitly retained “presence” of the past. Accordingly, implicit memory plays a central role in the recognition and the constitution of “something as something”.¹⁴⁸ Subsequently, such an

¹⁴⁵ “Auch das Erkennen ist ein Charakter, der die Erscheinung charakterisiert, mag dazu “Identifizieren” gehören oder nicht. Man wird ja sagen: Wenn ich wiedererkenne und ein Erinnerungsbild des früher gesehenen Hauses auftaucht, so steht das ja auch schon als “bekannt”, nicht neu da, und das jetzt neu Erfasste identifiziert sich in einer vereinheitlichen Deckung, nicht in eigentlicher synthetischer prädikativer Deckung mit dem “Bekannten”. Jedes Erinnerte hat den Charakter “bekannt”. Und heißt hier “bekannt” anderes als <der> Charakter der Erinnerung? Aber auch Gesehenes, Perzipiertes hat den Charakter “bekannt”, es hat den Erinnerungscharakter, den Charakter “das habe ich schon gesehen”. Das weist auf eine “verborgene Deckungseinheit” zwischen der perzeptiven Erscheinung und dunklen Erinnerungserscheinungen hin.” A VI 8 II, S. 18a-b.

¹⁴⁶ “Eben damit hat diese Wahrnehmung ihren Seinsinn als Selbstgebung und doch im Modus “Wieder”. Denn die wesensmäßige, immer neue Sedimentierung und immer neu mögliche und vermögliche Wiedererweckung und Wiedervergegenwärtigung ermöglicht und begründet die Identifizierung des “Seienden”” D 14/12b And further in the same manuscript: “Perception is apperception, and as such re-cognizing [...]” “Die Wahrnehmung ist ja Apperception und als solche Wiedererkennen.” D 14/33a.

¹⁴⁷ Hua XI, pp. 157, 188–191/(Husserl 2001a, pp. 205; 238–242).

¹⁴⁸ Accordingly, implicit memory also plays an important role in the constitution of *Typoi*, i.e., the pre-form of the concept as it is grounded in sensible experience. Once established, *Typoi* become

implicit experience of familiarity can in principle be made explicit and categorially formed by acts of thought. However, it remains originally based upon pre-predicative, spatio-temporal, bodily experience.

These observations are further developed in manuscript D 16, particularly regarding the bodily character of such memory. Here, the recognition of something as something is considered to be based upon the quasi-cyclical repetition of the perceptual movement.¹⁴⁹ Such a repetition is not a mere irregular succession of similar sensible impressions. It rather achieves what Husserl calls a *Nachstiftung*, a re-establishment, based upon the primal establishment [*Urstiftung*] of the givenness of a perceptual thing, i.e., it allows us to get acquainted with this thing, which becomes for us more and more familiar.

It is obvious that here, in such a repetition, we are not dealing with a mere repeating succession under coincidence of the same. Rather, in the repeated perception, in the repeated “re-establishment” of the first “primal establishment”, knowledge “deepens” in the form of an increase of familiarity, yet until a limit of complete familiarity.¹⁵⁰

Thus, our familiarity with the perceived thing itself is incremented (Hua XXXIX, p. 463). The here described repetition shall be first understood as related to the repetition and a retention of bodily movements. Together with bodily movement, the syntheses of inner time consciousness, allowing the sedimentation of my previous experience with their effectiveness [*Wirksamkeit*], and of the syntheses association, making the actualization of that effectiveness possible, play an essential role in this process. Concretely speaking, thus, the so-called re-establishment of the knowledge of a thing and the increasing familiarity with it and with the surrounding world are based on the implicit activity of body memory.

The bodily character of this memory emerges even more clearly if we take a closer look at the relationship between kinesthesia and the mode of givenness of the perceptual thing. Also, in this case, a specific form of associative synthesis between the kinesthetic course and the respective sensible and affective data is at play. In connection with the cyclical repetition of movement, or what Husserl

themselves a kind of implicit knowledge, which is implicitly at work in each new experience. Cf. EU, pp. 32f., 136f./Husserl 1973, pp. 36f., 121f). See also Lohmar (2008, pp. 119f.) and Summa (2012).

