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

Royal Heirs and the Uses of Soft Power in Nineteenth-Century Europe

Edited by
Frank Lorenz Müller
and Heidi Mehrkens

Palgrave Studies in Modern Monarchy

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Royal Heirs and the Uses of Soft Power in Nineteenth-Century Europe

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CHAPTER 1

'Winning their Trust and Affection': Royal Heirs and the Uses of Soft Power in Nineteenth-Century Europe

Frank Lorenz Müller

Having been widowed at the young age of 34, Prince Wilhelm, heir to the throne of Württemberg, soon found himself under pressure to re-marry. King Karl, the government and the press urged the prince to end his seclusion and delight the small German kingdom with the gift of a future queen. For a while the rather private Wilhelm played for time, though, and raised the emotional stakes. 'I have never lost sight of what I owe to my position as prince and to my country,' he declared, 'but I was too happy with my first wife to render myself unhappy for the rest of my life with a marriage of convenience; even a prince cannot be expected to endure that. I do not wish to give my country the example of a cold, loveless marriage!'[1] So, when Wilhelm eventually led Charlotte of Waldeck-Pyrmont to the altar in 1886, the good people of Württemberg had every reason to believe that this union was a love match. As the couple entered Stuttgart, the inhabitants of the Württemberg capital gave them an enthusiastic welcome.

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The reality behind the beautiful façade presented by the two newlyweds was, however, rather less lovely. Within months of Wilhelm's second nuptials he despaired of 'this comedy that I have to perform in front of the world, always making coquettish jokes, it often makes me want to crawl up the walls'. What mattered, he concluded rather wearily, was that he and his wife succeeded in presenting the image of a tenderly loving couple. 'We show ourselves together in the theatre, drive and walk together, if we feel like it', he told a close confidant the following year. 'But, but!!—If only I had never met her; she would have led a happy life alongside someone else, and I would at least have gone my own way quietly and—over time—even contentedly.'[2]

The sorry story of this royal heir's matrimonial life illustrates that, for the individuals involved, being compelled to make a favourable impression on a wider public could be a very grinding task indeed. Living up to a public expectation of a loving married life, visible evidence of which had to be presented to the eager eyes of an ever-present audience, was a fairly standard part of a repertoire of royal behaviour. This was increasingly regarded as necessary to woo the subjects. The public's expectations of the performance of their crowned betters were certainly very high. When, in September 1885, Copenhagen's *Illustreret Tidende* explained the tasks of a royal prince to its readers, the weekly paper chose nothing less demanding than the standards of the fairy tale: 'the King's son still wanders amongst us in disguise, slaying the dragons of envy and narrow-mindedness, sharing people's fate and circumstances and winning their trust and affection.'[3]

For all its sugary coating, this account powerfully reminds us of the new, varied and demanding range of public duties which heirs to the throne had to confront during the century that preceded the First World War. As the vehicles conveying notions and hopes associated with the future of their respective monarchical systems, the men and women whose birth or marriage predestined them one day to wear a crown had little choice. They had to engage with the task of managing and communicating the transformations of Europe's monarchies in the course of the long nineteenth century. These institutions, remarkably sturdy survivors amid a tumultuous age, were clearly heeding the famous advice given by Tancredi Falconeri in Di Lampedusa's *The Leopard*: 'If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.' Carefully veiled by ostensibly timeless traditions, Europe's monarchical systems engaged in significant and multi-layered processes of change.

Perhaps the most fundamental shift which took place (albeit at different speeds and to varying degrees) across what remained an overwhelmingly monarchical continent, affected the ability of nineteenth-century monarchs to wield power. For Britain, Lord Esher famously described this process as one where a once powerful monarchy ended up having to settle for mere influence.[4] What is more, as Vernon Bogdanor has observed for the Victorian case, with 'public opinion now being the motive force of government, there was a fundamental change in the character of monarchy. The means by which the sovereign could exert influence came to change.' Once the crown had achieved the position of a 'striking exemplar of the domestic virtues', though, it could reap considerable rewards. Recognized by the public as a 'moral force', the monarchy emerged with its authority enhanced—rather than diminished—from this 'transformation from power to influence'. For, if completed successfully, the change would make the monarch appear as the head of both the state and the nation.[5] Achieving this kind of superiority was anything but effortless, however, and there was something remarkable about the lengths to which nineteenth-century royal houses had to go in pursuit of it. Discussing the exertions Bavaria's Wittelsbach dynasty made in the fields of memory politics and monumental architecture in order to awaken the pride of the Bavarian nation in its ruling family, Volker Sellin has drawn attention to the oddness of this development: 'It is a peculiar phenomenon that a centuries-old dynasty, whose rule had, until recently, been legitimised in a quasi-self-evident fashion through timeless practice, now had to make such efforts to make itself remembered.'[6]

As these examples from Württemberg, Britain and Bavaria show, members of Europe's royal families had to extend and enhance their skill set if they wanted to maximize the benefits that could arise from the altered concept of the monarch's role in politics and society. The establishment of 'monarchical constitutionalism'—the constraining of a monarch's power by (usually codified) constitutional law and the sharing of its exercise with elected parliaments—was uneven and staggered across post-Napoleonic Europe.[7] It nevertheless had a momentous effect on the monarchs' duties. As old ligatures between rulers and ruled—such as a profound and widespread belief in the divine ordination of kingship—weakened, monarchy needed to justify itself in different ways. Amid this 'legitimacy crisis of the European monarchies'[8] the claim that the crown should continue to dispose in some fashion of the formidable powers of the modern state (armed forces, civil service, police, taxes, cultural and educational institutions), as well as the payment of civil lists to support courtly life, now needed to be legitimized afresh. There were two different yet complementary ways to achieve this: (i) by attaining the kind of public moral authority that gained a sovereign unparalleled love, as Queen Victoria smugly claimed for herself in 1844[9]; and (ii) through being associated with effective government that could stand up to parliamentary and public scrutiny, for 'at this present stage of history, only rule that guaranteed the happiness and peace of its subjects would be legitimate.'[10]

The application of relatively transparent criteria for governmental capability and efficaciousness, however, brought with it considerable risks; after all, the price of failure could be a forced abdication or the installation of a regent. To help them in this task monarchs needed allies. They tended to find them not amongst the new parliamentary bodies but within the administrative and governmental machinery of the modern state, amongst the ministers they appointed. In the constitutional system, monarchs were no longer the principal statesmen or leaders in battle—even if some of them may have harboured such ambitions. These functions were now fulfilled by the sovereign's chief minister and his most senior general. Monarchical rule in the age of monarchical constitutionalism was thus increasingly based on, contained by and dependent on ministerial government.[11] The incremental loss of royal power, which was assumed by ministerial elites, elected parliaments and elements of the public, edged sovereigns towards having to carve out new roles for themselves: as Bogdanor's analysis of the British case shows, these roles were public-facing.

Even for egregiously unambitious sovereigns, supine idleness did not amount to a viable strategy for dealing with these changed circumstances. The oft-quoted advice King Umberto I of Italy reportedly gave to his son—'Remember, to be a king all you need to know is how to sign your name, read a newspaper and mount a horse'[12]—thus needs to be taken with a large pinch of salt. Surrounded by subjects, whose joyous participation in royal events—as spectators, well-wishers, newspaper readers or collectors of patriotic trinkets—counted as a new form of legitimization, monarchs and their families had come under pressure to develop means to win, rather than command, hearts and minds. In this delicate game of wooing, royal mistakes or dereliction of duty would not go unpunished. After King Ludwig of Bavaria had failed to visit the town of Schweinfurt when he toured the surrounding region in 1865, the *Schweinfurter Tagblatt* crabbily warned 'how quickly the popularity of a prince can be jeopardized by indolence and how very unjust neglect can disgruntle even the most faithful adherents of a principle'. Ludwig's tendencies to shirk his public duties also worried the Munich Police Commissioner, who stated that such behaviour caused 'love and respect to wane, without which no regent can rule effectively'.[13] The re-fashioning of monarchy thus presented the sovereigns with a stark consequence, as Markus J. Prutsch observes: 'the more rational and economic the understanding of political institutions was, the more replaceable—and indeed superfluous—monarchs became if they did not meet public expectations.'[14]

Thus, while skills that related to traditional forms of monarchical rule—'hard power' techniques such as martial prowess or political ruthlessness—remained relevant, an array of new skills aimed at the acquisition and exercise of 'soft power' emerged as increasingly important for nineteenth-century monarchs. Hard power, according to the political scientist Joseph Nye, encompasses the means by which the compliance of others can be enforced—by coercion, force or payment, ultimately by the waging of war. Soft power, on the other hand, a term coined by Nye in 1990, revolves around the ability to make others want the same outcomes as you, the ability to shape the preferences of others; this is achieved by co-opting, persuading, charming, seducing or attracting them. 'You can appeal to a sense of attraction, love, or duty in our relationship and appeal to our shared values about the justness of contributing to those shared values and purposes. If I am persuaded to go along with your purposes without any explicit threat or exchange taking place—in short, if my behaviour is determined by an observable but intangible attraction—soft power is at work.'[15]

The ability to wield soft power, Nye insists, rests on culture, which he defines as the 'set of values and practices that create meaning for a society'.[16] This raises profound questions for the monarchies of nineteenth-century Europe. What were those societal values and practices that endowed monarchs with the means to exercise soft power? Were they merely inherited and then defended by monarchy? Was there, so to speak, a pre-existing, dwindling stock of 'royalist capital' from which dynasties had to eke out an increasingly marginal existence based on nostalgia and residual habits of deference? That, at least, was the sombre view of Privy Councillor Friedrich von Holstein, who warned in 1895 that Kaiser Wilhelm II would, in a few years' time, badly miss the 'royalist capital' he was 'thoughtlessly squandering'.[17]

The future of the system could not, however, be built on a tiny number of desperate believers, like the 121 sufferers of scrofula who had come to

Rheims cathedral in 1825 to be cured by the magic touch of the newly-anointed King Charles X.[18] Rather, new resources needed to be generated, appropriated and popularized. Monarchies' ability to read and respond to the predominant cultural and moral preferences of the societies surrounding them certainly played an important role in this context. It enabled royals to set in motion a virtuous circle: they could place themselves at the head of these trends, bask in their glory and then reinforce them in turn with their own personal and institutional charisma. After all, Queen Victoria regarded the unprecedented love for her as caused by 'our happy domestic home—which gives such a good example'. The publically celebrated role reportedly played by the German crown prince Friedrich Wilhelm was similarly based on his identification with a contemporary canon of public virtues that was not traditionally associated with monarchical behaviour: 'Always ahead, when it is about offering a home to the true, the good and the beautiful for the welfare of the community,' the daily *Berliner Tageblatt* wrote in 1881, 'the crown prince has become for all of us a symbol of that modest and yet industrious activity which always puts one's own interests last'[19] (see Image 1.1).

Even less-than-youthful royal heirs could still assume a well-publicized position at the cutting edge of technical progress and thus demonstrate that there was no contradiction between monarchy and modernity. In September 1910, for instance, Prince Ludwig, the sixty-five-year-old heir to the throne of Bavaria, was greeted by 'loud cheering' when he fearlessly climbed into a 'Parseval' airship to enjoy a 20-minute panoramic tour high above Munich.[20] A more modern expression of the renaissance of monarchical representation through the traditional means of royal travel can hardly be imagined.[21]

The existence of royal heirs—an essential feature of any dynastic system—may well have provided monarchies with a particularly valuable resource when it came to playing the soft power game.[22] For soft power, Nye observes, 'depends more than hard power upon the existence of willing interpreters',[23] and the next-in-line to the throne were perfectly equipped for this task. As highly visible prominent figures representing systems of rule that were increasingly in need of public endorsement and fresh sources of legitimacy, royal heirs were both expected and ideally placed to build consensus, popularize monarchical rule and generate renewed relevance for it. The role successors had to play vis-à-vis the demanding and varied range of duties that arose from this new sphere of soft power activities was particularly important because crown princes and crown



Image 1.1 A kindly, educated, fatherly and approachable future monarch: German Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm spreading a little soft power in his local village school, Ad. Frank (c. 1900), *Kaiser Friedrich und sein Schützling. Historische Erzählung aus den Tagen des Unvergeßlichen für die deutsche Jugend*, Berlin, 128–29 (after a watercolour by Wilhelm Hoffmann)

princesses automatically directed the public's gaze towards the future of the monarchy. Moreover, the ruling monarchs frequently kept their successors at arm's length from the sovereign's remaining control of direct political or military power. Royal heirs thus tended to have time, opportunity and the means to assume and develop innovative forms of soft power that complemented the powers of the ruler.[24] This could enhance both their own reputations and, more broadly, the image of the dynastic system as a whole. The typical generational pattern whereby heirs were denied access to the monarchs' dwindling range of hard power competencies thus maintained a momentum that led towards a future of monarchical power that was, increasingly, 'soft'.

A similar ratcheting effect that gradually reconfigured monarchical power in nineteenth-century Europe can be derived from Volker Sellin's concept of the nineteenth century as a 'Century of Restorations'. According to this interpretation, recurring acts of monarchical restoration, in the shape of constitutional concessions, were a hallmark of the age and constituted 'a policy of reform by which the legitimacy of divine-right monarchy was provided with new and additional foundations'.[25] As opposed to revolutionary rupture, *Restaurationspolitik* had the advantage of preserving a continuity based on the notion that the monarch formally retained the power of the state while the rights of political participation were extended to ever wider circles.[26] It was amongst these constantly widening circles to whom monarchical power was being transferred, that interpreters of royal soft power had to find willing receivers of the message.[27]

In this context, the role of the media—as both makers and products of a growing public sphere—was of signal importance.[28] In an information age, Nye recently observed, 'power is not only a function of whose army wins but also whose story wins'. With respect to the twenty-first century he added that 'the monarchy has provided a compelling narrative with more durability than the 15 minutes of fame enjoyed by celebrities who lack its institutional trappings'.[29]

Monarchy's ability to offer a compelling narrative and tell a winning story is not, however, such a recent phenomenon. Legends about the divinity that hedges a king have been about since time immemorial. In the nineteenth century, though, as the relationship between story-teller and audience was transformed, both the content of the monarchical narrative and the techniques of its dissemination underwent significant changes. The manner in which Walter Bagehot commented on the family dimension of the royal story—an issue famously high up on the scale of middle-class values—vividly illustrates this trend. ‘A family on the throne is an interesting idea also’, he observed with the nonchalance of a mildly entertained theatre-goer; ‘It brings down the pride of sovereignty to the level of petty life. No feeling could be more childish than the enthusiasm of the English at the marriage of the Prince of Wales. [...] But no feeling could be more like common human nature as it is, and as it is likely to be.’[30] As the story of Wilhelm of Württemberg’s bleak nuptials shows, however, many constitutional monarchs had to be prepared even to pay a very high price to secure this kind of childish enthusiasm. If the fairy-tale existence painted by the *Ilustreret Tidende* was indeed becoming the main option left to the continent’s many Prince Charmings, then dragon-slaying and the happily-ever-after were no longer optional, but compulsory.

The situation was hardly as straightforward, though, as that of a royal piper eagerly dancing to an increasingly democratic tune. After all, the successful operation of monarchical soft power—evidenced, to some extent, at least, by the survival and popularity of Europe’s monarchies—helped to reinforce an inherently unequal and hierarchical system of rule. For Edward Said, for instance, the use of soft power is ‘actually motivated by the particular desire for cultural hegemony’.[31] As such, the readiness of the heirs to Europe’s thrones to engage in activities aimed at attracting and persuading their subjects of the justness of the monarchical cause essentially remained an act of condescension that confirmed the notion of royal superiority. It was also anything but apolitical, but central to the shoring up of the status quo. In an attempt to undermine hopes for a bright future once the popular German crown prince had succeeded his conservative father, the republican paper *Der Sozialdemokrat* furiously rejected the ‘myth of the liberal crown prince’. This deceitful narrative, the paper claimed, had ‘kept the patient peoples quiet for centuries’ and was ‘still being believed my millions today, notwithstanding that in every single case to date hope has been followed by disappointment’.[32]

Yet even as implacable an organization of anti-monarchists as the Social Democrats would not prove immune to the charms of monarchical soft power. In 1916, at the height of the First World War, Wilhelm, once the unhappily married Württemberg heir, completed a quarter of a century on the throne. Over the years, he had not only perfected an outwardly impeccable marriage, but a public persona that combined a genial paternal dignity with a folksy affability and political reticence. Perhaps the warmest congratulations in his anniversary year came in the shape of a long article written by Wilhelm Keil, the leader of the

Württemberg Social Democrats, and published in the party newspaper: 'In Württemberg the relationship between king and people is unclouded. [...] All in all, it appears to us that nothing would be altered if a republic were to replace the monarchy in Württemberg tomorrow. If all the male and female citizens were asked to decide, no other candidate would have a better prospect of being placed at the head of the state than the current king.'[33] Thus, for better or worse, the employment of soft power by royal agents clearly had an important role to play in facilitating the survival of monarchies amid political systems that were becoming increasingly constitutional, parliamentary and democratic.

The growing importance of soft power—and of the skills required of those who sought to wield it—changed the face of monarchy. Royal individuals had to communicate with vastly increased and diverse audiences; they performed as 'media monarchs' and now needed to be charismatic or develop celebrity status.[34] Their system of rule, once august and absolute, now sought to demonstrate relevance and worth by being associated with welfare, philanthropy, virtue, accessibility, modernity and fashion. Since Caligula's callous motto *oderint dum metuant* no longer worked for monarchs without the means (or the desire) to strike fear into the hearts of their subjects, they and their successors could not afford to be hated. Now they needed to be loved and endorsed, or, as the political writer Friedrich Naumann put it in 1912: 'monarchs need majorities'.[35] They had to generate positive emotional resources such as love, affection, admiration or trust. Pulling out all the stops on the organ of human interaction in this great communicative process involved the whole family and the deployment of everything in the dynasties' arsenals: children and grandparents, ancient myths and modern trinkets, handsome men and stylish women. As the institution turned towards the acquisition of soft power after centuries of male domination, the outward face of monarchy emerged less gender-imbalanced and more feminized.

The crowns' move towards soft power was not, however, a business with ever diminishing margins. Many European dynasties learned that it paid off handsomely to strike the right note in an age where politics depended on success within an ever growing media market. In fact, a strong base of public support, an emotional bond of affection connecting the dynasty with the population, had the potential of restoring to the monarchs (through the back door, so to speak) a measure of political leverage usually associated with hard power. Successful soft power strategies made monarchs appear as reliable, strong and caring representatives of the nations, as the embodiments of its specific values. At best, monarchies emerged as stable and crisis-proof forms of government that were not inherently incapable of progressive transformation. Writing in the *Sozialistische Monatshefte* in 1909 even Ludwig Quessel, a Social Democrat journalist and parliamentarian, insisted that it was 'beyond doubt that the democratic demands of our programme could be realised just as well within a democratic monarchy as within a democratic republic' and argued against any violent upheaval to end the monarchical system.[36]

Faced with so little opposition, even from its enemies, popular monarchism could function as a 'comprehensive ideology of integration' through which large, politically active sections of society could be tied to an increasingly nationalized monarchy.[37] On a national level, this kind of support was apt to strengthen solidarity within state and society: a dynasty concerned with social welfare and the promotion of national culture could function as an integrative element. Yet again, this could work both ways. An obvious beneficiary of the nationalization of politics, a monarch could in turn build pride in the nation. As a direct consequence, the international standing of a monarchical state could benefit and monarchical figures contribute positively to inter-state relations. As members of a 'Royal International' (J. Paulmann) monarchical states were thus part of a process that, as Dieter Langewiesche observed, 'achieved or allowed the great work of the re-ordering of Europe through a number of phases in a relatively non-violent fashion'.[38]

The phenomenon of monarchical survival in nineteenth-century Europe thus poses questions about the relationship of soft power and hard power. On the one hand, there is a straightforward story about monarchs—constitutionally restrained, increasingly domesticated—losing their grip on hard power and fighting a resourceful rearguard action against their steady decline by equipping themselves with soft power as a, more or less satisfactory, hard power ersatz. Yet monarchs of the age (and their heirs) often continued to control significant residual forms of hard power and usually proved reluctant to relinquish them—even as they were gaining new soft power resources.

David Cannadine reminds us that even the Victorian monarchy—frequently regarded as the crown that had advanced most in a constitutional and parliamentary direction—revolved around a queen who 'believed that the monarchy's powers were "her appenange [sic] by gift of God", and that they must be preserved and handed on "unimpaired" to her successors'. In this she was at one with her husband Albert, who—for all of his commitment to royal philanthropy and domestic virtue—aimed 'not to diminish the power of the crown, but to enhance it'.[39] Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia, that paragon of bourgeois virtue, entertained the same ideas, and the fanciful neo-absolutist bombast that characterized the attitudes of his son, Kaiser Wilhelm II, are too notorious to require illustration.[40] Here, too, Nye's analysis of the interplay of these different forms of power provides an interesting concept: Smart Power—'defined as strategies that successfully combine hard and soft power resources in differing contexts'.[41] It appears plausible that this kind of notion—rather than interpretations that privilege narratives of steady decline, flaccid self-embourgeoisement or rigid persistence—provides a better understanding of the changing relationship of monarchy and power in nineteenth-century Europe.

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This volume offers a multifaceted and interlocking selection of studies on the uses of soft power skills by the heirs to the crowns of nineteenth-century Europe. In so doing it breaks new ground and also shines light on the political cultures of often under-explored European monarchies, such as Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, Greece and Italy—which can be read alongside the developments in more frequently analysed royal families such as those of Britain, Prussia or Austria-Hungary. The studies make clear that the cultivation of soft power skills and related areas of activity sprang from a political imperative—adaptation and self-preservation were a necessity for monarchical systems increasingly under pressure—rather than being the product of any congenital generosity or innate moral superiority on the part of the royals. It thus opens up a prominent historical phenomenon for dispassionate scrutiny. It allows us to examine the impact of this dimension of monarchical behaviour on the culture, society and politics of nineteenth-century Europe. And since monarchies are still highly active in this very arena, the consequences of the royal conquest of soft power remain a topical issue to this day. The chapters in this volume are grouped into four thematic sections: (I) Conduits of Communication, (II) Persuading Sceptical Audiences, (III) Emotional Appeals and (IV) Dynastic Identities.

Nineteenth-century monarchies had to confront the challenge of communicating their message to their new, enlarged and increasingly powerful political audiences. They had to make a publicly visible and audible case for their own continued and refreshed relevance and thus build legitimacy on new foundations. Part I, 'Conduits of Communication', explores a variety of ways in which these monarchical messages were disseminated and how successful were these methods. *Maria-Christina Marchi* explains that the emerging political market place was amongst the conceptual spaces where this task could be tackled in nineteenth-century Italy (Chap. 2). Here, the princely couple that would one day ascend the throne could be displayed in a visible and mobile royal 'Shop Window' that was suited for the young country's material and political culture. It also allowed the monarchical offering to compete with other narratives. In Chap. 3 *Kristina Widestedt* investigates the relationship between the monarchy as performers of public events, the press and the spectating crowd in Oscarian Sweden. Focusing in particular on the visual dimension, the study makes a case for considering the levels of agency of the witnesses of such events. Public diplomacy, the importance of royal visits and of ceremonial travel are at the centre of Chap. 4. *Erik Goldstein* surveys the visits to the United States of America of various members of the younger generation of Europe's monarchical families and gauges the means and limitations of this conduit of the royal message. The section concludes with *Milinda Banerjee*'s investigation of the ideas behind and responses to the trips the heirs to the British throne made to Bengal. Chapter 5 will pay particular attention to the visual perceptions of these occasions and how they were linked—in both British and Indian discourses—to notions of kingship.

Part II, 'Persuading Sceptical Audiences', examines moments of tension. While it formed part of the monarchical legend that hereditary succession within legitimate and established dynastic systems would deliver smooth and continuous generational transitions that spared countries upheaval and friction, this was often far from the truth. There were many cases where the anticipated succession aroused feelings of reservation, apprehension or downright hostility. Where the future rulers had to perform in front of sceptical audiences (or where their own political and stylistic choices even helped to foment such scepticism), crucial aspects of the task of a royal heir and their application of soft power techniques are thrown into sharp relief. This section opens with *Trond Norén Isaksen*'s examination of the lengths to which the younger generation of the Swedish Bernadotte dynasty went to win over their subjects within the Norwegian part of the union of their two crowns (Chap. 6). While sustained efforts were made here to employ the 'power of presence', this did not, in the end, suffice to secure the survival of the union. Chapter 7 considers the rather different case of 'Bertie', the Prince of Wales whose scandalous lifestyle tarnished not only his reputation but threatened to damage the prestige of the royal family. *Jane Ridley* suggests that these dangers were averted by a mixture of his own readiness to engage in some philanthropic work, the complementary role performed by his wife Alix and—counterintuitively—by the attractiveness his reckless masculinity held for some of the British public. An instructive contrast to the usual desire to win the public's favour is provided by *Alma Hannig*'s analysis of the Austrian heir Franz Ferdinand, whose limited and reluctant use of soft powers was never intended to win popularity but to prepare the ground for extending his own monarchical power (Chap. 8). 'Not for him the friendly wave', a contemporary observed caustically.

'Emotional Appeals', the focus of Part III, played a vital role in the transformation of nineteenth-century European monarchies. Acting like what Ute Frevert has called 'politicians of emotions' (*Gefühlspolitiker*),[42] heirs were now expected to win their subjects over for the royal cause by appealing to their hearts. This section will address how crown princes and crown princesses contributed to the public image of their dynasties through the medium of emotion. Heirs and heiresses seem particularly suited to connect with diverse audiences in this way through carefully staged rites of passage such as marriage or childbirth or through the physical attractiveness of youth. In Chap. 9 *Monika Wienfort* discusses the broad issue of the appropriation of the language and symbolism of family and its associated virtues and emotions for communication both within the monarchical sphere and between royals and their subjects. As the analyses presented in the following two chapters show, the magic of royal attraction developed into a spell cast by both princes and princesses alike. Chapter 10 illustrates how male heirs in late nineteenth-century Spain were raised and presented to exude a male aesthetic conveying a sense of independence as well as military and athletic prowess. *Richard Meyer Forsting* demonstrates that their handsome features were communicated through a careful management of visual media. Heiresses, like Princess Alix, the wife of the Prince of Wales, could also turn into celebrities. *Imke Polland* argues in Chap. 11 that Alix achieved the status of a role-model for fashion and grace that could win the monarchy a dimension of cultural leadership. In twentieth-century monarchies, such as post-war Britain, the public management of the emotional dimension—such as the love between an heiress and her betrothed—emerged as an essential part of royal PR strategies. In Chap. 12 *Edward Owens* uses the debate that arose over Princess Elizabeth's engagement to Prince Philip to show how emotions had become a tool that allowed royals to make their own decisions while having them publicly endorsed.

Part IV turns to the issue of 'Dynastic Identities'. As they had done for centuries, nineteenth-century monarchies continued to draw on heritage and tradition. In fact, this proved to be a key feature in their efforts to secure their influence in the age of European nation building. They used narratives steeped both in their own dynastic past and in the history of the nation to build and maintain (imagined) communities. Loyal subjects could thus feel united with their most exalted family, which now acted as the first representatives of the nation. The studies in this section will explore how heirs sought to generate, represent and utilize values which linked their dynasty to values which had built a glorious past. Their aim was to attract the nation's allegiance with a promise of a great future mirroring the glories of the historical narrative thus created. Adopting elements of an assumed collective national identity—such as the archaeological heritage and athletic prowess of Ancient Greece—could help the foreign Glücksborg dynasty to create support and acceptance within their chosen Hellenic nation, as *Miriam Schneider* demonstrates in Chap. 13. *Jeroen Koch* also shows that references to dynastic values could be employed to build trust in national structures that were still as fragile as the newly formed Kingdom of the United Netherlands (Chap. 14). Using very similar narrative patterns, individual figures, such as Prince William of Prussia, could fashion their own public image in line with an idealized version of his dynasty's most revered virtues. In Chap. 15 *Frank Sterkenburgh* examines how the literary genre of the authorized biography was used to serve this particular end.

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Each of these sections offers the reader new findings that generate a fuller, more nuanced understanding of the wider issue under consideration. But each section also allows the reader to focus on a specific analytical angle, yielding comparative insights. Our exploration of conduits of communication, for instance, invites us to assess the implications of the collaboration between monarchy and different forms of the media not only for the royals, but also for the development of the media landscapes in monarchical polities, and what price the media had to pay for being part of the royal show and the commercial dividend it paid. When assessing sceptical audiences and how soft power techniques were applied to win them over, the reader will be able to consider to what extent the presentational skills adopted by monarchical systems papered over important social or constitutional cracks, thus hiding them and delaying their proper repair. Similarly sceptical questions may arise in connection with the injection of emotions into the political performance of monarchies: did this benefit the development of a problem-orientated and rational approach to issues of political and social modernization? Finally, the use and dissemination of collective dynastic values needs to be seen in context when such constructs could be applied in ways that sought to exclude sections of society or discourage opposition and internal freedom.

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PART I

Conduits of Communication

CHAPTER 2

The Royal Shop Window: Royal Heirs and the Monarchy in Post-Risorgimento Italy, 1860–1878

Maria-Christina Marchi

On 22 April 1868, in the midst of a large adoring crowd, the King of Italy, accompanied by the young Prince Umberto, heir to the throne, and Princess Margherita in her white, daisy-studded wedding gown, made their way towards the church where the two young royals would be united in holy matrimony. With reports that as many as 50,000 people had travelled to Italy's dynastic capital, Turin, the piazza where the newly married couple appeared after the religious ceremony exploded with resounding cheers and unanimous *evviva*. The newlywed Prince and Princess of Piedmont subsequently travelled down the entire Via di Po in their carriage. Leaving all court etiquette behind, they greeted the crowds that had so numerously and enthusiastically gathered to celebrate this new beginning. Like luxury objects on display, the couple were paraded through the city, close enough for the ordinary people to see them, yet kept at a distance in order to maintain regal splendour. Both part of the crowd and simultaneously towering above it, the prince and princess spent the days before and after the wedding engaging with their people—from all sectors

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of society—and allowing Italians a glimpse into the life of its new royal family.

The wedding of the heir to the Italian throne marked a watershed moment for the peninsula's dynastic and media politics, as well as those of national display. The agenda moved away from heroic representations of the quasi-mythologized figures of the king, Vittorio Emanuele II, and the freedom-fighter Garibaldi, who, along with Cavour, had stood at the helm of the unification movement. The decade that followed required a seemingly more approachable representation of the newly unified country's national identity. The distancing from the heroic era of the Risorgimento was *necessary*, yet the direction it would take was still unclear.[1]

Efforts to achieve unification had brought together members of different political parties and social classes: republicans, democrats and monarchists had united during the Risorgimento period. Once the ideal of unification was (largely) achieved, the question of what political and constitutional form united Italy should take remained open. Among the ruling class there emerged a widespread belief that only the monarchy could unite the masses, because the concept and institutions of royalty were familiar to the overwhelming majority of the population.

The leading politician Francesco Crispi, who had been a fervent advocate of republican principles before unification, became one of the main builders of this new, 'national' royal image. He even wrote a pamphlet arguing that the Savoia were the only way to construct a truly unified country based on popular will: 'the monarchy unites us', he claimed, '[and] a republic would divide us'.[2] Crispi firmly advocated that it was the duty of both the monarchy and the people to 'create traditions', in order to make unification successful and build national cohesion.[3] This awareness that unity and national culture needed to be created denotes a conscious effort in constructing an Italian identity. Moreover, such an invention of tradition should also allow for a link to be established between crown and people, and between the region of Piedmont and the rest of Italy—both of which were crucial factors in consolidating post-Risorgimento Italy.[4] Thus, the engagement with the people and the decision to display the wedding on a public stage brought national attention to the royal couple and determined their subsequent role as living embodiments of *italianità* (Italian-ness), a form of 'cultural capital' which existed even before Italian unity.[5]

The evolution of nineteenth-century monarchy proceeded in the direction of enhanced public visibility and thus responded to the royals' need to be seen. This was achieved in a multitude of ways, including reproductions of photographic images (*cartes de visite*), the sale of objects and various paraphernalia, and royal visits and events. These were all important for creating the stage for the soft power play adopted—to varying degrees—by most of Europe's monarchies.[6] This chapter focuses on the role the Savoia family played in creating Italy's national monarchy and italianizing the peninsula in the post-unification period. The monarchy's central task consisted in the production and dissemination of a certain set of public images of itself throughout the country. These images were meant to show the monarchy as concerned with the wellbeing of the nation. Keen to appear modern and approachable, the monarchy was meant to act as an example of Italian-ness and help nationalize the still-fragmented peninsula. This was to be achieved through a variety of methods, aimed at making the dynasty's image accessible to all, while at the same time maintaining a certain sacral aura around the royal house.[7]

Like a precious and much sought-after object displayed behind the glass pane of a shop window, the monarchy was thus visible to all yet accessible only in theory. Distanced and shielded, though seemingly close to its people, the Italian royal house was not, however, exclusively focused on its cultural, ceremonial and philanthropic roles, like, for instance, the British monarchy seemed to be. Rather, following the example of the German and Austro-Hungarian monarchies, the Savoia found themselves balancing two very different functions of the Italian crown: that of being a political power player and at the same time one which based itself on domesticity and familial love. These ostensibly bourgeois values laid the ground for soft power politics through the presentation of idealized notions of domesticity and familial love. The part played by monarchies in creating a framework for wielding soft power will be analyzed to show how the marketing of Italy's monarchy—and especially the activities associated with the *future* rulers of the country—developed between 1860 and 1878, the period following unification. The focus will mainly be on the first heir to the throne, Umberto, and his wife and son, Margherita and Vittorio Emanuele III.

The monarchy, and especially the heirs to the throne, needed to be presented in a new way in post-Risorgimento Italy. As the only monarchy on the peninsula which had maintained a constitution, the Savoia's role as modern rulers seemed already cemented. However, this concept was merely attractive to the intellectual elite and not as easily sellable to the masses. The monarchy thus had to be displayed more widely, by employing the media developments of the time, for instance photography, as well as reviving older customs, such as travel and public display. In order to understand how this evolved, the way in which the monarchy was exhibited behind the glass pane of the national shop window—the creation of a 'symbolic market'—will be analysed.[8] This metaphor will serve to evaluate how the monarchy was displayed to the people, and what it was that made people stop and look at what was being presented. Who were the 'shopkeepers' that managed the display? The monarchy; the government? Who was the shop window aimed at specifically? Was it aimed at one part of society, or all of it?

Another dimension to which this metaphor points is the concept of exchange. Since shopping implies buying and selling, the question must be asked as to what the currency of exchange was: loyalty, devotion, control? And finally, was the relationship between the 'shopkeeper' and the 'customer' a mere business arrangement, or something more? Moreover, the competing shop windows (such as the symbolic goods proffered by the papacy and Giuseppe Garibaldi) that emerged during the long nineteenth century must also be taken into account as rivals in shaping the nation's identity after unification.

A focus on the heirs to the throne can reveal how soft power strategies evolved. While new approaches to national monarchical politics that were developing during the second half of the nineteenth century included royal pageantry and theatrics, the previous generations of monarchs were much more familiar with their traditional roles as absolute rulers. Carlo Alberto (1798–1849) and his son Vittorio Emanuele II (1820–1878), had been the first royals in Italy to bridge the gap between absolute and constitutional monarchy. Although hailed for having introduced and enforced a constitutional system, they still largely remained entrenched in the absolutist traditions within which they had grown up.

Vittorio Emanuele II had been educated to become a soldier and thanks to this military upbringing was able to assume a leading role in the wars of the Risorgimento. He was credited with being the 'father of the fatherland' and his role as unifier of the nation turned him into a legendary figure. After 1860, statues of him were erected all over the peninsula, especially after his death in 1878, when a statuomania ensued and his image adorned countless pedestals.[9] Unlike Umberto and Margherita, his son and daughter-in-law—who were presented to the people via an accessible shop window and mixed with the crowds at public events and festivities—Vittorio Emanuele II was raised on pedestals far above the crowd. The distance between his statues and his people mirrored his role as monarch. Personally uninterested in generating soft power, Vittorio Emanuele remained detached from later attempts to nationalize the country. His refusal to change his name from Vittorio Emanuele II and become Vittorio Emanuele I of Italy highlighted his rejection of any responsibility to act in the interest of consolidating national unification.

Thus, the public's attention was directed to the more malleable princely couple, and ideas of identity and national aspirations were projected onto them by parliamentarians, the national press and the rising official monarchical narrative. Their image was much easier to adapt to the evolving, self-aware public.[10] Rather than being lifted onto a plinth high above the bustle of daily life, the heirs moved to the much more accessible shop window. The way in which the heirs interacted with the public was novel to the Italian people, and not something that Vittorio Emanuele II was trained to do, which made it a key strategy in generating soft power. Therefore, the attention of the media, and through it (supposedly) the attention of the public, were shifted to the Prince and Princess of Piedmont, who played a crucial role in fashioning a more visible and accessible monarchy.

The reason for this was the delicate position in which both state and crown found themselves after the first wave of unification (1860–61). Not only had the Savoia deposed the numerous monarchs that had ruled across the Italian peninsula before 1860 (including, at the cost of excommunication, the Pope), but they also hailed from Piedmont, the northernmost part of the country, near the French border, which made them seem even more like foreign usurpers. Bestowing legitimacy on their rule was not an easy task. In the south, their conquest had been described as a forced *piemontizzazione* and sizeable portions of the population had remained loyal to Francesco II of the House of Bourbon.[11]

Although they did so in very different ways, both the Pope and Giuseppe Garibaldi offered competing narratives that challenged the legitimacy of the monarchy. The Vatican offered a familiar religion as a unifying tool, which pitted the Roman Church against the monarchy. It aggressively attacked the new state and encouraged the people to do so as well.[12] Garibaldi's image, on the other hand, was constructed from below as a sort of imagined alternative to how the dream of Italy had actually turned out. One of the main actors during the country's unification, Garibaldi's republican ideals meant that he could represent an alternative to the monarchy.[13] The cohesion both these movements created in certain areas of Italy rivalled the monarchy's own position. Thus, in order to publicize their image throughout the new kingdom and to legitimize their rule, the royal family had to be presented as a symbol of national unity and *italianità*, committed to overcoming such embedded divisions.

Italy, it was felt, needed political and national education, as well as a figurehead to represent the new state of affairs.[14] In this case, the symbolic embodiment of the nation was the monarchy. Yet it had to be a 'modern' monarchy, with the right to rule bestowed upon it 'by the grace of God and the will of the Nation', ready to serve its subjects.[15] Echoing Bagehot, Italian political commentator Angelo Camillo De Meis suggested that a good monarch's duty was to understand his subjects; 'the modern sovereign is he who most thinks the public's thoughts; he whose conscience is filled with and clearly understands the populace's ideas'.[16] Comprehensibility went both ways—not only did the sovereign have to understand his people, but the masses also had to understand their monarchy. This was achieved through propaganda and ideology, and more importantly, as Thomas Richards highlights in the case of the British crown, by selling the national ideology through the image of the reigning family.[17] In the case of the Savoia, this ideology—which portrayed Italianness as being built on three main attributes: kinship, faith and honour[18]—was sold through a portrayal of the royals as first and foremost a *family*, for, as Bagehot put it, 'a *family* on the throne is an interesting idea … It brings down the pride of sovereignty to the level of petty life.'[19]

In the British case, the 'spectacle of domestic monarchy', created both a 'demythologising equality' between crown and people as well as generating an 'intimate familiarity'.[20] A similar attempt was made in Italy after 1868 with the help of the national press. There were two significant issues arising from this medium: readership and censorship. Levels of literacy were a prominent concern in post-unification Italy, especially in the southern regions, where popular education had been repressed in the belief that it could compromise the ruling classes' position of power. Therefore, in the 1861 census of the peninsula it emerged that about 78 % of the population was illiterate.[21] Not only was literacy startlingly low, but censorship was also strongly enforced, especially in the years following unification, when civil war raged in the south and martial law was imposed in certain regions. Dissident voices were silenced and mainly government-approved news was circulated. As late as 1892, conservative politician Alessandro Guiccioli wrote in his diary that 'it is not possible anymore to read newspapers, because they have all been bought by the government'.[22] Censorship allowed a pro-monarchical narrative to emerge. The story of a great nation, recently unified by the glorious Savoia family, became central to the national narrative offered by the local and national newspapers.

In an attempt to provide the monarchy with ‘a symbolic energy’, the royal wedding of 1868 was covered extensively by several national newspapers.[23] According to Maurizio Ridolfi, this event marked one of the most significant stages in the process of the crown’s popular legitimization.[24] The heroes of the Risorgimento, who had previously been the dominant figures in newspapers, were set aside and the press shifted the public’s attention to the royal couple. *L’Opinione*, a liberal newspaper, wrote that the wedding in Turin, the Savoia’s old capital, was like a ‘spark’ that had travelled down the entire country, and that such an event would ‘establish more and more the national sentiment of independence’.[25] Like royal parades, the wedding provided an opportunity for investing the external world with meaning, ‘in part by linking the past to the present and the present to the future’. and providing a ‘sense of continuity’.[26] To mark the occasion, numerous poems and pamphlets were penned, including a *canto* from the renowned poet Giovanni Prati, from the irredentist territory of Trento.[27] Prati also alluded to the idea that this young couple could prove successful in unifying Italy beyond mere geographical borders. He wrote about the princess: ‘Margherita, a great hope for Italy starts from you’, thus placing faith in her skills and her future role as princess and later queen.[28]

A political honeymoon followed. The couple travelled from Turin to Milan, to Bologna, to Florence and to the southern provinces to make their faces known. It was a ‘journey of dynastic propaganda’, which also attempted to be what sociologist Clifford Geertz would classify as a ‘nation-building exercise’.[29] According to the *Gazzetta Ufficiale*, Umberto and Margherita were ‘festively welcomed’ everywhere on their journey towards their new home Naples.[30] In Florence, the then capital of the kingdom, festivities went on for several days. The programme brought together all social strata and allowed the city’s inhabitants to witness the royals first hand. In the initial proposal, the mayor’s office arranged three days of festivities, which would include an evening event in the royal palace’s Boboli gardens with public illuminations and free access. Moreover, the programme planned to include the gifting of a bunch of flowers to the Princess Margherita on behalf of the ‘daughters of the people’, as well as a ball for all.[31] The desire to include the masses, to tie monarchy and people together, was evident. This particular shop window was meant to show the finest displays that the crown could conjure up, allowing everyone to press their nose against the windowpane.

The finalized plans for the festivities included many of these activities, with both a ball for the masses, as well as one for the aristocracy. Overall, the newspapers reported that the celebrations were a great success, but the reliability of such accounts is difficult to judge. The public security guards in charge of policing the events reported that a considerable increase in the number of tourists was to be expected and that more guards would be necessary during the days of the couple's stay.[32] This would lend some support to the newspaper reports. Thus, the royal couple seemingly did attract crowds to Florence, which made good use of the lower train prices offered on the occasion. That so many decided to make the journey implies that there was a degree of popular demand to see the heirs. As both Körner and Kertzer have argued, the public's interest might be based on the notion of 'solidarity without consensus',[33] whereby ritual and events like the wedding were important 'symbolic behaviours' which allowed for a sense of solidarity, and unity to be injected where a real political consensus was still lacking.[34]

In Naples this lack of consensus was painfully evident. The dichotomy between the north and south of the country strained the relationship between people and crown. The decision to make the ex-capital of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies the permanent residence of the Princes of Piedmont was designed to bring north and south, monarchy and population, closer together. Despite the *Gazzetta Ufficiale* stating on 18 January 1868 that the Duke and Duchess of Aosta had been 'festively welcomed' by the local, civil and military, population, the British Consul in Naples reported that the couple's 'carriage was surrounded […] by a considerable number of policemen […], which produced a bad impression […] on the whole the reception was cold and but a few vivas could be heard'.[35]

The task at hand was clearly a complex one. Aside from entrenched Bourbon loyalties and widespread *brigantaggio*—a form of banditry and rebellion against the state—there was also deep mistrust in capabilities of the northern rulers. The government was aware of popular dissatisfaction with the new regime. Universal conscription, introduced in 1861, and the implementation of a grain tax in 1869 that targeted the underprivileged, increased southern discontent. Thus, it was believed by some of the ruling figures in Piedmont that by sending the heirs to Naples the southern provinces could be won over through the couple's physical presence and visibility. As Domenico Zanichelli, an Italian jurist from Modena, wrote in his 1889 study of the monarchy and the papacy: 'The people don't understand sovereignty unless it is embodied and manifested in a visible way.'[36]

L'Opinione was 'happy that Prince Umberto and his very attractive bride have gone to Naples [...] Their presence will be like very effective propaganda of the principles that they represent; youth and grace will achieve much more concrete and extensive conquests than reason and discourse could do.'[37] The paper appeared to be openly advocating the heirs' role as symbols of national unity and the mayor of Naples also attempted to spread this notion amongst the inhabitants of the southern metropolis. On a poster plastered all over the city he announced the couple's arrival, which would be celebrated 'without pomp', but through 'acts of charity' and that the population who have *learned* to love them should show that their 'love for the dynasty is for [them] the cult of freedom'.[38]

The visual impact of the heirs' role was thus of central importance. The display in the shop window had to be impeccable, but it also had to be accessible and mobile. It would have to be altered—enhanced even—to fit the southern provinces. The region was chosen as the home for the couple's child, Prince Vittorio Emanuele, who was born in the Reggia di Caserta, a palace just outside of Naples, on 11 November 1869. Baptized Vittorio Emanuele Ferdinando Maria Gennaro, Prince of Naples, his name indicated a conscious effort to tie the crown to the south and its traditions.[39] Vittorio Emanuele was the name of his grandfather and king, hero of the Risorgimento, whereas Ferdinando was a name commonly used in the Bourbon tradition. Gennaro was the patron saint of Naples and Maria served to link, if only symbolically, the excommunicated Savoia to the church.

Three days of celebrations followed the birth of the prince. According to the local newspaper, *Il Pungolo*, they attracted between 2,000 and 3,000 revellers.[40] Schoolchildren were awarded prizes for their achievements, the city was illuminated and alms were distributed amongst the poor.[41] The most striking aspect of these celebrations was the personal donation made by the king. Only a few months earlier *Il Pungolo* had attacked the city council for allowing L.250,000 to be spent on building the prince's crib and on the celebrations that would follow. 'Instead of charitable deeds of which there is evidently need', the complaint went, 'we will have festivities and splendid presents [...] Let the population demonstrate its own spirit—do not monopolise even the expression of its own feelings and of its own wishes.'[42] These criticisms against the governing bodies did not fall on deaf ears. The image of the monarchy as an institution that loved its people and put their needs before its own had to be fostered for the successful reception of the crown and its representatives.

The role played by the crown princely couple as centrepieces of the royal display was further highlighted in 1870–1871, after the conquest of Rome. The king had already found the transition from Turin to Florence very difficult, and was reportedly not inclined to move to Rome, which was shortly to become the kingdom's capital. The first royals officially to set foot in the new Italian capital in 1871 were thus Umberto and Margherita, who made the Quirinale palace their new home. In June they took part in the *Festa dello Statuto*, a national holiday implemented by the Savoia and the government.[43] According to the records of the city council, the organizers wanted prince Umberto to inaugurate both the *tiro a segno nazionale*, a national target shooting competition set up after unification by Garibaldi and the prince, and the unveiling of the king's bust at the Campidoglio. Following a donation, a kindergarten was named after Margherita. The festivities thus revolved around the young heirs, who became the symbols of the future of the monarchy and, consequently, of Italy's future.

Visibility was only one of many components used to set up the shop window; other features were required to make the display attractive to large portions of the population. The monarchy, together with the aid of local government, which organized events, sought to approach the construction of a national identity through spectacle and ritual. But, aside from these elements, a shop usually implies that some sort of exchange, symbolic or physical, might occur. The technological evolutions that surrounded photography were particularly useful in creating a commodified monarchy.

Photographs became desirable, and affordable, physical objects. *Cartes de visite*, for example, were highly collectible items; these cheap photographs allowed the population to create an 'intimate familiarity' with the royal family, as Plunkett claims for the British case.[44] These images tapped into the emotional desires that the consumers had regarding the monarchy and allowed for the dissemination of positive images of the royals. The Duca D'Aosta's wedding to Maria Vittoria dal Pozzo della Cisterna in 1867 prompted the first Savoia family collage to be created and distributed (see Image 2.1). Although rather formal, with Vittorio Emanuele II and all of the men in full uniform, and the women lavishly dressed, it still created a sense of family amongst the various members. Moreover, throughout the second half of the nineteenth century the Savoia were made into quasi-sacral objects of devotion, especially in the southern territories where religious ritual was central to everyday life.[45] In order to

SOCIETÀ EDITRICE CARTOLINE - TORINO
Vittorio Emanuele II e la sua famiglia nel 1870.

Image 2.1 Photomontage of the Savoia Royal Family, c. 1870 © Museo Civico del Risorgimento, Bologna

construct consensus and legitimize their rule, rituals, events and images were vital in order to emotionally involve the crowds and build a 'national civil religion'.[46]

The images disseminated by the Savoia had two main focal points, the masculine-cum-military and the more feminine sphere of family. The prince and the king were mainly depicted in their military uniforms, directing troop reviews, or posing for a portrait. This type of portraiture remained very popular in Italy, even beyond the First World War. Count Guiccioli, a close friend of Margherita and prefect of Rome (1894–1896), wrote in his diary that 'our [the Italian] army is truly the most successful creation of post-unification Italy', highlighting how central the military was in defining national identity.[47]

Having led revolutions both in Europe and in South America, Garibaldi was world famous. However, unlike the Savoia's own military traditions, Garibaldi's martial achievements had very radical connotations and his alliance with the Savoia was not in line with his more radical politics. Like Mazzini, he believed in a republican solution for Italy and saw the monarchy as a means to an end, rather than the end itself.[48] Therefore, there existed a great deal of tension between the monarchy and the man who had conquered the south, followed by his *mille*. The monarchy promoted a more formal and conservative military show, which fell in line with the traditions of the House of Savoia. The Savoia men still mainly acted as embodiments of hard power and the army. This image was important for the newly constructed country, in order to show that the armed forces were as strong and united as ever. In fact, military training remained the most important aspect of the heirs' education, and the festivities surrounding the sovereign's birthday (*genetliaco*) and the *Festa dello Statuto*, were above all occasions for military parades. During public appearances, the young prince, Vittorio Emanuele III, was often dressed in military uniform, and from an early age his education revolved around all things martial (see Image 2.2). Thus, Garibaldi's more radical military style was nevertheless integrated into the national narrative.

However, the bourgeois aspect of the Savoia dynasty was mainly restricted to the feminine sphere, especially to Margherita and her son Vittorio Emanuele. They tended to appear in much more relaxed poses in their photographs, demonstrating the natural closeness and affection between mother and son and encapsulating the notion of family. As these images show, the two appear to epitomize an idealized mother–son relationship, and prints of the two of them are among the most numerous surviving images of the time.[49] Their relaxed poses, the mother placing her hand on her son's shoulder, suggest intimacy, yet also propagate the idea of domesticity and family, which in turn appear to represent a degree of normalcy. Moreover, the young prince usually appeared dressed in various typical regional costumes, making his image adaptable to customers peering into shop windows across the country.

Margherita essentially added the feminine touch that Vittorio Emanuele II's rule lacked. His wife had died before unification and the country had no female presence to look to. The notion of family as a propaganda tool was almost non-existent in the royal sphere before the 1868 wedding, but the centrality of family was a universally accepted Italian principle. During the wedding Margherita was gifted pearls that had belonged to Vittorio Emanuele's deceased spouse. Such a symbolic passing on of the responsibility of future queen highlighted the importance of female royal influence in garnering support for the Savoia family.[50] She quickly became central to many facets of Italian life: to the country's fashion industry, its newspaper stories, its cuisine and its intelligentsia. Her wedding dress became the first of many outfits to feature prominently in newspaper narratives, with an


Stengel & Co., Dresda e Berlino. Ser III. 13202.
S. A. R. il Principe di Napoli erede al Trono,
nato il 11. Novembre 1869.

Image 2.2 *Carte de Visite*, HRH Prince of Naples (1890s) © Museo Civico del Risorgimento, Bologna entire magazine (*Margherita*) being dedicated to showing Italian women how to become just like her.

This magazine, published in 1878, became a very popular fashion *vade mecum*, suggesting methods for copying the royal's ways and looks. Her role, especially in public, seemed to outshine her husband's, with many writers at the time pointing to her as 'full of spirit' and a possible 'Garibaldi of peace'.[51] In the age of peace she—and her dynasty—would become the symbol of Italian-ness, just as Garibaldi had been during wartime. It was even argued that she might be 'the only man in House Savoia'.[52]

The amalgamation of the monarchy's physical visibility, together with its commodification—the 'dissemination of the self'—allowed the limits of royal influence to be stretched to a national level.[53] A symbolic market was being created, within which monarchy sought to sell a cohesive, national ideology to the people in return for loyalty to the crown.[54] By buying into this narrative, the customer was seemingly buying into the ideals of Italian-ness, which, while still tenuous, foregrounded certain values, such as family, unity, belonging and belief in the armed forces. This form of consensus implied that political organizations were able to produce ties of solidarity between the people and the national idea by disseminating material meant to 'make Italians' in exchange for their belief in the secular religion of monarchy.[55]

This desire to spread Italian-ness becomes more apparent through the organization, all over the peninsula, of exhibitions designed to promote the different layers of Italian identity. As early as 1861, a Great Exposition was set up in Florence, to highlight the national character. In 1871 an international marine exposition was inaugurated in Naples, and in Florence one was organized to celebrate female labour. In 1881 the Italian Industrial Exposition opened in Milan, and in 1884 Turin hosted the largest Italian National Exposition. These events, which celebrated the most banal as well as the most crucial elements of *italianità*, created constructed *lieux de mémoire*.[56] Although not necessarily places which themselves were sites of memory, they acted as symbolic proxies for the formation of an Italian identity, in the same way that the royal shop window on the main street did.

The 1861 exhibition in Florence—the first of its kind—was under the patronage of Prince Eugenio of Savoia-Carignano, a cousin of Vittorio Emanuele II's father, who was also in charge of aiding the ex-Grand Duchy of Tuscany's transition into the new Italian kingdom. In a report submitted to him in 1867, the exhibition's commission explained that the

1861 event had been set up ‘for political reasons’. It ‘proclaimed Italian unity, appearing to give a sense of effective completion to the extraordinary endeavour of the construction of the *patria*’ and its mission was to fight the ‘sense of isolation’ that permeated the disjuncture of the newly unified country.[57] It had a clear scope of bringing the country together, in the same way that monarchy was meant to.

The crown was very closely tied to these occasions. Margherita became the patron of the *Esposizione Nazionale del Lavoro Femminile*, and a commemorative medal was struck for the occasion. On one side it depicted a woman, needle in hand, bent over her work. On the other was the portrait of the princess, accompanied by the names of eleven Italian cities.

The Exhibition of Fine Arts, held in Naples in 1871, was the object of a memoir regarding the event, an increasingly common publication genre in post-Risorgimento Italy. The author, Pietro Coccoluto Ferrigni, was an Italian patriot and lawyer from Livorno, born to Neapolitan emigrant parents. He described the exhibition in great detail—its artefacts, the rooms—and in the introduction he drew attention to the inauguration of the exhibit: ‘The King […] the King! […] Vittorio Emanuele, with his tanned soldier-like face and with his pleasant gentlemanly countenance, was sitting in the first carriage, next to the prince Umberto, the princess Margherita, and the *principino* of Naples, and he returned his greetings to the population, visibly touched. The princess was as beautiful as always, that kind of delicate and suave beauty that is lit up by intelligence and kindness.’[58]

This extract offers a glimpse into the everyday world of a monarchy that was attempting to become national by attending festive occasions meant to delineate what the nation actually signified. Although Ferrigni’s description may have been coloured by his own personal political affiliations, the episode shows the united family front, the attention to appearance, and above all a desire to interact with the crowds, to be *seen*. In their shop window display the royals were presented to the people all dressed up and beautifully adorned—they were an ideal to live up to.

Nonetheless, many people were not able to purchase at the luxury end of the royal retail business—with commemorative coins and other memorabilia perhaps being out of the reach of the masses. Yet these parts of the population still made an effort to offer something in return for the spectacle. Both the cities of Turin and Florence determined that the best way of celebrating the wedding was by presenting Margherita with two very symbol-laden gifts, which were offered on behalf of the entire population.

The Minister of Education gave her a signed copy of celebrated Italian author Alessandro Manzoni's *On the Unity of the Italian Language and How to Spread it* (1868). The city of Turin provided the manuscript and a beautifully bejewelled box, 'an admirable piece of art', to contain the work.[59] The city also presented Margherita with a fan, which was displayed at the Palazzo della Accademia, and according to a contemporary commentator—whose sympathies did not lie with the royal family—it attracted 'great crowds'.[60]

In Florence, conscious attempts were made to use historical and symbolic ties to connect the Savoia family with the new capital and the new kingdom. In this case, the gift, as reported by the *Gazzetta Ufficiale*, was a piece of jewellery which could be used both as a brooch as well as a diadem. The design consisted of a daisy, a *margherita*, intertwined with a *fleur de lis*, the Florentine symbol. The gift was put on display for three days—once again allowing for public involvement and in order to promote a sense of popular inclusion in the gift-giving act—before it was presented to the princess.[61] However, the occasion also points to the divisions within this public of royal consumers. In fact, the general public were allowed three days to view the present, and one day was reserved for the leading political figures and nobles of the area, suggesting that the division between societal strata was still very much a reality. The royal shop was thus open at different times for different classes, implying that vicinity to the crown still depended on one's position in society. However, this division was seemingly overcome during public functions, when all could celebrate the monarchy in unison. In fact, so as to exteriorize this bond, Margherita wore the diadem during her entrance in Florence on 30 April 1868. The notion that the people were involved in the gift giving allows the creation of a personal dimension in the relationship with the crown. As Alexis Schwarzenbach has argued, especially in relation to *cartes de visite*, this sort of exchange was key in the nationalization of the monarchy.[62]

The shop window thus worked both ways—producing material and immaterial goods for popular consumption, but also attracting objects and attention from the population in exchange. It illustrates how the image of Italian monarchy was constructed, mainly from above, in order to make the notion of monarchy and Italian identity completely indivisible. Although the pressure from outside, competing businesses, like the papacy and Roman Catholic religion, and Garibaldi's republicanism, rendered the challenge even more difficult, a sustained attempt was made to bring the monarchy down from the pedestal of the Risorgimento and into the national spotlight of the *piazzas*. The transition, which largely began during the decade 1868–78, continued throughout the nineteenth century, attempting to balance the martial and domestic, as well as the traditional and modern sides of the monarchy in order to best appeal to the Italian audience.

There existed an unyielding effort, despite competing narratives and political instability, to present the crown in the national shop window in order to emotionally and culturally tie it to the masses. The shopkeepers, which were made up by government officials as well as by simple individuals, wanted to help display a symbol which could appeal to as many different people as possible, while still maintaining a sacral aura around the crown. Image-builders such as Crispi made the monarchy into a symbol of Italian-ness, dressing up the royal mannequins in national identity ideals. The extent of the heirs' personal agency to shape their own image was limited and the only one to truly show interest in the nationalizing project was Margherita, who 'miraculously conquered Rome',[63] and whose patriotism was well documented, and that of her son Vittorio Emanuele III, who reportedly believed that 'monarchies need to follow social movements or else they will disappear'.[64]

The desire to portray a royal family that was both modern and traditional, both legitimate and new, was a complex task, and the plethora of voices that needed to be appeased—the southern dissidents, the unhappy republican intelligentsia—meant that the shop window was eye-catching, yet at the same time incredibly cluttered. The lack of cohesion, and the desire to unite the peninsula yet still appeal to the local cultures, meant that the monarchy's aim to italianize the country was a difficulty ridden uphill climb.

NOTES

1. Bruno Tobia (2002), *Una patria per gli italiani: spazi, itinerari, monumenti nell'Italia unita (1870–1900)*, Rome, iv.
2. Francesco Crispi (1865), *Repubblica e monarchia: a Giuseppe Mazzini, lettera*, Turin, 5. Catherine Brice (2010), *Monarchie et Identité Nationale En Italie: 1861–1900*, Paris, 10.
3. Crispi (1865), 80.
4. See: E.J. Hobsbawm and T.O. Ranger (eds) (1992), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge, 101–65. In his chapter 'The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: the British Monarchy and the

'Invention of Tradition', c. 1820–1977', David Cannadine argues that the ruling elite consolidated their ideological dominance by exploiting royal pageantry as propaganda, instilling ideas of historical continuity and exchanging power in the monarchy's case for popularity. A similar phenomenon can be seen, to a lesser degree, in the Italian case.

5. Nicholas Doumanis (2001), *Italy*, London, 10.
6. The term 'soft power' was coined by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. in his book *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York 1990), and further developed in *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York 2004). As he explains in the latter volume, 'soft power' is 'attractive power […] the soft power of a country rests primarily on three sources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)', 6–11.
7. See Emilio Gentile (1996), *The sacralization of politics in fascist Italy*, Cambridge, MA. Also see Matthew Feldman and Roger Griffin (eds) (2004), *Fascism: Fascism and Culture*, London, 43. David I. Kertzer (1988), *Ritual, Politics, and Power*, New Haven, 2; Kertzer refers to this phenomenon as 'sacralisation of power'.
8. Siegfried Weichlein (2004), *Nation und Region: Integrationsprozesse im Bismarckreich*, Düsseldorf, 342.
9. The concept of statuomania, which derives from French historiographical discourse, refers to a phenomenon that, in the Italian case, flourished in the post-Risorgimento years and consisted of a considerable surge in numbers of monuments erected, throughout the peninsula, especially in honour of the Risorgimento's holy trinity: Vittorio Emanuele II, Giuseppe Garibaldi and Giuseppe Mazzini.
10. The notion of the rise of a self-aware public is developed by Jürgen Habermas in his (1989) *The structural transformation of the public sphere: an inquiry into a category of bourgeois society*, Cambridge, MA, 1–26; 30. As in the Italian case, Habermas's public sphere refers to a rising bourgeois class and the structures it is involved in, such as the political realm, the world of letters and the market of culture products, which Habermas analyses in the second chapter of his work. It is this rising bourgeois class (although very small in the Italian case) that I am mainly referring to when discussing a 'self-aware public'.
11. In 1860s, fear of such *piemontizzazione* was widespread in the south of Italy and concern was voiced by Pasquale Villari who exposed the

north to these issues in his letters that were eventually published in the newspaper *L'Opinione* in 1875, see: Pasquale Villari, (1878), *Le lettere meridionali ed altri scritti sulla questione sociale in Italia*, Florence.