¹⁴⁹“Often, perception is accomplished as repeating one, i.e., it cyclically returns to what has already previously been perceived, or to what is kept in mind, perceiving it anew, and from there, originally presenting again before the eyes what has already been brought to knowledge. The bringing-to-knowledge-anew, which here arises and consists in an open and possibly arbitrary continuation of repetition, is a fundamental shape of the formation of practiced experiential knowledge, the “instinctive” pre-form of the formation of “impressed” experience.” Hua XXXIX, p. 463.

¹⁵⁰“Es ist offenbar, dass es hier sich in einer solchen Wiederholung nicht um ein bloß wiederholendes Nacheinander unter Deckung im Selben handelt, sondern in der wiederholten Wahrnehmung, in der wiederholten “Nachstiftung” der erstmaligen “Urstiftung” “vertieft” sich die Kenntnis in Form der Steigerung der Vertrautheit, allerdings bis zu einer Grenze vollkommener Vertrautheit.” D 16/3b.

calls the process of “practicing” [*Einübung*], this association establishes a sensorimotor habit, which, from its part, grounds the acquisition of a familiarity with the correlation between our bodily movements and the kinesthetically “motivated” appearances of the thing.¹⁵¹ Consequently, body memory also grounds the genesis of our bodily abilities.¹⁵²

The dynamic unfolding of perceptual activity and the entailed tendency toward the optimal givenness of the perceptual thing also presuppose the operativeness of body memory. Such memory, indeed, allows us to develop a certain control upon our bodily movements and a certain disposition to perception, in relation to the *telos* of the optimal appearance of the thing:

Every appearance is only appearance, every experiencing object-apperception is only apperception from the activity of the Ego, which, on the one hand, intervenes in the passivity of the kinesthetic courses and, on the other hand, in the specific hyle in its joined passing-off. Following the hyle in its increase, [the Ego] directs itself to the optimal increased, in the change that lets it disappear again, it strives for its return, for a renewal of the line of increases and its optimum, and thereby it becomes conscious of the influence on the kinesthesia and, through them, of the optimum, such that it, the Ego, now gains control by exercising. And as acquisition [it gains] the free availability of what has been acquired, of the always anew identifiable on the path system of kinesthesia.¹⁵³

The genesis of the different bodily faculties, the acquisition of a certain control on one’s own bodily movement, and the development of the capacity to direct such movements in relation to practical or perceptual aims, all this presupposes the operativeness of body memory. Such a memory is itself based upon practicing-processes

¹⁵¹ “‘Practicing’. The Ego in the unity of a course of interests. Appropriation of the intention. Exercise hereto in the form of ability, of an intensified practical possibility. Now I can, if I want; thus it happens, starting from me, in doing, The content disappears. Not only decrease, but disappearance. Yet, kinesthetically, I regain it. What is the kinesthetic? An original happening of the “I move”, which obtains a relation to the affecting sense data, and with transformation of the interests” “‘Einübung’. Das Ich in der Einheit eines Interessenganges. Zueignung der Intention. Übung hierzu in <der> Form des Könnens, einer intensivierten Vermöglichkeit. Jetzt kann ich, wenn ich will; so geschieht es von mir her im Tun. Der Inhalt verschwindet. Nicht nur Minderung, sondern Verschwinden. Aber kinästhetisch gewinne ich es wieder. Was ist das Kinästhetische? Ein ursprüngliches Geschehen, des “ich bewege”, das Beziehung gewinnt zu affizierenden sinnlichen Daten, und mit Abwandlung der Interessen.” D 14/61b-62 a.

¹⁵² “This, however, refers indeed immediately to an original acquisition of these unities of faculty, to a genesis, in which, due to the immanent life structure in its regular style of change, the acquisition of faculty is possible” “Das aber verweist freilich sofort auf ein ursprüngliches Erwerben dieser Vermögenseinheiten, auf eine Genesis, in der aufgrund der immanenten Lebensstruktur in ihrem regelmäßigen Wandlungsstil das Vermögen-Erwerben möglich ist.” D10/21 a.

¹⁵³ “Jede Erscheinung ist nur Erscheinung, jede erfahrende Objektapperzeption nur Apperzeption aus der Aktivität des Ich, die <einerseits> in die Passivität der kinästhetischen Verläufe und andererseits <in> die spezifische Hyle in ihrem Miteinanderverlaufen eingreift, auf die Hyle und, ihren Steigerungen folgend, auf das optimal Besteigerte sich richtet, in dem Wandel, der es wieder verschwinden lässt, auf dessen Wiederkehr, auf Erneuerung der Steigerungsreihe und ihr <Ms.: sein> Optimum hinstrebt und dabei bewusst wird des Einflusses auf die Kinästhesie und durch sie vermittelt auf das Optimum; <so> dass es, <das Ich>, nun auf dem Wege der Übung Herrschaft gewinnt und als Erwerb die freie Verfügbarkeit über das Erworbene, immer wieder Identifizierbare auf dem Wege-System der Kinästhesen.” D 10/21 b.

[*Einiübung*], upon the repetition of bodily movements in different spatio-temporal situations, and upon the sedimentation of the associative relationship between bodily movement, sensations, and the appearances of the thing.

Body memory is not only relevant for the phenomenology of perception; it also plays a role in making bodily self-consciousness possible. The habits developed through practice and the control on one's own bodily movements, indeed, reflect the implicit and pre-reflective consciousness of one's own bodily faculties. Virtually entailing the totality of the retained bodily experiences, body memory is strictly connected with the bodily "I can". Such a double relevance of body memory emerges from the already mentioned manuscript D 10, in relation to the distinction between perspectivating and non-perspectivating kinesthesia. Whereas the former play a role in the changes of the perspectival appearance of things, the latter are self-related bodily movements. Both kinesthetic systems can be directed on the basis of one's own bodily practice and control. As we have seen, such practice and control are developed and habitualized as forms of body memory. Accordingly, body memory is the condition for the emergence of a pre-thematic consciousness of, for instance, the movements I can effectively perform with my hand, of the bodily positions I can assume in a certain situation, and of the capacity to direct my bodily movement in relation to the circumstances of the given situation. Thanks to the practicing of sensorimotor faculties and thanks to the sedimentation of experiences, we progressively learn to control our bodily movements. And this, as we have seen, not only in relation to our perceptual or cognitive interests, but also of emotional and dispositional interests [*Gefühls-* and *Gemütsinteressen*]. In relation to such interests, what Husserl calls a "practical intention" reveals to be oriented to obtaining control on one's own bodily position and kinesthesia, and this progressively gives shape to a system of control, or bodily practical possibility [*Vermöglichkeit*].

On a genetically basic level, body memory and kinesthesia shall be considered in relation to the sphere of instincts and drives. Notably, in manuscript C 16 (1932), Husserl focuses on such a relationship by thematizing the genesis and the acquisition of new habits in infants as a way to satisfy bodily instincts.¹⁵⁴ However, the meaning of such genetic remarks extends far more than the factual development, and rather concerns the genesis of the instinctual moments of subjective experience in general. The movements that are put into play to satisfy some bodily instincts

¹⁵⁴ "The first wakeful activities, the first affections that find an immediate instinctive fulfillment, for instance the sucking activities of a new-born baby. As soon as the smell of the mother's breast and the contact sensations of the lips occur, the instinctual tendency toward drinking is awakened, and an original adapted kinesthesia comes into play. [...] What is the purely egoic side of kinesthesia? Nothing else than the affection awakened in the Ego by the swindle-sensations (smell, etc.). If drinking is not immediately possible, what happens in this case? Perhaps the smell alone awakes another, so to say, an empty apperception, which however does not have any conscious "aim". If then touch occurs, then the way to fulfillment, however, is all the more an instinctive drive that toddles off, which is unfulfilled intention. Then, in fulfillment, swallowing movements, etc., as bringing fulfillment, as uncovering the instinctual drive. These are then modi of longing [*Begehr*en], quasi of will: pre-modi, but with the associated complexes of sensations that belong to the uncovering of this fulfillment." Hua Mat VIII, p. 326.