12. Martin Papenheim (2003), 'Roma o morte: culture wars in Italy', in: Christopher Clark and Wolfram Kaiser (eds), *Culture Wars: Secular–Catholic Conflict in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, Cambridge and New York, 202–26, 216–17. Papenheim illustrates this by analysing the points of contact between crown and church, such as religious masses. The performance of the *Te Deum* was tied to both traditions, monarchical and ecclesiastical, and neither wanted to dispense of it. It was, as Papenheim puts it, 'a war without boundaries'.
13. Lucy Riall (2007), *Garibaldi: Invention of a Hero*, New Haven, 365–67.
14. John Anthony Davis (ed.) (2000), *Italy in the Nineteenth Century: 1796–1900*, Oxford, 168.
15. 'Statuto Albertino', http://www.quirinale.it/qrnw/statico/costituzione/statutoalbertino.htm, accessed 12 December 2015.
16. Angelo Camillo De Meis (1927), *Il sovrano, saggio di filosofia politica con riferenza all'Italia* (1868), Bari, 9. See also Walter Bagehot (1867), *The English Constitution*, London, 99, where he states that the monarchy could be successful because it was 'an intelligible government. The mass of mankind understand it.'
17. Eva Giloi (2011), *Monarchy, Myth, and Material Culture in Germany 1750–1950*, Cambridge and New York, 7; Thomas Richards (1991), *The Commodity Culture of Victorian England: Advertising and Spectacle, 1851–1914*, Stanford, 5.
18. This triumvirate of values was first identified by historian Alberto Banti and constitute the basis for ideas of Italian-ness. This is naturally a simplified list of values; however, it is very useful in identifying the core attributes of the time. See: Alberto Mario Banti (2006), *La Nazione Del Risorgimento: Parentela, Santità e Onore alle Origini dell'Italia Unita*, Turin.
19. Bagehot (1867), *The English Constitution*, 104.
20. John Plunkett (2003), *Queen Victoria: First Media Monarch*, Oxford, 133 and 163.
21. Tullio De Mauro (1995), *Storia Linguistica dell'Italia Unita*, Rome, 36.
22. Alessandro Guiccioli (1973), *Diario di un conservatore*, Milan, 173.

23. Paolo Colombo (2004), 'Una Corona per una Nazione', in: Marina Tesoro (ed.), *Monarchia, tradizione, identità nazionale: Germania, Giappone e Italia tra Ottocento e Novecento*, Milan, 24.
24. Maurizio Ridolfi (2003), *Le Feste Nazionali*, Bologna, 31.
25. *L'Opinione*, 7 February 1868, 1.
26. Axel Körner, (2009), *Politics of Culture in Liberal Italy from Unification to Fascism*, New York, 198.
27. *Irredentismo* was a political and cultural movement that was born in the late 1860s and which developed throughout the nineteenth century. It favoured the extension of the Italian national borders to include regions that were perceived as culturally Italian, such as the Trentino. It became one of the driving forces of the First World War and was seen as the last step in the completion of Italian national unity.
28. Giovanni Prati (1868), *Canto di Giovanni Prati*, Prato, 1.
29. Carlo Casalengo (2001), *La Regina Margherita*, Bologna, 46; Ugoberto Alfassio Grimaldi (1970), *Il re "buono"*, Milan, 56; Clifford Geertz (1983), *Local Knowledge. Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology*, New York, 201.
30. *L'Opinione*, 24 November 1868, 1.
31. Archivio del Comune di Firenze, CF 4975, 'Feste date dal municipio nell'occasione del matrimonio di SAR il Principe Ereditario con la principessa Margherita di Savoia. 1868. Inserto 3, Incartamento relativo alle Notificazioni e Programma.'
32. Archivio del Comune di Firenze, CF 4975, 'Feste date dal municipio nell'occasione del matrimonio di SAR il Principe Ereditario con la principessa Margherita di Savoia. 1868, Inserto 36. Incartamento relativo alle Guardie di Pubblica Sicurezza.'
33. Kertzer (1988), 67.
34. Körner (2009), 197.
35. The National Archives, FO 45/130, 18 January 1868, 'Consul at Naples; Bonham'.
36. Domenico Zanichelli (1889), *Monarchia e papato in Italia: saggio*, Bologna, 221.
37. *L'Opinione,* 24 November 1868, 1.
38. Poster, G. Capitelli, Museo del Risorgimento di Milano, Archivio Bertarelli.
39. Archivio di Stato di Roma, Archivio Araldico, Stato Civile di Casa Savoia: Atti Vari, 'Fede di Battesimo di S.A.R. il Principe Vittorio Emanuele Ferdinando Maria Gennaro, Principe di Napoli, 11 November 1869.'

40. *Il Pungolo,* Anno X, Sunday, 28 November 1869.
41. *Il Pungolo,* Anno X, Saturday, 27 November 1869.
42. *Il Pungolo*, Anno X, Wednesday, 8 September 1869.
43. Ilaria Porciani (1997), *La Festa Della Nazione: Rappresentazione Dello Stato e Spazi Sociali nell'Italia Unita*, Bologna, 161–2.
44. Plunkett (2003), 163.
45. Porciani (1997), 153.
46. Ridolfi (2003), 12.
47. Guiccioli (1973), 52.
48. Giuseppe Mazzini (1861), *The Italian Question and the Republicans*, London, 3–4. He sees the struggle for Italy as a revolution, and one that might need monarchical intervention initially, but which ultimately is about national freedom.
49. As seen in the *ICCD*, the Italian national photography archive.
50. See: Catherine Brice (2006), 'Queen Margherita (1851–1926): The Only Man in House Savoy', in: Regina Schulte, *The Body of the Queen: Gender and Rule in the Courtly World, 1500–2000*, New York, 195–215.
51. Guiccioli (1973), 23; Aldo di Ricaldone (ed.) (1989), *Lettere (1862–1924)*, Rome, 52.
52. Romano Bracalini (1983), *La Regina Margherita*, Milan, 11.
53. Margaret Homans (1998), *Royal Representations: Queen Victoria and British Culture, 1837–1876*, Chicago, xxi.
54. Weichlein (2004), 342.
55. Kertzer (1988), 67.
56. See Pierre Nora (1989), 'Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire', *Representations* 26, 7–24.
57. Francesco Protonotari (1867), *Esposizione italiana tenuta in Firenze nel 1861 Relazione generale,* Florence, 6–7.
58. Yorick (1883), *Vedi Napoli e poi: ricordo dell'Esposizione nazionale di belle arti*, Naples, 25.
59. *L'Opinione*, 24 April 1868.
60. Luigi Re, *Quando Torino era Capitale, 1854–1892*, Archivio Diaristico Nazionale, 34.
61. Archivio del Comune, Firenze, CF 4975, 'Offerte dal Municipio di Firenze in occasione delle Auguste Nozze delle LL. AA. RR. Il Principe Umberto e la Principessa Margherita. Inserto 40, Incartamento relativo al Dono offerto dal Municipio alla Augusta Sposa.'

62. See Alexis Schwarzenbach (2004), ‘Royal Photographs: Emotions for the People’, *Conteurohist Contemporary European History* 13, 255–80.
63. Ugo Pesci (1971), *I primi anni di Roma capitale. 1870–1878*, Rome, 60.
64. Paolo Paulucci (1986), *Alla corte di Re Umberto: diario segreto*, Milan, 148.

CHAPTER 3

A Visible Presence: Royal Events, Media Images and Popular Spectatorship in Oscarian Sweden

Kristina Widestedt

This chapter adopts the perspective of those at the receiving end of royal soft power: royal subjects. While historical research has focused on strategic and symbolic power demonstrations by royal personages, the public reception of these communicative efforts has been less explored—one obvious reason being that the royal subjects of past eras are no longer available for interviews. However, newspapers and magazines in the media archives provide us with the means to establish a connection not only with the great men and women of history, but also with the crowd that constituted the historical public.

Although historical performance studies rooted in various disciplines (theatre, music, film etc.) have made valuable contributions to the research on historical audiences and have occasionally extended their reflections to the conceptual distinction between audience and public, there remains a lack of empirical studies of historical publics *as publics*, that is as collective bodies with a capacity to perform political actions and possessing

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a potential influence within society.[1] When it comes to royalty studies, scholarly interest in royal subjects has been scant. Their presence at royal events has rarely been observed and problematized, neither as an audience nor as a public. Aiming to address this research gap, the following study will try to provide an outline for developing the concept of the historical public into an analytical tool by turning away from the royals, directing the gaze towards the subjects looking at the royals, and towards the reporters looking at the subjects looking at the royals.

The Public Gaze

Without doubt, the fundamental relationship in a monarchy is that between monarch and subjects. This is, however, not a mutually constitutive relationship—while the ruler certainly needs the ruled for existential as well as semantic reasons, royal subjects have the (albeit theoretical) possibility to choose between remaining loyal to the monarch or taking power into their own hands. This potential is usually expressed in terms of *public opinion* or *the public voice*, a metaphor implicitly creating a preferred position for public political action: to speak up, to raise one's voice, has become the standard model for popular democratic empowerment in practice as well as in scholarly contexts. In deliberate contrast to this, political theorist Jeffrey Edward Green has outlined what he calls 'an ocular model of popular power' based on the practice of spectatorship.[2] Briefly, Green argues that 'the eyes of the people' serve important political functions by (a) placing the relationship between the people and their leader(s) at centre stage, (b) elevating the people's spectatorship into an empowered form of looking: a *popular gaze*, and (c) critically evaluating the personal characteristics of the leader(s).[3]

For my purposes here, this political empowerment of the spectator's position provides a perspective on the public presence at royal events that goes beyond the mere numbers of onlookers and allows the popular interest in 'seeing the royals' to take on a greater significance. Arguably, through the conceptualization of a popular gaze, individual acts of looking merge into a collective act of watching, thereby assigning politically charged meanings to the sensationalist urge for celebrity spotting, and transforming the collective of spectators from an audience to a public in possession of an empowered gaze. To include the media representations of this public and their spectatorship in the conceptual frame, *the public gaze* will henceforth be employed as an extended operationalization of Green's original concept.

What is this public gaze, and how could it be employed in analyses of media texts? According to several theories of gaze, the gaze as such should be understood as an empowered form of looking that occupies a superior viewing position and engages in close observation, critical inspection and sometimes surveillance.[4] Green's conceptualization of the popular gaze is in agreement with this: the popular gaze is collective, evaluative and implicitly disciplining.[5] The public gaze, as defined here, adds a dimension of publicness to the popular gaze: it resides in public spaces, and it is subject to mediation. But what happens when the popular gaze gets mediated? Film scholar Laura Mulvey argues that mediation of the gaze (any gaze) more or less imperceptibly reproduces its superior viewing position and transfers it onto the media audience.[6] This should make it possible for the researcher to explore not only the workings of contemporary mediated gazes, but also, by studying historic media texts, the viewing position of the historic public gaze.

The media theorist John B. Thompson draws a parallel between, on the one hand, the ability of communication media to detach the phenomenon of publicness from the sharing of a common locale, and, on the other hand, their ability to circulate symbolic forms beyond their context of production. On that basis he argues that 'the sphere of mediated publicness is extended in time and space'.[7] This extension in time and space is decisive for the present study.

Thus, combining the meanings of Green's popular gaze and Thompson's mediated publicness with a historical approach, the public gaze will serve as the primary tool for the following analyses of mediated public spectatorship, one of the common practices of the historical public—or, if you wish, an aspect of historic public life. Thus equipped, we will enter the streets of Stockholm, Sweden, as described in news reports about royal family events shortly before and after the turn of the nineteenth century.

King Oscar and the Media

The reign of King Oscar II (1872–1907) frames the introduction of new popular media in Sweden. In this respect, he is the Swedish equivalent of British Queen Victoria, 'the first media monarch'.[8] During Sweden's Oscarian era, still and moving images had their breakthrough, alongside Edison's phonograph, and were greeted enthusiastically by king and subjects alike. Newsreels of King Oscar opening exhibitions and receiving foreign monarchs are some of the oldest items in Swedish film archives, and the monarch's funeral in 1907 was cinematographed by several film companies.[9] The development of media technologies in the decades around the turn of the century is made obvious by comparing press reports from the stately events that framed King Oscar's reign: his coronation in 1873, and his funeral in 1907. During this period, the daily, weekly and monthly press gradually developed their technical capacity for image reproduction, as standard illustrations transformed from drawings through woodcuts and lithographs to studio portraits and news photography. Arguably, this increase of accessible visual reproduction techniques contributed to a slow but significant change in royal reporting.

In the pre-photography stage of the daily press, the coverage of royal appearances in public typically contained no visual images at all, or sometimes a single drawing with a bird's-eye view of the scene and its principal actors. Reports from King Oscar's coronation in Stockholm 1873 followed this pattern. The coverage in *Dagens Nyheter*, a popular Stockholm-based newspaper, consisted of long and detailed descriptions of the solemn procedure and its chain of events. Published on the actual coronation day, however, the texts were obviously written before the event had taken place, and details were corrected the following day to account for the heavy rain that had affected the coronation procession.[10]

With photographs increasingly used as a means of documenting royal appearances and events, writing reporters were able to gradually release themselves from the frame of descriptive representation and devote part of their attention to contextualization and interpretation of the events at large. The coverage of King Oscar's funeral in December 1907 provides an example of this reporting style. Press photographs displayed a variety of scenes: the king lying on lit de parade in the Royal Castle; interiors from the royal burial church on Riddarholmen; Swedish and foreign royals and dignitaries attending the funeral; and panoramas of the funeral procession passing thousands of sombre-looking Stockholmers lined up along the streets to catch a glimpse of the coffin. Although the people's presence was rather set aside in the footage, the headlines demonstrate an awareness of the important part played by the royal subjects in this carefully staged spectacle: 'King Oscar carried to his final rest on year's first beautiful winter's day. Thousands and thousands of spectators yesterday. Stockholmers queuing in minus 7 degrees from 6 AM yesterday morning.'[11]

Material and Points of Departure

The core material examined for this article consists of reports in two daily newspapers, Dagens Nyheter and Aftonbladet, on the receptions of two newlywed royal couples in Stockholm shortly after their weddings abroad: Crown Prince Gustaf and his spouse Victoria of Baden in 1881, and their eldest son Prince Gustaf Adolf and Princess Margaret of Connaught in 1905. Separated by a period of twenty-five years, these events illustrate the changes in media technologies and reportorial styles outlined above. They also, and more importantly, allow for comparisons of the positioning and behaviour of royal subjects as they were represented in news texts and footage from the occasions. The explorative point of departure draws on the concept of the public and on Green's model of ocular democracy in proposing that ordinary people present at such events possessed the opportunity to perform other, more empowered, roles than that of obedient participants in carefully staged performances of royal soft power.

The analytical challenge consists in capturing the mediated representations of these collective roles in a historical media material. Due to the traditional procedure governing royal family events and the formulaic character of royal reporting, the repertoire of possible roles is rather narrow and tends to be consistent through time. Arguably, this extends the validity of my analytical findings from single texts to the genre level.

Maintaining a focus on the visibility of the spectators in texts and imagery, the questions guiding the analysis are: In what situations were the people in the streets represented in texts, illustrations and photographs? Which words were used to describe them, what were they doing, how were their actions characterized? And based on that: in what capacities did the people participate in royal events, and what can be deduced about their ways of looking at the royals in general and the new princesses in particular?

1881: Living Walls and Implicit Rules of Conduct

When Crown Prince Gustaf married Princess Victoria of Baden in 1881, several loose ends in Swedish royal history were tied up: the relatively young Bernadotte dynasty (established in 1818, when Oscar II's grandfather Jean Baptiste became King Carl XIV Johan), through Victoria's noble lineage, became blood related to the two most prominent families preceding them on the Swedish throne: the Vasa and the Holstein-Gottorp dynasties. These fortunate circumstances were addressed in the festive decorations adorning the city of Stockholm on the first arrival of the newlywed couple, with the crowned pavilion raised by the boat landing on Riddarholmen covered in portraits of great Swedish kings, Carl XIV Johan being the most recent.[12] This display of royal family history linked Victoria and Gustaf even more closely together than the ties of marriage by emphasizing the couple's (allegedly) shared ancestry, and predicted, as it were, solid royal legitimacy and glorious prospects for their future offspring.

Neither of the two dailies studied contained any photographs or illustrations of the occasion, and the events were narrated to the readers in chronological order. The royal personages constitute the stable centre of the narrative, with the crowd appearing and disappearing in flickering images as the cortège carriage rolled through the streets of Stockholm.

Both papers opened their narrative with the royal couple's arrival in Stockholm on board the steamer *Sköldmön* ('The Valkyrie') from Drottningholm Castle in Lake Mälaren, succeeded by descriptions of the presumed view from the sea, with the heights on the south bank of the city filled with cheering people, flags and streamers waving from every flagpole by the seaside, and even the scruffiest firewood-boats decked with flags.[13] This is our first encounter with the happy crowd, a figurative idea frequently appearing in descriptions of royal events of this nature. The primary function of the happy crowd is to act in the name of the nation, expressing feelings of collective joy and embracing a festive mood for celebrations with the royal family. Its equivalent, the unhappy crowd, could be seen in the reports from King Oscar's funeral described above.

As the narrative develops, the city of Stockholm spreads out before the reader's eyes. The reporters' position by the central landing spot on Riddarholmen offers a magnificent view of church towers, flags, pillared bridges, beautifully decorated buildings… and a colossal mass of people, serving as props in the scenery and doing nothing besides being present. Like the flags and decorations, their primary function in the picture is that of being looked at. This throng of royal subjects, seemingly indispensable to any manifestation of monarchical splendour, constitute, as it were, the incarnation of the nation proper, lending it the contours of their physical mass and the life of their bodies. Further on in the story, the masses of people are described as 'living walls', rising in streets and pathways along the route taken by the cortège—a powerful yet dehumanizing metaphor of the masses as construction material for the nation. This perspective recurs on a smaller scale as grammar school pupils positioned under six gigantic poles in Birger Jarl Square are described as ‘living pyramids’, and a large number of girls in white dresses curled up in the windows of their private school with flowers in their hands are referred to as ‘a living decoration’.[14]

These are the two main perceptions of the collective of royal subjects: the emotional mass, and the physical mass. While the former serves to designate and express a national mood suitable for the occasion, the latter is employed as a symbol and sign of the nation’s subjection and loyalty to the royal family. In both cases, the homogeneous and disciplined behaviour of the mass stands out as a decisive element in its characterization.

In contrast to the mass, there are individuals or small groups of people who act differently and attract the reporters’ attention. These conspicuous elements in the crowd are constructed either as norm breakers behaving badly, or as norm benders behaving daringly but in an amusing and creative manner. On this particular occasion, we are introduced to a number of ‘voyeuristic onlookers’, having crowded into boats of all sizes close to the landing site. In contrast to the cheering multitudes on the south banks, this group of people are mentioned in negative terms, and more or less snubbed for behaving incorrectly. Were they perhaps too close to the centre of events? Even though the social distance between royals and subjects remained unthreatened, intrusions in the symbolic void supposed to surround the princely couple were apparently not appreciated. This reaction is best understood in the light of an observation repeatedly made by sociologists and media scholars: social order is articulated and preserved through the implicit yet unconditional connection between people’s social status and their physical proximity to the centre of power, which at this time was the royal family.[15] At symbolically significant events such as this, the contact between royals and commoners should adhere strictly to protocol, lest the aura of royalty be tarnished.

In the category of amusing and creative norm benders, we find a resourceful shop boy who had built an amphitheatre out of packing boxes and now charged 75 öre per person for an elevated viewing spot; a man placing his stepladder at people’s disposal for a small sum of money; a couple of gymnasts climbing up a drainpipe all the way to the second floor before being pulled down by the police (thus ultimately behaving badly although still amusingly); and a few voyeuristic onlookers suspended from a balcony by ropes, ‘tangling like spiders in a broken web’.[16]

The space between mass and individuals is occupied by loosely composed groups of royal subjects living their part in the celebrations a little too intensely. Their actions may be perfectly legitimate but they are prone to exaggeration. At this particular event, reporters picked on the hundreds of people taking to the roofs of the buildings surrounding the route of the procession, the beau monde occupying windows and balconies, and the thoughtless women throwing inappropriately large bouquets of flowers at the princely couple, who occasionally had to protect their heads from these floral missiles. In their descriptions of these actions, reporters adopted a police point of view and rebuked group members for disturbing the smooth workings of the public celebration ceremonies, even though the disturbances were caused by exaggerated royalist zeal rather than by acts of popular protest.

A prominent role in the reception ceremony was played by fifty young and reportedly flourishing girls, dressed in white and wearing bows in Sweden's and Baden's colours. They had been assigned the symbolic task of strewing the newlyweds' path with flowers as they came ashore. Standing in perfect formation, the youngest up front and the older slightly behind, they awaited the arrival of the royal steamer. When Prince Gustaf and his bride had left the reception pavilion and boarded their carriage, the spectators standing round the pavilion 'quickly darted forward to grab a trampled-down flower as a souvenir from the occasion'.[17]

This contrast between the well-disciplined performance of the young co-participants in the ceremony and the impulsive yet affectionate behaviour of the bystanders indicates that two parallel sets of rules guide the royal subjects at public events. One is obviously the formal protocol that outlines ceremonial procedure, thus regulating the actions of the royals and other participants in the events, and assigns special areas to the masses, in public places close to the centre stage. While the formal protocol does not involve the actual behaviour of the masses, this topic is of some concern to reporters, who distinguish between expected, accepted and reproved collective actions, thus simultaneously constructing and referring to an informal protocol for public behaviour, and exercising the right to correct the public when it makes mistakes.

In a previous study on the concert audience in Stockholm as represented in music journalism during the nineteenth century, I found that the words designating the audience affected the power relations between music critics, musicians and listeners. When the concert audience were referred to as representatives of the music-loving public, their approval or disapproval of a performance was framed as the public opinion. Correspondingly, when the concert audience were regarded as a gathering of fans and musical amateurs, their behaviour in the concert hall could be framed as overly emotional and their opinions reproved and contradicted by music critics.[18] Arguably, a similar pattern is activated in the news reports from the public reception ceremony of Crown Prince Gustaf and Crown Princess Victoria in 1881, with reporters distancing themselves from the collective of royal subjects and adopting a disciplinary role from an implied, though unsolicited, expert position. Besides indicating an unequal relationship between press and people, the construction of a superior reporter position points to a deferential attitude towards the court, in accordance with Plunkett's findings.[19]

Now to the theme of looking: what can we deduce about spectatorship and empowered gazes, based on the results of the analysis so far? We have observed that the main characteristic guiding the representations of norm breakers and norm benders appeared to be their pronounced desire to *see* the royal couple, a desire that led them to take inappropriate actions in pursuit of their goal. In contrast, the large masses were conceived as quite content with merely showing up at the scene to enjoy the event and then go back home. This construction of the collective of royal subjects leaves little or no room for political empowerment—apparently, the masses have no gaze. While the norm-flouting individuals were all eyes, they are depicted as scattered among the crowd and thus unable to unite in a collective gaze. The lack of representations of significant looks at the royals is arguably a prominent feature of these news reports. However, at least one instance of the evaluative public gaze appears, in a passage stating that the crown princess seemed immediately to capture the hearts of the city's inhabitants: '"How very kind she looks", was the phrase on everyone's lips along the cortège route, and many silent blessings doubtlessly mixed with the jubilant cheers. It was deeply felt that everyone was aware of the importance of this day and willing to do anything they could to make a good impression on the young princess. May this have been successful.'[20]

In conclusion, the analysis of this case leaves us with the impression of a hierarchical society where the royal subjects were indeed subjected to the king and other members of his family. Their main obligation on this occasion was to demonstrate their loyalty and affection in public. The papers served as mediators between the royals and the people, on the one hand confirming the national importance of the events through their extensive reports and on the other hand articulating the implicit expectation that every royal subject should feel loyalty and affection towards the king. Ultimately, then, the press bowed to the king and looked down on the public—a position that disagrees with current perceptions of the press as a representative and spokesman for the man in the street. The public gaze, in terms of a politically empowered collective look at the royals, was not represented in the news reports.

1905: A Sea of Handkerchiefs, and Walking Reporters

Crown Prince Gustaf's and Crown Princess Victoria's eldest son, Prince Gustaf Adolf, went westward to find his bride, Princess Margaret, who was introduced to Swedish newspaper readers as 'a daughter of Albion'. *Dagens Nyheter* related the story of the young couple's arrival in Stockholm on 9 July 1905 in a magnificent dramaturgical sweep.[21] The narrative begins with a prologue in Nynäshamn, south of Stockholm, at five o'clock in the morning. The train accommodating the newlyweds had been parked there overnight and their embarkation on the royal yacht HMS *Drott* was set to take place. Men from the local shooting club paraded the area, and despite the early hour, schoolchildren with British and Swedish flags formed a line along the red carpet from the railway platform to the landing stage. Cute little girls in white or national dresses carrying wicker baskets filled with marguerites had lined up closest to the royal waggon. When the royal couple appeared on the platform, they were greeted by the county governor Mr Isberg, and Professor Sjögren, the owner of the nearby manor. The presence of these gentlemen is typical of the reports from this royal event, where several prominent officials were identified by name, thus made to stand out from the crowd and the small groups of royal subjects, and forming a subcategory of local celebrities, themselves potential objects of public attention. Needless to say, they were all men.

A picture reporter from *Dagens Nyheter* accompanied HMS *Drott* all the way through the archipelago and into central Stockholm, thus having the opportunity to depict festive decorations and popular celebrations outside the city. The pictures he presented from the journey are reminiscent of the national romanticist landscape paintings from the time, with a calm blue sea reflecting the sunny sky, with grey and green islands floating peacefully in the Baltic, boasting villas and boathouses adorned in green leaves and cheering people flocked onto bare rocks like strange flowers. In contrast to the rather inert crowd of 1881, the inhabitants of the archipelago were represented as active and resourceful, waving with wreaths and bouquets, and singing 'God save the King' in unison as the royal yacht passed by. Despite their being very numerous, they were not referred to as a mass—people, spectators, the population, being the words employed.

As the yacht approached Stockholm, ‘a dark, shifting, moving band of rows and rows of spectators’ could be seen on the hills and heights, in the streets and quays of the city. And when the princely couple at long last were visible from the shore, the quays ‘turned snowy white with handkerchiefs’ and cheers rolled over the water.[22] The waving of handkerchiefs, hats and flowers in personal greetings to the royals represents a new element in the 1905 repertory of collective actions. So does the waiting, in streets and squares, on stairs and windowsills, in balconies and attic rooms. The long wait for the royals was repeatedly brought up in the texts, although always paired with remarks on the good-humoured patience among the waiting crowd; a pattern implying that reporters carefully avoided conveying even the slightest hint of possible popular discontent (Image 3.1).

In the heart of the city, ‘masses of people’ were packed in the streets as far as the eye could see, and people—‘ladies too!’—had climbed the roofs of the buildings adjacent to the landing site. Numerous cameras facing the reception pavilion were placed on the roof of the castle, and when


På Gustaf Adolfs torg.

Image 3.1 Stockholmers watching the arrival of Prince Gustaf Adolf and Princess Margaret on 9 July 1905, ‘På Gustaf Adolfs torg’, *Dagens Nyheter*, 10 July 1905 members of the royal family began to gather up there, they attracted the attention of ‘tens of thousands of eyes’. The presence of cameras in such a central spot reveals that successful negotiations between press and court had taken place before the event, thus predicting the gradual change in social dynamics that would eventually lead to the press and other news media replacing the royals as the symbolic centre of power.[23]

As the procession took off towards Norrbro, ‘tens of thousands of throats’ offered a hearty welcome, and the common opinion of Princess Margaret, expressed by ‘thousands of mouths’, was reportedly: ‘Oh, how pretty she is!’ In transforming the masses of people to certain body parts—eyes, throats, mouths—the reporter accentuated the essential actions expected from them: looking, cheering and talking to each other. The latter is particularly interesting, as it suggests the existence of a politically empowered, or at least opinionated, public. However, direct quotations from members of the audience are few and far between. Besides the alleged general opinion of the princess’s good looks, a woman squeezed in between a group of tall men and apparently seeing nothing of the royal cavalcade reportedly asked (with a rural accent), five minutes after the passing of the carriage, when the royal couple would show up. And an old lady waiting in front of the castle emphatically calls out ‘I certainly don’t come away from Stockholm empty-handed, now I’ve seen Queen Sophia’.[24] Neither of these utterances implies a political empowerment of the public, rather the opposite. Being a spectator apparently remains the primary, expected role for the royal subject.

However, a comparison points to considerable changes in reporting style between 1881 and 1905. The reporters’ superior distance to the people in the news reports from Crown Prince Gustaf’s and Crown Princess Victoria’s arrival in Stockholm is no longer present 1905. Instead, the distanced attitude has been replaced by a more democratic approach to the events, with reporters joining the crowd to capture the royal festivities from a popular perspective. This meant that the royals were no longer in the narrative centre. Rather, the reporters’ position among the crowd rendered the princely couple slightly ephemeral, as they came and went in the blink of an eye. The rapid passing of the carriage, a recurring theme in the reports, is met with resigned acceptance by the patient spectators, who nevertheless resist the implicit request to disperse when the cavalcade has passed by and remain in the streets amusing themselves: listening to the music corps, looking at the parading military, or even dancing in long and winding lines in Gustaf Adolf Square, opposite the castle.[25]

Most likely, one of the cameras on the roof of the Royal Castle belonged to *Dagens Nyheter*, since the news report in that paper included four photographs, one of which presented a bird's-eye view of the reception pavilion outside the castle. In contrast to 1881, the reports from this royal event were illustrated, in *Dagens Nyheter* with photographs and drawings, and in *Aftonbladet* with drawings only. The photographs may not be very good by modern standards, but their motives reveal their status as a medium. With no exception, the photos display the royal protagonists and/or the means of transport they used during the festivities: the barge carrying them ashore from HMS *Drott*, the carriage drawn by six horses. This conscientious effort to show the newspaper's readers the true likeness of the royals indicates at once the confidence placed in photography as a truthful source of representation, and the symbolic value of photography in modern news reporting. With cameras present at the centre of events, reporters were no longer the primary source for details of the royal family members' actions and appearances. As we have seen, this meant that journalists could leave the press gallery and walk the streets as anonymous observers, bringing different perspectives to the news story.

In both papers, drawings are a realm reserved for the people. Hastily drawn sketches capture the backs of a multitude of simply dressed spectators crowding in front of decorated buildings, or the many heads turned towards the passageway of the royal carriage. Arguably, this clear-cut division of labour between photos and drawings reflects at once the contemporary social hierarchy with the royals on top and the people below, and the exchangeability and anonymity of the royal subjects as opposed to the individual features of the members of the royal family. The photographs of royalty were probably looked at with considerable popular interest, even though it is impossible to tell in retrospect whether this curiosity was sparked by the photographic reproduction technology or by the royal personages in the images.

Press Photography and Royal Reporting

With the introduction of press photography, public demand for regular reports on the whereabouts of royal family members could be met with actual visual evidence. Indisputably, this had favourable effects on all parties involved: the royals multiplied the reach of their display of soft power without having to multiply the number of their public appearances; the reporters widened the scope of their journalistic coverage; and the reading public obtained visual access to the royal family on a regular basis. As Plunkett convincingly demonstrates, the straining and intrusive presence of press photographers (not to mention the even more intrusive film cameras) at royal family events initially reinforced rather than dissolved the hierarchical relationship between court and press, and turned the distribution of press tickets to such occasions into a more or less humiliating process of reportorial flattery and royal grace.[26] However, its popularity rapidly turned photography into the late nineteenth-century's dominant medium of realistic representations, not only in newspapers and magazines but also within the (bourgeois) family sphere and among contemporary celebrities from all walks of life. This meant that the conditions for royal photographic reporting were propitiously affected from several directions at once.[27] Considering that the contemporary market for photographs was large and constantly growing, it is reasonable to regard the public interest in the appearances of Crown Princess Victoria and Princess Margaret as simultaneously caused by and causing an increased dissemination of photographic images in late nineteenth-century Sweden.[28]

Without doubt, giving reporters and photographers privileged access to royal events affected the established power relations between the royals and the press and eventually transformed royal information policy towards an increased openness, thus laying the foundations for a modernization of monarchy. Correspondingly, it may be argued that the paradigm change in reportorial style, from mono-perspectival texts focused on royal personages as the verbal and visual centre of events, to multi-perspectival texts with one eye on the royal protagonists of the events and the other on participants and onlookers, gradually brought about a democratization of the content in royal reporting. This is already evident in the present study, and adds a new perspective to the scholarly discussions of news photography.

The Public Gaze Revisited

The ultimate intention guiding the empirical approach chosen for this study—to disregard news discourses about princes and princesses in favour of news discourses about royal subjects looking at princes and princesses—was to get closer to a phenomenon tentatively defined as *the public gaze*. I expected to find (traces of) evidence of an empowered form of looking at the royals, representations of a collective popular gaze with the capacity to critically evaluate the personal characteristics of members of the royal family as symbolic leaders of the nation. Regrettably, my expectations were not completely fulfilled, neither in the first nor the second case study. The sole element of mediated public evaluation in these news reports concerns the appearances of two foreign princesses brought to Sweden by two generations of heirs to the crown—a superficial matter, devoid of all political empowerment of the public. Or is it, really?

Provided that the royal female body is in fact the only entity subjected to a public evaluation in these news texts—public in both senses of the word—how can we understand this? Let us return to our central concept, the gaze. As an empowered form of looking, the gaze signifies the superiority of one symbolic viewing position over another: male over female, doctor over patient, the white colonizer over the non-white colonized.[29] A superior viewing position can be expressed in a number of different ways, all of which are more or less repressive and controlling in character: surveillance, rules of conduct, physical violence, sexual or racial harassment, and so on. Arguably, the public gaze activates two superior viewing positions: the collective over the individual, and the public over the private. In both cases, repression and control are exerted in the form of unanimous and public evaluation. Accordingly, I want to argue that the comments on the appearance of royal women, by reporters and by an undivided crowd, be interpreted as instances of the public gaze. The new princesses were without doubt being publicly measured against a norm of royal female beauty.

Following Green, such public evaluation should concern the personal and political qualities of the king as leader of the nation. That this is not the case in our material may be an effect of the traditional social order still prevailing in Sweden at the time. Then again, it may reveal a collective viewing position based on male superiority over women, regardless of their social status.

NOTES

1. See, for example, Miriam Hansen (1991), *Babel and Babylon*, Cambridge, MA; James Johnson (1995), *Listening in Paris*, Berkeley and Los Angeles; Richard Butsch (2000), *The making of American audiences from stage to television, 1750–1990*, Cambridge; Bruce McConachie (2008), *Engaging Audiences. A cognitive approach to spectating in the theatre*, London. See also Richard Butsch (2003),

'Popular Communication Audiences: A Historical Research Agenda', *Popular Communication* I (1), 15–21, for a well-informed discussion about the caveats as well as the potential gains of studying historical audiences.

2. Jeffrey Edward Green (2009), *The Eyes of the People: Democracy in an Age of Spectatorship*, Oxford.
3. Jeffrey Edward Green (2009), 8–14.
4. See, for example, Michel Foucault (1973), *The Birth of the Clinic*, London; Laura Mulvey (1975/1992), 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema', in: *The Sexual Subject. A Screen Reader in Sexuality*, New York and London, 22–34; E. Ann Kaplan (1997), *Looking for the Other: Feminism, Film and the Imperial Gaze*, New York and London.
5. Jeffrey Edward Green (2009), 1–31. The evaluative discourse characterizing popular appreciation of celebrities is further developed by Julie A. Wilson (2010), 'Star Testing: The Emerging Politics of Celebrity Gossip', *The Velvet Light Trap* 65, 25–38.
6. Laura Mulvey (1975/1992).
7. John B. Thompson (1995), *The Media and Modernity. A Social Theory of the Media*, Cambridge and Stanford, 235–49.
8. John Plunkett (2003), *Queen Victoria. First Media Monarch*, Oxford.
9. Pelle Snickars (2007), 'Julius Jaenzon som privatfilmare', in: Mats Jönsson and Erik Hedling (eds), *Välfärdsbilder—svensk film utanför biografen*, Stockholm, 50–73.
10. *Dagens Nyheter*, 12 and 13 May 1873.
11. *Dagens Nyheter*, 20 December 1907.
12. *Aftonbladet*, 3 October 1881.
13. *Dagens Nyheter*, 3 October 1881.
14. *Dagens Nyheter*, 3 October 1881.
15. See, for example, Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz (1992), *Media Events. The Live Broadcasting of History*, Harvard; Nick Couldry (2003), *Media Rituals: A Critical Approach*, London; Louise Phillips (1999), 'Media Discourse and the Danish Monarchy: Reconciling Egalitarianism and Royalism', *Media, Culture & Society* 21, 221–45. See also Kristina Widestedt (2009), 'Pressing the Centre of Attention: Three Royal Weddings and a Media Myth', in: Patrik Lundell and Mats Jönsson (eds), *Media and Monarchy in Sweden*, Gothenburg.
16. *Dagens Nyheter*, 3 October 1881.
17. *Dagens Nyheter*, 3 October 1881.

18. Kristina Widestedt (2001), *Ett tongivande förnuft. Musikkritik i dagspress 1780–1995* [Reason sets the tone. Music criticism in the daily press, 1780–1995], Stockholm.
19. John Plunkett (2003).
20. *Aftonbladet*, 3 October 1881.
21. *Dagens Nyheter*, 10 July 1905.
22. *Dagens Nyheter*, 10 July 1905.
23. Kristina Widestedt (2009).
24. *Dagens Nyheter*, 10 July 1905.
25. *Dagens Nyheter* and *Aftonbladet*, 10 July 1905.
26. John Plunkett (2003).
27. Nancy Armstrong (2001), ‘Monarchy in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, *Nineteenth-Century Contexts* 22, 495–536; Rachel Teukolsky (2013), ‘Cartomania: Sensation, Celebrity, and the Democratized Portrait’, *Victorian Studies* 37/3, 462–75. For a historical perspective on photography’s significance for individual self-promotion, see Alison Hearn (2013), ’Sentimental “greenbacks” of civilization’, in: *The Routledge Companion to Advertising and Promotional Culture*, 24–38.
28. Abigail Solomon-Godeau (1996), ‘The Other Side of Venus: The Visual Economy of Feminine Display’, in: Victoria de Grazia and Ellen Furlough (eds), *The Sex of Things. Gender and Consumption in Historical Perspective*, Los Angeles and London, 113–50. See also Rachel Teukolsky (2013); Nancy Armstrong (2001).
29. Laura Mulvey (1975/1992); Michel Foucault (1973); E. Ann Kaplan (1997).

CHAPTER 4

Royal Ambassadors: Monarchical Public Diplomacy and the United States

Erik Goldstein

The long nineteenth century saw numerous royal visits to the United States, one by an heir apparent, several by heirs presumptive, as well as others by senior members of Europe's royal families close in the line of succession. Two of these visits were high-profile events with clear political motivations: the 1860 visit of the Prince of Wales, and the 1902 visit of Prince Heinrich of Prussia. In 1838 the French Prince de Joinville made an exploratory visit, probative of the acceptability of royal representation to the new republic. Most of the royal visits were intended either to express goodwill or brought about by personal curiosity. All of these visits, though, served to connect the rising United States with the European system from which it had sought to break away, but with which the reality of global politics increasingly enmeshed it.

The European order during the long nineteenth century was structured largely along monarchical lines. It was a century in which dynastic diplomacy was still an important aspect of the functioning of the diplomatic system, for most of the European powers. The interconnecting web of dynastic relations was integral to European diplomacy and facilitated inter-state communication. To maintain this system, the Great Powers insisted that the new states emerging out of the disintegrating Ottoman

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empire adopt a monarchical form of government, usually with a monarch chosen from one of the established dynasties. As the United States became increasingly important in international relations, its republican structure left it outside this dynastic network. It therefore became necessary to find ways to involve the American republic in what literally was, at the time, a family of nations. Several of the European powers successfully made use of their royal families as part of what today is termed ‘public diplomacy’ in their dealings with the rising American republic, and it was often the royal heirs who served as the ambassadors.

The use of royal emissaries has proven to be an effective soft power tactic within a wider public diplomacy strategy. Part of the attraction may be the paradox that royal princes were usually meant to exemplify martial virtues, that is hard power—often in uniform, holding high military ranks, bedecked with medals and wearing a sword. Yet their diplomatic use is a classic exercise in soft power, aimed at improving relations in part through the attention and publicity their visits would attract. The nineteenth century marked the beginning of the mass news media age, and increasingly with the ability to disseminate images. These colourful royal figures, quite literally colourful in the way they were dressed, with seemingly exotic lives, made perfect copy, especially in faraway North America.

The first royal visitor to the United States came from France, during the July Monarchy, building on the legacy of French support of the American cause during the War of Independence. There was a personal connection linking the July Monarchy and the American Republic. Louis Philippe had lived as an exile in the United States for four years, 1793–97, as had two of his brothers.[1] At the time he was not the heir to a throne, but he did aspire to and did ultimately ascend one. During his stay he met many prominent Americans, including George Washington. While on his American sojourn, Louis Philippe visited Cape Cod in 1797, where a new town took the name Orleans, in honour of French support for America. Appropriately, the 1898 French transatlantic cable would land at this Orleans. It would be the first of several geographical, and therefore permanent, reminders of royal visits on the American map.

After 1830, now as King of the French, Louis Philippe sent his third son, the Prince de Joinville, on two visits to the United States. In 1838 the Prince was received by President Van Buren and subsequently in 1841 by President Tyler, the first European royal family member to be a guest at the Executive Mansion.[2] News of the likelihood of the Prince’s first visit appeared in American newspapers in early August 1837, repeating news from the Paris newspapers.[3] The Prince was serving in the French navy, and as part of an extended voyage his ship would call at American ports. His ship, the *Hercules*, docked at Norfolk, Virginia, from where Joinville travelled the short distance to Washington. His movements were widely covered by newspapers from New Orleans to New Hampshire.

Joinville's visit to Washington was brief but provided him with a good overview of American politics. Although ostensibly a private visit, the French minister accompanied him to the Congress, where he heard two of the great pre-Civil War figures, Senators John Calhoun and Henry Clay, and then met Secretary of State Daniel Webster. In the evening, the English-speaking prince was the guest of honour at a dinner arranged by the French minister, Charles-Edouard Pontois. The dinner guests were a notable group. They included the former American president, John Quincy Adams, who had served a long diplomatic apprenticeship in several European royal capitals, and who was at this time a member of the House of Representatives. Also present were the Vice President Richard Johnson, Speaker of the House James Polk, who would later become president, Senator Calhoun, Secretary of the Treasury Levi Woodbury, and Attorney General Hugh Legaré, who a few days later became acting secretary of state. The list is indicative of both the importance of the visit and the areas of French interest. Adams recorded of the guest of honour that he was 'of grave appearance and great simplicity of manners'.[4]

The prince continued northward, including what became an almost obligatory visit for a European visitor, to Niagara Falls, and on to New York, Boston and finally Newport, Rhode Island, where he rejoined the *Hercules*. Frustration was expressed in New Orleans that this prince of the House of Orléans was not to visit that most suitably named city.[5] During his visit to Newport, an important naval station, the visit of the French ships awakened, 'many recollections of the revolutionary era, when the ships of war of the same nation, under the Count de Grasse, lay in their harbour as the allies of the then infant republic'.[6]

Louis Philippe is usually recalled as the 'bourgeois king', and such values were entirely welcome to the emerging mercantile class in America. Joinville's second visit came in late 1841, having first sailed to Newfoundland to deal with a fisheries dispute. From there he called at New York for his ship *La Belle Epoque* to undergo repairs, and for himself to take a trip to the Mississippi. On his return to the east coast he was the guest of honour at a grand ball of 1500 guests, held at Boston's Faneuil Hall, nicknamed 'the cradle of liberty'. The venue was almost next to where his exiled father had lived during 1796, earning a living teaching French to some of Boston's fashionable young ladies.[7] Not everyone in the United States was impressed with a royal visit. The Ann Arbor, Michigan, *Signal of Liberty* noted that not only did the tickets to attend the ball cost $10, but that 'Only *four* of the troop of fashionable ladies present had the prodigious honor of dancing with a Prince—a genuine son of a king! It will doubtless be a consolation to them all their days.'[8]

Of his second visit Joinville later recalled, perhaps wistfully, of President Tyler, 'He was a blunt-spoken man with a big nose, who had successively filled the posts of governor of his own State (Virginia) and of President of the United States, in each case in consequence of the death of the actual incumbents, whose deputy he was. He could not have done better in a hereditary monarchy!'[9] The visit was one of the memorable events of Tyler's presidency. Tyler had fallen out with the Whigs, who controlled Congress, and who harried the accidental president. As a result, it 'was a spirit of spite rather than economy that prompted Tyler's Whig enemies in Congress to withhold the appropriations necessary for the proper upkeep of the Executive Mansion.[10] Nonetheless, Tyler was determined to put on a proper display for the visiting European prince.

One of those who met the prince, Jessie Benton Frémont, a member of a prominent political family and later a notable political activist, recalled, 'The President gave for him, not only the official dinner of ceremony, but a ball also. It was said there was Cabinet remonstrance against dancing in the White House as a "want of dignity," but Mr. Tyler rightly thought a dance would best please a young navy man and a Frenchman, and we had, therefore, a charming and unusually brilliant ball.'[11] The visit also had a very visible public diplomacy event, at a reception at the White House Joinville shook 3000 hands.[12] The only other notable social occasion of the Tyler presidency in honour of a foreign visitor was a reception for Charles Dickens.

The Joinville visits were purely goodwill ones. There were not many areas of Franco-American concern during the life of the July monarchy. However, the visits indicate some of the statecraft of Louis Philippe. France's many areas of foreign policy concern did not include North America, but Louis Philippe was all too aware of the unpredictable nature of international relations. He was the only European monarch who had lived in the United States, and understood the potential of the country from personal experience. He placed it on the diplomatic agenda of countries with which he wanted to build good relations, on the principle that one never knew when it might prove useful. Friendly relations with the United States would be helpful should problems arise with Britain. Overthrown in 1848, the Orléans family harboured hopes of restoration, and retained their fascination for the United States. The Comte de Paris, the Orléanist heir apparent, served in the United States army during the Civil War, as did his brother the Duke of Chartres, and later the Prince de Joinville wrote what is considered one of the classic military histories of the war.[13]

The most famous royal visit of the nineteenth century to the United States was unquestionably that of Albert Edward, Prince of Wales, the future Edward VII, in 1860. It was also the only visit by an heir apparent before the First World War. The Prince was then just 18 years of age and embarking on his adult role. As his first major solo appearance, it was decided to send him on a visit to Canada. Once that had been decided upon it was a relatively easy leap to extend the tour to include the United States. Outstanding major border disputes with the United States had just been resolved, and this visit would provide an opportunity to consolidate good relations symbolically. It was also in some ways the beginning of a new Grand Tour, encompassing the wonders of the New World and balancing the traditional tour eastwards from Britain. Soon after he returned from this trip the Prince embarked on a tour of the eastern Mediterranean.

The plan undoubtedly benefitted from the fact that President Buchanan had previously served as Minister to the Court of St James's and knew the royal family. Queen Victoria commented more than once that she found Buchanan 'quite agreeable'.[14] She also approved of his official hostess, his 'really lovely niece, Miss Lane, (very ladylike & not *at all* American)'.[15] The driving force, though, was undoubtedly the Prince Consort. Albert saw good relations with the United States as a prudent policy. As events transpired, just a year after the Prince of Wales's visit the last note Albert wrote, on the eve of his death, was aimed at defusing the threat of Anglo-American belligerency in the turmoil of the American Civil War.[16]

The Prince of Wales entered the United States at Detroit, theoretically *incognito* as Lord Renfrew, on 20 September 1860 to be greeted by 30,000 people.[17] He travelled on to Washington where he was met on his arrival at the station by the secretary of state and driven to the White House in the president's carriage. During a 'state dinner' the city was illuminated by fireworks, and Buchanan, for the only time in his presidency, allowed card playing. But the president found to his chagrin that when he went to go to sleep all the beds were occupied and he had to sleep on a settee. Buchanan's biographer comments of the visit that, 'The occasion seemed to symbolize an end to the traditional hatreds of Revolutionary days and marked the beginning of stronger Anglo-American friendship.'[18]

The Prince also visited Mount Vernon, the home of George Washington, where he planted a tree near Washington's tomb. It was redolent of powerful symbolism at the time, with the heir of George III paying homage at the shrine of the leader of the rebellion against him, a leader who himself had rejected a crown. In 1890 the prince learnt the tree had died and arranged for an English oak to replace it. On his death, Mount Vernon sent a wreath made of oak leaves from the tree. The stop at Mount Vernon, and usually the planting of a suitable sapling as a lasting memento, became a regular feature for high-profile visitors, allowing a nice melding of royal and republican virtues.[19]

In the immediate aftermath of the American Civil War, Russia sought to build on good Russo-American relations that had developed during that conflict, and to take advantage of the Anglo-American tension arising from British policy during the war. As part of this plan it sent the Grand Duke Alexis, younger son of Tsar Alexander II, on a goodwill visit with the Russian fleet in 1872.[20] Alexis was the first Russian of prominence, and the first Romanov, to visit the United States. Alexis was the nearest in line of succession to the Tsar who was available for such a mission, and his being a naval officer made an easy rationale for the visit.

During the Crimean War there had been sympathy for Russia in the United States, a matter of concern for Britain. During that conflict, a low point in Anglo-American relations occurred when British Minister John Crampton was declared *persona non grata* in 1856 and there was briefly talk of war.[21] In 1863, during the American Civil War, the Russian Baltic fleet visited the United States, with its 3000 sailors. The visit was widely interpreted in the United States as a signal of Russian support for the Union cause, in contrast to London's cool attitude and imperial France's almost hostile one. The visit symbolically built on the linked stories of the Tsar having freed the serfs near the time of the end of slavery in the United States. The emotional bond was further strengthened with the assassination of President Lincoln in 1866, and Alexander II's surviving of a similar attack the following year. The United States Congress authorized a joint resolution to congratulate Alexander II on his escape, and President Andrew Johnson sent the assistant secretary of the navy, a man bearing the evocative name of Gustavus Vasa Fox, to deliver it. The underlying purpose was to offer thanks to Russia for its support of the United States.

In 1868, Congress conspicuously decided not to send a resolution on the escape of the Duke of Edinburgh from an assassination attempt.[22]

In 1867, Russia sold Alaska to the United States, largely to keep the territory out of British hands. The same year saw the formation of the Canadian confederation, causing concern in the United States that this would strengthen British power in North America. It was also the year of the first American ‘package tour’ to Russia, and one of the participants, Mark Twain, recounted their reception in the Crimea by Alexander II at the Livadia Palace: ‘Any man could see that there was an intention here to show that Russia’s friendship for America was so genuine as to render even her private citizens objects worthy of kindly attentions.’[23] The Americans were also invited to tour the Tsarevich’s palace. There were, however, numerous smaller problems which irritated the Russo-American relationship. The 1872 visit by Alexis ‘was a chance to smooth over the rough spots and remind both countries of past and continued support and friendship’.[24] Given that it was the Tsar’s son, there was great speculation as to what might lie behind the visit, including that it might involve some form of alliance.

This was one of the royal visits that attracted extensive media attention. In particular, the grand duke’s buffalo-hunting expedition with the great Civil War cavalry commanders General Philip Sheridan and Lt. Col. George Custer, the latter now more famous for his last stand. The grand duke’s visit to Washington in November, however, was marred by a protocol nightmare. The Russian Minister Constantin Catacazy had been declared *persona non grata* in June for his abusive language and inappropriate use of the press. He had in fact been trying to disrupt the Anglo-American Alabama arbitration negotiations, to sow further division between these two countries. His methods, however, were considered inappropriate by the American government. When this occurred, Alexis’s visit had already been scheduled, and there would need to be a Russian minister in post. For whatever reason, St Petersburg made a serious blunder in delaying the appointment of a replacement, and ultimately had to ask if Catacazy could stay through the visit, after which he would be withdrawn. The result was that the grand duke had to be introduced to President Grant by a minister who had been declared *persona non grata* by the same president. Because of this their 23 November meeting lasted only fifteen minutes, and Alexis was in the capital for only one day. All other royal visits had received or would receive formal hospitality, but the president could hardly sit at a table with Catacazy, who left his post on 26 November.

Nevertheless, Grant did not want this protocol problem to mar Russo-American relations, and he dealt with the visit at some length in his 'State of the Union' message to Congress, 'The intimate friendly relations which have so long existed between the United States and Russia continue undisturbed. The visit of the third son of the Emperor is a proof that there is no desire on the part of his Government to diminish the cordiality of those relations.'[25] Alexis had in fact made a good impression, and Secretary of State Hamilton Fish noted in his diary that the grand duke was affable, and spoke fluent English. The visit also left another royal legacy on the map of the American republic, with Alexander, Illinois being renamed Alexis.[26] The visit overall did help to consolidate positive public sentiment towards Russia. It would only be during the reign of Alexis's brother, Alexander III, and his harsh domestic policies that public opinion would begin to turn against Russia.

The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw a number of lower profile royal visits to the United States. To the extent they attracted attention, it was mostly seen as testament to both the growing importance of the country, as well as the increased ease of travel. The mountain-climbing Italian prince Luigi Amadeo, Duke of the Abruzzi, cousin of Victor Emmanuel III, attracted attention in 1897 when he succeeded in reaching the summit of Mount St Elias in Alaska. As a result, the prince was chosen in 1907 by his cousin to represent Italy at the 300th anniversary of the Jamestown settlement, and during his visit enjoyed a private luncheon with fellow outdoorsman President Roosevelt at the White House.[27] The Duke of the Abruzzi also made the now almost expected pilgrimage to Mount Vernon, where he too planted a tree. Unfortunately, on this leg of his journey he fell in love with the daughter of an American senator, and for the next six years it was thought the prince would seek to marry this American, commoner and protestant.[28] Perhaps as a consequence, this was the only Italian instance of royal representation before the First World War.

Belgium and the Netherlands did provide two royal travellers, albeit whose visits passed almost unnoticed. One was the future King Albert of the Belgians, the eventual heir presumptive, in March 1898.[29] This came just as the United States went to war with Spain, and so attracted almost no publicity. Albert did have dinner at the White House and made the usual journey to Mount Vernon. Nonetheless, the visit was later put to good use to promote the Belgian cause come the First World War when, for example, *Vanity Fair* magazine ran an article recalling this 1898 visit.

The article highlighted Albert's early empathy for the United States, calling him 'to-day the most picturesque figure alive'.[30] Albert's experience demonstrates that the impact of royal visits often possess a long shelf-life. The converse was the case with the 1906 visit by the heir presumptive to the Dutch throne, Heinrich XXXII of Reuss-Köstritz.[31] What mention there was of his visit was favourable, with the *Washington Post* deeming him 'one of the most democratic and interesting of all the younger royal sons of Europe'.[32] It observed that the prince's visit to Washington was 'not unlike those made to the Capital City by hundreds of American citizens'. However, with the birth of an heir to the Dutch Queen Wilhelmina in 1909, Prince Heinrich disappeared from American memory.

In 1893 came a visit by Archduke Franz Ferdinand, who was in effect heir presumptive to the Habsburg Empire.[33] Given the archduke's relations with his uncle the Emperor Franz Joseph, this visit does not appear to have been connected with any policy objective. The archduke was going on a round-the-world journey, through Asia and the Pacific, so a visit to the United States was an obvious continuation. His interests were a mixture of seeing the continent's natural wonders, scientific observations and an ultimately frustrated hope of big game hunting. The archduke would, unlike previous royal visitors, cross the country from west to east.

The American minister at Vienna, Frederick Grant, son of the former president Ulysses Grant, notified Washington of the archduke's plan in October 1892. The chief rationale for his visit was to see the Columbian Exposition at Chicago. Like the Prince of Wales before him, he was to be, for official purposes, *incognito* as Count von Hohenberg, but whereas his British counterpart was flexible about the application of this concept, the archduke was less so. During his visit he clearly did not enjoy his encounters with the unfettered journalists of the New World. The result was not a public diplomacy success. As one account of his visit has observed, 'the Prince seemed to go out of his way to court unpopularity'.[34]

The archduke landed in September 1893 at Vancouver and travelled south to his first American stop at Spokane, Washington.[35] The War Office had notified all army commanders along his route to receive him with the honours due his rank as the representative of a head of state. His visit had been happily anticipated, but the archduke began his sojourn with a tin ear for popular interest. He offended the local army commander by declining the proffered honour of reviewing his troops, on the basis that he was *incognito*. This did not pass unnoticed, with the *Spokane Review* commenting that the archduke, 'persistently declines to put himself in touch with the officials and people and in consequence will learn little that will be of value when he shall be called to the Austrian throne'.[36] He probably did not improve local opinion when he published an account of his global travels in 1896 in which he commented that the streets of Spokane 'displayed an unusual amount of mud which reminded me of conditions in small localities in Asia Minor'.[37] It is perhaps not surprising that in 1914 his assassination did not even receive a mention in the Spokane press.

The rest of Franz Ferdinand's journey followed a similar pattern. Despite the initial reason for his visit, he spent barely a day at the Columbian Exhibition, and skipped the Austrian Village altogether, although its participants were eagerly awaiting him. The *Chicago Times* reported that this 'brought sorrow to the hearts of his patriotic countrymen'.[38] Despite speaking excellent English, the prince avoided any opportunities during his journey to project a positive image of the Empire. On his departure, *The Washington Post* covered the news with a headline 'On! Cruel, Cruel Prince' and the observation that the archduke 'goes home to Austria almost as ignorant of this proud and happy land as he was on the day he first struck it with his royal feet'.[39]

In the wake of the 1898 Spanish–American War the United States emerged as a global actor and other world powers now vied to establish better relations with it. In 1901, Theodore Roosevelt became president upon the assassination of his predecessor, in the same year that witnessed the death of Queen Victoria and the accession of Edward VII. This provided an Anglo-American opportunity to both mourn lost leaders and celebrate new ones.

Edward had maintained his interest in the United States ever since his visit, and with his skill at personal diplomacy, was arguably the first British leader to attempt to establish a 'special relationship' with the United States. He developed a rapport with Roosevelt that lasted literally until the eve of the king's death. The other emergent world power was Germany, which around 1898 had embarked upon a policy of *Weltpolitik*. In seeking closer relations with the United States the German Emperor Wilhelm II made use of a dynastic emissary for a high-profile visit, and also corresponded with the president.

In 1902, the German Emperor despatched his brother, Prince Heinrich of Prussia, to America. German–American relations had suffered a downturn during the Spanish–American War, when there was a widespread view in America that Germany had supported Spain, with an eye to acquiring the Philippines for itself. Conversely, American perceptions of British goodwill during that brief war had led to a quantum leap in Anglo-American sentiment. Heinrich's visit therefore was an opportunity to improve the tenor of relations and move German–American relations forward. Prince Heinrich, a career naval officer, was unquestionably better at public diplomacy than his older brother, admittedly not a difficult task, and he enjoyed a warm reception throughout his visit.

The original plan was typical Wilhelm II, who initially intended this as a personal mission. When the Wilhelmstrasse learnt of it, the diplomats were aghast, and the chancellor, Count von Bülow, had to fight to make it purely a courtesy visit.[40] Wilhelm's objective seems to have been to forge an American–German anti-British coalition. Wilhelm's biographer, John Röhl, has commented that 'the most flagrant of Kaiser Wilhelm's attempts to use personal diplomacy to launch a German–American coalition against the British Empire, or at least to undermine the growing fraternisation of Britain and America, was Prince Heinrich's "political propaganda tour" of the U.S.A. in February and March 1902'.[41] Prince Heinrich was accompanied by Admiral von Tirpitz, architect of German naval expansion. In the context of ongoing Anglo-German naval rivalry, and Roosevelt's clear interest in American maritime power, the courting of the goodwill of a potential major naval ally, was evident. The mounting great power tensions in Europe were reflected in the American press, with the newspapers most critical of his visit also being those that were most Anglophile.[42]

The opportunity for the visit was provided by the launching of a new yacht constructed for the kaiser in New York. President Roosevelt agreed that his daughter Alice would christen the new vessel, and Wilhelm II sent his yacht *Hohenzollern* to be present together with his brother Prince Heinrich so as to express to Roosevelt, 'once more my sincere feelings of friendship for the United States and their illustrious head'.[43] The German Crown Prince Wilhelm was probably viewed as not yet experienced enough to be entrusted with such a mission.[44] The kaiser demonstrated some grasp, if a poor one, of the uses of public diplomacy through his deployment of visits by members of the imperial family, small personal gifts and larger public ones, and other personal marks of esteem to attempt to influence foreign leaders.[45] It is possible that Wilhelm was hoping to establish with Roosevelt a 'Willy–Teddy' relationship similar to his 'Nicky–Willy' one with the tsar.

In a country without an honours system, its place was often taken by the bestowal of honorary degrees. Prince Heinrich received the accolade of an honorary doctorate from Harvard University, the first member of a

European royal family so recognized. Even more unusually, he was awarded the degree outside normal university celebrations, an honour previously accorded only to Presidents Washington, Monroe and Jackson, and the Marquis de Lafayette. Admittedly, in awarding the degree the anglophile President of Harvard, Charles Eliot, emphasized that the prince was the grandson of Queen Victoria![46]

The visit did provide a mutual upward bump in Anglo-German public sentiment. The American embassy at Berlin predicted as a result of Heinrich's warm reception in America, 'that Americans travelling or doing business throughout Germany will receive more friendly treatment generally, and that our fellow-citizens of German origin will be less liable to be molested while sojourning at their former homes'.[47] In a subsequent despatch, John Brinckerhoff Jackson, the chargé d'affaires at Berlin, aptly summed up not only this visit's impact, but that of royal visits in general, 'in no responsible quarter is it anticipated that Prince Henry's visit will have any definite political or commercial result, but confidence felt that "it will bear beautiful flowers, if not fruit"'.[48] John Röhl, though, concludes that this 'propaganda tour' did not achieve any lasting improvement in German–American relations, as it was lost at the end of the year in yet another phase of the ongoing Venezuela crisis.[49]

Roosevelt, by then out of office but aspiring to return, met the kaiser in 1910 and in a letter to George Otto Trevelyan, he commented that he did not think the kaiser as hostile to England as Prince Heinrich, of whom he thought Wilhelm 'is rather jealous…. Prince Henry is, I believe, a more really powerful man than the Kaiser, and a more cold-blooded man; and talking with him afterwards I was by no means sure that he did not have clearly in mind the chance some day using the German fleet against England if exactly the right opportunity arose, simply on the theory that might rules.'[50] These encounters provided some insight for a leading American into the often problematic relationships between monarchs and those in the line of succession.

American interest in royal heirs was evident in the press throughout the long nineteenth century. At the end of 1907, *The Washington Post* carried a lengthy article on 'Kings Who Will Reign in the Next Generation'.[51] Britain and Germany were seen as having the most obvious lines of succession, but it went on at some length to expound on the lack of suitable, healthy, mature heirs apparent amongst European monarchies. After explaining the situation in Belgium and the Netherlands, Austria required special explanation. The fate of Crown Prince Rudolph was well known.

The Washington Post explained that the next heir, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, 'was educated by the Jesuits, but, wonderful to relate, they failed to make a clever man of him'. The Countess Chotek was clearly thought intelligent and the papers indicated a hope that eventually their children would be placed in the line of succession. Note was made of the very recent birth of an Italian heir, though it could not resist the temptation to mention King Victor Emmanuel's 'importunate and impecunious family-in-law of Montenegro'. Most of the other royal houses were viewed as either unstable or with very young heirs apparent.

During the era from the establishment of the American republic until the outbreak of the First World War, and the end of a dynastic-dominated European order, many members of the royal families served as envoys of goodwill across the Atlantic. Their chief role was to affect the 'atmospherics' in bilateral relations, either to improve or consolidate good relations. It was also part of the education of the heirs, part of their grand tours. Given the multiple links connecting them, it is not surprising that Britain's use of this tool of public diplomacy was the most effective. It could call upon common history, language and literature—with the shared reading of the great cycle of Shakespearian royal plays. The visit of the Prince of Wales probably played a role in his interest in promoting good Anglo-American relations. The very last event he planned was a state dinner with Theodore Roosevelt.

France came next in its effective use of royal emissaries, and if the July monarchy had survived this could have had a significant impact on international relations. Louis Philippe not only had learnt from his American experience but made certain that at least one of his sons would as well. Russia may not have seen an American visit as part of the education of a possible heir, but Alexis's visit certainly helped smooth over a rough spot in Russo-American relations. Italy was a new state actor, but in the decades before the First World War it was beginning to make use of a royal envoy to a country with a large Italian diaspora. As for Austria-Hungary, although it too had a large diaspora in America, it failed to grasp the possibility of building better relations with a rising new power, perhaps a symptom of a dying empire. Where Germany is concerned, here the vagaries of the statecraft of Wilhelm II come in to play. When he decided to follow up on Prince Heinrich's visit with the gift of a statue of Friedrich the Great, he raised a howl of negative sentiment against this commemoration of a figure who hardly represented the values of the republic. Wilhelm's grasp of public diplomacy was as erratic as his grasp of other aspects of that art.

These royal visits were an initial effort to socialize the United States into the patterns of international interaction common amongst the European powers. Within Europe these came with well-established patterns and rituals, but now with the New World it would require feeling their way in a society which in many ways baffled the old order. At first, royal visits, as with those of the Prince de Joinville, were made to appear as appendages to other travel plans. Even the high-profile visit by the Prince of Wales took place under the fiction that it was an *incognito* addition to his Canadian tour. By the turn of the century, such pretence was dropped, with visitors such as Prince Heinrich of Prussia being received as honoured guests of the country. All, nonetheless, attracted public attention. Whether it was Joinville's shaking an endless number of hands, or the Prince of Wales waving to vast crowds, there was a careful mix of royal mystique and public access. Clearly the sensitivity to the public importance of their visits, rather than just the quieter meetings with the elite of the republic, shows some grasp of the importance of popular opinion in a country whose political system was particularly sensitive to the popular will. Even the obscure Prince of Reuss managed to receive a positive media mention for being both a prince and travelling to Washington in the manner of most Americans. The future Edward VII's American experience may well have helped shape his future handling of his public role, to the benefit of the monarchy.

Visits, though, can be counter-productive.[52] The Grand Duke Alexis's almost failed due to the problems at the Russian embassy, but his personal charm and Wild West exploits generated sufficient goodwill and public curiosity to relegate the protocol crisis to official circles. The Duke of the Abruzzi's romantic entanglements avoided the glare of publicity, and attention rather was focused on his mountaineering. Clearly, visiting royalty needed to either be seen in person, or at least vicariously seen to be engaged in adventurous pursuits. The experience of Archduke Franz Ferdinand was clearly one of lost opportunity. Although he had not been sent with a mission by the emperor or the Austro-Hungarian government, he could have used the visit to enhance his own standing as a future statesman. There was the legacy of the Prince of Wales's success to look back upon, and a receptive audience awaiting him. His unwillingness to pay attention to the potential popular interest in his visit, his disdain for the press, and his almost antagonistic relationship with it, made the journey at the very least unproductive in diplomatic terms. But then the archduke's sense of when and where to turn out in public would prove to be a fatal flaw. The visits of European heirs to thrones in the long nineteenth century were seen in the American republic as being, in effect, embassies extraordinary rather than plenipotentiary. Their perceived success or failure hinged largely on the ability of the royal emissary to engage effectively and publicly with a broadly diffused political society.

Royal heirs as ambassadors of goodwill often served as useful complements to the career diplomats in post, able to play more fully on popular emotion. On the eve of the Second World War, the British ambassador in Washington, Sir Ronald Lindsay, one of the great career diplomats of his generation, aptly summed up the purpose of royal ambassadors: 'The political dividend will not be clearly evident—but the political profit will be there.'[53]

Notes

1. Louis Antoine, Duke of Montpensier (d. 1807) and Louis Charles, Count of Beaujolais (d. 1808).
2. Prince de Joinville (1895), *Vieux souvenirs, 1818–1848*, Paris. Also appeared as Prince de Joinville (1895), *Memoirs of the Prince de Joinville* (trans. Lady Mary Lloyd), New York.
3. *Farmers' Cabinet* (Amherst, N.H.), 9 August 1837, 3, reporting news from the *Journal Des Debats* (Paris).
4. John Quincy Adams (1874–1877), *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams*, ed. Charles Francis Adams, Philadelphia, vol. IX, 543, entry for 26 May 1838.
5. *Daily Picayune* (New Orleans), 6 August 1838, 2.
6. *New Bedford Mercury* (New Bedford, MA), 7 June 1838, 1.
7. (1929) 'Entertaining the Son of the "Bourgeois King"', *Bulletin of the Business Historical Society*, 3/4, 15–17.
8. 'The Prince de Joinville', *Signal of Liberty* 1/38, 12 January 1842, 1.
9. Joinville (1895), 205.
10. Oliver Perry Chitwood (1939), *John Tyler: Champion of the Old South*, New York, 394.
11. Jessie Benton Fremont (1887), *Souvenirs of My Time*, Boston, 68.
12. Fremont (1887), 206.
13. Prince de Joinville (1863), *Guerre d'Amérique, campagne du Potomac, Mars–Juillet 1862*, Paris.
14. Wednesday, 15 February 1854 (Buckingham Palace). Princess Beatrice's copies, vol. 37 (1 January–30 June 1854), 63 and again on

Saturday, 17 February 1855. Princess Beatrice's copies, vol. 39 (1 January–30 June 1855), 108: www.queenvictoriasjournals.org.

15. Saturday, 17 February 1855. Princess Beatrice's copies, vol. 39 (1 January—30 June 1855), 108: www.queenvictoriasjournals.org.
16. Stanley Weintraub (1997), *Uncrowned King: The Life of Prince Albert,* New York, 488–89.
17. Philip Magnus (1964), *King Edward VII*, New York, 37.
18. Philip Shriver Klein (1970), *President James Buchanan*, University Park, 350.
19. Harrison Howell Dodge (1932), *Mount Vernon: Its Owner and Its Story*, Philadelphia.
20. Lee Farrow (2014), *Alexis in America: A Russian Grand Duke's Tour, 1871–1872*, Baton Rouge, 2014.
21. Crampton had been complicit in recruiting soldiers for Britain in the neutral United States. He was knighted on his return to Britain. He later served as Minister to Russia, 1858–1860.
22. Benjamin Moran diary, 22 May 1868. Library of Congress.
23. Mark Twain (1984), *The Innocents Abroad Roughing It*, New York, 310.
24. Farrow (2014), 6.
25. Ulysses S. Grant, 'Third Annual Message', 4 December 1871.
26. Named in 1870, it transpired there was already an Alexander, Illinois, so the naming opportunity was fortuitous.
27. Peter Bridges (2000), 'A Prince of Climbers', *Virginia Quarterly Review* 76/1, 38–51.
28. Katherine Elkins, daughter of Senator Stephen Elkins of West Virginia.
29. Albert's father Philippe, Count of Flanders, had been heir presumptive since 1869; Albert became his father's heir in 1891.
30. Ard Choille, 'King Albert in America', *Vanity Fair*, December 1914, 29.
31. Next in line to the Dutch Queen Wilhelmina (1880–1962) was Wilhelm Ernst, Duke of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach (1876–1923). It was thought that he would cede the Dutch succession to his aunt Princess Marie Alexandrine (1849–1922), who in turn would convey it to her son Heinrich XXXII of Reuss-Köstritz (1878–1935). The birth of the future Queen Juliana made this unlikely. See also Marquise de Fontenoy, 'Heir to a Throne on American Tour', *Washington Post*, 29 October 1906, 6.
32. 'Prince Visits Capital', *Washington Post*, 5 November 1906, 3.

33. Arthur J. May (1946), 'The Archduke Francis Ferdinand in the United States', *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society* 39/3, 333–44. Next in line was his father, Archduke Karl Ludwig (1833–1896), heir presumptive since 1889. It was thought he was likely to renounce his rights in favour of Franz Ferdinand.
34. May (1946), 340.
35. C.S. Kingston (1925), 'Franz Ferdinand at Spokane—1893', *Washington Historical Quarterly* 16/1, 3–7.
36. *Spokane Review*, 25 September 1893, quoted in Kingston (1925), 6.
37. Archduke Franz Ferdinand (1896), *Tagebuch meiner Reise um die Erde, 1892–1893*, vol. II, Vienna, 468, quoted in Kingston (1925), 6–7.
38. *Chicago Times*, 4 October 1893.
39. *Washington Post*, 8 October 1893, 4.
40. John Röhl (2014), *Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss of War and Exile, 1900–1941*, Cambridge, 224.
41. Röhl (2014), 223.
42. Clara Eve Schieber (1921), 'The Transformation of American Sentiment towards Germany, 1870–1914', *Journal of International Relations* 12/1, 50–74.
43. (1903) Emperor William to President Roosevelt, 10 January 1902; (1903) *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1902* [hereafter FRUS, 1903], Washington, 422.
44. His 1901 flirtation with the American Gladys Deacon may well have been another cause.
45. Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase (1991), 'Die Rolle Kaiser Wilhelms II. in den deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen', in John Röhl (ed.), *Der Ort Kaiser Wilhelms II. in der deutschen Geschicte*, Munich; and Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase (2003), 'The Uses of "Friendship". The "Personal Regime" of Wilhelm II and Theodore Roosevelt, 1901–1909', in Annika Mombauer and Wilhelm Deist (eds), *The Kaiser: New Research on Wilhelm II's Role in Imperial Germany*, Cambridge.
46. 'President Eliot's address at the special academic session called to confer the degree of Doctor of Laws on Prince Henry of Prussia, March 6, 1902', Appendix I in Charles W. Eliot (1915), *The Road Toward Peace*, Boston, 221–24. A fuller report is 'Prince Henry's Visit. At Sanders Theatre', *Harvard Graduates' Magazine*, June 1902.

47. (1903) FRUS, 1902, John B. Jackson (Berlin) to John Hay, 12 March 1902, 423.
48. (1903) FRUS, 1902, Jackson to Hay, 19 March 1902, 424.
49. Röhl (2014), 227.
50. Theodore Roosevelt to George Otto Trevelyan, 1 October 1911, in Elting E. Morison (ed.) (1954), *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, Cambridge, MA, vol. 7, 348–99.
51. ‘Kings Who Will Reign in the next Generation’, *Washington Post*, 29 December 1907, SM3.
52. Erik Goldstein (2008), ‘The Politics of the State Visit’, *Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 3/2, 153–78.
53. Lindsay (Washington) to Lord Crawford & Balcarres, 22 May 1939. Crawford 97/10. Papers of David Alexander Lindsay, 27th Earl of Crawford and Balcarres, National Library of Scotland.

CHAPTER 5

Ocular Sovereignty, Acclamatory Rulership and Political Communication: Visits of Princes of Wales to Bengal

Milinda Banerjee

What was the impact of British royal heirs on political consciousness in relation to colonial India? What can be gleaned in this respect from the visits to India of three successive Princes of Wales: the future Edward VII (in 1875–76), the future George V (in 1905–06), and the future Edward VIII (in 1921–22)?[1] Within India, the focus of this investigation will be on Bengal which, from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth century, constituted the political-cultural core of the British Indian Empire. The princely visits, so the argument will go, generated new languages of political communication which were supposed to unite ruler and ruled visually, affectively and (above all) personally, even as the precise implications of such communication created profound controversies and divisions among

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This chapter draws in part on empirical materials and analytical frameworks used in my doctoral dissertation from Heidelberg University: Milinda Banerjee (2014), *'The Mortal God': Debating Rulership and Genealogies of Sovereignty in Colonial India, 1858–1947 (with a primary focus on Bengal)*.

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various actors in Britain as well as Bengal. As a result, it will become clear that the ‘soft power’ histories of European royal heirs, and more broadly the impact of European monarchies on global political cultures of the long nineteenth century, can be studied more insightfully when they are probed within the entanglements that linked European royalty to the transcontinentally entangled geographies of colonialism.

Earlier historians have generally argued that these princely tours failed at convincing Indian audiences about the legitimacy of colonial rule. I propose to complicate this assumption by arguing that the influence of these royal visits on Indians was heterogeneous, and dependent on the political orientation as well as social location of colonized actors. While Indian princely and landed magnate families were often most vocally royalist, even anti-colonial Indian nationalists responded creatively to notions of benevolent rule communicated through the royal visits. I deploy two main concepts, ocular sovereignty and acclamatory rulership, to identify these modes of communication.

Taking a cue from studies on acclamation, notably by Ernst H. Kantorowicz,[2] and more recently by Giorgio Agamben,[3] I suggest that a dominant British colonial hope was that the prince, by his mere appearance—and not through his role in any dialogic conversation with Indians—would receive the acclaim of his subjects, embodying their affectionate loyalty. The duty of the prince was to become visible: through this mere sight, a sort of politico-metaphysical full presence was expected to come into being, reconciling sovereign and subject in a promised bond of protection and obedience. Yet many Indian actors subverted (what I would call) the model of ocular sovereignty, of imperial authority as resting on the visualization of the sovereign by the subjects. From their perspective, only a prince who performed concrete acts of welfare and responded to the grievances of common Indians deserved their acclaim. For many Indian nationalists, the princely visits gradually came to signify a fake kingship that veiled the insidious reality of imperial exploitation. Even as they rejected the hegemonic pretensions of the imperial state, these Indian actors nevertheless selectively and dialectically expropriated British royal idioms to generate their own grammars of authority that anticipated postcolonial welfare statehood.

ACCLAMATORY AND AFFECTIVE RULERSHIP: BRITISH PERSPECTIVES

To understand Bengali reactions to the Princes of Wales, it is important to sketch how the princely visits operated on the ground, in the localities of colonial society, and how imperial texts were produced to narrate and debate these visits in Britain, thus setting the parameters for Indian responses. For the colonial state, the princely visits were eminently asymmetrical: Indians were supposed to welcome, gaze at and acclaim their prince, but not to communicate directly with him other than in a general congratulatory mode. Indian communications were passed through local and central governments before they could reach the royals. The Government of Bengal, for example, received detailed instructions from the Government of India concerning the control of such communication. Addresses from private individuals were either filtered or specifically discouraged. Especially in the early twentieth century, Indians were prevented from communicating their political messages and anxieties to visiting royals. This format was valid not only for the visits of the Princes of Wales, but also for visits of other members of the royal family as well as for royal occasions like coronations and jubilees.[4]

If this created a communication disjuncture between prince and subject already, then the modality of princely celebration in Bengal further accentuated it. During the 1875–76 visit, for example, the prince met British officials as well as Indian princes and selected notables, but had no opportunity for mixing with common Indians. He attended church services, the races, a viceregal ball and the theatre, and visited various sports events and some governmental institutions.[5] This pattern for itinerant royalty continued well into the early twentieth century. In 1921–1922, the Prince of Wales opened the Victoria Memorial Hall in Calcutta, and was feted through fireworks and illumination, military celebrations, dances, levees, luncheons, and races.[6] In Bengal, and indeed across India, princely tours thus gave access to visiting royalty, but only to British and Indian elites; as far as communication was concerned, common Indians had little chance of having their grievances and hopes transmitted to the royals.

Yet, to many British imperial minds, this did not imply any structural failure. From their standpoint, the princes were not expected to engage in a conversation with Indians; they merely had to display themselves, and thereby gain the loyal acclaim of their subjects. It was on this note that Queen Victoria's Speech from the Throne of 8 February 1876 declared: 'The hearty affection with which he [the Prince of Wales] has been received by my Indian subjects of all classes and races assures me that they are happy under my rule, and loyal to my throne.'[7] This speech, as well as Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli's seminal address in the House of Commons on 17 February,[8] directly connected the princely visit to the assumption of the title of Empress of India by Victoria. For Disraeli, the 'courtly festivals' and 'investitures' that connected the visiting prince to the Indian rulers, physicalized the role of the latter as 'feudatories' of the British monarch.[9] Many other, generally Conservative, parliamentarians also underlined the 'loyalty' and 'affection' shown by Indians to the prince.[10] William Grantham offers an instance of this emotive language when he justified the imperial title by describing the Indian encounter with the prince: 'He went there the heir of their conquerors; he left it the adopted heir of their Throne; he went there unknown, except by reputation; he left it beloved by the people and the friend of every Chief'.[11]

Languages of feudal loyalty occasionally intersected with notions of election, as in the case of G.W. Leitner, an Orientalist resident of Hungarian origin in India. In an essay written in May 1876, Leitner supported the imperial title for Victoria, partly on the ground that 'it is German, because the loyal reception of the Prince of Wales by his Indian peers was in a (remote) manner like the election of Rudolph of Hapsburg as German Emperor; or, if the successful tiger hunt in Nepaul [*sic*] be compared with the march on Paris, like the election of King William to the German Empire'.[12] Leitner's idea of a 'German' model of electoral acclaim gains significance when we remember that he coined the title Kaisar-i-Hind (literally, Caesar of India), which was officially accepted as the Indian equivalent of the Latin and English imperial titles.

Not everyone agreed. In the fraught parliamentary debates of 1876, some—often, Liberal—parliamentarians argued that while Indians had indeed welcomed the prince, this did not imply that a change in the monarch's title was necessary, given that this would be unpopular either among the British, or among the Indians, or both. The impression created on the Indian press was of special concern for some British parliamentarians.[13] The importance of emotion in these discussions was underlined, among others, by the Earl of Shaftesbury, when he argued in the House of Lords that it was unfair to respond to Indian 'hospitality', 'fervour' and 'affection' to the prince by imposing on the Indians a title overtly signifying despotism, and designed thereby to hurt their 'public feeling' (a term he used in critical distinction to the concept of 'public opinion').[14] It would ultimately alienate Indians from 'unity of heart, unity of spirit, and a sense of common rights' with the British; what was needed, instead, was to train them in 'British sentiments', 'British principles' and 'British feeling', including loyalty to a king rather than to an emperor. Shaftesbury even hoped that sometime in the future Indians would thereby gain 'self-government' and enlist among the 'free and independent Powers'.[15] In these perspectives, the point about Indian acclaim and affection for the prince was used to challenge 'despotic' idioms of rulership.

This pattern of debate was also visible in the British Parliament in 1906, when the King's speech expressed hope that the princely visit would 'strengthen' among Indians 'the feeling of loyalty to the Crown' and 'attachment' to Britain.[16] This occurred at a time of rising anti-British nationalist politics which affected large parts of India, and especially the Western-educated middle classes, above all in Bengal. The immediate background was provided by Viceroy Lord Curzon's high-handed administration, and particularly by the official partition of Bengal along sectarian lines in 1905, which aimed at isolating and weakening the (mostly upper-caste Hindu Bengali) Indian nationalists. The Liberal parliamentarian Henry Cotton (who had served as chief secretary of the province and subsequently as Chief Commissioner of Assam, and had later been elected President of the Indian National Congress in 1904) referred to the welcome given to the Prince of Wales by Indians, and specifically by an Indian nationalist leader to demand that the British should be more sensitive to Indian political aspirations for participation in governance, and should also reunite Bengal.[17] But in the end a Liberal Secretary of State for India, John Morley, responded by shooting down the idea of reuniting Bengal.[18]

Acclamatory rulership thus thrived at the ambiguous, and often contradictory, intersections of colonial coercion and a desire for the subjects' affection, sometimes translating, in a limited way, into acknowledging the subjects' political rights. Beginning in the 1870s, many British commemoration texts, often authored by journalists and others who had accompanied the princes on their tours, tried to mask these contradictions. I would argue that one of the main intellectual strategies to do so was to produce a discourse on visualization. The mere sight of the prince was supposed to evoke a spontaneous outburst of loyalty and affection among the Indians, thereby embedding, in an oblique way, the legitimacy of colonial rule in the consent of the colonized.

The Times correspondent William Howard Russell's account is exemplary. He observed that when the prince (the future Edward VII) entered Calcutta: 'The "people" turned out in myriads to see the Shahzadah. Immense satisfaction is felt at this flesh and blood presentment of Royalty—a peculiar want of human nature has been gratified by the Prince's *avatar*.'[19] Russell's use of a sacralized idiom—his reference to the Indic term for divine incarnation to refer to the princely advent—needs to be connected to the production of monarchic political theologies in

Britain itself. Arthur Stanley, Dean of Westminster, thus suggested in his sermon at Westminster Abbey that the prince's tour of India should manifest the 'Christian principle' and be worthy of a 'Christian Empire'.[20] In a classicized flourish, Russell also cited Horace's *Ars Poetica* to affirm 'the value of the eye'; the sight of the prince would bind ruler and ruled.[21]

The production of this ocular language was undoubtedly rooted, in part, in new technologies of organized ritual, portraiture, and photographic production that made possible a hitherto unprecedented global circulation of images of rulership. The *Daily Telegraph* correspondent, J. Drew Gay, while explaining the visual splendour of the prince's visit to Bombay, underlined that Indians were especially fond of European (royal) portraits, such as those of the German Emperor Wilhelm, the Crown Prince of Prussia, Napoleon III, and the Pope. It was in a similar vein that the 'people […] gathered to gaze at the Prince'.[22] The *Central News* correspondent George Wheeler highlighted the pleasure of Indians in merely seeing their prince: 'The multitudes who flocked from distant villages to every town where the Prince was expected, displayed every token of rejoicing possible with their crude notions. In the cool morning or damp night there were always crowds to line the dusty roads along which he was to pass; children were held aloft to flourish their little arms at their future king.'[23]

The princely visits to India aimed at constructing soft power legitimacy for the British imperial order at two levels. First, their objective was to elicit the enthusiastic affection of the subjects. Second, the advent of the prince was meant to personify the ideals of good and civilized government supposedly embodied by British rule. In fact, the visualization of the sovereign was intertwined with understanding his communication of benevolent rule (see Image 5.1). Paraphrasing the speech of a high official of the Baroda princely state, Russell noted how Baroda's rulers had long 'been gazing on photographs of English Royalty. It was now their felicity to see that Prince who was heir to a sceptre […] which dispelled darkness, diffused light, paralysed the tyrant's hand, shivered the manacles of the slave, extended the bounds of freedom, accelerated the happiness and elevated the dignity of the human race.'[24] The seductive potential of the imperial state was thus fully harnessed through the princely tour; the promise of the colonial civilizing mission was incarnated in the sensory splendour of the royal sight. In a comparable note, Wheeler related Indian enthusiasm for the prince to British success in imposing 'just government', resulting in Indian 'contentment' with colonial governance.[25]


A DURBAR AT BOMBAY. INTERVIEW WITH THE GAEKWAR OF BARODA.

Image 5.1 A Durbar at Bombay. Interview with the Gaekwar of Baroda, *The Prince of Wales' Tour: A Diary in India*, by W.H. Russell, London 1877, 136), image courtesy of St Andrews University Library, St Andrews

As we shall notice later, Indian demonstrations of 'loyalty' were far from simple manifestations of affection towards British rule; in any case, by the 1900s, many Indian intellectuals and politicians had developed sophisticated critiques of princely tours. However, it was the 1921–22 visit which provoked the most intense confrontation between British perceptions and anti-colonial Indian ones. Several factors contributed to the atmosphere of hostility, including Indian grievances at colonial 'atrocities' in Punjab as well as (in particular, Indian Muslim) antagonism towards the British for their role in the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. The Non-Cooperation-Khilafat movement, in which Mahatma Gandhi played a leading role, brought together Indian Hindus and Muslims in common agitation against the British state. In Bengal, as elsewhere, the colonial state made strong police arrangements to protect the princely visit from these Indian agitators.[26]

To convey the business-as-usual mood, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal reported to the Government of India that the royal visit had been successful, and thus demonstrated 'the failure of the non-co-operation movement'.[27] British propaganda texts turned the visit into a competition about acclamatory rulership, highlighting that Indians gave 'hearty demonstration of noisy acclaim' to their prince with cries of '*Yuvraj ki jai*!' (Victory to the Crown Prince!).[28] Even in Calcutta, the Reuters correspondent Herbert Russell noticed a 'sheer reverence for Royalty which amounts to a worship in the Oriental mind'.[29] To highlight the transnational impact of British royalty on 'oriental' consciousness, it was suggested that later in Japan the prince had also received a tremendous welcome; abjuring their supposed traditional mode of silent awe towards rulers, the Japanese (like the Indians) had loudly voiced their welcome ('from thousands of Japanese throats') to the British heir.[30]

Within this intellectual landscape of narrating royal acclamations, a different note was struck by other colonial voices. The Governor of Bengal, Lord Lytton, suggested that the Chief Secretary's report was 'very misleading'. The prince had been in a 'very depressed state of mind owing to the bad reception he had received', and 'wrote a most depressed letter home from Calcutta'.[31] If anyone received popular Indian acclaim, it was Gandhi himself. Colonial intelligence reportage had to admit that there had been continual acclaims of '*Gandhi Maharaj ki Jai*!' (Victory to Great King Gandhi!).[32] At one level, this substitution can be analysed in terms of the failure of British monarchic legitimacy. I would, however, offer another interpretation: the acclamation of a quasi-royal Gandhi encoded a hybridized substitution of British monarchic sovereignty.[33] Through its very negation, British princely authority was preserved, in however transformed a manner, in the new acclamatory vision of Indian nationalist leadership. Royal communication was more successful in embedding itself in Indian politics than the imperial state intended. The next section explores some stages of this fascinating dialectic.

Vernacularizing Princely Rulership: The Princes of Wales in Bengali Political Imagination

Though British colonial voices often affirmed that Indians were naturally loyal to their prince, and to royalty in general, an examination of Indian (in this case, specifically, Bengali) attitudes demonstrates more complex scenarios. Indian elite actors, such as princes and the big landed gentry, generally used the princely visits to advance their own agendas. For example, in 1876, at a time when the ruling dynasty of the princely state of Tripura had been suffering from a series of dynastic succession crises, the ruler Birchandra Manikya gifted a copy of his lineage's genealogy, *Rajamala*, to the visiting Prince of Wales. It was a rather transparent attempt to affirm the dynasty's royal legitimacy in the eyes of the British.[34] Lower down the social scale, and to take an example from outside Bengal, Bhartendu Harishchandra, often considered the father of modern Hindi literature, submitted eulogistic poems to the prince at around the same time; this literary labour has been related to the civic offices in the northern Indian town of Banaras to which he was elevated through colonial patronage.[35]

A *quid pro quo* expectation frequently lay behind such professions of fidelity. During the 1905–1906 visit of the Prince of Wales, the Raja of Santosh, one of the premier Bengali *zamindar* landlords, vocally affirmed his loyalty to the prince, while simultaneously claiming that *zamindars* like him were the true 'sovereign' powers in Bengal whom the British needed to cultivate (in contradistinction to the nationalist party, the Indian National Congress). He advocated forming an association of *zamindars* whose (acclamatory) motto would be 'Long Live the King'; its objective, to ensure that 'their control over the mass will, therefore, as a matter of course, become as efficient and effective as it was when the present day political leaders were conspicuous by their absence'.[36] This royalism stemmed from a *zamindar* consciousness which felt threatened by rising Indian political radicalism (and also by an upwardly mobile and insubordinate peasantry which benefited from colonial tenancy reforms).

Perhaps the Bengali family that most successfully forged connections with British royal heirs in this period was the Cooch Behar princely couple, Maharaja Nripendra Narayan (r. 1863–1911) and his wife Sunity Devi. The family's connection with British royalty dated to Sunity Devi's father, the celebrated socio-religious reformer Keshub Chunder Sen. He had visited Britain in 1870, where he met Queen Victoria as well as Prince Leopold and Princess Louise. The Queen was interested in Indian social reforms, while Sen in turn professed his loyalty to the monarch.[37] The reformer would later gain fame, and some notoriety, for his ardent royalism. Partly through British colonial encouragement, his daughter was later given in marriage to the young ruler of the princely state of Cooch Behar. From 1878 (when Nripendra Narayan first visited Britain, and was introduced to the Queen and to the Prince of Wales) untill the early twentieth century, both husband and wife maintained strong personal and ceremonial connections with the British royal family. Both were invested with imperial honours, while Nripendra Narayan became an Aide-de-camp to the Prince of Wales and later of King-Emperor Edward VII.[38]

Sunity Devi's memoirs (the first autobiography in English by an Indian woman, published in 1921) help us capture these bonds. She professed 'loyalty to the Throne', and suggested that 'in the whole of India no family is more loyal to His Gracious Majesty than the Cooch Behar Raj family'.[39] Her writings demonstrate the manner in which she used her networks and emotive ties with British royalty, including with Princess, and later Queen, Alexandra (the wife of Edward VII), and with Princess, and later Queen, Mary (the wife of George V), to carve out a space for herself, her husband and sons in the heart of court culture in Britain. There, as well as in India, the couple also assiduously cultivated male royalty, especially British and German ones. Sunity Devi deployed these connections to critique the policies of British officials in India towards her family and to Indian princes, and, even more interestingly, to counteract this with a model of benevolent royal governance. Her prescriptive ideal was one of welfare-oriented rule by Indian princes, connected through royal allegiance to the British imperial monarchy, with Indian princely men and women also advising the British King and Queen about Indian affairs.[40]

Many other Bengalis longed for such access to British royalty, with far less success. During the 1875–76 visit, Indian nationalist newspapers frequently urged their readers to communicate their hopes and grievances to the Prince of Wales.[41] A literary articulation of this anxiety can be found in Nabinchandra Sen, a minor bureaucrat in the colonial administration, and one of the most celebrated Indian nationalist authors of the period. His long poem *Bharata-Uchchhvasa* (India's Outburst of Joy) began with an acclaim to the visiting Prince of Wales (the future Edward VII): '*Jaya Yuvaraja! Bhabi-Narapati!*' (Victory to the Crown Prince! Future Lord of Men!). The poem suggested that the people as well as the physical landscape of India, including the rivers, the seas, the hills and the winds, liturgically worshipped the prince (*rajarati*) and repeatedly voiced victory acclamations to the future king. India was shown to be yearning with moist eyes of love (*premardra nayane*) for a sight of the face of its own king (*dekhibe apan nrpati-badan*).

In the same breath, however, Sen complained that Britain had long ignored India's welfare. The visit of the prince would gain significance only if it signalled a British intention to institute a rule of kingly benevolence. With this aim, he asked the prince to assume the ancient Hindu throne (*adi hindusimhasana*) of the ancient Hindu nation (*adi hindujati*), which had been empty for ages. The poet lamented the manner in which British literature, music, arts and ways of life had replaced Hindu-Indian ones, even as India's traditional cotton textile and salt industries had been destroyed by those of Britain. But India could still boast of its past, embodied by the warrior rulers of the epic *Mahabharata* and by (late precolonial) Rajput, Maratha and Sikh history. The poem urged the prince to restore some of this lost glory; India would then stand together with the British in fighting against Russia and Prussia. Sen ended with the acclamation: '*Jaya Edward Bharata-Ishvara!*' (Victory to Edward, Lord of India!).[42]

Bharata-Uchchhvasa helps us understand the ways in which British notions of acclamatory rulership and of visualizing the sovereign were mirrored very closely by strands of Indian nationalist discourses. Yet there was also inversion and subversion. If British propaganda texts underlined that Indians supported colonial rule, then Sen suggested that the princely visit was in fact welcomed by Indians only because it promised relief from the economic exploitation and cultural imperialism created by British domination. The technology of gazing at the future king was a subversive political act, though, admittedly, embedded within a monarchic frame of politics. Sen also sought to indigenize princely rulership by exhorting Edward to be India's own king, in the same way that the rulers of *Mahabharata* and of the Rajputs Marathas, and Sikhs were. I would argue that it was in part through a dialectical translation of the British vision of a unified imperial monarchy that Sen produced his famous epic trilogy *Raivataka-Kurukshetra-Prabhas* (1887–97), which envisioned India under a unified Hindu national monarchy.[43] Inspired by the British monarchy, as well as frustrated by his inability to translate it into a rulership which would conform to (upper-caste Hindu) Indian ideas of welfare, Sen took recourse to precolonial South Asian myths and genealogies to map his indigenizing vision.

A comparable trajectory is visible in Rabindranath Tagore, modern India's most famous litterateur. As mentioned before, the princely visit of 1905–06 coincided with a powerful wave of anti-colonial agitation that was especially strong in Bengal. Tagore suggested that the prince's coming had been a failure because it sought to promote loyalty among Indians without giving them any reciprocal relief from colonial exploitation. He argued that the Prince of Wales represented a fake kingship, in so far as the real rulers of India were the insensitive British officials, merchants, owners of mines and tea plantations and Lancashire (a metonym for the British cotton textile industry). India did not have a real king; rather it suffered from *bahurajakata*, a neologism which implied rule by (too) many kings. Tagore felt that India would be better off in future if it were ruled by a traditional king, given that this would at least end its systemic exploitation by Britain. Even a British monarch who genuinely cared for Indians would be a preferable alternative. This king could be the Prince of Wales, if he agreed to settle in India and rule the country for its welfare; it could be any other British individual as well. Only to such a monarch could Indians show the *rajabhakti* (devotion to a king) which the British habitually claimed from Indians. While delineating this ideal, Rabindranath fell back on a constructed concept of Hindu rule, which was supposedly based on genuine devotion and reciprocal love, and which stood in contrast to the impersonal rule of machinery (*yantra*) which the British embodied.[44]

In one of his best-loved poems, *Shubhakshana* ('The Auspicious Moment', 1905), Tagore referred to the prince's visit rather more obliquely. He assumed the narrative guise of a young girl who threw her necklace at the feet of a visiting prince (*rajar dulal*, son of a king); however, this token of love was crushed by the prince's chariot.[45] While lacking any overt political message, the poem arguably shows an anticipatory subtext of frustrated *rajabhakti*. It was also perhaps in part through a sublation of British princely rulership that Tagore created an idea of God as a divine king who responded to the love of the people. Such tropes are scattered throughout his poetry collection *Kheya* (1905–06),[46] among many other works. What was common to both Sen and Tagore was an insurgent appropriation of British princely idioms with the aim of generating a Hindu-Indian grammar of benevolent rulership. The broader implication of this was the production of an Indian nationalist syntax of authority by utilizing some of the basic frames of British princely promise, even while rejecting the foundational assumptions of the legitimacy of colonial governance. Rather than standing for an existing good government, the image of the prince became the signifier of a future state that intervened personally for the betterment of the ruled.

Tagore's remarks need to be contextualized within broader contemporaneous public sphere discussions among Bengali nationalists who resented the colonially-imposed Partition of 1905.[47] The famous newspaper *Sandhya* proclaimed about the Prince of Wales: 'We shall honour him, but our hearts will not be filled with love and *bhakti*. The English sovereign cannot satisfy the cravings of loyalty in one's mind.'[48]

The *Daily Hitavadi* observed the low participation of middle classes and students in a meeting organized to plan the celebrations, and argued: ‘Government apparently does not think it desirable that people should show their love to their sovereign independently of it. It therefore appears to them on such occasions, with its entire machinery of laws and regulations, swords and bayonets, and badges and red-tape to their utter bewilderment and consternation.’[49]

Much of this anger stemmed from two reasons: first, the perceived absence of any substantial welfare-oriented activities to mark the princely visit; and second, the lack of any opportunity for middle- and lower-class Indians to communicate their desires to the prince. The *Hitavadi* thus critically questioned British ideas about the Orient: ‘When the occasion comes for wasting the people’s money India must act in the true fashion of an Oriental. But in other matters she is not considered as an Oriental. For what amount of revenue has been remitted, how many prisoners have been released,—in short what has the land gained by the Royal Visit?’[50] The *Hindi Bangavasi* lamented that nothing had been done to alleviate the conditions of the poor. They had not been given gold or silver, or even food, as was customary in pre-British times, among the Mughals, and even among contemporary princely states.[51] The references to Indian exemplars demonstrate the ways in which these newspapers constituted ‘indigenous’ ideals through a negative citation of British colonial governance, thereby also prefiguring the advent of Indian nationalist models of postcolonial welfare statehood.

This sensibility of anger and alienation resulted from the failure of common Indians to communicate their aspirations and expectations to the visiting prince or, ultimately, to the British monarch. The *Bharat Mitra* underscored: ‘The King has no opportunity to hear the petitions of his subject direct, but has to hear them through his representatives who never care to report the real condition of the people.’[52] While a dominant British colonial argument was that the princely visits had the inherent ability to communicate imperial benevolence, many Indians wanted more concrete acts of welfare. From this latter perspective, if rulership was neither communicative nor distributive, it appeared to be fake. The *Daily Hitavadi* observed:

> With Europeans, royal personages are like dolls—moved by springs, worked by machine. In European countries, royalty is a thing invested with great semblance of power, but in reality without any authority to personally guide the administration of the country. […] There were fireworks, illuminations,

> bands and parades, but for ourselves it all amounted to an experience of the thrust of the policeman's baton. There were no gifts or feeding of the poor; it all ended in exhibitions of authority by the police and by the subordinate English officials.[53]

From this Indian nationalist position, the bayonet or the baton represented the nightmarish epiphany of colonial kingship, substituting for a royal sceptre. The colonial state seemed to embody not a benevolent and genuinely royal authority, but rather merely the exploitative power of subordinate white officials and of the police who operated in the hollow left by an unreal king. The governmental apparatus had at its centre a royal mirage.

It was the 1921–22 visit, however, which staged the most direct confrontation around the grammar of princely authority. Regarding the prince's tour of Bengal, government reports suggested that the 'general attitude in the mufassil has been one of indifference. Several districts report that an idea was prevalent that the visit would do something to forward *swaraj* and that its failure, so far, in this respect, has been a disappointment. […] The lavish expenditure of money at a time of economic stress has been unfavourably commented on.'[54] As noted earlier, acclamations of '*Gandhi Maharaj ki jai*' only highlighted the failure of the colonial state to present itself as a hegemonic form of kingship. Indian nationalists organized successful *hartal* or boycotts of the prince's visit: shops were closed and popular participation in the celebrations in Bengal was limited.[55]

Interestingly, and despite the landscape of conflict, there was little hostility in Bengal to the Prince of Wales as such. Most newspapers agreed that Indians did not dislike the British royal family or the prince, but opposed the way in which he was being put to use by the colonial bureaucracy without satisfying various Indian aspirations. The *Hitavadi*, among others, noted that the prince's visit should be given meaning through the grant of self-government to India.[56] Several newspapers supported the boycott, though others suggested that the prince should be welcomed as a guest.[57] The *Amrita Bazar Patrika* felt that the Indians who would welcome the prince would do so out of affection for the 'Great Queen' Victoria, since no one had exerted such influence on Indians till Gandhi came.[58] The substitution of British monarchic hegemony was noticed by the *Indian Mirror*, when it reported that with the success of the boycott people would cease to respect the government, and only *Gandhi Maharaj* would be acclaimed.[59]

Conclusion

By focusing on discourses emanating from Britain as well as from Bengal, this chapter has argued that on both sides of the colonial divide new concepts of communicative rulership were forged through the visits of the Princes of Wales to India. I have identified important historical moments and transitions in these discourses. The 1875–76 visit already signalled potential divergences between British colonial and Indian nationalist expectations; the 1905–06 visit showed a rising Indian nationalist anger, aggravated especially by the Partition of Bengal; and the 1921–22 visit marked a climactic confrontation between the colonial state and the nationalists. While I have focused particularly on Bengal, some of these conclusions, and especially those concerning the 1921–22 visit, have a broader pan-Indian resonance.

In terms of ideologies of rule, I have suggested that British colonial as well as Indian nationalist actors worked within a connected discursive system, reflecting on the techniques through which the state could harness the consent of the ruled through princely communication. Within this connected system, however, there were divergences of opinion, but not along a simple colonizer versus colonized binary. I have thus highlighted internal fractures within British discussions; there were Liberal voices, for example, which questioned the legitimacy of authoritarian idioms and appealed for greater sensitivity to Indian political demands. However, a dominant strand in British colonial imagination insisted that the princely visits would automatically elicit the acclaim of the Indians, since the latter desired to see their rulers and offer their unquestioning loyalty.

I have further argued that this was not as deceptive an expectation as it might seem today. Many Western-educated upper- and middle-class Bengalis, drawn from the (mostly, upper-caste Hindu) *bhadralok* gentry, indeed desired to show loyalty and devotional love to a ruler. However, what this implied in practice depended largely on the social and political positions of the Indian actors concerned. Moreover, the image of the Prince of Wales, and the hope of a genuine kingship, was often strategically deployed to criticize the 'mechanical' and systemic nature of colonial economic extraction. From such vantage points, the imperial trope of 'personal' rule was creatively restyled into an anti-colonial conceptual weapon for denouncing 'impersonal' imperial exploitation. The colonial trope of ocular sovereignty, of imperial authority as embedded in the visual pleasure felt by Indians in seeing their ruler, was thereby neatly turned upside down through the very process by which Indians reclaimed their gaze.

Thus while British royal soft power was contradicted on the ground by the failure of the vast majority of Indians to communicate their hopes and grievances to the visiting princes or have their demands for welfare fulfilled, nevertheless, princely communication had paradoxically fecund results. Many of the Indian actors whom I discussed here did not reject British idioms of kingship altogether, but sought to remodel rulership to bring it more in tune with the aspirations of the governed. By using the frame of acclamatory rulership, I have shown that an important Indian nationalist hope was to offer acclaim and love to a ruler who would take care of the ruled. Such a stance entailed a complex passage towards Indian nationalist ideals of political leadership and welfare statehood by working through the grammar of British monarchic ideology and ritual. The confrontation between *Yuvaraj* and *Gandhi Maharaj* in 1921–22 offers a political-liturgical microcosm for this dialectical transfer of authority.

Notes

1. On the visits of the Princes of Wales to India see Chandrika Kaul (2006), 'Monarchical Display and the Politics of Empire: Princes of Wales and India 1870–1920s', *Twentieth Century British History* 17/4, 464–88; see also Chandrika Kaul (2003), *Reporting the Raj: The British Press and India, c. 1880–1922*, Manchester and New York, 230–56. I have also benefited from reading H. Hazel Hahn (2009), 'Indian Princes, Dancing Girls and Tigers: The Prince of Wales's Tour of India and Ceylon, 1875–1876', *Postcolonial Studies* 12/2, 173–92; and Hilary Sapire (2012), 'Ambiguities of Loyalism: The Prince of Wales in India and Africa, 1921–2 and 25', *History Workshop Journal* 73/1, 37–65.
2. Ernst H. Kantorowicz (1946), *Laudes Regiae: A Study in Liturgical Acclamations and Mediaeval Ruler Worship*, Berkeley.
3. Giorgio Agamben (2011), *The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government*, Stanford.
4. For instance: Political Department, Government of Bengal, File No. 153P, Proceeding Nos. B 209–215, 'Address Given by Private Individuals to His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales', abstract in Proceedings of July 1876 (original file destroyed); Notification No. 1377 of the Home Department, Government of India, 23 June 1887,

in Political Department, Government of Bengal, File No. 166, Proceeding No. 7, December 1887, 'Presentation of Addresses to the Members of the Royal Family'; Political Department, Political Branch, Government of Bengal, Confidential File No. 71/05 and 71(C)05(1), 'Presentation of Addresses to their Royal Highnesses'.

5. Political Department, Government of Bengal, File No. 153T, Proceeding Nos. B 219–220, July 1876, 'Detailed Programme of His Royal Highness' Proceedings'.
6. Political Department, Political Branch, Government of Bengal, Confidential List, File No. 350 (1–19), 1921, 'Appreciation of the General Effect of the Royal Visit to Bengal'.
7. The Queen's Speech, 8 February 1876, House of Lords, Hansard's *Parliamentary Debates*, 3rd series, ccxxvii, 1876, 4.
8. Mr Disraeli, 17 February 1876, House of Commons, ibid., 409.
9. Ibid., 426.
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11. Mr Grantham, 11 May 1876, House of Commons, Hansard's *Parliamentary Debates*, 3rd series, ccxxix, 1876, 428.
12. G.W. Leitner (1876), *Kaisar-i-Hind: The Only Appropriate Translation of the Title of Empress of India*, Lahore, 3.
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14. The Earl of Shaftesbury, 3 April 1876, House of Lords, Hansard's *Parliamentary Debates*, 3rd series, ccxxviii, 1876, 1041–42.
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47. RNPB July 1905 to January 1906.
48. RNPB 1905: *Sandhya*, 7 July.
49. RNPB 1905: *Daily Hitavadi*, 18 July.
50. RNPB 1906: *Hitavadi*, 12 January.
51. RNPB 1906: *Hindi Bangavasi*, 8 January.
52. RNPB 1905: *Bharat Mitra*, 18 November.
53. RNPB 1906: *Daily Hitavadi*, 9 January.
54. Memo, 31 December 1921, by E.H. Corbett, Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Intelligence Branch, Criminal Investigation Department, Bengal, in Political Department, Political Branch, Government of Bengal, Confidential List, File No. 350 (1–19), 1921, 'Appreciation of the General Effect of the Royal Visit to Bengal'. The

term ‘*mufassil*’ refers here to small town and rural areas (outside the capital and big cities); ‘*swaraj*’, in this context, refers to the Indian nationalist demand for self-rule.

55. Political Department, Political Branch, Government of Bengal, Confidential List, File No. 350 (1–19), 1921, ‘Appreciation of the General Effect of the Royal Visit to Bengal’.
56. RNPB 1921: *Hitavadi*, 1 July.
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58. RNPB 1921: *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 8 September.
59. RNPB 1921: *Indian Mirror*, 18 November.

PART II

Persuading Sceptical Audiences

CHAPTER 6

The Power of Presence: Crafting a Norwegian Identity for the Bernadotte Heirs

Trond Norén Isaksen

In a debate in the Norwegian Parliament in December 1859, Anton Martin Schweigaard, one of the great men of nineteenth-century Norwegian politics, declared that he found it 'self-evident that the position of the heirs to the union must be rather unusual. It is in their feelings and in their blood that they ought to be both things, Swede as well as Norwegian; their feelings lead them there, their interests lead them there, and I do not think there could be anything to object to these feelings and interests showing through their actions; as these prominent people have truly been placed above the nations'.[1]

The union of Sweden and Norway was the brainchild of Crown Prince Carl Johan of Sweden, who had been elected heir to the childless King Carl XIII in 1810. Norway was supposed to compensate Sweden for having lost Finland to Russia the previous year. Apparently inspired by the idea of natural borders, Carl Johan thought Sweden and Norway a more natural entity than Sweden and Finland. Carl Johan—the former Napoleonic Marshal Bernadotte—was a foreigner, though, and may not have known

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Scandinavia well enough to realise that the two countries were not as easily compatible as a look at the map may have led him to believe.

What complicated matters further was that the union, which was forged by military force in 1814, was one of the least integrated unions in history. Sweden and Norway were two independent kingdoms within a union of crowns, with the king and the foreign service as the only institutions that were shared by the two kingdoms. Strictly speaking, there was no king of Sweden and Norway; rather the King of Sweden and the King of Norway happened to be the same person.

Obviously the royal family were primarily Swedish and resided in Sweden most of the time, but it appears to have been understood from an early date that the heirs to the two crowns needed to acquire a Norwegian identity as well. This is what I have chosen to call 'the power of presence'. By spending time in Norway the royal family would be able at least to cast themselves in the role of Norwegians and perhaps even actually feel Norwegian as well as Swedish. This would provide the royals with a closer knowledge and understanding of Norwegian society and affairs, and create bonds with their subjects that would hopefully strengthen the monarchy's standing in Norway and thereby the union. As Queen Elizabeth II of Britain has reportedly said, a monarch has to be seen to be believed.

A Greater Honour: The Heir as Viceroy

During the preceding centuries, the Norwegians had seen little of their monarchs. In 1536, Norway had been declared part of the Danish realm, and most of the Dano-Norwegian monarchs visited Norway only once, if at all. When Norway regained its independence in 1814, the country's parliament was adamant that the pattern of royal absence should be broken. The revised constitution of 4 November stipulated that the king should spend part of each year in Norway, unless important obstacles prevented it. In fact, during his 26-year reign Carl XIV Johan came to Norway ten times, while Oscar I, his son, missed only one year before his health broke down.[2]

The MPs were also keen to ensure that the heir to the throne should spend time in Norway and acquaint himself with its people and affairs. To encourage this, they created the office of viceroy. While the Prime Minister and two other members of the cabinet took up residence in Stockholm in order to be close to the king, the rest of the cabinet remained in Christiania (now Oslo), where it was led by a *stattholder* (lieutenant of the realm).

The king could appoint the crown prince or the crown prince's eldest son viceroy, in which case he would take the lieutenant's place as chair of the cabinet. The role was not particularly powerful, however, and it was further restrained by the provision that the viceroy could not be absent from Norway for more than three months of the year.

The MP Jørgen Aall, who had been a member of the constituent assembly, proposed that the crown prince should hold the viceroyalty on a permanent basis and reside in Christiania. 'To be able to govern his states wisely, the prince needs to learn to know his people, and to know it he must often be among it, constantly socialise with it', he argued.[3] Niels Dahl referred to another MP's proposal that Norway ought to take part in the education of the heir, and argued that, since this suggestion had not received 'the necessary attention, it would be even more necessary that the crown prince at a more mature age learned to know Norway and the Norwegians, to love them and they him'.[4] A number of other MPs also desired that the heirs should be permanently present in Norway, while the priest and diarist Claus Pavels objected that although having the heir as viceroy would be a greater honour than having merely a lieutenant of the realm or a governor general, 'we would have to pay for that honour with a large royal household'. This he considered too expensive.[5]

On 12 November, parliament unanimously passed a motion asking King Carl XIII to appoint Crown Prince Carl Johan viceroy, pointing out that because of the Dano-Norwegian monarchs' rare visits Norway had 'miss[ed] all those advantages that follow from the kings' sojourns in the realm and their close acquaintance with it'. Parliament could only wish for the crown prince's 'longer presence among us, so that he would become fully acquainted with the country and its conditions'.[6] The frail old king replied, though, that he regretted not being able to grant the Norwegians' wish as he could not do without the crown prince at his side.[7] All in all, it was only from 9 to 17 November 1814 and again for six days in the summer of 1816 that Carl Johan was viceroy before succeeding to the thrones in 1818.

His son, Oscar, was the first to fill the office of viceroy for any longer period of time, first from April to October 1824 and again in the summer of 1833, when he travelled to Bergen and along the western coast. The main reason why the viceroyalty remained mostly vacant seems to have been the provision which limited the viceroy's absence to three months a year, which clashed with his also having duties and responsibilities in Sweden. Several attempts were made to extend or abolish this time limit, but they were not passed by parliament.[8]

Although it was mostly vacant, the viceroyalty long continued to be held up as an excellent way for the heir to the throne to acquaint himself with Norway, the Norwegians and Norwegian affairs. For instance, the MP Ole Valstad stated in 1859 that ‘I believe that kings and royal personages possess the same human nature as everyone else, and by that I mean that it would be a good thing if the future king could acquaint himself with our conditions through a prolonged stay. It is a common experience that it has often happened that people who might have had much against certain things or certain persons to a great extent have changed their opinions after getting to know these things or persons better, and I believe the same thing will happen to the future king’.[9] Schweigaard also found it obvious that the viceroyalty was ‘a very suitable means’ to ensure that the ‘future rulers become as much Norwegian as Swedish’.[10]

A Norwegian Education: Oscar I and His Sons

Education was the other main tool for crafting a Norwegian identity for the heirs. Carl Johan, who was already 51 years old when he became crown prince of Norway, spoke neither Norwegian nor Swedish and seems to have been considered French rather than Norwegian or Swedish. His son, Oscar, on the other hand, was only 11 when he came to Sweden in 1810 and learned fluent Swedish. From 1814 he also learned Norwegian and was able to act as his father’s interpreter and translator.

When Crown Prince Oscar became a father of four sons and one daughter between 1826 and 1831, he was keen that his sons should receive a thorough Norwegian education alongside their Swedish upbringing. ‘My reverence for the Norwegian Nation, [and] my gratitude for the affection I have received so many proofs of make me want to attempt to instil the same way of thinking in my sons’, he wrote to Count Herman Wedel Jarlsberg, the Lieutenant of the Realm, in August 1834. He added that the impressions received during childhood were the ones most difficult to erase and that they would be useful throughout his sons’ lives. Therefore, he found it ‘right that my sons from an early age should learn the Norwegian language, historical and contemporary Souvenirs, in one word everything that relates to the Norwegian people’s destinies and characteristics’. Referring to his sons’ educations as a ‘national affair’, he asked Wedel if he might recommend a suitable teacher.[11]

When Otto Aubert, a young mathematician whom Wedel had recommended, took up his post in November, the newspaper *Morgenbladet* described his appointment as ‘without doubt […] pleasant news to the Norwegian public’.[12] Aubert taught the three eldest princes, Carl, Gustaf and Oscar, Norwegian language, geography and history in addition to mathematics. The teacher reported to his brother that, during their first meeting, the crown prince had told him that it had been his ‘intention that they should learn and constantly hear Norwegian; it is useless [merely] to tell them that they are Norwegian as well as Swedish; they would always consider Norway, its people, language and customs as something alien unless they from childhood become as familiar with it as with what is Swedish’.[13] At the end of April 1835, Aubert noted that the two eldest princes understood Norwegian perfectly.[14] When Aubert died in 1838, he was succeeded by a naval officer, Wolfgang Wenzel Haffner.

Of the four sons of Crown Prince Oscar, who succeeded his father as Oscar I in 1844, the one who seems to have been most influenced by his Norwegian education was Prince Oscar. Although he was only the third son, he is of some importance here as he would eventually become heir to the thrones and then king. Initially, however, it was the eldest, Carl, who was set to become king (Image 6.1). In May 1856, at the age of 30, he was installed as viceroy of Norway and retained the post until June 1857. This was the longest viceroyalty ever, although he did spend part of the winter in Sweden. He brought his wife and daughter, and their stay in Christiania was so popular that it came to be remembered as ‘the viceregal idyll’. The viceroy was warmly welcomed,[15] and Carl immediately displayed great zest in touring the capital’s institutions and embarking on an extensive journey through southern Norway. At one stage of the journey he donned a red cap, which seems to have been considered quintessentially Norwegian at that time, and engravings of a photo of the viceroy with the red hat were a hit with the public.[16] One journal expressed the hope that the crown prince’s presence in Norway would bear fruit not only within the country but also in relation to Sweden: ‘when differences between the countries are to be evened out we hope that the crown prince will be a spokesman for what is better here than in the brother kingdom, and that the question thus will not, as ignorant Swedish publicists have thought, be solved solely by giving up and changing what is ours’.[17]

The viceroy also made personal friends among Norwegian politicians, most importantly Christian Birch-Reichenwald, who would come to exercise a certain influence over him. Shortly after he was installed as regent for his ailing father in June 1857, Carl dismissed several members of the cabinet and replaced them with his friends, most prominently



Image 6.1 Norway's Crown Prince Oscar showing his eldest son Prince Carl a painting of the city of Bergen which was presented to him in 1833 during a visit as viceroy; Fredric Westin, *Norges kronprins Oscar med arveprins Carl*, c. 1838 © The Municipality of Bergen. Photographer: Alf Edgar Andresen

Birch-Reichenwald. He would become the cabinet's leading man but fell out of favour with Carl in a dispute that erupted when Carl acceded to the thrones. The new king allowed himself to be pressured by the Swedish Parliament into breaking the promise he had made to the Norwegians to abolish the lieutenancy. In appointing a cabinet of friends, the crown prince laid himself open to accusations that he was stretching the limits of his authority; but Carl might have needed a cabinet of friends, for when Oscar I died and Carl succeeded to the thrones on 8 July 1859 there was no crown prince who could act as viceroy. The birth, in 1852, of Carl's only son, Prince Carl Oscar, had left his wife unable to bear more children, so when the young prince died 14 months later, Carl's brother Oscar became heir presumptive.

An heir presumptive could not be viceroy, though, and attempts to amend the constitution to allow that possibility failed.[18] In his memoirs, Oscar pretended that he did not mind, but other sources suggest that he actually did.[19] He wanted to spend a longer period of time in Norway so that his eldest son, Gustaf, who was born in 1858, would 'receive some years of Norwegian education',[20] and he actually drew up plans for what he would do with the viceroyalty, including working to establish an academy of art that would bring together music, painting and sculpture.[21] When the proposed amendment fell through, he resented being cut off from his intended sphere of activity.[22] The viceroyalty would consequently remain vacant for the whole of Carl XV's reign, but this was where Prince Oscar took the soft power of presence to a new level.

'A More Complete Personal Knowledge of Our Country Than Any King Before Him'

During his years as heir presumptive—and later as king—Oscar travelled extensively in Norway. When in Norway to attend his brother's coronation in Trondhjem on 5 August 1860, he took the opportunity to visit Romsdalen, Sogn and Valdres, areas of Norway which had rarely, if ever, seen a royal person. Another major tour took place in the summer of 1872, which was thought to be the 1000th anniversary of the Battle of Hafrsfjord, which was considered to have completed the unification of Norway. King Carl was ill, so Prince Oscar represented him at the main event at the alleged gravesite of the unifier King Harald the Fair-haired in Haugesund on 18 July. In his speech, which was delivered in Norwegian, the prince repeatedly addressed the crowds as 'dear countrymen' and referred to Norway as 'our fatherland'.[23] Afterwards, Prince Oscar set out on a journey to Hardanger and Voss, and it was in Bergen that he assumed the regency over both nations in lieu of his ailing brother.

Two months later, Oscar inherited the crowns. 'At the time of my accession on 18 September 1872 I was thought to be more popular in Norway than in Sweden', he wrote in his memoirs. He went on to explain that he had been taught by a Norwegian governor and that he had from an early age, mostly through that governor, acquired a firm knowledge of Norwegian issues, literature and language. He had served on Norwegian ships both as a cadet and an officer and he felt at home in Norway and with the Norwegians. 'This, but particularly the language skills, of which no one in the family could praise themselves as highly as I, were apparently the reasons why one looked more favourably upon me in Norway than in Sweden.'[24] There is a lot of braggadocio in his memoirs, but this was actually true. Carl XV had been very popular, but he nearly always spoke Swedish to Norwegians.[25]

In the summer of 1873, the new king made a long journey through the vast northern parts of Norway, all the way to the North Cape and the border with Russia. No king of Norway had set foot in those remote areas since Christian IV in 1599. The tour ended in Trondhjem, where Oscar II was crowned in the ancient cathedral on 18 July, a year to the day after the millennial celebrations. A few days earlier, the newspaper *Aftenposten* wrote: 'The journeys within the fatherland's boundaries that he has undertaken both earlier and particularly recently have greatly contributed to opening the people's hearts for the solemn occasion ahead of us, and through the bonds of mutual understanding and affection, King Oscar II and his Norwegian people shall feel ever more closely bound to each other.'[26]

On the day of the coronation, *Aftenposten* observed: 'Already as hereditary prince it was most important to him to obtain the most precise knowledge of our country's particular conditions, its nature both at sea and on land, and he forsook no opportunity to learn the people's way of thinking by personally socialising with them.' The paper added that he had continued these 'efforts which benefitted the nation in more than one way' after his accession, so it was not as a 'new man unknown to the people that King Oscar II today [sic] inherits the crown of the Kingdom of Norway, but precisely through the mutual knowledge and the reciprocal trust and confidence fostered in this way will king and people find the shared secure foundation to build even further upon'.[27]

Another newspaper observed that the journeys of 1860 and 1872 and the coronation journey ‘give him a more complete personal knowledge of our country than any king before him has possessed since the days of the Kalmar Union’,[28] that is since Norway ceased having its own king at the end of the fourteenth century. Royal presence and language skills had succeeded in adding trust and confidence to hereditary right as the pillars on which the Bernadottes’ possession of the Norwegian crown rested. Oscar II’s coronation was the golden moment of the union, but nevertheless it would all fall apart before the end of his reign.

A Time of Crises: Oscar II and His Sons

In 1897, Trondhjem celebrated the 900th anniversary of its foundation and invited the king to attend. 18 July was chosen for the main events after King Oscar made it clear that it was the only date that summer when he could possibly come to Trondhjem.[29] This caused an outcry from the local branch of the Liberal Party, which wanted to celebrate the jubilee on 29 July, the feast of St Olav, the king who had completed the Christianization of Norway. The medieval monarch had become the country’s patron saint and ‘eternal king’ after he was killed in the Battle of Stiklestad on that day, probably in 1030, in an attempt to win back his kingdom from the Danes. Norway was Lutheran by now, but as Olav’s death spelt the end of Danish rule, the slain saint was held up as a champion against foreign rule.

In one Liberal newspaper, a writer listed a series of misfortunes that had happened on the date 18 July and added that ‘there are some who do not call it a lucky day that a Swedish king came here on 18 July 1873 and was crowned as Norwegian [king] as well’.[30] Eleven days after the official celebrations, the Liberals gathered to celebrate St Olav’s day, but had to do so outdoors as the provost of the cathedral had refused them the use of the coronation church.[31] The main speaker was Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson, the firebrand author who was one of Oscar II’s and the union’s most vocal critics. Bjørnson asked rhetorically why Olav’s church was closed to them. ‘If we had our own king, who did not have to take anyone but us into consideration, would it then be closed? No, then we would be in there with the king as the first man among us.’[32]

Much had certainly changed in the 24 years between Oscar II’s coronation and Trondhjem’s 900th anniversary. ‘It will work in my days, but look, Oscar and his children, *they* will get hell!’ had been Carl XV’s dark prophecy about the union.[33] Indeed, Oscar II’s reign was marked by one union crisis after another, and the propaganda of the Norwegian Liberals—that the king was only Swedish—was so successful that even today many Norwegians refer to the nineteenth-century kings of Norway as ‘the Swedish King’ or ‘the King of Sweden’ even in wholly Norwegian contexts.

Oscar II had an advantage over Carl XV, or rather four advantages: four sons. This was useful, as the absence of any union institutions meant that the king relied on his family as a sort of secretariat for union issues.[34] His sons received an unusual education for princes of their day. After a couple of years of private schooling at home, their progressive mother insisted that they should go to school with other children in order to gain a wider knowledge of society.[35] However, following their father’s accession, a special school for the princes and some other pupils was set up at the Royal Palace in Stockholm.[36] It appears that they had no Norwegian teachers at either school, but in 1873–1875, Lieutenant Colonel O.W. Lund served as Crown Prince Gustaf’s Norwegian tutor and in the first half of 1880, Gustaf studied Norwegian law and history at the Royal Frederik University in Kristiania.[37] The next brother, Prince Oscar, also spent one term in Kristiania studying the Norwegian language and Norwegian history.[38] The third son, Carl, who chose a military career, does not appear to have studied in Norway, but the youngest son, Prince Eugen, was a student at the university in 1884.[39]

Of the four, Eugen seems to have been the only one who considered himself almost equally Swedish and Norwegian. A recognized artist, he often painted in Norway, had many friends there and at times seemed to prefer Norway to Sweden.[40] Indeed, in 1893 he told a friend that he was ‘strongly considering emigrating there’.[41] A firm anti-Nazi, he would eventually do Norway great services during the Second World War, when the union was nothing but a distant memory. ‘Emotionally he had once again become Prince of Norway’, wrote the Norwegian art historian Harry Fett, perhaps the prince’s best friend in later years, and added that ‘[h]ere I learnt to understand that it is possible to be the child of two nations’.[42] Prince Carl, on the other hand, at least once had to be reminded by his mother not to forget ‘that you are also still a Norwegian prince’.[43]

But it was of course the eldest brother, Gustaf, who was heir to the throne. When Crown Prince Gustaf married Princess Victoria of Baden in 1881, a grand ceremonial entrance into Kristiania was arranged for the following year. This was during the lead-up to a severe constitutional crisis which would end with the king’s power being dealt a mortal blow in

1884, when Prime Minister Christian Selmer's cabinet was impeached. This event marked the advent of parliamentarianism in Norway. The royal family's increased and perhaps more high-profile presence in these years seems to have been a way of trying to strengthen the enthusiasm for the royal family and thereby the union which they embodied.