are experienced by the bodily subject as kinesthetic sensations. As such, they can be considered as a mode of bodily self-affection. Yet, how are such kinesthetic and instinct-related activities connected to body memory? Husserl allows us to answer this question by referring to the cyclical course of instinctual movements and their rhythmical repetition, which is connected with the rhythm of the feeling of pleasure and unpleasure. Such a repetition is not the mere succession of experiences, but rather entails a synthesis that grounds a particular, or even an individual, style of experience. Moreover, such habitual movements can also give shape to a goal-representation. The association between the smell of the mother's breast, the haptic sensations, and the satisfaction of the hunger instinct is developed through the repetition and the implicit retention of bodily experiences (Hua Mat VIII, pp. 326–327). As this example shows, body memory also gives shape to intersubjective relationships: it emerges in an intercorporeal dimension and in an intersubjectively shared world.¹⁵⁵

Finally, the operativeness of body memory also comes to the fore in relation to what we have called playful movements, i.e., those movements that properly lack the representation of a goal. Among such movements we should count, for instance, the kicking-kinesthesia [*Strampelkinästhesen*], but also movements like dancing, etc.¹⁵⁶ Whereas the goal-oriented movements can be considered as “linearly” oriented toward their goal, and find an end when the goal is attained, the course of playful movements is a circular and potentially never-ending repetition. The *telos* of such movements is not outside the moving process itself, and the pleasure or displeasure that are related to such movements are not to be confused with the “complacency” that characterizes the satisfaction for having finally achieved a goal. Rather, pleasure arises from the very unfolding of movement, whereas unpleasure emerges whenever such an unfolding is hindered, or whenever there is some material resistance to the free unfolding of movement.¹⁵⁷ These playful movements also imply a mode of bodily consciousness that is strictly related to body memory. Through repetition and sedimentation, and through the association with pleasure or unpleasure, these movements ground the subjective acquaintance with the potentialities and the limits of one's own body. Moreover, they also make the acquisition of a certain control on one's own bodily capacities possible (Hua XXXIX, pp. 328–329). Yet, such a control

¹⁵⁵ Fuchs (2012) notably distinguishes two modalities of what we may call intersubjective body memory: intercorporeal and incorporative body memory. The former refers to the primary forms of affectively laden intersubjective relationships understood as intercorporeity [*Zwischenleiblichkeit*], the latter, grounded on imitation, to the progressive acquisition of social skills and the embodied adoption of specific roles and attitudes within a social context.

¹⁵⁶ See, notably, Straus (1960a).

¹⁵⁷ “The instinctive intention and instinctive pleasure of fulfillment does not concern a final state, but rather the whole process of continuously letting the momentary intentions fulfill themselves and, as bearer of new intentions, letting them transform to new fulfillments. Then, the unity of the process of intention-fulfillment, this is itself the *telos*, namely that the instinctive intention, which from the very beginning unitarily goes toward this merging of intentionality and its relaxing, and which fulfills itself as unitary not in one phase, but rather in the constant activity, fulfills itself.” Hua Mat VIII, p. 328.

and such an acquaintance would not be possible, if the repetition of bodily movement was an orderless succession that does not leave any traces for consciousness. Also, in this case, the formation of bodily control and acquaintance is grounded upon repetition, association, and the spatio-temporal syntheses of body memory. Such a memory, thus, not only grounds the pre-reflective consciousness of our movements, and the capacity to direct such movements; it also shapes the individual styles of movement and expression as modes of bodily behavior.

8.3 Conclusions

The analysis of bodily experience in Husserl's transcendental aesthetic once more confirms the claim that spatiality and temporality cannot be simply considered as parallel dimensions of experience. Rather, considering the body both as the organ of perception and as mediating the basic forms of self-awareness and world-relatedness, we have seen that bodily experience is essentially grounded upon the intertwining of spatiality and temporality.