During the crisis of 1884, Crown Prince Gustaf served briefly as viceroy when the king, at one stage, had to go to Stockholm, but that post had been further weakened by the fact that, since 1873, the cabinet in Kristiania was no longer led by a lieutenant of the realm but by a prime minister. The politically shrewd Queen Sophie wanted the crown prince to become viceroy for a longer period, and told one of her confidants, the historian and Conservative politician Yngvar Nielsen, that a viceregal court might become the social focal point of the capital and a place where people of different political beliefs might meet and become acquainted. Apparently she thought the crown prince would be able to act as some sort of mediator.[44] The plan seems to have foundered on the expectation that parliament would be unwilling to grant the necessary funds and that the prime minister would be reluctant to be downgraded to the second rank.[45]

1884 turned out to be the viceroyalty's swansong. Two years later, the Liberal MP Anton Qvam proposed a constitutional amendment to abolish it. The Committee on Constitutional Affairs observed that as the post had mainly remained vacant it was now widely thought redundant. Furthermore, it did not suit the parliamentary system as the viceroy could not appear in parliament, and the committee observed that while it had once been appreciated as a mark of Norway's independence, it had with time come to be considered a colonial stigma. The committee also noted that the idea of the viceroyalty as 'some sort of preparatory school for the country's future king' had been 'to some extent exaggerated'.[46] On 30 June 1891, parliament abolished the viceroyalty.[47]

The Last Heir: Prince Gustaf Adolf

Crown Prince Gustaf's and Crown Princess Victoria's firstborn, who saw the light of day in November 1882, was the first of the Bernadottes to receive a Norwegian name. He was called by the historical Swedish name Gustaf Adolf, but among his six names was also that of Olaf. In 1900, Gustaf Adolf was enrolled at the university in Kristiania. In October, the press reported that he was being 'thoroughly taught' both

Norwegian history and culture and that he studied Norwegian literature ‘in order to gain complete command of the language’. By that stage his literary studies had reached the first half of the eighteenth century and his historical studies the year 1814.[48] He was now being taught Norwegian history for two hours a day.[49] He returned to the Norwegian university in 1904, when he also received private tutorials in constitutional law.[50]

By the late nineteenth century, the railway made it possible for the royal family to come to Norway more often. Oscar II visited at least once a year except 1905, when he was first ill and then deposed,[51] while Queen Sophie spent almost every summer at Norwegian manors. But not all the younger princes were as frequent visitors, and as the union crises succeeded one another they seem to have become reluctant to go—possibly in order to stay out of trouble. King Oscar would occasionally have to adopt a rather firm tone to make them go to Norway.[52]

In 1900, a Swedish newspaper argued that royals’ short and infrequent visits to Norway were part of the reason for the Liberal Party’s aggressive stance towards the royal authority. It concluded: ‘The day when Norway finds that the royal family are comfortable and feel joy about its capital, its valleys and its fjords, a different wind will quite certainly blow forth over the freedom-loving country, and much strife that now threatens to tear us apart will be solved in good understanding.’[53]

Norwegian friends of the royal family agreed that they spent too little time in Norway and decided to try and do something about it. Led by Thomas Fearnley, Master of the Royal Hunt, they organized a collection among private citizens towards the purchase of a cabin in the remote valley of Sikkilsdalen, which was presented to Prince Gustaf Adolf and his brothers Wilhelm and Erik. The cabin was completed in 1902, and the visitors’ book shows that the princes came there primarily to shoot and fish.[54]

In October 1904, Prince Carl told the historian Yngvar Nielsen that he thought it should be laid down in law that a prince of the royal house should preside in the cabinet in Kristiania when the king was in Sweden and the other way around, and that he personally wanted to spend more time in Norway. The problem was that when Oscar II celebrated his silver jubilee with much pomp and circumstance in Kristiania in the autumn of 1897, the Norwegian press had taken up a discussion about the possibility of the union being dissolved by Crown Prince Gustaf inheriting the Swedish crown and Prince Carl the Norwegian one,[55] a debate which the latter apparently found embarrassing. Another problem was that a prince living in Norway had nothing to do now that the viceroyalty had been abolished.[56]

Prince Carl's idea might seem like an attempt to position himself ahead of the dissolution of the union that many now saw coming. Indeed, this might explain why Oscar II appears to have been firmly opposed to the idea of one of the princes settling permanently in Norway.[57] 'A secundogeniture can be very dangerous', he had written in his memoirs some years earlier.[58] Apparently he feared that a younger prince living in Norway might set up a rival court, build a power base and snatch the crown of Norway from the crown prince when the king died. But when Prince Gustaf Adolf became engaged to Princess Margaret of Britain in February 1905, it was decided that the newlyweds should settle in Norway.[59] It is not known what made King Oscar change his mind, but as Gustaf Adolf was the future king his living in Norway could not foster rivalry with the heir that might lead to the union's dissolution through secundogeniture. It would also provide Prince Gustaf Adolf with a chance to get to know Norway and to represent the royal family there. But that was not to be.

'A Kingless Country': The Heir Departs

'I am Norwegian too… but also Swedish… oh, this horrible position', King Oscar II lamented in January 1905.[60] But at the end of the day, he was first and foremost Swedish. 'What one has not understood in Norway is that in a dispute between the two countries I must side with the largest. And one forgets that the dynasty has been in Sweden since 1810, but in Norway only from 1814,' he said in March.[61]

'The royal family are Swedish, only Swedish, and it cannot be otherwise', wrote Jakob Schøning, a member of the cabinet, that same month. 'They are born, brought up, [and] live in Sweden. Norway is *underbruket* [that is, an uninhabited farm that is run together with another farm], which has to be visited now and then. To find the Norwegian King is like a first prize riddle. Carl Johan was French, and probably felt no more Swedish than Norwegian […]. Oscar I was surely the one most understanding towards Norway. Carl XV was Swedish through and through. Oscar II may have begun with the best intentions, but the years of the impeachment opened the gulf between him and the Norwegian people.'[62]

What brought the union down was the thorny issue of the Norwegian desire for a separate consular corps. On 8 February 1905, Crown Prince Gustaf stepped in as regent for his ailing 76-year-old father, and it thus fell to the heir to deal with the lead-up to the final crisis. He arrived in Kristiania five days later.[63] The political role played by the crown prince during the following weeks falls outside the scope of a book on soft power, but it is worth noting that Yngvar Nielsen begged him not to leave before the crisis was resolved: 'Departing will now or later be taken to mean that Norway is a kingless country, and then much may happen. But if the Regent is in Norway and shows that he stands whatever is done, then I expect the best.'[64]

Having appointed a new cabinet headed by Christian Michelsen on 11 March, Gustaf left the Norwegian capital. He would not see it again for 12 years. Two months later, the parliament unanimously passed a bill setting up a separate consular service. On 26 May, King Oscar resumed the reins of state, and it was rumoured that this was because the crown prince intended to give the bill the royal assent.[65] The once hawkish Gustaf had now become a dove. Realising that the union was doomed, he advocated that Sweden should take the initiative to dissolve it.[66] King Oscar himself insisted that his reason for returning to his duties was that the question of whether or not the bill should receive royal assent was of such importance that he would have to make the decision himself.[67] In a Council of State at the Royal Palace in Stockholm the following day, the king refused the royal assent. On 7 June, the Norwegian Parliament deposed Oscar II and thereby dissolved the union of crowns.

Many thought King Oscar had made a grave mistake in not coming to Kristiania after refusing the royal assent. 'There were many in this country who expected their king. But our king did not come', Nielsen upbraided King Oscar in the autumn.[68] Jakob Schøning asked Christian Michelsen, the mastermind of the dissolution of the union, what he would have done 'if King Oscar had come and stayed at the Palace'. Michelsen replied that he did not know, 'then I would have had to give it all up'.[69] Indeed, the government took that possibility so seriously that on the night between 6 and 7 June, they had the railway line blocked in case the king should come dashing to Kristiania at the very last moment.[70]

In the end, Oscar II, who had been brought up to consider himself both Swedish and Norwegian, who had prided himself on his knowledge of Norway and his fluent Norwegian, and who had spent more time in Norway than any monarch for centuries, underestimated the power of presence.

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CHAPTER 7

Bertie Prince of Wales: Prince Hal and the Widow of Windsor

Jane Ridley

The career of King Edward VII as royal heir seems at first sight a perfect fit for the soft power paradigm. Excluded from hard power for 40 years by his mother, Albert Edward (Bertie) Prince of Wales was forced to develop alternative strategies. As king, Edward VII excelled in the use of soft power which often turned into smart power. His 1903 visit to Paris offers a master class in the subject: unofficial, but working alongside the government rather than against it to facilitate the *entente* with France, the visit was a triumph of personal charisma, using the alternative 'soft' networks of courtesans, actresses and displaced aristocrats. At home, Edward VII seems to have understood, in a way that Queen Victoria never did, that power had shifted to elected politicians and the monarch's role was now about the projection of authority—through ceremonial activities, through locating the crown at Buckingham Palace rather than Windsor, and through being seen.

As Prince of Wales, however, Albert Edward's use of soft power was decidedly problematic. There was—there is—no job description for the Prince of Wales beyond securing the succession, a duty which Bertie had accomplished by the age of 23 with the birth of both an heir, Prince Albert Victor ('Eddy'), and a spare, Prince George. Bertie was persistently blocked from exercising any form of hard power by his mother, who refused to

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allow him access to government documents. The dominant royal soft power narrative for Britain was, as this chapter shows, a gendered female story constructed by Queen Victoria around her widowhood. In this narrative there was no role for the Prince of Wales except as the son whose 'fall' had caused his father's catastrophic death. This paper suggests that to counter the queen's narrative, Bertie constructed an alternative narrative of manliness. This however was a high-risk strategy. Manly behaviour led to scandals which, when they became public, made him seriously unpopular in the short term. In the long term, however, the prince's narrative resonated with the masculine values promoted by late nineteenth-century ideas of male dominance. A 'Prince Hal' narrative was constructed, which became smart power as it reinforced his powers as king.

Queen Victoria: Mourning as Smart Power

Bertie was brought up to follow the ideal of princely behaviour exemplified by Prince Albert. Albert's marriage to his first cousin, Victoria, gave him the opportunity to seize control of the British monarchy and perform the role of ruler for which he had been trained by Baron Stockmar and his uncle King Leopold I of the Belgians. According to Stockmar, the role of the sovereign in a constitutional monarchy was that of 'a permanent premier, who takes rank above the temporary head of the Cabinet, and in matters of discipline exercises supreme authority'.[1] After 1846, as the party system fractured, Albert used his position to seize extraordinary power, turning the monarchy into a secretariat which kept a vigilant watch on all departments of government.[2] This was buttressed by a soft power narrative of bourgeois domesticity, which formed a stark contrast with the debauchery of the Victoria's wicked uncles, the dissipated sons of George III.

Albert, who directed the education of his sons, designed a princely curriculum for the heir. Bertie was schooled one-on-one by tutors whose job it was to mould the prince in the image of his father—a man so cultured and well-read that he was as much at home composing state papers as he was conversing on terms of equality with artists and writers. Albert's education project failed spectacularly. To his parents' despair, Bertie refused to learn his lessons. They worried that he was backward. The worst blow came when the nineteen-year-old prince disgraced himself with a prostitute while on army manoeuvres in Ireland. Bertie's 'fall' mattered terribly because it undermined the narrative of the domesticated bourgeois family that Albert had so carefully constructed.

After Albert's death, Victoria attempted to carry on his political work, but she lacked the knowledge, the training and the inclination to do so. Unlike Albert, she was no workaholic. Her retreat into mourning and her disabling grief disqualified her from playing a hands-on political role. Perhaps this was just as well. After 1867 the monarchy haemorrhaged hard power as the rise of a two-party system and the enlargement of the electorate caused a shift of power to parliament. In her dealings with her ministers—especially Gladstone—Victoria seemed oblivious to this change, writing sometimes as if she had the power to hire and fire her prime minister.[3] In Victoria's case, however, her popularity grew as her power shrank.

In *The English Constitution* (1867) Walter Bagehot argued that the monarch's 'efficient' or executive power had declined, but the importance of the decorative role of the sovereign as a ceremonial figure was incalculable. This analysis sits uneasily with Victoria. A queen who appeared in public as rarely and reluctantly as the Widow of Windsor could hardly be called ornamental.[4] Perhaps the concept of soft power is more useful here than Bagehot's categories of the ornamental or dignified parts of the constitution. There was one aspect of soft power in which Victoria excelled: producing a compelling narrative. A natural storyteller, she used her diary and other writings to construct narratives of her life, positioning herself within that story. 'The poor fatherless baby of eight months is now the utterly broken-hearted and crushed widow of forty-two!' was her description of her life story immediately after Albert's death.[5] Victoria's tale of herself as the grief-stricken, black-garbed widow queen, surrounded by her children, mourning her beloved, is projected in carefully composed photographs and in her publications such as *Leaves from a Journal of our Life in the Highlands* (1868). The narrative of the grieving widow no doubt resonated with her people, but the truth was that mourning for the beloved prince had become a reason for doing—or not doing—exactly what she wanted. In other words, Victoria's mourning was a form of smart power. For all her seclusion, Victoria was shrewdly aware of public opinion; as Lord Salisbury remarked, 'when I knew what the Queen thought, I knew pretty certainly what view her subjects would take, and especially the middle class of her subjects'.[6]

In spite of her grief and shattered nerves, Victoria was determined on one thing: not to share power with her heir. She refused to allow him access to state papers and Foreign Office dispatches—the hard power that he yearned for. By claiming that Bertie's 'fall' disqualified him from ruling because it had killed Prince Albert—which was hardly a logical argument—Victoria used her soft power narrative to achieve a smart purpose—namely, to cling on to sole power herself.

The queen ordered her son to act as ‘social sovereign’. He was installed at Marlborough House with his wife Princess Alexandra (Alix) of Denmark as the head of London society, performing the public role which Victoria could—or would—no longer do. This exposed him to temptations, and the frequent pregnancies of Alexandra provided the opportunity to embark on a lifetime of adultery. In a vicious circle, the more scandals and affairs he was involved with, the more the queen distanced him, claiming that he was totally unfit to share power.

The Hanoverians were notorious for bad relations with their heirs. As Owen Morshead remarked, ‘They are like ducks, they trample on their young.’[7] In the eighteenth century royal family quarrels were politicized, and the reversionary interest became the focus of political opposition to the crown. In spite of much provocation from his mother, who nagged him, undermined him and spied on him, Bertie did not fight back. He made no attempt to forge a political opposition to the queen. Yet he seemed to show little aptitude or inclination for the construction of soft power roles. If soft power is most effective when it rests on culture, Albert Edward seems to have been hopelessly out of touch. He could hardly have been less ‘Victorian’. In the narrative of the bourgeois family created by his mother there was no role for him except as a cad from a novel by Trollope. Overweight, overdrawn and oversexed, his lifestyle appeared to revolve around debauchery and pleasure: gambling, racing, adultery, shooting and smoking.

Nor was he identified with British or English values. A cosmopolitan with a German accent (like all Victoria’s children), he spoke fluent French and German and spent several months each year staying with his German or Danish relations or living as an English milord in Paris. He had little interest in the British Empire. In an age of casual antisemitism he surrounded himself with Jewish financiers; some even thought he was a Jew.

The Crisis of 1871: Princess Alexandra and the Narrative of Atonement

The disconnect between the scandalous behaviour of the Prince of Wales and Victorian cultural values was revealed by the sensational Mordaunt divorce case in 1871. The evidence that appeared in court—and which was published verbatim in page after page in the newspapers—opened a window on the louche behaviour of the Prince of Wales's set. Harriett Mordaunt, who was declared insane and unfit to appear in court, had confessed to sleeping with a string of men 'often and in open day', prompting her husband Sir Charles Mordaunt to sue for divorce. The Prince of Wales was not actually named as a co-respondent, but he was forced to appear in court as a witness.[8] The lurid revelations of adultery and dissipation among the prince's Marlborough House Set triggered a crisis of legitimacy. 'Horrible disclosures of the depravity of the best London society', wrote the Reverend Kilvert in his remote Herefordshire vicarage.[9] Meanwhile, the Republican left raised the issue of public funds for the monarchy and demanded to know of the invisible Widow of Windsor *What Does She Do With It?* The papers of Francis Knollys, the prince's private secretary, reveal that behind the scenes he was at the same time frantically engaged in damage limitation over an attempted blackmail by the brother of the Paris courtesan La Barucci, as well as distancing the prince from the birth of his illegitimate child by Susan Vane-Tempest.

Bertie's claw back from this crisis is usually ascribed to the fortuitous attack of typhoid from which he almost died on 14 December 1871, exactly ten years after the death of Prince Albert. Death and illness were part of the armoury of Victorian soft power, as we have seen, but these were not get out of jail cards favoured by Bertie. When Victoria ordered court mourning for his baby son Prince John, who died in April 1871 a few hours after birth, Bertie replied: 'Want of feeling I never could show, but I think it is one's duty not to nurse one's sorrow, however much one may feel it.'[10]

In December 1871, however, Bertie was too ill to control the story. While he raved deliriously on his sickbed at Sandringham, a narrative was spun around his illness by Princess Alexandra and Queen Victoria. As the doctors issued hourly bulletins, each more alarming than the last, Alexandra watched devotedly night and day at his bedside. It was Alix who wrote to Victoria, inviting her to make an unprecedented visit to Sandringham, and the queen, who was still convalescent from sickness, delighted the nation by rushing in a special train to the bedside of the prodigal son. At the height of his illness, Alix slipped out to the church and passed a note to the vicar: 'I must leave, I fear, before the service is concluded that I may watch at [my husband's] bedside. Can you not say a few words in prayer in the early party of the service that I may join with you in prayer before I return to him?' *The Times* printed the note, and the image of the beautiful princess standing alone in the royal pew while the vicar prayed, trembling with emotion, stirred the nation's heart.[11] When the news came of Bertie's recovery the Reverend Kilvert was not alone in his reaction: 'I love that man now, and always will love him. I will never say a word against him [...] God bless him and keep him, the Child of England.'[12]

Alix played a crucial role in constructing a soft power narrative of atonement that transformed her errant husband from devil to holy prince. She knew what she was doing too. When Victoria objected to Gladstone's proposal that she should appear with Bertie at the public thanksgiving at St Paul's Cathedral, Alix explained: 'the whole nation has taken such a public share in our sorrow, it has been so entirely at one with us in our grief, that it may perhaps feel it has a kind of claim to join with us now in a public and universal thanksgiving'.[13] As the princess understood, the drama of Bertie's miraculous recovery had created a new royal narrative. How strange it was, wrote Bagehot, that 'a middle aged lady is about to drive, with a few little-known attendants, through part of London to return thanks for the recovery of her eldest son from fever, and the drive has assumed the proportions of a national event'.[14]

This soft power strategy was also smart. For one thing, it enabled the royals to resist Gladstone's attempts to find employment for the Prince of Wales. Gladstone proposed giving the prince a real job as the queen's representative in Ireland. Mother and son agreed in rejecting this. They feared that the role would identify the monarchy with Gladstone's radical Irish policy which Bertie deplored as much as his mother, in spite of his cordial personal relations with Gladstone. The irony was that Gladstone's attempt to raise the stock of the monarchy by holding a thanksgiving service had succeeded all too well. So popular had the royal family become that Gladstone stood no chance of forcing the prince to do something against his will.

Bertie still hankered after hard power, though, demanding access to Foreign Office dispatches as preparation for becoming king. Victoria shrewdly insisted that 'any preparation of this kind is quite useless, & the Prince of Wales will not do it' unless absolutely forced to.[15] Not until 1892 did Rosebery give the fifty-year-old prince the gold key which had once belonged to Albert and which opened the box of Foreign Office dispatches.

Yet Bertie refused to develop a conventional soft power role. Science and art, the province of Prince Albert, was discussed and rejected: the prince, who was rarely known to read a book, showed no aptitude and took little interest in the South Kensington project. Then there was philanthropy. This too was dismissed: the prince 'had never shown any inclination whatsoever for such work', said Knollys.[16]

Nevertheless, as Frank Prochaska has demonstrated, the prince already had an established charitable role. By 1870 he spent between 25 and 30 days a year on charitable work, often accompanied by Alix, who had boosted this role since her marriage in 1863.[17] In this Bertie followed the cult of philanthropic leadership established by Victoria and Albert. The queen's reluctance to appear meant that a heavier burden fell upon the prince, as he complained to her in 1871: 'You have no conception […] of the quantity of applications […] we get to open this place, lay a stone, public dinners, luncheons, fetes without end'.[18]

After his recovery from typhoid, Bertie's philanthropy increased. By the 1890s he was carrying out 45 engagements a year.[19] This was still less than the present Prince of Wales's 500–600 events, even allowing for helicopters. Henry Burdett, stockbroker and philanthropist, insinuated himself into favour, publishing *Prince, Princess and People* (1889), which documented the philanthropic work of the royal couple. Charity was no longer a simple matter of royal patronage benefitting a good cause. Burdett saw royal involvement as a way of promoting voluntarism, providing welfare in the private sector and pre-empting 'socialist' state intervention. King Edward's Hospital Fund (today the King's Fund), founded in 1897, was an inspired trade-off between the plutocrats' millions and the social reward of court access.

The idea that charity could actually benefit the monarchy (as well as the other way around)—that it could be used to forge a direct link between monarch and people—was only dimly grasped by Edward VII. Not until the First World War, under the direction of the greatest of all royal philanthropists, Queen Mary, did the monarch visit the working classes in their homes. Though Edward VII contributed greatly to the effectiveness of royal charitable work, he did not use it to enhance his own legitimacy. If anything, his links with Jewish financiers invited antisemitic sneers.

Family Life and Soft Power

After 1871, Bertie's life continued in its former rut, and scandal regularly punctuated his career. He seemed to have learned nothing. The Mordaunt case was followed only five years later by another adultery scandal—the labyrinthine Aylesford Affair. The Beresford scandal of 1891 also turned on adultery. Bertie enjoyed public liaisons with courtesans such as Skittles, and professional beauties such as Lillie Langtry and Patsy Cornwallis-West. There were American mistresses such as Jennie Churchill or Consuelo, Duchess of Manchester. The aristocrat Daisy Warwick brought scandal. Only her successor Mrs Keppel was discreet.

For the biographer, this catalogue of scrapes and disasters raises the question: how did he survive? One answer is because of the deferential character of the Victorian press. Tabloid intrusion and phone hacking would have slaughtered Edward VII if he had lived today. As it was, the worst he had to put up with was insinuations in *Truth* or hostilities from the republican *Reynolds's Newspaper*.[20]

Secondly, the prince succeeded in squaring the gap between his high-end royal lifestyle and an income which was less than that of a rich duke without appealing to parliament for a rise and thus inviting public scrutiny of his behaviour. By 'borrowing' from the Rothschilds or the Scottish millionaire James Mackenzie (were these loans ever repaid?) and by allowing his finances to be managed first by Baron Hirsch and then by Ernest Cassel, Bertie ensured that he was solvent when he acceded in 1901.

Negative factors such as these—no tabloids, no debts—go only part of the way towards explaining how Bertie not only survived but became more popular after 1871. Soft power offers fresh insights. This can be seen in two key respects. One was the role of Alexandra.

Alexandra, as we have noted, understood the language of soft power. One of the best-dressed beauties of her day, the semiotics of fashion was second nature to her. To please the public, she rarely used Paris dress-makers, but patronized British fashion houses such as Madame Elise or John Redworth. When her sister Dagmar visited London in 1873 with her husband the tsarevich, later Alexander III, the two sisters double dressed wearing identical dresses on thirteen occasions—a ruse that was intended to signal the closeness of relations between the two royal families.

Alexandra's loyalty to Bertie was crucial. In spite of his unfaithfulness, she never confronted him. Neither did she desert him, let alone threaten divorce. The closest she came to indicating her disapproval of Lady Warwick, the most threatening of the mistresses, was to leave the country and spend interminable visits with her relations in Greece, Denmark and Russia. The fairy-tale princess was the ultimate arbiter of chivalry at the Wales court—and it was the ambition of every mistress to be forgiven by Alix, if only in order to gain re-entry into the court.

At Sandringham she created a family home. Child-centred, boisterous and noisy, 'Dear old Sandringham' replicated the family life of the Danish court rather than the stiff and formal upbringing which the Prince of Wales had endured. Bertie complained that she 'got stuck' there, and refused to come up to London when she was expected to attend. But, so far as the public was concerned, the happy family life that Bertie enjoyed with his beautiful wife provided a wholesome antidote to the tales of mistresses.

Bertie the Playboy Prince: Masculinity as Smart Power

The narrative constructed by Bertie himself, however, was about masculinity. Royal masculinity is a neglected subject. Nancy Ellenberger's article on George Wyndham offers valuable insights into late nineteenth-century aristocratic masculinity which have considerable relevance for royals.[21] Early nineteenth-century aristocrats refreshed their political legitimacy by adopting earnest, Christian middle-class behaviours. This too was the survival strategy of Prince Albert, who presented the royal family as a beacon of bourgeois morality. In the late nineteenth century, as aristocratic politicians found themselves competing with growing middle-class talent, a shift to ideas of male dominance and vigour can be perceived. This chimes with the 'flight from domesticity' perceived by John Tosh in his work on middle-class masculinity.[22] This, it seems to me, is the context in which we need to view Bertie, Prince of Wales.

The letters and diaries of Edward VII are prime examples of 'British male phlegm'—dashed off at speed, virtually illegible, full of clichés, understated, never neglecting a reference to the weather.[23] This was partly a matter of discretion. Writing to women in this manner protected him from being compromised if the letters were leaked to the press, as his correspondence with Harriett Mordaunt had been. But there is no attempt in any of his letters to explore a sense of identity. Far from it, one gets the feeling that introspection and soul-searching would have been deemed effeminate—as indeed was spending an afternoon sitting indoors reading a book. His diaries, which he kept himself even as king, are filled with times of engagements and trains, and lists of names of guests for luncheon or dinner or people staying at house parties.

Bertie craved manly roles. As a youth, his ambition for an army career was denied him by his father. As an adult, he thirsted for military action. To his vast irritation he was forbidden by his mother from taking part in the 1882 Egyptian campaign. He found consolation is collecting military uniforms and being colonel-in-chief of regiments. He was regularly photographed wearing military attire. He sought masculine escape in battue shooting which, as I have argued elsewhere, became the 'court sport' of the Prince of Wales.[24] An indifferent shot himself, he enjoyed organizing the sport like a general organizing a battle.

In all soft power narratives, the gap between the story and reality makes the spinner vulnerable. In the case of Queen Victoria, the narrative of the queen as a paragon of moral behaviour and domestic virtue endured well into the twentieth century. Not until very recently was Victoria revealed as the mother from hell to her oldest son. Masculinity, however, was riskier than widowhood as a narrative. The Prince of Wales devoted considerable efforts to keeping some of his more manly exploits out of the public eye.

Not all these activities were scandalous. Even today it is a little-known fact that Bertie worked as a fireman. None of his biographers mention it, but Bertie enjoyed a secret London night life, not as Jack the Ripper, as some have suggested, but as a member of the auxiliary branch of the London Fire Brigade. The prince's night-time entertainment of watching fires with his friend the Duke of Sutherland brought him into contact with Captain Eyre Massey Shaw, head of the London Fire Brigade. The prince arranged to be summoned at night from the billiard table at Marlborough House to the fire station in Chandos Street, where his uniform and silver helmet hung on a special peg. When the Alhambra Theatre in Leicester Square burned down in a dramatic fire (7 December 1882), the prince narrowly avoided being crushed by falling red-hot masonry which killed one and injured several firemen standing beside him. Next morning, he visited the injured firemen at Charing Cross Hospital, bringing several boxes of the best cigars.[25] The prince's near escape was kept out of the newspapers; *The Times* merely reported that he had 'evinced his interest in the fire' by paying a personal visit to the charred ruins accompanied by Captain Shaw.[26]

His other 'manly' adventure was illicit romance. Vast living spaces, frequent extended foreign travel and lengthy weekend parties allowed him to pursue countless flirtations and affairs while preserving the outward civility of family and court life. As Prince of Wales, with no real occupation, he devoted himself to perfecting the organization of the outward rituals of social life. The subtext was his elaborately conducted secret assignations. How much time did he spend fantasizing and organizing these liaisons? His relationship with Daisy Warwick can be charted by a coded reference in his diaries—a letter D in reverse which turns out to indicate the date of an assignation often appears several times a week.[27] As Margot Asquith wrote: ‘Women have been the excitement and the joy, the achievement of his life.’[28]

Bertie’s womanizing was a liability, and it made him vulnerable to blackmail. The golden rule of the Marlborough House Set was no publicity. The Aylesford Scandal and the Beresford Scandal both turned on threats to expose the behaviour of the Prince of Wales. In the 1876 Aylesford Scandal, Lord Randolph Churchill threatened to blackmail the Prince by publishing compromising letters that he had written to Edith Lady Aylesford. (Like most of the prince’s letters these turn out to be distinctly unexciting.) For this, Churchill and his family were forced into exile in Ireland and ostracized from London society by the prince.

The Beresford Affair was essentially a quarrel between the prince and his friend Lord Charles Beresford, caused by the prince stealing Beresford’s mistress, Daisy Lady Brooke, later Warwick. Beresford used publicity as a threat. ‘The days of duelling are past’, he declared, ‘but there is a more just way of getting right done in such cases than ever duelling supplied and that is publicity’.[29] The affair was eventually brought to an end by Lord Salisbury, who persuaded Bertie to write a letter of apology. In return, the pamphlet composed by Beresford’s wife scurrilously relating the doings of the scandalous Lady Warwick was burned.

Attempts to firefight scandal went badly wrong during the Tranby Croft Affair in 1891. This began as a quarrel about cheating at a country house party attended by the Prince of Wales for Doncaster Races. Sir William Gordon-Cumming, a member of the prince’s set, was accused by the hosts, the Wilson family at Tranby Croft, of cheating at the game of baccarat. This was an illegal game, and the prince had acted as banker. Gordon-Cumming signed a paper agreeing never to pay cards again; in exchange his accusers vowed to keep silent about his cheating. The paper was signed by the prince.

Most accounts of Tranby Croft focus on whether or not Gordon-Cumming cheated, and why the Wilson family were so quick to accuse him. The prince’s bizarre decision to support the Wilson family, whom he barely knew, and throw over his old friend has given rise to various conspiracy theories. But consider the story from the soft power point of view: the gossip got out, and Gordon-Cumming decided to break the royal code of secrecy and bring an action for slander against the Wilson family. Once more, the prince found himself called as a witness. There is plenty of evidence that Bertie was anxious and upset before the trial—and with good reason. As with the Mordaunt case, the proceedings revealed the louche side of court life. The Prince of Wales, it seemed, spent his time horse-racing and regularly played an illegal game of chance, even travelling with his personal gambling counters, embossed with Prince of Wales feathers. Though the Wilson family's evidence was weak, the judge summed up against Gordon-Cumming, who lost the case. There were accusations that the case was a whitewash for the Prince of Wales.

The Times commented that the prince was not entitled to a private life. No matter how hard he worked at his public duties, the people had a right to know about his gambling and to deplore it because he was 'the visible embodiment of the monarchical principle'.[30] The implication was that the prince must lead a blameless life.

In one sense *The Times* was right. The narrative of the prince's private life—the gambling, shooting, horse-racing, mistresses—certainly was more or less known by the public. But did it follow that the public wanted a blameless prince? On the contrary, it is arguable the playboy prince's career of scrapes and scandals forged a new narrative. Perhaps the fact is that the prince survived *because* of the scandals and not in spite of them (see Image 7.1). After the Tranby Croft furore, the journalist W.T. Stead wrote a profile in which he argued that the prince was poised to effect a Henry V transformation.[31]

One of the first people to articulate this narrative was Disraeli. From about 1876 the prime minister took to referring to Bertie as Prince Hal—Shakespeare's Prince Henry in Henry IV who, as the novelist Disraeli well knew, went on to become the hero king Henry V.[32] Here is Disraeli describing an evening that his private secretary Monty Corry spent with the Prince of Wales in 1876. After dinner they went to another house for supper, 'and there he found Mr Standish and Mrs [Sloane] Stanley and the Jersey beauty whose name begins with an L [Lillie Langtry]; and what with oysters and champagne and so on it was getting very late and very late it was when they broke up. And then Prince Hal said, "I shall go to the Turf [Club] now and play whist"! Even Monty could not stand that and escaped, having had a real day with Prince Hal!'[33]

Prince Hal versus Edward the Caresser: Edward VII's Narrative as King

Bertie's narrative of masculinity was clearly in conflict with the Queen Victoria narrative of the grieving widow. After Tranby Croft, *Truth* carried a picture contrasting royalty in 1841 as the font of law and virtue with royalty in 1891, with the Prince of Wales horse-racing and card-playing.[34]


LE MUSÉE DE SIRES N°8
A & Cie, 19, Rue de Paradis, Paris . Reproduction Interdite
LE PRINCE DE GALLES.

Image 7.1 The cosmopolitan Albert Edward Prince of Wales, Vintage postcard after a lithograph by Gaston Roubille, *Le Prince des Galles: Le Musée de Sires. Gueulerie Contempoiraine, Feuilles de Caricatures Politiques*, no. 8, c. 1900, private collection Frank Lorenz Muller

When Victoria died the newspapers eulogized the old queen for the moral purity that she brought to the monarchy. There were many who, like Henry James, mourned the loss of the nation's mother. James nicknamed the new king Edward the Caresser, and thought him 'quite particularly vulgar!' Kipling called him a 'corpulent voluptuary'.[35] As late as 1964 Alan Lascelles expressed the same view, describing Edward as 'a selfish, spoilt, vulgar cad, who inflicted on us a lamentable legacy of corruption of taste. Both he and his present biographer [Philip Magnus] are fleshy Jews, a type that never appealed to me.'[36] But the Prince Hal male-gendered narrative also gained traction. The *Spectator* echoed the mood of the press when it hailed the new king as a reformed Prince Hal.[37] Wilfrid Blunt remarked that the king had 'certain qualities of amiability and of philistine tolerance of other people's sins and vulgarities which endear him to rich and poor, to the Stock Exchange Jews, to the Turf Bookmakers and to the Man in the Street. He will make an excellent King for a XXth Century England.'[38]

The masculine monarchy of Edward VII was not a bourgeois, family affair as Victoria's had been. As king, Edward VII usually posed for the photographer alone, without his family. He made no claim to domestic virtue or fidelity. The paradox of Edward VII's soft power was summed up by Logan Pearsall Smith: 'A virtuous king is a king who has shirked his proper function: to embody for his subjects an ideal of illustrious misbehaviour absolutely beyond their reach.'[39]

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CHAPTER 8

Archduke Franz Ferdinand: An Uncharming Prince?

Alma Hannig

'What does popularity mean? I do not care about it. I believe that it is the duty of the sovereign to do whatever he considers good, without thinking about whether the people like it or not.'[1] One might assume that these words were spoken by an absolute monarch from the early modern era or perhaps just after the revolution of 1848, when conservative rulers rejected parliamentary involvement and ignored public opinion. However, they were uttered in 1906 by the heir to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Franz Ferdinand. Although the archduke was aware of the growing importance of parliaments and the press at the beginning of the twentieth century, he believed that an emperor still stood above everyone else and consequently had no need to be popular. This led his contemporaries and some later historians to call Franz Ferdinand a 'man of the Cinquecento'[2] or a 'renaissance man'.[3] His statements regarding public opinion certainly seem to justify this characterization.

When he was assassinated in June 1914, Franz Ferdinand was the second man in the state. He had been expanding and demonstrating his power, especially in the last two or three years before the First World War.

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In comparison with other European heirs, Franz Ferdinand's involvement in political, military and cultural matters was very strong, in part due to the advanced age of Emperor Franz Joseph, who increasingly accepted his nephew's interference. In order to exert his influence, the archduke applied smart strategies as defined by the political scientist Joseph Nye: a combination of the hard and soft powers of coercion, payment and attraction (although Franz Ferdinand preferred hard power).[4] He seldom was able to attract and convert others to his opinion. Rather, he usually altered their outlook by threats. In short, the archduke was the most powerful royal heir of his time.

This study aims to present Franz Ferdinand's use of smart power and to explain why he largely abstained from using soft power. It begins with a short sketch of the archduke's powerful position in Austria-Hungary and his attitude towards the press and public opinion in general. Many contemporaries and famous Austrian authors have characterized him retrospectively as rather unpopular. In the second part, I will scrutinize this generally accepted view by analysing contemporary newspaper articles, private papers and diaries. What did Franz Ferdinand know about his own reputation and how did he handle it? Finally, I will touch upon some of the archduke's activities that may be associated with soft power. The conclusion will try to answer the question of how Franz Ferdinand's image and behaviour affected the reputation of the dynasty and monarchy amongst the Austrian public.

Franz Ferdinand's Power

Franz Ferdinand never was officially appointed heir to the throne. This was the result of the difficult circumstances under which he became heir in the first place—the suicide of his cousin Rudolf, the only son of the Emperor Franz Joseph in 1889. Normally, the next heir would have been Franz Joseph's brother Karl Ludwig, but as he was not much younger than the emperor himself and uninterested in politics, his son Franz Ferdinand emerged as the presumptive heir. In order to avoid public discussion of Rudolf's death and Karl Ludwig's uncomfortable position, though, there was no official announcement regarding the new heir. Franz Ferdinand simply began performing some of the duties of the heir and, after Karl Ludwig's death and Franz Ferdinand's recovery from tuberculosis, the emperor put him at the 'disposal of the Supreme Command' in 1898. Only then was Franz Ferdinand generally seen and accepted as the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne. In the meantime, the archduke carried out representative tasks, received military training and education and moved up the military career ladder. In 1913, he became the inspector general of the armed forces, the highest possible office as long as Emperor Franz Joseph lived. He undertook some reforms in the army, increased the size of the navy and brought some of his favourite candidates into the most important military positions.[5]

Franz Ferdinand's political influence was based on his military chancellery, especially after Major Alexander Brosch von Aarenau became its chief in 1905. Brosch transformed the chancellery into a think tank and a strong instrument of power. He hired a crew of competent consultants who worked on a reform programme and offered their expertise in foreign affairs, economics and domestic or regional policy. These men included military officials, politicians, journalists and experts in constitutional and international law, as well as representatives of the different nationalities.[6] With their support, Franz Ferdinand became extremely well informed about all current public affairs, while using his consultants as channels to popularize his ideas. Within a short time, the archduke gained influence in political, military and personnel policies, as well as in the arts and higher education—so much so, in fact, that Belvedere, the official seat of Franz Ferdinand and his military chancellery in Vienna, was often called a *Nebenregierung* (parallel government or shadow government) or even *Gegenregierung* (counter-government) to Emperor Franz Joseph. The emperor represented the present and Franz Ferdinand the future, so most careers depended on both of them.[7] The archduke's first successful intervention in personnel policy came in 1906, when he installed his favourites in several important posts, among them Aloys von Aehrenthal (Foreign Minister), Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf (Chief of the General Staff) and Franz von Schönaich (War Minister). Over time, the archduke managed to install more of his followers and intimates in important positions. In 1913–1914, hardly any post in politics, diplomacy or the military could be filled without consulting Franz Ferdinand or, at the very least, taking his opinion into consideration.[8] After his assassination in June 1914, the German ambassador in Vienna, Heinrich von Tschirschky, remarked: 'The hand of the archduke was noticed everywhere, not only in the army and navy, but in every ministry, in every provincial government and in the missions abroad.'[9]

Aehrenthal's successor, Count Leopold Berchtold, increasingly involved the archduke in the decision-making process, partly because of their similar views on foreign policy, but also because of Franz Ferdinand's other influential contacts, above all his dynastic networks. Franz Ferdinand's friendship with German Emperor Wilhelm II and their periodic meetings strengthened the heir's position in the Habsburg Monarchy.[10] This dynastic friendship shaped his image, both within and outside of Austria-Hungary. In 1912 and 1913, Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie visited Great Britain and were impressed by the friendly treatment they received at the court of George V. The archduke's invitation for the autumn of 1914 seemed also to be a promising step towards the further development and consolidation of relations between London and Vienna. Furthermore, the archduke established and used aristocratic, diplomatic and clerical networks for political purposes.[11] These networks and ambitions of the heir and his military chancellery, as well as the emperor's and Berchtold's growing willingness to tolerate and involve the archduke in decision-making processes, further built up Franz Ferdinand's power base within the Danube Monarchy.[12]

In contrast to military, foreign and personnel policy, the heir had little influence on domestic affairs in Austria and Hungary. On one hand, his uncle did not accept Franz Ferdinand's interventions in the domestic realm due to his poor relations with certain nationalities (Hungarians, Poles, Italians and Serbs) and the archduke's reform plans, which would have changed the dual structure of the state. On the other, Franz Ferdinand himself failed to establish stable connections to the political parties and leaders in Austria, and even less so in Hungary. The archduke despised democracy generally and the Austrian parliament in particular as an expression of democratic development since universal manhood suffrage was introduced in 1907.[13] Thus the aim of his domestic interference was usually not constructive cooperation, but rather playing political parties off against one another. He applied smart strategies, combining attractive offers and apparent benevolence with threats for the future, in order to prevent developments of which he disapproved.[14]

Franz Ferdinand and the Press

Despite his concentration on the means of hard power and his sceptical attitude towards a free press, Franz Ferdinand quickly recognized the importance of public opinion in a constitutional monarchy.[15] He distrusted the liberal press in and outside Austria-Hungary, and criticized it passionately, calling the journalists ‘plagues’ and ‘the most dreadful spawn’.[16] Before Alexander von Brosch became chief of the military chancellery, the archduke had read only Austrian newspapers, which confirmed his opinion.[17] In order to inform him about the diversity of opinions in the Habsburg Monarchy and abroad, Brosch supplied Franz Ferdinand with a daily international press review that the archduke read carefully and often commented upon.[18] It contained important topics of domestic and foreign policy, even including satire magazines, many of them already underlined and annotated by the chief of the chancellery.[19]

Franz Ferdinand thus came to appreciate the need for good press relations in order to promote his ideas publicly. Brosch hired several journalists to cooperate with the Belvedere in political campaigns: Friedrich Funder (*Reichspost)*, Leopold von Chlumecky (*Österreichische Rundschau*), Carl M. Danzer (*Armee-Zeitung*) and the political author Theodor von Sosnosky. They all supported the archduke’s political ideas and helped him to disseminate them. The military chancellery, above all Brosch, often wrote articles that were published anonymously in different newspapers. Franz Ferdinand gave numerous instructions to the chief of his military chancellery to influence public opinion both within and outside Austria-Hungary. Normally Brosch and his successor Bardolff responded quickly and positively, and sent him the published articles.[20]

The most important form of journalistic cooperation was that with Friedrich Funder and his *Reichspost*, the newspaper of the Christian Social Party, which over time became the mouthpiece of the Belvedere. In its beginnings in 1895, the *Reichspost*’s circulation of 5000 was negligible. But its topics and attitudes appealed to the archduke, especially its Catholic and anti-Hungarian aspects. Brosch invited Funder to the Belvedere in 1905, after which Funder received information and instructions concerning what to publish from the military chancellery several times a week. Funder published his articles not only in the *Reichspost*, but also in German newspapers like the *Kölnische Zeitung*.[21] The more the *Reichspost* earned a reputation as the archduke’s mouthpiece (especially after 1911), the more it grew in importance and readership.[22]

The aforementioned journalists all belonged to conservative and military-related groups. The Belvedere never had any contacts with the leading Austrian newspaper, the liberal *Neue Freie Presse*, which sympathized with the liberal parts of British, French and German societies and politics and openly criticized Russia and antisemitism.[23] The only view Franz Ferdinand and the *Neue Freie Presse* had in common was their Italo- and Serbophobia, but the archduke assailed the alleged dominance of the *Neue Freie Presse* in public and called it the '*Judenpresse*' (Jewish press). Conversely, the liberal press often excoriated the heir's political views and activities, especially with respect to Hungary.

In order to reach new readers among the liberal bureaucracy, financial circles and the middle classes, the Belvedere planned to buy some newspapers or to create a new one.[24] Especially from 1912 on, the military chancellery sought closer cooperation with the left-liberal *Zeit*, which was often heir-friendly though with differing opinions on some important questions.[25] At this time, articles from *Zeit* were almost overrepresented in the press review that the archduke received. Nonetheless, all attempts to buy or create a newspaper failed due to lack of money.

Whenever the archduke tried to influence the press, it always had to do with political issues rather than his popularity. For example, two topics dominated his press review from July 1913 to April 1914: the possible resignations of Foreign Minister Berchtold and the Chief of the General Staff Conrad. From the papers of the military chancellery, it is obvious that Franz Ferdinand initiated some of the articles, above all because he feared that Hungarian Prime Minister István Tisza could succeed Berchtold. In both cases, the public associated the assumed resignations to some extent with the archduke. Franz Ferdinand did not try to place himself in a positive light in these articles, but rather focused on conveying his message that both officials should stay.[26]

Since the archduke was particularly interested in political developments in Hungary and in Hungarian press comments about him personally, as well as on his policies and the monarchy in general, several archival boxes from his military chancellery deal exclusively with Hungarian issues. Most of the Hungarian newspapers were critical and even hostile towards the archduke.[27] His difficulties with the Hungarian press began when the young Franz Ferdinand was based in Hungary during his military education. Later, when he became seriously ill, the Hungarian press declared him almost dead.[28] He complained about 'such infamy and vulgarity'[29] and asked the emperor for help, but Franz Joseph demanded respect and restraint from his nephew towards the Hungarians. The conflicts increased as the archduke tried to interfere in Hungarian domestic policy and blackmailed the elites with his reform plans and the threat of abolition of political and military privileges.[30] The archduke mostly ignored negative statements regarding his person, as he did not aspire to becoming popular with the Hungarian public.[31] Thus, he often insisted on properly presenting his political plans in the press rather than trying to cooperate with some Hungarian newspapers or to introduce a new, archduke-friendly newspaper in Hungary.[32]

The Image of Franz Ferdinand in the Habsburg Monarchy

Together with some other literary works, Stefan Zweig's famous autobiography *The World of Yesterday* has decisively shaped the negative image of Franz Ferdinand. As Zweig wrote: 'But Franz Ferdinand lacked everything that counts for real popularity in Austria; amiability, personal charm and easygoingness. […] He was never seen to smile, and no photograph showed him relaxed. He had no sense for music, and no sense of humour, and his wife was equally unfriendly.'[33] Zweig's description of the indifferent response to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand became a part of the general cultural memory of the outbreak of the First World War, at least in the German-speaking world. The Austrian author claimed that there was neither profound sympathy nor mourning, and that many were relieved when they heard about Franz Ferdinand's death.

A quick look at the newspapers after the assassination reveals that Zweig's description was definitely not 'shared by the entire nation',[34] as he maintained. Every newspaper, including the liberal *Neue Freie Presse* and the socialist *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, which were known for their frosty relations with the archduke, described the shock and the sorrow that the people felt for the loss of this 'source of energy'[35] and bearer of hope. Many of the private papers of Franz Ferdinand's contemporaries also demonstrate that people in the Habsburg Monarchy felt a sense of desperation after the heir's death because he symbolized the venerable monarchy and embodied hopes for political reforms and a better future.[36] Only later did historians and other authors begin to emphasize the archduke's lack of popularity and to locate the reactions to his death somewhere between deep mourning and gloating. But no one has analysed his image systematically, from when he first became heir until his death.

As mentioned above, Franz Ferdinand was never officially introduced to the public as the heir. After Crown Prince Rudolf committed suicide in 1889, the press, out of reverence for the emperor, did not publish articles about Franz Ferdinand, which would have been the usual way to present a new heir to the public. As Franz Joseph obviously did not wish to be reminded of his son's tragic death, he did not even speak with Franz Ferdinand about the succession.[37] Still, the people, with the aid of the press, followed Franz Ferdinand's first steps with intense interest.[38] His uncle, Archduke Albrecht, a high ranking military officer and the moral authority of the Habsburg court, warned the 25-year-old archduke about the negative image he would bring upon the royal family and the army if he did not take his duties seriously enough and continued amusing himself with hunting and dancing.[39] Albrecht also reminded his nephew of his cousin Rudolf, who had compromised 'the monarchical principle and the reputation of the imperial house' by his wanton behaviour, and advised him instead to follow the good example of his uncle Franz Joseph, who 'renounced his youth' at age 18.[40]

Archduke Albrecht again admonished Franz Ferdinand for expressing the opinion, during his military service in Hungary, that German should become the official language of the whole Habsburg army. The indignant Hungarian press had responded by condemning the young archduke, and Albrecht advised him not to overreact, but rather to ignore the press campaign against him.[41] The old archduke was not the only one worrying about the public image of the new heir. Franz Ferdinand's teacher and adviser Max Vladimir Beck recommended that the archduke publish his diaries after his world tour in 1892–1893 in order to improve his public image.[42] Franz Ferdinand followed this advice, though only to a certain extent: he published the diaries after letting Beck read and correct them, but he did not accept some changes made by Beck in line with what today we would call political correctness.[43] Apparently, the heir apparent did not really endeavour to improve his public image.

Franz Ferdinand's long period of inactivity due to illness (tuberculosis) led most decision-makers to doubt that the archduke would ever recover to perform his functions. Although his brother Otto provoked endless scandals that damaged the reputation of the Habsburgs, the people loved him and the press and ruling classes declared him the new, alternative heir to the throne.[44] Subsequently, Franz Ferdinand became extremely distrustful in all respects and especially vis-à-vis journalists, politicians and the public.

Franz Ferdinand's marriage to Sophie Chotek in 1900 was the first occasion when the public became more familiar with the heir. However, his decision to marry a woman beneath his station displeased the aristocratic and royal circles not only in Austria, but in all the European monarchies.[45] Franz Ferdinand was not the first member of the imperial family to cause a scandal because of a morganatic marriage. But as heir to the throne, he put the future of the monarchy in question and destabilized the delicate social system of the ruling classes. Franz Joseph had always sought to keep the court and his family free of public debate. Now, several archdukes and archduchesses had damaged the public image of the House of Habsburg by demonstrating that not even the royal family respected its rules of rank and decorum.[46] Before the wedding, Franz Ferdinand thus had to swear an oath renouncing any Habsburg inheritance for his future children. The oath was published in all the newspapers, along with pictures of the bridal couple.

Compared to Habsburg standards and in accordance with Franz Joseph's directive, the wedding was modest and unspectacular. Nevertheless, an analysis of the press from all parts of the empire shows that journalists reported positively on the wedding celebration and the unconventional love match.[47] Many details about the ceremony, the guests and the general public enthusiasm for the bridal couple emerged.[48] The public also learned about many private and official aspects of Franz Ferdinand's life, and most articles showed him in the best possible light. What was neglected in 1889 was accomplished in 1900: private stories and anecdotes about the heir made him appear more popular. By that time, the *Reichspost* was writing the most favourable articles about the archduke and his wife.[49] It is not clear whether these sympathetic news articles were launched by the imperial court, or if the journalists were only satisfying existing public interest in the unknown heir.

For the most part, however, Franz Ferdinand did not capitalize on the situation as a starting point for the kind of positive image campaign most royal families knew how to wage. The archduke appeared to have scant interest in creating a positive public perception of himself. Indeed, according to his intimate, Ottokar Czernin, he 'despised' the striving for popularity.[50] He thus often risked negative headlines when he interfered with domestic and military policy, for instance when he demonstrated his silent protest against the universal suffrage introduced in Austria in 1907 by failing to appear at the opening of the first parliament (*Reichsrat*) following the general elections.[51]

Franz Ferdinand reached two important decisions following the court's reaction to his morganatic marriage: he would fulfil his representational duties as seldom as possible, and he and his family would avoid Vienna. In order to spare his wife and later his children the inconvenience of unequal treatment due to their lower rank, the archduke spent most of his time out of the capital. He enjoyed a very happy family life in his different residences; the main seat of the family became Konopište near Prague. In a constitutional monarchy where the press played an increasingly important role, Franz Ferdinand's retreat from the public sphere in Vienna was bad for his image.[52]

Stories about his private life gradually disappeared, not least because the archduke wished to protect himself and his family from public scrutiny (see Image 8.1). Many rumours thus circulated due to this lack of information. Contemporaries who observed Franz Ferdinand's family life unanimously affirmed that it was harmonious and happy, while external observers and some writers referred to the stinginess and bigotry of the princely couple.[53] Franz Ferdinand and Sophie's private life conformed to bourgeois rather than aristocratic standards, which some might have interpreted as a sign of parsimony. One characteristic that the general public never learned about the heir, but which was remembered by all his intimates, was his extraordinary warmth, love and tenderness towards his wife and children.[54] Over the years, the archduke's image lost its substance, and he increasingly appeared as an heir apparent *without a profile*.[55]

FRANZ FERDINAND—'THE BIG MYSTERY'[56]

On the occasion of Franz Ferdinand's fiftieth birthday in December 1913, almost every newspaper in Austria published an article about him.[57] Some, like the *Österreichische Rundschau*, brought out special editions in which Belvedere journalists Chlumecky and Sosnosky highlighted different facets of Franz Ferdinand's private life as well as political and military responsibilities.[58] Other newspapers wrote about the archduke's limited sphere of activity (military and representational duties). Unsurprisingly, the *Reichspost* presented the heir extremely positively in every respect, and sought to underline his significance for the present and future by describing the 'high duties' the heir had already attended to in all realms—military, politics, the economy, homeland security, his family, gardening and art collecting.[59] Honest, open criticism about the future monarch could not be expected on this occasion, though a few newspapers indirectly expressed their concern by not mentioning the archduke's birthday at all. It is remarkable that several journalists, among them Carl M. Danzer of *Danzer's Armee Zeitung*, characterized Franz Ferdinand as 'the big mystery, the enigmatic X, which lets the mathematical equation of the European great powers appear insoluble'.[60] It is remarkable, too, that the archduke, who had been heir to the Habsburg throne for almost a quarter


Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand
von Oesterreich d'Este mit Familie
H.C. KOSEL
WIEN, 1913.

Image 8.1 Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and his family in 1913, *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand von Oesterreich d'Este mit Familie*, Postcard, Vienna 1913, private collection Frank Lorenz Muller; the serious faces and the uniform worn by Franz Ferdinand are typical of official portraits. Private photographs usually show the family smiling and the archduke in civilian clothes.

of a century still appeared so mysterious, like a ‘Sphinx’.[61] Some explained it by calling him a man of the future who, according to his position, acted restrainedly.[62]

There were more reasons why Franz Ferdinand remained unknown: on the one hand, because of his aforementioned absence from Vienna even in difficult times; on the other, because he hardly ever gave private audiences, which he found boring.[63] Direct dialogue was the privilege of only a few people around him. Another aspect of the mystery surrounding Franz Ferdinand concerned his political plans. While the public certainly knew that he planned to reform the Habsburg monarchy, it remained unclear whether he wished to make it into a federal, trialistic or centralized state. Although several well-developed reform programmes existed, it is still uncertain which one the archduke would have implemented.[64] Of course, no heir to the throne could have publicized his plans as long as the emperor was alive. One may thus assume that the archduke deliberately sought to mislead people by regularly announcing different reform scenarios.[65] Unsurprisingly, this caused fear and uncertainty among his contemporaries.

The same holds for Franz Ferdinand’s hostile attitude towards some nationalities—that is, his animosity towards Hungarians, Poles, Italians, Serbs and Jews was well known, but no one knew what would come of this since everyone expected the emperor to treat his peoples neutrally. Would he change his way of thinking and acting in public? Would he accept Hungarian or Polish advisers? Could he, as emperor, refuse to give an audience to the Hungarian Prime Minister, as he had previously done? These unanswered questions made the public uncomfortable and divided it into supporters and opponents of Franz Ferdinand, as well as optimists and pessimists. Even his entourage developed contrasting opinions about him based on their personal experiences.[66] Moreover, the archduke’s unflattering character flaws, including a fiery temper, irascibility and volatility, were well known to those who regularly interacted with him, but were mostly discussed off the record at the Viennese court, among diplomats and politicians rather than in public.[67]

The most difficult question was that of war and peace. How would Franz Ferdinand act in the next crisis? Some contemporaries thought he was a dove while others considered him a hawk.[68] As the archduke often changed his opinion, nobody was quite sure what would happen when he ascended the throne.[69] Even the men who were close to him and viewed him positively criticized his sudden changes of mind. Many even became sceptical of his ability to rule.[70] In Serbia, Russia, France and Italy Franz Ferdinand was deemed a leader of the Viennese war party. Since the heir read newspapers from throughout the country and abroad, he was well informed about these perceptions.[71] However, there is no evidence that he tried to improve upon or change his reputation as a warmonger.[72] Again, one might suspect that the archduke consciously held his public in suspense.

Franz Ferdinand obviously did not believe that it was necessary to persuade or attract the public, and at most he tried to convince outstanding figures such as Franz Joseph or the German emperor. Some contemporaries doubted if a real friendship between Wilhelm II and Franz Ferdinand existed, and claimed that the archduke actually disliked the German emperor for his loud mannerisms and his attention- and popularity-seeking. But the intimacy of their correspondence, as well as the frequency of their mutual visits, points to the opposite.[73] Indeed, these royal meetings could have formed a good basis for a campaign to improve the archduke's reputation, as Wilhelm II was popular at that time. Also, his meetings with the Romanian King Carol and the British King George V, which were held in a cordial atmosphere, could have been built upon as an aspect of soft power and used to demonstrate royal solidarity and their common interest in preserving peace, not to mention their personal sympathy and confidence in one another. In fact, Franz Ferdinand's trip to the United Kingdom did improve his image and popularity there.

Although the archduke believed in the renewal of the Three Emperors League between Austria-Hungary, Russia and Germany, he did not develop a personal relationship with the Russian monarch or even plan a journey to St Petersburg, which could have been a positive signal to the general public in both countries. Likewise, Franz Ferdinand did not apply this instrument of soft power in the context of countries that he considered enemies of Austria-Hungary: Serbia, Bulgaria and Italy. He never visited these countries or France, the only republic among the Great Powers.[74]

Nor did Franz Ferdinand seek to utilize other means of soft power, such as cultural activities, to boost his popularity, although he had many opportunities. For example, in 1910, the archduke became the main protector of the Austro-Hungarian organization for heritage preservation and conservation (*K.K. Zentralkommission für Denkmalpflege*). His purpose was to protect and restore the cultural heritage he considered valuable, and to prevent the export of antiques to other European countries or the United States.[75] Many times, it was his private interest in certain antiques which led to them being placed under an export ban. Later the archduke would buy them at better prices. To most people, these activities were as little known as his military chancellery, which was directly and discreetly involved in his purchasing decisions. Although many contemporaries appreciated Franz Ferdinand's preservationist interventions, the heir apparent did not try to publicize his laudable efforts to preserve the national heritage.[76]

The greatest discrepancy in the image of the heir is visible in portraits and photographs. All official photos and paintings show a chilly, earnest, and unapproachable man, while private and unpublished photos record a smiling and humorous heir to the throne, irrespective of his function at that moment (as father, husband, friend, high-ranking military man or representative of the emperor) (see Image 8.2).[77] Evidently, the archduke did not aspire to winning the people's hearts, though he did wish to be taken seriously.

Ironically, shortly before he was killed Franz Ferdinand seemingly took a tentative first step towards practicing soft power for his private popularity. From 15 to 17 June 1914, he opened the gates of his private garden in Konopište to the public for the first time. The castle garden was known for the archduke's rosarium, and literally thousands of people—among them the famous Viennese journalist Karl Kraus—visited the 'decorative garden characterized by the most popular accessibility'.[78] There is no official explanation for why the archduke took this action and displayed a part of his private life, but it may be assumed that it contributed to a better image of the archduke and his family. Only the *Reichspost* and the Czech newspaper *Čech* reported on Franz Ferdinand and Sophie's walk and conversation with the visitors as well as their children welcoming the schoolchildren with sweets.[79] Due to the enormous interest of the public in his garden and the success of the event, the archduke decided he would open the gates every year.[80]

Finally, Franz Ferdinand and Sophie's journey to Sarajevo included agenda items that sought to attract their future subjects in Bosnia: visiting hospitals, schools, orphanages, bazaars and museums. In order to demonstrate their closeness to the people, the archduke and his wife travelled in an open-top car on 28 June 1914 and accepted the proposed limited security arrangements, which in the end proved fatal.

Image 8.2 Caught off-guard and with a smile: Franz Ferdinand as he was rarely depicted in official photographs (c. 1910–1914) © Heeresgeschichtliches Museum, Vienna

Conclusion

Franz Ferdinand gained great influence over political, military and cultural developments in the Habsburg Monarchy. Yet due to his autocratic character and ability to apply hard power instruments, the archduke did not appreciate the tools of soft power and never intended to employ it in the strict sense of the word—that is, to attract or win over the general public. Unlike his cousin Rudolf and his brother Otto, who were loved by the people despite their scandals, Franz Ferdinand never gained popularity. Without the interventions of his teachers and advisers, the heir would have probably provoked more unpopularity. Even his perfect family life could not inspire his future subjects. Being absent from Vienna, neither Franz Ferdinand nor his family were present in the mind of the people who formed their own diffuse image of the heir from the official articles and photos that presented a dutiful, reserved man who remained an enigma. His wife Sophie apparently did not comply with ideals of beauty for her time. Due to their lack of official social and cultural commitment, the couple was not associated with welfare and philanthropy nor with culture, modernity and fashion—the typical fields of soft power.[81] Franz Ferdinand and Sophie's cautious charm offensive in 1914 turned out to be successful, but their promising Bosnian journey ended in tragedy.[82]

The ambivalent public image of the archduke was to a large extent a consequence of his own attitude and actions. Franz Ferdinand simply did not care about his public image. Only when he feared that the reputation of the Habsburg Monarchy could be damaged, would he intervene.[83] Franz Ferdinand never tried to become a prince charming, as, in his opinion, a future monarch had no need to appeal to his subjects. The archduke was always amazed by Emperor Wilhelm's wish to be popular and loved by his people, since Franz Ferdinand considered respect and fear to be better tools for autocratic rule.[84] Even in the typical fields of soft power—the arts, education and media—the heir preferred hard power. His instrumentalization and desired control of the press foreshadowed the way he planned to rule: as an absolute monarch.[85] Franz Ferdinand obviously did not recognize the signs of the times. Although he was aware of his partly negative image within and outside the Habsburg Monarchy, he made no efforts to change it. Perhaps he (un)consciously followed his uncle's example: when Franz Joseph ascended the throne he ruled by military means and was not popular at all. It was many years until his subjects started to admire and worship him.[86] Things had changed, though, since 1848 and the archduke did not realize that renouncing soft power was tantamount to renouncing 'one source of influence' and 'an element of power'.[87]

When he applied instruments of soft power, Franz Ferdinand aimed to popularize his political views, not his person. It is difficult to determine the success and influence of his media campaigns. However, the impression prevails that he caused uncertainty and confusion. His change of mind and different reform plans led the people to doubt if Franz Ferdinand could guarantee a smooth transition and avoid wars and revolution. On one hand, he represented reforms, hopes and activity, on the other fear, uncertainty and volatility. Thus, instead of being an integrative element of the monarchy, Franz Ferdinand, with his contradictory character, polarized society and provoked a friend-foe pattern.