Considering the body as the organ of perception, we have seen how its situatedness entails both the moment of facticity and the openness to possible activity and change. That my lived-body is absolutely here and that my bodily experience is conditioned by what happens to my material body is not something I can change. It is something factually given. Yet, such facticity is not mere contingency, for experience is only possible on the basis of such a *Faktum*. On the other hand, however, the faculty of bodily movement implies the possibility to actively change, at least partially, the given perceptual circumstances and to make them more suitable to reach the optimal perceptual appearance. Situatedness, moreover, entails a qualitative characterization of the spatiality of the lived-body. My body is only secondarily positioned in objective space. Primarily, it has its own, qualitatively determined, "place". And the place of the perceived thing, their being above or below, is relative to the place of my body and its possible movements.¹⁵⁸ In the analyses of bodily self-awareness, moreover, we have seen how the property of sensitivity and the spreading-out of different bodily sensations shall be understood in light of the interweaving of spatiality and temporality. The feeling of bodily movement and the awareness of the "I can", as well as the sedimentation of the awareness of one's own bodily practical possibilities in and through body memory, further testify to such a basic interweaving of spatio-temporality. Besides situatedness, the latter supports the fundamental dynamism of bodily experience and self-experience. The temporal syntheses shall be considered as interwoven with sensible contents that are mediated by bodily spatial experience. Such a whole cannot be cut into pieces, even if its different moments can be abstractedly distinguished.

¹⁵⁸In this sense, the spatiality of the lived-body and of the perceptual things as correlated to my bodily experience, comes close to Aristotle's (1936, 208 b) understanding of *topos* in his *Physics*. See also Casey (1997, pp. 50f.).

The previous analyses also allow us to better understand the claim Husserl makes in his 1919 lecture course concerning the essential role of the body in sensible constitution. Referring to this lecture, in the introduction to this chapter, the question has been raised as to whether such a claim can be considered to be consistent with Husserl's understanding of phenomenology as an eidetic inquiry into the fundamental structures of consciousness. This further prompted us to ask whether Husserl would understand subjectivity as embodied or rather as bodily. Despite Husserl's well known remarks concerning the pure Ego, which certainly abstract from the bodily dimension, the previous analyses show that, if we give up such abstraction and if we particularly focus on the sensible moments of experience, subjectivity shall be considered as essentially bodily, and the experience of a bodily subject shall be addressed in the light of its spatio-temporal unfolding. Both moments, temporality and spatiality, necessarily refer to each other and can only be distinguished within the concrete whole of bodily experience. This shall indicate that subjectivity does not merely happen to accidentally have a body, it is rather constitutively bodily. Although it certainly remains possible to isolate the conscious structures and describe them also independently of the body, concrete subjective experience is essentially or structurally mediated by the body. In this sense, the facticity of bodily experience, which we have repeatedly encountered throughout this chapter, shall not be intended as a merely accidental. Bodily experience with its specific lawfulness rather belongs to the sphere Husserl indicates as the "necessity of a *Faktum*".¹⁵⁹

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¹⁵⁹Hua XVI, pp. 289f./(*Husserl 1997*, pp. 250f.).

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Part V

Conclusions

Chapter 9

Conclusions

Discussing Husserl's project of a phenomenologically grounded transcendental aesthetic, this study has focused on the relationship between spatiality and temporality within the field of sensible experience.

The first part has set the framework for the following inquiries by addressing the project of the transcendental aesthetic within Husserl's architectonic of experience. To conceive of the relationship between spatiality and temporality, this is the underlying premise of this work, we shall primarily focus on such a relationship at the basic level of experience, i.e., sensibility. The analyses developed in this book are meant to clarify how the inquiry into experience *von unten*, i.e., starting from its basic structures and dynamics, grounds the understanding of space and time, and of their relationship, as "fundamental", or constitutive, and not merely as "regional" phenomena. As Waldenfels points out, "regional" means that there are several forms of space and time, like cultural, biological, physical space and time, whereas "fundamental" means that place and space, as well as time, represent basic instances permeating perception, reason, meaning, order, intersubjectivity, self- and world-experience.¹ Conceiving of space and time as fundamental phenomena, thus, implies that experience as a whole cannot be considered apart from its spatio-temporal unfolding.

Analyzing Husserl's project of the transcendental aesthetic, and comparing it to Avenarius's critique of pure experience and to Kant's approach to sensibility in the first *Critique*, we have seen how the transcendental aesthetic fits into Husserl's stratified account of experience. The comparison of Husserl's and Avenarius's projects has notably allowed us to define the scope of the transcendental aesthetic, to understand how spatiality and temporality are involved in the constitution of the sensible thing and of the world of pure experience, and to formulate the questions concerning the stratification of experience and the meaning of facticity, which are further developed in the following chapters.

¹ Waldenfels (2009, pp. 25f.) makes this distinction with respect to space, yet I would extend it here to space and time, as well as to their interweaving.

On the basis of the critical comparison of Husserl's and Kant's views on sensibility, we could further thematize the meaning of the stratification of experience. Considering the relationship of spatiality and temporality from the bottom has allowed us to develop a more articulated phenomenological account of the architectonic of subjective experience in its relation to the world. My initial hypothesis was that, although the idea of the stratification of layers of experience shall be retained, since it allows us to describe the specific features of each moment and to bring to the fore both their inner constitutive potentialities and their limits, such descriptions need to be complemented by an inquiry into the modes of interplay among the different layers.

The comparison of Husserl's and Kant's approaches to the relationship between sensible experience and predicative thought has confirmed such a hypothesis. Both Husserl and Kant, indeed, recognize that there must be some basic organization in the sensible domain and that this organization grounds the more complex forms of experience and cognition. Moreover, they both emphasize the constitutive potential of the interplay between the faculties (Kant) and the layers of experience (Husserl). If we consider such interplay, the stratification of experience shall not be conceived too statically, as to signify that experience is made up of reciprocally independent moment that are, as it were, piled one on the top of the other. Even maintaining the relative autonomy of each layer, we shall emphasize that they do not proceed on separate paths within the process of experience and constitution. As we have seen by considering phenomena such as the experience of the thing independently of its conceptual determination or the possibility of chaos, there are several forms of interplay between the different layers. Experience, in this sense, shall be considered as a complex whole, whereby the different moments can certainly be distinguished for descriptive reasons, although they cannot be separated from each other. Such a re-evaluation of the architectonics grounds the understanding of experience as a field of dynamic interconnections among different ways of relating to the world.

Having thematized Husserl's project of the transcendental aesthetic, in the second and the third part, I have discussed how spatiality and temporality relate to each other within such a domain. Following Husserl's own interpretation, the relationship between spatiality and temporality has first been considered in the light of the concept of stratification. Consistently, the sphere of temporal constitution defines the most fundamental layer, with respect to which all others, included the sphere of spatial constitution, shall be considered as founded. Besides arguing for such a foundational relationship, Husserl retraces analogies and parallelisms between spatial and temporal constitution.² Thereby, the logic of the analogy apparently has a threefold function. First, it epistemologically allows us to formulate hypotheses concerning the structures of specific domains of experience on the basis of what has been discovered within other domains. For instance, the evidence

²To be true, Husserl tends to apply such an analogical view to different domains of experience. Besides the analogies between space and time constitution, in a larger sense, analogical relationships are detected, for instance, between the sphere of categorial and pre-categorial experience, as well as between the field of ethics or practical reason and the field of logical reason.

that there is something like spatial perspective allows us to formulate the hypothesis that there might be something analogous also in the sphere of temporality. Secondly, being analogy an equivalence among relationships, recognizing such an equivalence may allow us to intuit not only the members, but also the relationships themselves. The analogy between spatial and temporal perspective, for instance, may eventually allow us to have an insight into the relationships of closeness and remoteness. Thirdly, retracing analogical structures and correspondences among different layers and moments of experience seems to ground a unitary view of consciousness, namely the understanding of intentional consciousness as a unity of recurrent laws. My hypothesis in this respect was that, notwithstanding its heuristic potential, such an analogical reasoning does not allow us to properly describe several phenomena and to grasp the dynamics that is implied in sensible experience. Already in this second part, indeed, we have shown that there are limits to the analogical account of spatial and temporal constitution. Considering the analyses of the constitution of spatial and temporal objects, in both chapters of this part, we have seen that, beyond the analogies and the parallelisms, the spatial and the temporal dimensions of experience seem to be more deeply interconnected.