The words of the famous Viennese writer Karl Kraus after the assassination became a kind of dictum on the archduke: 'Not for him the friendly wave. He had none of the "winsome ways" that can soothe a people of onlookers with regard to the losses. He was not out to get to that unexplored territory that the Viennese calls his heart.'[88]

Notes

1. Andrássy Diary, cited in: Georg Franz (1943), *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand und die Pläne zur Reform der Habsburger Monarchie*, Brünn, Munich and Vienna, 59.
2. *Neue Freie Presse* (= *NFP*), 30 June 1914, 2.
3. Mensdorff Diary, 2 July 1914, in: Mensdorff Papers, in Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv Vienna (= HHStA), Box 4. Compare also Franz (1943), 16; Theodor von Sosnosky (1929), *Franz Ferdinand. Der Erzherzog-Thronfolger. Ein Lebensbild*, Munich and Berlin, 237.
4. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (2004), *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York.
5. The study is mainly based on the following biographies: Alma Hannig (2013), *Franz Ferdinand. Die Biografie*, Vienna; Jean-Paul Bled (2013), *Franz Ferdinand. Der eigensinnige Thronfolger*, Vienna, Cologne and Weimar; Rudolf Kiszling (1953), *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand von Österreich-Este. Leben, Pläne und Wirken am Schicksalsweg der Donaumonarchie*, Graz and Cologne; Sosnosky (1929); Leopold von Chlumecky (1929), *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinands Wirken und Wollen*, Berlin.
6. Franz (1943), 26–28, 69–75.
7. Rudolf Sieghart (1932), *Die letzten Jahrzehnte einer Großmacht. Menschen, Völker, Probleme des Habsburger-Reiches*, Berlin, 235. See also Sosnosky (1929), 119–20.
8. For concrete examples see Staatsarchiv Vienna, Kriegsarchiv, Militärkanzlei Franz Ferdinand (= KA MKFF), Box 109.
9. Tschirschky to Bethmann Hollweg, 2 July 1914, in: Imanuel Geiss (ed.)(1963), *Julikrise und Kriegsausbruch. Eine Dokumentensammlung*, vol. 1, Hannover, 66. See also Kiszling (1953), 38, 165.
10. Robert A. Kann (1951), ‘Emperor William II and Archduke Francis Ferdinand in Their Correspondence’, *American Historical Review* 57, 323–51.
11. For Franz Ferdinand’s networks see Alma Hannig (in press), ‘Franz Ferdinand—Power and Image’, in: Marc Cornwall (ed.), *Sarajevo 1914: Spark and Impact.*
12. For Franz Ferdinand’s interference in foreign policy see Hannig (2013), 134–94.
13. Bled (2013), 89, 136–39.

14. Lothar Höbelt (2011), 'Der Thronfolger und die politischen Parteien', *Études danubiennes* 27, 13–23. Compare Kiszling (1953), 87–118, 154–59, 215–47.
15. Chlumecky (1929), 290–91. See also Hannig (2013), 115–21.
16. Franz Ferdinand, 5 September 1893. Compare also 2 October 1893, in: [Franz Ferdinand] (1896), *Tagebuch meiner Reise um die Erde, 1892–1893*, vol. 2, Vienna, 428, 510. Franz Ferdinand to Marie von Thun, 27 July 1894, in: Ernst Rutkowski (2007), '… Ein schneeweißer Rehbock mit hellblauen Lichtern … Aus den Briefen des Thronfolgers Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand an die Gräfin Marie von Thun und Hohenstein, geb. Gräfin Chotek', *MÖSTA* 52, 247–71, 258.
17. Victor Eisenmenger (1930), *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand. Seinem Andenken gewidmet von seinem Leibarzt*, Zurich, Leipzig and Vienna, 140.
18. Friedrich Funder (1952), *Vom Gestern ins Heute. Aus dem Kaiserreich in die Republik*, Vienna, 380.
19. KA MKFF, Boxes 194–200.
20. For example, during the First Balkan War, Franz Ferdinand demanded more negative articles about 'Serbian cruelties' and Bardolff confirmed the success of his interventions. Franz Ferdinand to Bardolff, 20 November 1912, and Bardolff's response, in: KA MKFF, Box 194.
21. Funder (1952), 377–78. Compare Dagobert Pokorny (1950), *Die Wiener Tagespresse, und ihre Einflußfaktoren im ersten Weltkrieg 1914–1918*, Vienna, PhD diss, 266.
22. Edith Walter (1994), *Österreichische Tageszeitungen der Jahrhundertwende. Ideologischer Anspruch und ökonomische Erfordernisse*, Vienna, Cologne and Weimar, 81–85. In 1914, the circulation was 36,000. The most influential newspaper, *Neue Freie Presse*, had a circulation of 66,000.
23. Egon Raisp (1952), *Die Wiener Tagespresse 1848–1950. Versuch einer Typologie*, Vienna, PhD diss, 70–73.
24. HHStA, Hausarchiv, Franz Ferdinand's Private Papers (= FF PP), Box 12. Compare Chlumecky (1929), 290–94, 314–15; Funder (1952), 503; Sosnosky (1929), 120.
25. Raisp (1952), 79–80.
26. KA MKFF, Box 198.
27. See numerous articles in KA MKFF, Box 200.
28. Friedrich Weissensteiner (1994), *Franz Ferdinand: Der verhinderte Herrscher*, Vienna, 218.

29. Robert A. Kann (1976), *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand Studien*, Vienna, 118.
30. Funder (1952), 377–83.
31. Franz Ferdinand to Franz Joseph, 25 October 1895, in FF PP, Box 1.
32. Max Polatschek (1989), *Franz Ferdinand. Europas verlorene Hoffnung*, Vienna, 153, 156. Compare KA MKFF, Box 205.
33. Stefan Zweig (2002), *Die Welt von Gestern. Erinnerungen eines Europäers*, Frankfurt/M., 248. For other authors see Hannig (2013), 260–70.
34. Zweig (2002), 248–49. For a critical analysis of Zweig's *Welt von Gestern* see Bettina Heyl (2000), 'Stefan Zweig im Ersten Weltkrieg', in: Uwe Schneider and Andreas Schumann (eds), *"Krieg der Geister". Erster Weltkrieg und literarische Moderne*, Würzburg, 263–91.
35. *NFP*, 29 June 1914; *Arbeiterzeitung*, 29 June 1914. Most newspapers published pathetic and positive obituaries. See Alma Hannig (2014), '"Wer uns kränkt, den schlagen wir nieder": Die Wiener Tagespresse in der Julikrise 1914', in: Georg Eckert, Peter Geiss and Arne Karsten (eds), *Die Presse in der Julikrise 1914. Die internationale Berichterstattung und der Weg in den Ersten Weltkrieg*, Münster, 21–42, 25.
36. Hannig (2013), 207–10, 217–18. The same applies to the legend of the 'third-class funeral': the people feared damage for the reputation and credibility of the state as well as a political crisis when an official state funeral with all the European heads of state was not carried out. See Margit Silber (1992), *Obersthofmeister Alfred Fürst von Montenuovo. Höfische Geschichte in den beiden letzten Jahrzehnten der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie (1896–1916)*, vol. 2, Vienna, PhD diss, 772–801.
37. Emil Franzel (1964), *Franz Ferdinand d'Este. Leitbild einer konservativen Revolution*, Vienna and Munich, 23. Compare Bled (2013), 53.
38. Weissensteiner (1994), 80.
39. Archduke Albrecht to Franz Ferdinand, 10 November 1888 and 8 May 1889, in FF PP, Box 2.
40. Archduke Albrecht to Franz Ferdinand, 14 August 1889, in FF PP, Box 2.
41. Archduke Albrecht to Franz Ferdinand, 28 July1892, in FF PP, Box 2. Compare Bled (2013), 57–58; Kiszling (1953), 20. The official language in the Hungarian part of the army was Hungarian.
42. Beck to Franz Ferdinand, 30 June 1893, in FF PP, Box 2.

43. J. Chr. Allmayer-Beck (1956), *Ministerpräsident Baron Beck. Ein Staatsmann des alten Österreich*, Vienna, 31.
44. Eisenmenger (1930), 30.
45. Hannig (2013), 63.
46. For other examples of morganatic marriages see Martina Winkelhofer (2008), *'Viribus unitis'. Der Kaiser und sein Hof. Ein neues Franz-Joseph-Bild*, Vienna, 76, 189, 195, 199, 224, 235–36.
47. *Pester Lloyd*, 1 July 1900, 2; *Agramer Zeitung* and *Wiener Zeitung*, 2 July 1900, 1; *Prager Tagblatt*, 28 June 1900 and 1 July 1900, 1–3.
48. *NFP* and *Deutsches Volksblatt*, 2 July 1900, 1–2, *Neues Wiener Journal*, *Wiener Zeitung* and *Reichspost*, 1 July 1900, 3–4, 7–8, 6; *Prager Tagblatt*, 2 July 1900, 2–3. The satirical magazine *Der Floh*, called Sophie the 'empress of hearts', 1 July 1900, 1.
49. *Reichspos*t, 28 and 29 June 1900, 1.
50. Czernin to Franz Ferdinand, 27 January 1913, in: FF PP, Box 13. Compare Ottokar Czernin (1919), *Im Weltkriege*, Berlin and Vienna, 49.
51. Bled (2013), 139.
52. Sosnosky (1929), 242.
53. Carl Freiherr von Bardolff (1938), *Soldat im alten Österreich*, Jena, 132. Compare *Die Fackel* 4 (August 1902), 13–15; Sieghart (1932), 234; Sosnosky (1929), 239–40.
54. See for example Ludwig Freiherr von Pastor (1950), *Tagebücher, Briefe, Erinnerungen*, ed. Wilhelm Wühr, Heidelberg, 5 July 1914, 606. Czernin (1919), 57–58.
55. Sigmund Freud once characterized the archduke that way. Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fließ, 7 July 1898, in: Jeffrey M. Masson (ed.) (1986), *Sigmund Freud. Briefe an Wilhelm Fliess 1887–1904*, Frankfurt/M., 349.
56. *Danzer's Armee-Zeitung*, 18 December 1913, 1.
57. For example *NFP* and *Fremdenblatt*, 18 December 1913, 1.
58. All articles published in this special edition were authorized by Franz Ferdinand. See Sosnosky (1929), VII.
59. *Reichspost*, 18 December 1913, 1–2.
60. *Danzer's Armee-Zeitung*, 18 December 1913, 1.
61. Chlumecky (1929), 63. *Deutsches Volksblatt*, 18 December 1913, 1.
62. *Danzer's Armee-Zeitung*, 18 December 1913, 1.
63. See 'Brosch über den Thronfolger als Mensch und Soldat', in: Chlumecky (1929), 355–62, here 358. In contrast to the archduke, the emperor gave audiences every day, and twice a week even allowed a general audience for any subject of the state. See Jean-Paul Bled

(1988), *Franz Joseph. 'Der letzte Monarch der alten Schule'*, Vienna, Cologne and Graz, 351–52.

64. Franz (1943), 40–41, 82–99; Sosnosky (1929), 66–78, 238; Polatschek (1989), 242.
65. Bled (2013), 292.
66. Funder (1952), 493–96. Pastor (1950), 1 December 1908, 31 January 1914, 497, 589; Hohenlohe to Aehrenthal, 13 November 1907, in: Solomon Wank (ed.) (1994), *Aus dem Nachlaß Aehrenthal. Briefe und Dokumente zur österreichisch-ungarischen Innen- und Außenpolitik 1885–1912*, Graz, vol. 2, 555; Marga Lammasch and Hans Sperl (eds) (1922), *Heinrich Lammasch. Seine Aufzeichnungen, sein Wirken und seine Politik*, Vienna and Leipzig, 78; Sosnosky (1929), 238–39.
67. Czernin (1919), 47; Sieghart (1932), 234, 237, 241; Bardolff (1938), 136; Chlumecky (1929), 355–57.
68. In particular, the Austrian Peace Movement and Bertha von Suttner considered the archduke a warmonger. Brigitte Hamann (1986), *Bertha von Suttner. Ein Leben für den Frieden*, Munich and Zürich, 467–69, 495–96.
69. Bardolff (1938), 129. See, for example, the archduke's change of mind during the First Balkan War, in: Hannig (2013), 176–84.
70. Hohenlohe to Aehrenthal, 11 November 1906, in: Wank (ed.) (1994), vol. 1, 417.
71. Sosnosky (1929), VI, 236.
72. There were some attempts on behalf of the Foreign Ministry to improve the archduke's image in the foreign press, though not with respect to his warmongering. FF PP, Box 16.
73. Kann (1951), 324. Compare Czernin (1919), 55.
74. Hannig (2013), 150–71. It may be interesting to analyse Franz Ferdinand's guest and host behaviour during these meetings, as he sometimes obviously broke the rules of courtesy and hospitality. See Hannig (2013), 46, 83.
75. The best study on this topic: Theodor Brückler (2009), *Thronfolger Franz Ferdinand als Denkmalpfleger. Die 'Kunstakten' der Militärkanzlei im Österreichischen Staatsarchiv (Kriegsarchiv)*, Vienna, Cologne and Weimar. The same applies to his intervention in education: Franz Ferdinand supported what he considered good and tried to prevent everything that he did not appreciate (for example progressive education or modern professors).
76. Compare KA MKFF, boxes 155–70.

77. Hannig (2013), 73–74. Compare numerous photographs in Schlossarchiv Artstetten.
78. Karl Kraus, 'Franz Ferdinand und die Talente', *Die Fackel*, 10 July 1914, 2.
79. *Čech*, 17 June 1914, 5. *Reichspost*, Nachmittagsausgabe [afternoon edition], 17 June 1914, 3. Compare also Wladimir Aichelburg (2014), *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand von Österreich-Este 1863–1914. Notizen zu einem ungewöhnlichen Tagebuch eines außergewöhnlichen Lebens*, vol. 2, 1203. As most historians have only analysed the most important newspapers without finding a note on this, they conclude that Franz Ferdinand had not shown himself to the public. See Edgar Haider (2013), *Wien 1914. Alltag am Rande des Abgrundes*, Vienna, Cologne, Weimar, 210; Gordon Brook-Shepherd (1988), *Die Opfer von Sarajevo. Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand und Sophie von Chotek*, Stuttgart, 301–02; Hannig (2013), 195.
80. *Reichspost*, Nachmittagsausgabe, 18 June 1914, 3.
81. Polatschek (1989), 73.
82. See also the highly positive reaction of the public to Franz Ferdinand and Sophie at the Austrian Derby, the Viennese horse race, in June 1914. Haider (2013), 209.
83. For example, when the Czech politician and one of the most prominent critics of the Habsburg Monarchy, Tomáš Masaryk, was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize, the archduke took various measures in order to prevent it being awarded to him, as he feared damage to the monarchy´s reputation. See Alma Hannig (2015), 'Friedensnobelpreis für Tomáš Masaryk? Ein Intrigenspiel', *Český časopis historický* 113, 418–51, 438–46, 450.
84. Polatschek described the archduke in the following way: 'He wanted to rule, he demanded a silent obedience, neither approval nor applause.' Polatschek (1989), 248.
85. Franz (1943), 22–23; Sosnosky (1929), 232, 237–38. Compare Bled (2013), 201.
86. Bled (1988), 151, 391, 563.
87. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (2008), 'Public Diplomacy and Soft Power', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, 94–109, here 95–96.
88. Kraus (1914), 3–4: 'Er war kein Grüßer. Nichts hatte er von jener „gewinnenden" Art, die ein Volk von Zuschauern über die Verluste beruhigt. Auf jene unerforschte Gegend, die der Wiener sein Herz nennt, hatte er es nicht abgesehen.'

PART III

Emotional Appeals

CHAPTER 9

Dynastic Heritage and Bourgeois Morals: Monarchy and Family in the Nineteenth Century

Monika Wienfort

Most European monarchies today present themselves as authentic popular institutions. The constitutional type of parliamentary monarchy in Europe (probably with the exception of the Principality of Liechtenstein) emphatically acknowledges that the sovereignty of the people is a mode of legitimization requiring constant interaction with the media and the national public. One might also argue that the popular legitimization of modern European monarchy now reaches far beyond the national sphere, when one takes into account billions of people all over the world gathering before the television to watch a royal wedding (preferably in Britain).

Popularity as a manner and technique of convergence between the monarch and the people is put into effect not only by the media but by the royal families themselves. In line with Joseph Nye's concept of 'soft power' as a

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non-enforceable offering, one could speak of a selective appropriation of certain popular modes of conduct. These modes, presenting an emotional appeal to take part in events, often originated in the familial sphere, where one would certainly expect traditional obstacles. The choice of marital partners (*connubium*)—seen as the one decisive litmus test of social history in general—reveals an obvious and rather astonishing development. Over recent years, the royal heirs of Britain, Spain, Sweden, Monaco and Norway have married into their national middle classes: princes or princesses, the offspring of the dynasties' social equals, or at least the children of native nobilities, appear to be out of the race. The marital partners of European royals now hail from the popular rather than the noble classes, and future queens or queen consorts seem to arise, like the fairy tale Cinderella, 'out of the ashes'. Where most European royals are concerned, social equality of birth, which used to be decisive for most royal marriages during the nineteenth century, appears to be completely out of fashion. Interestingly, the typical royal heir is now destined for a love match only. This common feature concerning Europe's royal marriages puts the different representative schemes of monarchies—from the British 'grand style' to the ostentatious popularity of the Scandinavian royal families—in perspective.[1]

Current research on European monarchies during the nineteenth century still does not show an overwhelming interest in the connections between the royal families and the media. While John Plunkett presented Queen Victoria as 'first media monarch' more than a decade ago, even some of the most recent studies of European monarchies remain caught up in the context of politics and constitutions, of democratization and nationalization. Against an older interpretation that regarded European monarchies after 1789 in constant decline, many interpretations now delineate a vision of a remarkable persistence and ongoing popularity. The end of the German, Austrian and Russian monarchies in 1917 and 1918 have been explained not so much as the end-point of a slow and gradual process involving the loss of political power, but rather in the context of victory and defeat at the end of the First World War. While Britain, the Scandinavian and the Benelux countries retained their monarchies, defeat caused revolution and an abrupt end to the monarchy as the constitutional regime in Germany and Austria-Hungary. Seen over the entire length of the nineteenth century, though, many European monarchies can be said to have functioned rather successfully as national symbols and as means of effecting a national integration of peoples that were still, in many ways, heterogeneous. As for Britain, the idea of a nationalized and nationalizing monarchy, established during the 1990s, has influenced historical research in Germany and other European countries ever since.[2]

This chapter seeks to argue that the origins of a specific form of popularizing Europe's monarchies—the transferral of a dynastic tradition into a modern family realm—can be traced back well into the nineteenth century. Within this process, the concept of a bourgeois monarchy, the idea of a monarchy defined by a dynasty that is enriched and transformed by values and manners associated with the middle-class family, was of crucial importance. However, it is essential to note that this notion does not imply monarchs taking up a bourgeois lifestyle or simply becoming bourgeois. Rather, the notion of a bourgeois monarchy is composed of three elements, which profoundly changed the role of monarchy within national societies.

First, since the eighteenth century, a new mode of perception emerged which linked monarchy and the nation. Linda Colley has shown this for Britain and George III, who was perceived not only as the first English ruler of the House of Hanover, but also as an incarnation of an ordinary Englishman personified as 'Farmer George'. The usurper Napoleon became a yardstick for the relationship between monarchy and the French nation, while his general Bernadotte transferred the Napoleonic charisma to Sweden. The Prussian Queen Louise personified her country's fight against Napoleon, and the Spanish Queen Isabella II came to the throne with the assumption that she would embody a liberal Spanish nation, expressed in the constitution of Cadiz.

Secondly, the concept of a bourgeois monarchy conveyed a notion whereby the public could make certain demands of the monarch. The relationship between the monarch and the people no longer expressed itself in terms of rule and obedience but in a language of emotion and responsibility. Thirdly, within a traditional regal style, the adaptation of bourgeois manners, the creation of a monarch's private life, the emergence of a private family and the popularity of the idea of a private home evolved. In the eyes of their royal occupants, Osborne and Balmoral trumped Buckingham Palace and Windsor Castle. The intimate manor house of Paretz or the castle of Babelsberg near Potsdam were preferred over the city palaces in both Berlin and Potsdam. Many German princely families built or rebuilt small cosy palaces like the 'Kleines Palais' in Meiningen or the Veste Heldburg in Thuringia, where Duke Georg II resided with his morganatic wife, the former actress Baroness Helene von Heldburg.[3]

How and in what ways did the dynastic heritage of the European monarchies merge with the public image of a set of middle-class values in the course of the nineteenth century? Familiarity, and, dependent on that, domesticity and respectability became key issues in parallel discourses that took place both within royal families and in the public perceptions of monarchy. Certainly, these key notions did not bring about a complete adoption of bourgeois values by the royals or even the preponderance of a middleclass lifestyle. Core elements of a traditional dynastic heritage, namely a personal sense of chosen-ness by divine providence and the wish for an important political role remained prominent in the self-awareness and self-imagination of most European monarchs. Most ruling heads still held firm views on their own sovereignty, whether they interpreted it as divine right, or more modestly, as a moral duty. These constituting elements of a dynastic self-image of European monarchs arched over the very different state constitutions which ranged from parliamentary monarchy to the many German constitutions organized along the 'monarchical principle' of the French Charter of 1814.[4]

Familiarity

In the course of the nineteenth century, the influence of the bourgeois family ideal—involving the notions of marriage as a love match and of a loving and caring relationship between parents and children—meant that the ties between members of royal families intensified. They connected husband and wife, parents and children, and the wider, mostly transnational family of cousins, aunts and uncles. As a result of better means of communication, a royal culture of correspondence expanded, making letter-writing one of the most important and time-consuming occupations. Queen Victoria's communication network, which took notice of but significantly transcended any public-private distinction, covered many European countries. The correspondence between the queen and her eldest daughter Victoria, who was married to the German Crown Prince and later Emperor, Friedrich III, addressed family matters, European politics and British-German cultural differences.

In this, they were typical of Europe's royal families, whose members frequently wrote to one another, and whose correspondence routinely covered many topics from European politics to matters of education, art and fashion. It is not surprising that family matters featured very frequently. Among reigning families, the search for a suitable marriage partner for any royal child usually extended across the whole continent; propositions, pros and cons for nearly every prince or princess in Europe poured in from hundreds of similar letters. In general, the advertisement of candidates by letter came first, usually followed by—hopefully inconspicuous—visits. Decisions, first by the prospective husbands, secondly by both parents, and thirdly and lastly by the brides, could not be put off for long: attractive and healthy princesses with the appropriate denomination for Protestant or Catholic marriage circles were always in high demand. Accordingly, the marriage age for women of the dynastic nobility tended to be significantly lower than for the overall population, around 18.[5]

Royal marriage networks in the nineteenth century no longer indicated the priority of political alliance and future inheritance claims, as was significant for the ancien régime, but followed an overwhelming interest in the status of a reigning family, most often connected to the different Christian denominations. While the Protestant countries of Britain, Northern Europe and Germany formed a distinct marriage circle, the Protestant kingdom of Württemberg preferred to marry off their princesses to Russia. The Catholic Habsburg family was most often content with intermarriage within itself, while the Catholic dynasties of Saxony and Bavaria married Italian or Portuguese princes.[6]

In the nineteenth century, many letters of members of reigning families speak of the importance of love for, or at least affinity towards, a prospective marriage partner. Familiarity and intimacy, a personal connection between husband and wife, was the primary aim of all the efforts to bring suitable partners, preferably from other royal families, together. The purpose was not to imitate the middle-class ideal of a love match as such, or to impress the national public, but primarily to amalgamate a pride of rank with matters of family convenience and personal comfort. Whereas today the public visibility of a happy marriage is valued as a primary asset of royal performance in general, late nineteenth-century dynasties emphasized the hopes and wishes of royal children to be married at all, and to a spouse of their own liking. The dynastic tradition of keeping the royal children at the disposal of the monarch in matters of marriage and thereby requiring them either to marry a specific candidate or abandon the idea of marriage altogether, ultimately fell by the wayside. Even Queen Victoria, determined to present herself as the perfect ideal of a wife and widow, was not able to stop the marriages of her children, even though she would have preferred to keep at least one of her daughters unmarried at home. Gradually, the middle-class ideal of marriage as a citizen's birthright for men and women alike not only diffused into the lower classes but also into the dynastic nobility.[7]

From then on, match-making rose from a political necessity to a principal family business: Queen Victoria and her daughter Vicky frequently exchanged views about suitable marriage partners, especially for the queen's younger children. For the queen, her first experiences of marriage relations with other European dynasties made this business even more difficult. The marriage of her daughter Helena to Christian Schleswig-Holstein caused family problems with her son Edward and his Danish wife Alexandra. In 1866, the Austro-Prussian War created a family catastrophe, when the queen's daughters Vicky and Alice, the latter married to the Grand Duke of Hesse, stood on different sides. The Prussian crown princess complained to her mother about the contradictions between European politics and her familial obligations, which resulted in an impression of ultimate powerlessness: 'I have no control or influence over anything of the kind—and have for obvious reasons avoided mixing up any of my family feelings or interests with politics.'[8]

Nineteenth-century European nobility in general and the reigning dynasties in particular came to use a characteristic language of cousinhood as an emotional appeal. Of course, as in the early modern period, many individuals were actually next of kin, but the meaning of this language of intimacy went further, deriving primarily from a sense of an exalted status equality. No wonder that the president of the French Republic would always feel awkward in the company of the monarchical heads of state. The—Roman Catholic—Saxon royal family used the term '*Verwandtschaftlichkeit*' (behaving as if one were related), to mark the intimacy with the royal families of Bavaria, Savoy or the Queen of Sweden (who was born Josephine Leuchtenberg and whose mother was of Bavarian royal descent). The intimate connection even derived from former marriages by members of the house and perpetuated itself to form part of a genealogy. The social and cultural meanings of this practice conveyed a feeling of being personally on friendly terms while, at the same time, expressing the status of social equals.

When the Saxon-born Princess Elisabeth, Dowager Duchess of Genoa, married a member of the Italian lower nobility shortly after the death of her husband in 1855, King Johann of Saxony gave his permission for the marriage—though not without reservations. The new son-in-law had to keep 'an incognito as husband'. The king tolerated the decision of his daughter, but he would not accept the morganatic husband as officially related. 'Only before God', he assured his daughter, was Niccolo Rapallo his son-in-law exactly like his other sons-in-law. One should add that the

Saxon royal family did not in the least think about expelling Elizabeth from the family or punish her in any way. Of course, the marriage was out of keeping with the princess's station and therefore regrettable, but the status problem would remain with the husband, not with the princess or her family. Saxony's royal family interpreted royal status as an inalienable birthright, which even a woman was unable to forfeit.[9]

In her old age, Queen Victoria styled the royal household as a family, and a certain intimacy became crucial. Princess Beatrice served as her ultimate companion, and the queen selected her maids of honour from among the connections of those who already were or had been present in the royal household. Closeness to the queen became a matter of inheritance and tradition, and thereby represented a family value. In 1887, the young Marie Adeane, who at that time was not personally acquainted with the queen, was appointed maid of honour. This was a court office, to which one of her predecessors, Lady Sarah Lyttelton, had linked an expectation of being an 'improver of the national morals'. Reacting to a letter of gratitude from Lady Elizabeth Biddulph, Marie's mother, the queen wrote that it was 'a pleasure to have a grand-daughter and niece of those whom I have known so long'. She ended her letter with a reference to another member of this court family: 'We are pleased to have your brother Alick, who is always pleasant and very useful here'.[10] Victoria obviously relied upon the trustworthiness and service mentality of traditional court families rather than choosing a new companion individually.

The Biddulphs and Adeanes together made one family, and, by embodying a family, their members became part of the royal household, which, at least in the eyes of the queen, should itself function as a family. The royal household figured as an institution, which linked public representation of royalty to a kind of family life. Family-style manners were devoted to pleasantness, and pleasantness at court consisted of conversation skills and the willingness always to serve the queen's best interests. In Germany, the Crown Princess of Prussia, who had to cope with the fact that her in-laws made decisions concerning her ladies in waiting, often deplored that women were chosen whom she came to distrust. The court environment of Vicky and the royal heir Friedrich constantly suffered interventions motivated by the Liberal-Conservative conflicts characteristic of Prussian politics of the day.[11]

This constant amalgamation of dynasty and family, which featured the present and future of the dynasty, but no longer its past, took visual shape in the famous portrait of the British royal family by Franz Xaver

Winterhalter (1846). Victoria and Albert are presented as parents with five children. Obviously, the family, and not solely the female sovereign, dominates the scene. While the theme of the picture seems to be 'family all over', the dynasty nevertheless plays its part. Victoria, dressed formally, is wearing a crown; Edward, the heir, is standing next to her. The picture clearly shows the different positions of the siblings: Vicky as the eldest daughter and brightest child of the royal couple is situated only with the little children on the right and by this is ranked below her brother. The picture, which was put on public display in St James's Palace in 1847, and was circulated widely as an engraving, reveals a modern programme of Britain's nineteenth-century monarchy, whereby a contemporary family ideal was used to frame and thereby legitimize the present and the future of the dynasty.[12]

Photographs of the family in general became wildly popular during the second half of the nineteenth century. The ruling families of Europe made use of the culturally transforming technical innovation that was photography, and with it came a significant and near-omnipresent melding of dynasty and family. In Germany, the so called 'Four Emperors Picture' of 1882 showed the Emperor Wilhelm I and his three successive heirs (the youngest was the newborn Prince William, son of the future Emperor William II). The picture obviously depicted strong family ties from great grandfather to great grandson, with the great grandfather (Emperor William I) holding the baby in his arms. Nevertheless, as a family picture, the scene was incomplete. The fact that all four persons were male, and all female relations, the grandmothers, wives and mothers were omitted, affirmed that the photograph aimed primarily at the representation of the continuity of the dynasty. From this perspective, the (middle-class) family consisting of parents and children did not appear as relevant as the key members of the German dynasty.[13]

Domesticity

Linked to the prominence of familiarity, the new concept of domesticity emerged, which became—for better or worse—decisive for royal families. The concept of middle-class domesticity, based as it was on a transformation of the ideals of early modern paterfamilias literature, proved to be influential even for traditional domains of dynastic representation. Every monarchy in Europe had to deal with the topic of education and professional training of the royal children, among them of course the heir to the throne. During the nineteenth century, the societies of Europe's nation-states increasingly expected royal education to be informed by middle-class values such as a command of classical and modern knowledge as well as by moral virtues such as fidelity in marriage. In Italy, the new national public lambasted the Piedmont dynasty for showing a noticeable lack of interest in education. At least from the British perspective, Germany did not seem any better. Concerning the future Kaiser, the Prussian crown princess perceived herself as having failed to prepare her son for his future role. Much to his mother's regret, the young Wilhelm much preferred his military duties to reading classical authors. Parental care and the diligent education of princes in line with a catalogue of domestic virtues became a moral and civic duty for both dynastic and bourgeois families.

Reflecting on the death of Prince Albert of Coburg in 1899, Mary Mallet, Queen Victoria's maid of honour, ascribed the illness and death of the prince to the 'fast life' of Berlin's military officers: 'How strange royalties are, their children seem to lack the ordinary care bestowed on our own humblest middle class. Such a thing could never have happened to any of the boys I know and if it had his parents would be blamed by the whole of society.' The remark clearly shows English-German stereotyping, but it also exposed the expectations of European societies concerning an adoption of middle-class values by royal families.[14]

The relationship between the sovereign and the heir constitutes a central theme in the history of monarchy. The constant overlap between the public and the private dimensions of a father–son or a mother–son relationship seemed irritating for reigning families and societies alike. One way to get closer to this complexity is to study public events when the heir stood in for the parent as representative of the country. For example, in 1869, Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, the future Friedrich III of Prussia and Germany, represented Prussia at the opening of the Suez Canal, while on tour of the Eastern Mediterranean. Heirs to the throne certainly enjoyed occasional opportunities to represent the monarchy, however, in general they were not able to make a significant and autonomous contribution to great state occasions. Queen Victoria was always reluctant to let her son Edward play a leading role. He was trusted to represent her at levees and drawing rooms in Buckingham Palace, but not at events of any political significance. The queen often talked about the 'ideal of a good ruler' constituting a family project for royal parents and then presented Edward's perceived shortcomings not so much as a problem for the monarchy but as a personal and parental disappointment.[15]

In Germany, the Emperor Wilhelm I never allowed his son Friedrich Wilhelm to step out of his father's shadow. Queen Victoria cited the political unreliability and moral shortcomings of her eldest son as reasons for why she did not wish to let Edward stand in for her even though she more or less constantly avoided state occasions herself. Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, notwithstanding the fact that he was perceived as a bourgeois role model, was equally mistrusted by his father. Both Victoria and Wilhelm I very much preferred to view the heirs and future monarchs simply as sons, whose duties seemed very clear: obedience to the monarch, self-discipline and keeping a low profile. Both monarchs tended to use the family role of mother or father in order to limit the public role of the heir. The future monarchs had virtually no say even within their own intimate family circles. Friedrich and his wife constantly complained about their private and public powerlessness. Their older children, most notably Prince Wilhelm, turned to the emperor every time his parents made his life uncomfortable. In the case of Wilhelm and his brothers, the royal grandparents decided on the traditional military career, willfully ignoring many expectations of the middle-class and liberal public in Germany.[16]

While the relationship between the monarch and the heir to the throne implied political significance, the connection between the monarch and their other children might develop along more middle-class-like manners of favour and distance; Queen Victoria and her daughter Vicky maintained an intimate relationship, their correspondence eventually amounting to thousands of letters. The Prussian crown princess visited her mother and her beloved home country as often as possible. As Marie Mallet observed, not without some irony: 'At dinner in the evening the Queen and Empress discussed the state of the Italian Army with much heat, contradicting each other so vigorously that we all shook with internal laughter, it was most amusing to see two people who are never contradicted, playing the game with each other.'[17] Mallet's remark firstly dealt with the truly unconventional topic of this animated conversation between mother and daughter. A discussion of the state of the Italian army demonstrated that both these women shared political interests but also that they enjoyed access to information that was often male-privileged. As such, the domestic talk revealed itself as regal communication.

Domesticity also became important in other aspects of life. Many letters of European royals spoke of the longing and search for a smaller palace as a home. Since Victoria and Albert disliked Buckingham Palace and even Windsor Castle, they bought and remodelled Osborne and of course, Balmoral. To the public, the British press presented Osborne as a 'Royal villa' of 'English simplicity', ideal 'for privacy and recreation'. Victoria's Maid of Honour, Lady Lyttelton, wrote of 'the country taste of the Queen' and closely observed: 'The most important key is never out of Prince Albert's own keeping.'[18] Smaller palaces and houses made court routines easier and helped to create a family life, as Marie Mallet, in 1896, related from Balmoral: 'We have been a very happy little party quite like a family with all our private jokes and good-humoured chaff and no jars of any kind.' In a feature on the royal family at Balmoral, the queen's 'Highland Home', the 'total absence of that ostentatious display which would delight the vulgar' was promptly noted by the press.[19]

Due to the overwhelming influence of the grandparents—Emperor Wilhelm and Empress Augusta—the Prussian crown princess and her husband were not able to guide the education of their children in line with their own preferences, but they succeeded at least temporarily in leading an ordinary family life in suitable surroundings. The couple was never fond of the *Kronprinzenpalais* at Berlin, but preferred the admittedly also rather grand *Neues Palais* at the fringes of the Potsdam park of Sanssouci. When they were young, the children had breakfast with their parents on a regular basis. Like a middle-class mother, Victoria liked to be constantly present. In 1863, the King of Prussia presented the couple with the small estate of Bornstedt near Potsdam and Friedrich and Victoria modelled it into a rural and domestic idyll, completed by a dairy, a playground and ponies for the children.[20] In contrast, Wilhelm I and his wife Augusta abhorred spending time privately on their own. The couple openly rejected domesticity and opted instead for a constant flow of balls, dinners and theatre events, which made for a showy and glamorous court in Berlin. During the summer, Queen Augusta very much preferred to leave Berlin without her husband. In the eyes of Vicky, the constant search for entertainment and the escape from Berlin was directly opposed to the idea of a home: 'The Queen herself is glad to get away! And yet this is her home. It is too sad.'[21]

Domesticity as a family mode also mattered greatly within the context of court etiquette. At court, a meeting between sovereigns and their respective families, even if a sovereign from another country was included, could be styled as *en famille*. At certain occasions, the royal family was allowed to appear in simple clothing, '*en bourgeois*' and '*ureinfach*' (very simple), as the mistress of the robes of the Great Duchess of Mecklenburg, Paula von Bülow, explained. The certitude of status and the definition of a family event made it possible for members of reigning families to appear at the 'family dinner' (*Familientafel*) in simple and comfortable clothes rather than in court attire. Appearing '*en bourgeois*' defined the palace not as a place of royal representation but rather as a private household where domesticity and not splendour was held as the appropriate code of conduct.[22]

The most famous example of royal anti-domesticity in the nineteenth century seems to be Queen Isabella II of Spain. When Isabella came to the throne in 1833 at the age of three, the Spanish press described her as an 'innocent girl'. In Spain, innocence thus became the most popular notion for expressing political expectations of internal harmony, as a symbol of the union of a nation, shaped by political strife between the Conservative Catholic and the Liberal side. Obviously, there had never been such harmony, not even within the Liberal camp. Isabella's accession ultimately resulted in the Carlist War, which confronted her Liberal supporters with the Catholic and Conservative clientele of her uncle Don Carlos. The Carlist War not only represented a civil war between different political factions but also a war within the royal family itself. The Spanish succession crisis fundamentally rejected the nineteenth-century notion of a harmonious royal family representing the nation and adhered instead to a traditional mode of concurrent dynastic claims of different family members.[23]

The historian Isabel Burdiel has shown conclusively that gender as a political factor was involved in the institutionalization of Spain's post-revolutionary monarchy. This was particularly the case with regard to the symbolic politics pursued by nineteenth-century monarchies dealing with middle-class societies: 'What eventually cemented their political effectiveness, however, was the ability of the various Royal houses to *represent* the adaptation of the old forms of aristocratic behaviour to the new middle-class values of morality, self-control, reason and merit.' Whereas Queen Victoria had the great advantage to be able to satisfy many of these public expectations, most importantly through her happy marriage to Prince Albert, the opposite was the case with Isabella, who was eventually forced to abdicate the Spanish throne in 1868. In 1843, at the age of 13, she was officially proclaimed to be of age. Obviously, she was still too young to rule, while her mother, the former Queen Maria Christina, had abdicated the regency and left for exile in 1840. Still under the influence of her mother, she had to submit to the decision of the Liberal-Moderate government and the Cortes, the Spanish diet. This applied in particular to the question of her marriage. Because of the intense struggle between Britain and France over the political domination of Spain, neither a German, Saxe-Coburg prince, nor a French Orléans could win the position of a king consort (not prince consort, as in Britain). Isabella's arranged—or, one might say, forced—marriage at the age of 16 to her rather dull-witted and physically unattractive cousin Francisco de Asís, the politically weakest of the Bourbon princes available, was itself a result both of the political struggle at home and the dominating influence of western European powers.[24]

Isabella finally chose a way of life almost designed to encapsulate the very antithesis of a middle class queen. The list of Isabella's lovers, beginning with the progressive Liberal, General Serrano, was long; the private life of the queen piqued the national public and delegitimized the monarchy. The difference to the situation of the young Victoria seems to be very significant. Victoria was just a little older when she came to the throne, but one could not imagine seeing her forced into marriage, neither the queen mother nor Prime Minister Lord Melbourne or parliament would have been able to pursue such an endeavour under the eyes of the British public. Politically and privately, Queen Isabella fell prey to the Moderate Party, who had done so much to initialize a constitution characterized by strong powers of the monarch. Isabella successively gave birth to nine children, including the future king, Alfonso, and the Spanish public was subsequently inclined to ridicule the idea of legitimacy, which had been so powerful in earlier decades of Metternich's Europe. Politically, the king consort Francisco was portrayed as the queen's worst enemy, but during the 1860s, Isabella's reign lost its function for the Spanish Liberals. The demand for radical political change, abdication or revolution also grew as a result of the devastating public image of the crown. As Burdiel observes, the Prince of Asturias was sent to Sandhurst, not only to be educated in the military field but to learn the manners of a gentleman.[25]

Respectability

Respectability, deriving from familiarity and domesticity, created a nineteenth- and twentieth-century version of royal dignity. A lack of respectability might be seen as almost tantamount to a crisis of the monarchy. In 1870, Gladstone summed up the situation in harsh words: 'To speak in rude and general terms, the Queen is invisible, and the Prince of Wales is not respected.' It turned out, though, that different members of royal families were in some cases able to compensate for the personal shortcomings of their relatives and thus to provide a certain minimum quantum of respectability for the dynasty as a whole. Unlike her sons, for instance, Queen Victoria demanded and received the respect of the majority of her people. The representation of her court set a counter image to the public image of the Prince of Wales: 'I suppose our court is the simplest in Europe, but its very simplicity is dignified and touching', Mary Mallet observed.[26] In the Italian case, though, King Umberto I's penchant for mistresses did little to enhance the respectability of the monarchy. This problem was mitigated to some extent, though, by his wife. Margherita, an educated and attractive woman, who founded a salon for writers and intellectuals, was, as historians still argue today, 'the one indisputably regal presence in four generations of the House of Savoy'.[27]

The respectability of the monarchy increasingly derived from ordinary family events like marriages, births and deaths. As a result, even people who did not have any special regard for the monarch increasingly felt a specific royal aura. At the death of Edward VII, the young Alan Lascelles, who only later became private secretary to King George VI and Queen Elizabeth, noted in his diary: 'I fear my chief emotion at first was resentment at the inevitable postponement of the *Ring* [Richard Wagner's operas]. But now and again, with the intermittent boom of guns, and the half-masted flags, and the genuine blue faces in the streets, I quite got the sense of a national calamity and felt we'd lost a big man.' Lascelles found the translation of the king's body to Westminster 'dignified and moving', while uniforms and a 'grey-black crowd' showed 'regal splendour'.[28]

Familiarity and intimacy, reshaping dynastic traditions, played an important role both for the private lives and for the public representation of the monarchy. More precisely, royal representation was involved in a constant dialogue between dynastic traditions and rising middle-class values. Even the Emperor Wilhelm II, who loved to appear in regal splendour on film, did not fail to prepare for film scenes showing himself as a caring parent of his only daughter, Victoria Luise. Current research on the modern monarchy still draws inspiration from the famous phrase by Walter Bagehot: 'A family on the throne is an interesting idea.' Bagehot in particular aimed at female subjects, who were supposed to care 'more for a marriage than a ministry'. Yet the interplay between familiarity, domesticity and respectability appealed not only to female spectators of the royal performance. The development of a modern monarchy, legitimized and accepted by the people, succeeded not only in consequence of the adaptation of monarchical reign to changing constitutional principles. The functions of family and familiarity, embodied today by a middle class-spouse for the royal heir, is constantly connecting the traditions of dynasties to the everyday life of the people. A 'family on the throne' became not only 'an interesting idea' for the nineteenth century but continues to be a fascinating feature even for the twenty-first century.[29]

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CHAPTER 10

The Importance of Looking the Part: Heirs and Male Aesthetics in Nineteenth-Century Spain

Richard Meyer Forsting

Gender played a significant role in the representation and education of heirs to the throne in nineteenth-century Spain. Male aesthetics and qualities associated with masculinity impacted powerfully on the perception of Alfonso XII (r. 1875–85) and Alfonso XIII (r. 1886–1931). The emphasis that was placed on martial and male virtues in the education and representation of these male heirs clearly set them apart from Isabel II (r. 1833–68), whose image was heavily influenced by female stereotypes and whose education explicitly reflected notions derived from her gender. A study of these different representations of nineteenth-century heirs to the Spanish throne will highlight how important it was not only to be a manly future king, but also to look the part.

As a result of the political circumstances into which these three heirs were born, all of them played an important role in Spanish political imagination from a very early age. Isabel II became queen—though under a regency—when she was only three years old. She went on to represent the

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liberal hope for a better future in the fight against the ultra-Catholic, conservative forces that challenged her right to the throne in the Carlist War (1833–39). Alfonso saw his mother's reign end abruptly in September 1868 and was forced to flee into exile with her. After her abdication in 1870, the prince inherited her dynastic rights and soon became the centre of political plans to restore the Bourbon dynasty to the Spanish throne. In 1875 a military rebellion brought him back as King Alfonso XII, but his illness ended his reign after only ten years. At the time of his death he left no male heir, but his widow was pregnant and the promulgation of the new monarch was postponed until her confinement. The child born to Maria Christina of Habsburg in 1886 was Alfonso XIII. King from birth, he would not rule until his sixteenth birthday in May 1902. This chapter will treat young monarchs under a regency as heirs, for like the latter, they were very much seen as monarchs-in-waiting.

Theoretical approaches to masculinity have argued that the masculine has to be understood as historically conditioned, dynamic and defined against the female other. An examination of this dimension in the context of the soft power agenda of monarchs-in-waiting provides some insight into the increased significance and the important changes that the masculine ideal experienced during the nineteenth century. Moreover, this framework opens up an analytical perspective on the relationship between the representations of Alfonso XII and the reign of Isabel II, highlighting tensions and the increased need of the male to distance himself from the mother. This chapter will also focus on appeals to masculinity in images and the education of Alfonso XII and Alfonso XIII prior to and in the immediate aftermath of their accessions. These will be contrasted with the popular image of Isabel II in the years before her accession to power and with the importance that was placed on female qualities in her education. It will become clear that male aesthetics, and, in particular, an appeal to the martial, were essential elements in the representations of the young royals—attributes which had not been accessible to Isabel II. The function of this use of male aesthetics will be considered at the end.

The use of theoretical concepts in combination with an analysis of this specific historical context will illustrate that appeals to masculinity were essential in projecting male qualities associated with good kingship, such as independence, maturity and martial capabilities, onto the youthful royals. Traditionally, European monarchs, at least nominally, also fulfilled the role of military leaders, who campaigned with their troops. These images of masculine aesthetics, virtues and behaviour played into nineteenth-century bourgeois ideals of manliness, which emphasized independence, discipline and hard work. Thus the monarchy employed male aesthetics and military showmanship in its pictorial propaganda to create an affective link between the nation and their ruler. The creation of this emotional tie, which can certainly be viewed as the extension of the monarchy's soft power, was vital at a time when the monarchy saw its effective powers further restricted. Furthermore, soft power was of particular relevance to the Spanish monarchy due to its almost perpetual struggle for the hearts and minds of Spaniards against the claims of the Carlist branch of the family. The appeals to masculine virtue and the soft power acquired by Bourbon heirs added to the monarchy's stability because they helped to persuade and convince the Spanish people of their status as virtuous, deserving military men capable of leading the country into a better future.

Theoretical Approaches to Masculinity

Both the idea of habitus, as developed by Marcel Mauss among others,[1] and Pierre Bourdieu's and Michel Foucault's pioneering integration of the body into this concept, have demonstrated that the body and physical appearance are not ahistorical and fixed in time. Sociologists have generally used the concept of habitus to refer to individuals' learned habits, skills and tastes. Bourdieu provides a useful definition by describing the concept as the 'principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to obtain them'.[2] Bourdieu and Foucault, among others, have argued that these principles are shaped by social and historical context, structures and memory, which makes habitus a dynamic concept, which is subject to change over time.[3] When these frameworks are applied to the royal body it is possible to identify the projection and acquisition of a habitus by male heirs associated with masculine, martial and national qualities.[4] Furthermore, the emphasis on its dynamic nature allows for comparisons across time and the identification of evolution in the projection of masculinity as a result of a social, political and technological change.[5]

More recent approaches developed by sociologists and historians in the field of gender studies are also instructive. While gender studies initially focused mainly on the female body and gender relations, studies of masculinity have proliferated in recent years. These approaches explain different strategies in the representation and definition of masculinity. Of particular relevance to this study is Object Relations Theory, as developed by Nancy Chodorow, and theoretical research focusing on the role of military in conceptions of the male.[6] The former emphasizes the importance of de-identification of sons from their mothers and the rejection of feminine aspects in themselves. Both of these are involved in the process of attaining a 'model masculinity'. This approach is particularly relevant when analysing the habitus formation of young, male monarchs with strong mothers, as was the case for both Alfonso XII and his son. It is suggested that in such cases the masculine played a particularly important role in the growing-up process and independence came to be a key manly virtue that needed to be emphasized.

The military aspect of masculinity has been studied by Robert Nye, who has highlighted the importance of military virtues and capabilities in the context of empire and warfare.[7] Both of these are relevant to Alfonso XII and Alfonso XIII, as the former had to make his claim to the throne while Spain was involved in civil and colonial warfare (1873–78) and the latter experienced Spain's dramatic loss of its last remaining colonies in 1898.[8] Similarly, Svenja Goltermann has identified the ability to fight (*Wehrhaftigkeit*) as an essential quality in the definition of what it meant to be male within the context of nineteenth-century German gymnastic associations.[9] In the education of both the future Alfonso XII and Alfonso XIII, gymnastics and the steeling of the body, which was also emphasized by the German gymnastics movement, played an important role.[10] For the Italian case, Lucy Riall has demonstrated the centrality of military virtue (or the lack thereof) for conceptions of masculinity and more specifically for the figure of Garibaldi as an embodiment of the ideal, fighting and courageous male. In addition to these approaches, it is worth considering the theory of males undergoing a process of domestication in the course of the nineteenth century. The domestic aspect of masculinity, that is the emphasis on being a good husband and father and its opposite, the escapism from this reality in adventure stories and hypermasculinity of the soldier, have to be considered when analysing representations of the royal body.[11]

REPRESENTATIONS OF THE MALE HEIR: ALFONSO XII AND ALFONSO XIII

This chapter focuses on visual images of Alfonso XII and Alfonso XIII during their youth and prior to their formal rule. These amply illustrate the centrality of a masculine and martial image in the representations of male heirs in nineteenth-century Spain. To highlight the gender-specificity of these images they can be contrasted with representations of Isabel II during her youth, which focused on themes of feminine virtue. It is worth pointing out that the possibilities for the production and distribution of photographic material were much greater for the period of Alfonso XIII's youth than for that of his father. Not only had technology advanced and the illustrated press grown significantly, but Alfonso XII's access to the press was hampered while he was in exile between 1868 and 1874; many of his images needed to be shared and disseminated in relative secrecy.[12] These differences in historical context, reception and audiences need to be kept in mind when representations of the two heirs are compared.

Shortly after the abdication of Isabel II in favour of her son in June 1870, the later Alfonso XII was increasingly represented in military uniform. Images started to be disseminated in Spain, especially among those who favoured the return of the Bourbon monarchy with Alfonso as king, the so-called Alfonsists. A series of images show Prince Alfonso when he was about 14 years old in the military uniform of the Theresianum College in Vienna, where he was educated at the time. One particular photograph depicts him with a sabre, standing upright and staring pensively into the distance.[13] Perhaps most importantly it portrays him on his own, without his mother, who had become a highly polarizing figure during the last years of her reign. As will be discussed below, this exclusion of the former queen was quite deliberate and part of the wider attempt to dissociate the image of Alfonso XII from that of his mother. While it is not known how widely disseminated this image was, letters in the palace archive suggest that similar images of Alfonso were sent to various prominent Alfonsists and their associates.[14]

In a different set of images, produced later and distributed in Madrid between 1873 and 1874, significant changes can be observed in Alfonso's appearance and dress. He now sported a moustache and was more frequently represented wearing a Spanish uniform. One image shows Alfonso seated, in a Spanish cadet's uniform, next to a desk covered in paperwork. The seated pose makes him seem less lanky and more serious, while the impression is created that the image was produced while Alfonso was in the midst of his studies. This image communicates that Alfonso was being educated to be a king and a soldier. The replacement of the Austrian cadet's uniform with a Spanish one is significant, as it highlights the attempt to present the heir not only as a military man but essentially as a Spanish soldier, despite the many years he had spent in exile at this point.[15]

The Spanish public and supporters of Alfonso had to be acquainted with the image of the heir—they had few means to do so other than through these pictures distributed by the former royal family. The moustache and more serious demeanour were probably meant to be signs of his maturity and designed to dispel fears that he was too young to become king; he was, if not quite an adult yet, then rapidly becoming a real man. It is clear from these images that a soldierly masculinity was meant to add to the impression of Alfonso as a capable future ruler of Spain. In addition to that, the national uniform allowed Alfonso to highlight his Spanishness, which was essential to a prince who had spent a significant portion of his life abroad. This appeal to Spanishness through the uniform reinforced the claims Alfonso would make in the Sandhurst Manifesto, a document drafted by Prime Minister Cánovas and sent to Alfonso's supporters in Spain in 1874. This clarion call laid out what type of monarch the prince would be. He declared that he 'would not stop being a good Spaniard' no matter what the future brought.[16]

Shortly after his accession in January 1875 Alfonso XII went on to campaign with the troops fighting the Carlist insurrection in the North of Spain. This allowed for numerous depictions of Alfonso as a soldier, actively involved in the fighting. These images often took the form of Alfonso XII in military uniform and on horseback. The young monarch also grew a beard and would almost exclusively be portrayed in military uniform, matching his epithet of *El Pacificador*, the peace-maker, after both the Carlist War and Cuban war ended during his early reign.[17] The masculine martial image had become and remained a key staple in representations of Alfonso XII right until his death in 1885. The idea that manliness was a central concern for the supporters of Alfonso XII during his time is borne out by archival evidence. The correspondence between Isabel II and supporters of her son's claim to the throne contain recurring references to the idea that Alfonso needed to 'be made a real man' in his further schooling.[18] This was usually closely connected to the idea that he was to be sent to a respected military academy or at least be instructed further in the art of war.[19]

The masculine also featured heavily in representations of Alfonso XII's posthumous son, King Alfonso XIII. As had been the case with his father, this most frequently took the form of images featuring the young king in military uniform. The closer he came to the actual beginning of his rule at the age of 16, the more frequently he was portrayed in uniform and in the company of soldiers. In 1900 several images appeared of Alfonso

XIII dressed in military uniform on a visit to a factory producing equipment and machinery for the armed forces. In these photos he is accompanied by his mother and surrounded by other officers. These images were reproduced in the famous and highly popular illustrated magazine *La Illustración Española y Americana* and reinforced the connection between the ruler and the military, as well as demonstrating the link between the monarchy and modern technology.[20] In the aftermath of the humiliating defeat by the United States, these depictions can also be interpreted as a signal of royal support for the Spanish armed forces, who had been severely chastised by the media and the public. While Alfonso was barely a teenager when these pictures were taken, his uniform allows him to blend in with the other officers. This creates the impression of the king as part of the troops; the only thing that differentiated him was his youth and his position in the image.

Interestingly, a change can be observed toward the end of that same year. In some spreads of the *Illustración Española y Americana* Alfonso XIII still appeared in military uniform, but at this point his mother no longer featured. In fact, there are no more depictions of Alfonso XIII with his mother from this point onwards in the illustrated press. A spread from September 1900 includes images of Alfonso XIII's visit to a naval ship. One photograph depicts him surrounded by the much older naval officers on board, whose uniforms matched his own. Despite the accompanying text revealing that Alfonso was accompanied by his mother, there is no sign of her in any of the photographs printed by the paper. The aim seems to have been to show Alfonso XIII as an independent man, not reliant on his mother but operating in an exclusively masculine environment. The image stressed some form of male camaraderie, from which Maria Christina, as a woman and mother, was excluded.

In May 1901 the same paper reported extensively on the military manoeuvres in which Alfonso XIII took part, including several images of the young king's involvement in the training exercises and a text lauding his behaviour. There are photographs depicting Alfonso XIII on horseback, either on his own or with his military instructor.[21] One of the most interesting images shows Alfonso XIII on horseback with a carriage in the background. The reader is informed that the Queen Regent was riding in that carriage but she remained hidden from view—with her son on his horse occupying the foreground.[22] The symbolism of the image is apt. It conveyed a representation of Alfonso, which sought to exclude his mother and emphasized the independence and military capabilities of the young king. One of the vital steps in the process of Alfonso becoming his own man was clearly to achieve some form of independence from his mother. The text accompanying the spread gave the reader an overview of the role of the king in the military manoeuvres. It stressed Alfonso's exceptional posture when riding and furthermore highlighted his military instruction and ability in the field. Thus the king was presented to the public as a capable, independent military leader—qualities inextricably linked to masculinity and male virtue. In particular, the reference to his good posture comes across as an attempt to convey the aesthetically pleasing appearance of the king on horseback. Furthermore, posture in this case also demonstrates the rider's level of control over the horse, which is an indication of good horsemanship, which would be an essential skill in battle.

Military prowess and training were important beyond the images discussed. Alfonso was instructed extensively in military drill, tactics and technology. Military officers of the highest ranks featured prominently on his teaching staff and directed much of his education.[23] One of these was Ruiz Fornells, who in 1894 first published a lengthy book on the morality of the soldier. In this tract he argued that military training was essential when it came to ingraining manly virtues to youth and ensuring they would develop the right moral faculties.[24] This connection between military morality and masculine virtue appears to have had a strong influence and continued presence in the education of Alfonso XIII.

Functions of Masculinity

Representations of Alfonso XII and Alfonso XIII sought to project a militaristic, grown-up masculine image of the young monarchs, but what was the function served by these representations? The key questions to be addressed are: Why was masculinity such an important part of visual representations of the royal body? Why was it that military dress occupied such a central role in the vision of royal masculinity? To what extent and why do the representations of the royal body of Alfonso XII and Alfonso XIII differ? In the case of Alfonso XII the concept of Objective Relations Theory provides an interesting insight into why masculinity was such an important part of his royal image and why it was expressed through military dress and capability. As mentioned above, the theory posits that for boys to become men they have to de-identify from their mothers through a rejection of the feminine.[25] In the case of Alfonso XII this was relevant for two reasons.

Firstly, queenship had become increasingly discredited in nineteenth-century Spain. The regency of Maria Christina of the Two Sicilies was continuously plagued by accusations of court favouritism and ended in her being exiled.[26] Her daughter Isabel II's reign was similarly characterized by political favouritism and the influence of an obscure camarilla. In addition to that, her turbulent love-life led to the association of female rule with licentiousness. She never managed to represent the ideal of domesticity in the way that Queen Victoria did in England.[27]

Many contemporaries and the exclusively male elite thus felt confirmed in their misogynistic prejudices and considered female rule as inherently inferior to that of a male. This explains in part the great rejoicing at the birth of Alfonso in 1857, and in 1885 the decision to postpone the accession of the Princess of Asturias and wait and hope for the pregnant queen to give birth to a male heir.[28] Furthermore, under Isabel, the whole court had become associated with being effeminate and debauched—traits which were the polar opposite to bourgeois ideals such as merit, temperance and hard work. An example of the extent to which the court had been discredited are the pornographic cartoons of the royal family and court published after the fall of Isabel II in 1868, and even prior to that the rumours and insinuations surrounding the sexual inclinations of her husband Francisco de Asís.[29] Thus, Alfonso did not only distance himself from his mother but also from the father and his effeminate, unmanly image.

This discrediting of queenship went hand in hand with an elevation of the male qualities associated with kingship. It was with these qualities and the new middle-class virtues of merit and competence, as well as with the older aristocratic notion of service and manliness in battle, that the masculine and military image of Alfonso XII was meant to chime (see Image 10.1). At the same time, a manly image dissociated the future monarch from his mother and from the perceived failings of queenship. It is worth noting that the bourgeois and martial values could be seen as clearly distinct from each other. However, as Frank Lorenz Müller has shown for Germany in that period, bourgeois nationalist values and militarism could be reconciled and many members of the bourgeoisie were more than happy to strike an aggressive and warlike pose.[30]

The virtuous and aesthetic male representations outlined above thus served to distinguish the anticipated rule of the two Alfonsos emphatically from any tainted notion of queenship. They sought to achieve this by marking a stark contrast to the image Isabel II projected during



Image 10.1 Alfonso XII in Sandhurst military academy uniform (c. 1874) © INTERFOTO/Alamy Stock Photo

her youth under a regency (1833–43). While it is obvious that a military career was closed to her as a girl, the images publicized of the young queen had also sought to create a connection with the Spanish nation through an aesthetic and emotional appeal. However, rather than focusing on competence, strength or valour, images of Isabel had emphasized her innocence and purity. Portraits usually show her with symbols representing peace and progress, and in contrast to Alfonso XII and XIII her youthfulness was not hidden but accentuated. The emotional appeal of the images was meant to elicit compassion and affection. These priorities were also frequently reflected in the education of Isabel II, where subjects such as needlework, singing and piano lessons took up an important part of her schedule.[31] The purpose behind this presentational concept was to strengthen the legitimacy of her claim to the throne against the Carlist pretender by making her into a liberal icon and contrasting her innocence with the guilt of her absolutist father Fernando VII.[32] The scandalous nature of Isabel's later reign came as a cruelly ironic twist in the tail of this early story of purity and made it appear even more imperative that her son and grandson adopt a different mode of self-fashioning.

There was a second important reason for a masculine dissociation of Alfonso XII from his mother's reign that was central to Cánovas's strategy of returning the Bourbon prince to the Spanish throne. Apart from Isabel II being discredited as a ruler, Cánovas realised that the restoration could only go ahead if some of the elements that had brought her down were included, in particular the military elite. The political elements of the Sexenio, as the six years between the September 1868 revolution and the end of the republic in January 1874 are known, and the military leaders who took part in the overthrow of Isabel II were anxious about a return to the old system. Thus the emphasis on the maturity of Alfonso, the lack of family portraiture disseminated and the dissociation from his mother can also be seen as signalling political independence and a change from the past. The last point is particularly interesting and peculiar to this case, as it required a degree of compromise with that foundational principle of monarchical rule: dynastic continuity.

The centrality of the military element in Alfonso XII's habitus formation can be explained not only as dissociation from his mother, but also with reference to the aim of projecting *Wehrhaftigkeit* or military virtue.[33] This aspect of the habitus was highly relevant to a society at war on multiple fronts. Spain was involved in civil and colonial warfare in the lead-up to the Restoration. One essential hope and indeed promise nurtured by Cánovas was that Alfonso's accession would provide the nation with a capable military leader. Moreover, by his dynastic right alone he could end the challenge of the Carlist insurrection. Not surprisingly then, one of the first acts of the young monarch was to leave for the battlefield, signalling manly valour and his ability as a leader. While the Carlist faction did not immediately give up their resistance and the Cuban War also carried on for another three years, the enduring image of Alfonso XII would become that of the *Pacificador*, the pacifier of Spain, bringing peace to the metropole and Cuba. In addition to that, the habitus of a military man also appealed directly to the politically powerful upper echelons of the armed forces. It was Cánovas's plan to limit the political involvement of the military by making the army identify the king as one of their own. One way of achieving this was to project the image of Alfonso as a real man sharing their value systems and beliefs.

Many of these points also hold true for Alfonso XIII, but there are some important differences and changes to be noted. First of all, Maria Christina of Habsburg restored some of the prestige of queenship during her regency. This does not mean that dissociation from the mother as suggested by Object Relations Theory did not occur. Rather it seems to have happened later and was not as essential as it had been in Alfonso XII's case. However, queenship remained tainted and the prejudices against female rule, which were the flipside of the belief in the strength, virility and ultimate superiority of kingship, were still present.

There existed another parallel between father and son: the young age of both monarchs at their accession meant that images representing male domesticity (family portraits depicting the king as head of a household and good husband) were not accessible to them until later in their reigns. Interestingly, even then the domestic image never became a key part of representations of Alfonso XII. Perhaps this was due to the tragic turn taken by the marriage of the king and his first, highly popular wife Maria de las Mercedes. She died shortly after their marriage, which affected Alfonso deeply and made him profoundly unhappy.[34] It might well be that this episode, coupled with the relative lack of popularity of his new wife and his well-known philandering made it harder to publicize images of royal domestic bliss.

The continued or even increased importance of military dress in representations of Alfonso XIII (it is hard to find any images of Alfonso XIII between 1898 and 1902 which show him in civilian dress) can also be explained with reference to habitus formation within the nexus of empire, warfare and masculinity. As Martin Francis has observed for the British case: 'Between 1870 and 1914 the imperatives of empire celebrated a militaristic and robust hypermasculinity'.[35] This celebration of hypermasculinity made military virtue an essential part of habitus formation. The swift defeat at the hands of the American forces in 1898 and the subsequent loss of its Antillean colonies, termed '*el Desastre*' in Spain, had a profound effect on the Spanish psyche, leading to the perception that Spain was in need of moral and physical regeneration. Not only was the defeat explained in terms of military and technological inferiority but also to weakness of spirit and a general lack of virility and manliness among the male population.