In the third part, I have pursued the mentioned hypothesis and focused on such an interconnection under the heading of “spatio-temporal intertwining”. Thereby, the phenomenology of individuation, of perspectival givenness, of intentionality as a tendency toward fulfillment, and of the lived-body have been considered as the *topoi* that best exemplify the interweaving of spatiality and temporality in actual lived experience. A proper understanding of these phenomena, indeed, requires us to go beyond the parallel and analogical consideration of spatiality and temporality and to consider their relationship in terms of a profound interweaving or, as Husserl also suggests, of a configurative unity.³ This further reverberates on the understanding of consciousness and experience: these shall not be understood exclusively as unities of stratified and analogical structures, but rather as dynamic unities of interwoven moments.

Considering sensible constitution in the light of the spatio-temporal intertwining has notably allowed us to further investigate the dynamic and processual unfolding of lived experience and to bring to the fore the crucial role of movement in different domains.

For instance, the description of the experience of individuals, as we have seen, requires a phenomenological inquiry into the processes of individuation. And these have revealed to be originally grounded upon the irreversibility of the primal temporal process. However, we have also seen that the description of the concrete phenomenon of both “objective” and “subjective” individuation entails both temporal and spatial determinations, and that the understanding of the irreversibility of the temporal process reverberates on how we experience the spatiality of individuals and individual events. The phenomenology of individuation, thus, is grounded upon a dynamic understanding of conscious experience and its constitutive relation to the world.

³(Husserl 1946, p. 337)/(Husserl 1981, p. 246).

Developing the analyses on the constitution of tridimensional things, which we have begun in the second part, we have further argued that movement in its spatio-temporal unfolding plays an essential role in such a constitution. Notably, describing the phenomenon of spatial and temporal perspective, we have seen that both the determination of the singularity of each view on the thing and the process of uncovering more and more profiles are related to both spatiality and temporality. More precisely, we have seen that the phenomena of spatial and temporal perspective cannot be considered apart from each other, so that perspectival givenness shall be properly considered as a spatio-temporal phenomenon. The inquiry into the constitution of things on the basis of their perspectival givenness has prompted us to investigate the correlated intentional structures. Thereby, we have characterized intentionality as a tendency, or as a “movement” toward fulfillment. Considered in relation to the cognitive and practical interests that can be at play in perception, such a movement implies different forms of teleology, notably what Husserl calls finite and infinite teleology. Eventually, the primacy Husserl attributes to infinite teleology also suggests that there is a primacy of movement itself within perception. The *telos* of the intentional tendency in perception does not properly coincide with a fix state of full accomplishment, but rather with the very process of discovery or the actualization and re-iteration of its own movement.

Finally, we have shown how bodily experience itself is a dynamic process. This particularly emerges from the inquiry into the situatedness of bodily experience and from what we have called the aesthetic of the lived-body. Situatedness, indeed, is certainly determined by specific perceptual conditions and by the fact that experience takes place here and now, but it nevertheless also implies the potentiality of movement. The spatio-temporality of situation, thus, has been conceived as opening up a field of possible movements. And the awareness that we can possibly change our perceptual situation through movement has revealed to be one of the conditions for the constitution of a tridimensional thing. Also, the so-called aesthetic of the lived body substantiates the dynamic view on sensible experience. Particularly, this has been shown with respect to the rhythmical unfolding of sensings and their spreading-out, to the role of movement as a vehicle of bodily self-experience, and to the phenomenon of body memory in its different forms.

Having in mind the results of our inquiries into these issues, we can argue that movement in a large sense is both the *trait d’union* among the different *topoi* that testify to the interweaving of lived spatiality and temporality, and the expression of the liveliness [*Lebendigkeit*] of intentional consciousness. That is to say, the role of movement in sensible experience shall not only be considered from an empirical-psychological or anthropological point of view, but also transcendently, as a constitutive moment of what Husserl calls a “transcendental eidetic science of the world of experience as such” (A VII 14/29 a-b).⁴ Movement does not come into play to

⁴ Recognizing that movement has such a transcendental character, I still have some concerns with regard to the enactive approach of, for instance, Sheets-Johnstone (1998, pp. 133f.; 230–232). From her point of view, movement shall be considered as a universal principle that grounds and precedes the very constitution of subjectivity as “I can”. Distinguishing the subjective “I move”

determine *what* is effectively constituted, but rather *how* sensible constitution is possible in general for the experiencing subject.