As Lucy Riall has shown for the Italian Risorgimento, defeat can have a deep impact on a nation's perception of masculinity or the lack thereof.[36] Alfonso XIII in many ways embodied these concerns. Representations of Alfonso show him extolling the male and military virtues that had made Spain a great nation during its Golden Age in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. By the turn of the nineteenth century these perceived masculine values, such as virility, valour and independence, were not only associated with the military but were presented as national traits that could be found in Spanish history from the exploits of Hernan Cortes to the resistance to Napoleon. As the supreme leader of the army and the embodiment of the unity of Spain, which also increasingly came under attack from regionalism, it was essential for Alfonso XIII to embody positive martial, imperial and national traits, with these categories often overlapping. The highly militarized, hypermasculine image of Alfonso XIII was part of the strategy to represent the monarch as the embodiment of this manly value system (see Image 10.2).

CONCLUSION

It is fair to say that male aesthetics as visualized through military dress, pose and the rejection of the female, played a central role in forming and projecting a habitus associated with perceived male qualities. This was accompanied in Alfonso XII and Alfonso XIII, to varying degrees, with the need to dissociate from the mother to represent model masculinity and embody nationhood. The ultimate aim of the appeal to masculinity and militarism of Alfonso XII and Alfonso XIII was to attract military elites and wide sectors of the population to the monarchy,



Image 10.2 Alfonso XIII in uniform of German 66th Infantry Regiment (c. 1903) © Everett Collection Historical/Alamy Stock Photo

enhancing its authority and legitimacy. Joseph Nye has analysed the significance of this ‘power to attract’ and qualified it as a substantial component of soft power.[37]

As the Spanish monarchy faced increased pressures to legitimize dynastic rule and a substantial diminution of its hard power, in the form of restrictions on its room for action, it was vital to seek new sources of legitimacy and power. The acquisition of a masculine and militaristic habitus and its public representation was crucial to the expansion of the soft power of the monarchy, which allowed it to remain relevant and at least partially compensate for its decreasing hard power. It is difficult to gauge with any precision to what extent either Alfonso XII or Alfonso XIII were able to attract the Spanish population when they invoked the militarized image of the ideal male. While Alfonso XII’s military and masculine image as a man of action certainly contributed to his prestige once the wars in Cuba and Spain were concluded successfully, it is not entirely clear to what extent the representations analysed reached the wider populace. There is, however, evidence in the press that the masculine, virile and military image of both Alfonso XII and his son was transmitted at least to some sections of the Spanish public.

The daily *La Correspondencia de la Mañana* reported that ‘young Alfonso [XII] exceeded all expectations’ on his entry to Madrid on 14 January 1875, and remarked that his ‘expressive gaze, his martial bearing, elegant manners’ were noted by all who saw him and expressed their opinion.[38] The Alfonsist newspaper *La Época* informed its readers that ‘the King wore the Captain General uniform with the sash of Carlos III and the Order of the Garter on his chest’ and ‘rode superbly on a brilliant horse’.[39] The illustrated press accompanied the vivid imagery of the new king riding into the capital with high praise for his demeanour and looks. The largest illustrated newspaper, *La Ilustración Española y Americana*, commented on how Alfonso ‘rode elegantly on a splendid horse, which he subjected with a secure and firm hand’. Again we find reference to his ‘expressive gaze’ and his ‘serene’ demeanour. Furthermore, the newspaper relates a young man shouting ‘How young and how handsome is he!’ and an artisan saying that ‘He has the face of a good man’. It goes on to report that even a foreign correspondent named as Mr Detroyat from the Parisian *La Liberté* expressed his fascination with Alfonso and remarked that ‘He does not seem like a child due to the maturity of his judgement, the assuredness of his heart and the dominion he has over himself. Within a year your King will not be 18 but 30 years old.’[40] The demeanour, looks and manners of the king made him seem mature beyond his years and appears to have helped to create an emotional bond between the king, who presented himself publicly for the first time, and his people.

The body of Alfonso XIII gained great visibility when he had to take his oath on the constitution as he reached his majority in May 1902. The comments on the appearance and demeanour of the king give some insight into the role that masculinity played and how it sought to create emotional bond with the people. Thus *La Época* immediately pointed to the similarities between Alfonso's father's entry to Madrid and the procession to the Cortes, explicitly linking the image of the young monarch to 'the pacifying and gentlemanly King'. It also points out that Alfonso XIII had undergone the 'conversion of the tender boy into a handsome youth' and emphasizes the youthful manly virtues, such as 'vitality' and 'drive' that he would bring to his reign. In a final note the paper even comments on the 'good state of health of the monarch and his advantageous stature', which next to his mother 'made his height stand out quite significantly'. It appears that it was important for the reader to be informed of the good health and good looks of their monarch.[41] Similarly *La Ilustración Española y Americana* pointed out that 'the military reviews, where the King demonstrates his gallantry and resolve, were a beautiful spectacle and representation' and that the exercises Alfonso took part in 'symbolize the necessity to invigorate the body for the struggles of life'. While the king was still young, the paper remarked that he now 'renounced youth for the obligation of rule'.[42]

The young monarch was in the process of becoming a man and had hardened his body for the struggles to come. In a different article in the same paper, the historian, politician and writer Juan Pérez de Guzmán makes a similar point, and makes an even more specific reference to the body of the new king. He argues that there were no longer any questions as to the 'constitution of his physical individuality', as in his 'thin disposition and his favourable stature he carried all the guarantees of physical activity and energy that are the signs of vitality'. Moreover, he reported that the public was delighted to see that 'he [Alfonso XIII] has shown himself to be strong, lively and resolved, just as the imagination of the people personifies the individual who has to take such a superior post'. In other words, he was of the firm conviction that the Spanish people felt that Alfonso did indeed look the part.

It is, furthermore, reasonable to assume that the masculine presence of Alfonso XII increased the monarchy's power to attract members of the military elite. The period of frequent military uprisings was ended largely due to political and constitutional changes but the fact that the military found it easier to see the monarch as one of their own cannot be disregarded and formed an important element in ensuring the stability of the restoration settlement.[43] For Alfonso XIII the issue is more complicated. During his reign the king also became associated more closely with the military, but to the extent that he appeared to favour the military over civil elements in the case of disputes emerging between the two.[44] So while he managed to develop the power to attract military elites, he also became a polarizing figure that was associated with the hard power of the military as its only supporter. His close connection to the military transcended the boundaries of soft power attraction and ventured into the realm of hard power, which would eventually have fatal consequences for the Spanish monarchy.

Notes

1. Marcel Mauss (1960), 'Les techniques du corps', *Sociologie et anthropologie*, Paris, 363–86; Max Weber (1922), *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, Tübingen. The latter used the term habitus almost as an aside but made an important contribution to sociological understanding of behaviours.
2. Pierre Bourdieu (1990), *The Logic of Practice*, Stanford, 53.
3. While many of their works could be mentioned, see in particular Pierre Bourdieu (2001), *Masculine Domination*, Cambridge, and Michel Foucault (1979), *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Harmondsworth.
4. The pioneering work in this field is Ernst Hartwig Kantorowicz (1957), *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology*, Princeton, NJ, which established the difference between the 'body politic' and the 'body natural' of the monarch; Regina Schulte (2006) (ed.), *The Body of the Queen: Gender and Rule in the Courtly World, 1500–2000*, New York, includes several interesting studies on the role of the female body in queenship.
5. For an example of this see George L. Mosse (1996), *The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity*, New York and Oxford, 4–14.
6. For the original formulation of Object Relations Theory see Nancy Chodorow (1978), *The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and*

the Sociology of Gender, Berkeley. For a later, more historical account see Nancy Chodorow (1994), *Femininities, Masculinities, Sexualities: Freud and beyond*, Lexington, KY. The relation between the military spirit and masculinity see for example Berit Elisabeth Dencker (2001), 'Popular Gymnastics and the Military Spirit in Germany, 1848–1871', *Central European History* 34/04, 503–30 and Marcus Funck (2002), 'Ready for War? Conceptions of Military Manliness in the Prusso-German Officer Corps before the First World War', in: Karen Hagemann and Stefanie Schüler-Springorum (eds), *Home/Front: The Military, War and Gender in Twentieth Century Germany,* London, Oxford, 43–68.

7. Robert A. Nye (2005), 'Locating Masculinity: Some Recent Work on Men', *Signs* 30/3, 1937–62, 1937–40.
8. For the huge impact the loss of the overseas colonies, and in particular the loss of Cuba, had on the Spanish psyche, see Christopher Schmidt-Nowara (2007), 'A History of Disasters: Spanish Colonialism in the Age of Empire', *History Compass* 5, 943–54.
9. Svenja Goltermann (1998), *Körper der Nation: Habitusformierung und die Politik des Turnens 1860–1890*, Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft 126, Göttingen.
10. See Palacio Real Real Biblioteca (PRRB), II/4067 for detailed recording of Alfonso XII's gymnastic classes for 1863 and 1864. Alfonso XIII also had a dedicated teacher for gymnastics as shown by the personal record of Mariano Marco Ordax, Archivo General de Palacia (AGP), Caja 760, Legajo 23.
11. For a discussion of domestication, escapism and re-domestication see Martin Francis (2002), 'The Domestication of the Male? Recent Research on Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century British Masculinity', *The Historical Journal* 45/03, 637–52.
12. As has been shown by Manuel Espadas Burgos (1990), *Alfonso XII y los orígenes de la Restauración*, Madrid, 357–99, pro-Alfonso gatherings during the *Sexenio Democratico* (1868–1874) were allowed to continue with little interference by the government and it was well known who the supporters of the cause of Alfonso XII were.
13. PRRB, FOT/948-31, Image 10214369.
14. See for example the thank you note sent by the Marques de Sotomayor to Alfonso XII on 24 February 1871, AGP, Caja 22, Legajo 35.

15. Image in Melchor Fernández Almagro (1972), *Cánovas: su vida y su política*, Madrid.
16. The translation is my own, the document can be found online in full in Spanish on Wikisource at https://es.wikisource.org/wiki/Manifiesto_de_Sandhurst.
17. For a study of the relation between facial hair and masculinity see Christopher Oldstone-Moore (2005), 'The Beard Movement in Victorian Britain', *Victorian Studies* 48/1, 7–34, who has studied the British example.
18. AGP Caja 19, Legajo 18, Marques de Novaliches to Isabel II, 25 November 1872.
19. AGP Caja 24, Legajo 5-B, Cánovas to Isabel II, 2 May 1874.
20. *La Ilustración Española y Americana*, 30 September 1900.
21. *La Ilustración Española y Americana*, 22 May 1901.
22. *La Ilustración Española y Americana*, 22 May 1901.
23. King of Spain, Alfonso XIII (1961), *Diario intimo de Alfonso XIII / Recogido y comentado por J.L. Castillo-Puche*, second edition, Madrid.
24. Enrique Ruiz Fornells (1899), *La Educación Moral Del Soldado*, Tercera edición revisada y corregida, Toledo. The first edition was published in 1894.
25. Rosa Ana Gutiérrez Lloret (2011), 'Isabel II, de símbolo de la libertad a deshonra de España', in: Emilio La Parra López (ed.), *La imagen del poder: Reyes y regentes en la España del siglo XIX*, Madrid, 224–29.
26. For more on the discrediting of queenship during the reign of Maria Christina see María Ángeles Casado Sánchez (2011), 'María Cristina de Borbón. Una regente cuestionada' in: López (ed.), 133–58.
27. Isabel Burdiel (2004), 'The Queen, the Woman and the Middle Class. The Symbolic Failure of Isabel II of Spain', *Social History* 29/3, 302.
28. For more on this extraordinary episode in Spanish history see Carmina López Sánchez (2016), 'The Succession of an Unborn King: Constitutional Politics in Spain after the Death of Alfonso XII' in: Frank Lorenz Müller and Heidi Mehrkens (eds), *Sons and Heirs. Succession and Political Culture in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, London, 147–59.
29. See as evidence the cartoon series 'Los Borbones en Pelota', edited and commented upon in: Isabel Burdiel (2012) (ed.), *SEM: los borbones en pelota*, Zaragoza.

30. Frank Lorenz Müller (2007), 'The Spectre of a People in Arms: The Prussian Government and the Militarisation of German Nationalism, 1859–1864', *The English Historical Review* 122/495, 82–104.
31. For evidence of this see the memoirs written by her governess, Juana María de la Vega Espoz y Mina and Juan Pérez de Guzmán (1910), *Apuntes para la historia del tiempo en que ocupó los destinos de aya de S.M.Y.A. y camarera mayor de palacio*, Madrid.
32. Rosa Ana Gutiérrez Lloret (2011), 'Isabel II, de símbolo de la libertad a deshonra de España' in: López (ed.), 224–29.
33. On the concept of *Wehrhaftigkeit* and its role in the articulation of masculinity see Goltermann (1998).
34. See Alfonso XII's hunting diary in PRRB II/4051, Caja No. 15 'Libro de Caza de Alfonso XII', 1878.
35. Francis (2002), 640.
36. Lucy Riall (2012), 'Men at War: Masculinity and Military Ideals in the Risorgimento', in: Silvana Patriarca and Lucy Riall (eds), *The Risorgimento Revisited: Nationalism and Culture in Nineteenth-Century Italy*, Basingstoke and New York, 153.
37. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (2004), *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York, 6.
38. *La Correspondencia de la Mañana,* no. 23, 15 January 1875.
39. *La Época*, no. 8, 122, 15 January 1875.
40. *La Ilustración Española y Americana*, no. 11, 15 January 1875.
41. *La Época,* no. 18, 651, 17 May 1902.
42. *La Ilustración Española y Americana*, no. XIX, 22 May 1902.
43. One particularly interesting feature of this respect for Alfonso XII and acceptance of him as a fellow military officer that has not so far been studied is revealed by the extensive, detailed and highly technical correspondence of military elites and Alfonso XII, which can be found in the palace archive. One good example of this is the letter of General Jovellar sent to Alfonso XII from Habana during the Cuban insurrection. See AGP, Caja 12.832 Legajo 5, 25 June 1876.
44. Caroline Boyd (2003), 'El Rey soldado', in: Javier Moreno Luzón (ed.), *Alfonso XIII: un político en el trono*, Madrid, 215–16.

CHAPTER 11

How to *Fashion* the Popularity of the British Monarchy: Alexandra, Princess of Wales and the Attractions of Attire

Imke Polland

If one thinks back to the latest royal weddings—be it that in Britain in April 2011, or more recently, that in Sweden in June 2015—one of the topics stands out amongst those most frequently addressed by the commentators in the media: the wedding dress. However, the public and media interest in royal attire does not only arise in the context of grand royal events. Fashion seems to be a sphere through which people relate to the monarchy—and they have done so for quite some time. In British royal history, arguably one of the most fashionable and illustrious personas is Alexandra, who was Princess of Wales from 1863 to 1901.

When Alix, as she was known within the royal family, was considered as a bride for the future king of England, Sir Charles Phipps, Keeper of the Privy Purse, 'pointed out that "it is of the *first importance* that the Prince of Wales's wife should have beauty, agreeable manners, and the power of attracting people to her, and these the Princess Alexandra seems to possess in a remarkable degree"'.[1] What he aimed at, and expressly emphasized, can be referred to as one specification of what political scientist Joseph Nye

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describes as soft power, which relies 'on positive attraction in the sense of "alluring"'.[2] Nye's notion of attraction therefore basically designates the act of drawing attention, which in itself does not constitute soft power. Only if positive attention is attracted and if, in addition, it generates alluring impact, can the capacity to attract people be regarded as a form of soft power.[3] The alluring impact implied in this case is already inherent in the meanings of the word itself, which comprise the potential to capture the minds of the masses. Whether this 'capturing' or 'drawing attention' refers to a conscious act or simply denotes a personal quality or characteristic trait, is consciously left open at this point. What becomes clear, however, is that it is not in the least astonishing that the Princess of Wales was desired and indeed expected to have this faculty. As Nye argues, '"[b]eauty" or "charisma" […] tends to produce inspiration and adherence'.[4]

Those very features were, therefore, some of the central eligibility criteria, which Queen Victoria and the Princess Royal applied during their search for a wife for Prince Albert Edward. Georgina Battiscombe showed that many candidates were dismissed on that very count, but Princess Alexandra was agreed to have the potential of securing people's affection by possessing these 'intangible assets' so crucial to soft power.[5] Thus, she was expected to be able to generate what Nye calls 'attraction by example', which constitutes a 'passive approach to soft power'.[6] And an example she certainly was: Princess Alexandra was admired and adhered to, especially with regards to her style. Her appearance featured prominently in the press, her photographs—as *cartes de visite*—sold countless copies and were also actively circulated and discussed.

Taking these observations as a starting point, this chapter addresses the following questions: What was the relationship between royal attire and the popularity of the British monarchy? In what ways can Alexandra be said to have made use of fashion strategies? And in how far did changes in the media environment influence the notion of royal women as (fashion) icons?

To whom did the attraction and allure of Alexandra as a fashion example speak and at whom was it aimed? One might immediately think that Alexandra acted as an inspiration for women and that, consequently, she appealed mostly to female members of society. Although it is important to avoid overly rigid dichotomies, there are pragmatic reasons for arguing that, in terms of imitation or emulation, women were the central addressees in the fashion context. This is not to deny the complexity of attraction and appeal as fundamental acts of soft power, but rather to introduce the idea of a gender-specific (soft) power division of labour between the Prince and

Princess of Wales, which goes hand in hand with the notion of a gendered readership or mass of recipients. The royal couple provided a markedly differentiated identification potential as a result of the different behaviour of each of the spouses as well as of their different areas of influence.[7] Thus, they complemented each other in their appeals. While his lifestyle provoked antipathies at times, her popularity remained steady.[8] Battiscombe remarks that the 'Prince without his wife was not what the people wanted'.[9] With regard to the couple's joint engagements, it becomes clear that Alexandra fulfilled complementary functions. *The Times*'s description of their first state opening of parliament as king and queen exemplifies this:

> And, if the King were the most splendid and imposing figure in the pageant, the Queen imparted to it exquisite grace and charm. Beneath her Royal robe her Majesty wore a black dress—an indication of the national sorrow that hangs over this otherwise joyous occasion—[…] Her Majesty's stateliness of demeanour, her complete composure, and the interested glances which she cast around the Chamber were specially noted, even in the quick and fleeting impressions of the moment.[10]

Her appearance was supportive of their stately impression and her fashion soft power accentuated symbolic dimensions, thus adding to the layers of meaning and importance of the occasion. This type of coverage spoke to a collective readership, notwithstanding a further breakdown into gendered groups of recipients. As far as fashion trends were concerned, Alexandra's style featured prominently and frequently in the special newspaper sections for women such as 'The World of Women' (in *The Penny Illustrated Paper and Illustrated Times*), or 'Woman's World' (in the *Hampshire Telegraph and Sussex Chronicle* or the *Northern Echo*), to name a few. These did not just include minutely detailed descriptions of the Princess's dresses though.[11] Other trends, which Alexandra inspired among fashionable ladies, were also reported and quickly spread among all of society. The most striking example is the imitation of the so-called 'Alexandra limp', which perfectly demonstrates how far-reaching her attraction was. In its issue on 18 February 1899 the *Hampshire Telegraph and Sussex Chronicle* wrote: 'After a serious illness, the Princess for some time […] walked with a decided limp, and the fair devotees […] could not do less than follow so illustrious an example.'[12] With regards to fashions—in the extended sense of the term including not only sartorial trends, but also behavioural modes—royal women can be said to have set examples that were emulated.[13]

As was shown by the existence of dedicated newspaper rubrics or by the pursuit of a gendered approach to the application of soft power, the notion of a gendered audience was clearly present at the time. This means that the special role of female royals has to be further elaborated. Colleen Denney pointed to this when she observed that the 'royal woman's power, position, and dominion were embedded in the mantle she wore on each occasion'.[14] Clothing has continually been an essential element of court life. The garments and accessories worn there conveyed important messages about wealth, gender, age, social position or marital status.[15] By the nineteenth century, the number of people eligible for court presentation had increased so rapidly that the styles of court dress necessarily became more complex. Colin McDowell summed it up as follows:

> In the Edwardian era society revolved around the court to a much greater extent than it has since. [...] the King and Queen were the arbiters of taste, not only by their own dress, but by their approval of the appearance of those within their circle; from that tight court circle their influence spread to those members of the aristocracy who were not part of the court and also to the wealthy but not well-born members of London society; from them it spread to the middle classes.[16]

There were elaborate publications on appropriate court dress, such as Trendell's book *Dress Worn at His Majesty's Court*, published in 1908,[17] and the circle of people participating in the complex cultural formations of the court as a centre of society was widening. This led to the promotion of fashion as a means to create a certain interaction or engagement with royalty. This can be interpreted as a kind of trickle-down effect, which also highlights the reach of the fashion examples set at court. Princess Alexandra excelled in this passive form of interaction with the people. She did so by inspiring them; using Nye's phrase, she achieved it through 'attraction by example'. As dress historian Kate Strasdin notes, 'Contemporary broadsheets and periodicals described [the Princess] [...] as stylish, [...] [and] for those years when Alexandra was the most prominent and recognized member of the British monarchy, her sartorial reign was unrivalled.'[18]

It can thus be argued that Alexandra followed a fashion strategy to engage with the people by inspiring awe and admiration as well as serving as a role model. The fact that she was referred to as 'our true Queen of Hearts'[19] or as the 'sweet-natured, noble Consort'[20] in later years, reveals the success of her endeavors and hints at how Alexandra's enormous popularity extended to that of the institution of the monarchy. The term 'fashion strategy' is not to be equated with what Strasdin calls *sartorial strategy*, for her argument takes a different path. Strasdin uses the expression *sartorial* or *clothing strategy* to describe Alexandra's approach to dressing in light of psychological as well as physiological considerations. Concerns such as modesty or the desire to disguise her body's frailty are said to have influenced Alexandra's choice of clothing to a large extent. Thus the adjective *sartorial* serves to designate the realm of her strategic considerations. The term 'fashion strategy', which I want to introduce here, adds to Strasdin's elaborations since it considers the concept of fashion as a multilayered, complex sign system.[21] With respect to spheres of influence, the notion of a fashion strategy goes beyond sartorial strategies. It is a means of exerting soft power and influence by example.

AGENCY AND THE POWER OF APPEARANCE

A royal persona leads an essentially public life. This visibility can be said to work as a kind of cultural control mechanism of the self. As Michel Foucault termed it, '[h]e who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, [...] becomes the principle of his own subjection'.[22] The awareness of being a public figure therefore influences appearance and behaviour and keeps them in check to a fundamental degree. In Victorian times, when the notion of the private sphere was strongly associated with the female sex, being a princess, that is a woman in the public sphere, opened up several areas of conflict. As John Berger put it in *Ways of Seeing*, 'A woman must continuously watch herself. [...] And so she comes to consider the *surveyor* and the *surveyed* within her as the two constituent yet always distinct elements of her identity as a woman.'[23] So, especially for a woman, who, according to Berger, possesses an inner mechanism of culturally controlling her appearance and behaviour in everyday interactions, being looked at and judged by a heterogeneous public must be even more challenging.[24] She has constantly to imagine a mass of onlooking others, thus making her outward appearance *the* fundamental way of expressing herself.[25] As he goes on to explain: 'She has to survey everything she is and everything she does because how she appears to others [...] is of crucial importance for what is normally thought of as the success of her life.'[26]

If one follows this line of argument, a woman's agency at that time consisted, to some extent, in the process of fashioning herself. And it certainly did for Alexandra. With regard to Queen Victoria, the feminist and literary critic Margaret Homans explains that '[s]eeming, appearing, or being represented are instances of the Queen's agency, regardless of whether self-representation can be said to have been chosen or actively undertaken'.[27] Thus, in this context, agency can be linked directly to soft power, because it refers to an empowering which results from being (represented as) an example. Fashion writer Colin McDowell emphasizes how actively Alexandra was involved in fashion choices and thus in creating her appearances. In his book *A Hundred Years of Royal Style* he claims that 'Alexandra could always be relied upon to take an independent stand—and on nothing with greater certainty than her dress.'[28] This she demonstrated as soon as she became the fiancée of the Prince of Wales on the occasion of her arrival in England.

THE ARRIVAL OF THE 'VIRGIN BRIDE': THE PRINCESS OF WALES'S FIRST FASHION STRATEGY?

Princess Alexandra entered the stage upon her engagement to the Prince of Wales in 1862. At that time Queen Victoria had largely retreated from the public. This has to be underlined as one of the factors that gave the Danish princess such a major role in securing the popularity of the monarchy. Becoming the prominent female public figure representing the monarchy certainly did play its part, but the proper attire was inextricably linked to her performance of the role as princess.

When Alexandra visited England as Prince Edward's fiancée in 1862, she was portrayed in full mourning dress consoling Queen Victoria, whose beloved husband Prince Albert had died the year before.[29] With this representation she immediately emphasized her role as caring and supporting wife and daughter-in-law. She continued this symbolic form of expressing her solidarity and respect when she returned to London in March 1863 and was welcomed for her wedding. The scene was described as follows by the *Bristol Mercury* on 14 March 1863:

> On each side of the pier were seated four tiers of ladies and gentlemen, the varied hues of whose dresses formed two banks of varied and beautiful color. The great feature, however, of the arrangement was the bevy of sixty pretty maids who, ranged on each side of the pier, awaited, with dainty little baskets, filled with spring flowers, the arrival of the Princess, to scatter these nature's jewels, at the feet of the royal lady.[30]

Judging from this, the arrangements were such as to openly display and emphasize the capacity in which Alexandra had come to England. Her arrival was staged so that she would step ashore in the manner of a bride, being flanked by flower girls. This formation was carefully described, and it was added: 'The Princess was dressed with elegance and taste.'[31] What followed was a minute description of her attire. And this is when the breach with the aforementioned pattern occurred: Alexandra, though staged as a bride, was not wearing the gown fitting the occasion. Accounts similar to the following one, given in the *Leeds Mercury* on 10 March 1863, can be found in almost every newspaper article on the arrival of Princess Alexandra: 'The *Morning Post*, an authority in such matters, says: - The Princess was elegantly dressed. She wore a warm greyish dress, something approaching in colour to a mauve; the material appeared to be a rich corded silk, and it was trimmed round the bottom of the skirt with one narrow flounce. Her cloak was a rich violet coloured velvet, trimmed fully with sable fur. The bonnet was white silk, with blush roses and rosebuds.'[32]

Alexandra appeared wearing half-mourning attire, designated by the colors grey, mauve and violet. Thereby, the princess was adapting to and showing her respect for the Victorian mourning etiquette. That this choice of gown was very consciously made becomes evident in light of the description of events in the *Birmingham Daily Post* on 10 March 1863:

> When first seen on deck, the Princess was dressed entirely in white, with the exception of a few light-coloured flowers in her bonnet, and wore what was apparently a very warm white shawl, for she is still suffering from the effects of a severe cold. When she reappeared, at a quarter past twelve, upon the deck, she had changed her dress [...] The change made her look less youthful then when she wore white only, and her hair, smoothed down on either side of her forehead, took away partly from the almost childish expression with which she appears in her portraits with her hair à l'Impératrice.[33]

The fact that she chose to change her dress and not appear in white is highly interesting with regard to her apparent awareness of dress codes and their application. Thereby, she undermined the bridal pattern and rather capitalized on her display of respect and cordiality towards her new family, who was still in mourning for the late prince consort. And not only did her garments themselves work as a sign system, and in this way convey meanings, but following the considerations of Roland Barthes, one also has to look at another level of meaning-making at work here: that of the 'written garment'. Barthes states that it is the written garment which does not fulfill a practical or aesthetic function, but rather serves to communicate or create meaning.[34]

This example of a fashion strategy makes clear how subtly these sign systems worked and how symbolically relevant dress codes could be. Alexandra, in this way, carved out her image as a sincere and considerate future wife and daughter-in-law, as she showed respect for the queen's continued mourning for her late husband. By this performance of her allegiance to the British royal family, she did not only warm herself to their hearts, but also endeared herself to the people. Kate Strasdin noted that from 'the moment of her arrival in the country […] Alexandra's appearance dominated the press and she was to realize from an early stage in her marriage that her appearance could be powerful.'[35]

Alexandra made use of a certain kind of self-fashioning in the most literal sense of the word, not only to carve out a sense of self or identity for herself as the Princess of Wales, but also to communicate with the public in order to enhance the popularity of the British monarchy. She could thus draw the people towards her, showing moral impeccability and consideration. If one conceptualizes royal images and representations, however personal or private they may seem, as public and highly staged performances, they have to be acknowledged to be forms of communication. Fashion strategies referring to attire, appearance, manner, actions, expressions and so on play a fundamental part in this staging process. This does also become clear when one looks at examples of representations of Alexandra in the style of the 'virgin bride'. Already during her engagement, Alexandra was pictured in a manner that underlined her youth and her purity—that is virginity. Colleen Denney, in her analysis of Richard Lauchert's portrait of Alexandra, states that '[t]his portrait of Alexandra is thus representative of many other princesses whom court painters portrayed'.[36] Depicting the princess and wife to the Prince of Wales as a virtuous, pure woman dominated the portraits of the first years. Franz Winterhalter's painting *Princess Alexandra of Denmark (1844–1925) wife of Edward VII* from 1864 is a prominent example of this mode (see Image 11.1).

The painting depicts the princess covered in a dress of swelling layers of tulle, so expansive that it even reaches out of the lower frames of the painting. Her purity and happiness as a young bride are underlined—symbolized by the color of Alexandra's gown, as well as her floral hair decoration. Her slightly blushed cheeks and the way she averts her gaze serve to highlight the air of shyness and innocence that surrounds the



Image 11.1 Franz Winterhalter depicts Princess Alexandra as a young wife wearing a white ball dress in 1864 © Pictorial Press Ltd/Alamy Stock Foto

princess. The dimensions of her dress reveal a kind of inapproachability thus elevating a seemingly morally impeccable wife. With Denney it can be added that '[t]he symbolism of portraiture is one of status' and that class is underlined in this way as well.[37] The composition shapes, reflects and repeats certain traditions of royal portraiture.[38]

The examples considered so far can be classified as parts of the traditional iconography of depicting princesses or queens. In what follows, the changes into new patterns of representation will be traced, thus contouring Alexandra's transformation into a fashion icon and celebrity. Before the changing media environment and its impact on royal representations are addressed, though, her wedding dress and coronation gown will be explored in connection with Alexandra's fashion strategies.

Making the Right Choices for Ceremonial Attire: Wedding Dress and Coronation Gown

Alexandra's wedding dress contained a symbolic dimension. In contrast to the latest British royal wedding in 2011, where the wedding dress was the most fiercely guarded secret, a description of Alexandra's nuptial attire was released even before the wedding day itself. The following description published in *The Times* one day before the ceremony gives a detailed account of the bridal gown.

> The Princess's wedding dress will consist of a petticoat of pearl-white silk, embroidered with the rose, thistle, and shamrock trimmed with four rows of silver lace round the bottom, robing up the centre, over which will be suspended a train of crimson velvet, magnificently embroidered with the same designs in silver as the petticoat. The bodice and sleeves are composed of the same costly material.[39]

The embroidered floral symbols representing England (the rose), Ireland (the shamrock) and Scotland (the thistle) are striking. Combining the three underlines the unity of the Kingdom personified by the bride, the future mother of kings. The royal wedding dress thus already hints at how the wedding will promote a reassuring perspective for the future—and not only that of the institution of the monarchy itself, but also that of the country. Alexandra herself had been involved in the design of this wedding dress. McDowell claims that she had instructed her dressmaker down to the last detail about what kind of dress she would require.[40]

Shortly after the wedding, Alexandra had the dress remodeled into an evening gown. This was not only convenient in the most practical sense that she had another dress to wear in the busy London season following her wedding. It also reflected Alexandra's economical approach to her wardrobe. Most interestingly, the wedding dress—even though remodeled—retained clearly recognizable features of a bridal gown. Alexandra could be sure that those attending the society events where she wore the dress, would get to see a royal bride.[41] Thus, she managed to advance her *self-fashioning* to a form of agency that was a fashion strategy. By the use of attire, Alexandra publicly promoted virtues. She extended the period of time people thought of her as a bride, with all the notions of purity and virtue and the empathetic possibilities associated with this role.[42]

Another instance of Princess Alexandra's active participation in fashion choices, which fell into her sphere of agency, can be found in connection with her coronation gown. As research about the accurate and proper coronation dress of a queen consort was conducted, Alexandra wrote to Sir Arthur Ellis: ''I shall wear exactly what I like and so will all my ladies.'[43] And indeed she decided not to wear the traditional velvet coronation robe in violet shot-colored with crimson, but to commission a velvet cloth in her own shade of purple. Moreover, she commanded that the princesses should not—as was customary—wear blue, but that their dresses were to be violet.[44] The extent to which Alexandra exerted her influence regarding this important dress is highlighted by McDowell, who writes: 'Alexandra also broke with tradition by insisting that, although not entitled to them, she would have all the royal emblems, just like her husband, on her embroidery.'[45]

These ceremonies obviously imposed a strong focus and major significance on the choice of dress. However, Alexandra's status as a public persona, her (omni-)presence in the press through the detailed coverage of official appearances, as well as the increasing number of published portraits and photographs, brought about by the changing media environment, made fashion an element of serious consideration for the princess.

The Paradox of the Fashionable Princess

Despite these decisions made by Princess Alexandra concerning her dresses, it has to be kept in mind that a princess is never totally free in her choice of clothing. McDowell states that the 'Princess must never look anything but demure; she must never look threatening; above all, she must always look like a lady'.[46] Princesses have to meet the different expectations of the people as well as the protocol and are thus caught in between, in a constant staging process.

If a princess conforms to her role in terms of clothing and style, then why and how does she become a trendsetter or fashion-example? For she has to embody and represent stability and continuity, both of which are countered by fashion.[47] This discrepancy, a tension inherent in the princess's role, can be interpreted as a challenge that made her appeal even more powerful and enticing. Her royal status and her own staging of public appearances granted her admiration and attention, even if—or precisely because—the fashionable princess does not fully submit to the continuous innovations and provocations of fashion. To this can be added Tom Nairn's notion of 'Royal anti-*chic*'[48] or 'Regal pseudo-fashion'.[49] His expressions designate the paradox that '[r]egal femininity has to be permanently "in", however; and what is always in fashion can never truly be fashionable'.[50] In this way, by avoiding provoking fashion statements and instead following the line of sublime elegance, any criticism is pre-empted.

Princesses can nevertheless become fashion-examples: As is widely known, Alexandra coined a trend of chokers—the collared necklaces she regularly wore—although, as Strasdin has argued, she wore them for the pragmatic reason of concealing a scar on her neck that might have caused negative reporting and speculation about the wellbeing of the woman, who was meant to bear healthy children to secure the future of the institution. Thus, in this case fashion was used to prevent any possible damage to the popularity of the British monarchy and a sartorial strategy in Strasdin's sense was employed. Alongside the collared necklaces, Alexandra can be attributed to have 'set in motion a dress revolution' with her wearing of the tailor-made costume of pared-down suits.[51] Strasdin again proves this to have been a sartorial strategy, because this type of costume allowed the princess to emphasize her slim figure and was thus a 'rebuke to those who implied that her shape was indicative of poor health'.[52]

Apart from the obvious fashion trends she inspired, though, another example of a fashion strategy should be considered. It pertains to the subtle productions of meanings the Princess of Wales made use of in order to exert soft power by drawing attention. Royal attire is never solely a private matter, but always implies communication with the public. And so it did, *inter alia*, when Princess Alexandra appeared at Ascot 'in the same outfit that she had worn at Punchestown Races, a green dress of Irish poplin trimmed with Irish lace, with Irish shamrocks in her white bonnet'.[53]

This can be interpreted as a public demonstration of her inclination towards the Irish people after having become attached to them during a visit to Ireland earlier that year. Thus, the choice of dress involved an indirect political statement, an implicit positioning on her part in the 'Irish question'. As Battiscombe states, '[t]his gesture cost her something'.[54] It becomes clear that fashion strategies go further than sartorial strategies. The level of communication supplied by the means of dress exceeds that of dressing for reasons of concealment of, for example, physical flaws.

Royals as Celebrities: New Fashion Strategies in the Changing Media Environment

It is important also to emphasize the changing media environment of the time, which played a decisive role in turning Princess Alexandra into a fashion leader. Ultimately, it contributed to the emergence of the royals as specific and special parts of a rising celebrity culture. As David Cannadine emphasizes, there were significant changes in the media of the late nineteenth century, for example the dawn of the yellow press. This brought with it a change in the style of journalistic coverage and representation, which experienced a turn towards the nationalistic and became more emotional and sensationalist. The increase in the number of affordable papers, with rapidly growing circulation figures, went hand in hand with a conservative turn in the tone of reporting.[55] Cannadine points to the disappearance of comical criticism of the monarchy in the news. He writes: 'Edward VII's liaisons were discreetly ignored, and cartoonists [...] depicted great occasions in the lives and deaths of monarchs in a restrained and respectful way.'[56] In this manner, British royalty had become almost inviolable. The English press had seemingly agreed to an unspoken pact, which led to the monarchy having become 'virtually sacrosanct'.[57] Moreover, innovations in the fields of photography and printing rendered a new style of news coverage possible and enabled an inclusion of illustrations in affordable papers.

This change in reporting brought about a change in royal representations. Not only did photographs offer a very different kind of approachability, but the innovations in reproducing photographs in periodicals and other newspapers also meant that the images reproduced there suddenly achieved much greater circulation figures.[58] Thus, the change from what cultural historian Jeffrey Richards called the 'magic of distance' to what became the 'magic of familiarity' began.[59] These changes marked the transition from depicting princesses along the lines of traditional iconography to treating them as celebrities and fashion icons admired and adhered to by the masses. Tom Nairn's definition of stardom gained traction: 'celebrity is measured not by any moral or personal qualities but by the weight of accumulated press-clippings and moments of "exposure"'.[60]

These moments of exposure increased rapidly for Alexandra. According to John Plunkett the Princess of Wales was the most photographed personage of the nineteenth century.[61] These new kinds of depictions of royalty offered a seemingly more intimate interaction with the institution of the monarchy.[62] By the means of these familiarizing effects, the institution became more and more fused with the royal personas, the family behind the institution. This 'domestication of the monarchy', together with the image of the monarchy as family, was actively constructed and supported throughout the Victorian era.[63]

The series of engagement photographs of the Prince of Wales and Princess Alexandra published in 1862 offers an example of how the royals engaged in disseminating cultural narratives in the form of values. These images depicted an instance in which the couple functioned as moral role models, whose behaviour was discussed and assessed by the public. 'Several of the photographs', John Plunkett describes, 'show Edward or Alexandra standing with their arms resting lovingly on the shoulders of the other'.[64] These depictions are exemplary for the changes in royal portraiture in accordance with the increasingly domestic image of monarchy as family and its portrayal of devoted royal couples as premediated by Victoria and Albert, or Vicky and Frederick. Plunkett goes on to explain: 'These displays of intimacy were far removed from the formality of a state portrait and typify the appropriation of photography for family occasions. The romance they conveyed made these *cartes* highly successful. […] The photographs were nevertheless found to be distasteful by some commentators. Edward and Alexandra were felt to be indiscriminately making available their most private feelings.'[65]

Thus, an emotionalization was fostered and went hand in hand with a fashioning of the royals as more accessible personas, as celebrities, via an increase in instances of public revelations, even perceived to be intimate.

It is important to state in this context that these royal portraits were not only available in the news. Rather, the surge of the *cartes de visite* opened up a whole new manner of personal engagement with the royals, as well as contributing to their re-fashioning as celebrities and indeed to the constitution of the notion of stardom itself.[66] Plunkett writes: 'Celebrity photographs had a potent imaginative appeal that stemmed from the novelty of the individual and collective experience they generated. They had a notable collective agency because, [...] [t]heir ubiquity helped to provide a shared national experience of well-known individuals. [...] Significantly, though, the *carte* was equally notable for the intimate relationship it generated between individual consumers and well-known figures. [...] Celebrity *cartes* had an insinuating and sensuous realism.'[67]

Princess Alexandra was the decided favourite of the British people; many different portraits of her circulated by way of the *cartes*. The most popular *carte*, which sold over 300,000 copies, depicted the Princess of Wales carrying one of her children on her back (see Image 11.2).[68] This and other seemingly intimate family moments, so different from the former formal portraiture, were thus shared with the public and can be said to have been meant to foster endearing emotions towards the mother, Princess Alix. A representation of this sort, staged immediately after a period of illness, told the compelling stories of convalescence on the one hand and motherly love on the other. Thus, this image of 'health and vitality'[69] and of maternal affection also served to disseminate values—that is promote cultural ideals of family, feminine virtue and morale, as well as of physical health and exercise. What is also emphasized here, is the notion of stability epitomized and guaranteed by the Princess of Wales, whose function—amongst others—was to 'produce the infamous heir and spare', thus ensuring the continuity of the institution of the monarchy.

These depictions sold in high numbers and were highly valued by their owners and collectors. This hints at the impact of the 'intangible attraction'—the soft power influence exerted by the Princess of Wales. This form of staging can also be designated as a fashion strategy, since it includes an element of communication, of story-telling. Although one has to emphasize again that it is fashioning in the extended sense of the word—beyond fashion as clothing only—which is at work here.[70]

Apart from what they were actually showing, the *cartes* have to be regarded as highly tangible artefacts, which were not looked at with awe or from a deferential distance. People actually collected the *cartes*, catalogued them, and not least of all, gossiped about them.[71] This turned them into objects highly charged with emotions. Their potential for distributing feelings of attraction and allure was therefore not to be underestimated, which turns them into major agents of monarchy's soft power influence.

As has been shown, the sphere of fashion holds an attraction and a potential for alluring impact as well as an empathic fascination that princesses, as fashion icons, can utilize to enhance their standing with the public.



Image 11.2 Princess Alexandra carrying one of her children on her back; photographed by William and Daniel Downey in the late 1860s © Heritage Image Partnership Ltd/Alamy Stock Foto

This gendered sphere was constructed to be their realm throughout the Victorian age with its strict and complex codes of dress and its traditions—even if invented ones—of attire. This development has continued until today, if one considers how much emphasis is placed on every fashion item the Duchess of Cambridge appears in or with. The elegant simplicity of her attire has become emblematic of royal style in general. This also goes back to Alexandra, who was remarked to 'invariably stand […] out as the best-dressed woman because of the severe simplicity of her style'.[72] In this, the Princess of Wales followed Queen Victoria's advice not to dress like the fine London ladies, 'but rather to be *as different as possible by great simplicity*, which is more elegant'.[73]

Alexandra's style served as a reference point and a medium of communication as well as being admired and discussed. It thus (re-)produced gendered audiences and consumers along the way. The emotionally potent soft power of admiration and the commercialization accompanying this process are not to be underestimated. The attractions of attire have been and certainly continue to be a huge asset for the monarchy.

NOTES

1. Georgina Battiscombe (1972), *Queen Alexandra*, London, first published 1969, 34, [emphasis in the original].
2. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (2011), *The Future of Power*, New York, 92.
3. Nye (2011), 92.
4. Nye (2011), 92.
5. See Kate Strasdin (2013), 'Fashioning Alexandra: A Royal Approach to Style 1863–1910', *Costume* 47/2, 180–97, 196; Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (2004), *Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York, 6 and Battiscombe (1972), 16–18.
6. Nye (2011), 94.
7. One only has to think of Edward's continuous affairs, which might appeal to a certain kind of masculinity and Alexandra's ongoing support as the feminine counterpart.
8. Battiscombe (1972), 215.
9. Battiscombe (1972), 167.
10. 'State Opening of Parliament', *The Times*, 15 February 1901, 12.
11. A description in 'The World of Women' (*The Penny Illustrated Paper and Illustrated Times*, 19 March 1898, 188) serves as one example out of many: 'The Princess of Wales Wore a gown and train of black

velvet, embroidered silver; corsage embroidered to correspond and trimmed with English lace; headdress, tiara of diamonds, feather, and veil; ornaments, pearls and diamonds; orders, Victoria and Albert, Crown of India, St Catherine of Russia, St John of Jerusalem, the Danish Family and Golden Wedding Orders, and the Jubilee Commemoration Medal.'

12. 'The latest Craze', *Hampshire Telegraph and Sussex Chronicle*, 18 February 1899, Issue 6126.
13. The noun *fashion* stems from the French *façon*; its etymology thus already conveys that, next to shapes and styles, fashion may also refer to manners or modes of action and life, to customs and to the process of making (OED). Thus, a multilayered space of usage and signification is opened up.
14. Colleen Denney (2005), *Representing Diana, Princess of Wales. Cultural Memory and Fairy Tales Revisited*, Madison, 117.
15. Stephen Greenblatt examines the interrelation between forms of fashion, social expectations and standards and the process of identity formation. He develops the concept of self-fashioning with regard to the idea of the creation of a public persona. See Stephen Greenblatt (1980), *Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare*, Chicago.
16. Colin McDowell (1985), *A Hundred Years of Royal Style*, London, 12.
17. Herbert Trendell, *Dress Worn at His Majesty's Court*, London, 1908.
18. Strasdin (2013), 196. Alexandra's role as a fashion example had impacts on several levels; thus supporting the notion of her *sartorial reign*: As head of society she influenced standards of appearances and of what was tasteful and stylish. This affected audiences on a very personal level, because following fashions implies emotional involvement as it responds to processes of identity formation and social in- or exclusion. The newsworthiness of Alexandra's attire can be seen as another pillar of cultural reactions prompted by her appearances. Moreover, one has to take into account the economic impact: Following trends costs money; the clothing industry, dressmakers, stores, magazines and advertisers all profited from consumers' willingness to follow Alexandra's examples.
19. 'Talk of London', *The Penny Illustrated Paper and Illustrated Times*, 30 March 1901, 209.
20. 'Talk of London', *The Penny Illustrated Paper and Illustrated Times*, 25 May 1901, 337.

21. Christian Huck writes: ‘Fashion is always double, always other: it is the most corporeal, material, visually and tangibly perceivable *thing*, and at the same time it is the most abstract, transient, impalpable and imaginary *idea*.’ Christian Huck (2010), *Fashioning Society, or, The Mode of Modernity. Observing Fashion in Eighteenth-Century Britain*, Würzburg, 9 [emphasis in the original].
22. Michel Foucault (1979), *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison,* New York, 202–03.
23. John Berger (1972), *Ways of Seeing*, London, 45.
24. In this context one should briefly mention other theories of the (male) gaze, which refer to similar mechanisms, as developed *inter alia* by Jacques Lacan (1986), *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, London; Laura Mulvey (2009) *Visual and Other Pleasures*, Basingstoke and New York; Michel Foucault (1975) *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*, New York; Marita Sturken and Lisa Cartwright (2004) *Practices of Looking: An Introduction to Visual Culture*, Oxford.
25. And it also works in the other direction, that is, the gaze is directed back at society: ‘Seeing fashion becomes a mode of observing society’. Huck (2010), 31.
26. Berger (1972), 46.
27. Margaret Homans (1998), *Royal Representations: Queen Victoria and British Culture 1837–1876*, Chicago, xix.
28. McDowell (1985), 64.
29. Denney (2005), 27–28.
30. ‘The Marriage of the Prince of Wales and the Princess Alexandra’, *The Bristol Mercury*, 14 March 1863.
31. *The Bristol Mercury*, 14 March 1863.
32. ‘The Arrival of the Princess Alexandra’, *The Leeds Mercury*, 10 March 1863, Issue 7771.
33. ‘Incidents of the Princess’s Reception’, *Birmingham Daily Post*, 10 March 1863, Issue 1441.
34. Roland Barthes differentiates between three forms of garments. Next to the ‘real’ clothing, two other forms exist, which are forms of ‘represented clothing’ (8). ‘The first is the one presented to me as photography or drawn—it is image-clothing. The second is the same garment, but described, transformed into language [...] this is a written garment.’ Roland Barthes (1990) *The Fashion System*, translated by Matthew Ward and Richard Howard, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 3.

35. Strasdin (2013), 181.
36. Denney (2005), 51.
37. Denney (2005), 51.
38. In her chapter on ‘Courted Darlings and Virgin Brides’, Colleen Denney shows how these types of representational featurewere continued in the depictions of the next Princess of Wales, Lady Diana Spencer (see Denney (2005), 32–63).
39. *The Times*, 9 March 1863, 6.
40. McDowell (1985), 71–72.
41. Strasdin (2013), 184–85.
42. Strasdin (2013), 185.
43. Maurice V. Brett (ed.) (1934), *Journals and Letters of Reginald Viscount Esher*, vol. I. quoted after: Battiscombe (1972), 219; Battiscombe (218) noted that nobody ‘knew what was the correct dress for the Queen Consort to wear at the Coronation; the last Queen Consort had been Queen Adelaide and only the Grand Duchess Augusta had any clear recollection of King William IV's Coronation. Historians were consulted, records were turned up.’
44. McDowell (1985), 64.
45. McDowell (1985), 64.
46. McDowell (1985), 157.
47. See McDowell (1985), 30.
48. Tom Nairn (2011), *The Enchanted Glass: Britain and its Monarchy*, London, 31.
49. Nairn (2011), 30.
50. Nairn (2011), 30.
51. Strasdin (2013), 189.
52. Strasdin (2013), 189.
53. Battiscombe (1972), 96.
54. Battiscombe (1972), 96.
55. Cf. David Cannadine (2004), ‘The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the “Invention of Tradition”, c. 1820–1977’, in: Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge, 101–64, 122–23.
56. Cannadine (2004), 123.
57. Cannadine (2004), 123.
58. Cf. John Hannavy (ed.) (2008), *Encyclopedia of Nineteenth-Century Photography*, vol. 1, New York, 282.

59. Jeffrey Richards (2007), 'The monarchy and film 1900–2006', in: Andrzej Olechnowicz (ed), *The Monarchy and the British Nation, 1780 to the Present*, Cambridge, 258–79, 258.
60. Nairn (2011), 35.
61. John Plunkett (2003), *Queen Victoria: First Media Monarch*, Oxford, 159.
62. Plunkett (2003), 8.
63. Catherine Palmer (2008), '"Just like our family": Royalty, National Identity and Tourism', in: Philip Long and Nicola J. Palmer (eds), *Royal Tourism. Excursions around Monarchy.* Clevedon, 194–213, 200.
64. Plunkett (2003), 177.
65. Plunkett (2003), 177.
66. *Cartes de visite* are photographic portraits in a special format that proved affordable to the masses in the Victorian Age. See: Robin and Carol Wichard (1999), *Victorian Cartes-de-Visite*, Princes Risborough, 5–21; cf. Hannavy (2008), 282.
67. Plunkett (2003), 145 [emphasis in the original].
68. Robin and Carol Wichard (1999), 35.
69. Strasdin (2013), 191.
70. Kate Strasdin contextualizes this image of Princess Alexandra with her daughter temporally: After the publication of a *carte de visite* photograph depicting her during times of physical recovery in loose clothing and with open hair, this lively and playful image was published, underlining that the princess regained her strength. Her clothing again played a role, as Strasdin explains, because 'in contrast to the earlier image, Alexandra was now depicted as strong and vibrant […] her day dress looped in the fashion of a walking skirt and the whole image one of health and vitality' (191). Thus, her dress adds to and completes the meaning-making potential of the photograph.
71. Plunkett (2003), 173.
72. Battiscombe (1972), 106.
73. Battiscombe (1972), 106 [emphasis in the original].

CHAPTER 12

Love, Duty and Diplomacy: The Mixed Response to the 1947 Engagement of Princess Elizabeth

Edward Owens

On 5 January 1947, the weekly newspaper the *Sunday Pictorial* posed the direct question to readers in its front-page headline: 'Should our Future Queen Wed Philip?'[1] The significance of this eye-catching headline and the public poll that it advertised should not be underestimated: it was the first time that a British newspaper purposefully canvassed readers' opinions on a royal family issue.[2] More strikingly still, when the *Pictorial* came to publish the results of its poll the following Sunday, it announced that although 55 % of respondents favoured a marriage between Princess Elizabeth of Great Britain and Prince Philip of Greece on the condition the couple were in love, 40 % were opposed to it, mainly on grounds of British foreign policy.[3] This discovery signalled two things: first, that opinion polls conducted by the press invested the reading public with a new voice in relation to royal affairs which they could use to support or challenge decisions made at Buckingham Palace; secondly, that over half of the *Pictorial*'s respondents believed the couple's personal fulfilment was

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of greater importance than the political repercussions of what was viewed by some as a problematic dynastic alliance. This chapter builds on these themes to examine how the primacy popularly accorded romantic love as an emotion for self-enrichment acted to alleviate concerns regarding the geopolitical dimensions of the princess and prince's relationship. It also investigates how, following the *Pictorial*'s poll, royal aids and news editors worked in tandem to elevate a specific public image of Princess Elizabeth which emphasized that she would make sacrifices while enacting her public role in what appears to have been a strategy to stimulate public support for her and her choice of husband prior to the official announcement of their engagement in July 1947.

This analysis builds on a growing body of historical scholarship which has examined how the House of Windsor has sought to respond and adapt to social and political change in modern Britain. Focusing on royal philanthropy, commemorative culture and the interwar tours of the dominions, Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska and Frank Mort have revealed some of the strategies used by the monarchy and media to bring the royal family closer to British and Commonwealth subjects of the crown.[4] My own research, meanwhile, has examined how new kinds of mass media helped construct 'imagined communities' of readers, listeners, and viewers who felt intimately connected to members of the royal family on national occasions like royal weddings, coronations and Christmas Day.[5] This work on the recent history of the monarchy has partly drawn on methodologies pioneered by scholars working in the field of emotions and the way 'affect' and 'feeling' have structured public and private life.[6] Claire Langhamer has argued that romantic love was widely deemed to be crucial to personal development in 1940s Britain.[7] Building on this idea, this chapter analyses how Princess Elizabeth's outward desire to achieve the postwar romantic ideal functioned as a form of 'soft power': it generated empathy for her among a public who identified with her personal ambitions, which in turn fostered loyalty to her and adherence to the established social hierarchy.

This chapter begins by examining both the press's reaction to rumours of the royal betrothal and letters written by members of the public to the *Pictorial* in response to its January poll. This investigation will illuminate how Elizabeth was popularly viewed and how her romantic fulfilment was characterized by readers of the newspaper. I then move on to analyse how, in the lead up to the official announcement of the engagement in July 1947, royal aids and the media emphasized the princess's burdensome duties and her ostensible 'normality' in an attempt to generate public sympathy for her and, in so doing, support for her choice of Philip as a suitor. Finally, this chapter discusses how the media coverage of the newly affianced couple highlighted the emotional transformation experienced by the princess.

Rumours of a marriage between Elizabeth and Philip first arose in 1941, when Henry 'Chips' Channon, Tory politician, gossip and man-about-town, commented on a story circulated by the Greek royal family that the prince was intended for the princess. A friendship had blossomed between the couple in 1943 with the ambitious Lord Louis Mountbatten staging meetings between his nephew (Philip was his sister's son) and Elizabeth, the heiress presumptive.[8] Mountbatten also made the prince apply for British citizenship. As Philip had enjoyed a distinguished career in the Royal Navy after 1939, he was a strong candidate for British nationality. But as Ben Pimlott has noted, when the government discussed the prince's naturalization in October 1945, British Balkan diplomacy prevented his application from progressing. It was believed that if he was naturalized it would be construed either as an act in support of the Greek royalists, who were engaged in a civil war with Greek communists, or as a sign that the Greek royal family wanted to flee abroad. On 1 September 1946, a plebiscite officially reinstated the Greek monarchy, but the vote only drew attention to George II of Greece's authoritarian reputation, complicating any union with the Greek royal family and further delaying Philip's naturalization.

Royal biographer William Shawcross has noted that Elizabeth and Philip became 'unofficially engaged' during a holiday at Balmoral around this time, with rumours of a betrothal quickly filtering into newspaper gossip columns.[9] In response to the story, Britain's liberal press called for greater transparency in relation to any proposed marriage alliance with the Greek monarchy. The *Manchester Guardian* commented that if 'such an engagement were contemplated the Government would have to consider the political implications, and at present these would be vexatious since Greek affairs are the subject of so much controversy'. The newspaper argued that Prime Minister Clement Attlee had to make his government's views known to George VI and that the dominions needed to be consulted.[10] The *News Chronicle*'s political commentator, A.J. Cummings, similarly smuggled in a critique of the rumoured engagement under cover of safeguarding the 'strong links of mutual confidence' between Britain and the dominions, and added that the royals would welcome their subjects' thoughts on the betrothal: 'the King and Queen, it cannot be doubted, are fully conscious of the wisdom of learning in due course what is the public sentiment on the proposal of the Heiress Presumptive'.[11] As Adrian Bingham has argued, after the 1936 abdication crisis the *Daily Mirror* and *Sunday Pictorial* became more critical of the monarchy and other older hierarchies which they accused of misrepresenting public opinion and impeding social progress.[12] In this atmosphere of declining deference, the *Pictorial* responded to the *Chronicle*'s invitation to test public opinion on the princess's rumoured betrothal, printing in large capital letters on its front page: 'SHOULD OUR FUTURE QUEEN WED PHILIP?'

Despite this bold headline, the *Pictorial* displayed caution in approaching the story, its guarded attitude indicative of how unusual media scrutiny of the monarchy was in this period. It hid behind the *Guardian* and *Chronicle*'s previous editorials, quoting them at length and backing their 'demand for a franker approach to the whole question' of the rumoured engagement. In establishing its motives for testing public opinion, the *Pictorial* also referenced a *Guardian* article that had quoted Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin's speech from the House of Commons debate on Edward VIII's abdication ten years before: 'the King's wife was different from the position of the wife of any other citizen in the country; it was part of the price which the King has to pay'.[13] By quoting this passage, the *Pictorial* signalled its agreement with the *Guardian*, namely that the same rules applied to the heiress presumptive and, again citing Baldwin, that 'it is essentially a matter in which the voice of the people must be heard'.

In its discussion of the constitutional issue of Elizabeth's engagement, the *Pictorial* highlighted 'the political consequences of so strong a link between the British and Greek Royal Houses at this stage'.[14] There was recent precedent of intermarriage between the dynasties, with Princess Marina of Greece having wed the Duke of Kent in 1934. However, the Greek royal family had then been living in exile in Paris, and the royal wedding was staged as an act of rehabilitation that saw Marina resume her rightful royal position.[15] In the immediate postwar period and with the onset of the Cold War, the *Pictorial* expressed disquiet about the Soviet Union's reaction to Elizabeth's rumoured betrothal. As already noted, Greek royalists were embroiled in a civil war with Greek communists at this time, and it was felt that an engagement between the princess and Philip would signal British support for the Greek king and his fascist legacy, offending the Soviets in the 'game of Power Politics'.[16]

While the *Pictorial* recognized in the royal betrothal the same political complexities as the liberal *Guardian* and *Chronicle*, it also raised the possibility that the engagement was a true romance: ‘many people believe that if the Princess and Prince are in love, then nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of their marriage’. The *Pictorial* thus established the social binaries through which the British public would be consistently invited to make sense of the engagement: true love was presented as reason enough to overlook the political ramifications of the betrothal. The special significance ascribed to the princess and prince’s romance fitted with a postwar culture in which love was becoming increasingly central to concepts of self-fulfilment.[17] But this equation between love and public duty had a longer history too, echoing the Duke of Windsor’s romance with Wallis Simpson a decade earlier.[18] While Baldwin had disregarded public support for Edward VIII in 1936, the *Pictorial* adopted the stance that ‘above all, the loyal people over whom the young Princess will one day rule as Queen must also be afforded the opportunity of expressing their views’. And, using capital letters to emphasize its point, the newspaper asserted that the public’s views needed to be ascertained ‘NOT AFTER THE EVENT, AS WAS THE CASE WITH ANOTHER ROYAL CRISIS IN 1936, BUT BEFORE IT’.[19]

Bingham has noted how the *Pictorial*’s poll caused uproar in Fleet Street—evidence of its radical ambition. The owner of *Picture Post*, Edward Hulton, was ‘one of those appalled by the exercise’:

> The journalism of the *Sunday Pictorial* has reached a new low. It is difficult to write with any restraint about this latest effort by this self-appointed voice of the people, which is as genuinely mischievous and politically harmful as it is in gross bad taste, and infinitely wounding to the feelings of all those concerned.[20]

The language Hulton used to criticize the *Pictorial* reflected both the high esteem in which he held the royal family’s right to a private life and his view that the public had no right to cast judgement on their social superiors. The royalist *Daily Mail* also criticized the *Pictorial*’s decision to canvass public opinion on a royal matter, remarking that ‘the days are past when dynastic marriages meant Power politics […] The King and Queen […] can surely be trusted to safeguard the future of their eldest daughter, who will one day be our Queen.’[21] Downplaying the international political context at the centre of the episode, the *Mail* intimated that the betrothal was a private family affair. As replies to the poll poured in from all sections of society, however, the *Pictorial* declared the following Sunday that 55 %

of respondents favoured the marriage on the condition that it was indeed a love match, 40 % opposed it, and 5 % believed Elizabeth should not be prevented from marrying the Greek prince for political reasons, but should nonetheless renounce her right to the throne.[22]

Over a central double-page spread the newspaper offered ‘a full analysis of the results so far achieved’ and published a ‘representative sample’ of the letters it had received.[23] Women formed an ‘overwhelming majority’ of those who supported the marriage—‘provided the two young people are in love’—and this ‘feminine support’ tended to come from those aged 14 to 30 and older than 50. The *Pictorial* noted how ‘strong objection is taken by the majority of those readers (in favour) to any “appeasement” of foreign Powers in this “purely domestic” issue’. It described how phrases such as ‘the right to live their own lives’, ‘a purely private matter’ and ‘no interference in the dictates of Princess Elizabeth’s heart’, recurred in many letters. These sorts of expressions demonstrated how some supporters of the engagement believed that the princess’s private life should not impinge on her role as a political symbolic figurehead.

The ‘representative’ letters published in support of a betrothal revealed how some respondents also took a liberal, egalitarian attitude to the engagement. The Mayor and Mayoress of Winchester, Mr and Mrs Charles Sankey, advised ‘let Royalty be the same as their subjects in “affairs of the heart”—let them choose for themselves’. Nancy Harman from Hastings concurred, stating that Princess Elizabeth ‘should be able to marry the man she loves whether he be of Royal Birth or a commoner’, and included the caveat that ‘in her choice of a husband she should be guided only by her father and mother’. Mrs D. Morson of the London suburb Thornton Heath neatly summarized this belief when she compared the princess to her kin, describing how, as a family, they agreed that she ‘should have the same privileges as our own daughters—of choosing her own husband with her parents’ advice and consent’.[24] The parallels between Elizabeth and other young women in letters like these showed how great importance was attached to the ability to choose one’s partner, the princess’s ability to achieve true love conforming with wider postwar feminine expectations which made her seem ‘normal’ in her tastes. These responses also showed how the role of the royal family was often understood through the personal lives of its main protagonists, with respondents to the poll utilizing emotional language which displayed a personal familiarity in their characterization of Elizabeth and her relatives.

Other respondents contested this domestic, depoliticized image of the betrothal. The *Pictorial* remarked that letters it had received opposing the engagement had mainly been written by ‘politically-minded people, men just outnumbering women’. Of the 40 % against the marriage, ‘one letter in six was from a soldier or an ex-Serviceman who has fought overseas’, often writing on behalf of barracks or clubs to declare ‘let’s have no more foreigners in England’. Other respondents were particularly against allying with Greece or any foreign dynasty, arguing that the days of royal intermarriage were over, and with an ‘impressive majority’ stating the betrothal was a ‘political move’. In this way, opponents also seemed committed to a love match—but not with a foreign prince. They did not believe Elizabeth was in love and advised that she ‘follow in the footsteps of her father’ by marrying a commoner.[25]

Letters from respondents averse to the engagement were printed to support this position. While some critics xenophobically opposed the betrothal because of Philip’s ‘foreignness’, others took aim at the political standing of Greece, noting how it ‘will always be in trouble with someone’, or that a marriage was unwise ‘in view of the present world situation’. For example, a London correspondent echoed the *Pictorial*’s concern about the Soviet Union’s attitude to the betrothal, stating that any link with the Greek royal family would be ‘eyed with suspicion’ abroad, creating international tension. This author claimed that ‘the ruler of England and the British Empire has to make certain personal sacrifices for the benefit of the people. Where a match such as this one occurs the choice for Princess Elizabeth will be to sacrifice love for the future of her people.’[26]

This writer formulated a critique of the betrothal which resonated with the established discourse on the burdensome nature of royal status: the princess’s future position as the nation’s symbolic figurehead demanded that she sacrifice private emotional fulfilment. Yet, many respondents in favour of the engagement took the opposite view that Elizabeth’s personal happiness was paramount to her ability to perform her public role. A teenage girl from Portsmouth decided with her friends that the princess ‘should be free to marry whom she pleases if she loves him [because] we think a happy queen is a good queen’.[27] Phyllis Jones of London also noted that ‘if her private life is happy it is reasonable to suppose that Princess Elizabeth will make a better Queen than if she were unhappily married’.[28] Comments like these revealed how the postwar culture of romantic realization worked to frame Elizabeth’s constitutional position within a powerful emotional discourse: only by finding true love and happiness would she achieve her full potential as Britain's future monarch.