The idea of a spatio-temporal configuration of experience preceding the determination of space and time, suggested by Husserl in the manuscript quoted in the introduction, has now gained some more concreteness. Such a configuration shall be understood as spatio-temporal intertwining, i.e., as the interweaving of two constitutive dimensions of experience that can be determined only on the basis of their reciprocal relation.

The intertwining of spatiality and temporality in the different forms we have encountered grounds the lawfulness of experience at its most basic level. As we have seen throughout this book, such lawfulness of concrete experience defines a fundamental kind of “rationality” that cannot be inferentially explicated by resorting to underlying principles, rather being a *Faktum* of experience. Such a *Faktum* shall not be considered as coincident with an arbitrary *Tatsache*; it rather has its own apodicticity and necessity, designating an concrete feature of experience, which cannot be considered to be eidetic, and yet cannot be otherwise.⁵

These considerations eventually reverberate on the understanding of the world-relatedness of the experiencing subject. Although this might appear to be at variance with the claim made in *Ideas I* concerning the apodicticity of the *Faktum* of inner experience only, our discussion of the individuation of subjectivity in and through spatio-temporal experiences, and our argument concerning the constitutively bodily nature of subjectivity have shown why consciousness cannot be understood apart from its relation to the experienced world. In the processes of spatialization and temporalization, there is, rather, a reciprocal determination between subjectivity and the world, so that both poles can only be considered by virtue of their relationship. This clearly calls into question the imaginability of the “annihilation of the world”. For the world is both the spatio-temporal horizon of possible appearance with its inner lawfulness, and the ground for all possible subjective experience. The possibility of a universal *epoché* that brackets the validity of all positings concerning the being or not being of the world does not challenge the “fact” that we find the world as a universal ground [*Boden*] of all our experience. Every doubting concerning the being or not being of things, and concerning the validity of experience in general, indeed, presupposes the original givenness of the world as the ground of experience and thought. Without the givenness of the world as a totality and without the adherence to the world as the ground of all possible experience, which is expressed by what Husserl calls a “fundamental certainty” [*Bodengewissheit*], no

from physical movement, I consider the former as inseparable from subjective experience, as an elementary mode of implicit self-consciousness. Accordingly, subjectivity itself, given its constant intentional and bodily activity and its relatedness to the world, should be conceived as movement.

⁵ On the different meanings of the concept of facticity and fact, see, notably, Micali (2008, pp. 79f.); Bisin (2006, pp. 218f.); English (1998); Landgrebe (1982); Vergani (1997). What is important for the argument made in this book, as we have repeatedly seen, is the distinction between the facticity of a *Tatsache* and of a *Faktum*, whereby, different from the former, the latter entails a specific form of necessity.

doubting or bracketing would indeed be possible (Hua XXXIX, pp. 255–256). Conversely, the previous analyses also impinge on the very characterization of subjectivity as *quod nulla re indiget ad existendum*. Indeed, it is clear that the phenomena belonging to the domain of sensible experience and the interweaving of lived spatiality and temporality in this experience call into question such a characterization, which would imply a tacit agreement with the hypothesis of the annihilation of the world. Quite to the contrary, those phenomena have allowed us to thematize the structure of intentionality in relation to the subject's worldliness [*Welthaftigkeit*], and furthermore to investigate the relation between the two poles of manifestation, i.e., the objective pole as its accusative and the subjective pole as its dative. In the most fundamental sense, the subject and the world stay in a relationship of reciprocal co-determination. This relationship, or the basis network of experience, can be said to “precede” and contribute to the constitution of the relata.

The necessary fact of experiential rationality, thus, is correlated to the necessary fact of the lawfulness of world-experience and of the subjective adherence to the world as the ground of all possible experience. The inquiry into the interweaving of spatiality and temporality within the transcendental aesthetic has allowed us to bring to the fore how such lawful rationality is concretely expressed in the dynamics of aesthetic constitution.

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