In summarizing the results gathered after the first week of the poll, the *Pictorial* reaffirmed the divide along which the royal betrothal would be judged: it was a story of true love versus the concerns of international diplomacy. The newspaper emphasized the importance of romantic fulfilment when it continued its poll a second week. Aiming to obtain 'the truest possible reflection of mass opinion', it issued readers with a coupon that gave them only two answers to choose from: 'Princess Elizabeth and Prince Philip should marry if they are in love and no obstacle should be placed in their way'; or, 'there should be no royal marriage between Princess Elizabeth and Prince Philip of Greece'.[29] This narrowing of options consolidated a story supposedly split between romance and duty, which was again amplified when the newspaper disclosed the final results of its royal poll the following Sunday: 64 % of respondents supported the marriage if it was a love match, and just 32 % opposed it.[30] The *Pictorial* published a selection of mainly positive letters from the 'thousands upon thousands' it claimed to have received 'from all classes' to reiterate the same set of messages from the week before. One letter again focused on the theme that Elizabeth's personal fulfilment would make up for the demanding tasks she faced as a royal public servant. Mrs M.I. Tebble from Shropshire presented love as a reward for royal duty:

> If Princess Elizabeth and Prince Philip are in love and wish to marry they should be allowed to do so. Princess Elizabeth, both now and later as a ruling Queen, will have to give up much of her time to State affairs and will also be expected to have children as heirs to the Throne. Therefore her home life should be as *happy* as possible. Prince Philip seems a healthy, intelligent man. If he is allowed to marry the Princess and can fulfil his duties as well as the Duchess of Kent he will no doubt become very popular with the British people.[31]

As well as noting the high regard she had for Princess Marina, Mrs Tebble expressed the view that Elizabeth's personal happiness would compensate for a life of public service. One of the duties she identified was the requirement to produce heirs, revealing how the princess's gender also shaped the constitutional expectations placed on her by members of the public. As a young woman who seemed to entertain domestic aspirations, the princess may have been better placed to get her way in these circumstances than a male heir apparent would have been. Emotional control was deemed to be vital to public deportment in the masculine world of high politics, and a male heir may have been expected to forsake love and place national political responsibility ahead of private fulfilment.[32]

What clearly emerged from the *Pictorial*'s poll was the popular belief that the princess's role was unenviable, her future happiness hinging on her finding true love. This consolatory motif became increasingly important to the official projection of the romance as it played out over the course of the next six months. Royal aids and the British media worked to consolidate an empathetic culture around Elizabeth which centred on how private fulfilment would make up for the burdens of royal public life. One of the most significant instances where this official discourse was mobilized was in the broadcast which the princess delivered to the Commonwealth on her twenty-first birthday. At the end of January 1947, Elizabeth left London with her family for a four-month tour of the Union of South Africa. They arrived in Cape Town in mid-February and then embarked on an extensive trip around South Africa in an effort to calm the rising tide of nationalism that had undermined the country's political stability. Ben Pimlott has noted that the tour demonstrated the monarchy's value as a 'link in an association of nations and territories whose ties had become tenuous, because of war, British economic weakness, and nascent nationalism'.[33] As a youthful symbol of the vitality of the monarchy, Elizabeth, like her uncle Edward, who toured the dominions as his father's representative, helped propagate an image of the crown as the single link that bound together disparate imperial peoples.[34]

The princess's twenty-first birthday fell on 21 April, three days before she was due to return to England. As the climax to the royal visit, she broadcast a special message to the Commonwealth and empire, which Pimlott suggested became the most important public address of her life.[35] Judging from the available evidence, it seems that the message was written for Elizabeth by the journalist and royal biographer, Dermott Morrah, who reported on the South African tour for *The Times*, whilst acting as unofficial speechwriter.[36] The king's private secretary, Alan Lascelles, described in a letter to Morrah how he could 'not recall one [draft broadcast] that has so completely satisfied me and left me feeling that no single word should be altered'.[37] As well as being transmitted live by radio, the newsreels recorded a version of the princess's birthday message. She thanked her subjects for their good wishes and, speaking on behalf of all the young men and women of the Commonwealth and empire, she told listeners and viewers how they had to work together to ensure the future prosperity of the constituent nations of the British world. She ended the message discussing the theme of service.[38] In the vein of her father and grandfather, she pledged her life to the empire and all of its peoples, stressing that she required their mutual support as well:

> I declare before you all that my whole life, whether it be long or short, shall be devoted to your service and the service of our great Imperial family to which we all belong, but I shall not have the strength to carry out this resolution alone unless you join in it with me, as I now invite you to do. I know that your support will be unfailingly given. God help me to make good my vow and God bless all of you who are willing to share in it.[39]

Pimlott has suggested that the princess's account of the enduring vitality of imperial relations inspired British audiences who were 'exasperated by restrictions, and worn out after the added hardship of a terrible winter'.[40] But he did not discuss how this message was intended to enhance public support for the princess in anticipation of the announcement of her engagement to Philip: the language used here sought to evoke empathy from listeners and viewers, with Elizabeth inviting them to support her in her ostensibly onerous role. As Lascelles confided in Morrah before the princess delivered her pledge, 'the speaker herself told me that it had made her cry. Good, said I, for if it makes you cry now, it will make 200 million other people cry when they hear you deliver it, and that is what we want.'[41] Clearly, the courtier was conscious of the intimate emotional register of the princess's broadcast and believed that it would stir strong feelings among its audiences.

Morrah was also asked by Buckingham Palace to prepare an official biography of the princess to coincide with her twenty-first birthday.[42] The result was a piece of royal propaganda which repeatedly emphasized that Elizabeth was representative of all women of her generation: 'simple, warm-hearted, hard-working, painstaking, cultivated, humorous and above all friendly' she was 'a typical daughter of the Britain of her time'. The implied message contained in this biography was that Elizabeth, like all young British women, should be allowed to fall in love and choose who she married, especially in light of the sacrifices she was going to make on behalf of the nation and empire. Morrah's biography became the authoritative source on Elizabeth's personal life, with British newspapers drawing on his descriptions in their congratulatory messages to the princess on her birthday. The *Daily Mail* quoted Morrah on how Elizabeth was ‘a girl of the age’, enjoying modern pastimes like dancing, cinema and dining out, before reminding its readers that she ‘faces a vocation and a career without parallel in the world today’.[43] The other leading popular royalist paper, the *Daily Express*, similarly highlighted how ‘the happiness of being a lovely young woman in an admiring world will be tempered more and more by the demands of the office for which she is destined’.[44] Newsreels were more direct than the press in juxtaposing Elizabeth’s rumoured ambitions to marry Philip and the emotional fulfilment this could bring with accounts of the oppressive nature of her royal station. In its special birthday report, *Pathé News* extended its congratulations to the princess and explained how Philip had been linked to her as a suitor, but that Buckingham Palace had denied all rumours. To end its report, the newsreel stressed the burdens which lay ahead of the princess: ‘Increasingly heavy public duties fall upon the shoulders of the heir presumptive to the throne. Britain and the Empire know that she will discharge these duties as her parents have done in the service of her people. We hope, too, that she may be allowed to find her own personal happiness. We salute the young girl who accepts such world-wide responsibilities.’[45]

In this way then, loyal newsreels and newspapers worked to engender empathy for Elizabeth so that the public would support her decision to marry Philip, in spite of the public criticism of him exposed by the *Sunday Pictorial*’s poll in January.

Meanwhile, back at home, Lord Mountbatten had launched a campaign to produce an appealing public image for his nephew, Philip. The prince was finally naturalized as a British subject in March 1947 and, in his purported egalitarianism and modern tastes, he and the princess seemed well matched.[46] Following Elizabeth’s return to England, the couple’s betrothal was at last announced on 9 July 1947. The media generally reacted positively, publicizing the engagement in front-page headlines.[47] Articles on the prince now only used his new British-sounding name, ‘Lieutenant Philip Mountbatten’, and his charm, wit, good looks and progressive politics combined to characterize him as a suitable consort for Britain’s future queen.

Following the official announcement of the betrothal, it was crucial that the media maintained the image of a ‘true romance’ and the idea that the princess had found personal fulfilment to make up for the difficult public role that lay ahead of her. Historians who have studied companionate marriage in postwar Britain have argued that it was rooted in mutual emotional fulfilment, sexual attraction and located within a privatized conception of the home.[48] The media constructed an idealized imagery of companionate love around Elizabeth and Philip to emphasize the emotional reality of their love story. For example, the *Sunday Express* noted how:

> All girls discuss young men, and Elizabeth and her friends were no exception. So it soon became common knowledge that a tall, blond and handsome naval officer called Philip was her favourite. Luckily his appearance came up to the high standard she had once set herself many years before when she said, 'when I marry, my husband will have to be very tall and very good-looking.' Some time later, when a friend pointed out that she might have to marry for political reasons, she replied, 'I couldn't marry a man I didn't love.'[49]

These purported first-hand insights into the princess's ideas on love were very innovative. For the first time, a journalist ascribed direct speech to Elizabeth to underline the normality of her desire to find love with a handsome man: like 'all girls', she talked about 'young men' with her friends and placed special importance on 'good looks'. Furthermore, these feminine insights substantiated the view that Elizabeth's romantic ambitions were more important than constitutional politics.

With the support of palace authorities, the media was also able to use visual images to try and convince audiences that it was a real love match. The day after the engagement was announced, royal aids arranged for the couple to be filmed and photographed at a special sitting at Buckingham Palace. All four major newsreel distributors used the same footage from this sitting. New kinds of emotional gesture were introduced on film that had been deemed unsuitable 13 years earlier. Prince George and Princess Marina had posed for the newsreels, but had not initially physically touched one another. Now, in the more expressive mid-1940s, Elizabeth and Philip strolled together arm-in-arm, exchanged smiles, laughed inaudibly and talked between glances at the camera (see Image 12.1).[50]

The newsreels used romantic soundtracks to heighten the ambiance of these scenes, which included close-up images of the engagement ring worn by Elizabeth. The *British Movietone News* commentator drew special attention to the princess's facial expression: 'in these, the first special studies of the pair since the news of their engagement, it is easy to see the radiant happiness of the princess, as she and her very good looking husband-to-be pose for the cameras in the palace'. The princess's smile received extensive coverage in the press as well, with popular and elite newspapers regularly

Image 12.1 Princess Elizabeth and Prince Philip strolling together, arm-in-arm, for the press and newsreel cameras following the announcement of their engagement on 9 July 1947 © AF archive/Alamy Stock Photo

commenting on an illustrating how happy she looked.[51] In this respect, Elizabeth's smile became a sign of her emotional transformation.

The final act of recognition staged by courtiers and the media was a balcony appearance on the evening of 10 July which saw the princess and her fiancé present themselves to large crowds gathered outside Buckingham Palace's gates. The newsreel coverage of this interaction functioned as symbolic acknowledgement of the public's acceptance of Philip. Boasting to cinema viewers how it had waited 'with the film industry's biggest lens trained on the palace balcony', *Pathé News* presented audiences with images of the couple stepping out onto the veranda and waving to the crowds. These scenes were interspersed with images of the large crowds waving at the royal couple, the commentator remarking over a soundtrack of audible cheering how the 'heiress to the throne and her future husband met the British people'. The film sought to dispel any lingering doubts viewers might have about the political suitability of the betrothal when the commentator stated how George VI looked 'particularly happy' as he, the queen, and Princess Margaret joined the couple on the balcony.[52] As with newspaper reports which highlighted how the king had 'gladly given his consent' to the marriage, this comment acted as an official seal of approval designed to ease anxieties about the international impact of the romance.[53]

In conclusion, this chapter has examined how, following the mixed public response to rumours that Elizabeth and Philip had become unofficially engaged, palace courtiers and royal aids worked in tandem with the British media to emphasize how the princess shared in the popular ambition of other women her age to marry for love and find self-fulfilment through a happy domestic life. Equally, this public relations campaign highlighted the ostensibly burdensome nature of royal public life in order to foster empathy for the princess and her desire for personal fulfilment, which in turn might offset the onerous duties that lay ahead of her. The media coverage of the engagement and the letters written in response to the *Sunday Pictorial*'s poll illuminate how popular understandings of Princess Elizabeth's constitutional role as heiress to the throne were anchored in her image as a seemingly 'normal' young woman in mid-1940s Britain who, like other people of her generation, placed great value on true love. Through the enactment of everyday desire, the princess thus became a relatable and empathetic figure with whom members of the public could identify, which in turn generated a strong emotional loyalty to her and the institution she represented.

NOTES

1. *Sunday Pictorial*, 5 January 1947, 1.
2. Adrian Bingham, whose research focuses on the British popular press in this period, has corroborated that this was the first time a newspaper deliberately polled its readers' opinions on a royal family issue. See Bingham (2009), *Family Newspapers? Sex, Private Life, and the British Popular Press, 1918–1978*, Oxford, 97–98.
3. *Sunday Pictorial*, 12 January 1947, 1.
4. Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska (2016), 'Royal Death and Living Memorials: the Funerals and Commemoration of George V and George VI, 1936–52', *Historical Research* 89/243, 158–75; Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska (2014), 'Keep Fit and Play the Game: George VI, Outdoor Recreation and Social Cohesion in Interwar Britain', *Cultural and Social History* 11/1, 111–29; Frank Mort (2014a), 'Love in a Cold Climate: Letters, Public Opinion and Monarchy in the 1936 Abdication Crisis', *Twentieth Century British History* 25/1, 30–62; Frank Mort (2014b), 'On Tour with the Prince of Wales: Monarchy, Empire and Celebrity Culture in the 1920s', unpublished paper delivered at the University of Manchester, 26 February. On these topics, also see Frank Prochaska (1995), *Royal Bounty: The Making of a Welfare Monarchy*, New Haven, CT; Chandrika Kaul (2006), 'Monarchical Display and the Politics of Empire: Princes of Wales and India, 1870–1920s', *Twentieth Century British History* 17/4, 464–88.
5. Edward Owens, 'Monarchy, Mass Communication and Emotion: The 1934 Royal Love Story of Prince George and Princess Marina' (forthcoming); Edward Owens, *The Media and the Transformation of the British Monarchy, 1932–1953*, (PhD thesis: University of Manchester, 2015). For the term 'imagined communities', see Benedict Anderson (1986), *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London, 22–36.
6. For recent contributions to this field, see Thomas Dixon (2015), *Weeping Britannia: Portrait of a Nation in Tears*, Oxford; Jan Plamper (2015), *The History of Emotions: An Introduction*, Oxford.
7. Claire Langhamer (2013), *The English in Love: The Intimate Story of an Emotional Revolution*, Oxford, 3–7, 23–5; Claire Langhamer (2012), 'Love, Selfhood and Authenticity in Post-War Britain', *Cultural and Social History* 9/2, 277–97, 277–82.

8. For a discussion of the Greek royal family's reputation in this period and the negotiations between the British government, the House of Windsor and Lord Mountbatten regarding Philip's naturalization, see Ben Pimlott (2002), *The Queen: Elizabeth II and the Monarchy*, London, 94–101.
9. William Shawcross (2009), *Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother: An Official Biography*, Basingstoke, 625. For an example of press rumours, see *Daily Express*, 9 November 1946, 2.
10. *Manchester Guardian*, 2 January 1947, 4.
11. *News Chronicle*, 3 January 1947, as quoted in *Sunday Pictorial*, 5 January 1947, 1.
12. Bingham (2009), 97–98.
13. *Sunday Pictorial*, 5 January 1947, 1.
14. *Sunday Pictorial*, 5 January 1947, 1.
15. Owens, 'Monarchy, Mass Communication and Emotion'.
16. *Sunday Pictorial*, 5 January 1947, 1.
17. Langhamer (2013), 3–7.
18. Mort (2014a), 45–47.
19. *Sunday Pictorial*, 5 January 1947, 1.
20. Bingham (2009), 245.
21. *Daily Mail*, 6 January 1947, 2.
22. *Sunday Pictorial*, 12 January 1947, 1.
23. *Sunday Pictorial*, 12 January 1947, 4–5. It is possible that the *Pictorial* fabricated its results, either to make the betrothal seem more contentious than it actually was, or to disguise overwhelming hostility to the marriage in order to avoid the palace's opprobrium. But given the sensitivity of the topic, it seems likely that the newspaper would not have risked excessive manipulation for fear of discovery, and I have therefore interpreted the results at face value.
24. *Sunday Pictorial*, 12 January 1947, 4–5.
25. *Sunday Pictorial*, 12 January 1947, 4.
26. *Sunday Pictorial*, 12 January 1947, 5.
27. *Sunday Pictorial*, 12 January 1947, 5.
28. *Sunday Pictorial*, 12 January 1947, 4.
29. *Sunday Pictorial*, 12 January 1947, 5.
30. *Sunday Pictorial*, 19 January 1947, 1.
31. *Sunday Pictorial*, 19 January 1947, 7. NB. The newspaper's italicized emphasis.

32. Martin Francis (2002), 'Tears, Tantrums, and Bared Teeth: The Emotional Economy of Three Conservative Prime Ministers, 1951–1963', *Journal of British Studies* 41/3, 354–87, 358–63.
33. Pimlott (2002), 118.
34. Mort (2014b); Kaul (2006).
35. Pimlott (2002), 118.
36. Tom Utley for the *Daily Mail* (8 June 2012), 'How Grandad's words made Churchill and the Queen cry. How sad Beardy misquoted them this week…', http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2156173/Grandads-words-Churchill-Queen-How-sad-Beardy-misquoted-week-.html, accessed 6 February 2016.
37. Utley (2012).
38. On the royal public language of duty and service, see Philip Williamson (2007), 'The Monarchy and Public Values, 1900–1953', in: Andrzej Olechnowicz (ed.), *The Monarchy and the British Nation, 1780 to the Present*, Cambridge, 223–57, 230–31.
39. Quoted in Pimlott (2002), 117.
40. Pimlott (2002), 118.
41. Utley (2012).
42. Dermot Morrah (1947), *Princess Elizabeth: The Illustrated Story of Twenty-One Years in the Life of the Heir Presumptive*, London.
43. *Daily Mail*, 21 April 1947, 1.
44. *Daily Express*, 21 April 1947, 2.
45. *Pathé News*, 'Princess Elizabeth is 21: The Girl Who Will Be Queen', 21 April 1947; *British Paramount News*, 'Heiress to the Throne', 21 April 1947.
46. Pimlott (2002), 99–101.
47. The only notable exception was the *Daily Mirror* which, in line with its own and the *Pictorial*'s less deferential attitude towards the hierarchical social order, published a front-page editorial calling on readers to work together in order to save the economy: the implied message was that Britain was run by its people, not the social elite. *Daily Mirror*, 10 July 1947, 1.
48. Janet Finch and Penny Summerfield (1991), 'Social Reconstruction and the Emergence of Companionate Marriage, 1945–1959', in: David Clark (ed.), *Marriage, Domestic Life and Social Change: Writings for Jacqueline Burgoyne*, London, 7–32; Langhamer (2013), 47–48.
49. *Sunday Express*, 13 July 1947, 2.

50. For example, compare *Gaumont British News*, 'The Royal Engagement', 14 July 1947, in which Elizabeth and Philip stroll arm-in-arm, with the film of Prince George and Princess Marina from 1934, which shows the couple walking side-by-side but not physically touching. *British Movietone News*, 'Royal Honeymoon', 6 December 1934.
51. *British Movietone News*, 'Royal Betrothal'. Also see *Daily Telegraph*, 10 July 1947, 1; *Daily Mail*, 11 July 1947, 5; *Daily Mirror*, 21 November 1947, 1.
52. *Pathé News*, 'The Royal Romance', 14 July 1947. Also see *Gaumont British News*, 'The Royal Engagement', 14 July 1947.
53. *Daily Express*, 10 July 1947, 1; *Daily Mail*, 10 July 1947, 1; *Daily Telegraph*, 10 July 1947, 1; *News Chronicle*, 10 July 1947, 1.

PART IV

Dynastic Identities

CHAPTER 13

A 'Sporting Hermes': Crown Prince Constantine and the Ancient Heritage of Modern Greece

Miriam Schneider

Shortly before the opening of the Interim Olympic Games in Athens on 22 April 1906, the Greek daily *Asty* commented on the enthusiastic spirit which pervaded the nation on the eve of this great international event.[1] There was a joyful expectation that the visitors from Europe and the world streaming to the cradle of Western civilization would be surprised to find both a proud people worthy of their glorious ancestors and a modernizing nation-state which had made considerable progress since winning its independence in 1829. Up to this point, the great powers had not looked kindly on what they perceived to be a backward, troublesome 'pigmy' state whose grand territorial aspirations were derived from long-gone past glories. In 1897, the Greeks had therefore tried their own luck only to suffer a humiliating military defeat at the hands of the Ottoman forces. Now, however, so the subtext of the article implied, a new opportunity

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for realizing their dreams was offering itself in the shape of peaceful international events such as the Olympic Games. By gaining a different sort of 'victory […] limited to the great and splendid works of peace', that is by showing that Greece stood on an equal footing with the civilized countries of the West, the Hellenes would be able to win over Europe's foreign-policy makers. This, they hoped, would enable them to attain their irredentist goals vis-à-vis the Greek-inhabited areas of the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans.

The man credited with having brought about this opportunity, 'the first creator and the first inspirer of these great enterprises' was none other than Crown Prince Constantine of Greece (1868–1923), who happened to be the president of the Greek Olympic Committee. As the *Asty* article explained, Constantine had distinguished himself as a 'peacemaker' and 'civilizer of a nation', feats by no means inferior to the 'work of a commander in war'. He was 'the man of letters of Greece' and 'her sporting Hermes'; for he had invited the first International Archaeological Congress to Athens in 1905, and now, for the second time, he was presiding over the Olympic Games, another great 'work of civilization'. Twice the prince had thus used the 'living pillar of antiquity', the material and spiritual heritage of ancient Greece, to support modern Greek ambitions. Therefore, he had endeared himself to his people as 'the summing up and the incarnation of the noblest ideals of his race'.

Judging from these journalistic effusions, Crown Prince Constantine had 'made it' in 1906. After 43 years of manoeuvring and negotiating, his dynasty, the royal House of Glücksborg, seemed to have reached a moment of unmitigated popularity. In 1863, Constantine's father, then a 17-year-old princeling from Denmark, had been elected by the European concert of powers to succeed the deposed King Otto I (1815–1867) on the throne of the young and politically unstable Greek state. Against most expectations, King George I of the Hellenes (1845–1913) had proved remarkably successful in stabilizing the institution of monarchy in a country infamous for its radically democratic constitution and a general proclivity to political unrest.[2] The shrewd diplomat had focused his energy on the royal prerogative of foreign politics and used his powerful dynastic connections with Russia and Britain to advance Greek interests on the international stage. Since the prime role envisaged by the Greeks for their royal family involved their function as goodwill ambassadors for the national cause of a fairly minor Balkans power, this earned him considerable respect. Without international recognition, the *Megali Idea*, the country's irredentist agenda of establishing a Greater Greek state encompassing all the Greek-inhabited areas which had once formed part of the Byzantine Empire, would have to remain a chimera.[3]

Even though George achieved some territorial gains, he was never able to inspire feelings of sympathy or affection amongst his notoriously indifferent subjects. Until 1875 he was criticized for his unconstitutional meddling in domestic politics; then, when a major crisis had resolved the issue, it was his frequent and prolonged absences from Athens, his cosmopolitan lifestyle, and his pronounced passivity in domestic politics that people found fault with.[4] The task of truly nationalizing and popularizing his dynasty, therefore, fell to his firstborn son and heir, Constantine, Duke of Sparta. From his earliest childhood, this boy was destined to become a truly national prince, raised in the Orthodox faith and the Greek language; and he would ignite the ardent passions of the Greek citizens, both by virtue of his position and by his own activity.

As *Asty* noted, one of the most successful strategies Constantine employed to align himself with Greek national feeling in the years 1894 to 1906 was his adoption of a peculiar blend of national cultural politics and international public diplomacy. By championing what the anonymous author referred to as 'works of peace and civilization'—the idea of a revival of the ancient Olympics in modern-day Athens and the first International Archaeological Congress—the prince was following the unwritten handbook of soft power.[5] On a national level, Constantine tapped into one of the most formative myths of Modern Greek national identity and one of the richest sources of national pride: the allegedly unbroken cultural link between the ancient Greek commonwealth and the modern Greek state and the claim to a revival that it seemed to corroborate ('the living pillar of antiquity'). By promoting himself and his dynasty as the carriers and safeguards of the nation's most sacred values ('the most noble ideals of his race'), he was able to win the favour of his sceptical audience. At the same time and on an international level, the heir to the throne utilized Greece's symbolic capital, her archaeological riches and presumed athletic tradition, to advertise his nation—and its aspirations—to a global audience which shared the Greeks' esteem for classical antiquity. The temporary successes achieved in the sphere of cultural diplomacy, in turn, endeared his dynasty to a domestic public which was just as quick to criticize its governing elite as it was eager to interpret any signs of international recognition as a permit to realise its expansionist dreams.

THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL CONGRESS, 25–30 MARCH 1905

The first 'great enterprise' alluded to by the article from *Asty* was the International Archaeological Congress which Constantine convened in Athens in 1905. Attended by more than 850 scholars representing a broad range of institutions from Europe and America, this congress proved a major success. Over a period of five days the entire spectrum of archaeology 'in the broadest sense possible' was discussed, from prehistoric to medieval, from topography to numismatics, from museum ethics to the illegal trade in antiquities.[6] The selection of Athens as venue acknowledged the fact that Greece had taken centre stage in one of the era's supreme disciplines.[7] The Greeks were afforded the opportunity to prove to the world that they had thrown off the cultural tutelage of the Western imperial powers and become 'worthy and able stewards' of their own ennobling heritage.[8] The Hellenic monarchy, on the other hand, by using its transnational dynastic skills to best national advantage and by providing an international stage for Greek national pride, could show its commitment to both Greece's national identity and future ambitions.

Over recent years, the ideological frameworks of archaeology as it emerged as a discipline in nineteenth-century Europe have been studied according to the paradigm of informal cultural imperialism. Inspired by neo-classicist, romantic, and nationalist thinking, Western imperial powers such as Britain, France or Germany colonized the past of developing countries such as Italy or Greece. They did so either by claiming the spiritual inheritance of their Golden Ages of civilization, the Roman Empire or the Greek city-states, or by actually appropriating their material remains.[9] The age of the 'big dig' witnessed a series of major excavations in the Mediterranean and the Ottoman Empire primarily designed to enhance the national prestige of the initiators (for example Germany in Olympia, France in Delphi, or America in Corinth).[10] International competition—not unlike the scramble for Africa—was also visible in the craze for establishing relevant academic institutions, the so-called foreign schools or archaeological institutes, which mushroomed in Athens and Rome between 1846 and 1909. While these bodies studied the ruins of classical antiquity on the ground, the modern inhabitants of the areas thus investigated were discarded as 'degenerated from their earlier ancestors' or as altogether descending from different, 'barbaric' peoples.[11]

Postcolonial scholars have characterized the local response to this paternalism as a sort of 'self-colonizing' process by which independent nations such as the Greeks bought into the model of the Golden Age, developed an obsession with classical antiquity and purged their histories and historic sites of any contaminating 'barbaric' traces.[12] In the more favourable standard interpretation, though, the Greeks were self-assertively utilizing the classical model imposed upon them to build a modern, secular 'imagined community' and to further their own national interests. By adopting 'Western ideals' and forging their national identity around the projected cultural link with classical antiquity they bolstered their claim to 'participation in European modernity from a position of superiority' (that is through direct descent from the fathers of Western civilization). As material 'signifiers' of this glorious continuity, the nation's ruins were its best asset.[13] Early into their independent history, therefore, the Greeks initiated measures to control access to their material heritage through restrictive laws, and to nationalize their archaeological service. The Archaeological Society, founded in 1837, led by some of the most influential Greek scholars of the day and lavishly funded by Greece's only lottery, organized major excavations in Athens and Attica. Ruins which had formed part of everyday life for centuries were monumentalized and museums were established both in the capital and in the provinces to acquaint the entire populace with the glorious implications of their pre-medieval past.[14]

As a discipline so crucial to national identity and international recognition, archaeology could not be ignored by the monarchy, itself a double-edged Western import which was only accepted as a tool for winning international prestige. King Otto had set a famous example for the protection of Greece's ancient remains by ordering the restoration of the Acropolis and by rebuilding the temple of Athena Nike. His neo-classicist reinvention of Athens and his choice of German advisors both in the political and the cultural sphere, however, had still been part of the Western paternalism that his subjects rejected. In 1843, a revolt demanding an end to the neo-absolutist style of his reign and the removal of all foreigners from the administration had resulted in both a new constitution and in the dismissal of his first director of antiquities, Ludwig Ross.

Greece's ancient heritage would subsequently be managed by a succession of eminent national and nationalist scholars, including Alexandros Rizos Rangavis (1809–1862), Kyriakos Pittakis (1798–1863), Stephanos Koumanoudis (1819–1898) and Panagiotis Kavvadias (1849–1928).[15] After Otto's deposition in 1862, which even his dedicated cultural activities had not been able to prevent, King George, who occupied the very same palace that his predecessor had so hastily abandoned, adopted a more low-key role in archaeology. It was his son who, by assuming the presidency of the Archaeological Society, took up the challenge again. He chose an altogether different approach, though: one that recognized both Greece's cultural autonomy and her foreign political dependence on the goodwill of the great powers. As a result, his strategy combined nationalism with internationalism.[16]

This was just the right blend for the national-yet-cosmopolitan Duke of Sparta. Constantine, the eldest son of a Danish-born king and a Russian-born queen, was destined to become Greece's first native prince—'Greek by birth, by religion, and by education', as Dimitrios Vikelas (1835–1908), a wealthy expatriate and intellectual, remarked in 1888.[17] He had received a thoroughly national education from a range of leading Greek academics to prepare him for his role. His main tutor, though, as in many royal families, was a foreigner: the Prussian philologist Otto Lüders (1844–1912), who also happened to be the first director of the German Archaeological Institute. What seems to have been an unlikely choice in the face of King George's anti-Prussian leanings can be explained by the fact that throughout the nineteenth century German scholars were leading in the fields of classical philology and archaeology, two subjects which were not only vital parts of any European elite education but especially important for the heir to the throne of the Hellenic kingdom.[18] Greek school and university curricula put a heavy emphasis on all disciplines which could instil a sense of continuity and national community in a populace which, prior to the romantic revival of the nineteenth century, had felt little connection with the heathen cultures that had formerly existed in the area.[19] Once he had been thoroughly instructed in all the subjects essential for his role as a national prince, Constantine could set to work on his two most important tasks: linking the foreign monarchy with Greece's national heritage and using Greece's symbolic capital to further her international prestige. Carefully avoiding either subservience to Western paternalism or an overly nationalist approach, he did what his dynasty (the transnational House of Glücksborg) and his country (a neutral second-rate power in the midst of imperial rivalry) could do best: organize an international congress.

Such an event had been a long-cherished wish of both the Greek Archaeological Service and the foreign schools in Athens. A royal decree from 1901 got the ball rolling by establishing an organizing committee whose executive members included the minister of public instruction, the director of antiquities and the rector of the National University of Athens. It would henceforth regularly meet in the palace of its president, the Duke of Sparta. Constantine, who was primarily a military man, left all content-related matters to the experts; but he proved a capable organizer and gave some valuable input regarding contacting and accommodating the international guests.[20] Over a period of four years, a sizeable programme was put together and the invitations ‘issued at state level’ met with such enthusiastic response that the congress turned out to be ‘an important diplomatic event’.[21]

The layered diplomatic ramifications of this venture were revealingly addressed in Crown Prince Constantine’s opening speech. On the one hand, he seized upon the soft spot of the representatives of the civilized world—their neo-classicist ‘admiration for the glory and beauty of ancient Greece’—to remind them of the achievements of the modern Greeks as the worthy ‘sons and heirs of the ancient Hellenes’.[22] This message was underscored by the fitting surroundings of the welcoming ceremony and by the supporting programme, which had both been carefully chosen to advertise the nation’s material and scholarly progress to the world. By scheduling the congress for March 1905, the organizers had been able to stage the inaugural ceremony using one of their best-loved and most charismatic archaeological brands, the Parthenon, which had just been partly restored in a major project carried out by the Greek Archaeological Service (1898–1902); a series of well-planned additional excursions led the international visitors to all the other major classical sites excavated in Greece and beyond in the past decades (from Mycenae to Delphi, Cnossos to Cos, Pergamum to Troy).[23]

The guests could thus witness with their own eyes what Constantine proudly stressed in his speech: that Greece, within the limits of her resources, had accomplished the noble task of ‘conserving and saving, discovering and excavating the monuments of [her] national past’ and had thereby become an important ‘vestibule of classical studies’.[24] The national dimension of the congress was emphasized by the choice of the date for the opening ceremony: 25 March was Independence Day in Greece, a joyful holiday linking the event with the projected ‘re-birth’ of the Greek nation 84 years earlier. On the other hand, the crown prince sent out a message which was meant to transcend the pettiness of nationalist archaeological competition, inviting everyone to join Greece in her project of ‘study[ing] the monuments left to us by the ancient world’. As he remarked, the heritage of antiquity was a ‘common treasure for all the civilized peoples’.[25] So far, Greek archaeology, though attracting researchers from all over Europe, had been ‘distinctly divided’, with each foreign school working jealously for itself and no joint excavations taking place.

Now, the International Congress, by bringing together the competing imperial powers and the 'colonized' Greeks, marked a step towards a growing internationalism in science.[26] As Constantine put it, it was meant to celebrate and enhance the 'cordial collaboration between the nations' in the service of archaeological progress.[27]

While access to the congress was limited to archaeologists and invited guests, the newspaper-devouring Athenians could follow its reverberations in the press. Here, national pride and Greece's international image were at the forefront. The literary magazine *Estia*, for example, published a serial report on 'Archaeological excavations in Greece, 1834–1905', proudly taking stock of the country's monuments and clearly distinguishing between domestic and local excavations; and *Asty*, claiming greater public involvement, commented that the foreign guests had come not only to study 'antiquities' but 'also contemporary Greece'.[28] Widely honoured at the time, Constantine's contribution to the success of the congress has been largely forgotten.[29] His organizational skills, however, have been recognized in relation with another, even more momentous international event: the Olympic Games.

The Modern Olympic Games in Athens, 25 March–3 April 1896 and 9–19 April 1906

Competitive sport and mega sports events such as the Football World Cup or the Olympics have developed an immense soft power potential in the course of the twentieth century—a resource, which, as the recent FIFA corruption scandal shows, is worth considerable amounts of money to some states.[30] The worldwide publicity and commercialization taken for granted today would have been inconceivable in 1894, when Greece, a politically unstable Balkan state which was striving to modernize and had just gone bankrupt in the process, accepted the invitation of the International Olympic Congress to host the first modern games.[31] Opponents of the scheme, including the Western-style statesman and reformer Charilaos Trikoupis, did not regard the country's symbolic capital as sufficient to pay for the extravagance; nor was there a modern sporting culture to build on in a nation which lacked both a landed aristocracy and a domestic commercial bourgeoisie.[32]

A few men, though, chief among them Crown Prince Constantine and Dimitrios Vikelas, a Paris-based intellectual from the Greek diaspora, who was about to become the first president of the International Olympic

Committee, sensed enough of an advantage to seize the opportunity. In the eyes of the historian David Young, they had even arranged a 'tentative agreement' with Baron Pierre de Coubertin, the committee's founder, long before the congress cast its vote.[33] By jumping on the bandwagon of the athletic movement and providing Coubertin with an attractive historic setting for what was in fact a very modern and obscure invention, they were pursuing an agenda not unlike that of the archaeological congress. Domestically, the national project was meant to strengthen patriotic feelings and cohesion among Greek citizens by invoking the 'Olympic spirit'—a malleable force which both the national team and the host nation at large were meant to embody.[34] Vikelas, a patriotic observer from abroad, was hoping for a break from the party political strife which had ripped through and crippled his home country for decades. Meanwhile, Constantine, aimed to topple the antiroyalist modernizer Trikoupis, raise morale after the bankruptcy and rally the nation behind the crown.[35]

Externally, the games provided the perfect platform for 'nation branding'[36] or, as Constantine put it in a motivation speech, for 'impress[ing our guests] favourably with our country'.[37] By stressing the link with ancient Greek culture and living up to the organizational challenge of a major sports event, Greece could prove her status as a modern, Westernized country.[38] Her efforts, in Vikelas's view, would result in an improved infrastructure, increased tourism, higher economic competitiveness and, most of all, a revision of Greece's battered international reputation.[39] Eventually, the 1896 Olympics were so successful and caused such national enthusiasm that calls were made for Athens to become the permanent site of the games. Thanks to a compromise negotiated, amongst others, by the crown prince, who was eager to garner the popular enthusiasm for the monarchy, the games would indeed return once more in 1906. Though later erroneously labelled 'Interim Games', it was actually the unparalleled splendour of this second event which ultimately secured the survival of the Olympic movement after the failures of Paris 1900 and St Louis 1904.[40]

The idea of reviving the ancient Olympics had long formed part of wider Greek attempts to recapture the glory of their ancient ancestors by re-establishing their culture and institutions. In the years between 1859 and 1889, first King Otto and then King George had presided over the so-called 'Zappas Olympics', a peculiar, though not unsuccessful modern take on the concept that combined sports competitions with industrial and agricultural exhibitions and was funded by a wealthy expatriate.[41] In June 1890, Constantine had taken up the tradition and announced another Olympiad which never materialized. He was an eager supporter of the Panhellenic Gymnastic Society, though, which had been founded in 1891 by Ioannis Phokianos and was just the institution needed to start an athletics movement in Greece. It was probably his military background, German training and plans for a professional reorganization of the army which triggered the crown prince's interest in sports—a leisure pursuit often associated with the strengthening of the nation's male bodies and thus with military defence.[42] Coubertin himself had become attracted to sports as a 'compensation strategy' for the humiliating defeat of the French forces in the Franco-Prussian War of 1871. By 1890, though, the focus of his Olympic project had shifted from the competitive aspect to the 'celebration of humanity and brotherhood'. This blend provided an attractive tool both for Greece's more militaristic nationalists (the supporters of Trikoupis's great antagonist, Theodoros Deligiannis) and for those who hoped to advance Greece's expansionist interests by internationalizing her profile.[43] The crown prince occupied a middle position between the two camps.

In April 1894, Coubertin, a clever marketing strategist and snob always eager to muster the support of Europe's royalty, managed to win Constantine as an honorary member of his International Congress. Interestingly enough, he was enlisted by Charles Waldstein, the head of the American School in Athens, during a rare visit to an excavation site in Argos.[44] By getting the royal family of Greece on board, Coubertin had secured the games. For when Prime Minister Trikoupis refused to support the choice of Athens as the first venue for the Olympics on the grounds of insufficient funding, and following the subsequent resignation of the organizing committee, Constantine, convinced that his patronage would attract other supporters, took charge and made the games happen anyway. As president, he appointed a new general committee and several sub-committees, some of which were headed by his own brothers, Prince George and Prince Nicholas. The Glücksborgs always acted as a clan. Constantine publicly declared his faith in the feasibility of the plans and even won the support of the Athens trade unions by protecting one of their rallies. Most importantly, he secured the funding for the lavish restoration of the ancient Panathenaic Stadium by personally enlisting one of Greece's richest diaspora merchants, George Averoff—who, in turn, would be commemorated by a monument on the site.[45] As Coubertin later remarked, 'Almost everything that went well at Athens […] was the result of the personal efforts of the Crown Prince.'[46] In 1906, the Greek organizing committee and its president again impressed foreign observers with the way in which they used all the resources at their disposal to secure the broadest possible international participation. For example, the Duke of Sparta mobilised his dynastic relatives from the princely House of Hohenlohe and the royal House of Windsor,[47]

During the games, the royal family, both in their roles as august spectators and as officials, showed an unwavering commitment which greatly contributed to the general enthusiasm pervading the city. The audience, both inside the stadium and on the surrounding hills, consisted mainly of Greek citizens. Since the games coincided with both Easter Sunday (24 March) and, as had previously been the case with the archaeological congress, Independence Day (25 March), a joyous mood prevailed which resulted not only in national pride, but also in a dignified generosity towards the many victories won by foreign athletes. The most memorable moment of the entire event, however, occurred when Spyros Louis, a Greek farmer, came first in the newly-invented Olympic marathon. In a gesture of honest exuberance which at the same time allowed the monarchy to partake in the symbolic importance of this victory, Constantine and his brother George would run across the finish line with the exhausted athlete and then lift him onto their shoulders (Image 13.1).[48]

Throughout the 1896 and 1906 games, the royal family were remarkably present. As James E. Sullivan, the American Commissioner to the Olympics, remarked with an enthusiasm typical of American 'aristomania',[49] the way in which they personally conducted the majority of the sports contests and ensured dignified proceedings was 'simply astonishing'. Never had he seen 'such fine sportsmen' as the royal princes who displayed a remarkable 'knowledge of athletics' and an 'absolute desire to be fair'; 'many of the contestants [even…] refused to go on until one of the Princes was there to see that there was no possible chance of anything but fair play'.[50] The image of incorruptible sportsmanship associated with royalty is an understudied subject, but in 1896 and 1906 it left foreign and domestic audiences alike with a feeling that the monarchy had served Greece's best interests by not being partial to them.

'Sporting Hermes' Versus 'Son of the Eagle'

In their assessment of the first Athens Olympics, Dimitrios Vikelas, a Greek royalist, and Pierre de Coubertin, a French republican, agreed that one of the most beneficial outcomes had been a new public awareness and



Image 13.1 The Greek shepherd Spiridon 'Spyros' Louis, winner of the marathon at the Olympic Games 1896, with Crown Prince Constantine © INTERFOTO/ Alamy Stock Photo

appreciation of the many virtues of the heir to the throne. Constantine had come into a 'more immediate, frequent and pronounced contact with his fellow-citizens',[51] who in turn had learned that the crown prince was not only 'high-minded and patriotic', but also endowed with 'a happy combination of prudence and high spirit' which made him 'especially adapted to govern the Hellenes. […] The Greek people have now a better idea of the worth of their future sovereign: they have seen him at work, and have gained respect for and confidence in him.'[52] By successfully negotiating the seemingly apolitical fields of cultural engagement, a major scholarly enterprise and a mass sports event, Constantine, in the first few years of his apprenticeship, had achieved some very tangible gains. He had helped to enhance the national consciousness in a populace which had become more aware of the attraction its material and spiritual heritage exerted upon Western audiences. He had heightened Greece's international prestige, which was felt to be a prerequisite for the recognition of her territorial aspirations. And, most importantly, he had elevated the crown in the eyes of the Greek people.

The stability of the Glücksborg monarchy mainly rested on two pillars. One was its advocacy of Greece's *Megali Idea* by means of royal diplomacy. King George's pursuit of this policy had gained him some respect amongst his subjects, though it was by no means unconditional.[53] The other pillar was the nationalization of the dynasty, a process which included identification with Greek national goals, but went much beyond it. By happily deserting Athens for the pleasures of Copenhagen or Paris whenever the opportunity arose, King George had not exactly left the impression that he cared much for his home country. It was by combining both pillars—diplomacy and a national politics of memory, which inserted the dynasty into the much-stressed line of classical tradition—that the Duke of Sparta managed to meet the expectations that the Greeks had of him as a truly national prince. His organizational work introduced him to Greece's small circle of cultured elites, while his presence at major national events and the publicity that came from it popularized his persona and transplanted the monarchy into that vital modern location that is the 'centre of attention'.[54] But how much were his soft power achievements really worth?

As we know, the Greek people had a chequered relationship with their royal family. Time and time again they would pin unrealistically high hopes on their dynastic connections and public diplomacy—only to be disappointed by the actual outcomes.[55] For, by the end of the nineteenth century, royal diplomacy had outlived itself. 'Chance acquisitions without effort' were no longer possible, and goodwill alone did not redraw the boundaries across the complicated Balkan powder keg.[56] The monarchy's popularity would fluctuate with the ups and downs of joyful anticipation and frustrated ambition.[57] Thus, the exuberance of 1896 translated into the martial spirit of 1897, when Greece started an ill-fated military campaign against the Ottoman forces over the island of Crete. Within months, Constantine's popularity plummeted, as the unlucky commander-in-chief led the ill-prepared Hellenic army into a Thessalian disaster. The intervention of his cousin, the Russian Tsar, spared Greece further humiliation and established Prince George as high commissioner of the autonomous Cretan state.

In March 1905, though, the archaeological congress was overshadowed by news of the Theriso revolt, an armed insurgency instigated by the Cretan Eleftherios Venizelos (1864–1936) against Prince George's 'unfortunate regime', which had been unable to achieve its main task of transferring complete authority to Greece.[58] One year later, Athens was alive with optimism once more, since the presence of King Edward VII, King George's brother-in-law, at the opening of the second Olympics in Athens was read as a sign of British support for a long-looked-for union with Crete. All that was actually negotiated behind the stage, however, was an exit strategy for Prince George—and thus for the British peacekeeping forces—from an untenable situation. As a newspaper remarked, the 'Athenian flowers' of the games were soon 'turned into clubs against Crete and Hellenism'.[59]

Any subsequent attempts to recreate the public enthusiasm and international acclaim of 1896 or 1906 by continuing the tradition of intercalated Olympic Games failed. In 1910, they were thwarted by the political turmoil in the wake of the Goudi coup. This military revolt temporarily forced the royal princes to resign from their army offices and brought the antiroyalist Venizelos to power. In 1914, the recent end of the Balkan Wars made any festivities impossible.[60]

Read in this light, the assertions from the newspaper *Asty* that the 'work of a commander in war [...] is not superior to the work of the peacemaker' obtain a new meaning. '[B]eautiful works of peace' were a valid interim solution for a king in waiting '[u]p to the time when [he] will triumph as a Greek commander in war'.[61] But in the political discourse of young and ambitious Balkan nations such as Greece, soft power assertions could not compete with the hard facts of martial prowess and military victory, the conventional sources of monarchical legitimacy.[62]

Ultimately, Constantine, a deeply controversial figure with a split legacy, would win his place among Greek heroes not as a 'sporting Hermes', but as the victorious leader of the armed forces in the First and Second Balkan Wars (1912–1913). As a song still popular amongst Greek royalists today would have it, he became 'the son of the eagle'.[63] This imagery referred to the 'king of the skies' as an icon of power and strength, to Zeus, the father of the Olympian Gods who was associated with it, but most of all to the double-headed eagle which had served as an emblem of the last Byzantine imperial dynasty. As such, it was a much more fitting symbol for the expansionist aspirations of the modern Greeks and for the military pretensions of their heir to the throne than any other god of the Greek city-states could ever be.

As the Hellenic state gradually consolidated, the Byzantine Empire - with its centralized monarchy, Christian faith and territorial extensions - became increasingly crucial to its self-conception and national ideology. Byzantine history was rediscovered as the missing link between ancient and modern Greece, and Byzantine archaeology, an 'indigenous' counterpart to the cultural imperialism of the West, was utilized to establish the Greeks as the rightful successors of the East Roman Emperors.[64] While Constantine's self-representation as a safeguard of Greece's ancient heritage appealed to a global audience steeped in the classical tradition and to those sections of society which hoped to be able to exploit Western admiration, his popularity within Greek society at large rested on an equally important second myth. In Greek popular culture, he was generally seen as the successor to the last emperor of the Palaeologus dynasty, Constantine XI, who died in 1453. By taking matters into his own hands and successfully leading the reformed Greek forces into the bloody turmoil of the Balkan Wars, the crown prince came close to fulfilling a legend which had sustained his public image throughout the ups and downs of his heirship: that the Byzantine Empire would be resurrected and the city of Constantinople and the Hagia Sophia brought back into the Greek fold when a king named Constantine and a queen named Sophia would ascend the Hellenic throne.[65] This was his moment of unmitigated success.

Notes

1. 'The spirit of the Olympic Games', *Asty*, April 1906, as cited and translated by James E. Sullivan (1906), The Olympic Games at Athens 1906, New York.
2. Greece was generally referred to as a 'crowned democracy' (βασιλευομένη δημοκρατία). Gunnar Hering (1992), *Die Politischen Parteien in Griechenland, 1821–1936*, vol. 1, Munich, 381.
3. George Markopoulos (1968), 'King George I and the expansion of Greece', *Balkan Studies* 9, 21–40.
4. Dimitrios Vikelas, 'Vingt-cinq années de règne constitutionnel en Grèce', *La Nouvelle Revue* 1889, 492–519; Hering (1992), 434–78; for discussions of George's public perception cf. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin, Griechenland 50 Nr. 1, R7472–7484. Cf. Edda-Binder Iijima and Ekkehard Kraft (2009), 'Making of States. Constitutional Monarchies in the Balkans', in: Wim van Meurs and Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (eds), *Ottomans into Europeans. State and Institution-Building in South-Eastern Europe*, London, 1–29.
5. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (2004), *Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York, 5–7; Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (eds)

(2009), *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, New York and London, 3–6.

6. Historical Archive of the Archaeological Service, 'The First International Congress of Archaeology', http://nam.culture.gr/portal/page/portal/deam/virtual_exhibitions/HAAS/Congress1905, accessed 10 September 2015.
7. Stephen L. Dyson (2006), *In Pursuit of Ancient Pasts. A History of Classical Archaeology in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, New Haven, CT, and London, 65, 131–32.
8. Yannis Hamilakis (2007), *The Nation and its Ruins. Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece*, Oxford and New York, 77–82.
9. Margarita Díaz-Andreu García (2007), *A World History of Nineteenth-Century Archaeology. Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Past*, Oxford, 99–128; Dimitris Plantzos (2014), 'Dead archaeologists, buried gods. Archaeology as an agent of modernity in Greece', in: Dimitris Tziovas (ed.), *Re-Imagining the Past. Antiquity and Modern Greek Culture*, Oxford, 147–64, 148–50.
10. Dyson (2006), 115–26; Diaz-Andreu (2007), 107–9.
11. Diaz-Andreu (2007), 102–3, 127–29.
12. Plantzos (2014), 148–50; cf. Diaz-Andreu (2007), 127–30.
13. Hamilakis (2007), 77–78. Cf. Dyson (2006), 72; Diaz-Andreu (2007), 129–30.
14. Roland and Francois Etienne (1992), *The Search for Ancient Greece*, New York, 108–9; Hamilakis (2007), 82–6; Dyson, 123.
15. Etienne (1992), 91–93; Dyson (2006), 73.
16. Cf. for nationalism and internationalism in the Olympic Games: Alexander Kitroeff (2004), *Wrestling with the Ancients: Modern Greek Identity and the Olympics*, New York, 27.
17. Vikelas (1889), 505.
18. Dyson (2006), 82–87. For a discussion of Constantine's education cf. Miriam Schneider (2015), 'The Prussian Duke of Sparta', http://heirstothethrone-project.net/?page_id=1467, accessed 10 September 2015.
19. Ted Zervas (2012), *The Making of a Modern Greek Identity. Education, Nationalism and the Teaching of a Greek National Past*, New York.
20. Anon. (1905), *Comptes rendus du Congrès international d'archéologie, 1re session, Athènes 1905*, Athens, 56–66.

21. 'The First International Congress of Archaeology': http://nam.culture.gr/portal/page/portal/deam/virtual_exhibitions/HAAS/Congress1905 (cf. note 5).
22. Speech given by Crown Prince Constantine on 25 March 1905, as cited in: *Comptes rendus* (1905), 88.
23. *Comptes rendus* (1905), 58 and 69; Acropolis restoration service, 'Restoration', http://www.ysma.gr/en/restoration, accessed 10 September 2015.
24. *Comptes rendus* (1905), 88–89.
25. *Comptes rendus* (1905), 88–89.
26. Etienne (1992), 114; Dyson (2006), 131–2.
27. *Comptes rendus* (1905), 88–89.
28. 'Archaeological excavations in Greece, 1834–1905', *Estia*, 24–27 March 1905; 'Foreign archaeological excavations', *Estia*, 28–30 March; 'To those responsible for the Archaeological Congress', *Asty*, 20 March 1905.
29. For example 'The opening of the congress', *Asty*, 26 March 1905.
30. Jonathan Grix and Barrie Houlihan (2014), 'Sports mega events as part of a nation's soft power strategy', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 16/4, 572–96, 572–74.
31. Kitroeff (2004), 33.
32. David C. Young (1996), *The Modern Olympics. A Struggle for Revival*, Baltimore, MD, 109–11; Michael Llewellyn-Smith (2004), *Olympics in Athens 1896. The Invention of the Modern Olympic Games*, London, 5; Kitroeff (2004), 6–12.
33. Young (1996), 98–100.
34. Cf. Kristine Toohey and Anthony J. Veal (2007), *The Olympic Games. A Social Science Perspective*, Wallingford and Cambridge, MA, 37; Elena Yalouri, 'Possessing antiquity: Reconnecting to the Greek past in the present', in: Tziovas (2014), 174; Grix and Houlihan (2004), 574, 576.
35. Andreas Morbach (1998), *Dimítrios Vikelas, patriotischer Literat und Kosmopolit. Leben und Wirken des ersten Präsidenten des Internationalen Olympischen Komitees*, Würzburg, 11; Kitroeff (2004), 32–37.
36. Grix and Houlihan (2004), 578.
37. Speech given before the Greek Organizing Committee, 13 January 1895, as cited in: Pierre de Coubertin, Timoleon J. Philemon et al. (eds.) (1897), *The Olympic Games BC 776–AD 1896*, Athens, 14–15.
38. Llewellyn-Smith (2004), 3; Kitroeff (2004), 3.

39. Morbach (1998), 11.
40. Karl Lennartz (2002), 'The Second International Olympic Games in Athens 1906', *Journal of Olympic History* 10, 10–27; cf. Llewellyn-Smith (2004), 199–200; Young (1996), 160–62; Kitroeff (2004), 53–54.
41. Young (1996), 1–20, 42–45.
42. Young (1996), 64–67; Llewellyn-Smith (2004), 5.
43. Kitroeff (2004), 28–29, 32–35.
44. Young (1996), 89–98.
45. Llewellyn-Smith (2004), 5, 116; Young (1996), 108–28; Kitroeff (2004), 36.
46. Pierre de Coubertin as cited in Norbert Müller (ed.) (2000), *Olympism: Selected Writings*, Lausanne, 343.
47. Kitroeff (2004), 62–64; Karl Lennartz (2013), 'Fürst Philipp Ernst zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, erster deutscher NOK-Präsident', in: Alma Hannig (ed.), *Die Familie Hohenlohe. Eine europäische Dynastie im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Cologne, 133–56.
48. Young (1996), 139–60; Kitroeff (2004), 47–8.
49. Rudy Koshar (2000), *German Travel Cultures*, Oxford and New York, 52–54.
50. Sullivan (1906), 16–21.
51. Speech given by Dimitrios Vikelas before the Association des Etudiants Grecs de Paris, 5 April 1895, as cited in Morbach (1998), 343–62 (my translation).
52. Pierre de Coubertin (1897), 'The Olympic Games of 1896', *The Century Illustrated Monthly Magazine* 53/31, 39–53, 50–53.
53. Amédée Britsch (1910), *La jeune Athenes. Une démocratie en Orient*, Paris, 201–07; Gaston Deschamps (1897), La Grece d'aujourdhui, Paris, 56–60.
54. Cf. Kristina Widestedt (2009), 'Pressing the centre of attention. Three royal weddings and a media myth', in: Mats Jörnsson and Patrik Lundell (eds), *Media and Monarchy in Sweden*, Göteborg, 47–58.
55. For another example of this relationship cf. Schneider (2015).
56. Hering (1992), 495.
57. Cf. William Miller (1898), *Travels and Politics in the East*, New York, 279–80.
58. See for example: 'Shedding full light on Cretan events', *Akropolis*, 19 March 1905; Robert Holland and Diana Markides (2006), *The British*

and the Hellenes. Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1850–1960, New York, 108, 117.

59. Kitroeff (2004), 68; Holland and Markides (2006), 267.
60. Lennartz (2002), 10–27.
61. *Asty* 1906 (cf. note 1).
62. Basil Gounaris (2009), 'Model nation and caricature state. Competing Greek perspectives on the Balkans and Hellas, 1797–1896', in: Roderick Beaton and David Ricks (eds), *The Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past*, London and New York, 137–50, 142.
63. 'The son of the eagle marches ahead/and in his glory he leads us, he leads us/with a bare blade. The eagle, the eagle./Where he treads the earth quakes.//The troops await their orders,/because Constantine leads them./And our army becomes a lion again when the enemy appears.'
64. Hamilakis (2004), 109, 114–18; Diaz-Andreu (2007), 106.
65. Walter Christmas (1914), *King George of Greece*, London, 132.

CHAPTER 14

The King as Father, Orangism and the Uses of a Hero: King William I of the Netherlands and the Prince of Orange, 1815–1840

Jeroen Koch

A Double Problem

Part of dynastic rule is the politics of representation, and representation requires a level of control of public memory. That both memory and representation are cultural constructions is nowadays a commonplace. We analyse the composite parts of public memory, and read its forced symbolism.[1] The politics of representation and memory can be regarded as instruments of 'soft power', as defined by Joseph Nye: the kind of power that attracts and co-opts as a means of persuasion or of shaping the

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This chapter is based on the new biographies of the three nineteenth-century Dutch Orange kings: Jeroen Koch (2013), *Koning Willem I. 1772–1843*, Amsterdam; Jeroen van Zanten (2013), *Koning Willem II. 1792–1849*, Amsterdam; Dik van der Meulen (2013), *Koning Willem III. 1817–1890*, Amsterdam.

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preferences of others through appeal—but without resorting to coercion or the use of money.[2] Although Nye originally developed the concept for the analysis of foreign policy, soft power can also be found in the way governments, as systems of rule, seek to strengthen their legitimacy. The concept of soft power can fruitfully be applied to the way the House of Orange attempted to bolster their legitimacy after being installed as the Royal House in the United Kingdom of the Netherlands after the French Revolution and the Napoleonic rule. Contemporaries, loyal politicians assisted by the court, consciously created a myth around the Orange family. They actively used the instruments of soft power to create an emotional bond between the ruler and the ruled. The United Kingdom of the Netherlands, a territory combining today's Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, was very much a *new* state, with the king (who, as the ruler of Luxembourg, bore the title of grand duke) himself among its new constructions. After all, in spite of their ambitions to act as monarchs, the Orange princes had been stadtholders before the revolution, that is *servants* of the Dutch United Provinces, or more exactly: servants separately of each of the seven provinces.[3]

Two problems are of interest to us here. The first concerns the difficulties of fusing the Northern and the Southern provinces into one kingdom with one national myth spun around the one royal family. The name for the ideology generated to bind dynasty and nation together is 'Orangism'. This turned out to be a rather vague concept covering a variety of feelings and notions that originated from among certain elites, various religious groups and social classes—for example, the aristocracy, various Protestant groups and sections of the urban working classes.[4] A further problem consisted in the poor relationship between King William I and the royal heir, Prince William of Orange, who would become King William II in 1840. My object here is to show how dynastic values and national collective identity interlinked and were put to use as a means of soft power.

The Return of the Orange Family?

'Orange forever! Holland is free again.' These were the first words of the famous proclamation of 17 November 1813, which announced the return, after an absence lasting almost 20 years, of William Frederick, Prince of Orange, to the Northern Netherlands. A pro-Orange political elite framed the prince coming back as a return to normality:

Trade will flourish again.
Political quarrels belong to the past,
All sorrow is forgotten
And forgiven.
[…]
The nation gets a cheerful day
Paid for by the community.
Without looting or abuse.
Everyone thanks GOD.
The old days return.
Orange forever![5]

On the very evening in December 1813 when William was proclaimed sovereign prince, he gave a speech. Uttering words which the Amsterdam politician Joan Melchior Kemper, a professor of law at Leyden University, had drafted for him, William declared that he was 'given back to his People, whom he had never stopped loving, as a father returning to his family'.[6] The prince had to be careful. After 20 years of absence he hardly knew whom he could trust. Except for a few old loyal magistrates he found himself surrounded by strangers, among them Kemper.

'A father returning to his family'; this made some sense if one was prepared to forget the civil strife of the 1780s, when Dutch revolutionaries, who called themselves Patriots (Kemper had been one of them), had driven his supposedly tyrannical father William V, the last stadtholder of the republic, from The Hague. With references being made to his ancestors from William the Silent onwards, Orangists, former Patriots and former Dutch officials of the French government, who together improvised a transitional government in the Northern Netherlands, now presented the returned dynastic leader as the defender of freedom—the freedom of the nation, of Protestantism, of religious tolerance, or of tolerance in general. The Dutch started numbering their leaders anew. After the stadtholders William I (the Silent), Maurice, Frederick Henry, William II, William III (William and Mary), William IV and William V, now, suggesting continuity *and* a new beginning at the same time, the sovereign prince was called William I. 'No it is not William VI whom the people asked to return', a paper wrote in December 1813, 'it is William I'.[7] This was a conscious act of framing, a politics of remembering as well as of forgetting. It was above all the years between 1785 and 1787 that were to be forgotten: the time when the Patriots, who had cherished the idea of the sovereignty of the people, were beaten by Prussian troops who had been invited by William's mother, Wilhelmina of Prussia, to repress the revolution. Indeed, William I was so tainted by the memory of the 'minor civil war' of the 1780s that some Dutch and British politicians argued in 1813 that it would be better to make his eldest son the new sovereign of the Netherlands instead of him.[8]

This politics of connecting the Orange forefathers with the freedom and the fatherland, as well as of framing the king as the *returning* father of the nation only made sense in the Northern provinces. There one could at least call it a return. In the Southern provinces, in Belgium, the former Austrian Netherlands, William I initially seemed to be little more than the next foreign ruler after the Austrians, the French revolutionaries and Napoleon. Yet, from the summer of 1815 onwards, the king also was presented as the father of the nation in the South. The word 'returned' was scrupulously avoided, though William I, who was keen to elaborate on the family metaphor and called all his subjects 'his children', immediately made a mistake by referring to the inhabitants of the Southern provinces as his 'adopted children'. When problems arose in the South—and they came quickly as the Roman Catholic Church protested against the constitutional equality of the Protestant Church, and liberals railed against the curbing of the press and the obligation for French-speaking lawyers to use Dutch—he even called them his 'refractory' or 'restive' children. During the last years of his rule, when Belgium was already independent, and a Dutch opposition grew impatient with his authoritarian style of rule, William complained that he only had 'naughty children'.[9]

Proclaiming that the nation was like a family under the guidance of the king-father was of course an exercise in very old symbolism, dating back to ancient history. Since then all kinds of new meanings had been added, though even in these early decades of the nineteenth century, the royal family came to be seen as the upholder of family values—both socially and culturally.[10] The symbolism belonged to the arsenal of soft politics used by any ruling dynasty. Yet after 1813 this family symbolism around the king also had a sharper edge. Politically, the paternalistic hierarchy was meant to point to an alternative to the egalitarian vision of the nation, to the dangerous idea—propagated by American and French revolutionaries—that the nation consisted of free and equal citizens. Suggesting cohesion, concern and warmth, the metaphor of the father and his children sanctioned, above all, 'natural' authority: the strong and self-evident leadership by the king. Indeed, in these post-Napoleonic years the cosy family symbolism around the king, the dynasty and the nation was more politics than ever and an attempt both to gain legitimacy as well as ascendancy, and to forge a national collective identity.[11] Ideally, this national identity had to be a Dutch-cum-Belgian identity. As an act of linguistic politics, William I's government used the Dutch word *Nederlanders* (the Dutch) and the French word *Belges* (the Belgians) as equivalents. On the day of his inauguration in Brussels on 21 September 1815 the words '*de Monarchie der Nederlanden*' (the Monarchy of the Netherlands) that the king used in his official address to the members of parliament was translated in French as '*la Monarchie des Belges*'.[12]

The Problem of Legitimacy: Some Examples of Soft Power Politics

William I clearly needed to bolster the legitimacy of his rule, the basis of which was unclear. Was the new United Kingdom of the Netherlands just a creation of the Great Powers, of Great Britain in particular? The king's rule was explicitly not rooted in the will of the people; this idea, the corollary of the nation as a body of free and equal citizens, had been rejected as too revolutionary. Was William's royal position legitimized by the constitution? If the political elite might have thought so, then the king denied that this was the case. In 1814, William I told his son that the constitution was just 'a plaything for the masses, an illusion for their liberty, which I can use according to the circumstances'. Somewhat later he concluded: 'I also exist without the constitution, parliament only exists by grace of it.'[13] When talking to ministers and other state officials the king frequently liked to invoke a phrase from Article 73 of the constitution of 1815: 'Only the King decides.'[14]

Referring to Burgundy, to the Low Countries in the age of the sixteenth-century Habsburg emperor Charles V, an age before the Dutch revolt and the reformation, was one way in which William I and his counsellors tried to solve the problem of legitimacy. On the day William I proclaimed himself king, 16 March 1815—the step was triggered by Napoleon's return from Elba—he said of the Southern provinces:

> It is not just a piece of land that is added to the fatherland. No, a whole nation joins us, a nation that by its manners and morals, by its language and historical memories already belonged to us, as brothers and sisters. [...] Uniting and amalgamating all the XVII Dutch provinces in one single State, more than once was wished for—during the reign of Charles V, in the times of Father William [William the Silent], and later in the ideas of enlightened and patriotic leaders.[15]

On the day of his inauguration in Brussels on 21 September 1815 he again referred to Charles V and William the Silent, emphasizing the fact that his famous ancestor had been educated at the court of the Habsburg emperor, also in Brussels.

Historical examples were also used in religious politics, which were always a delicate issue in the kingdom. Freedom of religion and religious tolerance was the message, something the North claimed to have been used to since the end of the sixteenth century, but which was new to the rather traditional Roman Catholic South. To drive home the message of religious freedom under Orange rule, in 1820, at the Industrial Exhibition in Ghent, a painting by Ignatius van Bree was presented. It showed William the Silent defending Roman Catholics during the Calvinist reign of terror in Ghent in the year 1578. Historical propaganda around the beneficent rule of the House of Orange throughout the ages was fused with displaying the products of industrial politics, which as an important part of a general welfare politics was the *real* backbone of the rule of William I, the king who tried to bring prosperity to the nation.[16]

A successful economic policy did a lot for winning the trust and affection of subjects new and old, but it can hardly be called soft power. To be sure, several instruments of soft power were used. On Wednesdays King William I held his public audiences at the royal palace, and they could last for hours. All the subjects who called at the palace gate were received and after a little chat with the king, were given some money. The reason for the royal gift and the amount granted would be meticulously recorded in large cashbooks.[17] Foreign visitors were impressed and amazed. One of them, the French man of letters Xavier Marmier, who in the late 1830s joined the queue before the king's palace in The Hague, reported:

> I had the opportunity to study the rare scene of subjects approaching their king in a time when revolutionaries were a real menace to the crowned heads of state, and when all over Europe kings had to be protected by armed guards. On the table there already lay three large sheets of paper, on it the names of the visitors of the day. People of different age and rank surrounded me. University professors from Leyden defending the interests of their Alma Mater to the Sovereign, a timid student presenting his thesis to the King, a poor widow begging for some money; next to the decorated field officer in a beautiful uniform with epaulettes and medals one saw a naval cadet, wearing a simple blue dress-coat, a small kepi on his head; a rich merchant, whose name was good for millions of Guilders at the Amsterdam stock exchange, sat next to an applicant asking for a humble job. In the palace on this day

> all were equal, and privileges of birth and class were suspended. The workingman could precede the nobleman, the pupil his master, the soldier the officer. In an adjacent drawing-room there stood the King, leaning against a console-table, and friendly greeting everyone who came before him, listening to their requests and complaints, and sending them away with a little nod of his head. I could see the faces of humble folks, entering the room, their heads down, who suddenly were enlivened by a salutary hope, and leaving with the certainty the King had listened to them.[18]

Such public audiences were part of an old monarchical tradition, reaching back to medieval times. Another old practice that was used to strengthen the bonds between king, dynasty and nation was visiting the country. This also was an instrument of soft power. The court in the United Kingdom of the Netherlands changed its location between North and South from year to year, which also meant that the royal family would move from The Hague to Brussels or vice versa. Moreover, the king visited a number of provinces every year. The itineraries were meticulously prepared. Beginning his day's work at 5 or 6 o'clock in the morning, and seconded by one of his sons or his daughter, the king would inspect factories, harbours and canals, was welcomed by city councils, magistrates, clergymen and priests, received honours from the local regiment, and was invited to meet delegates of societies of all kind—waving to his subjects all along the way, while the local brass-band played the national anthem. Audiences would also be granted during these visits. Now the king did not just receive everyone, though, as was his practice on normal Wednesdays; these audiences were used to inform and to be informed by governors, mayors and chief constables.

The longest royal journey through the country took place in May and June 1829.[19] In response to the growing unrest in the Southern provinces the king decided to take a look for himself. The government was petitioned, as was the constitutional right of the citizens, with article 161 of the constitution of 1815 granting them the freedom to petition the authorities, including the king. There were protests against the heavy taxation of food, against the state-regulated education of Roman Catholic priests and against the curbing of the press. It drove southern Catholics and liberals into each other's arms and contributed to a climate of rebellion that would eventually end in the Belgian revolution of 1830–1831. The aim of the king's visit was, naturally, to appease his subjects. Yet, in the gathering political storm the limits of this kind of soft power politics rapidly became only too evident. Every word the king used was carefully scrutinized. And when, after six weeks travelling, William concluded in Liege that he only had met satisfied, obedient and hardworking subjects, that the grievances were not real and that the protests against his rule were the work of a tiny minority, of some individuals behaving badly, the inhabitants of the Southern provinces reacted with even more protest.[20]

Orangism, North and South

Of particular interest here is the sentiment called *Orangism*, a concept which groups together all kinds of loyalty, however vague, that were extended to the Orange dynasty. In Dutch historiography one frequently stumbles over the idea that monarchism in the Netherlands is essentially Orangism, thereby creating a contrast between this sentiment and royalism. Referring to its golden age, to the Dutch Republic of the seventeenth century, it suggests that Dutch society today constitutes a ‘crowned republic’ with the Orange monarch as the head of state. Orangism is behind the national feast on the birthday of the king or the queen, it fuels the periodic hysteria around the national football team, it drives the excessive interest in anything the members of the royal family do or do not do. Since the end of the nineteenth century, much of this modern Orangist activity has stemmed from ordinary inhabitants, from committees in villages, towns and city quarters.[21] In the republic, before 1795, it was divided into an orthodox Calvinist Orangism, an aristocratic Orangism and a popular Orangism, all of which were quite different from each other. After 1800, in the Northern Netherlands a new kind of Orangism slowly came into being as part of a spirit of reconciliation and fostered by the circumstance that the members of the dynasty were in exile; all kinds of beautiful feelings could harmlessly be projected onto them, an advantage that ended the moment they returned.[22]

The Orangism of the period of William I’s reign, after his return in November 1813, had its own peculiarities. Cultivating feelings of loyalty towards the ruling dynasty by the subjects became a task of the state. More than ever before or after, Orangism was government policy. Etchings of the return of the Orange prince in the Netherlands, of his inauguration in Amsterdam and Brussels and of the members of the royal family were produced in large quantities and spread by the central state institutions, by the court, the government, the municipalities and by churches and universities. For the first time Dutch coins showed the portrait of the dynastic leader. Yet, the best example of the state sponsored Orangism of this period can be found in the newly organized Netherlands Reformed Church, which by January 1816 grouped together all the different Calvinist churches in the Netherlands under the authority of the king, who himself became the head of the church organization. William I understood the church to be an instrument of state power, not unlike the enlightened monarchs of the eighteenth century or Napoleon. Uniting God, Orange and fatherland, one of the main tasks of the protestant clergy became cultivating the 'Love for King and Country'. An attempt was thus made to generate soft power within the context of very real institutional hard power.[23]

New forms of Orangism from below suddenly sprang into life as a result of the Belgian revolution of 1830. Indeed, here we find an example of early nationalism in the Northern Netherlands. The inhabitants grouped together as a nation and united as one people around the Orange dynasty, Protestantism and a sense of continuity from the old republican days to the present—all invoked in opposition to the seditious Catholic and liberal Belgians, 'Jesuits and Jacobins'. Only in reaction to this Dutch nationalist reflex did a Belgian nationalism spread across the Southern provinces which transformed an opposition that initially had only asked for their constitutional liberties to be respected. '*Roi, consacre nos droits*' they sang in the first version of '*La Brabaçonne*', the Belgian national anthem, the text of which radicalized as the rebellion was becoming a full-scale revolution.[24]

Even more remarkable was the fact that the Belgian revolution also gave birth to a Belgian Orangism that was opposed to the new Belgian state. In contrast to the Orangism of the North that could and did refer to the stadtholderian past and the monarchical present and was quite satisfied with the dismantling of the Dutch United Kingdom, this Southern Orangism, a product of the rule of William I and of expectations of the coming rule of his son, the Prince of Orange, propagated the prolongation and the restoration of the larger united kingdom. Although the expelled king of the Netherlands supported this Belgian Orangism with ample funds, it was a movement from below.[25] It was strong both in the Dutch- and the French-speaking parts of the new Belgian state, and among its followers were industrial entrepreneurs, loyal army officers, Catholic priests, and large parts of the population in cities like Ghent and Antwerp, as well as members of the former ruling elite under William I. These Belgian Orangists were partisans of a lost cause, the United Kingdom of the Netherlands being one of the many sinking ships of history.[26] After the death of the Dutch king William II in 1849, the movement dwindled rapidly.

Waterloo and the Royal Heir

In his attempt to keep the South under Orange rule, William I used his sons, especially the royal heir, who was more popular in the Southern provinces than the king himself. There were several reasons for why the Prince of Orange was held in such high esteem in the South. One was the splendour of his court, which contrasted markedly with the sobriety his father displayed. More important was his vast military clientele. After 1814, the Prince of Orange successfully convinced his father to rehabilitate the officers from the Southern provinces who had served in the armies of Napoleon, thereby creating strong personal bonds of loyalty. Last but not least, there were the differences between father and son in political outlook. The Prince of Orange had sympathy for the liberals and for liberalism and showed a lot of understanding for the Roman Catholics. In the North the Prince of Orange was even suspected of crypto-Catholicism. The young William disliked the Northern Netherlands with its cold and damp climate and its praise of bourgeois mediocrity. The North, above all, was the land he had to flee as a little boy.[27]

In contrast to his father, the prince knew how to act under pressure, and when on 24 August 1830, the king's birthday, the rebellion started in the South, young Prince William was immediately sent to Brussels to negotiate. Unfortunately, his desperate father simultaneously gave Prince Frederick, his second son, the order to suppress the unrest with violence. Yet, after four days of fighting in the streets of Brussels during the last days of September 1830, Frederick's army withdrew without being able to obtain a victory over the rebellious population. Belgium was lost for the Orange dynasty.

Two of the most curious moments during the Belgian revolution involved the royal heir. On 1 September 1830 Alexandre Gendebien, the leader of the moderate insurgents in the South, offered the Prince of Orange a Belgian crown: 'The separation of the two countries is unavoidable', he told the prince. 'Accept the rule over Belgium as viceroy, or preferably, as king. The last option immediately will be accepted in Belgium. After the death of your father, the two parts of the country can be reunited without problems.'[28] In October, three weeks after his brother's failed military action in Brussels, the young William, in another attempt to retain the South for the Orange dynasty, placed himself at the head of the revolutionary movement, proclaiming: 'Belgians! I have studied your situation with care. I understand your predicament and recognize your independence.

I will put myself at the head of the movement that is given power by your nationality and that will lead you to a new stability.'[29] This illustrated the confusion in the country and did a lot of harm to the position of the royal heir in the Northern Netherlands. His reputation was restored in August 1831, when Prince William regained his honour by leading a short punitive expedition against the new Belgian kingdom.

In the Northern Netherlands the Prince of Orange had also been very popular for a time. That, above all, was the fruit of the Battle of Waterloo, fought on 18 June 1815. In the Netherlands the hero of Waterloo was not Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington (although King William I made the British commander-in-chief 'Prince of Waterloo' in 1815). It was not Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher or August Neidhardt von Gneisenau, the German heroes of the battle, either. Nor was it Napoleon, whom the French still seem to regard as the real victor. In the Netherlands the hero of Waterloo, *and* of Quatre-Bras two days before Waterloo, was—and is—the Prince of Orange, the former adjutant of Wellington in the Peninsular War. The legendary battle would be invoked over and over again to augment Orange rule.[30]

Waterloo had been a gift from heaven for the Dutch king. It meant a lot that Napoleon was given his *coup de grâce* on Dutch soil, *his* territory. First, for the Great Powers, the king realised, the new kingdom had proven its worth; it indeed was *le Boulevard de l'Europe*—the bulwark against renewed French aggression that the Congress of Vienna wanted it to be. Second, Waterloo, and especially the heroic role of the 22-year-old prince William, who was wounded on the battlefield, gave his father and the House of Orange the longed-for popular legitimacy, as the royal family immediately recognized. 'The complete and glorious victory of the allies, gained in the Netherlands and deciding the fate of France and all of Europe and saving the kingdom of my son from a mortal threat; and the heroic part played by my grandson it really established the Royal House and gave it firm ground', Wilhelmina of Prussia, the king's old mother, wrote a few weeks after the battle.[31]

The king and his advisors acted accordingly. Over and over again William I would use his son's fame for his state propaganda, by ordering etchings of the battle scene to be given away as presents, by leading high visitors around the very battlefield he himself had avoided in June 1815, and by encouraging battlefield tourism. He also bought a huge canvas: Jan Willem Pieneman's *Battle of Waterloo*, today the largest picture in the Amsterdam Rijksmuseum. When it was finished in 1824 it was first shown in London and Brussels.[32] In 1826, a Dutch lion, cast in iron, was placed upon an artificial hill on the battlefield. This also was a tribute to the Prince of Orange; although irreparably damaging the battlefield—much to the chagrin of Wellington—hill and lion mark the place where the prince was wounded. And every year Waterloo would be remembered: from 1816 until the Second World War, 18 June was a national holiday in the Netherlands. The remembering of the last battle against Napoleon had immediately become part of William I's royal soft power tools. Already, in August 1815, the king told the members of parliament: 'There comes a time when the Battles of Quatre-Bras and Waterloo will be regarded as two shining pillars of the new Dutch State. Fortunate the father whose sons had the honour to help to raise those pillars and sprinkle them with their blood.'[33]

The public celebrated the prince-hero in its own way. On 2 July 1815, two weeks after the Battle of Waterloo, the young William had recovered sufficiently to visit a church where to his and God's glory a *Te Deum* was sung. Shortly thereafter, during a theatre visit, the cast surprised the prince with a special song and through a hidden mechanism behind his chair a laurel-crown was placed upon his head. After the performance, the audience gave the prince a standing ovation, a practice that would often be repeated during the following years. Visiting Brussels and Waterloo in August 1815, Walter Scott was surprised by the spontaneous veneration of the prince. At every corner in Brussels a storyteller or street singer celebrated his heroic deeds. Parliament decided to give the prince three palaces: Soestdijk in the North, Tervuren in the South, and a new palace to be built in Brussels, the beautiful classicist building by the architects Charles Vander Straeten and Tieleman Franciscus Suys. It was finished in 1828, so William and Anna resided only two years in the building, which today houses the Belgian Academy Palace.[34] The veneration of the prince continued. In 1831, after the punitive action against Belgium, the Dutch poet Willem Hendrik Warnsinck compared the Prince of Orange with his martial *stadholderian* ancestors:

> Is it Maurice or Frederick Henry,
> Or is it the third William,
> Rising from the dust?
> No! It is the Hero of Waterloo,
> The Crown Prince, the hope of the Dutch,
> He avenges us; he saves our honour,
> And gives us peace at heart.[35]

Dynastic Claustrophobia

After 1815, the king consistently sought to cash-in on his eldest son's fame as hero of Waterloo. For the royal heir, being used by his father was nothing new, on the contrary. From 1807 onwards, young William had been the only hope left for the Orange dynasty. By that year, there was nothing left to inherit, except for a few small estates in Poland. For reasons too complicated to summarize here the Orange family had lost everything: their position as hereditary stadtholders of the Dutch Republic, their position in Nassau, where they had been princes in the Holy Roman Empire, and their positions in Fulda, Dortmund, Corvey and Weingarten, which together were the reparations the family had been given after the Peace of Amiens of 1802. The only means for the Orange dynasty to regain a position *somewhere* in Europe was to let the young William marry someone poised to inherit a throne. Of the three possibilities of 'dynastic politics'—that is to reign, to fight and to marry—by 1807 only the last option remained.

The Orange dynasty's marriage politics now aimed at Charlotte, Princess of Wales. She was to become the spouse of the young prince William; it was a conscious effort to repeat the most successful alliance by marriage the *stadtholderian* family had ever contracted: that of William III and Mary II. In December 1813 William and Charlotte were engaged, but the plans for their marriage collapsed under an avalanche of difficulties, public and private: two heirs to two thrones, the power play between parliament and the prince regent, a clash between Whigs and Tories, the impossible combination of characters of the prince and princess, and the quarrels between Charlotte and her divorced parents, Princess Caroline and the prince regent.[36]

By 1815 the Prince of Orange knew very well what it was to be an instrument of his father's politics. He would never get used to it. Prince William developed a veritable case of 'dynastic claustrophobia'. One symptom of this condition was blaming his father for all that went wrong, something made easier by the fact father and son always clashed. William I was a stern and authoritarian king, enlightened in a more coercive sense. And he was jealous: 'Yes, I also fought against the French at Quatre-Bras. But we were beaten and no one wrote about it', he gibed at his frightened daughter-in-law Anna Paulowna, the sister of Tsar Alexander; his eldest son *had* married in 1816.[37]

To his despair, the king was unable to control his vainglorious son, who was almost a one-man revolution. Prince William was one of those young veterans who were dissatisfied with a post-Napoleonic order, which was explicitly presented as a *restoration*. Was this the world for which they had risked their lives? Ex-officers, in particular, longed for new adventure. The frustration of these armed bohemians took several forms: craving for new glory, political radicalism or outright conspiracy against the restored monarchs.[38] Prince William tried it all. He was very popular in Brussels, not least amongst circles of officers, freemasons and French revolutionaries who had flocked there after Napoleon's downfall. Among them was Lazare Carnot, one of the *régicides* (king murderers) who had voted for the execution of Louis XVI, but also a member of Robespierre's Committee of Public Safety, and erstwhile Minister of War for Napoleon. In 1816 and 1817, Carnot, with others, contacted the prince with a plan to topple the unpopular restored King Louis XVIII of France. The Orange prince should become the new French king. The young prince was flattered, and even asked his new brother-in-law Tsar Alexander for military assistance. A year later, William's name came up during the investigation of an attempted murder of Wellington. This time he had nothing to do with it.[39] So reckless in his dealings with revolutionaries (*and* in his amorous contacts with women *and* men) was the Prince of Orange, that he constantly endangered the reputation of the Dutch royal family, especially as family values amalgamated with bourgeois morality, and stood for more than just a legitimization of patriarchal authority. Paying off blackmailers became a recurring and expensive nuisance for his father. Eventually the king would only make use of his eldest son in times of crisis—foremost, as we have seen above, during the Belgian revolution of 1830.[40]

Prince William inherited the throne in 1840, after the abdication of his disillusioned father. Belgium was lost, as the king in 1839 finally admitted; the state was almost bankrupt, and liberals were pressing for constitutional reform. A widower since 1837, the king wanted to marry one of the ladies-in-waiting of the late queen. This time his eldest son, who had loved his mother, avenged himself by using the idea of family values to stage a public scandal against his father. By remarrying, the royal heir thought, the king had betrayed the memory of the deceased queen. And besides that: the old king's new wife not only was a Roman Catholic, she was not of equal birth and, coming from the Southern Netherlands, a Belgian woman.[41]

Conclusion

In royal families the sense of sharing a common fate is always stronger than the feeling of solidarity. The family members are condemned to one another, and this is especially true for the dynastic leader and the dynastic heir. In times of revolution this mutual dependence is all the more pressing.

After 1813/1815 a new myth had to be woven around the Orange family in the new kingdom of the Netherlands, fusing dynastic values, family values and collective national identity. The politics of memory provided one strategy, although it was different in the North, where the Republic was invoked, and the South, where looking back on Burgundy and Charles V became commonplace. In both cases the memory was highly selective. A very special case was the memory of the battle of Waterloo. Here, military honour, the beginnings of the new state, the legitimacy of royal rule and the strained relationship between king and heir came into play.

This politics of memory provides one example of the use of soft power in the new United Kingdom of the Netherlands. The different forms of Orangism in early nineteenth-century Netherlands were also important. At first this was part of the politics of the state, an effort from above to create emotional bonds of trust and affection between the ruler and the ruled by using a rather vague ideology. It was not very effective. Far more successful, in this period of revolution and war, were the forms of Orangism that came from below as a result of the very real political struggles during and after the Belgian revolution. The longed-for sentiments almost sprang up spontaneously. In the Northern Netherlands the majority seemed glad to be rid of the Southern Provinces: the king, the Orange dynasty, the state—now it all belonged to them, to the small Dutch Protestant nation. In the South, in Belgium, Orangism became part of the opposition against the new state. This time it was an emotional bond between the Dutch king, his heir the Prince of Orange and some of their former subjects. Of course, one could call this soft power politics. But then the problem is that court and government could make use of these sentiments, but were hardly able to control them—not even if the relationship between the king and the royal heir had been better.

NOTES

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CHAPTER 15

Narrating Prince Wilhelm of Prussia: Commemorative Biography as Monarchical Politics of Memory

Frederik Frank Sterkenburgh

On 26 June 1888 the Prussian *Staatsministerium* discussed the upcoming publication of the memoirs of Louis Schneider, the former reader of the late Kaiser Wilhelm I. Though he had become emperor only ten days earlier, Wilhelm II was already determined to build a cult around his grandfather. He feared that these memoirs would create the impression that Schneider had played an important political role and that this supposed influence would damage the late emperor's reputation. Bismarck had no such fears. He stated that the publication would quickly prove Schneider's irrelevance.[1] Bismarck's low opinion of Schneider was representative of the

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latter's standing at the Hohenzollern court. During the Franco-Prussian War, the then Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm had criticized Schneider for passing on military information to the press, lacking tact and making boastful comments in private.[2] The memoirs were duly published and no criticism of Wilhelm I emerged. Wilhelm II was nevertheless worried that the myth surrounding his grandfather had been damaged. Otto Stolberg, the minister of the royal house, was to fall victim to the emperor's unease. Having refused to pay Schneider's heirs so that they would censure the memoirs, Stolberg was eventually forced to resign.[3]

The discussion in the *Staatsministerium* reflected that contemporaries found it hard to grasp how heavily Wilhelm I had drawn on Schneider in his effort to construct his own public persona. For more than two decades this had been part of how Wilhelm had exercised his monarchical role. In spite of this, historians still claim that, in fulfilling his imperial office, Wilhelm was consistently overruled by Bismarck.[4] Guntram Schulze-Wegener's recent biography of Wilhelm, however, offers a more nuanced argument. It points to how the emperor carried out his role with dignity and selflessness, an observation previously made by Otto Pflanze.[5] It is questionable, though, whether Wilhelm's exercise of his monarchical role can solely be defined through his relation with Bismarck, important though he remains. Instead, an application of Joseph Nye's concept of 'soft power', that seeks to show how monarchs generated support for and legitimacy of their role through the cultivation of values, culture, policies and institutions can help to challenge this argument.[6] It can demonstrate that part of Wilhelm's political actions went beyond Bismarck's reach and shows the former to be a political actor in his own right. It can, likewise, outline what relation existed between Wilhelm's agency as heir to the throne and then as monarch.

The present chapter will use Wilhelm's collaboration with Louis Schneider to show how Wilhelm generated and sought to apply soft power from the mid-1850s onwards. It will argue that the article on the Prince of Prussia as heir to the, penned by Schneider in 1856, set the precedent for the use of commemorative biographies as a means of constructing a historical narrative around Wilhelm's public persona. These biographies would subsequently be appropriated to target specific audiences and temporal contexts in order to generate popular legitimacy. They also served particular political purposes. Written at a time when monarchs increasingly sought to present themselves as epitomes of their nation in order to accommodate the rise of nationalism and the nation-state, these commemorative biographies could capitalize on the increased status of History as a discipline and the mass print media. Schneider's articles and books helped to portray Wilhelm as the embodiment of Prussian characteristics in a way that sought to appeal to both liberal and conservative audiences. They also defended some of his monarchical prerogatives.

The first part of the chapter will set out the constellation of the mid-1850s which caused Wilhelm to engage with commemorative biographies. It will then detail how this biographical article established some of the topoi on which Schneider would build in subsequent biographies of Wilhelm, as well as generate expectations of his coming reign. The third part will demonstrate how the form of commemorative biographies and specific elements of the 1856 article could be appropriated once Wilhelm had become Prussian king and German emperor, how they served to defend his monarchical prerogatives and forge his posthumous memory.

Commemorative Biographies as Instruments of Monarchical Politics of Memory

Wilhelm's turn to commemorative biographies becomes understandable against the background of his position in the mid-1850s. After his return from exile in England, where he had fled in the wake of the 1848 revolutions, he led the campaign to stamp out the insurrection in Baden in 1849. This fulfilled his long held ambition to be a military commander.[7] A symbol of the old political order during the upheavals of 1848, Wilhelm's active role in 1849 helped to restore his standing among court and military circles.[8] The prince recognized though, that after the Baden campaign few if any prestigious military operations that could strengthen his reputation among the political establishment and the population could be expected for the foreseeable future. When the Crimean War broke out and Prussia remained neutral, Wilhelm wrote to Oldwig von Natzmer that 'for us soldiers who like to see some result after the preparations in peacetime, time seems to last long: one does not get younger and so I have to settle with the episode in Baden'.[9] In addition to this, the Prince of Prussia was politically isolated. He argued with his brother over the resignation of Minister of War Eduard von Bonin. Wilhelm feared that Bonin's dismissal was engineered by the king's Russophile court camarilla in order to move Prussia into the Russian camp. In a letter to his brother, he urged to withdraw Bonin's dismissal and threatened to dissociate himself from the king's policies. Friedrich Wilhelm ignored Wilhelm's defiance, temporarily relieved him from his command and sent him on leave to Baden.[10] Though the prince's insubordination ended peacefully, he withdrew hereafter to his post as inspector of the Prussian infantry in order to distance himself from a policy he did not support.[11]

Wilhelm thus had good reasons for cultivating his public standing. David Barclay has argued that Friedrich Wilhelm IV had failed in his attempt to make his monarchical project 'the outgrowth of an all-embracing vision of ideological, cultural, political, moral and religious regeneration in Germany. The king had been determined to modernize the monarchy while creating a total and positive alternative to "the revolution"'.[12] The revolution of 1848 demonstrated that 'his vision of a *ständisch* monarchy in an anti-revolutionary, monarchist Europe was *passé*'.[13] Indeed, Friedrich Wilhelm IV's monarchical project did little to address the rising nationalism by merging it with a dynastic narrative. Significantly, his *Neues Museum* in Berlin, an institution aimed at educating the people, did not celebrate the Hohenzollern as a dynasty or Prussia as a state.[14] This set Friedrich Wilhelm apart from other monarchs, such as the kings of Saxony, Hanover and Württemberg, who did seek to construct a dynastic history and forge a distinct identity for their state.[15] Against this background, Wilhelm could distinguish himself from his brother and enhance his standing by presenting himself as the future monarch who embodied the merging of a dynastic and national identity.

Using commemorative biographies as a way to mediate a historical narrative that linked dynastic and national elements was one way to achieve this. Hans Renders has defined the commemorative biography as a work based on some research, but mostly serving to canonize the subject's reputation. The positive account reinforces what the readers already know about the subject, and these biographies are usually written at the request of or authorized by the subject, or are at the very least seen as reinforcing the subject's existing reputation. Contrary to Renders's claim, however, that commemorative biographies serve to confirm the uniqueness of the subject, the commemorative biographies Wilhelm authorized explicitly sought to portray him as the embodiment of a specific entity—the Prussian dynasty and state.[16] Commemorative biographies can function as a form of memory politics when used in the way Edgar Wolfrum has defined as characteristic of *Geschichtspolitik*: as a political discourse on history which serves to simplify reality, to amend an existing narrative and use codifying elements to structure the discourse.[17] Such a political discourse on history can assume features of a political myth, in particular in the way it narrates certain events as exemplary and integrates contradictions through a narrative process and as a source of legitimacy.[18]

The significance of Wilhelm's use of commemorative biographies is that it places the prince in the exercise of his role firmly in the context of the mid-nineteenth century with its high estimation of the discipline of History and a growing readership.[19] In so doing, Wilhelm followed the example of other European monarchs who used them for similar purposes. In his introduction to his biography of the late King Wilhelm II of the Netherlands, which was commissioned by his successor Wilhelm III, Johannes Bosscha wrote to the Dowager Queen Anna Paulowna that the biography was meant to convince 'his countrymen, […] that through God's will the Netherlands and the Orange dynasty were related to each other through the events of the past, the needs of the time and the conditions of the happiness of both in the future'.[20] This function was recognized too by Wilhelm II's brother, who, in 1881, requested that the military historian François de Bas write a biography of him to underline the role of the dynasty in the Netherlands' military history in the preceding century.[21] Yet the best-known example of royal commemorative biographies of this period remains perhaps the five-volume life of Prince Albert, written in the 1860s and 1870s by Theodore Martin under the close supervision of Queen Victoria in order to canonize the memory of her late husband.[22]

As Renders' definition of commemorative biographies makes clear, it was essential for Wilhelm to employ an author who could guild his reputation and utilize an effective literary style. That he would draw on Louis Schneider was unsurprising. Schneider was a staunch royalist, Russophile and a publicist with a background in Berlin's literary and theatre circles. For many years he belonged to the literary group *Der Tunnel über der Spree*, which included authors such as Theodor Fontane, Theodor Storm and Franz Kugler. Since 1848 he had drawn closer to Wilhelm, and, through publications in the *Wehrzeitung*, acted as his mouthpiece in military matters. He also edited and was de facto the sole contributor to the *Soldatenfreund*. Both of these military periodicals aimed at educating the common soldier. With regards to his own persona, Wilhelm insisted that Schneider depict him with praise.[23] Importantly, Schneider already had experience with royal biography, having previously written an extended piece on Friedrich Wilhelm III's relation to the theatre for Rulemann Eylert's biography of the king.[24]

In November 1855 Wilhelm initiated the 1856 biographical article. With the 50th anniversary of his officer's commission approaching in 1857, he suggested that Schneider write his military obituary, to be published in case of his death, and to that end provided him with an overview of his promotions. Schneider further completed this list, which Wilhelm titled 'Inventory of services given to the Prussian state and German fatherland, as well as the decorations and promotions received for this'. The writer subsequently decided to rework this list into a biographical article that would serve as an example of 'loyal fulfilment of duty'. He prepared a draft manuscript and sent it to Wilhelm, who would insert corrections and additions of particular events or points of view he wished to emphasize or to be left out. Wilhelm thus remained the arbiter of his biography. For example, he insisted that Schneider should not cover the year 1848 in great detail or elaborate on why he was forced to seek exile in England. Thus amended, the manuscript was sent back to Schneider. In order to keep secret that Wilhelm was the source of the article, though, the prince refused to meet up with Schneider to discuss the manuscript. The article was published in the *Soldatenfreund* in December 1856. It was little noticed at first, as the magazine barely circulated outside the army, so that its effect on the intended wider audiences may have been limited. After Wilhelm's assumption of the regency, though, the article attracted more interest and thereafter quickly went out of print. Schneider subsequently decided to expand the biography into a separate edition of the *Soldatenfreund* and bring the narrative to 1861, the year of Wilhelm's coronation.[25]

Setting a Precedent: Schneider's 1856 Article

At first glance, Schneider's article provided a chronological narrative. But the article was in fact structured by 'codifying elements' (Wolfrum) which formed the foundation of the narrative. Individually, these elements served specific purposes, addressing particular audiences and conveying distinct political arguments. Taken together, these elements constructed a narrative in which Wilhelm's persona was presented as the dynastic epitome of the Prussian nation, albeit in contemporary terms. Schneider consciously widened the gap between the monarchy of the eighteenth century and its nineteenth-century successor. In the opening of the article he noted that only weeks before Wilhelm's birth Frederick the Great's widow, Elisabeth Christine had died. King Friedrich Wilhelm II was present at Wilhelm's christening but would die later that year.[26] Such distancing was also applied to the prince's siblings, in particular his elder brother and heir to the throne Friedrich Wilhelm, who received barely a mention. Once he had ascended the throne and Wilhelm had become the heir-presumptive, references to Friedrich Wilhelm IV remained formal. In this sense, the article began to reverse the situation from Wilhelm's youth when, as a second-born son and through the absence of print media and photography, he had received considerably less attention than his older brother.[27] By distancing Wilhelm from older and younger members of the dynasty a biographical dyad was constructed between the prince and his parents, King Friedrich Wilhelm III and Queen Louise.

Wilhelm and his parents were presented as models of bourgeois virtue and committed to their country. Schneider described that 'whenever government affairs allowed, the young King Friedrich Wilhelm III […] was with his children, personally took care of the toys and went each night with the Queen to their children's rooms, where he saw them lying in their beds and quietly kissed their foreheads'.[28] Louise is described as taking her sons to all military plays and Schneider recounted her widely known response to the Prussian army's defeat at Jena, when her children heard her saying 'You see me in tears, I cry for the downfall of our army, it did not meet the expectations of the king'.[29] Approvingly, Schneider quoted from a letter Queen Louise had written to her father, in which she stated that Wilhelm 'would be like his father, simple, modest and wise'.[30] In turn, the prince was depicted as piously devoted to his parents. At Wilhelm's insistence, Schneider described the prince's presence at his parents' respective deathbeds. In the case of Friedrich Wilhelm III's death, Wilhelm had provided Schneider with the relevant details.[31] Underlining such family virtues saved Schneider from having to discuss Wilhelm's own rather bleak domestic life. By the mid-1850s, the prince's marriage was well known for its unhappiness, which was reflected by them having only two children.[32] Wilhelm's early courtship with Elisa Radziwill, broken off at his father's insistence, is not discussed in Schneider's article. Unsurprisingly, the article does not refer to Wilhelm's numerous extramarital affairs either. However, as Karl Heinz Börner has noted, Wilhelm was quite successful in covering up these affairs—to the extent that even those closest around him knew very little about them.[33]

Highlighting his and his parents' domestic virtues of family bliss and devotion to their country helped Wilhelm to cultivate and consolidate his reputation with the liberal bourgeoisie. In the early 1850s the prince had already enhanced his standing as a result of his governorship of the more liberal-minded Rhineland and by publicly stating his support for moderate liberal constitutional reform.[34] Monika Wienfort has argued that the staging of an exemplary family life emerged as an important source of legitimacy: not the dynasty, but the family became a guiding political principle next to the state and nation. The image of the family with the authority of the father became the metaphor of the state taking care of his children. This contributed to the idea of good government that gained support from the educated classes.[35] It was amongst this group that Schneider's article was meant to deepen the support for Wilhelm.

There is, however, a second layer of importance to the specific way Louise's maternal care and experience of victimhood during Wilhelm's youth are depicted by Schneider. His emphasis on Louise's motherhood and worry about her country contributed to sentimentalizing Louise's memory in a way that did not necessarily follow the 'hard' nationalist myth of the late queen. In recent years historians such as Birte Förster, Eva Giloi and Philipp Demandt have demonstrated that in the years before and after German unification a myth was constructed around Louise. It drew on notions of victimhood and innocence in order to overcome the gruesome reality of war. In addition, Louise could be represented as the ideal of Prussian and German femininity.[36] As Louise's representation in Schneider's article demonstrates, this specific cultivation of the Louise-myth was enhanced through Wilhelm's active involvement as early as the 1850s.

Schneider's depiction of Wilhelm's personal virtues was complemented by an emphasis on his Christianity. This served to cultivate the support of conservative groups alongside the educated liberal classes. Schneider uses Wilhelm's *Konfirmation* in 1815 as an example of this. According to Schneider 'his *Glaubensbekenntnis* was firmly rooted in the Protestant Christianity and herein he showed himself worthy to be a member of the ruling house which is seen as the haven of the Protestant religion in Germany'.[37] Such a statement allowed Schneider to do two things. By portraying Wilhelm as a traditional Protestant he set himself apart from his brother, whose personal faith was much broader and romantically inspired. Friedrich Wilhelm IV had sought to make this part of a wider attempt at religious renewal in Prussia to counter 'the rationalist tendencies of the modern world with spiritual weapons'.[38]

Schneider also applied a Borussian understanding of Prussian-German history to Wilhelm's biography: by presenting Wilhelm as the epitome of the ruling Protestant dynasty in Germany, he differentiated him from the Habsburgs and proffered a small-German perspective on the question of German unification. This was coupled with a patriarchal and hierarchical Christianity. Schneider quotes from Wilhelm's *Konfirmation*, where he acknowledged that being part of the aristocracy came with obligations, that his strengths were to be used for the fatherland, that nobody should feel burdened by his royal status, but should be put at ease by him and reminded of their duties.[39]

The second structuring element in Schneider's narrative was Wilhelm's portrayal as a military leader, consisting of depictions of him as a reformer and operational commander. The former was communicated through the discussion of a brochure Wilhelm had written in 1848 and which had subsequently been edited and published by Schneider.[40] Here Wilhelm discussed the military implications for the Prussian army of a possible German unification. The problems that he discussed, above all the length of conscription, remained a live issue in the 1850s. In fact, the decision to refer to the brochure in the article says much about the perspective of Wilhelm as a future monarch that Schneider sought to give. In 1856 Wilhelm had been member of a committee which was to provide recommendations to King Friedrich Wilhelm IV on the length of the conscription service and other questions of rearmament. Via Schneider, Wilhelm voiced his opinions in the press.[41] Discussing the brochure here not only served to suggest that a royal-led military reform was still possible since the military prerogatives of the Hohenzollern monarch had remained unaltered after the 1848 revolutions.[42] It also provided Wilhelm with another opportunity to reiterate his own position on the length of the conscription.

This stance was complemented by underlining Wilhelm as an operational commander. Schneider emphasized his strategic skills and military appearance. The 1849 Baden campaign served to illustrate this. In the wake of the 1848 revolutions, a wave of insurrections broke out in 1849 across various German states, including Baden. A Prussian military expedition under Wilhelm's command culminated in the siege of Rastatt, which effectively ended the rebellion. Schneider claimed that this was the result of Wilhelm's operational plan.[43] These strategic capabilities were complemented by the prince's willingness to share in his soldiers' dangers. According to Schneider, he 'took up headquarters in the Castle Favorite near Rastatt, where he was permanently in the vicinity of the soldiers carrying out the siege, inspected the positions daily, visited the camps and issued all orders which brought an end to the insurrection in Baden'.[44] This served to increase the loyalty and veneration his troops felt for him.[45] Schneider quoted from the memoirs of Friedrich Wilhelm Hackländer, a writer and officer: 'The Prince of Prussia, a beautiful, tall figure has a friendly, clear and exceptionally charming facial expression, bright eyes and a deep, clear voice. The Prince has a blond moustache, of which the tips are a little turned upward and sideburns, as it was introduced in the Prussian army. He wore the simple uniform of a general, to which was attached the Pour le Mérite and in the buttonhole the iron cross which he received during the wars of liberation'.[46]

Emphasizing Wilhelm's military leadership helped to present him as a charismatic military royal and future monarch. It served to strengthen his standing as the army's principal representative. Once more, it distanced him from his brother Friedrich Wilhelm IV, whose corpulent appearance and largely ceremonial interest in the military made him the least martial monarch among the Hohenzollern rulers.[47] Recently, both Dieter Langewiesche and Volker Sellin have pointed to the importance of martial glory as well as its commemoration in the form of monarchical monuments, which formed a crucial test of political legitimacy.[48] In addition, as Heinz Dollinger has pointed out, the military monarchy offered an alternative to a *Bürgerkönigtum*, (bourgeois monarchy), in particular in states such as Prussia where military prerogatives had remained unaltered despite constitutional changes.[49] Presenting Wilhelm in this manner helped to prevent him from once more re-emerging as the representative of an outdated political order. Instead, it invested Wilhelm's military leadership with charismatic and popular characteristics (see Image 15.1). Dollinger has argued that the image of the monarch as military leader was related to 'popular kingship' (*Volkskönigtum*).[50] Though Wilhelm never developed this image as far as his contemporaries Napoleon I and Napoleon III, the trope was nonetheless already a familiar one in Prussian culture. As Frank Lorenz Müller has argued, approachability of the monarch as military commander not only implicitly 'confirmed a hierarchical mode of the ruler and ruled', it also served as a reminder of the existing image of Frederick the Great as a victorious military figure and a man of the people. Wilhelm's son Friedrich Wilhelm would later tap into this notion in his depictions of himself as a military commander during and after the wars of German unification.[51] As the example of Schneider's article demonstrates, Wilhelm also utilized this trope.

The third structuring element in Schneider's 1856 article centres on Wilhelm as the representative and embodiment of Prussia abroad. Here Schneider and Wilhelm sought to appeal to liberal and conservative groups by demonstrating the prince's closeness to both England and Russia. In 1853, Wilhelm was Queen Victoria and Prince Consort Albert's guest



Image 15.1 The embodiment of military virtue: Prince Wilhelm of Prussia in a wood engraving from 1854 © INTERFOTO/Alamy Stock Photo

of honour at a fleet review at Spithead, with ships from the Prussian and British navies present. It is telling that Schneider had shifted his emphasis. In earlier articles on the visit, published in the *Wehrzeitung*, the focus was on military details; they underlined the standing and performance of the Prussian navy abroad. The details were provided by Wilhelm, who gave a description of the event for his brother and suggested publishing parts of the letter.[52] In this instance, the details were published in the *Wehrzeitung* in August 1853.[53] This reflected a common practice that some letters were deliberately written for publication in order to increase the reader's sense of intimacy with the life of the monarch.[54]

In Schneider's 1856 article, however, the focus is on Wilhelm representing Prussia abroad. The visit to England is listed amongst a series of trips Wilhelm undertook that year, including a military manoeuvre at the request of the German Bund and a reception by Emperor Franz Josef in Vienna. Schneider added that 'both in Olmütz as well as thereafter in Vienna the Prince of Prussia received the manifold demonstrations of esteem in which his name was held well beyond the borders of the Prussian fatherland'.[55]

A similar argument—with an added purpose—was present in Schneider's descriptions of Wilhelm's encounters with the Russian Emperor Nicholas I. Here too a military occasion provided the backdrop for a monarchical encounter where princes met as representatives of their states, as well as refreshing a shared historical memory. In 1834 Wilhelm attended the unveiling of the Alexandrian column in St Petersburg. Schneider quoted Nicholas I commenting on the detachment of Prussian troops which Wilhelm led. The veterans chosen by the king to represent the Prussian army 'demonstrate for the eyes of the whole of Europe the brotherhood in arms, which both sovereigns had founded between the two peoples and which Providence has blessed by their shared memories of national glory'.[56] Schneider also covered the troop review held at Kalisch in Russian Poland the following year, where Nicholas was in overall command, while Wilhelm commanded an army corps. 'As always, at Kalisch the Prince appeared to all observers as the very example of a conscientious soldier, eager for service and as the future military commander who would lead his troops to victory.'[57]

There was a dual meaning to the narrative of these visits. Johannes Paulmann has argued that as the international order of the Holy Alliance gave way to a system of competing monarchical nation-states in the middle of the nineteenth century, the role of the monarch and the military as embodying the nation abroad was articulated in a more pronounced fashion. Certain types of military events, such as fleet reviews, were particularly important in terms of presenting monarchs to each other as national representatives.[58] This was the mould in which Wilhelm was cast by Schneider. Though some of the monarchical encounters happened while the Holy Alliance was still in place, presenting these as meetings of national monarchical representatives of their respective countries gave Wilhelm the appearance of a thoroughly contemporary future monarch. Additionally, there was a direct political interest at work here. Evoking Wilhelm's grand reception in England could suggest—to liberal audiences—a future alliance with that kingdom. Indeed, Wilhelm advocated this, as well as a breach with Russia, once he became regent in 1858.[59] Nonetheless, Wilhelm's private sympathy and emotional attachment always remained with Russia, as it had been ever since the Napoleonic wars.[60] Conservatives concerned over a reversal of Prussia's foreign policy if Wilhelm were to succeed his brother could derive comfort from the extensive descriptions of the esteem in which the prince was held in Russia, as well as the familial ties connecting the two dynasties.

Defending Prerogatives and Forging Memory: Schneider's Later Biographies

Though Schneider's 1856 article only received more attention once Wilhelm had ascended the throne, in retrospect its significance was to show the utility of commemorative biographies. Wolfgang Neugebauer has argued that the fact that there were fewer royal councils after 1867 demonstrated the monarch's withdrawal from everyday politics. In the German Reich, with its increased governmental complexity, the decline of dynastic factors in international relations, the growing dominance of Bismarck and Wilhelm's aging, it was inevitable that the emperor would be less engaged in the political decision-making process. Nonetheless, Wilhelm zealously defended his monarchical prerogatives, such as summoning officials to give reports (*Vorträge*). Not until 1883 did Wilhelm establish the practice that the chief of the general staff was permitted to report directly to the monarch.[61] But upholding such prerogatives was by no means something William restricted to the inner world of the Prussian government. Here, too, the commemorative biographies could be put to use. In the adaptability of their narrative, Schneider's works showed again characteristics of political myth, and the flexibility of the myth allowed it to endure.[62]

Defending Wilhelm's military prerogatives was one of the main purposes of the later book-length biographies Schneider wrote of the German emperor. The final instalment appeared in 1875, entitled *Emperor Wilhelm. Military Biography 1867–1871. Continuation of the two volumes 'King Wilhelm' which encompass the years 1864–1867 and published by the same publisher*. This final volume—Schneider died in 1878—was the latest in what had grown into a continuous biographical project on Wilhelm I. It appropriated the image of Wilhelm as a *roi connétable* for the decade during and after the wars of German unification. During these wars, Schneider authored articles for the *Staatsanzeiger*, the *Preußische Zeitung* and the *Soldatenfreund*. Many of these articles were written with Wilhelm's consent and were corrected by him, such as the piece on the battle of Vionville (Mars-la-Tour).[63]

After the wars, these articles then served as the basis for the book-length biographies. The composition process between Schneider and Wilhelm remained the same, as did many of the themes. In his biography of Wilhelm in the war of 1866 Schneider had written that 'King Wilhelm was in his 69th year, and that he himself would command his army, share in its dangers, as his ancestors had done, was self-evident, given his sense of duty, his thinking and preferences.'[64] In the 1875 edition of his biography of German Emperor Wilhelm, Schneider stated that 'one cannot possibly imagine the thoughts and feelings of a king and supreme commander at the same time on the eve of a great battle, where so much depends on a victory or defeat in a battle! What must a king think in these moments, how must he consider the smallest details of the army simultaneously with the grand relations of the European states, balance all the odds and favours. How he must consider history, experience and character of his subordinates. […] The greater the adulation of the population in good times, the greater their blame in times of misfortune, however much it is the king's responsibility. […] Hence his motto: "Consider first, then dare!"'.[65]

Invoking this motto reveals the intentions Schneider—and by implication Wilhelm—pursued with these military biographies: they served to underline the Hohenzollern monarch's military primacy within the state. The motto would later adorn the coat of arms of Helmuth von Moltke, chief of the Prussian general staff. It was frequently cited when describing him as an intellectual and thoughtful officer. One consequence of the victorious wars of German unification was also that the population now saw Moltke as the scientific architect of military victory. The field marshal himself had done much to enhance this perception, by explaining his tactics and strategies to journalists present during the war, as well as through the official histories of the wars written by him or under his supervision by the historical section of the General Staff.[66] Although Wilhelm himself supported this division of labour, he was jealous of Moltke's victories, as one of the latter's officers noted.[67]

As a result, Wilhelm sought to guard and underline that the military primacy and prerogatives still remained with the monarch. Schneider's later biographies were dominated by this issue. Thematically, the narrative hardly deviated from that of the 1856 article. As demonstrated above, the article underlined Wilhelm's personal military leadership and how this formed part of a dynastic lineage which presented the Hohenzollern monarchs as brave warriors. Emphasizing such heroism would resonate with the political culture of imperial Germany. Matthew Jefferies has argued that the *Gründerzeit*-era of the new empire saw a 'characteristic preoccupation with the heroic individual. Whether in the world of business, politics or the arts, the focus was on the "great men" upon whom, it was believed, history relied'.[68] Within a nation state that essentially was a dynastic confederation and valued military prowess, depicting Wilhelm as the capable military monarch was tantamount to cultivating contemporary defences of monarchical prerogatives.

One function remained for Schneider's works. Since the late 1840s Schneider had compiled notes and drafted manuscripts on his acquaintance with Wilhelm, with the purpose of publishing these as a memoir. Wilhelm had agreed to this, on the condition that these would not be published until after his death.[69] In so doing, Wilhelm sought to forge his posthumous memory by giving the reading public insight in his private sphere as the embodiment of Prussian virtues and the military monarchy. Alexa Geisthövel has argued that with the rise of the mass printed media, monarchs were increasingly observed by the public. This meant that not only their rule but their presence in general came under scrutiny, with criteria such as dignity, proximity to the people and the degree to which insights could be gleaned from the monarch's private sphere being applied.[70]

As Wilhelm's reader, Schneider was particularly suited to provide these insights. Writing about Wilhelm as a tireless worker, he described how the monarch would read dispatches over his morning coffee, take the first train to Potsdam to inspect his troops even if he had attended a ball the night before and that during the train journey he would listen to reports.[71] Schneider hinted at Wilhelm's modesty: when he was shown a depiction of himself as Charlemagne he rejected it.[72] A visit to Wilhelm when he was lying ill in his bedroom in his palace at Berlin's Unter den Linden, gave Schneider the opportunity to convey an impression of the room: hardly any light came in, the iron camp bed stood in an alcove and there was only simple furniture.[73] Combined, Schneider's descriptions gave the image of the German emperor who—during the 1870s at least—wanted to be remembered as foremost the embodiment of Prussian, rather than German, virtues. Schneider's memoirs were not reprinted after 1888, but these, as well as his earlier works, did have the cumulative effect of narrating Wilhelm as epitomizing the Prussian state. As such, the works surely contributed to their persistence in subsequent Prussian-German cultural memory and literature. As late as 2006, Christopher Clark would reiterate the image of Wilhelm as the embodiment of Prussian virtues, citing thrift, punctuality, simplicity and self-discipline.[74]

Conclusion

When Heinrich Poschinger suggested in 1882 that dispatches from the Prussian embassy in St Petersburg could be published, Bismarck rejected this with the remark that Wilhelm did not want any revelations on his reign being published at this stage.[75] Whether or not these were indeed Wilhelm's wishes or Bismarck's—and Bismarck often made sure these were hard to separate—by 1882 Wilhelm had already sought to craft a historical narrative for his public persona. Indeed, there are good reasons to interpret the period of Wilhelm's collaboration with Schneider as a coherent, single phase in the overall public persona Wilhelm sought to project. Despite Schneider's numerous biographies often serving different purposes, their overarching narrative was consistently monarchical-Borussian, aimed at defending the monarchical form of government and Wilhelm as the embodiment of the ascending Prussian dynasty within Germany and Europe. Seen as such, this phase is directly linked to Wilhelm's support for German unification in the early 1850s, his refusal to develop an imperial representation of his role after the proclamation of the German empire and his persistent, if declining, practice of presiding over the royal councils as part of the traditional prerogatives of the Prussian monarch in the 1870s.[76] Coincidentally, but significantly, Schneider died in 1878 when Wilhelm gradually began to withdraw from the day-to-day running of the government. Though, in the 1880s, Wilhelm would provide the same sort of editorial assistance to Oskar Meding in the latter's biographies of the first German emperor, their cooperation never emulated the proximity, duration and themes that Wilhelm and Schneider shared.

By utilizing commemorative biographies, Wilhelm was thus more active in exercising in his royal and imperial role in the 1850s, 1860s and 1870s than has previously been assumed. This adds to Winfried Baumgart's argument that Wilhelm as heir in his correspondence with his brother King Wilhelm Friedrich IV sought to influence the decision making process of Prussia's government in the 1840s and 1850s.[77] It makes clear that Wilhelm was capable—not only in private correspondence, but also for a wider public—of drawing on particular tropes variously to distance himself from his brother, forward his own political opinions or to generate support for his coming reign. This conclusion goes against the assumption that Wilhelm was frequently just an ornament to Bismarck's politics. In fact, Wilhelm's cooperation with Schneider shows that important parts of crafting Wilhelm's public persona went without Bismarck's knowledge or intervention. Much of the dissatisfaction at court against Schneider and the inability to comprehend his activities stemmed from the author's operating often beyond the reach of either the court or government. Finally, Schneider's commemorative biographies demonstrate to what extent Wilhelm had actively crafted the image of himself as the epitome of the Prussian dynastic nation. Through his adherence to this image, Wilhelm decisively influenced the perception and operation of his imperial role after 1871. But it also demonstrates the importance and continuity of the use of soft power from his time as heir to the Prussian throne onwards.

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CHAPTER 16

How European was Nineteenth-Century Royal Soft Power?

Heidi Mehrkens

A recent TV documentary on Queen Elizabeth II, whose 90th birthday was celebrated in April 2016, featured ten exclusive interviews with members of the royal family. Putting together a programme that showed the queen 'as a family woman and a stateswoman' and also picked up 'on the light-hearted side of royal life' took almost two years. The Duchess of Cambridge revealed that her son, two-year old Prince George, addresses his great-grandmother simply as Gan-Gan and that the queen leaves 'little gifts' for him and his sister Princess Charlotte in their bedrooms whenever they stay with her.[1] This 'intimate portrait' of the monarch is a prime example of how royal soft power is generated. The documentary provides a carefully composed glance at the private life of the head of state, inviting the audience to relate to Elizabeth II as the respected and loving head of her growing family.

How we perceive royals and their dynasties today—as families, as celebrities, as charitable figureheads of society or as superfluous relics of a bygone age—is deeply rooted in nineteenth-century European monarchical cultures. Exploring the historical dimension of royal soft power deepens our understanding of how dynasties learned to build and maintain emotional bonds—trust and affection—between them and their subjects. This helped to create new legitimacy for the monarchy. The case

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studies gathered in this volume aim to open up paths into a new field of research by exploring how, from the early nineteenth-century onwards, royal families all over Europe gradually learned to communicate with their ambient public spheres by developing the very soft power tools which are still being used by the ruling houses of the twenty-first century.

Royal soft power strategies, as well as expectations expressed by the audiences, seem strikingly similar even across very different constitutional and national contexts. People of every station in the newly unified Italy, in Sweden, Britain or in the German Kaiserreich bought royal memorabilia or, from the 1850s, collected photographs displaying portraits of their dynasty. All over monarchical Europe, royal families provided not only material for this ever-growing market, but created occasions where they were exposed to the public gaze. Across monarchical Europe, people flocked to catch a glimpse of a royal celebrity passing through decorated streets on the occasion of a royal wedding or an official visit. Does this mean that royal soft power in the nineteenth century was truly an international or transnational phenomenon, a common European feature? Or did it remain characterized, above all, by national, dynastic and individual peculiarities?

The case studies explored in this volume, ranging from the early nineteenth century to the 1940s, also open up questions about the long-term developments of royal soft power. Can it be assumed that, in the long run, structural contexts—media landscapes, constitutions, or social change—shaped the ways in which soft power was perceived and used? Or are we rather dealing with the expression of a common monarchical practice, arrived at as the result of exchange and transfer processes that took place via international royal networks? In other words, to what extent did royals become the actual agents and directors of their ongoing engagement with the public sphere? On what occasions did nineteenth-century monarchs, just like Queen Elizabeth II for the documentary on her birthday, grant controlled access to their palaces for representatives of the media? Focusing on royal heirs in particular, how did their role within the dynasty qualify them to apply soft power strategies?

When soft power practices were used in different national contexts, can we assume that they broadly tended to yield the same results? Did royal trinkets sell as well and give their owners as much pleasure in the Kaiserreich as after they were displayed in Italy's monarchical shop window? If the impact of royal advertising measures was in fact varied, why and when was this the case? Finally, if we consider the relationship of hard and soft power addressed in Frank Lorenz Müller's introduction to this volume, is there some sort of complementarity or a balancing seesaw effect in place? Did royals really have to give up hard power to gain soft power in exchange, or can we think of dynasties still very much in possession of monarchical prerogatives who were at the same time successful in building soft power resources?

Our case studies suggest first tentative answers to some of these questions. One recurring pattern concerns the central function of the expanding transnational media markets for the successful use of royal soft power. It is noticeable that in the very different constitutional-monarchical contexts addressed in this volume all available media genres were used to woo different audiences and enhance soft power: Italian families were encouraged to buy royal trinkets and to put them on display in their homes; the Indian and Swedish onlookers who witnessed lavish processions on the occasion of a royal wedding or visit found themselves to be topics of contemporary press coverage; and patriotic Greeks burst into martial song to give cheers to their crown prince.

Media-supported techniques of communication played a vital role in addressing not only the audiences at home, but also when visiting monarchical and non-monarchical countries in Europe and overseas. A particular impact seems to have resulted from the visual presence of the monarchy; hence, nineteenth-century soft power strategies often relied on the power of personal presence, as in the case of the Dutch dynasty seeking to bind the North and South of their realm together using the popularity of a hero-prince, or when the Swedish dynasty dispatched their heirs to connect with their Norwegian subjects. Where permanent personal presence was not feasible or desired the distribution of images filled the gap, including highly visible displays of fashion and regal style, beauty and elegance.

What is more, royal soft power was not just a process of top-down communication but rather a case of reciprocal agency; the addressees consuming the royal message did not necessarily accept the image of the monarchy that was intended. Spectators on site, newspaper readers and buyers of merchandise—they all projected their own expectations onto the monarchy by actively engaging with it. Audiences had the power to enhance or diminish royal soft power, for example by cheering and applauding a prince who lived up to expectations of regal behaviour. As some princes visiting the United States experienced, audiences in non-monarchical countries could openly express their disappointment if their hopes to see a member of a royal family were not fulfilled.

Another observation is that expectations as to what defined an attractive, trustworthy monarchy varied at different points in time or within the various national contexts. The public image of the monarchy, generated to enhance soft power, could, for example, concentrate on the masculine virtues of a royal warrior (as was the case with royal heirs in Spain and Prussia), or on domestic bliss and female attraction, if we consider Princess Alexandra's representation in the British monarchy. Yet it seems that soft power strategies never completely jettisoned the elements of royal mystery and the power of ancient dynastic tradition. Despite tendencies to embrace bourgeois values publically, a specific royal style and way of living could not be left out of the picture in order to gain lasting support. Monarchy certainly had to be seen to be believed, but nineteenth-century royals had to remain recognizably and visibly *royal* in their own sphere.

With regard to the specific role of the future monarch, no general rule prescribed precisely what an heir's soft power strategy had to look like. Archduke Franz Ferdinand is a prime example that heirs had the freedom not to court their subjects if they so chose. To a certain degree this is also true for Albert Edward Prince of Wales, who refused to engage with the public in the manner his parents expected of him. Selling the image of a domesticated and disciplined royal family was a feature of nineteenth-century monarchies, but it clearly did not suit this smoking, gambling and fun-loving roué. Yet in many cases it seems that dynasties and heirs developed if not a strategy, then a more general idea of the part a successor to the throne could play in public—the good father, the brave soldier, the avid politician, the patron of the arts and sciences. Credibility was key, the public persona and the way soft power was to be created could not differ considerably from the heir's personality. Royal soft power was always based on the attraction of authenticity, of a glimpse at the 'real person' behind the office. In their interviews for the TV documentary, the Prince of Wales as well as the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge not only revealed details about the 'intimate' life of the monarch. The audience also witnessed their function in the line of succession, which places them ideally to gather support for the monarchy. By displaying a winning and convincingly authentic personality, the heir and the younger generation close to the throne have every opportunity to connect with their audiences in a way that no monarch in office ever could.

Notwithstanding the broad range of topics and European dynasties collected in this volume, research on this topic is still very much in its early stages. In order to find convincing answers to some of the larger questions raised here, more studies will have to be undertaken into how monarchs and their families communicated with their varying, growing and increasingly self-conscious audiences. In many cases this is hampered by a lack of accessible and expressive sources for nineteenth-century monarchies, especially regarding questions of agency, reception and impact of royal soft power. More often than not it will therefore prove difficult to show who was involved in developing soft power strategies for a member of a royal dynasty and at which point in time. The findings presented here carefully suggest a more conscious use of media strategies and engagement with (or brushing aside of) soft power in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, the actual involvement of royal families, governments, individual consultants or oppositional politicians will have to be researched case by case, preferably even beyond the contexts of European monarchy. This promising field of research could profit immensely from comparing European nineteenth-century soft power strategies and impacts with those found in non-European monarchies, for example Japan during the Meiji restoration.

On a different note, it will also be worthwhile to learn more about how monarchical soft power impacted on various economies. The commercial promise that came with ‘selling the monarchy’ did not escape the families in question: royal soft power strategies created markets for memorabilia, they encouraged technical innovations and enhanced the professionalization of certain trades.[2] Monarchical events furthered cultural and economic transfer on an international scale; royal weddings, jubilees or coronations attracted an audience from abroad that bought travel tickets, booked hotel rooms and reserved restaurant tables in order to participate in the royal experience. How did these aspects of supply and demand, the (lack of) legalization in terms of brand protection, copyrights and rights of privacy affect the development of royal soft power both on a national and transnational scale?

Finally, further research will help to determine if the concept of soft power and its terminology that originated in international relations are useful as a historical category to analyse how the relationship between dynasties and their audiences changed over decades, with a lasting impact on the perception of modern monarchy. What binds the case studies in this volume together is a focus on how dynasties came to realize that their subjects’ devotion and affection could no longer be taken for granted. The term soft power, as it is used in this volume, describes the efforts made by various agents to reconcile expectations and demands of dynasties and their subjects alike and to create new sources of legitimacy for an ancient, yet still attractive monarchical system.

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2. On the marketing of the British monarchy in the twenty-first century see for example Cele C. Otnes and Pauline Maclaran (2015), *Royal Fever. The British Monarchy in Consumer Culture*, Berkeley, CA.

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